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3-90 | 236 | Chapter 11
Figure 11-4. Example of a delay forward of a specified line for a specified time
11-36. The second characteristic is that the commander must specify the acceptable level of risk for the
security force to take. Acceptable risk ranges from accepting decisive engagement in an attempt to hold
terrain for a given time to maintaining the integrity of the delaying force. The depth of the assigned area
available for the delay, the time needed by the higher echelon headquarters, and the delaying force’s
subsequent missions determine the amount of acceptable risk.
11-37. The third characteristic is that the commander must specify whether the delaying force may use the
entire assigned area or must delay from specific BPs. A delay using the entire assigned area is preferable, but
a delay from specific positions may be required to coordinate two or more units in the delay. To enhance
command and control and to coordinate the battle across a broad front, commanders can assign specific BPs
down to platoon level. Commanders may direct units to delay within their assigned area if that best supports
the scheme of maneuver.
Command and Control in a Delay
11-38. Communications are essential to the success of this variation of a retrograde, and commanders build
redundancy into the communications architecture. Digital and analog systems help ensure redundancy by
providing a COP. This allows one command post to temporarily assume the duties of another command post
if it is destroyed, displaced, or has suffered an enemy cyberspace or electromagnetic attack.
11-39. While planning a delay, the main command post is normally the first command post to displace,
leaving the tactical command post to control the delay until the reestablishment of the main command post
in a secure location. The main command post may displace by echelon, leaving a residual command and
control capability in the original location. |
3-90 | 237 | Retrograde
Intelligence in a Delay
11-40. When conducting a delay operation, commanders may not get the most effective use of supporting
intelligence assets. They echelon organic and supporting information collection systems rearward to maintain
partial coverage of the assigned area during the delay. This increases the importance of effective collection
management. However, commanders must rely on the dissemination of intelligence from higher echelons
and combat information, such as that from manned and unmanned aircraft systems, to make up for the
degradation in collection when systems displace.
Effects of Terrain in a Delay
11-41. Commanders take advantage of the terrain when planning how to position forces and conduct
operations. They select terrain that favors friendly actions and hampers enemy actions. The terrain dictates
where a delaying force can orient on a moving enemy force and ambush it. During a delay, restrictive terrain
facilitates shorter displacements initiated at closer range to enemy forces. Commanders conducting
operations in restrictive terrain select locations that restrict the enemy force’s movement and prevent the
enemy force from massing its combat power. On the other hand, flat or open terrain requires earlier
displacements at greater distances to stay in front of the advancing enemy force. In open terrain, the most
important consideration in selecting a position is a good, long-range field of fire.
11-42. In restricted terrain, positions tend to be closer together. In open terrain, delay positions are often far
apart. In selecting positions, commanders consider natural and manmade obstacles, particularly when the
enemy force has numerous armored combat systems.
11-43. Commanders identify routes that reinforcements, artillery units, command posts, and sustainment
elements will use and keep under their control and free of obstacles. Alternate routes should be available so
that a friendly force can bypass closed or contaminated choke points.
11-44. Disengaging from an enemy force while displacing from one position to the next has challenges.
The unit’s disengagement plans include—
* The maneuver concept of operations for tactical elements after disengagement, which includes the
movement routes for each small unit.
* Fires to suppress enemy forces and cover the unit’s movement.
* Electromagnetic warfare activities to disrupt enemy command and control at critical moments.
* Obscurants to conceal the unit’s movement, conduct a military deception operation, or cover
passage points.
* Contact points and passage points if moving through friendly lines.
* Disengagement start times.
* The earliest time for functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements to move.
* Designated units responsible for closing lanes through obstacles and executing reserved obstacles.
Movement and Maneuver in a Delay
11-45. A delay is one of the most difficult tasks to execute. The primary reason is that the delaying force
must engage attacking enemy forces to slow their movement, yet not become decisively engaged. In certain
situations, commanders may direct a decisive engagement to prevent an enemy force from prematurely
crossing a delay line or to risk a part of the force to avoid jeopardizing the entire delaying force. The delaying
unit maintains continuous coordination with any flank units as it displaces rearward.
11-46. Armored and Stryker-equipped forces, supported by lethal and nonlethal capabilities, are highly
suitable for delay operations in most terrain. Their organic firepower allows them to engage enemy forces
effectively at long ranges, and their mobility allows them to move quickly between subsequent positions or
to a flank. These same characteristics also allow these forces as a reserve to launch rapid counterattacks to
extract delaying forces from untenable situations.
11-47. Dismounted infantry forces are especially suited to conduct delays in restricted and severely
restricted terrain. They take advantage of such terrain, reinforced by the use of obstacles, to hinder the
mobility of enemy combat systems and their supporting tactical vehicles. Dismounted infantry forces can |
3-90 | 238 | Chapter 11
also participate in stay-behind operations. This type of terrain offers cover for the movement of friendly
infantry forces and favors using ambushes against enemy forces. Because of the restrictions on organic
motorized transportation assets and the limited protection available to infantry units, commanders
specifically plan for their displacement.
11-48. Commanders may employ air assault forces in a manner similar to that of other dismounted infantry
units in a delay. However, air assault forces possess additional useful capabilities in a delay operation.
Because of their habitual relationship with helicopter units, they can rapidly deploy, redeploy, and disperse
in open terrain if the weather is suitable and the necessary landing and pickup zones exist. The combination
of dismounted infantry, attack and assault helicopters, and fire support systems found in air assault units
allows delaying commanders to concentrate combat power rapidly at key locations to attrit enemy forces
through repeated ambushes. The combined arms nature of air assault units also makes them extremely useful
for conducting security and reserve operations over large geographical areas against mechanized and
dismounted enemy forces. However, their extraction is a high-risk activity when pressured by an armored
enemy force or in the presence of a significant air defense threat.
11-49. The mobility, lethality, and long range of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aviation make these assets
invaluable to a force conducting a delay. Commanders can also use air assault forces to conduct
counterattacks and spoiling attacks as part of a combined arms force. Other uses of rotary-wing assets in a
delay include the rapid rearward movement of sustainment assets, the deployment of infantry, and the
deployment of reconnaissance forces.
11-50. During a delay, countermobility is the most important engineer planning consideration. However, if
the delaying force must cross one or more major obstacles, the major engineer planning consideration is
mobility. Commanders set realistic and specific priorities for the engineer effort. They monitor its progress
to prevent it from dissipating countermobility efforts throughout the area. Commanders employ engineers in
depth. This is crucial when commanders conduct noncontiguous operations, or when enemy forces attack
deep into the support area of a force conducting contiguous operations, or when enemy forces have the ability
to employ weapons of mass destruction. The maneuver element provides security for the engineers so that
they can concentrate their efforts on engineer tasks.
11-51. Because of the importance of mobility and countermobility tasks, a unit conducting a delay probably
has few engineer assets to devote to survivability tasks. Units should maximize the use of obscurants to
provide concealment for movement and assembly when weather conditions are favorable. Smoke curtains,
blankets, and haze may protect withdrawing columns, critical points, and routes. Commanders take
precautions to ensure that the smoke does not provide a screen for the enemy’s advance. (See ATP 3-11.50
for more information on battlefield obscuration.)
Preparing for a Delay
11-52. The defensive preparations outlined in Chapter 8 apply when conducting a delay. Resources,
including time available, determine the extent of preparations. Commanders’ top priority is reconnaissance.
Additionally, the preparation of subsequent positions receives a higher priority than it does in either a mobile
or an area defense. It is not always possible to complete all preparations before starting delay operations.
Consequently, delaying units continue to prepare and adapt plans as a situation develops.
11-53. In the delay, commanders use BPs in a manner similar to the mobile defense. However, commanders
place more emphasis on width than depth. Within each BP, most of the available firepower is oriented toward
the expected enemy avenue of approach. Commanders must provide adequate flank and rear security, since
the delaying unit must furnish its own security. Each crew and squad learn the routes from its primary
positions to alternate, supplementary, and sequential positions. Furthermore, commanders conduct
reconnaissance of subsequent BPs and prepare routes for displacing. In preparing a BP, commanders
conducting a delay place less emphasis on installing protective obstacles, establishing final protective lines,
and stockpiling ammunition in either an area or a mobile defense. Leaders sometimes refer to BPs as delay
positions during the conduct of a delay.
11-54. Commanders deploy their security force well forward of the initial delay positions to give early
warning of any enemy forces approaching. When the security force detects and reports enemy forces
approaching, commanders reconcile these reports against decision support matrixes and event templates to |
3-90 | 239 | Retrograde
support their decisions and identify enemy COAs. Based on an analysis of ongoing events and a prediction
of how the battle will unfold, commanders can direct one subordinate element to maneuver in a manner
designed to draw the advancing enemy force into a position of disadvantage.
Executing a Delay
11-55. The complexity of a delay requires the subordinate elements of a force to execute different, yet
complementary, actions. In a delay, attacks, area defenses, mobile defenses, and other actions may occur in
any sequence or simultaneously. For example, commanders may elect to assign one force the task of securing
a key road intersection for a set amount of time, while another force can attack the enemy flank. Therefore,
the enemy force must deploy into a hasty defense, which delays any further enemy attacks.
11-56. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield defines enemy COAs. Initially, intelligence assets attempt
to determine if enemy forces recognize the delay. Subsequently, they focus on how enemy forces react to the
delay. Information collection assets monitor enemy attempts to envelop the flanks or strike the rear of the
rearward moving friendly force. They also focus on actions of any enemy airborne, air assault, and attack
aviation units that may try to interdict the movement of the friendly force. Commanders conducting delays
attempt to detect the enemy force’s advance early to adjust the scheme of maneuver and concentrate sufficient
combat power to delay the enemy force effectively.
11-57. The security force fixes, defeats, and destroys the enemy force’s reconnaissance and security
elements without risk of becoming decisively engaged. It directs fires at the approaching enemy force as far
forward of the delay positions as possible. Engaging a moving enemy force at long ranges inflicts more
casualties on an attacking enemy force before it can engage the delaying force; it also slows the enemy force’s
tempo of operations. The more a delaying force can eliminate an enemy force’s reconnaissance assets, the
more likely the enemy force will move with caution.
11-58. Once the security force makes contact with the enemy force, it maintains contact. As an enemy force
approaches, it moves by bounds back to the flanks of the defending units, keeping the enemy force under
constant observation. This prevents the enemy force from finding gaps between delaying units and attacking
the exposed flanks of delaying units. The security force uses covered, concealed, and coordinated routes to
avoid enemy and friendly fires.
11-59. Recovering security assets may be more difficult if the security force needs to pass through the range
of the delaying force. Recovery should be to the flanks of delay positions and not through friendly
engagement areas or TRPs unless a tactical situation makes such movement necessary. Security forces move
so that they do not reveal the locations of other friendly elements.
11-60. The main body uses various techniques to execute the delay. These include ambushes,
counterattacks, spoiling attacks, artillery raids, electromagnetic warfare, and close air support. Commanders
of delaying forces preserve the force’s freedom to maneuver by engaging enemy forces with sufficient force
to stop their advance temporarily. The delaying forces use obstacles and defensive positions in depth to slow
and canalize enemy forces and exploit the mobility of their combat systems to confuse and defeat them. Once
a delay starts, units displace rapidly between positions. Whenever possible, commanders grasp any
opportunity to seize the initiative, even if only temporarily. Delaying forces may conduct counterattacks from
unexpected directions to confuse enemy commanders.
11-61. In a delay, commanders use lethal and nonlethal capabilities to delay enemy forces, inflict casualties,
and assist the friendly force in gaining a mobility advantage over enemy forces. Lethal and nonlethal effects
continue throughout the delay. These assets can disrupt the enemy’s follow-on forces and restrict the
immediate battle to the enemy’s committed forces. Fixed- and rotary-wing assets can engage enemy forces
before they come in range of other supporting lethal and nonlethal assets.
11-62. Effects generated by lethal and nonlethal assets support direct fire engagements to prevent an enemy
force from conducting an attack on the delay position. Lethal and nonlethal assets separate enemy formations
by attacking an enemy force when it concentrates near choke points and in engagement areas. Integrating
fires and obstacles makes it difficult for an enemy force to maneuver through engagement areas. The delaying
force disrupts an enemy’s momentum by forcing deployment and by inflicting casualties. Lethal and
nonlethal capabilities assist delaying forces by— |
3-90 | 240 | Chapter 11
* Assisting in disengaging maneuver forces.
* Suppressing enemy forces.
* Degrading an enemy force’s ability to move and communicate.
* Obscuring an enemy force’s overwatching support by fire positions and degrading enemy
intelligence and target acquisition systems.
* Reinforcing or closing breaches or lanes in obstacles.
* Executing FPFs.
* Screening friendly displacements and disengagements by using obscurants. (This also degrades
an enemy force’s terminal guidance of precision-guided munitions.)
* Destroying high-payoff targets.
* Supporting limited counterattacks.
11-63. As an advancing enemy force approaches the delay position, they cross one or more trigger lines
and move into engagement areas within the range of the delaying force’s anti-armor missiles, tank cannons,
and small arms. Commanders hold their delaying force’s direct fire until enemy forces are positioned where
their fire plans and schemes of maneuver require their use. They control fires of the delaying forces in the
same manner as in any defense. The more damage a delaying force can inflict on enemy forces, the longer it
can stay in position.
11-64. As an enemy force attacks and maneuvers against a delaying force, delaying commanders
continuously assess the situation to guide the displacements of the delay force to avoid becoming decisively
engaged. Units use lethal and nonlethal capabilities from multiple domains to engage enemy forces while the
delaying force disengages and withdraws from delay positions. Integrated fires and FPFs directed at and in
front of enemy positions allow a delaying force to disengage.
11-65. Division and brigade commanders collaboratively plan and facilitate decentralized execution of a
delay to battalion and lower echelons. Senior commanders rely on their subordinates to accomplish the
mission and request help when needed. Commanders establish the acceptable risk and displacement criteria.
Subordinates displace once they meet the previously established delay criteria. A displacement may be a
preplanned event or time dependent. The senior commander monitors the delay and intervenes when the
displacement of one unit threatens the survival of another.
11-66. The delaying force relies heavily on lethal and nonlethal effects to suppress and disrupt enemy
forces, so the delaying force can disengage, move, and occupy new positions. If a subordinate element cannot
maintain separation from enemy forces, commanders can shift additional combat enablers and other resources
to that particular assigned area to counter the enemy forces’ success. As one subordinate element displaces,
delaying commanders order other subordinate elements to change their orientation to cover the move. Each
displacing element travels along its designated route, using demolitions as required and requesting additional
fire support if the enemy force continues to maintain contact.
11-67. Passing through obstacle lanes during displacement between positions poses significant risks to the
delaying force. The unit passing through a linear obstacle may become more vulnerable to an enemy force’s
attack because of the danger of the delaying force bunching up on the far side of an obstacle. Obstacle lanes
also increase the time required for a passing unit to transit through an area. Commanders prevent an enemy
force from engaging passing units until they can redeploy into a tactical formation.
11-68. Reserves and air assets should not be committed early in the delay unless its integrity is threatened.
Typically, commanders commit their reserves to help a unit disengage and regain its ability to maneuver or
to prevent an enemy force from exploiting an advantage. Commanders’ early commitment of their initial
reserves reduces their ability to influence the battle unless they can reconstitute new reserves. Commanders
that can extract, re-designate, or otherwise reconstitute their reserves can quickly commit their reserves
several times through the delay.
11-69. In the delay, commanders balance the location of their force’s sustainment elements with capability
to provide adequate support and protection from enemy indirect fire. Artillery ammunition stocks must be
capable of sustaining the quantity of fire support required in the delay. Maintenance operations in a delay
focus on evacuating rather than returning disabled or damaged vehicles to combat. Units evacuate these |
3-90 | 241 | Retrograde
vehicles from the security area unless they can quickly repair them. Units destroy inoperative vehicles that
they cannot evacuate to prevent their capture.
Terminating the Delay
11-70. A delay operation terminates when the delaying force conducts a rearward passage of lines through
a defending force, the delaying force reaches defensible terrain and transitions to the defense, the advancing
enemy force reaches a culminating point, or the delaying force transitions to the offense. If the advancing
enemy force reaches a culmination point, the delaying force maintains contact in current positions, withdraws
to perform another mission, or transitions to the offense. In all cases, the senior commander must plan for the
expected outcome of the delay. If commanders expect a friendly counterattack, they plan for the forward
passage of the counterattack force, conserve resources to ensure combat superiority, and handover
appropriate assigned areas.
WITHDRAW
11-71. A withdraw is to disengage from an enemy force and move in a direction away from the enemy
(ADP 3-90). Commanders may or may not conduct a withdrawal under enemy pressure. Subordinate units
may withdraw without the entire force withdrawing. A unit conducts a withdrawal for the reasons listed at
the beginning of this chapter. In addition, a withdrawal may precede a retirement operation.
11-72. Although commanders avoid withdrawing from action under enemy pressure, this is not always
possible. They may conduct a withdrawal when the situation requires rapid action to save the command from
disaster. This usually occurs after a tactical reverse or after a unit reaches its culminating point. When an
aggressive enemy force becomes aware of a friendly force’s withdrawal or its intention to withdraw, the
attacking enemy commander attempts to exploit the withdrawal, using all available capabilities to turn the
friendly force’s withdrawal into a rout. The attacking enemy force may have ground and air superiority and
continuously attempt to pursue, encircle, and destroy the withdrawing force. The attacking enemy
commander may use a combination of direct pressure and enveloping forces and fires to isolate the
withdrawing friendly force.
11-73. Withdrawals are inherently dangerous because they involve moving units to the rear and away from
an enemy force. The heavier the fighting and the closer the contact with an enemy force, the more difficult
the withdrawal. OPSEC is extremely important. A unit usually confines its rearward movement to times and
conditions when an advancing enemy force cannot observe the movement, so that the enemy force cannot
easily detect the operation. To retain the element of surprise and freedom of action, commanders consider
the enemy’s abilities to observe friendly movements. OPSEC is critical during the initial stages of a
withdrawal, when most of the functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements displace.
11-74. Units withdraw to assembly areas or new defensive positions. Alternatively, they can withdraw
indirectly to either area through one or more intermediate positions. When preparing new positions,
commanders balance the need for security with the need to establish the defense.
Organization of Forces for a Withdrawal
11-75. Commanders organize a withdrawing unit into a security force, a main body, and a reserve. They
also organize a detachment left in contact and stay-behind forces if the scheme of maneuver requires them.
Commanders avoid changing task organization unless subordinates have sufficient planning time. However,
circumstances may dictate rapid task organization changes immediately before a withdrawal, such as when
the unit must conduct an immediate withdrawal to prevent encirclement.
11-76. The security force maintains contact with the enemy force until ordered to disengage or until another
force takes over. It simulates the continued presence of the main body, which requires additional allocation
of combat multipliers beyond those normally allocated to a force of its size. The greater its mobility and
range advantages over the enemy force, then the easier for the security force to cover the main body’s
withdrawal. Commanders organize most available combat power to their security forces as a rear guard or a
rear covering force, since the most probable threat to a withdrawing force is a pursuing enemy. However,
security forces must maintain all around security of the withdrawing force. When an enemy force can |
3-90 | 242 | Chapter 11
infiltrate or insert forces ahead of the withdrawing force, commanders may establish an advance guard to
clear the route or assigned areas. They designate a flank guard or screen, as the situation requires.
11-77. When a security zone exists between the two main opposing forces, the existing security force can
transition on order to a rear guard or rear covering force. It then conducts delay operations until commanders
order it to disengage and break contact with the enemy force. When the withdrawing force is in close contact
with the enemy force, a security zone does not normally exist. Withdrawals under these conditions require
that security forces adopt different techniques. For example, the detachment left in contact establishes a way
to break contact sequentially with the enemy force.
11-78. The main body of the withdrawing force consists of all elements remaining after the senior
commander resources a security force and reserve. Commanders in a withdrawal generally find it difficult to
resource a reserve, but they make every attempt to do so. When the complete formation withdraws under
pressure, the reserve may take limited offensive action, such as spoiling attacks, to disorganize, disrupt, and
delay the enemy force. It can counter penetrations between positions, reinforce threatened areas, protect
withdrawal routes, and free encircled or heavily engaged forces.
Withdrawal Control Measures
11-79. Withdrawing forces protect themselves while simultaneously moving combat power away from
enemy forces. This requires careful coordination among all forces. Throughout an operation, commanders
strictly control rearward movement and maintain the ability to concentrate combat power at key times and
places. Figure 11-5 illustrates that commanders use the same control measures in the withdrawal that they
employ in the delay or the defense. Withdrawal control measures also include the routes used by each unit in
the withdrawal and their movement times.
Figure 11-5. Example control measures for a withdrawal using a detachment left in contact |
3-90 | 243 | Retrograde
Planning a Withdrawal
11-80. Commanders plan and coordinate a withdrawal in the same manner as a delay, although some
mission variables apply differently between a delay and a withdrawal. A withdrawal always begins under the
threat of enemy interference. Because the force is most vulnerable if the enemy force attacks, commanders
always plan for a withdrawal under pressure. They then develop contingencies for a withdrawal without
pressure. In both cases, their main considerations are to—
* Plan a deliberate break from the enemy force.
* Displace the main body rapidly, free of enemy interference.
* Safeguard the withdrawal routes.
* Retain sufficient maneuver and functional and multifunctional support and sustainment
capabilities throughout the operation to support forces in contact with the enemy force.
11-81. A withdrawal may be assisted or unassisted. It may or may not take place under enemy pressure.
These two factors combined produce the four techniques shown in figure 11-6. The figure also depicts the
tactical mission symbols for a withdrawal and a withdrawal under enemy pressure.
Figure 11-6. Withdrawal techniques
11-82. Commanders prefer to conduct a withdrawal while not under pressure and without assistance. An
assisting unit requires commanders to add additional coordination and prompt unit actions. In a withdrawal
under enemy pressure, all units withdraw simultaneously when available routes allow, using the tactics of a
delay to fight their way to the rear. When the simultaneous withdrawal of all forces is not practical,
commanders decide the order of withdrawal. Several factors influence their decision, including—
* Subsequent missions.
* Availability of transportation assets and routes.
* Disposition of friendly and enemy forces.
* Level and nature of enemy pressure.
* Degree of urgency associated with the withdrawal.
11-83. Commanders must make three interrelated key decisions: when to start the movement of selected
functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements, when to start displacing forward elements,
and when to start the security force’s disengagement operations. Commanders avoid premature actions that
indicate a withdrawal to enemy forces. They anticipate enemy means of interference and plan for employing
security forces, lethal and nonlethal capabilities, and air assets. |
3-90 | 244 | Chapter 11
11-84. Commanders conducting a withdrawal without enemy pressure can plan when to begin the
withdrawal. They have the option of taking risks to increase the displacement capabilities of the withdrawing
force. For example, commanders may order their main bodies to conduct tactical road marches instead of
moving in tactical formations. They can plan for stay-behind forces as part of their operations.
11-85. A withdrawing force can receive assistance from another force in the form of—
* Additional security for the area through which the withdrawing force will pass.
* Information concerning withdrawal routes.
* Forces to secure choke points or key terrain along withdrawal routes.
* Elements to assist in movement control, such as military police to conduct traffic control points.
* Required maneuver and functional and multifunctional support and sustainment, which can
involve conducting a counterattack to assist the withdrawing unit in disengaging from enemy
forces.
Preparing for a Withdrawal
11-86. Before withdrawing, the main body dispatches quartering parties to help it occupy the new position.
In an unassisted withdrawal, the withdrawing unit establishes its own security force and reserve. It
reconnoiters and secures the routes it uses for its rearward movement while sustaining itself during the
withdrawal. The withdrawing unit must disengage from enemy forces.
11-87. Concealing supplies along movement routes can simplify support requirements and reduce the
enemy force’s ability to interfere with logistics operations. This allows sustainment units to withdraw earlier
than they otherwise could. Commanders carefully consider whether to place supplies in caches. Once cached,
supplies are difficult to recover if an operation does not go as planned. Other than medical items, a
withdrawing unit evacuates or destroys all supplies that it cannot evacuate to prevent their capture.
Commanders establish destruction criteria for each class of supply by both time and event.
Executing a Withdrawal
11-88. Typically, when under enemy pressure, the force facing the least amount of contact withdraws first.
The more heavily engaged forces generally withdraw supported by indirect fires and a security force, if
available. Withdrawing forces take advantage of obstacles to assist in breaking contact with the enemy force.
They conduct night movements and use obscuration to screen friendly movement reducing the accuracy of
enemy direct and indirect fires and enemy observations of friendly movements. The security force continues
to use alternate and subsequent positions until the entire friendly force breaks contact with the enemy force.
11-89. The security force may remain in position as part of tactical deception. The main body moves
rearward to intermediate or final positions as rapidly as possible. After the main body withdraws to a safe
distance, the security force begins its rearward movement. Once the security force begins moving, it assumes
the duties of a rear guard. Even if the enemy force does not pursue the withdrawing force, the security force
continues to act as the rear guard unless commanders assign that mission to another element. However, if not
pursued by the enemy force, the security force may remain in a march column.
11-90. The main body moves rapidly on multiple routes to reconnoitered positions. It may occupy a series
of intermediate positions before completing the withdrawal. Usually functional and multifunctional support
units and their convoy escorts, move first, and precede combat units in the withdrawal. Commanders ensure
the disciplined use of routes during a withdrawal, despite confusion and enemy pressure.
11-91. When the main body withdraws, its reserve remains well forward to assist the security force and
other units by employing supporting direct and indirect fires and counterattacks. The reserve can launch
spoiling attacks to disorganize and delay the enemy force and extricate encircled or heavily engaged forces.
11-92. If the security force and the reserve cannot prevent the enemy force from closing on the main body,
commanders commit some or all of the main body to prevent the enemy force from further interfering with
the withdrawal. If the security force fails to slow the enemy force, the main body delays or defends. In this
event, the withdrawal resumes at the earliest possible time. If the enemy force blocks movement to the rear,
commanders can direct their units to alternate routes to bypass the enemy force. Alternatively, the
withdrawing force can attack through the enemy force. |
3-90 | 245 | Retrograde
Terminating a Withdrawal
11-93. Once the withdrawing force successfully disengages from the enemy force, it has two options. It can
rejoin the overall defense under conditions that are more favorable, or it can transition into a retirement and
continue to move away from the enemy force and toward its next mission.
RETIREMENT
11-94. A retirement is when a force out of contact moves away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). A retiring unit
organizes for combat, but it does not anticipate interference from enemy ground forces. Retirement operations
are usually conducted to reposition forces for future operations or to accommodate the current concept of
operations. Typically, another unit’s security force covers the movement of one formation as the unit
conducts a retirement. However, enemy mobile forces, unconventional forces, air strikes, air assault
operations, or long-range fires may attempt to interdict the retiring unit. Commanders plan for enemy actions
and organize their forces to fight in self-defense.
11-95. When a withdrawal from action precedes a retirement, the actual retirement begins after the unit
breaks contact and organizes into its march formation organization. (While a force withdrawing without
enemy pressure can also use march columns, the difference between the two situations is the probability of
enemy interference.) Units conduct retirements as tactical road marches where security and speed are the
most important considerations.
11-96. Each retiring unit generally moves toward an assembly area, which should support the preparations
for the unit’s next mission. Commanders consider unit capabilities to support defensive actions, if combat
occurs during the retirement, when determining routes to assembly areas.
11-97. The initial action in a retirement is to move sustainment units and supplies to the rear. At the
designated time, the retiring unit executes a withdrawal from action and forms into a march formation. The
unit can first move into an assembly area, if this step is necessary, before moving into a march formation to
reestablish command and control or resupply. Once it forms a march formation, the force is prepared to
initiate the retirement. During the initial phase, the force retires in multiple small columns. As the distance
from the enemy force increases, smaller columns can consolidate into larger ones for ease of movement
control. The number of routes and the potential for enemy contact influence how and when this occurs.
Organization of Forces for a Retirement
11-98. Commanders normally designate security elements and a main body in a retirement. Figure 11-7 on
page 11-18 illustrates this organization of forces. The formations employed during a retirement depend on
the number of available routes and the potential for enemy interference. Commanders typically move major
elements to the rear simultaneously. However, limited roles or a flank threat may require echeloning of the
movement in terms of time and ground locations.
11-99. The terrain and the enemy threat dictate whether a retiring force establishes a single rear security
force, which is usually a rear guard, or whether each column forms a separate rear security force. These
security forces protect the rearward moving columns from surprise, harassment, and attack by any pursuing
enemy force. Their size and composition depend on the strength and imminence of the enemy threat. These
security elements generally remain in march columns unless potential exists for enemy interference. If an
enemy force establishes contact, the rear security element conducts a delay.
11-100. The retiring march columns normally require an advance guard augmented by engineers focused on
mobility. Commanders focus their engineers supporting their rear guards on countermobility. They assign
flank security elements to prevent potential enemy interference with their retiring force’s extended columns.
Commanders may designate flank security responsibilities to subordinate march units.
11-101. The main body organizes in a manner opposite that of an approach march. The movement of
functional and multifunctional support and sustainment units ideally precedes the movement of combat
forces. When necessary, elements of the main body can reinforce the rear guard or any other security element.
Because fire support elements and attack aviation elements of the main body can respond rapidly, they are
usually the first elements tasked for this mission. |
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Figure 11-7. Example organization of forces for a retirement
Retirement Control Measures
11-102. The control measures used in a retirement are the same as those in a delay and a withdrawal. As in
a withdrawal, thorough planning and strict adherence to routes and movement times facilitate an orderly
retirement. Typically, commanders control movement using movement times, routes, and checkpoints. |
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Enabling Operations
Enabling operations are operations that connect offensive, defensive, and stability
operations together. On their own, they are not decisive, but they help set conditions
for the execution of all operations. They are complex enough that they require a either
a deliberate planning effort or a well developed and understood SOP to execute. Part
Four consists of nine chapters that describe reconnaissance, security operations,
troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, countermobility, mobility, tactical
deception, and link-up operations.
Chapter 12
Reconnaissance
This chapter addresses general reconnaissance considerations, reconnaissance
fundamentals, reconnaissance management, forms of reconnaissance operations,
reconnaissance methods, and recuperation and reconstitution of reconnaissance assets.
(See FM 3-98 for more detail on reconnaissance operations.)
GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE CONSIDERATIONS
12-1. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities and resources of an
enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic or other
characteristics of a particular area, by visual observation or other detection methods (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance
is one part of information collection; the other three parts that comprise information collection are security,
intelligence operations, and surveillance. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace,
surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other
means (JP 3-0). Although there are similarities between reconnaissance and surveillance to facilitate
information collection, reconnaissance collection uses multiple means, including surveillance, to find
information by systematically checking multiple locations in a designated operational area. Instead of
focusing on one specific piece of required information, reconnaissance can help provide units with a broader
understanding of the impacts the terrain, weather, and enemy that ultimately assists the higher headquarters
planning efforts. Whereas surveillance is more persistent and looming and tends to be more passive. Units
perform reconnaissance tasks before, during, and after other operations to obtain information that
commanders and their staffs use in the IPB process so they can formulate, confirm, or modify enemy courses
of action and to drive planned or unplanned commander decisions within the friendly plan.
12-2. Reconnaissance identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to movement, and the
disposition of enemy forces and the civilian population, so units can maneuver their forces freely and rapidly.
Reconnaissance prior to unit movements and occupation of assembly areas is critical to protecting friendly
forces and preserving combat power. Units also perform reconnaissance to keep their forces free from contact
as long as possible so that they can concentrate on their main effort. Leaders at every echelon disseminate |
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information to emphasize the importance of reporting to their Soldiers and rapidly updating digital and analog
systems to reflect friendly, enemy, and neutral activities.
RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS
12-3. There are seven fundamentals of successful reconnaissance operations:
* Ensure continuous reconnaissance.
* Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.
* Orient on the reconnaissance objective.
* Report all required information rapidly and accurately.
* Retain freedom of maneuver.
* Gain and maintain enemy contact.
* Develop the situation rapidly.
Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance
12-4. Effective reconnaissance is continuous. Units conduct reconnaissance before, during, and after all their
operations. Reconnaissance gathers information that commanders use when deciding to execute current,
branch, or sequel plans. The nature of priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements
change as operations transition. Units employ reconnaissance assets to report friendly unit locations, status,
and sustainment requirements during chaotic situations. It is important that all Soldiers act as sensors and
report their observations in a timely manner.
12-5. Before operations, reconnaissance fills gaps in information about enemy forces, the terrain, and civil
considerations. During operations, reconnaissance assets provide units with updated information that verifies
their enemy forces’ composition, dispositions, and intentions. This allows those commanders to verify which
potential COAs enemy forces are attempting to execute. It also allows commanders to determine if their plans
are still valid based on ongoing events within their assigned areas. After operations, reconnaissance elements
maintain contact with enemy forces to determine the enemy’s next move. At a minimum, units ensure the
continuous conduct of reconnaissance as part of all their security missions. This includes the performance of
local security by forces not currently in contact.
12-6. Reconnaissance performed over extended distances and time requires units to pace or rotate their
reconnaissance assets to maintain continuous coverage. Scouts require time for rest, resupply, training, and
the performance of troop leading procedures. Technical reconnaissance assets require time for preventive
maintenance checks and services. Commanders determine where, and when, they require maximum
reconnaissance efforts and then manage their available reconnaissance assets to ensure their availability at
critical times and places.
Do Not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve
12-7. Commanders never keep their reconnaissance assets in reserve. This does not mean that units commit
all their assets all the time. When committed, reconnaissance assets use all their resources to accomplish the
mission. They use their reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and the mission variables to achieve
the maximum coverage needed to answer their critical information requirements. At times, this requires them
to task, re-assign, or minimize the reconnaissance assets to ensure their availability at critical times and
places. They do not recover and sustain reconnaissance assets by placing them in the reserve. They consider
all their reconnaissance assets as committed assets with specific missions at all times. They may keep units
with multiple roles that can conduct reconnaissance, security, and other combat missions in an economy of
force role as their reserve for future security or combat missions.
Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective
12-8. Commanders use their reconnaissance objectives to focus reconnaissance efforts. Reconnaissance
objective is the most important result desired from that specific reconnaissance effort. The objective can
be either threat or terrain based, depending on what type of operation a battalion or higher echelon is
conducting. Every reconnaissance mission specifies a reconnaissance objective by priority, intent, and the |
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information to obtain. Commanders assign reconnaissance objectives based on PIRs resulting from the IPB
process and the reconnaissance asset’s capabilities and limitations. A reconnaissance objective can be
information about a specific geographic location, such as the cross-country trafficability of a specific area,
to confirm or deny a specific activity of a threat, or to specify the location of a threat such as a specific piece
of equipment or an entire system. Furthermore, reconnaissance units use their reconnaissance objective to
guide them in setting priorities when they lack time to complete all the tasks associated with performing a
specific type of reconnaissance. Reconnaissance assets remain focused on achieving these objectives
regardless of what they encounter during their missions. These assets implement reconnaissance objectives
to focus their efforts when time, enemy action, or other factors prevent them from performing all the tasks
normally associated with a particular form of reconnaissance.
Report All Required Information Rapidly and Accurately
12-9. Reconnaissance assets acquire and report accurate and timely combat information about their
reconnaissance objectives. This information may quickly lose its value, which is why it is important that the
latest time information of value is included with information requirements to aid in timely reporting and
avoid wasting reconnaissance assets. Reconnaissance assets report exactly what they see and, if appropriate,
what they do not see as this information is potentially tied to PIRs or information requirements. Seemingly
unimportant information may be extremely important when combined with other information. Reports of no
enemy activity are as important as reports of enemy activity. Unit information management plans ensure that
unit reconnaissance assets have the proper communications equipment to support the echelon’s integrated
information collection plan.
Retain Freedom of Maneuver
12-10. Reconnaissance assets need to retain their battlefield mobility, refine tactical knowledge of terrain
and the enemy, and maintain their initiative to complete their missions. Reconnaissance stops and battle
begins when these assets become decisively engaged. Reconnaissance assets require clear engagement and
disengagement criteria that support their commander’s intent. They employ proper movement and
reconnaissance techniques, use overwatching fires, and follow standard operating procedures.
Reconnaissance assets adopt formations designed to gain contact with the smallest friendly element prior to
approaching areas where enemy contact is expected. This provides friendly elements maximum maneuver
space and prevents the entire reconnaissance element from becoming decisively engaged. Units use the IPB
process to identify anticipated areas of likely contact. Use of indirect fires to provide suppression and
obscuration as well as to destroy point targets is a method reconnaissance elements use to retain their freedom
of maneuver. Reconnaissance units have a working relationship with Army aviation reconnaissance assets
that can enable freedom of maneuver through early warning as well as destruction of direct threats to ground
reconnaissance forces.
Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact
12-11. Reconnaissance assets gaining contact with enemy forces maintain contact unless their commander
orders otherwise, or their survival is at risk. This does not mean individual scout and reconnaissance teams
cannot break contact with enemy forces. Units conducting reconnaissance are responsible for maintaining
contact once it occurs. Contact can range from visual to direct fire contact. After contact the unit decides
which form or forms of contact is best for maintaining enemy contact so they can continue to provide required
information. Survivability is a key consideration for the unit in determining which forms of contact to
maintain. Leaders at all echelons must decide which forms of contact, through available assets, will enable
the reconnaissance force to maintain contact and can switch between them as needed. Surveillance, combined
with stealth, is often sufficient to maintain contact and is the preferred method. Units conducting
reconnaissance avoid direct fire contact with enemy forces unless it is necessary to gain essential information.
Develop the Situation Rapidly
12-12. Reconnaissance assets develop the situation immediately upon contact with enemy forces or
obstacles. Report enemy force composition, dispositions, activities, and movements and maneuver. If contact
is made with an obstacle, then reconnaissance assets determine the type and extent of the obstacle and if the |
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obstacle is actively being overwatched and covered with either direct or indirect fires. Enemy obstacle
locations and compositions can provide information concerning enemy force positions, weapon capabilities,
and scheme of fires. Reconnaissance assets develop the situation using action on contact drills.
RECONNAISSANCE MANAGEMENT
12-13. No single reconnaissance asset can answer every information collection requirement, and there are
rarely enough reconnaissance assets to cover every requirement. Staffs use a mix of reconnaissance
management methods, such as cueing, mixing, redundancy, and task-organizing, to use their limited assets
most effectively and collect the most critical information as quickly as possible.
12-14. Cueing is the integration of one or more types of reconnaissance or surveillance systems to
provide information that directs follow-on collecting of more detailed information by another system.
Cueing helps to focus limited reconnaissance and surveillance assets, especially limited ground assets, which
can rarely examine every part of a large area closely. Electronic, thermal, visual, audio, and other technical
assets with wide-area surveillance capabilities (often working from aerial platforms) can quickly determine
areas of enemy concentration or areas without an enemy presence. These assets may cue ground and aerial
reconnaissance assets to investigate specific areas to confirm and amplify information developed by technical
assets. For example, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System and Guardrail-equipped aircraft can
cover large areas and cue ground reconnaissance or unmanned aircraft once they identify the presence of
enemy forces. Units may dispatch ground reconnaissance or UAS to verify this information and track enemy
assets for targeting purposes. Similarly, a ground reconnaissance asset can cue surveillance assets. Units use
reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and use the complementary capabilities of other assets to
verify and expand information.
12-15. Mixing is using two or more different capabilities to collect against the same information
requirement. Employing a mix of systems not only increases the probability of collection, but also provides
information that is more complete. For example, a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft
may detect and locate a moving enemy tactical force, while the division or corps analysis and control element
uses organic and supporting assets to determine its identity, organizational structure, and indications of its
future plans. Employing a mix of systems is always desirable if the situation and available resources permit.
Mixing systems can also help uncover enemy deception attempts by revealing discrepancies in reports from
different collectors.
12-16. Redundancy is using two or more like capabilities to collect against the same information
requirement. Commanders decide which NAIs justify having more than one asset covering them based on
the priority of their information requirements. When more than one asset covers the same NAI, a backup is
available in the event that one asset cannot reach the NAI in time, the first asset suffers mechanical failure,
or the enemy force detects and engages the first asset. For example, two observation posts overwatching the
same NAI from two different locations. Redundancy also improves the chances of successful information
collection.
12-17. Commanders may task-organize their reconnaissance assets by placing additional assets under their
subordinates’ control to increase asset effectiveness and survivability. These assets may include additional
signal retransmission elements, engineer reconnaissance elements, civil affairs teams, or additional security
forces such as an infantry platoon.
COMMANDER’S RECONNAISSANCE GUIDANCE
12-18. The guidance the commander provides to the reconnaissance assets is key in collecting PIR to aid in
the decision making of higher echelons. There are three sections to the commander’s reconnaissance
guidance: focus, tempo, and engagement and disengagement criteria. Tempo is a key element to the
commander’s reconnaissance guidance as it refers to the level of detail and level of aggressiveness required
to accomplish the reconnaissance mission. (See FM 3-98 for more information on commander’s
reconnaissance guidance.) |
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Focus
12-19. The focus of the reconnaissance defines the reconnaissance unit’s area of emphasis and is composed
of four categories: threat, civil, terrain, and weather effects. A focus aids the reconnaissance effort by
narrowing the scope of operations to obtain the information that is most important to developing the situation
and aid in planning for future operations. Commanders and staffs further the reconnaissance efforts by
focusing on specific reconnaissance objectives. The objective should directly support the end state stated
within the commander’s intent.
Tempo
12-20. The reconnaissance tempo is the level of detail and level of aggressiveness required to accomplish
reconnaissance operations. The level of detail is conveyed using the terms “rapid” and “deliberate” to
establish the necessary number of tasks required, based on the amount of time available, in a reconnaissance
operation to sufficiently answer the supported commander’s PIR. The level of aggressiveness addresses the
necessity to avoid either detection or engagement and is conveyed through the terms “forceful” and
“stealthy”. Commanders analyze the mission variables of METT-TC(I) to assist them in determining the best
reconnaissance tempo for a specific form of reconnaissance. Although the terms may not be mutually
exclusive, the three major factors that drive the selection of the specific terms will be time, commander’s
intent, and the known enemy situation.
Level of Detail
12-21. Reconnaissance tempo has two levels of detail: rapid or deliberate. Commanders first identify the
tasks associated with the assigned reconnaissance mission. Rapid or deliberate is used by the commander to
focus on the appropriate level of detail necessary for the supported commander to make decisions.
12-22. In a rapid reconnaissance, commanders prescribe the minimum number of tasks necessary to
accomplish the mission. By assigning a rapid reconnaissance, the commander is focusing on a reduced
number of tasks and specificity of information associated with the assigned tasks. This is more easily
accomplished with a greater understanding of the operational environment, or when only specific information
is needed to facilitate the supported commander’s decisions. The limitation of rapid reconnaissance is a
higher risk to the force due to reduced specificity and less detailed information about the operational
environment.
12-23. In a deliberate reconnaissance all tasks for that mission must be accomplished to ensure success and
answer PIRs. This is inherently more time intensive due to the amount of required information to collect and
tasks to complete and is necessary when the understanding of the operational environment is vague.
Deliberate reconnaissance requires meticulous information collection, and is conducted when there is limited
enemy presence, when more time is available, or the commander requires more detailed information about
the operational environment. The limitation of a deliberate reconnaissance is that it may require augmentation
to include more detailed information collection assets and may require more deliberate sustainment planning.
Level of Aggressiveness
12-24. Reconnaissance tempo has two levels of aggressiveness: forceful or stealthy. A forceful level of
aggressiveness develops the situation by employing air and ground reconnaissance, technical means, and
direct and indirect fire systems to rapidly develop the situation. Forceful reconnaissance is appropriate when
favorable relative combat power analysis permits, when limited time necessitates, or when aggressive
engagement is necessary to gain the required information. Units conducting forceful reconnaissance can
move overtly as direct and indirect contact will not hinder or may enable the collection effort. A stealthy
level of aggressiveness emphasizes avoiding detection and direct and indirect contact as it will hinder
collection efforts and could limit freedom of maneuver. Stealthy reconnaissance typically takes more time
than forceful reconnaissance and is appropriate when time is available and the unit is either unable to fight
for information based on relative combat analysis, the commander wants forces to remain undetected, or
when a higher headquarters is unwilling to accept a higher threshold of risk. Units also use UAS
independently, or in conjunction with ground reconnaissance assets, to execute stealthy reconnaissance. |
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12-25. The levels of detail and aggressiveness combine to give the commander four combinations of tempo
to choose from. The four combinations of reconnaissance tempo are—
* Rapid and forceful.
Limited information requirements.
Mission timeline emphasizes prompt collection.
Overt movement is acceptable.
Direct and indirect fires will not hinder or may enhance collection efforts.
* Rapid and stealthy.
Limited information requirements.
Mission timeline emphasizes prompt collection.
Covert movement is required.
Direct and indirect fire contact will hinder collection efforts and movement and maneuver.
* Deliberate and forceful.
Extensive information requirements.
Mission timeline allows comprehensive collection.
Overt movement is acceptable.
Direct and indirect fires will not hinder or may enhance collection efforts.
* Deliberate and stealthy.
Mission timeline allows detailed collection.
Extensive information requirements.
Covert movement is required.
Direct and indirect fire contact will hinder collection efforts and movement and maneuver.
12-26. It is less important that commanders use the specific terms (rapid or deliberate, forceful or stealthy)
to communicate an organization's reconnaissance tempo. Instead, commanders should strive to provide
guidance within each area of tempo to assist subordinate units in understanding how the reconnaissance effort
is nested within the supported organization’s operating tempo. Generally speaking, commanders should
inform the reconnaissance force how much information pertaining to the enemy and terrain they need to
gather, how quickly that information must be gathered, and how aggressively to pursue that information.
Engagement and Disengagement Criteria
12-27. Engagement criteria are protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating engagement
with an enemy force. Commanders must clearly define the size or type of enemy force they want their
subordinate elements to engage or avoid. The commander ensures that subordinate leaders understand this to
avoid becoming decisively engaged which prevents the unit from continuing reconnaissance operations.
Commanders use bypass criteria to direct bypassing or handing off certain sizes or types of units to maintain
the tempo of the operation based upon subsequent planned operations and guidance from higher. Bypass
criteria are measures established by higher echelon headquarters that specify the conditions and size
under which enemy units and contact may be avoided. Reconnaissance assets direct and rehearse
handover of enemy targets between friendly units as required when specified enemy formations are bypassed.
12-28. Disengagement criteria are protocols that specify those circumstances where a friendly force
must break contact with direct fire and observed indirect fire to avoid becoming decisively engaged or
to preserve friendly combat power. Just like engagement criteria, it is critical for the commander to clearly
state when the subordinate elements must break contact with direct fire with enemy forces to prevent
becoming decisively engaged and more importantly retain freedom of maneuver.
CHARACTERISTICS OF RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS
12-29. Every unit has a requirement to report information about the terrain, weather, civilian activities, and
friendly and enemy dispositions. Troops in close combat and reconnaissance patrols of maneuver units at all
echelons collect information on enemy units with which they are in contact. In echelon support areas, reserve |
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maneuver forces, functional and multifunctional support, sustainment elements, other government agencies,
and multinational forces observe and report civilian and enemy activity and significant changes in terrain
trafficability. Although all units conduct reconnaissance, those specifically trained in reconnaissance
operations are cavalry, manned and unmanned aviation reconnaissance, scouts, and special forces. Some
branches, such as engineers, civil affairs, and chemical, have specific ground reconnaissance tasks to perform
that complement the force’s overall reconnaissance effort. However, maneuver battalions, BCTs, divisions,
and corps commanders primarily use their organic or attached ground and aerial reconnaissance assets, and
their space operations, target acquisition, and intelligence elements to conduct reconnaissance operations.
12-30. Battalion and higher echelon commanders assign missions to their reconnaissance assets based on
the organization, equipment, and training of those assets. They know the capabilities and limitations of their
available reconnaissance assets. This ensures the appropriate employment of these assets based on their
capabilities. They will also augment their reconnaissance assets with enablers if they recognize that the
reconnaissance task requires additional augmentation to be successful. Table 12-1 shows the typical nesting
of reconnaissance and surveillance assets available at different echelons.
Table 12-1. Typical reconnaissance and surveillance assets available
Platoon CO/TM BN/TF BCT Division Corps
Observation post C/T C/T C/T C/T C/T C/T
Reconnaissance patrol C/T C/T C/T C/T C/T C/T
Combat outpost A A C/T C/T C/T C/T
Scout platoon A A C/T C/T
Cavalry troop A A C/T C/T
Cavalry squadron A A C/T A
Chemical reconnaissance A A C/T C/T C/T
Artillery target acquisition A C/T C/T C/T
systems
Air defense radar systems A A C/T C/T
Other military information A C/T C/T C/T
collection assets
Air cavalry squadron A C/T C/T
Unmanned aircraft systems A A A C/T C/T C/T
Cavalry regiment A C/T
Special forces and rangers A A
Technical surveillance A A C/T C/T
platforms
A Echelon can routinely expect the information from that source to be made available to it.
C/T Echelon controls or routinely tasks the asset.
BCT brigade combat team BN/TF battalion or task force CO/TM company or team
12-31. Commanders primarily employ a combination of manned ground and air assets supported by
technical systems to perform reconnaissance. These assets use the strengths of one system to overcome the
weaknesses of another. They delineate reporting procedures for all units to disseminate information gathered
during reconnaissance that facilitates mission accomplishment.
12-32. Commanders employ all available resources, not just reconnaissance units, to satisfy their existing
information requirements. Joint forward observers and fire support teams report combat information.
Forward deployed air defense units observe and report enemy aircraft and air corridors in use as well as
supplement available air control radars. Specialized reconnaissance assets such as these will have unique
requirements of time on objective, distance to objective, and movement. Planning and integration are required
to ensure that requirements of the mission variables of the reconnaissance commander and the collection
requirements are effectively balanced. Ground reconnaissance can involve assets not specifically tailored for
the mission. |
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12-33. During the conduct of any form of reconnaissance, the commander may require information about a
specific aspect of the area of operations. To obtain this information the commander may direct a specific
focus task which typically requires the use of an organization uniquely trained and equipped for the mission.
Focus tasks include CBRN, civil, electromagnetic, and engineer reconnaissance.
12-34. CBRN reconnaissance includes missions to obtain information on suspected or confirmed chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear threats and hazards in an assigned area. CBRN reconnaissance identifies
indicators of enemy CBRN production or employment, and indicators related to civilian or industrial facilities
that could be weaponized or produce hazards when damaged or destroyed. (See ATP 3-11.37/MCRP
10-10E.7/NTTP 3-11.29/AFTTP 3-22.44 for more on CBRN reconnaissance.)
12-35. Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific
civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events (JP 3-
57). Civil reconnaissance verifies or refutes civil information, supports operational environment assessments,
and detects and monitors changes in the civil component. It is conducted over time through routine
engagement and patterned civil observance using active and passive sensors, virtual sensors, and other means.
(See FM 3-57 for more information on civil reconnaissance.)
12-36. Electromagnetic reconnaissance is the detection, location, identification, and evaluation of foreign
electromagnetic radiations (JP 3-85). Electromagnetic reconnaissance supports information collection at
brigade and higher echelons using assigned electromagnetic warfare personnel and capabilities. Information
obtained through electromagnetic reconnaissance assists the commander with situational understanding and
can support signals intelligence activities. Electromagnetic reconnaissance may result in electromagnetic
protection modifications or lead to an electromagnetic attack against enemy capabilities. (See FM 3-12 for
more information on electromagnetic reconnaissance.)
12-37. Engineer reconnaissance obtains information about the infrastructure, terrain, or threat. This may
include data on obstacles, gap crossing sites, airfields, bridges, tunnels, roads, and trails. Engineer units do
not have designated reconnaissance teams. Engineer reconnaissance is directed and task-organized based on
mission requirements using assets that would otherwise support other engineer missions. (See
ATP 3-34.81/MCWP 3-17.4 for more on engineer reconnaissance.)
12-38. Ground reconnaissance elements are generally limited in the depth to which they can conduct
reconnaissance. However, they can operate in weather conditions that prohibit aerial reconnaissance
operations. Reconnaissance conducted by manned and unmanned aircraft systems complement ground
reconnaissance by increasing the speed and depth of reconnaissance over designated areas. Aerial
reconnaissance assets can operate over terrain that hinders ground operations, such as swamps, extremely
rugged terrain, or deep snow. Aviation assets can operate at a considerable depth, far in advance of dedicated
ground reconnaissance elements focused on close operations. Thus, aviation assets provide units with
additional time to react to enemy forces. Manned and unmanned aerial reconnaissance assets use their optics,
video, thermal imaging, electronic sensors, and communications capabilities to detect and report enemy
activities. All types of aviation units generate pilot reports when conducting their primary missions. These
reports are often a source of valuable combat information.
12-39. While several technical systems can perform reconnaissance, most of these systems are surveillance
platforms. Surveillance complements reconnaissance by cueing the commitment of reconnaissance assets
against specific locations or specially targeted enemy units.
12-40. Military intelligence units conduct supporting intelligence operations. They provide electronic
intercept, UAS sensor feeds, and human intelligence, counterintelligence, and downlinks from theater and
national assets. Theater and national reconnaissance and surveillance systems broadcast information and
intelligence to commanders and provide near real-time imagery as a part of an integrated intelligence effort.
Artillery and air defense target acquisition radars complement military intelligence surveillance systems as a
part of that effort. Examples of human intelligence collection include face-to-face interrogation of captured
enemy Soldiers, screening of the civilian population, and debriefing of friendly Soldiers, such as scouts and
special operations forces. (See JP 2-0 or FM 2-22.3 for more information about human intelligence
collection.)
12-41. Division and corps headquarters have various ways to obtain information from space reconnaissance
assets. Various sensors found on these assets use the breadth of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to gather |
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data for situational awareness, planning, intelligence, and operations by ground forces. Space reconnaissance
assets can continue reconnaissance regardless of the enemy capability to defend against air and ground
reconnaissance assets. Space and terrestrial weather may have varying effects on the different space-based
sensors and the portion of the EMS being used. Certain space-based reconnaissance assets can be limited in
the amount of support provided due to the physical limitations of their orbit and revisit times.
FORMS OF RECONNAISSANCE
12-42. The five forms of reconnaissance operations are—
* Zone reconnaissance.
* Area reconnaissance.
* Route reconnaissance.
* Reconnaissance in force.
* Special reconnaissance.
12-43. Table 12-2 shows what types of Army reconnaissance units are typically assigned the forms of
reconnaissance operations. Special operations forces conduct special reconnaissance.
Table 12-2. Dedicated reconnaissance units and forms of reconnaissance operations
Scout Troop or Air Cavalry Brigade Division Special
Platoon company cavalry squadron combat operation
team forces
Zone X X X X X
Area X X X X X
Route X X X
Reconnaissance X (if
X X
in force reinforced)
Special X
ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
12-44. Zone reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to
obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined
by boundaries. Commanders assign a zone reconnaissance mission when they need additional information
on a zone before committing other forces. It is appropriate when the enemy situation is vague, existing
knowledge of the terrain is limited, or combat operations have altered the terrain. A zone reconnaissance may
include several route or area reconnaissance missions assigned to subordinate units.
12-45. Zone reconnaissance is normally a deliberate process and units need to allow adequate time to
perform this task. It takes more time than any other reconnaissance operation. It normally involves extended
distances and starts from a LD. It requires the employment of all ground elements executing the zone
reconnaissance abreast of each other. Commanders may forgo detailed reconnaissance of these zones and
focus assets on NAIs that reveal enemy dispositions and intentions when their reconnaissance objectives are
enemy forces. Reconnaissance units do not disregard terrain when focusing on enemy forces. However, they
minimize their terrain reconnaissance efforts to what influences the NAIs.
Tasks Associated with Zone Reconnaissance
12-46. Units performing zone reconnaissance accomplish the following tasks within capability (unless
otherwise ordered):
* Find and report all enemy forces within the zone.
* Based on engagement criteria, clear all enemy forces in the designated assigned area of the unit
conducting reconnaissance.
* Determine the trafficability of all terrain in the zone including built-up areas.
* Locate and determine the extent of all contaminated areas in the zone. |
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* Inspect and classify all bridges in the zone.
* Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts.
* Locate fords, crossing sites, or obstacle bypasses in the zone.
* Locate and clear all mines, obstacles, and barriers in the zone.
* Report reconnaissance information.
* Reconnoiter all terrain in the zone.
* Locate bypass around built-up areas, obstacles, and contaminated areas.
* Reconnoiter specific terrain in the zone.
* Reconnoiter defiles along the route. Clear them of enemy and obstacles or locate a bypass.
Organization of Forces for a Zone Reconnaissance
12-47. Several subordinate units operate abreast within their assigned area when performing a zone
reconnaissance. Commanders directing their forces to perform a zone reconnaissance designate a maneuver
reserve when they expect to encounter significant enemy forces. That reserve should contain significant
combat power. For example, armored company teams normally perform this task for a cavalry squadron in
an armored BCT. Units conducting a zone reconnaissance ensure fires assets can adequately support
throughout the execution of the operation.
Control Measures for a Zone Reconnaissance
12-48. Commanders control the performance of zone reconnaissance by assigning areas to units conducting
the reconnaissance. They may designate their zone by designating lateral boundaries, lines of departure, and
LOAs. Units conducting zone reconnaissance can further divide their zone with additional lateral boundaries
to define subordinate unit’s zones. Figure 12-1 is an example of a sketch showing how commanders control
zone reconnaissance. The primary difference between an area reconnaissance and a zone reconnaissance is
that a zone reconnaissance typically involves larger areas than those associated with the performance of area
reconnaissance. |
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Figure 12-1. Example of zone reconnaissance control measures
AREA RECONNAISSANCE
12-49. Area reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed
information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area. This area may consist of a
single location, such as a town, a ridgeline, a forest, an airhead, a bridge, an installation, or any other critical
operational feature such as obstacles. Obstacles are considered as either natural or man-made and can include
areas with CBRN contamination. Commanders assign an area reconnaissance when information on the
enemy situation is limited or when focused reconnaissance yields specific information on the area in question.
Area reconnaissance is normally smaller than zone reconnaissance and is not usually contiguous to other
friendly areas targeted for reconnaissance.
12-50. Commanders may forgo detailed reconnaissance of their respective areas and focus their assets on
NAIs that reveal enemy compositions, dispositions, and intentions when their reconnaissance objectives are
oriented on enemy forces. Reconnaissance units cannot disregard terrain while focusing on enemy forces in
this situation. However, they minimize their terrain reconnaissance efforts to those that may influence NAIs. |
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Tasks Associated with the Performance of an Area Reconnaissance
12-51. Units performing an area reconnaissance perform the following tasks within capability (unless
otherwise ordered):
* Confirm or deny commander’s PIRs.
* Reconnoiter specific terrain in the area.
* Find and report all enemy forces within the area.
* Determine the trafficability of all terrain in the area, to include built-up areas.
* Locate and determine the extent of all contamination in the area.
* Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, defiles, and culverts.
* Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges in the area.
* Inspect and classify all bridges in the area.
* Locate a bypass around built-up areas, obstacles, and contamination in area.
* Locate any bypasses for existing obstacles in the area.
* Locate and clear all mines, obstacles, and barriers in the area.
* Report reconnaissance information.
Organization of Forces for an Area Reconnaissance
12-52. Considerations for the organization of forces for an area reconnaissance are the same as organizing
a zone reconnaissance. (See paragraph 12-47.) The overall commander of those units performing the area
reconnaissance establishes a maneuver reserve if that individual expects units to encounter significant enemy
forces. This reserve needs adequate combat power to reinforce decisively engaged reconnaissance forces. A
tank-heavy company team normally performs this task for a cavalry squadron of an armored BCT.
Commanders ordering the performance of an area reconnaissance provide their reconnaissance elements with
adequate fire support assets that move with those elements if the areas they are reconnoitering are located
beyond supporting range of their main bodies.
Control Measures for an Area Reconnaissance
12-53. Figure 12-2 is a sketch showing that commanders control an area reconnaissance using the same
control measures as in a zone reconnaissance. The primary difference between an area and a zone
reconnaissance is that a zone reconnaissance typically involves larger areas than those associated with the
performance of area reconnaissance. Units conducting area reconnaissance can further divide their assigned
area with additional lateral boundaries to define subordinate unit assigned areas. These subordinates’
assigned areas are not necessarily the same size. |
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Figure 12-2. Example of area reconnaissance control measures
12-54. Units place additional control measures on recognizable terrain where possible. They locate contact
points where they determine that it is necessary for adjacent units to make physical contact and the time the
contact takes place. They use phase lines to coordinate the movement of elements operating abreast.
Checkpoints indicate critical terrain features and help to control ground movement and coordinate air-ground
integration. Commanders use FSCMs to control direct and indirect fires. They use additional control
measures as necessary. In addition, commanders assigning the area reconnaissance mission specify the routes
their reconnaissance units will use to enter their assigned areas. Units depart these assigned areas on different
routes upon completion of their area reconnaissance tasks.
12-55. Units inform the commander assigning the mission if they lack the time or resources to complete all
the tasks listed in paragraph 12-51. Their respective commanders then issue further guidance on which tasks
each unit needs to complete or the respective priority of these tasks. Their different reconnaissance objectives
may make it clear which tasks are more important. These units report and await further instruction if they
determine that they cannot complete assigned tasks after initiating their reconnaissance efforts. This includes
such things as clearing enemy forces from their assigned areas or supporting the maneuver of their respective
main bodies by reducing obstacles to create lanes. (See FM 3-98 for additional information on the
performance of area reconnaissance.) |
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ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
12-56. Route reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of
a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. The
route may be a road, highway, trail, mobility corridor, avenue of approach, or axis of advance. The
reconnaissance effort provides new or updated information on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge
classifications, and enemy, adversary, and civilian activity along the route. Commanders normally assign this
mission during a zone or area reconnaissance when they require more information on a specific route for
friendly movement.
Tasks Associated with a Route Reconnaissance
12-57. Units conducting route reconnaissance perform specific tasks, unless ordered otherwise by their
commanders. If they do not have the time or resources to complete all the tasks associated with the
performance of a route reconnaissance, units inform their higher echelon commanders. Those higher echelon
commanders then issue further guidance on which tasks these units must complete or the priority of each
task. (This guidance is usually clear from their individual reconnaissance objectives.) If they determine that
they cannot complete all assigned tasks after initiating their route reconnaissance, such as clearing enemy
forces or reducing obstacles, units report and continue to execute the mission within capability while
simultaneously waiting for further guidance from their higher headquarters. (See FM 3-98 and ATP 3-34.81/
MCWP 3-17.4 for additional information concerning route reconnaissance.)
12-58. Route reconnaissance tasks (within capability) include—
* Find, report, and, based on engagement criteria, clear all enemy forces that can influence
movement along the route.
* Reconnoiter and determine the trafficability of the route.
* Reconnoiter all terrain that the enemy can use to influence movement along the route, such as
choke points, ambush sites, pickup zones, landing zones, and drop zones.
* Reconnoiter all built-up areas along route.
* Reconnoiter all lateral routes.
* Locate bypasses around built-up areas, obstacles, and contaminated areas.
* Inspect and classify all bridges within the area.
* Reconnoiter defiles along the route. Clear them of enemy and obstacles or locate a bypass.
* Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts.
* Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges on the route.
* Locate and clear all mines, obstacles, and barriers on the route.
* Submit route report.
Organization of Forces for a Route Reconnaissance
12-59. Commanders assign route reconnaissance as a separate mission or as a specified task for units
conducting a zone or area reconnaissance. A platoon conducts a route reconnaissance over only one route at
a time. For larger organizations, the number of platoons available directly influences the number of routes
covered simultaneously. Integrating ground, air, and technical assets ensures a faster and more complete
route reconnaissance.
12-60. A ground reconnaissance effort is essential if the mission is to conduct detailed reconnaissance of
one or more routes or the mission requires clearing enemy forces from those routes and adjacent terrain.
Commanders operate and equip forces conducting ground reconnaissance to enable them to respond to enemy
forces they encounter. Ground reconnaissance forces require immediate access to responsive fire support and
other combat enablers. This is especially true when units expect to make contact with significant enemy
forces. If commanders require detailed information on specific routes, engineer assets can determine the
classification of critical points along routes more quickly and accurately than scouts can. If commanders
anticipate encountering significant obstacles, they include combat engineers as part of their ground
reconnaissance forces. Commanders can also include CBRN, civil affairs, or EMS reconnaissance assets as
required. |
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12-61. Commanders employ aerial reconnaissance when required by the mission variables. However, aerial
reconnaissance can rarely clear enemy forces from locations where they can affect movement on these routes
and aircraft cannot breach obstacles. When time is limited, aerial reconnaissance is essential to determine
which areas are clear of enemy forces and obstacles. Aerial reconnaissance can also cue ground
reconnaissance assets regarding where to focus their efforts.
Control Measures Associated with a Route Reconnaissance
12-62. Commanders create an assigned area for the unit conducting the reconnaissance. They place lateral
boundaries on both sides of reconnoitered routes. These lateral boundaries are far enough out from these
routes to allow reconnaissance of all terrain from which an enemy force could influence each reconnoitered
route. They draw lines of departure with reference to battlefield locations where enemy contact is possible.
Commanders generally place these lines of departure before and perpendicular to the reconnoitered routes.
This allows adequate maneuver space for the unit conducting the reconnaissance to deploy into a movement
formation. These lines of departure create the rear boundary of the assigned area occupied by the units
conducting the route reconnaissance. Commanders place LOAs far enough beyond the RP for each examined
route, including any terrain from which an enemy force could influence that route. Together a SP and an
associated release point define a reconnoitered route. Commanders require detailed information on these
routes and may add phase lines and checkpoints to coordinate reconnaissance, control movement, or
designate critical points. They place additional control measures on terrain features identifiable from the
ground and the air to coordinate indirect and direct fires and assist in air to ground coordination. Figure 12-3
depicts control measures associated with performing a route reconnaissance.
Figure 12-3. Example of route reconnaissance control measures |
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RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE
12-63. A reconnaissance in force is a form of reconnaissance operation designed to discover or test
the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information. Battalion-sized task
forces or larger organizations usually conduct a reconnaissance in force. Commanders assign this operation
when an enemy force is operating within an area and they cannot obtain adequate intelligence about the
enemy force by other means. Units may also conduct a reconnaissance in force in restrictive terrain where an
enemy is likely to ambush smaller reconnaissance forces. Reconnaissance in force is forceful reconnaissance,
conducted as an offensive operation with clearly stated reconnaissance objectives. The overall goal of a
reconnaissance in force is to determine exploitable enemy weaknesses. It differs from other reconnaissance
operations because commanders direct their performance to gain information solely about an enemy force.
Commanders plan for both the reinforcement and the retrograde of their forces. They plan a reinforcement
so they can exploit success and they plan a retrograde if they encounter superior enemy forces.
Tasks Associated with a Reconnaissance in Force
12-64. Units performing a reconnaissance in force carry out these tasks:
* Penetrate the enemy’s disruption zone and determine its size and depth.
* Determine the location and disposition of enemy forces.
* Attack enemy positions and attempt to force the enemy to react by using local reserves or major
counterattack forces, employing fires, adjusting positions, and employing specific weapon
systems.
* Determine weaknesses in the enemy’s disposition to exploit.
* Locate obstacles and create lanes as specified.
* Enter areas of operation in complex terrain not previously occupied by friendly forces such as
urban environments.
As with other reconnaissance tasks, units performing reconnaissance in force report and continue to conduct
their mission as they await further guidance from their higher headquarters if they cannot complete their
assigned tasks.
Organization of Forces for a Reconnaissance in Force
12-65. While specifically trained and equipped units usually conduct the other reconnaissance tasks, any
maneuver force can conduct a reconnaissance in force. Commanders directing the performance of a
reconnaissance in force organize their forces in the same way as they organize offensive operations. They
normally direct the performance of a reconnaissance in force as a movement to contact or a series of frontal
attacks across broad frontages. The lack of enemy information dictates that these forces are large and strong
enough to develop the situation. They need to be capable of protecting themselves long enough to receive
support from other friendly assets. The less commanders know about their opposing enemy forces, the
stronger they organize each friendly force.
Control Measures for a Reconnaissance in Force
12-66. The control measures associated with a reconnaissance in force are the same as for offensive
operations. See paragraphs A-44 through A-61 for offensive operations control measures.
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
12-67. Special reconnaissance is reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation
in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information
of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional
forces (JP 3-05). These actions provide an additional capability for commanders and supplement other
conventional reconnaissance actions. Sometimes only visual observation or other collection methods in the
target area can obtain the desired information, even with offensive cyber electromagnetic warfare techniques,
long-range sensors, and overhead platforms. Special operations forces are equipped and possess capabilities |
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enabling them to conduct reconnaissance on denied and hostile areas normally inaccessible to other forces or
assets. Special reconnaissance activities include—
* Environmental reconnaissance.
* Armed reconnaissance.
* Target and threat assessment.
* Post-strike reconnaissance.
See ATP 3-18.4 for additional information on special reconnaissance activities.
RECONNAISSANCE STAFF INTEGRATION
12-68. The performance of reconnaissance operations contributes significantly to each commander’s
battlefield visualization. Staffs develop Annex B (Intelligence) to the base plan or order to support their
commander’s decision-making process.
12-69. Commanders make judicious, yet aggressive, use of their available reconnaissance assets.
Reconnaissance planning ensures that available reconnaissance assets produce the greatest results.
Commanders set priorities for their reconnaissance assets as time and the assets themselves are limited.
Generating many unfocused missions rapidly wears down these assets, making them less effective and
potentially leaving enemy vulnerabilities undiscovered.
12-70. Commanders ensure the coordination and synchronization of all subordinate echelons for the
reconnaissance effort. Since the need for information gained by reconnaissance is integral to all elements of
operations and warfighting functions, reconnaissance operations demand an integrated approach to planning,
preparation, and execution. The two habitual participants in the reconnaissance planning process are the
operations and intelligence staff officers. Operations staff officers have primary staff responsibility for
reconnaissance planning, allocating, and tasking resources. Normally, they are responsible for ground and
aerial reconnaissance assets, which include manned aviation, small UAS, engineers, CBRN, and artillery.
Intelligence staff officers have primary responsibility for ground surveillance systems, larger UAS, and
special electronics mission aircraft. Civil affairs operations staff officers have primary responsibility for
planning civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and the analysis, evaluation, and integration of civil
information into the common operational picture. Commanders ensure their staffs adopt an integrated
combined arms approach to planning, preparing, executing, and assessing reconnaissance as an integral part
of their information collection plans.
INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN
12-71. Units coordinate their reconnaissance efforts with other higher echelon and lateral units to maximize
information collection. Staffs, primarily intelligence staff officers, identify gaps in available intelligence,
based on their initial IPB and their commanders’ critical information requirements. The IPB process identifies
factors that impact their information collection efforts, such as—
* Avenues of approach that support friendly movement and exploit enemy weaknesses.
* Key terrain, choke points, obstacles, and hazard areas.
* Enemy positions, especially exploitable flanks.
* Observation points.
12-72. The performance of reconnaissance tasks (part of their information collection efforts) and the IPB
process are interactive and iterative, each feeding the other. (See FM 3-55 for more information on the
information collection process and ATP 2-01.3 for more information on the IPB process.)
12-73. Intelligence and operations staff officers develop their initial synchronization plans to acquire
information to help answer PIRs based on available information collection assets. These plans assign specific
information collection tasks to specific units for action. They integrate information collection into the
operation order and appropriate annexes.
12-74. Operations staff officers use these synchronization plans when they prepare Annex L (Information
Collection) to the operation orders. This annex provides for the flexible execution of reconnaissance
operations, including the provision for adequate synchronization of fire support, sustainment, and other |
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warfighting functions when completed to ensure the reconnaissance mission is adequately supported. (See
ADP 5-0 for more information on the integration of information collection—including reconnaissance—into
the military decision-making process.)
12-75. Civil affairs operations staff officers plan for civil reconnaissance and civil engagement similar to
the way intelligence cells plan information collection. The civil affairs operations staff officers prioritize their
civil reconnaissance and civil engagement information collection tasks to fill existing information gaps. The
information collected allows them to update the civil affairs operations running estimates. The civil affairs
operations concept of operations takes into account the quality of existing area assessments and civil
information databases. (See FM 3-57 for additional information on civil reconnaissance and civil
engagement.)
RECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES
12-76. There are two reconnaissance techniques commanders employ to answer information requirements:
reconnaissance push and reconnaissance pull. Commanders employ these techniques based on their level of
understanding of the operational environment combined with the time available to refine their understanding.
In selecting one technique over the other, the commander considers the following:
* Degree of the situational understanding of the enemy.
* Time available to collect the information.
* Leadership ability of subordinate commanders.
* Proficiency of subordinate units to plan and rapidly react for uncertain situations.
12-77. Reconnaissance pull is reconnaissance that determines which routes are suitable for maneuver,
where the enemy is strong and weak, and where gaps exist, thus pulling the main body toward and
along the path of least resistance. This facilitates the commander’s initiative and agility. Reconnaissance
assets initially work over a broad area to develop the enemy situation. As units gain an understanding of
enemy weaknesses, they then “pull” the main body to positions of tactical advantage. Reconnaissance pull
knowingly emphasizes opportunity at the expense of a detailed, well-rehearsed plan, and unity of effort.
Commanders base plans on several viable branches or COAs triggered by decision points. These decision
points are tied to reconnaissance assets’ ability to answer commander’s critical information requirements.
Leaders at all levels must understand and rehearse branches and sequels. A reconnaissance pull can also be
used when higher echelons have not selected a specific COA while the unit conducting the reconnaissance
answers key PIRs to help develop the plan. This facilitates commanders’ initiative and agility.
12-78. Reconnaissance push is reconnaissance that refines the common operational picture, enabling
the commander to finalize the plan and support main and supporting efforts. It is normally used once
the commander commits to a scheme of maneuver or COA. In these cases, commanders “push”
reconnaissance assets into specific portions of their areas of operation to confirm, deny, and validate planning
assumptions that impact operations. Reconnaissance push emphasizes detailed, well-rehearsed planning.
Typically, a COA has already been selected for the echelon executing the mission when a reconnaissance
push is used.
12-79. The primary reason for using one method instead of the other is the time available. The time required
to develop a COA can give enemy forces more time to recover and prepare, thereby increasing the risk of
higher casualties than necessary. Commanders balance the time needed to develop a COA with the need to
act rapidly and decisively on the battlefield. There is no available model a commander can use to determine
how much time is enough; that determination is part of the tactical art.
SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT
12-80. Sustaining reconnaissance assets before, during, and after their commitment is a vital part of
maintaining reconnaissance capabilities. The methods employed by units to sustain their deployed
reconnaissance assets depend on the situations. Units address reconnaissance asset sustainment as part of
their planning process for each reconnaissance operation.
12-81. Reconnaissance elements frequently operate in locations distant from their sustaining base. They
either carry a large enough basic load, or their units task-organize them with assets necessary to sustain them |
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until they can be relieved. Units carefully plan for casualty evacuation in both COAs. An alternative solution
is to plan and coordinate for sustainment from nearby units.
RECONNAISSANCE METHODS
12-82. Commanders consider the mission variables and the capabilities of their reconnaissance assets when
deciding on a reconnaissance method. When possible, commanders typically employ combinations of these
methods to increase the reconnaissance operation’s effectiveness. The reconnaissance methods include
dismounted, mounted, aerial (manned and unmanned), and reconnaissance by fire.
DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
12-83. Dismounted reconnaissance is the most time-consuming method used by ground units. However, it
permits the most detailed information collection about the enemy, terrain, civil considerations, and
infrastructure. A commander considers using dismounted reconnaissance when—
* Stealth is required, or security is the primary concern.
* Time is available.
* Detailed information is required.
* The reconnaissance objective is a stationary threat, fixed site, or terrain feature.
* Unit expects, or has made, enemy contact through visual and/or electromagnetic means.
* Environment conditions favor dismounted reconnaissance or hinder mounted reconnaissance. (For
example, terrain is muddy or swampy and is easier to traverse on foot.)
* The terrain or threat preclude use of reconnaissance vehicles.
* Vehicles are not available.
* Terrain creates a visual dead space that prevents using optics or sensors.
MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
12-84. Mounted reconnaissance enables a more rapid tempo while increasing the potential compromise of
reconnaissance operations. Mounted reconnaissance should take advantage of standoff capabilities provided
by surveillance and weapon systems to observe and engage from greater ranges. A commander considers
using mounted reconnaissance when—
* Time is limited.
* Distance to reconnaissance objective requires mounted movement.
* Stealth and security are not primary concerns.
* Detailed information is not required, or the mounted method affords the same scope as the
dismounted method.
* Environmental conditions permit this type of reconnaissance. (For example, the terrain is
relatively flat and dry and tracked and wheeled vehicles can traverse with little difficulty.)
* Enemy location is known.
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
12-85. Manned and unmanned aircraft system organizations are specifically equipped, organized, and
trained to conduct reconnaissance. These capabilities are a key component of BCTs and above echelons
information collection activities. Both UAS and manned aircraft possess the capability to operate
independently or in conjunction with ground reconnaissance elements.
12-86. Implementing airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) is a key requirement for the effective
integration of aerial reconnaissance into all operations. At the BCT level and above units must ensure ACMs
are planned and included in their unit airspace plans. |
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Manned Aerial Reconnaissance
12-87. Manned aerial reconnaissance units are specifically equipped, trained, and organized to conduct
zone, area, and route reconnaissance. If properly task-organized they are capable of executing a
reconnaissance in force. Both aviation formations are organized and trained to conduct reconnaissance in
support of the division’s maneuver plan. Aviation units employed at the troop and squadron levels,
particularly the air cavalry squadron, can conduct reconnaissance at distance (up to 100 km beyond the
FLOT), across restrictive terrain, and at a high tempo (weather permitting). Aviation units can insert
surveillance teams at, or near, observation posts. Aircrews can observe and provide security on station for
extended times using rotation techniques if they have detailed requirements in advance. Alternatively,
aviation units may be task-organized with ground reconnaissance assets to evaluate routes and obstacles and
classify bridges. Units use aerial reconnaissance to cue other reconnaissance methods or sensors to specific
areas increasing the overall information collection capability. (See FM 3-04 for more information on Army
aviation and reconnaissance).
Unmanned Aircraft System Aerial Reconnaissance
12-88. UAS are best suited to execute route, zone, and area reconnaissance. UAS offer numerous
advantages to commanders including the ability to—
* Observe areas and objectives where terrain or a threat can hinder ground or manned aerial
reconnaissance.
* Operate at extended distances or extended durations, or both.
* Maximize standoff distance to retain the element of surprise and increase force security.
12-89. When employing UAS units must have procedures to execute a battle handover between a UAS and
other reconnaissance assets. This could include a reconnaissance handover to another UAS platform, manned
aircraft, or ground reconnaissance asset. Furthermore, units must have procedures in place in the event of a
loss of data link between the UAS and its operators.
RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE
12-90. Reconnaissance by fire is a reconnaissance technique in which a unit fires on a suspected enemy
position. This technique is appropriate when time is critical and stealthy maneuver to develop the situation
further is not possible. The fires may be either direct, indirect, or a combination of both to cause the enemy
forces to disclose their presence by movement or return fire. The advantage of indirect fire is that it does not
give away friendly locations and usually causes enemy forces to displace from the impact area. However,
reconnaissance by fire may not cause a seasoned or prepared enemy force to react.
RECONNAISSANCE UNDER LIMITED-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS
12-91. Battlefield obscuration, fog, rain, and snow reduce visibility. Generally, reconnaissance during
limited visibility takes more time than during periods of normal visibility. However, limited-visibility
conditions provide better stealth and enhance the survivability of reconnaissance assets. Units frequently
employ dismounted reconnaissance patrols at night. These patrols use light amplification devices, thermal
observation devices, and electronic surveillance devices to compensate for reduced visibility conditions.
12-92. Mounted reconnaissance normally focuses on road networks during limited-visibility conditions. An
enemy force can detect engine and track noises of friendly mounted reconnaissance elements at considerable
distances at night. This makes mounted reconnaissance elements susceptible to ambush. Strict noise and light
discipline, along with masking sounds, such as artillery fires, help mounted reconnaissance forces avoid
compromise or ambush.
12-93. High winds, extreme temperature, loose topsoil, or sand may adversely affect aerial reconnaissance.
Aerial reconnaissance units plan their missions in much the same way as ground units. They use the same
type of operations graphic control measures and consider the same critical tasks. Aerial reconnaissance units
organize aviation assets to accomplish missions by considering the same IPB aspects as ground forces.
Commanders focus on air hazards to navigation and anticipated enemy air defense capabilities. (See ATP 2-
01.3 for more information on the effects of weather and atmospheric conditions.) |
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RECUPERATION AND RECONSTITUTION OF RECONNAISSANCE
ASSETS
12-94. Units must plan for the recuperation and reconstitution of reconnaissance forces. The relieving unit
or units must be capable of accomplishing the reconnaissance objective assigned. Relieving units must
complete a deliberate relief in place to ensure continuous reconnaissance while maintaining contact with the
enemy force. When a commander employs small units continuously for extended periods, they can become
ineffective. When this occurs, restoring these units to acceptable levels of effectiveness may require either
recuperation or reconstitution. Recuperation—a short break for rest, resupply, and maintenance—is often
sufficient to return units to effectiveness. Units can extend these recuperation periods to conduct refresher
training, new equipment training, or any required specialized training for the next mission.
12-95. Reconnaissance units and systems are vulnerable to detection, engagement, and destruction by
enemy forces. Commanders determine whether to reconstitute, by either regenerating or reorganizing these
units, when this occurs and they can no longer perform their primary missions.
12-96. Regenerating a unit requires significant resources. The organization two echelons above the unit
being regenerated directs the regeneration procedure and coordinates for the necessary personnel, equipment,
and supplies from the appropriate theater sustainment command supporting organization if that headquarters
lacks organic, assigned, or attached sustainment assets. For example, a BCT can regenerate one of its cavalry
troops. In the regeneration process, the BCT could use a combination of weapon system replacement
operations, battle damage assessment and repair, normal replacement operations, and medical returnees to
provide the needed resources. Units could use these resources, combined with training, to regenerate the
degraded troop’s combat power. Alternatively, they could designate one of their maneuver companies to
perform cavalry troop functions. |
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Security Operations
This chapter addresses those considerations unique to the performance of security
operations. General offensive and defensive considerations discussed previously in this
manual continue to apply to security operations. This chapter addresses the general
security considerations and types of security operations.
GENERAL SECURITY OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS
13-1. Security operations are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate
warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within
which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their
protected forces (ADP 3-90). They prevent surprise, reduce uncertainty, and provide early warning of enemy
activities. Security operations are a dynamic effort that anticipates and thwarts enemy collection efforts.
When successful, security operations allow the force to maintain the initiative.
13-2. Security operations are not to be confused with the more general term of security. Security is measures
taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may,
impair its effectiveness (JP 3-10). Security includes a wide range of activities such as preventing unauthorized
access into secure areas or establishing perimeter security around an operating base. Security is inherent in
all operations and is always the first priority of work. Furthermore, security is the responsibility of every
Soldier and unit whereas security operations are distinct missions.
13-3. The main difference between the performance of security operations and reconnaissance operations is
that security operations orient on the force, area, or facility, while reconnaissance operations orient on enemy
and terrain. Security operations are supporting efforts. As a supporting effort, economy of force is often a
condition associated with the performance of security operations. Security operations are essential for
preserving friendly forces combat power. Paragraphs 13-4 through 13-9 include general security
considerations that are applicable to all security operations and units.
LOCAL SECURITY
13-4. Local security is the low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the
enemy. All units are responsible for their own local security and responding to Level I threats. Local security
is not an operation of its own. It includes any local measure taken by units that protect against enemy actions.
It involves avoiding enemy detection or deceiving the enemy about friendly positions and intention. Local
security provides immediate protection to friendly forces and is typically performed by a unit for self-
protection, but it may also be provided by another unit when the security requirements are greater than the
unit security capabilities. Local security may include countermobility and survivability activities as well as
the use of active and passive measures to provide local security.
OBSERVATION POSTS
13-5. An observation post is a position from which observations are made or fires are directed and
adjusted. All observation posts should possess appropriate communications. While aerial observers and
sensor systems are extremely useful, those systems do not constitute aerial observation posts. The security
force unit determines tentative initial observation post locations along or behind the screen line to ensure
effective surveillance of their sectors of observation and designated NAIs. The unit or asset that occupies
each observation post may shift its exact location to achieve the commander’s intent. Units may place more
than one observation post along high-speed avenues of approach to allow the tracking of an enemy contact |
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from one observation post to another, which allows the maintaining of the enemy contact without requiring
security forces to displace. Security force commanders task subordinate units to perform reconnaissance and
combat patrols to cover gaps between observation posts. Units place restrictive FSCMs around observation
post locations to prevent fratricide.
13-6. Observation posts may be either mounted or dismounted. Mounted observation posts can use their
vehicular optics, weapons systems, and tactical mobility to displace rapidly when necessary. However, an
enemy force can detect them more readily than dismounted observation posts. Dismounted observation posts
provide maximum stealth but lack the speed of displacement, optics, and weapons of mounted ones. It takes
a minimum of two Soldiers to establish an observation post, and then they can only operate effectively for
no more than 12 hours. Observation posts manned for more than 12 hours require a minimum of an infantry
squad or scout section to ensure continuous operation. The screening force patrols dead maneuver space and
the area between observation posts, conducts resupply operations, and rests or sustains its personnel. In
addition, under limited-visibility conditions, units can establish observation posts as listening posts to take
advantage of the increased auditory acuteness that occurs when Soldier vision is degraded.
COMBAT OUTPOSTS
13-7. A combat outpost is a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat
operations. Using combat outposts is a technique for employing security forces in restrictive terrain that
precludes mounted security forces from covering the area. Units also use combat outposts when enemy forces
infiltrating into and through the security area could overrun smaller observation posts. They use a combat
outpost to extend the depth of the security area, to keep friendly forward observation posts in place until they
can observe the enemy force’s main body, or to secure friendly forward observation posts that enemy forces
might encircle. Both mounted and dismounted forces can employ combat outposts.
13-8. While the mission variables determine the size, location, and number of combat outposts a unit
establishes, a reinforced platoon typically occupies each combat outpost. A combat outpost requires enough
resources to accomplish its missions, but it should not seriously deplete the strength of the main body. It is
usually located far enough forward of the protected force to preclude enemy ground reconnaissance elements
from observing the actions of the protected force.
13-9. Units organize the combat outpost to provide an all-around defense to withstand a superior enemy
force. When the enemy force has significant armored capability, commanders may give combat outposts
more antitank weapons. Forces operating combat outposts can conduct aggressive patrolling, engage and
destroy enemy reconnaissance elements, and engage the enemy main body before their extraction. Units plan
to extract friendly forces from their outposts before enemy forces overrun them.
SECURITY OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS
13-10. Commanders designate a security force when using any of the types of security operations. The
protected force may not always be a military force; it can also be a civilian population, civil institutions, and
civilian infrastructure in the unit’s assigned area. FM 3-90 describes security operations that focus on
securing a force. Units may perform security operations to the front, flanks, or rear of their main body. All
maneuver forces are capable of conducting security operations. To obtain proficiency in security operations,
units need habitual support relationships with attachments and established SOPs. Commanders ensure that
subordinate units perform the associated security tasks in support of their security operation.
13-11. In addition to the operational and mission variables, there are several general considerations when
performing security operations. These apply to all security operations, but they are most applicable to the
performance of screen, guard, and cover operations. These additional considerations include—
* Security fundamentals.
* Commander’s security guidance.
* Security forces size.
* Location and orientation of the security forces.
* Time the security force must be established.
* Criteria for ending the security mission. |
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* Augmentation of security forces.
* Special requirements or constraints.
* Fires planning.
* Integration of ground and Army aviation.
* Engineer planning
* Sustainment.
* Positioning of command posts and combat trains.
* Reporting.
These considerations are in addition to the planning considerations applicable to other types of operations
discussed in this publication.
SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS
13-12. Successful security operations depend on properly applying the five fundamentals:
* Provide early and accurate warning.
* Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
* Orient of the protected force, area, or facility to be secured.
* Perform continuous reconnaissance.
* Maintain enemy contact.
Provide Early and Accurate Warning
13-13. The security force provides early warning by detecting enemy forces quickly and reporting
information accurately to the main body. The security force operates at varying distances from the main body
based on the mission variables. At a minimum, it operates far enough from the main body to prevent enemy
ground forces from observing or engaging the main body with direct fires. The earlier the security force
detects enemy forces, the more time the main body has to assess the changing situation and react.
Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space
13-14. Each security force provides its main body with enough reaction time and maneuver space to respond
effectively to likely enemy actions by operating at a distance from the main body and by offering resistance
to approaching enemy forces. Units determine the amount of time and space required to respond to
information provided by their IPB process and the time their main bodies require to react to enemy COAs.
Security forces operating at a distance from their main bodies offer more time and space to their main bodies
to react to enemy forces. Each security force attempts to hinder an enemy force’s advance by acting within
its capabilities and mission constraints.
Orient on the Force, Area, of Facility to be Secured
13-15. Security forces focus all their actions on protecting and providing early warning to force, area, or
facility they are securing. They operate between the force, area, or facility and known or suspected enemy
units. If the force they are securing moves, security forces move moves and orients on their movement.
Security force units need to know the moving forces’ scheme of maneuver to keep their security force
between these main bodies and approaching enemy forces. The value of terrain occupied by security forces
hinges on the degree of resistance those security forces can provide to their respective main bodies from that
terrain.
Perform Continuous Reconnaissance
13-16. Security forces aggressively and continuously seek out enemy forces and reconnoiter key terrain
within their assigned areas. They perform area or zone reconnaissance to detect enemy movement or enemy
preparations for action and to learn as much as possible about the terrain. In stability-focused operations,
terrain information includes a larger focus on the civilian population. The ultimate goal of security forces is
to determine the enemy force’s COA and assist their main bodies to counter it. Terrain information focuses |
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on terrain advantages or disadvantages to both the enemy and friendly forces for the performance of offensive
or defensive operations. Stationary security forces use combinations of observation posts, aviation elements,
patrols, and information collection assets to perform reconnaissance. Moving security forces perform area,
route, or zone reconnaissance as well as using observation posts to detect enemy movements and
preparations.
Maintain Enemy Contact
13-17. Once security forces make enemy contact, they do not break contact unless specifically directed by
their main body commander. However, the first security asset that makes contact does not have to maintain
contact if the entire security force maintains contact with the enemy force. The security force ensures that
their subordinate security assets handover contact with the enemy force from one asset to another. Security
forces continuously collect information on the enemy force’s activities to assist their main body in
determining potential and actual enemy COAs, thus preventing those enemy forces from surprising their
main bodies. Maintaining continuous visual contact allows security forces freedom of maneuver and
flexibility to use direct or indirect fires on enemy forces. These considerations require security forces to have
depth in space and time to maneuver.
COMMANDER’S SECURITY GUIDANCE
13-18. During security operations, it is important for the ground elements conducting security operations to
understand the commander’s intent in a clear and concise manner so that they can accomplish the stated
objectives within the required timeframe. The commander provides the guidance through dialogue
throughout mission planning and the final operation order. The security guidance has three sections: focus,
duration, and engagement and disengagement criteria. Paragraphs 13-19 through 13-22 outline the contents
of the commander’s security guidance. (See FM 3-98 for more information on commander’s security
guidance.)
Focus
13-19. Commanders focus their forces by identifying a security objective in support of the force, area, or
facility being protected. Security objective is the most important entity to protect during that specific
security effort. Commanders and leaders of units conducting security operations should anticipate the focus
to change throughout the phases in an operation as the security objective may change to enable the execution
of current and future operations. A security objective can range from creating time to allow forces to establish
a defense to forcing an enemy force to travel down an avenue of approach. Furthermore, units use their
security objective to guide them in setting priorities when they lack time to complete all the tasks associated
with performing a specific type of security operation. Units conducting security operations need to establish,
clarify, and prioritize security tasks that enable the security objective to remain protected.
Duration
13-20. The second section of a commander’s security guidance covers duration. A duration can be either
short or long. Short duration security operations will last no longer than 12 hours. Units usually use these
security operations to take advantage of time available and to maximize the massing of reconnaissance assets
through observation posts and other observing capabilities. Long duration security operations will last 12
hours or longer. The number of observation posts and capabilities will be less than short duration due to the
number of personnel and support needed to continuously enable the operation. The smaller number of
observation posts is due to implementing a rest cycle to ensure that dismounted Soldiers in the observation
posts stay focused when in position.
Engagement and Disengagement Criteria
13-21. Commanders must clearly define the size or type of enemy force they want their subordinate
elements to engage or avoid. The commander ensures that subordinate leaders understand this in order to
avoid becoming decisively engaged which prevents the unit from continuing security operations. |
3-90 | 273 | Security Operations
13-22. Just like engagement criteria, it is critical for the commander to clearly state when the subordinate
elements must break contact with enemy forces to prevent becoming decisively engaged and more
importantly retain the ability to secure the identified protected objective. During security operations these
criteria are often tied to planned transitions that are based on conditions for the security force to break contact
with the enemy or the anticipated duration of the security operation.
Security Force Size
13-23. Main body commanders designate the size of the security force and its mission. This designation
determines the limits of the security forces’ responsibilities. Table 13-1 shows typical sizes of security forces
at various echelons in relation to their missions. The limited capabilities of most maneuver platoons prohibit
them from having a mission separate from their parent company. Scout platoons are the exception to this
rule.
Table 13-1. Typical size of security forces for a given mission and echelon
Security mission
Echelon Flank or rear
Screen Advance guard Cover
guard
Battalion task Scout platoon Company team
force
Brigade combat Company team or Battalion task Company team or Reinforced
team (BCT) cavalry squadron force or reinforced cavalry squadron combined arms
cavalry squadron battalion, battalion
task force or
reinforced cavalry
squadron
Division Cavalry squadron, Reinforced cavalry Reinforced cavalry Reinforced BCT
combined arms squadron or BCT squadron,
battalion, or combined arms
battalion task force battalion, or
battalion task force
Corps Combat aviation Division, armored Division, armored Reinforced
brigade, combined BCT, Stryker BCT BCT, Stryker BCT, division or
arms battalion, combined arms armored BCT
battalion task force battalion, battalion
task force
Echelons above Combat aviation Reinforced Combat aviation Reinforced
corps (joint force brigade, armored division or corps brigade, armored division or corps
land component or BCT, Stryker BCT BCT, or Stryker
numbered Army) BCT
LOCATION AND ORIENTATION OF THE SECURITY AREA
13-24. Main body units determine the location, orientation, and depth of the security area where their
security forces operate. Units identify avenues of approach and NAIs. Depth in the security area provides the
main body with time to react to approaching enemy. Occupying a deep security area allows the security force
to destroy enemy reconnaissance assets without compromising critical observation posts or positions. It also
prevents enemy forces from penetrating the security area and prevents gaps from occurring when observation
posts or units displace or are lost. Security forces cover less depth in a wide area because they have fewer
resources to position in depth. Very shallow security areas may require units to resource their security forces
to perform guard operations to provide more reaction time.
13-25. Security force units conduct a detailed analysis of the terrain in the security area. They establish the
initial dispositions of their security forces (usually a screen line) as far forward as possible on terrain that
provides good observation of avenues of approach. Next, they assign clear responsibility for identified
avenues of approach and designated NAIs. When conducting screen or guard operations, their initial screen
lines are within supporting range of their main bodies yet provide the desired amount of early warning. |
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TIME THE SECURITY FORCE MUST BE ESTABLISHED
13-26. Main body units determine when to establish their security forces. They base their decision on the
actions of the main body and enemy forces. They allow enough time for their security force to move and
occupy their security areas to prevent enemy forces from penetrating those security areas undetected. The
mission variables influence how these security forces deploy and occupy their positions. Units position their
security forces so they can continue performing security tasks after completing their initial mission. This
frequently occurs when a reconnaissance mission halts at a designated phase line.
CRITERIA FOR ENDING THE SECURITY MISSION
13-27. Security missions are usually time or event driven and determined by the security force’s higher
headquarters. The commander gives the unit the necessary details through the commander’s security
guidance. The criteria for ending a security mission can be an action by the main body (such as completing
a specific mission), a fixed time (for example, not allowing an enemy force to penetrate a PL for two hours),
or criteria based on the enemy force (such as its size). Security force units normally require the permission
of their main body commanders to withdraw behind their rear boundaries to terminate their security missions.
AUGMENTATION OF SECURITY FORCES
13-28. The assignment of security areas larger than the areas of influence of these security forces’ organic
weapons requires the augmentation of those forces’ organic combat power. Main body units are responsible
for reinforcing their security forces in this case. They place additional maneuver and functional and
multifunctional support assets under the operational control or in support of their security force. Units
commonly attach engineers, chemical, civil affairs, or EMS reconnaissance elements to their security forces
at the company or troop level. Additionally, any unique security mission requirements may require assets not
organic to these security forces.
13-29. Information collection assets greatly enhance the performance of security tasks. These assets
conduct rapid surveillance of large areas to detect enemy presence. Data from remote sensors, UAS sensors,
unattended ground sensors, signals intelligence systems, and downlinks from national assets can expand the
areas under surveillance and cue security forces. Rotary-wing aircraft detect and report enemy forces at
extended ranges with thermal imaging and other advanced detection equipment. This permits security force
units to concentrate their forces on likely enemy avenues of approach, NAIs, targeted areas of interest, and
restrictive terrain that degrades sensor performance. They employ their information collection assets to detect
enemy force movements. This gains time to reposition their security forces and mass other assets to counter
enemy actions. Main body units request higher echelon support if their security force intelligence assets
cannot provide sufficient advance warning.
SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS OR CONSTRAINTS
13-30. Main body commanders may impose special requirements or constraints, including engagement,
disengagement, and bypass criteria (located in the commander’s security guidance). They may order their
security forces to avoid decisive engagements or avoid falling below a certain combat strength. Units may
be willing to accept a lesser degree of security, which results from either the loss of more terrain or reduced
preparation time by the main body, to preserve their security forces for later use. The opposite is also true,
main body commanders may be willing to risk their security force becoming decisively engaged to create
time for the main body.
FIRES PLANNING
13-31. Main body units request nonlethal effects and position fire support assets to support screen and guard
forces. They allocate additional artillery to support covering forces. If they assign their security forces wide
assigned areas, units may have to position fire support assts and other nonlethal capabilities to provide
effective coverage of only the most likely enemy avenues of approach. This is particularly important for a
screen because often the screening force relies on indirect fire to delay or disrupt enemy forces. Providing
adequate indirect fire support to their security forces may require main body units to position their artillery
systems well forward in the main body formation. |
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INTEGRATION OF GROUND AND ARMY AVIATION OPERATIONS
13-32. Integrating ground and Army aviation operations is critical to the successful performance of security
tasks. Aviation units and systems, including rotary-, fixed-wing, and UAS can conduct reconnaissance of the
security area while the ground element of the security force moves forward. They can perform these tasks:
* Screen beyond the location of the security force (front, flank, or rear).
* Conduct reconnaissance of areas between ground maneuver units.
* Assist in maintaining contact between the security force and the main body.
* Assist in clearing areas between flank security elements and their main body during the
performance of moving flank security tasks.
* Assist in disengaging security forces, especially when conducting battle handover and passage of
lines with their main bodies.
* Surveilling terrain that is hard to reach or would require too much time to cover with ground
reconnaissance assets.
ENGINEER PLANNING
13-33. Countermobility plays a critical role in providing security. Security forces can maintain a mobility
advantage over enemy forces by employing properly integrated obstacles. In the defense, units may initially
mass engineer support in their security area and then shift support to their MBAs once their MBA units are
prepared to begin developing engagement areas. They also enhance security force mobility by identifying
alternate routes that allow them to reposition and task-organize engineers to provide breaching capabilities.
Main body units determine the risk of prioritizing their countermobility efforts in their security areas rather
than in their MBAs. In the offense, units can employ situational obstacles (covered by fire) on the flanks of
an advancing force to provide additional security.
SUSTAINMENT
13-34. Main body staffs embed their security force sustainment requirements in the operation order and
annexes. A key component in security force sustainment is developing, maintaining, and using SOPs.
Sustainment requirements ensure that staffs include their security force requirements in their sustainment
rehearsals.
13-35. Security force units designate an individual or element in their security force who is responsible for
sustaining their force. They also designate individuals and elements who coordinate for sustainment support.
This is normally a senior noncommissioned officer in platoons and companies (or troops) assigned to perform
security tasks. For example, the platoon sergeant of a scout platoon establishing a flank screen for a battalion
task force may have to coordinate with the first sergeant of the adjacent company team to ensure sustainment
of the scout platoon. Likewise, the first sergeant or executive officer of a cavalry troop accomplishing a
screening mission away from the rest of the cavalry squadron may coordinate directly with the BCT logistics
staff officer or the forward support company of the maneuver battalion closest to the troop’s assigned area
and the brigade support battalion staff for resupply and medical treatment. This individual requires access to
the appropriate communications networks to coordinate logistics support and medical evacuation.
13-36. The individual responsible for sustaining the security force coordinates with the appropriate
supporting sustainment points of contact as soon as possible after receiving the mission warning order. The
security force commander gives the exact sustainment requirements for the security force—including any
specialized items of supply required by the mission, such as cratering charges—to the supporting sustainment
organization. Security force units ensure that the supporting sustainment organization establishes
communication links with the security force and receives a copy of the supported security force’s sustainment
overlay or concept of sustainment.
13-37. Units place special attention on treating and evacuating casualties for security forces operating away
from normal medical support because of time, terrain, or distance factors, or a need for the security force to
remain undetected by enemy forces. For this reason, the security force should include as many Soldiers
trained as combat lifesavers as possible. The more combat lifesavers in the security force, the more prepared |
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it is for casualties. Rehearsals at all levels within the security force are also paramount to prepare for potential
casualties.
POSITIONING OF SECURITY FORCE COMMAND POST AND COMBAT TRAINS
13-38. Security force commanders move to where they can best control the operation. This is often where
they can observe the most dangerous enemy avenue of approach. Security force units position their command
post to provide continuous control and reporting during initial movements. They position the security force’s
combat trains behind masking terrain, but the combat trains remain close enough to the combat elements of
the security force to provide rapid response. Units position the combat trains along routes that provide good
mobility laterally and in depth.
REPORTING
13-39. Security forces report enemy force activities to their main bodies. The main body headquarters is
responsible for disseminating that information to other affected friendly forces. Main body units ensure their
security forces are provided the current intelligence assessment and combat information obtained by their
main bodies. This supplements their security forces’ information collection capabilities. By continuously
exchanging information, security force units and main body units have time to choose suitable COAs. Digital
systems greatly assist units in maintaining situational understanding to create a common operational picture.
MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITY MISSIONS
13-40. Security forces use different movement techniques between stationary and moving security missions
based on the operational and mission variables and the commander’s security guidance. These techniques are
divided into those used during stationary missions and those used during moving missions.
Movement into Security Areas for Stationary Security Missions
13-41. When deploying into the security area, the security force addresses two competing requirements: to
establish the security area quickly to meet mission requirements and to provide the necessary level of security
for itself. The security force moves into the security area using one of three methods: tactical movement,
movement to contact, or zone reconnaissance.
13-42. The first technique of deploying is a tactical movement from the rear boundary of the security area
to the initial positions. This method is the fastest but least secure. The security force moves to a release point
on the rear boundary. From the release point, subordinate elements deploy to occupy initial positions, moving
by the quickest means possible. This method is appropriate when the security force unit does not expect
enemy contact, time is critical, or previous zone reconnaissance of the security area conducted by aviation
units or aerial assets found no enemy in the security area.
13-43. In the second technique, the security force conducts a movement to contact from a LD (usually the
rear boundary of the security area) to the initial positions. This method is slower than a tactical road march
but more secure. It is appropriate when enemy contact is likely, time is limited, the situation does not require
detailed reconnaissance of the terrain, or aviation elements or other assets conducting zone reconnaissance
forward of the ground element detect enemy forces in the security area.
13-44. The third technique for moving to the initial position is for the security force to conduct a zone
reconnaissance from the security area’s rear boundary to its initial security line positions or the forward limit
of the security area. This is the most secure method. Given adequate time, this method is preferred because
it allows the security force to clear the security area and become familiar with the terrain that it may have to
defend. The security force reconnoiters potential subsequent positions and fire support system firing positions
as it moves to its initial positions. A zone reconnaissance is appropriate when time is available and
information about enemy forces or terrain is unknown. While this technique provides information of tactical
value on the enemy forces and terrain in the area, it also consumes time. Using aerial reconnaissance forward
of the ground units increases the speed and security of the movement. |
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Movement During Moving Flank Security Missions
13-45. There are three techniques of occupying and moving in a flank security area for moving security
missions. These techniques are based on how the security force crosses the LD:
* Separately from the main body and deploys to perform the mission.
* Separately from main body, lead elements conduct a movement to contact.
* With the main body and conducts a zone reconnaissance out to the limit of the security area.
13-46. Commanders should not require the security force to make its own penetration when it faces prepared
enemy defenses. This may prevent or significantly delay the security force from assuming its duties. They
often combine the three techniques described in paragraphs 13-47 through 13-49.
Separately from the Main Body and Deploys to Perform the Mission
13-47. In the first technique, the security force crosses the LD separately from the main body and deploys
to execute the mission. The security force then conducts a tactical movement parallel to the main body and
drops off observation posts or occupies BPs along the flank of the main body. This technique keeps the two
forces from interfering with each other during deployment. When another force penetrates the line of contact
and the main body is not in contact with the enemy force and moves quickly, it is appropriate that the LD is
uncontested, and outputs from the IPB process indicate unlikely enemy contact. It is the fastest but least
secure technique. Figure 13-1 depicts this technique.
Figure 13-1. Example of the security force crossing LD separately to deploy and establish a
flank screen
Separately from the Main Body and Lead Elements Conduct a Movement to Contact
13-48. Figure 13-2 on page 13-10 illustrates a second technique. The security force crosses the LD
separately from the main body, and its lead elements conduct a movement to contact. Follow-on elements
occupy positions as they reach them. This technique is appropriate when the main body is moving slower |
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than in the first method, the LD is uncontested, and the IPB process estimates possible enemy contact. It is
slower than the previous technique but provides better security.
Figure 13-2. Example of the security force crossing separately and the lead element
conducting a movement to contact
With the Main Body and Conducts a Zone Reconnaissance out to the Limit of the Security Area
13-49. Finally, in the third technique, the security force crosses the LD with the main body and conducts a
zone reconnaissance out to the far limit of the security area. This technique is appropriate when the LD is
also the line of contact, the main body makes its own penetration of the enemy defenses along the line of
contact, the main body is moving slowly, and leaders do not clearly understand the enemy situation. The
security force may follow the lead element of the main body through the gap and deploy when the situation
permits. This technique provides increased security for both the security force and the main body; it is also
the most time consuming. Figure 13-3 depicts this third technique. |
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Figure 13-3. Example of the security force crossing with the main body and conducting a zone
reconnaissance
TYPES OF SECURITY OPERATIONS
13-50. Commanders assign security missions based on the degree of security desired and the amount of
combat power required. The four types of security operations and their associated methods and formations
are—
* Screen.
Stationary.
Moving (flank and rear).
* Guard.
Advance guard (stationary and moving).
Flank guard (stationary and moving).
Rear guard.
* Cover.
Offensive cover (advance and flank).
Defensive cover (front, flank, and rear).
* Area security.
Site security.
Line of communication and route security.
Convoy security.
Response force operations.
Area damage control. |
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13-51. The four types of security operations provide increasing levels of security for the main body.
However, more combat power in the security force means less for the main body. Screen operations provide
early warning to the main body. Guard operations prevent enemy observation and direct fire on the main
body. Cover operations protect the main body from enemy observation and effective direct fire. Area security
protects friendly installations, routes, units, and facilities within a prescribed area. All types of security
operations provide protection and early warning to the protected forces, which provides reaction time and
maneuver space to the commander preserving freedom of action.
13-52. The screen, guard, and cover operations share many common control measures, starting with
boundaries defining the security area. The force’s main body establishes the security area. For a security
force operating to the front of the main body, the lateral boundaries of the security area are normally an
extension of the lateral boundaries of the main body. The security force’s rear boundary is normally the battle
handover line.
13-53. Commanders depict the performance of security operations on overlays using a lightning bolt on
either side of the symbol representing the unit performing the security operations. They are labeled with the
letter S, G, or C to denote screen, guard, or cover. The end of the lightning bolt has arrowheads that touch
the designated control measures, which define the left and right limits of the security operation. Figure 13-4
depicts guard and screen control measures for the security forces performing those operations.
Figure 13-4. Example security operations control measures
13-54. The main body or the security force may designate additional PLs to control the operation. These
PLs may serve as subsequent screen or delay lines. Each security force element reports to the commander
when crossing PLs or occupying screen or delay lines. Displacement to these subsequent PLs is event driven
(enemy or friendly) or time driven. The approach of an enemy force, relief of a friendly unit, or movement |
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of the protected force dictates the movement of security forces. Security force commanders normally assign
additional lateral boundaries in their security areas to delineate assigned areas for subordinate units.
13-55. Units use checkpoints and NAIs to coordinate and synchronize movement and collection. They use
contact points to facilitate coordination with flank units during front and rear security missions or between
elements of a security force in the security area. Units conducting flank security for a moving force physically
contact their main bodies at contact points. Security force units establish observation posts or coordinate for
aerial assets to ensure coverage of specific NAIs or avenues of approach as necessary.
Note. For the descriptions below, the security force’s security objective is their higher
headquarters’ main body.
SCREEN
13-56. Screen is a type of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force
(ADP 3-90). Screens provide less protection than guards or covers. Screen missions are defensive in nature
and accomplished by establishing a series of observation posts and patrols to ensure observation of the
assigned sector. The screen force gains and maintains enemy contact consistent with the fundamentals and
destroys or repels enemy reconnaissance units by conducting counterreconnaissance. Counterreconnaissance
is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a unit to counter enemy reconnaissance and
surveillance efforts. A unit performing a screen observes, identifies, and reports enemy actions. Generally, a
screening force engages and destroys enemy reconnaissance elements within its capabilities—augmented by
indirect fires—but otherwise fights only in self-defense. The screen has the minimum combat power
necessary to provide early warning and allows commanders to retain the bulk of the main body’s combat
power for commitment at the decisive place and time. A screen provides the least amount of protection of
any security mission; it does not have the combat power to develop the situation.
13-57. A screen is appropriate to cover gaps between forces, exposed flanks, or the rear of stationary and
moving forces. Units can place a screen in front of a stationary formation. Designed to provide minimum
security with minimum forces, a screen is usually an economy of force operation. Units assign and resource
a guard or cover mission instead of a screen if they expect significant enemy forces or they require a
significant amount of time and space to provide the required degree of protection. The security element
forward of a moving force conducts a guard or cover because a moving screen lacks the combat power to
defeat or contain the lead elements of an enemy force.
13-58. A security force normally conducts a screen by establishing a series of observation posts and patrols
to ensure adequate surveillance of the assigned area. Units use reconnaissance patrols (mounted, dismounted,
and aerial), relocate observation posts, and employ technical assets to ensure continuous and overlapping
surveillance. They also employ terrain data-base analytical support systems to ensure the integration of
friendly information collection assets to provide necessary coverage.
Screen Tasks
13-59. Unless the commander orders otherwise, a security force conducting a screen performs these tasks
within the limits of its capabilities:
* Detect and report all enemy elements attempting to pass through the screen, both ground and
aerial, and provide the protected force commander early warning of enemy activities.
* Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy, defeat, or disrupt all enemy reconnaissance elements
within capabilities and according to engagement criteria. Allow no enemy ground element to pass
through the screen undetected and unreported.
* Maintain contact with the protected force and other forces operating on its flank.
* Maintain contact with enemy forces and report activity in the assigned area.
* Maintain continuous observation of all avenues of approach that affect the main body’s mission.
* Locate and identify the lead elements that indicate the enemy’s main attack, as prescribed in the
enemy’s order of battle based on the IPB (when facing an echeloned enemy force). |
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* While displacing, determine the direction of enemy movement, maintain contact, and report threat
activities.
13-60. A unit can normally screen an avenue of approach two echelons larger than itself, such as a battalion
scout platoon screening a battalion-sized avenue of approach or a cavalry troop screening a brigade-sized
avenue of approach. Security force units inform their higher echelon commanders of shortfalls when their
forces lack the time or other resources to complete all screen operations. They request guidance on which
tasks they must complete and their priority. After initiating the screen, if security force units determine their
forces cannot complete all assigned tasks—such as maintain continuous observation of all avenues of
approach that affect the main body’s mission—they inform their higher echelon commanders and await
further instructions while the unit continues to screen to the best of their ability.
Organization of Forces
13-61. A screen normally requires the subordinate elements of the security force to deploy abreast. A screen
force normally organizes itself into a number of observation posts determined by the number of avenues of
approach into the main body and any additional NAIs the security force must cover, as specified by the main
force commander. The screening force may retain a small reserve to extract endangered observation posts.
Screen Control Measures
13-62. The control measures necessary to conduct a screen include phase lines, observation posts, named
areas of interest, handover lines, and contact points. Figure 13-5 depicts example screen control measures.
Figure 13-5. Control measures used in a screen mission
Executing a Stationary Screen
13-63. Screening forces establish observation posts with overlapping fields of observation when
establishing screens. Security force units adjust the locations of subordinate screening elements to take |
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advantage of established links with higher echelon sensors and collection assets. Patrols reconnoiter areas
that observation posts cannot observe. The force retains a small reserve, if possible. The screening force
establishes observation posts in depth on high-speed avenues of approach if forces are available and the depth
of the security area allows. Screening force units plan routes between their initial and subsequent screen lines
to facilitate rapid occupation of these subsequent screen lines. They deploy their assets in depth in positions
where those assets can react to contingencies that develop during the screen mission. They take advantage of
surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation equipment and information provided by higher level
systems to expand the area and quality of security provided.
13-64. Established observation posts employ cover and concealment to remain undetected. They report the
presence of enemy elements. Prompt, accurate reporting of enemy force locations is essential to keep enemy
forces from overrunning friendly observation posts. Units can reposition observation posts to keep contact
with enemy forces. Observation posts employ fire support channels to request and control indirect fires to
engage detected enemy forces. This helps screening observation posts avoid detection and prevents enemy
forces from penetrating the screen line. Observation posts may engage enemy reconnaissance assets with
their direct fire systems if indirect fires cannot destroy those enemy reconnaissance assets. Observation posts
also attempt to slow the movement of other enemy elements, primarily using indirect fires and close air
support.
13-65. Observation posts report and request to move to the next screen line as enemy pressure threatens
their security. Commanders establish criteria based on certain enemy or friendly actions that allow their
screening forces to displace to subsequent screen lines. These criteria allow subordinates to use their initiative
when conducting operations. Screening forces emphasize rapid movement while maintaining contact with
enemy forces when displacing from one screen line to another. This ensures the rapid closing of any gaps in
observation that occurred during movement. Likewise, screening force command elements displace as
required to maintain control and avoid enemy detection and destruction. Screening forces repeat this
procedure as often as necessary.
13-66. Screening force commanders decide when to move from one screen to another. However, main body
commanders decide when the screening force can conduct either a reconnaissance handover with the next
echelon of reconnaissance or a battle handover with the main body.
Executing a Moving Screen
13-67. A screening force maintains a moving screen along the flanks and rear of the protected force, never
to the front of a moving formation. A screening force is not employed in front of a moving formation because
a screen does not prevent enemy forces from penetrating it and making contact with the protected force. Zone
reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force, and guard are missions given to units in front of a moving force.
The screen movement is keyed to time and distance factors associated with the main body’s movement. (See
figure 13-6 on page 13-16.) Responsibilities for a moving flank screen begin at the front of the main body’s
lead combat element and end at the rear of the protected force. They do not include front and rear security
forces. A force executes a moving screen in the same way it conducts a stationary screen, except for the
movement techniques.
13-68. The lead element of a moving screen performs three tasks. It maintains contact with the protected
force’s main body, reconnoiters the area between the main body and the security force’s routes of advance,
and reconnoiters the security force’s route. It performs these tasks by conducting a zone reconnaissance. |
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Figure 13-6. Moving flank screen
13-69. The screening force may use several methods to move the screen as the protected force moves.
Table 13-2 summarizes each method’s advantages and disadvantages.
Table 13-2. Screen movement methods
Method Characteristics Advantages Disadvantages
• Main body moves faster. • Very secure method. • Execution takes
• Conducted by platoon, • Maintains maximum time.
Alternate company, or troop. surveillance over the • Disrupts unit
bounds by
• Contact is possible. security area. integrity.
observation
posts • Conducted from rear to front.
• Main body moves faster. • Execution does not take • May leave
• Conducted by platoon, a great deal of time. temporary gaps in
Alternate company, or troop. • Maintains good coverage.
bounds by
units • Contact is possible. surveillance over the
security area.
• Conducted from rear to front.
• Maintains unit integrity.
• Main body moves slowly. • Most secure method. • Execution takes the
• Conducted by platoon, • Maintains maximum most time.
company, or troop. surveillance. • Unit is less secure
• Contact is possible. • Maintains unit integrity. when all elements
are moving
Successive • Conducted simultaneously or simultaneously.
bounds in succession.
• Simultaneous
• Unit should maintain an air
movement may
screen during ground
leave temporary
movement.
gaps. |
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Table 13-2. Screen movement methods (continued)
Method Characteristics Advantages Disadvantages
• Main body is moving • Observation posts • Least secure
relatively quickly. displace quickly. method.
• Performed as a route • Maintains unit integrity.
Continuous reconnaissance.
marching • Enemy contact is not likely.
• Unit should maintain an air
screen on the flank.
13-70. Units consider the mission variables when deciding which movement method to employ. Figures
13-7 below and 13-8 on page 13-18 illustrate four methods of controlling movement along a screen line.
These methods are—
* Alternate bounds by individual observation posts from the rear to the front. (Company-sized and
smaller units usually employ this method.)
* Alternate bounds by subordinate units from the rear to the front.
* Successive bounds by units along the screen line.
* Continuous marching along the route of advance.
Figure 13-7. Examples of alternate bound by OP and alternate bound by unit |
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Figure 13-8. Example of successive bound by unit and continuous marching methods of
displacement
Screening Operations During Limited Visibility
13-71. Limited visibility often affects the screening force’s ground and air observation. During limited
visibility, the screening force uses all available night and thermal observation devices and electronic
surveillance devices. Although the screening force can use technical information collection assets to offset
limited visibility, it should also adjust its techniques and procedures to the conditions. For example, screening
force units may adjust the number and location of observation posts in limited-visibility conditions. They can
establish more observation posts to cover avenues of approach that these conditions mask. They plan for
illumination and use it when necessary. Screening force units closely coordinate their combat and
reconnaissance patrols to prevent misidentification and friendly fire incidents. Noise and light discipline
prevents compromise of observation posts by enemy reconnaissance forces. Additional observation posts
along enemy avenues of approach can provide depth to facilitate the detection of enemy forces that eluded
forward security elements.
GUARD
13-72. Guard is a type of security operation conducted to protect the main body by fighting to gain time
while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADP 3-90). A guard
differs from a screen in that a guard force contains sufficient combat power to defeat, cause the withdrawal
of, or fix the lead elements of an enemy ground force before it can engage the main body with direct fire. A
guard force routinely engages enemy forces with direct and indirect fires. A screening force, however,
primarily uses indirect fires or close air support to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements and slow the
movement of other enemy forces. A guard force uses all means at its disposal to prevent enemy forces from
penetrating to a position to observe and engage the main body. It operates within the range of the main body’s |
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fire support weapons, deploying over a narrower front than a comparable-sized screening force to permit
concentrating combat power.
13-73. Units employ a guard when enemy contact is expected, and they require additional security beyond
that provided by a screen. The multiple requirements of the guard mission often occur simultaneously over
large areas. While the guard force’s exact size is determined by prevailing mission variables, table 13-1 on
page 13-5 provides guidance on the size of an echelon’s guard force.
13-74. The three types of guard operations are advance, flank, and rear guard. Commanders can assign a
guard mission to protect either a stationary or a moving force.
13-75. A unit conducting a guard performs tasks within its capabilities unless ordered otherwise. If a unit
lacks the time, lacks resources, or is unable to complete all tasks, it must inform the higher echelon assigning
the mission of the shortfall and request guidance on which tasks to complete or the priority of tasks. Guard
tasks, within capability are to—
* Detect and report all enemy elements attempting to pass through the guard, both ground and aerial,
and provide the protected force commander early warning of enemy activities.
* Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy or defeat all enemy reconnaissance elements according
to engagement criteria. Must prevent ground observation and direct fire against the main body.
* Maintain contact with the protected force and other forces operating on its flanks.
* Maintain contact with enemy forces and report activity in the assigned area.
* Maintain observation of avenues of approach that affect the protected forces mission.
* Locate and identify the lead elements that indicate the enemy’s main attack, as prescribed in the
enemy’s order of battle based upon IPB (when facing an echeloned enemy force).
* While displacing, determine the direction of enemy movement, maintain contact, and report threat
activities.
* While displacing, impede and harasses the enemy, within capability, to provide the protected force
commander with additional time and maneuver space.
* Cause the enemy main body to deploy prematurely.
* Prevent visual contact and direct fire against the protected force.
* Deny the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and objective of the main body.
13-76. If a guard turns into a meeting engagement—
* Destroy enemy reconnaissance and lead elements of the main body.
* Determine the location of enemy assailable flanks.
* Fix enemy forces to allow the main body to maneuver around enemy strengths or through
weaknesses.
Organization of a Guard Force
13-77. Whether the guard force is stationary or moving, the types of guard missions, knowledge of the
terrain, and enemy dictate the task organization of the guard force. The guard force commander normally
organizes the guard force as an area defense, a delay, a zone reconnaissance, or a movement to contact.
Control Measures
13-78. Units use control measures to control the operations of guard forces in the security area. The mission
also influences the size of the assigned areas given to subordinate elements. For example, a movement to
contact normally occurs across a narrower unit frontage than a zone reconnaissance to allow adequate
concentration of combat power.
13-79. Guard force commanders may task subordinate elements to conduct screen missions to the front and
flanks of the guard force. This provides early warning of enemy forces and helps maintain contact with flank
forces and any higher echelon security force. An example is a cavalry squadron screen in front of a brigade
operating as a division advance guard. The presence of a higher echelon security force also influences how |
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guard force commanders organize available forces and conduct their tasks. It specifically influences the areas
of fire support and sustainment.
Advance Guard
13-80. An advance guard for a stationary force operates defensively. It defends or delays in accordance
with the main body commander’s intent. An advance guard for a moving force operates offensively as
depicted in figure 13-9. The advance guard develops the situation so the main body can use its combat power
to the greatest effect. Units do not dissipate the main body’s combat power through piecemeal commitment.
The full combat power of the main body must be available to mass and defeat the main enemy force.
Figure 13-9. Advance guard for division attack
13-81. An advance guard for a moving force normally conducts a movement to contact. It organizes and
uses the control measures typically associated with the conduct of a movement to contact. Advance guard
force units normally deploy their ground elements abreast to cover the axis of advance or the main body’s
assigned area.
13-82. The advance guard clears enemy elements from the axis of advance or designated portions of the
assigned area. This allows the main body to move unimpeded, prevents the unnecessary delay of the main
body, and defers the deployment of the main body for as long as possible.
13-83. The advance guard can operate behind the security force of a higher echelon. For example, a division
may use a reinforced reconnaissance squadron as an advanced guard, while each brigade column organizes
one of its battalion task forces into an advance guard. (See figure 13-9.) The higher echelon security force
initially develops the situation. Commanders may task the advance guard within their capability to—
* Coordinate and conduct the rearward passage of lines of the security force.
* Reduce obstacles to create lanes or improve existing lanes as required to support the maneuver of
the main body. |
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* Eliminate enemy forces bypassed by the security force.
* Coordinate and conduct a forward passage of lines through the security force and fix enemy forces
in the enemy’s main defensive positions to allow the friendly main body to maneuver.
13-84. The movement of multiple security forces and the handover of a detected enemy force from the
higher echelon security force to the lower echelon security force are controlled using checkpoints, contact
points, PLs, handover lines, and disengagement criteria, in addition to other graphic control measures. At a
minimum, the higher echelon security force has a rear boundary that is also the forward boundary of the
advance guard.
13-85. The advance guard engages in offensive operations when necessary to accomplish the mission. After
the guard makes enemy contact, the commander determines whether the guard mission requires an attack, a
defense, or a delay based on the mission variables. For example, if the guard force has sufficient combat
power to defeat an enemy force, it conducts a hasty attack. The guard force avoids assaulting strong enemy
positions from the front. If the enemy forces attempt to withdraw, the advance guard continues the attack
with the intent to destroy the enemy force. If the advance guard encounters an enemy force that it cannot stop
from interfering with the movement of the main body, the security force reports its presence to the main
body. It then establishes a defense, continues conducting reconnaissance, and prepares to pass elements of
the main body forward while facilitating the deployment of the main body.
13-86. Guard force units can delay rearward one or more positions to avoid decisive engagement if the
depth of the security area permits, and they do not have enough combat power to defeat an approaching
enemy force. This reduces the enemy force’s combat power. Guard forces accept decisive engagement to
prevent enemy ground forces from employing their direct-fire systems to engage the main body unless their
higher echelon commanders relieve them of their mission.
Flank Guard
13-87. A flank guard protects an exposed flank of the main body. A flank guard is similar to a flank screen
except that the unit plans defensive positions in addition to observation posts.
13-88. Main body units assign an area to each flank guard that is sufficiently deep to provide early warning
and reaction time. However, each flank guard remains within supporting range of the main body’s indirect
fire systems. Flank guard units consider the front and rear of the flank of the main body, the axis taken by
the main body, the enemy’s capabilities, and the available avenues of approach when determining the exact
positions their forces initially occupy.
13-89. Each flank guard moves to its initial positions using one of the movement techniques. On reaching
its initial position, the flank guard establishes defensive positions in assigned BPs or in its assigned area and
establishes a screening element forward of these positions. In situations where knowledge about the enemy
force is vague, the flank guard maintains a larger reserve than in situations where the enemy force’s actions
are more predictable. Figure 13-10 on page 13-22 depicts an example stationary flank guard. |
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Figure 13-10. Stationary flank guard
13-90. When conducting a moving flank guard, units address additional considerations beyond those
applying to a moving flank screen. Instead of occupying a series of observation posts, the security force plans
a series of BPs. Figure 13-11 depicts example control measures for a moving flank guard. The security force
monitors potential enemy avenues of approach for as long as the enemy threatens the main body. Once the
flank guard makes contact with enemy forces, it can attack, defend to defeat, or fix enemy ground forces in
their current positions before they can engage the friendly main body or conduct a delay as the situation
requires.
13-91. The lead element of a moving flank guard performs three tasks. It maintains contact with the
protected force’s main body, reconnoiters the area between that main body and the flank guard’s routes of
advance, and reconnoiters the flank guard’s route. It performs these tasks by conducting a zone
reconnaissance. |
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Figure 13-11. Moving flank guard control measures
13-92. The speed the guard force can maintain needs to be a deliberate planning consideration as generally
the guard force will be in less desirable terrain on the flank compared to the main body, which normally is
on an avenue of approach suited to support its movement. The exact size of the assigned area for any unit
conducting a guard depends on the mission variables. For example, a commander assigns an armor brigade
combat team cavalry squadron an assigned area with a frontage no larger than 13km. In this example an
armored cavalry troop would be assigned an area with a frontage no larger than 5km. If the security force is
assigned a frontage larger than they can support, the main body commander can mitigate the lack of coverage
by providing additional ground or aerial assets to supplement the security force’s mission and maintain
contact between the security force and main body.
13-93. The rest of the flank guard marches along the route of advance and occupies BPs as necessary. The
criteria for the route are the same as in a moving flank screen. The unit designates company-sized BPs parallel
to the axis of the main body. The flank guard unit places BPs outside the flank guard’s route of advance and
along avenues of approach into the flank guard. The flank guard occupies observation posts along a screen
line forward of these BPs.
13-94. Since the flank guard is moving in one direction and orienting on providing protection to the secured
force in another direction, the flank guard unit plans control measures to facilitate this dual orientation. These
control measures are normally associated with the moving screen, as well as PLs that run parallel to the
direction of movement of the main body. Units use these PLs to control the delay or defense if enemy forces
attack from the protected flank. (See figure 13-12 on page 13-29 for an attack using a covering force.) The
main body commander may also assign the flank guard a new security objective that secures the flank for the
main body’s objective during the main body’s actions on the objective.
13-95. The flank guard regulates its movement along the route of advance by the pace of the main body,
the distance to the objective, and the enemy force’s situation. The three methods of movement are successive |
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bounds, alternate bounds, or continuous marching. If the main body stops, the flank guard occupies blocking
positions. As the speed of the main body changes, the flank guard changes its movement methods, which
could result in the ability of the guard force’s capability to fight to gain time for the main body. If the main
body continues to increase its rate of march, the guard force will either need to have additional resources
attached to maintain tempo or the main body assumes more risk by screening a portion of the flank. The
guard commander must not allow the force to fall behind the main body or stay stationary along the route
becoming a lucrative target.
13-96. If the flank guard becomes overextended, the guard commander informs the main body commander
and recommends one of the following COAs:
* Reinforce the flank guard.
* Reduce the size of the flank guard’s assigned area.
* Screen a portion of the area and guard the rest.
Rear Guard
13-97. The rear guard protects the exposed rear of the main body. This occurs during offensive operations
when the main body breaks contact with flanking forces or during a retrograde. Units may deploy a rear guard
behind both moving and stationary main bodies. The rear guard for a moving force displaces to successive
BPs along PLs or delay lines in depth as the main body moves. The nature of enemy contact determines the
exact movement method or combination of methods used in the displacement (successive bounds, alternate
bounds, and continuous marching).
13-98. During a retrograde, the rear guard normally deploys its ground maneuver elements abreast, behind
the main body’s forward maneuver units, generally across the entire assigned area. After the main body
conducts a rearward passage of lines, the rear guard accepts battle handover and then defends or delays.
Alternatively, the rear guard may conduct a relief in place as part of a military deception plan or may take
advantage of defendable terrain. In both cases, the rear guard establishes passage points and assists the
rearward passage of the main body, if necessary. The rear guard accomplishes its defensive mission in the
same way as any other guard operation after the main body clears the security area. As the main body moves,
the rear guard moves to subsequent PLs in depth. Contact with the enemy force may eventually be lost if it
does not follow the retrograding friendly force. Fighting a defense or a delay is necessary if an enemy force
detects the movement and attacks.
COVER
13-99. Cover is a type of security operation done independent of the main body to protect them by fighting
to gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADP 3-
90). The covering force’s distance forward of the main body depends on the main body commander’s
intentions and instructions, the terrain, the enemy location and strength, and the main body and covering
force’s rates of march. The frontage assigned to a security force executing a cover is the same frontage as the
assigned area of the main body. It is here that the covering force executes assigned tasks. The biggest
difference between a guard force and a covering force is that a covering force is able to operate independently
of the main body, while a guard force relies on indirect support from the main body.
13-100. A covering force, or portions of it, often become decisively engaged with enemy forces. Therefore,
the covering force must have substantial combat power to engage the enemy and accomplish its mission. A
covering force develops the situation earlier than a screen or a guard force. It engages longer and more often
and defeats larger enemy forces.
13-101. While a covering force provides more security than a screen or guard force, it also requires more
resources. Before assigning a cover mission, the main body commander determines if the unit has enough
combat power to resource a covering force and the main effort. When the commander lacks the resources to
support both, the main body commander must assign the security force a less resource intensive security
mission, either a screen or a guard.
13-102. A covering force performs all the tasks of screening and guard forces. A covering force for a
stationary force performs a defensive mission, while a covering force for a moving force generally conducts |
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offensive actions. A covering force normally operates forward of the main body in the offense or defense, or
to the rear for a retrograde operation. Unusual circumstances could dictate a flank covering force, but this is
normally a screen or guard mission.
Organization of a Covering Force
13-103. Whether the cover is for a stationary (defending) or moving (attacking) force, the various types of
cover missions, as well as knowledge of the terrain and enemy forces, dictate the specific task organization
of the covering force. The covering force unit normally plans to conduct the cover mission as an area defense.
The covering force also normally employs tactics associated with the conduct of a delay, a zone
reconnaissance, and a movement to contact.
13-104. Commanders normally assign subordinate units one of these missions or the mission of screen or
guard. The covering force organizes and uses control measures associated with the before-mentioned
missions. In addition, units establish control measures necessary for conducting the covering force’s passage
of lines (forward and rearward).
13-105. Corps normally build their covering force around a reinforced armored BCT or a division, although
they can deploy any mobile force as their covering force. Both have the control structures necessary for the
forces involved and the capability to cover the geographic area typically required in a cover security mission.
Corps tailor these units to be self-contained by reinforcing them with assets such as joint fires, attack
helicopters, field artillery, engineers, air defense, tanks, and infantry units with appropriate sustainment
assets. They usually allocate additional artillery and engineer support to their covering force because it
operates beyond support range of their main body. Covering force commanders normally maintain a sizable
reserve to conduct counterattacks in the defense and to defeat enemy counterattacks in the offense.
13-106. A division covering force is normally a reinforced BCT. It performs reconnaissance or other security
missions. If the division assigned area is narrow enough, an adequately reinforced combined arms battalion,
reconnaissance squadron, or Stryker battalion may perform a cover mission. At both corps and division
echelons, the amount of reinforcement provided to the covering force determines the distance and time it can
operate away from the main body. These reinforcements typically revert to their parent organizations once
the covering mission is complete. BCTs and battalions typically organize a guard force instead of a covering
force because their resources are limited.
13-107. Since one task of the covering force is to deceive the enemy commander into thinking enemy forces
have found the main body, commanders should supply the covering force with combat systems that are
representative of the main body. For example, if the main body has organic or reinforcing systems (such as
the M270 multiple launch rocket system) available to it, they should organize the covering force with the
same systems.
Offensive Cover
13-108. An offensive covering force seizes the initiative early for the main body, allowing the main body to
attack decisively. Figure 13-12 on page 13-26 shows an attacking main body with an advance covering force
and a flank guard. |
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Figure 13-12. Attack using a covering force
13-109. Unless the higher echelon orders otherwise, an offensive covering force performs specific tasks
within its capabilities. If a covering force lacks the time or other resources to complete all these tasks, it must
inform the higher headquarters assigning the mission of the shortfall and request guidance on which tasks to
complete or the priority of tasks. After starting the mission, if the unit determines that it cannot complete an
assigned task, such as destroying or repelling enemy reconnaissance and security forces in the enemy security
area, it must report to the higher echelon and await further instructions while the unit continues to execute
their assigned mission. Offensive covering force tasks include—
* Destroy, disrupt, or fix enemy forces and reconnaissance assets in the disruption zone.
* Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy or defeat all enemy reconnaissance elements. Must
prevent ground observation and direct fire against the main body.
* Maintain contact with the protected force and other forces operating on its flanks.
* Gain and maintain contact with enemy forces and report activity in the assigned area.
* Maintain observation of avenues of approach that affect the protected forces’ mission.
* Locate and identify enemy forces in the battle zone and conduct handover to follow-on forces.
* Cause the enemy to commit resources to counter the cover force that would have been used against
the main body.
* Deny the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and objective of the main body.
* Determine enemy strengths, weaknesses, and disposition, and exploit opportunities until main
body forces are committed.
* Clear or bypass enemy forces in the assigned area in accordance with engagement criteria.
* Conduct reconnaissance along the main body’s axis of advance.
* Penetrate the enemy’s disruption zone to locate enemy main defensive positions. |
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* Locate gaps or weaknesses in the enemy’s defensive scheme.
* Defeat or repel enemy forces as directed by the higher commander.
* Fix enemy forces to allow the main body to maneuver around enemy strengths or through enemy
weaknesses.
13-110. If the mission turns into a meeting engagement—
* Destroy enemy reconnaissance and lead elements of the main body.
* Determine the location of enemy assailable flanks.
* Fix enemy forces to allow the main body to maneuver around enemy strengths or through
weaknesses.
13-111. Planning for offensive covering force operations is similar to planning for zone reconnaissance or
movement to contact. Mission analysis using the products of the IPB process helps determine the width of
the area to cover and areas (NAIs and TAIs) or routes of special importance. Commanders determine specific
missions for subordinate elements and assign boundaries. The covering force retains a reserve that is ready
to deploy anywhere in the covering force area. This reserve may be centrally located; the commander
typically locates it on the most dangerous or critical avenue of approach in the security area.
13-112. The covering force advances on a broad front, normally with its subordinate ground maneuver
elements abreast (except for the reserve). This force clears the enemy’s disruption zone of small combat
elements while penetrating the enemy force’s main defenses. Attack reconnaissance aircraft normally
reconnoiter forward of advancing ground covering force elements. On enemy contact, the attack
reconnaissance aircrews report the enemy force’s location to the appropriate ground unit and maintain
contact. Once attack reconnaissance aircraft make contact, the covering force rapidly develops the situation.
It reports enemy dispositions immediately to the main body, so that the main body can exploit enemy
weaknesses. The covering force fixes encountered enemy forces and destroys them. The covering force does
not bypass enemy forces without the guidance of the main body commander.
13-113. If the covering force discovers a gap in the enemy force’s defenses, it prepares to exploit the gap
and disrupt the integrity of that defense. The covering force immediately reports this to the main body, so the
main body commander can divert main body follow-on forces to support the penetration. The main body
synchronizes the covering force’s penetration with the other arriving maneuver units, functional and
multifunctional support units, and sustainment units to prevent counterattacking enemy forces from isolating
and destroying the penetrating elements of the covering force.
13-114. When the covering force cannot advance, it defends and prepares to assist the forward passage of
lines of main body units. It continues to perform reconnaissance of enemy positions to locate gaps or
assailable flanks. The covering force may guide main body units as they attack through or around the covering
force. If the covering force has accomplished its mission, the main body attacks the enemy’s weak point with
previously uncommitted main body forces at the appropriate time.
Flank Cover
13-115. When the main body commander perceives a significant threat to a flank, the main body normally
establishes a flank covering force. That force conducts its mission in much the same way as a flank guard
performs its mission. The main differences between the two missions are the scope of operations and the
distance the covering force operates away from the main body.
13-116. Flank covering forces clear the area between their route of advance and their main body just as flank
guards do. They also maintain contact with specified main body elements. These elements are normally part
of the advance guard for the flank unit of the main body.
Defensive Cover
13-117. A defensive covering force prevents enemy forces from attacking at the time, place, and combat
strength of their choosing. Defensive cover gains time for the main body, enabling it to deploy, move, or
prepare defenses in the MBA. It accomplishes this by disrupting the enemy force’s attack, contesting the
enemy’s possession of the initiative, and establishing the conditions for friendly operations. The covering |
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force makes the enemy force deploy repeatedly to fight through the covering force and commit the enemy
force’s reserve or follow-on forces to sustain momentum. Figure 13-13 depicts a defensive cover.
Figure 13-13 Example of a defensive cover
13-118. Unless the higher echelon commander orders otherwise, a defensive covering force performs certain
tasks within its capabilities. If a unit does not have the time or resources to complete all of these tasks, it must
inform the headquarters assigning the mission of the shortfall and request guidance on which tasks to
complete or on the priority of tasks. After starting the mission, if the unit determines it cannot complete an
assigned task, such as defeat enemy advance guard formations, it must report to the higher echelon
commander and await further instructions while the unit continues its assigned mission. A defensive covering
force emphasizes these tasks within their capability:
* Detect, report, and destroy all enemy elements attempting to pass through the cover, both ground
and aerial, and provide the protected force commander early warning of enemy activities.
* Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy or defeat all enemy reconnaissance elements. Must
prevent ground observation and direct fire against the main body.
* Maintain contact with the protected force and other forces operating on its flanks.
* Maintain contact with enemy forces and report activity in the assigned area.
* Maintain observation of avenues of approach that affect the protected forces mission.
* Locate and identify the lead elements that indicate the enemy’s main attack, as prescribed in the
enemy’s order of battle based upon IPB (when facing an echeloned enemy force).
* While displacing, determine the direction of enemy movement, maintain contact, and report threat
activities.
* While displacing, impede and harasses the enemy to provide the protected force commander with
additional time and maneuver space.
* Cause the enemy main body to deploy prematurely and then report its direction of travel.
* Deny the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and location of the MBA.
* Determine enemy strengths, weaknesses, and disposition, and exploit opportunities until main
body forces are committed. |
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13-119. The defensive covering force may be required to defend, delay, or counterattack. The covering force
may have to reconnoiter and clear the area before establishing the cover if another unit is not currently
occupying the covering force area. As in offensive operations, aerial reconnaissance is necessary to extend
the covered area. Army aviation units can screen less threatened areas and rapidly reinforce with their fires
when an enemy force heavily engages other elements of the covering force.
13-120. Enemy forces may attempt to force the covering force back toward the MBA during the operation.
If this happens, the covering force conducts a rearward passage of lines and a battle handover with the main
body. Once the covering force completes its battle handover with the main body, they can do one of three
things, separately or in combination. They can undergo reconstitution, execute economy of force missions,
or become part of the echelon reserve. Alternatively, they may use them to locate and follow the movement
of the enemy’s follow-on forces. They only establish BPs in the MBA as a last resort.
13-121. The conduct of a rearward passage of lines is part of a defensive cover with its associated
requirement to transfer responsibility for the battle between units. Units thoroughly plan this complex task
as an integral part of the covering force mission. Covering force elements begin their rearward passage of
lines either upon meeting disengagement criteria or upon order of the covering force commander. When any
element of the covering force begins rearward movement to pass through the MBA, the higher commander
must be informed. Passage of lines may not occur simultaneously for all covering force units. As some units
begin passage, others may still be taking advantage of offensive opportunities in other parts of the security
area. The covering force prepares to continue fighting in those portions of the security area where friendly
subordinate forces are successful to set up offensive opportunities for the main body.
13-122. The covering force exercises caution when issuing orders. Commanders at each echelon have a
different perspective of the battle. This is never truer than in a covering force action. For example, while the
covering force may be told to delay forward of a river line for 72 hours, the covering force commander may
tell subordinate task force units to defend in certain BPs, perhaps for a specified period. Once the period
expires, the covering force should not automatically retire from the covering force area. It must create enough
resistance to force the enemy commander to deploy the enemy’s main forces. Commanders at each echelon
precisely state the mission to their subordinate units without telling them how to do it. (See ADP 6-0 for
doctrine on mission command.) Units, when told to delay, must fight the urge to shoot too little, pull back
too early, and move back too far. It is imperative that commanders convey to subordinates precisely what
their purpose is in the context of the overall mission.
Rear Cover
13-123. A rear cover mission is similar to a rear guard mission. A rear covering force protects the main body
moving away from the enemy. The covering force deploys behind the forward maneuver units of the main
body, conducts battle handover and passage of lines, and then defends or delays. Alternatively, the covering
force may conduct a relief in place as part of a deception plan or to take advantage of the best defensive
terrain.
13-124. The covering force establishes passage points and assists the rearward passage of the main body.
Following the passage of the main body, the mission is conducted the same as any other defensive cover
operation. As the main body moves, the covering force displaces to subsequent phase lines in depth. If the
enemy does not follow the withdrawing forces, contact may eventually be lost. Fighting a defense or delay
is necessary if the enemy detects the movement and attacks.
AREA SECURITY
13-125. Area security is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of
communications, and activities within a specific area. Area security operations occur during all types of
operations. The synchronization and integration of area and local security are essential to protecting the force.
Area security operations support a higher echelon’s overall operation and require them to take advantage of
local security measures performed by all units in the area, regardless of their command and control
relationships. Although vital to the success of military operations, area security is normally an economy-of-
force mission, often designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations that generate and
maintain combat power. |
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13-126. Units executing area security focus on the protected force, installation, route, or area. Protected
forces range from echelon headquarters, artillery, and echelon reserves to the sustaining base. Protected
installations can also be part of the sustaining base, or they can constitute part of the area’s infrastructure.
Areas to secure range from specific points (bridges and defiles) to terrain features (ridgelines and hills), to
large civilian population centers and their adjacent areas. Population-centric area security missions are
conducted at any time but are almost a fixture during irregular warfare. These population-centric area security
missions typically combine aspects of the area defensive and offensive operations to eliminate the effect of
internal defense threats.
13-127. Typically, units assigned an area security mission operate in a division or higher echelon’s rear area
and facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control
forces. Area security in the rear area preserves the commander’s freedom to move reserves, position fire
support capabilities, provide command and control, and conduct sustaining operations.
13-128. Forces engaged in area security are typically organized in a manner that emphasizes their mobility,
lethality, and communications capabilities. The task organization of the unit assigned the area security
mission should correspond with the level of threat. For example, if the threat is a Level II threat, a military
police company should be sufficient. If the threat is a Level III threat, a combined arms team from a brigade
combat team is a more appropriate unit. Friendly forces conducting area security initially provide early
warning against an unexpected enemy or adversary attack and then, within capabilities, defeat those attacks.
Early warning may come from ground, aerial, or space-based sensors. Area security may provide
reconnaissance on NAIs to answer commander’s critical information requirements, aiding in tactical decision
making and confirming or denying threat intentions.
13-129. All commanders apportion combat power and dedicate assets based on an analysis of the operational
environment, the likelihood of threat action, the relative value of friendly resources, and risk to civilian
populations. Although all friendly resources have value, the mission variables of METT-TC (I) make some
resources, assets, or key terrain more essential to successful mission accomplishment from enemy or
adversary and friendly perspectives. Commanders create and use a decision support matrix and template to
facilitate decision making, issue guidance, and allocate resources. Criticality, vulnerability, and
recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities that
become the focus of area security.
13-130. A unit restrains its use of force when conducting area security operations when civilians are present.
However, commanders remain responsible for protecting the force, and they consider this responsibility when
establishing rules of engagement. They explain restrictions on conducting operations to ensure everyone
understands those restrictions. Soldiers must understand that their actions may have far-reaching positive or
negative effects. Commanders communicate that media and adversaries can quickly exploit Soldiers’ actions,
especially the way they treat civilians.
13-131. Sometimes area security forces must retain readiness over long periods without contact with enemy
forces. This occurs most often when the enemy special purpose forces or insurgents are overmatched. In this
case, the enemy normally tries to avoid engaging friendly forces unless it is on terms favorable to the enemy.
Forces conducting area security should not develop a sense of complacency, even if the enemy force appears
to have ceased operations in the secured area. Additionally, friendly forces should be mindful of mines and
booby traps in these situations. Successful units assume that the enemy force regularly observes friendly
operations to identify routines, weak points, and lax security for the opportunity to strike with minimum risk.
This requires leaders to maintain vigilance and discipline in their Soldiers to prevent that opportunity from
developing.
13-132. Area security focuses on the following activities:
* Site security. Area security forces provide protection through area security techniques that involve
the employment of protection and security assets in a layered, integrated, redundant manner. A
unit conducting site security may protect locations such as—
Base/base camp defense. Base defense consists of the local military measures, both normal
and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or
sabotage of, a base, to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to United
States forces (JP 3-10). |
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Assembly area security. Protection is critical for forces that are arrayed in tactical assembly
areas and do not possess comprehensive, organic protection capabilities or are focused on
other mission objectives.
Critical asset security. Critical asset security is the protection and security of personnel and
physical assets or information that is analyzed and deemed essential to the operation and
success of the mission and to resources required for protection (ADP 3-37). For example,
command posts and operations centers are often protected through area security techniques
that involve the employment of protection and security assets in a layered, integrated, and
redundant manner. This can often keep hostile threats at a distance by maximizing the standoff
distance from explosive effects, while keeping the protected asset outside the range of enemy
or adversary direct-fire weapons and observation.
Port area and pier security. Ground forces may provide area security for air and seaports along
with pier areas. (See JP 3-10 for additional information on dedicated port security units.)
* Line of communication and route security. The security and protection of lines of communications
and supply routes are critical to military operations because most support traffic moves along these
routes. The security of lines of communications and supply routes (rail, pipeline, highway, and
waterway) presents one of the greatest security challenges in an AO. Line of communication and
route security operations are defensive in nature and are terrain oriented. A route security force
prevents an enemy or adversary force from impeding, harassing, or destroying traffic along a route
or portions of a route.
* Convoy security. A convoy security operation is a specialized type of line of communication or
route security operations. Units conduct convoy security operations when there are insufficient
friendly forces to continuously secure routes in an AO and there is a significant danger of enemy
or adversary ground action directed against the convoy. Commanders may also conduct convoy
security operations in conjunction with route security operations. Planning includes designating
units for convoy security; providing guidance on techniques for units to provide for their own
security during convoys; or establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying
critical assets. Local or theater policy typically dictates when and which convoys receive security
and protection. (See ATP 4-01.45/MCRP 3-40F.7/NTTP 4-01.6/AFTTP 3-2.58 for more
information on convoy security training.)
* Response force operations. Response forces take measures to prevent enemy attacks. Response
force operations expediently reinforce unit organic protection capabilities or complement that
protection with maneuver capabilities based on the threat. (See FM 3-39 for more information on
quick response force operations.)
Mobile security force. A mobile security force is a highly mobile and dedicated security force
with the capability to defeat Level I and II threats in a joint security area (JP 3-10). Typically,
a mobile security force is a military police unit.
Tactical combat force. A tactical combat force is a rapidly deployable, air-ground, mobile
combat unit with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets assigned to,
and capable of defeating Level III threats, including combined arms (JP 3-10). Typically, a
tactical combat force is either a combined arms battalion, Stryker infantry battalion, or a
cavalry squadron.
Quick response force. Quick response forces are a dedicated force on a base with adequate
tactical mobility and fire support designated to defeat Level I and Level II threats and shape
Level III threats until they can be defeated by a tactical combat force or other available
response forces (ATP 3-37.10/MCRP 3-4D.13).
* Area damage control. Area damage control consists of measures taken before, during, and/or after
hostile actions or natural or man-made disasters to reduce the probability of damage and minimize
its effects (JP 3-10). Units assigned this activity immediately begin hardening critical assets and
take action to prevent damage before hostile actions. During and after hostile action, when the
damage and scope of the attack is limited, units respond and recover with local assets and
resources. This recovery involves resuming operations, maintaining or restoring order, evacuating
casualties, isolating danger or hazard areas, and mitigating personnel and material losses. (See JP
3-10 for more information on area damage control.) |
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Troop Movement
This chapter discusses the general considerations of troop movement. Those
considerations include types of troop movements, methods of troop movements, how
to organize, march techniques, and graphic control measures. This chapter also
discusses the planning, preparation, and execution of troop movements.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF TROOP MOVEMENT
14-1. The ability of units to posture friendly forces in the right starting location to conduct operations
depends on their ability to move forces. The essence of battlefield agility is the capability to conduct rapid
and orderly movement to concentrate combat power at decisive points and times. Units can expect the enemy
to attempt to deny freedom of movement throughout their assigned area. Successful movement places troops
and equipment at their destination at the proper time, ready for combat. Units can expedite dismounted and
mounted movements by the conduct of forced marches when necessary.
TYPES OF TROOP MOVEMENT
14-2. Troop movement is the movement of Soldiers and units from one place to another by any available
means. Units perform troop movements using different methods such as dismounted and mounted
movements using tactical vehicles and motor transport for air, rail, and water means in various combinations.
The method employed depends on the situation, the size and composition of the moving unit, the distance
the unit must cover, the urgency of execution, and the condition of the troops. It also depends on the
availability, suitability, and capacity of the different means of transportation. Troop movements over
extended distances have extensive sustainment considerations. The two types of troop movement are
nontactical and tactical movement.
Nontactical Movement
14-3. Nontactical movement is a movement in which troops and vehicles are arranged to expedite their
movement and conserve time and energy when no enemy ground interference is anticipated. Units only
conduct nontactical movements in secure areas. Examples of nontactical movements include rail and highway
movement in the continental United States. Once units deploy into a theater of operations, they do not
normally conduct nontactical movements.
Tactical Movement
14-4. A tactical movement is a movement in which troops and vehicles are arranged to protect combat
forces during movement when a threat of enemy interference is possible. Units maintain security against
enemy attacks from both the air and ground and prepare to take immediate action against enemy ambushes,
although they do not expect contact with significant enemy ground forces. During movement, the moving
force employs security measures, even when contact with enemy ground forces is not expected. During a
tactical movement, units are always prepared to take immediate action. There are three methods of a tactical
movements that units of all types can conduct: approach march, forced march, and tactical road march.
Figure 14-1 on page 14-2 depicts a tactical movement. |
3-90 | 302 | Chapter 14
Figure 14-1. Tactical movement
Approach March
14-5. An approach march is the advance of a combat unit when direct contact with the enemy is
intended. Units employ an approach march when they know the approximate location of enemy forces.
Commanders task-organize units conducting an approach march before the march begins to allow them to
transition to an on-order or be-prepared mission without making major organizational adjustments. For
example, commanders direct artillery units to march in their supported unit’s columns, while engineer units
are well forward to facilitate mobility. The approach march terminates in a march objective—such as an
attack position, assembly area, assault position—or it can be used to transition to an attack. Reserve and
follow and assume forces may also conduct an approach march forward of a LD. Figure 14-2 depicts an
approach march.
Figure 14-2. Approach march |
3-90 | 303 | Troop Movement
14-6. Based on the products of the IPB process, the overall commander assigns an area or an axis of advance
in combination with routes to a unit conducting an approach march. These routes, assigned areas, or axes
facilitate the force’s movement and maximize its use of concealment. Commanders assign the force
conducting the main effort and forces conducting each supporting effort separate routes, assigned areas, or
axes of advance unless an individual subordinate unit has the task of either follow and assume or follow and
support.
14-7. As the approach march nears areas of likely enemy interference, commanders divide their unit’s main
body into smaller, less vulnerable columns that move on additional multiple routes or cross country while
continuing to employ security elements. They take advantage of successful reconnaissance and security
operations to increase the distance traveled before the main body begins to maneuver. As discussed in Chapter
13, the advance and any flank guards remain within supporting distance of the main body, which stays in
these smaller columns to conceal their movement.
Forced March
14-8. A forced march is a march longer or faster than usual or in adverse conditions. Forced marches
require speed, exertion, and an increase in the number of hours marched each day beyond normal standards.
Soldiers cannot sustain forced marches for more than a short period. In a forced march, a unit may not halt
as often or for as long as recommended for maintenance, rest, feeding, and fuel. Units must understand that
immediately following a long and fast march, Soldiers and combat vehicles experience a temporary
deterioration in their physical condition. The combat effectiveness and cohesion of the unit also temporarily
decreases. The plan must accommodate stragglers and address increased maintenance failures.
Tactical Road March
14-9. A tactical road march is a rapid movement used to relocate units within an assigned area to
prepare for combat operations. The primary consideration of the tactical road march is rapid movement.
Typically, a unit executes a tactical road march using the mounted method of troop movement. Based on the
mission variables a unit can execute a dismounted tactical road march. However, the moving force employs
security measures, even when contact with enemy ground forces is not expected. Units conducting tactical
road marches may or may not be organized into combined arms formation. For example, a forward support
company providing supplies to its supported maneuver companies can execute a tactical road march. During
a tactical road march, the commander is always prepared to take immediate action if the enemy attacks.
METHODS OF TROOP MOVEMENTS
14-10. There are five methods of troop movements that units can execute. These methods are—
* Dismounted movement (foot marches).
* Mounted movement (road marches).
* Air movement.
* Rail movement.
* Water movement.
Generally, units can execute these methods in combination. For example, a unit can initially execute a
mounted movement and then transition to a dismounted movement. Additionally, each method can be applied
to nontactical or tactical movement.
Dismounted Movement
14-11. A dismounted movement is a movement of troops and equipment mainly by foot, with limited
support by vehicles. Dismounted movements are also called foot marches. Dismounted movements increase
units’ maneuver options. Their positive characteristics include combat readiness (because all Soldiers can
immediately respond to enemy attack without the need to dismount), ease of control, adaptability to terrain,
and independence from the existing road network. Their limitations include a slow movement rate and
increased personnel fatigue. A unit conducts a dismounted movement when the situation requires stealth, the
distance to travel is short, transportation or fuel is limited, or the situation or terrain precludes moving other |
3-90 | 304 | Chapter 14
ways. (See ATP 3-21.18 for more information on the techniques and procedures for conducting dismounted
movement.)
Mounted Movement
14-12. A mounted movement is the movement of troops and equipment by combat and tactical
vehicles. Mounted movements are also called road marches. Armored and mechanized units routinely
conduct mounted movements. The speed of the march and the increased supplies that can accompany the
unit characterize this movement method. Armored and Stryker maneuver units are normally self-sufficient
when conducting mounted movements over short distances. Infantry maneuver units cannot move themselves
with organic truck assets and require assistance from transportation elements to conduct mounted
movements. Considerations for mounted movements over extended distances include—
* The ability of routes to support the numbers, sizes, and weights of the tactical and combat vehicles
assigned to or supporting the moving unit.
* Available refueling and maintenance sites and crew rest areas.
* The need for recovery and evacuation assets.
See ATP 4-16 for more information on route synchronization and movement planning.
Air Movement
14-13. Air movement is an air transport of units, personnel, supplies, and equipment including airdrops and
air landings (JP 3-36). Units conduct air movements to move troops and equipment; to emplace systems; and
to transport ammunition, fuel, and other high-value supplies through transport by helicopter and fixed wing
aircraft. They may employ air movements as a substitute for ground tactical movements or to augment ground
tactical movements. Air movements are generally faster than ground tactical movements and they can bypass
ground threats. (See FM 3-04 for additional information concerning air movement.)
Rail Movement
14-14. Units use rail assets to conduct troop movement if they are available in an assigned area. Rail
movements involve United States, partner nation, and local nation commercial trains. Rail movement can
move a significant quantity of supplies and vehicles over extended distances on land quickly. Responsibility
for coordinating the use of railroads resides in the Army Forces headquarters in the theater of operations.
(See ATP 4-14 for additional information concerning rail movement.)
Water Movement
14-15. Water movements use vessels to transport equipment, supplies, and personnel. Water movement
involves United States, partner nation and local nation commercial and military vessels. Water movements
are slower than air movements, however they can move larger quantities of equipment and supplies and are
more cost efficient than air movement. (See ATP 4-15 for additional information concerning water
movement.)
ORGANIZATION FOR TACTICAL TROOP MOVEMENTS
14-16. There are several differences between the organization of troop movements. An approach march
prioritizes security over speed while nontactical movement, tactical road march, and forced march prioritizes
speed over security. A unit conducting an approach march employs larger security forces because of its
greater chance for enemy contact. Units conducting approach marches arrange into combined arms
organizations. An approach march allows units to disperse their task-organized forces into tactical formations
without being constrained to existing roads and trails. A nontactical movement, tactical road march, or forced
march can organize into columns for rapid movement. For example, vehicles of similar type, speed, and
cross-country capabilities move together. Units conducting troop movements establish appropriate tactical
intervals between vehicles. They also use fewer routes than units conducting approach marches. |
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Approach March Organization
14-17. Units use approach marches in a theater of operations when contact with an enemy force is possible
or anticipated. This style of movement emphasizes tactical considerations such as security over the efficiency
of movement. Units organize their subordinate forces to conduct combat operations in an approach march
and generally maintain unit integrity throughout its movement. Units plan for enemy interference while
moving or shortly after arriving at its destination. Units conducting an approach march use formations and
techniques consistent with the mission variables. The unit may conduct them over unsecured routes if no
friendly forces exist between the foremost elements of the moving force and enemy forces. The echelon
operations officer is responsible for planning these tactical movements with input from other staff members.
14-18. During approach marches, units use movement formations and movement techniques to balance
security and speed throughout the operation. The seven movement formations are—
* Column.
* Line.
* Wedge.
* Echelon (left or right).
* Vee.
* Diamond.
* Box.
14-19. The three movement techniques are—
* Traveling.
* Traveling overwatch.
* Bounding overwatch.
See Chapter 2 for more information on movement formations and movement techniques.
Tactical Road March or Forced March Organization
14-20. The organization for a tactical road march and forced march is the march column. A march column
is all march serials using the same route for a single movement under control of a single commander.
The subordinate element for a march column is a march serial. A march serial is a subdivision of a march
column organized under one commander. An example is a battalion serial formed from a brigade-sized
march column. The subordinate element for the march serial is a march unit. A march unit is a subdivision
of a march serial. It moves and halts under the control of a single commander who uses voice and visual
signals. An example of a march unit is a company from a battalion-sized march serial.
14-21. A march column provides excellent speed, control, and flexibility but only provides local security.
Units use a march column when speed is essential and enemy contact is unlikely. However, units space
functional and multifunctional support elements, such as air defense and engineers, throughout the column
to protect and support the movement. Prior to movement, reconnaissance elements conduct route
reconnaissance of the predetermined march route to determine trafficability. Units organize a march column
into four elements: reconnaissance, quartering party, main body, and trail party.
14-22. The reconnaissance element conducts route reconnaissance and area reconnaissance of the assembly
areas. A thorough reconnaissance of the route leading to the start point will assist units in crossing the start
point on time. Each serial should conduct its own reconnaissance. The reconnaissance element uses the
reconnaissance fundamentals and executes reconnaissance tasks discussed in Chapter 12.
14-23. A quartering party is a group dispatched to a new assigned area in advance of the main body.
A unit quartering party usually accompanies the route reconnaissance effort to the designated assembly area
or established RP. Unit SOPs establish the exact composition of the quartering party and its transportation,
security, communications equipment needs, and specific duties. However, it is small enough to move quickly
while still maintaining a significant self-defense capability. The leader of the quartering party is empowered
by the commander of the main body to make tactical decisions. The quartering party secures, reconnoiters,
and organizes an area for the main body’s arrival and occupation. It typically reconnoiters and confirms the
tentative locations selected by the commander of its parent element based on a map reconnaissance. When |
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necessary, the quartering party changes previously assigned unit locations in the assembly area. The
quartering party guides the main body into position from the RP to precise locations in the assembly area.
14-24. The main body of the march column consists of the remainder of the unit, including attachments and
minus the trail party. The main body is the principal part of a tactical command or formation. It does not
include detached elements of the command, such as advance guards, flank guards, and covering forces (ADP
3-90). The trail party is the last march unit in a march column. It maintains communications with the
main body. The function of the trail party is to recover disabled vehicles or control stragglers during a
movement. If the trail party cannot repair a disabled vehicle immediately, it tows the disabled vehicle and
moves its crew and passengers to a secure maintenance collection point along the movement route.
14-25. During extended movements, halts are necessary to rest personnel, service vehicles, and adjust
movement schedules. The march order or unit SOP regulates when to take halts. In short motor movements,
units schedule short halts every two to three hours of movement, and a halt may last up to an hour. Long halts
occur on marches that exceed 24 hours. When possible, these halts are not to exceed two hours. Units do not
schedule long halts at night to allow maximum time for night movement. During halts, each unit normally
clears the march route and moves to a previously selected assembly area to prevent route congestion and
avoid possible enemy attack. Units establish security and take other measures to protect the force. Unit
leaders promptly notify commanders of the time and approximate length of unscheduled halts.
MARCH TECHNIQUES
14-26. Organized march columns employ three march techniques: open column, close column, and
infiltration march. All techniques use scheduled halts to control and sustain the road march. The mission
variables influence the distances between vehicles and dismounted Soldiers. During movement, elements in
a column may encounter many different types of routes and obstacles simultaneously. Consequently, parts
of the column may be moving at different speeds, which can produce an undesirable accordion effect. The
movement order establishes the order of march, rate of march, interval or time gaps between units, column
gap, and maximum catch up speed. Unless commanders direct them not to do so for security reasons, march
units report when they have crossed each control point. Units maintain air and ground security throughout
the movement.
Open Column
14-27. In an open column, units increase distances between vehicles and dismounted Soldiers for greater
dispersion. The distance between vehicles varies from 50 to 100 meters (54 to 110 yards), and it may be
greater if required. The distance between dismounted Soldiers varies from two to five meters (2 to 5 yards)
to allow for dispersion and maneuver space for marching comfort. Any distance that exceeds five meters (5
yards) between dismounted Soldiers increases the length of the column and hinders control. Units normally
use the open column technique during daylight. They may also employ it at night by use of infrared lights,
blackout lights, or passive night vision equipment. Using an open column roughly doubles the column’s
length and thereby doubles the time it takes to clear a point when compared to a close column moving at the
same speed. The open column is the most common march technique because it offers the most security while
still providing leaders a reasonable degree of control. In an open column, vehicle density varies from 15 to
20 vehicles per kilometer. A single infantry company, with intervals between its platoons, occupies roughly
a kilometer of road or trail.
Close Column
14-28. In a close column, units space vehicles approximately 20 to 25 meters apart. At night, vehicles are
spaced so each driver can see the two lights in the blackout marker of the vehicle ahead. Units normally
employ a close column for marches during darkness under blackout driving conditions or for marches in
restricted terrain. This method of marching provides maximum traffic capacity of a route, but it provides
little dispersion. Normally, vehicle density is 40 to 50 vehicles per kilometer along the route in a close
column. During dismounted movements, leaders reduce the distance between individual Soldiers to one to
three meters to help maintain contact and facilitate control. |
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Infiltration March
14-29. Units dispatch vehicles in small groups, or at irregular intervals, at a rate that keeps the traffic density
down and prevents undue massing of vehicles during a move by infiltration. Infiltration provides the best
passive defense against enemy observation and attack. It is suited for tactical movements when there is
enough time and road space and a commander desires the maximum security, military deception, and
dispersion. The disadvantages of an infiltration are that more time is required to complete the move, column
control is challenging, and it protracts the recovery of broken-down vehicles by the trail party when compared
to vehicle recovery in close and open columns. Additionally, units cannot restore their unit integrity until the
last vehicle arrives at the destination, complicating the unit’s onward deployment.
Note. Infiltration as a tactical march technique during troop movement differs from Chapter 2’s
discussion of infiltration as a form of maneuver.
14-30. Units emphasize security during halts. Soldiers tend to let their guard down and relax their vigilance
during halts. Units address this by defining unit actions in SOPs for various types of halts, such as
maintenance or security halts.
GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES
14-31. Units executing tactical and nontactical movements often use strip maps or overlays to depict critical
information graphically about the route to subordinates. The overlay or strip map shows the route, SPs, RPs,
checkpoints, critical points (such as bridges), light lines, and traffic control posts (TCPs). Figure 14-3 depicts
some of these route control measures. A light line is a designated line forward of which vehicles are
required to use blackout lights during periods of limited visibility. (Figure 14-4 on page 14-8 shows a
sample strip map.) Other graphic control measures include assembly areas and phase lines.
Figure 14-3. Example overlay with route control measures |
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Figure 14-4. Example strip map
14-32. The start point is a point on a route on which marching elements fall under the control of a designated
march commander. All routes have a designated SP. It is an easily recognizable point on a map and on the
ground, such as a road junction. It is far enough from the assembly area to allow units to organize and move
at the prescribed speed and interval when the unit reaches the SP.
14-33. A release point is a point on a route where marching elements move out of centralized control. Each
SP has a corresponding RP. It is an easily recognizable point on the map and on the ground. Marching units
do not stop at their RPs. Instead, as they move through their RPs, either they transition to a follow-on mission
or a unit guide meets marching units and leads them to assembly areas. For example, a unit conducting a
route reconnaissance reaching their RP can transition to a screen.
14-34. Units designate checkpoints along routes to facilitate control over the movement of marching forces.
The movement overlay identifies critical points along the route where interference with movement might
occur. Units position TCPs along routes to prevent congestion and confusion. Military police or unit
personnel may operate TCPs. These Soldiers report to the appropriate area movement control organization
when each convoy, march column, and march serial arrives at their TCP.
14-35. There are five route classification designations: open route, supervised route, dispatch route,
prohibited route, and reserved route. Each route’s designation varies based on the mission variables. See table
14-1. |
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Table 14-1. Route designations
Type Description Control
This is the least restrictive control measure. Any unit may use the Minimum control
Open route
route without a movement credit. is exercised.
The movement control headquarters will specify the size of convoys,
Supervised Limited control
the type of traffic, or characteristics of vehicles that require a
route is exercised.
movement credit to use the route.
A movement credit is required to use this route regardless of the
number or types of vehicles. A dispatch route will normally be
Dispatch
designated when traffic volume is expected to exceed capacity or
route
when the route is critical to operations and priority of use must be Full control is
strictly enforced. exercised.
The route is reserved for the exclusive use of a particular unit(s) or
Reserved
type of traffic and no other units or traffic may use the route. Reserved
route
routes may be identified for large-unit movements.
The route is closed and units or traffic may not use the route. A route
Prohibited may be prohibited due to washouts, destroyed bridges, maintenance,
route construction work, or enemy activity. It may be prohibited for only short
periods, such as the time necessary to do repairs.
PLANNING A TROOP MOVEMENT
14-36. Commander’s plan, prepare, execute, and assess troop movements to ensure the organized and
uninterrupted flow of units throughout an area. The objective of a successful move is for a unit to arrive at
its destination in a condition suitable to its probable employment. The goal of all movement planning is to
retain flexibility to execute a variety of plans to meet ever-changing conditions. Leaders ensure that unit
movement SOPs contain specifics. Leaders conduct rehearsals to ensure that the unit’s Soldiers and
subordinate leaders understand the movement SOPs. These SOPs use standard task organizations to simplify
planning, provide flexibility, and allow greater responsiveness by establishing habitual relationships among
the unit’s subordinate elements and outside supporting elements.
14-37. The movement order is the result of the unit’s planning process. The Army movement order is
prepared as Tab C (Transportation) of Annex F (Sustainment) to an operation order or as a separate operation
order. Prepared in five-paragraph format, Tab C provides critical information to plan and execute movement.
Information normally found in Tab C includes the destination, routes, orders of march, rates of march, times
that each serial (or march element for serial movement orders) arrives and clears its SP, intervals, speeds,
scheduled maintenance halts, communications, and location of the commander. Units also identify logistics
sites and services in Tab C. Information and procedures contained in the unit’s movement SOP are not
included. The movement order should include a strip map or overlay. (See FM 5-0 for more information on
operation orders.)
14-38. The movement order discusses procedures for succession of command in the march unit, march
serial, and march column if those procedures vary from the unit’s established SOP. It also addresses the
procedures for disseminating information; the transmission of changes in command location, including the
activation of alternate command nodes. The alternate means of internal and external communications to each
march unit that vary from established SOPs are included. It also addresses who has the authority to activate
alternative routes.
14-39. Units base the movement order on the mission variables. The movement order establishes how the
unit moves from its current location to the desired location. The integration of and support from maneuver
and functional and multifunctional support—such as artillery, intelligence, military police, engineers,
aviation, and air support—are critical for successful tactical and nontactical movement. The commander’s
staff develops the detailed movement order based on established priorities.
14-40. The movement order and unit SOP address the possibility of ambushes, indirect fires, and air attacks.
These SOP includes drills for reacting to these circumstances. Passive measures mitigating an air attack
include route selection, vehicle intervals, and movement during limited visibility. In case of attack, units have |
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casualty evacuation plans. These plans take into account SOP items such as using combat lifesavers and
dispersing medical evacuation assets throughout the convoy.
14-41. For units that are not completely mobile with organic vehicles, such as an Army division
headquarters and many sustainment units, units can either conduct a shuttle with organic vehicles or request
assistance from transportation units. Shuttling requires transporting troops, equipment, and supplies by a
series of round trips with the same vehicles. Units may also shuttle by carrying successive parts of a load for
short distances while the remaining Soldiers continue on foot.
14-42. The higher headquarters sustainment staff normally coordinates the sustainment to moving units,
although units carry sufficient fuel and lubricants in their unit trains to conduct local movements. In
coordination with the engineers, the sustainment staff ensures that routes suffice for the projected types and
numbers of vehicles and supplies. Units need to know the load carrying capability of routes and the maximum
distances that they can support their forces. Also, units may to need to re-task or consolidate troop carry
capacity if troop transport is not provided. Sustainment operators determine if any sustainment assets displace
to support the mission. Units also establish halts for refueling as part of the movement plan. Halt times should
be long enough and locations large enough to allow the entire march unit to refuel.
14-43. The simplest troop movement to plan and conduct is one where the commander directing the
movement controls the assigned area. In this situation, units use established command and control systems.
The headquarters ordering the movement schedules the movement times and approves the routes, while its
movements control organization allocates the required space and time on the approved routes. If the
movement results in a unit going outside its parent headquarters’ area, that unit requires coordination through
various movement control centers. Otherwise, a higher headquarters must plan and control the movement.
14-44. Whenever possible, units disperse their forces by using multiple routes to move their forces. This
reduces the length of columns, vulnerability to enemy air attack, and amount of time the routes are
unavailable to other units. Multiple routes provide units with the flexibility to react to unexpected situations
and permit more rapid concentration of combat power. The three primary challenges of using multiple routes
are in exercising command and control, providing logistic and maintenance support on all routes, and the
reassembly or consolidation of forces at the movement’s conclusion.
14-45. Since enemy contact is less likely for troop movements that occur behind the forward line of troops
or line of departure, units use march columns and serials to control the movement of forces on limited routes.
Units use dispersion and multiple routes to avoid detection and increase survivability. Units plan for
reconsolidation to occur after the march column or march serial passes their assigned release point.
Regardless of the type of area a unit will occupy at the movement’s conclusion, planners must ensure the
area where forces will consolidate is defendable and large enough for all forces.
14-46. For movements beyond the forward line of troops or line of departure units use their preferred
tactical movement formations and techniques. Tactical units do not use march columns or serials unless
necessary, since enemy contact is likely and security should be balanced with speed. Units maintain
dispersion between formations and plan to consolidate forces prior to entering their assault positions.
14-47. The echelon transportation officer uses route classification components, such as route widths, route
types, military load classifications, overhead clearance, route obstructions, and special conditions to
determine the traffic circulation plan. A supporting geospatial engineer team provides most of this
information. Engineer reconnaissance obtains necessary information not contained in existing geospatial
databases.
14-48. The staff depicts the echelon traffic circulation plan on overlays using transportation control
measures. The traffic circulation plan considers—
* The most restrictive route features and route designations.
* Direction of movement over each route.
* Location of boundaries, units, highway regulation points, TCPs, and principal supply points.
* Major geographic features.
* Routes designated for one-way traffic.
* Separate routes for sustainment and tactical units. |
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* Current data on traffic regulations and control restrictions, obstructions, detours, defiles,
capacities, surface conditions, and enemy activities that affect the highway net.
14-49. The provost marshal prepares a traffic control plan from information contained in the traffic
circulation plan. The traffic control plan is normally prepared in the form of an overlay. Units use available
aviation elements, movement regulating teams, and military police units to assist in traffic control, but they
can assign this mission to other elements, such as battalion scout platoons.
PREPARING A TROOP MOVEMENT
14-50. Reconnaissance precedes unit movement. Before a unit starts any march, a reconnaissance element
from that unit reconnoiters the route from its current location to the SP and determines how long it will take
the unit to reach the SP. This reconnaissance element continues beyond the SP and carefully examines the
route’s trafficability, including the impact of weather, road surfaces, and terrain and civil considerations, such
as local nation use. This reconnaissance also includes alternative routes and choke points, such as defiles,
bridges, and fords, which could slow the march. This reconnaissance element complements map and technical
reconnaissance and provides units with important information about the terrain, obstacles, and potential
enemy forces in the area. Units then establish TCPs at critical locations or mark important information to
avoid confusion.
14-51. A quartering party often accompanies reconnaissance elements to mark routes and BPs. The
quartering party may also secure new positions with observation posts or limited forces until the unit
conducting the movement arrives.
14-52. The unit begins a tactical movement, such as an approach march, fully supplied. The unit refuels at
every opportunity, such as at halts and on arrival at the final destination. The transportation of fuel and the
security of existing stockpiles are major factors in any mounted movement. Commanders may choose to
conduct a refuel on the move to extend the range of the unit’s vehicles. Refuel on the move is a technique
where units position tankers just off the route to refuel vehicles rapidly. Such refueling provides only
established quantities necessary to extend the vehicles’ range to the desired distance. The type and method
of movement selected will determine the need for pre-positioned sustainment assets to conduct rapid and
efficient refueling and resupply.
EXECUTING A TROOP MOVEMENT
14-53. A unit’s ability to move depends on its march discipline and ability to maintain required movement
standards and procedures as prescribed by its movement SOP and movement order. This includes staying on
the route and maintaining start, passage, and clear times. March discipline is essential throughout the
movement. Any deviation from the movement order may interfere with the movements of other units and
may have serious consequences. However, march discipline can only be maintained with established
movement control.
14-54. Movement control is the dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating
movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications
to sustain land forces (ADP 4-0). It is on a continuum involving coordinating and integrating logistics,
movement information, and programs that span all the levels of warfare. The balancing of requirements
against capabilities and assigning resources based on the commander’s priorities guide the conduct of
movement control. Movement control gives commanders the ability to deconflict the movement of units—
troop movement—and the distribution of supplies and services inherent in sustainment.
14-55. Units may not move across boundaries into another unit’s assigned area without receiving clearance
from the owning unit. The designation, maintenance, route security, and control of movement along routes
in an assigned area are the responsibility of the owning unit unless the higher echelon’s coordinating
instructions direct otherwise. An example is when one or more routes are reserved for the exclusive use of a
combined arms battalion operating forward of a BCT as a guard force. (See ATP 4-16 for a more information
on movement control and the establishment of route synchronization measures.)
14-56. The strength and composition of the moving unit’s security elements vary depending on the mission
variables. Units employ organic assets and supporting security assets to protect forces from enemy activities. |
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They position them to the front, rear, flanks, and above, of formations while moving and at the halt to provide
all around security for the main body. Units can also enhance security by adopting a march formation and
movement technique that facilitates applying combat power in the direction enemy contact is expected.
14-57. Higher echelon sustainment organizations may support some tactical movements. When the
situation permits, sustainment organizations establish maintenance, ambulance exchange, and supply points
along the route to support the movement. While procedures, amounts, and types of external support vary,
each sustainment organization ensures that these sites are operational at the designated times and locations.
External sustainment along the route may include aeromedical evacuation, maintenance, water, petroleum,
oils, and lubricants. Maintenance sites generally consist of maintenance collection points where disabled
vehicles can be moved for limited maintenance and Class IX supplies. Vehicles unable to continue the
movement remain at maintenance collection points and join their parent organization when repaired. The
troop movement is complete when the last march unit clears the RP. |
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Relief in Place
This chapter discusses the general considerations of conducting a relief in place. It then
discusses the organization of forces, control measures, planning, and preparation
associated with a relief in place. Lastly, this chapter discusses the execution of a relief
in place.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF A RELIEF IN PLACE
15-1. Units conduct a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat
effectiveness of committed force. The higher echelon headquarters directs when and where to conduct the
relief and establishes the appropriate control measures. A relief may serve to free the relieved unit for other
tasks such as decontamination, reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, maintenance, specialized training,
resuming offensive operations, or as part of a deception operation. For example, the enemy’s reaction to
friendly forces conducting a relief may cause it to move reserves from an area where the friendly commander
wants to conduct a penetration.
15-2. A relief in place is an operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is
replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and
the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3). In this operation, the
responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned area transfer to the incoming unit.
The three variations of a relief are sequential, simultaneous, or staggered:
* A sequential relief in place occurs when each element within the relieved unit is relieved in
succession, from right to left, left to right, front to rear, or rear to front (ADP 3-90).
* A simultaneous relief in place occurs when all elements are relieved at the same time (ADP 3-90).
* A staggered relief in place occurs when each element is relieved in a sequence determined by the
tactical situation, not its geographical orientation (ADP 3-90).
15-3. Simultaneous relief takes the least time to execute but is more easily detected by enemy forces.
Sequential or staggered reliefs can occur over a significant amount of time. These three relief techniques can
occur regardless of the type of operation in which the unit is participating.
15-4. A relief in place is characterized as either deliberate or hasty, depending on the amount of planning
and preparations associated with the relief in place. The major differences are the depth and detail of planning
and, potentially, the execution time. Detailed planning generally facilitates shorter execution time by
determining exactly what units need to do and the resources needed to accomplish the mission. Deliberate
planning allows commanders and staffs to identify, develop, and coordinate solutions to potential problems
before they occur and to ensure the availability of resources when and where needed.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR A RELIEF IN PLACE
15-5. When possible, both units involved in a relief in place should be of similar type—such as Armor
company or light infantry battalion—and task-organized to help maintain operations security. If not, the
incoming commander decides on which positions to man, which to not man, and where to establish new
positions. The incoming unit assumes the same task organization as the outgoing unit but adjusts it based on
its modified tables of organization and equipment. It assigns responsibilities and deploys in a configuration
similar to the outgoing unit.
15-6. The incoming unit establishes advance parties to conduct detailed coordination and preparations for
the operation, down to the company level and possibly to the platoon level. These advance parties infiltrate |
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forward to avoid detection. They normally include the echelon’s tactical command post, which co-locates
with the main command post of the outgoing unit. Commanders may also attach liaison personnel to
subordinate units to ensure a smooth transition between units.
CONTROL MEASURES FOR A RELIEF IN PLACE
15-7. Control measures associated with a relief in place are generally restrictive to prevent fratricide. At a
minimum, these measures include the assigned area with its associated boundaries and current positions.
Other graphics to help with the coordination of the relief in place include—
* Point control measures such as coordination points, contact points, start points, and release points.
* Movement control measures such as routes, passage lanes, and gaps.
* Assembly areas.
* Fire support coordination measures such as target reference points and engagement areas and
defensive direct fire control measures, such as TRPs and engagement areas.
Units may use any additional graphic control measures necessary to prevent fratricide and to control a relief
in place. Figure 15-1 depicts an example brigade relief in place.
Figure 15-1. Example of a brigade relief in place
PLANNING A RELIEF IN PLACE
15-8. Once ordered to conduct a relief in place, the incoming unit contacts the outgoing unit. If possible,
they coordinate to co-locate their command posts to facilitate coordination between the two units. If the
outgoing unit’s forward elements can defend the assigned area, the incoming unit executes the relief in place
from the rear to the front. This facilitates movement and terrain management.
15-9. In a deliberate relief, units exchange plans and liaison personnel, conduct briefings, perform detailed
reconnaissance, and publish orders with detailed instructions. In a hasty relief, commanders abbreviate the
planning process and control execution. In both cases, the outgoing unit designates liaison personnel from its |
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combat, functional, and multifunctional support and sustainment elements to remain with the incoming unit
until completing the necessary plans. The incoming unit receives current intelligence, operations, and
sustainment information from the outgoing unit as well as from common higher echelon headquarters,
adjacent units, and subordinate elements. The complexity of a relief in place requires extensive liaison and
reconnaissance. Exchanging information about enemy forces and civilian situations, friendly dispositions,
terrain analysis, and fire support and obstacle plans—coupled with reconnaissance—helps relieving units
plan and execute the mission.
15-10. The relief is a vulnerable operation. The units involved concentrate on security while preparing for
and executing the operation. The intent of the operation is to complete the relief without discovery by enemy
forces. Consequently, units typically plan reliefs for execution during periods of reduced visibility such as
night or fog. Concealing the relief from enemy forces is a primary concern when the unit conducts the relief
as part of an economy of force measure to free forces for other operations. Enemy forces should perceive
only one unit’s command structure in operation—the outgoing unit—until the operation is complete. This
requires a detailed knowledge of friendly vulnerabilities. If the enemy should detect the relief and attack
during the transition, the outgoing unit commander controls all units in the assigned area unless otherwise
specified in the operation order.
15-11. Generally, as soon as the mutual higher echelon headquarters issues the warning order, the
commander of the incoming unit co-locates the tactical command post—with the main command post of the
outgoing unit. At a minimum, the incoming unit establishes communications and liaison with the outgoing
unit. The warning order designates the time of relief, relieving and relieved units, and sequence of events. It
specifies the future missions of the outgoing unit, route priorities, any restrictions on advance parties, any
extraordinary security measures, and the time and place for issuing the complete order. During a relief in
place, commanders and leaders from the incoming unit conduct a reconnaissance of the area they are to
assume. The reconnaissance focuses on routes into the area, routes to positions, the positions themselves, the
current disposition of the outgoing unit, and any obstacles that could affect troop movement.
15-12. The two commanders of the units conducting the relief decide on a time or an event that initiates the
passage of command. This allows the smooth transition of command from one commander to another.
Normally, this occurs when the frontline subordinate commanders have assumed responsibility for their
respective assigned areas, and the incoming commander has established sufficient communications to control
the operation. Regardless of their parent organization, all units in the assigned area come under the
operational control of a single commander if the units come under attack or when a specified event occurs
during the relief.
15-13. The fire support coordinators establish FSCMs and identify artillery and other available fire support
units to support the relief. The incoming unit adopts the fire plan of the outgoing unit, and both units support
the relief. This maintains fire support if enemy forces detect the relief and try to exploit the situation. Units
plan their fires to deceive enemy forces and expedite the relief. Units also ensure that they maintain normal
activity patterns. For example, a unit continues to expend the same average number of artillery rounds per
day during the relief that it expended before the initiation of the relief. Units do not relieve fire support or
functional and multifunctional support and sustainment units at the same time as the maneuver units they
support. They relieve those organizations before or after the primary relief operation.
15-14. The relief plan specifies the method used in relieving artillery units. If terrain allows, incoming
artillery units do not occupy previously used firing positions. Instead, incoming firing units establish firing
positions near the firing positions of the outgoing unit and carefully integrate their fires with the relieved
unit. Occupying firing positions at night or during periods of poor visibility enhances OPSEC.
15-15. Units ensure air and missile defense units provide area coverage of the incoming forces. Typically,
air defense units focus their available assets at critical sites, such as identified choke points, BPs, assembly
areas, and command posts.
15-16. Handover of obstacles is a complex procedure. The incoming unit verifies the obstacle records of
the outgoing unit. Initially, the engineer priority is to provide mobility to the incoming unit. It focuses on the
routes and lanes leading into the assigned area. Once the relief occurs, priority of the mobility and
survivability effort transitions to support the incoming unit’s continuing mission. Units may require
additional engineer support to assist with survivability tasks to support the incoming force. |
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15-17. Force intermingling is inherent in a relief. The consequences of mutual interference between the
units and the complexity associated with such areas as traffic control, fire support coordination, obstacle
plans, and communications require close coordination among all headquarters involved. Commanders
establish early liaison between the incoming and outgoing forces. The relief plan also addresses the relief in
place of these computer networks and information systems.
15-18. The incoming unit is responsible for all sustainment operations. As the support elements of the
outgoing unit displace, they leave the incoming unit supply stocks based on previous coordination. If the
units conducting the relief have different modified tables of organization and equipment, units conduct a
mission analysis to determine the method the relieving unit will use to meet its responsibilities and the
weapons systems it will use. The unit staff must determine any special support requirements the incoming
unit will have and address supporting those requirements with the available supporting sustainment
organizations. The unit sustainment staff ensures that both commanders are aware of constraints that may
affect the incoming unit. The headquarters of the outgoing unit coordinates traffic movement into and out of
the assigned area.
PREPARING FOR A RELIEF IN PLACE
15-19. Units conceal the relief from enemy forces for as long as possible. At the first indication that a relief
is necessary, which is usually the warning order for the incoming unit, both the outgoing and incoming units
review their OPSEC plans and procedures. Units may use military deception measures when conducting a
relief in place to maintain secrecy. To maintain security during a relief in place, the incoming unit makes
maximum use of the outgoing unit’s radio networks and operators. Both units involved in the relief operate
on the command frequencies and encryption variables of the combat net radios of the outgoing unit at all
levels.
15-20. The units conducting a relief in place conduct rehearsals to discover any weaknesses in the plan and
familiarize all elements of both forces with the plan. Finding time for rehearsals requires commanders and
staffs to focus on time management.
15-21. Reconnaissance elements of the incoming unit precede its movement with a route reconnaissance of
the assembly area. They conduct reconnaissance of the routes leading from the assembly areas to the positions
of the outgoing unit. The commander of the incoming unit normally conducts a leader’s reconnaissance
before starting the operation.
15-22. While the units are conducting the relief in place, their common higher headquarters and other units
continue actions to mask the relief and prevent enemy forces from detecting or interfering with the relief.
These include using demonstrations, feints, smoke, and indirect fires.
EXECUTING A RELIEF IN PLACE
15-23. Units strive to conceal the relief from enemy forces. For example, during a sequential or staggered
relief, the incoming unit may occupy the same positions as the outgoing unit. Alternatively, the incoming
unit may establish positions near the outgoing unit. However, occupying different positions makes early
discovery by enemy forces more likely. Any increase in activity in forward positions can reveal the relief to
enemy forces. Information-collection efforts focus on establishing if enemy forces have discovered the relief
before its completion.
15-24. An enemy force usually detects a relief effort from the increased activity from the movement of the
incoming and outgoing units by Soldiers and equipment moving into and out of positions. Additionally, after
any period of combat, differences in the types and amount of equipment exist between the incoming unit and
the outgoing unit even if they have the same modified tables of organization and equipment. These
differences can also reveal the relief to enemy forces. The two units establish guidelines for exchanging
compatible equipment and supplies to limit these differences. It may be necessary to exchange certain
weapons, supplies, equipment, and occasionally, vehicles between units. When major differences in the
number of combat systems between the units exist—for example, when a tank-heavy task force relieves a
mechanized infantry task force—inoperable equipment or vehicle decoys may assist in hiding the change of
units. |
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15-25. In a simultaneous relief, the incoming unit begins moving from its current location to assembly areas
in the assigned area of the outgoing unit. Once the relief begins, all elements involved execute the relief as
quickly as possible. Both units are vulnerable to enemy attack because of the concentration, movement, and
intermingling of forces in a simultaneous relief. Any unnecessary delay during execution provides enemy
forces additional time to acquire and engage the forces involved. All units in the assigned area start under the
operational control of the outgoing going unit commander until the time or event established in the operation
order when the responsibility and authorities change to the incoming unit commander. Usually, the trigger to
change from the outgoing commander to the incoming commander is when the incoming commander has
sufficient communications to control the operation and roughly two thirds of the personnel responsible or
security active in the assigned area.
15-26. As the first incoming element arrives from the assembly area to assume the position, it establishes a
screen of the outgoing unit’s positions as the tactical situation permits. The remainder of the incoming unit
moves forward to positions behind the outgoing unit. The incoming unit may use the outgoing unit’s alternate
and supplementary defensive positions to take advantage of any previous defensive preparations. At the
previously established time or event, passage of command takes place. At that point the commander of the
incoming unit informs all units involved in the relief of the passage of command.
15-27. The relieved unit continues to defend. The incoming unit’s advance parties coordinate procedures
for the rearward passage of the outgoing unit. On order, the outgoing unit begins withdrawing through the
incoming unit and moves to assembly areas. Crew-served weapons are usually the first elements relieved
after exchanging range cards. The incoming unit replaces them on a one for one basis to the maximum extent
possible to maintain the illusion of routine activity. The outgoing unit’s functional and multifunctional
support and sustainment assets assist both the outgoing and incoming units during this period.
15-28. A relief does not normally require artillery units to relieve weapon system for weapon system unless
the terrain limits the number of firing positions available. Generally, the outgoing unit’s artillery and other
fire support assets remain in place until all other outgoing elements displace and are available to reinforce
the fires of the incoming unit in case the enemy tries to interfere. If the purpose of the relief is to continue
the attack, the artillery of both forces generally remains in place to support the subsequent operation.
15-29. Multiple routes that allow only one-way traffic can simplify the forward and rearward movement of
both units. The incoming unit controls both units’ traffic management assets. Commanders use these assets
to help control unit and convoy movement on LOCs throughout their assigned area.
15-30. A relief in place may involve the relief of an allied or coalition multinational force. Units consider
these additional points when such reliefs occur:
* Dissimilar unit organizations may require special adjustments in assigned areas.
* Control of fire support may require special liaison.
* Language difficulties may require an increased use of guides and translators and require more time
to execute.
* Using outgoing unit communications requires special signal arrangements and additional
operators.
* Ammunition and equipment incompatibility may make exchanging assets more difficult. |
3-90 | 319 | Chapter 16
Passage of Lines
This chapter discusses the performance of forward and rearward passages of lines. It
first discusses general considerations, organization of forces, and control measures for
a passage of lines. Next, the chapter discusses planning considerations associated with
a passage of lines. Finally, it discusses a forward and rearward passage of lines.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A PASSAGE OF LINES
16-1. A passage of lines is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s
combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (JP 3-18). There are two
types: a forward passage of lines and a rearward passage of lines. Units perform a passage of lines to continue
their attacks or perform counterattack, retrograde, and security operations that involve advancing or
withdrawing through other units’ positions. A passage of lines potentially involves close combat. It involves
transferring the responsibility for the assigned area between two units. That transfer of authority usually
occurs when roughly two thirds of the passing force have moved through one or more passage points. The
headquarters directing the passage of lines is responsible for determining when the passage of lines starts and
ends. If not directed by higher authority, the stationary unit commander and the passing unit commanders
determine—by mutual agreement—the time to pass command. They disseminate this information to the
lowest levels of both organizations.
16-2. Units have several reasons for conducting a passage of lines. These reasons include to—
* Sustain offensive tempo.
* Maintain the viability of the defense by transferring responsibility from one unit to another.
* Transition from the performance of delay or security operation by one force to the defense.
* Transition a unit for another mission or task.
16-3. Units can conduct two variations of a passage of lines: a forward passage of lines or a rearward passage
of lines. A forward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving
toward the enemy (ADP 3-90). A rearward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s
positions while moving away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). Ideally, the passing unit’s operations do not
interfere with the stationary unit.
16-4. The headquarters directing the passage of lines is responsible for determining when the passage of
lines starts and finishes. Because of the difficulty and risks inherent in a passage of lines, the headquarters
directing the passage of lines usually positions C2 to oversee and deconflict the operation. The passing unit
is responsible for establishing communications with the stationary unit. The only exception to this is when
the passing unit is in direct contact, at which point to assist the unit in contact the stationary unit works to
establish communications. Ideally, the headquarters responsible for the passage of lines co-locates the
stationary force. If the headquarters responsible for the passage of lines is unable to co-locate with the
stationary unit, then the passing unit establishes communications with the stationary unit.
16-5. After receiving the warning order that directs a passage of lines, the passing unit’s commander and key
staff representatives generally co-locate with the command post of the stationary unit to facilitate in planning
the passage and establishing common situational understanding. If the passing unit cannot co-locate one of
its command posts to help plan the passage, it conducts extensive liaison with the stationary unit. |
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16-6. The planning focus for both the passing unit and the stationary unit is on operations following the
passage. While this occurs, the two units involved coordinate the following:
* The exchange of intelligence and combat information to include products and databases.
* Current friendly dispositions and tactical plans, especially deception and obstacle plans.
* Direct and indirect fires and close air support plans.
* Any graphic control measures and graphics not directed by the higher headquarters, such as
boundary changes, the battle handover lines, emergency logistics points, and assembly area and
firing positions for artillery, air defense, and other units.
* Long-range and short-range recognition symbols and vehicle markings to reduce the probability
of fratricide.
* Signal operating instruction details, such as call signs, frequencies, and recognition signals.
* Time and conditions for transfer control of the assigned areas from one headquarters to the other,
if not previously established.
* Provisions for movement control, including contact points, start and release points, primary and
alternate routes, route selection, priorities for using routes and facilities, passage points, and
provision for guides.
* Reconnaissance by elements of the passing unit.
* Security measures during the passage, including nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance
or biological detection systems.
* Fires, obscurants, and any other combat sustainment provided by the stationary unit.
* Measures to reduce both units’ vulnerability to attack by enemy weapons of mass destruction.
* Operations security measures required before or during the passage.
* Allocation of terrain for use by the passing force.
* Air defense cover—up to and forward of the battle handover line.
* Sustainment support for the passing unit provided by the stationary unit, especially fuel,
maintenance, and medical treatment.
* Population of icons within computer systems that track friendly system and unit locations to
increase situational awareness and reduce the probability of friendly fire incidents.
* Detailed isolated Soldier guidance.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR A PASSAGE OF LINES
16-7. A unit may participate in a passage of lines as either the passing or the stationary force. Performance
of a passage of lines does not require a special task organization with the exception that the stationary force
provides guides and sustainment assets to expedite the movement of the passing force. Both the passing and
stationary forces maintain their previous combat organization during the passage. The stationary unit
conducts operations against enemy forces that can interfere with the passage if it has the capability to do so.
However, operations directed against enemy forces may be the responsibility of a higher echelon, depending
on the echelon at which the passage takes place.
16-8. A forward passing unit’s order of march is generally reconnaissance and security elements first. The
main body moves next, followed by functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements. The
overall headquarters integrates artillery and engineers into the order of march based on the mission variables.
The passing unit reverses this order of march in a rearward passage of lines. Attack helicopters and armed
UASs are useful in providing security to the passing force.
CONTROL MEASURES FOR A PASSAGE OF LINES
16-9. Control measures associated with a passage of lines are generally restrictive to prevent fratricide. At a
minimum, they include:
* Assigned area.
* Assembly areas.
* Attack positions. |
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* BHL.
* Contact points.
* Passage points.
* Passage lanes
* Routes.
* Gaps.
* Phase lines.
* Recognition signals.
* The headquarters directing the passage of lines designates or recommends:
* Routes.
* Start and end times for the passage of lines.
Units may also use SPs, RPs, FSCMs such as CFLs, and other control measures as necessary to conduct this
operation. Figure 16-1 depicts these control measures.
Figure 16-1. Control measures associated with a rearward passage of lines
16-10. The stationary unit establishes the necessary graphic control measures for the passage after
coordination with the passing unit commander. The stationary unit establishes these measures because it
controls the terrain. It knows the location of its obstacles and the tactical plan. In some cases, the higher
echelon headquarters directing the passage may have previously established the necessary control measures.
If the control measures dictated by the higher echelon headquarters are not sufficient—because they do not
contain enough passage points, lanes, and so forth—the two units can agree to add the necessary measures
and report to higher the additional control measures. |
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16-11. A passage point is a designated place where passing units pass through the stationary unit. (See
paragraph A-32 for more information and symbol.) The location of this point is where the commander wants
subordinate units to execute a passage of lines. In a forward passage of lines, the passage point marks the
location where stationary force restrictions placed on the passing unit no longer bind the actions of the passing
unit. On the other hand, in a rearward passage of lines, the passage point marks the location where the
stationary unit can restrict the movement and maneuver of the passing force. Between the contact point and
the release point, the stationary unit controls the passing force’s movement.
16-12. A passage lane is a lane through an enemy or friendly obstacle that provides safe passage for a
passing force. (See paragraph A-30 for more information and symbol). The lane may be cleared, including
being reduced and proofed, as part of a breach operation, or it may be included as part of the design of a
friendly obstacle. It is a clear route through an obstacle. Passage lanes normally end where a route begins.
That route should allow the passing unit to move rapidly through the stationary unit’s area.
PLANNING A PASSAGE OF LINES
16-13. As with any activity involving transferred combat responsibility from one unit to another, the
complex nature of a passage of lines involves risk. The passage of lines is either hasty or deliberate. In a
hasty passage of lines, commanders use verbal orders. In a deliberate passage of lines, both the stationary
and moving force have time to—
* Exchange plans, intelligence, databases, and liaison personnel.
* Conduct reconnaissance.
* Publish written orders.
* Conduct briefings and rehearsals.
16-14. The higher commander directing the passage of lines is responsible for designating—
* Subsequent missions for both forces.
* When and under what conditions passage of command takes place.
* Start and end times for the passage.
* Contact points between the units involved.
* Any necessary common control measures.
That higher echelon commander normally establishes this designated information in an order directing the
passage. Close coordination and understanding between the units are essential in the absence of higher
guidance.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
16-15. Units plan their passages of lines to maintain enemy contact and provide constant fires on enemy
forces. They reduce risk and ensure synchronization through detailed planning and centralized execution.
The need for positive control increases during the passage because of the intermingling of passing and
stationary forces. The passage requires close coordination, clearly understood control measures, and liaison
among all headquarters and echelons involved in the passage. Clear identification of the moment or event
that causes one force to assume responsibility for the assigned area from another is vital to successfully
performing this task.
16-16. A passage of lines requires clear determination of responsibilities. During a passage of lines, two
parallel chains of command operate simultaneously in one area, and this may cause confusion. The passing
unit’s command posts may co-locate at the stationary unit’s command post after receiving the warning order.
This co-location reduces the risk associated with a passage because it makes it easier to coordinate between
the two units. It facilitates planning the passage and establishing common situational understanding. If the
passing unit cannot co-locate one of its command posts to help plan the passage, it conducts extensive liaison
with the stationary unit. Following completion of the passage, the planning focus for both units is on their
operations.
16-17. Passing forces focus their planning efforts on two general areas: coordination with stationary forces
and guidance to their subordinate units performing these passages. These planning efforts occur |
3-90 | 323 | Passage of Lines
simultaneously. Passing forces’ plans address necessary branches and sequels in case enemy forces attack
them during the execution of their passages to prevent degrading friendly maneuver.
16-18. The passage of lines requires effective communication between passing and stationary forces. Units
build redundancy of communication signals and means into their passage plans. They also designate contact
points to ensure effective communication between these forces at the lowest possible tactical level.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
16-19. The stationary unit identifies multiple routes through its assigned area. The passing unit begins
reconnaissance of these routes as soon as possible. The stationary unit physically shows all obstacles, routes,
and gaps through them to the passing unit. It provides guides for the passing unit—especially through
obstacles—and occupies contact points and passage points. The passing unit begins to reconnoiter its routes
to the established contact points with the stationary unit’s troops. The stationary unit establishes a security
area in which responsibility transitions from the stationary force to the moving force. Normally, a BHL
designates the forward edge of this area. The BHL is within direct fire range and observed indirect fire range
of the stationary force.
16-20. Passing unit commanders prefer to perform their passages through gaps in stationary unit positions
rather than through lanes or routes that traverse those positions. This reduces the vulnerability of both passing
and stationary units resulting from concentrating systems when units pass directly through the positions of
other units. It also avoids the danger associated with concentrating passing units into passage lanes.
16-21. Table 16-1 depicts the minimum number of passage lanes a BCT requires to execute a passage of
lines. The routes and lanes should provide cover, concealment, and rapid movement of the passing force.
Units may designate alternative routes and lanes for CBRN-contaminated elements of the moving force.
These lanes disrupt the combat capability of the stationary unit to the minimal possible amount. If the terrain
and enemy situation allow, units seek additional lanes to speed the process.
Table 16-1. Brigade Combat Team passage lane requirements
Brigade Combat Team Minimum Passage Lanes
Forward Passage of Lines 2
Rearward Passage of Lines 1
In any passage of lines, a BCT needs at least one additional
lane for its tactical vehicles
16-22. Passing units normally have priority of route use to and within stationary unit assigned areas.
Clearing and maintaining passage routes up to the BHL are the responsibility of the stationary force.
Stationary forces provide passing forces with obstacle overlays. Passing units prepare to help maintain these
routes, and they position their engineer equipment accordingly. Stationary units control traffic within their
assigned areas until passing units assume control. Passing units augment the traffic control capabilities of
stationary units as required during the passage.
INTELLIGENCE
16-23. Prior to a passage of lines, the stationary unit’s intelligence staff must exchange all intelligence
products and databases with the intelligence staff of the passing force. This intelligence includes known and
suspected enemy locations, enemy unit strengths, and enemy activity focusing on the previous 72 hours.
16-24. In a forward passage of lines information collection assets are primarily tasked to support offensive
operations following passage of lines completion. In a rearward passage of lines information collection assets
are primarily tasked to support defensive operations following passage of lines completion.
FIRES
16-25. Generally, the stationary unit commander controls the allocation of firing positions until the
execution of the BHL. The fires cells of the stationary and the passing units agree on the allocation of firing
positions. These positions are far enough forward to support the performance of the passage without having |
3-90 | 324 | Chapter 16
to displace artillery assets during critical stages of the passage. Ideally, enemy forces have not previously
identified these positions.
16-26. Detailed air and missile defense planning is essential. Passing units tend to move slowly and often
in some type of column formation during their passage. Passing and stationary unit vehicle congestion
presents lucrative targets to enemy aircraft and missiles. Dissemination of early warning and airspace control
information reduces the risk of fratricide to friendly aviation assets while increasing the probability of the
timely detection of enemy aircraft and missiles. Strict weapons control status among pilots and air and missile
defense units is critical, especially during limited visibility.
SUSTAINMENT AND PROTECTION
16-27. Stationary forces furnish passing forces with necessary assistance (within their capabilities) as far
forward as possible, but behind the BHL. Staffs can coordinate this assistance in advance or provide it on an
emergency basis. The types of assistance typically provided includes—
* Evacuating casualties and detainees.
* Using areas and facilities such as water points and medical facilities.
* Controlling routes and traffic management.
* Recovering disabled vehicles and equipment.
* Controlling dislocated civilians.
This assistance expedites the passage of lines.
FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES
16-28. The purpose of a forward passage of lines is to move forces forward to conduct offensive operations.
Units performing forward passages of lines maintain enemy contact while allowing the relief of previously
committed forces. Stationary units control and secure their assigned areas far enough to their front that
moving units can pass through them and deploy into movement formations prior to those moving units
making enemy contact. Generally, stationary units support passing units with direct fires until those passing
units mask those direct fires. Stationary units continue providing fire support to passing units until those
passing units move beyond the range of those systems. Stationary units secure the lines of departure of
forward passing units until these later units can assume those responsibilities. The boundaries of forward
passing units after they complete their passage do not have to coincide with the boundaries of stationary units.
Figure 16-2 depicts a forward passage of lines. |
3-90 | 325 | Passage of Lines
Figure 16-2. Forward passage of lines
PLANNING A FORWARD PASSAGE
16-29. Planning considerations discussed in paragraphs 16-13 through 16-27 apply during forward passage
of lines. Close coordination between the passing and stationary force is crucial to enable the successful
execution of the forward passage and subsequent transfer of responsibility. The stationary force controls and
secures the assigned area far enough to its front that the moving force can pass through the stationary force
and reform into a combat formation before contact with an enemy force. Generally, passing units assume
control of their respective assigned areas forward of the BHL after two-thirds of forward passing combat
elements move through their passage points.
PREPARING A FORWARD PASSAGE
16-30. Passing units perform reconnaissance from their current locations to their designated assembly areas
for the passage of lines. These assembly areas are generally located to the rear of stationary units. These
passing units occupy their designated assembly areas after completing this reconnaissance. Commanders
task-organize their passing units in those assembly areas for their subsequent missions before initiating their
forward passages of lines. Units preparing for forward passages of lines avoid regrouping in their attack
positions.
EXECUTING A FORWARD PASSAGE
16-31. Ideally, forward passing forces move in their desired movement formations as move through gaps
in stationary unit positions without halting. This minimizes the time both forces are concentrated in forward
areas and makes them less vulnerable to enemy attack. If not, they deploy to their desired movement
formation as soon as they can. |
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16-32. Passages of lines occur rapidly once initiated. Units perform a passage of lines when and where
enemy forces have the least capability to detect it, such as at night or during periods of reduced visibility.
Units consider using obscuration to screen friendly movement in any passage of lines, even at night. Each
forward passing force’s command post passes through the stationary force’s lines as soon as possible after
its lead elements complete their forward passage and locates where it can best control operations.
16-33. Direct fire support by stationary forces ends when combat elements of passing forces, including their
reserves, mask that support or move beyond direct fire range. However, artillery, air defense, and other long-
range systems continue to support forward passing forces until previously designated events occur or a higher
echelon headquarters directs them to conduct another mission.
16-34. Stationary forces provide security throughout the performance of the forward passages of lines. The
movement of the forward passing main body units begin from their assembly areas to attack positions.
Passing forces conduct their final preparations for the passage of lines and the attack in those attack positions.
Passing forces move to and occupy attack positions when enemy observation is unlikely. Stationary forces
clear any obstacles from designated passage gaps, lanes, or routes. They guide passing force elements from
contact points through passage points.
16-35. Stationary forces’ direct and indirect fire assets normally support the movement of passing forces.
Commanders direct any supporting electromagnetic warfare capabilities—especially electromagnetic
attack—against enemy command and control nodes. Their objective is to disrupt the enemy force’s
dissemination of information and ability to react effectively to friendly operations. Any preparation or
covering fires coincide with the movement of passing forces from their attack positions to passage lanes.
16-36. After the forward moving unit commander assumes responsibility for the area, that commander
coordinates all fire support. Depending on the situation, the passing commander may continue to use only
the fire support assets of the stationary force until the passage of lines is complete. This allows forward
passing force fire support assets to move forward with the rest of their unit and conserve their ammunition
for later expenditures. On passage of responsibility, the passing unit commander also assumes control of fire
forward of the BHL. For example, the passing unit commander moves the CFL forward to conform to the
movement of forward security elements.
16-37. The stationary unit provides the passing unit with the previously coordinated sustainment as far
forward as possible. The stationary unit concentrates on providing the passing unit with emergency medical,
recovery, and fuel supplies to enable the passing unit to move through the stationary unit’s positions rapidly.
16-38. The principles of a forward passage of lines are the same when dissimilar forces, such as dismounted
infantry and armored forces, are involved. However, the execution differs in that the type and amount of
assistance provided by stationary forces changes because of the different capabilities and requirements of
these different types of forces. The higher echelon commander ordering the passage can direct the provision
of additional resources from other sources to meet the assistance requirements of forward passing forces.
REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES
16-39. A rearward passage of lines is similar in concept to a forward passage of lines. It continues the
defense, maintaining enemy contact while allowing for recovery of security or other forward deployed forces.
Units may or may not conduct this operation under enemy pressure.
PLANNING A REARWARD PASSAGE
16-40. The planning considerations discussed in paragraphs 16-13 through 16-27 continue to apply during
a rearward passage of lines. However, rearward movement is likely to be more difficult because—
* The enemy force probably has the initiative, which tends to reduce the time available to perform
liaison, reconnoiter, and make detailed plans.
* If rearward moving forces have been in action, Soldiers are tired and possibly disorganized.
* The enemy force may be applying pressure on the passing force.
* Possible intermixing of friendly and enemy forces increases the probability of fratricide. |
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16-41. Close coordination between the passing and stationary force is crucial to successful execution of the
rearward passage and subsequent transfer of responsibility. This requirement for close coordination is even
more critical when the tactical situation results in a staggered or incremental rearward passage across an
assigned area. Passing force commanders relinquish control of their subordinate elements remaining in
contact at the time of the transfer of responsibility to stationary force commanders. Generally, stationary units
assume control of their respective assigned areas forward of the BHL after two-thirds of rearward passing
combat elements move through their passage points.
PREPARING A REARWARD PASSAGE
16-42. Rearward passing forces begin coordination with those stationary forces through which they are
going to move after receiving their warning orders. The command posts of both forces involved move to a
position where they can co-locate as part of the preparations for the rearward passage.
16-43. The commanders of these forces coordinate the same details as those outlined for a forward passage
of lines. If necessary, fire support assets from the stationary force occupy positions forward of their primary
positions to give maximum coverage of forces to the rearward moving unit. The two staffs coordinate those
control measures necessary to support retrograde operations and their associated rearward passage of lines.
(See paragraphs 16-9 through 16-12 for a discussion of control measures.) These two commanders establish
a probable time to initiate passage.
EXECUTING A REARWARD PASSAGE
16-44. Passing forces maintain command of their subordinate elements throughout their retrograde and
rearward passage. The normal order of march in a rearward passage of lines is sustainment elements, main
command post, functional and multifunctional support elements, tactical command post, and combat units.
Passage points mark the locations where rearward passing forces come under the control of restrictions placed
by stationary forces. If enemy forces continue to press their attacks, passing forces continue to control
operations from the co-located command posts while stationary forces monitor and control the passage of
lines in their assigned areas until battle handover occurs. Passing force command posts pass through the lines
as soon as possible after the lead elements complete their passage. On passage of command, stationary forces
assume control of ongoing operations.
16-45. Stationary forces provide rearward passing forces with as much assistance as possible, just as they
do during a forward passage of lines. The provision of indirect and direct fire support to passing forces by
stationary forces is crucial for the success of these passages. This is especially important in covering the
withdrawal of detachments left in contact during a delay. Stationary force fire support assets answer calls for
fire from the passing force until battle handover occurs. The passing force’s fire support assets echelon
rearward to provide continuous fire support for the passing force until it can successfully disengage.
Stationary forces initiate and clear calls for all fires forward of their locations once passing forces transfer
control operations to them. The same procedure applies to any direct support air and missile defense assets.
16-46. Stationary forces ensure that passing forces are able to move through passage routes and lanes. They
employ available engineer assets to maintain these routes and lanes for use by passing forces. Stationary
force commanders shift these assets to close gaps in their obstacles and defensive positions once passing
forces and their forward security elements disengage and withdraw through their forward security areas. |
3-90 | 329 | Chapter 17
Countermobility
Countermobility operations is a combined arms activity. This chapter addresses the
general considerations for countermobility, terrain reinforcement, obstacle intent,
obstacle employment principles, and obstacle emplacement.
GENERAL COUNTERMOBILITY CONSIDERATIONS
17-1. Countermobility is a set of combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural and man-
made obstacles to prevent the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver (ATP 3-90.8/MCTP 3-34B). The
primary purposes of countermobility are to shape enemy movement and maneuver and to prevent the enemy
from gaining a position of advantage. Countermobility directly supports offensive and defensive operations,
but only indirectly supports stability and defense support of civil authorities tasks. Offensive and defensive
operations are always combined with stability operations; defense support of civil authorities tasks are
typically only performed in support of homeland defense.
17-2. Countermobility can be confused with other tasks or activities that may also employ obstacles. An
obstacle is any barrier designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement and maneuver, and
to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment (JP 3-15). Antiterrorism, physical security,
survivability, safety, and traffic operations often employ obstacles such as perimeter fencing, concrete walls,
and vehicular barriers. However, only countermobility involves tactical obstacle employment with effects
directly linked to tactical mission tasks. Another discernible difference of countermobility is that it is a
combined arms activity conducted to directly support offensive and defensive operations, which may be
combined with stability and defense support of civil authorities tasks.
17-3. Countermobility enables combined arms forces to shape enemy movement and maneuver and prevent
the enemy from gaining a position of advantage. In the offense, countermobility is conducted to help isolate
objectives and prevent the enemy from repositioning, reinforcing, and counterattacking. It enables flank
protection along an axis of advance or as an integrated economy-of-force effort to provide general flank
security. In the defense, countermobility disrupts enemy attack formations and enables friendly forces to
defeat the enemy in detail. Obstacles help channel the enemy into engagement areas throughout and protect
the flanks of friendly forces conducting a counterattack.
17-4. In support of offensive operations, countermobility may be required to defend a lodgment and protect
selected sites and positions from which combat power must be generated and sustained. The unit’s options
for emplacing reinforcing obstacles in the offense are often limited because of challenges in gaining early
access to much of the assigned area. This increases the importance of taking advantage of existing obstacles
and the natural restrictiveness of the terrain. It also increases the unit’s reliance on rapid obstacle
emplacement capabilities, especially remotely delivered obstacles to reinforce the terrain.
17-5. In support of defensive operations, countermobility operations use tactical obstacles to shape
engagements and maximize the effects of fires and use protective obstacles to provide close-in protection
around defensive positions. Protective obstacles help warn, prevent, and mitigate intrusion into critical fixed
sites such as assembly areas and sustainment sites, or a final enemy assault onto a unit position. Erecting
obstacles is also a critical supportive task to conducting denial operations. In the defense, earlier access to
more of the assigned areas typically provides units with the time and information to consider a broader range
of options for reinforcing the terrain. In addition to the rapid obstacle emplacement capabilities often used in
the offense, units can often use more time- and resource-intensive techniques to reinforce the terrain for
longer periods. This may or may not be the case in support of lodgments. Such techniques include mostly |
3-90 | 330 | Chapter 17
constructed obstacles and some demolition obstacles. During a retrograde, including security force passage,
the requirement for obstacle control will typically be increased.
17-6. Units must weigh the risks of employing obstacles, especially lethal obstacles, near civilians and
consider enhancing marking and restrictions to mitigate their risk. Units rely heavily on command-detonated,
self-deactivating, or nonexplosive obstacles to deny the enemy freedom of movement and provide close-in
protection. Denying enemy freedom of movement may involve disrupting the transportation of weapons and
supplies and the emplacement of explosive hazards along roads or routes. Networked munitions are ideal
when conducting countermobility in support defensive efforts around base camps and other critical fixed
sites and infrastructure.
17-7. The conduct of countermobility typically involves engineers and includes proper obstacle integration
with the maneuver plan, adherence to obstacle emplacement authority, and positive obstacle control.
Combined arms obstacle integration synchronizes countermobility into the concept of operations. Because
most obstacles have the potential to deny freedom of movement and maneuver to friendly forces and enemy
forces, it is critical that units properly weigh the risks and evaluate the trade-offs of employing various types
of obstacles. Countermobility includes the following tasks:
* Site obstacles.
* Construct, emplace, or detonate obstacles.
* Mark, report, and record obstacles.
* Maintain obstacle integration.
TERRAIN REINFORCEMENT
17-8. Units reinforce terrain by employing existing, reinforcing, tactical, and protective obstacles to prevent
the enemy from gaining a position of advantage. They take full advantage of the natural restrictiveness of the
existing terrain to minimize the time, effort, and materiel needed to achieve the desired effects and offset the
limited, available quantities of scatterable mines and networked munitions.
EXISTING OBSTACLES
17-9. Existing obstacles are inherent aspects of the terrain that impede movement and maneuver. Existing
obstacles may be natural (intractable soils, rivers, mountains, wooded areas) or manmade (enemy explosive
and nonexplosive obstacles and structures, including bridges, canals, railroads, and embankments associated
with them). Although not specifically designed or intended as an obstacle, structures may pose as an obstacle
based on existing characteristics or altered characteristics that result from combat operations or a catastrophic
event. Structures such as bridges and overpasses present an inherent impediment to mobility based on weight
and clearance restrictions. Existing obstacles are shown on the modified combined obstacle overlay (also
known as a MCOO) developed as part of the IPB process.
REINFORCING OBSTACLES
17-10. Reinforcing obstacles are those manmade obstacles that strengthen existing terrain to achieve a
desired effect. For U.S. forces, reinforcing obstacles on land consist of land mines, networked munitions, and
demolition and constructed obstacles:
* Land mines. A land mine is a munition on or near the ground or other surface area that is designed
to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle (ATP 3-90.8/MCTP
3-34B). Land mines can be employed in quantities within a specific area to form a minefield, or
they can be used individually to reinforce nonexplosive obstacles. Land mines fall into the two
general categories:
Nonpersistent. Nonpersistent land mines are capable of self-destructing or self-deactivating.
Land mines can be further defined as antivehicle or antipersonnel. They can be air-, artillery-
, or ground-delivered.
Persistent. Persistent land mines are not capable of self-destructing or self-deactivating. |
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Note. As of 1 January 2011, U.S. forces are no longer authorized to employ persistent (those that
are not self-destructing or self-deactivating) or nondetectable land mines.
* Networked munitions. Networked munitions are remotely controlled, interconnected, weapons
systems designed to provide rapidly emplaced ground-based countermobility and protection
capability through scalable application of lethal and nonlethal means (JP 3-15).
* Demolition obstacles. Demolition obstacles are created using explosives. Examples include
bridge or other structure demolition (rubble) and road craters. (See ATP 3-90.8/MCTP 3-34B for
more information on demolition obstacles.)
* Constructed obstacles. Constructed obstacles are created without the direct use of explosives.
Examples include wire obstacles, antivehicle ditches, or similar construction that typically
involves the use of heavy equipment. (See ATP 3-90.8/MCTP 3-34B for more information on
constructed obstacles.)
17-11. The use of some obstacles, specifically mines, is governed by U.S. law, U.S. policies, and
international treaties or agreements. The United States regards mines as lawful weapons when employed
according to accepted legal standards. These laws and policies are complex and subject to change; therefore,
it is essential that commanders coordinate with legal advisors when developing local rules of engagement
(ROE) and ensure that legal advisors review law and policies for legal sufficiency. (See JP 3-15 for more
information on the laws, agreements, and policies that are most significant to the employment of obstacles.)
TACTICAL OBSTACLES
17-12. The primary purposes of tactical obstacles are to shape enemy maneuver and to maximize the effects
of fires. Tactical obstacles directly attack the ability of a force to move, mass, and reinforce; therefore, they
affect the tempo of operations. Units integrate obstacles into the scheme of maneuver to enhance the effects
of fires. Preexisting obstacles that a unit reinforces and integrates with observation and fires may become
tactical obstacles. The types of tactical obstacles are clearly distinguished by the differences in execution
criteria. The three types are—
* Directed obstacles.
* Situational obstacles.
* Reserved obstacles.
17-13. A directed obstacle is an obstacle directed by a higher commander as a specified task to a subordinate
unit (ATP 3-90.8/MCTP 3-34B). The higher commander directs and resources these obstacles as specified
tasks to a subordinate unit. Units plan, prepare, and execute directed obstacles during the preparation of the
area of operations. Most tactical obstacles are directed obstacles.
17-14. A situational obstacle is an obstacle that a unit plans and possibly prepares prior to starting an
operation but does not execute unless specific criteria are met (ATP 3-90.8/MCTP 3-34B). Situational
obstacles are preplanned obstacles as part of a TAI. They provide the commander with flexibility for
emplacing tactical obstacles based on battlefield development.
17-15. A reserved obstacle is an obstacle of any type, for which the commander restricts execution authority
(ATP 3-90.8). The commander specifies a unit that is responsible for preparing, guarding, and executing
reserved-obstacle emplacement. Units execute reserved obstacles only on command of the authorized
commander or based on specific criteria identified by the commander. The purpose of a reserved obstacle is
to retain control over the mobility along an avenue of approach. Commanders use reserved obstacles when
failure to maintain control over the mobility along an avenue of approach will have disastrous effects on the
current battle or future operations.
PROTECTIVE OBSTACLES
17-16. Protective obstacles are employed to protect people, equipment, supplies, and facilities against
threats. Protective obstacles have two primary roles, defense and security: |
3-90 | 332 | Chapter 17
* Defense. Protective obstacles provide friendly forces with local, close-in protection. They prevent
the enemy from delivering a surprise assault from areas close to a position and are integrated with
FPFs to defeat the final assault of the enemy. Protective obstacles are employed to defeat mounted
and dismounted threats.
* Security. Protective obstacles are used to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against friendly forces
and critical fixed sites (such as air facilities, bases or base camps, critical infrastructure, and
sustainment sites). Protective obstacles used for security produce scalable effects that range from
lethal to nonlethal and are appropriate for the situation based on the ROE.
17-17. Protective obstacles are key enablers to survivability operations, physical security, and antiterrorism.
Units on the move rely on rapidly emplaced protective obstacles that units can quickly recover, deactivate,
or destroy. Stationary units continuously improve their security posture. (See ADP 3-37 for more information
on the use of obstacles in supporting protection tasks that are not considered countermobility tasks.)
OBSTACLE INTENT
17-18. Obstacle intent describes how obstacles support the commander’s concept of operations. Obstacle
intent consists of the—
* Target.
* Effect.
* Relative location.
TARGET
17-19. The target is the enemy force that the commander wants to affect with tactical obstacles. The
commander usually identifies the target in terms of the enemy size and type, the echelon, the avenue of
approach, or a combination of these things.
EFFECT
17-20. Tactical obstacles and fires—direct and indirect—manipulate the enemy in a way that supports the
commander’s intent and scheme of movement and maneuver (or scheme of maneuver). Obstacle effect
describes the effect that the commander wants the obstacles, combined with fires, to have on the enemy. The
obstacle effect—
* Drives integration.
* Focuses subordinate fires.
* Focuses obstacle effort.
* Multiplies firepower effects.
17-21. It is important to remember that obstacle effects occur because of the combined effects of fires and
obstacles, rather than from obstacles alone. Tactical obstacles produce one of the following effects (see
paragraphs 17-24 through 17-45 for protective obstacle effects):
* Block.
* Disrupt.
* Fix.
* Turn.
17-22. Each obstacle effect is graphically represented by an obstacle effect symbol, as shown in table 17-1.
Obstacle effect symbols are used as control measures for obstacle groups and as elements of the control
measures for obstacle zones and belts. During COA development, obstacle effect symbols are also used in
developing and showing the initial obstacle plan that supports each COA. |
3-90 | 333 | Countermobility
Table 17-1. Tactical obstacle effects
Function Template Example
Note. Symbols colored gray are used to help
explain how the control measure is used and
are not a part of the control measure.
Obstacle effect symbols
Obstacle effect describes the effect that the commander wants obstacles and
fires to have on the enemy (see ATP 3-90.8/MCTP 3-34B)
Block
An obstacle effect that
integrates fire planning
and obstacle effort to
stop an attacker along a
specific avenue of
approach or to prevent
the attacking force from
passing through an
engagement area.
Disrupt
An obstacle effect that
focuses fire planning
and obstacle effort to
cause the enemy to
break up its formation
and tempo, interrupt its
timetable, commit
breaching assets
prematurely, and attack
in a piecemeal effort.
Fix
An obstacle effect that
focuses fire planning
and obstacle effort to
slow an attacker’s
movement within a
specified area, normally
an engagement area.
Turn
An obstacle effect that
integrates fire planning
and obstacle effort to
divert an enemy
formation from one
avenue of approach to
an adjacent avenue of
approach or into an
engagement area.
17-23. Obstacle effects and their symbols resemble some of the tactical mission tasks and symbols
described in Appendix A. However, obstacle effects and obstacle effect symbols differ from tactical mission
tasks and tactical mission task symbols. Tactical mission task symbols are used during COA development to
show information (the what or why) about a friendly force action. Obstacle effect symbols are used during
COA development to show how obstacles will support each COA. Obstacle effects must support tactical
mission tasks, but the best way to do that may require designating an obstacle effect that differs from the
supported tactical mission task or placing it in a different location; for example, achieving the tactical mission
task fix in a specified location may require turn or block obstacle effects in front of, behind, or adjacent to |
3-90 | 334 | Chapter 17
that location depending on the effects of terrain. Similarly, the obstacle effect symbols in table 17-1 have
different orientation, meaning, and application than the tactical mission task symbols they resemble.
Block Effect
17-24. Block is an obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle efforts to stop an attacker along
a specific avenue of approach or to prevent the attacking force from passing through an engagement area. To
accomplish the block effect, the obstacles and fires must—
* Prevent the enemy from bypassing or breaching the obstacles.
* Maximize available standoff.
* Stop enemy forward movement.
17-25. Units consider obstacle protection when planning fire control measures. The first mission of the
overwatching force is to stop any bypassing or breaching attempt. They respond to any attempt to breach or
bypass with direct and indirect fires. Block obstacles stop enemy maneuver and cause the enemy to commit
breaching assets that can be destroyed by fire.
17-26. To support survivability, units position forces to provide standoff so that the force can survive. The
engagement area must cover the width of the entire avenue of approach. The maximum effective range of the
overwatching weapons minus the standoff distance limits the depth of the engagement area. The commander
positions forces so that they can mass interlocking fires across the entire avenue of approach. The defending
force must be able to concentrate all available fires within the obstacle group. Units array weapon systems in
depth based on their maximum effective ranges.
17-27. The success of a block obstacle is measured by its impact on the enemy advance, not by enemy
losses. The block effect is the most resource-intensive obstacle effect to achieve and is usually only limited
to critical points on the battlefield. Normally, the purposes of forces overwatching a block obstacle is to
defeat lead enemy units and cause the attacker to reconsider the deployment of follow-on forces.
Commanders allocate sufficient combat power to achieve all effects of the obstacle which demand protecting
the obstacle and defeating enemy forces encountering it.
17-28. Achieving the block effect requires the integration of complex obstacles—those that require more
than one reduction technique to create a lane—with massed fires to defeat the breaching effort of the attacking
force. Units array obstacles successively in a concentrated area. When the attacking force reduces one
obstacle integrated with massed fires, it encounters another obstacle integrated with massed fires. Obstacles
must defeat the mounted and dismounted breaching efforts of the attacking force. They must span the entire
width of the assembly area, allowing no bypass. Obstacles intended to prevent an attacking force from using
a specific assembly area should be readily visible to discourage further progress forward. Obstacles used to
prevent an attacking force from passing through an engagement area should be less visible to avoid
discouraging the enemy from entering the engagement area. Fires should be planned, not on the obstacles,
but on the locations where enemy forces will move to when they are blocked.
Disrupt Effect
17-29. Disrupt is an obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to
break up its formation and tempo, interrupt its timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in
a piecemeal effort. The disrupt effect also helps to deceive the enemy concerning the location of friendly
defensive positions, separate combat echelons, or separate combat forces from its logistics support. To
accomplish the disrupt effect, the obstacles and fires must—
* Cause the enemy to deploy early.
* Slow and disrupt part of the enemy force.
* Allow part of the enemy force to advance unimpeded.
17-30. Obstacles must normally attack half of the targeted avenue of approach to achieve the disrupt effect.
The obstacles should not require extensive resources for construction or emplacement. Units normally use
the disrupt effect beyond engagement areas, while being careful not to inadvertently discourage the enemy
from entering the engagement area. |
3-90 | 335 | Countermobility
17-31. Indirect fires and long-range direct fires are used to cause the enemy to change from a march
formation to a prebattle or attack formation, resulting in reduced closure speed and increased time to engage
the enemy in the engagement area. Generally, indirect fires alone will not force an enemy to deploy except
when dismounted.
17-32. Units plan suppression and neutralization indirect fire targets or groups on the obstacles in a disrupt
obstacle group. Indirect fires are used with the obstacles to slow the part of the enemy force that makes
contact with the obstacles. Units also use every means available to disrupt enemy command and control
throughout the enemy formation. Units use electromagnetic warfare, obscuration, and indirect fires to disrupt
the decision cycle of the enemy and increase the direct fire window on the unimpeded part of the enemy
force.
17-33. Units use target reference points to mass direct fires against the part of the enemy formation that is
not impeded by obstacles and indirect fires. Units do not execute those fires until the enemy force separates
from its parent formation. They use direct fire weapons that can deliver a lethal initial volley of fire. A quick
volley is critical if the enemy has good command and control and can react quickly to the disruption of its
formation. Disengagement criteria are also a consideration in weapons selection. If units plan a short
engagement, they choose a weapon system that can fire and maneuver without becoming decisively engaged.
If they expect a long engagement, they select a weapon system that can sustain rapid fire with sufficient
survivability to support the engagement.
17-34. Units plan fire control measures that allow for the shift of direct or indirect fires to the enemy that
are slowed by the obstacle or to the enemy bypassing the obstacle. Key leaders are positioned where they can
best assess the obstacle effect. If the enemy is rapidly breaching the obstacles, they may shift direct fires
against the enemy breaching assets. If a large force bypasses, units may shift all fires against the unimpeded
enemy to inflict maximum losses and then reposition friendly forces to subsequent positions.
Fix Effect
17-35. Fix is an obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s movement
within a specified area, normally an engagement area. The fix effect allows time to acquire, target, and
destroy the enemy with direct and indirect fires throughout the depth of an engagement area or avenue of
approach. The fix effect helps fires to defeat the enemy in detail or to gain the necessary time for forces to
reposition while inflicting maximum casualties. To accomplish the fix effect, the obstacles and fires must—
* Cause the enemy to deploy into attack formation early.
* Cause the enemy to advance slowly into the engagement area.
* Make the enemy fight in multiple directions within the engagement area.
17-36. Units specify the amount of time or effect that the combined effect of fires and obstacles must
achieve. The fix effect may generate the time necessary for the defending force to break contact and disengage
as the attacking force maneuvers into the area. To achieve the fix effect, units array obstacles in depth to
cause the attacking formation to react and breach repeatedly. The obstacles must influence the entire width
of the avenue of approach but not make the terrain impenetrable. The individual obstacles must look as if
they could be easily bypassed or reduced. Units combine obstacles that are clearly visible with others that are
unseen (such as obstacles on the reverse slope help to confuse the attacking force once it encounters the
obstacles).
17-37. Units plan artillery- and aviation-delivered fires forward of the obstacles to suppress or neutralize
the enemy. They synchronize indirect fires with long-range direct fires that cause the enemy to deploy out of
a march or a prebattle formation. If the enemy is in an attack formation, this allows obstacles and fires to
attack the full frontage of the enemy.
17-38. Initially, units’ orient fires on the enemy force as a whole; however, destroying enemy breaching
assets becomes increasingly important as the enemy continues to advance into the engagement area. To
maximize obstacle effect and inflict maximum losses on the enemy, the fire plan requires an increase in the
intensity of fires as the enemy advances. Units plan successive TRPs, integrated with obstacles closer to the
BPs, which trigger engagement by additional weapons. They vary the intensity of fires through fire control
to allow the enemy to continue a slowed advance. When the enemy fully commits, friendly forces complete
its destruction. |
3-90 | 336 | Chapter 17
17-39. Once the enemy commits in the engagement area, the fire plan causes the enemy to fight in as many
directions as possible. This serves to further slow its advance, disrupt its command and control, and reduce
its ability to mass, allowing friendly forces to provide interlocking fires with flank shots on individual targets.
Combining fires from multiple directions with the random orientation of individual obstacles further confuses
the attacker. For direct fires, units consider the use of TRPs and supplementary positions to reorient fires.
They also consider the use of protective obstacles to protect the force. The fire support officer and fire support
teams plan targets to hold the enemy in the engagement area and aim final protective fires on critical mobility
corridors that may let the enemy threaten friendly positions.
Turn Effect
17-40. Turn is an obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to divert an enemy
formation from one avenue of approach to an adjacent avenue of approach or into an engagement area. To
accomplish the turn effect, the obstacles and fires must—
* Prevent the enemy from bypassing or breaching the obstacle.
* Cause the enemy to bypass in the desired direction.
* Maintain pressure on the enemy throughout the turn and exploit its exposed flank.
17-41. Developing a turn obstacle requires mobility corridors and avenues of approach that are well defined
by restricted terrain. To achieve a turn effect, the obstacles must have a subtle orientation relative to the
approach of the attacking force. The obstacles and fires allow bypasses in the direction that is desired by the
friendly scheme of movement and maneuver (or scheme of maneuver). Obstacles at the start of the turn are
visible to the attacking force and look more complex than those in the direction of the turn.
17-42. The anchor point, the initial point of the turn, is where most turn obstacles fail. Therefore, it is critical
that units reinforce the anchor point with concentrated direct and indirect fires to achieve the turn effect.
Units normally anchor turn obstacle groups to restricted terrain or to a strong point. They approve fire support
coordination measures, which enable the focus of all available fires first at the anchor point. When the enemy
encounters the obstacle, the combination of fires, obstacles, and terrain must limit their ability to breach or
bypass at the anchor point.
17-43. Units plan an indirect fire target or group to turn the enemy away from the anchor point. They focus
enough direct fire assets to deal with the size of the enemy force expected at that point; for example, if an
enemy company is expected at the anchor point, then at least one friendly platoon should be allocated to mass
fires at that point. If the enemy breaches the obstacle at the anchor point, the turning effect could be lost—
compromising the friendly defensive plan.
17-44. The critical task in achieving the turn effect is to use obstacles and overwhelming fires to cause the
enemy to move in the direction that is desired by the friendly unit. As the engagement progresses, the friendly
force prevents enemy attempts to breach the obstacle by designating enemy breaching assets as priority
targets. Direct fire weapon systems are the primary means for destroying enemy breaching equipment.
Artillery- and aviation-delivered fires can attack individual targets, but they may be less timely. Plan indirect
fires—artillery and mortars—in front of, on top of, to the side of, and behind obstacles to maximize their
effect as combat multipliers. Developing fire control measures through the planning of NAIs, TAIs, triggers,
and targets to support obstacles in the obstacle group will make indirect fires more responsive and effective.
17-45. Units develop a fire plan with fire control measures that allow them to shift fires as necessary to
cover the turn effect. Direct and indirect fires shift in unison to attack and maintain pressure on the enemy
force’s flank. Fires covering the length of the turn effect are less focused than at the turn point. Company
commanders facilitate this by assigning platoon sectors of fire between TRPs. Units usually execute indirect
fires in groups instead of aiming at individual targets. Direct and indirect fires continue throughout the length
and depth of the turn effect. These fires simultaneously exploit the vulnerability created by the turn effect
and protect the integrity of the obstacles.
RELATIVE LOCATION
17-46. Relative location refers to the location of a tactical or protective obstacle in relation to maneuver or
fire control measures such as avenues of approach, BPs, or engagement areas. Engineers and other
countermobility planners describe planned obstacle locations in relation to maneuver or fire control measures |
3-90 | 337 | Countermobility
to help maneuver commanders visualize linkages between obstacles, fires, and maneuver and to ensure
obstacle integration.
OBSTACLES EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES
17-47. The basic employment principles for obstacles are—
* Support the maneuver commander’s plan.
* Integrate with observation and fires.
* Integrate with other obstacles.
* Employ in depth.
* Employ for surprise.
See ATP 3-90.8/MCTP 3-34B for more information on obstacle employment principles.
OBSTACLE EMPLACEMENT AUTHORITY
17-48. Obstacle emplacement authority is the authority to emplace reinforcing obstacles. Geographic
combatant commanders have the authority to emplace obstacles in their areas of responsibility within the
ROE. They may delegate emplacement authority to subordinate commanders, down to the lowest echelon
necessary to allow for maximum flexibility in executing tactical missions, while ensuring that the
employment of reinforcing obstacles is consistent with the ROE and supportive of current and future
operations. Commanders consider the particular system characteristics, including inherent hazards that it
might pose to friendly forces and civilians and the ROE in determining the emplacement authority for
scatterable mines. The duration of scatterable mines employment is a primary consideration in determining
the extent to which emplacement authority should be delegated. When used as protective obstacles, higher
commanders typically delegate emplacement authority to the commanders of small units (platoon or
company or team) and base camps. The commander’s guidance on emplacement authority is stated in the
unit’s order.
17-49. Commanders use obstacle control measures and other specific guidance or orders to grant or
withhold obstacle emplacement authority to subordinate commanders and provide obstacle control. For
example, a commander may withhold authority by shaping obstacle control measures within the area of
operations of a subordinate unit so that a specific area is not included, such as a counterattack axis, to ensure
the freedom of movement and maneuver of other units in that area. Likewise, the commander may also state
in an order that a specific area, such as a counterattack axis, is an obstacle-restricted area.
17-50. Subordinate commanders who desire to emplace an obstacle outside a zone, belt, or group must
submit a report of intention for that obstacle. The report doubles as a request when units initiate it at levels
below emplacement authority. Units do not submit the report if the higher headquarters grants emplacement
authority. Commanders give the authorization to emplace obstacles when they establish obstacle control
measures. As an exception, units do not submit reports of intention for directed obstacles that are part of an
operation plan or operation order approved by the obstacle emplacement authority.
17-51. Commanders and staffs consider time, width, and depth when planning for obstacle control. For
example, a commander may use an on-order obstacle zone to give a subordinate obstacle emplacement
authority only after a certain time or event. Likewise, a commander may direct that only scatterable mines
with a certain self-destruct time or networked munitions with on and off features can be emplaced in a specific
area. Maneuver control measures can aid in focusing the width and depth of obstacle control measures.
17-52. Typical graphics that may be used include—
* Unit boundaries and PLs.
* BHLs and forward edges of the battle area.
* Lines of departure and lines of contact.
* Fire support coordination line, no-fire areas, and coordinated fire lines.
* Passage lanes and corridors. |
3-90 | 338 | Chapter 17
* Counterattack axis and movement routes.
* Objectives, future BPs, and avenues of approach.
17-53. Obstacle control planning is guided by—
* Supporting current operations.
* Maximizing subordinate flexibility.
* Facilitating future operations.
17-54. Commanders use obstacle control to focus obstacle effort where it will clearly support their intent
and concept of operations. They also use obstacle control to ensure that obstacles will not interfere with
current operations or limit their ability to respond to unforeseen situations.
OBSTACLE CONTROL MEASURES
17-55. Obstacles can be natural, manmade, or a combination of both. Forces emplace tactical and protective
obstacles that reinforce terrain restrictions and existing obstacles and integrate them with fires to affect enemy
movement or maneuver and shape engagements. Obstacle control measures are specific measures that
grant obstacle-emplacing authority. They consist of—
* Zones.
* Belts.
* Groups.
* Restrictions.
The remainder of this chapter discusses these control measure with Figure 17-1 on page 17-12 providing a
brief summary of each control measure in a single graphic. Commanders with an assigned area can only
emplace protective obstacles unless authorized by a higher echelon commander.
17-56. An analysis of the higher echelon headquarters’ mission and commander’s intent identifies
information that may impact the mission. The components of this analysis are intent, assigned areas, military
deception, directed and implied tasks, limitations, available assets, risk, and emplacement timelines and risk.
Among the directed obstacle tasks are the planning, preparation, and execution of reserve obstacles. Reserve
obstacles allow the force to retain control over the mobility along a given avenue of approach.
Obstacle Zones
17-57. An obstacle zone is a division-level command and control measure to designate specific land areas
where lower echelons are allowed to employ tactical obstacles (JP 3-15). Corps and division commanders
use them to grant obstacle emplacement authority to brigades (including other major subordinate units).
Obstacle zones are permissive, allowing a brigade combat team to place reinforcing obstacles to support its
scheme of maneuver without interfering with future operations.
17-58. If the obstacle zone encompasses the entire brigade combat team assigned area, another graphic is
unnecessary. Commanders may designate the entire assigned area as an obstacle zone with the unit
boundaries defining the geographic limits of the zone. Obstacle zones do not cross brigade combat team
boundaries. Commanders assign obstacle zones to a single subordinate unit to ensure unity of effort, just as
they would when assigning defensive assigned areas or BPs. This keeps tactical obstacle responsibility along
the same lines as control of direct and indirect fires. This does not normally create vulnerabilities on the
boundary between units since the commander bases the assignment of both subordinate assigned areas and
obstacle zones on defined avenues of approach.
17-59. A commander does not normally assign an obstacle effect (block, fix, turn, or disrupt) to an obstacle
zone. This allows subordinate commander’s flexibility in using obstacles. The commander should establish
construction and resourcing priorities between different obstacle zones.
Obstacle Belts
17-60. An obstacle belt is a brigade-level command and control measure, normally depicted graphically, to
show where within an obstacle zone the ground tactical commander plans to limit friendly obstacle
employment and focus the defense (JP 3-15). It assigns an intent to the obstacle plan and provides the |
3-90 | 339 | Countermobility
necessary guidance on the overall effect of obstacles within a belt. Commanders plan obstacle belts within
assigned obstacle zones to grant obstacle emplacement authority to their major subordinate units. Obstacle
belts also focus obstacles to support the brigade scheme of maneuver and ensure that obstacles do not interfere
with the maneuver of any higher headquarters.
17-61. Obstacle belts are restrictive. Commanders can direct a subordinate unit to construct one or more
obstacles to create an effect in an area. They do not specify the type or number of obstacles. Obstacle belts
do not cross unit boundaries for the same reasons discussed in obstacle zones. (See discussion beginning in
paragraph 17-57 for more information). A single unit is responsible for a belt; however, a commander may
assign more than one belt to a unit.
17-62. A brigade combat team commander normally assigns an obstacle effect and priority to each obstacle
belt. As with the obstacle zone, the target and relative location are apparent. Adding a specific obstacle effect
gives purpose and direction to subordinate battalion obstacle planning. When brigade combat team
commanders assign an obstacle effect, they ensure that obstacles within the belt complement the brigade
combat team fire plan.
17-63. A corps, division, or brigade commander may authorize emplacement certain types of protective
obstacles outside obstacle zones or belts. Normally, the commander authorizes company team and base
commanders to emplace protective obstacles within 500 meters (546 yards) of their positions, depending on
the mission variables. The commander usually limits the types of obstacles a unit may use for protective
obstacles that are outside obstacle control measures. For example, the commander may allow only wire- and
command-detonated mines outside of control measures for protective obstacles. Furthermore, commanders
may require that minefields be fenced on all sides, after obtaining legal guidance concerning current rules
and policies on mine emplacement, to prevent friendly fire incidents.
Obstacle Groups
17-64. Obstacle groups are one or more individual obstacles that provide a specific obstacle effect.
Battalions use obstacle groups to ensure that company teams emplace individual obstacles supporting their
maneuver schemes. In rare cases, brigades, divisions, or even corps may use obstacle groups for specific
tactical obstacles. Units integrate obstacle groups with their direct and indirect fire plans. Brigade and
maneuver battalion commanders plan their placement within designated obstacle zones or belts, respectively.
17-65. Unlike obstacle zones or belts, obstacle groups are not areas but relative locations for actual
obstacles. Commanders normally show obstacle groups using the obstacle effect symbols. When detailed
planning is possible (including detailed ground reconnaissance), commanders may show obstacle groups
using individual obstacle symbols.
17-66. Company team commanders and engineers can adjust obstacles in the group if the intent and link to
the fire plan remain intact. They make minor changes to obstacles and fire control measures based on terrain
realities. For example, a commander may move a fixing obstacle group and direct fire TRPs 100 meters (109
yards) to avoid having them masked by rolling terrain. However, a major change to the obstacle group
location requires the approval of the commander who ordered the obstacle group emplacement.
Individual Obstacles
17-67. Each type of individual obstacle, such as abatis and antitank ditches, has its associated symbol. Once
a unit constructs an individual obstacle, it records the obstacle’s location and reports its emplacement through
the chain of command. Commanders must report individual obstacles in sufficient detail so that any unit
moving through the area can bypass or reduce the obstacle without excessive risk. Each headquarters is
responsible to ensure the dissemination of exact obstacle locations throughout its organization. Commanders
rarely depict individual obstacle symbols on maps above the battalion echelon. This publication does not
depict individual obstacle symbols. TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A discusses individual obstacles.
Obstacle Restrictions
17-68. Commanders may use obstacle restrictions to provide additional obstacle control and to limit the
specific types of obstacles used, such as restricting the use of buried mines. These restrictions ensure that
subordinates do not use obstacles with characteristics that impair future operations. These restrictions also
allow commanders to focus the use of limited resources for the main effort by restricting their use elsewhere. |
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