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3-90 | 132 | Chapter 5
5-75. Units use screening smoke to conceal units and individual positions, or obscuration to blind enemy
forces. Screening smoke is particularly effective during movement to, and assault on, the objective. Care
must be taken to avoid screening smoke obscuring friendly units. Units place obscuration in front of enemy
positions, on the far side of obstacles, and in areas that restrict maneuver. They may use obscuration over
their support areas to limit enemy observation. The neutralization of enemy thermal viewers requires the use
of multispectral obscuration.
5-76. Units employ all fire support means to destroy or suppress enemy forces and sustain the momentum of
their attacks. They improve the likelihood of success by carefully synchronizing the effects of indirect fire
systems or available air assets. Units plan fires in series or groups to support maneuver against enemy forces
on or near their geographical objectives. Assault elements move rapidly across their objectives as their units
shift artillery fires and obscurants from the objective to other targets. Support elements maintain suppressive
fires to isolate objectives and prevent enemy forces from reinforcing or counterattacking. These support
elements also destroy escaping enemy forces and systems. Units employ information capabilities, such as
cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare, to attack enemy command and control information
systems as part of this effort.
5-77. Units limit position changes of fire support systems because position changes reduce the volume of
available fires. Units balance the need to maintain that amount of artillery support against enemy counterfire
capabilities with their need to provide continued coverage as attacking units continue to move forward.
Supporting indirect fire assets move into their new positions one subordinate unit at a time, by echelon, to
maintain support throughout the attack. Units can use any available air assets to provide supporting fires, in
addition to organic mortar systems, while field artillery batteries displace.
5-78. Small enemy units moving toward the penetrated area can disrupt the synchronization of the final
assault. As friendly units and weapon systems crews engage enemy targets, they tend to focus on their
immediate opponents rather than the overall situation. Loss of situational understanding combined with the
defending enemy forces’ more detailed knowledge of the terrain allows small enemy forces to inflict a great
deal of damage on friendly attacking forces. Attacking unit leaders need to understand the flow of combat
and retain the capability to engage these enemy forces before they can alter the outcome of their assaults.
Commanders can commit their reserves to maintain the momentum of their attacks and keep pressure on
enemy forces. This also hinders enemy attempts to stabilize the situation.
5-79. Units isolate and destroy portions of the enemy defense in sequence when attacking well-prepared,
integrated enemy defenses. See figures 5-4 and 5-5 to see this process illustrated. Friendly forces isolate,
suppress, obscure, and bypass selected enemy positions. For example, obscuration delivered by field artillery
and mortars in front of the objective—between the force and the enemy—screens friendly breach and assault
force movement and obscures enemy weapon systems. Units place fires on and beyond the flanks of an
objective to isolate an enemy position. These fires include obscuration; high-explosive, improved
conventional munitions (if available); and precision-guided munitions delivered by a mix of field artillery,
fixed-wing aviation assets, and attack helicopters. In addition, units may employ short duration scatterable
mines in conjunction with terminally guided munitions to help isolate and impair an enemy force’s ability to
counterattack. (Their use must not impede the conduct of exploitation and pursuit operations.) Units can
employ jammers to cut information system links between enemy maneuver forces and their supporting
artillery. |
3-90 | 133 | Attack
Figure 5-4. Attack of an objective, breach
Figure 5-5. Attack of an objective, assault |
3-90 | 134 | Chapter 5
5-80. Units mass overwhelming combat power in sequence against isolated centers of resistance. Assault
element commanders can task-organize their elements to assault one portion of an objective at a time. The
enemy force may attempt to reinforce its defending forces or counterattack during the friendly force’s attack.
Once the attacking force reaches the far side of the objective, selected elements clear remaining pockets of
resistance while the bulk of the assault force prepares for a possible enemy counterattack. After assault forces
reach their objectives, support forces leave their support by fire positions and rejoin assault forces or move
to blocking positions to counter possible enemy counterattacks.
Mounted Assault
5-81. Units consider the terrain, obstacles, and the strength of enemy anti-armor defenses when determining
whether to conduct a mounted or dismounted attack. Mounted assaults accelerate the operation’s execution
by allowing the greatest speed and shock action and providing the best protection against small arms and
indirect fires while conserving the strength of the infantry Soldiers conducting the assault.
5-82. Armored units can conduct a mounted assault when facing weak, hastily prepared, disorganized
resistance, or when attacking with overwhelming combat power. They concentrate all supporting fires to
destroy and neutralize enemy forces and fix local reserves when conducting a mounted assault. Tanks,
infantry fighting vehicles, and amphibious assault carriers use cannons and machineguns to engage targets
for as long as possible. Other weapons increase their rate of fire as commanders lift or shift fires from one
type of weapon to another. The assault force advances close to its objective under the cover of these
supporting fires.
5-83. Assault forces attack using shock action and firepower to overrun enemy positions as soon as their
commanders shift supporting fires beyond their objectives. Mechanized infantry elements move as close as
possible to their objectives while remaining mounted in their combat vehicles. Commanders give the order
for infantry elements to dismount from their carriers when the danger to the mounted infantry elements
exceeds the protection offered by their combat vehicles.
5-84. Units may employ this technique with armored forces rapidly clearing an objective against an enemy
force that lacks a robust anti-armor capability. First, the assaulting forces overrun their objectives. Then, the
accompanying mechanized infantry Soldiers dismount from their combat vehicles on the far side of their
objectives and sweep their objectives from the far side back to the near side to clear any remaining pockets
of enemy resistance. The ability of armored forces to closely follow friendly mortar and artillery fires as they
shift across their objectives is a major advantage. Units secure their objectives immediately after they shift
their supporting fires to deny enemy forces time to move from protective to firing positions.
Dismounted Assault
5-85. Light infantry and Stryker units assault an objective utilizing dismounted infantry. Typically, Stryker
units use their vehicle platforms in support of the dismounted assault.
5-86. Units usually conduct dismounted assaults when—
* The terrain favors dismounted operations.
* Enemy forces have a strong anti-armor capability.
* Tanks and armored combat vehicles are not available to lead the assault even though the mission
variables favor their employment.
* Enemy obstacles prevent maneuver across the objective.
* Friendly forces require stealth to close on the objective.
* Mounted assaults stall on or short of the objective.
* Enemy forces are in prepared positions.
Commanders determine if, when, and where any Stryker infantry forces dismount from their combat vehicles
based on analysis of the mission variables and the degree of risk involved.
5-87. Commanders of attacking forces advance beyond the geographical boundaries of enemy defensive
positions whenever possible before stopping to consolidate and reorganize. This is because enemy forces
with considerable indirect fire capabilities are likely to have developed preplanned targets on those positions
for rapid engagement in case of their loss and to support enemy counterattacks. |
3-90 | 135 | Attack
FOLLOW THROUGH
5-88. Once the objective is seized and friendly forces establish security, subordinate units clear their
objective of enemy forces, consolidate and reorganize, and prepare for enemy counterattacks. Units position
their armored and antitank systems in overwatch to cover likely enemy mounted avenues of approach.
Mechanized infantry forces normally dismount and orient along likely dismounted and mounted avenues of
approach. Mortars, command posts, and sustainment assets move forward to consolidate. Units also dispatch
patrols to ensure contact with any adjacent friendly forces. Otherwise, a gap would occur, which an enemy
force could exploit during a counterattack. Units are responsible for establishing contact with units to their
left and right as defined by the direction to enemy forces.
5-89. When the situation allows, units work to gain or maintain contact with those enemy forces that have
abandoned their recent positions or objectives immediately after the friendly assaults conclude. Units send
patrols in any direction required to maintain or regain contact with enemy forces in their assigned areas.
Higher echelon commanders reposition their information collection assets and adjust their missions as
necessary to maintain contact. With an understanding of the friendly and enemy situation, commanders have
a decision to make. They can exploit success and continue their attacks or terminate their attack. After seizing
an objective, the most likely on-order mission is to continue the attack.
Continuing the Attack
5-90. Units seek to achieve a breakthrough that can turn into an exploitation or a pursuit by continuing their
attacks. A breakthrough is a rupturing of the enemy’s forward defense that occurs as a result of an
attack. At BCT echelon and below, units maintain contact and attempt to exploit their success. Normally, a
division, corps, or higher echelon commander, makes the decision regarding whether to initiate an
exploitation or pursuit or to terminate offensive actions.
5-91. Units plan logical sequels to their attacks as part of their follow through. Attacking forces plan for
exploitation. Exploiting forces plan for the pursuit of a defeated enemy force. Units seek to employ their
subordinate forces during an exploitation without overextending their sustainment capabilities. Commanders
plan to have fresh units pass around or through forward units to sustain their attacks’ momentum. They may
assign these fresh units with the task of follow and support or follow and assume in an effort to maintain
tempo. Commanders of any unit conducting the offense envision how, under what conditions, where, and
when their unit transitions to the defense, based on possible enemy countermoves and other events.
5-92. Fire support assets move quickly to take advantage of the natural reduction in support requirements
that occur when their supported unit takes enemy positions. Field artillery units reposition to where they can
support renewed attacks when ammunition supplies and enemy actions permit. Attacks by manned and
unmanned aircraft systems can provide support while these artillery systems reposition. Road conditions,
such as destroyed bridges or large numbers of dislocated civilians, and unit cross-country mobility
capabilities affect the exact time of repositioning.
5-93. Units attempt to exploit the deterioration of enemy positions by attacking before enemy forces can
reconstitute an effective defense. Units employ precision-guided munitions in combination with the
maneuver of armor or Stryker formations, Army aviation, and air support to achieve decisive results.
5-94. Ordinarily, defending enemy forces attempt to hold their positions until nightfall to be able to complete
their withdrawal under the cover of darkness. Attacking units maintain pressure, continuing their attacks at
night. Friendly units maintain enemy contact through these attacks. This keeps enemy forces off balance and
makes their withdrawal from action extremely difficult. If enemy forces are too strong to overrun, friendly
units concentrate their efforts on enveloping or encircling retrograding enemy forces when enemy forces try
to conduct a delay. Attacks aggressively pushed through the hostile front may isolate major elements and
force enemy forces to evacuate their entire defensive position before they can construct viable fallback
positions.
5-95. Successful attacking units penetrate deeply into hostile positions to attack enemy reserves, artillery,
command and control nodes, and lines of communications. Either assault or support units attack the enemy
force’s newly exposed flanks to widen gaps in the enemy’s defensive position. Units send forces that have a
high degree of tactical mobility through those gaps to exploit the penetration, attack the enemy force from |
3-90 | 136 | Chapter 5
the rear, and prevent the enemy’s escape. Force multipliers—such as fixed-wing aviation assets—concentrate
on supporting ground forces exploiting the penetration.
5-96. Attacking units may have to bypass enemy units to maintain their tempo when they transition to an
exploitation or pursuit. Units bypass enemy forces according to previously established bypass criteria. At a
minimum, bypassed enemy forces remain under observation or fixed in place by other units until passed off
to follow-on units.
5-97. Units intensify their information collection efforts to obtain the situational understanding necessary to
decide on a COA if enemy forces succeed in withdrawing major forces from action. Aggressive units may
prevent enemy forces from reconstituting an effective defense in a rearward position. They may have to delay
the renewal of their attacks until those information collection efforts are successful so they can formulate
tactically sound plans if the enemy succeeds in occupying new defensive positions.
Terminating the Attack
5-98. If all objectives have been accomplished, or the unit has culminated, the unit terminates the attack and
establishes a defense until relieved.
5-99. Units preplan the location and future missions of each element. Artillery and other fire support systems
mass fires on enemy assembly areas and enemy troops forming for counterattacks. Commanders may alert
their reserves to protect the flanks of attacking units, hold ground seized by them, or counter enemy
counterattacks. They may use antitank minefields or other obstacles to cover likely enemy avenues of
approach. Units improve these obstacles and defensive positions when they have time and resources.
5-100. Units designate target reference points, final protective fires (FPFs), engagement areas, and other
direct and indirect fire control measures. Once in position, subordinate elements modify preplanned measures
and improve defensive capabilities as required. Echelon scout or cavalry units deploy beyond these local
security patrols to conduct their reconnaissance or security missions.
VARIATIONS OF ATTACKS
5-101. Units use variations of the attack to organize forces against specific enemy dispositions. Attack
variations include—
* Ambush.
* Counterattack.
* Raid.
* Spoiling attack.
The commander’s intent and mission variables determine the specific variation. As subordinate attack
variations, they share many of the planning, preparation, and execution considerations of the attack.
Paragraphs 5-102 through 5-150 discuss the unique considerations of each variation of the attack: ambush,
counterattack, raid, and spoiling attack.
AMBUSH
5-102. An ambush is a variation of attack from concealed positions against a moving or temporarily
halted enemy. An ambush stops, denies, or destroys enemy forces by maximizing the element of surprise.
Ambushes can employ direct fire systems as well as other destructive means, such as command-detonated
mines, indirect fires, and supporting nonlethal effects. They may include an assault to close with and destroy
enemy forces. In an ambush, the ambush force does not normally seize and hold ground objectives.
5-103. The two methods of an ambush are the point ambush and the area ambush. In a point ambush, a unit
deploys to attack a single kill zone. In an area ambush, a unit deploys into two or more related point ambushes.
A unit smaller than a platoon does not conduct an area ambush. The kill zone is the location where fires are
concentrated in an ambush. Typically, kill zones use heavy direct fire for a short duration. Whereas
engagement areas tend to use indirect and direct fires for longer duration over a larger area. |
3-90 | 137 | Attack
5-104. A specific type of a point ambush is an anti-armor ambush. The anti-armor ambush is significantly
different from a typical point ambush in that it typically involves only crew-served weapons and anti-armor
systems and can be conducted at longer ranges.
5-105. Ambushes are hasty or deliberate, but they take place along a continuum. A hasty ambush is an
immediate reaction to an unexpected opportunity conducted using SOPs and battle drills. Units plan
deliberate ambushes as specific actions against specific targets. Detailed information about a target, such as
size, organization, weapons, equipment carried, route, direction of movement, and times the target reaches
or passes certain points on its route may be available. All forces may conduct an ambush. There are no
ambush specific control measures. Ambushes are further categorized as near or far ambushes based on the
proximity of the friendly force to the enemy force.
5-106. The normal goal of an ambush is the death or capture of all enemy personnel located within the kill
zone. Another goal could be to destroy certain designated vehicles. Ideally, the ambush force destroys the
ambushed enemy so quickly that enemy personnel within the kill zone cannot report the engagement.
Organization of Forces for an Ambush
5-107. Units typically organize an ambush into three elements: assault, support, and security. The assault
element fires into the kill zone. Its goal is to destroy the enemy force. When used, the assault force attacks
into and clears the kill zone. Commanders may assign additional tasks—including searching for items of
intelligence value, capturing prisoners, and completing the destruction of enemy equipment to preclude its
immediate reuse—to their assault force. The support element supports the assault element by firing into and
around the kill zone, and it provides the ambush’s primary killing power. The support element attempts to
destroy most of the enemy’s combat power before the assault element moves into the objective or kill zone.
The security element isolates the kill zone, provides early warning of the arrival of any enemy relief force,
and provides security for the assault and support elements. It secures the objective rally point and blocks
enemy avenues of approach into and out of the ambush site, which prevents enemy forces from entering or
leaving.
Planning an Ambush
5-108. During terrain analysis, leaders identify at least four different locations: the ambush site, the kill
zone, security positions, and rally points. As far as possible, units avoid ideal ambush sites because alert
enemies avoid them if possible. Since enemies increase their vigilance and security when they must enter
them, surprise is difficult to achieve. Instead, units should choose unlikely sites when possible. Other
planning considerations for an ambush include—
* A no-later-than time to establish the ambush.
* A tentative ambush formation or, for an area ambush, element locations.
* Insertion and exit routes.
* A forward passage of lines and movement to the ambush site in tactical formation.
* Actions if enemy forces detect the ambush before its initiation.
* A scheme of maneuver that maximizes engagement of the enemy force’s flank or rear, provides
early warning of target approach, includes assault element actions in the kill zone, and details how
the ambush element displaces from the ambush site.
* Actions on the objective.
* Obstacles to augment the effects of the friendly fire.
* A fire support plan that integrates the direct fire and obstacle plans, which results in the enemy
force’s isolation, inflicts maximum damage, and supports ambush forces in their rally points.
* The criteria for initiating the ambush. For example, units only engage enemy formations of the
same or smaller size and withhold fire until the target moves into the kill zone.
* Any required changes to the ambushing unit’s fire distribution SOP.
* Rear security measures.
* Selecting appropriate standoff ranges for anti-armor weapons and maintaining clear line of sight. |
3-90 | 138 | Chapter 5
5-109. Point ambush techniques include employing a linear or L-shaped formation. The names of these
formations describe deployment of the support element around the kill zone. The ambush formation is
important because it determines whether a point ambush can deliver the heavy volume of fire necessary to
isolate, fix, and destroy the enemy. Units determine the formation used based on the advantages and
disadvantages of each formation in relation to the mission variables.
5-110. In a linear ambush, the assault and support elements generally deploy parallel to the target’s route
of movement—the long axis of the kill zone—that subjects the target to flanking fire in the line formation.
(Figure 5-6 depicts a sketch of a linear ambush.) The security element positions itself where it can best
provide security to the assault and support elements. The size of the area covered by the support element’s
weapons limits the size of the target trapped in the kill zone. Natural, manmade, and military obstacles—
reinforced with tactical obstacles integrated with direct and indirect fires—trap the target in the kill zone. A
disadvantage of the line formation is that the target may disperse so that it is larger than the kill zone.
5-111. The linear ambush formation is effective in close terrain, which restricts the target’s movement, and
in open terrain where existing or reinforcing obstacles block one flank. Units may place similar obstacles
between their assault and support elements and their kill zones to protect their ambush forces from the target’s
counter ambush drills. When ambush forces deploy in a line formation, they leave access lanes through these
protective obstacles so that they can assault the target. An advantage of the line formation is that it is relatively
easy to control under all conditions of visibility.
Figure 5-6. Example of a linear ambush
5-112. The L-shaped formation is a variation of the line formation as shown in figure 5-7. The long leg of
the “L” (the assault element) is parallel to the kill zone and provides flanking fire. An advantage of the “L”
formation is that the short leg (the support element) is at the end of the kill zone and at a right angle to it and
blocks the enemy’s forward movement. It also provides enfilading fire that interlocks with fire from the other
leg. Units can employ an L-shaped formation on a straight stretch of trail, road, stream, or at a sharp bend. |
3-90 | 139 | Attack
Figure 5-7. Example of an L-shaped ambush
5-113. An area ambush is most effective when enemy movement is largely restricted to trails or roads.
Figure 5-8 on page 5-22 is a sketch of an area ambush. The area should offer several suitable point ambush
sites. Units select a central ambush site around which to organize outlying ambushes. They determine the
enemy force’s possible avenues of approach and escape routes once they select the central ambush site.
Commanders assign outlying point ambush sites to subordinates to cover these avenues. Friendly ambushing
forces report all enemy traffic going toward or away from the central ambush site to their higher headquarters
after those forces occupy those outlying sites. These outlying ambushes allow enemy elements to pass
through their kill zones until their commanders initiate their central ambush. Once the central ambush begins,
these outlying ambushes prevent enemy troops from escaping or entering the area. |
3-90 | 140 | Chapter 5
Figure 5-8. Area ambush
5-114. Leaders of forces performing an ambush specify the signals required to control the ambush. They
make frequent changes to the meaning of audible and visual signals to avoid setting patterns that enemy
forces can recognize. Otherwise, enemy forces might recognize a signal and react in time to avoid the
ambush’s full effects. For example, if ambushing forces always employ a white star cluster to signal
withdrawal in a night ambush, an alert enemy force might fire one and cause a friendly ambushing force to
withdraw prematurely. The subordinate elements of the ambush unit must receive communications—in the
form of signals—that relay this information:
* Target approaching, normally given by a member of the security team to warn the ambush
commander and the ambush elements of the target’s progress.
* Initiate the ambush, given by the ambushing element’s commander. (This signal should be the use
of the most casualty-producing and reliable weapon or explosive, such as a main gun round from
a tank or infantry carrier, the detonation of mines or explosives, or other direct fire crew-served
weapons.)
* Lift or shift fire, given when initiating the assault on the target; all fires must stop or shift at once
so that the assault element can attack before the target can react.
* Assault, given when the assault force is to move into the kill zone and complete its activities.
* Cease fire, given to cease all fires.
* Withdraw from the kill zone or ambush site, given when the ambush is completed or an enemy
relief force is approaching.
5-115. Leaders use various signals to communicate this information, such as radio transmissions, voice
commands, vehicle horns, whistles, or pyrotechnics. All signals must have at least one backup. For example,
if the signal to shift fire fails, the assault element should not attack the target unless it receives the backup
signal. Signals sent out before initiation of the ambush should not expose the ambush to enemy detection.
Units review SOP signals to see if they need to be revised or augmented to meet specific situational
requirements. |
3-90 | 141 | Attack
Preparation for an Ambush
5-116. The keys to a successful ambush are surprise, coordinated fires, and control. Surprise allows the
ambush force to seize control of the situation. If total surprise is not possible, it must be so nearly complete
that the target does not expect the ambush until it is too late to react effectively. Thorough planning,
preparation, and execution help achieve surprise.
5-117. Leaders conduct their leader’s reconnaissance with key personnel to confirm or modify the plan.
This reconnaissance should be covert to remain undetected and preclude alerting enemy forces. If necessary,
commanders modify their ambush plans and immediately disseminate those changes to subordinate leaders
and other affected organizations. Leaders maintain close control during movement to, occupation of, and
withdrawal from ambush sites. Control is most critical when ambush units are approaching their targets.
Leaders enforce camouflage, noise, and light discipline. All ambush force elements reconnoiter their routes
of withdrawal to selected rally points. When possible, all Soldiers within the ambush force reconnoiter the
routes they use.
5-118. The ambush unit’s security element remains at full alert and uses all available observation devices
to detect the enemy’s approach to the ambush site. Small-unit leaders within each ambush element rotate
each Soldier’s duties as necessary to maintain alertness.
5-119. Leaders position and coordinate all weapons, including mines and demolitions, to obtain the
maximum effectiveness against targets in their kill zones. All fires, including those of supporting artillery
and mortars, are coordinated. Each support element isolates its kill zone, prevents the target’s escape or
reinforcement, and delivers a large volume of highly concentrated surprise fire into that kill zone. This fire
must inflict maximum damage so assault elements can quickly assault and destroy their targets.
Execution of an Ambush
5-120. Fire discipline is a key part of any ambush. Soldiers withhold fire until the ambush leader gives the
signal to initiate the ambush. The initiation signal should be from the most deadly and reliable weapon in the
ambush. Once initiated, the support and assault elements deliver accurate fires at the maximum rate possible.
Failure to deliver accurate and rapid fires delays the assault, giving the target time to react and increasing the
possibility of fratricide. Accurate fires help achieve surprise and destroy targeted elements. When it is
necessary to assault the target, the lifting or shifting of fires must be precise. The assault element does not
conduct its assault until achieving elimination of enemy fires or resistance.
5-121. The ambush force may have to withdraw by bounds if the ambush fails and the enemy force pursues.
It should use obscuration to help conceal its withdrawal. Activating limited duration minefields along
withdrawal routes after the passage of the withdrawing ambush force can help stop or delay enemy pursuit.
Commanders position their support elements to assist the withdrawal of their assault elements.
5-122. Ambush forces withdraw to their rally points, reorganize, and start their return march on their
commanders’ orders. Assault forces halt and disseminate any combat information obtained to all ambush
elements at previously established locations. Ambushing forces do not need to halt if their assault force’s
information systems are able to disseminate this combat information.
5-123. Once ambush forces return, commanders or their representatives debrief them to help identify enemy
patterns of response, activities, and procedures, both inside and outside the ambush area. Unit assistant chiefs
of staff and intelligence personnel report this information to all appropriate organizations through intelligence
channels. Units adjust tactics, techniques, and procedures to account for new enemy information. (See ATP
3-21.8 for additional information on the conduct of small unit ambushes.)
COUNTERATTACK
5-124. A counterattack is a variation of attack by a defending force against an attacking enemy force.
Units should not counterattack unless there is a reasonable chance of success. Units executing a counterattack
can use all or part of the defending force, to include their reserve, against an attacking enemy. The specific
purpose for a counterattack is to deny to the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s purpose and regain the
initiative from the enemy through offensive action. Counterattacking forces maneuver to isolate and destroy
designated enemy forces. Counterattacking forces can attack by fire into an engagement area to defeat or |
3-90 | 142 | Chapter 5
destroy an enemy force, restore the original position, or block an enemy penetration. In sustained defensive
actions, units counterattack toward limited objectives, such as regaining lost battle positions (BPs). Once
launched, counterattacks become their echelon’s main effort. (Figure 5-9 illustrates projected major
counterattacks.)
Figure 5-9. Example of counterattacks
5-125. It is difficult for enemy forces to fight a defensive battle in response to friendly counterattacks after
they reach their culminating point because—
* Defensive preparations are hasty.
* Enemy forces are not adequately organized for defense.
* Reorganizing for a defense requires more time than the friendly commander allows.
* Enemy forces have reduced combat power, and they are dispersed across the battlefield.
* Enemy forces are physically fatigued.
5-126. Units plan and conduct counterattacks to attack enemy forces when and where enemy forces are
most vulnerable. This is often when an enemy force is attempting to overcome friendly defensive positions.
Normally, enemy forces attempt to retain a reserve or striking force to reinforce these vulnerabilities, once
opposing units commit their counterattack forces. Commanders assign terrain objectives to counterattacking
forces even when their counterattacks are force oriented to control the maneuver of their counterattacking
forces. Units normally assign attack by fire positions when counterattacking using primarily direct and
indirect fires.
5-127. The two methods of counterattacks are major and local. Local counterattacks are attacks to retake
positions lost to enemy action or to exploit targets of opportunity. A major counterattack seizes the initiative
from an enemy force through offensive action after an enemy force launches an attack. Units also conduct |
3-90 | 143 | Attack
major counterattacks to defeat or block an enemy penetration that endangers the integrity of their entire
defense, or to attrit an enemy force by the defeat or destruction of isolated portions of it. In both cases, waiting
for an enemy force to act first may reveal the enemy’s main effort and create an assailable flank to exploit.
Organization of Forces for a Counterattack
5-128. Units conducting a local counterattack often consist of defending forces that survive after completing
their withdrawal from lost positions and the unit’s reserve. Units performing a local counterattack are unlikely
to change the internal task organization of these immediately available forces because this most likely will
delay initiation of these local counterattacks. Units may be able to designate elements to conduct
reconnaissance.
5-129. Units conducting a major counterattack typically organize their combined arms assets into forces for
security, reconnaissance, main body, and reserve. They use defending forces already in contact with enemy
forces to fix or contain those same enemy forces. Commanders may use a force committed to the
counterattack, their reserve, another echelon’s reserve, or commanders may designate any other force to be
their counterattack force. Units complete changes in task organization in time to allow subordinate forces to
conduct rehearsals with their attached or supporting elements as time allows.
5-130. A counterattack force is a committed force if its commander’s defensive scheme hinges on a
counterattack to destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, or isolate the attacking enemy force. The reserve becomes a
committed force when ordered to conduct planned counterattacks. Units conducting mobile defenses allocate
field artillery, engineers, and other combat enablers to their striking forces because their defensive schemes
hinge on counterattacks by their striking forces. In this case, commanders designate other forces as their
reserves.
Planning a Counterattack
5-131. Units plan their counterattacks against enemy forces when those enemy forces are vulnerable. Their
defenses create gaps between attacking enemy units, exposing the flanks and rear of elements of attacking
enemy forces as they advance. The seizure of defended positions typically leaves attacking enemy forces
temporarily disorganized, depleted, and ill prepared to meet sudden counterattacks. Units must assess their
situations rapidly since opportunities for effective local counterattacks are usually brief and must execute
their counterattacks swiftly. They assign objectives or attack by fire positions to counterattacking forces,
depending on if they intend their counterattacking forces to close with and assault enemy forces. Local
counterattacks may or may not be the result of previous deliberate planning.
5-132. Units normally develop their major counterattack plans as branches or sequels to their main
defensive plans. A major counterattack may achieve surprise when it strikes enemy forces from an
unanticipated direction. For that reason, units involve forces allocated to the performance of a major
counterattack, such as the strike force in a mobile defense, in developing those plans as well as any plans to
exploit potential success.
5-133. Units generally have two options when executing a counterattack. The first, and generally preferred,
technique is to attack using forces not previously committed to the defense. This is because defending units
may still be decisively engaged. Attacking forces may come from the reserve or consist of reinforcements.
Since these forces were not recently or actively involved in combat, they are more likely to—
* Be at authorized strength levels.
* Enjoy a higher combat system operationally ready rate.
* Have leaders and Soldiers who are more likely to be rested and thus capable of prolonged,
continuous operations.
* Have a complete basic load of supplies.
* Have the time and energy to plan and prepare for offensive action.
* Be able to maneuver out of physical contact with enemy forces.
5-134. Potential drawbacks to using forces not previously committed to the defense:
* Forces are required to conduct a forward passage of lines.
* Enemy information collection assets are likely to detect the arrival of significant reinforcements. |
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* Defending in noncontiguous assigned areas has different requirements. To mass overwhelming
combat power in the main effort might require friendly forces to adopt economy of force measures
in some assigned areas while temporarily abandoning others in order to concentrate sufficient
combat power.
5-135. The second technique when transitioning to the offense is to use the currently defending forces to
attack. This technique generally has these advantages:
* Speed of execution:
Units do not have to move from an assembly area or potentially other assigned areas.
Units do not have to conduct a forward passage of line.
Units already have a common operational picture that includes knowledge of the enemy
force’s patterns of operation.
* Increased likelihood of catching enemy forces by surprise. Units move less and so avoid
potentially alerting enemy forces to potential offensive operations.
5-136. Potential disadvantages of this technique are that the attacking force generally lacks stamina and
sustainment, specifically ammunition. The attacking force must be quickly replaced if friendly offensive
actions are not to culminate quickly.
Preparing a Counterattack
5-137. The keys to preparing a successful counterattack are surprise, control, and coordinated fires. Surprise
allows a counterattacking force to seize control of a situation. If total surprise is not possible, it must be so
nearly complete that the targeted enemy force does not expect the attack until it is too late to react effectively.
Thorough planning and preparation help achieve surprise. Units adjust the positioning of their information
collection assets and the missions given those assets to determine the location and targets for their
counterattacks.
5-138. Control of a counterattack begins with a unit’s plan. Commanders conduct their leader’s
reconnaissance with key personnel to confirm or modify their counterattack plans. They modify their plans
and disseminate those changes to subordinate leaders and other affected organizations as necessary. If
possible, each counterattack force element reconnoiters its planned axis of advance and the routes it takes.
Units maintain close control during movement to and occupation of hide positions and the information
collection process. This control is necessary so enemy forces do not detect the presence of counterattacking
forces before they can initiate their counterattacks. Leaders enforce camouflage, noise, and light discipline.
5-139. Units coordinate their fire support by adjusting the planned positions of weapon systems to obtain
maximum effectiveness against targets in the planned objectives, and they request support from assets not
typically available to their echelon. Units coordinate all fires, including those of supporting artillery and
mortars. They use these fires to isolate a targeted enemy force in planned locations or engagement areas while
preventing its escape or reinforcement. These fires inflict maximum damage quickly before enemy forces
can respond to the counterattack.
Executing a Counterattack
5-140. Units conduct counterattacks in the same way they conduct any other attack. Subordinates initiate
local counterattacks with available forces when those actions fit within their higher echelon commander’s
intent. A local counterattack should be swift and violent. Units exploit enemy disorganization, such as the
confusion that temporarily exists in an attacking force after it seizes a defended position. A rapidly mounted
local counterattack may yield better results than a more deliberate counterattack executed by a higher echelon
because of the speed at which forces can launch them.
5-141. Units may conduct local counterattacks to retain or seize positions on the flanks of a strong enemy
penetration. This prevents enemy forces from widening the penetration while forces from other defending
units engage the penetrating enemy forces. Holding these flanks can also prevent the sacrifice of positional
depth because the limited gap in the defensive position prevents an attacking enemy force from fully
exploiting its success. |
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RAID
5-142. A raid is a variation of attack to temporarily seize an objective with a planned withdrawal. The
purposes of the raid are to: secure information, capture personnel or equipment, destroy a capability, rescue
and recover individuals and equipment, or confuse an adversary. Raids are usually small, involving battalion-
sized or smaller forces. Figure 5-10 illustrates the five phases of a raid. In the first phase, the raiding force
inserts or infiltrates into the objective area. In phase two, the raiding force isolates the objective area from
outside support or reinforcement, including enemy air assets. In phase three, the unit overcomes any enemy
forces at or near the objective in a violently executed surprise attack using all available firepower for shock
effect. In phase four, the force seizes the objective and accomplishes its assigned task quickly before any
surviving enemy forces in the objective area can recover or receive outside reinforcements. Lastly, in phase
five the raiding force withdraws from the objective area and is extracted, usually using a different route than
that used for movement to the objective.
Figure 5-10. Five phases of a raid
5-143. A simplified raid chain of command is an essential organizational requirement. A raid usually
requires a force carefully tailored to neutralize specific enemy forces operating near an objective and to
perform whatever additional functions are required to accomplish the objectives of the raid. These additional
functions can consist of the demolition of bridges over major water obstacles or the recovery of an attack
helicopter pilot shot down forward of the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Units incorporate any necessary
support specialists during the initial planning stage of the operation.
5-144. When commanders and staffs plan raids, they require precise, time-sensitive intelligence. The
planning process determines how control, sustainment, and target acquisition occur during a raid. Planners
also develop techniques and procedures for conducting operations across the FLOT given specific mission
variables expected to exist during the conduct of the raid. Commanders and staffs develop as many alternative
COAs as time and the situation permit. They carefully weigh each alternative. Commanders and staffs |
3-90 | 146 | Chapter 5
determine the risks associated with conducting the mission and possible repercussions in addition to those
planning considerations associated with other offensive operations.
5-145. At a minimum, all elements involved in a raid must rehearse their individual missions and tasks. If
time permits all elements involved in a raid rehearse the entire mission together to ensure synchronization
and understanding. The key elements in determining the level of detail and the opportunities for rehearsal
before mission execution are time, OPSEC, and deception requirements.
5-146. Raids conducted by ground maneuver forces within the depths of the enemy’s support zones tend to
be audacious, rapid, and of short duration. Logistics support is minimal; units carry as much ammunition and
petroleum, oils, and lubricants as possible, taking advantage of any captured enemy supplies. Once the raiding
force crosses its LD, only limited, emergency aerial resupply of critical supplies and medical evacuation are
feasible because of the absence of a secure LOC. Units must thoroughly plan for aerial resupply of a raiding
force since it entails greater risk than normal operations.
SPOILING ATTACK
5-147. A spoiling attack is a variation of an attack employed against an enemy preparing for an attack.
The objective of a spoiling attack is to disrupt the enemy force’s offensive capabilities and timelines while
destroying targeted enemy personnel and equipment. A spoiling attack is not to seize terrain or other physical
objectives. Units perform spoiling attacks whenever possible during their performance of defensive tasks.
Spoiling attacks strike enemy forces while they are halted in assembly areas or attack positions, often when
they are preparing for their own offensive operations. A spoiling attack usually involves armored, attack
helicopter, or fire support elements attacking enemy assembly positions in front of the main battle area.
Figure 5-11 depicts a spoiling attack.
5-148. Units conduct spoiling attacks to—
* Disrupt the enemy force’s offensive preparations.
* Destroy key assets that the enemy force requires to attack, such as fire support systems, fuel and
ammunition stocks, and bridging equipment.
* Gain additional time for defending forces to prepare their positions.
* Reduce the enemy force’s current advantage in the correlation of forces.
Figure 5-11. Spoiling attack |
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5-149. Units can employ their reserves in spoiling attacks to throw the enemy’s offensive preparations off
their timetable. In this case, commanders assume the risk of not having a reserve or designate other forces as
their echelon reserve. The following considerations affect a spoiling attack:
* Commanders may want to limit the size of the forces used in executing their spoiling attacks.
* Units do not conduct spoiling attacks if the loss or destruction of the friendly attacking force would
jeopardize the defending force’s ability to accomplish the defensive mission.
* The mobility of the force available for the spoiling attack should be equal to or greater than that
of the targeted enemy force.
* Operations by artillery, aviation, or electromagnetic systems to prevent enemy elements not in
contact from interfering with the spoiling attack are necessary to ensure the success of the
operation.
5-150. There are two conditions that must be met to conduct a successful spoiling attack:
* The spoiling attack’s objective must be obtainable before the enemy force can respond to the attack
in a synchronized and coordinated manner.
* Commanders must prevent the overextension of forces conducting their spoiling attacks. |
3-90 | 149 | Chapter 6
Exploitation
An exploitation takes full advantage of offensive success. Commanders at all echelons
exploit successful offensive actions. Exploiting success at every opportunity denies an
enemy force time to reconstitute an effective defense by shifting forces or by regaining
the initiative through a counterattack. This chapter discusses the general
considerations, organization of forces, control measures, planning and preparation
considerations, and execution considerations for an exploitation. All units, regardless
of their size, conduct exploitations.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN EXPLOITATION
6-1. An exploitation is a type of offensive operation following a successful attack to disorganize the enemy
in depth. Exploitation reinforces disorganization and confusion in the enemy’s command and control (C2)
systems. The enemy force’s tactical defeat reduces its ability to react and adds confusion in the enemy’s C2
structure. Units conduct exploitations to take advantage of this reduction in enemy capabilities to make
permanent what would be only a temporary tactical effect.
6-2. A unit conducts an exploitation when it capitalizes on tactical opportunities created while
accomplishing successful offensive operations. A unit exploits to maintain or increase their successes by
preventing enemy forces from reconstituting an effective defense or to recover from the initial attack.
Whenever possible, the lead attacking unit transitions directly to the exploitation after accomplishing its
mission. If this is not feasible, units pass additional forces into the lead. They act quickly to capitalize on
these successes. Although exploitations may appear insignificant, their cumulative effects can be decisive.
Subordinate commanders, working within their higher echelon commander’s intent, use their initiative to
launch exploitations. Units inform their higher headquarters when initiating exploitations. This prevents
disruption of the higher echelon’s battle and allows the higher echelon headquarters to assess the possibility
of the enemy forces fleeing. This would lead to the initiation of pursuit operations.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR AN EXPLOITATION
6-3. The forces conducting an attack are also the forces that initially exploit that attack’s success—
reconnaissance and security, main body, and reserve. Typically, commanders do not assign a subordinate
unit the mission of exploitation before starting a movement to contact or attack. Units reorganize internally
to reflect the specific mission variables when an opportunity to exploit success occurs. Units request any
required additional resources to support the exploitation from the appropriate headquarters. Additional
resources may include assets that allow the exploiting force to identify and attack targets in depth. Resources
may also include assets that have the capability to conceal or mislead the enemy of the actions of the
exploiting force. Each exploitation force should be large enough to defend itself from enemy forces it expects
to encounter. It should also be a reasonably self-sufficient combined arms force capable of operations beyond
the supporting range of the main body.
6-4. Commanders should not expect those units that create the conditions for an exploitation to continue
the exploitation in depth. If they plan to exploit with specific subordinate units, they specify the degree of
damage or risk to those units that they are willing to accept during the operation. If the initial attacking units
incur significant losses of combat power, commanders relieve them as soon as possible. Units continue the
exploitation with a previously uncommitted force once the initial exploiting force’s combat power weakens
because of fatigue, disorganization, attrition, or need to resupply. They also commit fresh forces when the |
3-90 | 150 | Chapter 6
initial exploiting force needs to hold ground or resupply. The relieving force requires a high degree of tactical
mobility so it can continue the exploitation.
6-5. An exploitation may be more effective if units commit additional forces and assign them the task of
follow and support or follow and assume. They assign follow and support missions to units designated to
assist exploiting forces by relieving them of tasks that would slow their advances. The lead unit and any
follow and assume or follow and support units exchange liaison teams to facilitate the transfer of
responsibilities. Units designated to follow and assume conduct a forward passage of lines and replace the
initial exploiting forces before they approach their culminating point. Normally, the next higher echelon
commander retains control of the forces performing the task of follow and support or follow and assume.
When possible, units assigned these tasks should possess mobility equal to that of the exploiting unit or
receive additional engineer and transportation assets to provide the necessary mobility. Once organized, they
are committed forces and receive artillery, air defense, engineer, and other functional and multifunctional
support and sustainment forces based on the mission variables. In an exploitation operation projected to
achieve significant depth, commanders may attach elements of a follow and support unit to the exploiting
force to ensure unity of command and effort. Units retain only those reserves necessary to ensure flexibility
of operation, continued momentum in the advance, and likely enemy responses to the exploitation.
6-6. Since the force conducting an exploitation operation typically covers a wider front than an attacking
force, fire support assets may find their supported elements operating outside normal supporting ranges. Fire
support assets must displace forward to ensure continued fire support on and beyond enemy formations, but
this may impede the support to an exploiting force’s flank elements. Commanders typically establish a
command or support relationship between the exploiting force’s subordinate elements and fire support units
(and other combat enablers) to provide the required support. Alternatively, they may move additional
reinforcing fire support elements forward to ensure fires coverage.
6-7. The joint air and missile defense coverage for the initial attack is likely to remain effective throughout
an exploitation. However, this air and missile defense coverage may become less effective when tactical
commanders accept risk and require these air and missile defense assets to cover more area as their forces
advance. Commanders consider the risks with moving out of air and missile defense coverage. Units request
adjustments in that coverage to conform to the unit’s tactical maneuvers.
6-8. An exploitation mission demands a force with a significant mobility advantage over enemy forces.
This mobility advantage may favor forces with tracked or wheeled armored combat vehicles. Attack
helicopters and air assault assets may constitute a portion of an exploiting force’s combat power. Dismounted
infantry conducting a vertical envelopment are extremely useful in seizing key terrain such as defiles and
crossing obstacles. They can also disrupt enemy transportation nodes along the exploiting force’s route of
advance into and through the enemy force’s rear. Units integrate combat engineers into the exploiting force
to breach obstacles, keep ground forces maneuvering, and provide countermobility protection to the flanks.
They also use engineers to maintain the force’s supply routes.
Reconnaissance and Security Forces
6-9. When units initiate an exploitation operation, the exact enemy situation may not be clear. They order
one or more subordinates to conduct reconnaissance to gain and maintain enemy contact. Those forces
conducting reconnaissance also provide a degree of security. Supporting collection assets, other information
collection assets, and intelligence produced by adjacent, higher, and lower echelons complement their
reconnaissance efforts. These assets assist units in maintaining a situational understanding of the strength,
dispositions, capabilities, and intentions of all significant enemy elements within their areas of interest.
Commanders normally emphasize reconnaissance more than security operations when conducting
exploitation. Nevertheless, since forces exploiting success tend to move independently, the overall
commander addresses the total force’s security requirements.
6-10. Units assign the appropriate security missions to appropriate subordinates in the same way they do for
a movement to contact (discussed in Chapter 4). Exploiting commanders typically organize the forward most
security element into a covering force to protect their main body’s movement and develop the situation before
they commit their main body. These security elements respond directly to the overall commander. |
3-90 | 151 | Exploitation
6-11. If they are unable to resource a covering force for independent operations, exploiting units may use an
advance guard in place of a covering force. This is typical for a BCT conducting exploitation on its own. In
some cases when the higher echelon (corps or division) creates a covering force, a BCT subordinate to that
corps or division may still push out its own advance guard behind the covering force. This normally occurs
when subordinate exploiting units advance in multiple parallel columns.
Main Body
6-12. The actions of the unit’s main body during the exploitation are the same as the actions during a
movement to contact. See discussion beginning in paragraph 4-9 for more information on the actions for the
main body during a movement to contact.
Reserve
6-13. The actions of the unit’s reserve during the exploitation are the same as the actions during a movement
to contact. See discussion in paragraph 4-11 for more information on the actions for the reserve during a
movement to contact.
COMMON CONTROL MEASURES FOR AN EXPLOITATION
6-14. Exploitation uses fewer control measures than many other operations because of the uncertain enemy
situation and the need to provide subordinate commanders with the maximum flexibility to accomplish the
mission. Figure 6-1 on page 6-4 depicts example control measures for an exploitation. Commanders can use
a limit of advance instead of objectives. Planners develop control measures as part of the planning process.
They issue these control measures as part of the attack order to facilitate the transition to exploitation.
6-15. A unit conducting exploitation normally operates in the same assigned area its higher commander
assigned it for the attack. The exploiting unit assigns subordinate units their own assigned areas. Units may
change boundaries between subordinate forces often to take advantage of opportunities. Since an exploiting
unit deploys reconnaissance and security forces, units adjust boundaries as the exploiting force advances.
They designate obstacle-restricted areas to prevent friendly obstacles from hindering the movement of the
exploiting force. To enhance security, commanders designate obstacle zones or belts (depending on the
echelon) on the flanks of the exploiting force’s mobility corridors. Units use phase lines and subsequent
objectives to control the conduct of the exploitation. They use objectives to orient the movement of exploiting
forces. Although exploitation may result in seizing terrain as an objective, it focuses primarily on completing
the destruction of the enemy force. Commanders establish a limit of advance if they anticipate culmination
or some other restriction influencing their operations, such as extending operations beyond supporting ranges
and being unable to mitigate this risk.
6-16. Units normally employ permissive FSCMs during exploitation. A coordinated fire line (CFL) ensures
rapid response. Movement of the CFL is particularly important to provide adequate support as the force
continues to advance. Even if commanders do not anticipate culminating, the establishment of a forward
control measure is important to facilitate operations by a higher echelon headquarters beyond that control
measure. Units can use additional control measures, such as target reference points and checkpoints, as
required. |
3-90 | 152 | Chapter 6
Figure 6-1. Example exploitation control measures
PLANNING AN EXPLOITATION
6-17. The commander’s ability to deny enemy forces flexibility by anticipating enemy counteractions is
critical to a successful exploitation. Commanders arrange operations to deny enemy forces the ability to
respond to attacks by disrupting the enemy’s decision cycles.
6-18. Exploitation planning begins during the preparation phase of all offensive actions. To avoid losing
critical time during the transition from a movement to contact or an attack to an exploitation, commanders
tentatively identify forces, objectives, and assigned areas for subordinate units before the mission begins.
The defeat of enemy forces and the seizure of objectives deny the enemy forces routes of escape, resulting
in the encirclement of selected enemy forces and the destruction of enemy C2 nodes and sustainment
facilities. BCT and higher echelon commanders initiate an exploitation as a branch or a sequel to their existing
operations once they recognize that the opportunity to conduct an exploitation exists. Higher echelon
commanders may direct that lower tactical commanders immediately exploit the successes of their units.
6-19. Commanders plan for decentralized execution during the conduct of an exploitation. The commander’s
intent prepares subordinates to exercise initiative throughout the operation. Commanders state the purpose
of the exploitation, which may be to force the retrograde of enemy forces from an area, encircle enemy forces
so they cannot withdraw, expand a lane or gap, attack along a flank, or destroy enemy artillery and other fire
support systems. The intent must describe the desired end state. That intent also determines the force’s main
and supporting efforts.
6-20. A clear commander’s intent provides subordinates with guidance on integrating their operations into
the overall operations of the higher echelon headquarters. Subordinates seize all opportunities to damage
enemy forces or accelerate the tempo of friendly operations. Commanders place few restrictions on
subordinates. These restrictions may include clear instructions regarding the seizure of key terrain and the
bypass criteria for enemy forces. Reliable, secure communications among the exploiting force, the follow
and support force, and the commander facilitates coordination that maximizes the impact of the exploitation.
However, all subordinate commands use the higher commander’s intent to continue to the desired end state,
even if they lose communications.
6-21. During exploitation planning and execution, commanders balance the force conducting the
exploitation’s need for speed and momentum against its need for security as it begins to move beyond |
3-90 | 153 | Exploitation
supporting range of the rest of the force. Generally, commanders prevent a force conducting an exploitation
to move outside of supporting distance of the main body. Determining the supporting distance requires some
knowledge of the enemy force’s remaining capabilities. Generally, units approach exploitation planning with
a sense of guarded optimism. It is an excellent opportunity to shatter enemy cohesion and exploit a position
of relative advantage over enemy forces. However, units cannot allow enemy forces to draw their exploiting
force into a salient where it is subject to defeat in detail by an enemy counterattack.
6-22. An exploitation may take the form of a movement to contact with a series of hasty attacks.
Commanders usually issue a series of fragmentary orders that designate—
* Movement formation.
* The unit positions.
* Required modifications to task organization.
* Bypass criteria.
* Revised or new control measures that assist with the maneuver.
6-23. Forces conducting exploitation normally maneuver on a wide front and on at least two axes. The forces
on each axis are capable of independent action, depending on the mobility of the force, the road network, and
other aspects of the terrain. In some cases, rather than assigning subordinates their own assigned areas,
commanders may designate a movement formation for the entire unit to concentrate all combat power against
a specific enemy element. (See Chapter 2 for more information on movement formations.)
6-24. The fire support plan includes allocating support for meeting engagements or hasty attacks that occur
during the exploitation. The fire support coordinator plans targets beyond the projected locations of the
exploiting maneuver forces to shield those forces from enemy counterattacks. The fire support coordinator
then addresses how to provide fire support to the force in its movement to the LOA and targets locations
beyond the LOA to disrupt enemy LOCs.
6-25. Units plan for fires displacement as an integral part of an exploitation. Indirect fire assets must displace
at a faster pace than during normal offensive actions while maintaining the capability to provide accurate and
lethal fires. Units plan on subordinate forces using less ammunition during an exploitation than in an attack
because retrograding enemy forces are normally not in prepared positions. Units also consider requesting
close air support in an exploitation, especially to support those forces moving beyond the supporting range
of the main body. There may be an increase in risk if enemy forces retreat into an integrated air defense
network. Army aviation and joint aircraft can help identify and track high-payoff targets forward of the
exploiting force.
6-26. Commanders anticipate the exploitation and ensure that the sustainment plan supports the force all the
way to the LOA. Planning for sustainment in the exploitation includes designating—
* Future MSRs.
* Logistics release points.
* Maintenance collection points.
* Casualty collection points.
* Medical treatment facilities.
* Ambulance exchange points.
* Prisoner of war collection points.
6-27. Functional and multifunctional sustainment arrangements must remain flexible during exploitation
operations. Units can attach functional and multifunctional sustainment units to exploiting maneuver forces.
This changes the normal support relationship between the two forces to a command relationship for the
duration of the operation. Alternatively, supporting sustainment assets can follow an exploiting force in an
echeloned manner along MSRs. Transportation and supplies to sustain the force become more complicated
as an exploitation progresses. Sustainment units must accompany the force with enough fuel, spare parts,
ammunition, and so on, to prevent culmination. Supply lines become a challenge during the exploitation as
routes degrade and the conduct of route and convoy security can occur.
6-28. In sustaining an exploitation, planners primarily focus on petroleum, oil, and lubricants consumption
and vehicle maintenance. A significant factor is that an exploiting force tends to travel on a broad front, |
3-90 | 154 | Chapter 6
which may necessitate designating one or more MSRs to handle the dispersion. Sustainment operators remain
prepared to move their sustainment assets forward and move them more often than in an attack.
6-29. Selecting a flexible MSR is critical because sustainment units must respond to changes in the direction
of the exploitation. Engineers have responsibility for MSR maintenance. During planning, commanders
address the control of sustainment unit positioning and convoys. The tactical commander calls supporting as
well as organic sustainment units forward and redirects them as needed. Units may have to plan for guides
to assist the movement of these sustainment assets around bypassed enemy positions and obstacles.
Commanders may assign elements from the reserve to conduct support area security to help protect
sustainment and other supporting elements or to secure their MSRs. They plan for controlling dislocated
civilians on the battlefield so that their presence does not interfere with follow-on maneuver and support
assets.
6-30. Units plan situational obstacles for each phase of the operation. For example, commanders direct the
emplacement of scatterable minefields to deny enemy counterattacking forces specific avenues of approach.
PREPARING AN EXPLOITATION
6-31. The preparations for the conduct of an exploitation are the same as those for an attack. See paragraphs
5-32 through 5-46 for additional information on preparing for an attack.
EXECUTING AN EXPLOITATION
6-32. An exploitation may be initiated through orders or when reaching prescribed objectives or phase lines.
Units weigh the risk when conducting exploitations for limited visibility, fatigue, inclement weather,
fratricide, and the exhaustion from extended operations. An exploitation typically requires reconnaissance,
firepower, and maneuver of previously uncommitted units. Units support exploiting forces with tactical air
support, attack aviation, artillery fires, and other fires assets. Units participating in an exploitation apply the
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures appropriate for a unit of their size conducting a movement to
contact and an attack.
6-33. To maintain sufficient forces to conduct exploitation, commanders ensure that subordinates focus on
the commander’s intent. Subordinate commands should not dissipate their combat power by seeking minor
tactical successes or becoming fixed by engaging enemy forces smaller than those in the bypass criteria. They
strive to reach their assigned objective with the maximum possible strength as rapidly as possible.
6-34. A transition from attack to exploitation may be hard to distinguish. An abrupt transition may occur
when a force uses large numbers of precision munitions, achieves surprise, or overwhelms a much weaker
enemy force. Normally, commanders order an exploitation after their force seizes or secures its objective.
With adequate support, they can launch an exploitation with the initial assault or at any time after that,
depending on the effects of the fires and their guidance.
6-35. Since an exploitation takes advantage of previous success, forces previously allocated to attack enemy
forces normally continue their ongoing activities. These activities include—
* Attrition or defeat of enemy reserves before their commitment.
* Destruction of enemy countermobility assets before their employment on a friendly axis of
advance for the exploiting force.
* Disruption of enemy units attempting to reestablish a coherent defense.
* Disruption of enemy sustaining operations.
An exploitation assumes units have timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence to target these enemy actions. |
3-90 | 155 | Exploitation
6-36. Commanders can also initiate an exploitation when they realize that an enemy force is having difficulty
maintaining its position or cohesion. Updated intelligence is crucial to commanders, since it is difficult to
predict the exact conditions required to transition from an attack to exploitation. Therefore, commanders and
subordinates watch the enemy force’s defenses for indications of disintegration that may signal the
opportunity to transition to exploitation. Indicators may include—
* The threat or use of weapons of mass destruction by enemy forces.
* A flood of civilians on the attack axis.
* An increase in enemy reconnaissance.
* An increase in rearward movement, especially by fire support elements and reserves.
* Enemy preparation to demolish or destroy facilities, installations, equipment, and supply
stockpiles.
* Various units intermix their vehicles and personnel in movement formations or march columns.
* Significant increases in the number of prisoners captured.
* A decrease in the intensity of enemy fire.
* Fires increasing in one or more portions of the line of contact that do not reflect the developing
situation and occur at a time when the amount of defensive fires appears to be decreasing.
* A considerable decrease in an enemy force’s resistance.
* Disorganized enemy defenses.
* A significant increase in abandoned enemy war materiel.
* Reports confirming the capture or absence of enemy leaders.
* Friendly forces overrunning enemy artillery, C2 facilities, and supply points.
* Enemy units disintegrating and friendly companies and battalions defeating enemy battalion and
brigade-sized units, respectively.
6-37. Commanders have two general methods to exploit battlefield success. The first method is to exploit
with the forces that achieved the initial battlefield success. In this method, commanders expect those forces
to exploit their own success. This is extremely common at low tactical echelons, such as at battalion echelons
and below, at all points along the range of operations. Commanders select this method when an attacking
unit has accomplished its mission with minimum loss, and it is the force most readily available to continue
the advance. It may become necessary to reorganize and resupply these forces while they are still moving to
maintain the momentum of the exploitation.
6-38. The second method is to exploit with forces other than the unit that achieved the initial battlefield
success. This other force may be the echelon reserve or specifically designated follow and assume forces. In
this method, this other force is committed by passing around, over, or through the forces that achieved the
initial success. This method is generally indicated when the attacking echelon still has essential tasks to
accomplish, is still actively engaged with enemy forces, or requires reorganization before it can continue the
advance. This commonly occurs in exploitations by brigades and larger units.
FIND THE ENEMY
6-39. When an offensive mission is accomplished, units at all echelons deploy their reconnaissance and
security forces to discover whether the opportunity exists to initiate exploitation. This effort must start almost
immediately after an attacking unit seizes its objective. These reconnaissance and security forces must gain
and maintain enemy contact while remaining within the supporting range of their parent organization.
Gaining and maintaining contact with enemy forces is critical since enemy forces may be trying to break
contact or reorganize.
6-40. The commander’s intent determines how much contact is required to maintain pressure on an enemy
force, increase their disorganization, or seize key or decisive terrain. Units employ their reconnaissance assets
to observe enemy force movements and search for weakly defended enemy positions. If those assets are not
available, other maneuver units perform those reconnaissance tasks. While maintaining observation of enemy
forces, the reconnaissance force tries to locate enemy reserves, uncommitted forces, and blocking positions.
This effort helps the exploiting force avoid ambushes as the enemy force seeks to recover the initiative by
counterattacking. |
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6-41. Units use aerial reconnaissance to augment ground reconnaissance. They employ aerial sensors, such
as manned and unmanned aircraft systems, in advance of ground maneuver reconnaissance. This allows aerial
observation of named and targeted areas of interest that facilitate their maneuver and cue the attack of targets.
Armed manned and unmanned aircraft can locate enemy positions and engage enemy forces to disrupt their
movement and preparations. Aerial assets maintain constant contact and pressure on the enemy.
6-42. A commander’s decision to exploit stems from the assumption that enemy forces have already been
somewhat disrupted. Units use all available resources to maintain pressure and overwhelm enemy forces.
Units combine the effects of operations against enemy reserves and uncommitted forces with the rapid
maneuver of ground forces to maintain this disruption. When permissible, attack aviation elements can
maneuver in front of or over exploiting ground maneuver forces to destroy targets. Units seek to integrate
fixed-wing aircraft into the fires plan for attacking these targets. The exploiting force advances to keep the
enemy force off balance and degrade enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The
exploiting force’s fire support system must deliver massed fires quickly to respond to any contingencies that
arise during the exploitation.
FIX THE ENEMY
6-43. As part of its shaping operations, an exploiting force has three goals in fixing an enemy force. First,
fix enemy units in positions out of supporting distance of each other. This allows the exploiting force to
defeat enemy forces in detail. Second, units attack out of contact enemy forces before they can affect the
exploitation. By attacking these enemy forces, units seek to fix them in their current positions or force them
to move to locations where they can be contained until the exploiting force, or a follow and support force can
engage and defeat them. Third, it achieves a specific targeting effect—such as causing 15 percent casualties—
that disrupts the enemy commander’s plan.
FINISH THE ENEMY
6-44. The exploiting force maneuvers to maintain pressure on the enemy and to prevent their reorganization
or escape. Units take advantage of any available vertical envelopment capabilities to accomplish these
missions. The exploiting force clears only enough of its assigned area to permit its advance. It cuts through
enemy logistics units and LOCs to seize objectives vital to the enemy force’s defense. It attacks from the
march to overrun weak enemy formations. Exploiting forces can, based on the bypass criteria, contain and
bypass those enemy pockets of resistance too small to jeopardize the mission. Commanders report enemy
forces to adjacent units, following units, and higher echelon headquarters.
6-45. If an enemy unit is too strong for the leading elements of the exploiting force to overrun and destroy,
succeeding elements of the force conduct a hasty attack based on the combat information provided by its
leading elements. In almost all cases, units use forms of maneuver other than the frontal attack, to produce
faster and better results with fewer casualties. While the exploiting force is seeking one or more assailable
flanks, available fire support systems continue to engage enemy forces to divert attention from the attempted
envelopment and destroy as much enemy combat power as possible.
6-46. An exploiting force may face prepared belts of defensive positions in depth when it is exploiting the
initial success of the attack. Therefore, the exploiting force must move to attack and destroy enemy defending
forces before they can occupy subsequent or supplemental positions. The faster the exploiting force moves,
the less likely it is that succeeding defensive lines will be fully prepared and the less effort it will take to
penetrate each successive defensive position. The exploiting force attacks and maneuvers as many times as
necessary until it breaks completely through the enemy force’s defenses.
6-47. A commander’s primary concern when initiating an exploitation resulting from a successful attack is
rapidly shifting the force into the appropriate task organization to take advantage of a window of opportunity.
Commanders control their formation as it moves and prevent its overextension. They anticipate the enemy
force’s reactions to friendly actions. The real danger to the exploiting force is not the immediate enemy force,
but the enemy forces not yet engaged. Overextension is a risk inherent in exploitation. While commanders
avoid overextension, they must also guard against being overcautious. |
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FOLLOW THROUGH
6-48. Once the exploitation begins, friendly forces quickly move to attack enemy forces. The exploitation
continues so enemy forces cannot escape. The exploiting force retains terrain only as necessary to accomplish
its mission. Commanders are careful not to dissipate combat power to achieve minor tactical successes or to
reduce small enemy forces. They shift operations to reconnaissance and surveillance, countermobility, and
protection tasks because of the possibility of an enemy counterattack once their exploiting forces reach their
respective objectives.
6-49. During an exploitation, units often surround or bypass enemy forces. Surrender appeals and ultimatums
are particularly effective when directed against surrounded, isolated, or bypassed enemy units. While the
exploiting force conducts its operations, the follow and support force, if available—
* Widens or secures the flanks.
* Destroys bypassed enemy units.
* Relieves supported units that have halted to contain enemy forces.
* Blocks the movement of enemy reinforcements.
* Opens and secures LOCs.
* Guards prisoners, key areas, seized enemy bases and installations, and routes.
* Controls dislocated civilians.
* Secures key terrain.
* Secures potential threats (abandoned enemy equipment, weapons, ordnance, explosives, and toxic
information materials including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear).
6-50. At some point, units conducting exploitation either reach their culminating point or transition to a
pursuit. Culmination can occur for various reasons, such as friendly losses or the enemy’s commitment of a
reserve. Units transition to another type of operation once they make an assessment that their force is
approaching culmination. For example, a pursuit enables units to complete the enemy force’s destruction. |
3-90 | 159 | Chapter 7
Pursuit
This chapter discusses pursuit and its general considerations. It then discusses
organization of forces, control measures, planning, and the execution of a pursuit.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A PURSUIT
7-1. A pursuit is a type of offensive operation to catch or cut off a disorganized hostile force attempting to
escape, with the aim of destroying it. Pursuit operations begin when an enemy force loses internal cohesion
and is unable to mount an organized defense. A pursuit leaves enemy forces trapped, unprepared, unable to
defend, and faced with the options of surrender or destruction. Pursuits include the rapid shifting of units,
continuous day and night movements, hasty attacks, containment of bypassed enemy forces, large numbers
of prisoners, and a willingness to forgo some synchronization to maintain pressure on a fleeing enemy.
Pursuits require swift maneuver and attacks by friendly forces to strike the enemy force’s most vulnerable
areas. A successful pursuit requires flexible forces, initiative by commanders at all echelons, and a high
tempo during execution.
7-2. A pursuit focuses on the complete destruction of fleeing enemy force. Attriting hostile forces on their
LOCs does not effectively ensure the destruction of an enemy force. Units in a pursuit try to combine direct
pressure against fleeing forces with an enveloping or encircling maneuver to prevent the enemy force from
fleeing. This fixes the enemy force in positions where the enemy force can be defeated in detail. If it becomes
apparent that enemy resistance has broken down entirely, and the enemy is fleeing the battlefield, any
offensive operation can transition to a pursuit.
7-3. Conducting a pursuit requires a deliberate decision by a commander, as friendly forces face increased
risk of becoming isolated and encircled by the enemy. Typically, corps and division commanders order
subordinate units to conduct a pursuit. Once the pursuit begins, the subordinate unit maintains contact with
the enemy forces and pursues fleeing enemy forces without further orders. The unit maintains the pursuit as
long as the enemy force appears disorganized. The attacker risks becoming disorganized if they move too
quickly. To sustain the pursuit, units must be prepared for increased physical and mental effort.
7-4. Units must be aware of any approaching culmination points. Enemy forces are usually displacing back
to their supply bases, and potentially their own forces, while friendly forces become less effective as they
expend resources faster than they can replace them. Reasons to stop a pursuit may include—
* The presence of reorganized enemy forces.
* Increased enemy resistance.
* Fatigue.
* A lack of supplies.
* Inability to secure flanks.
* A diversion of friendly units to security missions.
* The need to contain bypassed enemy units.
* Inability to maintain adequate contact with adjacent friendly units.
The unit staff should develop a decision support template that depicts decision points, timelines associated
with the movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other relevant information before the unit
reaches an unidentified culmination point. |
3-90 | 160 | Chapter 7
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR A PURSUIT
7-5. Normally, commanders do not organize specifically for pursuit operations ahead of time, although unit
staffs may plan for a pursuit as a branch or sequel to the current order. Therefore, units must be flexible to
react when the situation presents itself. A unit’s maneuver and sustainment forces continue their ongoing
activities, while the commander readjusts priorities to better support the pursuit and ensures subordinate units
are as self-sufficient as resources permit. Units request and acquire additional support from higher echelon
headquarters based on the mission variables. For most pursuits, commanders assign subordinate forces
security, direct pressure, encircling, follow and support, and reserve missions. The direct pressure force is a
force employed in a pursuit that orients on the enemy main body to prevent enemy disengagement or
defensive reconstitution. The encircling force is the force that maneuvers to the rear or flank of the
enemy to prevent the enemy’s escape. The enemy can be destroyed between the direct pressure force and
encircling force. The encircling force advances or flies along routes parallel to the enemy’s line of retreat. If
the encircling force cannot outdistance the enemy to cut the enemy off, the encircling force may also attack
the flank of a retreating enemy. Given sufficient resources, units can assign more than one force the
encirclement mission. The subordinate unit assigned the follow and support mission polices the battlefield to
prevent the dissipation of the combat power of the unit assigned the direct pressure mission. The discussion
beginning in paragraph B-42 addresses the duties of a follow and support force. Reserves allow commanders
to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities or respond to enemy counterattacks.
7-6. There are two variations of a pursuit; each involves assigning a subordinate the mission of maintaining
direct pressure on the rearward moving enemy force. The first is a frontal pursuit that employs only direct
pressure. The second is a combination that uses one subordinate element to maintain direct pressure and one
or more other subordinate forces to encircling the retrograding enemy force. The combination pursuit is
generally more effective. Either the subordinate applying direct pressure or the subordinate conducting the
encirclement can be conducting the main effort in a combination pursuit.
7-7. The force providing direct pressure must be strong enough to defeat enemy rear guard actions and
maintain pressure on the enemy’s main body. It forces the enemy force to deploy frequently in an attempt to
delay the advance of the force applying direct pressure and restricts the enemy force’s ability to break contact.
The force applying direct pressure must be as mobile as the enemy force. Armored and Stryker units are
ideally suited to this role in open terrain, but commanders can employ dismounted infantry forces if the
enemy force is also dismounted and the terrain prevents the use of more mobile forces.
7-8. The encircling force’s mobility must be equal—preferably superior—to the withdrawing enemy force.
If there is no inherent mobility differential, units must create one. This differential can also result from the
force applying direct pressure to force the enemy force to deploy. Units can also enhance and sometimes
create this mobility advantage by conducting countermobility operations against the enemy force, specifically
targeting locations—including choke points or bridges—that hinder the fleeing enemy force’s withdrawal.
Armored, air assault, and airborne forces are well suited for this encircling mission. Attack aviation elements
are also effective when used as part of this encircling force.
7-9. The encircling force must be strong enough to defend itself from the enemy force’s main body and
slow or fix the enemy force until the friendly force applying direct pressure can combine with the encircling
force to destroy the enemy force. It must be capable of mounting a hasty defense without placing itself at risk
of defeat. The force conducting the encirclement must be self-contained, since it normally operates out of
supporting range of friendly indirect fire systems. Therefore, it frequently has additional supporting artillery.
7-10. The primary mission of this encircling force is to prevent the enemy force’s escape, but commanders
can assign other missions to their forces conducting the encirclement. These other missions can include—
* Detecting or identifying weapons of mass destruction and marking the site for sensitive site
exploitation.
* Linking up with airborne or air assault forces in their airheads.
* Reporting terrain conditions and other combat information beyond what is normally addressed in
the unit standard operating procedures.
7-11. Direct pressure and encircling forces require engineer support to create lanes through obstacles, which
enables them to move rapidly and continuously. Units should place combat engineers well forward in unit |
3-90 | 161 | Pursuit
movement formations to breach any unpassable obstacles quickly. Engineers accompanying the encircling
force must also be prepared to conduct survivability tasks.
FRONTAL PURSUIT
7-12. In a frontal pursuit, units employ a single force to maintain direct pressure on the fleeing enemy along
the same routes used by that enemy. Commanders choose this option in two situations. The first is when they
cannot create a subordinate force with a sufficient mobility advantage to get behind a retrograding enemy
force. The second is when they cannot provide enough resources to the force conducting the encirclement to
allow that force to survive and sustain itself until achieving linkup with the direct pressure force. Either
situation can occur because of restrictive terrain or because an enemy force withdraws in a disciplined,
cohesive formation and still has significant combat power. Figure 7-1 depicts a frontal pursuit.
Figure 7-1. Frontal pursuit
COMBINATION PURSUIT
7-13. In the combination pursuit a direct pressure force and an encircling force work together to destroy the
enemy. The direct pressure force normally conducts a series of attacks to slow the enemy force’s retirement
by forcing the enemy force to stand and defend. In the combination pursuit, the force providing direct pressure
initiates a frontal pursuit immediately on discovering the enemy force fleeing from the battlefield. This slows
the tempo of the enemy force’s withdrawal (or fixes the enemy force in its current position if possible) and
may destroy the enemy’s rear security force. By maintaining constant pressure, the force providing direct
pressure helps to maintain conditions necessary for the success of the force conducting the envelopment
operation. This latter force advances or flies along routes parallel to the fleeing enemy force. If the encircling
force cannot outdistance the enemy force to cut the enemy force off, the encircling force may also attack the
flank of a fleeing enemy force. The force conducting the encircling operation conducts an envelopment or a
turning movement to position itself where it can block the enemy force’s escape and trap the enemy force
between the direct pressure force and the encircling force. Figure 7-2 on page 7-4 depicts a combination
pursuit. |
3-90 | 162 | Chapter 7
Figure 7-2. Combination pursuit
CONTROL MEASURES FOR A PURSUIT
7-14. Pursuit control measures should be flexible and allow adjustments to reflect changing conditions. Units
use control measures in the pursuit to—
* Retain tactical options to converge on the most important axis or to redirect the pursuit effort on
a new axis.
* Provide subordinate units as much freedom of action as possible, consistent with security and
maintenance of command integrity.
* Provide units the flexibility to engage enemy reserves or counterattack forces.
* Prevent fratricide.
7-15. Commanders employ centralized planning and decentralized execution during a pursuit. They balance
the need to prevent fratricide and friendly fire incidents with the need to allow subordinates to take advantage
of fleeting opportunities in a pursuit with rapidly moving forces and an evolving situation. Commanders
designate assigned areas for each maneuver unit involved in the pursuit. During a pursuit, they establish few
control measures for the direct pressure force other than phase lines, checkpoints, and some fire control
measures such as a restrictive fire line. Units use phase lines to designate a forward and rearward boundary
for the direct pressure force. The forward boundary relieves the direct pressure force of any responsibility
beyond the forward boundary. It also gives the higher echelon headquarters flexibility to coordinate with the |
3-90 | 163 | Pursuit
encircling force and address enemy elements located beyond that forward boundary. The rear boundary
becomes the boundary between the direct pressure force and the follow and support force.
7-16. If the encircling force is a ground element, the control measures are almost identical to those used
during an envelopment, as shown in figure 7-3. Units designate routes, axis of advance, or assigned areas
adjacent to that of direct pressure forces to allow the encircling force to move parallel to retrograding enemy
forces and eventually move ahead of those enemy forces. Commanders can designate terrain objectives as
guides for encircling forces. However, commanders may change these objectives rapidly and frequently,
based on the progress of encircling forces and enemy actions. These objectives should be terrain features that
provide encircling forces defensible terrain that enemy forces cannot easily bypass. Units often select choke
points, such as defiles and bridges, as objectives for the encircling force.
Figure 7-3. Example pursuit control measures
7-17. Units establish boundaries or RFLs between the forces conducting the encircling and direct pressure
forces before those encircling forces reach their objectives. Other FSCMs should relieve encircling forces of
unnecessary fire support coordination responsibilities. The overall commander directs security operations
beyond those encircling forces, allowing them to engage retrograding enemy forces without devoting
resources to flank and rear security. The overall commander establishes additional control measures to control
the convergence of both elements of the friendly force, such as RFLs, phase lines, and contact points. |
3-90 | 164 | Chapter 7
PLANNING A PURSUIT
7-18. Units anticipate an enemy fleeing from the battlefield as either a branch or a sequel to the plan. The
plan identifies possible forces for security, direct pressure, encircling, follow and support, and reserve as well
as issue an on-order or be-prepared mission to these forces. They should employ the maximum number of
available maneuver forces in the pursuit. Units base the details of their plans on the enemy force’s anticipated
actions, the formation of attacking troops, and the amount of planning time available. Commanders and staffs
also consider—
* Possible routes the enemy force might use to flee from the battlefield.
* Availability of information collection assets to detect enemy forces and acquire targets in depth.
* Scheme of movement and maneuver.
* Availability and condition of pursuit routes.
* Availability of forces to keep the pressure on the enemy force until its destruction is complete.
* Critical terrain features.
* Use of reconnaissance and security forces.
* Allocation of munitions and aviation support.
* Availability of functional and multifunctional support and sustainment resources.
7-19. Pursuit planning addresses the possibility of defending temporarily during operational pauses while
preparing to continue the pursuit or to consolidate gains. However, using an operational pause generally
results in the abandonment of the pursuit because the enemy force is able to use that time to organize a
coherent defense. The pursuit plan results in forces prepared to conduct wide-ranging operations using all
available maneuver assets throughout the assigned area to complete the destruction of the enemy force.
7-20. Units must address how to detect the enemy force from fleeing the battlefield. Otherwise, the enemy
force may succeed in reorganizing and establish a hasty defense. Units look for indicators of an enemy
fleeing, such as when the enemy force—
* Lacks the capability to maintain its current position or cohesion.
* Conducts limited local counterattacks.
* Intensifies reconnaissance and intelligence efforts.
* Increases the amount of rearward movements and changes the type of elements conducting them,
especially by fire support and reserves.
* Prepares facilities, installations, equipment, and supply stockpiles for demolition and destruction.
* Decreases fire in intensity and effectiveness through the assigned area.
* Increases fires in one or more individual portions of the front that do not relate to the developing
situation, or when the amount of defensive fires seems to be decreasing.
7-21. The presence or absence of any of these signs may not necessarily indicate the start of a retrograde
operation. The enemy force could be attempting to draw friendly forces into an ambush or setting up a
counterattack as part of its defense. When commanders initiate a pursuit, they often create the encircling
force from uncommitted or reserve elements. Normally, these forces do not have allocated fire support assets.
Units plan how to redistribute fire support assets to support the encircling forces. Attack helicopters and
fixed-wing aircraft are well suited to support the encircling force.
7-22. Engineer mobility and countermobility assets sustain the rate of advance and hinder the enemy force’s
withdrawal. Engineers prepare the route of advance and support the lateral dispersion of units transitioning
to the pursuit and the movement of the reserve. During the pursuit, units plan for engineers to provide assault
bridging and emergency road repairs to sustain the tempo of the pursuit. Units also plan to use engineer assets
to block any bypassed enemy force’s withdrawal routes by using antitank and command-operated mines,
demolitions, and obstacles.
7-23. Sustainment units plan for increased demand for fuel and maintenance as the tempo of operations
increases. In the pursuit, priority for sustainment normally goes to units having the greatest success.
Sustainment planners need to anticipate success, since the depth of the pursuit depends on the capability of
sustainment assets to support the operation. Units should plan to sustain as far forward as possible during the
pursuit, including attaching bulk sustainment assets further down than normally considered. The sustainment |
3-90 | 165 | Pursuit
elements supporting the pursuing force should be as mobile as possible. Sustainment planners support the
pursuing force by coordinating items such as providing casualty evacuation over unsecured routes. Units may
need aerial resupply or well secured convoys to support this force. Security for sustainment convoys and
lines of communications are major planning considerations. Units use all available sustainment assets to
provide essential support to the forces pursuing enemy forces.
PREPARING A PURSUIT
7-24. The considerations for preparing a pursuit are the same as an attack which is outlined in Chapter 5. See
paragraphs 5-32 through 5-46 for additional information on preparing for a pursuit.
EXECUTING A PURSUIT
7-25. The purpose of a pursuit is to destroy the enemy forces while the enemy force is disorganized and
fleeing from the battlefield. This generally occurs by trapping enemy forces between direct pressure forces
and encircling forces or a major geographic barrier—such as an unfordable river—followed by the enemy
force’s destruction. Timeliness in deciding to initiate a pursuit is critical to its success. If the enemy force
begins to take flight undetected, it avoids the disruption that would come from the constant pressure resultant
of a pursuit. Units should anticipate that enemy forces will flee at times of limited visibility.
7-26. Units often conduct pursuits as a series of encirclements in which they intercept, isolate, and capture
or destroy successive portions of a fleeing enemy force. Direct pressure forces conduct a series of hasty
attacks to destroy any enemy forces executing security missions, maintain constant pressure on the enemy
main body, and slow the rate at which enemy forces can flee. These forces fix, disrupt, and destroy enemy
elements, provided such actions do not interfere with their primary mission of maintaining constant pressure
on the enemy’s main body. To maintain tempo, the direct pressure force can pass off large enemy forces to
follow and support units, if the bypassed enemy forces do not pose a significant risk to the direct pressure
force on the fleeing enemy.
FIND THE ENEMY
7-27. The echelon that discovers the enemy fleeing first acts to maintain contact with the enemy force across
a wide area without waiting for orders from higher echelon headquarters. This ensures that the enemy force
does not consolidate and reorganize into a unit capable of mounting an organized defense. These forces in
contact constitute the core of the direct pressure force. As the situation permits, they re-form into a movement
column with reconnaissance and security elements in the lead and, if necessary, to the flank.
7-28. During a pursuit, the intelligence effort is intensive. Information collection assets concentrate on all
routes that enemy forces could use when conducting a retrograde operation. These assets report on the
disposition of fleeing enemy forces and on the movement of the enemy reserves as the pursuit develops. The
tactical situation during a pursuit may become obscure because of its depth. Much of the information needed
during a pursuit concerns areas and activities beyond the fleeing enemy force. Therefore, the information
provided by higher echelon information collection assets can give a commander an understanding of what is
beyond the enemy force. However, commanders need to confirm this information with reconnaissance
enablers. They can determine—
* The rearward movement of enemy sustainment forces.
* The composition of retrograding forces and their direction of movement.
* The composition and direction of movement of enemy reserves.
* The nature of obstacles and intermediate defensive positions.
Information about uncommitted enemy reserves and prepared positions is vital when a pursuit force may be
approaching a culminating point; it may be the basis for terminating the pursuit.
FIX THE ENEMY
7-29. Keeping enemy forces from reconstituting and reorganizing an effective defense is critical to success.
Constant pressure by direct pressure forces and echelon fire support systems disrupts and weakens enemy |
3-90 | 166 | Chapter 7
forces during a pursuit. Units use fires to keep pressure on enemy forces. They do not allow enemy
commanders to adjust their forces freely to counter friendly force actions. Indirect and joint fires harass and
disrupt the enemy force’s attempts to move engaged forces to the rear or bring previously uncommitted forces
into action. In a pursuit, main efforts may include the ground maneuver of the direct pressure or the encircling
force. Fire support targets in a pursuit include fires on enemy columns and troop or vehicle concentrations.
Units may use fire support assets to repulse enemy counterattacks, destroy or delay enemy reserves, and
destroy enemy fire support systems. They use all nonlethal and lethal effects at their disposal against the
enemy force’s C2 system as an integral part of fixing the enemy while they concentrate on destroying or
degrading the enemy force’s capability to reconstitute and synchronize an effective defense.
7-30. Units fix fleeing enemy forces by pressuring enemy forces with maneuver or with nonlethal and lethal
fires. Disruption of enemy C2 systems by direct pressure forces significantly degrades enemy force
capabilities to counter friendly efforts. This makes the goal of fixing an enemy force much easier to
accomplish.
7-31. An enemy force attempts to use its reserves to reestablish the organization of its forces or facilitate the
fleeing of enemy forces. Fixing enemy reserves is essential to the pursuit’s success and is normally the focus
of echelon shaping operations. The direct pressure force fixes enemy reserves in place or slows them down
so that they remain outside supporting distance until the destruction of the withdrawing enemy force.
FINISH THE ENEMY
7-32. The overall commander of the pursuit normally combines the actions of a subordinate conducting a
frontal pursuit to provide direct pressure on the fleeing enemy force with the actions of a second subordinate
attempting to encircle that same fleeing enemy. The force providing direct pressure advances in a column
formation as quickly as possible. After a successful penetration of a defending enemy force, existing gaps
among the different elements of the force and the direct pressure force often increase. To prevent the
vulnerability of open flanks, the overall commander can deploy uncommitted elements with a reserve mission
where they can respond to flank dangers. The overall commander does not expect a uniform rate of advance
on all axes. Some columns may move rapidly while others may engage in penetrating the enemy force’s rear
guard defensive positions or opposing enemy counterattacks.
7-33. The actions of the force applying direct pressure should facilitate the commitment of another force
moving parallel to the rearward moving enemy force in an attempt to encircle that enemy force. The depth
of the pursuit depends on the size of the forces involved. The commander directing the initiation of a pursuit
informs the higher echelon commander of this intention. This allows the higher echelon headquarters to avoid
desynchronizing other operations and ensures the necessary resources are devoted to the unit conducting the
pursuit.
7-34. The force providing direct pressure normally tasks its forward subordinate element to provide an
advance guard to prevent enemy forces from ambushing its main body and to overrun or bypass small enemy
forces. This advance guard moves on multiple routes. If it encounters enemy units beyond its capacity to
defeat, it conducts actions on contact to develop the situation. The commander of the direct pressure force
uses combat information from actions on contact to guide the main body to a position of advantage where it
can seriously degrade or destroy the retrograding enemy force. The actions of the force providing direct
pressure may or may not be in conjunction with the actions of any encircling force.
7-35. The overall pursuit commander does everything possible to place a friendly force behind a retrograding
enemy force to trap the bulk of the enemy force between the encircling force and the force providing direct
pressure. The force providing direct pressure maintains enough pressure on the retrograding enemy force so
that the encircling force can envelop it. To envelop the enemy force, the direct pressure force must be strong
enough to overcome any enemy rear guard before the enemy’s main body can complete its retrograde and
reestablish a coherent defense. Once in position, the encircling force defends or attacks as necessary,
responding to the enemy force’s actions and those of the force providing direct pressure, to complete the
enemy force’s isolation.
7-36. If the enemy force succeeds in reorganizing and forming a perimeter, the pursuing unit should encircle
the enemy force. (See Appendix C for more information on encirclements.) |
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FOLLOW THROUGH
7-37. Once a commander initiates a pursuit, it continues until a higher echelon commander terminates the
pursuit or their intent and end state are achieved. This typically occurs when one of the following conditions
are met:
* The pursuing force destroys or captures the enemy force and resistance ceases.
* The pursuing force fixes the enemy force for follow-on forces.
* That commander makes an assessment that the pursuing force is close to a culminating point.
* The higher echelon cannot support a pursuing force.
7-38. Units often transition from a pursuit into other types of offensive and defensive actions. If the enemy
force attempts to reorganize, forces conducting a pursuit execute hasty attacks. They conduct an exploitation
to capitalize on the success of these attacks and then move back into pursuit. Forces conducting a pursuit
may also transition into a defense if the pursuing force reaches a culminating point. This usually occurs when
the enemy force introduces strong reinforcements to prepare for a counteroffensive. The higher echelon
commander may transition to stability operations and begin consolidating gains if the pursuit successfully
destroys the enemy force. |
3-90 | 169 | PART THREE
Defensive Operations
Commanders use defensive operations to destroy enemy forces; to retain terrain,
resources, and population centers; and to regain the initiative. Part Three consists of
four chapters that describe the fundamentals of the defense and the three types of
defensive operations—area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde.
Chapter 8
The Defense
Defensive actions are operations that create conditions for the offense that allow Army
forces to regain the initiative. This chapter covers the purpose, characteristics, types,
common control measures, common planning considerations, and transitions for the
defense.
PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE
8-1. While the offense is more decisive, the defense is usually stronger. However, the conduct of the defense
alone normally cannot determine the outcome of battles. The purpose of the defense is to create conditions
for the offense that allow Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting the defense
include—
* Countering enemy action.
* Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to an enemy.
* Attriting or fixing an enemy as a prelude to the offense.
* Increasing an enemy’s vulnerability by forcing an enemy commander to concentrate subordinate
forces.
8-2. A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and
develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. The inherent strengths of the defense are
the defender’s ability to occupy positions before an attack and use the available time to improve those
defenses. A defending force stops improving its defensive preparations only when it retrogrades or begins to
engage enemy forces. A defending force continuously takes opportunities afforded by lulls in action to
improve its positions and repair combat damage during execution of the defense.
8-3. A defending force does not wait passively to be attacked. A defending force aggressively seeks ways
of attriting and weakening enemy forces before close combat begins. A defending force maneuvers to place
enemy forces in a position of disadvantage and attacks those enemy forces at every opportunity. The static
and mobile elements of a defense combine to deprive enemy forces of the initiative. A defending force
contains enemy forces while seeking every opportunity to transition to the offense.
8-4. Units can visualize their defensive assigned area using a main battle area (MBA), a security area,
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), the FLOT, and rear area. The main battle area is the area where
the commander intends to deploy the bulk of their unit to defeat an attacking enemy. The security area |
3-90 | 170 | Chapter 8
is that area occupied by a unit’s security elements and includes the areas of influence of those security
elements. The forward edge of the battle area is the foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground
combat units are deployed to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units,
excluding areas in which covering or screening forces are operating (JP 3-09.3). The forward line of own
troops is a line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation
at a specific time.
Note. Throughout chapters 8 through 11, this publication will use the terms MBA, security area,
forward edge of battle area, and FLOT as a visualization method of describing the assigned area
for defending units.
8-5. Units generally place their reserve where they can easily reinforce the main effort. However, the
reserve may reinforce other priorities in the defense. Units use a reserve to—
* Seize the initiative.
* Destroy enemy forces.
* Reinforce forces.
* Block enemy avenues of approach.
* Counterattack.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSE
8-6. Successful defenses share these characteristics:
* Disruption.
* Flexibility.
* Maneuver.
* Mass and concentration.
* Depth.
* Preparation.
* Security.
See ADP 3-90 for more information on the characteristics of the defense.
TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
8-7. There are three types of defensive operations:
* Area defense.
* Mobile defense.
* Retrograde.
These three types of operations have significantly different concepts and present different problems. Units
consider each independently when planning and executing the defense. Although the names of these types
convey the overall aim of a selected operation, each type usually contains elements of the other and combines
static and mobile elements. Table 8-1 depicts the symbols for an area defense and mobile defense. Table 8-2
depicts the symbols for retrograde operations. |
3-90 | 171 | The Defense
Table 8-1. Defensive operations symbols
Type of Defense Symbol
Area defense
Mobile defense
Table 8-2. Retrograde task symbols
Retrograde Task Symbol
Delay
Withdraw
Retirement
AREA DEFENSE
8-8. An area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to
designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADP 3-90). The purpose of
an area defense is to retain the terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually
supporting prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between these positions.
The main effort focuses fires into engagement areas, possibly supplemented by a counterattack. Units at all
echelons can conduct an area defense. They may use an area defense to transition to offensive operations,
retrograde, or stability operations. The variations of an area defense are defense of linear obstacle, perimeter
defense, and reverse slope defense. (See Chapter 9 for more information on area defense.)
MOBILE DEFENSE
8-9. A mobile defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the
enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADP 3-90). The mobile defense focuses on defeating or
destroying enemy forces by allowing them to advance to a point where they are exposed to a decisive
counterattack. A mobile defense includes a fixing force and a striking force:
* A fixing force is a force designated to supplement the striking force by preventing the enemy from
moving from a specific area for a specific time (ADP 3-90). Units use the fixing force to hold |
3-90 | 172 | Chapter 8
attacking enemy forces in position, to turn attacking enemy forces into ambush areas, and to retain
areas from which to launch the striking force.
* The striking force is a dedicated counterattack force in a mobile defense constituted with the bulk
of available combat power (ADP 3-90).
8-10. A mobile defense requires assigned areas of considerable depth. Units shape the battlefield causing an
enemy force to overextend its LOCs, expose its flanks, and dissipate its combat power. Likewise, they must
be able to move their forces into a position where they can defeat the attacking force. Divisions and larger
formations normally execute mobile defenses. In limited circumstances a BCT can execute a mobile defense
unilaterally. (See Chapter 10 for more information on mobile defense.)
RETROGRADE
8-11. A retrograde is a type of defensive operation involving organized movement away from the enemy
(ADP 3-90). An enemy force may compel these operations, or units may execute them voluntarily. In either
case, the higher echelon headquarters executing the retrograde must approve the operation before its
initiation. The retrograde is not conducted in isolation; it is a transitional operation. It is part of a larger
maneuver scheme designed to preserve combat power in order to regain the initiative in future operations.
The three variations of the retrograde are delay, withdraw, and retirement. (See Chapter 11 for more
information on retrograde.)
COMMON DEFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES
8-12. Paragraphs A-63 through A-88 define common control measures specific to defensive operations.
Units use the minimum control measures required to complete their missions while providing subordinates
the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation.
8-13. Units control the defense by using control measures that provide the flexibility needed to respond to
changes in the situation and allow them to concentrate combat power at the decisive point. Common
defensive control measures are:
* Engagement area (EA).
* Battle position (BP).
* Battle handover line (BHL).
* Named area of interest (NAI).
* Target areas of interest (TAI).
* Fire support coordination measures (FSCMs).
* Disengagement line.
* Phase lines.
COMMON DEFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
8-14. A defense is more effective when there is adequate time to thoroughly plan and prepare defensive
positions. Lack of preparation time may cause units to maintain a larger reserve force or accept greater risks
than usual. All units must be capable of mounting a defense with minimal preparation, but a strong defense
takes time to organize and prepare. Time is always a critical factor so units must establish clear priorities of
work to provide focus for critical capabilities such as countermobility assets. If an enemy attack does not
take place at the predicted time, units use the additional time to continue improving their position. Units
increase the effectiveness of the security area, establish additional fighting positions (alternate,
supplementary, and subsequent), refine the defensive plan (to include branches and sequels), conduct
defensive rehearsals, and maintain vehicles and personnel.
8-15. To gain time to organize a defense, units may order the security force to conduct a delay while the
main body disengages and moves to more advantageous positions. The security force must know how long
it needs to delay enemy forces for the main body so that it can task-organize and prepare its defense. Security
forces are also given additional tasks to disrupt the enemy’s attack and attrit key enemy formations or |
3-90 | 173 | The Defense
capabilities. These additional tasks help to set the conditions for a successful defense in the main battle area
by separating enemy forces from each other and denying them the ability to mass at their decisive points.
8-16. At the attack’s onset, defending units yield the initiative to enemy forces. However, they exploit the
advantages of prepared, mutually supporting positions organized for all around defense and knowledge of
the terrain to slow the enemy’s momentum. Defending units hinder enemy offensive preparations by using
lethal and nonlethal means to reduce the coherence of the enemy force’s attack and begin to wrest the
initiative from the enemy force. The defending force draws the enemy into engagement areas where
defending forces can initiate combat on their own terms. The defending force surprises the enemy with
concentrated and integrated fires that violently erupt on exposed enemy formations from concealed and
protected positions. Defending units then counterattack enemy forces with repeated unexpected attacks and
they exploit small tactical successes and opportunities to stop the attacker’s momentum.
8-17. The defending force does not have to kill every enemy soldier, squad, or combat system to be
successful. It only has to destroy the enemy’s ability to synchronize a combined arms team or the enemy
soldiers’ will to fight. Those events signal a transition period that affords the defending commander the
opportunity to seize the initiative and return to the offense.
8-18. Units consider the implications of combat on the civilian population. Civilians often affect friendly
combat operations. Units conduct operations in accordance with U.S. and international law. This may mean
that civilians place demands on logistics systems or place themselves in combat areas, influencing fire
coordination measures and synchronization of warfighting functions.
8-19. The common defensive planning considerations addressed in paragraphs 8-20 through 8-133 apply to
all defensive operations. In the defense, synchronizing the elements of combat power allows units to
desynchronize and destroy the enemy. Defensive synchronization normally results from detailed planning
and preparation among the various units participating in an operation. While these activities may be separated
in time and maneuver space, they are synchronized so the enemy feels their combined consequences at
decisive times and places. All defenses are a mix of static and dynamic actions. As an operation evolves,
units shift main and supporting efforts to press the engagement and keep the enemy off balance. Synchronized
prior planning and preparation bolsters the unit’s combat power and increases the effectiveness of the
defense.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
8-20. A defense generally imposes few restrictions on the defending unit. It allows freedom of maneuver
within assigned boundaries but requires units to prevent enemy penetration of the rear boundary. This mission
allows units to distribute forces to suit the terrain and plan an engagement that integrates direct and indirect
fires. Commanders ensure that subordinate unit defensive plans are compatible and that control measures,
such as contact points and phase lines, are sufficient for coordination when assigning areas. The defensive
plan addresses what happens when the defense transitions.
8-21. Defensive operations are often difficult to conduct because the enemy force possesses the initiative
and usually has superior combat power. Defending units may have to frequently shift supporting efforts to
contain the enemy’s attack until the defending force can seize the initiative. This may require units to adjust
subordinate units’ assigned areas, repeatedly commit and reconstitute the reserve, and modify the original
plan.
8-22. Units begin defensive preparations immediately upon moving into position. A technique that units use
is reporting set and established to indicate their level of preparation. “Set” occurs when defending units are
in position and prepared to conduct a hasty defense. “Established” occurs when defending units are prepared
to conduct a deliberate defense according to the base plan.
8-23. Defending units may change task organization to respond to the existing or projected situation, such
as forming a detachment to be left in contact before conducting a withdrawal. Whenever possible, task
organization changes take place between units that have previously trained or operated together to take
advantage of established interpersonal relationships. Task-organized units place special attention on ensuring
that each element directs its efforts toward accomplishing the overall unit’s mission. This requires
commanders to ensure the synchronizing of objectives, control measures, movement routes, and defensive |
3-90 | 174 | Chapter 8
positions as well as ensuring their subordinates understand their specifically assigned tasks. It also requires
using a SOP common to each element of the task-organized unit. Failure to synchronize task-organized
elements has often resulted in mission failure during operations.
8-24. To break through the MBA, the enemy often attacks along boundaries of defending units when they
can be identified. Therefore, units at every echelon ensure that the plan for their part of the defense is properly
coordinated, not only within their units, but also with adjacent and supporting units. Commanders coordinate
by personally visiting subordinate commanders on the ground when possible or by establishing contact
points. Staffs rapidly disseminate coordination decisions to all concerned. Leaders consider these planning
aspects in the coordination process:
* The higher commander’s intent and concept of operations.
* The tactics applied by adjacent and supporting units.
* Control measures that enhance coordination between units.
* Planning for mutual support.
* Information collection and target acquisition.
* Location and composition of security forces.
* Obstacles and demolitions.
* Fires, including employing antitank systems, illumination, and obscuration.
* Air defense coverage areas.
* Employing the reserve in conjunction with fire support systems.
* Communications.
8-25. Because command posts tend to be stationary in the defense, units place them in hardened areas or
protective terrain and reduce their electronic signature. Command posts must remain capable of rapidly
relocating to respond to battlefield developments.
8-26. Defending units typically yield terrain along with the civilian inhabitants—which makes dealing with
those civilians more difficult in the defense than in the offense. However, defending units need to prevent
the uncoordinated movement of dislocated civilians within their assigned area. Such uncoordinated
movements hamper the execution of friendly defenses by hindering the repositioning of defending forces,
the sustainment of defending forces, and the evacuation of casualties. It is also important that the defending
units meet their legal obligations to the civilian inhabitants within their assigned areas.
8-27. Conditions that require conducting denial and stay-behind operations can arise during defensive
operations. These two operations have their own unique planning and execution considerations.
Denial Operations
8-28. Sometimes, enemy units capture a friendly force's equipment and supplies. This situation often occurs
during the conduct of defensive and retrograde operations. To prevent this, defending commanders conduct
denial operations. Denial operations are actions to hinder or deny the enemy the use of terrain, supplies,
or facilities. They may include destroying, removing, and contaminating those supplies and facilities or
erecting obstacles. The principles of denial are—
* Commanders order the destruction of military equipment and supplies only when friendly forces
cannot prevent them from falling into enemy hands.
* Commanders deny enemy forces the use of military equipment and supplies by means of its
destruction, removal, or contamination.
* Steps taken to deny stocks do not preclude their later use by friendly forces, if possible.
* Deliberately destroying medical equipment and supplies and making food and water unfit for
consumption is unlawful under the terms of the Geneva Conventions.
8-29. In denial operations, the definition of a unit's military equipment and supplies could expand to include
military installations and any civilian equipment and supplies used by the friendly force. Only immediate
military necessity permits the destruction of civilian property under the law of war. Determining whether
there is sufficient necessity to justify destruction is a complex decision that requires consideration of moral, |
3-90 | 175 | The Defense
political, and legal considerations. Additionally, civil instability increased by the destruction of civilian
property, material, and equipment could have adverse effects on the outcomes of future operations.
8-30. Commanders who order denial operations consider the potential value of the military equipment and
supplies to an enemy force when determining the priorities and the extent of the operation. Examples of high
priorities for denial include—
* Classified equipment, material, and documents.
* Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (known as POL).
* Sophisticated weapon systems or electronic equipment.
* Heavy weapons and associated ammunition.
* Communications equipment.
* Ferrying and bridging equipment.
* Air, sea, and land transport systems.
* Any other military supplies, equipment, or facilities are a lesser priority in denial operations.
8-31. Denial also prevents an enemy from repairing a system by cannibalizing several systems. Commanders
issue detailed instructions to deny military equipment and supplies to prevent an enemy force from using
them. The unit must destroy the same parts in each type of system.
8-32. Denial differs from countermobility operations because commanders design denial operations to
deprive the enemy force of some, or all, of the short-term benefits of capturing an area. The impact of denial
operations on civilian inhabitants and the environment of the area act as a moral and a legal constraint on
their use by U.S. forces. Commanders involve their legal advisor and civil affairs operations staff in planning
denial operations.
8-33. Commanders ensure that executing the denial plan does not adversely affect the unit's future
operations. This includes carefully considering the force's demolition policy in relation to the purpose of the
rearward movement and the contemplated subsequent actions of the force. Widespread demolitions during a
retrograde may greatly hinder a friendly force moving back into the area more than enemy forces during a
friendly retrograde. For example, destroying the transportation infrastructure increases friendly force
logistics difficulties once friendly forces recapture an area. Removing or destroying militarily significant
supplies and equipment, such as fuel, obstacle materials, and rail cars, from an area requires friendly forces
to bring similar assets with them when they reoccupy an area.
8-34. Commanders can expand a denial operation to prevent enemy forces from exploiting resources, such
as—
* Fuel, minerals, and the civilian population.
* Facilities, such as river locks, railroad switching yards, road interchanges, bridges, and industrial
plants.
* Routes of communication, such as telephone exchanges, radio stations, and television stations.
8-35. The defending force can assist civil authorities in evacuating civilians. The defending force either
removes the resources, supplies, and facilities from areas abandoned to enemy forces or destroys them in
place. Denial operations may be either total or limited.
8-36. Total denial operations can produce long-term political, economic, military, and environmental effects.
Total denial operations have operational level, and possibly strategic level, impact. Total denial operations
consume large quantities of transportation and engineer resources and require considerable time to plan and
execute.
8-37. Limited or partial denial operations are particularly suitable if a defending force expects to regain
control of the area within a short time. The removal or destruction of only a few key components can reduce
a facility to limited utility, yet it allows for the facility's quick restoration of all functions upon its return to
friendly control. American forces only destroy discrete targets of significant military value. Limited denial
operations normally do not affect the advance of properly supported enemy formations possessing cross-
country mobility. However, they can seriously impede an enemy force's road bound and rail bound logistics
support if commanders properly plan and execute them. |
3-90 | 176 | Chapter 8
Stay-Behind Operations
8-38. A stay-behind operation is an operation in which a unit remains in position to conduct a specified
mission while the remainder of the force withdraws or retires from an area. The force for this operation
consists of enough combat, functional and multifunctional support, and sustainment elements to protect and
sustain its fighting capability for the duration of the mission. A stay-behind force may also result from enemy
actions that bypass friendly forces.
8-39. The primary purpose of the stay-behind force is to deceive an enemy force into believing the parent
unit is still in position while most of the unit withdraws and disrupts enemy forces. A stay-behind force is a
high-risk mission because of the potential for its encirclement and destruction by enemy forces. Resupply
and casualty evacuation are also extremely difficult. Commanders consider assigning these missions only
after a thorough analysis of the mission variables. A stay-behind force attacks enemy combat forces and
command nodes, functional and multifunctional support, and sustainment elements from unexpected
directions. These attacks may cause enemy follow-on forces to be more cautious and to slow down to clear
possible attack and ambush sites. Commanders may require the stay-behind force to conduct a breakout from
encirclement and linkup operations after it completes its mission.
8-40. A dismounted, stay-behind infantry force surprises an enemy force by conducting a series of raids and
ambushes. Commanders can insert this infantry force via infiltration, air assault, or airborne operations; it
can also be a bypassed force. Attacks in the enemy support area by friendly armored forces can cover a larger
area than attacks by dismounted infantry forces.
8-41. Stay-behind operations eventually require the stay-behind force to reenter friendly lines or link up with
other elements, often in more than one location. Commanders carefully coordinate this reentry to prevent
friendly fire incidents. Commanders select the best return routes available for the stay-behind force, and they
guard gaps or lanes through obstacles along these routes.
8-42. Commanders conduct stay-behind operations only when confident that the stay-behind force will rejoin
the main body, extract itself in alternative ways, or the main body will fight its way forward to link up with
the stay-behind force. It is critical that the commander and staff develop detailed isolated Soldier guidance
when planning the stay-behind operation. (See FM 3-50 for more information on isolated Soldier guidance.)
8-43. A detachment left in contact is an element left in contact as part of the previously designated
security force while the main body conducts its withdrawal. It simulates—as nearly as possible—the
continued presence of the main body until it is too late for an enemy force to react by conducting activities
such as electronic transmissions or attacks. The detachment left in contact (DLIC) requires specific
instructions about what to do when the enemy force attacks and when and under what circumstances to delay
or withdraw. If the detachment left in contact must disengage from the enemy force, it uses the same
techniques as in the delay. If required, commanders provide these detachments additional recovery,
evacuation, and transportation assets to use after disengagement to speed their rearward movement.
8-44. While both a detachment left in contact and a stay-behind force delay and disrupt the enemy, the
biggest difference is the level of stealth. A stay-behind force delays the enemy through small scale
engagements such as raids and ambushes. A stay-behind force only masses its combat power when combat
power ratios and the tactical situation are in its favor. A detachment left in contact engages the enemy and
tries to represent itself as a larger force, so its presence must be known as it fights in a very conventional
manner. Both forces seek to link-up with friendly forces when they accomplish their commander’s intent.
8-45. Two methods exist to resource the detachment left in contact. The first method is for each major
subordinate element of the withdrawing force to leave a sub element in place. For example, in a BCT
withdrawal, each maneuver battalion leaves a task-organized company team in contact. Typically, these
teams fall under a senior DLIC commander designated by the brigade commander. The second method is
one major subordinate command of the withdrawing force can stay behind as the DLIC. Figure 8-1 depicts a
BCT with three maneuver battalions leaving one task-organized battalion as the detachment left in contact.
That battalion expands its security responsibilities to cover the width of the BCTs' assigned area. |
3-90 | 177 | The Defense
Figure 8-1. Example detachment left in contact
8-46. When a DLIC is used, commanders create an additional security force behind the existing main
defensive positions to assist the withdrawal process. They can create an additional force from the
withdrawing unit or from an assisting unit. The DLIC can conduct a delay for this additional security force
and then join it, or the DLIC can conduct a battle handover and then conduct a rearward passage of lines. In
either case, the additional security force becomes the rear guard.
Civil Considerations
8-47. Units’ defensive concepts of operations address how the preparation and conduct of the defense will
influence the civilian population in their assigned areas. This includes the conduct of noncombatant
evacuation operations for U.S. civilians and other authorized groups. Commanders have legal obligations to
civilian populations in their assigned areas. Ideally, the local nation government will have the capability to
conduct the six primary stability tasks. Defending units conduct only those minimum-essential stability tasks
required by the mission variables and expend only the minimum-essential resources to meet their legal and
ethical responsibilities to civilians during the execution of a defense.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
8-48. Defending units intend to defeat an enemy force’s attack by overwhelming it with direct and indirect
fires before it conducts its final assault on friendly defensive positions. As an enemy force’s attack fails, it
attempts to withdraw or transition to a defense in the face of friendly counterattacks. If enemy forces succeed
in overrunning a key defensive position, the defending force counterattacks to overwhelm enemy forces
before they can either organize a defense or exploit their initial success.
Exploit the Advantages of Terrain
8-49. Units exploit the advantages of occupying the terrain where the battle will occur. The defending force
engages the attacker from locations that give the defending force an advantage. These locations include |
3-90 | 178 | Chapter 8
defiles, rivers, thick woods, swamps, cliffs, canals, built-up areas, and reverse slopes. Effective defensive
positions in the MBA use natural and man-made obstacles. Units may choose to shape the battlefield by
defending in one area to deny terrain to enemy forces while delaying in another area to deceive the enemy
into believing that the attacking enemy force has achieved success.
8-50. Defending units use key terrain to impede an enemy force’s movement and place overwatching
elements in positions to provide early warning and engage enemy forces with indirect fires. These positions
can be located forward of the topographical crest and on the flanks of positions in a valley or depression.
Defending units select terrain that allows the massing of friendly fires and forces the enemy to commit its
forces piecemeal into friendly engagement areas. This exposes portions of the enemy force to destruction
without giving up the advantages of fighting from protected positions. Examples of key terrain include terrain
that permits the defending force to cover a major obstacle system by fire and important road junctions or
choke points that affect troop movements.
8-51. Units determine the probable combat power ratios the defenders will face and establish positions
accordingly. Once defending units arrive at acceptable force ratios—or the degree of risk is clear—they
allocate available forces and begin planning engagement areas. They determine where to engage enemy
forces on each enemy avenue of approach. Defending units array forces on those avenues of approach and
establish engagement areas using obstacles and fires to canalize enemy forces into them. They take actions
to increase the kill probabilities of various weapons systems at different ranges. This includes establishing
range markers for direct fire weapons, confirming the zero on weapons, and clearing obstacles that might
impede wire-guided munitions.
8-52. The seven steps of engagement area development include the following:
* Identify likely enemy avenues of approach.
* Identify most likely enemy course of action.
* Determine where to kill the enemy.
* Position subordinate forces and weapons systems.
* Plan and integrate obstacles.
* Plan and integrate fires.
* Rehearse the execution of operations within the engagement area.
For more information on engagement area development see ATP 3-21.10.
8-53. Generally, defending forces have the advantage of preparing the terrain by reinforcing natural
obstacles, fortifying positions, and rehearsing operations. First, they prepare the ground to force the
piecemeal commitment of the enemy and its subsequent defeat in detail. Second, they identify good locations
for engagement areas along the enemy’s expected avenue of approach, such as in open areas dominated by
terrain that offers adequate cover and concealment for the defending forces. Defending forces use natural and
reinforcing obstacles to compel the enemy into these prepared engagement areas. Units employ and
continuously strengthen obstacles and fortifications to improve the natural defensive strength of a position,
which has a direct bearing on the distribution of forces, frontages, and depth of the defense. Lastly, defending
forces rehearse defensive operations.
8-54. Examples of terrain features that favor the defense include—
* A series of parallel ridges across the line of hostile advance.
* Unfordable streams, swamps, lakes, and other obstacles on the front and flanks.
* High ground with good observation and long-range fields of fire.
* Concealed movement routes immediately behind defensive positions.
* A limited road network in front of the line of contact to confine enemy forces to predictable
avenues of approach.
* A good road network behind the line of contact that allows a defending unit to reposition forces
as the battle progresses.
8-55. The opposite of terrain conditions listed in paragraph 8-54 degrades a force’s ability to conduct
defensive operations. For example, terrain with a limited road network that canalizes the defending force
allows enemy forces to predict its movement and take steps to interdict that movement. |
3-90 | 179 | The Defense
8-56. Units conduct survivability moves among their primary, alternate, supplementary, and subsequent
positions based on the mission variables. A survivability move is a move that involves rapidly displacing a
unit, command post, or facility in response to direct and indirect fires, the approach of a threat or as a
proactive measure based on intelligence, meteorological data, and risk assessment of enemy capabilities and
intentions (ADP 3-90).
Maintain Security
8-57. Units use security operations to prevent enemy forces from determining friendly locations, strengths,
weaknesses, and to preserve combat power. They also try to delay and disrupt an attacking force by making
it deploy prematurely. Defending units can mitigate an attacker’s inherent advantage of initiative regarding
the time, place, plan, direction, strength, and composition of the attack by disrupting enemy formations and
countering reconnaissance efforts, causing them to blindly attack into prepared defenses. Defending units
counter enemy reconnaissance through both active and passive measures. They must not permit enemy
information collection assets to determine the precise location and strength of defensive positions, obstacles,
engagement areas, and reserves. First, the defending force conducts reconnaissance to gain and maintain
contact with the enemy. Second, each echelon normally establishes a security area forward of its MBA. The
security area is separated from the MBA by the FEBA. It extends as far to the front and flanks as necessary
for the security force to deploy. Forces in the security area furnish information on enemy forces and delay,
deceive, and disrupt enemy forces and conduct counterreconnaissance. All units conduct local security
operations within their assigned areas to prevent enemy forces from disrupting operations, to include echelon
support areas. Units implement OPSEC and other protection measures to deny enemy forces information
about friendly dispositions.
Disrupt the Enemy Attack at Every Opportunity
8-58. The defending force conducts operations throughout the depth of the enemy’s formation to destroy key
enemy units and assets, particularly their artillery and reserves, or disrupt their timely introduction into battle
at the point of engagement. This allows the defending force to regain the initiative. The defending force
conducts spoiling attacks to disrupt the enemy force’s concentrations and attack preparations. The defending
force counterattacks enemy successes rapidly with a friendly reserve, the forces at hand, or a striking force
before enemy forces can exploit success. Units use direct fires to mass combat power. Units designate direct
fire control measures to focus, shift, or distribute direct fires on enemy formations or within engagement
areas.
Mass the Effects of Combat Power
8-59. A defending force must mass its combat power to overwhelm enemy forces and regain the initiative.
When required, units use economy of force measures in areas that do not involve the main effort to mass
forces for use at the decisive point. In an area defense, defending units use engagement areas to concentrate
combat power from mutually supporting positions. In a mobile defense, units use the striking force to
generate combat power at decisive points. Another way forces can apply the effects of mass is by committing
the reserve.
8-60. Typically, defending units engage advancing enemy forces using two primary methods—echelonment
of fires and simultaneous fires. In echelonment of fires, units engage an advancing enemy force at the
maximum effective range of available weapon systems. They then employ an increasing volume of fire by
engaging with shorter range systems as the attacking enemy force continues to close on their positions while
continuing to engage the attacker with longer range systems. This allows for defending units to attrit and
defeat enemy forces as far forward of friendly defensive positions as is possible. It also allows the defender
to engage the enemy for longer periods which normally allows for more kills forward of the defender’s
positions. Defending units normally employ this method of engagement against enemy formations of similar
or larger size than defending forces. The major disadvantage of this method is that once defenders employ
indirect fire systems, it allows enemy forces to locate the firing positions of those systems. This allows enemy
forces to engage the defending forces with fires. Also at lower tactical levels, it may make flank shots against
enemy armored systems more difficult to obtain at longer ranges. (See ATP 3-09.42 for more information on
echelonment of fires.) |
3-90 | 180 | Chapter 8
8-61. Another method of engaging an advancing enemy force uses the simultaneous employment of all
weapon systems. This method can draw more enemy forces into an engagement area before firing, preventing
forces further back from bypassing and resulting in a greater shock effect and more kills on first engagement.
However, the engagement occurs at a much closer range, and the mass and momentum of attacking enemy
forces may still carry them into friendly positions. This method is ideal for use in situations where parts of
the attacking enemy force are isolated from the direct fire support of the rest of the enemy force. This might
occur when employing a reverse slope defense or defending from an attacking enemy element that is
considerably smaller or possesses significantly less lethal capabilities than the defending force. In this case,
the defending unit entices the majority of the attacking enemy force to enter friendly engagement areas.
Armored and Stryker Forces
8-62. When most of a defending force consists of units equipped with armored combat vehicles, units
conduct a defense designed to take advantage of the tactical mobility and protection offered by them. Combat
vehicles provide defending forces with the capability to maneuver and delay the advance of an enemy force
and then immediately change from a delay to a mobile defense or counterattack. Forces equipped with
armored combat vehicles are well suited for use as security and MBA forces. Armored and Stryker forces are
better suited for operations within a CBRN environment than dismounted infantry forces are because of their
organic collective protection systems.
Dismounted Infantry Forces
8-63. When facing enemy dismounted forces, units deploy and use defending dismounted infantry forces in
the same way as they use defending armored and Stryker forces against enemy armored and motorized forces.
Dismounted infantry forces facing an armored enemy force are primarily used in static roles within the MBA
or in security roles in the echelon support area. They are also most effective when fighting from prepared
defenses or in restricted terrain, such as swamps, woods, hilly and mountainous areas, and urban areas.
Dismounted infantry forces can take advantage of their stealth and ability to move through restrictive terrain
to place weapon systems in unexpected locations undetected. However, they are far more vulnerable than
armored forces to direct and indirect fires, especially when away from prepared defenses and overhead cover.
8-64. Units use airborne and air assault units in the same manner as other dismounted forces once they deploy
into their drop zones or landing zones. However, there may be problems in extracting a committed airborne
or air assault force, particularly if it is in direct contact with the enemy. Use of an airborne force in a reserve
role requires its proximity to readily available certified airdrop crews and aircraft and is therefore generally
unsuited as a reserve. Because of its inherent mobility and potential reaction speed, an air assault force is
often well suited for a reserve role during the conduct of the defense, but also faces restrictions based on
weather. Their role as a dismounted reserve might include the following tasks:
* Rapid reinforcement of a threatened position.
* Establishment of a blocking position, possibly in conjunction with existing defensive positions.
* Echelon support area security operations, such as containment of an enemy airborne or air assault.
* Reinforcement of encircled friendly forces.
* Flank protection.
Aviation Forces
8-65. Aviation forces—rotary, fixed wing, and unmanned aircraft systems—are particularly valuable in the
defense because of their speed, mobility, and versatility. Their tasks can include—
* Reconnaissance and security operations.
* Disrupting, destroying, and delaying enemy forces in the deep and close areas.
* Counterattacks and spoiling attacks.
* Controlling the ground for limited periods where a unit does not wish to commit ground forces
irrevocably (for example, forward of an executed obstacle).
* Closing gaps in a defense plan before the arrival of ground maneuver forces.
* Defeating enemy penetrations. |
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* Facilitating the disengagement of ground forces.
* Countering enemy activities in the echelon support area, in particular enemy airborne or air assault
forces.
* Resupplying defending forces with Class IV barrier material or facilitating casualty evacuation.
* Assisting in the countermobility effort.
These tasks may require additional ground forces to achieve the desired effect.
Ensure Mutual Support
8-66. Mutual support exists when positions and units reinforce each other with direct and indirect fires, thus
preventing the enemy from attacking one position without one or more adjacent positions subjecting it to
fires. Mutual support increases the strength of all defensive positions, prevents defeat in detail, and helps
prevent infiltration between positions. Tactical positions achieve maximum degree of mutual support when
they are located to observe or monitor the ground between their positions or conduct patrols to prevent any
enemy infiltration. During periods of limited visibility, units position small tactical units closer together to
retain the advantages of mutual support. Unit leaders coordinate the nature and extent of their mutual support.
Countermobility
8-67. In the defense, units normally prioritize engineer efforts on countermobility and survivability over
mobility. This means that defending units typically require large quantities of Class IV and Class V material
and specialized equipment to construct obstacles and fighting and survivability positions. Units ensure that
they synchronize these efforts with their sustainment plans.
8-68. Units plan to canalize enemy forces into a salient. In this case, they take advantage of the enemy force’s
forward orientation by fixing the enemy force and then delivering a blow to the enemy force’s flank or rear.
As an enemy’s attacking force culminates and assumes a defensive posture, friendly defending units rapidly
coordinate and concentrate all fires against unprepared and unsupported segments of the attacking enemy
force. Friendly forces may deliver these fires simultaneously or sequentially.
8-69. When planning obstacles, units consider not only current operations but also future operations. They
design obstacles for current operations, so they do not hinder future operations. Units can designate certain
obstacles to shape the battlefield as high priority reserved obstacles. Units assign responsibility for
preparation of reserved obstacles to a subordinate unit but retain authority for ordering their completion. One
example of a reserved obstacle is a destruction of a highway bridge over a major river. Such obstacles receive
the highest priority in preparation and, if ordered, execution by the designated subordinate unit.
8-70. Units integrate reinforcing obstacles with existing obstacles to improve the natural restrictive nature
of the terrain to halt or slow enemy movement, canalize enemy movement into engagement areas, and protect
friendly positions and maneuver. They must integrate their obstacles with fires to be effective. This requires
the ability to deliver effective fires well beyond the obstacle’s location. When possible, units conceal
obstacles from hostile observation. They coordinate obstacle plans with adjacent units and conform to the
obstacle zone or belts of higher echelons.
8-71. Effective obstacles block, turn, fix, disrupt, or force the enemy to attempt to breach them. A defending
unit tries to predict enemy points of breach based on terrain and probable enemy objectives. A defending
force develops means to counter enemy breach attempts, such as pre-coordinated fires. The attacker will try
to conceal the time and location of the breach. The defending unit’s plan addresses how to counter such a
breach, to include reestablishing the obstacle by using scatterable mines and other techniques.
8-72. Improvement to the defense is continuous. Given time and resources, a defending force constructs
additional obstacle systems in depth, paying special attention to its assailable flanks and rear. The rear is
especially vulnerable if noncontiguous assigned areas or nontraditional threats exist. Obstacle systems can
provide additional protection from enemy attacks by forcing an enemy to spend time and resources to breach
or bypass them. This gives the defending force more time to engage enemy forces attempting to execute
breach or bypass operations.
8-73. Units designate the subordinate unit responsible for establishing and securing each obstacle. They may
retain execution authority for some obstacles or restrict the use of some types of obstacles to allow other |
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battlefield activities to occur. Units allow subordinate units some flexibility in selecting the exact positioning
of obstacles. However, all units must know which gaps or lanes—through obstacles and crossing sites—to
keep open for movements, as well as the firing and self-destruct times of scatterable mines to prevent delays
in movement. Units follow specific and clear orders for executing reserve obstacles and closing lanes. As
each lane closes, the closing unit reports the lane’s closure to the higher echelon, subordinate, and adjacent
headquarters to preclude displacing units from moving into unmarked or abandoned obstacles.
8-74. Primarily company-sized and smaller units construct protective obstacles. Leaders within these small
units ensure that observation and fires cover all obstacles to hinder breaching. Deliberate protective obstacles
are common around fixed sites. Protective obstacles are a key component of survivability operations. They
are tied in with final protective fires and provide friendly forces with close-in protection. Units at all echelons
track defensive preparations, such as establishing Class IV and Class V supply points and start or completion
times of obstacle belts and groups. Commanders use artillery, air, or ground systems to reseed minefields
that an enemy has breached. (See Chapter 17 for further information on combined arms countermobility
operations.)
Mobility
8-75. During the defense, mobility tasks include maintaining routes, coordinating gaps in existing obstacles,
and supporting counterattacks. Engineers also open helicopter landing zones and tactical landing strips for
fixed-wing aircraft. Maintaining and improving routes and creating bypass or alternate routes at critical points
are major engineering tasks because movement routes are subject to fires from enemy artillery and air support
systems. These enemy fires may necessitate deploying engineer equipment forward, such as assault bridging
and bulldozers. Units can also evacuate or restrict movement of dislocated civilians to routes not required by
friendly forces to avoid detracting from the mobility of the defending force. A unit’s coordination with
available civil affairs forces, intergovernmental and nongovernmental entities, and potentially local nation
government officials can also assist units in preserving their combat power.
8-76. Typically, a unit’s priority of mobility support is to routes used by counterattacking forces, then to
routes used by main body forces displacing to subsequent positions. Mobility support mainly involves
reducing obstacles and improving or constructing combat roads and trails to allow tactical support vehicles
to accompany moving combat vehicles. Units coordinate carefully to ensure units leave lanes or gaps in
obstacles for repositioning main body units and committing the counterattack force. CBRN reconnaissance
systems also contribute to the force’s mobility in a contaminated environment.
Obscuration
8-77. Units use obscuration to disrupt the enemy’s assault or movement formations and to deny the enemy’s
use of target acquisition optics, visual navigation aids, air avenues of approach, landing zones, and drop
zones. Obscuration creates gaps in enemy formations, separates or isolates attacking units, and disrupts
enemy planned movements. Bispectral obscuration can blind attackers who lack thermal viewers or other
enhanced optical systems. It prevents overwatching enemy elements from observing and engaging the
defender, while defending forces with advanced optical systems can acquire and engage the enemy within
the smoke. The commander can use smoke to facilitate friendly target acquisition by highlighting enemy
systems against a light background while degrading the enemy’s optics. Smoke used to mask obstacles
located in low-level flight corridors and on landing and drop zones can prevent an enemy from using these
drop zones or greatly increase the enemy’s risk.
8-78. Units use smoke-generation capabilities to mark targets and screen or obscure friendly positions. They
must carefully employ obscurants with regard to enemy systems and friendly capabilities. Improper use can
create an advantage for the enemy. The effectiveness of smoke depends on weather conditions and the
quantity of smoke employed. Units coordinate the use of smoke generators, artillery or mortar smoke, and
smoke pot employment. These smoke-producing systems are most effective when used together to achieve
synergistic effects. Using smoke can also enhance military deception operations and cover friendly
movements. (See ATP 3-11.50 for more information on planning, preparing, and executing battlefield
obscuration.) |
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Limited-Visibility Adjustments
8-79. The ability of attacking forces to create conditions of limited visibility—including thermal neutralizing
smoke—and the smoke and dust associated with a battle also means that defending units must be able to
rapidly modify their defense to one that is effective during limited visibility. Defending units should plan for
limited visibility rather than full visibility during defensive planning. In this case, defending units may need
to move closer to the avenues of approach they are guarding. Sensors may still have some value in these
conditions.
8-80. Units can expect attacking enemy forces to create or take advantage of limited-visibility conditions.
Defending units expect attacking forces to take advantage of limited-visibility conditions to—
* Conduct reconnaissance operations to locate the defending force’s weapons, defensive obstacles,
and positions.
* Breach or reduce defensive obstacles.
* Move elements through gaps in the defending forces coverage caused by reduced weapon ranges.
8-81. A valid defensive plan includes these items to help overcome potential limited-visibility problems:
* Long-range detection equipment, such as radar, sensors, and thermal imaging devices, focused on
well-defined avenues of approach. Employing multiple means in the same area of interest
improves the likelihood of detection.
* Deployed weapons systems and some units along avenues of approach that follow terrain features
potentially used by an enemy force for orientation in darkness, such as wood lines and water
courses.
* Increased numbers of infantry, scouts, observation posts, combat patrols, and anti-armor teams
deployed forward on secondary avenues of approach and between subordinate unit defensive
positions to detect and slow enemy movement, especially enemy infiltration attempts, and protect
obstacles against enemy breaching attempts.
* Emplaced point obstacles and early warning devices along likely night approaches to slow
advancing enemy forces or to alert defenders to enemy presence.
* Planned and rehearsed weapons systems and unit displacements and the massing of fires on
projected enemy approaches. (Defending units moving over previously reconnoitered routes
should be able to move faster than an enemy force moving through unfamiliar terrain.)
* Planned illumination on or behind likely engagement areas to silhouette enemy forces while
leaving defenders in shadows and darkness.
* Adjustments to the organization of the defense for limited visibility that commence before dark
and are completely reversed to their daylight configuration before dawn.
INTELLIGENCE
8-82. During the planning process, units use intelligence to identify probable enemy objectives and avenues
of approach. From those probable objectives and avenues of approach, they develop NAIs and TAIs. Units
study patterns of enemy operations and an enemy force’s vulnerability to counterattack, interdiction,
electromagnetic warfare, air attacks, and canalization by obstacles. Units also examine an enemy force’s
capability to conduct air attacks, insert forces behind friendly units, and employ CBRN weapons. Units also
determine how soon a follow-on enemy force can join an engagement when they are defending against an
enemy attacking in echelons.
8-83. Commanders direct their information collection assets to determine the locations, strengths, and
probable intentions of attacking enemy forces before and throughout their defense. They prioritize early
identification of the enemy's main effort within their assigned areas. Commanders may need to complement
information collection operations with combat actions that test enemy intentions. Fighting for information
can have two benefits: it can make enemy forces reveal their intentions and their preparations.
8-84. Units use available information collection assets—such as geospatial intelligence, ground surveillance,
and reconnaissance—to study the terrain. By studying the terrain, they try to determine the principal enemy
and friendly mounted, dismounted, and air avenues of approach. Units determine the most advantageous area
for the enemy force’s main attack, as well as other mission variables. Just as in the offense, the echelon |
3-90 | 184 | Chapter 8
intelligence and operations officers, in coordination with the rest of the staff, develop a synchronized and
integrated information collection plan that satisfies the unit’s maneuver, targeting, and information
requirements.
8-85. A unit’s ability to see enemy forces is critical to the conduct of the defense. Defensive plans must
address the sustainment, replacement, and reconstitution of information collection assets throughout the
preparation and execution of the defense. In the defense, the performance of information collection tasks
overlaps unit planning and preparing phases. Leaders performing these tasks often deploy within their
assigned areas before their units fully develop their plans. These leaders need to respond to changes in
orientation and mission. Commanders ensure that their staffs fully plan, prepare, and assess the execution of
their information collection synchronization plans to ensure that all their commander's critical information
requirements are answered to inform their overall plans.
FIRES
8-86. In the defense, units use fires to neutralize, suppress, or destroy enemy forces; to delay or disrupt an
enemy force’s ability to execute a given COA; and to enhance the effects of massed direct fires. Thus, fire
support systems support both the commander’s main and supporting efforts.
8-87. A defending force is more effective if it can locate and attack enemy forces while they are stationary
and concentrated in assembly areas or advancing along LOCs, as opposed to when attacking enemy forces
deploy in combat formations within the MBA. To accomplish this, a defending force must employ available
indirect and joint fires throughout its assigned area and closely link them to target acquisition means, such as
information collection assets.
8-88. As defensive plans develop, units visualize how to synchronize, coordinate, and distribute the effects
of indirect and direct fire at the decisive time and place. They place permissive FSCMs as close as possible
to friendly positions to enable the rapid engagement of attacking enemy forces by indirect and joint fires.
Units coordinate the massing of fires effects on enemy targets, concentrated at obstacles and other choke
points, before enemy forces can disperse. Proper distribution of fires ensures the massing of overwhelming
combat power at these points and ensures the destruction or neutralization of high-payoff targets without
wasting assets through repetitive engagements by multiple friendly systems.
8-89. Effects from multiple domains have the greatest impact on an enemy when units synchronize them
with direct fires, obstacles, and counterattack plans. Units integrate the fire support and obstacle plans from
the beginning of planning for a defense. Indirect fires complement the effects of obstacles and can disrupt
enemy attempts to breach or bypass these obstacles. All elements in the fire support chain must understand
the commander’s intent, the scheme of maneuver, and the obstacle plan.
8-90. Various fire support considerations exist for each phase of the defense. As part of shaping operations
or supporting efforts during defense preparations, units try to disrupt an enemy force’s attack preparations
by—
* Employing indirect fires on choke points and likely enemy force assembly areas.
* Employing air support on known, suspected, and likely enemy force locations.
* Attriting enemy resources by continuously engaging high-payoff targets.
* Conducting electromagnetic warfare to degrade the enemy force’s ability to command and control
forces.
* Employing counterfires to engage and destroy enemy artillery and mortar systems attempting to
deliver suppressive fires.
* Providing fires in support of the unit’s security operations, such as a unit conducting the tactical
mission task of counterreconnaissance.
8-91. Units may want to wait to execute a counterfire mission until an engagement begins in the MBA.
However, when defending forces enjoy qualitative advantages in fire support, the advantages gained from a
counterfire battle usually outweigh the risks to the defending force. The defender’s ability to mass fires
quickly and then rapidly reposition forces is a major factor in disrupting enemy forces and establishing the
conditions for successful defensive operations. |
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8-92. Units employ fires to support the security force, using precision and other munitions to destroy enemy
reconnaissance elements and other high-payoff targets. This also helps to deceive enemy forces about the
location of the MBA. Units support their security forces by planning the delivery of fires at appropriate times
and places throughout their assigned areas to slow and canalize an enemy force as it approaches the security
area. This allows defending security forces to engage enemy forces on favorable terms. To prevent fratricide
and friendly fire incidents, units place no-fire areas over security force elements. Finally, defending units use
fires to support the withdrawal of the security force once the security force’s shaping operation is complete
and the defending unit is prepared to conduct MBA operations.
8-93. Air support can play an important part in attriting or destroying enemy forces. Often, only aircraft are
available to oppose an enemy penetration until ground forces can redeploy. Units use air interdiction and
close air support to disrupt an enemy advance. Close air support can operate with Army helicopters and
artillery assets. Additionally, units can incorporate artillery fires with electromagnetic warfare and joint
systems to suppress enemy air defenses while aircraft engage targets. Air interdiction can delay, destroy, or
neutralize enemy follow-on forces, thereby providing the unit with additional time to prepare defensive
positions.
8-94. Once the engagement moves into the MBA, fire support assets continue to target enemy combat units
to force them to deploy. At the same time, these assets inflict casualties, disrupt the cohesion of the enemy’s
attack, and impede the enemy’s ability to mass combat power. Fire support assets continue to attack an enemy
follow-on force before it can be committed to the MBA. Fire support assets attack enemy command and
control facilities and logistics sites in depth to isolate the attacking enemy force. Units take advantage of the
range and flexibility of fire support weapons to mass fires at critical points, such as obstacles and engagement
areas, to slow and canalize the enemy force to provide better targets for direct fire systems. Fire support
systems cover barriers, gaps, and open areas within the MBA. Units assign tasks to these fire support systems,
including closing obstacle gaps or reseeding previously breached obstacles in accordance with the rules of
engagement. Other tasks include—
* Massing fires to suppress enemy direct and indirect fire systems to facilitate defensive maneuver,
especially counterattack and disengagement.
* Neutralizing or isolating enemy forces that have penetrated the defensive area and impeding the
movement of enemy reserves.
* Attacking enemy artillery and forward air defense elements.
* Using jamming to degrade or disrupt the enemy force’s ability to transmit data and information.
* Reallocating fire support assets, after identifying the enemy’s main effort, to reinforce fires in the
most vulnerable areas.
* Disrupting the enemy combined arms team through such action as separating attacking enemy
combat vehicles from enemy dismounted infantry.
8-95. In response to shallow enemy penetrations, artillery units normally reposition their systems laterally,
away from the points of enemy penetration. This allows the defender’s artillery systems to provide fire
support throughout the area of penetration.
SUSTAINMENT
8-96. Units address several unique sustainment considerations in the defensive plan. Priorities for
replenishment are normally ammunition and materials to construct caching ammunition and limited amounts
of petroleum products. Units place these materials in centrally located positions within obstacles and
defensive positions. There is normally a reduced need for bulk fuel in the defense compared to the offense.
There may be an increased demand for decontaminants and CBRN collective and personal protective
equipment. Units consider stockpiling for the MBA. If necessary, units plan to destroy those stocks as part
of a delay. The supply of obstacle materials in a defense can be a significant problem that requires detailed
coordination and long lead times. Units are careful to not overlook the transportation assets and personnel
required in obtaining, moving, and uncrating barrier material and associated obstacle-creating munitions,
such as demolition charges and mines.
8-97. Commanders ensure that echelon sustainment officers and sustainment unit commanders supporting
the defending force understand the commander’s tactical intent. Sustainment officers can then establish |
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support priorities in accordance with the commander’s intent and plan sustainment operations to ensure the
supportability of the operation. Units also address sustainment during branches and sequels to the defense
plan, such as a counterattack into the flank of an adjacent unit.
8-98. Maneuver units resupply regularly and maintain supply stocks in case an enemy breakthrough disrupts
the replenishment flow. At the battalion and BCT levels, units ensure combat configured loads are delivered
to maneuver units regularly. Combat configured loads are packages of potable and non-potable water; CBRN
defense supplies; barrier materials; ammunition; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; medical supplies; and repair
parts tailored to a specific-sized unit. This eliminates the need to request supplies and reduces the chance that
a lapse in communications interrupts the supply flow and jeopardizes the integrity of the defense. Units
resupply the supported maneuver unit using this push system until it requests otherwise. Units can use utility
and cargo helicopters to deliver supplies directly from the echelon support area to the defending unit. Units
use information systems to tailor these combat-configured push packages to the demands of the supported
maneuver units.
8-99. If defending units do not expect enemy forces to conduct a limited-visibility attack, the defending force
can conduct resupply during periods of limited visibility. This reduces the chance for enemy interference
with the resupply process, but it also lengthens the amount of time it takes to complete the process. If
defending units expect the enemy to conduct a limited-visibility attack, they conduct resupply during
daylight. When enemy forces possess significant air, satellite, or unmanned aircraft capabilities, friendly
forces may be required to infiltrate resupply vehicles to reduce the chance of enemy detection.
8-100. Terrain management is a critical consideration in the echelon support area. Units position each
sustainment unit where it can best fulfill its support tasks while using minimal resources to maintain security
in conjunction with other units located in the echelon support area. In contiguous operations, units position
echelon sustainment facilities farther away from the forward edge of the battle area in a defense than in an
offense to avoid interfering with the movement of units between BPs or the forward movement of
counterattack forces. These facilities are located far enough behind friendly lines that likely enemy advances
do not compel the relocation of critical sustainment capabilities at inopportune times. However, those
sustainment capabilities supporting the unit must be close enough to provide responsive support. In
noncontiguous operations, units position sustainment facilities in areas within the perimeters of ground
maneuver units to provide security and avoid interrupting their sustainment functions. Units distribute similar
functional sustainment units throughout the defensive area in both environments. This distribution allows
them to designate one sustainment unit to pick up the workload of a displacing second sustainment until the
second sustainment unit is once again operational.
8-101. Defending units provide maintenance support as far forward as possible at maintenance collection
points to reduce the need to evacuate equipment. The purpose of the maintenance effort is to fix as far forward
as possible those systems that can return to maneuver units in combat-ready condition. Units ensure that
multifunctional forward logistics elements contain the maximum variety of maintenance personnel with
appropriate equipment, such as repair sets, kits, and outfits, to repair weapon systems quickly.
8-102. Medical support associated with the defense anticipates significant casualties just as in the offense.
Units plan to augment available ambulances if a mass casualty situation develops. Units should always plan
for mass casualties and have an evacuation plan, including ambulance exchange points and air evacuation,
which accounts for the use of both standard and nonstandard air and ground platforms.
8-103. The conduct of troop movements and resupply convoys is critical to a successful defense. Units
balance terrain management, movement planning, and traffic circulation control priorities. They plan
multiple routes throughout the assigned areas and closely control their use. They may allocate mobility
resources to maintain main supply routes to support units and supplies moving forward and to evacuate
personnel and equipment to the rear. Military police ease these movements, prevent congestion, and respond
to maneuver plan changes. Units plan for dislocated civilians and the effect that they have on friendly military
operations. Civil affairs staff assist units in planning populace and resources control measures. Local nation
and international organizations minimize the impact of disaster or conflict on dislocated civilians. Units
coordinate air and ground movements supporting their scheme of maneuver with any other affected Services.
They also coordinate such movements with any affected organic and external Army aviation, fire support,
air defense, and ground maneuver units. |
3-90 | 187 | The Defense
8-104. During the preparatory phase of the defense, sustainment operators normally pre-position supply
stocks, particularly ammunition and barrier materials, in the BPs of defending forces. They also establish
maintenance and casualty collection points. Sustainment operators address these and other sustainment
preparations in the planning process to avoid compromising the operation. Units can include sustainment
preparations in their military deception plans.
PROTECTION
8-105. Unit survivability is critical to defensive success. Protection preserves subordinate unit capabilities
so that units can use those capabilities to apply maximum combat power at the desired times and places.
Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations for units in
determining protection priorities. They use available decision support tools and analyses to assess the unit’s
critical assets and key vulnerabilities. Units plan and prepare for enemy attacks by predicting where the next
attack will occur and applying measures to mitigate the attack. These enemy attacks may be from
conventional, irregular, or terrorist forces and drive changes in local unit protection or individual protective
measures. Incident management plans and environmental considerations integrate the protection tasks and
their associated systems. The protection tasks discussed in paragraphs 8-106 through 8-133 have additional
defense-specific planning considerations not addressed in Chapter 1. (See ADP 3-37 for more information
on protection tasks.)
Survivability
8-106. Since an attacking enemy force usually has the initiative in terms of where and when it will attack,
a defending unit takes many actions to protect the force from losses due to enemy actions. The survivability
effort for the defense enables units to concentrate firepower from fixed positions. To avoid detection through
the forms of contact and destruction by enemy forces, units move frequently and establish survivability
positions quickly. To provide flexibility, units may need primary, alternate, supplementary, and sequential
positions. This is particularly true of units defending key or decisive terrain. Units enhance their survivability
by using concealment, military deception, dispersion, masking, and field fortifications. Units avoid
predictable defensive preparations because enemy forces tend to attack lightly defended areas.
8-107. When preparing area and mobile defenses, engineers supporting the defensive effort help maneuver
and supporting units prepare fighting and survivability positions. Units locate these positions throughout the
defending unit’s assigned areas from the security area, through the MBA, to the echelon support area. BCTs
pass survivability requirements beyond the capabilities of their brigade engineer battalions to the current
operations integrating cell in their higher echelon headquarters. That headquarters then tasks a maneuver
enhancement brigade or functional engineer brigade to provide the required support based on the mission
variables. These engineers also prepare any strongpoints required by the concept of operations.
8-108. Survivability tasks include preparing and constructing trenches; command post shelters; and artillery
firing, radar, and combat vehicle fighting positions. Units provide guidance on the level of protection—such
as hull defilade or overhead cover, system priorities, and early use of specialized engineer systems that can
construct survivability positions. Their priority in engineer survivability planning during defensive operations
is determining the most appropriate locations and standards for the construction of survivability positions.
This includes such things as determining overhead cover standards, such as capable of resisting penetration
by 82mm mortar or 152mm howitzer shells.
8-109. Units protect supplies against blast, shrapnel, incendiaries, and CBRN contamination. They can
protect supplies loaded on tactical vehicles against almost anything but a direct hit by constructing berms
large enough to accommodate vehicles and deep enough to keep supplies below ground level. These berms
may not provide the desired degree of protection against an enemy force using indirect fire or cluster
munitions. The echelon engineer officer can advise sustainment operators about storage area sites that reduce
the requirements for engineer survivability support without reducing the degree of protection provided.
8-110. The defending unit’s subordinate maneuver elements occupy their assigned areas as soon as possible.
This allows those units to have as much time as possible to prepare their defensive positions and enhance the
defensive characteristics of the terrain within those assigned areas. This includes the construction of fighting
and survivability positions. |
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8-111. Units employ three principles to enhance the concealment of their defensive positions from ground
and aerial observation—siting, discipline, and construction:
* Siting means selecting the most advantageous position in which to hide a person, an object, or an
activity. This is often the shadows provided by wood lines and buildings.
* Strict concealment discipline by units and individual Soldiers is required for success in any
concealment effort. Units avoid activities that change the appearance of an area or reveal the
presence of military equipment. Laxness and carelessness reveal positions. Tracks, spoil, and
debris are the most common signs of military activity that indicate concealed objects. Units ensure
that new tracks follow existing paths, roads, fences, or natural lines in the terrain pattern. Units do
not end exposed routes at a position but extend them to another logical termination. Units brush
out, camouflage, or cover their tracks, if practical. Units cover or place spoil and debris on
positions and equipment to blend with the surroundings. Units add artificial camouflage when the
terrain and natural vegetation are inadequate for concealment.
* Construction involves adding natural materials to blend with the surrounding terrain.
8-112. Leaders ensure Soldiers understand the importance, principles, and techniques of camouflage. All
personnel must ensure the effectiveness of all camouflage measures and maintain strict camouflage
discipline. In addition to hiding equipment, units can avoid detection by using techniques such as placing
mud on glassy surfaces and unfilled sandbags over windshields.
8-113. Major defensive positions, sustainment sites, command posts, and other facilities may require special
camouflage. Camouflage measures that provide this protection include constructing dummy positions and
decoys. Units carefully plan the use of such measures within the framework of real positions and ongoing
and future operations. Five fundamental methods work to camouflage and conceal individual weapons, units,
installations, and activities—hiding, blending, disguising, disrupting, and decoying:
* Hiding is the complete concealment of an object by some form of physical screen. For example,
sod placed over mines hides the mines; the overhead canopy of trees hides the objects beneath
from aerial observation; tunnels hide objects located within them; a building’s roof and walls,
camouflage net, or tarpaulin hides objects beneath them; and a defilade position hides objects from
ground observation. In some cases, the screen may be invisible. In other instances, the screen may
be visible, but it hides the activity behind it.
* Blending is arranging or applying camouflage materials on, over, and around an object so that it
appears to be part of the background. Examples include applying face paint to the exposed areas
of skin, and adding burlap, paint, and live vegetation to helmets and clothing to closely resemble
or blend into the background. Units can apply the same technique for equipment or structures.
* Disguising is the intentional misleading of the enemy about the friendly force’s identity, strength,
and intention, and may draw enemy fire from real assets. Therefore, the simulation of objects,
pieces of equipment, or activities may have military significance. Inflatable tanks, tents, and
buildings can look like the real thing to an aerial observer.
* Disrupting is the technique that alters or eliminates regular patterns and target characteristics.
Disrupting techniques include pattern painting, deploying camouflage nets over selected portions
of a target, and using shape disrupters (such as camouflage sails) to eliminate regular target
patterns.
* Decoying is the technique that deploys a false or simulated target within a target scene or in a
position where the enemy might conclude that it has found the correct target. Decoys generally
draw fire away from real targets. Depending on their fidelity and deployment, decoys greatly
enhance survivability.
8-114. Units employ damage limiting measures as part of unit survivability measures. These measures
attempt to limit damage if enemy forces detect the position. Damage limiting measures make enemy forces
destroy friendly equipment one piece at a time and use multiple attacks. Enemy forces should never be able
to put a unit out of action with just a single attack. One type of damage limiting measure is units disperse to
limit the damage done by an enemy attack. Dispersed troops and vehicles make attacking forces concentrate
on single, small targets in which system or target location inaccuracies may cause enemy weapons systems
to miss intended targets. An enemy force may employ any cluster munitions to counter friendly dispersion
efforts. The wider the dispersion of unit personnel and equipment, the greater the potential for limiting |
3-90 | 189 | The Defense
damage. This can also make it harder to mass effects. Units position forces and installations to avoid
congestion, but do not disperse them to the extent that there is a risk of defeat in detail by an enemy force
employing conventional munitions or weapons of mass destruction.
8-115. Units also use cover to limit the amount of damage and casualties that they can receive because of
an enemy attack. Folds in the earth, natural depressions, trees, buildings, and walls offer cover; individuals
and units seek them out and use them habitually. If units deploy in flat terrain lacking cover, digging in or
sandbagging can offer some protection. The unit employs obscuration if it is moving and cannot use natural
cover or cannot build fortifications. Obscurants (including smoke) make target acquisition much more
difficult for attacking forces. The defending unit must do everything it can to avoid an attack in the first place
as part of its survivability measures, but if it is attacked, it uses cover and dispersion to limit the amount of
damage.
8-116. In addition to cover and concealment units employ tactical deception to increase their survivability.
This can include use of decoys, frequent repositioning of units, and construction of false battle positions.
(See Chapter 19 for more information on tactical deception.)
Air and Missile Defense
8-117. Army AMD units will not normally be positioned to provide AMD support to security forces in the
defending unit’s security area. Short-range air defense units may be assigned or attached to defending units
to support maneuver forces and protect critical static assets. They may be able to range portions of the MBA
to provide some general support. Generally, defending ground forces depend on offensive and defensive
counterair warfare operations conducted by fixed-wing aircraft and short- and long-range surface-to-air
missiles for defense against enemy aircraft and missiles. Defending ground units employ small arms air
defense against enemy aircraft attacking their positions and enemy UASs.
8-118. Air and missile defense supports the conduct of the defense by engaging targets throughout the
assigned area with air and missile defense fires and defensive counterair operations. In the defense, general
fire support considerations for supporting the concept of operations include—
* Planning for target acquisition and sensors to provide coverage of NAIs, TAIs, and critical assets.
* Providing fires in support of defensive counterair operations to prevent enemy aerial attacks.
* Providing integrated air and missile defense fires in synchronization with maneuver and
electromagnetic warfare countermeasures in the conduct of decisive and shaping operations.
* Providing fires to support counterattacks.
* Providing fires in support of main and supporting efforts.
See JP 3-01 for additional information on joint counterair operations.
Force Health Protection
8-119. Defensive operations can result in prolonged occupation of static positions and corresponding
exposure of personnel and equipment to weather and other environmental effects or health threats that can
quickly degrade readiness. Proper planning and employment of force health protection asset to mitigate
potential health threats is critical to conducting defensive operations. Units enforce environmental
disciplines, such as hydration, field hygiene and sanitation, protective clothing, and maintenance. Defensive
operations also may entail sustained enemy bombardments resulting in dramatic effects on the mental and
behavioral health of unit personnel. Soldiers can become combat ineffective from heavy indirect fire, even if
exposure is for short durations. Units deliberately emplace systems for combat and operational stress
identification and treatment to reduce the return to duty time of affected personnel.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
8-120. Defending units in static positions are vulnerable to CBRN threats and hazards. Units specify the
degree of acceptable risk and establish priorities for their CBRN assets. They must balance the dispersion of
forces and installations to increase CBRN survivability with the ability to mass overwhelming combat power
to defeat enemy forces. |
3-90 | 190 | Chapter 8
8-121. Units develop, train, and rehearse a CBRN protection plan to protect personnel and equipment from
CBRN hazards. Units conduct mission-oriented protective posture level analysis results to determine initial
individual protective equipment levels, decontaminants, water, and other CBRN equipment requirements.
Higher echelon headquarters often establish the mission-oriented protective posture level. Force health
personnel maintain situational awareness and surveillance of personnel strength information for indications
of force contamination, epidemics, or other anomalies apparent in force health data. Units ensure that they
can conduct CBRN defense measures including surveillance, protection and decontamination of military
personnel and equipment. Commanders are responsible for CBRN passive defense training to prepare the
unit to operate in a CBRN environment.
8-122. CBRN personnel contribute to the overall protection of units located in defensive positions. Units
employ CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance elements along movement routes and at potential choke
points. CBRN vulnerability assessments provide a list of recommended preventive measures for units to
consider before and after they move into their defensive positions. These assessments provide a list of
preventive measures that can range from mission-oriented protective posture levels, CBRN agent
characteristics on persistency and volatility, to establishing or activating collective protection systems and
establishing personnel and equipment decontamination sites. Proper use of CBRN assets enables units to
reduce casualties and complete the mission. (See FM 3-11 for more information on CBRN operations.)
Operations Security
8-123. As part of the defense, the echelon’s OPSEC program and any military deception or survivability
efforts should conceal the locations of defensive positions, engineer support, the disposition of forces, and
the timing of any offensive operations from the enemy or mislead the enemy regarding this information.
These measures prevent the enemy from launching effective spoiling attacks. (For more information on
military deception see FM 3-13.4. For more information on operations security see ATP 3-13.3.)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
8-124. Explosive ordnance disposal elements provide the capability to detect, identify, evaluate, render safe,
exploit, and dispose of explosive hazards to ensure friendly forces maintain their freedom of movement.
These elements can also render safe and dispose of explosive hazards that deny access to or threaten supplies,
facilities, and other critical assets. These hazards can include conventional unexploded ordnance, high-yield
explosives and associated materials, improvised explosive devices, and weapons of mass destruction.
Explosive ordnance disposal may dispose of hazardous foreign or U.S. ammunition; unexploded ordnance;
and individual, booby-trapped, and chemical mines. Breaching and clearance of minefields is primarily an
engineer responsibility (See ATP 4-32 for more information on explosive ordnance disposal operations).
Detention Operations
8-125. During the defense, units must plan for capturing numerous detainees, most of whom are categorized
as enemy prisoners of war. The classification of these detainees varies according to operational environments.
Defending units may capture individual detainees or entire enemy units separated and disorganized from
combat. Unit staffs consider detention operations when developing defensive plans. Planners account for all
aspects of detainee operations while planning for the supported operation. To ensure that units are prepared
to incorporate detainee operations during planning, units establish mechanisms that ensure effective
consideration of potential detainee operations and their supporting activities. Units monitor the actual number
of detainees closely to avoid devoting too many or too few resources to detainee operations.
8-126. All Soldiers participating in military operations must be prepared to process and safeguard detainees.
Actions at the point of capture—the point at which a Soldier has the custody of, and is responsible for
safeguarding, a detainee—can directly affect mission success and could have a lasting impact on U.S. tactical,
operational, and theater strategic military objectives. Military police are trained in detainee operations and
support the force by relieving units of detainees to reduce the impact on combat forces. (See FM 3-63 for
more information on detainee operations.) |
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Area Security
8-127. The enemy will employ of mix of long-range fires, aircraft, cannons, missiles, and rockets, as well
as ground maneuver and special purpose forces, to attack defending forces, command and control nodes,
lines of communication (LOCs), sustainment sites, and civilian population centers to disrupt a unit’s defense.
Units pay attention to area and local security throughout the conduct of the defense. This is especially true
when the defending unit conducts noncontiguous operations. Units protect their forces and critical assets
through a variety of measures. Forces conducting area security in the defense can deter, detect, or defeat
terrorist elements in addition to providing protection from more conventional threats.
8-128. The success of unit defensive actions may depend on protecting the echelon support area from enemy
attacks. Units address any early detection and immediate destruction of enemy forces attempting to operate
in the echelon support area or interdict LOCs between support areas and maneuver forces. Enemy attacks in
the echelon support area can range in size from individual saboteurs to enemy airborne or air assault insertions
targeted against key facilities and capabilities. These enemy activities, especially at smaller unit levels, may
even precede the onset of hostilities and may be almost indistinguishable from terrorist acts.
8-129. Units clearly define responsibilities for the security of units in the echelon support area. The unit
designated as responsible for a given echelon support area (for example, the maneuver enhancement brigade
for the division support area) is responsible for defensive planning and risk mitigation in that area. That unit
can designate the commanders of tenant units (except medical corps officers) as base and base cluster
commanders. Those base and base cluster units are responsible for the local security of their respective bases
and base clusters. The unit responsible for the echelon support area can also designate protection standards
and defensive readiness conditions for tenant units and units transiting through the area. Higher protection
standards can affect the ability of those supporting sustainment units to perform their primary mission—
support the operations of maneuver and other forces. Units coordinate to mitigate effects of security
operations on the primary functions of the echelon support area.
8-130. The echelon’s OPSEC program and any deception or survivability efforts should conceal the
location of the friendly objective, the main effort, the disposition of forces, and the timing of the defense
from enemy forces or mislead enemy forces regarding this information. These measures prevent enemy forces
from launching effective spoiling attacks.
8-131. Planners determine how military police elements supporting the defending unit enhance unit
protection capabilities by conducting area security (including reconnaissance, surveillance, base security,
protective services, secure routes and convoys, and physical security measures) inside and outside the echelon
support area. Military police also perform response force operations to defeat Level II threats against bases
and base clusters located in that support area. Military police maintain contact with Level III threats in the
echelon support area until a tactical combat force can respond.
Risk Management
8-132. The likelihood of fratricide decreases during defensive operations compared to offensive operations.
During defensive operations, friendly forces are typically stationary and the enemy is maneuvering towards
them. However, instances for fratricide are typically higher during transitions, such as going on the offense
or retrograding.
8-133. During the preparation phase of defensive actions, planning and rehearsals are the primary tools for
identifying and reducing risk. The types of risks identified determine the type of rehearsal conducted.
Rehearsals should extend to all levels of command and involve all key players. Considerations for their use
include—
* Confirmation briefs to ensure leaders understand what they have been told to do.
* Backbriefs to ensure subordinates course of actions meets their higher echelon commander’s
intent.
* Rehearsals to ensure all Soldiers understand how their organization synchronizes with the rest of
the friendly forces in offensive operations. |
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TRANSITIONS
8-134. If a defense is successful, units anticipate and transition to either offensive operations or stability
operations. If an area or a mobile defense is unsuccessful, forces transition into a retrograde. Transition from
one type of operation to another requires accurate situational assessment capabilities as well as mental and
physical agility of all those involved.
8-135. Units deliberately plan for branch or sequel operations, which assist the transition process and allow
them to create conditions necessary for a successful transition. Such planning addresses the need to control
the tempo of operations, maintain contact with both enemy and friendly forces, and keep the enemy force off
balance. Transition planning establishes the procedures and priorities by which a unit prepares for the next
mission. Based on the mission variables, it establishes the required organization of forces and control
measures necessary for success. Probable transitions should be identified by units with a staff and reflect on
the commanders’ decision support products.
8-136. Prior contingency planning decreases the time needed to adjust the tempo of combat operations when
a unit transitions from a focus on the defense to other operations. It does this by allowing subordinate units
to simultaneously plan and prepare for subsequent operations. Preparations typically include resupplying unit
basic loads and repositioning or reallocating supporting systems.
8-137. A unit’s contingency planning also reduces the amount of time and confusion when it is unsuccessful
in its defensive efforts and must transition to retrograde operations. Units designate subordinate units to
conduct delaying operations and to evacuate casualties and inoperative equipment. They use retrograde
operations to preserve the force as a combat-capable formation until they can establish those conditions
necessary for a successful defense.
TRANSITION TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
8-138. A defending unit transitions to the offense by anticipating when and where an enemy force will reach
its culminating point or require an operational pause before it can continue. At those moments, the defending
force has odds that are more favorable. Combat power ratios favor a defending force. The enemy force will
do everything it can to keep friendly forces from knowing it is approaching that culmination point and thus
is overextended. Indicators that the enemy force is becoming overextended include when—
* Enemy forces begin to transition to the defense; this defense may be by forces in or out of contact
with friendly forces.
* Enemy forces suffer heavy losses.
* Enemy forces start to deploy before encountering friendly forces.
* Enemy forces are defeated in most engagements.
* Enemy forces are committed piecemeal in continued enemy attacks.
* Enemy reserves are identified among the attacking forces.
* Examination of captured or killed enemy soldiers and captured or destroyed enemy equipment and
supplies shows that the enemy force is unable to sustain itself.
* Enemy operations show a noticeable reduction in tempo.
* Local counterattacks meet with unexpected success.
8-139. In a mobile defense, transitioning to the offense generally follows the striking force’s counterattack.
In an area defense, units designate a portion of their force to conduct the attack. This force usually includes
the echelon’s available reserves.
8-140. As units transition their forces from the defense to the offense, they—
* Establish a LD. This may require the conduct of local, small-scale attacks to seize terrain necessary
for the conduct of offensive operations or to destroy enemy forces that could threaten the larger
offensive action.
* Maintain contact with enemy forces, using combinations of available information collection assets
to develop the information required to plan future operations and avoid falling for enemy military
deception operations. |
3-90 | 193 | The Defense
* Maintain or regain contact with adjacent units in a contiguous assigned area and ensure that
subordinate units remain capable of mutual support in a noncontiguous assigned area.
* Maneuver capabilities based on probable future employment. For example, fire support assets tend
to move forward so that their range encompasses additional enemy forces and terrain.
* Transition the focus of engineer efforts from countermobility and survivability to mobility.
* Submit a prioritized protection list to influence the positioning of these air and missile defense
assets.
8-141. Units reorganize and resupply concurrently with other transition activities. This requires sustainment
to transition from a chosen location to an emphasis on ensuring the force’s ability to advance and maneuver.
For example, in the defense, the sustainment effort may focus on Class IV and Class V items and evacuation
of combat-damaged systems. In the offense, the sustainment effort may focus on providing Class III and
forward repair of maintenance and combat losses. A transition is often a time to perform deferred equipment
maintenance. Additional assets may also be available on a temporary basis for casualty evacuation and
medical treatment because of a reduction in the tempo of operations.
8-142. Units should not wait too long to transition from the defense to the offense as the enemy force
approaches its culminating point. At that point, enemy forces are dispersed, extended in depth, and weakened.
At that time, any enemy defensive preparations will be hasty, and they will not have their forces adequately
positioned for the defense. Units want the enemy force in this posture when they transition to the offense.
They do not want to give the enemy force time to prepare for the defense. Additionally, the psychological
shock on enemy soldiers will be greater if they suddenly find themselves desperately defending on new and
often unfavorable terms while friendly Soldiers will enjoy a psychological boost by going on the offense.
8-143. If units in contact transitions to the attack, they must retain sufficient forces in contact to fix enemy
forces. Units concentrate their attacks by reinforcing select subordinate units so they can execute the attack,
and if necessary, maintain the existing defense. They can also adjust the defensive boundaries of subordinate
units so entire units can withdraw and concentrate for the attack. For more information on transitioning to
the offense, see counterattacks in Chapter 5.
8-144. If a defensive operation leads to a stalemate with both forces left in contact, defending units seek to
retain the initiative and create conditions for future operations. Commanders prepare their defending units to
move rapidly to subsequent defensive positions during battle lulls because of the risks associated with
defending twice from the same positions. This is because the enemy force now knows the location of friendly
defensive positions and can target them with supporting fires unless those defending forces can displace.
Defending units stay in place and continue to fight unless they can suppress enemy forces or take other actions
to break contact with enemy forces if there are no battle lulls. This is because of the risk when units try to
displace from prepared positions while still under enemy pressure.
TRANSITION TO THE RETROGRADE
8-145. Defending units unable to maintain the integrity of their defense must transition to a retrograde
operation or risk destruction. A retrograde involves either a delay, withdrawal, or retirement operation. These
operations may occur simultaneously or sequentially. As in other operations, the commander’s intent and
concept of operations drive planning for retrograde operations. Each variation of the retrograde operation has
its unique planning considerations, but considerations common to all retrograde operations are risk, the
synchronization of forces, and rear operations. Chapter 11 addresses planning, preparing, and executing
considerations for retrograde operations. However, many key considerations receive special emphasis during
the transition from the defense to the retrograde.
8-146. The transition to retrograde operations must be accompanied by efforts designed to—
* Reduce the enemy force’s strength and combat power.
* Provide friendly reinforcements.
* Concentrate forces elsewhere for the attack.
* Prepare stronger defenses elsewhere in the assigned area.
* Lure or force part or all of the enemy force into areas where it can be counterattacked. |
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8-147. The complexity and fluidity of retrograde operations and the absolute need to synchronize the entire
operation dictates the need for detailed, centralized planning and decentralized execution. Planning for
retrograde operations begins with the preparation of plans for the follow-on mission. The concept of
operations and commander’s intent drive those plans.
8-148. The nature of retrograde operations involves an inherent risk of degrading the defending force’s
morale. Commanders remain well forward and visible. They ensure that subordinate leaders and Soldiers
understand the purpose and intent of the operation as well as their role in accomplishing the mission.
Thorough planning, effective control, and aggressive leadership minimize risk during a retrograde and
enhance the probability of success.
8-149. Intelligence requirements dramatically increase as friendly forces begin their movement to other
locations and the combat capabilities of units in contact are reduced. Units develop a synchronized and
integrated information collection plan to identify and locate enemy attempts to pursue, outflank, and isolate
the defending force as it transitions to the retrograde. As units transition to the retrograde, they make every
effort to conserve combat power. Units consider the need to—
* Balance the risk of conserving combat power while remaining disposed to the intent of the
defensive mission.
* Disengage and withdraw units lacking tactical mobility and nonessential elements before the
retrograde of the main body.
* Use mobile forces to cover the retrograde of less mobile forces.
* Use the minimum-essential combat power necessary to provide security for the retrograde of the
main body.
TRANSITION TO STABILITY
8-150. Units may transition to stability operations if the defense retained decisive terrain, denied vital areas
to enemy forces, and successfully defended against attacking enemy forces removing the need for an
offensive operation. As in other operations, the commander’s intent and concept of operations drive the
planning for stability tasks. Generally, units focus on meeting immediate essential service and civil security
needs for civilians in the assigned area while coordinating with any existing local nation government and
nongovernmental organizations before addressing the other primary stability tasks. Support requirements
may change dramatically. Units will probably need to change their rules of engagement and ensure that those
changes are quickly distributed to all levels.
8-151. When a unit transitions from a defense to stability, the unit will generally execute a sequel to its
previous defensive order. Units reorganize to introduce those capabilities required by changes in the mission
variables. If commanders and staffs are unfamiliar with the civil considerations of their assigned area, they
should refer to assigned or attached civil affairs units operating in their area or their higher headquarters if
they have no command or support relationship with a civil affairs unit. The command and control and
protection functions remain relevant to prevent Soldiers from relaxing discipline and safety standards as the
stress of active defensive actions disappears. |
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Area Defense
This chapter addresses general considerations, organization of forces, and control
measures typical to an area defense. It then discusses how to plan, prepare, and execute
an area defense. Lastly, this chapter discusses the variations of the area defense.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN AREA DEFENSE
9-1. An area defense capitalizes on the strength inherent in a closely integrated defensive operation. An
area defense enables forces to consolidate, reorganize, and transition to another tactical operation, such as
the offense. Commanders may assign their subordinate units the task of conducting an area defense.
Subordinate echelons defend within their assigned areas as part of their higher echelon’s operations.
9-2. Units conduct an area defense when—
* Directed to defend or retain specified terrain.
* They cannot resource a striking force.
* Their available forces possess less mobility than enemy forces.
* The terrain affords natural lines of resistance and limits the enemy force to a few well-defined
avenues of approach, thereby restricting the enemy force’s maneuver.
* They have enough time to organize their defensive positions.
* Terrain constraints and lack of friendly air superiority limit the striking force’s options in a mobile
defense to a few probable employment options.
* Conditions require the preservation of forces when transitioning from a focus on the performance
of offensive operations to stability tasks.
9-3. Units conducting an area defense combine static and mobile tasks to accomplish their missions. Static
actions usually consist of fires from prepared positions. Mobile actions include using the fires provided by
units in prepared positions as a base for counterattacks and repositioning units between defensive positions.
Units can use their reserves and uncommitted forces to conduct counterattacks and spoiling attacks to
desynchronize enemy forces or prevent them from massing.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR AN AREA DEFENSE
9-4. An area defense is organized with a security force, main body, and a reserve. Since an area defense
focuses on retaining key terrain, most of the unit’s combat power in the main battle area is positioned to
support the defense of that terrain, while security forces provide early warning. See paragraphs 9-24 through
9-37 for more information on position selection in the defense.
SECURITY FORCE
9-5. Units balance their need for strong security forces to shape their operation and their main body’s main
effort. They usually allocate security forces to provide early warning and protect those main body forces,
systems, and locations necessary to conduct their main effort from unexpected enemy contact. The location
of these security forces is usually in front of the main defensive positions where forces are contiguous with
one another. These security forces locate on avenues of approach between their respective protected forces
and known or suspected enemy force locations on noncontiguous battlefields. |
3-90 | 196 | Chapter 9
9-6. Maneuver battalion and BCT security forces normally conduct forward screen or guard operations.
Division and corps commanders may employ a forward covering force. Division commanders may have their
forward security forces conduct a guard if their parent corps employs a forward covering force.
9-7. Commanders designate flank security forces to cover gaps on the unit’s flanks. This occurs when gaps
between units develop during the conduct of defensive operations. A flank screen or guard is critical if an
enemy avenue of approach into the defended area from the flanks could be uncovered during the defense.
MAIN BODY
9-8. Units build their main effort around identified key terrain. A unit’s main effort in an area defense
focuses on retaining that key terrain by using fires from mutually supporting, prepared positions
supplemented by one or more counterattacks and repositioning forces. A unit’s main effort normally involves
close combat since an area defense emphasizes terrain retention.
9-9. Units normally position their echelon’s main body—the bulk of combat power—in their MBA where
they want to conduct their main effort. They organize their main body to fix and finish attacking enemy
forces. Most of the units in a main body deploy into prepared defensive positions within their MBA.
However, some mobile elements may hide and are ready to deploy where and when needed.
RESERVE
9-10. Units’ defensive plans should be able to succeed without use of their reserves. However, their reserves’
most likely task is to conduct counterattacks based on previously prepared plans. Lower echelon commanders
use their reserves primarily to conduct local counterattacks to restore the integrity of their defense or to
exploit opportunities. Senior commanders use their reserves to seize the initiative from enemy forces when
opportunities to do so present themselves. For example, a corps commander may choose to employ their
reserve against enemy fire support assets and follow-on forces to limit the enemy commander’s ability to
mass combat power on the corps main effort.
9-11. Commanders can assign their reserve a wide variety of tasks to accomplish, and their reserves need to
be flexible enough to perform other tasks. Commanders may find it necessary to commit their reserves to
restore the integrity of their defenses by blocking enemy penetrations or reinforcing fires into engagement
areas. Secondary tasks for a reserve may also include—
* Reinforcing the defense of committed forces.
* Blocking or containing enemy forces that penetrate friendly defensive positions.
* Relieving depleted units and providing for continuous operations.
* Reacting to threats directed against friendly sustainment efforts.
* Extending the flanks of defending units to prevent their envelopment.
* Covering retrograde movements.
9-12. Defending units usually have difficulties establishing and resourcing their reserves because they are
normally facing enemy forces with superior combat power. Nevertheless, commanders at each echelon down
to the battalion retain reserves as a means of ensuring mission accomplishment and for exploiting
opportunities through offensive action.
9-13. Units may not be able to resource separate reserves in some situations. Therefore, they may constitute
all or a portion of their reserves from their security forces (after those forces conduct a rearward passage of
lines through MBA units). If units employ a security force as the reserve for an area defense, they withdraw
the force so it has sufficient time to occupy the reserve positions, perform the necessary degree of
reconstitution, and prepare plans for reserve roles. However, this is not the preferred option. Before battle
handover, the senior commander must state the acceptable risk to security forces or the disengagement criteria
in quantifiable terms, such as friendly strength levels, time, or event. In this case, after completing the
rearward passage, security forces move to assembly areas to prepare for their subsequent operations. These
areas should be free from enemy interference and clear of MBA units, LOCs, and MSRs. |
3-90 | 197 | Area Defense
CONTROL MEASURES FOR AN AREA DEFENSE
9-14. Units organize their area defense by designating engagement areas. Using the seven steps of EA
development, defending units determine where to place BPs and how best to assign areas to subordinate units.
Units create security areas in front of their MBAs. Security areas should be deep enough to make enemy
forces displace as much of their supporting forces as possible, such as cannon artillery, sensors, and air
defense artillery gun systems, before attacking. Units also designate echelon support areas.
9-15. Area defense maneuver graphic control measures may include‒
* Engagement areas.
* Boundaries.
* FEBA.
* Battle handover lines.
* Strong points.
* TRPs.
* NAIs.
* TAIs.
* Decision points.
* Passage points.
* Various other fire control and countermobility control measures.
9-16. Figure 9-1 depicts example area defense control measures. Appendix A defines these defensive control
measures.
Figure 9-1. Example area defense control measures
9-17. Commanders give their subordinate commanders specific guidance on the initial positioning of forces.
Commanders ensure the synchronization of subordinate units’ defensive plans, and that control measures,
such as contact points and phase lines, enable subordinate commanders and prevent fratricide. If subordinate
unit commanders prepare their defensive plans in isolation, assailable flanks between subordinate units could |
3-90 | 198 | Chapter 9
easily develop. Commanders are responsible for fires and movement planning between the positions of their
subordinate units.
PLANNING AN AREA DEFENSE
9-18. The key to a successful area defense is the integration and synchronization of all available assets. The
general defensive planning considerations addressed in Chapter 8 apply to the area defense. They assign
missions, allocate forces, and apportion functional and multifunctional support and sustainment resources.
Commanders decide where to concentrate their efforts and where to take risks. They can rapidly redirect
attack aviation and field artillery systems initially allocated to supporting efforts to support their main effort
at the appropriate time.
9-19. Units organize their forces differently for contiguous and noncontiguous assigned areas. Figure 9-2
graphically depicts the organization of forces for an area defense in contiguous assigned areas while figure
9-3 graphically depicts the organization of forces for an area defense in noncontiguous assigned areas. Figure
9-2 does not designate the exact security missions performed by security forces because those vary from
screen to cover based on the mission variables.
Figure 9-2. Organization of forces for an area defense, contiguous assigned areas |
3-90 | 199 | Area Defense
Figure 9-3. Organization of forces for an area defense, noncontiguous assigned areas
9-20. Commanders describe their concept of operations in sufficient detail so that their staffs and subordinate
commanders understand precisely how commanders intend to fight their battles. Commanders ensure the
coordination of maneuver and supporting actions among subordinates.
9-21. Commanders’ keys to successful area defense include—
* Concentrating effects.
* Depth of the defensive area.
* Security.
* Taking full advantage of the terrain.
* Flexibility of defensive actions.
* Timely resumption of offensive actions.
9-22. Units organize their defensive efforts based on their analysis of the mission variables and their higher
echelon commander’s concept. They decide where to concentrate their efforts and how to economize forces.
Initial friendly actions force enemy units to enter established engagement areas. Friendly forces regain the
initiative from enemy forces when they successfully perform their area defense. They take advantage of
available offensive opportunities that do not risk the integrity of their defenses.
9-23. Sustainment units in an area defense require a careful balance among establishing forward supply
stocks of petroleum, oils, and lubricants; barrier material; and ammunition in adequate amounts to support
defending units. These units avoid having so many supplies located in forward locations that units cannot
rapidly move them to counter or avoid enemy advances. Commanders can lawfully obtain from local civilian
infrastructure any suitable petroleum, oils, and lubricants, barrier material, construction equipment, and
laborers which will reduce the defending unit’s transportation requirements. Proper forecasting of supply and
support requirements is important to the success of the area defense. Likewise, units forward deploy
maintenance and medical support with their associated repair parts and medical supplies. Those systems and
Soldiers or equipment that cannot return quickly to the battle are rapidly evacuated from forward defensive
positions to avoid unduly burdening medical and maintenance elements.
POSITION SELECTION
9-24. Successful units carefully design their defense plan to ensure they can halt enemy attacks and develop
opportunities to seize the initiative and resume offensive operations. The cohesion of defending forces |
3-90 | 200 | Chapter 9
significantly affects the overall effectiveness of the area defense. Units prepare to adjust their defensive
dispositions to meet changes in the enemy’s dispositions to maintain that cohesion.
9-25. The area defense requires units in defensive positions to accomplish their mission independently or in
combination by defeating enemy forces by fire, absorbing the strength of the attack within their positions, or
destroying enemy forces with local counterattacks. Units combine the advantages of fighting from prepared
positions, obstacles, planned fires, and local counterattacks to isolate and overwhelm selected enemy
formations. They rapidly shift the purpose and location of their main effort throughout their assigned areas
as conditions change. Commanders may have to reposition defending units within their defensive positions
or reposition between terrain features to mass the effects of overwhelming fires against attacking enemy
units. The defensive plans designate axes of advance and routes for the commitment or movement of their
reserves, or the forward or rearward passage of one unit through another. Those plans identify air axes for
aerial maneuver by attack aviation elements, air assault units, or fixed-wing aircraft. Their operations
processes identify decision points associated with the initiation of these counterattacks, the repositioning of
forces, and other actions.
9-26. The capability to reposition relies on defending forces having tactical mobility. Defending forces stay
in their prepared positions and accept the possibility of becoming decisively engaged if they lack this mobility
advantage.
9-27. Commanders assigning defensive missions define their defended areas. They have to accept gaps and
conduct noncontiguous operations when defending on broad fronts with minimal forces. This results in a
noncontiguous FLOT. Defending shallow assigned areas requires units to operate well forward with a
corresponding reduction in their flexibility.
9-28. The ideal area defense is one where effective mutual support exists throughout the width and depth of
the defender’s tactical positions. Units organize and occupy defensive positions based on their natural
defensive strength. Defending units maintain tactical integrity within their defensive areas. Units conducting
an area defense normally address flank security requirements by assigning those responsibilities to
subordinate elements or organizing a separate security force to perform that task.
9-29. Units typically have two methods for the placement of their positions when conducting an area defense:
defense in depth and forward defense. A higher echelon commander may dictate the method to their
subordinates or subordinates may retain the flexibility to choose the method of an area defense. These two
methods are not exclusionary. Part of a defending unit can conduct a forward defense while the other part
conducts a defense in depth.
Defense in Depth
9-30. Units normally prefer to perform a defense in depth. Forces defending in depth absorb the momentum
of enemy attacks by making enemy forces attack repeatedly through a series of mutually supporting positions.
Building these positions requires significant time and engineer support to increase the survivability and
countermobility of those positions. Depth gives fire support assets time to deliver effects on multiple
locations against selected elements of the attacking enemy force. Depth provides more reaction time for
defending forces to respond by repositioning or counterattacking. Units continuously employ their
information collection assets to gather additional information about the attacking enemy’s intentions and
capabilities between the time combat starts and the time the enemy commits to a COA. Depth reduces the
risk of enemy forces rapidly penetrating the MBA along unexpected directions.
9-31. Units also employ a defense in depth when enemy forces can employ large quantities of indirect fires.
Units disperse their forces throughout their assigned area when conducting a defense in depth. They take area
damage control measures to reduce the effects of these munitions and weapons on defending friendly forces,
and they deny enemy forces lucrative targets. The degree of dispersal adopted by defending forces is a
function of the enemy and friendly forces’ capabilities as well as the terrain to rapidly concentrate combat
power at decisive points.
9-32. Commanders can position their defending units in successive layers of BPs along likely enemy avenues
of approach when conducting a defense in depth. (Figure 9-4 is a sketch illustrating this concept. It depicts a |
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division conducting a defense in depth with subordinate BCTs deployed in noncontiguous assigned areas
with enemy avenues of approach shown.) Commanders usually decide to conduct a defense in depth when—
* Their defensive missions are not restrictive and allow them to operate throughout the depths of
their assigned areas.
* The terrain within their assigned areas does not favor a forward defense, and there is better
defensible terrain deeper within their assigned areas.
* There is significant depth available, allowing the trading of space for time.
* The cover and concealment on or near the FEBA is limited.
Figure 9-4. Example defense in depth
9-33. Large units, such as divisions or corps, employing a defense in depth can conduct an area defense on
a wider frontage than they can if they adopt a forward defense. This is because a forward defense has no time
or maneuver space to reposition forces. A defense in depth allows units to use security forces in the forward
part of their MBA to identify the enemy force’s main effort and control the depth of the enemy force’s
penetration into their MBA. By their defensive actions, these forces provide units with time to react to enemy
actions and allow defending units to take offensive steps to eliminate enemy options, such as conducting
counterattacks into the flanks of advancing enemy forces.
Forward Defense
9-34. When units defend forward within their assigned areas, they organize their forces so they can commit
most of their available combat power early in their defensive efforts. To accomplish this, units may deploy
their forces forward in their respective assigned areas or plan counterattacks well forward in the MBA or
even beyond the MBA. Units can conduct their main effort from forward defensive positions near the FEBA
in a forward defense. Figure 9-5 on page 9-8 is a sketch illustrating this concept. Units concentrate significant
portions of their available combat power toward engagement areas located along their FEBA. The intent is
to prevent significant enemy penetrations into their defensive areas. Units conduct forward defense
operations to retain these positions along their FEBA and counterattack any enemy penetrations. However,
the defending force’s lack of depth may allow enemy forces to exploit success if they penetrate the friendly
force’s main defensive positions. |
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Figure 9-5. Example forward defense
9-35. Commanders may choose to conduct a forward defense when—
* The best defensive positions, natural obstacles, and natural engagement areas are located along
the FEBA.
* Cover and concealment in the rear portion of their assigned areas are limited.
* The higher commander directs them to retain forward terrain.
* The terrain in the assigned area does not support a mobile defense.
* The enemy has superior mobility.
Positioning the Reserve
9-36. Defending units have the ability to seize the initiative by counterattacking over familiar ground to
destroy halted or disorganized enemy forces. Their reserve is a key component of these counterattacks.
Defending units protect their counterattacking forces by employing overwatching fires from friendly
positions. Commanders direct counterattacks against an enemy force’s exposed rear or flanks whenever
possible.
9-37. Units expend significant effort during the planning process to ensure the effective use of their reserves.
They may locate their reserves within their assigned areas where those reserves can employ existing road
networks. Those road networks allow the rapid displacement of these reserves throughout their assigned areas
in response to different opportunities or contingencies. Commanders have more flexibility and can take
greater risk in employing their reserves if their higher echelon headquarters has not committed its reserve.
See Chapter 1 for more information on general considerations for positioning the reserve.
SPOILING ATTACKS AND COUNTERATTACKS
9-38. Units do not wait for the enemy to initiate an attack when developing their defensive plans. They seek
opportunities to conduct spoiling attacks and counterattacks against enemy forces. Units execute spoiling
attacks and local counterattacks to disrupt the enemy’s attack preparations and buy time and maneuver space |
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for defensive preparations. In an area defense, units plan major counterattacks as a branch or sequel to the
main defensive operation.
9-39. A spoiling attack preempts or disrupts an enemy force’s ability to launch an attack, while a
counterattack prevents an enemy force from exploiting successes. The forces conducting either variation of
attack need to be capable to develop the situation, defend themselves, and force the enemy to react. This
allows friendly forces to place the enemy’s attack plan at risk. See Chapter 5 for more information on spoiling
attacks and counterattacks.
PREPARATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN AREA DEFENSE
9-40. When planning for an area defense, units focus their collection activities on confirming templated
enemy courses of action, identifying favorable terrain for the defense, and answering the commander’s
critical information requirements. Information obtained from those activities may or may not cause units to
refine their plans. Defensive preparations allow time for any necessary additional coordination and
synchronization among different headquarters. They also allow for the conduct of those supporting efforts
that fall within their defensive capabilities and OPSEC guidelines. Defending units may have to commit
substantial forces to security operations or conduct spoiling attacks if they know that enemy forces will attack
before they finish their defensive preparations.
9-41. Units normally establish an area defense after they complete the deployment process of force
projection, complete their offensive actions, or are in assembly areas. Commanders issue warning orders
stating the mission and identifying any special considerations. While subordinate units complete their current
missions, unit staffs perform detailed planning. Staffs coordinate for the pre-positioning of ammunition and
barrier material in secure areas near the unit’s projected defensive positions before starting the operation.
9-42. Upon receiving initial mission orders, defending units establish a local security posture and occupy
hide positions in sector before beginning defensive preparations. Security forces immediately assume their
security mission and prepare positions simultaneously. Commanders conduct reconnaissance of their
defensive areas and establish forward security areas before their units occupy their defensive positions. Units
may pre-position supplies, such as ammunition and barrier materiel, once they can secure those positions and
supplies. The mission variables are the deciding consideration in establishing priorities. Those priorities can
include—
* Establishing local security and deploying security forces.
* Emplacing communications assets to support the unit’s primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency communications for each primary, supplemental, and alternative positions.
* Establishing contact points with any adjacent units so that their commanders can coordinate and
synchronize their defensive efforts.
* Identifying engagement areas where commanders seek to engage and destroy enemy forces.
* Emplacing obstacles and surveying indirect fire targets to support these obstacles.
* Positioning key weapon systems to engage into engagement areas and cover obstacles.
* Planning fire control measures, such as TRPs, trigger lines, and FPFs to support these engagement
areas.
* Positioning the reserve.
* Designating and appropriately clearing fields of fire.
* Preparing primary fighting positions based on the anticipated fighting conditions, such as the time
of day and weather conditions.
* Providing concealment and camouflage for fighting and survivability positions as they are
constructed.
* Positioning observers who can see both targets and trigger lines.
* Positioning any available critical friendly zones over friendly positions by establishing sensor
coverage and direct communications links between sensors and shooters.
* Installing limited-visibility aids, such as thermal hot spots and chemical lights on TRPs.
* Updating range cards and sector sketches as required.
* Preparing alternate fighting positions. |
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* Designating and preparing supplementary positions.
* Designating hide positions and rehearsing movements to and from all fighting positions. (Units
may place their vehicles in hide positions at any time while preparing the defensive position.)
* Improving trafficability of projected counterattack routes.
* Pre-stocking ammunition in positions where it can survive anticipated enemy preparation fires.
* Positioning barrier material for constructing fighting positions and obstacles.
* Rehearsing movements under daylight and limited-visibility conditions.
* Establishing sleep and rest plans.
* Continuing to improve the defense.
9-43. Survivability positions enhance the strength of a defensive position by providing Soldiers and weapons
systems with specified degrees of cover from enemy fires. Units initiate construction of survivability
positions based on their priorities of work, and they continue to build and improve them until the last possible
moment. The degree of overhead, frontal, and side protection provided varies with the location of the
sheltered troops and enemy capabilities. Defending units improve communications routes throughout their
defensive positions to ease movement of supplies and forces as time and resources allow. Communications
routes are particularly important for reserves. Units establish tactical communications with their various
subordinate elements and offsite antennas to reduce their electromagnetic signature.
9-44. Defending units rehearse how they move to and from primary, alternate, supplementary, and sequential
positions. These rehearsals establish the time necessary to conduct these movements under different
environmental conditions. Units modify their existing defensive plans based on the results of these rehearsals
and changes in the mission variables. They check that the routes taken during these rehearsals do not show
obvious signs of heavy use. These steps can include the conduct of only dismounted rehearsals, only moving
one vehicle per platoon, and taking steps to eliminate signs of movement such as sweeping snow back over
the tracks made during the rehearsal.
9-45. Commanders ensure close coordination among their subordinates. One way to do this during the
preparation phase is for them to take their subordinate commanders to vantage points in the MBA if such
sites are available. They can conduct rehearsals and finalize coordination from those positions. This technique
also helps commanders transmit their intent and share their situational understanding.
9-46. The location, composition, and movement of echelon reserves are typically essential elements of
friendly information. Other typical essential elements of friendly information in the defense include location
of main obstacle belts, location of critical countermobility assets, indirect fire assets, and supply points.
Enemy reconnaissance focuses on finding these reserves and reporting when and where they commit.
9-47. Units integrate sustainment into their maneuver rehearsals to verify that routes for support do not cross
or conflict with routes used by their reserves or other maneuver elements. They balance the use of
ammunition and other supply caches against their ability to secure those caches. Units also ensure the
availability of alternate lines of communications and MSRs to support their contingency plans and changes
in tactical situations.
9-48. Units ensure the integration of available combat enablers into their plans. During this phase,
commanders verify that their subordinate commanders and other leaders have a shared understanding of their
plans and can execute them with minimal guidance. One technique that commanders use to ensure
subordinate understanding is the receipt of backbriefs from their subordinates after they issue their orders.
EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN AREA DEFENSE
9-49. In an area defense, units use various techniques and procedures to accomplish their missions.
Defending forces repeatedly seek to force the enemy to maneuver into engagement areas where they can
target them. Defending forces operate mainly from prepared, protected positions to concentrate combat power
against attempted enemy breakthroughs and flanking movements. Units use their mobile forces to cover gaps
between their defensive positions, reinforce those positions as necessary, and counterattack to seal
penetrations or block enemy attempts at flanking movements. Figure 9-6 illustrates control measures that
units can use when mixing static and mobile elements in an area defense. |
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Figure 9-6. Example area defense
9-50. The mission variables—most importantly time—determine how closely units can synchronize their
supporting efforts with their main efforts. Units conduct supporting efforts designed to regain the initiative
by limiting an attacking enemy force’s options and disrupting an enemy force’s plan. Supporting efforts
prevent enemy forces from massing and creating windows of opportunity for the conduct of the main effort.
This allows defending forces to defeat attacking enemy forces in detail. Units also employ supporting efforts
to disrupt enemy operations by attacking enemy command posts at critical stages in a battle or by striking
and eliminating key enemy elements and capabilities. This could be river crossing equipment and supplies in
regions that contain numerous unfordable rivers. Reconnaissance and security operations are normally
components of the echelon’s shaping operations and supporting efforts.
9-51. Gaining and maintaining enemy contact in the face of an enemy force’s determined efforts to destroy
friendly information collection assets is vital to the success of defensive actions. As an enemy force’s attack
begins, defending units strive to identify the locations and capabilities of committed enemy units, to
determine the enemy’s intent and direction of attack, and to gain time to react. Initially, defending units
accomplish these goals in their security areas. The sources of this type of intelligence include reconnaissance
and security forces, intelligence units, special operations forces, and aviation elements. Battalions and
companies are increasingly able to access combat information provided by technical means belonging to
higher echelons, such as UAS and signals intelligence, to provide the required reaction time. Units ensure
the distribution of a COP throughout their forces during the battle as a basis for subordinate commanders’
actions. Units use the information available, in conjunction with military judgment, to determine the point at
which enemy forces commit to a given COA.
9-52. Units’ security forces seek to disrupt enemy reconnaissance forces and mask dispositions, capabilities,
and intent of their defending forces. This occurs simultaneously with friendly information collection assets
helping to determine an enemy forces’ chosen COA. Ideally, security area engagements cause enemy forces
to conduct a movement to contact against friendly prepared defenses.
9-53. Security forces use every opportunity to gain information, delay, and disrupt the enemy. Their
commanders prepare to pass through or around MBA forces as quickly as possible by using multiple passage |
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points, gaps, or lanes along the FEBA as the security forces displaces. This usually occurs in one location at
a time until all security forces complete their retrograde. However, the security force may pass in sequence
based on enemy pressure. Transfer of responsibility occurs forward of the FEBA at the BHL. Security forces
make any required last-minute coordination with MBA forces at contact points to ensure their rapid passage
through the MBA. Figure 9-7 illustrates the use of a BHL and other control measures associated with the
rearward movement of forward security forces.
VARIATIONS OF THE AREA DEFENSE
9-54. The variations of the area defense have unique conditions and their own planning considerations. The
three variations of area defense are:
* Defense of a linear obstacle.
* Perimeter defense.
* Reverse slope defense.
9-55. When determining their variation of the area defense, units decide the location of defensible terrain
within their assigned areas based on terrain characteristics and their estimate of the enemy force’s chosen
COA. Those terrain characteristics include terrain relief patterns, avenues of approach into and within the
assigned areas, the location of any key or decisive terrain, and existing obstacles and choke points, including
rivers and fording sites. The other mission variables also influence this decision.
DEFENSE OF A LINEAR OBSTACLE
9-56. Units may conduct a variation of an area defense along or behind a linear obstacle (see figure 9-7).
Linear obstacles, such as mountain ranges or rivers generally favor a forward defense. The planning,
preparation, and execution of a defense of a linear obstacle is not different than any other area defense. The
main difference is that the defense focuses on the linear natural or man-made obstacle as opposed to a separate
key terrain feature, such as an urban area or hill.
9-57. A defending force seeks to defeat any enemy forces attempting to seize a bridgehead across a linear
obstacle. Local defending units immediately counterattack any enemy bridgeheads to destroy enemy forces
located within the bridgehead, while higher echelons attempt to isolate enemy bridgehead sites. If an enemy
force seizes a bridgehead and strikes out rapidly, it could quickly penetrate the defending force. An enemy
penetration requires units to conduct either a counterattack, delay, or a withdrawal.
9-58. It is extremely difficult to deploy in strength along the entire length of a linear obstacle. Defending
units must conduct economy of force measures in some areas. In an area defense, units’ use of a defense in
depth accepts the possibility that enemy forces may conduct a crossing at a given point. The depth of the
defense should prevent an enemy force from rapidly exploiting its success. It also diffuses the enemy force’s
combat power by causing enemy forces to contain bypassed friendly defensive positions in addition to
continuing to attack friendly positions in greater depth. Once the enemy force secures several bridgeheads,
the defending force moves to contain them. Defending commanders may choose not to counterattack until
they can mass overwhelming combat power. They will probably choose to eliminate the bridgeheads
sequentially in this case. However, defenders risk allowing enemy forces to establish and fortify bridgeheads
and crossing sites to the extent that a counterattack force is unable to eliminate them. |
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Figure 9-7. Example of a defense of a linear obstacle
PERIMETER DEFENSE
9-59. Units may employ the perimeter defense as a variation when conducting an area defense when the unit
is required to orient on all directions. They also use it in other circumstances, such as when 360-degree
security is required when taking a temporary halt during a troop movement.
9-60. The prerequisites for a successful perimeter defense are aggressive patrolling and security operations
outside the perimeter. A unit within the perimeter can perform these activities, or another force, such as the
territorial defense forces of a local nation in which hostilities occur, can perform them. A unit can organize
a perimeter defense to accomplish a specific mission, such as protecting a firebase or providing immediate
self-protection, such as during resupply operations when all around security is required. Commanders
establish a perimeter when a unit must hold key terrain, such as a strong point, or when it must defend itself
in noncontiguous areas where a unit cannot tie its defense in with adjacent units. This occurs when a unit is
operating behind enemy lines or when it is securing an isolated objective, such as a bridge, mountain pass,
or airfield. Bypassed or isolated friendly forces also need to form a perimeter to allow them to defend in
place. Forces located within the confines of a base or base cluster in their echelon support also need to
establish a perimeter defense. Figure 9-8 on page 9-14 depicts an example of a perimeter defense. |
3-90 | 208 | Chapter 9
Figure 9-8. Example of a perimeter defense
9-61. A major characteristic of a perimeter defense is a secure inner area with most of the combat power
located on the perimeter. Another characteristic is the ease of access for resupply operations. Units coordinate
direct and indirect fire plans to prevent accidentally engaging neighboring friendly units and noncombatants.
Normally, the reserve centrally locates to react to a penetration of the perimeter at any point.
9-62. Perimeters vary in shape depending on the terrain and situation. Units may reinforce those most
vulnerable parts of their perimeter with additional resources once they determine the most probable direction
of enemy attack. The perimeter shape conforms to the terrain features that best use friendly observation and
fields of fire. Units can increase the effectiveness of a perimeter by tying it into a natural obstacle, such as a
river, which allows a defending unit to concentrate its combat power in more threatened areas.
Organization of Forces
9-63. A perimeter defense has no special organization of forces. They organize in the traditional
reconnaissance and security force, main body, and reserve. Units may employ all defending forces forward
along a perimeter or establish a defense in depth within a perimeter. They employ patrols, raids, ambushes,
air attacks, and supporting fires to harass and destroy enemy forces before they make contact with the
perimeter, thus providing defense in depth with both techniques.
9-64. In a forward defense, commanders place all subordinate units in positions along the perimeter. Figure
9-9 illustrates how a battalion commander could divide the perimeter into subordinate unit assigned areas
with boundaries and contact points. This method reduces the possibility of fratricide and friendly fire
incidents within the perimeter and maximizes combat power on the perimeter.
9-65. Constructing an outer and inner perimeter creating defensive depth is a technique of a defense in depth.
Figure 9-9 illustrates this technique using an infantry BCT occupying an assembly area while waiting for its
engineer battalion and third infantry battalion to arrive in the joint operations area. The infantry BCT
commander directs the two subordinate infantry battalion commanders to place two of their companies along
the outer perimeter reinforced with detachments from their weapons companies and one company in reserve.
This configuration gives depth to each battalion’s positions and facilitates control. The figure does not depict
the cavalry squadron since it occupies positions outside the perimeter in this example. Alternatively, figure
9-10 illustrates how this infantry BCT commander could elect to assign the outer perimeter to the two infantry
battalions and have the cavalry squadron resource an inner perimeter, retaining a larger, more tactically
mobile central reserve. |
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Figure 9-9. Example of a perimeter defense in depth
Figure 9-10. Battalion perimeter, squadron reserve |
3-90 | 210 | Chapter 9
9-66. Commanders position forces within a perimeter to decrease the possibility of an enemy force
simultaneously suppressing the inner and outer perimeter forces with the same fires. Friendly forces within
the perimeter provide mutual support. In open terrain, they cover gaps on the outer perimeter between units
with fires. They do not allow gaps between defensive fighting positions when the unit is in restrictive terrain
with restricted fields of fire and observation. This may mean that a unit defends along a narrower frontage
than on more open terrain. Commanders may also have to employ all subordinate units on the line formed by
the perimeter. Units ensure that outer perimeter positions have rearward protection from inner perimeter
weapons if an inner perimeter is established.
9-67. Units can assign combat vehicles supporting defense firing positions on the perimeter to cover the most
likely mounted avenues of approach. Based on their mobility, combat vehicles can also form the unit’s
reserve. Vehicle commanders select and prepare alternate and supplemental firing positions and routes to and
from them. If a perimeter has several mounted avenues of approach leading to it, units may elect to hold
combat vehicles in hide positions until an enemy force approaches. Units prepare routes, firing positions, and
range cards for all positions. Small-unit leaders must ensure that vehicles do not destroy communications
wires when vehicles move from one position to another.
9-68. The need to hold or protect terrain features—such as bridges, airfields, or landing zones—from enemy
observation and fires may restrict the positioning of units within a perimeter. These factors, as well as the
inability to achieve depth, make a perimeter defense vulnerable to penetration by heavy enemy forces. Units
reduce these vulnerabilities by—
* Developing information collection plans that provide early warning.
* Positioning anti-armor systems on restrictive terrain to concentrate fires on armor approaches.
* Providing as much depth as the diameter of the perimeter to allow the proper placement of security
elements and the reserve and the designation of secondary sectors of fire for anti-armor weapons.
* Constructing obstacles to fix or block enemy forces, so friendly units can effectively engage them.
* Using obscurants and military deception.
9-69. If isolation from other friendly units drives commanders to form a perimeter, such as when conducting
echelon support area security or when encircled, functional and multifunctional support and sustainment
elements from other units may seek to take advantage of that perimeter’s protection. The base commander
gives these elements defensive missions based on their capabilities within the base formed by the perimeter.
Units coordinate and integrate any fire support provided from outside the perimeter into the overall defensive
plan. This extra fire support conserves the ammunition of units within the perimeter.
9-70. Units normally employ reconnaissance assets, such as a scout platoon, outside the perimeter to provide
early warning. They augment perimeter security with squad sized or smaller observation posts forward of the
perimeter provided and controlled by units positioned along that perimeter. These security elements position
to observe avenues of approach. Patrols examine areas not under observation by stationary elements. Any
security forces operating outside the perimeter coordinate their passage of lines into and out of the perimeter
with the appropriate perimeter units.
9-71. The reserve may be a designated unit or a provisional force organized from available personnel and
equipment. The reserve forms a second line of defense behind the perimeter forces. Ideally, the reserve is
mobile enough to react to enemy action along any part of the perimeter. Units position the reserve to block
the most dangerous avenue of approach and assigns on-order positions on other critical avenues. They may
task combat vehicles initially occupying firing positions on the perimeter with the mission of reinforcing the
reserve.
Control Measures
9-72. Commanders, in a perimeter defense, use control measures to designate the trace of the perimeter, BPs,
contact points, and lateral and forward boundaries. They can use engagement areas (EAs), target reference
points (TRPs), final protective fires (FPFs), and principal direction of fire as fire control measures. Units
designate checkpoints, contact points, passage points, and passage routes for use by local reconnaissance,
surveillance, and security elements operating outside the perimeter boundary. Figure 9-11 illustrates some of
these control measures. |
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Planning a Perimeter Defense
9-73. Defending units position their forces and plan fire and movement so they can respond to the widest
possible range of enemy actions. Defending commanders, assisted by their staffs, prepare plans, including
counterattack plans. Units rehearse, evaluate, and revise their plans as needed. The availability of landing
and drop zones protected from enemy observation and fire is a major consideration when selecting and
organizing the perimeter defense. Units must emphasize supply economy and protect existing supply stocks
since aerial resupply is vulnerable to weather and enemy fires. Commanders consider the fundamentals of an
area defense in paragraphs 9-18 through 9-39 when planning a perimeter defense.
Figure 9-11. Example perimeter defense control measures
9-74. The mission variables considered when commanders and staffs developed their counterattack plans as
branches or sequels to their defensive plans may not correspond exactly with the situation when the moment
comes to execute those counterattacks. Units reassess and revise their counterattack plans based on their
revised situational understanding as their defenses unfold. This revised understanding results from an updated
common operational picture as new intelligence and combat information becomes available to answer these
questions:
* Is a counterattack feasible or should commanders use the reserve to contain enemy successes?
* When and where should defending forces counterattack?
* What parts of the defending force should counterattack?
* What should defending forces block or contain in the case of successful enemy penetrations?
* Is there enough time to complete the counterattack before the arrival of enemy follow-on forces?
* Can commanders conduct their counterattack using only available fires or must ground maneuver
forces be committed? |
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Use of Terrain
9-75. Proper evaluation and organization of an area’s terrain are essential to maximize the effectiveness of a
force conducting perimeter defense. Units consider—
* Natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
* Using artificial obstacles to enhance the natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
* Existing roads, railways, and waterways used for military LOCs and civilian commerce.
* Controlled land areas surrounding the perimeter to a range beyond that of enemy mortars and
rockets.
Security
9-76. An effective security requires early warnings. Early warnings of pending enemy actions allow units
the time to react to any threat. Combat outposts, patrols, sensors, target acquisition radars, and aerial
surveillance provide early warning. Civil information, human intelligence, and observed changes in a
populations pattern of life near the position are excellent indicators of pending enemy actions. Security
measures vary with the enemy threat, forces available, and the other mission variables; however, all around
security is essential.
Mutual Support
9-77. Units position defending forces to ensure mutual employment of defensive resources, such as crew-
served weapons, observation, and maneuver elements. Mutual support between defensive elements requires
careful planning, positioning, and coordination because of the circular aspects of the perimeter defense. They
use surveillance, obstacles, prearranged indirect fires, and maneuver elements to exploit or reinforce fires to
control any gaps in the perimeter. Defensive plans provide for using all available support, including indirect
fire, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft.
All-Around Defense
9-78. In defensive planning, units prepare to defend against an enemy attack from any direction and designate
the unit defending the most likely enemy avenue of approach the main effort. They employ flexible plans
and position their reserve to react to any threat. They commit maneuver elements and supporting weapons to
detect, engage, and destroy an attacking enemy force. Commanders assign defensive positions and sectors of
fire to all personnel within the perimeter.
Defense in Depth
9-79. Alternate, subsequent, and supplementary positions, combat outposts, and mutually supporting strong
points forward of the perimeter extend the depth of a defense. Units plan fires to the maximum range
throughout a defensive area. They may place protective obstacles around critical locations within the
perimeter during periods of reduced visibility to disrupt the enemy’s plan and add depth to the defense.
Responsiveness
9-80. An attacking enemy force has the advantage of deciding when, where, and with what force to attack.
Defending units prepare plans—including counterattack plans—and rehearse, assess, and revise them as
necessary. The defensive plan contains procedures for timely responses by fire support teams and maneuver
forces.
Maximum Use of Offensive Action
9-81. Since the objective of a perimeter defense is to maintain a secure position, units use offensive actions
to engage enemy forces outside the perimeter. On initial occupation of a perimeter, friendly forces take
offensive actions to destroy enemy forces in the immediate area. Once the perimeter area is clear, a relatively
smaller force can defend the perimeter, thereby releasing other forces for other operations. Units employ
patrols, raids, ambushes, aerial attacks, and supporting fires to harass and destroy enemy forces to prevent
them from threatening the perimeter. They maintain constant communications and a COP with subordinates |
3-90 | 213 | Area Defense
within the perimeter. Commanders direct their subordinates to conduct appropriate actions to remove threats
located within their assigned areas and sectors of fire.
Executing a Perimeter Defense
9-82. Attacks against a perimeter may range from long-range sniper, mortar, rocket fire, or attacks by suicide
demolition squads to attacks by major enemy ground and air forces. Mortars, artillery, tanks, and anti-armor
missile systems from within the perimeter engage enemy forces at long ranges. As an attack comes within
small-arms range, other weapons on the perimeter engage enemy forces. If the assault continues, the
defending force employs its FPFs. If enemy forces penetrate the perimeter, the reserve blocks the penetration
or counterattacks to restore the perimeter. After committing the initial reserve, commanders reconstitute
another reserve to meet other threats. This force normally comes from an unengaged unit on a different
portion of the perimeter. If commanders use an unengaged force to constitute a new reserve, they must retain
sufficient forces to defend the vacated sector, unless the situation forces commanders to assume that degree
of risk.
9-83. Sustainment elements may provide support from within the perimeter or from outside locations,
depending on the mission and the status of the unit providing the defensive perimeter, type of transport
available, weather, and terrain. Commanders often sustain units in contested areas without secure ground
LOCs by air.
Find the Enemy
9-84. This typically occurs once friendly security forces make initial enemy contact. The security force does
not idly await the arrival of the enemy. They take an active role as part of the information collection activities
to find the enemy and understand their location, disposition, strength, and course of action.
9-85. The security force also conducts counterreconnaissance against enemy reconnaissance and intelligence
assets. Destroying these assets allows units to force enemy units to deploy into formations on the ground of
those commanders’ choosing, thus helping to disrupt and desynchronize the enemy force’s plan. This also
prevents the enemy from understanding the composition and disposition of the main effort of the defense and
forces the enemy to attack into an unknown situation.
Fix the Enemy
9-86. Units do everything possible to limit an enemy force’s options when conducting an area defense. They
conduct supporting efforts to constrain the enemy into specific COAs, control enemy movements, or fix
enemy forces in given locations. Units continue to find, delay, or attrit enemy forces for follow on and reserve
to keep them from entering the MBA when executing these operations.
9-87. Units have several options to help fix attacking enemy forces. They can design supporting efforts—
such as securing the flanks and point of a penetration—to fix enemy forces and allow friendly forces to
execute decisive maneuver elsewhere. Combat outposts and strong points can also deny enemy force’s
movement to or through a location.
9-88. Units use obstacles to fix, turn, block, or disrupt to limit the enemy force’s options. Properly executed
obstacles result from top-down and bottom-up obstacle planning and emplacement. Blocking forces can also
affect enemy movement. A blocking force may achieve its mission from a variety of positions depending on
the mission variables.
Finish the Enemy
9-89. The main effort occurs in the MBA in an area defense. This is where the effects of supporting efforts,
coupled with sustaining operations, combine with the main effort of the main body forces to defeat enemy
forces. Commanders’ goals are to prevent enemy forces from further advances by using a combination of
fires from prepared positions, obstacles, and mobile reserves.
9-90. Generating massed effects is especially critical to units conducting the defense of large areas against
enemy forces with significant advantages in combat power. An attacking enemy force has the ability to select
the point and time of attack. Therefore, an attacking enemy force can mass forces at specific points, thus |
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dramatically influencing the ratio of forces at these points of attack. Defending units quickly determine their
enemy force’s intent and the effects of terrain. This allows defending units and their weapon systems to
concentrate the effects of combat power against enemy forces at those points and restore a more favorable
force ratio.
9-91. Units carefully plan and coordinate the withdrawal of their forward security forces through MBA
forward positions. MBA forces assume responsibility for a battle at the BHL. Units may find it necessary to
increase the intensity of the direct and indirect fire support they provide to these forward security forces. This
support allows those security forces to break direct contact with an enemy force as they approach the BHL
and FEBA and conduct a rearward passage of lines. Units may also employ obscuration to assist in the
retrograde maneuver of their security forces. Units guard rearward passage lanes in obstacle complexes left
for the withdrawal of their security forces and arrange for closing those lanes after the passage of those forces.
MBA forces provide other support as required to assist the withdrawal of these security forces.
9-92. Attacking enemy forces try to find vulnerabilities and passage points after they reach the MBA,
possibly by conducting a series of probing attacks. Defending units engage enemy lead forces as these attacks
develop. Defending units select and reinforce terrain to canalize attacking enemy forces and limit the
available maneuver space. This limited maneuver space tends to slow enemy advances and cause enemy
formations to compress with resulting increased force densities. These conditions favor the employment of
defensive fires and air support. Defending units employ simultaneous and sequential fires to impose the
maximum possible enemy losses at this stage of a battle.
9-93. Subordinate elements maneuver using massed direct and indirect fire and movement to gain positional
advantage over assaulting enemy forces. Commanders also direct engineer obstacle and sustainment efforts
by assigning priorities. They reposition forces to meet enemy forces where they actually are rather than where
they projected enemy forces would be. Commanders direct operations and support subordinate elements by
providing the necessary functional and multifunctional support and sustainment assets. They control the
commitment of their reserves. Units engage enemy follow-on forces with long-range rockets and air support
at division echelons and above. Units can defeat an echeloned enemy’s attack in detail, one echelon at a time,
if they can delay the entry of enemy follow-on forces into the MBA. This is because disrupting the enemy
force’s timetable can lead to the creation of exploitable gaps between the enemy force’s committed and
subsequent echelons.
9-94. Gaps between defensive positions may be necessary within the MBA due to a lack of defending forces.
Units do not leave gaps in or near points where they project enemy forces will commit their main effort.
Units continue to observe these gaps and cover them with their available fires. Where possible, units block
these gaps by emplacing obstacles or moving in friendly forces.
9-95. Commanders clearly define responsibilities for dealing with each enemy penetration. They take steps
to block enemy MBA penetrations and destroy any penetrating enemy forces as soon as possible. This usually
requires the employment of friendly reserves. Units may need to extend defensive actions within the depth
of their assigned areas to counter enemy penetrations not stopped farther forward.
9-96. Units do not allow attacking enemy forces to consolidate on any newly won objectives, unless this fits
in their operational concepts for the defense. Generally, units conduct local counterattacks with available
local resources to prevent enemy forces from consolidating on those objectives. The smallest possible units
conduct these local counterattacks. However, commanders remain aware of the need to avoid piecemeal
commitment. Units do not abandon their positions unless this action aligns with their higher echelon
commander’s intent or that higher echelon commander grants them permission to do so. Defending forces
contain enemy penetrations if they are unable to repulse enemy forces until they can act in concert with major
counterattacking forces. Units orchestrate their counterattacks with the effects of all their elements of combat
power, such as their supporting fire support systems.
9-97. Units employ all available resources necessary to ensure success when counterattacking. Their
reserves’ counterattack usually becomes their main effort on their commitment. One of commanders’ most
critical decisions is the commitment of their reserve. Therefore, commanders avoid premature or piecemeal
commitment of reserves. Commanders may reinforce their reserves before commitment to give them greater
capabilities to counter enemy action. Units do not counterattack as an automatic reaction to an enemy
penetration. Nor do commanders commit reserves solely because enemy forces reach a certain phase line or |
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other location. Units may employ fire support assets and local counterattacks by forces already defending to
destroy, disrupt, or attrit enemy penetrations, thus avoiding the need to commit reserves. Units launch their
counterattacks when enemy forces present their flanks, overextend, or the enemy forces’ momentum
dissipates. Units can target counterattacks to isolate and destroy selected enemy forces within the MBA once
they can identify the flanks of the enemy force’s main effort.
9-98. Sometimes commanders may determine that their reserves are unable to conduct successful
counterattacks. Units use their available resources to block, contain, or delay enemy forces in this situation.
This gains time for the employment of higher echelon reserves. Commanders and staffs adjust their existing
defensive plans to integrate these high-echelon reserves into their defensive and counterattack schemes. Units
adjust boundaries and designate additional BPs for occupation. They plan the routes units will use and any
necessary adjustments to existing command and support relationships. They can speed the process of
positioning and moving these reserves by designating routes, allocating mobility assets, and providing traffic
control personnel and guides at designated contact points to lead and brief them on the situation. Units employ
maneuver battalion scouts, military police, and cavalry units to provide traffic control during the movement
of these reserves because they have the combat power to protect themselves from those small enemy forces
that units may encounter in this situation.
Follow Through
9-99. Defensive actions aim to retain terrain and create conditions for a counteroffensive that regains the
initiative. The area defense does this by causing enemy forces to sustain unacceptable losses before reaching
their objectives.
9-100. Upon defeating the enemy attack, commanders have a decision to make. They can consolidate,
reorganize, and begin the counterattack. They can consolidate and reorganize and prepare to defend again. If
they are unable to defeat the enemy attack, they need to transition to a retrograde. Any decision to withdraw
must account for the current situation in adjacent defensive areas. Only the higher echelon commander who
ordered the defense can designate a new FEBA or authorize a retrograde operation. No matter what option is
chosen, units must continue to conduct MEDEVAC and CASEVAC, battle damage assessment and repair,
detainee operations, and begin setting conditions for the branch or sequel to their defense.
REVERSE SLOPE DEFENSE
9-101. For a reverse slope defense, units organize their defense on the portion of a terrain feature or slope
with a topographical crest that masks the main defensive positions from enemy observation and direct fire.
All or part of the defending force may employ this technique. It is generally useful at lower tactical echelons,
such as battalion and below.
9-102. Units base a successful reverse slope defense on denying enemy forces the topographical crest.
Although a defender may not occupy a crest in strength, controlling the crest by fire is essential for success.
Controlling the crest reduces the effects of indirect fire (mortar, artillery, and close air support) and draws
the battle into small-arms range. Units use a reverse slope defense to provide a defending force an opportunity
to gain surprise. Their goal is to make enemy forces commit forces against the forward slope of the defense,
causing enemy forces to attack in an uncoordinated fashion across the exposed topographical crest. Firing
from covered and concealed positions throughout the battle area, the defending force maintains a distinct
advantage over the exposed enemy forces and canalizes them through unfamiliar terrain into engagement
areas Figure 9-12 on page 9-22 shows the terminology associated with the reverse slope defense. |
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Figure 9-12. Slope terminology
9-103. Units choose to conduct a reverse slope defense when—
* The crest and forward slope are untenable because the enemy force enjoys a quantitative or
qualitative advantage in firepower at that point.
* Enemy forces cannot depress enough to engage friendly forces.
* The crest and forward slope offer little or no cover and concealment.
* The forward slope has been lost to enemy action or not seized.
* Mutual support by flank units can adequately cover the forward slope.
* Variance in the friendly force’s tactical pattern is advisable to deceive or surprise enemy forces.
* Forced to assume a hasty defense while in contact with or close to enemy forces.
9-104. A reverse slope defense may deceive enemy forces regarding the true location and organization of
its main defensive positions. This defense protects the main defensive positions from preparation fires and
causes enemy forces to deploy into assault formations prematurely. The forward crest of the main defensive
positions limits the enemy force’s observation. It reduces the effectiveness of enemy indirect fires and close
air support rendering the enemy force’s direct fire weapons ineffective. The defending force may surprise
enemy forces as they crest the high ground, engaging them with massed fires. Units on the reverse slope have
more freedom of movement until the crest is lost. The reverse slope defense also removes any direct fire
stand-off advantage the enemy may have.
9-105. However, using a reverse slope defense has several disadvantages:
* The effective range of direct fire weapons may be limited.
* Once security elements withdraw, enemy forces can advance largely unimpeded until attacking
elements crest the high ground in front of the main defensive positions.
* The enemy force has the advantage of attacking downhill.
* Maintaining observation of the enemy force is difficult.
* In some cases, units can cover obstacles only from positions on the forward slope.
Organizations of Forces
9-106. Commanders task-organize their forces to give each unit enough combat power to accomplish its
mission once their schemes of maneuver are determined. A unit conducting a reverse slope defense normally
task-organize their forces into a security force, a main body, and a reserve.
9-107. Units position the security force where they can observe the forward slope, the terrain forward of it,
and other approaches to the defending position. Security elements destroy enemy reconnaissance assets,
delay enemy forces, disorganize the enemy force’s attack, and deceive enemy forces regarding the exact |
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location of the main defense. They position information collection assets and observation posts near or
forward of the topographical crest to provide long-range observation of both the enemy force’s flanks and
front. An observation post may vary in size from a two-man team to a rifle squad or to a multiple combat
vehicle section in each position. Units employ sufficient forces to provide observation and a usually a screen
for the MBA. During periods of reduced visibility, units should increase the numbers and sizes of these
detachments to provide security against infiltration or unexpected attack. Aggressive night combat patrols
and ambushes are an essential part of the security process.
9-108. To achieve surprise and limit an enemy force’s ability to maneuver, units organize the main body
into defensive positions to mass fires on attacking enemy forces as they cross the topographic crest. In a
reverse slope defense, the key position denies enemy penetration and supports forward elements by fire. The
defending force maintains observation and fires over the entire forward slope as long as possible to destroy
enemy forces, thus preventing enemy forces from massing for a final assault. From defensive positions on
the reverse slope, the close-in battle builds in intensity. The defending force does not fire its direct fire
weapons, which are located throughout the MBA (on adjacent slope positions, counterslope positions, or
reverse slope positions) until suitable targets appear. At the same time, the defending force shifts the effects
of its indirect fires to those areas forward of the crest and forward military slope.
9-109. When possible, other units on complementary terrain support units in reverse slope positions. This
is especially desirable when those supporting units can observe and place fires on the crest and forward slope.
In a defense on a counterslope (reverse forward slope), fires must cover the area immediately in front of the
reverse slope positions to the topographical crest. Units organize defensive positions to permit fires on enemy
approaches around and over the crest and on the forward slopes of adjacent terrain features, if applicable.
The key factors that affect the organization of these areas are mutually supporting covered and concealed
positions, numerous existing and reinforcing obstacles, the ability to bring devastating fires from all available
weapons onto the crest, and a counterattack force. Depending on the terrain, the most desirable location for
the reserve may be on the counterslope or the reverse military crest of the counterslope.
Control Measures
9-110. Defensive control measures introduced in previous chapters continue to apply. Units place
engagement areas and obstacles on the reverse slope. The topographical crest normally marks the far edge of
the engagement area. Defending forces must dominate the crest with fires to prevent enemy forces from
successfully engaging the main body.
Executing a Reverse Slope Defense
9-111. When executing a reverse slope defense, units place special emphasis on—
* The proper organization of the forward slope to provide observation across the entire front and
security to the main BPs.
* A fire support plan to prevent the enemy force’s occupation and use of the topographical crest.
* A counterattack plan that specifies measures necessary to clear the crest or regain it from enemy
control.
* Fire support to destroy, disrupt, and attrit enemy forces on the forward slope.
9-112. Units normally place FPFs along the topographical crest and employ them as enemy forces reach
the first row of defiladed obstacles. Units use the reserve to counterattack and expel the enemy from the
topographical crest if massed indirect fires do not defeat the attack.
9-113. A reverse slope defense pursues offensive opportunities through surprise and deceptive actions. It is
uniquely suited to infantry forces in mountainous terrain. When conducting a reverse slope defense, surprise
results from defending in a manner for which the enemy forces are not prepared. Once this defense
successfully halts an enemy attack, it may have limited further value because the effect of surprise is difficult
to attain.
9-114. The entire forward security force should not withdraw automatically as soon as the first enemy units
reach the FEBA. Units can leave in place security elements located in areas where enemy forces have not
advanced. These security forces adjust to the enemy force’s advance and continue to conduct security |
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operations as far forward as possible. They continue to resist enemy supporting efforts, such as the enemy’s
reconnaissance effort, thereby upsetting the enemy’s coordination and allowing MBA units to fight one
engagement or battle at a time. Doing this increases the chances for success even if the enemy attack
penetrates the MBA in one or more areas. In some cases, security forces can attack enemy elements from the
rear, engage high-payoff targets, or operate between echelons to isolate leading enemy units.
9-115. Commanders may order security force information collection assets to displace to one or both sides
of an enemy penetration and continue to maintain observation of enemy forces approaching the MBA. These
information collection assets can facilitate friendly counterattacks by observing and providing access to the
enemy force’s flanks. Alternatively, units may plan to monitor those areas where enemy forces have not
advanced into the MBA solely by technical means to prevent the isolation and possible encirclement of these
assets.
9-116. Units coordinate battle handover between their security forces and MBA forces as quickly and
efficiently as possible to minimize vulnerability to enemy fire. Security forces need to retain freedom of
maneuver until the start of their passage of lines. Fire support assets help cover the withdrawal of these
security forces. Support and sustainment elements of the security force leave the security area as early as
possible to avoid hampering the movement of maneuver forces. Normally, the security force hands off the
battle to the nearest MBA force.
9-117. Units consider their security force’s next mission before initiating battle handover between their
security and MBA force. Factors that may affect this decision are the status of their security forces, their
subsequent mission preparation requirements, and the size and nature of the reserve required by the situation.
Commanders may decide to employ their security forces immediately as their reserve, which would release
their initial reserves for other tasks. Alternately, they may decide to use their security forces to conduct
additional security operations on the flanks of MBA forces as a battle progresses. However, it may be some
time before a given security force is ready for commitment. Therefore, units more often wait until their
security forces reconstitute and they commit their initial reserves before designating their former security
forces as their new reserves.
9-118. Units plan the location of their security forces assembly areas on the follow-on missions they assign
to those security forces. They locate those assembly areas to rapidly support their ongoing operations yet
keep withdrawn security units from interfering with ongoing decisive and shaping operations. After passage,
their security forces normally move to these locations to prepare for subsequent operations. At a minimum,
units rearm and refuel their security forces as soon as possible after their relief from the security mission.
Additional sustainment concerns include casualty evacuation, maintenance requirements, and resupply of
other classes of supply. |
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Mobile Defense
This chapter first discusses mobile defense and its general considerations. It then
discusses organization of forces and control measures. Lastly, this chapter discusses
how to plan, prepare, and execute a mobile defense.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A MOBILE DEFENSE
10-1. A mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying enemy forces by allowing them to advance to a
point where the striking force can conduct a decisive counterattack. The area defense, on the other hand,
focuses on retaining terrain by absorbing an attacking force into an interlocked series of positions where units
destroy the attacking force largely by fires.
10-2. Units smaller than a division do not normally conduct a mobile defense because of their limited
capabilities to conduct multiple engagements throughout the width and depth of an assigned area while
simultaneously resourcing forces for striking, fixing, and reserve. Typically, the striking force in a mobile
defense may consist of one-half to two-thirds of the defender’s combat power. BCTs and smaller units
generally conduct an area defense or a delay as part of the fixing force as units shape the enemy force’s
penetration, or they attack as part of the striking force. Alternatively, they can constitute a portion of the
reserve.
10-3. The mission variables may dictate that a unit conducts a mobile defense when defending against an
enemy force with greater combat power but less mobility. The following circumstances favor when to
conduct a mobile defense:
* The defending force possesses equal or greater mobility than the enemy force.
* The frontage assigned exceeds the defending force’s capability to establish an effective area or
positional defense.
* The depth of the assigned area encourages attacking enemy forces to overextend and move into
unfavorable positions where they are vulnerable to a counterattack.
* Time for preparing defensive positions is limited.
* Sufficient armored, Stryker, aviation, Army, and joint fires are available to allow rapid
concentration of combat power.
* The assigned area lacks well-defined avenues of approach and consists largely of flat, open terrain.
* The mission does not require denying the enemy specific terrain.
10-4. Units conducting a mobile defense anticipate enemy penetrations into defended areas and use obstacles
and defensive positions to shape and control penetrations. They also use counterattacks either to draw enemy
forces into entering planned penetration areas or to deceive the enemy commander as to the nature of the
defense. Risks associated with the conduct of a mobile defense include—
* The fixing force may be isolated and defeated in detail because of the need to resource the striking
force to the detriment of the fixing force.
* Enemy operations may impair the ability of the striking force to react at critical points.
* The enemy force may not move into the area intended by the defending commander.
* The attacking enemy force may retain some momentum as it approaches desired engagement
areas. |
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* The defending force may not gain a timely, accurate picture of the attacking enemy force’s
locations and dispositions required by the striking force to execute the main effort.
* The decentralized operations required in a mobile defense may increase potential for friendly fire
incidents.
Command and control systems improve the ability of the friendly force to gain and maintain a COP, which
reduces the risk associated with this type of defense. Figure 10-1 depicts a mobile defense.
Figure 10-1. Mobile defense
10-5. Just as in an area defense, commanders of a mobile defense consider how their operations impact the
civilian population within the assigned area. The impact of the population is of more concern during a mobile
defense than it is during an area defense because the scope of maneuver and tempo of operations is much
larger. Civilian attempts to avoid advancing enemy formations and locations where combat occurs will
impede the ground maneuver of defending units unless commanders account for their presence and provide
alternative routes for dislocated civilians. Units communicate these routes to the civilian population using
various means to ensure they receive the information. Ideally, local nation civilian or military organizations
provide civilian traffic regulations and immediate essential services along those civilian evacuation routes
(along with the other five primary stability tasks). However, if the local nation cannot perform these tasks,
the defending unit will have to perform them. Screening of civilians by units is necessary in this case to
preclude enemy agents from using these routes to infiltrate friendly defensive positions. At all times,
commanders must meet legal obligations to local civilian populations.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES FOR A MOBILE DEFENSE
10-6. Units organize the main body into two principal groups: the fixing force and the striking force. In a
mobile defense, reconnaissance and security, reserve, and sustaining forces accomplish the same tasks as in
an area defense. Units adjust their task organization before committing subordinate units to combat. Figure
10-2 illustrates the organization of forces for a mobile defense. |
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Figure 10-2. Organization of forces for a mobile defense
10-7. A fixing force is a force designated to supplement the striking force by preventing the enemy from
moving from a specific area for a specific time. The fixing force is used to hold attacking enemy forces in
position, by canalizing attacking enemy forces into engagement areas, and to retain areas from which to
launch the striking force. A fixing force is organized with the minimum combat power needed to accomplish
its mission. The fixing force turns, blocks, and delays an attacking enemy force. It tries to shape an enemy
penetration or contain an enemy force’s advance. Typically, it has most of the countermobility assets of the
defending unit. The fixing force may conduct defensive actions over considerable depth within the MBA.
However, it must be prepared to stop and hold terrain on short notice to assist the striking force on its
commitment. The operations of the fixing force establish the conditions for a decisive attack by the striking
force at a favorable location. The fixing force sets the condition for the striking force. The fixing force
executes its portion of the defense by combining an area defense and a delaying action.
10-8. The striking force is a dedicated counterattack force in a mobile defense constituted with the bulk of
available combat power. The commander’s most critical decisions are when, where, and under what
conditions they should commit the striking force. The striking force contains the maximum combat power
available to commanders at the time of its counterattack. This is the main effort for the unit during the mobile
defense. The striking force is a combined arms force that has greater combat power and mobility than the
force it seeks to defeat or destroy. Units consider the effects of surprise when determining the relative combat
power of their striking forces and their targeted enemy units. The striking force is normally task-organized
with all support and sustainment assets before its commitment. Units should position mobility enhancing
assets near the lead elements of their striking forces.
10-9. A striking force is the key to a successful mobile defense. All its contingencies relate to its attack. If
the opportunity does not exist to commit the striking force, the defending unit repositions forces to establish
the conditions for success. The striking force must have mobility equal to or greater than that of its targeted |
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enemy force. It can obtain this mobility through task organization, countermobility operations to slow and
disrupt enemy movements, and mobility operations to facilitate the rapid shifting of friendly formations. The
striking force requires access to multiple routes because an attacking enemy force normally denies the
defending force freedom of action.
10-10. Resourcing a reserve in a mobile defense is difficult and requires commanders to analyze risk. The
unit must balance the size of the reserve with taking forces away from either the fixing or strike force.
Commanders generally plan priorities for the reserve to prevent the fixing force from failing or to exploit the
success of the striking force.
CONTROL MEASURES FOR A MOBILE DEFENSE
10-11. Since the mobile defense is the combination of a unit conducting an area defense and a separate unit
conducting a counterattack, it takes control measures from both. These control measures include designating
assigned areas of the fixing and striking forces with their associated boundaries, BPs, and phase lines. Units
designate a LD or a line of contact as part of the graphic control measures for the striking force. They may
designate an axis of advance for the striking force. Units can designate attack by fire or support by fire
positions. They use engagement areas, TRPs, TAIs, and FPFs as necessary. They designate NAIs to focus
the efforts of reconnaissance and surveillance assets. This allows units to determine an enemy force’s course
of action. Units also designate checkpoints, contact points, passage points, passage routes, and passage lanes
for use by reconnaissance and surveillance assets, security units, and the striking force. Figure 10-3 depicts
example control measures for a mobile defense.
Figure 10-3. Example of mobile defense control measures
10-12. Commanders provide the striking force commander with control measures to focus the striking force
at the decisive time and place and to deconflict fires with the fixing force. At a minimum, the striking force
commander needs to know decision points that lead to the commitment of the striking force, the limit of
advance, and boundaries of the striking force’s assigned area. If the overall commander imposes either an
axis of attack or a direction of attack as a control measure, that higher echelon commander restricts the |
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striking force commander’s freedom of maneuver. However, such restrictions may be necessary to avoid
contact with enemy forces that could distract the striking force from accomplishing its primary mission. Units
may have to determine and transmit these control measures rapidly for subordinates to take advantage of an
opportunity to commit the striking force in the counterattack. Units also develop graphics that help them
recover the defense’s integrity if the striking force is not successful in its attack. (Appendix A explains these
control measures.)
PLANNING A MOBILE DEFENSE
10-13. The key to a successful mobile defense is the integration and synchronization of all available assets
to maximize the combat power of the defending unit, particularly the striking force. Units integrate and
synchronize their plans to deliver combined effects at decisive times and places.
10-14. In a mobile defense, units may take advantage of terrain or obscurants to hide a striking force until
the enemy force's forward elements pass the striking force. Until committed, the striking force maintains a
defense. This technique closely resembles the use of stay-behind forces. Similarly, commanders may order
friendly units inadvertently bypassed by enemy forces not to break out immediately so that they may
capitalize on their position to destroy enemy forces.
10-15. A mobile defense gives enemy forces an opportunity to conduct a limited penetration or advance
along a limited frontage with a portion of their forces. Units conducting a mobile defense employ minimal
forces as the fixing force. This generally allows enemy forces to penetrate or cross an obstacle in at least one
location. Once this occurs, the fixing force isolates and fixes the enemy penetration. Once the penetration is
fixed, defending units launch a counterattack by using the striking force to destroy the fixed enemy. Units
may also choose this variation when an enemy force is likely to use weapons of mass destruction.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
10-16. The ability to maintain the mobility advantage of a defending force is an important aspect of the
mobile defense. This mobility advantage may result from or be enhanced by countermobility actions directed
against an attacking enemy force. In the mobile defense plan, units ensure their reserves and striking force
have freedom of maneuver. Simultaneously, the fixing forces restrict the enemy’s mobility and momentum,
while guiding or forcing the enemy into areas that favor the defense.
10-17. Most countermobility assets support the operations of the fixing force. Most mobility assets support
the operations of the striking force. Situational obstacles provide a tremendous advantage to defending forces
in a mobile defense. These obstacles are a combat multiplier because they enable economy of force measures.
Units use situational obstacles to exploit enemy vulnerabilities, exploit success, separate enemy follow-on
forces, and provide flank protection.
FIRES
10-18. The carefully planned indirect fires of all weapons is the basis for an effective mobile defense. The
striking force conducts the main effort in a mobile defense. It requires continuous and concentrated fire
support. Commanders weight their main effort, in part, by allocating field artillery and other weapon systems
to it. They rapidly shift indirect fire support from the fixing force to the striking force. These fire support
systems do not have to move with the striking force if it remains within supporting range.
10-19. Units plan to move their fire support assets to locations where they can support the fixing and strike
force. Fire support assets, especially when employing precision munitions, can partially compensate for a
lack of maneuver forces in the striking force. Units take precautions to prevent fratricide as the striking force
approaches the fixing force’s engagement areas by establishing RFLs while supporting air and artillery assets
interdict enemy movements.
SUSTAINMENT
10-20. When planning to sustain the mobile defense, planners must look beyond the fixing force’s
supporting effort to support the striking force’s counterattack. The greater the distance the striking force must
cover when moving from its assembly area to its final objective, the greater the amount of supplies needed |
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to support that move. Once committed, units in the striking force require priority of fuel, ammunition, and
maintenance support over comparable units in the fixing force. Units establish casualty treatment and
evacuation procedures for both the fixing force and the striking force. The fixing force will likely suffer a
higher percentage of casualties than the striking force as it absorbs the enemy force’s attack. When the
striking force must move a considerable distance from its assembly area, units should consider establishing
a tactical assembly area near the fixing force prior to the assault on the enemy. Commanders weigh the
benefits of establishing these bases against the cost in terms of combat power or effort diverted from the
support mission to secure intermediate staging bases before establishing them. (See ATP 3-35 for additional
information on intermediate staging bases.)
PREPARING A MOBILE DEFENSE
10-21. Preparations for a mobile defense include developing the fixing force’s defensive positions and
engagement areas. Units aggressively use information collection assets to track enemy forces as they
approach. Engineers participate in conducting route and area reconnaissance to find and classify existing
routes. They improve existing routes and open new routes for use during the battle by the striking force. They
also conduct counter mobility and survivability operations for the fixing force.
10-22. The striking force assembles in one or more areas depending on the width of the assigned area, the
terrain, enemy capabilities, and their commander’s intent. Before the enemy attack begins, the striking force
may deploy some or all of its elements forward in the MBA to—
* Deceive the enemy force regarding the purpose of the striking force.
* Occupy dummy BPs.
* Create a false impression of unit boundaries, which is important when operating with a mix of
armored, Stryker, and light infantry forces or multinational forces.
* Conduct reconnaissance of routes between the striking force’s assembly areas and potential
objectives.
10-23. The enemy force attempts to discover the strength, composition, and location of units that constitute
the fixing force and the striking force. Units use protective measures, such as security forces and OPSEC, to
deny the enemy force information. Friendly units use those measures to degrade the collection capabilities
of enemy reconnaissance and surveillance assets. Commanders routinely reposition units to mislead the
enemy force and to protect the friendly force. In addition, units incorporate OPSEC, tactical deception, and
other protective measures into plans and preparations. They attempt to portray an area defense to the enemy
force while hiding the striking force.
EXECUTING A MOBILE DEFENSE
10-24. The first two steps of the tactical framework are normally done by the fixing force. The finish step
is normally the mobile defense’s main effort, while the follow through step is normally a branch or sequel
operation done by both forces.
10-25. Units executing a mobile defense maintain the flexibility to yield terrain and shape the enemy
penetration. They may even entice the enemy force by appearing to uncover an objective of strategic or
operational value to the enemy force. The striking force maneuvers to conduct the main effort—the
counterattack—once the results of the actions of the fixing force shape the situation to meet the commander’s
intent.
FIND THE ENEMY
10-26. Units conducting a mobile defense focus on discovering the enemy’s strength and exact locations to
facilitate the effectiveness of the striking force. The security force (guard or cover) or the fixing force
confirms the enemy force’s course of action and the main avenues of approach used by the enemy force.
Commanders normally task other information collection assets to determine the location of enemy reserves
and follow-on forces. Early detection of an enemy force’s main effort provides units with reaction time to
adjust their fixing force’s positions and shape the enemy penetration, which, in turn, provides the time |
3-90 | 225 | Mobile Defense
necessary to commit the striking force. The striking force commander requires timely updates of the enemy
situation to ensure that the striking force engages the enemy force at the right location and time.
10-27. While conducting delaying tasks, the security force determines what routes the enemy force is using,
where the enemy force is strong or weak, and where gaps exist within enemy formations. This information
aids units in seizing the initiative by identifying opportunities. Further, it helps direct the striking force along
the path of least resistance, as it maneuvers to employ its combat power at the critical time and place.
FIX THE ENEMY
10-28. In a mobile defense, units conduct supporting efforts to disrupt the enemy force’s commitment of
reserves and follow-on echelons into the battle. These supporting efforts create the conditions for committing
the striking force by isolating the object of the striking force and destroying the enemy force’s key command
and control nodes, logistics resupply units, and reserves. Whenever possible, units sequence these supporting
efforts, including the use of electromagnetic warfare, so that their effects coincide with the commitment of
the striking force. To generate a tempo that temporarily paralyzes enemy C2, units increase the intensity of
these supporting efforts on the commitment of the striking force. Units continue to conduct supporting efforts
once the striking force commits to prevent enemy forces outside the objective area from interfering with the
decisive counterattack.
10-29. Fixing the enemy force establishes conditions necessary for the main effort by the striking force.
Typically, commanders of the defending force allow the enemy force to penetrate the MBA before the
striking force attacks as shown in figure 10-4 on page 10-8. The fixing force may employ a combination of
area defense, delay, and strong point techniques to shape the enemy penetration. The intent of the fixing force
is not necessarily to defeat the enemy force but to shape the penetration of the enemy force to facilitate a
decisive counterattack by the striking force. Commanders ensure that the missions and task organization of
subordinate units within the fixing force are consistent with the concept for preventing the enemy penetration.
Defensive positions within the fixing force may not be contiguous since the fixing force contains only the
minimum-essential combat power to accomplish its mission.
10-30. In a mobile defense, units retain ground only to facilitate the commitment of the striking force. Units
can yield ground to make the enemy commander think that their attack is successful or to entice the enemy
to move to a point where the striking force can attack. The fixing force’s use of obstacles supports this shaping
effort and helps it gain a mobility advantage over enemy forces.
10-31. During a mobile defense, commanders may need to commit the reserve to reinforce the fixing force
and help shape the battlefield. They position their reserves so they can effectively react to the enemy force’s
most likely and most dangerous course of action. Without a reserve, commanders assume significant risk in
attempting to shape enemy penetrations. Circumstances may also force them to employ elements of the
striking force to assist the fixing force. If that occurs, units can use available long-range fire support assets
and attack helicopters. These assets allow them to rapidly disengage and shift support during the striking
force’s commitment. |
3-90 | 226 | Chapter 10
Figure 10-4. Mobile defense before commitment of striking force
FINISH THE ENEMY
10-32. Commanders’ situational understanding is critical in establishing the conditions that initiate the
striking force’s movement and in determining the general area that serves as a focus for the counterattack.
Situational understanding includes identifying those points in time and maneuver space where the
counterattack proves decisive. The unit staff synchronizes the unit’s activities in time and maneuver space to
mass the effects of the striking force at the right time and place by establishing decision points.
10-33. The actions of the striking force are the echelon’s main effort on its commitment. Information
collection assets focus on tracking the enemy force’s advance. The striking force commander continuously
receives intelligence and information updates that allow that commander to adjust the counterattack to defeat
the enemy. Once the enemy starts its attack, any forward-deployed elements of the striking force withdraw
to assembly areas or attack positions and prepare for their commitment.
10-34. The defending commander launches the striking force in a counterattack when its offensive power
is greater than the targeted attacking enemy force. Piecemeal commitment of the striking force in support of
local objectives jeopardizes the success of the overall operation. The striking force must execute the
counterattack rapidly and violently, employing all combat power necessary to ensure success. The striking
force may be committed at a different time and area than anticipated. Thus, it must be able to respond to
unexpected developments rapidly and decisively. Figure 10-5 depicts a mobile defense after commitment of
a striking force.
10-35. Because the striking force normally attacks a moving enemy force, it generally assumes a formation
with a covering force, an advance guard, a main body, and either a follow and support or a follow and assume
force. The strike force commander designates flank responsibilities and may even allocate a force against a
particularly vulnerable flank. The striking force takes advantage of obstacles, such as rivers or obstacle zones,
to prevent the enemy from counterattacking the strike force. However, the striking force moves quickly and
mitigates risk to its flanks, using speed and situational understanding to provide security. |
3-90 | 227 | Mobile Defense
Figure 10-5. Mobile defense after commitment of striking force
10-36. The striking force attacks in a formation that provides maximum combat power forward to destroy
the enemy force. The striking force takes advantage of its mobility and firepower to seize the initiative by
overwhelming the enemy force with swift strikes that cripple the enemy force’s C2 system, disrupt attacking
enemy formations, and destroy enemy combat systems. Units ensure that fire support and fixing force efforts
capture the enemy force’s attention and posture the enemy force for attack by the striking force. During the
counterattack, the striking force commander may have one element of the striking force occupy support by
fire positions to suppress the enemy force, while another striking force element prepares to assault the
objective. Armored, Stryker, and light infantry forces may make this assault.
10-37. Engineers should be well forward to enhance the mobility of the striking force. These lead engineers
search for existing obstacles and clear routes within their capabilities. Follow-on engineers expand breaches,
improve routes, and replace assault bridges with more permanent structures. Engineers with flank forces
focus on countermobility to protect the striking force’s flanks.
FOLLOW THROUGH
10-38. Units use defensive actions to create the opportunity to transition to the offense. In a mobile defense,
that transitional opportunity generally results from the success of the striking force’s attack. Units exploit
success and attempt to establish conditions for a pursuit or an exploitation, based on the success of the striking
force’s attack. If the mobile defense is unsuccessful and the enemy force retains the initiative, units must
either reestablish a defense or conduct retrograde operations. |
3-90 | 229 | Chapter 11
Retrograde
This chapter discusses the retrograde and its general considerations. It then discusses
the three variations of the retrograde: delay, withdrawal, and retirement.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE RETROGRADE
11-1. A retrograde is organized movement away from the enemy. It may be forced by enemy actions, or it
may be made voluntarily. In either case, the higher echelon commander of the force must approve the
retrograde prior to execution. The three variations of the retrograde are delay, withdrawal, and retirement.
Units may execute retrogrades to—
* Transition to other operations.
* Gain time without becoming decisively engaged.
* Resist, exhaust, and damage an enemy force in situations that do not favor a defense.
* Draw enemy forces into an unfavorable situation or extend the enemy’s LOCs.
* Preserve the force or avoid combat under undesirable conditions, such as continuing an operation
that no longer promises success.
* Reposition forces to conform to movements of other friendly troops.
* Position the force for use elsewhere in other missions.
* Simplify sustainment of the force by shortening LOCs.
* Position the force where it can safely conduct reconstitution.
* Adjust the defensive scheme to secure terrain more favorable to the defense.
* Deceive enemy forces.
11-2. Leaders ensure Soldiers remain disciplined and aggressive during retrograde operations to preserve
unit morale. Additionally, units can counter any negative effects on morale by planning and efficiently
executing the retrograde and ensuring Soldiers understand their task, purpose, and the duration of the
operation. Retrogrades can negatively affect Soldiers’ morale more than any other type of operation because
they may view a retrograde as a defeat. After completing a retrograde operation, commanders may
reconstitute their forces.
11-3. Military police conduct security and mobility support to preserve the retrograde force’s freedom of
movement. They augment supporting military forces by establishing traffic control posts and enable route
and convoy security. Military police also provide support through the execution of detainee operations.
11-4. The extended frontages and ranges common to retrograde operations make the provision of fire support
difficult and limit the ability to mass fires. Therefore, retrograde forces, especially delay forces, often have
more fire support assets. Commanders’ risk of losing supporting artillery systems and their ammunition
stocks increases when conducting retrograde operations. Therefore, they balance their decision to commit
fire support systems forward against anticipated requirements in subsequent battle stages. In particular, units
take steps to protect their artillery systems against the direct fires of mobile enemy elements. Units can use
available rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft to augment or replace artillery systems.
11-5. During a retrograde, sustainment units echelon their movements to maintain adequate support to the
committed force. They maintain maximum dispersion consistent with control and local security. They aim to
provide uninterrupted support and maximum protection during the time it takes to conduct the retrograde
operation. By echeloning support, units reduce the time each sustainment unit spends moving, preventing it
from performing its primary support tasks. High-priority assets may require added protection to prevent their
loss or capture. To reduce congestion and interference with the operations of combat, functional and |
3-90 | 230 | Chapter 11
multifunctional support units and supporting sustainment assets displace as early as possible, normally during
periods of limited visibility. The early displacement of sustainment units can also prevent revealing friendly
future operations to the enemy force.
11-6. A retrograde movement is any movement to the rear or away from the enemy. Such movements
may be classified as a withdrawal, retirement, or delaying action. Retrograde operations generally require
more Class III and possibly more Class V supplies than during the conduct of other defensive operations.
These supplies must be available for emergency issue. These two factors combine to increase the demand for
transportation assets and maneuver space on MSRs. This, in turn, increases the need for movement
management and pre-positioned services and supplies. Sustainment units carry and cache necessary fuel and
ammunition stocks as required by the specific situation.
11-7. The sustainment provided must be mobile to cope with demands of the tactical situation that typically
occur during a retrograde operation. Units prevent unnecessary supplies from accumulating in areas projected
for abandonment. Only essential medical and logistics support should be located in the area involved in the
retrograde operation.
11-8. Commanders establish maintenance, recovery, evacuation priorities, and destruction criteria for
inoperable equipment. Maintenance requirements generally overwhelm the organic capabilities of forward
units during a retrograde operation. Higher headquarters place as much maintenance, recovery, and
evacuation assets forward as possible to augment or relieve combat elements of the burden of repairing
unserviceable equipment. Recovery and evacuation vehicles position themselves at critical locations to keep
disabled vehicles from blocking movement routes. Forward units evacuate systems that they cannot repair
within established timelines. They use all available means to accomplish this, including equipment
transporters and armored vehicles with inoperative weapon systems. Units destroy inoperable equipment to
prevent its capture when recovery and evacuation are impossible. When possible, units destroy the same vital
components in each type of system to prevent the enemy from rapidly exploiting captured friendly systems
through battlefield cannibalization.
11-9. Commanders assign transportation priorities for the movement of combat troops and their supplies, the
movement of obstacle materials to impede enemy forces, and the evacuation of casualties and repairable
equipment. Units keep MSRs open and decontaminated as necessary. They also increase the amount of
transportation assets available to assist in the retrograde.
11-10. Generally, units use alternate supply routes rather than just a few main supply routes. Some routes
remain open for traffic moving to the front while the bulk of functional and multifunctional support and
sustainment units displace farther rearward. Commanders designate and reserve routes for civilian traffic
including dislocating civilians. Commanders avoid designating routes that cross or otherwise interfere with
the unit’s MSRs as much as possible.
11-11. The senior military person present determines when to request medical evacuation and assigns
precedence of evacuation. The advice of the senior medical person at the scene, the patient’s condition, and
the tactical situation all influence this decision. Assignment of medical evacuation precedence is necessary.
The precedence provides the supporting medical unit and controlling headquarters with information used in
determining priorities for committing their evacuation assets. For this reason, correct assignment of
precedence cannot be overemphasized; overclassification remains a continuing challenge. Medical assets
evacuate patients as quickly as possible, consistent with available resources and pending missions. Medical
elements supporting the retrograding force provide rapid evacuation of casualties to medical facilities.
Medical evacuation requirements are especially demanding in the large assigned areas common to the
retrograde. Units may augment the ground ambulance capabilities of supporting forward medical units.
VARIATIONS OF RETROGRADE
11-12. Variations of retrograde have unique conditions and their own planning considerations. The three
variations of retrograde are—
* Delay.
* Withdraw.
* Retirement. |
3-90 | 231 | Retrograde
DELAY
11-13. A delay is when a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s
momentum and inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming decisively engaged
(ADP 3-90). A delay is one of the most demanding of all ground combat operations. A delay wears down
enemy forces so that friendly forces can regain the initiative through offensive action, buys time to establish
an effective defense, or determines enemy intentions as part of a security operation. Normally in a delay,
inflicting casualties on enemy forces is secondary to gaining time. For example, a flank security force
conducts a delay operation to provide time for the protected force to establish a viable defense along its
threatened flank. A force conducting a delay normally avoids a decisive engagement except when preventing
enemy penetration of a phase line for a specific duration.
11-14. A delay operation can occur when units do not have enough forces to attack or defend. It may also
occur, based on a unit’s mission, in conjunction with a higher echelon commander’s intent. Commanders
may base their decision to conduct a delay not on the unit’s combat power, but on other mission variables.
For example, during security operations, units may conduct a delay as a supporting effort to draw enemy
forces into an area where they are vulnerable to a friendly counterattack. Another example is a delay instituted
as an economy of force effort to allow units to conduct offensive actions elsewhere.
11-15. The ability of a force to trade maneuver space for time requires depth within the delaying force’s
assigned area. The amount of depth required depends on several factors, including the—
* Amount of time to be gained.
* Relative combat power of friendly and enemy forces.
* Relative mobility of the forces.
* Nature of the terrain.
* Ability to shape the assigned area with obstacles and fires.
* Degree of acceptable risk.
Ordinarily, the greater the depth, the lower the risk involved to the delaying force and the greater the chance
for success.
11-16. A delay succeeds by causing enemy forces to fight through a series of defensive positions. A
delaying force must offer a continued threat of serious opposition, causing enemy forces to repeatedly deploy
and maneuver. Delaying forces displace to subsequent positions before enemy forces are able to concentrate
sufficient resources to decisively engage and defeat delaying forces in their current position. The length of
time a force can remain in a position without facing the danger of decisive engagement is primarily a function
of relative combat power and the mission variables, such as terrain and weather.
11-17. Commanders normally assign subordinate units contiguous assigned areas deeper than they are wide.
They use obstacles, implement fires, and move throughout the depth of each assigned area. If units plan the
delay to last a short time or the assigned area’s depth is limited, the delaying unit may need to delay from a
single set of positions. If units expect the delay to last for a longer period, or if sufficient depth is available,
the delaying unit may delay using either an alternating or subsequent bounding technique to execute the
delay.
11-18. In both techniques, delaying forces normally reconnoiter their next positions before occupying them
and, if possible, post guides at their next position. Additionally, in executing both techniques, it is critical
that the delaying force maintains contact with enemy forces between delay positions. Table 11-1 on page
11-4 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of these two techniques. |
3-90 | 232 | Chapter 11
Table 11-1. Considerations for delay techniques
Method of delay Use when Advantages Disadvantages
Delay from alternating Assigned area is Allows positioning in Requires passage of
positions narrow. depth. lines.
Forces are adequate to Allows more time for Engages only part of the
be split between equipment and Soldier force at one time.
different positions. maintenance.
Increases flexibility.
Delay from subsequent Assigned area is wide. Masses fires of all Limited depth to the
positions Forces available do not available combat delay positions.
allow themselves to be elements. Less available time to
split. prepare each position.
Less flexibility.
11-19. Units normally prefer to bound from alternating positions when adequate forces are available and
the assigned area has sufficient depth. In a delay using alternating bounds, two or more units in a single
assigned area occupy delaying positions in depth. As the first unit engages enemy forces, the second unit
occupies the next position in depth and prepares to assume responsibility for the operation. The first force
disengages and passes around or through the second force. It then moves to the next position and prepares to
reengage enemy forces while the second force engages enemy forces. Units normally use alternate positions
when their delaying forces operate on narrow fronts. A delay using alternating bounds is particularly useful
on the most dangerous avenues of approach because it offers greater security than a delay using subsequent
bounds. However, it requires more forces and continuous maneuver coordination. Additionally, delaying
forces risk losing contact with enemy forces between their delay positions. Figure 11-1 depicts a delay from
alternating positions.
Figure 11-1. Delay from alternating positions
11-20. Units delaying using subsequent positions when the assigned area is so wide that available forces
cannot occupy more than a single tier of positions. In a delay using subsequent bounds, all delaying units are |
3-90 | 233 | Retrograde
committed to each of the series of BPs or across the assigned area on the same PL. Most of the delaying force
is located well forward. The mission dictates the delay from one BP or PL to the next. Units stagger the
movement of delaying elements so that elements are not moving at the same time. Figure 11-2 illustrates a
delay from subsequent positions.
Figure 11-2. Delay from subsequent positions
Organization of Forces
11-21. Units normally organize the delaying force into a main body, a security force, and a reserve. The
security force usually conducts a screen forward of the initial delay positions.
11-22. The main body, which contains the majority of the delaying force’s combat power, uses alternating
or subsequent bounds to conduct the delay. Commanders usually deploy their main bodies as complete units
into forward positions when conducting a delay from subsequent positions. They divide the main body into
two parts, roughly equal in combat power, to occupy each set of positions when conducting a delay using
alternating bounds.
11-23. Commanders retain a reserve to contain enemy penetrations between positions, to reinforce fires into
engagement areas, or to help a unit disengage from enemy forces. All these missions require a reserve with
enough combat power and mobility to attack the enemy ensuring its reaction to the attack.
11-24. Functional and multifunctional support and sustainment assets are widely dispersed and often
attached to the units they support because of the width of the assigned areas normally assigned in a delay.
Engineer priorities are normally countermobility first, then mobility. However, restrictive terrain that
impedes friendly movement may require units to reverse priorities. Close coordination is necessary so
engineer obstacles are covered by fire and do not impede planned withdrawal routes of delaying forces or the
commitment of a counterattacking reserve force. The delaying force should have a greater allocation of fire
support systems, including Service and joint aviation, to enable the delay force to break contact if necessary.
11-25. The requirement to maintain continuous support during the delay requires sustainment organizations
to echelon their assets throughout the area. This echeloning, coupled with the wide dispersion of combat
forces inherent in a delay, complicates the execution of the delay. |
3-90 | 234 | Chapter 11
Delay Control Measures
11-26. The delay consists of a series of independent small-unit actions that occur simultaneously across the
front. Subordinate units need freedom of action. Figure 11-3 depicts common graphics used in a delay
including assigned areas, PLs, BPs, contact points, checkpoints, engagement areas, trigger lines, points,
TRPs, and disengagement lines. Commanders designate contact points in front of, between, and behind units
to assist coordination, ensure continuity of the delay, and draw attention to enemy avenues of approach into
unit flanks.
Figure 11-3. Example of common delay control measures
11-27. Commanders assign each likely enemy avenue of approach to only one subordinate unit when
designating subordinate units’ assigned areas. When commanders assign subordinates their assigned areas,
terrain that controls fire and observation into those areas is included.
11-28. Units designate additional PLs beyond those established by the higher echelon as necessary to
control the unit’s movement during the delay. A delay line is a phase line over which an enemy is not
allowed to cross before a specific date and time or enemy condition. The delay line is depicted as part of
the graphic control measure. Designating delay lines is a command decision that imposes a high degree of
risk on the delaying unit. The delaying unit does everything in its power—including becoming decisively
engaged—to prevent enemy forces from crossing that line before the time indicated. A delay line may also
be event driven. For example, commanders can order delaying units to prevent penetration of the delay line
until supporting engineers complete construction of rearward obstacle belts.
Planning a Delay
11-29. Units must understand and exercise the basic defensive tactics outlined in Chapter 8 to conduct a
successful delay. However, these defensive basics for a delay have unique considerations, and the
significance of these considerations varies based on the mission variables. In a delay, units operate on
extended frontages at great risk from advancing enemy forces. The tactical situation constantly changes and
the opportunities for maneuver are few. Subordinate units must have the flexibility to take immediate actions |
3-90 | 235 | Retrograde
to retain the integrity of their forces. This helps retain their freedom of maneuver and inflict maximum
destruction on enemy forces.
11-30. Commanders and their staffs identify ground and air avenues for enemy attacks and friendly
counterattacks. When avenues of approach diverge or pass from one assigned area to another, adjacent units
coordinate with each other. Using the results of IPB, units designate initial and subsequent delay positions
on key terrain that covers likely enemy avenues of approach throughout the depth of the assigned area
allocated to the delay mission.
11-31. Commanders of delaying forces must maintain a mobility advantage over their attackers. They
maintain this advantage by fully using the mobility inherent in their available combat and tactical systems.
Engineering and fire support enablers are critical to this effort. Units take additional steps to enhance friendly
mobility and degrade enemy mobility, such as building combat trails between delaying positions and
preparing bridges over major rivers for demolition. The delaying force should be capable of constructing
large numbers of obstacles and delivering long-range fires. For example, while the enemy force travels in
movement formations that allow it to press its attack, the delaying force aims to engage the enemy force as
early and often as possible. This forces the enemy out of their preferred formations and into a series of time-
consuming deployments into assault formations.
11-32. Air defense of a delaying force has three main considerations: the protection of the force while it is
in position, the protection of any forces left in contact, and the protection of the force as it moves to the rear.
Priority should be toward maintaining the mobility of the force. Air defense assets remain mobile yet able to
engage aerial targets with little advance warning. These assets should work in teams and be able to move to
the rear in alternating bounds. This ensures that dedicated air defense assets are in position and that they have
the flexibility needed to keep pace with operations. Air defense firing points are not obvious positions that
an enemy force would target as part of preparation or supporting fires. The brigade air defense and airspace
management element provide early warning of enemy air attack over combat net radios using the command
net at brigade echelons and below.
11-33. Flanks and gaps between units are always areas of concern. In a linear deployment, attacking enemy
forces can bypass or outflank the delaying force if coordination between adjacent friendly units is weak or if
one unit creates a gap by moving rearward too rapidly. Therefore, units designate BPs to guard approaches
into the assigned area. Adjacent units of different commands exchange liaisons to ensure coordination.
11-34. Displacement criteria should specify at what point—either event or time driven—the delaying force
should begin its displacement. Units calculate enemy closure rates for the terrain and compare them to
friendly displacement rates between positions. Units can calculate movement times by comparing time and
distance factors. Units determine required obstacle effects and emplacement locations by applying the enemy
force’s probable closure rates and formations to available mobility corridors. This also helps them determine
if and where delay forces will be required to or likely to be decisively engaged to achieve their delay
objective. Careful consideration of the mission variables, especially terrain analysis, is an inherent part of
delay planning.
Characteristics of the Delay
11-35. Commanders must clearly describe three certain characteristics to their subordinate conducting a
delay mission. First, they direct one of two methods: delay within the assigned area or delay forward of a
specified line or terrain feature for a specified time. Commanders usually base that time on another unit
completing its activities, such as establishing rearward defensive positions. A mission of delay in the assigned
area implies that force integrity is a prime consideration. In this case, the delaying force delays enemy forces
as long as possible while avoiding decisive engagement. Generally, this force displaces upon meeting
predetermined criteria, such as when an enemy force reaches a disengagement line. The control measures are
the same for both alternatives except that during a delay forward of a specified line for a specified time,
commanders annotate the PL with the specified time. If commanders establish delay lines, mission
accomplishment outweighs preservation of the force’s integrity. It may require that delaying force hold a
given position until ordered to displace. Figure 11-4 on page 11-8 depicts a delay forward of a specified line
for a specified time. |
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