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operation incorporates some form of fixing an enemy force. For example, in an area defense friendly forces
seek to fix enemy forces within engagement areas tied into obstacles to destroy them. In the attack, friendly
forces fix an enemy while another force finishes the enemy by massing overwhelming combat power.
Finish the Enemy
1-37. While the enemy is fixed, friendly forces maintain momentum and mass overwhelming combat power
to assault an objective to destroy enemy forces. An assault is a short and violent well-ordered attack
against a local objective. Assaults occur at all tactical echelons. They can range from a squad assaulting a
single gun emplacement to a brigade assaulting an enemy strong point. An assault ends when enemy forces
are destroyed or have capitulated to friendly forces. Finishing the enemy requires aggressive application of
combat power and small unit battle drills supported by all the forms of contact. The main effort of an
operation finishes the enemy.
Follow Through
1-38. Once an enemy is finished, actions by friendly forces are not complete. Small remaining elements of
the enemy may require friendly forces to destroy them in detail. If all enemy forces are not neutralized,
friendly forces maintain constant pressure to keep them off balance while capitalizing on successful tactical
actions.
1-39. Follow through includes more than destroying remaining enemy forces. It also includes consolidating
and reorganizing activities and executing transitions. These actions aid in posturing friendly forces for future
operations.
1-40. Besides just consolidating and reorganizing friendly forces also execute a wide variety of activities
such as casualty evacuation, detainee operations, and sustainment operations. To maintain momentum and
tempo units account for these activities within their concept of operations. However, extensive consolidation
or reorganization activities may result in a unit’s culmination and require a transition.
1-41. Transitions occur for a variety of reasons and are not just the result of a unit culminating or a temporary
setback. They are a deliberate part of progress towards mission accomplishment, such as changing the phase
of an operation or shifting from offensive operations to stability operations. Transitions can be difficult,
particularly if they are unanticipated. During planning units identify potential transition points to reduce the
increased friction inherent in transitions and maintain an accurate common operational picture to assess the
progress of operations.
1-42. Offensive or defensive operations will likely continue unless all enemy forces are destroyed or
capitulate. If this is the case, execution of follow through resets the cycle and units begin to find the enemy
again. If finishing the enemy results in their total destruction or defeat and the cessation of offensive or
defensive operations, friendly forces will likely transition to stability operations.
Battle Drill
1-43. In addition to accomplishing the mission, every plan contains options for exploiting success or any
advantages that may arise. Units exploit success by aggressively executing their plans, promoting subordinate
leader initiative, and rapidly executing battle drills.
1-44. A battle drill is rehearsed and well understood actions made in response to common battlefield
occurrences (ADP 3-90). Battle drills are the actions of individual Soldiers and small units, typically when
they meet the enemy. They require minimal leader orders to accomplish and are initiated on a cue, such as
an enemy action or a leader’s order, and are a trained response to that cue. Battle drills are designed to be
quickly executed without the application of a deliberate decision-making process. Examples include “react
to indirect fire” or “vehicle recovery.” Although battle drills are commonly initiated when enemy contact is
made during close combat, they can also occur within command posts when a specific type of information is
received and action needs to be taken to support those units in contact. Leaders develop or use battle drills
specific to their capabilities and operations to assist subordinates in execution of common instances during
all operations. |
3-90 | 31 | Army Tactics
Battle Handover
1-45. A battle handover is a coordinated mission between two units that transfers responsibility for
fighting an enemy force from one unit to the other. It sustains continuity of the combined arms fight and
protects the combat power of both forces involved. Battle handover is usually associated with conducting a
passage of lines, a relief in place, and a breakout of an encircled force. Battle handover occurs along a general
trace line designated as the battle handover line (BHL), generally a phase line forward of the stationary force.
(See appendix A for more information on a battle handover line.)
Control Measures
1-46. Coordinating and synchronizing actions requires using control measures. A control measure is a means
of regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADP 6-0). Control measures help commanders’ direct actions
by establishing responsibilities and limits that prevent subordinate unit actions from impeding one another
and prevent fratricide. They also foster coordination and cooperation between forces without unnecessarily
restricting freedom of action. Control measures may be detailed (such as an operation order) or simple (such
as a checkpoint). Control measures are prescriptive and provide control without requiring detailed
explanation. Good control measures foster freedom of action, decision making, initiative, reporting, and
prevent fratricide.
1-47. Control measures can be permissive or restrictive. Permissive control measures facilitate action while
restrictive control measures limit action. Control measures may be graphical (such as phase lines) or
procedural (such as target engagement priorities). Commanders should establish only the minimum control
measures necessary to provide essential coordination and deconfliction between units. Restrictive control
measures only remain in place as long as required for mission accomplishment.
1-48. Determining what control measures are necessary to adequately command and control operations
without overburdening subordinates is a key consideration for every unit. This is particularly important for
company and below formations who may not possess the same digital systems or capabilities as their higher
headquarters.
Graphic Control Measures
1-49. A graphic control measure is a symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting
functions (ADP 6-0). Commander’s establish graphic control measures to regulate maneuver, movement,
airspace, fires, and other aspects of operations. In general, all graphic control measures should relate to easily
identifiable natural or man-made terrain. Regardless of their specific function, each control measure should
have a specific purpose: mass the effects of combat power, synchronize subordinate forces’ operations,
minimize the possibility of fratricide, or comply with the law of armed conflict.
1-50. At battalion and higher echelons, graphic control measures are initially identified during course of
action development and refined throughout the operations process. However, a course of action sketch rarely
provides the necessary detail to adequately command and control operations during execution. As plans and
orders are refined subordinate echelons will typically add control measures to those from their higher
headquarters. For example, a battalion may be tasked to seize an objective during an attack from their BCT
headquarters. While the objective is assigned by the BCT, the battalion determines what control measures
are necessary within that objective to adequately command and control their forces. When units develop
control measures, they share those control measures with their subordinate units, higher headquarters, and
adjacent units.
Digital and Analog Control Measures
1-51. Digital systems provide leaders numerous benefits to aid in developing, implementing, and modifying
control measures. Many of these systems possess the capability to display active and inactive graphic control
measure overlays as well as provide notifications for control measure violations even if that control measure
is not actively displayed. An advantage of these digital systems is the ability to rapidly share information,
such as adjustments to control measures, as well as the ability to maintain a clearer common operational
picture within command posts. The disadvantage to these digital systems is that many are not resident at the |
3-90 | 32 | Chapter 1
lowest tactical echelons, and they create an electromagnetic signature which can either be jammed or used
for targeting purposes.
1-52. Analog control measures are hand-drawn on maps or overlays and are used by every echelon.
Generally, battalion and above echelons use paper maps with overlays as a backup to many of their digital
systems. Company and below echelons are more likely to use paper maps with overlays containing analog
control measures as their primary means of command and control. These overlays consist of graphical control
measures that allow the organization to maintain a common operational picture and continue operations
within a degraded communications environment.
Note. FM 3-90 contains numerous figures containing graphic control measures when describing
offensive, defensive, and enabling operations. For clarity, these figures contain only the major
applicable graphic control measures. Appendix A contains additional information on each of the
control measures discussed in FM 3-90. For a complete listing of all control measures see
FM 1-02.2.
Terrain Management
1-53. Units manage terrain to coordinate and synchronize their operations with friendly forces. Terrain
management is the process of allocating terrain by specifying locations for units and activities to
deconflict activities that might interfere with each other. For example, an artillery unit is assigned a
position area for artillery (PAA) to provide indirect fires. The PAA frames for the artillery unit the area for
executing their fire missions and lets other units know that they need to coordinate with the PAA owner if
they need to move through that area. Examples of terrain management include but are not limited to—
* Assigned areas including area of operations, zone, and sector.
* PAA.
* Assembly area.
* Battle position.
* Route.
* Lane.
* Axis of advance.
1-54. Assigning areas to subordinates is a key operational framework and terrain management consideration
for headquarters at every echelon. When appropriate units may further subdivide their assigned area into
assigned areas for their subordinate formations. A higher headquarters remains responsible for any area not
assigned to a subordinate unit. A unit moving through or delivering effects into another units assigned area
must coordinate with the assigned unit.
1-55. The types of assigned areas include area of operations, zone, and sector. While there are numerous
other control measures that enable terrain management only area of operations, zone, and sector are part of
the assigned area model. Each assigned area has unique characteristics and employment considerations
outlined below.
Area of Operations
1-56. An area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that
should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). Units can use an area
of operations (AO) during offensive, defensive, and stability operations. An AO is defined by boundaries
that fully enclose the area. An AO is useful when a higher headquarters requires a greater degree of control.
Units assigned an AO must be capable of performing specific responsibilities. These responsibilities
include—
* Terrain management.
* Information collection, integration, and synchronization.
* Civil affairs operations.
* Movement control. |
3-90 | 33 | Army Tactics
* Clearance of fires.
* Security.
* Personnel recovery.
* Airspace management.
* Minimum-essential stability operations tasks, which are—
Establish civil security.
Provide immediate needs (access to food, water, shelter, and medical treatment).
1-57. Commanders can add, remove, or adjust a subordinate units’ AO responsibilities based on the situation
and mission variables. However, when assigning an AO, a higher echelon headquarters must inform the
subordinate unit of any changes to the responsibilities listed above.
Zone and Sector
1-58. A zone is an operational area assigned to a unit in the offense that only has rear and lateral boundaries
(FM 3-0). The non-bounded side of a zone is open towards enemy forces. A higher echelon headquarters
uses fire support coordination and maneuver control measures such as a limit of advance and a coordinated
fire line to synchronize its deep operations with those of a subordinate unit. Zones allow higher headquarters
to adjust deep operations without having to change unit boundaries. This gives greater flexibility to the higher
headquarters for controlling deep operations, allowing subordinate units to focus on close and rear operations.
A zone is best for front-line units executing high-tempo offensive operations characterized by direct fire
contact with the enemy and a fluid forward line of troops (FLOT). Units treat everything behind the forward
line of troops as an AO with the associated nine responsibilities. Zone can be further subdivided as needed.
(See appendix A for more information on zones.)
1-59. A sector is an operational area assigned to a unit in the defense that has rear and lateral boundaries
with interlocking fires (FM 3-0). The non-bounded side is open towards the enemy. A higher echelon
headquarters uses fire support coordination and maneuver control measures such as battle positions and
trigger lines to synchronize subordinate units. Higher headquarters are responsible for synchronizing
operations forward of the main battle and security areas or coordinated fire line. Units use sectors to
synchronize and coordinate engagement areas and allow for mutually supporting fields of fire, which do not
require coordination between adjacent units. Units treat everything behind the forward line of troops as an
AO with the associated nine responsibilities. Sectors can be further subdivided as needed. (See appendix A
for more information on sectors.)
Forms of Contact
1-60. Contact is an interaction between two forces. There are three possible types of interactions:
* Both forces are in contact with each other.
* A friendly force is in contact with an enemy force, while the enemy force is out of contact with
the friendly force.
* A friendly force is out of contact with an enemy force; however, the enemy force is in contact with
the friendly force.
1-61. The forms of contact describe the method of interaction that positively identifies the location or activity
of a force. The forms of contact also—
* Quickly describe to others what is happening.
* Describe the method of engagement.
* Provide an understanding of a force’s capabilities and ranges.
* If a force is in contact, can trigger additional actions, typically in the form of battle drills.
1-62. An exception to these forms of contact are interactions with friendly or neutral entities such as civilians,
nongovernmental organizations, or friendly and neutral military forces. This interaction triggers a decision
from friendly leaders and are usually categorized as a non-hostile form of contact.
1-63. Whenever a force gains contact with another force, the gaining force can impede the freedom of action
of that other force while enhancing their own freedom of action. For example, after gaining visual contact on |
3-90 | 34 | Chapter 1
an enemy, friendly forces are able to maneuver—out of enemy contact—to a position to best destroy the
enemy force. Ideally, when friendly forces engage enemy forces, they use as many different forms of contact
as possible to create a dilemma for the enemy and allow the friendly force to accomplish its mission.
1-64. Leaders always account for how to defend or mitigate against the enemy using these forms of contact.
They also make plans on how to use these forms of contact against the enemy. Not every unit or echelon will
have all of these capabilities, but they will use as many as they have.
1-65. The nine forms of contact are—
* Direct. Interactions from ground-based, line of sight weapons systems (including small arms, tank
main guns, and anti-tank missiles).
* Indirect. Interactions from non-line of sight weapons systems (including cannon artillery,
mortars, and rockets).
* Non-hostile. Neutral interactions that may degrade military operations (including civilians on the
battlefield, nongovernmental organizations, or neutral forces).
* Obstacle. Interactions from natural and manmade obstacles (including rivers and minefields).
* Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN). Interactions from friendly, enemy,
and civilian CBRN effects (including chemical attacks, nuclear attacks, industrial accidents, and
toxic or hazardous).
* Aerial. Interactions from air-based combat platforms (including attack helicopters, armed UAS,
and fixed-wing aircraft).
* Visual. Interaction from acquisition via the human eye, optical, or electro-optical systems
(including ground reconnaissance, telescopic, thermal, and infrared sights on weapons and sensor
platforms such as UAS and satellites).
* Electromagnetic. Interactions via systems used to acquire, degrade, or destroy using select
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum (including radar systems, jamming, cyberspace, and
electromagnetic pulse).
* Influence. Interactions through the information dimension intended to shape the perceptions,
behaviors, and decision making of people relative to a policy or military objective (including
through social media, telecommunications, human interaction, and other forms of communication
and contact).
1-66. Visual contact allows a force to gain understanding of another other force with or without the other
force’s knowledge. With direct, indirect, and aerial forms of contact, visual contact is assumed. For CBRN,
obstacle, non-hostile, electromagnetic, and influence contact, visual contact is not assumed and must be
confirmed to clearly describe what is happening. For example, an animal could trigger an electronic ground
sensor and a unit must confirm with visual contact whether the ground sensor was activated by enemy forces
or by an animal.
1-67. When friendly forces are directed to “gain and maintain contact,” units decide which form or forms of
contact is best to use for the situation. Ultimately, they are required to understand where the enemy force is
and what it is trying to do all while minimizing the forms of contact the enemy has on friendly forces.
1-68. Friendly forces should expect that the enemy always has them under some form of visual,
electromagnetic, and influence contact. The proliferation of communication capabilities results in an
increasing ability of friendly, neutral, and adversarial actors to influence one another. The increasing use of
social media on the battlefield by various actors will drive perceptions of all actors. This should not cause
inaction by leaders, but rather encourage disciplined actions that will help to mitigate enemy contact.
Activities to mitigate this include, but are not limited to, masking, deception, electromagnetic spectrum
discipline, and camouflage.
Actions on Contact
1-69. Actions on contact is a process to help leaders understand what is happening and to take action.
Actions on contact is not intended to generate a rigid, lockstep response to the enemy. Rather, the goal is to
provide an orderly framework that enables leaders to apply sound decision making and timely actions to
complete the operation. |
3-90 | 35 | Army Tactics
1-70. Actions on contact are applicable to all types of operations. Figure 1-3 is a graphical depiction of
actions on contact. They are just as applicable to a squad coming into direct fire contact with an enemy during
a movement to contact, an armor company observing enemy in the defense, a signal element ambushed by
the enemy, or a division in the attack. This framework is a way for leaders to quickly determine if things
are going according to plan and what actions they need to take to either stay on plan or adjust to the new
situation. Actions on contact are—
* React.
* Develop the situation.
* Choose an action.
* Execute and report.
Figure 1-3. Actions on contact
1-71. No matter what a friendly force is or doing, once they make contact with the enemy, they conduct
actions on contact. The unit carries out these actions on contact regardless of whether the enemy has detected
its presence. Actions on contact are not to be confused with the battle drill of “react to contact” which is a
trained response, requires minimal orders to accomplish, and is initiated by an enemy action. Actions on
contact can also start with a unit reacting to contact, which simultaneously starts the actions on contact
process for different echelons.
1-72. Typically, a unit’s standard operating procedure dictates specific actions, to include battle drills and
reports, depending on the type of contact. Additionally, the mission variables, commander’s intent and
guidance, and scheme of maneuver guide the actions individual units take when they make contact with
enemy forces.
1-73. Leaders understand that at different echelons, actions on contact requires different amount of time to
conduct with the biggest discriminator being the time it takes to develop the situation. For companies and
below, units can quickly develop the situation and choose an action to execute. For battalions and higher, to
synchronize their echelon properly to a new action, it may need to execute the rapid decision-making and
synchronization process (known as RDSP) or a hasty military decisionmaking process (MDMP) session.
Leaders balance the need to conduct their actions on contact with the need to maintain momentum.
React
1-74. If the enemy initiates the contact, the element in contact conducts the react to contact battle drill. Any
unengaged portion monitors the situation and prepares to either support the portion of the unit in contact or
continue the mission. Simultaneously, the unit in contact reports the contact to their higher headquarters |
3-90 | 36 | Chapter 1
which helps them to develop the situation. This also alerts the higher echelon and allows the initiation of
necessary actions.
1-75. If friendly forces make contact first without the enemy being aware, they pause and determine if they
have been detected, if not they move to a location where they won’t be observed and continue the actions on
contact process. One of the tenets of multidomain operations is to make contact with the smallest element
possible. This element is the one that reacts to contact, while the rest of the force begins conducting actions
on contact at different tempos.
Develop the Situation
1-76. The unit in contact develops the situation to define the threat being faced. This helps to develop the
situation across the front of the unit and ultimately provides more maneuver space to execute further actions.
As the situation develops and the enemy force’s dispositions, strength, and intentions become clearer, the
unit in contact submits additional reports. Typical things to consider include, but is not limited to—
* Size, activity, location, composition, and orientation of the enemy force.
* Impact of obstacles and terrain.
* Enemy capabilities.
* Probable enemy intentions.
* Method of gaining positional advantage over the enemy.
* Friendly situation (location, strength, and capabilities).
* Possible friendly actions to achieve the specified end state.
1-77. For lower echelons such as companies and below, it will not take long to develop the situation based
on their small frontage. Meanwhile for a brigade or division, based on their frontage, it will take longer to
develop the situation and determine if the enemy is acting according to the plan before the commander can
make an informed decision.
Choose an Action
1-78. After the unit makes contact, its leader gathers information to make an assessment based on their
understanding of the enemy and friendly forces’ composition and disposition and chooses an action consistent
with the higher echelon commander’s intent and within the unit’s capabilities. These actions typically are—
* Attack.
* Bypass.
* Defend.
* Delay.
* Withdrawal.
1-79. For obstacles covered by fire, the unit can either seek a bypass or conduct breaching operations as part
of a hasty attack. For obstacles not covered by fire, the unit can either seek a bypass or create the required
number of lanes to support its maneuver or the maneuver of a supported unit.
1-80. Circumstances may dictate that the action requires a higher commander’s approval. Reasons for
needing a higher commander’s approval could include—
* Action requires additional resources.
* Action is not within the commander’s intent.
* Action sets conditions for the higher echelon to continue.
* Action changes their higher echelon’s scheme of maneuver.
1-81. The leader of the unit in contact must report to the next higher echelon commander for action approval
if the circumstances in paragraph 1-80 apply. Higher approval is required since the unit in contact’s actions
could change the entire friendly force’s scheme of maneuver. The higher echelon carefully avoids focusing
on initial security engagements to the detriment of operations directed against the enemy main body.
1-82. If the action is within the commander’s intent and doesn’t meet any of the criteria in paragraph 1-80
the unit in contact executes the chosen action with no additional approval needed. To avoid delay, unit |
3-90 | 37 | Army Tactics
standard operating procedures (SOPs) and commander guidance may provide automatic approval of certain
actions. The next higher echelon commander always has the option of disapproving the unit in contact’s
action based on its impact to the overall mission.
Execute and Report
1-83. With the action selected and, if needed, approved by their higher echelon, the unit in contact takes the
appropriate actions. The unit initiates direct and indirect fires to gain the initiative if it is appropriate to engage
enemy forces. If the action is to attack, the unit in contact immediately attacks if it has sufficient, immediately
available combat power to overwhelm the enemy force. If the action is to defend or withdraw the unit in
contact does so while maintaining contact and continuing to gain as much information as possible about the
enemy forces disposition and positions. If the action is to bypass the enemy, the unit in contact maintains
contact and continues their mission. Unless specifically told by their higher headquarters to break contact,
the unit in contact will maintain contact no matter which action is chosen. Regardless of the chosen action,
reporting to the next higher echelon is required to ensure the unit is staying within the commander’s intent.
Tactical Mission Tasks
1-84. A task is a clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization, or
derived during mission analysis, that must be done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority (JP 1, Vol 1).
A tactical mission task is the specific activity a unit performs while executing a tactical operation or
form of maneuver. Tactical mission tasks are used as components of a mission statement or given as tasks
to subordinate units. While all tactical mission tasks are defined, most have a symbol. Appendix B lists
tactical mission tasks, their definitions, and shows their associated symbol.
1-85. Tactical mission tasks are essential in the development of a mission statement. A mission statement is
a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task(s), purpose, and action
containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why (JP 5-0). The “what” is either a task or a type
of operation or both and is expressed in terms of action verbs. For example, a higher headquarters can assign
a subordinate unit to conduct an area defense and block the enemy to prevent the enemy from crossing a
phase line. The purpose or the why of the mission statement is interconnected to the tactical task. The “why”
provides the reason the unit is to execute the task and the method the unit contributes to the higher echelon’s
headquarters. The purpose is critical in the formation of the mission statement. (See ATP 5-0.2-2 for an
example list of purposes.)
Multinational Operations Considerations
1-86. Army forces can expect to operate with multinational partners. Multinational operations is a collective
term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the
structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). Multinational operations present opportunities including—
* Providing international legitimacy that helps isolate adversary or enemy forces.
* Partners may have different authorities allowing them to employ capabilities in multiple domains.
* Providing additional combat forces who may possess capabilities the joint force may lack.
1-87. Multinational operational operations also include numerous challenges including—
* Language issues.
* National caveats on the use of forces, rules of engagement, authorities, and approval to share
information and intelligence.
* Interoperability concerns.
1-88. Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical,
operational, and strategic objectives (JP 3-0). The Army’s approach to interoperability encompasses all
components and operational domains. This approach facilitates the ability of Army forces to operate with
other unified action partners, including multinational partners. To increase multinational interoperability the
Army participates in numerous bilateral and multilateral activities. Some of these activities result in
standardization agreements or doctrine. These products serve as a baseline for cooperation among
multinational partners. For tactical Army forces, these products can be transparent. For example, Army forces |
3-90 | 38 | Chapter 1
operating as part of the multinational North Atlantic Treaty Organization use the same military operational
symbols as their multinational partners. These agreements streamline sharing and communicating graphic
operational information such as overlays among members.
1-89. Situations may arise where Army forces execute operations with multinational partners without an
existing standardization agreement. This is most likely to occur during ad-hoc multinational operations.
During these situations units must rely on liaison officers, clear and uncomplicated orders, and sharing sound
tactical advice with their partners. Whenever possible, units take advantage of opportunities to train with
multinational forces to increase their skills in executing multinational operations. (See FM 3-16 for more
information on multinational operations.)
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
1-90. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and
employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADP 3-0). Direct
fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes
tasks associated with force projection. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole
or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver directly gains or exploits positions of relative advantage to
accomplish the mission.
1-91. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes these tasks:
* Move.
* Maneuver.
* Employ direct fires.
* Occupy an area.
* Conduct mobility and countermobility.
* Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.
* Employ battlefield obscuration.
Local Security
1-92. Local security is the low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy
(ADP 3-90). It includes any local measure taken by all friendly units against enemy actions to prevent a unit
from being surprised and is an important part of maintaining the initiative. It involves avoiding enemy
detection or deceiving enemy forces about friendly positions and intentions. It also includes finding any
enemy forces in the immediate vicinity and knowing as much as possible about the enemy force’s positions
and intentions. Local security prevents a unit from being surprised, and it is an important part of maintaining
the initiative. All units perform local security when conducting operations.
1-93. Units use both active and passive measures to provide local security. Active measures include using
observation posts and patrols, establishing specific levels of alert in the unit, and establishing SOPs detailing
alert procedures. Passive local security measures include using camouflage, movement control, noise and
light discipline, electromagnetic protection, and proper communications procedures. They also include
employing available sensors, night vision devices, and daylight sights to maintain surveillance over the
immediate area.
Reserve
1-94. A reserve is that portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the beginning of an
engagement to be available for a decisive movement (ADP 3-90). Commanders employ their reserves to
exploit success or prevent failure. A reserve provides the unit flexibility by responding to unexpected
situations and enables friendly forces to exploit or regain the initiative quickly because it is an uncommitted
force. Once committed, a reserve’s actions normally become or reinforce the echelon’s main effort. Often a
commander’s most difficult and important decision concerns the time, place, and circumstances for
committing the reserve. Commanders do not employ their reserve as a follow and support force or a follow
and assume force. Other considerations for commanders are not placing artillery and other fire support |
3-90 | 39 | Army Tactics
systems and reconnaissance assets in reserve. Such systems committed to echelon support operations are not
in reserve.
1-95. Units also plan how to reconstitute their reserves after commitment of their original reserves. A higher
unit can designate a subordinate unit’s reserves as its new echelon reserve or assign another subordinate unit
to assume the mission of the reserve. Units have more flexibility and can take greater risk in employing their
reserves if their higher echelon headquarters has not committed its reserve. Units never develop a course of
action (COA) that assumes the use of a higher echelons reserve.
1-96. Commander’s generally place their reserve where they can easily reinforce the main effort and
whenever possible, beyond the enemy force’s direct fire range. Commanders decide whether to orient their
reserves on their most likely mission or their most important mission when deciding where to place their
reserves. They generally position their reserves to the rear of their units, in a location that provides maximum
protection from enemy observation and fire. Units consider several factors when determining the exact
location for their reserves. These factors include:
* Orientating on their most likely mission or their most important mission.
* Response time to various planning priorities.
* Access to main supply routes (MSRs).
* Locations of probable enemy penetrations.
* Terrain.
* Availability of cover and concealment.
Initially units may position their reserves in forward locations to deceive enemy forces and obscure
subordinate unit boundaries. Obscuring subordinate unit boundaries is especially important for
dissimilar units such as armored and dismounted infantry.
1-97. Units can task-organize their reserves into small elements and position them where they can react
quickly to local combat developments in restrictive terrain that lacks movement routes. This dispersion
provides increased protection, but it reduces the ability of a reserve to mass fires. Units look for the
availability of covered lateral and forward high-speed deployment routes for their reserves. These reserves
require movement priority along those routes when they are committed. Units ensure the maintenance of
communications between these dispersed elements. This may require establishing retransmission nodes for
combat net radios. Units maintain centrally located reserves positioned somewhat farther from the FLOT in
open terrain. An enemy forces’ potential to employ weapons of mass destruction and conduct air interdiction
are other factors commanders consider when deciding where to position their reserves.
1-98. Units position their reserves beyond the enemy force’s direct fire range whenever possible. This is
easier to achieve at higher echelons than at lower echelons. Each reserve element takes defensive measures
to prevent its acquisition and attack by enemy indirect fire systems. These measures include camouflage,
local security, and control of electronic emissions.
1-99. A reserve must be able to move quickly to different locations in response to different contingencies.
For example, a quick reaction force is a type of reserve used during stability operations. A quick reaction
force is a commander designated force to respond to threat attacks or emergencies. For armored and
Stryker reserves, an important consideration is cross-country mobility or road networks. For dismounted
infantry forces, the key considerations are the existing road networks, the availability of ground and air
transportation, or the availability of pickup and landing zones for use by supporting assets that enable the
reserve to conduct air assault operations. This is easier to achieve at higher echelons than at lower echelons.
Each reserve element takes defensive measures to prevent its acquisition and attack by enemy indirect fire
systems. These measures include camouflage, local security, and control of electromagnetic emissions.
1-100. When issuing orders, commanders assign the reserve the task of “reserve” and assign it priorities for
planning, which is unlike other subordinate elements that are assigned a tactical mission task and purpose.
Commanders assign no more than three planning priorities based on the probability they could happen and
time to prepare. Commitment of the reserve is listed on the commander’s decision support matrix and
decision support table. |
3-90 | 40 | Chapter 1
Daylight Operations
1-101. Daylight operations allow friendly forces to use their equipment while facilitating control of their
maneuver. They are psychologically and physically the least stressful on the units. Also, the unit can control
movement more easily when all subordinates can see one another. Two major disadvantages to daylight
operations are enemy forces can use their weapon systems more effectively to oppose friendly forces and
friendly forces neutralize any technical overmatch they have for operations during limited visibility.
Limited-Visibility Operations
1-102. There are two general limited-visibility conditions: those in which technology, such as thermal
sights, can overcome or partially overcome, and those that such technology cannot overcome. The first
category includes darkness. The second category includes dense battlefield dust, smoke, heavy rain, snow,
fog, or any other conditions that artificial illumination, image intensification, radar, or other sensors cannot
partially overcome.
1-103. The mission variables normally require an operation conducted during limited visibility to be more
deliberate than in daylight operations. The exception is when an attack occurs as part of the follow up to a
daylight attack or as part of an exploitation or pursuit. Units planning night attacks consider how limited
visibility complicates controlling units, Soldiers, and fires. Limited visibility also complicates identifying
and engaging targets; navigating and moving without detection; locating, treating, and evacuating casualties;
and locating, bypassing, or breaching obstacles.
1-104. Trained forces equipped for limited-visibility operations have significant advantages over enemy
forces that are unprepared for limited-visibility operations. Examples of limited-visibility operations are
nighttime, weather (blizzards, sandstorms, and heavy rain), and thick vegetation. When enemy forces have
increased their limited-visibility capabilities, friendly forces must emphasize noise and light discipline during
limited-visibility operations. For example, Soldiers who leave their laser sights on increase the likelihood of
revealing their position and losing the element of surprise. Table 1-1 on page 1-19 outlines the advantages
and disadvantages of conducting limited-visibility attacks.
1-105. The organization of forces for a limited-visibility operation is the same during daylight operations.
However, changing an existing task organization under limited-visibility conditions typically requires more
time and effort than it does during daylight operations.
1-106. Non-illuminated attacks offer the best chance of gaining surprise. However, units plan for
illumination for every limited-visibility operation, so that it is readily available if required. Units can choose
to conduct a non-illuminated operation until subordinate forces make contact with enemy forces. At that
point, they can direct the illumination of the objective. Enemy units can also choose to employ illumination
to increase the effectiveness of their efforts. All leaders within an attacking unit must understand the time,
conditions, and employment authority for illumination.
1-107. Units plan for limited-visibility operations as they do for daylight operations while emphasizing—
* Keeping the plan simple.
* Taking additional time for reconnaissance.
* Taking advantage of easily identifiable terrain features, such as roads and railroad tracks, when
establishing control measures.
* Using intermediate objectives as necessary to control and maintain the correct movement direction
during the attack.
* Concealing preparations.
* Scheduling initial rehearsals during daylight, with the final rehearsal at night.
* Positioning security elements. |
3-90 | 41 | Army Tactics
Table 1-1. Considerations for limited-visibility operations
Advantages of limited-visibility operations Disadvantages of limited-visibility operations
• Defenses are more susceptible to • Control of maneuver forces in the absence of
infiltration. technical means is more difficult.
• Darkness can conceal the movement and • Stationary defending forces can react more
position of large forces in both offense and easily than attacking forces.
defense. Physical and psychological • Extreme weather may degrade or prevent
factors favor attacking forces, as shock,
aviation support, including unmanned aircraft
disorientation, and isolation are easier to
systems.
achieve.
• Attacking forces have increased difficulty
• Air assets can operate more easily in
determining the limits of obstacle systems.
contested airspace because air defenders
• Restrictive terrain is more difficult to traverse.
with only optical sights have greater
difficulty acquiring targets at night. • Light, obscuration, noise, and fires can deceive
• The element of surprise may increase attacking and defending forces.
because forces are more susceptible to • Attacking forces lose momentum because of the
military deception techniques, such as need to conduct attacks at a reduced tempo to
decoy fighting positions, decoy equipment, maintain the coherence of the unit.
dummy lights, noise, obscuration, and
• Land navigation is more difficult at night; units
fires. Applies to both offense and defense.
may get separated, lose cohesion, and support
• Reserves cannot employ as quickly at elements can move to the wrong positions.
night as forces can during daylight
• Defending forces can reposition or emplace
conditions. True for both offense and
obstacles during limited visibility to help avoid
defense. Defense likely benefits from
detection by friendly information collection
interior lines when employing the reserve.
assets.
• Attacking units are easier to ambush at night.
• Adjusting indirect fire is difficult, even with night-
vision devices or illumination.
• Units require significantly larger quantities of
signal ammunition such as tracers, flares, and
illumination rounds.
• Units have more difficulty locating and
evacuating casualties.
• The risk of fratricide increases.
• Effective range of direct fire weapon systems
decreases due to visibility, degraded target
detection and identification.
1-108. Units establish control measures to facilitate visualizing, describing, and directing subordinate and
supporting forces during limited-visibility operations. Units also take advantage of the technical capabilities
of advanced equipment as they become available.
1-109. Absent positive information to the contrary, units must assume that enemy forces possess the same
limited-visibility observation capabilities as friendly forces when conducting a limited-visibility operations.
Using terrain to mask movement and deployment remains critical because limited visibility may create a
false sense of protection from enemy observation. During movement, leaders reduce the distances between
vehicles or individual Soldiers as necessary to allow one system or Soldier to observe the other. This
decreases the time necessary to react to enemy contact.
Movement
1-110. In the context of Army tactics, movement is the positioning of combat power to establish the
conditions for maneuver (ADP 3-90). The distinction between movement and maneuver is whether or not
friendly forces are moving in conjunction with friendly direct or established indirect fire support. A friendly
force chooses a movement technique based on the threat prior to enemy contact. To direct movement, Army
forces use the movement techniques, movement formations, and battle drills to mitigate the risk of making |
3-90 | 42 | Chapter 1
contact with the enemy before maneuvering. (See Chapter 2 for more information on movement techniques
and formations.)
Employment of Direct Fires
1-111. A field of fire is the area that a weapon or group of weapons may cover effectively from a given
position. In selecting a position, a unit must balance how the field of fire will best gain an advantage while
simultaneously providing cover and mitigating the effect of the enemy’s weapons systems.
1-112. Fire control measures are the means by which leaders control direct fires. Application of these
concepts, procedures, and techniques helps the unit acquire the enemy, focus fires on the enemy, distribute
the results of the fires, and prevent fratricide. At the same time, no single measure suffices to control fires
effectively. Common fire control measures are—
* Target reference point.
* Rules of engagement.
* Engagement area.
* Sector of fire.
* Weapons safety posture.
* Direction of fire.
* Weapons control status.
* Terrain-based quadrant.
* Engagement priorities.
* Friendly-based quadrant.
* Trigger.
* Maximum engagement line.
* Restrictive fire line (RFL).
* Final protective line (FPL).
* Engagement techniques.
* Fire patterns.
* Target array.
Principles for Direct Fire Planning and Control
1-113. Leaders apply eight fundamental principles during planning, preparing for, and executing direct
fires. These principles are not to restrict the actions of subordinates but to facilitate their ability to acquire
and to engage with direct fire against the threat. These principles are—
* Destroy the greatest threat first.
* Mass the effects of direct fire.
* Employ the best weapon for the specific target.
* Avoid target overkill.
* Minimize exposure.
* Plan and implement control measures.
* Plan for limited-visibility conditions.
* Plan for degraded capabilities.
Destroy the Greatest Threat First
1-114. The order in which the unit engages enemy forces directly relates to the danger they present and how
the engagement will seize the initiative. Leaders should assess the greatest threat not only in terms of
capability, but also how a given target nests within the enemy’s capabilities and desired friendly end state.
The enemy forces’ threat depends on their weapons, range, and positioning in relation to and comparison to
the friendly force. In general, a friendly force, when presented with multiple targets, should initially
concentrate fires to destroy the greatest threat, and then distribute fires over the remainder of the enemy force. |
3-90 | 43 | Army Tactics
At the tactical unit level, the greatest threat may be an enemy command and control system, which directs
the fires and maneuver of the enemy force.
Mass the Effects of Direct Fire
1-115. Leader’s mass direct fires to achieve decisive results. Massing direct fires entails focusing available
direct fires at critical points and distributing the effects. Random application of direct fires is unlikely to have
a desired effect on the enemy.
Employ the Best Weapon for the Specific Target
1-116. Using the appropriate weapon for the target increases the probability of rapid enemy destruction or
suppression while preserving resources. Key factors on determining the employment of weapon and
ammunition type are target type, range, exposure, weapons and ammunition availability, and desired targets
effects. Units array forces based on the mission variables.
Avoid Target Overkill
1-117. Target overkill—the overuse of weapon systems to achieve an effect—wastes ammunition and ties
up weapons that are better employed acquiring and engaging other threats. Having every weapon engage a
different threat, however, must be tempered by the requirement to destroy the greatest threats first.
Commanders use only the amount of fire required to achieve the necessary effects. There may be reasons to
demonstrate target overkill as a method directed against enemy morale in specific conditions related to
commander’s intent.
Minimize Exposure
1-118. The unit increases its survivability by exposing Soldiers to the minimal extent necessary to engage
the enemy effectively. Natural or manmade defilades provide the best cover from lethal direct fire munitions.
Friendly units minimize exposure by constantly seeking effective available cover, attempting to engage the
enemy from the flank, remaining dispersed, firing from multiple positions, and limiting engagement times.
Plan and Implement Control Measures
1-119. The unit has numerous tools to assist in the planning and implementation of controlling direct fires.
These tools include graphic control measures for friendly forces, engagement criteria, identification training
for combat vehicles and aircraft, unit weapons safety posture, weapons control status, recognition markings,
and a situational understanding to include range cards, area sketches, and rehearsals. Knowledge and
employment of applicable control measures are the primary means of preventing fratricide and noncombatant
casualties.
Plan for Limited-Visibility Conditions
1-120. Units operating during hours of limited visibility can engage enemy forces at nearly the same range
as during daylight hours with limited-visibility fire control equipment. Units should inspect and bring their
limited-visibility equipment prior to conducting operations. This prevents Soldiers from becoming
unprepared to the changes in the weather and from daylight to nighttime.
1-121. Obscurants such as dense fog, heavy smoke, and blowing sand can reduce the capabilities of thermal
and infrared equipment. Although decreased acquisition capabilities have minimal effect on area fire, point
target engagements can occur at decreased ranges. The unit develops contingency plans for such extreme
limited-visibility conditions, such as establishing listening posts, trigger lines, and target reference points
capable of visual contact with thermals.
Plan for Degraded Capabilities
1-122. The unit initially develops a plan based on the unit’s maximum effective capabilities. It then makes
alternate plans for implementation in the event of casualties, weapon damage, or failure. While units cannot
anticipate or plan for every situation, they plan for the most probable occurrences. Building redundancy into |
3-90 | 44 | Chapter 1
the plan, such as having two systems observe the same area, is an invaluable asset when the situation (and
the number of available systems) permits. Designating alternate sectors of fire provides adjacent elements a
means of shifting fires if the enemy knocks one of them out of action.
Consolidate
1-123. Consolidate is to organize and strengthen a captured position to use it against the enemy. Units
continuously assess their combat power and determine if they are achieving their objectives. At times, they
may need to consolidate or reconstitute their forces. Units consolidate to ensure the friendly force maintains
its capability and does not lose what it has gained or become disadvantaged. There is a difference between
the actions taken to consolidate and to reconstitute.
1-124. Units consolidate on seized positions by repelling enemy forces only if it is tactically necessary or
advantageous. Normally, units exploit their successes. However, they may have to take tactical pauses while
performing their actions to consolidate, given the existing mission variables. Consolidate may vary from a
rapid repositioning of forces and security elements to a reorganization of the friendly force and detailed
improvement of the position for defense. Consolidate includes—
* Conducting reconnaissance.
* Establishing security.
* Eliminating enemy pockets of resistance.
* Positioning forces to enable them to defend against possible enemy counterattacks.
* Adjusting direct and indirect fire planning.
* Preparing their units for potential follow-on missions.
Chapter 5 discusses consolidate in detail as part of the offense.
Reconstitution
1-125. Reconstitution is an operation that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level
of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources (ATP 3-94.4).
Reconstitution consists of two major elements: reorganization and regeneration. Reconstitution operations
are essential to rebuilding the combat power of a degraded unit. This encompasses more than just
accumulating personnel and weapons systems and then projecting them forward. Because of the likely heavy
casualties during combat operations, surviving leaders and undamaged equipment are likely to assume new
roles in a reconstituted unit.
Reorganization
1-126. Reorganization is all measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat effectiveness or
return it to a specified level of combat capability (ATP 3-94.4). Reorganization is the action of expedient
cross leveling of internal resources in a degraded unit in place to restore or increase combat effectiveness.
Reorganization is an option when the operating tempo is such that the risk for removing a unit from the
operation risks the mission. There are two types of reorganization operations, immediate and deliberate. Units
base the type of reorganization operation executed on mission variables. These actions include—
* Cross-leveling equipment and personnel.
* Matching operational weapon systems with crews.
* Forming composite units by joining two or more attrited units to form a single mission-capable
unit.
* Changing task organization in preparation for the next operation.
1-127. Immediate reorganization is the quick and usually temporary restoration of degraded units to
minimum levels of effectiveness. Normally, a unit implements immediate reorganization in its current
combat position or as close to that site as possible to meet near-term needs. To accomplish this, units use
information in orders, unit SOPs (such as battle rosters, redistribution criteria, and contingency manning
standards), and immediately available assets. |
3-90 | 45 | Army Tactics
1-128. Units conduct deliberate reorganization when they have more time and resources available. It usually
occurs farther to the rear than immediate reorganization. Procedures are similar to those for immediate
reorganization, but some replacement personnel and equipment may be available, and the unit has additional
time to conduct resupply and maintenance activities.
1-129. Reorganization aims to improve a unit’s capability until more extensive efforts can occur if
resources, the tactical situation, and time permit. Since reorganization involves activities internal to a unit, it
is the most expedient means of maintaining combat power after contact with the enemy.
Regeneration
1-130. Regeneration is the rebuilding of a unit through large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment,
and supplies, including the reestablishment of essential command and control and the conduct of mission-
essential training for the unit (ATP 3-94.4). Regeneration is the deliberate restoration of a unit’s combat
power; it is considerably more resource intensive than reorganization. Regeneration is time intensive and
requires days to weeks to execute. Because of the intensive nature of regeneration, it occurs at a designated
regeneration site after the unit disengages from operations. Commanders normally situate the regeneration
site in a relatively secure location. Tactical units only execute and do not plan the regeneration process.
INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
1-131. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding
the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment
(ADP 3-0). The intelligence warfighting function fuses the information collected through with primary
tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations.
1-132. Intelligence is a product, a process, and a function that enables the Army to conduct operations by
supporting the commander and command and control (which is accomplished by supporting the rest of the
staff). Commanders and staffs rely on many different types of intelligence products. The intelligence process
is continuous and directly supports the operations process by developing information requirements, collecting
on those requirements, processing data into information, analyzing information and intelligence from all
sources, producing intelligence, and when necessary, developing the situation through operations.
1-133. Intelligence supports decision makers and staffs by providing situational understanding of the threat,
terrain and weather, civil considerations, and other aspects of the operational environment. Intelligence
supports the commander and staff with analysis and production of effective timely, relevant, accurate, and
predictive assessments and products tailored to the commander’s and staff’s specific needs.
1-134. The intelligence warfighting function supports the commander through a broad range of tasks. These
tasks are interrelated, require the participation of the commander and staff, and are often conducted
simultaneously. The intelligence warfighting function tasks facilitate the commander’s visualization and
understanding of the threat and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. The intelligence
warfighting function includes the following tasks:
* Provide intelligence support to force generation—the task of generating intelligence knowledge
concerning an operational environment, facilitating future intelligence operations, and tailoring
the force.
* Provide support to situational understanding—the task of providing information and intelligence
to commanders to assist them in achieving a clear understanding of the force’s current state with
relation to the threat and other relevant aspects of the operational environment.
* Conduct information collection—the task that synchronizes and integrates the planning and
employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination
systems in direct support of current and future operations.
* Provide intelligence support to targeting and information operations—the task of providing the
commander information and intelligence support for targeting to achieve lethal and nonlethal
effects.
Table 1-2 on page 1-24 illustrates how the intelligence warfighting function tasks support the commander.
See ADP 2-0 and FM 2-0 for more discussions on intelligence tasks. |
3-90 | 46 | Chapter 1
Table 1-2. Intelligence warfighting function tasks that support the commander
Intelligence tasks Commander’s focus Commander’s decisions
Provide intelligence support to Orient on •Should the unit’s level of readiness be
force generation: contingencies. increased?
•Provide intelligence readiness. •Should the operation plan be
•Establish an intelligence architecture. implemented?
•Provide intelligence overwatch.
•Generate intelligence knowledge.
•Tailor the intelligence force.
Provide support to situational •Plan an operation. •Which COA will be implemented?
understanding: •Prepare. •Which enemy actions are expected?
•Perform IPB. •Execute. •What mitigation strategies should be
•Perform situation development. developed and implemented to reduce
•Assess.
•Provide tactical intelligence the potential impact of operations on the
•Secure the force.
overwatch. population?
•Determine 2nd and
•Conduct police intelligence
3rd order effects on
operations. operations and the
•Provide intelligence support to civil populace.
affairs operations.
Conduct information collection: •Plan information Which DPs, HPTs, and HVTs are
•Collection management. collection for an linked to the threat’s actions?
operation, including
•Are the assets available and in position
•Direct information collection.
PED requirements. to collect on the DPs, HPTs, and HVTs?
•Execute collection.
•Prepare. •Have the assets been repositioned for
•Conduct intelligence-related missions
•Execute. branches or sequels?
and operations.
•Assess.
Provide intelligence support to •Create lethal or •Are the unit’s lethal and nonlethal
targeting and information nonlethal effects actions and maneuver effective?
operations: against targets. •Which targets should be re-engaged?
•Provide intelligence support to •Destroy, suppress,
•Are the unit’s information operations
targeting. disrupt, or neutralize
effective?
•Provide intelligence support to targets.
information operations. •Reposition
intelligence or attack
•Provide intelligence support to
combat assessment. assets.
COA course of action HVT high-value target
DP decision point IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
HPT high-payoff target PED processing, exploitation, and dissemination
FIRES WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
1-135. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all
domains against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations (ADP 3-
0). Units must execute and integrate fires, in combination with the other elements of combat power, to create
and converge effects and achieve the desired end state.
1-136. The fires warfighting function tasks are—
* Execute fires across the five domains and in the information environment, employing—
Surface-to-surface fires.
Air-to-surface fires.
Surface-to-air fires.
Cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare.
Space operations. |
3-90 | 47 | Army Tactics
Multinational fires.
Special operations.
Information operations.
* Integrate Army, multinational, and joint fires through—
Targeting.
Operations process.
Fire support planning.
Airspace planning and management.
Electromagnetic spectrum management.
Multinational integration.
Rehearsals.
For additional information on fires tasks see ADP 3-19, FM 3-09, and FM 3-01.
1-137. The military decision-making process (MDMP) synchronizes the unit’s scheme of maneuver with
the provision of fire support. The plan must identify critical times and places where units need the maximum
effects from their fire support assets. That planning must consider existing limitations on employing fires,
such as rules of engagement, presence of friendly forces within the assigned area, desired conditions of
subsequent phases, and requirements for collateral damage assessments. Each commander’s guidance gives
specified attack criteria for supporting fires assets, thus focusing the staff and unit planning and execution
efforts on those critical times and events. Specified attack criteria are a compilation of commander’s
guidance, desired effects, and high-payoff targets and attack priorities. The time available to plan operations
constrains a commander’s ability to synchronize fire support operations that employ well-matched effects of
all available assets against high-payoff targets.
1-138. The integration of indirect fire support is fundamental to the success of a unit’s scheme of maneuver.
Indirect fire planning reconciles top-down planning and bottom-up refinement. Indirect fire supports the
unit’s maneuver by planning preparation fires, which includes the different types of effects: harassing,
interdiction, suppressive, destruction, and deception fires. These fires can be time or event driven. (See FM
3-09 for definition of desired effects.)
Fire Support Planning and Coordination
1-139. The unit’s ability to orchestrate and employ all available fire support resources as a system and to
integrate and synchronize fire support with the concept of operations results from an established process
known as fire support planning and coordination. Fire support planning is the continuous process of
analyzing, allocating, integrating, synchronizing, and scheduling fires to describe how the effects of fires
facilitate maneuver force actions (FM 3-09). Successful fire support planning is the result of the fire support
coordinator’s aggressive contribution to the maneuver commander’s planning and decision-making process.
Fire support coordination is the planning and executing of fire so targets are adequately covered by a suitable
weapon or group of weapons (JP 3-09). Formal coordination binds fire support resources together to create
a unity of effort so that the multiple effects of each fire support asset across all domains are rapidly and
continuously integrated and synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.
1-140. Fire supporters utilize the principles of fire support planning and coordination when advising the
unit on the execution of fire support. These principles are extensions of the functions of fire support. The fire
support planning and coordination principles are––
* Plan early and continuously.
* Ensure the continuous flow of targeting information.
* Consider the use of all lethal and nonlethal attack capabilities.
* Furnish the type of support requested.
* Use the most effective fire support attack/delivery system.
* Avoid unnecessary duplication.
* Consider airspace coordination.
* Provide adequate support. |
3-90 | 48 | Chapter 1
* Provide for rapid and continuous coordination.
* Provide for flexibility.
* Use fire support coordination measures.
1-141. During execution, fire supporters use the principles of fire support execution to anticipate the
dynamics of combat operations, maintain situational awareness of the operational environment, and leverage
interoperable fire support command and control systems and attack and delivery capabilities. The fire support
execution principles include––
* Adequate fire support for the committed units.
* Weight to the main effort.
* Immediately available fire support for the commander to influence the operation.
* Facilitate future operations.
* Maximize feasible centralized control.
* Never place artillery in reserve.
1-142. Units emphasize accomplishing simple and rapidly integrated fire support plans using quick-fire
planning techniques and SOPs to focus fires on seizing the initiative. They integrate their fire assets as far
forward as possible in their movement formations to facilitate the early emplacement of those assets. One
example of this integration is the use of an unmanned aircraft system forward site team from a combat
aviation brigade temporarily attached to a field artillery brigade to identify targets for destruction.
1-143. Artillery, mortars, and some electromagnetic attack capabilities must occupy positions that are well
forward and still within supporting range of the flanks of maneuver forces to provide responsive indirect and
nonlethal fires. Units consider the effect that movement by echelon or battery has on the amount of fire
support available. They should support the unit’s main effort with priority of fires.
1-144. Responsiveness can be achieved by the following:
* Training, especially digital sustainment training.
* Streamlining the call for fire by using digital systems.
* Planning fire support requirements in advance.
* Establishing a permissive battlefield design, to include airspace.
* Establishing permissive fire support coordination measures.
* Conducting rehearsals.
* Employing time on target.
* Continually training observers in all aspects of fire support.
* Limiting radio transmissions on fire networks to time-sensitive, mission-essential traffic only.
1-145. The linking of Army forward observers, joint fires observers, and target acquisition assets to quick
fire or exclusive networks also provides responsive fires. Responsive fire networks allow the lead observers
to communicate directly with specific field artillery and mortar units. These kinds of communications
arrangements enhance responsiveness through streamlined net structures and focused priorities.
Communications planning should also include the need for communications networks for the clearing of
targets for rotary- and fixed-wing attacks.
1-146. Army units focus on integrating and synchronizing lethal and nonlethal activities. To preserve
warfighting capabilities, and reduce the capabilities of potential adversaries, units utilize combinations of
cyberspace, space operations, information operations, and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative. At the BCT level and above, units utilize cyberspace electromagnetic
activities sections to assist in requesting cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities. These include
offensive and defensive cyberspace, and Department of Defense information network operations,
electromagnetic attack, electromagnetic protection, and electromagnetic warfare support. (For more
information on cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare, see FM 3-12). |
3-90 | 49 | Army Tactics
Airspace Control and Airspace Management
1-147. The joint force commander designates an airspace control authority to develop, coordinate, and
publish airspace control procedures for operating the airspace control system in the joint operations area. The
airspace control authority establishes an airspace control plan that provides specific planning guidance and
procedures for the airspace control system for the joint operations area. The airspace control order is an order
implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests for airspace
coordinating measures (JP 3-52).
1-148. Airspace control is the exercise of delegated authority over designated airspace and users through
control procedures and coordination measures to maximize operational effectiveness (JP 3-52). Airspace
control is not synonymous with airspace management. Airspace control is reliant on airspace management
capabilities provided by airspace control elements including military, U.S. civil, and host-nation air traffic
control. Airspace management is the planning, coordination, integration, and regulation of airspace by
airspace control elements in support of airspace control (JP 3-52). Controlling and managing airspace is a
requirement to effectively integrate capabilities from multiple domains during military operations.
1-149. Any formation that employs aviation platforms (including UAS), surface-to-surface fires, or surface-
to-air fires is an airspace user. Therefore, leaders at all echelons must understand the techniques and
procedures used to integrate airspace capabilities into ground schemes of maneuver. At the tactical level,
while numerous echelons can perform airspace management tasks, the division is the lowest echelon capable
of performing airspace control. At battalion level and above, the U.S. Air Force provides tactical air control
parties to assist in airspace management and provide terminal attack control of close air support missions.
1-150. Army units develop unit airspace plans, which consist of airspace coordinating measures (ACMs)
that are integrated to support operations. BCT and above headquarters submit their unit airspace plans to their
higher headquarters for inclusion into that echelon’s unit airspace plan. Ultimately, the consolidated unit
airspace plan reaches the battlefield coordination detachment and these ACMs, which are the Army’s
requirements for airspace, are then combined with the other components of the joint force airspace
requirements and integrated into the airspace control order produced by the Joint Force Air Component
Command.
1-151. ACMs are employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and
simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Airspace elements establish ACMs to accomplish one
or more functions:
* Establish coordinated airspace for specific airspace users.
* Restrict the actions of some airspace users.
* Create airspace in which units can use weapons with minimum risk to other friendly forces.
* Control actions of specific airspace users.
* Require airspace users to accomplish specific actions.
See JP 3-52, FM 3-52, ATP 3-52.1/MCRP 3-20F.4 (MCWP 3-25.13)/NTTP 3-56.4/AFTTP 3-2.78, and
ATP 3-91.1/AFTTP 3-2.86 for more information on airspace control and airspace management processes,
procedures, and control measures.
SUSTAINMENT WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
1-152. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and
services to ensure freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0).
Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. Successful sustainment enables freedom
of action by increasing the number of options available to the commander. Sustainment is essential for
retaining and exploiting the initiative. The sustainment warfighting function consists of four elements:
* Logistics.
* Health service support.
* Financial management.
* Personnel services. |
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FM 3-90 focuses on logistics, and medical considerations as they apply to tactical operations. For additional
information on the sustainment warfighting function see ADP 4-0.
Logistics
1-153. During planning, units assess their basic load to determine its adequacy to support an operation. A
basic load is the quantity of supplies required to be on hand within, and moved by a unit formation, expressed
according to the wartime organization of the unit or formation and maintained at the prescribed levels
(JP 4-09). Units further configure their basic load into combat loads for specific missions. Combat loads are
the minimum mission-essential equipment and supplies as determined by the commander responsible for
carrying out the mission, required for Soldiers to fight and survive immediate combat operations (FM 4-40).
Combat loads are not standardized nor are quantities established since all are mission dependent.
1-154. Units can use logistics packages and throughput distribution of combat configured loads to resupply
maneuver units maintaining momentum and tempo. A logistics package is a grouping of multiple classes
of supply and supply vehicles under the control of a single convoy commander. Throughput distribution
is a method of distribution which bypasses one or more intermediate supply echelons in the supply system to
avoid multiple handling. A combat configured load consists of packages of water, Class I, Class III (B), Class
IV, Class V, Class VIII, and Class IX constructed to support the type and mission of a maneuver unit. The
supporting unit calculates and recommends the composition of combat configured loads based upon the
controlled supply rate, forecasting, and historical data. Units determine the amount of cross loading required
for supplies to prevent all of one type of supply from loss by the destruction of a single vehicle or aircraft.
Units must also anticipate and plan for dynamic changes to task organization to ensure the appropriate
ammunition types, repair parts, and petroleum, oil, and lubrications products are packaged and distributed
accordingly.
1-155. Logistics units and materiel remain close to the maneuver force to ensure short turnaround time for
supplies and services. This includes uploading as much critical materiel (such as ammunition and petroleum,
oils, and lubricants) as possible and coordinating to preclude multiple units near each other. Units take into
account the risk of enemy detection of logistics preparations for an attack.
1-156. The availability of adequate supplies and transportation to sustain an operation from start to finish
is critical to mission success. Sustainment planners must account for logistics requirements during mission
analysis to ensure the selected course of action and any potential branch plan is supportable. Based on the
type of mission and expected consumption factors, they anticipate requirements and arrange for resupply via
multiple means according to the concept of support. Additionally, logistics planners ensure their counterparts
at the next higher echelon are fully aware of the sustainment requirements and priorities to aid in adding
flexibility to the system (for example, potential need to throughput a class of supply for an urgent
requirement, such as ammunition or bulk fuel). Supply lines of communications are strained, and
requirements for repair and replacement of weapon systems increase. Requirements for petroleum, oils, and
lubricants increase because of the distance combat vehicles are likely to travel. Sustainment units in direct
support of maneuver units must be as agile and mobile as the forces they support. One way to provide
continuous support is to task-organize sustainment elements with their supported maneuver formations.
1-157. Field maintenance assets move as far forward as possible and as the tactical situation allows to repair
and return inoperable and damaged equipment to an operational status. Crews continue to perform their
preventive maintenance checks and services in accordance with the operational climate and terrain. Battle
damage assessment and repair is critical to sustaining offensive actions. Battle damage assessment is the
estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system
assessment, resulting from the application of fires (JP 3-0). Crews as well as maintenance and recovery teams
conduct battle damage assessment and repair of disabled equipment by expeditiously fixing, bypassing, or
using field expedient components. Battle damage assessment and repair restores the minimum-essential
combat capabilities necessary to support a specific combat mission or to enable the equipment to self-recover.
1-158. Establishing aerial resupply and forward logistics bases may be necessary to sustain operations such
as exploitation and pursuit conducted at great distances from a unit’s sustaining base. The unit or support
activity at an airlift’s point of origin is responsible for obtaining the required packing, shipping, and sling-
load equipment. It prepares the load for aerial transport, prepares the pickup zone, and conducts air-loading
operations. The unit located at the airlift destination is responsible for preparing the landing zone to |
3-90 | 51 | Army Tactics
accommodate aerial resupply, preparing to receive the load such as the right material handling equipment,
and returning non-expendable equipment such as cargo pallets, sling-load equipment, or containers.
Health Service Support
1-159. Health service support encompasses all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by
Army Medicine to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the behavioral and physical well-being of
personnel by providing direct patient care that includes medical treatment (organic and area support),
hospitalization, medical evacuation to include medical regulating, and medical logistics to include blood
management (FM 4-02). Health service support also includes the treatment of CBRN patients and as directed,
provides support to other Services, agencies, and organizations. (See FM 4-02 for additional information for
health service support).
Medical Treatment (Organic and Area Support)
1-160. The medical treatment function encompasses Roles 1 and 2 medical treatment support. These roles
of care are provided by organic assets (medical platoons in battalions and treatment teams assigned to
sustainment units) or on an area support basis from supporting medical companies or detachments. Within
the BCTs and echelons above brigade Army Health System units, this support is provided by the medical
company (brigade support) and the medical company (area support). The area support mission encompasses
routine sick call and support provided by all ten medical functions. (See FM 4-02 for additional information
on medical treatment).
Hospitalization
1-161. Theater hospitalization provides essential care within the theater evacuation policy to either return a
patient to duty or stabilize a patient for evacuation to a definitive care facility outside the AO. A hospital is
a medical treatment facility capable of providing inpatient care. The Role 3 hospital centers execute the
theater hospitalization mission. The Role 3 medical treatment facilities are appropriately staffed and equipped
to provide diagnostic and therapeutic services, as well as the necessary supporting services required to
perform its assigned mission and functions. (See ATP 4-02.10 for additional information on hospitalization).
Medical Evacuation
1-162. Medical evacuation is the timely and effective movement of the wounded, injured, or ill to and
between medical treatment facilities on dedicated and properly marked medical platforms with enroute care
provided by medical personnel (ATP 4-02.2). Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) refers to both ground and
air evacuation of casualties and joint or partnered air evacuation elements. Air MEDEVAC employs air assets
from the air ambulance companies assigned to the combat aviation brigade to evacuate casualties. Leaders
must consider the basic tenets that influence the employment of MEDEVAC assets. These factors include
the—
* Patient’s medical condition.
* Forces employment.
* Enemy’s anticipated course of action and air defense capabilities.
* Anticipated patient load.
* Expected areas of patient density.
* Availability of MEDEVAC resources to include ground and air crews.
* Availability, location, and type of supporting medical treatment facilities.
* Adherence to the protections afforded to medical personnel, patients, medical units, and medical
transports under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
* Unit airspace plan.
* Obstacle plans.
* Fire support plan (to ensure MEDEVAC assets are not dispatched onto routes and at the times
affected by the fire support mission).
* Road network or dedicated MEDEVAC routes (contaminated and clean). |
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* Weather conditions.
Medical Logistics
1-163. FM 3-90 does not discuss medical logistics. (See FM 4-02 and ATP 4-02.1 for more information on
medical logistics.)
Additional Medical Considerations
1-164. Tactical combat casualty care and casualty evacuation are not medical support functions. However,
these are vital concepts for leaders to understand and implement during tactical operations.
Tactical Combat Casualty Care
1-165. Tactical combat casualty care is divided into the three phases: care under fire, tactical field care, and
tactical evacuation care. Tactical combat casualty care occurs during a combat mission and is the military
counterpart to prehospital emergency medical treatment. Tactical combat casualty care in the military is most
commonly provided by enlisted personnel and includes self-aid and buddy aid (first aid), combat lifesaver
(enhanced first aid), Army combat medics and critical care flight paramedics, corpsmen from the Navy and
Marine Corps and the U.S. Coast Guard, and both medics and pararescuemen in the U.S. Air Force.
1-166. In the care under fire phase, combat medical personnel and their units are under effective hostile fire
and are very limited in the care they can provide. During this phase, only those lifesaving interventions that
must be performed immediately are undertaken. Soldiers mainly focus on stabilizing the casualties to
transport them to the next higher medical facility.
1-167. During the tactical field care phase, medical personnel and their patients are no longer under
effective hostile fire and medical personnel can provide more extensive patient care. In this phase,
interventions directed at other life-threatening conditions, as well as resuscitation and other measures to
increase the comfort of the patient may be performed. During tactical field care, personnel must be prepared
to transition back to care under fire, or to prepare the casualty for tactical evacuation, as the tactical situation
changes.
1-168. In the tactical evacuation care phase, casualties are transported from the battlefield to medical
treatment facilities. Evacuation can be by either MEDEVAC or casualty evacuation. (See FM 4-02 for more
information on tactical combat casualty care).
Casualty Evacuation
1-169. If MEDEVAC platforms are available, casualties should be evacuated on these platforms to ensure
that they receive proper enroute medical care. However, if dedicated medical evacuation assets are
unavailable, units use non-dedicated vehicles to transport causalities. Casualty evacuation is the movement
of casualties aboard nonmedical vehicles or aircraft without enroute medical care (FM 4-02). Casualty
evacuation (CASEVAC) involves the unregulated movement of casualties using tactical or logistic aircraft
and vehicles. These vehicles or aircraft are not staffed with medical personnel for enroute care (unless
augmentation is planned for in the operation plan). These vehicles and aircraft do not have organic medical
equipment. If the combat medic is not available to provide care enroute, the combat lifesaver may accompany
the casualties to monitor their conditions.
1-170. Combat operations place a significant burden on medical resources due to the magnitude and
lethality of the forces involved. Medical units must anticipate large numbers of casualties in a short period
due to the capabilities of modern conventional weapons and the possible employment of weapons of mass
destruction. These mass casualty situations can rapidly exceed the capabilities of medical assets. Mass
casualty refers to any number of human casualties produced across a period of time that exceeds available
medical support capabilities (JP 4-02). Careful planning and coordination are necessary to minimize the
extent to which medical capabilities are overwhelmed. CASEVAC must occur concurrently with operations.
Units that cease aggressive maneuver to evacuate casualties while in enemy contact are likely to both suffer
additional casualties while stationary and fail their mission. Effective management of mass casualty situations |
3-90 | 53 | Army Tactics
depends on established and rehearsed unit-level mass casualty plans. There are a number of other variables
which can ensure the success of a unit's mass casualty response. These include, but are not limited to—
* Coordination of additional medical support and augmentation of medical evacuation support,
forward resuscitative and surgical detachments, combat support and field hospitals, casualty
collection points, ambulance exchange points, and established Class VIII resupply.
* Rapid clearance of casualties from the battlefield (independent of MEDEVAC).
* Providing effective tactical combat casualty care for the injured.
* Continuous flow of casualties to the medical treatment facilities at the next higher role of care.
* Use of alternative assets when the number of casualties overwhelms the capacity of available
medical evacuation systems.
PROTECTION WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
1-171. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or
mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve combat power and enable freedom of action (FM
3-0). Protection encompasses everything that makes the Army forces hard to detect and hard to destroy.
Protection requires units to understand and visualize threats and hazards in an operational environment. This
understanding allows units to prioritize their requirements and commit capabilities and resources according
to those priorities. The protection warfighting function is the responsibility of all unit types and echelons in
order to maintain the force’s integrity and combat power.
1-172. The protection warfighting function includes these tasks:
* Conduct survivability operations.
* Coordinate air and missile defense support.
* Conduct populace and resources control.
* Conduct electromagnetic protection.
* Perform cyberspace security and defense.
* Provide force health protection.
* Conduct CBRN operations.
* Provide explosive ordnance disposal support.
* Conduct personnel recovery.
* Conduct detention operations.
* Conduct risk management.
* Implement physical security procedures.
* Apply antiterrorism measures.
* Conduct police operations.
* Conduct area security.
* Implement operations security.
Survivability Operations
1-173. Survivability is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand
hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission
(ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C). Survivability operations are those protection activities that alter the physical
environment by providing or improving cover, camouflage, and concealment (ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C).
Units exploit existing terrain features to enhance their survivability by altering the physical environment to
provide or improve their cover and concealment. Likewise, units can use natural or manmade materials as
camouflage to confuse, mislead, or evade the enemy to enhance their survivability.
1-174. All units conduct survivability operations within the limits of their capabilities. These include
camouflaging their positions and constructing individual or crew served fighting positions. Engineers and
CBRN units possess additional capabilities to assist survivability operations. These include hardening
structures and positions and the reconnaissance, surveillance, and decontamination of CBRN hazards. |
3-90 | 54 | Chapter 1
1-175. Survivability operations enhance the ability to avoid or withstand hostile actions by altering the
physical environment. They accomplish this through four tasks:
* Constructing fighting positions.
* Constructing protective positions.
* Hardening facilities.
* Employing camouflage and concealment.
The first three tasks focus on providing cover, while the fourth task focuses on providing protection from
observation and surveillance. These four tasks often have the added benefit of providing some degree of
shelter or protection from the elements. All four tasks are often addressed in combination. For example,
constructing fighting positions and protective positions usually also requires employing camouflage and
concealment. Employing camouflage and concealment often accompanies activities to harden facilities.
Air and Missile Defense
1-176. Army air defense artillery forces provide low-to-high altitude air and missile defense (AMD), and
contribute to situational understanding, airspace management, freedom of movement, freedom from aerial
attack, and early warning. These capabilities deter or defeat enemy aerial threats, protect the friendly force
and high-value assets, and enable the friendly force’s freedom to operate. Enemy air threats include but are
not limited to rockets, missiles, unmanned aircraft, and manned rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. Counterair
is a mission at the theater level that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a
desired degree of control of the air and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles,
both before and after launch (JP 3-01). Counterair, from the active air defense perspective is a joint
responsibility and will vary based on assets available and priorities. The area air defense commander through
the area air defense plan executes this mission for a theater and provides the required integration and close
coordination between Army air defense artillery forces and other counterair forces. Short-range air defense
(known as SHORAD) assets may be attached or in direct support of corps and divisions.
1-177. Units employ both active and passive methods of air defense to include air defense artillery systems,
direct fire weapons systems, and air guards. Active AMD are direct defensive actions taken to destroy,
nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It
includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, electromagnetic warfare, and other available weapons.
Active missile defense requires early detection of missiles in flight to permit cueing, acquisition, tracking,
classification, identification, and destruction as soon as possible after launch. Passive AMD are all measures,
other than active air defenses, taken to minimize the effects of hostile air and missile threats against friendly
forces and assets. All units conduct passive actions to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy air threat. These
measures include camouflage, concealment, military deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy,
detection and warning systems, and the use of protective construction. Passive actions are a unit’s first line
of defense and improve survivability by reducing the likelihood of being detected and targeted from the air
and by mitigating the potential effects of air surveillance and attack. Passive missile defense measures include
detecting air and missile launches, predicting impact points, providing threat identification, and
disseminating early warning. It includes measures initiated to reduce vulnerability and to minimize the effect
of damage caused by missile attack.
1-178. Generally, the joint force uses both offensive and defensive counterair operations to dominate enemy
airspace and prevent the launch of threats. Offensive counterair operations include the suppression of enemy
air defenses. Defensive counterair operations defeat enemy air and missile threats attempting to penetrate or
attack through friendly airspace. Units integrate joint forces to exploit the mutually beneficial effects of
offensive and defensive actions to destroy, neutralize, or minimize air and missile threats.
1-179. Units coordinate and clear air and missile defense fires on the ground and through the airspace to
enable rapid and timely engagement of threats while preventing fratricide. However, the ground force
executing the defense ensures that as much as possible of their defended asset list is in range of these air and
missile defense systems. Units take both active and passive air defense measures to protect themselves from
aerial attack.
1-180. A ground force’s organic weapons are its primary defense against short-range air threats. Units
weigh the air threat with their ability to mitigate the threat when considering options for operations. Units |
3-90 | 55 | Army Tactics
position available organic or supporting radars in locations to best support the operation. The selection of
those positions reflects a risk assessment designed to preclude their early loss to enemy action. Units establish
air defense priorities based on the concept of operations, scheme of maneuver, air situation, and the air
defense priorities. Friendly air defense communicates weapon status to friendly assets, balances protection
of ground units, and prevents fratricide of friendly air assets.
Populace and Resources Control
1-181. Units include populace and resources control measures in their planning and execution of all
operations. Ensuring proper implementation of populace and resources controls can keep civilians from
potentially getting harmed by or disrupting military operations, increase OPSEC by limiting their access to
sensitive areas, and disrupt illegal activities that can affect military logistics. During the conduct of large-
scale combat operations, an indigenous civil government will probably not be able to define, enact, and
enforce populace and resources control measures. (See FM 3-57, ATP 3-39.30, and ATP 3-57.10 for
additional information on the conduct of populace and resource control.)
Electromagnetic Protection
1-182. Many Army capabilities—including communications, cyberspace operations, information
collection, space capabilities, target detection, and precision guided munitions—depend on assured access to
the electromagnetic spectrum. The tasks to protect Army access to the electromagnetic spectrum are—
* Conduct electromagnetic protection actions.
* Conduct electromagnetic spectrum operations.
* Conduct defensive electromagnetic attack.
For more information on electromagnetic protection, see JP 3-85.
Conduct Electromagnetic Protection Actions
1-183. Electromagnetic protection is a division of electromagnetic warfare involving actions taken to
protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic
spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability (JP 3-85). This includes actions taken
to ensure friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as frequency agility in a radio or variable pulse
repetition frequency in radar. Electromagnetic protection protects U.S. and allied systems from the effects of
friendly and enemy electromagnetic attack and electromagnetic interference.
1-184. Electromagnetic protection actions include—
* Electromagnetic compatibility.
* Electromagnetic hardening.
* Electronic masking.
* Emission control.
* Wartime reserve modes.
Conduct Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
1-185. Electromagnetic spectrum operations is coordinated military actions to exploit, attack, protect, and
manage the electromagnetic environment (JP 3-85). Electromagnetic spectrum operations enable
electromagnetic systems to perform their functions in the intended environment without causing or suffering
unacceptable interference.
Conduct Defensive Electromagnetic Attack
1-186. Defensive electromagnetic attack primarily protects friendly personnel and equipment or platforms
against lethal attacks by denying enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum to guide or trigger weapons.
Defensive electromagnetic attack uses the electromagnetic spectrum to protect personnel, facilities,
capabilities, and equipment. Examples of self-protection and other protection measures include the use of
expendables (flares and active decoys), jammers, towed decoys, directed-energy infrared countermeasures,
and counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device systems. |
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Perform Cyberspace Security and Cyberspace Defense
1-187. The Army secures and defends the network through a defense-in-depth approach, incorporating
layered security and defenses. The tasks to secure and defend cyberspace are—
* Perform cybersecurity activities.
* Conduct defensive cyberspace operations-internal defensive measures.
1-188. Cyberspace security are actions taken within protected cyberspace to prevent unauthorized access
to, an exploitation of, or damage to computers and networks, including platform information technology
(JP 3-12). Cyberspace security is not specific to an enemy or adversary. Cyberspace security actions protect
the networks and systems through all phases of network planning and implementation. Cyberspace security
activities include vulnerability assessment and analysis, vulnerability management, incident handling,
continuous monitoring, and detection and restoration capabilities to shield and preserve information and
information systems.
1-189. Cyberspace defense are actions taken within protected cyberspace to defeat specific threats that have
breached or are threatening to breach cyberspace security measures (JP 3-12). The purpose of cyberspace
defense includes actions to protect, detect, characterize, counter, and mitigate threats. Such defensive actions
are usually created by the joint force command or Service that owns or operates the network, except in cases
where these defensive actions would affect the operations of networks outside the responsibility of the
respective joint force command or Service.
Force Health Protection
1-190. Force health protection are measures that promote, improve, or conserve the behavioral and physical
well-being of Soldiers comprised of preventive and treatment aspects of medical functions that include
combat and operational stress control, dental services, veterinary services, operational public health, and
laboratory services. Enabling a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from
health hazards (FM 4-02). (See FM 4-02 for additional information on force health protection).
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
1-191. CBRN support to operations include the simultaneous application of the assess, protect, and mitigate
functions guided by hazard awareness and understanding. CBRN units enable movement and maneuver of
supported units in accordance with the concept of operations and scheme of maneuver.
1-192. CBRN staff assess potential CBRN threats and hazards and recommend mitigation measures to
protect the force while minimizing degradation of units, personnel, equipment, and facilities from effects that
would hinder operations. CBRN staffs advise units on risks and friendly vulnerabilities through their
understanding of the operational environment and the enemy’s capabilities. Measures to protect against and
mitigate CBRN effects include proper protective equipment, exposure guidance, and alarm conditions.
1-193. CBRN operations include active measures to gain information on CBRN threats, enabling units to
mitigate these threats and limit vulnerabilities while continuing operations. CBRN defense measures include
individual, crew, and collective tasks. Units conduct CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance operations as
complementary operations to facilitate maneuver by understanding the CBRN hazards. The time, techniques,
and CBRN assets required to achieve reconnaissance objectives are determined by the intelligence
requirements and mission variables. CBRN protection and mitigation measures increase the ability of the
force to operate under CBRN conditions but may decrease operational tempo and increase sustainment
requirements. (See FM 3-11 for more information on CBRN operations).
Personnel Recovery
1-194. Soldiers have an increased likelihood of becoming isolated during offensive operations. Units must
train both the individual and staff on how to react when an isolating event occurs. Army personnel recovery
is the military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel
(FM 3-50). Training includes the personnel recovery tasks of report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate
as well as the Code of Conduct and individual isolation tasks (survive, resist, escape, evade). |
3-90 | 57 | Army Tactics
Detention Operations
1-195. Detention involves the detainment of a population or group that poses some level of threat to military
operations. Unit staffs consider detention operations when developing plans. Detainee planning enables
providing necessary resources to construct and operate detention facilities for the projected number of
detainees. Units monitor the actual number of detainees closely to avoid devoting too many or too few
resources to detention operations. It is essential to address all aspects of detainee operations while planning
for the supported offensive operation. To ensure that units are prepared to incorporate detainee operations
during planning, units establish mechanisms that ensure effective consideration of potential detainee
operations and their supporting activities.
1-196. Detainee operations begin at the point of capture—the point at which a Soldier has the custody of,
and is responsible for safeguarding, a detainee. Soldiers must be prepared to process and safeguard detainees.
Actions at the point of capture—the point at which a Soldier has the custody of, and is responsible for
safeguarding, a detainee—can directly affect mission success and could have a lasting impact on U.S. tactical,
operational, and strategic military objectives. All Soldiers must be prepared to process and safeguard
detainees. Upon capture, Soldiers must use the five Ss and T technique (short for search, silence, segregate,
safeguard, speed, and tag) to process detainees. This technique provides a structure with which to guide
Soldiers in conducting detainee operations until custody of the detainee transfers to another authority or
location. (See FM 3-63 for additional details on detainee operations).
1-197. During the conduct of operations, Soldiers may capture enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). At the point
of capture, the detainees and EPWs share the same five Ss and T technique. However, the legal framework
is different. The local nation has the legal authority for procedures for civilian detentions. However, Soldiers
must handle EPWs in accordance with international law and treat them humanely; Soldiers must not abuse
EPWs physically or mentally. EPWs must be allowed to keep their personal protective equipment. The unit
is responsible for their care. If a unit cannot evacuate EPWs in a reasonable time, they must give EPWs food,
water, and first aid. Soldiers should not give EPWs comfort items such as cigarettes or candy.
Risk Management
1-198. Leaders must assume risk in knowing that subordinate leaders will not only accept, but also take
risks to achieve mission success. Leaders identify and refine controls through continual dialogue with
subordinate leaders to ensure their understanding of the commander’s intent. Time is a key factor in assessing
and understanding risks that could impact successful operations. Reduced time impacts the tempo of
operations as well as compresses planning timelines and asset requests. Such impacts can have significant
downward implications to units on the ground. A compressed timeline can add additional risk to operations
with the following:
* Lack of implementing and resourcing potential deception activities.
* Rushed planning methodologies leading to incomplete plans.
* Confusing or unclear operation orders that lead to multiple fragmentary orders or verbal orders
that can be misunderstood.
* An inability to request or use information collection assets resulting in ambiguity before
operations.
* Lack of necessary rehearsals depending on the complexity and number of forces involved.
* An inability to provide necessary information for protection-related mitigation efforts in a CBRN
environment such as mission-oriented protective posture, known as MOPP, or operational
exposure guidance, known as OEG.
* Link-up procedures between organic and external forces.
* Lack of competing courses of action (COAs) resulting in an unnecessary limiting of options.
1-199. When planning operations, leaders need to thoroughly understand the potential enemy formations
they may encounter. This is achieved through a solid understanding of intelligence preparation of the
battlefield and the threat template and situational template to ensure that friendly forces have the appropriate
force ratio to execute both offensive and defensive operations. If the force ratio is not a preferred one, the
unit assumes risk to the force and accomplishing directed mission objectives. This is also important for when
units have to assume risk when planning branches, sequels, and follow-on operations. |
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1-200. Maintaining an awareness of the common operational picture (COP) as an operation progresses is
another key risk reduction technique. To aid leaders and Soldiers in this process, units develop and employ
effective techniques and standard operating procedures, including—
* Monitoring the next higher echelon’s radio network.
* Having communication between units.
* Providing COP updates.
* Including accurate position reporting.
* Training and using liaison officers.
* Overseeing local security.
For more information on risk management see ATP 5-19.
Antiterrorism
1-201. Antiterrorism consists of defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and
property to terrorist acts, including limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces (JP
3-26). Antiterrorism is always a consideration for all forces. (See ATP 3-37.2 for additional information on
antiterrorism operations).
Police Operations
1-202. Police operations encompass two tasks—law enforcement and policing. These two tasks are
complementary and interdependent but are conducted with a different intent. Law enforcement is conducted
for the purpose of enforcing laws, investigating crimes, and apprehending (when warranted) persons for
adjudication within the appropriate judicial system. Policing is the application of control measures within an
area of operation to maintain law and order, safety, and other matters affecting the general welfare of the
population (FM 3-39). Policing focuses on maintaining order and establishing security—not the enforcement
of laws on the population or to compelling compliance at the risk of legal penalties. The relative emphasis
given to policing and law enforcement tasks is based on the operational and mission variables, including the
presence of the applicable rule of law. An operational environment characterized by general war will require
police operations heavily weighted toward policing tasks, with minimal emphasis on law enforcement.
Operational environments characterized by relative stability and governance under the rule of law will require
much more law enforcement activity and less focus on policing tasks. (See ATP 3-39.10 for additional
information on police operations).
Area Security
1-203. Area security is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of
communications, and activities within a specific area. Area security operations occur regardless of which
operation is currently dominant. Area security is conducted through the following five variations—
* Site security. A unit conducting site security may protect locations such as base/base camps,
tactical assembly areas, critical assets, port areas and piers.
* Line of communication and route security
* Convoy security.
* Response force operations. Types of response forces include a mobile security force, such as a
military police unit, and a tactical combat force, such as a combined arms battalion.
* Area damage control.
1-204. Operations in noncontiguous assigned areas require units to emphasize area security. During
offensive and retrograde operations, the speed at which the main body moves provides some measure of
security. Rapidly moving units in open terrain will deploy a forward security force to provide advance
warning of enemy forces. Technical assets can be used when no security force is assigned. In restrictive
terrain, security forces focus on key terrain such as potential choke points.
1-205. Commanders execute echelon support area and base security as part of an echelon’s sustaining
operations responsibilities. Area security is normally an economy of force measure ensuring the continued
conduct of sustaining operations to support the echelon’s main and supporting efforts. All area security |
3-90 | 59 | Army Tactics
operations take advantage of the local security measures performed by all units regardless of their location
in the assigned area. (See ADP 3-37 for more information on the variations of area security.)
1-206. A unit develops specific rules of engagement when conducting area security, particularly when
civilians are present. However, commanders remain responsible for protecting the force, and they consider
this responsibility when establishing rules of engagement. They explain restrictions on conducting operations
to ensure everyone understands those restrictions. Soldiers must understand that their actions may have far-
reaching positive or negative effects. Commanders iterate that media and adversaries can quickly exploit
their Soldiers’ actions, especially the way they treat civilians.
1-207. Sometimes area security forces must retain readiness over long periods without contact with enemy
forces. This occurs most often when the enemy special purpose forces or insurgents are overmatched. Forces
conducting area security should not develop a sense of complacency, even if the enemy force appears to have
ceased operations in the secured area. Additionally, friendly forces should be mindful of mines and booby
traps in these situations. Successful units assume that the enemy force regularly observes friendly operations
to identify routines, weak points, and lax security for the opportunity to strike with minimum risk. This
requires leaders to maintain vigilance and discipline in their Soldiers to preclude that opportunity from
developing.
Operations Security
1-208. Operations security is a capability that identifies and controls critical information, indicators of
friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk
of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities (JP 3-13.3). Operations security (OPSEC) is applied throughout all
operations to protect any information or activities of friendly elements. The practice of OPSEC denies the
enemy of information that it may use to disrupt or defeat actions by friendly forces.
1-209. OPSEC is not only concerned with protecting planning and preparation activities, but also
encompasses applying effective field craft, camouflage, concealment, and masking. These techniques deny
and disrupt the enemy’s ability to gain information through reconnaissance and surveillance. It includes
explaining to Soldiers methods the enemy uses to find and target their cell phones, gather geo-location tags
from personal photos, and collect information from posts to social media. Other examples include how all
lead-up activities—to include pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections, vehicle loading, and
modifications—can indicate future movements or operations and can provide enemy forces with an initial
understanding of friendly force activities.
1-210. A units OPSEC program and any deception or survivability efforts should conceal the location of
the friendly objective, the main effort, the disposition of forces, and the timing of the offense from enemy
forces or mislead them regarding this information. These measures prevent enemy forces from launching
effective spoiling attacks. |
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Movement and Forms of Maneuver
This chapter discusses movement formations, movement techniques, and the five
forms of maneuver.
MOVEMENT FORMATIONS
2-1. A movement formation is an ordered arrangement of forces for a specific purpose and describes the
general configuration of a unit on the ground (ADP 3-90). Movement formations allow a unit to move on the
battlefield based on the terrain and enemy threat. Terrain characteristics and visibility determine the actual
arrangement and location of the unit’s personnel and vehicles within a given formation. There are seven
different movement formations:
* Column.
* Line.
* Wedge.
* Echelon (left or right).
* Vee.
* Diamond.
* Box.
2-2. Each movement formation has its advantages and disadvantages. A unit may employ a series of
movement formations during a movement or maneuver based on changing terrain or threat. Commanders
consider the advantages and disadvantages that each formation has in the areas of command and control,
firepower orientation, ability to mass fires, and flexibility. The use of standard formations allows units to
transition from one formation to another, giving additional flexibility when adjusting to changes in the
mission variables. Movement formations describe how combat or security elements maneuver in relation to
each other and the main body. By designating the movement formation planned for use, units—
* Establish the geographic relationship between units.
* Indicate probable reactions once an enemy force makes contact with the formation.
* Indicate the level of security desired.
* Establish the preponderant orientation of subordinate weapon systems.
* Posture friendly forces for the attack.
COLUMN FORMATION
2-3. The column formation is a movement formation with elements arranged one behind another. A
unit moves in column formation when the unit does not anticipate early contact, the objective is distant, and
speed and control are critical. Figure 2-1 on page 2-2 depicts a column formation. The location of direct fire
systems within the column reflects the column’s length and the range fans of those systems. Normally, the
lead element uses a traveling overwatch technique while the following units are in traveling formation. A
column formation—
* Provides the best formation to move large forces quickly, especially with limited routes and
limited visibility.
* Makes enemy contact with a small part of the total force while facilitating control and allowing
the unit to quickly mass forces.
* Provides a base for easy transition to other formations.
* Works in restricted terrain. |
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2-4. There are also disadvantages to using a column formation. These include—
* Units can only immediately apply the majority of the column’s firepower on the column’s flanks.
* The length of the column affects movement and terrain management.
* Possibly inadvertently bypassing enemy units or positions and exposing the unit’s flanks.
* Running head-on into an enemy deployed perpendicular to the column’s direction of movement.
Restricted terrain may limit the ability of friendly forces to maneuver if contact is made to the front of
the formation.
Figure 2-1. Column formation
LINE FORMATION
2-5. A line formation is a movement formation in which elements move abreast of each other. A unit
typically employs this formation when assaulting an objective because it concentrates firepower to the front
in the direction of movement. Figure 2-2 depicts a line formation. A line formation also—
* Facilitates speed and shock in closing with an enemy force.
* Allows the coverage of wide frontages.
* Facilitates the occupation of attack by fire or support by fire positions.
2-6. There are also disadvantages of a line formation:
* Provides less flexibility of maneuver than other formations since it does not distribute units in
depth.
* Linear deployment allows a unit deployed on line to bring only limited firepower to bear on either
flank.
* Provides limited or no reserve.
* Limits overwatch forces.
* Limits control of a unit using a line formation in restricted terrain or under conditions of limited
visibility. |
3-90 | 63 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
Figure 2-2. Line formation
WEDGE FORMATION
2-7. The wedge formation is a movement formation with one lead element and the trail elements are
paired off abreast of each other on the flanks. Units use this formation to attack an enemy appearing to
the front and flanks. Figure 2-3 on page 2-4 depicts a wedge formation. Any unit can conduct a wedge
formation; if there are an even number of maneuver elements, one side will be longer that the other. Leaders
designate which side they want longer by directing a “heavy side.” For example, if a leader said they wanted
the unit in a “wedge formation—heavy left,” then the left side of the unit would have more elements than the
right side of the element. A unit uses the wedge when contact with an enemy force is possible or expected,
but the enemy force’s location and dispositions are vague. It is the preferred formation for a movement to
contact in an organization with three subordinate maneuver units because it initiates contact with one unit
while retaining two other subordinate uncommitted units positioned to maneuver and further develop the
situation. Within the wedge, subordinate units employ the formation best suited to the terrain, visibility, and
likelihood of contact. Employing a wedge formation—
* Provides maximum firepower forward and allows units to use a large portion of their firepower
on the flanks.
* Allows rapid crossing of open terrain when enemy contact is not expected.
* Facilitates control.
* Allows for rapid changes in the direction of movement.
* Facilitates the rapid change to other movement formations.
2-8. The primary disadvantages to the wedge formation are that it—
* Requires sufficient maneuver space or multiple routes for dispersion laterally and in depth.
* Lacks ease of control in restricted terrain or poor visibility. |
3-90 | 64 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-3. Wedge formation
ECHELON FORMATION
2-9. An echelon formation is a movement formation with elements arranged on an angle to the left or
to the right of the direction of attack (echelon left, echelon right). This formation provides focused
firepower forward and to the flank of the direction of the echelon. It facilitates control in open areas. It
provides minimal security to the opposite flank in the direction of the echeloning. A unit with knowledge of
potential enemy locations can use an echelon formation to deploy subordinate ground elements diagonally
left or right or as a way to work within a higher echelon movement formation. Figure 2-4 depicts an echelon
left formation and figure 2-5 depicts an echelon right formation. Units operating on the flank of a larger
formation commonly use this formation. An echelon formation—
* Facilitates control in open terrain.
* Allows the concentration of the unit’s firepower forward and to the flank in the direction of the
echelon.
* Allows forces not in contact to maneuver against known enemy forces because all elements will
not simultaneously make contact.
2-10. The primary disadvantages of this formation are—
* Difficult to maintain control over the unit in restricted terrain.
* Lacks security or firepower on the opposite side of the echelon. |
3-90 | 65 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
Figure 2-4. Echelon left formation
Figure 2-5. Echelon right formation |
3-90 | 66 | Chapter 2
VEE FORMATION
2-11. A vee formation is a movement formation with two elements abreast and one or more elements
trailing. If there are more elements after the trail element in the vee formation, the trail elements can be in
front or behind the main body. This arrangement is suited for an advance against a known threat to the front.
Figure 2-6 depicts a vee formation. Units use this formation when they know the enemy force’s location and
disposition and expect enemy contact. It—
* Provides maximum firepower forward and good firepower to the flanks, but the firepower on the
flanks is less than that provided by the wedge.
* Facilitates a continued maneuver after making contact and a rapid transition to the assault.
* Allows a unit to change quickly to a line, wedge, or column formation.
2-12. The primary disadvantages to this formation include:
* Reorientation in the direction of movement, such as a 90-degree turn, are more difficult than using
the wedge.
* Control is difficult in restricted terrain and under limited-visibility conditions.
* Lead element masks fires of the trail element.
* Requires sufficient maneuver space for dispersion laterally and in depth.
Figure 2-6. Vee formation |
3-90 | 67 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
DIAMOND FORMATION
2-13. A diamond formation is a movement formation with one element leading, one element positioned
on each flank, and the remaining elements to the rear. The non-security units of the diamond usually
move in a column formation inside of the diamond. It is most effective during approach marches,
exploitations, or pursuits when the unit has only general knowledge about the enemy. Figure 2-7 depicts a
diamond formation. Advantages of employing a diamond formation include—
* Allowing units to maneuver to either flank immediately, regardless of which subordinate element
makes enemy contact.
* Facilitates making enemy contact with the smallest possible force yet provides all around security.
* Provides firepower to the front and flanks.
* Changes easily and quickly to another formation.
* Facilitates speed of movement while remaining easy to control.
* Provides an uncommitted force for use as a reserve.
2-14. The primary disadvantages of this formation are that it—
* Requires sufficient maneuver space or multiple routes for dispersion laterally and in depth.
* Requires four subordinate maneuver elements.
Figure 2-7. Diamond formation |
3-90 | 68 | Chapter 2
BOX FORMATION
2-15. The box formation is a movement formation with elements arranged in a box or square, or two
elements up and two elements back. This formation is only used when the unit has four security or combat
elements. It is a flexible formation providing equal firepower in all directions. This formation can cause up
to 50 percent of the force becoming decisively engaged simultaneously, thereby limiting the combat power
available to maneuver against an enemy force. The box formation arranges the unit with two forward and
two trail maneuver elements. Figure 2-8 on page 2-8 depicts a box formation. Units with only three
subordinate maneuver elements cannot adopt the box formation unless reinforced with an additional
maneuver element. The subordinate elements of the box usually move in a column formation within the box
formation. Units often use this formation when executing an approach march, exploitation, or pursuit when
they have only general knowledge about the enemy. Employing a box formation—
* Allows a unit to change quickly and easily to any other formation.
* Facilitates rapid movement yet still provides all around security.
* Provides firepower to the front and flanks.
* Maintains control more easily than a line formation.
2-16. Using the box formation also has disadvantages. These include—
* The requirement for sufficient maneuver space or multiple routes for dispersion.
* At battalion and company echelons, the possibility exists of enemy units massing on one element
at a time as the presence of other friendly forces can mask other element’s direct fires.
Figure 2-8. Box formation |
3-90 | 69 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES
2-17. Units use the movement formations in conjunction with three movement techniques: traveling,
traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. Movement techniques limit the unit’s exposure to enemy fire
and position the unit to react to enemy contact. Units select the appropriate movement technique based on
the chance of enemy contact. Figure 2-9 illustrates when a unit is most likely to use each technique. While
moving, individual Soldiers and vehicles use the terrain to protect themselves when enemy contact is possible
or expected. They use natural cover and concealment to avoid enemy fires. Soldiers and vehicle crews—
* Take active countermeasures, such as using obscuration and direct and indirect fire, to suppress
or obscure suspected enemy positions.
* Cross open areas quickly and avoid large open areas, especially areas surrounded by high ground
or terrain that can cover and conceal enemy forces.
* Avoid possible kill zones because it is easier to cross difficult terrain than to fight enemy forces
on unfavorable terms.
* Do not silhouette themselves against the skyline.
* Do not move directly forward from a concealed firing position.
Figure 2-9. Movement techniques usages in relation to enemy contact |
3-90 | 70 | Chapter 2
TRAVELING
2-18. Traveling is a movement technique used when speed is necessary and contact with enemy forces
is not likely. All elements of the unit move simultaneously. Commanders or small-unit leaders are located
where they can best control the situation. Trailing elements may move in parallel columns to shorten the
column and reaction time. Figure 2-10 depicts the traveling movement technique.
Figure 2-10. Traveling movement technique
TRAVELING OVERWATCH
2-19. Traveling overwatch is a movement technique used when contact with enemy forces is possible.
A short distance, which varies with the terrain, separates the lead element and trailing element. The trailing
element moves at variable speeds and may pause for short periods to overwatch the lead element. It controls
its movement based on the terrain and the lead element. The rear element overwatches at such a distance that
if enemy forces engage the lead element, it will not prevent the rear element from firing or moving to support
the lead element. Figure 2-11 depicts this technique and shows how the overwatch can simultaneously occur
at multiple echelons. |
3-90 | 71 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
Figure 2-11. Traveling overwatch movement technique
BOUNDING OVERWATCH
2-20. Bounding overwatch is a movement technique used when contact with enemy forces is expected.
The unit moves by bounds. One element always halts in position to overwatch another element while it
moves. The overwatching element positions to support the moving unit by fire or maneuver. Units use the
bounding overwatch movement technique when expecting to make contact with enemy forces. There are two
variations of this technique: alternating bounds and successive bounds.
2-21. In both cases, the overwatching elements cover the bounding elements from covered or concealed
positions with good observation and fields of fire against possible enemy positions. The support by fire
positions also offer protection for stationary weapons platforms. They can immediately support the bounding
elements with fires or maneuver against the enemy if the bounding elements make contact. Unless they make
contact en-route, the bounding elements move via covered and concealed routes into the next set of support
by fire positions. Leaders base the length of a bound on the terrain and the range of overwatching weapons.
They can use the uncommitted part of their forces whenever needed as part of an immediate and controlled
reaction to any threat to the bounding force.
2-22. If the unit uses alternate bounds, the bounding element moves forward, halts, and occupies a support
by fire position. The stationary element always covers the bounding element’s movement, halt, and
occupation of the bounding element’s support by fire position. The bounding element advances past the
stationary element, takes an overwatch position, and becomes the new forward element. The former
stationary element now becomes the bounding element, advances past the stationary element, and occupies
a new support by fire position. This method is usually more rapid than successive bounds. Figure 2-12 on
page 2-12 illustrates a bounding overwatch using alternating bounds.
2-23. As depicted in figure 2-13 on page 2-12, if the unit uses successive bounds, the lead element, covered
by the trail element, advances and occupies a support by fire position. The rear element advances to a support
by fire position abreast of the lead element and halts. The lead element moves to the next position and the
move continues. Only one element moves at a time, and the rear element avoids advancing beyond the lead
element. |
3-90 | 72 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-12. Bounding overwatch movement technique (alternating bounds)
Figure 2-13. Bounding overwatch movement technique (successive bounds)
FIVE FORMS OF MANEUVER
2-24. Forms of maneuver are distinct tactical combinations of fire and movement with a unique set of
doctrinal characteristics that differ primarily in the relationship between the maneuvering force and the
enemy (ADP 3-90). A form is a broad way of describing a scheme of maneuver. Units generally use the types
of offensive and defensive operations to explain the overarching operation whereas the forms of maneuver
are the basis for courses of action. Table 2-1 lists and illustrates the symbols for the five forms of maneuver. |
3-90 | 73 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
Table 2-1. Forms of maneuver and planning symbols
Form of maneuver Planning symbol
Frontal attack
Penetration
Envelopment
Turning movement
Infiltration
2-25. Combined arms organizations accomplish their mission by synchronizing the warfighting functions to
execute these forms of maneuver. Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms
to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially. Understanding the
characteristics of an assigned area and the enemy’s dispositions helps units determine the best form of
maneuver.
2-26. A single operation may contain multiple forms of maneuver, such as a frontal attack to clear a security
area followed by a penetration to create a gap in enemy defenses. A form of maneuver can also be used in
the defense. For example, in a mobile defense the striking force conducts an envelopment to destroy the
enemy. Typically, a higher headquarters does not dictate what form of maneuver a subordinate should use,
but if the situation warrants, a higher echelon may constrain a subordinate force to a specific form of
maneuver. The successful execution of any forms of maneuver requires trained forces capable of shifting
their formations quickly in response to a changing enemy situation.
FRONTAL ATTACK
2-27. A frontal attack is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker
enemy force or fix a larger enemy force in place over a broad front. As depicted in figure 2-14 on page
2-14 an attacking force uses a frontal attack to overrun a weak enemy force. They normally employ a frontal
attack to— |
3-90 | 74 | Chapter 2
* Clear enemy security forces.
* Overwhelm a shattered enemy force during an exploitation or pursuit.
* Fix enemy forces in place as part of another operation.
* Conduct a reconnaissance in force.
Figure 2-14. Frontal attack
2-28. A frontal attack is necessary when assailable flanks do not exist. Frontal attack maintain continuous
pressure along the entire front until a breach occurs or the attacking forces succeed in pushing the enemy
forces back. Consequently, units rarely conduct frontal attack when they lack overwhelming combat power
unless fixing the enemy is vital to a larger operation’s success.
Organization of Forces
2-29. There is no unique organization of forces associated with a frontal attack. Units executing a frontal
attack organize into a security force, a main body, and a reserve. The mission variables dictate the specific
task organization of a unit.
Control Measures
2-30. Units conducting a frontal attack may not require any additional control measures beyond those
established to control the overall mission. This includes at a minimum an assigned area and an objective.
Units can also use any other control measure necessary to control the frontal attack, including—
* Attack positions.
* Lines of departure.
* Phase lines.
* Assault positions. |
3-90 | 75 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
* Limits of advance.
* Directions of attack or axes of advance for every maneuver unit.
Planning a Frontal Attack
2-31. It is seldom possible for a unit to exert sufficient pressure to overwhelm an enemy force using a frontal
attack, since it strikes the enemy force along a significant portion of the enemy’s front. There are many
considerations for a force to execute a frontal attack. These considerations can include—
* A friendly force tasked to fix the enemy force in place.
* Terrain that dictates the unit cannot execute another form of maneuver.
* Friendly forces have overwhelming combat power to quickly finish the enemy in position.
2-32. A unit’s planning efforts should reflect these considerations. When considering employing a frontal
attack as a shaping operation, units also consider other means for fixing the enemy force in position, such as
feints or demonstrations, and employing indirect fires to mitigate risk.
Executing a Frontal Attack
2-33. Units conducting frontal attack advance on a broad front, normally with their subordinate ground
maneuver elements abreast (except for the reserve). The security force clears enemy reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition assets while the main body advances. An attacking force seeks to fix
enemy forces and gain positional advantage to destroy them using maneuver.
2-34. If an attacking unit discovers a gap in the enemy force’s defenses, friendly units seek to exploit that
weakness and disrupt the integrity of the enemy force’s defense. Units assess the situation to ensure that
enemy forces are not luring them into an engagement area. Units synchronize the exploitation to prevent
counterattacking enemy forces from isolating and destroying successful subordinate elements of the attacking
friendly force.
2-35. When units conducting a frontal attack can no longer advance, they transition to a defensive posture.
Once set in the defense, they continue to perform reconnaissance of enemy positions to locate gaps or
assailable flanks and may assist the forward passage of lines of follow-on forces.
PENETRATION
2-36. A penetration is a form of maneuver in which a force attacks on a narrow front. Destroying the
continuity of a defense enables the enemy force’s subsequent isolation and defeat in detail. The penetration
extends from the enemy force’s disruption zone through the battle zone into the enemy support zone. Units
employ a penetration when—
* Weak spots are identified in enemy defenses through reconnaissance, surveillance, and security
operations.
* Conditions do not permit an envelopment, such as the enemy having no assailable flank.
Organization of Forces
2-37. Penetrating a defensive position requires overwhelming combat power at the point of penetration and
combat superiority to continue the momentum of the attack. Units allocate combat power and designate
control measures to fix enemy reserves and long-range weapons in their current locations and to isolate
enemy forces within the area selected for penetration. Penetrations organize into a breach force, support
force, assault force, and a reserve. These elements exist for each location the force is required to penetrate.
Units should not withhold combat power from the initial penetration to conduct additional penetrations unless
there is sufficient combat power to ensure the success of the initial penetration.
Breach Force
2-38. The breach force is responsible for executing the initial penetration of the enemy’s defense. The breach
force. The breach force is typically the main effort until the breach is complete. Depending on the situation
the breach force may also be responsible for widening the gaps of the initial penetration. |
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Support Force
2-39. The support force is responsible for fixing defending enemy forces along a broad front to allow the
breach and assault forces to penetrate along a narrow front. The support force is a supporting effort to the
breach and assault forces.
Assault Force
2-40. The assault force is responsible for seizing the penetration objectives on the far side of the penetration.
It is typically the main effort. Depending on the situation the assault force may have a follow-and-support
mission to the breach force.
Reserve
2-41. The use of the reserve avoids diverting the assault element from attacking the final objective of the
penetration. Units assign subordinate units the tactical mission tasks of follow-and-support or follow-and-
assume to ensure rapid exploitation of initial success.
See paragraphs 2-51 through 2-57 for how these forces execute a penetration.
Control Measures
2-42. A unit conducting a penetration normally has a narrower assigned area than a unit conducting a frontal
attack. The minimum control measures for a penetration are—
* An assigned area to every maneuver unit.
* Axis of advance or a direction of attack.
* A line of departure (LD) or line of contact (LC).
* The time of the attack or time of assault.
* Phase lines.
* An objective.
* Limits of advance (LOAs) to control and synchronize attacks. (Units can use BHLs instead of
LOAs if they know where they will likely commit their follow and assume forces.)
* Checkpoints.
* Graphic control measures associated with breaching operations, such as points of breach and lanes.
* Probable lines of deployment.
* Support by fire positions and attack by fire positions.
* Fire support coordination measures.
2-43. The lateral boundaries of a unit or units assigned the main effort are narrow to help maintain the mass
necessary at the area of penetration. Units locate LOAs far enough beyond the enemy’s main defensive
positions to complete their breach of those positions. They adjust existing boundaries to accommodate the
new situation if operations result in opportunities to exploit success and pursue retreating enemy forces or
expand the penetration.
Planning a Penetration
2-44. The success of a penetration depends primarily on a coordinated and synchronized plan executed at a
high tempo against comparatively weak enemy defenses. The terrain behind an area selected to penetrate
must allow follow-on forces to proceed from the breach to a deeper objective.
2-45. The depth of an enemy position and the relative strength of attacking echelons determine the width of
a penetration. The availability of artillery, air support, and other combat enablers for an attacking force helps
units determine relative combat power. A wider gap allows friendly forces to pass through more quickly and
in large-sized formations, making it more difficult for enemy forces to close the gap. The deeper a penetration,
the easier it is to expose an enemy force’s flanks by the breach, and the less likely it is that an enemy force
will be in a position to restore its front by falling back. |
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2-46. Plans for penetrating a defensive position include isolating, suppressing, and destroying by fire enemy
forces in an area selected for the penetration. These plans should also address how to isolate the area of
penetration from support or reinforcement by enemy forces located outside the area. A critical part of a plan
is positioning friendly assets so that units can mass the effects of their combat power to accomplish these
results without giving away the location of the penetration.
2-47. The majority of units and assets are in positions where the effects of their combat power apply to the
area selected for penetration. Plans for the penetration normally have three phases:
* Breaching the enemy force’s main defensive positions.
* Widening the gap created to secure the penetration’s flanks.
* Seizing an objective and subsequently exploiting the success of the penetration.
2-48. Planning the sequence of these phases depends on the situation. In some situations, if there are
weaknesses or gaps in an enemy force’s front, it is possible for armored forces to breach the enemy force’s
defenses and proceed straight to an objective. Simultaneously, infantry units could conduct local
envelopment and exploitation operations.
2-49. Supporting efforts for outside the area of penetration are normally to isolate enemy forces on the flanks
of the penetration. Synchronizing the effects of rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, artillery fires, and obscuration
to delay or disrupt repositioning forces are examples of supporting efforts. Units usually attempt to penetrate
the enemy’s defensive positions along a boundary between two enemy units because defenses tend to be less
effective along a boundary.
2-50. Units plan penetrating through the enemy force’s defensive positions in enough depth so enemy forces
cannot reestablish a viable defense in rearward positions. Units do not divert the strength of attacking forces
to widening the gap to secure the flanks of the penetration until the forces achieve sufficient depth. However,
plans should address contingencies, such as enemy counterattacks against the penetration’s flanks, if the unit
culminates at any point during the operation or actions to take if the penetration is unsuccessful. Plans provide
for uninterrupted support to attacking elements as they close with the enemy and accomplish their mission.
Executing a Penetration
2-51. After the initial breach of the enemy force’s defense, the situation determines the sequence of the
remaining two phases. If enemy forces are in a weak position, it may be possible for the lead attacking force
to seize the penetration’s final objective while simultaneously widening the initial breach. (See discussion
beginning in paragraph 18-9 for more information on breaching.)
Breaching the Enemy’s Main Defensive Positions
2-52. The support force fixes the enemy along a broad front to allow the breach and assault forces to penetrate
on a relatively narrow front. The support force can accomplish this by adjusting its lateral boundaries to the
point or points of penetration or by extending its boundaries to fix the enemy on a broader front. This allows
the force conducting the penetration to focus overwhelming combat power at that location. The support force
locates where it can suppress the enemy for the breaching and the assaulting forces. The breach force
establishes a lane or lanes to facilitate the assault force operation. The breach force can also be assigned near
objectives to prepare the passing of the assault force. Figure 2-15 on page 2-18 depicts a penetration with
two support forces fixing enemy forces on a broad front and the breach and assault forces executing the
penetration. |
3-90 | 78 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-15. Penetration
2-53. Supporting efforts focus on the remainder of the enemy forces in their current positions and isolate the
objective from enemy forces. These operations prevent enemy forces from disengaging to reinforce enemy
units opposing the main effort. Units track the battle’s progress to ensure that subordinate forces penetrate
entirely through the enemy force’s main defensive positions and not just the enemy force’s disruption zone.
2-54. Enemy forces normally try to slow down or stop a breach to gain time to react to the changing situation.
The attacking unit must rapidly exploit and reinforce success. The attacker masses resources and additional
units as necessary to ensure completing the penetration through the enemy force’s defensive positions.
Widening the Gap to Secure the Penetration’s Flanks
2-55. Once the attacking force penetrates the main defenses, it begins to widen the penetration of the enemy
force’s defensive positions by conducting a series of shallow envelopments or attacks by fire. The task of
widening the gap of the penetration is normally assigned to a follow-and-support force. Commanders also
have the option of committing their reserve to accomplish that task. If the reserve is committed, the
commander must designate another reserve, or the unit will not have the forces available to commit a reserve
to another operation. Units plan to meet enemy counterattacks by shifting fires or committing reserves or
follow and assume forces. They can use obstacles on the flanks of the penetration as a combat multiplier to
assist in defeating any local enemy counterattacks and to maintain the force’s tempo.
Seizing an Objective and Subsequent Exploitation
2-56. The assault force attacks objectives to destroy the continuity of the enemy’s defensive position.
Frequently, that objective is so far from the area of penetration that the unit or units initially conducting the
penetration cannot seize it without pausing. In that event, units plan to commit the reserve or attack with the
assault force through the breaching force early. Exploitation beyond the objective tends to be executed by
divisions and corps. The exact force mix depends on the mission variables, while the armored, Stryker, and
aviation forces are generally suited for subsequent exploitation. |
3-90 | 79 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
2-57. Divisions and corps may initiate an attack by simultaneously launching two or more convergent
penetrations against weak locations on the enemy front. Often this method of attack helps isolate an extremely
strong enemy defense. Units assign supporting efforts to contain any enemy positions that may influence the
penetration.
ENVELOPMENT
2-58. Envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force avoids an enemy’s principal
defense by attacking along an assailable flank. An envelopment avoids the enemy force’s strength—the
enemy’s front—where the effects of enemy fires and obstacles are generally the greatest and attacks the
enemy to the flank or rear. Envelopments force the enemy to fight in two or more directions simultaneously
to meet the converging efforts of an attack. Envelopments focus either on seizing terrain, destroying enemy
forces, or interdicting enemy withdrawal routes. Units prefer to conduct an envelopment instead of a
penetration or a frontal attack because generally the flanks of the defending forces are weaker and provide
the attacking forces the most opportunities to destroy the enemy force. The main effort focuses on attacking
an assailable flank. If no assailable flank is available, the attacking force creates one through the conduct of
a penetration. The three variations of the envelopment are—
* Single envelopment.
* Double envelopment.
* Vertical envelopment.
2-59. A single envelopment is a variation of envelopment where a force attacks along one flank of an
enemy force. A single envelopment is generally easier to control and does not require a significant number
of forces. See figure 2-16 on page 2-20 for an illustration of a single envelopment.
2-60. A double envelopment is a variation of envelopment where forces simultaneously attack along
both flanks of an enemy force. A force seeking to execute a double envelopment must also have a substantial
mobility advantage over defending forces. A unit performs a double envelopment by conducting a frontal
attack to fix enemy forces in place while enveloping both of the enemy force’s flanks. A double envelopment
generally requires more forces than a single envelopment and are more difficult to control.
2-61. A vertical envelopment is a variation of envelopment where air-dropped or airlanded troops
attack an enemy forces’ rear, flank, or both. A force seeking to execute a vertical envelopment requires
the necessary vertical lift capability and indirect fire assets to suppress enemy air defense capability. Because
of the forces required, normally only divisions and larger organizations can conduct double and vertical
envelopments, since these organizations have the resources and the capability to control these envelopments.
A vertical envelopment, by either airborne assault or air assault, allows the commander to—
* Overcome distances quickly, overfly barriers, and bypass enemy defenses.
* Extend the area over which the commander can exert influence.
* Leaves the enemy defenses more vulnerable to attack from the main body.
* Disperse reserve forces widely for survivability reasons while maintaining their capability for
effective and rapid response.
* Exploit combat power by increasing tactical mobility.
* Seize key terrain to deny the enemy’s use. |
3-90 | 80 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-16. Single envelopment
Organization of Forces
2-62. During a single or double envelopment units organize their forces to perform two primary tasks: fixing
the enemy force and executing the envelopment. Units conducting an envelopment task organize forces into
a fixing force, enveloping force, security force, and a reserve. The only organizational difference between a
single envelopment and double envelopment is that a double envelopment consists of two enveloping forces.
The fixing force normally conducts a frontal attack to fix enemy forces in their current positions to prevent
their escape and reduce their capability to react against the enveloping force. The fixing force should use the
minimal amount of combat power to fix the enemy while ensuring the majority of combat power is in the
enveloping force. During a double envelopment, commanders typically designate the most likely to succeed
of the two envelopment operations as the main effort for resources. The enveloping force maneuvers behind
the enemy’s battle zone to defeat enemy forces in their positions, but from an unexpected direction. The
security force prevents the enemy from discovering friendly dispositions, capabilities, and intentions, or
hindering the envelopment.
2-63. Units executing a vertical envelopment organize friendly forces into an air assault task force or an
airborne task force. The air assault task force is a temporary group of integrated forces tailored to a specific
mission under the command of a single headquarters. The air assault task force consists of an air assault force
and the ground assault force. The ground assault force is task-organized with enough combat power to seize
or fix the objective or enemy force. The airborne task force is organized by an assault echelon, follow-on
echelon, and rear echelon. The assault echelon is task-organized with enough combat power to seize or fix
the objective or enemy force. (See FM 3-99 for more information on airborne and air assault operations.)
Control Measures
2-64. At a minimum, commanders assign an area for each unit participating in an envelopment. They also
designate phase lines, support by fire and attack by fire positions, contact points, and appropriate fire
coordination measures, such as a RFL or boundary between converging forces, and any other control
measures necessary to control the envelopment. Figure 2-17 is an example of control measures used when
conducting an envelopment. |
3-90 | 81 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
Figure 2-17. Envelopment control measures.
Planning an Envelopment
2-65. Successful envelopment planning requires knowing and understanding enemy forces and their
capabilities. Units seek to maneuver the enveloping force around or over the enemy force’s main defenses to
secure objectives on the enemy force’s flank or rear. From those objectives, the enveloping force can use its
positional advantage to employ superior combat power against a defending enemy force oriented in the wrong
direction. A unit uses information collection assets to determine the disposition and capabilities of enemy
forces to detect and react to their operations.
2-66. Units plan for the force conducting the envelopment to remain within supporting distance of the fixing
force. Supporting distance is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to
the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation
(ADP 3-0). Sustaining the enveloping force requires deliberate planning because only intermittent ground
lines of communications (LOCs) between the echelon support area and the enveloping force may exist.
2-67. Units develop branch and sequel plans to the envelopment operation to exploit the envelopment’s
success. These plans consider the transition to a pursuit in order to complete the destruction of the enemy
force or to halt and pass forward the reserve or follow and support forces.
Executing an Envelopment
2-68. A successful envelopment depends largely on the degree of surprise units achieve against enemy forces
or the use of overwhelming combat power. The envelopment’s probability of success also increases when an
enveloping force has superior mobility and intelligence, possesses air superiority, and has supporting efforts
that fix the bulk of the enemy’s forces in their current positions.
2-69. Normally, units orient the majority of their combat power toward where they expect to engage enemy
forces, while assuming risk by placing less combat power on their own flanks. The attacking unit creates an
assailable enemy flank using whatever means necessary. The enveloping force then moves rapidly to exploit |
3-90 | 82 | Chapter 2
the situation before enemy forces strengthen an assailable flank by preparing positions in depth or by
engaging their reserve. Rapid movement around the enemy force’s flank is essential to prevent enemy forces
from occupying previously prepared positions. Higher headquarters’ supporting efforts attempt to prevent
the enemy from reconstituting reserves from other portions of the enemy front.
2-70. After the initial envelopment of one flank, which places enemy forces at a disadvantage, units have
many options. They may choose to exploit success by generating additional combat power along the same
axis. Units can destroy or defeat the enveloped enemy force in place, or transition to another type of operation,
such as an exploitation, pursuit, or encirclement.
TURNING MOVEMENT
2-71. A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the
enemy’s principal defensive positions by attacking to the rear of their current positions forcing them
to move or divert forces to meet the threat. A turning movement differs from an envelopment because the
force conducting a turning movement seeks to make enemy forces displace from their current locations,
whereas an enveloping force seeks to engage enemy forces in their current locations from an unexpected
direction. It can also be conducted using waterborne or amphibious means. Figure 2-18 graphically depicts a
turning movement. Units frequently transition this form of offensive maneuver from the attack into an
exploitation or pursuit. The turning force must also be capable of operating outside supporting distances for
a set time. Only divisions and above can execute a turning movement. This is due to these echelons possessing
the organic resources to organize a turning force that can operate outside the supporting distance of the main
body and force enemy units out of their current positions. execute a turning movement.
Figure 2-18. Turning movement |
3-90 | 83 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
Organization of Forces
2-72. The task organization for a turning movement are the following:
* Security force.
* Diversion force.
* Turning force.
* Reserve.
2-73. The security force performs security and reconnaissance tasks as part of its enabling operations. A
diversion force is task-organized to ensure the success of the turning force. The diversion force conducts
operations, such as attacks designed to divert the enemy force’s attention away from the turning force. The
force conducting the turning movement is the turning force. The turning force conducts the echelon’s main
effort and is resourced appropriately. The reserve is positioned to support the turning force. However, the
reserve can support the security or diversion force if required.
Control Measures
2-74. Units designate control measures as necessary to synchronize subordinate force’s operations. These
control measures include—
* Phase lines.
* Contact points.
* Objectives.
* Limits of advance.
* Appropriate fire control measures.
Planning a Turning Movement
2-75. Selecting the right terrain-oriented objective of a turning movement is of major importance to the
success of the operation. This causes the enemy forces to relocate from their current position to meet the
friendly force in a position away from their previous occupied position or risk catastrophic defeat. The unit’s
scheme of maneuver in a turning movement may vary depending on the specific situation and mission
variables. In addition to common offensive planning considerations, units conducting a turning movement
pay special attention to planning branches and sequels to the turning movement, including—
* Transitioning to an exploitation or pursuit.
* Transitioning to a defense.
* Linking up the turning force and diversion force.
* Retrograding the turning force.
2-76. After developing the tactical plan, units plan how the turning force maneuvers to its objective. They
develop the turning force’s movement, loading, and staging plans if they require outside transportation assets.
Units plan to occupy key terrain that threatens the enemy force’s survival or remain mobile and seek ways to
exploit the turning force’s success.
2-77. If there is an early linkup with the main body during a turning movement, the turning force normally
plans to defend the terrain required to protect itself. Once reinforcement or linkup with the main body occurs,
units plan how to use the turning force to continue the attack or relieve the main body so it can prepare for
subsequent missions.
2-78. The distances between forces and the existence of intermittent LOCs magnify the problems inherent
in providing sustainment to a maneuver force during a turning movement. Therefore, when planning a turning
movement, units describe the sustainment conditions required or acceptable for the operation.
2-79. Units consider the provision of all supplies and equipment required for mission accomplishment as an
integral part of tactical planning. They plan and organize unit sustainment operations to support a rapid tempo
of highly mobile and widely dispersed operations. Turning movements tend to have greater supporting
distances and responsibilities. Sustainment planners recognize this and adjust their plans using available |
3-90 | 84 | Chapter 2
resources. Subordinate units carry only those supplies required to meet their immediate needs into the
operation.
Executing a Turning Movement
2-80. Successful turning movements threaten the enemy force into a dilemma. First, enemy forces must move
from their original positions to meet the threat presented by the turning force. Often enemy forces must
commit available reserves against this new threat, which exposes their reserves to friendly fires. After the
turning movement, enemy forces must engage the friendly force on ground that they have not chosen or
prepared. The other option for enemy forces is to continue to hold the terrain they occupy at the risk of
becoming enveloped and potentially encircled by friendly forces. Whenever possible, units conducting a
turning movement try to reach the terrain-oriented objective that compels enemy forces to reposition prior to
encountering them. Friendly forces finding their way into the enemy force’s rear area to rapidly exploit the
situation seek to achieve their objectives before the enemy can react. Rapid movement is essential to prevent
enemy forces from occupying previously prepared positions in the enemy force’s rear.
2-81. The maneuver of the turning force is what causes enemy forces to leave their positions. A turning force
normally conducts most of its operations outside the supporting range of the diversion force and possibly
outside its supporting distance. The turning force must contain sufficient maneuver, functional, and
multifunctional capabilities to operate independently for a specified period. Units organize the reserve to
exploit success by using either the turning force or the diversion force.
INFILTRATION
2-82. An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement
through or into an area occupied by enemy forces. Infiltration is also a march technique used well before
encountering enemy forces to avoid enemy information collection assets. Infiltration occurs by land, water,
air, or a combination of means. Moving and assembling forces covertly through enemy positions takes a lot
of time. A successful infiltration requires the infiltrating force to avoid detection and engagement by enemy
forces. Since this requirement limits the size and strength of the infiltrating force, and infiltrated forces alone
can rarely defeat an enemy force, units use infiltration in conjunction with and in support of other forms of
offensive maneuver. Figure 2-19 depicts an infiltration. |
3-90 | 85 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
Figure 2-19. Infiltration
2-83. Units conduct infiltration to move all or a portion of a unit through gaps in the enemy force’s defenses
to—
* Reconnoiter known or templated enemy positions and conduct surveillance of named areas of
interest and targeted areas of interest.
* Attack enemy-held positions from an unexpected direction.
* Occupy a support by fire position to support the main effort.
* Secure key terrain.
* Conduct ambushes and raids to destroy vital facilities and disrupt the enemy force’s defensive
structure by attacking enemy reserves, fire support and air defense systems, communications
nodes, and sustainment elements.
* Conduct a covert breach of an obstacle or obstacle complex.
2-84. Special operations forces and dismounted infantry units up to brigade size are best suited to conduct
an infiltration. In some circumstances, armored- and Stryker-equipped forces operating in small units can
conduct an infiltration when the terrain can mask their force’s movement signature. The proliferation of
technology leads to increased situational understanding for both friendly and enemy forces as well as an
increased chance of detecting units conducting an infiltration. Understanding the capabilities of these
technologies informs the decision as to whether an infiltration is feasible. |
3-90 | 86 | Chapter 2
Organization of Forces
2-85. Infiltrating units generally organize into a security force and a main body. Normally, to be successful,
an infiltrating force must avoid detection until it reaches its objective rally point. The infiltrating unit
organizes the main body into one or more infiltrating elements. These elements are the largest size element
possible that meet requirements for stealth and ease of movement. This organization increases control and
the speed of the infiltration while providing responsive combat power. Units determine the exact size and
number of infiltrating elements based on the situation.
2-86. Units consider the following factors when determining how to organize available forces. Smaller
infiltrating elements are not as easy to detect as larger elements and can get through smaller defensive gaps.
Even the detection of one or two small elements by enemy forces may not prevent an infiltrating unit from
accomplishing its mission. Larger infiltrating elements are easier to detect, and their discovery is more apt to
endanger the success of the mission but if compromised are better equipped to react. A unit with many smaller
infiltrating elements requires more time to complete the infiltration and needs more linkup points than a
similar sized unit with only a few and larger infiltrating elements. Many smaller infiltrating elements are also
harder to control than fewer, larger elements.
2-87. If resources allow, units designate security forces that move ahead of, to the flanks of, and to the rear
of each infiltrating element’s main body. These security forces may be assigned either screen or guard
missions. They determine the sizes and orientation of security elements based on the situation. Each
infiltrating element is responsible for its own reconnaissance effort.
2-88. Sustainment of an infiltrating force normally depends on the force’s basic load of supplies and those
medical and maintenance assets accompanying the infiltrating force. After completing the mission, units
reopen LOCs to conduct normal sustainment operations.
Control Measures
2-89. Control measures for an infiltration include, at a minimum—
* One or more infiltration lanes.
* A LD or point of departure (PD).
* Movement routes with associated start points (SPs) and release points (RPs), or a direction or axis
of attack.
* Linkup or rally points, including objective rally points.
* Assault positions.
* One or more objectives.
* A limit of advance.
* Phase lines.
* Checkpoints.
* Attack position.
If it is not necessary for the entire infiltrating unit to reassemble to accomplish its mission, the objective may
be broken into smaller objectives. Each infiltrating element would then move directly to its objective to
conduct its mission.
Planning an Infiltration
2-90. The activities and functions associated with the process of planning an infiltration are the same as with
any other offensive operation. That planning takes advantage of that unit’s ability to surprise enemy forces.
The planning process synchronizes the warfighting functions that support the infiltrating unit, especially
precise information collection. Without precise, detailed intelligence, infiltration maneuvers become high-
risk probing operations that can be costly and time consuming. Careful planning, full information collection
integration, detailed analysis, and OPSEC enable an infiltrating force to avoid an enemy force. This
minimizes direct contact and maximizes surprise.
2-91. Sustaining infiltrations requires detailed planning with regard to medical evacuation, maintenance
support, and resupply classes of supply for the infiltrating unit. Unlike the other forms of maneuver, |
3-90 | 87 | Movement and Forms of Maneuver
infiltration purposely maneuvers units out of sustainment range for longer periods to surprise the enemy. The
prolonged time away from medical evacuation, maintenance, and resupply of classes of supply increases the
risk to the infiltrating unit, which requires detailed planning to mitigate. After identifying gaps or weaknesses
in the enemy force’s defensive positions, units assign infiltration lanes, contact points, and objectives to
subordinate units. These objectives afford the infiltrating force positions of advantage over enemy forces (the
objectives are not required to be to the rear of the enemy force). Each subordinate unit picks one or more
routes within the assigned lane and establishes additional contact points, rally points, assault points, and other
control measures as required.
2-92. Units require routes within an infiltration lane to be far enough apart to prevent an infiltrating element
on one route from seeing other infiltrating elements, but close enough so that an infiltrating element could
switch quickly to another route if the situation requires it. They may use single or multiple infiltration lanes
depending on the infiltrating force’s size, the amount of detailed information on enemy dispositions, terrain,
time allowed, and number of lanes available. Units require each route to provide infiltrating elements cover
and concealment while avoiding known enemy and civilian locations and movement routes as much as
possible. If possible, the subordinate unit selects the exact routes during the preparation phase after
reconnoitering each infiltration lane. That subordinate decides whether the unit infiltrates as a whole or as
smaller elements, depending on the enemy force’s density and strength.
2-93. A single infiltration lane—
* Facilitates navigation, control, and reassembly.
* Requires the existence or creation of only one gap in the enemy force’s position.
* Reduces the area for which detailed intelligence is required.
2-94. Multiple infiltration lanes—
* Require the existence or creation of more gaps in the enemy force’s security area.
* Reduce the possibility of compromising the entire force.
* Increase difficulty with maintaining control.
2-95. The sizes and numbers of infiltrating elements are major considerations for units when deciding
whether to use a single lane or multiple infiltration lanes. If the infiltration takes place using multiple
elements, contingency plans must address the following situations:
* A lead element, possibly the security force, makes contact, but the trail elements have not started
infiltrating.
* A lead element infiltrates successfully but compromises one or more trailing elements.
* A linkup point is compromised.
* An element is isolated by the enemy.
2-96. The infiltration plan also addresses the following considerations:
* Availability of supporting fires throughout the operation.
* Linkup or extraction of the infiltrating unit after mission completion.
* Sustainment of the infiltrating force during the operation, including casualty evacuation.
* Tactical deception operations.
* Linkup of various infiltrating elements.
* Command and control of forces.
* Positioning of combat vehicles to support the infiltrating elements.
* Use of limited visibility and rough terrain to mask movement and reduce possible detection.
* Infiltration of the largest elements possible to maintain speed and control.
* Rehearsals.
* Abort criteria.
* Critical friendly zones.
2-97. Planned recognition signals and linkup procedures for the infiltration should be simple and quick. If
there have not been any firing or other noises, users of signals should consider the probability of detection.
However, if there have already been assaults, artillery, and small arms fire, stealth is less of a concern. A lack |
3-90 | 88 | Chapter 2
of time and the short distance involved in many infiltration operations may make conducting formal linkup
procedures unnecessary.
Preparing an Infiltration
2-98. Once the objective, infiltration lanes, and linkup or rally points are selected, commanders’ direct
information collection operations to update and confirm intelligence requirements. Friendly information
collection operations identify enemy sensors and surveillance systems. Units then revise the plan to reflect
current conditions in the assigned area.
Executing an Infiltration
2-99. Moving undetected during an infiltration requires a considerable amount of time. The infiltrating unit
moves from its assembly area or current position through the start point and then continues moving along the
infiltration route to a release point. If small elements are conducting the infiltration, the unit uses a series of
linkup points to reassemble into a coherent unit.
2-100. If the complete unit is conducting the infiltration, the forward security force begins its movement
first and the main body follows. The distance between the forward security force and the main body depends
on the mission variables. The security force must be far enough ahead of the main body so that it can either
deploy or move to another route if the forward security force discovers enemy forces. The forward security
force in an infiltration needs enough time to move in a stealthy and secure manner. Enemy units should not
be able to move undetected between the forward security force and the main body.
2-101. As the infiltrating unit moves, the security force reports the cover and concealment of each route,
enemy activity, location of danger areas and linkup points, enemy activity on the objective, and other combat
information. The unit attempts to avoid enemy and civilian contact; however, contact does not always mean
the mission is compromised. The infiltrating unit engages targets first with indirect fires to avoid revealing
its presence and exact location.
2-102. If necessary, the forward security force conducts actions on contact while the main body moves to
another route, reconstitutes a forward security force, and continues the mission. If the main body makes
contact unexpectedly, it either bypasses the encountered enemy force or attacks the enemy force if the enemy
has little combat power or cannot be bypassed. During an infiltration, the forward security force ignores
ineffective enemy fire and continues to move.
2-103. The infiltrating unit’s elements move to an assembly area or an objective rally point to consolidate
and reorganize their combat power, refine the plan, and conduct any last-minute coordination before
continuing the mission. The unit then conducts those tasks needed to accomplish its mission, which could be
an attack, raid, ambush, seizing key terrain, or information collection.
2-104. Units may need to abort an infiltration operation if the mission variables change during the
infiltration, creating a condition where units can no longer accomplish the infiltration. Examples of changes
that might trigger such an action include—
* Significant portions of the infiltrating force’s combat power are lost through navigation errors,
enemy action, accidents, or maintenance failures.
* Movement or significant reinforcement of a force-oriented objective.
* Detection of the infiltration by enemy forces.
* Changes in the tactical situation that make the mission no longer appropriate.
Units develop criteria for aborting the infiltration as part of the planning process. They transmit the decision
to abort the infiltration to all appropriate headquarters for action and information. |
3-90 | 89 | PART TWO
Offensive Operations
Commanders use offensive operations to defeat and destroy enemy forces as well as
to seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Part Two consists of five chapters
that describe the fundamentals of the offense and the four types of offensive
operations—movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.
Chapter 3
The Offense
Offensive actions are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy forces and
seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander’s will on
the enemy. The basics discussed in this chapter apply to the conduct of all types of
offensive operations.
PURPOSES OF THE OFFENSE
3-1. The offense is the decisive form of war. The offense is the ultimate means commanders have of
imposing their will on enemy forces. The main purposes of the offense are to defeat enemy forces, destroy
enemy forces, and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers. Additionally, units conduct the
offense to—
* Secure decisive terrain.
* Deprive the enemy of resources.
* Gain information.
* Fix an enemy force in position.
* Disrupt an enemy force’s attack.
* Set the conditions for successful future operations.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE
3-2. Successful offenses share these characteristics:
* Audacity.
* Concentration.
* Surprise.
* Tempo.
See ADP 3-90 for more information on the purposes and characteristics of the offense. |
3-90 | 90 | Chapter 3
TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-3. The types of offensive operations describe the general sequence of the offense and recommended
formations. The purpose of the operation discriminates one from another. The four types of offensive
operations are—
* Movement to contact.
* Attack.
* Exploitation.
* Pursuit.
Table 3-1 contains the planning symbols associated with movement to contact, exploitation, and pursuit.
Table 3-1. Types of the offensive operations and planning symbols
Type Planning Symbol
Movement to contact
Exploitation
Pursuit
Note. Attack does not have a planning symbol. Unless a commander deems it is necessary to
constrain their subordinates the default type of offensive operation is an attack and graphic control
measures such as an axis of advance or direction of attack can be used to convey the commander’s
intent. Additionally, exploitations and pursuits are generally a branch or sequel to a successful
attack.
Movement to Contact
3-4. Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact to
develop the situation. It creates favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. Units conduct a
movement to contact when the enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack. Forces
conducting a movement to contact seek to make contact using the smallest friendly force feasible. If friendly
forces make contact with an enemy, they have five options: attack, defend, bypass, delay, or withdraw. There
are two variations of movement to contact:
* Search and attack.
* Cordon and search.
See Chapter 4 for more information on movement to contact. |
3-90 | 91 | The Offense
Attack
3-5. An attack is a type of offensive operation that defeats enemy forces, seizes terrain or secures
terrain. Attacks incorporate coordinated maneuver. An attack differs from a movement to contact since
knowledge of the enemy’s disposition enables units to synchronize and employ combat power more
effectively. There are four variations of an attack:
* Ambush.
* Counterattack.
* Raid.
* Spoiling attacks.
See Chapter 5 for more information on attack.
Exploitation
3-6. An exploitation is a type of offensive operation following a successful attack to disorganize the
enemy in depth. Exploitations seek to disintegrate enemy forces to the extent that they have no alternative
but surrender or retreat. Exploitations take advantage of tactical opportunities. Division and higher echelon
headquarters normally plan exploitations as branches or sequels to current operations. See chapter 6 for more
information on exploitation.
Pursuit
3-7. A pursuit is a type of offensive operation to catch or cut off a disorganized hostile force
attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. Pursuits entail rapid movement and decentralized
control. Pursuits require the pursuing force to retain more mobility than the enemy force. Any offensive
operation can transition into a pursuit if enemy resistance breaks down and enemy forces flee. Pursuits
generally follow successful exploitations with the purpose of completing the destruction of enemy forces
before they can reorganize. There are two variations of pursuits:
* Frontal.
* Combination.
See Chapter 7 for more information on pursuit.
COMMON OFFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3-8. The widespread application of highly accurate and lethal weapons, the high degree of tactical mobility,
ever-present sensors, and a complex operational environment all characterize contemporary combined arms
warfare. Units have a higher probability of tactical success when they can first visualize the battlefield,
understand the implications of existing friendly and enemy dispositions, and take effective action to impose
their will on the situation. The planning considerations for the offense also apply to the defense with
situationally appropriate modifications.
3-9. Only a determined offense, conducted at a high tempo and to great depth, attains the enemy force’s
destruction. The attacker’s principal advantage is that it possesses the initiative. Maintaining the initiative
allows units to engage the enemy at the time, and in a manner of their choosing. Attacking units have the
time and opportunity to develop a plan and to concentrate the effects of subordinate forces and combat
enablers to create conditions for success. Units strike the enemy in unexpected ways at unexpected times and
places. They focus on attacking the right combination of targets, not necessarily the biggest or the closest.
These attacks are rapidly and violently executed, unpredictable, and seek to disorient enemy forces.
3-10. Attacking units maintain tempo by rapidly following up on attacks throughout the depth of the
battlefield to keep enemy forces off-balance and deny them the ability to recover. Friendly forces develop
flexible plans that allow them to take advantage of opportunities to maintain the initiative and dictate the
tempo of operations against the enemy. Due to the intensity and high pace of offensive operations, units take
proactive measures to prevent early culmination prior to accomplishing their assigned mission. The tempo of
friendly operations must be fast enough to prevent effective counteraction and attacking units change their
means and methods before enemy forces can adapt to them. |
3-90 | 92 | Chapter 3
3-11. Table 3-2 illustrates some of the common control measures used during offensive operations.
Additionally, paragraphs A-6 through A-61 define and discuss common offensive control measures used to
synchronize the effects of combat power. Units use the minimum control measures required to complete their
missions while providing subordinates the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation while
preventing fratricide.
Table 3-2. Common offensive control measures
Common offensive control measures
Assault positions Checkpoints Probable line of contact
Assault time Direction of attack Probable line of deployment
Assembly areas Final coordination line Objectives
Attack by fire positions Limit of advance Objective rally point
Attack position Line of departure Support by fire position
Axis of advance Phase lines Time of attack
Battle handover line Point of departure Zone
3-12. Line of sight overlays help protect the force by identifying intervisibility lines, where units cannot
make visual and direct fire contact. An enemy force will have difficulty engaging friendly forces with direct
fire weapons without line of sight. Situation templates also help protect the force. If units know how fast an
enemy force can respond to their actions, they can sequence operations so they occur at times and places
where an enemy force cannot respond effectively. Units calculate enemy response times by determining
enemy artillery range fans, movement times between enemy reserve assembly area locations and advancing
friendly forces, and other related intelligence items.
COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
3-13. Synchronizing the six warfighting functions through planning and preparation increases a unit’s
effectiveness when executing operations. However, the fluid nature of combat requires leaders to orchestrate
the actions of subordinates during the execution phase. Leaders determine where they can best affect the flow
of operations and influence critical events by redirecting the effects of committed forces, changing priorities
of support, or employing echelon reserves. This redirection normally means that units are well forward in the
echelon’s formation, usually with the force designated to conduct the main effort or at a location where a key
decision or task must be accomplished to enable the success of the main effort. Examples of key tasks or
decisions can include the execution of a forward passage of lines or a wet-gap crossing. Once the unit
conducting the main effort makes contact with the enemy, friendly forces quickly move to where they best
can assess the situation and direct the continuation of offensive operations.
3-14. At battalion and above, units anticipate requirements to shift the main effort during an offense to press
the battle and keep enemy forces off balance. They develop decision points to support these changes using
both human and technical means to validate decision points.
3-15. In addition to assigning objectives and identifying decision points, leaders at all echelons consider how
to exploit advantages that arise during operations and the seizure of intermediate and final objectives. Leaders
exploit success by aggressively executing the plan, taking advantage of subordinate initiative, and employing
trained units capable of rapidly executing standard drills. The echelon reserve also provides a flexible
capability to exploit unforeseen advantages.
3-16. Units maintain communications and comprehensive throughput of information among all units
throughout the offense. They plan how to position and reposition command and control systems to help
control operations. Units plan how to expand the communications coverage to accommodate increased
distances and enemy efforts to deny friendly communications systems as the unit advances. Units provide
for redundant communication means.
3-17. A unit maintains its common operating picture throughout an operation. For a common operating
picture to aid a unit in maintaining situational awareness, the unit requires timely and frequent updates of
relevant information. All echelons report information on the disposition and activities of friendly and enemy
forces. |
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3-18. A well-trained unit with rehearsed standard operating procedures, augmented with digital systems,
enjoys reduced engagement times and an enhanced planning process. This enhances its ability to control the
tempo of the battle and stay ahead of the enemy’s decision cycle. Greatly improved knowledge of enemy and
friendly situations facilitates the employment of fires and maneuver at extended ranges. Such knowledge also
enhances friendly forces’ freedom to move to those battlefield locations that best enable their ability to
influence the battle or engagement at the critical time and place.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
3-19. Attacking units maneuver to avoid enemy strengths and to seek positions of relative advantage that
they can exploit to accomplish their mission. They seek to overwhelm enemy forces with one or more
unexpected attacks before enemy forces have time to react in an organized fashion. Echelon security forces
prevent an enemy force from discovering friendly dispositions, capabilities, and intentions, or from
interfering with the preparations for the attack. Finally, units maneuver to close with and destroy enemy
forces by close combat and shock effect. Close combat is warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight,
supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets (ADP 3-0). Close combat encompasses all actions that
place friendly forces in immediate contact with enemy forces where units use direct fire and movement in
combination to defeat or destroy enemy forces or to seize and retain ground.
3-20. The forward movement of subordinate units is critical to the unit maintaining the initiative necessary
for successful offensive actions. By maintaining a high tempo, units deny enemy forces a chance to plan,
prepare, and execute an effective response to friendly offensive actions. This is a key way to ensure the
survivability of the force. Techniques for maintaining a high offensive tempo include using multiple routes,
dispersion, highly mobile forces, piecemeal destruction of isolated enemy forces, scheduled rotation and
relief of forces before they culminate, and the wise use of terrain. The exact techniques employed in a specific
situation must address the mission variables.
3-21. Units can overwhelm an enemy force by seizing and retaining key and decisive terrain early. Key
terrain is an identifiable characteristic whose seizure or retention affords a marked advantage to either
combatant (ADP 3-90). When present, decisive terrain is key terrain whose seizure and retention is
mandatory for successful mission accomplishment (ADP 3-90). If decisive terrain is present, commanders
designate it to communicate its importance to their concept of operations. A friendly force must control
decisive terrain to accomplish its mission. (See ADP 3-90 and ATP 2-01.3 for more information on key
terrain.)
INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
3-22. Units use available information collection assets to study the terrain and confirm or deny the enemy
force’s strengths, dispositions, and likely intentions, especially where and in what strength the enemy force
defends. Indications of the location and composition of obstacles and the positioning of engineer assets may
be key in determining where and when an enemy force defends. These assets also gather information
concerning the civilian population within an assigned area to confirm or deny their numbers, locations, and
likely intentions, especially with regard to staying in shelters or fleeing from combat operations.
3-23. By studying the terrain, units try to determine the principal mounted and dismounted avenues of
approach to their objectives. They also try to determine the most advantageous areas for the enemy’s main
defense, routes that enemy forces may use to conduct counterattacks, and other factors, such as observation
and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (known as
OAKOC). Attacking units continuously conduct information collection (reconnaissance, surveillance,
intelligence operations, and security operations) during their offensive actions because it is unlikely that they
have complete knowledge of the enemy force’s intentions and actions.
3-24. Commander’s critical information requirements in the offense commonly include three to five focuses
such as—
* Locations, composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the enemy force, to include
high-value targets and enemy reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities.
* Location of unmanned aircraft system ground control stations and launch and recovery sites.
* Probable locations of enemy reconnaissance objectives. |
3-90 | 94 | Chapter 3
* Locations of possible enemy assembly areas.
* Locations of enemy indirect fire weapons systems and units.
* Locations of gaps, assailable flanks, and other enemy weaknesses.
* Locations of areas for friendly and enemy air assault and parachute assault operations.
* Locations of enemy air defense gun and missile units and air defense radars.
* Locations of enemy electromagnetic warfare units.
* Effects of weather and terrain on current and projected operations.
* Information related to areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (known as
ASCOPE) about civilians located within the unit’s assigned area.
* Likely withdrawal routes for enemy forces.
* Anticipated timetable schedules for the enemy force’s most likely course of action and other
probable courses of action.
* Locations of enemy command and control and intelligence nodes, reconnaissance and surveillance
systems, and the frequencies used by the information systems linking these systems.
* Locations of enemy sustainment assets.
* Location of reserves, reserves movement routes, indications of enemy main effort, and indicators
driving friendly force commander’s decisions.
3-25. If friendly information collection assets cannot answer the commander’s information requirements,
units can commit additional internal resources, decide to execute the offense with the current information, or
request additional information collection support from information to higher echelon and adjacent units.
3-26. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield process assists the units in the offense with—
* Identification of key terrain features, and manmade and natural obstacles.
* Trafficability and cross-country mobility analysis.
* Line of sight overlays.
* Situation templates.
FIRES WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
3-27. The coordinated use of indirect fires and joint fires enable units to gain and maintain fire superiority
throughout all offensive actions. Units use various methods and assets to achieve the desired effects on
targeted enemy forces and thereby enable friendly maneuver. This includes Army indirect systems and joint
fires.
Army Fire Support
3-28. Indirect fire assets provide units with options for gaining and maintaining fire superiority. Fire
superiority are the dominating fires of one force over another force that permits that force to maneuver
at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the other. They use long-range artillery
systems (both cannon and rocket) along with rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft to engage enemy forces
throughout the depth of the enemy’s positions.
3-29. Fire support planning is the continuing process of analyzing, allocating, and scheduling fires. It
determines how fires are used, what types of targets to attack, what collection assets units use to acquire and
track those targets, what assets they use to attack targets, and what assets verify effects on these targets. This
planning does not stop at the objective or the limit of advance. Units give attention to flanks and potential
enemy hide positions. Coordination among echelon fire cells and the proper use of fire support coordination
measures are critical to prevent fratricide. Units plan to employ available fires to delay or neutralize
repositioning enemy forces to include enemy reserves. They also use fires to suppress, neutralize, or destroy
those enemy forces and systems that can most affect their units’ closure on their objectives. Units establish
triggers for the initiation, shifting, and lifting of fires based on the mission variables.
3-30. The fire support coordinator (known as FSCOORD), or chief of fires depending on the echelon,
integrates fires into the unit’s scheme of maneuver. Fire support coordinators plan the appropriate fire support
for their unit. These fires can be time or event driven. The fire support coordinator plans fires on known and |
3-90 | 95 | The Offense
likely enemy positions, which may include templated enemy positions. Successful massing of indirect fires
and fixed-wing attacks requires a fire cell that can proficiently track friendly indirect fire asset positions and
movements and that knows the various systems effective fire ranges. It also requires a tactical air control
party proficient in the timely execution of close air support.
3-31. Units must weigh the probable effects of preparation fires against achieving a greater degree of surprise
against enemy forces. Friendly fires always run the risk of receiving counter fires. Units balance this risk
with the requirements of the mission to determine whether to employ preparation fires. They may decide to
employ terminally guided munitions to destroy select high-payoff targets or use these munitions in mass
against part of the enemy defense to facilitate a breach and negate the requirement for long-duration
preparation fires by using area fire munitions.
3-32. Units may choose to make an initial assault without using preparation fires to achieve tactical surprise.
However, they always plan fires to support their units’ operations so that they are available if needed.
Preparation fires are normally high-volume fires delivered over a short period to maximize surprise and shock
effect. These preparation fires also include the conduct of electromagnetic warfare and cyber operations.
Preparation fires can continue while ground maneuver elements are moving. This consideration applies to
the conduct of all offensive operations.
3-33. Artillery and mortars must occupy positions that are well forward and still within supporting range of
the flanks of maneuver forces to provide responsive indirect fires. Units consider the effect that movement
by echelon or battery has on the amount of fire support available. They should support the unit’s main effort
with priority of fires. If the operation contains phases, the main effort generally has priority of fires. Units
place coordinated fire lines (CFLs) as close as possible to friendly maneuver forces and plan on-order CFLs
on phase lines so that those CFLs can quickly shift as their forces advance. This allows the rapid engagement
of targets beyond the CFL by the maximum number of available systems. Units establish critical friendly
zones to protect critical actions, such as support-by-fire positions and breaching efforts.
3-34. Linking Army forward observers, joint fires observers, and target acquisition assets to quick fire or
exclusive networks also provides responsive fires. Responsive fire networks allow the lead observers to
communicate directly with specific field artillery or mortar fire units. These kinds of communication
arrangements enhance responsiveness through streamlined network structures and focused priorities.
Communications planning should also include the need for communications networks for the clearing of
targets for rotary- and fixed-wing attacks.
3-35. Units employ information capabilities to support the offense. As friendly forces move through the
enemy force’s disruption zone and close into the enemy’s main battle zone, electromagnetic warfare jamming
resources concentrate on neutralizing enemy fire control, target acquisition, unmanned systems control
nodes, and information collection systems. They use military deception to prevent the enemy force from
determining the location and objective of the friendly main effort. In addition, intelligence sensors continue
to provide combat information and guidance to both friendly jammers and lethal indirect fire weapon systems,
so attacking units can destroy enemy command and control nodes, reconnaissance and surveillance assets,
artillery, and other high-payoff targets. Units synchronize the timing and conduct of these offensive actions,
so they achieve maximum effectiveness.
Joint Fires
3-36. Joint fires assist ground forces in shaping operations. Joint fires are fires delivered during the
employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in
support of a common objective (JP 3-0). The principles in the application of joint fires are generally the same
between offensive, defensive, and enabling operations. Joint surface-to-surface fires include—
* Army indirect fire, cyber, and electromagnetic warfare assets tasked with supporting Air Force,
Navy, or Marine Corps operations.
* Navy missile and naval gun fire, cyber, and electromagnetic warfare assets supporting Army units.
* Marine Corps indirect fire assets supporting Army units. |
3-90 | 96 | Chapter 3
Joint air-to-surface fires include—
* Army rotary-wing or UAS supporting Air Force, Navy or Marine Corps operations.
* Navy and Air Force fixed-wing, and electromagnetic warfare assets.
* Marine Corps fixed- or rotary-wing or UAS supporting Army units.
See JP 3-09, ADP 3-19, FM 3-09, and ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-31.6/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP 3-2.6 for
information on joint fires.
SUSTAINMENT WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
3-37. Offensive operations will require more reinforcements, fuel, medical, equipment, and materiel
compared to defensive and enabling operations. Also, offensive operations increase the likelihood of
generating mass casualties and replacing personnel and equipment. Offensive operations require greater
precision in sustainment and will be executed at a higher operating tempo than other types of operations. This
requires a flexible and adaptable sustainment structure to meet the demands of offensive operations. In the
offense, the sustainment focus is on logistics and health service support. Proper echeloning of logistics and
medical assets are key to maintaining tempo and minimizing risk in offensive operations.
Logistics
3-38. Logistic units and material remain close to the maneuver force to ensure short turnaround time for
supplies and services. This includes uploading as much critical materiel, such as ammunition and petroleum,
oils, and lubricants, as possible and coordinating to preclude attempted occupation of a logistics release point
by more than one unit at a time. This allows units to reduce risk by lowering their physical and electronic
signature during resupply operations. Units make decisions regarding the risk of enemy detection of logistics
preparations for an attack.
3-39. Responsive sustainment of the offense begins during mission analysis and continues throughout the
operation based on the expertise of the planners and the preparation and agility of the sustainment units during
execution as the potential for supplies to not be available increases as the operation progresses. Logisticians
must assist with the development of feasible courses of action during planning and anticipate changes of
requirements during execution. They must consider alternative routes and different means to accomplish the
timely delivery of the required support and they must provide their leaders with options to overcome whatever
obstacles appear. The laws of physics constrain the art of the possible, but ingenuity and innovation can
deliver solutions to problems that appear insurmountable.
3-40. The variety and complexity of offensive actions requires that units establish flexible and tailorable
transportation systems. There may be a wide dispersion of forces and lengthening of lines of communication.
Required capabilities include movement control, terminal operations, and mode operations.
3-41. Units need to closely monitor emerging resupply and rearm requirements in conjunction with ongoing
operations. The prioritization of the requirements must be thought out and appropriate for the units with
follow-on missions, rather than units that are most depleted in conjunction with the potential shift in mission
priorities as the operation progresses.
Health Service Support
3-42. The burden on medical resources increases due to the intensity of offensive actions and the increased
distances over which support is required as a force advances. The unit re-allocates medical resources as the
tactical situation changes. Medical units can anticipate large numbers of casualties in a short period due to
destructive capabilities of modern conventional weapons and the employment of weapons of mass
destruction. These mass casualty situations can exceed the capabilities of organic and direct support medical
assets to treat the numbers of casualties sustained. To prevent this from occurring, planners anticipate this
possibility and coordinate with area support medical units to help absorb a rise in battlefield injuries. Careful
planning and coordination avoid compromising the standard of medical care for injured Soldiers. Effective
management of mass casualty situations depends on established and rehearsed mass casualty plans and |
3-90 | 97 | The Offense
detailed medical planning. Units consider several other variables that ensure the success of mass casualty
response plans. These include, but are not limited to—
* The coordination and synchronization of additional medical support or augmentation, such as
medical evacuation support, forward resuscitative surgical intervention provided by forward
resuscitative and surgical detachments, combat support and field hospitals, casualty collection
points, ambulance exchange points, and established Class VIII resupply.
* Quick location and evacuation of injured personnel from the battlefield.
* Providing effective tactical combat casualty care and emergency medical treatment for injured
personnel.
* Continuous flow of casualties to medical treatment facilities at the next higher role of care.
* Use of casualty evacuation assets when the number of casualties overwhelms the capacity of the
medical evacuation system.
* Accurate triage and rapid medical evacuation of injured personnel to medical treatment facilities
at the next higher role of care.
* Planning of MEDEVAC routes (ground and air) along with contingencies during times of
hazardous trafficability.
* MEDAVAC capacity is rarely sufficient, and units must designate casualty evacuation capability
within their formations.
PROTECTION WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
3-43. Protection prevents or mitigates detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve combat power and
enable freedom of action. To help preserve the force, units ensure they address all protection tasks during the
unit’s planning, preparation, and execution, while also constantly assessing the effectiveness of those
protection tasks. In the offense, protection is applied carefully and selectively to ensure that it does not hinder
a unit’s freedom of action. This is accomplished through protection integration and synchronization where
and when significant threats and hazards are projected in the offensive plan. The fluidity and rapid tempo of
the offense poses challenges when protecting friendly assets to deny enemy forces the ability to interfere with
friendly force operations.
3-44. Protection is a key consideration at every echelon and all military activities have some inherent or
organic protection capability (such as survivability, antiterrorism measures, local security). Higher echelons
employ protection systems to enable lower echelon maneuver and deny enemy forces the ability to interfere
with subordinate forces’ ongoing operations. Lower echelons use reconnaissance and security forces to
protect forward maneuver forces and exposed flanks. At the lowest tactical levels, units use deception, cover,
concealment, and dispersion to counter threat capabilities and preserve critical capabilities, assets, and
activities. (See ADP 3-37 for information on protection tasks).
Air and Missile Defense
3-45. A ground force’s primary air defense systems are its organic weapons to defend against short-range air
threats, supported by joint fighter aircraft conducting offensive and defensive counterair operations. The joint
force may not have air superiority or even air parity. Units weigh the air threat with their ability to mitigate
the threat when considering options for offensive operations. During offensive actions, units direct the
positioning of available organic or supporting radars in those locations where they can best initially support
the unit’s attack. The selection of those positions reflects a risk assessment designed to preclude their early
loss to enemy action. The air defense airspace management (known as ADAM) cell in the echelon staff
communicates with the appropriate air and missile defense (AMD) command post. That AMD command post
provides additional information to the supported unit to expand the fidelity of the air picture, including
information on engaged air threats by the joint force air component unit, Army Patriot air defense systems,
and short-range air defense. The attacking unit concentrates on conducting passive protection measures
during its offensive actions. If attacked by enemy aerial systems in assembly areas, attack positions, or while
moving, the unit disperses and conducts small-arms air defense. Units at each echelon establish air defense
priorities based on the concept of operations, scheme of maneuver, air situation, and air defense priorities
established by higher headquarters. If units have Army air defense systems supporting their attack, they
generally weight that coverage toward their main efforts and establish protective corridors over terrain |
3-90 | 98 | Chapter 3
traversed by subordinate units conducting that operation. Command of all air defense assets requires complete
and timely communications to ensure proper weapon status for the protection of friendly air support assets.
3-46. Protection measures are an essential part of air and missile defense planning at all levels. All units
conduct passive actions in conjunction with their missions. Passive actions reduce the effectiveness of the
enemy air threat.
3-47. Tactical air defense support focuses on—
* Enemy UAS.
* Enemy rotary-wing aircraft.
* Enemy fixed-wing aircraft.
Survivability
3-48. All units have an inherent responsibility to improve their positions and take proactive measures to
protect their forces, whether they are in an assembly area or maneuvering. Survivability operations consist
of three areas designed to focus efforts on mitigating friendly losses to hostile actions or environments:
providing or improving cover, concealment, and camouflage. Units normally consider the impact of
constructing protective emplacements for artillery and sustainment concentrations as part of the planning
process. Units do not employ protective positions in the offense as extensively as they do in the defense.
Such terrain modifications may require significant amounts of time, making them impractical for protecting
assets that must frequently move to keep pace with operations. However, units may require the hardening of
key command and control facilities, especially those with detectable electronic signatures. Maneuver units
construct hasty fighting positions as soon as possible when they halt or pause during the conduct of offensive
operations. Forces conducting offensive actions continue to use camouflage, cover, concealment,
survivability moves, maximum existing terrain, obscuration, and deception.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
3-49. Explosive ordnance disposal units assess and render safe hazards to protect the force. These elements
can dispose of all explosive hazards to include foreign or U.S. ammunition, unexploded ordnance, mines,
and CBRN munitions. Engineers identify, breach, and clear minefields. Explosive ordinance disposal forces
render safe explosive hazards that restrict unit freedom of movement or deny access to or threaten critical
assets or operations. (See ATP 4-32 for more information on explosive ordinance disposal operations.)
Coordinate Air and Missile Defense
3-50. Air and missile defense assets during an offensive operation can provide vital protection from air
threats and contribute to the freedom of maneuver by friendly forces. Units coordinate and synchronize air
and missile defense assets for coverage over maneuver forces and their critical assets, to include denying
surveillance by threat aerial platforms. Air and missile defense assets also protect forward-based
infrastructure—such as lines of communications and command nodes—from aerial attack, determine and
predict reporting ballistic missile launch points and impact points, and provide early warning and
surveillance.
3-51. Unit protection cell planners coordinate with the unit air and defense airspace management cell for
AMD to protect the unit’s prioritized protection list, ensuring the protection of critical assets and forces from
enemy air attack, missile attack, and surveillance.
3-52. AMD assets integrate protective systems by using the six employment guidelines—mutual support,
overlapping fires, balanced fires, weighted coverage, early engagement, and defense in depth—and additional
considerations necessary to mass and mix AMD capabilities. These employment guidelines enable air
defense artillery forces to successfully accomplish combat missions and support overall force objectives.
Risk Management
3-53. The likelihood of fratricide increases during offensive operations compared to defensive operations.
During offensive operations, friendly forces maneuver towards enemy forces, while another friendly force |
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gains fire superiority. The convergence of friendly forces at the decisive point is the riskiest part of any
offensive operation.
3-54. During offensive operations, various briefs and rehearsals are the primary tools for reducing risk
identified during planning and preparation. The types of risks identified assist in determining the type of
rehearsal conducted. Rehearsals should extend to all levels of command and involve all key players.
3-55. Risk management considerations during offensive operations include—
* Confirmation briefs to ensure leaders understand their assigned mission and key tasks.
* Backbriefs to ensure subordinates’ course of actions meets their higher echelons commander’s
intent.
* Rehearsals to ensure shared understanding between units and refine applicable control measures
to synchronize operations.
3-56. The following factors may reveal risks during rehearsals:
* Types of rehearsals such as combined arms or fires rehearsals.
* Training and proficiency levels of units and individuals.
* The habitual relationships between units conducting the offensive operation.
* The physical readiness of the troops conducting the offensive operation.
Area Security
3-57. Area security operations typically support offensive operations by ensuring the continual conduct of
sustainment operations that generate and maintain combat power to maintain tempo and extend operational
reach. Additionally, area security operations allow units to provide protection to critical assets without a
significant diversion of combat power. During the offense, various military organizations may be involved
in conducting area security operations in an economy-of-force role to protect lines of communications,
convoys, or critical fixed sites and radars. Bases and base camps employ local security measures (including
explosive ordnance disposal, assessments and recommendations, random antiterrorism measures, and
increased force protection conditions) but may be vulnerable to enemy or adversary remnant forces requiring
a response that is beyond base camp capabilities. In support areas, units conduct area damage control to
prevent and respond to the negative effects of enemy or adversary action that can diminish combat power.
TRANSITIONS
3-58. Units transition from offensive operations only when they result in complete victory and the end of
hostilities, reach a culminating point, or receive a change in mission from a higher unit. Generally, units in
the offense transition to the defense or stability. All offensive actions that do not achieve complete victory
reach a culminating point for a variety of reasons, such as when—
* Initiative shifts from the attacking force to the enemy.
* Friendly forces encounter heavily defended areas that they cannot bypass.
* Fuel, ammunition, and other supplies fail to keep up with expenditures.
* Soldiers become physically exhausted.
* Casualties and equipment losses become too much for an organization to handle.
* Repairs and replacements do not keep pace with damage and losses.
* Reserves or follow-on forces are not available to continue the advance.
* Enemy reinforcements attack, or the defender counterattacks with fresh troops.
Several of these causes may combine to halt an offense. In some cases, the unit can regain its momentum,
but this only happens after difficult fighting or an operational pause.
3-59. Transitions do not just occur between offense, defense, and stability operations. During offensive
operations it may be necessary, or planned, for units to execute a short halt to operations without necessarily
executing a transition. An example would be a unit executing a short halt in an assault position prior to
maneuvering during an attack. The halt, or tactical pause, should be as brief as possible to ensure the unit
does not lose momentum. |
3-90 | 100 | Chapter 3
3-60. Units anticipate the reasons listed in paragraph 3-58, plan a pause to replenish combat power, and
phase their operations accordingly before subordinate forces reach their culminating points. Simultaneously,
units attempt to prevent enemy forces from knowing when friendly forces become overextended.
TRANSITION TO DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-61. Once offensive actions begin, the attacking unit tries to sense when subordinates reach, or are about to
reach, their culminating points. Before they reach them, units transition to a focus on defensive operations.
They have more freedom to choose where and when to halt an attack if they sense that subordinate forces are
approaching culmination. Units plan future activities to aid the defense, minimize vulnerability to attack, and
facilitate renewal of the offense as the force transitions to branches or sequels of ongoing operations. For
example, to prevent overburdening the extended LOCs that units should manage when and how they begin
to transition to prevent a LOC bottleneck.
3-62. Units anticipate the ending of unit offensive actions by preparing branches and sequels and transmitting
them to subordinates via orders. These orders include the time or circumstances under which the current
offense transitions to a defensive operation, the missions and locations of subordinate units, and control
measures. As units transition from an offensive focus to a defensive focus, they—
* Maintain contact and surveillance of enemy forces by combining reconnaissance units and
surveillance assets to develop the information required to plan future actions.
* Establish a security area and local security measures.
* Position artillery assets to ensure the support of security forces.
* Position forces for probable future employment.
* Maintain or regain contact with adjacent friendly units in a contiguous assigned area and ensure
that units remain capable of mutual support in a noncontiguous assigned area.
* Transition engineer effort by shifting emphasis from mobility to countermobility and survivability.
* Consolidate and reorganize.
* Explain the rationale for transitioning from the offense to their Soldiers.
* Emplace protective obstacles.
* Resupply with fuel and ammunition.
* Occupy defensible terrain.
3-63. Units reorganize and resupply during transitions. This requires a transition in the sustainment effort
with a shift in emphasis from ensuring the force’s ability to move forward to ensuring the force’s ability to
defend on its chosen location (by increasing forward stocks of construction, barrier, and obstacle material
and ammunition). A transition is often a time when units can perform equipment maintenance. Additional
assets may also be available for casualty evacuation and medical treatment because of a reduced tempo of
operations.
3-64. Units should not wait too long to transition from the offense to the defense as subordinate forces
approach their culminating points. Without prior planning, transitioning to defensive actions after reaching a
culminating point is extremely difficult. There are several reasons for this:
* Defensive preparations are hasty, and forces are not adequately disposed for the defense.
* Defensive reorganization requires more time than an enemy force may allow.
* Usually attacking forces approaching culmination find themselves dispersed across the width and
depth of their assigned areas with reduced combat power.
* The shift to the defense requires a psychological adjustment. Soldiers who have become
accustomed to advancing must now halt and operate defensively on new and often unfavorable
terms.
3-65. Units can use two techniques when transitioning to a defensive operation. The first technique is for the
leading elements to commit forces and push forward to claim enough ground to establish a security area
anchored on defensible terrain. A security area is that area occupied by a unit’s security elements and includes
the areas of influence of those security elements (ADP 3-90). The main force moves forward or rearward as
necessary to occupy key terrain and institutes a hasty defense that progresses into a deliberate defense as time |
3-90 | 101 | The Offense
and resources allow. The second technique is to establish a security area generally along the unit’s final
positions, moving the main body rearward to defensible terrain. The security force thins out and the remaining
force deploys to organize the defense. In both methods, the unit keeps the security area with the appropriate
depth to enable dispersion and minimize early threat acquisition of friendly positions.
3-66. In the first technique, the security area often lacks depth because the force lacks sufficient combat
power to seize required terrain. In the second technique, enemy forces may accurately template the forward
trace of friendly units and engage with artillery and other fire support systems. These actions often result in
the loss of additional friendly Soldiers and equipment and expend more resources.
3-67. If units determine the necessity of terminating an offense and conducting a retrograde, typically
subordinate units initially conduct an area defense from their current locations. This lasts until their units can
synchronize their activities to conduct retrograde operations. The amount of effort expended in establishing
an area defense depends on the mission variables.
TRANSITION TO STABILITY
3-68. The end of focused offensive operations may not be the decisive act. The successful performance of
stability tasks may be the main effort in a major operation or campaign. Units and staffs plan the transition
to focus on the conduct of stability tasks from the conduct of offensive operations. To assist in this transition
to stability-focused operations, units continuously consolidate gains. Units consider activities necessary to
consolidate gains while seeking to achieve their end state. It is the final exploitation of tactical success. |
3-90 | 103 | Chapter 4
Movement to Contact
This chapter discusses movement to contact beginning with its general considerations.
It then discusses organization, control measures, and conducting a movement to
contact. It then discusses two variations of a movement to contact: search and attack
and cordon and search. Lastly, it talks about transitioning from a movement to contact
to another type of offensive or defensive operation.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
4-1. A movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact to
develop the situation. Units perform a movement to contact when the tactical situation is unclear, or the
enemy force succeeds in breaking contact with friendly forces. A properly executed movement to contact
develops the situation and maintains the unit’s freedom of action after establishing contact with the enemy.
This is essential in maintaining the initiative and achieving a position of advantage. Movement to contact
allows units to create conditions for subsequent operations. Once contact is made with an enemy force, the
friendly force quickly transitions either to an attack, a hasty defense, or bypasses enroute to their objective.
4-2. An enemy force’s use of terrain, operations security, and military deception operations can degrade
the friendly forces situational understanding and require small tactical units to conduct movements to contact.
A movement to contact employs purposeful and aggressive movement, decentralized control, and the hasty
deployment of combined arms formations from the march. The fundamentals of a movement to contact are—
* Focus all efforts on finding enemy forces.
* The initial contact force should be small, mobile, self-contained, and avoid becoming decisively
engaged by the enemy’s main body.
* Task-organize the force and use movement formations and battle drills to deploy and attack rapidly
in any direction.
* Keep subordinate forces within supporting distances to facilitate gaining and maintaining contact.
* Upon gaining contact, maintain that contact regardless of the course of action (COA) adopted.
* Close air support, air interdiction, and counterair operations are essential to the success of large-
scale movements to contact. Local air superiority or, at a minimum, air parity is vital to the
operation’s success.
4-3. A movement to contact increases the odds of a unit executing a meeting engagement. A meeting
engagement is a combat action that occurs when a moving force engages an enemy at an unexpected
time and place. The enemy force encountered may be either stationary or moving. A meeting engagement
does not require both forces to be surprised. The force making unexpected contact is the one conducting a
meeting engagement. Such encounters often occur in small-unit operations when reconnaissance has been
ineffective. The force that reacts first to the unexpected contact generally gains an advantage over its enemy.
4-4. A meeting engagement may also occur when opponents are aware of each other, and both decide to
attack to obtain a tactical advantage. Additionally, a meeting engagement may occur when one force attempts
to deploy into a hasty defense while the other force attacks before its opponent can organize an effective
defense. No matter how the force makes contact, seizing the initiative is the overriding imperative. Prompt
execution of battle drills at platoon level and below, and standard actions on contact for larger units, can give
that initiative to the friendly force. |
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ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
4-5. At a minimum, a movement to contact is organized with forward security forces—either a covering
force or an advance guard—and a main body. The reserve, fires, engineer, and sustainment assets are included
in the main body. Based on the mission variables, commanders may increase their unit’s security by
resourcing an offensive covering force and an advance guard for each column, as well as flank and rear
security. Figure 4-1 depicts a generic organization of forces for a movement to contact.
Figure 4-1. Organization of forces for a movement to contact
4-6. Initiating a movement to contact requires units to be out of contact with the enemy main body.
However, units may have enough information to target enemy reconnaissance assets, uncommitted forces,
reserves, or sustaining operations activities. Commanders normally designate forces, such as long-range
artillery systems and fixed-wing aircraft to engage known enemy elements within their assigned area. The
forward security element is critical to the protection of the main body and enables units to make contact on
their terms.
FORWARD SECURITY FORCES
4-7. Units conducting a movement to contact can organize their security force as an advance guard force, a
covering force, or both. This provides the main body with early warning, protects the movement of the main
body, and develops the situation before committing the main body. A guard force is a force that contains
sufficient combat power to defeat, cause the withdrawal of, or fix the lead elements of an enemy ground force
before it can engage the main body with direct fire. A covering force is a self-contained force capable of
operating independently of the main body, unlike a guard force to conduct the cover task. This covering force
accomplishes the same effect as a guard and reports directly to the establishing commander.
4-8. Each element of the force synchronizes its actions with adjacent and supporting units, maintaining
contact and coordination as prescribed in orders and unit SOPs. The lead elements of the main body maintain
contact with the security force. The rear and flank security elements maintain contact with and orient on the
main body’s movement. These security forces prevent unnecessary delay in the movement and premature |
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deployment of the main body as long as possible. Commanders may instruct the advance guard to eliminate
small pockets of resistance bypassed by the covering force (if both are used). The conduct of the security
forces in the movement to contact are the same as those for security operations. (See Chapter 13 for additional
information on security operations.)
MAIN BODY
4-9. A main body consists of forces not assigned to security duties. It normally includes the maneuver
forces conducting the main effort once contact is made with the enemy as well as fires, engineer, and
sustainment assets to support the operation The combat elements of the main body prepare to respond to
enemy contact that the unit’s security forces make. If the situation allows, commanders can assign a follow
and support mission to a subordinate maneuver unit. This allows that subordinate unit to relieve security
forces and perform tasks such as containing bypassed enemy forces, handling dislocated civilians, and
clearing routes. Security forces can then continue their primary mission.
4-10. Units frequently find that their main supply routes (MSRs) become extended as operations proceed.
Aerial resupply may be necessary to support large-scale movement to contacts or to maintain the momentum
of the main body. Combat trains containing fuel, ammunition, medical assets, and maintenance assets move
with their supported battalion or company team. Fuel and ammunition stocks remain loaded on tactical
vehicles in the combat trains so they can quickly move when necessary. Battalion field trains move with a
higher support echelon, such as the brigade support battalion, in the main body of each BCT. Aviation units
use forward arming and refuel points (known as FARPs) to reduce aircraft turnaround time.
RESERVE
4-11. Commanders designate a portion of the main body for use as the reserve. The mission variables
determine the size of the reserve, and the more unknown the enemy situation, the larger the size of the reserve.
On contact with enemy forces, a reserve provides flexibility to react to unforeseen circumstances and allows
a unit to resume its movement. See paragraphs 1-94 through 1-100 for more information on the reserve.
COMMON CONTROL MEASURES FOR A MOVEMENT TO
CONTACT
4-12. Units use the minimal number and type of control measures possible in a movement to contact because
of the uncertain enemy situation. These measures include designation of an assigned area with left, right,
front, and rear boundaries, or a separate assigned area bounded by a continuous boundary in noncontiguous
operations. Commanders further divide their assigned area into subordinate unit assigned areas to facilitate
subordinate unit actions.
4-13. A movement to contact usually starts from a LD at the time specified in the operation order.
Commanders control a movement to contact by using phase lines, contact points, and checkpoints as required.
They also control the depth of the movement to contact by using a LOA or a forward boundary. Figure 4-2
on page 4-4 depicts example common movement to contact control measures and also depicts a limit of
advance and not a forward boundary. Commanders can designate one or more objectives to limit the extent
of a movement to contact and orient the force. However, these are often terrain oriented and used only to
guide movement. Although a movement to contact may result in taking a terrain objective, the primary focus
should be on gaining contact with enemy forces and developing the situation. If a unit has enough information
to locate significant enemy forces, then it should plan an attack.
4-14. Commanders use boundaries to separate the various organizational elements and clearly establish
responsibilities between different organizations. They synchronize the movement to contact with control
measures, battle drills, and formation discipline. |
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Figure 4-2. Example movement to contact control measures
4-15. Commanders designate a series of phase lines that can successively become the new rear boundary of
the forward security elements as that force advances. Each security area rear boundary becomes the forward
boundary of the main body and shifts as the security force moves forward. The rear boundary of the main
body designates the limit of responsibility of the rear security element. This line also shifts as the main body
moves forward. Units may use an axis of advance to control movement. However, there is the risk that their
forces may not detect and may inadvertently bypass enemy forces outside the axis.
PLANNING A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
4-16. Planning for a movement to contact requires units to balance competing requirements in the allocation
of combat power. The first requirement is to determine an enemy force’s location and intent. The second
requirement is to execute security operations to protect the main body. The main body focuses its planning
and preparation on the conduct of hasty attacks, bypassing forces, and hasty defenses. The plan must address
actions anticipated by the unit based on available information and anticipated times and locations of meeting
engagements. Commanders also task their forward security forces with conducting route reconnaissance of
routes the main body traverses.
4-17. Units seek to gain contact by using the smallest elements possible. These elements are normally ground
or aerial units performing reconnaissance but may include UAS or other collection assets. Units may task-
organize their reconnaissance assets with additional combat power to allow them to develop the situation.
The movement formation of the main body should also make initial contact with the smallest force possible.
It should provide for efficient movement of the force and adequate reserves. Commanders choose to have all,
or part of the main body conduct an approach march as part of the movement to contact to provide efficiency
and freedom of action to the main body. (See Chapter 14 for additional information on troop movement.)
4-18. The frontage assigned to a unit in a movement to contact must allow it to apply sufficient combat
power to maintain the momentum of the operation. Reducing the frontage normally gives a unit more combat
power to develop the situation upon contact while maintaining the required momentum. The forward security
force should have uncommitted forces available to develop the situation without requiring the deployment of
the main body. The benefits of a wider frontage include increasing the likelihood of making contact with the
enemy and reducing the potential of inadvertently bypassing enemy formations. |
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4-19. Units primarily rely on fires assets to weight the lead element’s combat power, but they also provide
the lead element with the additional combat enablers needed to accomplish the mission. Indirect fires system
support maneuver forces to get within direct fire range and engage enemy forces.
4-20. The reconnaissance effort may proceed faster in a movement to contact than in a zone reconnaissance
because the emphasis is on making contact with enemy forces. However, commanders must recognize that
there is an increased risk in bypassing enemy units when increasing the speed of the reconnaissance effort.
4-21. Based on mission variables, commanders clearly state bypass criteria. For example, an armored or
Stryker BCT commander in an open desert environment could state that the bypass criteria is an enemy-
mounted force smaller than a platoon. The BCT clears all enemy forces larger than a mounted platoon from
that brigade’s axis of advance. Any force that bypassed an enemy unit must maintain contact with it until
handing it off to another friendly element, usually a force assigned a follow and support mission. See
paragraph 12-27 for a discussion on bypass criteria.
4-22. The intelligence officer, assisted by engineer and air defense staff representatives, carefully analyzes
the terrain, including air avenues of approach. At a minimum, the intelligence staff identifies the enemy
force’s most dangerous and most likely COA in the mission analysis portion during the MDMP. Because of
the force’s vulnerability, the intelligence officer must not underestimate enemy forces during a movement to
contact. A thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process—a modified combined obstacle
overlay that includes intervisibility overlays, threat courses of action, and event templates—enhances the
force’s security by indicating danger areas where the force is most likely to make contact with enemy forces.
It also helps to determine movement times between phase lines and other locations. Potential danger areas
are likely enemy defensive locations, engagement areas, observation posts, and obstacles. The fires system
targets these areas. They become on-order priority targets placed into effect or cancelled as the lead element
can confirm or deny enemy force presence. The information collection annex of the movement to contact
order must address coverage of these danger areas. If reconnaissance forces cannot clear these areas, more
deliberate movement techniques are required. These areas and resource shortages should be identified during
the MDMP process. Resources should be reallocated, or maneuver adjusted based on the results of COA
analysis.
4-23. Commanders develop decision points to support changes in the force’s movement technique or
movement formation. Using human and technical means to validate decision points, commanders determine
the acceptable degree of risk based on the mission. The commander’s confidence in the products of the IPB
process and the acceptable risk determine the unit’s movement formation and scheme of maneuver. In a high-
risk environment, it is usually better to increase the distance between forward elements and the main body
than to slow the speed of advance.
4-24. Higher headquarters execute supporting operations in support of their subordinates as part of a
movement to contact. This occurs when the information regarding the enemy reserves and follow-on forces
is available, but information regarding enemy forces in proximity to the friendly force is not available. As in
any other type of operation, units plan to focus operations on finding enemy forces and then delaying,
disrupting, or destroying each enemy force before it arrives in direct fire range. This allows maneuver forces
to prepare to engage enemy units on their arrival.
4-25. Commanders can opt not to designate a main effort until forces make contact with enemy forces, unless
there is a specific reason to designate one. They retain resources under direct control to reinforce the main
effort. Commanders may designate the main effort during the initial stages of a movement to contact because
of the presence of a key piece of terrain or an avenue of approach.
PREPARING A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
4-26. The preparations for conducting a movement to contact are the same as those for an attack. (See
paragraphs 5-32 through 5-46 for additional information on preparation for attacks.) The only difference is
the focus on battle drills since the location and disposition of the enemy is unknown. |
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EXECUTING A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
4-27. The commander of the forward security force chooses a movement formation (based on the mission
variables) and makes contact with the smallest possible force while providing flexibility for maneuver.
Whatever formation the unit chooses, it must be able to deploy appropriately once it determines an enemy
force’s location. The unit ensures that the route or axis of advance traveled by the main body is free of enemy
forces. The main body may move continuously (using traveling and traveling overwatch) or by bounds (using
bounding overwatch). It moves by bounds when contact with an enemy force is expected and the terrain is
favorable. The overall commander may position some indirect fire assets, such as a mortar platoon or artillery
battery and forward observers, with the forward security force. These forward observers can help overwatch
the forward security force movement while indirect fires focus on suppressing enemy weapons, obscuring
enemy observation posts, and screening friendly movement.
4-28. Behind the forward security force, the main body advances over multiple parallel routes with numerous
lateral branches to remain flexible and reduce the time needed to initiate maneuver. (While it is preferred for
a battalion to use multiple routes, battalions and smaller units can move on a singular route.) In a movement
to contact, the main body’s march disposition must allow maximum flexibility for maneuvering during
movement and when establishing contact with an enemy force.
4-29. The main body keeps enough distance between itself and its forward security force to maintain
flexibility for maneuver. This distance varies with the echelon of command, the terrain, and the availability
of information about enemy forces. The main body may execute a tactical movement for all or part of the
movement to contact to use the available road network efficiently or reduce the time needed to move from
one location to another. Command posts and supply trains seek routes that allow them to remain responsive
throughout an assigned area and occupy hasty positions as necessary.
4-30. Fire support systems should focus on suppression missions to disrupt enemy forward security elements
as they make contact and focus on obscuration of enemy forces missions or screen exposed friendly forces
when conducting a movement to contact. They schedule synchronized movements of fire support systems
with the movement of the rest of the force. Fire support systems that cannot match the cross-country mobility
of ground maneuver units may cause them to slow their rate of advance. If these units do not slow down, they
run the risk of outrunning their fire support. Units synchronize the employment of close air support to prevent
enemy forces from regaining balance while ground fire support assets are repositioning. The main body
updates the high-payoff target list during a movement to contact operation as necessary.
4-31. Similar considerations apply to air and missile defense when enemy forces possess these capabilities.
A unit conducting a movement to contact remains aware of the air and missile defense umbrella provided by
radars, air defense systems, and the joint combat air patrol.
4-32. The unit’s tempo, momentum, tactical dispersal, and attention to electromagnetic emission control
complicate an enemy force’s ability to detect and target the main body prior to making contact. Once a
friendly force makes contact and masses against detected enemy forces, it becomes vulnerable to strikes by
enemy conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. A friendly force must mass effects rapidly
in a meeting engagement and disperse again as soon as it overcomes resistance to avoid enemy
counteractions.
4-33. Movement should be as rapid as the terrain, the mobility of the force, and the enemy situation permits.
Open terrain provides maneuver space on either side of the line of march and facilitates high-speed
movement. It also allows for greater dispersal and usually permits more separation between forward security
elements and the main body than restricted terrain allows. Units should never commit their main bodies to
canalizing terrain before forward security elements have ensured the main bodies can maintain freedom of
movement within that terrain. Enemy forces may have established fire support control measures that allow
enemy forces to employ non-observed harassing and interdiction fires on friendly forces traversing these
choke points. Units may shorten the distance between elements to decrease reaction time or deploy their force
to prepare for contact as the enemy situation develops.
4-34. At battalion and company echelons, a force moves along covered or concealed positions along routes
using terrain to minimize its vulnerability to enemy weapons. Further, an overwatching force should cover |
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the moving force. Regardless of the specific movement technique employed, subordinate elements need to
provide mutual support and be knowledgeable of each other’s sectors of fire.
4-35. The moving force must attempt to cross any obstacles it encounters without loss of momentum by
conducting hasty (in stride) breaches. Units use forward security forces in an attempt to seize intact bridges
whenever possible. Lead security elements bypass or breach obstacles as quickly as possible to maintain the
momentum of the movement. If lead security elements cannot overcome obstacles, commanders direct
subsequent elements of the main body to breach the obstacle site. Following forces can also reduce obstacles
and improve routes that hinder the unit’s sustainment flow.
Find the Enemy
4-36. Units gain and maintain enemy contact to further shape operations for a movement to contact. All
information collection assets focus on determining an enemy force’s disposition and providing units with
current intelligence and relevant combat information; this ensures that they can commit friendly forces under
optimal conditions. Units use all available sources of combat information to find an enemy force’s location
and disposition. Corps and divisions leverage collection assets from organic, attached, and direct support
units; special operations forces; and joint and multinational assets to gain contact with enemy forces. BCTs
and their subordinate battalions use their organic reconnaissance assets to gain contact. This contact may be
in any of eight forms (see paragraphs 1-60 through 1-68 for a discussion on the nine forms of contact). Units
use information collection systems to cue aerial and ground reconnaissance by their attached BCTs and
combat aviation brigades.
4-37. The enemy situation becomes clearer as the unit’s forward security elements conduct actions on contact
to develop the situation in accordance with their commander’s intent and plan. By determining the strength,
location, and disposition of enemy forces, these security elements allow units to focus the effects of the main
body’s combat power against the enemy main body. The overall force must remain flexible to exploit both
intelligence and combat information. The security force should not allow an enemy force to break contact
unless it receives an order from the friendly force commander. When a strong covering force has not preceded
the advance guard, the advance guard should seize terrain that offers essential observation.
4-38. The unit’s security force often gains a tactical advantage over an enemy force by using tempo and
initiative to conduct actions on contact, allowing it to gain and maintain contact without becoming decisively
engaged. Decisively engaged is when a fully committed force or unit cannot maneuver or extricate itself.
Once the lead elements of a force conducting a movement to contact encounter an enemy force, they conduct
actions on contact. The unit treats obstacles like any other form of enemy contact, since it assumes that the
enemy force has covered these obstacles by fire. The unit carries out actions on contact regardless of whether
the enemy force has detected its presence. How quickly the unit develops the situation is directly related to
its security. This tempo is directly related to the unit’s previous training to execute SOPs and drills.
Fix the Enemy
4-39. On contact, the main body brings overwhelming fires on enemy forces to prevent the enemy forces
from conducting either a spoiling attack, organizing a coherent defense, or withdrawing. With the enemy
fixed, the security force maneuvers quickly to find gaps in the enemy force’s defenses. Units use information
collection assets to gain as much information as possible about the enemy force’s dispositions, strengths,
capabilities, and intentions. As more intelligence becomes available, the main body attacks to destroy the
enemy. The higher headquarters of the unit conducting the movement to contact conducts countermobility
operations to prevent enemy reserves from moving to counter the unit’s actions.
4-40. The security force does not allow enemy security and main body forces to maneuver against the
friendly main body. The security force’s organization, size, and combat power are major factors that
determine the size of the enemy force it can defeat or fix in place without deploying the main body.
4-41. Units use aerial maneuver and fire support assets to fix enemy forces in their current positions by
directly attacking enemy maneuver elements and command and control systems and emplacing situational
obstacles. The typical priorities are to attack—
* Enemy forces in contact.
* Enemy command and control (C2) and fire direction control facilities. |
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* Enemy fire support assets.
* Moving enemy forces not yet in contact, such as follow-on forces and reserves.
4-42. Attack priorities vary with mission variables. Attack rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft can engage enemy
forces throughout the depth of an assigned area (if the suppression of enemy air defenses can reduce the risk
to aircraft to an acceptable degree).
4-43. The techniques units employ to fix enemy forces when both forces are moving differ from those
employed when enemy forces are stationary during a meeting engagement. In both situations, when the
security force cannot overrun enemy forces by conducting a hasty frontal attack, units deploy a portion of
their main body. When this occurs, the unit transitions to an attack and is no longer conducting a movement
to contact.
Finish the Enemy
4-44. If possible, friendly security forces overwhelm enemy security forces by executing a frontal attack to
make contact with the enemy main body. If this is not possible, friendly security forces fix enemy security
forces and the main body conducts a penetration or envelopment of the enemy security forces. This makes
the main body the main effort of the movement to contact and is a key reason why units ensure that their
main bodies avoid enemy engagement until a time and place of their choosing. They maneuver their main
bodies at a tempo the enemy force cannot match. They do this to overwhelm the enemy before it can react
effectively or reinforce. Units attempt to defeat the enemy security force in detail while still maintaining the
momentum of the advance, until the unit makes contact with the enemy main body.
4-45. If the main body initiates a frontal attack, it deploys rapidly to the vicinity of the line of contact.
Commanders of maneuvering units coordinate forward passage through friendly forces in contact as required.
The intent is to deliver the assault before the enemy force can deploy or reinforce its engaged forces.
Commanders may order an attack from a march column. They can also wait to attack until they can deploy
forward the bulk of their main body. They avoid piecemeal commitment, except when rapid action is
essential, their units have combat superiority and can maintain that superiority throughout their attacks, or
when the terrain forces that COA.
4-46. Units attempting an envelopment focus on attacking the enemy force’s flanks and rear before the
enemy force can prepare to counter these actions. They use security forces to fix enemy forces while their
main bodies maneuver to look for an assailable flank. Alternatively, they use their main body to fix the enemy
force while their reserve finds an assailable flank.
4-47. If the enemy force is not rapidly defeated, commanders have three options: bypass, transition to a
deliberate attack, or conduct a defense. In all cases, they make every effort to retain the initiative by
conducting violent and resolute attacks and preventing enemy forces from countering them. Simultaneously,
units maintain momentum by synchronizing the actions of friendly maneuver, functional and multifunctional
support, and sustainment elements.
Follow Through
4-48. After a successful attack, friendly forces either continue movement to their final objective or they
conduct a hasty defense to consolidate and reorganize before continuing. If the location of the enemy main
body is still unclear and friendly forces have not reached their limit of advance, the unit resumes their
movement to contact.
VARIATIONS FOR A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
4-49. Movement to contact has two variations: search and attack and cordon and search. Paragraphs 4-50
through 4-82 further discuss these variations.
SEARCH AND ATTACK
4-50. Search and attack is a variation of a movement to contact where a friendly force conducts
coordinated attacks to defeat a distributed enemy force. Units employ this variation of a movement to |
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contact when enemy forces are operating as small, dispersed elements, and the units cannot target them by
any methods other than a physical search. Units may also use a search and attack when the task is to deny
enemy forces the ability to move within a given area. Primarily, dismounted infantry forces conduct a search
and attack. Armored, mechanized, and Stryker-equipped forces often support dismounted infantry
performing this task. A search and attack often occurs during the conduct of irregular warfare. However, it
may also be necessary when conducting noncontiguous operations during combat operations and
consolidating gains.
4-51. All echelons can conduct search and attack operations. However, a division rarely conducts search and
attack operations simultaneously throughout its assigned area. BCTs, maneuver battalions, and companies
normally conduct search and attack operations. BCTs assist their subordinate maneuver battalions conducting
a search and attack by ensuring the availability of indirect fires and other support.
Organization of Forces for a Search and Attack
4-52. Commander’s task-organize into reconnaissance, fixing, and finishing forces, each with a specific task
and purpose. Alternatively, all units can be involved in the reconnaissance effort with individual subordinate
elements performing the fixing and finishing functions based on the situation.
4-53. Commanders base the size of their reconnaissance forces on available information about the size of
enemy forces in their assigned areas, and the size of these assigned areas in terms of the geography and the
size of the civilian population. The more uncertainty that exists within a situation, the larger the
reconnaissance force. A reconnaissance force typically consists of scout, infantry, aviation, and
electromagnetic warfare assets. A fixing force must have enough combat power to isolate enemy forces once
the reconnaissance force finds them. The finishing force is normally the main body of that echelon. It must
have enough combat power to defeat the enemy forces expected within its assigned area. Commanders can
direct subordinate units to retain their own finishing force, or they can retain direct control of the finishing
force. Units may also rotate subordinate elements through the reconnaissance, fixing, and finishing roles.
However, rotating roles may require a change in task organization and additional time for training and
rehearsal.
Control Measures for a Search and Attack
4-54. Units establish control measures that allow decentralized action and small-unit initiative to the greatest
extent possible. Figure 4-3 on page 4-10 depicts the minimum control measures for a search and attack which
include an assigned area, target reference points (TRPs), objectives, checkpoints, and contact points. The use
of target reference points facilitates responsive fire support upon making contact with enemy forces. They
use objectives and checkpoints to guide the movement of subordinate elements. They use other control
measures, such as phase lines and named areas of interest (NAIs), as necessary. (Appendix A discusses these
common control measures.) |
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Figure 4-3. Search and attack control measures
Planning a Search and Attack
4-55. Units conduct a search and attack for one or more of the following purposes:
* Destroy enemy forces: render enemy forces in an assigned area combat ineffective.
* Deny the area: prevent enemy forces from operating unhindered in a given area, for example, in
any area that the enemy is using for a base camp or for logistics support.
* Protect the force: prevent enemy forces from massing to disrupt or destroy friendly military or
civilian operations, equipment, property, and facilities.
* Collect information: gain information about enemy forces and the terrain to confirm the enemy
COA predicted by the IPB process.
The products of the IPB process are critical to conducting a search and attack. They focus the force’s
reconnaissance efforts on likely enemy locations.
4-56. The search and attack plan places the finishing force, as the main effort, where it can best maneuver to
destroy enemy forces or essential facilities once located by reconnaissance assets. Typically, the finishing
force occupies a central location in an assigned area. However, the terrain may allow units to position their
finishing forces outside search and attack areas. Commanders weight their main effort by using priority of
fires and assigning priorities of support to available combat enablers, such as engineer elements and
helicopter lift support. Units establish control measures as necessary to consolidate and reorganize and
concentrate the combat power of the force before the attack. Once a reconnaissance force locates an enemy
force, fixing and finishing forces can destroy it. Units also develop contingency plans in the event of the
compromise of their reconnaissance force.
4-57. Fire support plans must provide flexible and rapidly delivered fires to achieve their commander’s
desired effects throughout an assigned area. Units position fire support assets so they can support subordinate
elements throughout their assigned areas. They must establish procedures for rapidly clearing fires. To clear |
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fires rapidly, command posts and small-unit commanders track and report the locations of all subordinate
elements. Because of the uncertain enemy situation, units assign clear fire support relationships.
Executing a Search and Attack
4-58. Each subordinate element operating in its own assigned area searches for and attacks enemy forces
within its capability. Units may enter an assigned area by infiltrating as an entire unit and then splitting out
or by infiltrating as smaller units via ground, air, or water. Units should use previously established control
measures and communications means between any closing elements to prevent fratricide and friendly fire
incidents. The reconnaissance force conducts an area reconnaissance to reconnoiter identified named areas
of interests.
4-59. Once the reconnaissance force finds enemy forces, the fixing force develops the situation and executes
one of two options based on the commander’s guidance and the mission variables. The first option is to block
identified routes that the detected enemy forces can use to escape or employ reinforcements. The fixing force
maintains contact with enemy forces and positions to isolate and fix enemy forces before the finishing force
attacks. The second option is to conduct an attack to fix enemy forces in their current positions until the
finishing force arrives. The fixing force attacks if it meets the commander’s intent and if it can generate
sufficient combat power against detected enemy forces. Units may need to position the fixing force before
the reconnaissance force enters an assigned area, depending on the enemy force’s mobility and the probability
of the compromise of the reconnaissance force.
4-60. BCTs (and possibly battalions) may establish fire support bases to provide fire support coverage
throughout an assigned area during search and attack operations in complex terrain. These positions should
be mutually supporting and prepared for all around defense. Fire support bases are also located in positions
that facilitate aerial resupply. The development of these positions depends on the mission variables because
their establishment requires diverting combat power to protect assets in these fire support bases.
4-61. If conditions are not right to use the finishing force or main body to attack detected enemy forces, the
reconnaissance or the fixing force can continue to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities to
develop the situation further. Whenever this occurs, the force maintaining surveillance must be careful to
avoid detection and possible enemy ambushes.
4-62. The finishing force or main body may move behind the reconnaissance and fixing forces, or it may
locate at a pickup zone and conduct air assault movement into a landing zone near enemy forces, once enemy
forces are located. The finishing force or main body must be responsive enough to engage enemy forces
before they can break contact with the reconnaissance force or the fixing force. The echelon intelligence
officer provides the commander with an estimate of the time it takes enemy forces to displace from their
locations. The commander provides additional mobility assets, so the finishing force or main body can
respond within that timeframe.
4-63. Units use their finishing force or main body to destroy detected and fixed enemy forces during a search
and attack by conducting hasty or deliberate attacks. One unit maneuvers to block enemy escape routes while
another unit conducts the attack, or units employ indirect fire or close air support to destroy enemy forces.
Units may have the finishing force or main body establish area ambushes and use the reconnaissance and
fixing forces to drive enemy forces into the ambushes.
CORDON AND SEARCH
4-64. The second variation to conduct a movement to contact is cordon and search. Cordon and search is a
variation of movement to contact where a friendly force isolates and searches a target area. Typically,
units execute cordon and searches to capture or destroy possible enemy forces and contraband. Cordon and
search operations take place throughout the range of military operations. Generally, cordon and search are
conducted during stability operations or situations where the likelihood of large-scale organized violence is
unlikely. Units conducting a cordon and search organize their subordinate units into four elements—
command, security, search or assault, and support. The security element must be large enough to establish
both an inner and an outer cordon around the target area of the search. In that regard, cordon and search
operations are similar to encirclements. Maneuver battalions and lower echelons normally conduct cordons
and searches. |
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4-65. Cordon and search operations occur in five phases: reconnaissance, movement to the objective, cordon
establishment, search, and retrograde. These phases are descriptive of a cordon and search and are not
prescriptive.
4-66. The reconnaissance phase is initiated upon receipt of mission and continues throughout the planning
process. Planners conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield, develop a scheme of maneuver, and
refine the plan. The friendly force performs the necessary reconnaissance to gain information and complete
the plan. A complete order is issued, allowing time for leaders to develop subordinate plans and conduct
rehearsals. The planning phase ends when rehearsals, pre-combat checks, and inspections are complete, and
the unit crosses the LD.
4-67. Movement to the objective area occurs as a single unit or in separate serials sequenced along differing
routes. Leaders consider terrain and threat assessments to determine appropriate movement formations and
techniques. The movement phase ends when the security element reaches its release point and begins
establishing the cordon.
4-68. Establishing a cordon entails emplacing an outer and inner cordon, simultaneously or sequentially. The
cordon is considered established when the objective area is isolated, and it continues until the force
commences retrograde. Leaders consider allocating priority of intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance,
fires, and nonlethal assets to the cordon element once the cordon is established.
4-69. Clearing the objective area and searching target areas occur once the objective area is isolated. Forces
may undertake additional activity after the objective is clear, including tactical questioning, site exploitation,
providing medical attention to local nationals, communicating with local leaders, and conducting other
influence activities. The amount of time spent at an objective area depends on factors including the size of
the objective, the number of adversaries to vet, the amount of material of likely intelligence-value present,
the presence of explosive hazards, and the size and augmentation of the search element.
4-70. The enemy may force cordon and search operations, or a unit may execute them voluntarily. A
retrograde is a transitional operation; it is not conducted in isolation. Stay-behind reconnaissance forces may
be employed to observe activity for a period after the cordon and search force departs the objective area.
Retrograde is not complete until all personnel, including stay-behind forces, arrive in the designated assembly
area. Retrograde is the most vulnerable phase of cordon and search operations, possibly rife with personnel
accountability issues and interdiction by enemy forces along anticipated retrograde routes. Leaders strongly
consider using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and joint fires assets to support the retrograde.
(See Chapter 11 for additional information on retrograde operations.)
Principles for a Cordon and Search
4-71. The principles of cordon and search are comprehensive and fundamental rules to guide battalions. The
principles are not a checklist. While the commander considers these principles, they do not apply in the same
way to every situation. Instead, the principles summarize characteristics of successful cordon and search
operations. For the unit, the value in these principles lies in analyzing a pending operation while
synchronizing efforts and determining if or when to deviate from the principles based on the current situation.
The nine principles of cordon and search are—
* Speed.
* Surprise.
* Isolation.
* Proper target identification.
* Timeliness.
* Accountability.
* Minimization of collateral damage.
* Detailed search.
* Legitimacy. |
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Methods of Cordon and Search
4-72. Units have two methods for conducting a cordon and search: cordon and knock and cordon and enter.
The primary difference in methods is the level of force required to gain access to the target. In a cordon and
knock, the search element requests or demands access to the target. In a cordon and enter, the search element
accesses the target by force. Regardless of the method, search elements must be prepared to escalate force
appropriately to gain access to the target. Leaders consider the terminal effects of fires and ensure friendly
location awareness to prevent fratricide and limit collateral damage to the greatest extent possible.
Control Measures for Cordon and Search
4-73. Control measures useful for conducting cordon and search include—
* Assembly area.
* Line of departure.
* Checkpoints.
* Contact points.
* Objectives.
* Rally points.
* Phase lines.
* Routes.
* Restricted fire line.
Planning a Cordon and Search
4-74. During planning (includes preparation) and reconnaissance, mission analysis is conducted through
either the MDMP or troop leading procedures process, focusing on the task and purpose, intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (identification of target and target areas), and tentative scheme of maneuver.
Detailed direct fire plans serve as risk mitigation measures to prevent fratricide between clearing elements
and the cordon. Support forces external to the battalion are task-organized and warning orders are issued. As
planning serves to focus the information collection effort by identifying what to look for and where to look
for it, reconnaissance helps to refine the planning process by answering through collection, information
requirements, and priority intelligence requirements. Although the plan is continually updated with
reconnaissance and surveillance throughout the operation, this phase ends with the unit issuing the completed
order, conducting final rehearsals and inspections, and crossing the LD.
Preparing a Cordon and Search
4-75. The level of rehearsal and extent of participation depend upon the time available and the physical
location of participants. Rehearsals may be full or reduced force. Multiple rehearsal types and techniques
may be used in preparation for a mission. For example, confirmation briefs and backbriefs may be required
following the issuance of an operation order, and a map rehearsal may be conducted via remote
communications equipment or in person once subordinate elements have completed their plans.
4-76. Rehearsals should address non-mission-specific tasks and mission-specific execution details and be
more than a mere discussion of what is supposed to happen. Effective rehearsals test subordinate
understanding of key activities, including the spatial relationships and timing of key actions; contingencies;
communication; and purpose, priorities, allocation, and resourcing of support. Leaders normally issue
rehearsal guidance via published warning orders.
4-77. Non-mission-specific task rehearsals might include—
* Battle drills and other standard operating procedures, such as assaulting a building or reacting to
enemy contact.
* Breaching obstacles and doorways.
* Search techniques (such as individual, vehicle, and room).
* Detainee and captured materiel handling and processing.
* Tactical callout. |
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4-78. Mission-specific execution activity rehearsals might include—
* Emplacing inner and outer cordons.
* Target area clearance.
* Retrograde from the objective area.
Executing a Cordon and Search
4-79. The execution of the cordon may be executed sequentially or simultaneously using single or
multidirectional ingress routes. The methods may be used alone or combined. For example, the outer cordon
position may be occupied sequentially via a single ingress route followed by a sequential occupation of the
inner cordon positions via a single ingress route. Figure 4-4 depicts the symbol for a cordon and search.
4-80. The search element prepares to move to the target area during cordon emplacement. The search and
assault element movement to the target area may be simultaneous, nearly simultaneous, or sequential in
relation to the cordon emplacement.
Figure 4-4. Cordon and search symbol
4-81. When combined, the outer cordon positions may be occupied simultaneously from multidirectional
ingress routes, followed by a sequential occupation of the inner cordon positions via a single ingress route.
Figure 4-5 depicts inner and outer cordons for a battalion level cordon and search. |
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Figure 4-5. Example inner and outer cordons
4-82. Considerations for each cordon and search technique follow:
* In a sequential occupation, the security element successively occupies inner and outer cordon
positions. This occupation allows for ease of control and simplicity of maneuver but accepts the
risk that an alert adversary may have an opportunity to react or escape the target area.
* In a simultaneous occupation, the security element occupies cordon positions simultaneously (or
near simultaneously). This occupation achieves tactical surprise in the objective and target areas
and reduces the opportunity for an adversary to react or escape the target area.
* Using a single ingress route, the cordon and search force moves to the objective area in a column
along a single route or from a single landing zone until elements reach designated release points.
Using a single ingress route maximizes control but increases the time required to isolate the
objective area and offers an adversary the opportunity to more easily delay joint force access to
the objective area.
* Using multidirectional ingress routes, the cordon and search force moves to the objective area
from multiple directions using multiple routes or landing zones. Using multidirectional ingress
routes enables simultaneous occupation of outer cordon positions and rapid isolation of the
objective area. However, this technique requires detailed time and distance analysis to synchronize
cordon and search force arrival in the objective area; increases C2 complexity; and dilutes
concentration of combat power during movement to the objective area.
TRANSITIONS
4-83. If the enemy force is not rapidly defeated, commanders have three options: bypass, transition to a
deliberate attack, or conduct a defense. In all cases, commanders make every effort to retain the initiative by
conducting violent and resolute attacks and preventing enemy forces from countering them. Simultaneously, |
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units maintain momentum by synchronizing the actions of friendly maneuver, functional and multifunctional
support, and sustainment elements.
TRANSITION TO AN ATTACK
4-84. The decision to conduct a hasty or deliberate operation is based on the commander’s current knowledge
of the enemy situation and assessment of whether the assets available (to include time) and the means to
coordinate and synchronize those assets are adequate to accomplish the mission. If assets and means are
lacking, the unit takes additional time to plan and prepare for the operation or bring additional forces to bear
on the problem. The commander makes that choice in an environment of uncertainty, which always entails
some risk. Ongoing improvements in command and control systems continue to assist in the development of
a common operational picture of friendly and enemy forces while facilitating decision making and
communicating decisions to friendly forces.
TRANSITION TO A DEFENSE
4-85. Some transitions require friendly forces to transition into a defense. If the movement to contact does
not defeat the enemy force or the friendly force has lost, then friendly forces get a different momentum. This
changed momentum may dictate the transition into the defense. Friendly forces may lose their momentum
and transition from a movement to contact to a defense for several reasons:
* The size, location, and composition of the enemy is significantly different than what was
templated, and the friendly force risks destruction if they continue the movement to contact.
* If directed by their higher headquarters during planning. For example, if the unit was directed to
conduct a movement to contact to a specified phase line and arrive without meeting the enemy
then a hasty defense is needed to hold the terrain gained until directed to move on.
* Friendly forces outrun their logistics and risk culmination.
* Friendly combat losses prevent the unit from continuing to advance.
* The loss of external assets within range to support the continued advance of friendly forces.
4-86. If friendly forces lose momentum, the commander decides when to transition to a defense. The
commander must utilize all information available; especially combat power against combat ratios to make
this decision. See Part Three for execution of the defense. |
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Attack
This chapter addresses those considerations unique to an attack. The general offensive
considerations discussed in chapter 3 continue to apply. This chapter addresses the
general considerations, organization of forces, common control measures, planning,
preparation, execution considerations, and the four variations of an attack.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ATTACK
5-1. An attack is a type of offensive operation that defeats enemy forces, seizes terrain, or secures terrain.
An attack masses the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of an enemy force
with a tempo and intensity that the enemy force cannot match. Attacking units seek positions of advantage
and deliberately synchronize their combined arms teams.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR AN ATTACK
5-2. Commander’s task-organize their forces to give each unit enough combat power to accomplish its
mission once the commander determines their schemes of maneuver. Units normally organize their forces
into a security force, a main body, and a reserve, all supported by sustainment organizations. The best place
and time for an attacking force to task-organize is when it is in an assembly area. This allows units to complete
any changes in task organization in time to conduct rehearsals with their attached and supporting elements.
FORWARD SECURITY FORCE
5-3. While planning and preparing for operations, units have a security force to their front. Upon initiating
movement toward their objective, they place a reconnaissance and security force to their front to identify
enemy locations, dispositions, and strengths. These forces also confirm trafficability of axes of advance and
cross-mobility corridors. They also destroy (within capabilities) as much of the enemy in the disruption zone
as possible, enabling the main body to focus on the enemy in the battle zone. Units only resource dedicated
flank or rear security forces during an attack if the attack uncovers one or more flank or the rear of the
attacking force as they advance. Commanders designate flank or rear security forces and assign them a guard
or screen mission, depending on the mission variables. Attacking forces should maintain a forward security
element. The size of the forward security element is based upon if the friendly force has gained and
maintained visual contact of the enemy.
MAIN BODY
5-4. Units organize their main bodies into combined arms formations to conduct their main and supporting
efforts. They aim their main effort towards decisive points. Decisive points can consist of the immediate
destruction of selected enemy forces, the enemy force’s capability to resist, seizure of terrain objectives, or
the defeat of the enemy force’s plan. Units’ schemes of maneuver identify the focus of their main effort. All
their forces’ available resources operate in concert to ensure the success of the main effort. The subordinate
unit or units designated to conduct the main effort can change during the course of the attacks. Units designate
assault, breach, and support forces if they expect to conduct breaching operations during their attack.
5-5. Units retain flexibility by arranging their forces in depth, retaining strong reserves, and maintaining
centralized control of long-range fire support systems. Units focus their available resources to support their
main efforts achievement of its objective. Units cannot allow enemy actions, minor changes in the situation,
or the lack of success by other supporting efforts to divert combat power from the main effort. |
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5-6. Commanders may need to designate one or more of their units to conduct supporting efforts to create
windows of opportunity for executing their main effort. They use the minimal combat power necessary to
accomplish their missions, since overwhelming combat power cannot be employed everywhere. Units
conducting supporting efforts usually have a wider assigned area than those conducting the main effort.
Commanders can assign the tasks of follow and assume or follow and support to subordinate units.
RESERVE
5-7. The strength and composition of the reserve vary with the mission variables, the form of maneuver,
and the risk accepted. In an attack, the combat power allocated to the reserve depends primarily on the level
of uncertainty about enemy forces, especially the strength of any expected enemy counterattacks. For
example, in a hasty attack a reserve can contain up to one third of a force’s combat power. Alternatively,
units size their reserve to defeat their enemy’s projected available counterattack forces in deliberate attacks.
They should not constitute their reserves by weakening their main effort. A reserve requires mobility equal
to or greater than the most dangerous enemy ground threat, and it should be able to counter that threat. See
paragraphs 1-94 through 1-100 more information on a reserve.
COMMON CONTROL MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH AN ATTACK
5-8. A higher echelon commander assigns the area to units conducting offensive actions within which they
operate. Within these assigned areas, units at a minimum designate these control measures:
* A phase line as the LD, which may also be the line of contact (LC).
* The time to initiate the operation.
* The objective.
If necessary, a commander can assign an area (zone or area of operations) or use axis of advance, direction
of attack, routes, or additional phase lines to further control maneuver forces. Figure 5-1 depicts common
control measures associated with an attack.
Figure 5-1. Example of attack control measures
5-9. Units can use any other control measures necessary to control an attack. Short of the LD, units may
designate assembly areas and attack positions where they prepare for offensive actions or wait for established
required conditions to initiate the attack. Beyond the LD, units may designate checkpoints, PLs, probable |
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lines of deployment (PLDs), assault positions, direct fire control measures, and indirect fire support
coordination measures (FSCMs). Between the PLD and the objective, units can use a final coordination line
(FCL), assault positions, support by fire and attack by fire positions, and a time of assault to further control
the final stage of their attacks. Beyond the objective, commanders can impose a LOA if they do not want
their units to conduct exploitation or a pursuit or template where they want their forces to position after the
completion of the attack such as a battle position or blocking position.
5-10. Units increase control over the movement of all attacking elements in attacks during limited visibility
conditions. Typically, they impose additional control measures beyond those used in daylight attacks. These
additional measures may include using a PD and a direction of attack.
PLANNING FOR AN ATTACK
5-11. In an attack, units seek to keep enemy forces off balance while continually reducing the enemy force’s
options. Friendly forces seek to place enemy forces into a position where they can easily be defeated or
destroyed. Friendly forces focus effects on enemy forces that seek to prevent the unit from accomplishing its
mission and seizing its objective. Planning helps commanders synchronize the effects of combat power
through the MDMP and troop leading procedures.
5-12. Units focus the effects of friendly systems to achieve fire superiority and allow their maneuver forces
to breach enemy defensive networks. A friendly force must gain and maintain fire superiority at critical points
during an attack. The unit uses long-range artillery systems (cannon and rockets) and air support (rotary- and
fixed-wing) to engage the enemy throughout the depth of the enemy’s defensive positions. The warfighting
functions provide a model of how units organize and employ the force to ensure all capabilities of the force
are synchronized in time and maneuver space during an attack.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
5-13. Commanders assign subordinate units their missions and use control measures necessary to
synchronize and maintain control over the operation. Units plan to control the attack by determining the
methods through command posts and signal assets and use graphic control measures (such as probable line
of contact and enemy trigger lines) to manage the attack. They also control the attack by stating the desired
effect of fires on the enemy weapons system such as suppression or destruction using previously developed
enemy situational and weapons templates. Units match friendly weapon systems against selected enemy
systems to determine the PLD as they array subordinate elements to shape the battlefield. They determine
how long it takes subordinates to move from the LD to the PLD and any required support by fire positions
once they determine their respective PLDs. They establish when and where their forces must maneuver into
enemy direct fire range.
5-14. In addition to accomplishing the mission, every attack plan contains provisions for exploiting success
or any advantages that may arise during the operation. Units exploit success by aggressively executing their
plans, promoting subordinate leader initiative, and rapidly executing battle drills.
5-15. Information systems offer ways that units can gain and maintain enemy contact. Units enhance shared
situational understanding by developing SOPs that govern the COP. Information systems improve the rapid,
clear communication of orders and commander’s intent, thereby reducing the confusion and friction of battle.
This is especially true when the lowest tactical echelons can rapidly update the data on the information
systems providing that common operational picture. The disposition and activities of friendly and enemy
forces and third-party agencies are important elements of information. Service and joint intelligence systems
feeding those information systems enable commanders and echelon staffs to detect and track enemy forces
without having subordinate forces make physical contact with enemy forces. The ability to see and
understand the situation before enemy forces do allows friendly forces to act first and maneuver out of direct
contact with enemy forces at a high tempo. These abilities allow units to position their subordinate forces
where those forces can overwhelm selected elements of the enemy force. This disrupts and destroys the
enemy’s combined arms team. Such attacks—delivered simultaneously with precision by air, land, maritime,
space, and cyberspace systems throughout the width, height, and depth of the battlefield—can stun enemy
forces and rapidly lead to their defeat. |
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MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
5-16. Units seek to surprise enemy forces through movement and maneuver by choosing an unexpected
direction, time, type, or strength for the attack. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuses
enemy command and control systems, induces psychological shock in enemy forces, and reduces the
coherence of the enemy defense. Units can achieve tactical surprise by attacking in bad weather and over
seemingly impassible terrain, conducting feints and demonstrations, and maintaining a high tempo, thereby
destroying enemy forces. All of which is enhanced by the effective employment of OPSEC. For example, a
unit in extremely hilly or mountainous terrain may consider transporting dismounted infantry forces to the
heights and have them maneuver down the terrain. Units may plan different attack times for their main and
supporting efforts to mislead enemy forces and allow the shifting of supporting fires to successive attacking
echelons. However, simultaneous attacks provide a means to maximize the effects of mass in the initial
assault. Simultaneous attacks also prevent enemy forces from concentrating defensive fires against
successive attacks.
5-17. Commanders and their subordinate leaders focus on the routes and formations their units use to traverse
the terrain from the LD or PD to the objective during the planning process. Some locations may require
attacking units to change formation, direction of movement, or movement technique when they reach those
locations. Units designate contact points at critical locations to ensure coordination between adjacent units.
5-18. Units attack targets throughout the depth of the enemy’s defense to keep the enemy force off balance
and limit enemy freedom of action. However, for the main effort, units concentrate the effects of
overwhelming combat power to shatter the cohesion of the enemy force’s defense. Units accomplish this by
applying combat power against enemy forces at a level of violence and in a manner that enemy forces cannot
match. For example, a battalion commander can mass an Army combined arms battalion’s firepower and
rapid advancement against an enemy rifle company’s hastily prepared defensive position.
INTELLIGENCE
5-19. Commanders require information on an enemy force’s organization, equipment, and tactics to
determine the appropriate employment of unit and system capabilities and tactics. They need to understand
an enemy force’s strengths and weaknesses. Units develop threat courses of action and enemy situational
templates based on analysis of all available combat information and intelligence. These products address both
conventional and unconventional threats and are useful in determining the feasibility of available COAs.
Ideally, this knowledge is available early in the planning phase.
5-20. Units conduct information collection activities before they attack. Information requirements can
include—
* The location and depth of enemy reserves.
* The location and extent of obstacles, potential breach sites, enemy engagement areas, and
contaminated areas.
* The location of areas where attacking units can become disoriented, such as rough or restrictive
terrain.
* The most favorable routes of approach to the attack objective.
* Areas that attack forces can use for flanking fire and maneuver, such as support by fire and attack
by fire positions.
* Suitability of planned friendly assault, artillery, and sustainment positions.
* Enemy deception operations.
* Current and future weather impacts to operations.
* Anything that requires a commander’s decision.
Commanders and leaders at all echelons personally participate in this process.
5-21. Units take every opportunity to gain and refine combat information regarding enemy forces. They
employ information collection assets to gather combat information and process it into intelligence.
Information gathered during the planning phase is especially useful in determining the viability of each COA
developed. Generally, units cannot conduct deliberate attacks if they do not know the location of most of the |
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defending enemy force’s units and systems. If that is the case, units must conduct a movement to contact or
spend more time collecting information.
5-22. Units collect information through reconnaissance; this information is analyzed and combined with
other available information to become intelligence. Units employ reconnaissance over a broad area that
allows their reconnaissance elements to identify enemy weaknesses to exploit and identify enemy strengths
to avoid. Units exploit the situation by choosing COAs that allow their main effort to attack enemy
weaknesses and penetrate identified gaps in an enemy force’s defense. Commanders can then commit their
forces to widen the gap and envelop enemy forces. Their reconnaissance elements continue to move, seeking
paths of least resistance and pulling their main bodies deep into the enemy force’s rear.
5-23. Once friendly reconnaissance elements gain contact with enemy forces, they develop the situation. If
the objective is an enemy force, the reconnaissance element orients on it to maintain contact and determine
as much as possible about its dispositions.
5-24. Units ensure reconnaissance and surveillance of enemy defensive positions and terrain critical to their
schemes of maneuver continue throughout their attacks. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets can detect
attempts by enemy forces to modify their defenses. In turn, this allows units to adjust their schemes of
maneuver as the enemy situation becomes clearer. They can use human and technological means, acting
separately or in combination, to provide the required degree of reconnaissance and surveillance.
FIRES
5-25. The planning process synchronizes the unit’s maneuver with the provision of fire support. It must
identify critical times and places where units need the maximum effects from their fire support assets. This
planning considers existing limitations on employing fires, such as weapon ranges, presence of friendly
forces within the assigned area, desired conditions of subsequent phases, rules of engagement and positive
identification requirements, and requirements for collateral damage assessments. Units combine movement
with fires to mass effects, achieve surprise, destroy enemy forces, and obtain decisive results. Each
commander’s guidance identifies fire support tasks that supporting fires organizations must accomplish to
support the scheme of maneuver. Throughout planning, units develop various targeting products to support
fire support execution. These include a high-payoff target list, target selection standards, and an attack
guidance matrix. The purpose of these products is to ensure the efficient and effective application of fire
support that supports the scheme of maneuver. (See FM 3-09 for more information on fire support task
development and targeting products.)
5-26. Units emphasize accomplishing simple and rapidly integrated fire support plans using quick fire
planning techniques and SOPs. They integrate their fire assets as far forward as possible in unit movement
formations to facilitate the early emplacement of those assets. Friendly forces concentrate fires on forward
enemy elements to enable maneuver efforts to close with enemy positions. Fires can isolate forward enemy
elements by using long-range fires, air support, and electromagnetic warfare.
5-27. Fire support facilitates the attacking units’ maneuver by destroying or neutralizing strong enemy forces
and positions. Fire support systems take full advantage of available preparation time to achieve these
demanding effects criteria. Fire plans feature the following characteristics:
* Target locations confirmed or denied by information collection efforts.
* Designation of target sensor to shooter communication links.
* Possible use of preparation and deception fires to shape an enemy force’s defense.
* Air support to destroy high-payoff targets.
* Proactive suppression of enemy air defense efforts.
* Preparation fires that shift just as the maneuver force arrives on the objective.
* A suppression and obscuration fire plan to support operations.
* Pre-positioned ammunition backed by prepackaged munitions stocks capable of rapid delivery.
* Integration of nonlethal effects, such as electromagnetic attack and military information support
operations, into the attack guidance matrix.
* Integration of primary and backup observers to engage high-payoff targets. |
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* FSCMs—accounting for danger close and other technical constraints—allow maneuver forces to
get as close as possible to the objective before lifting fires.
* Signals for lifting and shifting fires on the objective.
* Do not dilute fire support capabilities to the extent they are unable to concentrate in support of the
main effort.
* Plan for echelonment of fires.
* Maximize use of organic fires.
SUSTAINMENT
5-28. Units prioritize their sustainment operations to support their attacking forces. They prioritize
sustainment support by designating who has priority for resupply combined with task-organizing capabilities
(for example, shifting fuel tankers and operators from one unit to another). Prioritization weights the main
effort by ensuring the right forces have the required supplies and equipment to accomplish the most important
tasks.
5-29. Lines of communication typically increase during attacks. Therefore, units consider forward
positioning sustainment assets to increase their operational reach and flexibility. Units also consider the
availability and feasibility of using aerial assets to augment ground-based sustainment operations. This
includes the ability to execute aerial resupply and aerial medical evacuation. Units must not assume the
friendly forces possess air supremacy or air superiority which may preclude the use of aerial assets to execute
sustainment operations.
5-30. Units must balance positioning supporting sustainment assets forward to support the attacking force
with maintaining force protection. Forward positioning sustainment assets can create a risk. If the enemy is
able to target and destroy these assets, then they may force the culmination of friendly operations prior to
their success. Commanders need to balance account for this risk when considering the placement of
sustainment assets during an attack. From these forward locations, units can sustain attacking forces and
when applicable, shift priority of support to the units conducting the main effort. As attacking forces advance,
their supporting sustainment units and capabilities displace forward as required to shorten supply lines, using
displacement techniques designed to ensure uninterrupted support to maneuver units.
PROTECTION
5-31. Prioritization of protection tasks is vital to supporting an attack, however the prioritization will vary
by echelon based on the resources and capabilities available. The mission variables guide the priorities or
protection tasks and resources. Protections tasks that support the attack include but are not limited to: OPSEC,
detention operations, CBRN operations, survivability operations, area security, and air and missile defense.
PREPARING FOR AN ATTACK
5-32. Even in fluid situations, attacks are best organized and coordinated in assembly areas. Units may opt
not to use assembly areas if they determine that rapid action is essential to retain tactical advantages. Detailed
advance planning—combined with digital communications, SOPs, and battle drills—may reduce negative
impacts of such a decision.
5-33. Attacking units move into their assembly areas during the preparation phase unless they are already
located in their assembly area. They move with as much secrecy as possible, normally at night and along
routes that prevent or degrade an enemy force’s capabilities to observe or detect their movement. They avoid
congesting their assembly areas and occupy those areas for the minimum possible time. Units are responsible
for their own protection activities, such as local ground security, while in their assembly areas.
5-34. Attacking units continue priorities of work to the extent the situation and mission allow before moving
to attack positions. Preparations include but are not necessarily limited to—
* Protecting the force.
* Task-organizing.
* Performing reconnaissance. |
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* Refining the plan.
* Briefing the troops.
* Pre-combat checks.
* Pre-combat inspections.
* Moving logistics and medical support forward.
* Conducting rehearsals.
* Promoting adequate rest for both leaders and Soldiers.
* Positioning the force for subsequent action.
5-35. Leaders at all levels conduct a reconnaissance of the actual terrain when this does not compromise
OPSEC or result in excessive risk. In some areas, geospatial intelligence databases can enable leaders to
conduct a virtual reconnaissance when a physical reconnaissance is not practical. Leaders should also
reconnoiter the terrain at night when preparing for a limited-visibility attack.
5-36. A thorough reconnaissance of the objective, its foreground, and other enemy positions is a critical part
of attack preparation. Units exploit all available information collection assets to provide commanders
necessary information. This includes requesting joint surveillance feeds of enemy movements from higher
echelons or imagery of enemy obstacles.
5-37. Reconnaissance forces infiltrate through the enemy disruption zone to conduct a zone or area
reconnaissance. They can employ precision munitions and conventional indirect fires to destroy detected
enemy outposts while remaining undetected. They locate and attempt to infiltrate the enemy’s main defensive
positions to confirm enemy unit dispositions. When properly task-organized, units may also give forces
conducting reconnaissance the mission to conduct covert breaches in the enemy force’s obstacle complexes
to facilitate rapid movement of their parent units’ decisive or shaping operations.
5-38. Units exercise and refine their schemes of maneuver and fires during rehearsals. These rehearsals are
an important part of ensuring their plans’ coordination and synchronization. Commanders review the
anticipated battle sequence with subordinate leaders to ensure all units understand the plan, the relationship
between fire and movement, and the synchronization of critical events as part of their rehearsal process.
Sample critical events to focus on at rehearsals include—
* Execution triggers.
* Moving from assembly areas to individual unit LDs.
* Maneuvering from the LD to the PLD.
* Occupying support by fire positions.
* Conducting a breach or gap crossing (as appropriate).
* Assaulting the objective.
* Consolidating on the objective.
* Exploiting success or pursuing a withdrawing enemy.
* Actions of echelon reserves.
Units must also conduct separate, stand-alone warfighting function rehearsals such as sustainment, fires, and
C2 as necessary. The rehearsals should account any adverse conditions that are possible which would provide
time to identify and prepare them to cope with problems. These rehearsals include battle drills, such as
breaching minefields at lower tactical echelons.
5-39. From their assembly areas, attacking units move to their attack positions. (See figure 5-2 on page 5-8.)
Units move from assembly areas to the attack positions in the same way as for any other tactical movement.
The number of columns each unit employs in its movement depends on the availability of suitable routes and
the friendly and enemy situation. The tactical situation and the order in which commanders want subordinate
units to arrive at their attack positions governs the march formation. The LD facilitates the simultaneous
initiation of the attack at the prescribed time by all attacking units. |
3-90 | 126 | Chapter 5
Figure 5-2. Example control measures for movement from assembly area to attack position
5-40. Dismounted infantry units move by tactical vehicles to the maximum extent possible prior to the arrival
of identified dismount points to avoid prematurely exhausting their Soldiers. However, dismounted infantry
forces should not travel too far forward in tactical vehicles. Enemy forces can detect the noise and other
battlefield signatures associated with using tactical vehicles at a greater distance than they can detect
dismounted infantry Soldiers. An enemy force will probably respond to friendly tactical vehicles with direct
and indirect fire systems. Units weigh the need for security against the time required to conduct a foot march
and its resulting effects on their Soldiers’ physical stamina.
5-41. Units move rapidly through their attack positions and across LDs controlled by friendly forces. Units
use their designated attack positions only as needed. For example, it is a place they refuel before crossing the
LD to ensure sufficient fuel to reach the objective. Units use attack positions when friendly conditions have
not yet been set. Units should minimize the time they remain stationary in their attack positions. Generally,
units should initiate actions to protect themselves and increase their survivability every 10 to 15 minutes.
This includes such things as deploying local security, deploying camouflage nets, and starting the
construction of fighting and survivability positions. Units can use quartering parties to assist in occupying
their attack positions.
5-42. Commanders may designate points of departure for their attacking units instead of an LD for units
attacking on foot using infiltration and stealth. Armored and Stryker units normally use gaps or lanes through
friendly positions to allow them to deploy into movement formations before they cross the LD.
5-43. Preliminary operations for an attack may include using preparation fire and the relief of units in contact
by executing a relief in place or a forward passage of lines. The relief of units may be desirable to continue
the momentum of the attack with fresh troops, change the direction of the attack, exploit a weakness in the
enemy position with reserves, or initiate an offensive on a stabilized front.
5-44. Tactical commanders use artillery, mortar, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, electromagnetic warfare, and
military information support operations to conduct preparation fire. They develop their preparation fire from
the top down, with bottom-up refinement. Those subordinate units most affected by the effects of these
preparation fires must strongly emphasize the bottom-up refinement process. Preparation fire can—
* Destroy enemy forces.
* Suppress, neutralize, or disrupt high-value or high-payoff targets. |
3-90 | 127 | Attack
* Gain fire superiority.
* Suppress enemy forces in their defensive positions.
* Facilitate the attacking force’s maneuver.
* Deceive enemy forces.
* Isolate enemy forces.
5-45. These preparation fires may initially destroy or disrupt only the enemy’s reconnaissance and security
forces and their positions if attacking forces are in contact with the enemy’s disruption zone. In either case,
counterfires conducted as part of preparation fire can degrade the enemy’s fire support systems and assist in
achieving fire superiority.
5-46. Commanders ensure that attacking maneuver forces have the functional and multifunctional support
and sustainment assets necessary to conduct the operation and maintain the momentum of their attacks as
part of the preparation process. That support and sustainment effort must anticipate future maneuvers to
ensure the uninterrupted advance of maneuver forces.
EXECUTING AN ATTACK
5-47. An attack consists of a series of advances and assaults by attacking units until they accomplish their
mission. Commanders at all echelons use their initiative to shift their main effort among units as necessary
to take advantage of opportunities and momentum to ensure the enemy force’s rapid destruction. Attacking
units move as quickly as possible, following reconnaissance elements through gaps in the enemy force’s
defenses. Units shift their efforts to reinforce success and carry the battle deep into the enemy force’s rear.
Commanders do not delay their attacks to preserve the alignment of subordinate units or adhere too closely
to their preconceived plans.
5-48. Units strive to retain their freedom of action while protecting their forces. They continually seek
opportunities to defeat, destroy, or reduce the enemy force’s combat power or shatter the enemy force’s
cohesion and capability to fight even if those opportunities deviate from their previous detailed plans for
defeating the enemy force. Units avoid strict adherence to plans no longer appropriate to battlefield
conditions.
5-49. Commanders avoid becoming so committed to their initial plan that they neglect opportunities. They
remain mentally prepared to abandon failed attacks and exploit unanticipated successes or enemy errors by
designating other units to conduct their main effort in response to changing situations. Commanders follow
the tactical framework when attacking.
FIND THE ENEMY
5-50. Gaining and maintaining contact with an enemy force, who is determined to break contact, is vital to
the success of offensive actions. A defending enemy force generally establishes a disruption zone around
those forces occupying the main line of defense to make early contact with attacking forces to determine their
capabilities, intent, COA, and to disrupt their approach. An enemy unit uses that disruption zone to defeat
friendly reconnaissance forces and hide enemy dispositions, capabilities, and intent. An enemy commander’s
goal is to compel the attacking force to conduct a movement to contact against defending enemy forces that
know the exact location of the attacking force.
5-51. Units employ their combat power to overwhelm enemy forces based on their situational understanding.
However, echelons below division do not normally have the detection, tracking, and weapon systems
necessary to conduct supporting efforts directed against enemy forces not currently committed to close
combat. The way a unit gains and maintains contact depends on whether the unit is in contact with the
enemy’s disruption zone or the enemy’s battle zone. It also depends on the echelon of the unit in the nested
layers of reconnaissance and security. For example, the intent of a corps’ reconnaissance effort is to determine
the dispositions, composition, direction of movement, and rate of movement of a defending enemy’s
significant forces. A reinforced armored BCT, task-organized as a covering force or advance guard, can fight
through most disruption zones, develop the situation, confirm information provided by technical means, and
force enemy forces to reveal additional information prior to divisions executing close operations. This
additional information often includes locating the enemy’s tactical and possibly operational reserves. At a |
3-90 | 128 | Chapter 5
lower echelon, a maneuver battalion constituting the advance guard of the main body of a BCT can use its
scout platoon to conduct a zone reconnaissance that focuses on acquiring enemy positions and obstacles.
5-52. The ability of units to anticipate an enemy force’s actions by gaining and maintaining contact with all
significant parts of their opposing enemy forces—to include tracking enemy reserves, fire support, and
follow-on forces—increases the security of attacking forces. Units seek to detect enemy attempts to shift
major elements of defending enemy forces or launch a counterattack. They can prevent enemy reconnaissance
assets from detecting major friendly force attacking movements by sending out a force to conduct zone
reconnaissance with an on-order security mission. The risks to an enemy force increase when friendly forces
impede or deny success to enemy collection assets. These factors result in providing attacking units with
additional time to take advantage of changing situations. Moving within an enemy force’s decision cycle
allows friendly units to take advantage of successes by transitioning to the tasks of exploitation and pursuit
and to complete the enemy’s destruction.
FIX THE ENEMY
5-53. The purpose of fixing enemy forces is to prevent the enemy from repositioning within their battle zone.
Every friendly move causes the enemy force to react. An enemy commander opposes friendly units
attempting to fix enemy’s forces. Friendly units do everything possible to limit the options available to enemy
forces. Fixing an enemy into a given position or COA and controlling the enemy force’s movements limit
enemy options and reduce the amount of battlefield uncertainty and associated risk.
5-54. Units seek to fix enemy forces with the minimum amount of combat power. Commanders normally
allocate the bulk of their friendly combat power to forces conducting their main effort. Thus, fixing operations
are supporting efforts. Therefore, units carefully consider which enemy elements to fix and target only those
that can significantly affect the outcome of their operations. The longer the requirement to fix these forces,
the more resources units need to accomplish the mission. Generally, the support force engages enemy forces
so they cannot respond to the friendly main effort. This may require units to slow the rate of movement of
selected enemy units to prevent them from influencing the outcome of the operation.
5-55. Reducing uncertainty allows friendly forces to maneuver to mass the effects of overwhelming combat
power against a portion of an enemy force. It gives units more time to modify their attack plan as necessary
and synchronize their employment of friendly forces. It allows units to mass forces in one place by using
economy of force measures in other areas. Units may also try to fix selected enemy units, such as the enemy
reserve or follow-on force, to prevent them from repositioning or maneuvering against friendly forces
conducting the main effort.
5-56. Severing enemy lines of communications and main supply routes over prolonged periods by using
interdiction measures is another way to fix enemy forces. These measures can range from air interdiction that
destroys bridges and rail switching yards to ambushes of enemy resupply convoys conducted by infiltrating
combat patrols.
5-57. Another method of fixing enemy forces is to tie obstacles into the existing terrain to further canalize
and slow the movement of enemy reserves. At lower tactical echelons, scatterable minefields can isolate
objectives from possible enemy reinforcement or counterattacks and block or disrupt enemy actions to the
flanks. Units can use tactical deception operations and activities, such as demonstrations and false preparation
fires, to fix enemy forces. Using extensive obscuration and vehicle mockups in a tactical deception effort can
also assist in fixing targeted enemy forces.
5-58. Another method of isolating the objective is to use lethal and nonlethal effects. Lethal effects may
range from sniper fire to a joint fire plan designed to destroy a selected portion of an enemy force. Nonlethal
effects, such as electromagnetic warfare, can prevent enemy forces from receiving orders or vital intelligence
and information or disrupt enemy fire control systems.
FINISH THE ENEMY
5-59. With the enemy force found and fixed, commanders maneuver subordinate forces to accomplish the
mission. Units seek to avoid an enemy’s defensive strength by attacking through a point of relative weakness,
such as a flank or rear. |
3-90 | 129 | Attack
5-60. The key to success is to strike hard and fast, overwhelm a portion of the enemy force, and then quickly
transition to the next objective or phase. This maintains the momentum of the attack without reducing the
pressure on enemy forces. Additionally, units make every effort to locate and track enemy reserves and
follow-on forces to prevent friendly forces from unexpected attack by significant enemy forces. It also allows
units time to delay, disrupt, or destroy these enemy forces before they can interfere with their attacks.
5-61. The rest of this section shows an example of how a friendly force would finish the enemy. It includes
actions to disrupt the enemy; movement from the line of departure; actions at the probable line of deployment,
assault position, final coordination line; and actions on the objective–both mounted and dismounted.
Disrupting the Enemy
5-62. As part of finishing the enemy, friendly units disrupt the enemy force to increase the likelihood of
success during the attack. Disrupting one or more parts of the enemy combined arms team creates multiple
dilemmas for the enemy, weakens the entire enemy force, and allows friendly units to attack selected portions
of the remaining enemy force. This disruption effort usually occurs at echelons above brigade because lower
echelons lack the necessary reconnaissance, target acquisition, intelligence analysis, cyber and
electromagnetic warfare, and target attack assets to engage enemy forces not committed to close combat.
Their assessment and decisions regarding what to disrupt, when to disrupt, and for what purpose are critical
Creating multiple dilemmas synchronized to deliver effects at the most opportune time overwhelms the
enemy’s ability to command and control their forces and respond effectively.
5-63. For example, the goal of disrupting an enemy fire support system is to allow friendly forces to
maneuver and mass the effects of their weapon systems against the enemy without the enemy’s indirect fire
weapons being able to engage friendly forces. Attacking forces can accomplish this by attacking enemy
forward observers, fire direction centers, command posts, artillery and rocket systems, or ammunition storage
areas. Each set of targets requires a different amount of resources. The probability of success, the
effectiveness of the attack, and the time necessary to achieve the desired target effects varies with each set of
targets. Timing is also important. If units execute their associated supporting efforts too early, an enemy force
may have time to recover and respond before friendly forces conducting their main effort can complete their
maneuver.
5-64. Units seek to use the element of surprise to conduct operations that strike at enemy forces upon making
any type of contact with enemy forces. This surprise denies enemy forces the opportunity to focus and
synchronize combat power against attacking friendly forces. It prevents enemy forces from massing
defending enemy forces or fires at critical times and locations. Surprise can produce confusion, fear, and
piecemeal resistance. These operations disrupt both the enemy’s combined arms team and the enemy
commander’s ability to plan operations and control enemy forces. These operations, once initiated, continue
throughout their attacks. Units use any existing advantages over enemy forces in these areas to aid their
disruption process through lethal and nonlethal effects.
Movement from the Line of Departure
5-65. Units transition from movement to maneuver once they cross their LDs. If circumstances dictate
crossing the LD not in their proper movement formation they establish a probable line of deployment to
indicate where they will transition to their appropriate movement formation. They move aggressively and as
quickly as the terrain and enemy situation allows. They move forward using appropriate movement
techniques assisted by the fires of supporting units. Fire and movement are closely integrated and
coordinated. Effective suppressive fires facilitate friendly movement, and friendly movement facilitates
effective fires. Attacking units use avenues of approach that avoid strong enemy defensive positions, take
advantage of all available cover and concealment, and maneuver forces to positions of advantage against the
defending enemy forces. Units use obscurants to conceal their movement where cover and concealment are
not available. Any delays in establishing obscuration and suppressive fires before crossing their LDs may
require attacking units to occupy their assault positions.
5-66. Artillery and other ground-based fires assets move as necessary to ensure that attacking units remain
within supporting range. Units analyze the time it takes maneuver units to move from their LDs to their PLDs
and the distances involved. This analysis provides the data that units use to ensure supporting systems can |
3-90 | 130 | Chapter 5
provide the necessary fire support before their supported maneuver units move inside the effective range of
enemy direct fire weapon systems. Units use fires delivered from fixed- and rotary-wing systems and the
autonomous operation capabilities of artillery systems to help counter enemy artillery range advantages.
5-67. Units deploy to maintain maximum firepower against known enemy positions when they expect to
make contact at or shortly beyond their LDs. Commanders select the formation that best balances firepower,
tempo, security, and control for the specific situation. They have the option of deploying a security force in
front of their attacking units. Units may also employ flank or rear security forces if required by the enemy
situation. They may not want to change formations during the attack because of potential loss of momentum
resulting from such changes. Attacking forces transition to the bounding overwatch movement technique
when they expect enemy contact. See paragraphs 2-20 through 2-23 for more information on the bounding
overwatch movement technique.
5-68. Between the LD and the PLD, attackers seize intermediate objectives only to eliminate enemy positions
or apply additional suppressive fires. Artillery, rocket, electromagnetic warfare, and aerial assets engage
targets of opportunity and enemy security forces. They direct subordinate forces to occupy predesignated
support by fire positions as their units approach suspected enemy positions or danger areas. Lethal fires,
suppression, and obscuration enable attacking forces to occupy these support by fire positions. Units use
direct fires from these positions to suppress enemy forces while the rest of their formation continues to
advance toward their objectives.
5-69. Units engage known enemy forces with the maximum combat power to overwhelm them as quickly as
possible. Attacking units that encounter a small enemy unit on the way to their objectives either quickly
overrun or bypass that small enemy unit if it meets the bypass criteria.
Actions at the Probable Line of Deployment, Assault Position, or Final Coordination Line
5-70. Attacking units maintain their pace of advance as they approach their PLDs. Commanders divide their
attacking units into one or more assault and support forces either before or on reaching the PLD. Infantry
Soldiers dismount from their combat vehicles at their PLD, if necessary. All forces supporting the assault
force are in their support by fire positions before the assault force crosses the PLD. Units synchronize the
occupation of support by fire positions with the maneuver of their supported attacking units to limit the
vulnerability of the forces occupying these positions. They use unit tactical SOPs, battle drills, prearranged
signals, EAs, and target reference points (TRPs) to control the direct fires from these supporting positions.
Units normally employ RFLs between converging forces.
5-71. Figure 5-3 shows that the PLD can be co-located or near the assault position. Units ensure that the final
preparations of their breach forces in assault positions do not delay maneuver to breach points as soon as
conditions are set. Whenever possible, assault forces rapidly pass through their assault positions. They may
have to halt in their assault positions while supporting and suppressive fires lift and shift. In this case, if the
defending enemy force anticipates the assault, assault forces deploy into covered positions, and obscure their
positions with smoke. Support forces continue their suppressive fires on the objective for as long as assault
forces remain in their assault positions. |
3-90 | 131 | Attack
Figure 5-3. Example of a probable line of deployment and assault position
5-72. Once support forces create the conditions, breach forces reduce, proof, and mark the required number
of lanes through the enemy force’s tactical obstacles to support the maneuver of assault forces. Commanders
clearly identify conditions that allow their breach forces to proceed to avoid confusion. From their probable
lines of deployment, assault forces maneuver against or around enemy forces to take advantage of support
forces’ efforts to suppress targeted enemy positions. Support forces employ direct and indirect fires against
selected enemy positions to destroy, suppress, obscure, or neutralize enemy weapons and cover the assault
forces’ maneuver. Assault forces closely follow these supporting fires to accomplish their mission.
Actions on the Objective
5-73. Units employ overwhelming and simultaneous fire, movement, and violence during their final assaults
to finish the enemy. These violent assaults destroy, defeat, or drive enemy forces from their objective areas.
Small units conduct the final assault while operating under the control of the appropriate echelon command
post. Armored forces have the option of conducting this final assault in either a mounted or dismounted
configuration. Stryker forces typically conduct the assault with their dismounted forces with support from
their vehicles.
5-74. The key to forward movement when assault forces are under enemy direct fire is to return effective
fire. Destructive or suppressive fires are most effective when fired by stationary support forces. These fires
prevent enemy forces from firing effectively at moving assault forces. Support forces place a heavy volume
of fires on enemy forces to destroy, neutralize, or suppress them once they are in position and assault forces
are prepared to move. The ability of support forces to move to advantageous terrain is critical to ensuring
success. They reduce their rate of fire to sustainable levels to conserve ammunition as assault forces close on
their objectives once they suppress the enemy’s positions. This ensures that they have enough ammunition
to support the assault. Support forces increase their rate of fire to ensure continued suppression when assault
forces near their objectives. This allows assault forces to assault enemy positions before the enemy can react.
Commanders provide specific signals for support forces to ceasefire, shift their fire to another target area, or
walk their fire across the objective in front of the assault force. Alternatively, these later actions may occur
when the assault begins. |
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