FM
stringclasses 43
values | page
int64 1
477
| text
stringlengths 6
8.45k
|
|---|---|---|
3-98 | 21 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
Figure 1-1. Reconnaissance and security in offensive, defensive, and stability operations
BCT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CAVALRY UNITS
1-37. The core competencies of Cavalry forces are to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in close
contact with enemy forces and civilian populations. These competencies allow the BCT to accomplish its
core missions. Cavalry forces facilitate the supported commander’s ability to concentrate superior combat
power against the enemy at the decisive time and place, and take appropriate actions to consolidate gains
while preparing for the next mission.
1-38. For reconnaissance and security operations to be most effective, they must be initiated early in the
planning process for BCT-level missions and continued throughout the mission. Consequently, commanders
and staffs develop information requirements throughout the operations process and assess, add, or delete
requirements continuously during planning and execution.
1-39. Cavalry commanders conduct operations consistent with reconnaissance and security fundamentals.
The BCT commander uses reconnaissance and security fundamentals to identify gaps or weaknesses in the
plan as well as opportunities to exploit and improve situational understanding. Reconnaissance and security
operations answer PIRs and enable the commander to make decisions and direct forces to achieve mission
success. Both reconnaissance and security operations enable successful offense, defense, and stability tasks.
Commanders and staffs first identify information gaps during the military decision-making process (MDMP)
and continuously assess, adapt, add, and delete requirements throughout the operation. Staffs identify
specified, implied, and essential tasks necessary for mission success during mission analysis, reviewing
available assets, and identifying resource and information shortfalls.
1-40. During mission analysis, staffs identify critical facts and assumptions aiding in the development of the
initial CCIRs, which is comprised of PIRs and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs), facilitating
timely decision-making. PIRs are information requirements necessary to understand the adversary or |
3-98 | 22 | Chapter 1
operational environment. PIRs identify information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil
considerations that the commander considers most important and impact upon future decisions. FFIRs
identify information about friendly forces and supporting capabilities, which affects future courses of action
and decisions from a friendly perspective. (Refer to chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation of CCIRs.)
1-41. Based upon identified information requirements, staffs assign tasks to prioritize, manage, and develop
the collection of information requirements leading to future decisions. As staffs identify requirements
necessary for successful execution, they recommend and assign tasks to Cavalry units to conduct reconnaissance
and provide answers allowing the commander to make decisions and capitalize on opportunities.
GENERAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY UNITS
1-42. During operations, the commander and staff’s time and resources are balanced between four major
activities in a continuous learning and adaptive cycle called the operations process, including planning,
preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for more information.)
Operations process activities are sequential but not discrete; all overlap and recur as circumstances demand.
1-43. Commanders implement early information collection and security to protect and prepare the force for
execution. Cavalry units should deploy in the planning phase to shape preparation activities and execution.
(Refer to ADP 5-0 for more information.)
1-44. Commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational understanding before execution of the
mission, which requires aggressive and continuous information collection from Cavalry forces. Information
collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets
as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future
operations (FM 3-55). Through information collection, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and
employ collection capabilities and forces to collect timely and accurate information to meet CCIRs and other
information requirements.
1-45. The force as a whole is often vulnerable to surprise and enemy attacks during preparation, when forces
are often concentrated in assembly areas (AAs). Security operations (screen, guard, cover, and area security)
are essential during preparation. Cavalry units assigned to security operations execute missions while the rest
of the force prepares for the overall operation.
1-46. When a Cavalry unit’s higher headquarters is conducting offensive operations, the Cavalry unit
develops the situation for the higher commander. For example, in a brigade movement to contact, the Cavalry
squadron may be the lead element conducting zone reconnaissance.
1-47. During defensive actions, a higher headquarters typically tasks the Cavalry unit with conducting
security operations to provide early warning and reaction time, deny enemy reconnaissance efforts, and
protect the main body. The commander tasks the Cavalry unit to execute security operations based upon the
degree of protection required by the higher headquarters.
1-48. Every operation integrates stability tasks, which are critical to sustaining or establishing civil security
and control over areas, populations, and resources. Cavalry units focus on reconnaissance and security
operations that enable its higher headquarters to develop a better understanding of the situation. Cavalry units
are critical to successful execution of stability tasks and the units’ ability to consolidate tactical gains.
1-49. Commanders task-organize Cavalry units with the combat power necessary to accomplish the mission
based upon mission variables. If a higher headquarters is conducting security operations, it assigns
appropriate security operations to the Cavalry unit and ensures the Cavalry unit is appropriately task
organized to accomplish their mission. Augmentation may include an aviation task force (TF), armored and
mechanized Infantry units, additional Cavalry units, engineer units for mobility and reconnaissance, artillery
in direct support, close air support, military intelligence units, air defense units, CBRN reconnaissance units,
and logistical elements. Reconnaissance and security operations often precede the main operation in time and
space; therefore, commanders can task-organize enablers organized with Cavalry units from divisions and
corps to provide reconnaissance and security at EAB. Subsequently, BCT commanders must be judicious
when detaching combat power from the Cavalry squadron, such as designating the squadron Armored
company as a BCT reserve, based on the importance of the BCT commander’s information and security
requirements. This loss of combat power inhibits the scope of the squadron’s possible security tasks, |
3-98 | 23 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
especially for the conduct of a guard. Mission variables and the commander’s intent determine which
additional capabilities the Cavalry unit requires.
BRIGADE OPERATIONS OFFICER AND SQUADRON EMPLOYMENT
1-50. BCT commanders and their staff integrate operations and intelligence when conducting reconnaissance
and security operations. A commander focuses information collection, combined arms, sustainment and
signal organizations, and reconnaissance efforts to answer the commander’s PIRs through the BCT or brigade
operations staff officer (S-3).
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM S-3
1-51. The BCT S-3 is responsible for coordinating and synchronizing information collection with
reconnaissance and security operations. The BCT S-3 allocates organic, attached, and supporting information
collection capabilities to answer PIRs or refine reconnaissance objectives. The S-3 ensures reconnaissance
operations enable the commander to make decisions as to how to employ the BCT’s combat power and
achieve desired outcomes and objectives. In concert with the brigade and subordinate staffs, the BCT S-3
ensures operations conducted by the Cavalry squadron and other information collection units are nested,
complementary, and focused on mission accomplishment.
1-52. BCTs establish coordination within the staff and collaborate with the Cavalry squadron staff to
synchronize reconnaissance and security operations. The brigade reconnaissance cell might include an S-2
(intelligence community/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), an S-3 plans, a fire support officer
(field artillery battalion), a brigade logistics staff officer (S-4), a brigade aviation element, brigade
sustainment assets, and the Air Force’s tactical air control party who can coordinate with close air support
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance personnel (see figure 1-2, page 1-12). The Cavalry
squadron can provide a staff officer, whose loss will not degrade squadron staff operations, to serve as a
liaison officer to the brigade reconnaissance cell. To achieve intent, the BCT commander task organizes the
Cavalry squadron with the necessary combined arms, engineers, military police, CBRN, sustainment, and
signal organizations to execute the mission. At the conclusion of mission analysis, the BCT publishes the
commander’s intent, including reconnaissance and security guidance and a fragmentary order to initiate
reconnaissance and security operations. Usually, the Cavalry squadron is the lead element in the brigade.
Parallel, integrated, and collaborative planning between the Cavalry squadron and BCT staffs is essential to
the timely execution of operations and the integration of intelligence collection with reconnaissance and
security operations. |
3-98 | 24 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-2. Brigade reconnaissance cell
CAVALRY EMPLOYMENT IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
1-53. The BCT commander employs the Cavalry squadron based on mission variables. The squadron can
operate in its own area of operations, unassigned deep areas in the BCT area of operations, or across another
maneuver battalion’s area of operations.
Assignment of Cavalry Squadron’s Area of Operations
1-54. When the BCT commander assigns the Cavalry squadron a specific area of operations, squadrons must
be prepared to perform the following actions (see figure 1-3):
* Terrain management.
* Information collection.
* Civil-military operations (with attached civil affairs forces).
* Movement control (air-ground).
* Clearance of fires.
* Security. |
3-98 | 25 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
* Personnel recovery.
* Manage airspace users.
* Minimal essential stability tasks.
1-55. Assignment of an area of operations provides the squadron with the maneuver space necessary to
execute its assigned mission. The BCT commander and staff ensure the squadron is task organized with
sufficient assets to accomplish the squadron’s assigned mission.
Figure 1-3. Squadron in its own area of operations
Within BCT Deep Areas
1-56. The squadron can also operate in BCT deep area. In noncontiguous areas of operations, the deep area
is the area between noncontiguous areas of operations or beyond contiguous areas of operations. (Refer to
ADP 3-0 for more information.) A commander’s deep area generally extends beyond subordinate units’
boundaries out to the limits of the commander’s designated area of operations. The purpose of operations in
the deep area often is tied to setting conditions for future events. The BCT commander may assign urban
areas to maneuver battalions thus allowing them to focus on that area while the Cavalry squadron conducts
operations in the open areas. The BCT may have deep areas due to—
* A decision to accept risk due to a low threat level.
* Areas not assigned to battalions are sparsely populated or the terrain is compartmentalized.
* Insufficient combat power to assign all areas to subordinate battalions.
1-57. The BCT is responsible for controlling deep areas within its area of operations. The BCT commander
may direct the Cavalry squadron to operate in the deep area (see figure 1-4, page 1-14). Squadrons operating
in the BCT deep area are not usually responsible for the entire deep area. The squadron in the deep area
generally operates in one of the following ways:
* In a contiguous portion of the unassigned area.
* In multiple, noncontiguous area of operations within the unassigned area.
* Within focused target areas of interest (TAIs) or named areas of interest (NAIs). |
3-98 | 26 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-4. Squadron in BCT deep area of operations
Across Another Battalion’s Area of Operations
1-58. The squadron may conduct operations in front of and across another battalion’s operation area, such
as during an area security mission or in preparation for offensive or defensive tasks (see figure 1-5). In this
case, the BCT commander assigns the entire area of operations to subordinate units or battalions. The BCT
commander retains control of the squadron by assigning an area of operations in front of and across the
maneuver battalions (for example, along a route). The squadron commander retains command and control of
the squadron and its significant information collection capabilities. Conditions may include hybrid threat
networks operating across brigade boundaries. During transitions to offense or defense, the BCT commander
can direct the squadron commander to place troops under tactical control to the maneuver battalions (for
example, one troop in front of each maneuver battalion’s scout platoon). The squadron remains focused on
collecting information to assist in answering the higher commander’s PIRs or other information requirements.
When operating across other battalion’s area of operations, higher headquarters still assigns specific missions
to squadrons. |
3-98 | 27 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
Figure 1-5. Squadron operating across another battalion’s area of operations
EMPLOYMENT METHOD COMPARISON
1-59. On a contiguous battlefield, the Cavalry squadron may have an area of operations forward of the
battalions or operate across the BCT area of operations. On a noncontiguous battlefield, the Cavalry squadron
may operate in the unassigned area inside the BCT’s area of operations. On a contiguous battlefield where
there are no unassigned areas, the Cavalry squadron may employ elements within the BCT area of operations
or across battalion areas of operations to answer information requirements that cross battalion boundaries,
such as a route security mission that spans the BCT area of operations (see figure 1-6, page 1-17). The
squadron may have an area of operations to meet an economy of force role in areas where the primary mission
is reconnaissance and security. Table 1-1, page 1-16 is a comparison of the three general employment
methods. |
3-98 | 28 | Chapter 1
Table 1-1. Squadron employment comparisons
EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS
Assignment in its own Operation in the Operations across another
area of operations BCT deep areas battalion’s area of operations
Tactical Route reconnaissance Route reconnaissance Route reconnaissance
Tasks Area reconnaissance Area reconnaissance Area reconnaissance
Zone reconnaissance Area security Area security
Recon in force Route security Route security
Screen Convoy security Convoy security
Guard Hasty attack
Cover
Area security
Route security
Convoy security
Hasty attack
Advantages Least restrictive. Mitigates some risk to BCT in BCT commander can focus
Focuses squadron efforts in the unassigned areas. squadron where needed most.
one area. Allows BCT to focus battalions Enables detailed coordination
Covers a broader area. in smaller area of operations. with maneuver battalions and
Limits risk of fratricide. Potentially enables ability to BCT.
identify networks across larger Battalions can provide rapid
Provides greater freedom of
area. transition to offensive and
action and maneuver.
Allows the BCT commander to defensive tasks.
Simplifies sustainment.
weight the main effort.
Disadvant- Broader area may require Most restrictive. Requires significant and
ages significant augmentation. Increased risk of fratricide. constant coordination with
Broad knowledge of area of Potential for disbursed maneuver battalions and BCT.
operations rather than deeper operations over a large area; Restrictive to freedom of action.
understanding. noncontiguous operations within Greatest risk of fratricide.
Provides limited view of the squadron. Increases sustainment
networks (cannot operate High coordination with adjacent complexity.
across boundaries). units and BCT headquarters
Difficult fire support. most difficult sustainment
operations.
Most difficult fire support.
Legend
BCT brigade combat team SPT support |
3-98 | 29 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
Figure 1-6. Squadron conducting reconnaissance in the brigade area of operations
BCT RECONNAISSANCE AND COLLECTION TEAMING
1-60. BCT reconnaissance and collection teaming is the pairing of collection assets to conduct integrated
reconnaissance and security operations to answer CCIRs. Commanders do not keep their reconnaissance and
information collection assets in reserve. The commander forms reconnaissance and collection teams to
complement reconnaissance and intelligence collection capabilities. These teams consist of appropriate
combinations of Cavalry Soldiers and multidiscipline intelligence Soldiers.
1-61. The BCT’s military intelligence company provides multidiscipline intelligence operations.
Multidiscipline intelligence operations include limited signals intelligence (SIGINT), electromagnetic
warfare, interrogation of prisoners of war, multidisciplinary counterintelligence, tactical human intelligence
(HUMINT), and air reconnaissance from tactical unmanned aircraft systems (known as TUASs). BCT
commanders build reconnaissance and collection teams to execute offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.
1-62. The BCT’s organic military intelligence company can be used to augment the Cavalry squadron based
on mission variables and PIRs. They operate together to secure collection assets and provide the appropriate
combat information and intelligence necessary to answer the PIRs of the supported commander. These
brigade reconnaissance, collection, and security teams provide the supported commander with the ability to
separate combatants from noncombatants more effectively under conditions of uncertainty.
1-63. The military intelligence company includes multifunctional teams comprised of all sources of
HUMINT and SIGINT disciplines, HUMINT collection teams, counterintelligence teams, SIGINT platoons,
and operational management teams that coordinate the various team missions. (Refer to ATP 2-19.4 for more
information.) BCT commanders can augment the squadron to ensure they have secure access to the local
population, which is essential for military intelligence discipline collection tasks by the brigade. |
3-98 | 30 | Chapter 1
COMPOSITION OF COLLECTION TEAMS
1-64. The lowest level for task-organizing Cavalry units with additional assets and capabilities is the section.
However, most assets operate under the operational control of a Cavalry troop or scout platoon. For example,
a scout platoon from the Cavalry squadron can receive an attached or operational control
SIGINT/electromagnetic warfare. Intelligence and reconnaissance teams provide enhanced security for
military intelligence teams, facilitate its movement, and expand the capability of reconnaissance during a
mission. Reconnaissance and collection teams combine and integrate collection and reconnaissance
specialties to accomplish the mission. Teaming allows rapid communication and sharing of information as
teams work together to answer critical information requirements.
SECTION V – ORGANIZATIONS
1-65. Cavalry units are essential to the brigade. Reconnaissance and security operations are essential to all
successful large-scale combat operations. Through effective information collection and continuous
reconnaissance, brigades develop and sustain the understanding to defeat adaptive and determined enemies.
Reconnaissance and security operations assist brigades in adapting to uncertainty. Reconnaissance and
security operations allow the brigade to understand the tactical, human, and political environment; visualize
operations; develop the situation, and identify or create options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Cavalry units provide flexibility, adaptability, and depth to the maneuver commander’s operations.
1-66. Cavalry units provide information to the commander about the enemy location, disposition, and
composition (see figure 1-7 and figures 1-8 and 1-9 [page 1-20]). Cavalry units preserve the BCT’s freedom
of maneuver. Successful reconnaissance allows the BCT commander to initiate combat under advantageous
conditions to defeat the enemy and accomplish the mission. Roles and organizations listed in this manual
depict habitual attachments and augmentees.
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
1-67. The BCT is the Army’s fundamental combined arms organization and its primary close combat force.
The BCT includes units and capabilities from every warfighting function; it is task organized to meet specific
mission requirements.
1-68. The Cavalry squadron is the BCT commander’s main asset for executing reconnaissance and security
operations at the brigade level; however, each subordinate organization of a BCT is responsible for
information collection, local reconnaissance, and security within their assigned area of operations. When the
BCT assigns reconnaissance or security missions to a subordinate element, it task organizes subordinate
elements and allocates the resources necessary to meet mission requirements. To perform reconnaissance or
security operations, the BCT commander may allocate armored and mechanized Infantry units,
reconnaissance units, engineer reconnaissance teams (ERTs), aviation units, air defense units, artillery, close
air support, intelligence systems, and sustainment units.
1-69. In addition to the Cavalry squadron, the military intelligence company serves as a BCT organic
collection capability. The military intelligence company is organic to the brigade engineer battalion (BEB).
Most of the intelligence personnel and assets within the BCT are assigned to the military intelligence
company. The BCT commander and staff task organize the military intelligence company based on mission
variables of METT-TC (I). The military intelligence company deploys and provides single-source collection,
TUAS capabilities, and collected intelligence processing capabilities to the BCT and maneuver units.
HUMINT, SIGINT, and TUAS capabilities within the military intelligence company are used habitually to
augment the Cavalry squadron during reconnaissance operations to maximize rapid and accurate information
collection. (Refer to FM 2-0 and ATP 2-19.4 for more information on the capabilities of the military
intelligence company.)
1-70. Armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) have the following reconnaissance units and habitual
enablers within their organizations:
* One Cavalry squadron.
Three Cavalry troops within the Cavalry squadron. Two scout platoons within each Cavalry troop.
One Armored company within the squadron. Three tank platoons within the Armored company. |
3-98 | 31 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
* Three combined arms battalions. Each combined arms battalion has one scout platoon within the
headquarters and headquarters company.
* One CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon organic to the BEB.
* One TUAS platoon from within the military intelligence company.
* Two combat engineer companies within the brigade engineer battalion. Each combat engineer
company can create ad hoc ERTs from within its organic platoons and squads or from those tasks
organized by echelon above the BCT engineer units. (Refer to ATP 3-34.81 for more information
on engineer reconnaissance capabilities.)
Figure 1-7. ABCT Cavalry units and enablers (shaded)
1-71. Infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) have the following reconnaissance units and habitual enablers
within their organizations:
* One Cavalry squadron:
Two motorized Cavalry troops within the Cavalry squadron. Three motorized scout platoons
within each Cavalry troop.
One dismounted Cavalry troop. Two dismounted scout platoons within the dismounted troop.
* Three Infantry battalions. Each Infantry battalion has one scout platoon within the headquarters
and headquarters company.
* One CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon organic to the BEB.
* One TUAS platoon from within the military intelligence company.
* Two combat engineer companies within the brigade engineer battalion. Each combat engineer
company can create ad hoc ERTs from within its organic platoons and squads or from those tasks
organized by echelon above the BCT engineer units. |
3-98 | 32 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-8. IBCT Cavalry units and enablers (shaded)
1-72. Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) have the following reconnaissance units and habitual enablers
within their organizations:
* One Cavalry squadron:
Three Cavalry troops. Two scout platoons within each Cavalry troop.
One weapons troop consisting of three antiarmor platoons.
* Three maneuver battalions. Each maneuver battalion has one scout platoon within the headquarters
and headquarters company.
* One CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon within the BEB.
* One TUAS platoon within the military intelligence company.
* Two combat engineer companies within the BEB. Each combat engineer company can create ad
hoc ERTs from within its organic platoons and squads or from those tasks organized by echelon
above the BCT engineer units.
Figure 1-9. SBCT Cavalry units (shaded) |
3-98 | 33 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
CAVALRY SQUADRONS
1-73. Cavalry squadrons conduct reconnaissance and security operations in close contact with enemy forces
and civilian populations. They maintain contact with the enemy to fight for information while preserving
their own freedom to maneuver. They shape the battlefield for the commander to allow the BCT to close with
and destroy the enemy through maneuver and superior firepower at a time and place of the commanders choosing.
1-74. All ground Cavalry squadrons possess the following capabilities:
* Fight for information within unit capabilities.
* Gather information about all categories of threats.
* Provide all-weather, continuous, accurate, and timely reconnaissance in complex terrain.
* Rapidly develop the situation.
* Reduce risk and enhance survivability by providing information that allows the higher
headquarters commander to avoid contact or to achieve overwhelming combat power.
* Assist in shaping the area of operations by providing information or directing precision joint fires
to disrupt the enemy commander’s decision cycle and deny planned or future options.
* Conduct collaborative and parallel planning that fully integrates with higher and adjacent units
and results in employment of reconnaissance and security assets to support higher headquarters operations.
* Reestablish command and control through two distinctly different situations listed below:
Repel an enemy attack that disrupted command and control.
Retransmission of information for units or elements out of communication range of the main body.
1-75. All ground Cavalry squadrons are constrained in that—
* They require augmentation to perform effective offensive and defensive actions as an economy of
force role.
* Wheeled vehicle-equipped squadrons lack direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability in open
and rolling terrain and need augmentation when arrayed against enemy armor.
* Medium-wheeled vehicles have limited cross-country mobility.
AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON
1-76. As an element of the combat aviation brigade, the air Cavalry squadron (known as ACS) provides
accurate and timely information collection, provides reaction time and maneuver space, and destroys, defeats,
diverts, or disrupts enemy forces to support the combined arms team. Although the ACS is fully capable of
conducting attacks, the integration of RQ-7B UASs at the troop level makes the ACS the best formation for
conducting reconnaissance, security, and movement to contact as primary missions, with attack operations
as a secondary mission.
ORGANIZATION
1-77. The ACS consists of a headquarters troop, three air Cavalry troops (known as ACTs) equipped with
eight AH-64s and four RQ-7B Shadow UASs each, an aviation maintenance troop, and a forward support
troop. Figure 1-10, page 1-22 provides ACS organizations.
CAPABILITIES
1-78. The ACS conducts the following tasks:
* Zone, route, and area reconnaissance.
* Reconnaissance in force (when task organized).
* Screen.
* Guard and area security (when task organized).
* Movement to contact.
* Attack. |
3-98 | 34 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-10. Air Cavalry squadron
AIR CAVALRY TROOP
1-79. The primary mission of the ACT is to conduct reconnaissance and security operations. The ACT
extends the aerial reconnaissance and security capabilities of the BCT with the use of long-range optics,
organic UAS for manned unmanned teaming, and trained scouts. ACTs provide timely combat information
concerning the enemy, terrain, and weather throughout the area of operation and early warning against enemy
observation or attack. ACTs augment ground forces when conducting guard and cover operations. The ACT
possesses strengths and limitations that must be clearly understood for their effects to be maximized.
1-80. The ACT has the following capabilities:
* High degree of maneuverability.
* Increased lethality and ability to provide target acquisition.
* Demonstrated flexibility in changing battlefield situations.
* Adds depth in all reconnaissance and security missions.
1-81. The ACT has the following limitations:
* Limited operations in adverse weather or zero visibility conditions.
* Limited, continuous 24-hour-a-day operations.
* Limited situation time due to refueling and rearming requirements resulting in increased situation
updates as aircraft rotate in and out of the area of operation.
CAVALRY TROOPS
1-82. Cavalry troops conduct reconnaissance and security missions throughout their area of operations. The
Cavalry troops provide the BCT commander and staff with an all-weather information collection capability.
Use of long-range optics, organic UAS, and trained scouts enable Cavalry troops to answer information
requirements and create an accurate operational picture of the area of operations. That operational picture
can focus on any mixture of the METT-TC (I) variables required by the BCT and Cavalry squadron commanders.
1-83. The Cavalry troop’s operational picture forms a squadron common operational picture. The common
operational picture allows commanders within and external to the BCT to assess the situation and develop
their situational understanding of the correct courses of action. This discussion focuses on the Cavalry troops
of the BCT organizational variants of the ABCT, the IBCT, and the SBCT.
TROOP MISSIONS
1-84. Regardless of organization, Cavalry troops conduct reconnaissance and security missions to support
the information collection plan outlined in Annex L of the BCT’s operation order (OPORD). Cavalry troops |
3-98 | 35 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
can develop the situation in close contact with civilian populations. They can conduct security force
assistance, and multinational reconnaissance and security tasks.
1-85. Cavalry troops can perform limited offensive and defensive tasks though they typically support
higher-level offensive and defensive task completion through reconnaissance and security missions. The
commander considers the troop’s capabilities and limitations before employing the troop in any specific
mission.
ROLES AND ORGANIZATION
1-86. As the squadron commander’s eyes and ears, the Cavalry troop is the squadron commander’s primary
reconnaissance and information collection asset. Reconnaissance units provide the combat information the
commander needs to conduct informed planning, direct operations, and visualize the area of operations. The
unit skillfully conducts reconnaissance and security missions to collect information on enemy locations,
dispositions, compositions, and battle damage assessments. In turn, these operations allow the commander
to shape the area of operations proactively and accept or initiate contact at times and places of the
commander’s choosing.
1-87. Cavalry troops conduct reconnaissance and security missions throughout the squadron area of
operations. The troop develops the situation by focusing on the reconnaissance objective in a designated area
of operations. All types of troops can do this through the task organization of additional combat power to
provide the ability to fight for information and increase lethality in security operations. The task organization
of tank platoons to an ABCT Cavalry troop allows the use of the hunter-killer concept for reconnaissance
and security. An SBCT Cavalry troop can receive similar augmentation from antiarmor platoons from the
SBCT weapons troop.
COMMON CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
1-88. All types of BCT Cavalry troops have the following capabilities:
* Provide all-weather, continuous, accurate, and timely information through the combined use of
long-range advanced scout surveillance systems, UASs, and mounted and dismounted scouts.
* Gather information about enemy threats.
* Rapidly develop the situation and direct reconnaissance tasks to answer PIRs.
* Overcome enemy deception and cover and concealment by employing integrated information
collection and reconnaissance and surveillance systems.
* Employ joint fires to include the fires support team, weapons locating radar, and UASs.
* Conduct stealthy reconnaissance or fight for information against light and motorized forces or, if
reinforced, against armored forces.
* Reduce risk and enhance survivability by providing information that allows the squadron to avoid
contact or achieve a combat power advantage if contact is necessary.
* Assist in shaping the area of operations by providing information or directing fires to disrupt the enemy.
1-89. BCT Cavalry troops can have the following limitations, which can be mitigated with careful
employment or augmentation:
* When there are limited dismounts within the scout sections, sections may have to combine to
generate the required dismounts to conduct the following:
Long-duration observation posts.
Long-duration screening.
Dismounted tasks associated with zone, area, or route reconnaissance.
* Limited direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability (IBCT Cavalry squadron).
* Require augmentation to perform technical engineer reconnaissance tasks.
* Speed of movement is generally equal to that of the main body, making it challenging to stay
ahead while on the march.
* Limited counter-UAS assets and communications jamming. |
3-98 | 36 | Chapter 1
ARMORED COMPANY
1-90. The ABCT Cavalry squadron has an organic Armored company. The Armored company is comprised
of a headquarters and three tank platoons that organize, equip, and train to fight with organic assets or as a
task organized company team. The headquarters element has two tanks commanded by the commander and
executive officer.
1-91. The Armored company’s mission is to close with the enemy utilizing maneuver to destroy or capture the
enemy, repel the enemy’s assault by fire, and engage in close combat and counterattack. The company
maneuvers in all types of terrain, weather, and visibility conditions. The company capitalizes on long-range,
direct fire combat with enemy mechanized or armored units in open terrain with speed and shock effect.
1-92. The Armored company in the Cavalry squadron enables reconnaissance and security. It provides the
BCT commander with flexibility, adaptability, and depth to the Cavalry squadron’s scheme of maneuver by
synchronizing and integrating combined arms. The Armored company enables the squadron to fight for
information and develop the situation in and out of contact against a broad range of threats, adversaries, and enemies.
CAPABILITIES
1-93. The Armored company has the following capabilities:
* Conducts operations requiring firepower, mobility, armor protection, and shock effect.
* Employs a combination of fire and maneuver to destroy enemy tanks, fighting vehicles, antiarmor
systems, and emplacements.
LIMITATIONS
1-94. The Armored company has the following limitations:
* Lack of resources to operate a functional command post.
* Very high consumption rate of classes III, V, and IX (petroleum, oil, and lubricants/ammunition/
repair parts and components for equipment maintenance).
* Dependency on logistics packages (LOGPACs) from the forward support company (FSC) to
maintain continuous operations.
* Limited recovery assets across the squadron.
WEAPONS TROOP
1-95. The SBCT Cavalry squadron has an organic weapons troop. The SBCT weapons troop’s role is to
provide direct fires to facilitate maneuver. The formation adds depth to the Cavalry squadron by enhancing
maneuver to deliver direct fires at the decisive point. Employed correctly and synchronized with other
maneuver units, they facilitate the Cavalry squadron’s ability to conduct effective reconnaissance and
security operations.
1-96. The SBCT weapons troop has antitank guided missile platoons. The troop has a headquarters section
with an assigned Infantry carrier vehicle. Habitual attachments include a fires support team with a fire support
vehicle from the field artillery battalion to manage indirect fires and medics with a medical support vehicle.
1-97. The weapons troop in the Cavalry squadron enhances the reconnaissance and security capabilities of
the Cavalry squadron. The weapons troop provides the BCT commander with flexibility, adaptability, and
depth so the squadron can fight for information and develop the situation against a broad range of threats,
adversaries, and enemies throughout the area of operations.
CAPABILITIES
1-98. The weapons troop has the following capabilities:
* The SBCT antiarmor platoon engages the enemy through long-range, antiarmor fires and
maneuvers to destroy or to repel assaults by fire and counterattack.
* Many of the Stryker vehicles can be transported by C-130 and heavier aircraft. |
3-98 | 37 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
* The TOW system provides direct fire against armored targets out to 4,500 meters and bunkers out
to 3,000 meters.
LIMITATIONS
1-99. The weapons troop has the following limitations:
* Lack of resources to operate a functional command post.
* By design, the Stryker family of vehicles does not have the level of protection necessary to fight
against heavily armored vehicles.
* The antitank guided missile variant must rely on their mobility and maneuverability, in coordination
with other units, to effectively engage targets and then displace.
SCOUT PLATOON
1-100. The fundamental role of the scout platoon is to conduct aggressive reconnaissance to satisfy the
battalion and brigade CCIRs. The Cavalry troop commanders and the combined arms battalion commanders
give missions to the scout platoons and the platoons progressively build situational awareness of the
commanders’ operational environments. The critical information the platoon provides enables the
commander to develop situational understanding, make comprehensive plans and decisions, and direct
follow-on or future operations. Scout platoons of the combined arms battalion provide the link from forward
reconnaissance elements to the main body maneuver units.
CBRN RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLATOON
1-101. The CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon in the IBCT provides dismounted CBRN
reconnaissance and surveillance and site assessments to protect the force and support offensive operations.
They can execute missions in restrictive terrain and in dense urban and subterranean environments. The
CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon in support of the ABCT and SBCT provides early warning
of CBRN hazards with the advantage of speed and protection offered by the nuclear, biological, chemical
reconnaissance vehicle. While conducting reconnaissance operations, CBRN reconnaissance and
surveillance platoons capitalize on their observation of NAIs to answer PIRs in addition to their CBRN
specific tasks. |
3-98 | 39 | Chapter 2
Threats
The various actors in any area of operations can qualify as a threat, an enemy, an
adversary, a neutral, or a friend. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces
that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national
interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). Threats may include individuals, groups of
individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states,
or national alliances. Threats become enemies when they execute their capability to do
harm to the United States.
An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized
(ADP 3-0). An enemy is a combatant and therefore is treated as such. An adversary is
a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the
use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). During offensive, defensive, and stability
operations, a neutral is a party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly
or enemy forces (ADP 3-0). A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination
of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorists, or criminal elements unified to achieve
mutually benefitting effects (ADP 3-0). (Refer to ADP 3-0 and JP 3-0 for more
information.)
SECTION I − UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT
A peer threat is an adversary or enemy able to oppose U.S. forces worldwide effectively while enjoying
a position of relative advantage in a specific region. These threats can generate equal or temporarily superior
combat power in geographical proximity to a conflict area with U.S. forces. A peer threat also may have a
cultural affinity to specific regions, providing them with relative advantages in terms of time, space, and
sanctuary. They generate tactical, operational, and strategic challenges, an order of magnitude more
challenging militarily than other adversaries. (Refer to ADP 3-0 for more information.)
Note. Threat forces use the term electronic warfare, which differs from U.S. doctrine’s use of
electromagnetic warfare. Electronic warfare consists of the measure’s threats conduct to control
or deny friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the threat. For U.S.
forces, electromagnetic warfare is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and
directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-85).
Understanding threats, enemies, and adversaries, to include both state and nonstate actors in the context
of the operational environment, is essential for the BCT commander to understand, visualize, describe, direct,
lead, and assess operations. To develop and maintain estimates of the situation as the basis for continuous
adaptation, commanders and staffs consider their own forces in the context of threats, enemies, and
adversaries as well as the mission, terrain, friendly forces, and civilian populations. The BCT must be
prepared to engage in close combat with adaptive enemies and adversaries while operating in complex terrain
and among civilian populations. Actors in the operational environment may include regular or irregular
forces, or agents of—
* Other nation-states.
* Political parties and officials.
* Transnational criminal organizations. |
3-98 | 40 | Chapter 2
* Media.
* Indigenous governmental security forces.
* International and private security organizations.
* Multinational corporations.
* Joint, interagency, international, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations.
Current and future combat operations require the BCT to fight and win in large-scale combat operations
and limited contingency operations in various types of environments. These environments may be
mountainous, urban, jungle, desert, arctic, Antarctic, or subterranean environments. Besides the physical
challenges presented by complex terrain, the continuous interactions of numerous threats, each with their
own agendas, objectives, interests, and allegiances, influence the operational environment and
mission accomplishment.
The human and political dynamics in a peer or near peer fight increases the complexity of BCT
operations. Commanders and staffs work to understand the complex relationships and interactions between
threats that produce tactical challenges and opportunities in their favor. Understanding a peer or near peer
threat is critical to seizing, retaining, and exploiting each echelon in deep operations to consolidate tactical
gains to achieve sustainable outcomes consistent with the mission.
Nation-states organize, train, equip, and employ regular forces to defeat an enemy’s armed forces,
destroy an enemy’s war-making capacity, seize territory, and defend territory. Regular forces often possess
technologically advanced weapon systems that can match the capabilities of U.S. forces’ weapons systems.
These weapon systems are integrated into mechanized or motorized combined arms formations as well as
light infantry forces. BCTs are prepared to defeat enemy forces that include armored fighting vehicles,
antiarmor systems, air defense systems, manned and unmanned aircraft, indirect fire systems, mines, digital
communications systems, and cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare activities. (Refer to JP 3-85 for more
information.) Regular forces also may possess CBRN capabilities and may have access to space capabilities.
Regular forces’ organizations are hierarchical (for example, companies, battalions, brigades, and so forth)
with a generally centralized command and control structure. Regular forces can conduct long-term
campaigns and employ combinations of conventional and unconventional tactics. Examples of regular
forces include—
* People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China.
* Russian Army.
* North Korean People’s Army.
* Islamic Republic of Iran Army.
Note. Near peer threat comparison of the People’s Liberation Army combined arms brigade
organization structure resembles that of a U.S. Army BCT to include the organic reconnaissance
force. (Refer to ATP 7-100.3 for more information.)
Enemy threat organizations employ conventional, unconventional, and terrorist tactics and methods to
achieve their strategic goals and political aims. Nontraditional threats combine regular and irregular threats
or criminal elements unified (or allied) to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Additional threats may include
nation-states that employ regular as well as proxy forces. Conventional threats can operate under a centralized
or decentralized command and control structure.
IRREGULAR FORCES
Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces,
police, or other internal security forces. Irregular forces employ unconventional, asymmetric methods to
counter U.S. advantages. Unconventional methods may include terrorism, tactics, and guerrilla warfare.
Weaker enemy organizations often use unconventional methods to exhaust the United States collective will
through protracted conflict. They usually employ sophisticated strategies that combine economic, political,
and informational initiatives to subvert U.S. partners, strengthen their own organizations, and disrupt
U.S. efforts to accomplish their mission. Irregular forces or complex threats are often combinations of |
3-98 | 41 | Threats
paramilitaries, guerillas, and criminal organizations and networks. Irregular forces often work in concert with
regular forces to support their objectives.
Irregular forces or complex threats usually have political objectives motivated by ideologies or
grievances. These grievances may be real or perceived. Identifying their objectives and motivations is often
difficult because—
* There may be multiple untraditional threats groups with differing goals and motivations.
* Leaders change and the organization’s goals shift over time.
* Movement leaders may have different motivations from their followers.
* Organizations hide their true motivations and make false claims.
Irregular forces customarily operate in small, dispersed, decentralized formations or cells (team and
squad size) within a decentralized command and control structure while retaining the ability to concentrate
forces if they perceive weakness. They establish local, regional, and worldwide support networks. Irregular
threats’ military capabilities often include small-arms weapons, antitank weapons, man-portable air defense
missiles, mortars, short-range rockets, homemade radio frequency weapons, rudimentary robotics, UASs,
and land mines. Some irregular threats possess significant financial means, including state sponsorship, and
can acquire advanced weapon systems and technologies. Irregular forces that have engaged in recent armed
conflict include the—
* Revolutionary Army Forces of Columbia-People’s Army (1964).
* Mujahidin in Afghanistan (1979).
* Palestine Liberation Organization in the West Bank (2001).
* Taliban in Afghanistan (2001).
* Al Qaeda in Iraq (2007).
* Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (2013).
* Iran’s Quds Force support to nonstate threat in foreign countries.
Note. Russia’s version of hybrid warfare is built for limited war in which nations do not pursue
strategies of annihilation but instead seek to impose their political will without destroying the
political institutions of their adversaries. Russian hybrid warfare is a byproduct of the information
age that seeks to operate in multiple domains to find methods to achieve a relative position of
advantage in relation to an adversary, or to perpetually conduct operations aimed at weakening
the adversary from the inside out. To do so, Russia leverages information, cyber, and electronic
operations in addition to employing special operations forces to sow the seeds of discontent within
the target population.
Combat experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other recent conflicts (such as those in Lebanon, Mali,
Syria, Gaza, Northern Nigeria, and Southern Thailand) reveal a migration of capabilities, tactics, and
techniques previously associated only with military forces of nation-states to state-sponsored and nonstate
threat organizations. This migration of capabilities presents BCTs with challenges that extend beyond
defeating an enemy’s regular force. Threats combine regular and irregular warfare and include adopting
strategies, tactics, and techniques to evade and disrupt U.S. advantages and to gain tactical advantages within
the physical, cognitive, informational, and political dimensions of armed conflict. As a result, the BCT must
be prepared to assess the situation continuously and adapt to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
STATE AND NONSTATE THREATS
The BCT must prepare to defeat determined state and nonstate threats that combine conventional and
unconventional tactics to avoid the U.S. forces’ strengths (such as mobility, long-range surveillance, and
precision fires capabilities) while attacking perceived vulnerabilities (such as the difficulty in distinguishing
the enemy from the civilian population). Threats combine a variety of means, including conventional
combined arms operations, nontraditional tactics, political subversion, and information warfare, to
accomplish objectives and attack U.S. forces. Enemies and adversaries exploit perceived U.S. and coalition |
3-98 | 42 | Chapter 2
military, political, social, economic, and information vulnerabilities as they seek to seize the initiative and
dictate the terms and tempo of operations in their favor.
Enemy organizations employ countermeasures to limit U.S. forces’ ability to develop the situation,
avoid decisive engagements, and initiate contact under advantageous conditions. Enemy organizations
employ technological countermeasures to reduce their signature on the battlefield and degrade U.S. forces’
ability to detect, engage, and destroy them. Many hostile nation-states continue to procure conventional
capabilities, such as armor and antiarmor, manned aircraft, and air defense systems, which are increasingly
available to nonstate enemy organizations and enemy threats. Enemy forces also integrate emerging
technologies, such as robotics, UAS, loitering munitions, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum technology,
and nanotechnologies. Enemies and adversaries combine conventional and unconventional tactics to counter,
evade, or disrupt U.S. forces’ efforts across the range of military operations.
The BCT commander must understand the threat in the context of local conditions that affect the
mission. Such a contextualized understanding allows commanders to identify emerging opportunities to
seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
SECTION II − THREAT CAPABILITIES, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES
Peer threats can employ resources across multiple domains to create lethal and nonlethal effects with
operational significance throughout an operational environment. They seek to delay deployment of
U.S forces and inflict significant damage across multiple domains in a short period to achieve their goals
before culminating. A peer threat uses various methods to employ their instruments of power to render
U.S. military power irrelevant. (Refer to ADP 3-0 for more information.) Five broad methods, used in
combination by peer threats, include—
* Information warfare.
* Preclusion.
* Isolation.
* Sanctuary.
* System warfare.
Note. The People’s Liberation Army employment of system warfare supports the development of
several traditional military strategies, such as preclusion, isolation, and sanctuary throughout all
domains and at all levels of war. Preclusion is achieved by keeping enemy commanders and forces
off balance through asymmetric means, such as deception and information warfare, while
simultaneously denying them the use of wide geographic areas through long-range
reconnaissance-strike capabilities.
Peer and near peer threats can employ effects that include communications and navigation disruption
and partial or total loss of space capabilities. Developing and maintaining these capabilities requires extensive
recruitment, training, and outsourcing of personnel with the required skill set to conduct such attacks.
Enemy organizations employ tactical and technical countermeasures to counter U.S. operational and
tactical advantages. Tactical countermeasures include deception operations, dispersion, and concealment.
The enemy employs technological countermeasures, such as cyberspace attacks, Global Positioning System
jamming, and other forms of electromagnetic warfare. Technical countermeasures can be used to create a
denied, degraded, and disrupted space-operating environment to evade and disrupt the U.S. forces’ ability to
operate effectively.
BCT commanders and staffs anticipate enemy capabilities. Commanders and staffs determine the
enemy’s capabilities across multiple domains or contested aspects of the mission including the physical,
cognitive, and informational dimension. This allows the BCT commander and staff to request the proper
enablers required to counter enemy capabilities and augment reconnaissance forces to enable early detection
of these threats. |
3-98 | 43 | Threats
PHYSICAL DIMENSION
Enemies operate within complex terrain to evade U.S. weapon systems and advanced, combined arms
air-ground capabilities while trying to gain a tactical advantage. Even with regular forces, the enemy can
operate in and among populations to evade detection, preserve combat power, and retain freedom of
movement. The enemy looks to gain the same tactical advantages as U.S. forces such as control of key terrain
and the civil populous.
To achieve and maintain any tactical advantage, the enemy resorts to a multitude of tactics to include
establishing relationships with local, regional, and transnational criminal organizations and contract military
organizations to finance their operations and gain access to illicit trafficking networks for the movement of
weapons, munitions, people, narcotics, or money. The enemy also can use these organizations to conduct
reconnaissance and early warning to preserve the combat power of regular forces.
COGNITIVE AND INFORMATIONAL DIMENSION
Enemies recognize the importance of public perception and its impact on the conduct of operations.
The enemy attempts to influence the will of the American people, key allies, and the conflicting populations
through enemy information activities and attacks on U.S. and allies’ assets at home or abroad. The enemy
uses information for effect. The enemy spreads misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda to shape
local and international public opinion and perception against the United States, host-nation, or coalition
forces by undermining ongoing stabilization efforts, marginalizing friendly successes or exaggerating enemy
successes, exploiting instances of friendly force missteps, and fabricating or exaggerating friendly force
cultural shortcomings. Enemy organizations attempt to manipulate local, regional, and worldwide news and
social media outlets to achieve their goals. The psychological operations planners assigned or attached to the
BCT or squadron have the resources to analyze and counter the enemy’s actions. Functioning cell phone
networks are key terrain within the information dimension. The population can use smartphones to document
friendly operations that may aid enemy collection or propaganda efforts.
COUNTERING ADAPTATIONS AND RETAINING THE INITIATIVE
Countering enemy adaptations and retaining the initiative in future, armed conflict requires forces that
understand the threat and the operational environment. Reconnaissance operations must overcome
increasingly sophisticated area-denial actions and capabilities to develop the situation. Combined arms and
joint capabilities must be integrated effectively to seize the initiative and dominate an increasingly
challenging and complex environment.
Commanders and staffs must understand the tactical, human, and political dynamics associated with
current and future armed conflict because of the requirements and challenges of the near, close, and deep
operational environment. They must understand enemy organizations’ dynamics and capabilities within all
operational environments. Identifying and distinguishing these groups and the associated dynamics is
extremely difficult and requires a detailed, in-depth information collection effort through every phase of the
operation. Only through an effective information collection effort can the BCT gain the understanding
necessary to defeat an adaptive and determined enemy on current and future battlefields.
SECTION III − RECONNAISSANCE DISRUPTION, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES
The enemy employs combinations of lethal (for example, offensive and defensive tasks, assassination,
and ambushes) and nonlethal (political subversion, propaganda, and intimidation) actions to disrupt U.S.
forces to shape the environment, influence key actors, and to consolidate gains and efforts to accomplish the mission.
The following vignette demonstrates how a peer-threat employed a new and effective reconnaissance-strike
model during recent military operations in the Russo-Ukrainian War’s Donbas campaign. The Donbas
campaign was a conflict between Ukrainian forces and Russia-backed separatist groups. The 2014 Russo-Ukrainian
War was an unconventional approach of warfare for Russia. Russia used irregular fighters, disinformation
tactics, conventional military support, and Russian troops to destabilize the Donbas Region. The following
vignette introduces new and emerging threat tactics that near peer threats have brought forth on today’s battlefield. |
3-98 | 44 | Chapter 2
Russian’s Reconnaissance-strike Model
During the Russo-Ukrainian War’s Donbas campaign, Russia’s use of drones, supported with
Russian indirect fire assets, proved to be an effective method to dominate land battle and gain
the tactical advantage against their peer threats. On July 11, 2014, Ukrainian forces began to
uncoil from their AA and prepare for offensive operations. Russian forces used drones cued by
electronic signature-tracking systems to identify Ukrainian force positions to target them when
they were most vulnerable. At approximately 0400 hours, when it was still dark and Ukrainian
forces were disorganized, Ukrainian forces heard drones overhead. Shortly after, the
Ukrainian tactical radio network fell silent. All Ukrainian communication systems were
simultaneously jammed followed by volleys of accurate and deadly indirect fire strikes directly
on Ukrainian force positions. The bombardment lasted four minutes and the Russians bombed
Ukrainian force positions with a barrage of rockets and artillery. By the end of the attack,
Ukrainian forces suffered over 30 soldiers killed in action with several others severely wounded,
and over 2 battalions worth of combat power destroyed and rendered combat ineffective.
This revamped tactic is known as the Russians’ reconnaissance-strike model which is a mixture
of drones, rockets, artillery fire, special reconnaissance, cyber capabilities, and geo-locating
technology to find, fix, and destroy the enemy on the battlefield in near-real time. Russians
demonstrated the effective use of this type of reconnaissance-strike model and they continually
use this model on the battlefield today. Russians believe in an “artillery destroys, infantry
occupies” mentality, and they could be expected to use their indirect fire systems to destroy
their enemy at the first opportunity. The slaughter of Ukrainian forces at Zelenopilla
demonstrated how the Russians have updated and improved their tactics using technology and
enhanced military capabilities like accurate, long-range artillery and rockets to destroy their
enemies without much tactical risk to themselves.
During reconnaissance and security operations, forces must be aware of how the battlefield of
the 21st century has changed, and how surveillance systems like drones or UAS are an effective
tool when the system is observing for an artillery battery. Sensors are now able to scan for a
unit’s electronic signature, which provides the enemy with accurate locations on the battlefield.
Near peer and peer threats have developed new and emerging tactics and reconnaissance and
security operations must develop ways to counter these enemy disruption techniques and
tactics. Peer and near peer threats have refined their reconnaissance fire system where they
could have reconnaissance to engagement using high-precision, long-range weapons tied to
immediate and real-time data.
Disruption techniques and tactics are designed to disrupt, destroy, and change the course of
military operations against the enemy during large-scale combat operations. This vignette
provides an example of how the enemy can rapidly gain and maintain contact through multiple
means. Near peer and peer threats do not want to be vulnerable; therefore, they use aggressive
counterreconnaissance methods to destroy ground reconnaissance forces early. The Ukrainian
army was unable to defend the eastern region of Ukraine after this attack. Emerging threats
group their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and their indirect fire units
around each other, which usually provides a location for a high-payoff target, if identified.
Enemy forces use deception, cover and concealment, and obscuration to achieve positions of relative
advantage. They may move in different types of units, groups, or formations to avoid obvious detection and
to concentrate against perceived weaknesses. Irregular and regular forces often conduct short engagements
and attempt to break contact before U.S. forces can bring indirect fire or other capabilities to bear. The enemy
employs deception measures to reduce U.S. forces’ information collection efforts. Deception measures
include enemy formations, hardened and buried facilities, and multispectral decoys to mask the signatures of |
3-98 | 45 | Threats
high-value systems (for example, short-range, ballistic missiles, and surface-to-air missile launchers).
Deception may also include the enemy’s ability to mask their signature in the EMS preventing U.S. forces
from being able to discern between an enemy’s electromagnetic signature and that of a host nation or civilian
signature.
The enemy exploits safe havens within hostile states or in ungoverned areas and takes advantage of
subterranean infrastructures (for example, tunnels, underground facilities, sewers, and drainage systems) to
avoid detection. Enemies evade precision fires by employing Global Positioning System jammers around
possible targets, preventing accurate engagements. As enemies evade U.S. and coalition forces, they
simultaneously seek to expand their freedom of movement through intimidation and coercion.
Note. Russia conducts counterreconnaissance by locating, defeating and destroying enemy
reconnaissance efforts. They will use dummy positions and radio nets, conduct false movement, and
camouflage real and dummy positions. Create a false forward edge of defense. Check the effectiveness of
camouflage habitually and particularly from the air.
OVERVIEW ENEMY RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS
The enemy conducts reconnaissance operations to assess a BCT’s strengths and weaknesses, identify
opportunities, achieve positions of relative advantage, and to neutralize a BCT’s mobility and firepower
strengths. Enemy security operations protect their key elements of combat power, giving their commanders
information and decision space, and enable affective risk assessment. A conventional enemy executes tactical
reconnaissance in which ground reconnaissance forces use one or more forms of reconnaissance to meet
intelligence collection requirements.
Russia’s utilization of drones is an example of peer and near peer threat reconnaissance tactics. The
employment of drones and UAS is not to conduct aerial observation exclusively; instead, they are part of a
highly-integrated system that benefits from operating under the protection of a dense, integrated air defense
system coverage and long-range strike capability. The Russians’ reconnaissance-strike model is an
amalgamation of drones, armed UAS, rocket and artillery fire, and special reconnaissance. Russian’s cyber
capabilities have geo-locating technology that delivers impressive tactical and operational results. This strike
may focus on friendly reconnaissance elements, or it may focus on command and control, fires, or
sustainment elements necessary to support reconnaissance.
Enemy reconnaissance elements execute multiple forms of reconnaissance to include combat
reconnaissance in which ground reconnaissance forces conduct direct action against an opposing force to
force the other commander to make a decision. Other forms of reconnaissance include reconnaissance by fire
and technical reconnaissance in which electronic intelligence and signal intelligence capabilities are used to
support collection efforts through surveillance of the electromagnetic spectrum. Similar to U.S. ground
reconnaissance forces, enemy conventional forces augment their ground reconnaissance forces with a host
of enablers that support rapid and aggressive information collection.
Enemy reconnaissance elements can operate among the civilian population to avoid detection. The
enemy can employ regular or irregular forces amongst the civilian population to gain and maintain contact
with an opposing force while avoiding a direct engagement. Enabled with UAS, SIGINT, or electromagnetic
warfare capabilities an enemy reconnaissance force hidden among a civilian population can conduct effective
information collection that can result in accurate indirect fires or degradation of friendly force’s command
and control systems.
COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
The enemy conducts deliberate counterreconnaissance tasks to deny the BCT their ability to develop
the situation in close contact or close operations with the enemy and civilian population. Conventional enemy
counterreconnaissance efforts include antiarmor and antipersonnel ambushes, indirect fires, UAS
capabilities, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, electromagnetic countermeasures, cyberspace attacks, raids, and
spoiling attacks to degrade a BCT’s reconnaissance and security operations. |
3-98 | 46 | Chapter 2
Additionally, the enemy conducts propaganda and disinformation to discredit the BCT and to generate
popular opposition to U.S. and coalition efforts. The use of proxy forces and contracted forces by the enemy
to conduct reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance has become a more common tactic in an effort to
preserve combat power and avoid casualties amongst regular forces. The enemy can integrate proxy forces
and contracted forces easily into a civilian population to either influence the local populous or remain
concealed to gain and maintain contact with an opposing force.
The enemy augments the tactical capabilities of combined arms teams with inexpensive
countermeasures (such as land mines and fire and smoke as a weapon system) to impede U.S. forces. The
enemy seeks to leverage commercial and military technologies for precision strike capability, satellite
imagery, forward-looking infrared, and electromagnetic warfare systems or platforms. The enemy looks to
conduct aggressive counterreconnaissance operations to preserve combat power and deny a BCT’s ability to
collect information and make timely decisions.
UNDERSTAND BEING MATCHED
The force structure of peer and near peer threat reconnaissance forces is almost identical to
reconnaissance forces within a BCT. BCT commanders and staffs should understand that the BCT’s
reconnaissance and security efforts are matched in the disruption zone of the battlefield with similar
capabilities if not superior capabilities. Any BCT reconnaissance and security force makes contact early with
the enemy through multiple forms of contact. BCT commanders and staffs must anticipate threat tactics in
order to augment reconnaissance and security forces with enablers that allow the BCT to succeed in
maintaining an advantage over enemy forces.
Regular, irregular, and nontraditional forces present formidable tactical challenges to BCTs through
area denial, artillery munitions, land mines, and antiaircraft systems. The enemy emphasizes deception,
cover, infiltration techniques, mobility, and most importantly, depth for its defense and operations. Together,
regular, irregular, and nontraditional forces on the current and future battlefield employ significant combined
arms capabilities that seek to disrupt BCT operations and dislocate BCT combined arms capabilities. The
enemy is adept at employing electronic warfare and cyberspace capabilities to identify and target friendly
reconnaissance elements for high volumes of fires.
In addition, enemies are proficient at establishing and maintaining communications as well as
disrupting U.S. forces’ automated command and control systems and combined-arms capabilities through
combinations of Global Positioning System jamming, cyberspace attacks, data pirating, and potential satellite
neutralization. The use of these anti-access and area denial capabilities and techniques are to prevent advance
and freedom of action for allied units terrestrially, as well as creating a denied, degraded, and disrupted
space-operating environment. |
3-98 | 47 | Chapter 3
Mission Command
BCT and squadron commanders apply mission command principles to develop the
situation in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. Commanders use
the mission command principles exercising command and control of subordinate units
to build their understanding, visualization, and description of the operational
environment, the terrain, local populations, and the enemy. At the same time,
commanders use the information gained from reconnaissance and security operations
to modify existing or developing plans and to reallocate BCT assets as they refine their
direction, leadership, and assessment of both reconnaissance and security operations and
the BCT’s decisive operations.
The role of reconnaissance and security operations in mission command is essential.
Mission command requires the BCT and squadron commander to convey a clear
commander’s intent and clear reconnaissance and security guidance. Commander’s
guidance becomes essential in reconnaissance and security operations where multiple
operational and mission variables interact with the lethal application of combat power.
Such dynamic interaction often compels subordinate commanders to make difficult
decisions in unforeseen circumstances. Commanders and staffs refine the concept of
the operations during planning and make adjustments throughout operations as Cavalry
forces develop the situation or conditions change.
SECTION I – MISSION COMMAND FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY
3-1. Military operations are complex human endeavors. The threats, enemies, and adversaries that U.S.
forces face in combat consist of capable, adaptable, and determined enemies who resist U.S. forces actions,
employ countermeasures to our strengths and capabilities, and seek to impose their will on all actors within
the operational environment. Army forces conduct operations among civilian groups who are influenced by
military operations. As a result, Army forces encounter a wide variety of political agendas and changing
perceptions throughout an operational area. As operations progress in close contact with enemy forces and
civilian populations, commanders face thinking and adaptive enemies, changing civilian perceptions, and
differing agendas of various organizations and actors. The result of the continuous process of interactions is
an uncertain environment.
PRINCIPLES OF MISSION COMMAND
3-2. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate
decision-making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). Mission command
includes visualizing the current situation and the future end state, then formulating operations concepts to
employ offensive, defensive, and stability operations to move from one state to the other. Mission command
is one of the foundations of the Army’s operating concept. When contrasted with detailed command, mission
command emphasizes centralized intent and decentralized execution through disciplined initiative.
3-3. Mission command assists commanders and staffs in countering the uncertainty of operations by
reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders understand some decisions must be made
quickly and are better made at the point of action. Further, mission command is based on mutual trust and a |
3-98 | 48 | Chapter 3
3-4. Shared understanding and purpose between commanders, subordinates, staffs, and unified action
partners. The following principles enable successful mission command:
* Competence.
* Mutual trust.
* Shared understanding.
* Commander’s intent.
* Mission orders.
* Disciplined initiative.
* Risk acceptance.
Note. Refer to ADP 6-0 for a detailed discussion of the principles of mission command.
3-5. Mutual trust, shared understanding, clear intent, mission orders, and disciplined initiative fosters agile
and adaptive forces. Commanders create and sustain shared understanding and purpose through collaboration
and dialogue within their organizations and with unified action partners to facilitate unity of effort.
Commanders provide clear intent and use mission orders to identify information gaps, to describe their
reconnaissance guidance, assign tasks, and allocate resources. Predicated on the commander’s guidance,
subordinate units take appropriate actions to develop the situation, answer identified information
requirements, identify, create, and exploit opportunities, anticipate change, and perform the necessary
coordination without requiring new orders.
3-6. The nature of military operations requires responsibility and decision-making at the point of action.
Mission command demands leaders who can adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment
techniques to the specific situation. Mission command demands agile and adaptive Cavalry organizations
that can develop the situation through action in close contact with the enemy and civilian population to set
conditions for future success. Although BCT and squadron commanders and staffs must accept that they may
often have to act despite significant gaps in their understanding, focused reconnaissance and security
operations answer the prioritized information requirements that seek to eliminate information gaps. The
resulting combat information and intelligence allow commanders and staffs to make timely adjustments in
response to changes.
EXERCISE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
3-7. The principles of mission command and the exercise of command and control enable BCT and
squadron commanders to develop the situation while in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations.
These help to develop their understanding, visualization, and description of the operational environment,
also. Through effective information collection and continuous reconnaissance and security operations, BCTs
develop and sustain the necessary tactical and operational understanding to defeat adaptive and determined
enemies as well as set conditions to consolidate tactical gains. Reconnaissance and security operations
improve situational understanding and enable commanders to—
* Understand the tactical, human, and political dynamics within an area of operations.
* Visualize operations in the context of mission variables of METT-TC (I).
* Describe the commander’s decisive operations in time, space, and purpose with a greater degree
of detail, accuracy, and fidelity.
* Direct the execution of decisive operations with higher degrees of flexibility, adaptability,
synchronization, and integration.
* Lead the BCT to concentrate its strengths against enemy weakness.
* Assess progress through continuous reconnaissance, monitoring, and evaluation.
* Modify existing or developing plans and reallocate BCT capabilities or units based on changing
tactical situations.
* Achieve tactical depth.
* Identify and create options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. |
3-98 | 49 | Mission Command
3-8. Based on their initial understanding of the operational environment and the tactical situation, BCT and
squadron commanders generate information requirements for the BCT and its organic Cavalry organizations.
Commanders visualize how the Cavalry squadron and other reconnaissance and security capabilities or units
(including national-level intelligence assets, surveillance assets, joint enablers, and SOF) can work together
to contribute to the overall success of the mission. The Cavalry squadron is the BCT commander’s primary
unit to develop the situation and provide the combat information that ultimately refines subsequent courses
of action for the BCT’s decisive operations. As a result, the BCT commander, working with the staff, the
BCT S-3 (see chapter 1), and the Cavalry squadron commander, directs reconnaissance and security
operations to address information requirements and intelligence gaps.
3-9. Effective reconnaissance and security operations create opportunities that allow commanders to
confirm or deny assumptions, make decisions, and take action. Commanders establish the CCIRs, and
continuously update information requirements based on changing battlefield conditions. Commanders and
their staffs first identify information gaps and continuously assess, adapt, add, and delete requirements
throughout the operation. As staffs identify requirements necessary for successful execution, they
recommend and assign tasks for Cavalry units to conduct reconnaissance and provide answers that allow the
commander to make timely and effective decisions. As commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and
employ collection assets to answer the commander’s CCIRs and other information requirements, they must—
* Develop and continuously update a list of intelligence requirements.
* Identify and update the CCIRs.
* Tie the CCIRs directly to the scheme of maneuver and decision points.
* Limit the CCIRs to only critical intelligence and combat information needs.
* Seek higher echelons’ collection of and answers to information requirements.
* Ensure CCIRs include the latest time information is of value (LTIOV) to aid timely reporting and
decision-making.
3-10. The commander sets reconnaissance and security priorities early, as reconnaissance and security
operations precede main body movement, which minimizes the Cavalry unit’s time available for troop
leading procedures, including planning and rehearsal times, precombat checks and inspections, and
maintenance. The commander sets priorities in the warning order (WARNORD), establishing the focus,
reconnaissance tempo, security duration, and engagement and disengagement criteria. Missions without focus
degrade the collection capabilities of the Cavalry unit. Improper utilization of assets can leave the force
vulnerable or a catastrophic threat undiscovered.
3-11. Reconnaissance and security operations are most effective when command and control elements
integrate multiple combined arms and air-ground teams. Reconnaissance and security operations require
quick dissemination and execution of orders. Reconnaissance leaders must be decisive, make plans quickly,
pass information available to subordinates, report to higher headquarters accurately and rapidly, and be
responsive to changing conditions on the battlefield.
3-12. The following historical example illustrates the value of a flexible Cavalry force that directly
contributed to effective mission command. The operations of Napoleon’s cavalry corps during the
1806 campaign against the Prussian Army demonstrate how cavalry, particularly when operating in close
contact with the enemy and civilian populations, were essential in Napoleon’s successful campaign.
Napoleon’s Cavalry and Mission Command
On October 12, 1806, the French Cavalry swept through the little Saxon village of Zeitz,
25 miles south of Leipzig. Napoleon’s light cavalry, which was his principal cavalry force,
was executing an advanced guard forward of the lead corps of the Grande Armée. As the
cavalry secured the town, scouts and commanders immediately collected critical combat
information for their emperor. Marshal Joachim Murat, Napoleon’s chief of cavalry, and his
staff halted temporarily to interrogate the local postmaster, priest, mayor, and essential
civilians concerning the location and disposition of the Prussian Army, key terrain features,
and critical civilian activities. In Zeitz, a French spy emerged from the crowd of onlookers
and reported that the enemy lay to the west and south, near Erfurt. |
3-98 | 50 | Chapter 3
A scout produced pen, paper, and a field desk from his kit, established a hasty command post
and rapidly converted the spy’s initial report into multiple copies of an important message
that contained the critical combat information that the reconnaissance organization knew
their commander and the emperor needed. Murat approved the report and handed it to a series
of riders who maneuvered along a series of connecting files that relayed the message
to Napoleon.
That night the report reached Napoleon. The emperor and his staff quickly analyzed the
combat information, updated situation maps, and then, in a rush of rapid, harshly accented
orders, updated the plan and issued a series of fragmentary orders. By the next morning, all
of Napoleon’s subordinates received the same word; the enemy was massing to the west
around Erfurt and Weimer. Two days later, elements of the Grande Armée, operating
decentralized but still within mutual support, and taking advantage of the effective
reconnaissance and security operations of its cavalry screen, crushed the Prussian Army in
the battle of Jena-Auerstadt.
SECTION II – COMMAND AND CONTROL
3-13. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control. Command and control is the
exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in
the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1, Volume 2). Command and control alone does not destroy an enemy
force, secure an objective, or resupply an element. However, none of these activities could be coordinated
towards a common objective, or synchronized to achieve the maximum effect, without effective command
and control. The countless activities a military force must perform gain purpose and direction executing
command and control. The ultimate goal of command and control is mission accomplishment.
3-14. The operations process is the Army’s framework for organizing and putting command and control into
action. The operations process consists of major command and control activities performed during
reconnaissance and security operations (planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing). To
function effectively and have the greatest chance for successful mission accomplishment, commanders,
supported by their staffs, employ the operations process to drive both conceptual and detailed planning.
Conceptual and detailed planning is necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational
environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.
3-15. The operations process and reconnaissance and security operations are mutually dependent. Just as the
planning, preparation, and assessment of the operations process informs and directs reconnaissance and
security operations, the BCTs and squadrons conduct reconnaissance operations during all phases of the
operations process. The BCTs and squadrons provide the necessary information to complete plans,
preparations, adjust the execution of operations, and provide further assessments of the tactical situation and
the operational environment. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; planning, preparing,
executing, and continuously assessing the operation overlap and recur as the circumstances of the tactical
situation and operational environment demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process. Upon
completion of the initial order, planning continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances
(and timely reports from Cavalry units). Preparing begins during the planning and continues through
execution. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to gain a position of relative
advantage. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for more information.)
OPERATIONS PROCESS
3-16. Commanders and staffs use the operations process to integrate numerous tasks executed by the BCT’s
organic Cavalry organizations and other subordinate units. Commanders must organize and train their staffs
and subordinates as an integrated team to plan, prepare, execute, and assess reconnaissance and security
operations while simultaneously planning, preparing, and assessing the BCT’s decisive operations.
3-17. In addition to the principles of mission command, commanders and staffs consider the following to
employ the operations process effectively: |
3-98 | 51 | Mission Command
* Commanders drive the operations process.
* Commanders and staffs actively collaborate to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations.
* Commanders and staffs build and maintain situational understanding.
* Commanders and staffs apply critical and creative thinking.
COMMANDERS DRIVE THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
3-18. The commander is the central figure in the operations process. While the staff performs essential
functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, the commander is ultimately responsible for
accomplishing assigned missions.
3-19. Commanders encourage disciplined initiative through a clear commander’s intent while providing
enough direction to integrate and synchronize the force at the decisive place and time during reconnaissance
and security operations. Early dissemination of intent is important as Cavalry operations precede main body
movement and the conduct of decisive operations. The commander relies upon subordinates to respond
quickly to mission-type orders and to execute disciplined initiative. Figure 3-3, page 3-15 provides a
graphical depiction of how the commander’s primary tasks are aligned with elements of reconnaissance and
security planning. To this end, the commander performs six primary tasks. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for additional
information.) These tasks are to—
* Understand.
* Visualize.
* Describe.
* Direct.
* Lead.
* Assess.
Understand
3-20. Understanding is fundamental to the commander’s ability to establish a situation’s context. Moreover,
understanding is essential to effective decision-making during planning and execution. Analysis provides the
information used to develop understanding and frame the tactical problem in the context of the operational
environment. In addition, detailed planning assists commanders in developing their initial understanding of
the operational environment and the tactical challenges further. To develop better understandings of
operational environments, as well as the specific characteristics of mission variables of METT-TC (I),
commanders circulate within their areas of operations and collaborate and consult with subordinate
commanders, Soldiers, and key staff officers (such as the BCT S-3 outlined in chapter 1). Using their own
training, experience, education, and inputs from others (including running estimates from the staff and unified
action partners), commanders improve their understandings of operational environments and specific tactical
problems throughout the operations process.
3-21. Reconnaissance and security operations, as part of the BCT’s information collection efforts, are
indispensable to building and improving the commander’s understanding of the situation. As commanders
refine their understanding, they must quickly formulate the CCIRs, keep them current, determine where to
place key personnel, and arrange for liaison teams to contribute further to improving the commander’s
understanding. In short, greater understanding of the situation enables commanders to make better decisions
throughout the conduct of operations.
Visualize
3-22. As commanders begin to understand their operational environment and the tactical problem, they
visualize potential solutions and their desired end state. A commander’s visualization is the mental process
of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational
approach by which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 6-0). The process of commander’s visualization
applies to both the BCT’s primary mission (its decisive operation) as well as the collective visualization of
reconnaissance and security operations that influence the BCT’s decisive operations. |
3-98 | 52 | Chapter 3
3-23. Close collaboration between the BCT commander and the Cavalry squadron commander, as well as
close synchronization between the BCT staff and the squadron staff, are critical to developing the BCT’s
visualization of reconnaissance and security operations. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for more information.)
Assignment of a mission focused on specific reconnaissance and security objectives provides the focus for
developing the commander’s visualization that, in turn, provides the basis for developing plans and orders.
During preparation and execution, the commander’s visualization helps commanders (and their subordinates)
make timely decisions as they adapt to changing conditions and the updated information reports produced by
the BCT’s reconnaissance and security operations.
Describe
3-24. After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates to facilitate
shared understanding and purpose. During planning, commanders ensure subordinates understand their
visualization well enough to begin course of action development. During execution, commanders describe
modifications to their visualization; modifications informed by continuous reconnaissance and security
operations in updated planning guidance and directives resulting in fragmentary orders that adjust the unit’s
mission. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms refining and clarifying their
visualization, as circumstances require. Commanders express their visualization in terms of—
* Commander’s intent.
* Planning guidance.
* CCIR.
* Essential element of friendly information (EEFI).
* Reconnaissance and security guidance.
Commander’s Intent
3-25. Commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired
military end state that supports mission command and provides focus to the staff. Commander’s intent assists
subordinate and supporting commanders in achieving the commander’s desired results without further orders,
even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (Refer to JP 3-0 and ADP 5-0 for more information.)
3-26. The commander’s intent statement describes what constitutes success for the reconnaissance and
security operation including the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and the conditions that define the end state.
Intent links the mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units. A clear commander’s intent
facilitates a shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions that represent mission
accomplishment. During execution, the commander’s intent spurs disciplined initiative.
3-27. The commander’s intent must be easy to remember and clearly understood by commanders and staff
two echelons lower in the chain of command. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of writing the
commander’s intent statement.) The more concise the commander’s intent, the easier it is for everyone to
recall and understand. Commanders develop and personalize their intent statement using the following components:
* Expanded purpose.
* Key tasks.
* End state.
3-28. When describing the expanded purpose of the reconnaissance and security operation, the commander’s
intent does not restate the why of the mission statement. Rather, it addresses the broader purpose of the
operation and its relationship to the force as a whole. Often, the commander’s intent incorporates how the
operation relates to one or more of the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security. The commander’s intent
clearly conveys the expanded purpose of an operation.
3-29. Key tasks are those significant activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end
state (ADP 6-0). Key tasks are not specified tasks for a subordinate unit; however, they may be sources of
implied tasks. During execution when significant opportunities present themselves or the concept of
operations no longer fits the situation, subordinates use key tasks to keep their efforts focused on achieving
the desired end state. |
3-98 | 53 | Mission Command
3-30. The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation
concludes. Commanders describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly
force in relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, other friendly forces, and civil considerations.
A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort among the force and with unified action partners.
Planning Guidance
3-31. Commanders provide planning guidance to the staff based upon their visualization of the current
situation, their experience, and their professional military judgment. Planning guidance reflects how the
commander sees the operation unfolding with sufficient detail, context, and clarity. Planning guidance
broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the
mission within the higher commander’s intent. Broad and general guidance gives the staff and subordinate
leaders maximum latitude, which allows the BCT staff and the Cavalry squadron staff to develop flexible
and effective options in parallel, simultaneous, and complementary efforts. Leaders within the BCT’s Cavalry
organizations, the leaders who execute the reconnaissance and security missions in support of the BCT, must
clearly understand the BCT commander’s planning guidance so they know what and when to report as they
identify combat information, fill information gaps, and answer PIRs.
Commander’s Information Collection Effort
3-32. The commander’s information collection effort answers CCIRs (specifically PIRs and FFIRs).
Figure 3-1 illustrates the key doctrinal terms and definitions used throughout this manual.
Figure 3-1. CCIR and EEFI breakdown
3-33. A commander’s critical information requirement is specific information identified by the commander
as being essential to facilitate timely decision making (JP 3-0). The CCIRs consist of PIRs focused on the
adversary and environment, FFIRs focused on friendly forces and supporting capabilities, and EEFI.
3-34. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need
to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment (JP 2-0). PIRs identify information
about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations the commander considers most important and
impact on future decisions. Normally, PIRs are tied to either an NAI or a TAI. PIRs become the central
focus for the Cavalry organizations conducting the BCT’s reconnaissance and security operations.
LTIOV is the time that the planning Staff needs information collected in order to answer PIR and inform the
commander to make a decision. Therefore, LTIOV is the primary planning factor when determining the
reconnaissance tempo for information collection operations and will dictate the level of detail to be collected
and the stealth required (see ATP 2-01).
3-35. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand
the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). FFIRs identify the information about the |
3-98 | 54 | Chapter 3
mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers
most important.
3-36. Essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a
threat would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should
be protected from enemy detection (ADP 6-0). Although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority.
EEFIs establish elements of information to protect rather than elements of information to seek or collect.
EEFI identification is central to prioritizing units, information, or activities focusing on security tasks.
Cavalry units’ use of operations security process develop EEFI associated with unit operations, capabilities,
activities, limitations, and intentions that require protection.
3-37. A CCIR directly influences decision-making and facilitates the successful execution of flexible
military operations or decision point tactics. Commanders decide to designate an information requirement as
a CCIR based on probable decisions and their visualization of the course of the operation. During planning,
staffs recommend information requirements for commanders to designate as CCIRs. During preparation and
execution, both the BCT and the Cavalry squadron staff may recommend changes to CCIRs based on
assessments. A CCIR is—
* Specified by a commander for a specific operation.
* Applicable only to the commander who specifies it (or their subordinates executing
reconnaissance and security tasks to support the commander).
* Situation dependent, directly linked to a current mission or a decision that will create a new
mission, branch, or sequel to the current mission.
* Time-sensitive.
* A design and planning requirement.
3-38. BCT commanders prioritize and limit the number of CCIRs to focus Cavalry assets to support BCT
operations. With fewer prioritized CCIRs, subordinate units can apply greater concentrations of combat
power and reconnaissance focus to each information requirement. At the same time, fewer prioritized CCIRs
facilitate timely and accurate reporting and provide the commander with the required information sooner.
3-39. Throughout an operation, the list of CCIRs constantly changes. BCT commanders, through their staffs,
effective liaison teams, the tactical network, and direct communications with their subordinate commanders
constantly refine and develop their information requirements. Commanders can add and delete CCIRs based
on the information needed for specific decisions.
Commander’s Reconnaissance and Security Guidance
3-40. Reconnaissance and security operations are enduring missions conducted by Cavalry units; therefore,
commanders provide clear reconnaissance and security guidance that enables freedom of action to develop
the situation and adequate direction to ensure their organic Cavalry organizations can accomplish stated
reconnaissance and security objectives within the required timeframe. The commander’s reconnaissance and
security planning guidance is nested with the higher commander’s intent. The reconnaissance and security
guidance provides a clear understanding of the Cavalry organization’s task, purpose, objective, and how the
Cavalry organization will effectively answer information requirements on enemy and terrain to enable the
higher commander to make timely decisions.
3-41. Reconnaissance guidance explains the focus, reconnaissance tempo, and guidelines for engagement.
The commander develops the planning guidance based on the BCT mission, timeline, and intents to satisfy
information requirements and to identify opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The
commander specifies different reconnaissance guidance for each phase of an operation and can adjust the
components of the guidance throughout an operation as the situation changes or develops. BCT and maneuver
battalion commanders include their reconnaissance and security guidance in, Annex L, Scheme of
Information Collection, paragraph 3 (Execution). Commanders of organizations that focus on reconnaissance
and security (such as reconnaissance and security TFs, or Cavalry squadrons) include reconnaissance and
security guidance in Annex L, paragraph 3 (Execution), commander’s intent, found in Annex L. It is critical
that initial reconnaissance and security guidance is published as part of WARNORD #2 to provide Cavalry
formations sufficient time to collect the required information to inform their higher headquarters’
decision-making process. As the BCT commander and staff become more aware of the situation, they can |
3-98 | 55 | Mission Command
publish refined reconnaissance guidance in the OPORD and updated Annex L to provide all ground
reconnaissance forces with detailed and specific information. The commander’s reconnaissance guidance
and how it is issued to the Cavalry squadron is not prescriptive; however, it is critical that the BCT establishes
some form of guidance for the Cavalry squadron that enables them to focus on what the BCT needs to know
about enemy, terrain, and the decisions to be made. A dialogue between the BCT commander and the Cavalry
squadron commander will suffice as long as the result of the dialogue is a mutual understanding of the overall
commander’s intent. For more information on the commander’s dialogue, refer to paragraphs 3-66 through
3-68 of this chapter. The commander’s reconnaissance guidance consists of three elements—
* Focus.
* Reconnaissance tempo.
* Engagement criteria and disengagement criteria, both lethal and nonlethal.
Focus
3-42. Reconnaissance focus defines the Cavalry organization’s area of emphasis and has four categories:
threat, civil, terrain, and weather effects. The higher commander’s intent serves as the basis for establishing
the focus for reconnaissance tasks. The Cavalry organization uses focus to narrow the scope of tasks in order
to get the most important information to develop the situation for future operations. Like many elements
within the commander’s reconnaissance guidance, the focus can change during different operation phases.
3-43. Commanders orient their reconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnaissance objective in the area
of operations. The reconnaissance objective is the most important result desired from that specific
reconnaissance effort. The reconnaissance objective could be a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy force,
or other mission or operational variable about which the commander wants to obtain additional information.
For example, if the reconnaissance operation is threat focused, then the reconnaissance objective could be a
specific type of equipment, or an entire system, such as an integrated air defense system. The reconnaissance
objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by specifying the most important result to obtain
from the reconnaissance effort. Every reconnaissance mission specifies a reconnaissance objective. The
commander assigns a reconnaissance objective based on PIRs resulting from the IPB process, which should
directly support the end state as defined in the commander’s intent. The reconnaissance objective can be
information about a specific geographic location (such as the cross-country trafficability of a specific area),
a specific enemy or adversary activity to be confirmed or denied, or a specific enemy or adversary unit to
be located and tracked. When the reconnaissance unit does not have enough time to complete all the tasks
associated with a specific form of reconnaissance, it uses the reconnaissance objective to guide it in
setting priorities.
3-44. Additionally, a reconnaissance objective may include gaining an awareness of how the local society
affects military operations. Cavalry organizations may have to conduct reconnaissance to gather information
on the size, location, composition, and political temperament of the society. Such reconnaissance focuses on
developing an understanding of the cultural and human factors that affect friendly as well as adversarial
perceptions and operations, such as religion, ethnicity, language, and political or tribal organizations. Civil
considerations also address infrastructure—the systems that support the inhabitants, economy, and
government of a specific area. Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events compose the
civil considerations potentially included as a component of reconnaissance focus. Regardless of its focus on
terrain, the enemy, or civil considerations, the reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the
reconnaissance effort by stating the most important result of the reconnaissance effort.
Reconnaissance Tempo
3-45. The reconnaissance tempo is the level of detail and level of aggressiveness required to accomplish
reconnaissance operations. The level of detail is conveyed using the terms “rapid” and “deliberate” to
establish the necessary number of tasks required, based on the amount of time available, in a reconnaissance
operation to sufficiently answer the supported commander’s PIR. The level of aggressiveness addresses the
necessity to avoid either detection or engagement and is conveyed through the terms “forceful” and
“stealthy”. Commanders analyze the mission variables of METT-TC (I) to assist them in determining the
best reconnaissance tempo for a specific type of reconnaissance. |
3-98 | 56 | Chapter 3
3-46. The level of detail assigned will naturally impact the depth of information collected. Commanders
identify the number of tasks associated with a type of reconnaissance. In a rapid reconnaissance, commanders
prescribe the minimum number of tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. By assigning a rapid
reconnaissance, the commander is accepting a reduced number of tasks and specificity of information
associated with the assigned tasks. This is more easily accomplished with a greater understanding of the
operational environment, or when only specific information is needed to facilitate the supported commander's
decisions. The limitation of rapid reconnaissance is a higher risk to the force due to reduced specificity and
less detailed information about the operational environment.
3-47. A deliberate reconnaissance implies all tasks for that type of reconnaissance must be accomplished to
ensure mission success and to answer PIR. This is usually necessary when the understanding of the
operational environment is vague. A deliberate reconnaissance tempo is inherently more time intensive due
to the amount of required information to collect and tasks to complete. It requires meticulous information
collection, and is conducted when there is limited enemy presence, when more time is available, or the
commander requires more detailed information about the operational environment. The limitation of a
deliberate reconnaissance is that it may require augmentation to include more detailed information collection
assets and may require more deliberate sustainment planning.
3-48. The level of aggressiveness in a reconnaissance is how the commander directs a reconnaissance force's
reaction to contact with the enemy. In a stealthy reconnaissance, units are governed by more restrictive
engagement /bypass criteria. This is appropriate when time is available and the unit is either unable to fight
for information based on relative combat analysis, dismounted scouts are unable to sustain direct contact, the
commander wants forces to remain undetected, or when a higher headquarters is unwilling to accept a higher
threshold of risk with reconnaissance forces as a means of achieving economy of force.
3-49. A forceful reconnaissance requires a reconnaissance force to develop the situation through action and
they are governed by more permissive, aggressive engagement criteria. This is appropriate when favorable
relative combat power analysis permits, when limited time necessitates, or when aggressive engagement is
necessary to gain the required information. Commanders may also select a level of aggressiveness based on
their desire to shape the operational environment and influence enemy decision-making.
3-50. Rapid and deliberate are mutually exclusive levels of detail, as one cannot be rapid and deliberate at
the same time. Similarly, stealthy and forceful are mutually exclusive levels of aggressiveness. This provides
commanders with four sets of reconnaissance tempos they can assign as seen in figure 3-2. |
3-98 | 57 | Mission Command
Figure 3-2. Reconnaissance tempo
3-51. For context, a rapid and forceful tempo for route reconnaissance might entail hastily assessing the
trafficability of bridges and bypasses; hastily observing for threat indicators (rapid movement results in hasty
assessments); and engaging two enemy platoons or less (forceful due to the permissive engagement criteria).
Whereas a deliberate and stealthy tempo might entail committing engineer assets to classify (time-consuming
and deliberate) the bridges along a route (concerned with the complete task of bridge classification), while
engaging any threat lesser than a squad (stealthy due to restrictive engagement criteria).
3-52. It is less important that commanders use the specific terms (rapid or deliberate, forceful or stealthy) to
communicate an organization’s reconnaissance tempo. Instead, commanders should strive to provide
guidance within each area of tempo to assist subordinate units in understanding how the reconnaissance effort
is nested within the supported organization’s operating tempo. Generally speaking, commanders should let
reconnaissance forces know how much information that pertains to enemy and terrain that they need to gather,
how quickly they need to gather the information, and how aggressive they can be in the pursuit of that
information.
Engagement Criteria
3-53. Engagement criteria are protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating engagement with an
enemy force (FM 3-90-1). They can either be restrictive, limiting the freedom that leaders allow their
subordinates during engagements, or permissive, allowing subordinates their own judgment in initiating and
completing engagements with threat forces. The squadron commander visualizes engagement criteria through
an analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC (I).
3-54. Commanders must define the size or type of enemy force they expect their subordinate units to engage
or avoid, and they must specify the conditions. These decisions drive the planning for direct and indirect
fires, as well as the establishment of bypass criteria. Bypass criteria are measures established by higher
echelon headquarters that specify the conditions and size under which enemy units and contact may be |
3-98 | 58 | Chapter 3
avoided (ADP 3-90). The establishment of bypass criteria requires the commander, staff, and subordinate
commanders to develop a plan and allocate resources to maintain visual contact with bypassed or bypassing
threat elements. Commanders visualize how they expect engagements to be conducted and create their
engagement criteria to both retain freedom of maneuver and prevent a decisive engagement. The squadron
commander must consider information engagement and how the squadron interacts and influences the
local population.
3-55. Merely defining engagement criteria using terms like “aggressive” or “discreet” is not sufficient.
Engagement criteria should be defined using precise doctrinal terms. Again, the squadron commander issues
specific planning guidance to define the engagement criteria. Commanders use size and description of the
enemy composition to create an understanding for their unit of the engagement criteria. The staff and
subordinate commanders refine that guidance into specific execution information. Examples include
the following:
* Engagement criteria.
* Engagement priorities.
* Direct fire control measures to mass fires and control fire distribution.
* Guidance for actions on contact.
* Bypass criteria.
* Reconnaissance handover criteria.
* Priority of fires.
* Rules of engagement or rules for use of force.
* Fire support coordination measures.
* Weapons control status.
Disengagement Criteria
3-56. Disengagement criteria are protocols that specify those circumstances where a friendly force must
break contact with the direct fire and observed indirect fire to prevent decisive engagement. The commander
develops the disengagement criteria for reconnaissance operations. The disengagement criteria are
enemy-based and given in quantifiable terms. The disengagement criteria are well-thought-out, developed in
the planning process to prevent Cavalry units from becoming decisively engaged, and allow them to retain
freedom of maneuver. A disengagement involves moving to a location where enemy forces cannot engage
friendly forces through direct fire contact or observed indirect fires. The disengagement criteria indicate the
conditions or size of enemy forces such that contact may spoil mission objectives or enemy forces may
overmatch the Cavalry unit.
Commander’s Security Guidance
3-57. Although similar to the reconnaissance guidance, the commander’s security guidance has unique
components that require additional consideration and planning in addition to the reconnaissance guidance.
Commanders provide clear security guidance that offers freedom of action and direction to ensure their
organic Cavalry organizations can accomplish the stated objectives within the required timeframe. The
commander’s security planning guidance provides a clear understanding of the Cavalry organization’s task,
purpose, and objective, and the security operation’s protection requirements. The components of the
commander’s security guidance are—
* Focus.
* Security duration.
* Engagement criteria and disengagement criteria.
Focus
3-58. The security focus defines what the Cavalry organization is to protect and why. The focus describes
the expected results of the security operation and has four categories: threat, terrain, civil, and friendly. (Refer
to chapter 5 for additional information on security operations.) The security focus could change during each
phase of the security operation. |
3-98 | 59 | Mission Command
3-59. The security focus allows the commander to determine specific tasks, their priority, and their relation
to the intent and end state. Moreover, focus allows subordinate commanders to narrow their operations to
acquire the most important information for higher headquarters and protect the most critical activities.
3-60. Commanders orient their security assets by identifying a security objective in the area of operations.
The security objective is the most important result desired from that specific security effort. The security
objective clarifies and prioritizes the tasks for the Cavalry unit nested within the maneuver plan of the
protected commander. The BCT commander provides focus to the protecting force’s efforts to accomplish
the mission efficiently and effectively. As an example, the security objective may constitute locating and
defeating enemy reconnaissance forces, confirming or denying the commander and staff’s initial assessment,
providing early warning and reaction time to the main body, or protecting the main body from enemy
observation and engagement.
Security Duration
3-61. Clearly articulating the duration of security operations allows the commander to establish associated
time requirements that drive security operations planning, such as the method of establishing observation
posts (either mounted or dismounted), battle positions, length of UAS rotation, and required logistical and
communications support necessary to execute the mission. The security durations are short (less than
12 hours) and long (greater than 12 hours). Duration can also relate to depth, especially in screen missions,
as time is needed to deploy properly into screen areas to achieve the required depth throughout the area of
operations. Commanders consider tasks, their CCIRs, the LTIOV, tactical risk, movement techniques,
reconnaissance methods, and formations when articulating the security duration. The two observation posts
that Cavalry units employ are described below:
* Short duration: Cavalry organizations establish and staff short duration observation posts for less
than 12 hours. Cavalry units establish short duration observation posts quickly, so commanders
can take advantage of available time and mass reconnaissance assets by maximizing the number
of observation posts and associated observing forces on the ground and in the air for a short period.
* Long duration: Cavalry organizations establish and staff long duration observation posts for
greater than 12 hours. Significantly, the number of observation posts decreases as platoons and
troops must allocate additional forces to each observation post to manage a deliberate rotation
schedule and rest plan. Units must coordinate for adequate resupply of all supply classes to support
observation posts that operate for extended periods.
Engagement and Disengagement Criteria
3-62. Just as the commander issues guidance for engagement and disengagement criteria in reconnaissance
guidance in paragraphs 3-51 to 3-54 (page 3-11), the same criteria apply to security operations.
3-63. The BCT commander provides the security force with engagement and disengagement criteria for the
operation. Engagement criteria direct the squadron either to engage and destroy enemy reconnaissance assets
or to allow enemy reconnaissance assets to pass in order to identify, disrupt, or isolate the enemy’s
second-echelon forces with direct and indirect fires. The BCT and security force must still have a plan to
maintain contact with enemy reconnaissance assets that bypass the security force.
3-64. Engagement criteria identify two specific themes: under which conditions the protecting force can
attack enemy forces, and what the security force can attack within its capabilities and task organization. A
protecting force has a restrictive engagement criterion when the BCT desires the protecting force to remain
hidden in order to report on the enemy composition and disposition. Likewise, a protecting force has an
unrestricted engagement criterion and may destroy enemy reconnaissance assets within their capability when
friendly forces overmatch enemy forces or when the commander requires an aggressive
counterreconnaissance effort.
3-65. The commander develops the disengagement criteria in conjunction with engagement criteria for
security operations. Similar to reconnaissance guidance, the disengagement criteria for security operations
are well thought out and developed in the planning process to prevent a security force from becoming
decisively engaged. A disengagement involves moving to a location where enemy forces can no longer
engage the security force through direct fire contact or observed indirect fires. The disengagement criteria |
3-98 | 60 | Chapter 3
indicate the conditions or size of enemy forces such that contact may spoil mission objectives or enemy forces
may overmatch a security force. Disengagement criteria in security operations is often tied to planned
transitions that are based on conditions for the security force to break contact with the enemy or the
anticipated duration of the security operation. For example, a security force may meet its disengagement
criteria to avoid a decisive engagement or enemy overmatch ahead of a planned transition such as a forward
passage of lines or rearward passage of lines resulting in the protected force having to commit forces earlier
than anticipated. The disengagement criteria for a security force must be clear, concise, and understood at
the lowest echelon to anticipate potential transitions and allow the protected force to maintain reaction time
and space. For more on transition planning, reference chapter 5, section IV of this manual beginning on page 5-41.
DIRECT
3-66. Commanders direct all aspects of operations by establishing their commanders’ intents, setting
achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units. Throughout the operations process,
commanders direct forces by—
* Preparing and approving plans and orders.
* Establishing command and support relationships.
* Assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures, and task organization.
* Positioning units to maximize combat power.
* Positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure effective command and control.
* Allocating resources to exploit developing opportunities and counter emerging threats.
* Committing the BCT reserve, as required.
LEAD
3-67. Through leadership, commanders provide purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate
commanders, their staffs, and Soldiers. The commander’s physical presence is necessary to lead effectively.
During reconnaissance and security operations, the BCT commander balances the time between leading the
staff through the operations process and providing purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate
commanders and Soldiers forward of the command post. Once the Cavalry squadron initiates their
reconnaissance and security missions, the Cavalry squadron commander commands the squadron from where
they can best conduct command and control of the squadron’s assets while maintaining communication with
the BCT main body as the Cavalry squadron develops the situation.
3-68. BCT commanders conduct a commander's dialogue with subordinate commanders to provide effective
guidance to ensure a shared understanding of the commander’s intent and essential tasks assigned to
subordinate elements. To be effective, the commander's dialogue should be a face-to-face event; however,
the situation may prevent a face-to face meeting, which means the BCT commander identifies other
communication means to ensure the execution of a dialogue with subordinate commanders. The BCT
commander’s dialogue with the Cavalry squadron commander occurs early and often throughout the
operations process and the execution of the BCT mission. The BCT commander initiates a commander’s
dialogue with the Cavalry squadron commander as early as the BCT's receipt of mission.
3-69. The dialogue between the BCT commander and the Cavalry squadron commander at the beginning of
the operations process is critical as it has the potential, especially in a time constrained environment, to serve
as the BCT commander’s primary opportunity to issue the essential reconnaissance and security guidance
that the Cavalry squadron requires to effectively enable the BCT commander to make decisions. The BCT
staff develops reconnaissance and security guidance that is refined and approved by the BCT commander
and then published in WARNORD #2. The BCT staff refines the guidance throughout the MDMP as the
Cavalry squadron answers information requirements. The BCT staff publishes the refined guidance in the
OPORD. However, the BCT commander uses the commander’s dialogue to provide the Cavalry squadron
commander with the CCIRs based on the BCT commander’s understanding of the mission and the mission
variables. The dialogue also provides the Cavalry squadron commander the ability to assist the BCT
commander in refining the CCIRs based on the Cavalry squadron commander's understanding of the BCT
commander’s intent and the mission variables. The reconnaissance and security guidance issued from the
BCT commander to the Cavalry squadron commander may not cover all of the components of the |
3-98 | 61 | Mission Command
reconnaissance and security guidance, but it should contain enough information to allow the Cavalry
squadron commander to refine the guidance in order to issue more detailed reconnaissance and security
guidance to the Cavalry squadron subordinate commanders that is nested with the BCT commander’s intent.
3-70. The primary attendees for the BCT commander's dialogue are the subordinate battalion and squadron
commanders. However, BCT staff members, at a minimum the S-2 and S-3, should be in attendance to ensure
synchronization of efforts across the BCT. The presence of subordinate battalion commanders at the dialogue
when the BCT commander issues reconnaissance and security guidance to the Cavalry squadron commander
enables the other battalion commanders to understand the tasks being executed by the Cavalry squadron and
how that effects the main and supporting efforts of the other battalions. The presence of the BCT S-2, S-3,
and other staff primaries enables the synchronization of all information collection assets to include the
Cavalry squadron and battalion scout platoons. Staff presence at the commander’s dialogue ensures a shared
understanding of the BCT commander’s intent and any changes that may be a result of the BCT commander’s
dialogue with the subordinate commanders.
ASSESS
3-71. Commanders continuously assess situations to understand current conditions and to determine how
operations are progressing. Commanders use continuous assessment to anticipate and adapt the force to
changing circumstances. Commanders incorporate staff, subordinate commanders, and unified action
partners into their assessments of situations. Based on their assessments, commanders modify plans and
orders to adapt the force to changing circumstances (see figure 3-3).
Figure 3-3. Development of guidance for reconnaissance and security tasks |
3-98 | 62 | Chapter 3
COMMANDERS AND STAFFS COLLABORATE TO PLAN, PREPARE,
EXECUTE, AND ASSESS
3-72. The operations process consists of the major activities of command and control conducted during
operations, which are planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. Commanders drive the
operations process while remaining focused on the major aspects of operations. Staffs conduct the operations
process; they assist commanders with the details of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing.
3-73. The continuous nature of the operations process, as well as the critical combat information and timely
and accurate reports provided during reconnaissance and security operations, allow commanders and staffs
to make adjustments. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate activities and operations throughout
BCTs and squadrons as they exercise mission command. Throughout the operations process, commanders
develop an understanding and appreciation of operational environments and tactical situations. They
formulate plans and provide purpose, direction, and guidance to BCTs. Commanders then adjust operations
based on changes to the operational environments and tactical situations. Adjusting operations allows
commanders to gain positions of relative advantage over the enemy. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for more information.)
3-74. Throughout the entire operations process, the staff supports the commander and subordinate
commanders in understanding the situation, so they can make recommendations and implement decisions
throughout the conduct of the operation. The staff does this by conducting the operations process (plan,
prepare, execute, and assess), and knowledge and information management.
PLAN
3-75. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and
determining effective ways to bring that future about (ADP 5-0). An Army leader plans to create a common
vision among subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action partners. Planning results in an order that
communicates a commander’s vision clearly and directs actions to synchronize forces in time, space, and
purpose for achieving objectives and accomplishing missions.
3-76. All planning is based on imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future. Planning cannot
predict the operation’s outcomes, describe with precision the enemy’s behaviors, or anticipate the civilian
population’s responses to military operations. The understanding and learning that occur during planning
have great value, even if operations do not proceed precisely as envisioned, because that process of planning
results in the improved situational understanding that facilitates future decision-making. Leaders use plans
and planning to—
* Understand and develop solutions to problems.
* Anticipate events and adapt to changing circumstances.
* Task-organize the force and prioritize efforts.
Understand and Develop Solutions
3-77. The commander and staff conduct conceptual planning (using the Army design methodology) to
understand, visualize, and describe the operational environment and the operational approach to the problem.
The Army design methodology results in an improved understanding of the operational environment and an
operational approach that serves as a link between conceptual and detailed planning. The methodology may
also result in an initial problem statement, an initial commander’s intent, and a commander’s initial
reconnaissance and security guidance. Based on their understanding and learning gained while using the
Army design methodology, commanders issue planning guidance, including an operational approach, to
guide more detailed planning with either the MDMP or the rapid decision-making and synchronization
process (RDSP). (Refer to FM 6-0 and ADP 5-0 for more information.) The BCT and Cavalry squadron’s
planning efforts use the MDMP to create a synchronized plan that provides mission-type orders to
subordinate units, including the BCT’s Cavalry squadron.
3-78. The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation
and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). The MDMP
integrates the activities of the commanders, staffs, subordinate headquarters, and unified action partners to
decide on a course of action that accomplishes the mission and to produce an OPORD for execution. Leaders
use the MDMP to apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to |
3-98 | 63 | Mission Command
understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. Commanders, staffs, and
others use the MDMP to think critically and creatively while planning. Using the MDMP results in an
improved understanding of the situation and an order that guides the force through preparation and execution.
3-79. The MDMP consists of seven steps. Each step of the MDMP has various inputs, a method (step) to
conduct, and outputs. The outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation and facilitate the next
step of the MDMP.
3-80. The MDMP facilitates collaboration and parallel planning. The BCT headquarters solicits input and
continuously shares information concerning future operations through planning meetings, WARNORDs,
OPORDs, and fragmentary orders. Commanders encourage active collaborations to build shared
understandings of situations, participate in course of action development and decision-making, and resolve
conflicts before publishing orders.
3-81. The MDMP also drives preparation. Since time is a factor in all operations, commanders and staffs
conduct time analyses of their planning and preparation activities early in the planning process. Time analysis
may require the commander to direct subordinates through a series of WARNORDs to start necessary
movements, conduct task organization changes, begin reconnaissance and security operations, and execute
other preparation activities before completing the plan. For example, to support reconnaissance and security
operations, the Cavalry squadron commander and staff must conduct parallel planning with the BCT staff, as
seen in figure 3-4, page 3-18. |
3-98 | 64 | Chapter 3
Figure 3-4. BCT information collection timeline
3-82. The commander is the most crucial participant in the MDMP. More than merely a decision-maker in
the process, a commander uses his or her experience, knowledge, and judgment to drive staff planning efforts.
During the MDMP, commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing.
3-83. The staff’s efforts during the MDMP focus on assisting the commander in understanding the situation,
making decisions, and synchronizing those decisions into a fully developed plan or order. Staff activities
during planning initially focus on mission analysis. Commanders use the products the staffs produce during
mission analyses to understand situations and develop a commander’s visualization. The mission analysis
products also define the staff’s input into the initial phases of the BCT’s reconnaissance and security operations.
3-84. The RDSP is a decision-making and planning technique that commanders and staffs commonly use
during execution when available planning time is limited. (See FM 6-0 for more information regarding the
RDSP.) The MDMP is a time-intensive systematic process that provides the optimal solution, while the RDSP
seeks a rapid and effective solution within the commander’s intent. The RDSP is a time-friendly
decision-making and synchronization process that allows leaders to combine experience and intuition to
understand situations quickly and develop courses of action. The Cavalry squadron staff most often executes |
3-98 | 65 | Mission Command
a RDSP following completion of their MDMP as they execute operations within the BCT’s MDMP planning
cycle, in addition to the Cavalry squadron’s continuously transitioning between reconnaissance and security
operations. The RDSP does not take the place of the MDMP; however, the RDSP supplements the MDMP
when time is limited and the staff is unable to conduct the full MDMP. The RDSP includes the following
five steps:
* Step 1. Compare the current situation to the order.
* Step 2. Make the determination that a decision is required and determine the type.
* Step 3. Develop a course of action.
* Step 4. Refine and validate the course of action.
* Step 5. Issue and implement the order.
Anticipate Events and Adapt to Changing Circumstances
3-85. Cavalry squadrons are the eyes and ears of the BCT. The BCT commander, the squadron commander
and staffs must assist the BCT commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the area of
operations and the tactical situation. The squadron’s primary purpose is to answer the BCT commander’s
PIRs (see figure 3-5, page 3-20).
3-86. Outputs of the IPB, such as the enemy situational templates, the event template, and the BCT and
squadron commanders’ CCIRs are critically important to assisting the BCT in anticipating events and
adapting to changing situations. As commanders articulate, assess, and refine their information requirements,
the BCT and squadron staffs further refine the commanders’ information requirements into specific
information collection plans.
3-87. As described previously in this chapter, PIRs are intelligence requirements that drive decision points.
(Refer to FM 1-02.1 and ADP 3-90 for additional information.) For example, the BCT commander could
establish PIRs concerning enemy capabilities and disposition as well as PIRs concerning civil considerations
in conjunction with a series of FFIRs about the BCT.
3-88. The BCT commander requires information about the enemy to make informed decisions, such as—
* When will enemy artillery be in range of our main body?
* Where is the enemy main body?
* Where are civilians on the battlefield?
3-89. The BCT commander requires information about FFIRs (the things we know about ourselves) to make
informed decisions, such as—
* Completion and status of defensive preparations.
* Loss of communications with the Cavalry squadron.
* Loss of key weapons system.
* Significant maintenance issues.
3-90. The Cavalry squadron staff further refines the BCT commander’s PIRs into discrete groups and
indicators. Indicators, in intelligence usage, are items of information that reflects the intention or capability
of an enemy and/or adversary to adopt or reject a course of action (JP 2-0). Indicators are collected within
NAIs or TAIs. In the below example, the BCT commander needs to know, “will the enemy attack within the
next 72 hours?” After developing PIRs into groups and indicators, the staff and troop commanders then assign
specific information requirements (SIRs) to facilitate tasking by matching requirements to asset capability.
The staff and troop commanders develop SIRs for each information collection asset based on capabilities of
the asset and the expected threat activity (see figure 3-5, page 3-20). SIRs provide specific information about
specific threat activity (or lack thereof) at specific locations. Cavalry units should have access to all
information requirements at the lowest level to enable them to timely and accurately report to the commander,
which assists the commander in developing his or her situational understanding. After doing an analysis of
probable firing positions given the terrain, the groups’ indicators, and SIRs for their respective area of
operations could include the following: |
3-98 | 66 | Chapter 3
PIR 1: Will the enemy attack within the next 72 hours?
* Group 1.1: Positioning of air defense artillery (ADA) assets.
Indicator 1.1.1: Are there any ZSU-23s present?
SIR 1.1.1.1: Report any transmissions across the J frequency band.
SIR 1.1.1.2: Report light tracked vehicle with satellite dish.
* Group 1.2: Positioning of fires assets.
Indicator 1.2.1: Are there three or more BM-21s?
SIR 1.2.1.1: Report intercept of low angle fires.
SIR 1.2.1.2: Report wheeled vehicle with rocket tubes.
SIR 1.2.2.1: Report tracked artillery.
SIR 1.2.2.2: Report intercept of medium angle fires.
Figure 3-5. Priority intelligence requirement breakdown
3-91. The Cavalry squadron has a supporting relationship to the BCT’s reconnaissance and security
operation. The squadron staff often operates on a parallel planning timeline with the BCT staff during the
operations process.
Note. The development of CCIRs (both PIRs and FFIRs) is an operations function led by the BCT
S-3 in collaboration with the BCT S-2 and refined by the BCT commander. |
3-98 | 67 | Mission Command
Task Organize the Force and Prioritize Efforts
3-92. Task organization is a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission
(ADP 5-0). Commanders task organize the force by establishing command and support relationships
according to their analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC (I).
3-93. BCTs task organize and assign command relationships for their Cavalry formations to execute
combined arms, air-ground operations to accomplish their assigned mission in their anticipated operational
environment. The BCT establishes conditions for reconnaissance and security operations by enabling the
Cavalry squadron with aviation support, joint and organic fires, and additional intelligence collection assets.
This may include partnering with and access to joint and national-level intelligence assets. The more
sufficient the task organization, the more capable the reconnaissance organization is to develop the situation
through action, especially in an unclear operational environment. Similarly, in stability tasks, task organizing
the squadrons with assets specific to collecting information for follow-on operations (such as civil affairs,
translators, engineers, and infrastructure assessment teams) allows commanders to receive relevant
information in a timely fashion.
3-94. When task organizing, commanders and staffs should clearly define the command and support
relationships between organizations. The type of command relationship relates to the nature of the operation
and the expected duration of the organization. The duration of the task organization and command and support
relationships should be defined by transition points where the unit changes mission or priority of support.
3-95. When task organizing, commanders and staffs should consider the various information collection and
combined arms reconnaissance and security assets available to BCTs. Information collection assets can be
categorized several different ways. Table 3-1, page 3-22 outlines organic capabilities of BCT units.
3-96. Additional combat power enhances the Cavalry squadron’s ability to gain and maintain contact and
execute reconnaissance and battle handover. Additional combat power provides the Cavalry squadron with
an increased capability to defeat enemy reconnaissance and security organizations and survive chance
encounters. Task organizing additional combat power with the BCT’s Cavalry squadron gives the brigade a
marked advantage during decisive operations.
3-97. Although properly task organized, Cavalry organizations can produce effects that outweigh the
diversion of combat power from the main body, such as achieving an economy of force. The BCT commander
should consider that dedicating these additional capabilities to the Cavalry squadron comes at the expense of
capability for potential follow-on operations. Therefore, commanders should carefully consider the risks of
executing reconnaissance operations as an economy of force. |
3-98 | 68 | Chapter 3
Table 3-1. Available reconnaissance and security information collection capabilities
Organization Capability
Conduct combined arms, air-ground reconnaissance, and security
missions as needed to meet information requirements.
Conduct area, zone, route reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force, or
Cavalry Squadron
reconnaissance as part of a security operation.
In difficult terrain, conduct area, zone, and route reconnaissance or
reconnaissance in force by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.
Conduct combined arms and air-ground operations as needed to meet
Combined Arms Battalion, information requirements. These operations include the reconnaissance
Stryker Infantry Battalion, and and security missions conducted by the battalion scout platoon as well
Infantry Battalion as providing additional combat power (through task organization) to
reinforce the brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) organic Cavalry squadron.
Air Cavalry Squadron and
Attack Battalion (attached from Conduct aerial reconnaissance and security missions in close
the Combat Aviation Brigade coordination with the BCT’s Cavalry squadron (through task organization).
[CAB])
Supports the BCT and its subordinate commands through collection,
analysis, and dissemination of information and intelligence.
Conducts analysis, full motion video, signals intelligence, and human
intelligence collection.
Military Intelligence Company Conducts situation development, target development, and support to
lethal and nonlethal targeting, indications and warning, assessment,
and protection.
Conducts intelligence reach for transmission and receipt of intelligence
products from national to tactical.
Fire support personnel report combat information and assessment of the
Field Artillery Battalion effects of fires. Weapons locating radars locate the positions of threat
firing elements for engagement.
Provide additional information collected during conduct of primary
missions. Can provide information on types of wounds or injuries,
Brigade Support Battalion
diseases, and the health and welfare of a population that refines
understanding of the operational environment or enemy capabilities.
Conduct technical engineer reconnaissance missions to fulfill information
Engineer Reconnaissance
requirements. Engineer reconnaissance teams typically identify
Teams
obstacle, mobility, and infrastructure information.
Chemical, Biological,
CBRN platoon conducts reconnaissance missions to detect, identify,
Radiological, and Nuclear
mark, and report the presence of CBRN hazards.
(CBRN) Platoon
PREPARE
3-98. Preparation is those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an
operation (ADP 5-0). Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success.
Preparation requires commanders, staffs, and units to ensure that the force is trained, equipped, and ready to
execute operations.
3-99. During preparation, commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational understanding
prior to execution of their decisive operations. The BCT and its organic Cavalry squadron must be prepared
to execute aggressive and continuous reconnaissance and security operations during the preparation phase of
the operations process.
3-100. At the same time, the BCT is often most vulnerable to surprise and enemy attacks during preparation,
when forces might be concentrated in AAs. While leaders are away from their units and concentrated together
for rehearsals, part of the force could be moving to task organize. Required supplies may be unavailable or
being repositioned. As a result, security operations are essential during this phase of the operations process. |
3-98 | 69 | Mission Command
3-101. Commanders and staffs must revise and refine their initial plan during preparation. The
commander’s situational understanding changes over the course of the operations process as enemy actions
require them to revise their plan. The ongoing reconnaissance and security operations generate both
applicable combat information and unforeseen opportunities. During preparation, commanders confirm or
deny assumptions made during planning. Commanders must revise and refine their operational plan when
reconnaissance and security operations provide significant new information from PIRs or FFIRs.
3-102. Finally, commanders and staffs conduct effective confirmation briefs and rehearsals. A confirmation
brief is a brief subordinate leaders give to the higher commander immediately after the operation order is
given to confirm understanding (ADP 5-0). The brief is the leaders’ understanding of the commander’s intent,
their specific tasks, the BCT commander’s reconnaissance guidance, and the relationship between their
mission and those of the other units in the operation (see ADP 5-0). Ideally, the commander conducts
confirmation briefs in person with selected staff members.
3-103. A rehearsal is a session in which the commander and staff or unit practices expected actions to
improve performance during execution (ADP 5-0). Both confirmation briefs and rehearsals are essential to
ensure that subordinate commanders and staffs understand the concept of operations and the commander’s
intent. Rehearsals and confirmation briefs allow leaders to practice synchronizing operations at times and
places critical to mission accomplishment. Effective rehearsals and confirmation briefs solidify the sequence
of the operation’s key actions and improve mutual understanding throughout the unit. During preparation,
commanders and staffs must ensure that the BCT and the Cavalry squadron are—
* Securing and protecting the force.
* Conducting aggressive reconnaissance to improve commanders’ situational understanding.
* Revising, refining, and rehearsing the operational plan.
* Integrating, organizing, and configuring their task organized, combined-arms, air-ground teams.
* Ensuring forces and resources are ready for execution.
Note. The BCT and the Cavalry squadron should also conduct a reconnaissance and security
rehearsal to ensure that the BCT reconnaissance and security plan meets the commander’s intent
and is synchronized throughout the BCT. The BCT commander, executive officer, S-2, S-3, fire
support coordinator, Cavalry squadron commander, military intelligence company commander,
and other BCT staff cells (for example, sustainment, information operations, and mobile
communications) should attend. The rehearsal should last no longer than 1 hour and should focus
on rehearsing reconnaissance and security tasks that address each decision point and PIR, and their
associated NAIs.
EXECUTE
3-104. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission. (Refer
to ADP 5-0 for more information.) In execution, commanders, staffs, and subordinate commanders focus
their efforts on translating decisions into actions. During execution, the tactical situation changes rapidly.
Operations the commander originally envisioned during planning may bear little resemblance to actual
events. Subordinate commanders require maximum latitude to take advantage of unforeseen situations in the
form of both opportunities and challenges to execute actions on contact, develop the situation through action,
and meet the commander’s intent, even when the original order no longer applies.
3-105. Cavalry organizations assist BCTs in developing the situation through action. Cavalry organizations
within the BCTs must effectively seize the initiative through combined arms, air-ground teams and execute
decision point tactics.
Seize the Initiative through Combined-Arms, Air-Ground Team
3-106. Reconnaissance and security operations, by their nature, are combined arms, air-ground operations.
These operations provide the commander with information and intelligence to reduce uncertainty and enable
rapid decision-making. Moreover, the same combined arms, air-ground teams can present enemy forces with
multiple forms of contact, forcing them to react continuously. Aviation assets provide critical complementary |
3-98 | 70 | Chapter 3
effects to the BCT’s organic Cavalry squadrons during reconnaissance and security operations. Specifically,
air assets provide direct fire, extensive observation capabilities, and facilitate the rapid movement of supplies
and personnel during reconnaissance and security operations. Attack and reconnaissance rotary- and
fixed-wing aircraft employ guided and unguided munitions, while Army attack aviation and fixed-wing assets
can provide close air support to ground forces to strengthen the ground Cavalry squadron’s ability to retain
freedom of maneuver and action to conduct counterreconnaissance operations. Additionally, these assets can
quickly transition to conduct interdiction missions by destroying high-value and high-payoff targets within a
TAI or as identified during reconnaissance or security operations. Rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft can provide
additional observation to assist the Cavalry organization in maintaining contact.
3-107. For a combined arms air-ground team to enable the conduct of reconnaissance and security
operations properly, it must coordinate the allocation of sufficient indirect fires. The squadron must augment
their organic mortars with rocket and cannon artillery either in a direct support relationship or through priority
of fires. This provides mobility and survivability for the aviation TF by enabling them to avoid, suppress, or
kill air defense threats. This also allows attack aviation to conserve critical munitions by using cannons to
shape the disruption zone for the squadron’s ground maneuver and rockets to destroy or neutralize
high-payoff targets in the deep area.
3-108. Effective air-ground operations build upon relationships, mutual trust, application of joint and Army
doctrine, and a common understanding of the operational environment, operation, and mission. They require
detailed planning, coordination, and synchronized employment of ground and air maneuver and fire to
achieve the commander’s objectives and ensure freedom of movement and action. Air-ground operations
require detailed planning of synchronized timelines, aviation element task and purpose, and airspace and
close air support employment.
3-109. The key to implementing aviation assets into reconnaissance and security operations is early
integration into the supported commander’s operations process. The supported commander and staff must
understand the capabilities and limitations of the aviation unit, the types of aircraft available, and the doctrinal
missions and roles that aviation can support. Regardless of the type of reconnaissance or security operation,
integrating aviation into the early stages of planning allows the supported commander, staff, and subordinates
to leverage the capabilities and deconflict issues critical to the effective use and synchronization of aviation
in a combined arms environment. The aviation commander’s plan must be nested and deconflicted with the
ground scheme of maneuver. Aviation-specific information includes the location of aerial observation posts,
battle positions, forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), ingress and egress corridors and routes, UAS
launch and recovery sites, and other airspace coordinating measures. These locations and assets must
integrate with the ground scheme of maneuver, ground observation posts and artillery positions, and other
airspace restrictions, such as UAS restricted operations zones, so they do not interfere with indirect fires,
maneuver by other units, or aviation use. Consideration to the positioning and securing of the aviation unit’s
maintenance and support assets in a forward location is essential to minimize distance traveled yet still
maintain supportability. Coordinating airspace for the rapid and efficient use of fires and aviation is essential
and must be reviewed often. Once planning is complete, all ground and aviation units must be using the same
common operational picture to prevent fratricide and to conduct operations efficiently.
3-110. The BCT’s combined arms, air-ground teams operate and disperse over wide areas to evade enemy
surveillance and strike capabilities, to deceive the enemy, and to achieve surprise. Aviation units can quickly
reconnoiter terrain that is difficult or hard to reach with ground vehicles, large swaths of open area (such as
desert plains and open valleys), or the dead space between ground observation posts and battle positions.
Attack and reconnaissance aviation units are ideally suited for reconnaissance and security operations due to
the superior speed, mobility, and firepower inherent to aviation. Attack and reconnaissance aircraft have
advanced day and night observation and target acquisition systems, long-range digital and voice
communication capabilities, and can integrate with UAS platforms for increased situational awareness and
information collection. Attack and reconnaissance aviation enable the BCT to concentrate rapidly against
decisive points to attack enemy weaknesses, isolate the enemy from sources of strength, or strike the enemy
from unexpected directions. |
3-98 | 71 | Mission Command
Execute Decision Points
3-111. The commander and staff’s ability to anticipate changing conditions on the battlefield is key to
mission success. Commanders and their staffs must see themselves and other friendly forces in addition to
the terrain, threats, enemies, and adversaries, and the population. Reconnaissance and security operations
allow commanders to anticipate changing conditions accurately. Cavalry organizations confirm or deny the
commander’s and the staff’s initial anticipatory assumptions. For example, during course of action analysis,
commanders and staffs focus on critical events that directly influence mission accomplishment. In addition,
the commander may identify PIRs that answer the commander’s decision points during these identified
critical events. The decision support matrix coupled with the decision support template is the result of a
commander and staff’s ability to visualize the battlefield and identify critical points where transitions or
decisions must occur.
3-112. A decision point is a point in space and the latest time when the commander or staff anticipates
making a key decision concerning a specific course of action (JP 5-0). A decision support template is a
combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of war-gaming that depicts decision points,
timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of
information required to execute a specific friendly course of action (JP 2-0). A decision support matrix is a
written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision points and associated actions at those
decision points (ADP 5-0).
3-113. The decisions commanders and staffs must make during the execution of operations are either
execution decisions or adjustment decisions. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for additional information.) Execution
decisions involve options anticipated in planning and outlined in the OPORD. Adjustment decisions involve
options that commanders did not anticipate—they respond to unanticipated opportunities and threats and
require implementing and synchronizing unanticipated operations. Adjustment decisions may include a
decision to develop an entirely new plan.
3-114. Cavalry organizations answer SIRs to support the brigade’s PIRs and decision points. Answering
SIRs provides the commander with the flexibility necessary for mission accomplishment. During mission
execution, the staff is continually updating their critical facts and assumptions based on reports from
reconnaissance and security operations. The technique of using decision points to influence critical events on
the battlefield highlights the necessity for continuous reporting during mission execution.
3-115. The location of commanders and their tactical command posts should facilitate the rapid and
effective decision-making under the anticipated tactical and operational decisions contained within the
decision support matrix, the decision support template, and updated assessments of the situation. To create,
identify, and seize fleeting opportunities, squadron and BCT commanders must be capable of commanding
forward and take advantage of tactical networks (frequency modulation, long-range, and digital networks) to
confirm combat information, update their understanding, visualization, description, direction, assessment,
and leadership of combat operations to make timely and effective tactical and operational decisions.
ASSESS
3-116. BCT, squadron commanders, and their staffs prioritize information collection activities by providing
their reconnaissance guidance and intent early in the planning process, establishing CCIRs, and updating
information requirements based on changing battlefield conditions as reported by their Cavalry organizations.
While doing so, commanders and their staffs must ensure that the CCIRs directly inform decisions associated
with their scheme of maneuver to provide flexibility and agility as they develop the situation and determine
the disposition, intent, and capabilities of enemy organizations. Commanders and staffs must aggressively
seek higher echelons’ collection of, and answers to, the information requirements as well as identify the time
sensitivity of their CCIRs with the LTIOV and resulting decisions to ensure timely decision-making.
MAINTAINING SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
3-117. Successful operations demand timely and effective decisions based on available information
provided by effective reconnaissance and security operations. As a result, commanders and staffs must build
and maintain situational understanding throughout the operations process. Situational understanding is the
product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the
operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). Building and maintaining situational understanding is essential |
3-98 | 72 | Chapter 3
to establishing the situation’s context, developing effective plans, assessing operations, and making effective
decisions throughout the operations process. (Refer to ADP 6-0 for more information.)
ENCOURAGING COLLABORATION AND DIALOGUE
3-118. Throughout the operations process, commanders encourage continuous collaboration and dialogue
among the staff and with unified action partners to plan, execute, and assess reconnaissance and security
operations. Collaboration and dialogue develops shared understanding throughout the force. The operations
and intelligence-working group comprises designated staff officers that coordinate and integrate information
collection activities and provide the commander and the BCT S-3 with recommendations. The operations
and intelligence-working group develops and refines the information collection plan as part of the BCT’s
reconnaissance and security operations. (Refer to FM 3-55 for more information.)
3-119. The BCT S-3 directs the operations efforts of coordinating and integrating special staff officers. The
S-3 integrates and synchronizes plans and orders and supervises management of the CCIRs. The BCT S-2
works with the entire staff to prepare the information collection plan and identify information collection
requirements for inclusion. The intelligence staff, with input from the staff representatives, assists the brigade
S-3 with developing the information collection matrix by recommending methods or assets to task for
collection. The BCT S-2 identifies intelligence assets and resources that can provide answers to the CCIRs,
including HUMINT, geospatial intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and SIGINT.
3-120. The intelligence cell manages intelligence operations to support the overall unit mission. The staff
weather office provides planning expertise on weather conditions and effects for friendly and enemy forces
to inform FFIRs. The staff weather office assists with the planning and execution of air, ground, and space
operations and provides services in accordance with responsibilities outlined in AR 115-10.
3-121. The BCT S-3 is the primary information collection tasking and directing staff officer within the unit,
tasking the organic and assigned assets for execution. Before publishing the information collection plan, the
S-3 coordinates with other command post staff to ensure synchronization with the other elements of the
OPORD. The operations and intelligence working group is represented by the following:
* Assistant brigade engineer.
* Air defense airspace management representative.
* Aviation officer.
* Air liaison officer.
* Military intelligence company commander.
* Cavalry squadron S-3.
* Cavalry squadron S-2.
* Cavalry squadron liaison officer.
* Fire support officer.
* Cavalry squadron signal staff officer (S-6).
* Cyber-electromagnetic warfare officer.
* CBRN officer.
* Sustainment cell representative.
* Information operations officer.
* Civil affairs officer.
* Judge advocate general (if available).
* Public affairs officer (if available).
3-122. The operations and intelligence working group directly supports the commander with executing
command and control of reconnaissance and security operations by performing four primary command and
control warfighting function tasks listed below (refer to ADP 6-0 for more information):
* Command forces.
* Control operations.
* Drive the operations process.
* Establish the command and control system. |
3-98 | 73 | Mission Command
SECTION III – INTEGRATING PROCESSES
3-123. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs integrate the warfighting functions to
synchronize the force according to the commander’s intent, reconnaissance focus, concept of operations, and
updated combat information provided by the BCT’s reconnaissance and security operations. The integrating
processes for reconnaissance and security operations are—
* IPB.
* Targeting.
* Information collection.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
3-124. Reconnaissance and security operations begin with developing and adapting the commander’s IPB.
The commander’s IPB including understanding threat capabilities, visualizing enemy courses of actions, and
developing associated decision support matrices and templates.
3-125. An IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and other aspects of an operational
environment within a specific geographic area. The entire staff participates in the IPB to develop and sustain
an understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. An IPB identifies options
available to friendly and threat forces. ATP 2-01.3 discusses IPB in detail.
TARGETING
3-126. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response
to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting begins in planning.
Targeting is an iterative process that continues through preparation and execution.
3-127. The targeting process is comprised of four basic steps: decide; detect; deliver; and assess. Targeting,
nested within the operations process, provides an effective method for matching friendly force capabilities
against enemy targets. The decide step sets priorities for intelligence operations, reconnaissance and security
operations, and attack planning. The decide step draws heavily on detailed IPB and the timely and accurate
reporting of the BCT’s Cavalry organizations to provide a continuous assessment of the enemy situation.
Staff develops NAIs and TAIs to support the commander’s decision-making regarding targeting and to
effectively target threats.
3-128. To ensure effective targeting, commanders and staffs establish intelligence operations priorities for
each phase or critical event of an operation and effectively translate these priorities into clear reconnaissance
guidance. A high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the
mission (JP 3-60). The loss of a high-value target degrades important enemy functions significantly
throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest. Priorities depicted using visual products and matrices
communicate the importance of specific targets to the enemy’s course of action and those targets that, if
destroyed, would contribute favorably to the friendly course of action. The high-payoff target is a target
whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60).
The collection plan guides Cavalry units to answer the commander’s PIRs, including finding those high-payoff
targets designated as PIRs.
NAMED AREA OF INTEREST
3-129. A named area of interest is a geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that
will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected, usually to capture indications of adversary
courses of action (JP 2-0). NAIs provide a graphical method to focus Cavalry organizations as they execute
security missions. Significantly, NAIs link most probable and most dangerous threat activities to terrain
where those activities may occur. Given the NAIs, subordinate commanders can prioritize the employment
and deployment of their forces and assets to provide the most effective observation and coverage throughout
the area of operations as they develop their scheme of maneuver and observation plans. |
3-98 | 74 | Chapter 3
3-130. NAIs should not be tied to specific terrain but developed based on threat locations or suspected
locations during the MDMP and IPB. Planners use their event template and event matrices to determine
where to place NAIs and TAIs to confirm or deny threat activity and help determine the threat course of
action for the commander.
TARGET AREA OF INTEREST
3-131. A target area of interest is the geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and
engaged by friendly forces (JP 2-0). Commanders use TAIs to apply a specific effect against a specific target
with a specific outcome. Unit staffs develop TAIs during the MDMP. Commanders designate TAIs for any
organic or supporting system including lethal and nonlethal effects.
TIMELY REPORTING AND ASSESSMENT
3-132. During mission planning and mission execution, Cavalry organizations provide timely and accurate
combat information through combined arms operations and their associated reports. These reports allow the
staff and the BCT commander to update their running estimates based on the most recent and accurate reports
reconnaissance and security operations generate. At the same time, Cavalry operations execute assigned
security missions while the rest of the force prepares for the overall operation. The force as a whole is often
vulnerable to surprise and enemy attack during preparation, when forces are often concentrated in AAs.
Security operations (screen, guard, cover, and area security) are essential during preparation.
3-133. Commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational understanding before execution of
the mission. Cavalry forces aggressively and continuously collect information to improve situational
understanding. Through information collection, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ
collection assets and forces to collect timely and accurate information to satisfy the CCIRs and other
information requirements.
3-134. The commander and staff’s ability to anticipate changing conditions on the battlefield is key in
seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. To be effective, the intelligence and operations staffs base the
information collection plan on the initial IPB and modify it as the intelligence running estimate changes.
Other staff sections’ running estimates may contain requirements for inclusion into the information collection
plan. Additionally, the staff plans synchronization into the scheme of maneuver and adds updates as that
scheme changes. Properly synchronized information collection planning begins with developing and
updating the IPB including threat characteristics, enemy templates, enemy course of action statements, and
an enemy event template or matrix.
3-135. During course of action analysis, the staff focuses on critical events that directly influence mission
accomplishment. During these critical events, the staff may identify PIRs that answer decision points. The
decision support matrix coupled with the decision support template is a result of a staff’s ability to visualize
the battlefield and identify potential points of friction.
3-136. As execution of the plan progresses, the staff refines decision point timelines used as the basis for
the LTIOV. The staff stays alert to the need for recommending changes in the information collection plan
due to refinements. As the need for change arises, the intelligence staff coordinates with the appropriate staff
sections to update the products required to refine the information collection plan.
CUE COLLECTION ASSETS TO OTHER REQUIREMENTS
3-137. The intelligence and operations staffs at the BCT and Cavalry squadron track the status of collection
assets, cross-cueing them as needed, and teaming assets together as appropriate to answer PIRs. For example,
a Soldier reports the absence of normal activity in a normally active market area. In that case, the staff could
recommend redirecting UASs or other surveillance means to monitor the area for a potential threat.
ELIMINATE SATISFIED REQUIREMENTS
3-138. As an operation progresses, the operations and intelligence cell tracks the status of each collection
task, analyzes SIRs, and monitors tasks for the satisfaction of requirements. The staffs pay particular attention |
3-98 | 75 | Mission Command
to assets not producing required results, which may trigger adjustments to the information collection plan or
require the reallocation of collection assets.
3-139. The operations and intelligence staff eliminate satisfied requirements and irrelevant requirements
from the collection plan, even if unsatisfied. In this case, the operations staff, in coordination with the intelligence
staff, relieves the collection assets of further responsibility to collect information on the original task.
3-140. The staffs must still periodically reassess whether or not satisfied requirements remain satisfied due
to changing conditions, the introduction of enemy reinforcements, or other changes to mission variables.
RETASK CAVALRY ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSETS
3-141. As the situation changes, or when Cavalry organizations meet the initial information requirements,
the commander and the staff should redirect the focus of reconnaissance and security operations. Retasking
is assigning an information collection asset or a Cavalry unit with a new, modified, or refocused task and
purpose. Generally, retasking is accomplished at the squadron level through a fragmentary order published
by the S-3. Retasking occurs—
* Upon completion of its initial requirement.
* When an original task becomes irrelevant.
* On order, after the LTIOV, and having not satisfied the original requirement. (Adjusting the
LTIOV may be required.)
* As planned to support a branch or sequel.
* To respond to a change in the tactical or operational situation.
DEVELOP AND ADD NEW REQUIREMENTS
3-142. As the operation progresses and the threat situation develops, commanders generate new
requirements. The intelligence staff begins updating requirements planning by identifying and prioritizing
new requirements, evaluating resources based on priorities, and making appropriate recommendations to the
commander and operations officer.
TRANSITION
3-143. Updating information collection taskings may result in a change of focus for several collection
assets. Collection assets may require rest and refit, or lead-time for employment to effectively transition from
one mission or operation to another.
UPDATE THE COLLECTION PLAN
3-144. The staff updates the information collection plan as the reconnaissance assets answer requirements.
Evaluation of reporting, production, and dissemination identifies the need for focus or refocus and assigning
or reassigning collection assets. As the current tactical situation changes, adjustments are made to the overall
information collection plan to keep collection tasks synchronized. Listed below are the steps for updating the
information collection plan. These steps are collaborative efforts by the intelligence and operations staffs.
Some steps predominately engage the intelligence staff, others the operations staff, and some steps may
require coordination with other staff sections:
* Keep information collection activities synchronized to operations.
* Cue assets to other collection requirements.
* Eliminate satisfied requirements.
* Develop and add new requirements.
* Retask assets.
* Transition to the next operation. |
3-98 | 76 | Chapter 3
SCREEN REPORTS
3-145. The staff uses the criteria listed below to screen incoming reports to determine whether the collection
tasks have been satisfied:
* Relevance: Does the information address the collection task? If not, use this information to satisfy
other requirements.
* Completeness: Is essential information missing? (Refer to the original collection task.)
* Timeliness: Has the asset reported by the LTIOV as established in the original task?
* Opportunities for cueing: Can this asset or another asset take advantage of the new information to
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall information collection effort?
CORRELATE REPORTS TO REQUIREMENTS
3-146. Correlating and evaluating intelligence reports to the original requirement is essential to effective
requirements management. Timely requirements management includes dissemination and receipt of reports
and related information to the original requesters and other users.
3-147. The staff tracks which specific collection task originates from which requirement, ensuring the
collected information provided to the original requester (and to all who need the information) is timely. For
efficiency and timeliness, the staff ensures they receive the proper collection assets to determine which
requirements have been satisfied and which require additional collection.
3-148. The staff address the following potential challenges:
* Large volumes of information that could overwhelm the staff’s capabilities.
* Reports that partially satisfy collection tasks.
* Assets reporting information without referring to the original tasking.
* Circular reporting or unnecessary message traffic.
3-149. Information collection assets do not submit reports that state nothing significant to report. They
should report collection occurred but observed no activity thus satisfying the information collection task.
Lack of activity might be a significant indicator. “Nothing observed” states more plainly that information
collection activities occurred.
ASSESSMENTS
3-150. Commanders and staffs should conduct assessments before and after each engagement to update
information collection guidance and increase their own understanding of the situation. Feedback is essential
for maintaining effectiveness and alerting leaders of deficiencies.
3-151. Following each assessment, staff sections should work together to tailor the information collection
plan making it as seamless as possible by removing information sharing barriers. Feedback reinforces
whether collection or production satisfies the original task or request, provides guidance if it does not, and
aids in the redistribution of assets to capitalize on opportunities or fill identified voids. |
3-98 | 77 | Chapter 4
Reconnaissance Operations
Cavalry formations conduct combined-arms, reconnaissance operations to determine
enemy composition and disposition as well as to gather information on the operational
environment. Reconnaissance operations enable all units to seize, retain, and exploit
the initiative across the range of military operations by identifying, creating, and
capitalizing upon opportunities, providing them with information facilitating
decision-making, and the concentration of unified efforts against decisive points.
SECTION I – RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS, METHODS, MANAGEMENT
4-1. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities and resources of an
enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, or other
characteristics of a particular area, by visual observation or other detection methods (JP 2-0). Conducting
reconnaissance before and during other combat operations provides information to the commander so they
can confirm, deny, and modify the concept of operations. Within the BCT, the Cavalry squadron is the
principal reconnaissance organization.
RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS
4-2. Planning and executing reconnaissance operations consists of seven fundamentals. Paragraphs 4-3
through 4-9 (page 4-2) describe each fundamental.
4-3. Ensure continuous reconnaissance. BCTs require continuous information collection throughout all
phases and critical events of all operations. Commanders direct information collection throughout all
operations and task-organize Cavalry assets to collect required information vital to enhancing the
commander’s ability to make informed decisions. Continuous reconnaissance provides commanders with a
constant flow of relevant information to identify and seize key terrain, confirm or deny enemy composition,
disposition, strength, and courses of action. Continuous reconnaissance also provides reaction time and
maneuver space for unpredicted enemy actions.
4-4. Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve. Continuous and focused collection efforts require an
efficient mix and redundancy of reconnaissance assets; however, this does not mean employing all assets and
capabilities simultaneously. Commanders maximize employment of their reconnaissance assets and
capabilities to answer their CCIRs. BCTs task and position reconnaissance assets and capabilities at the
appropriate time, place, and in the right combination (human, sensor, and technical means) to maximize their
impact, allow for timely analysis of information, and aid decision-making at the appropriate echelon.
Note. This does not mean Cavalry units should not have a reserve. Instead, Cavalry units should
generate a reserve from nonreconnaissance units (for example, the tank company in an ABCT, an
antitank guided missile platoon from the weapons troop in an SBCT, or a platoon from a weapons
company in an IBCT).
4-5. Orient on the reconnaissance objective. Commanders establish the reconnaissance objective with a
specific task, purpose, and focus to direct reconnaissance efforts. The reconnaissance objective specifies the
most important result to obtain from the reconnaissance effort and clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance
effort. Cavalry formations use NAIs to focus information collection to answer PIRs. However, observing
NAIs is just a means of collecting information or the initial assessment as to where information and indicators |
3-98 | 78 | Chapter 4
might be collected. Orienting on the reconnaissance objective helps Cavalry formations understand when and
if it should adjust information collection of an NAI.
4-6. Report all required information rapidly and accurately. Commanders develop plans and make decisions
based upon the analysis of information subordinate units collect. Commanders require quick and accurate
reports to make informed decisions on the proper application of forces. Rapid reporting allows staffs
maximum time to analyze information and make timely recommendations to the commander. Information
requirements tied to decision points with an LTIOV date-time group provide focus for units collecting
information and ensure units report information to facilitate timely decisions.
4-7. Retain freedom of maneuver. Tactical mobility and maneuver drive the success of reconnaissance
operations. Commanders and staffs consider task organization, movement techniques, and scheme of
maneuver to retain the unit’s ability to maneuver. Reconnaissance operations confirm or deny assumptions
about terrain and enemy made during mission analysis and IPB to identify opportunities and maintain
freedom of maneuver for the BCT. Counterreconnaissance operations retain freedom of maneuver by denying
enemy collection efforts and identifying opportunities for the command to seize, retain, and exploit initiative.
Commanders change movement techniques and employ multiple assets to make contact with the smallest
possible element and to avoid becoming decisively engaged. Commanders retain freedom of maneuver by
avoiding decisive engagement with a superior force and develop the situation further. Commanders
consistently balance the requirement to maintain contact with retaining freedom of maneuver.
4-8. Gain and maintain enemy contact. Cavalry forces find and sustain contact with the enemy on terms
and conditions of their choosing. Using at least one of the nine forms of contact (visual, direct, indirect,
nonhostile, obstacles, aircraft, CBRN, influence, and electromagnetic warfare), commanders and staffs plan
for and integrate aerial and ground sensors, manned platforms and unmanned systems, dismounted
operations, SIGINT, geospatial intelligence, HUMINT, and visual observation to gain contact with the enemy
using the smallest element possible. Intelligence units can provide a wide array of support to assist Cavalry
forces in detecting and tracking the enemy, such as UAS imagery and full motion video or geo-location
provided by SIGINT collectors. Once units make contact, Cavalry forces maintain contact, until specific
orders are given, a change of mission occurs when directed by a higher headquarters, or the unit conducts a
reconnaissance handover with another unit. Maintaining contact with the enemy provides real-time
information of the enemy’s composition, disposition, strength, and actions that allow staffs to analyze and make
recommendations to the commander.
4-9. Develop the situation rapidly. Cavalry forces act instinctively and urgently to increase the
commander’s situational understanding of the terrain, enemy, and civilian population. Effective Cavalry
forces understand how time impacts movement (both friendly and enemy) and how timely collection of
information requirements supports the commander’s decision-making. The reconnaissance scheme of
maneuver and tempo matches the requisite urgency to answer the necessary information requirements.
Cavalry forces collect on directed reconnaissance objectives in close contact with civilian populations while
selectively choosing to fight enemy forces to determine intent, disposition, composition, and strength.
4-10. The following vignette highlights a Cavalry organization’s use of reconnaissance fundamentals to
locate an opposing force during the Civil War.
Reed’s Bridge
In the days preceding the battle of Chickamauga, the roads in northwest Georgia were filled
with columns of marching and countermarching soldiers as the Union Army of the
Cumberland and the Confederate Army of Tennessee maneuvered in preparation for battle.
By mid-September, General Rosecrans had begun to concentrate Union forces, but the action
took time. Most of his army remained south of Chattanooga, while smaller forces garrisoned
the town and occupied key locations nearby.
General Bragg’s Army of Tennessee sought to engage and destroy a portion of Rosecrans’s
army before it could be reinforced. Alternatively, he sought to interpose his Confederate
Army between Rosecrans and the main Union supply depot at Chattanooga, forcing an
engagement. Critical to Union planning lay the determination of Bragg’s location and intent.
Therefore, mounted forces, including Colonel H. G. Minty’s Cavalry brigade were |
3-98 | 79 | Reconnaissance Operations
dispatched to find the Confederates. Minty’s mission also included screening the northern
or left flank of Rosecrans’s consolidating army.
On 15 September, the Union cavalry crossed Chickamauga Creek at Reed’s Bridge and
pushed patrols eastward toward Ringgold. Minty’s troopers initially found little sign of
Confederate activity, but they did identify several potential crossing sites over the
Chickamauga that enemy forces might use. On the 17th, a probe toward the town by Union
infantry encountered a concentrated force of Confederates and retired. Minty also noted the
enemy presence and the apparent northward shift of Bragg’s army in preparation for a thrust
across the Chickamauga into the left flank of Rosecrans’s still consolidating forces. This
information concerning Confederate activity was reported to Minty’s chain of command.
Colonel Minty also maintained patrols to observe the Confederates at Ringgold. His actions
triggered the dispatch of additional Union mounted elements to cover crossings over the
Chickamauga on each of his flanks.
Ensure continuous reconnaissance. The regular use of small patrols during the day and at
night to monitor activities at Ringgold enabled Minty to accurately locate, monitor, and
forecast Confederate intentions and forces.
Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve. Minty’s Cavalry brigade managed
reconnaissance patrols with a redundancy of day and night small patrols to answer the corps
commander’s information requirements.
Orient on the reconnaissance objective. Minty remained focused upon obtaining information
on enemy troop locations and movements, resulting in his correct identification of the
Confederate concentration at Ringgold and its likely purpose.
Report all required information rapidly and accurately. Minty provided at least nine reports
to his corps commander in four days with most of the reports arriving across several miles
within a few hours. He also sent reports to other Union commanders in his vicinity to keep
them apprised of the tactical situation. He relied upon a network of dispatchers to sustain
these communication links.
Retain freedom of maneuver. Minty’s success in finding and tracking Confederate forces
stemmed from his ability to avoid becoming decisively or unnecessarily engaged in
combat operations.
Gain and maintain contact. Minty’s reconnaissance patrols located and tracked Confederate
troop movements into and around Ringgold in accordance with his original instructions.
Develop the situation rapidly. The nine reports that Minty provided his corps commander
over a four-day period allowed his higher headquarters to develop the situation rapidly and
employ combat power accordingly.
COMMANDER’S RECONNAISSANCE GUIDANCE
4-11. The commander’s reconnaissance guidance should consist of the reconnaissance focus, tempo, and
engagement and disengagement criteria. In providing this guidance, the commander describes, shapes, and
prioritizes the intended vision of the reconnaissance effort supporting the overall scheme of maneuver and
the specific roles of the Cavalry unit. Echelon must understand the commander’s guidance and the importance
of accomplishing the mission.
4-12. Detailed information on the commander’s dialogue and the commander’s reconnaissance guidance is
in chapter 3 of this manual.
RECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES
4-13. Two reconnaissance techniques commanders employ to answer information requirements are
reconnaissance-push and reconnaissance-pull. Commanders employ these techniques based on their level of |
3-98 | 80 | Chapter 4
understanding of the operational environment combined with the time available to refine their understanding.
In selecting one technique over the other, the commander considers the following:
* Degree of the situational understanding of the enemy.
* Time available to collect the information.
* Leadership ability of subordinate commanders.
* Proficiency of subordinate units to plan and rapidly react for uncertain situations.
4-14. Reconnaissance-push is reconnaissance that refines the common operational picture, enabling the
commander to finalize the plan and support shaping and decisive operations. Commanders use
reconnaissance-push when they have relatively thorough understandings of the operational environments. In
these cases, commanders “push” reconnaissance assets into specific portions of their areas of operations to
confirm, deny, and validate planning assumptions affecting operations. Reconnaissance-push emphasizes
detailed, well-rehearsed planning.
4-15. Reconnaissance-pull is reconnaissance that determines which routes are suitable for maneuver, where
the enemy is strong and weak, and where gaps exist, thus pulling the main body toward and along the path
of least resistance. Commanders use reconnaissance-pull when they are uncertain of the compositions and
dispositions of enemy forces in their areas of operations, information concerning terrain is vague, and time
is limited. In these cases, reconnaissance assets initially work over broad areas to develop the enemy
situations. As they gain an understanding of enemy weaknesses, they then “pull” the main body to positions
of tactical advantage. Reconnaissance-pull knowingly emphasizes opportunity at the expense of a detailed,
well-rehearsed plan, and unity of effort. Commanders base plans on several viable branches or courses of
action triggered by decision points that reconnaissance assets operate to answer associated CCIRs. Leaders
at all levels must understand and rehearse branches and sequels.
RECONNAISSANCE METHODS
4-16. Cavalry units use appropriate combinations of dismounted, mounted, aerial (manned and unmanned),
reconnaissance by fire methods, and space assets to accomplish their missions during reconnaissance
operations. No means is mutually exclusive of another, since the greater number of capabilities and units
applied to information collection increases the operation’s effectiveness. All units conduct reconnaissance
using a combination of dismounted, mounted, aerial, and reconnaissance by fire methods, augmented with
brigade and higher echelon technical sensor capabilities.
DISMOUNTED
4-17. Dismounted reconnaissance is the most time-consuming method used by ground units but permits the
most detailed information collection about the enemy, terrain, civil considerations, and infrastructure. The
commander considers using dismounted reconnaissance when—
* Stealth is required, or security is the primary concern.
* Time is available.
* Detailed information is required.
* The reconnaissance objective is a stationary threat, fixed site, or terrain feature.
* The unit expects, or has made, enemy contact through visual and/or electromagnetic means.
* Reconnaissance vehicles cannot move through an area due to terrain or threat.
* The terrain creates a visual dead space that prevents using optics or sensors.
* Vehicles are not available.
MOUNTED
4-18. Mounted reconnaissance enables a more rapid tempo while increasing the potential compromise of
reconnaissance efforts. Mounted reconnaissance should take advantage of standoff capabilities provided by
surveillance and weapon systems to observe and engage from greater distances. Successful reconnaissance
operations mix mounted and dismounted methods based on the enemy situation and time available. The
commander considers mounted reconnaissance when— |
3-98 | 81 | Reconnaissance Operations
* Time is limited.
* Distances require mounted movement.
* Stealth and security are not primary concerns.
* Detailed information is not required, or the mounted method affords the same scope as the
dismounted method.
* The nature of the reconnaissance objective allows vehicles to approach, such as a terrain feature
or road intersection in stability tasks.
* The enemy location is known.
AERIAL
4-19. Aerial reconnaissance conducted by Army or joint aviation assets serves as a link between sensors and
mounted or dismounted reconnaissance. Commanders use aerial reconnaissance to cue other reconnaissance
methods to specific areas, thereby increasing the operation’s overall efficiency. Aerial reconnaissance assets
can rapidly transition to hasty attack or security operations without necessarily becoming decisively engaged
due to their mobility, speed, range, flexibility, lethality, and precision. Complex terrain, adverse weather,
enemy air defense systems, and deception and countermeasures degrade the effectiveness of aerial
reconnaissance. The commander considers aerial reconnaissance when—
* Weather permits.
* Time is extremely limited, or information is required quickly.
* Ground reconnaissance elements are not available.
* The objective is at an extended range.
* A target requires verification.
* The enemy locations are known and extremely dangerous (high risk) to ground assets or are vague
but considered high risk to ground assets.
* The terrain is complex.
RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE
4-20. Reconnaissance by fire is a technique in which a unit fires on a suspected enemy position.
Reconnaissance by fire requires reconnaissance elements to place direct or indirect fire on positions
reasonably suspected of enemy occupation. The goal is to cause the enemy to react by moving or returning
fire, thus disclosing their disposition or willingness to fight. Leaders use this reconnaissance method when
enemy contact is expected and time is limited, or when the unit cannot maneuver to develop the situation.
Commanders consider reconnaissance by fire when the unit—
* Identifies a natural or manufactured obstacle with suspicion of enemy nearby.
* Detects an obvious kill zone.
* Identifies a suspected enemy position that fits the situational template.
* Determines signs of recent activity, such as track marks or trash.
* Locates probable enemy bunker complexes.
4-21. Reconnaissance by fire eliminates the element of surprise the Cavalry element may have had, and it
may give the enemy detailed knowledge of their location. However, reconnaissance by fire may reduce the
chance of ambush within established kill zones. Disciplined troops in prepared positions might not react to
the fires, particularly if the fires are ineffective and do not inflict damage or casualties. As a result,
reconnaissance by fire should not entail the indiscriminate use of direct and indirect fires at all wood lines
and hilltops with the hope that the enemy will react.
Note. Commanders are required to avoid the targeting of neutral or civilian objects. Unless civilian
objects on a possible target location are engaged in hostilities, they would not be valid targets. |
3-98 | 82 | Chapter 4
RECONNAISSANCE MANAGEMENT
4-22. The Cavalry unit commander and staffs manage assets by cueing, mixing, and redundancy.
Reconnaissance management allows the unit to collect the most critical information with multiple
perspectives at the appropriate time. The BCT S-3 manages and synchronizes all capabilities and units to
support the brigade and Cavalry squadron execution. Cueing, mixing, and redundancy maximize collection
efforts and allow the primary focus to be on reconnaissance objectives that may yield the most information.
The details of cueing, mixing, and redundancy are as follows:
* Cueing is the integration of one or more types of reconnaissance or surveillance systems to provide
information that directs follow-on collecting of more detailed information by another system.
These systems may signal other ground or air reconnaissance assets to investigate specific areas
in order to confirm, deny, or verify information. For example, a dismounted observation post may
observe an NAI along avenue of approach 1, while an unmanned ground sensor surveys avenue
of approach 2. Upon activation of the unmanned ground sensor conducting surveillance of avenue
of approach 2, the observation post is retasked to observe avenue of approach 2 to confirm or deny
enemy presence or movement along the avenue of approach.
* Mixing is using two or more different capabilities to collect against the same information
requirement. Employing different systems is always desirable when the situation and available
resources permit. This method increases the probability of collecting information and tends to
provide more complete information. Mixing can defeat deception attempts by highlighting
discrepancies in information reported by different collection assets. For example, one observation
post and one UAS focused on one NAI.
* Redundancy is using two or more like capabilities to collect against the same information
requirement. Redundancy improves the chances the reconnaissance element collects the required
information and provides depth, should one element become compromised. For example, two
observation posts focused on one NAI.
4-23. The BCT commander task organizes with additional assets from within or without the Cavalry unit to
increase the effectiveness and survivability of a Cavalry asset. For example, the BCT task organizes a Cavalry
squadron with a lasing team, a signal retransmission element, and an ERT to improve fires lethality, increase
communications range, and enhance mobility capabilities organic to the squadron. (Refer to ADP 3-90 for
more information.)
RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES
4-24. Although the Cavalry scout directly observing the target is the commander’s most flexible
reconnaissance asset, the commander maximizes all the collection capabilities and units, manned and
unmanned, to assess the enemy and the effects of the terrain on enemy and friendly forces. Besides knowing
the capabilities and limitations of these systems, commanders and staffs understand all systems are
susceptible to deception and countermeasures.
4-25. The following assets and capabilities integrate into the information collection effort through cueing,
mixing, and redundancy. These capabilities provide the commander with critical information at the
appropriate time, utilizing the fewest assets.
SENSORS
4-26. Sensors allow flexibility in economizing aerial, dismounted, or mounted capabilities. Commanders use
sensors to observe areas where contact may not be expected but is possible, or for surveillance of areas over
extended periods. Sensors facilitate ground reconnaissance by providing redundancy and confirmation for
other capabilities and units operating in different areas of the battlefield. They can extend surveillance
distance between ground reconnaissance and the threat. The commander considers sensor reconnaissance to
expand the scope of coverage in a larger area of operations, to conduct missions of an extended duration, to
conduct CBRN reconnaissance, or to cue a more thorough ground or aerial reconnaissance of a given area. |
3-98 | 83 | Reconnaissance Operations
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
4-27. UAS platforms can locate and identify major enemy forces, moving vehicles, weapons systems, and
other targets. Additionally, UASs can detect and confirm information on the ground, such as the position of
friendly forces or the presence of noncombatant civilians. Besides its organic UASs, the unit may plan and
control employment of UASs from supporting organizations.
Note. Airspace management and coordination is a critical consideration for the employment of
UASs. (Refer to FM 3-52 and ATP 3-52.1 for more information.)
4-28. UAS employment is most effective forward or on the flanks. Employed together, UASs and manned
or unmanned ground reconnaissance elements provide excellent surveillance capability. Other capabilities
include the following:
* Support target acquisition efforts and lethal attacks on enemy reconnaissance and advance forces.
* Assist in zone, area, and route reconnaissance operations.
* Locate and determine enemy force composition, disposition, and activity.
* Maintain contact with enemy forces.
* Provide target location with enough accuracy to enable immediate target handover and first round
fire-for-effect engagements.
* Provide or enhance multispectral sensor coverage of the area of operations.
* Provide information to ground reconnaissance elements, increasing survivability.
* Reduce or eliminate exposure time of ground reconnaissance elements in high-risk environments.
* Support mission duration beyond those of manned systems.
* Provide digital connectivity that enables rapid product dissemination and constant communications.
4-29. While UASs are excellent force multipliers, they have limited effectiveness in locating well-covered
or concealed enemy forces. UASs organic to the reconnaissance unit are not suited for deep, long duration
searches. Other limitations include the following:
* Vulnerability to enemy fire.
* Weather restrictions, such as cloud cover or turbulence.
* Line-of-sight requirement between the aircraft and ground control stations.
* Limited frequencies for UAS control.
* Airspace coordination issues.
* Limited sensor field of view.
* Limited detection capability in complex terrain.
* Unique class III/V requirements.
* Inability to provide first-hand knowledge of the situation.
* Fragile components.
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
4-30. BCTs use information developed by the SIGINT systems organic or task organized to the BCT.
SIGINT systems can monitor or scan for signals, stop at detected signals, and restart after a predetermined
time or when manually cued. The system has on-the-move signal intercept capabilities. Electromagnetic
support (ES) and SIGINT often share the same or similar assets and resources, and personnel conducting ES
could be required to collect information that meets both requirements simultaneously. The distinction
between ES and SIGINT is determined by who has operational control of assets collecting information. (See
FM 3-12 for further details.)
SURVEILLANCE
4-31. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace, surface, or subsurface areas,
places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means (JP 3-0). Surveillance |
3-98 | 84 | Chapter 4
involves observing an area to collect information and observing the threat and local population in an NAI or
a TAI. Surveillance may be a stand-alone mission or part of a reconnaissance mission (particularly area
reconnaissance). Elements conducting surveillance must maximize assets, maintain continuous surveillance
on all NAIs and TAIs, and report all information accurately. A variety of assets (ground, air, sea, and space),
means (Soldiers and systems), and mediums (through the electromagnetic spectrum) can perform
surveillance tasks. Effective surveillance—
* Maintains continuous observations of all assigned NAIs and TAIs.
* Provides early warning.
* Detects, tracks, and assesses key targets.
* Provides mixed, redundant, and overlapping coverage.
4-32. Cavalry units conduct surveillance as a “task” while conducting reconnaissance operations.
Surveillance is similar to reconnaissance, because they both include observation and reporting and involve
detection, location, tracking, and identification of entities in an assigned area, gaining environmental data.
Surveillance is distinct from reconnaissance in that surveillance is tiered and layered with technical
capabilities and systems that collect information. Surveillance is passive and continuous; reconnaissance is
active in the collection of information (such as maneuver) and usually includes human participation and
fighting for information. Surveillance and reconnaissance complement each other by cueing the commitment
of collection capabilities against locations or specially targeted enemy units.
SECTION II – RECONNAISSANCE TYPES
4-33. The five types of reconnaissance operations are zone, area, route, reconnaissance in force, and special
reconnaissance. All types of reconnaissance, driven by the fundamentals of reconnaissance, answer PIRs that
allow the commander and staff to understand and visualize the environment, develop the situation, create
options, identify opportunities, and make decisions.
4-34. Zone reconnaissance allows intelligence development on threat, terrain, infrastructure, and society
within a specified zone of operations. Zone reconnaissance operations are generally large, deliberate, and
thorough efforts designed to gain a significant amount of information. Area reconnaissance focuses
reconnaissance efforts within a smaller geographic area than zone reconnaissance but requires collecting the
same information as for zone reconnaissance, as well as information about dominant terrain outside the
specified area from which the threat can still influence friendly operations. Route reconnaissance is a directed
operation to obtain detailed information of a specific route and the influential terrain along the route.
Reconnaissance in force is an operation to determine the enemy’s strength, disposition, and reactions in a
specified area, conducted by battalion-sized TFs or larger elements. Special reconnaissance is an operation
conducted by SOF in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and politically sensitive environments to collect or
verify information of strategic or operational significance. Special reconnaissance capabilities and assets are
not usually available to conventional forces.
Note. When the Cavalry unit receives a reconnaissance mission from higher headquarters, the unit
may perform a combination of reconnaissance types to answer the higher commander’s
information requirements. For example, if the Cavalry squadron’s mission is to conduct zone
reconnaissance, their subordinate units may conduct a combination of zone, area, or route
reconnaissance missions inside the assigned squadron zone of operations. |
3-98 | 85 | Reconnaissance Operations
4-35. Table 4-1 shows which types of Cavalry units could conduct which type of reconnaissance operation.
SOF conducts special reconnaissance operations.
Table 4-1. Dedicated reconnaissance units and types of reconnaissance operations
Scout Platoon Troop or Air Cavalry Cavalry BCT Division Special Operations
Company Squadron Forces
Zone X X X X X
Area X X X X X
Route X X X
Reconnaissance X X X
in Force (if
reinforced)
Special X
Legend
BCT brigade combat team
ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
4-36. Zone reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain
detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries
(ADP 3-90). Any unit can perform zone reconnaissance, though the Cavalry squadron conducts zone
reconnaissance in advance of the BCT’s maneuver battalions to develop information and intelligence,
affecting the success of current and future BCT operations. A commander assigns zone reconnaissance when
the enemy situation is vague or when information related to terrain, infrastructure, or the civil populous is
limited. Commanders require specific information from zone reconnaissance to develop or refine their
courses of action before deploying additional forces into the zones. In this regard, zone reconnaissance may
orient on the main body’s subsequent area of operations or a specific axis of advance. Zone reconnaissance
is the broadest and overarching of the reconnaissance types and is an appropriate mission for the BCT’s
Cavalry squadron. The more focused types of reconnaissance operations (area and route reconnaissance) may
be included as specified tasks during zone reconnaissance.
4-37. Commanders must work to balance available time with critical collection requirements to ensure they
provide the necessary information for their higher commanders. To do this, commanders deliberately focus
collection requirements and adjust their reconnaissance methods to increase the overall tempo of the
operation. However, as tempo increases, so does the risk associated with zone reconnaissance and follow-on
operations. Commanders choose to task organize the reconnaissance force to mitigate risks associated with
an increased tempo of operations and to provide Cavalry organizations with an ability to develop the situation
through action in close contact with the enemy and civilian population.
TASKS
4-38. The Cavalry squadron commander, working with the BCT commander, determines the priority of tasks
that best answers PIRs. The commander then focuses the squadron’s collection efforts against these
requirements. The primary tasks conducted within capability and associated with zone reconnaissance are—
* Find and report all enemy forces within the zone.
* Clear all enemy forces in the designated, assigned area of the unit conducting reconnaissance in
accordance with engagement criteria.
* Determine the trafficability of all terrain in the zone, including built-up areas.
* Locate and determine the extent of all contaminated areas in the zone.
* Inspect and classify all bridges within the zone.
* Inspect and classify overpasses, underpasses, and culverts.
* Reconnoiter defiles along the route. Clear them of enemy and obstacles, or locate a bypass. |
3-98 | 86 | Chapter 4
* Locate fords or crossing sites, or obstacle bypasses, within the zone.
* Locate and clear any mines, obstacles, and barriers in the zone.
* Report reconnaissance information.
4-39. Based on priority, the commander may direct the following:
* Reconnoiter all terrain within the zone.
* Reconnoiter specific terrain within the zone.
* Locate bypasses around built-up areas, obstacles, and contaminated areas.
BCT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-40. BCT commanders direct zone reconnaissance to develop the situation for follow-on offensive,
defensive, or stability tasks. The Cavalry squadron is the BCT commander’s primary reconnaissance unit to
develop the situation and refine subsequent courses of action. Consequently, BCT commanders must provide
planning guidance and clear intent for zone reconnaissance operations that offer both freedom of action and
adequate direction to ensure their Cavalry squadrons accomplish defined reconnaissance objectives within
the required timeframe.
4-41. The BCT commander’s intent for zone reconnaissance provides focus for information collection.
Based on the potential scale of zone reconnaissance, commanders prioritize collection efforts on
reconnaissance objectives determined during the IPB process. The event template, terrain analysis, and enemy
situation template create information requirements that in turn focus collection efforts. These requirements,
linked to CCIRs, assist the BCT commander and staff with developing and refining courses of action.
4-42. Regardless of the amount of information known, the BCT commander initially defines and consistently
refines the type of information needed (information requirements) and when it is needed. The BCT
commander describes how the reconnaissance efforts enable follow-on operations. The Cavalry squadron
serves as the BCT commander’s eyes and ears allowing the commander to have a better understanding of the
operational environment and have the ability to focus the main effort at positions of tactical advantage.
Finally, the BCT commander defines the Cavalry squadron’s role when the squadron transitions from zone
reconnaissance to a follow-on operation.
4-43. When reconnaissance assets react to contact, they affect the reconnaissance tempo. Therefore,
engagement, disengagement, and bypass criteria are essential considerations from the BCT to the section
level. The criteria for which subordinate elements lethally engage or disengage enemy forces help the
squadron gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Commanders may direct bypassing or handing off
certain sizes or types of units to maintain the tempo of the operation based upon subsequent planned
operations and guidance from higher. Follow-on forces must understand engagement/disengagement and
bypass criteria. Reconnaissance assets direct and rehearse deliberate handover of enemy targets between
friendly units as required during engagement, disengagements, and transitions.
4-44. To enable information collection, one of the major considerations for the BCT staff when planning
zone reconnaissance is the Cavalry squadron’s task organization. BCTs task organize and assign command
relationships for their Cavalry formations to accomplish their assigned mission in their anticipated area of
operations. The BCT sets conditions for zone reconnaissance by enabling the Cavalry squadron with
additional capabilities, such as rotary-wing aircraft, air defense support, joint and organic fires. The BCT also
provides information collection assets, mobility support, increased sustainment capacity, retransmission
capability, Infantry, and Armored based upon available units, information collection requirements, and
estimates of the enemy’s capabilities and assets. Effective Cavalry is task organized with additional assets
that allow them to collect information and intelligence in close contact with the enemy and civil population
without placing the unit in a position of disadvantage or risk of enemy overmatch. A sufficient task
organization enables the unit conducting zone reconnaissance to develop the situation through action,
especially in an unclear operational environment. Similarly, when conducting operations focused on the
conduct of stability tasks, task organizing the squadron with capabilities specific to collecting information
for follow-on operations (such as civil affairs, translators, or a complete infrastructure assessment team)
provides information in a timely fashion. |
3-98 | 87 | Reconnaissance Operations
4-45. The positioning of sustainment assets depends on the depth of the zone, anticipated duration of the
operation, and sustainment requirements during operations. Class III, class V, maintenance collection, and
medical evacuation are of primary concern. A forward-positioned FARP reduces aircraft turnaround time.
The FARP may be in the squadron zone or in the area of operations of the lead unit behind the squadron.
4-46. Dedication of additional capabilities comes at a potential cost to follow-on operations. Additional
combat power enhances the Cavalry squadron’s ability to gain and maintain contact and execute
reconnaissance and battle handover while providing an increased capacity to defeat enemy reconnaissance
and security forces. Above all other considerations, an appropriately task-organized squadron has the ability
to take advantage of situations and opportunities identified during zone reconnaissance. Seizing opportunities
provides the BCT with a marked advantage during decisive operations. Therefore, commanders should
carefully consider the significant risks assumed in executing reconnaissance operations as an economy of
force without appropriately task organizing the Cavalry force.
Note. “Reconnaissance organizations require versatility to adapt to ever-evolving tactical
situations and operational realities. Versatility without survivability and combat power has little
relevance. Reconnaissance units unable to survive contact with an enemy and incapable of
overcoming even light resistance tend to be marginalized either by a threat or by their own
commanders. Even stealthy reconnaissance requires an ability to survive a chance contact or an
ambush that may occur with little warning.” (Cameron, page 577.)
CAVALRY SQUADRON PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-47. When developing planning guidance, Cavalry squadron commanders incorporate the BCT
commander’s intent and concept for follow-on forces into their overall scheme of maneuver. When
conducting all the types of reconnaissance, focus, reconnaissance tempo, and engagement/disengagement
criteria are critical components of the commander’s reconnaissance guidance.
4-48. The tempo and uncertainty of military operations rarely allows sufficient time to collect all the relevant
or required information during zone reconnaissance. Therefore, commanders must focus their formations on
specific reconnaissance objectives that validate or invalidate assumptions and confirm or deny planned
courses of action. Prioritization allows the Cavalry squadron to increase the speed of collection and
accomplish reconnaissance objectives in sufficient time to facilitate the main effort’s movement and
maneuver to positions of tactical advantage. Mission analysis and IPB produces terrain analysis, enemy
situational templates, and an event template to predict how the military aspects of terrain, mission variables,
and civil considerations affect friendly and enemy forces. The squadron uses available information to
prioritize tasks and determine factors, such as—
* Speed, movement, and reconnaissance techniques.
* Overall focus of reconnaissance.
* Task, purpose, and focus for subordinate troops, task-organized assets, and boundaries (zones) for
ground troops.
* Essential aerial on-station times or locations if available.
4-49. Commanders direct the reconnaissance tempo during zone reconnaissance to enable the timely
collection of information and intelligence to facilitate successful subsequent operations. Commanders
prescribe the scope to collect against specific reconnaissance objectives, and speed and movement techniques
during different portions of the operation, task organization of reconnaissance assets to create efficient
collection, and a timeline for collection in their planning guidance. The combination of these factors creates
a tempo for zone reconnaissance.
4-50. To control movement, the squadron assigns zones for the ground troops (see figure 4-1, page 4-12).
Zone reconnaissance begins at the line of departure and concludes at a specified limit of advance (LOA) with
lateral boundaries defining the area of operations. Subordinate zones may not be the same size. The main
body frequently orients movement along a major route, especially an axis of advance though travelling
directly along the route incurs tactical risk. Reconnaissance of the route becomes a specified task for a troop,
typically. Phase lines (PLs) control progress through the zone. Boundaries and PLs are drawn along
recognizable terrain. Contact points along boundaries maintain coordinated reconnaissance between adjacent |
3-98 | 88 | Chapter 4
units. Checkpoints indicate critical terrain features, control reconnaissance movement and reporting, and
coordinate air and ground actions.
Figure 4-1. IBCT zone reconnaissance graphics
4-51. Cavalry units conduct detailed fires planning regardless of the assigned task or prescribed tempo.
Deliberate fire planning has two components, indirect and direct. A commander deliberately plans and
integrates indirect fire support into the scheme of maneuver to enhance the effectiveness of direct fires. Fires
integration ensures that templated enemy forces are targeted with the most casualty-producing weapon
systems. By setting the conditions to engage the enemy with indirect fires, the commander can degrade the
enemy scheme of maneuver without exposing friendly forces to observation and direct fire engagement until
necessary. Commanders establish a direct fire plan based on METT-TC (I). Fire distribution allows the
commander to achieve massing fires and effects on the enemy to degrade or destroy their ability to command
and control their forces. Proper direct fire planning—
* Destroys the most dangerous enemy assets first.
* Uses each weapon system in its best role.
* Concentrates fires and effects on long-range targets. |
3-98 | 89 | Reconnaissance Operations
* Takes the best shots and exposes only those combat vehicles that actually need to fire.
* Avoids target overkill.
4-52. Integration of combined arms, air-ground operations are essential to the success of reconnaissance
operations. Considerations for the integration of air-ground operations include the following:
* Command and control relationship.
* Rotary-wing employment plan, task, and purpose.
* Ground troops’ missions.
* Tasks performed by air and ground troops.
4-53. Rotary-wing support increases the effectiveness of the reconnaissance efforts by reconnoitering open
terrain, reconnoitering forward of the ground troops, screening flanks, and locating enemy forces. Integrated
and synchronized aerial reconnaissance allows ground troops to focus on terrain, routes, and reconnaissance
of obstacles and enemy. When air and ground reconnaissance efforts are integrated, the squadron develops
the situation faster with more fidelity for the BCT commander.
4-54. Usually, the squadron retains control of task-organized reinforcements when the situation is vague.
Engineers are typically task organized to maneuver elements along primary and alternate routes to assist in
technical reconnaissance, obstacle reduction, and route repair.
4-55. The BCT field artillery battalion has an organic command relationship with the BCT. Priority of fire
for artillery to the Cavalry troops is based on intelligence or the main effort. Normally, priority for ADA
protects trains, command posts, artillery batteries, and task organized or designated reserve.
4-56. Commanders at all levels position themselves in the best position to command subordinate units and
gain situational awareness. Normally, the squadron tactical command post and main command post are
operational to ensure continuous communications over extended distances within the squadron and to higher
headquarters. Usually, the combat trains command post moves through the center of the zone along a route
providing good movement laterally and in-depth. A unit, maintenance collection point is usually co-located
with, or near the combat train’s command post. The combat train’s command post can promote security and
provide command and control of the unit, maintenance collection point, and role 1. The field trains of the
Cavalry squadron either co-locates with the brigade support battalion (BSB) or echelons in-depth behind the
combat trains. Command posts and sustainment assets remain mobile and bound forward as the
squadron advances.
4-57. The purpose of a forward passage of lines is to move forces forward to conduct operations. A forward
passage of lines ensures the maintenance of enemy contact while allowing the relief of previously committed
forces. The stationary force controls and secures the area of operations far enough to its front that the moving
force can pass through the stationary force and reform into a combat formation before contact with an enemy
force. A forward passage of lines allows the Cavalry squadron or units conducting reconnaissance to avoid
being harassed or assaulted with hostile intent by enemy forces as they begin operations. Forward or rearward
passage of lines can occur during any type of reconnaissance or security operations. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for
more information.)
4-58. Upon completion of the mission, the squadron proceeds with assigned follow-on missions. In the
absence of an assigned mission, typically, the squadron conducts security missions in the form of a screen or
guard along the LOA or to the flank of a supported unit. If the squadron encounters major enemy formations
before the objective and do not find a gap or bypass, the squadron conducts a screen or guard, continues
reconnaissance, and prepares to pass main body forces forward.
AREA RECONNAISSANCE
4-59. Area reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed
information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (ADP 3-90). Area reconnaissance is
detailed reconnaissance in specific locations that answers PIRs and develops the situation to provide options
to the commander. The commander assigns area reconnaissance when information on the enemy situation is
more developed, when focused reconnaissance in the given area may yield specific information related to
terrain or decision points, or when more detailed information is required in a designated area. The area |
3-98 | 90 | Chapter 4
targeted for reconnaissance may consist of a future friendly position, such as brigade support areas (BSAs)
or position areas for artillery. Frequently, area reconnaissance is defined as an NAI or a TAI to focus the unit
on a more specific area, such as a building, bridge, obstacle, or key terrain.
TASKS
4-60. Area reconnaissance comprises the same tasks as zone reconnaissance. Based on time and the
commander’s intent, the commander may direct reconnaissance for SIRs only. Like zone reconnaissance, the
commander should provide focus to the unit in the commander’s intent within the OPORD and list the tasks
in the specific instructions. Primary tasks conducted within capability and associated with area
reconnaissance are—
* Confirm or deny the commander’s PIRs.
* Determine the trafficability of all terrain in the area, including built-up areas.
* Find and report all enemy forces within the area.
* Reconnoiter specific terrain within the area.
* Report reconnaissance information.
4-61. Other area reconnaissance tasks include the following:
* Inspect and classify all bridges within the area.
* Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges within the area.
* Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, defiles, and culverts.
* Locate and clear all mines, obstacles, and barriers in the area.
* Locate bypasses around built-up areas.
* Locate and determine the extent of all contamination in the area, as well as bypasses around
contaminated areas.
* Locate any bypasses for existing obstacles in the area that cannot be cleared.
BCT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-62. The planning considerations for area reconnaissance at the BCT are the same as for zone
reconnaissance. The BCT commander provides focus within the area and the reconnaissance tempo. The
BCT commander also provides the reconnaissance objective and the engagement/disengagement criteria for
the maneuver to the reconnaissance objective.
CAVALRY SQUADRON PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-63. The planning considerations for area reconnaissance at the squadron level are the same as for zone
reconnaissance, with some unique considerations. In area reconnaissance, the squadron’s IPB analysis
determines the speed, formations, and movement techniques used to travel to the area. Depending on the size
of the area, the commander decides the appropriate size force required to reconnoiter the objective. En route
to or inside the area, the squadron establishes control measures as in zone reconnaissance (see figure 4-2).
4-64. If another unit occupies an AA, the squadron reconnoiters avenues of approach and mobility corridors
leading to the area to support that force. That squadron can secure the area initially; until the unit’s quartering
parties arrive. The squadron continues with assigned missions or moves to screen that force as it conducts
AA operations. Upon completion of reconnaissance, the troop or squadron departs the area along a different route.
4-65. The squadron establishes control measures for area reconnaissance in the same manner as for zone
reconnaissance. The squadron designates the area to reconnoiter with a continuous closed line, usually
depicted as an NAI.
4-66. The key distinction between zone and area reconnaissance is not which echelon can conduct either
task, or the size of the area or zone to be reconnoitered. The key distinctions, instead, rely on the amount of
information known about the enemy and operational environment, as well as the amount of risk the
commander is willing to accept. Therefore, the commander might accept risk moving to the NAI or TAI to
maximize the amount of time the unit can conduct the area reconnaissance. Whereas, in zone reconnaissance, |
3-98 | 91 | Reconnaissance Operations
the unit would deploy into a maneuver formation at the LD and conduct reconnaissance throughout the zone
to mitigate the risk incurred by not understanding the enemy situation.
Figure 4-2. SBCT area reconnaissance
ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
4-67. Route reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a
specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (ADP 3-90).
A route may include a road, highway, trail, tunnel, bridge, and ferry. Routes include a designated start point
and end point. Reconnaissance of a route is essential when intelligence indicates a probability of enemy
contact or obstacle along the route, or in the area and surrounding terrain, or when information concerning
the surrounding, influential terrain is vague or unknown. The commander assigns route reconnaissance either
as a discrete operation or as an implied task during zone reconnaissance. Units collect information about
roads, bridges, tunnels, fords, waterways, and other natural and artificial terrain features that can affect
mobility. Route reconnaissance provides commanders with more detailed information about the route and
terrain that can influence the unit. Commanders use this information to prevent surprise, determine
trafficability for follow-on forces, and confirm or deny staff estimates and assumptions made during the
operations process. Route reconnaissance is not to be confused with route classification, which can be
included in route reconnaissance. Typically, engineer reconnaissance platoons perform a route classification,
which requires technical measurements and analysis. |
3-98 | 92 | Chapter 4
TASKS
4-68. Certain tasks are required during route reconnaissance, unless otherwise directed by the higher
commander. These tasks are not a checklist or arranged sequentially, as some may not be necessary for
mission accomplishment. If time is limited, the commander directs reconnaissance for SIRs. The tasks
conducted within capability and associated with route reconnaissance are—
* Find, report, and clear all enemy forces that can influence movement along the route in accordance
with engagement criteria.
* Reconnoiter and determine the trafficability of the route.
* Reconnoiter all terrain the enemy can use to influence movement along the route, such as choke
points, ambush sites, and pickup, landing, and drop zones.
* Reconnoiter all built-up areas along the route.
* Reconnoiter all lateral routes.
* Locate bypasses around built-up and contaminated areas.
* Inspect and classify all bridges within the area.
* Reconnoiter defiles along the route. Clear them of enemy and obstacles, or locate a bypass.
* Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges on the route.
* Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts.
* Locate and clear all mines and barriers on the route, and locate bypasses around any obstacles that
cannot be cleared.
* Submit route report.
BCT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-69. The BCT commander assigns a route reconnaissance mission when plans call for using a specific route
for friendly movement. The planning considerations for route reconnaissance at brigade level are the same
as for zone reconnaissance, with additional considerations. BCT commanders assign the Cavalry squadron a
single route along the length or width of the area of operations or along multiple, geographically separate
routes, albeit commanders seldom assign single routes to squadrons. The squadron can establish its own
routes with different functions. Commanders can add those functions as objectives to specify different types
of routes. Examples of such routes are portrayed in figure 4-3 and figure 5-4 (page 5-19). The BCT
commander provides focus, reconnaissance tempo, and engagement and disengagement criteria as they relate
to the main body considerations for reconnaissance or battle handover.
CAVALRY SQUADRON PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-70. The planning considerations for route reconnaissance at the squadron level are the same as for zone
reconnaissance, with some unique considerations. When a squadron conducts route reconnaissance of a
single route, one troop acts as the main reconnaissance unit with the other troops operating abreast on the
flanks to reconnoiter terrain features that dominate or influence the main route. When deciding how much
terrain on each flank of the route to reconnoiter, the commander determines possible danger areas and the
nature of the potential threat. The squadron then determines the task organization and command relationships
of any combined arms attachments, based on the IPB and mission analysis.
4-71. When the squadron conducts route reconnaissance of multiple routes whereon enemy contact is
probable, a troop conducts reconnaissance of one route while the other troops secure their flanks. If contact
is unlikely, the troop may reconnoiter with assigned scout platoons through multiple routes, which must be
close enough together for the troop commander to control the operation. Integrated air and ground
reconnaissance provides for faster and more complete reconnaissance. The squadron establishes control
measures for route reconnaissance by creating an area of operations for the unit conducting reconnaissance.
The commander places lateral boundaries on both sides of the route far enough out to allow reconnaissance
of all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along the route. An LD is placed
perpendicularly to the route, and at a starting point at the beginning of the route. Figure 4-3 illustrates a start
point. The LD creates the rear boundary of the area of operations. The commander then places an LOA far
enough beyond the route’s release point to include terrain from which the enemy could influence the route. |
3-98 | 93 | Reconnaissance Operations
The start and release points define that section of the route where the unit collects detailed information. The
commander places PLs and checkpoints to maintain coordinated reconnaissance, control movement and
maneuver, or designate critical points. The commander places additional control measures to coordinate
indirect and direct fire, as necessary (see figure 4-3).
Figure 4-3. SBCT route reconnaissance mission
PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS
4-72. The commander integrates ground, air, and other technical assets to allow for either faster or more
detailed route reconnaissance. The commander orders aerial reconnaissance if the squadron must complete
the reconnaissance mission quickly. When time is limited, aerial reconnaissance is essential in determining
areas clear of enemy forces and obstacles and in cueing ground reconnaissance about where to focus efforts.
4-73. The commander establishes priorities of fire and indirect fire control measures if enemy contact is
possible or expected. The squadron considers built-up areas, protected sites, and civilians in both the planning
and execution of indirect fires.
4-74. If the commander requires detailed information on a route, ERTs can conduct deliberate
reconnaissance of critical points along the route more quickly and accurately than route reconnaissance
conducted by a Cavalry unit. If the commander anticipates significant obstacles or is required to determine a
hasty classification of bridges, fords, ferry sites, and tunnels, engineers are normally task organized to
the squadron. |
3-98 | 94 | Chapter 4
4-75. If CBRN contamination is expected, CBRN reconnaissance assets should accompany the force
conducting ground reconnaissance. They can detect, identify, and locate CBRN hazards more accurately and
quickly than organic Cavalry units.
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE
4-76. Reconnaissance in force is a type of reconnaissance operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s
strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information (ADP 3-90). Usually, reconnaissance in
force is a limited objective operation conducted by a battalion-sized TF, Cavalry squadron, or larger force.
The commander assigns reconnaissance in force when the enemy is operating within a specific area and the
commander cannot obtain adequate intelligence by other means. Reconnaissance in force is an aggressive
reconnaissance, which develops information and intelligence in contact with the enemy to determine and
exploit enemy weaknesses. The commander plans for both the retrograde and reinforcement of the friendly
force (in case it should encounter superior enemy forces) and for the exploitation of its success.
4-77. During reconnaissance in force, the subordinate elements of the Cavalry unit conduct offensive tasks
and zone, area, and route reconnaissance operations. The Cavalry squadron often conducts reconnaissance in
force in advance of a BCT movement to contact in order to allow the main body freedom of maneuver and
mass combat power.
4-78. BCT commanders order squadrons to conduct reconnaissance in force as a stand-alone operation or as
the lead in conjunction with a brigade attack. Based upon enemy composition and other METT-TC (I)
variables, the Cavalry squadron may require augmentation with maneuver and fires elements to conduct
reconnaissance in force as a stand-alone operation. Cavalry forces need to retain freedom of maneuver while
conducting tasks during reconnaissance in force operations.
TASKS
4-79. Tasks for reconnaissance in force include the following:
* Penetrate the enemy’s security area, and determine its size and depth.
* Determine the location and disposition of enemy forces.
* Attack enemy positions, and attempt to force the enemy to react by using local reserves or major
counterattack forces, employing fires and specific weapons systems, and adjusting positions.
* Determine weaknesses in the enemy’s disposition to exploit.
* Locate obstacles, and create lanes as specified.
* Enter areas of operations in complex terrain not previously occupied by friendly forces, such as
urban environments.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-80. The planning considerations for reconnaissance in force are the same as for zone reconnaissance. The
control measures of reconnaissance in force are the same as for offensive tasks. (Refer to ADP 3-90 for
more information.)
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
4-81. Special reconnaissance is characterized as reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a
special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or
verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally
found in conventional forces (JP 3-05). Special reconnaissance tasks support the collection of the joint TF
commander’s PIRs. A special operations liaison may provide a responsive reporting capability in situations
wherein the special operations TF commander has been requested to collect intelligence information that
supports the intelligence requirements of a conventional force commander.
4-82. An SOF element conducting special reconnaissance supports the joint TF commander’s overall
information collection efforts. The SOF element does not suspend or alter their collection efforts to support
another collection plan unless the joint TF commander directs them to do so. SOF are equipped and possess |
3-98 | 95 | Reconnaissance Operations
capabilities to conduct reconnaissance on denied and hostile areas normally inaccessible to other forces or
assets. Special reconnaissance activities include—
* Environmental reconnaissance.
* Armed reconnaissance.
* Target and threat assessment.
* Post-strike reconnaissance.
4-83. Commanders establish mutual liaison capacity within both the brigade and SOF to understand
collection task prioritization and to understand associated reporting requirements and mechanisms. Special
reconnaissance may occur prior to conventional forces entering a designated area of operations. Commanders
and staffs must understand when, where, and why special reconnaissance operations are being conducted to
establish unity of purpose and provide any necessary additional forces. Detailed coordination is imperative
between SOF and conventional elements in order to support the operational element appropriately. (Refer to
ATP 3-18.4 for more information on special reconnaissance.)
4-84. Electromagnetic reconnaissance (ER) is the detection, location, identification, and evaluation of
foreign electromagnetic radiations (energy) (JP 3-85). Electromagnetic reconnaissance is an action used to
support information collection and is an element of the tactical task reconnaissance. Information obtained
through electromagnetic reconnaissance assists the commander with situational understanding and
decision-making. (See FM 3-12 for more information on ER.)
SECTION III – RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER
4-85. A reconnaissance handover is the action that occurs between two elements to coordinate the
transfer of information and responsibility for observation of potential threat contact, or the transfer
of an assigned area from one element to another. A reconnaissance handover occurs between the BCT
and other BCTs, SOF, foreign military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, or indigenous persons. A
reconnaissance handover occurs between the BCT’s Cavalry squadron and battalion scouts, as well as
maneuver battalions. Reconnaissance handovers could occur between manned and unmanned elements, like
the ACS.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-86. Reconnaissance and security operations require the unit conducting the handover to coordinate with
higher, lower, and adjacent units. Planning for these operations requires the reconnaissance handover
coordination to start at the higher echelons and execute at the lowest element. A reconnaissance handover
ensures information requirements are transferred between units to maintain initiative and tempo and to ease
transitions. Well-planned and executed reconnaissance handovers ease transitions in plans, phases, and
priorities of effort and mitigate information gaps between units.
4-87. Planning for a reconnaissance handover takes place as part of a change of mission before or during
operations. When planning before an operation, commanders review the completed plan for layered,
redundant reconnaissance and security, using all available capabilities and units. Commanders and staff direct
control measures, such as a reconnaissance handover line between units or potential designated coordination,
points to facilitate ground linkup, along with other graphic control measures that aid in command and control.
A reconnaissance handover line is a designated phase line on the ground where reconnaissance
responsibility transitions from one element to another.
4-88. A reconnaissance handover is typically associated with a trigger, a coordination point, or PLs
designated as the reconnaissance handover line to ensure positive control and chain of custody from the initial
force to the force assuming responsibility and control. A reconnaissance handover prevents gaps or seams
from emerging that the enemy can exploit. Once handover is complete, the force transferring control either
passes to the rear through the main body, assuming responsibility for the reconnaissance objective as a
rearward passage of lines, or continues farther into the zone to continue their reconnaissance mission. |
3-98 | 96 | Chapter 4
EXECUTION AND TASKS
4-89. A reconnaissance handover involves transferring physical, visual, electromagnetic, or digital
observation in a number of combinations. Reconnaissance assets, such as ground sensors and UASs, may
transfer responsibility during the reconnaissance handover. A reconnaissance handover is similar to a battle
handover in that its conduct is in conjunction with other tasks, such as relief in place, linkup, and passage of
lines (see figures 4-4, 4-5 [page 4-22], and 4-6 [page 4-23]).
4-90. Leaders and planners at all levels coordinate and execute reconnaissance handover tasks while
considering the following:
* Redundant surveillance to assist in maintaining enemy contact.
* Location and criteria for a reconnaissance handover.
* Communications plan between handover elements.
* Exchanging operations and fires plans.
* Exchanging intelligence and information collection assets.
* Identifying and coordinating for target handover, as necessary.
* Contact points or linkup points.
* Collocating command posts.
* Transfer and acceptance of command between units.
* Rehearsals.
* Recognition signals. |
3-98 | 97 | Reconnaissance Operations
Figure 4-4. Reconnaissance handover |
3-98 | 98 | Chapter 4
Figure 4-5. Reconnaissance handover between squadron and combat aviation brigade |
3-98 | 99 | Reconnaissance Operations
Figure 4-6. Reconnaissance handover, follow-on battalion continues mission
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER
4-91. Based on their forward proximity in the area of operations, reconnaissance forces may often be the
first friendly units to encounter SOF units. (Refer to chapter 6 for more details.) Conventional reconnaissance
forces may operate in conjunction with SOF. Depending on the command relationship, a reconnaissance
handover may be required to conduct a relief in place with SOF, conduct joint operations with SOF, or in
passing through SOF areas. Units use the same planning steps listed above when conducting an SOF
reconnaissance handover. |
3-98 | 101 | Chapter 5
Security Operations
Security operations are operations to provide early and accurate warning of enemy
operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within
which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to
effectively use their force. Security is inherent in all operations and is always the first
priority of work. Commanders use continual reconnaissance and the development of
information requirements to provide security. Commanders follow the five
fundamentals of security during security operations to ensure early and accurate
warning of enemy forces. Security operations provide reaction time and maneuver
space to develop the situation and determine the most effective use of force to
neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemy forces. There are four types of security operations:
screen, guard, cover, and area security. Each security type provides varying levels of
protection to the main body. The commander weighs operational and mission variables
with the end state to select the appropriate security type.
SECTION I – SECURITY BASICS
5-1. Security is an essential part to all BCT operations. Maneuver units perform security missions as part
of a larger security force or operate independently with task-organized attachments. The main difference
between security operations and reconnaissance operations is that security operations orient on the protected
force, area, or facility to be protected, while reconnaissance is enemy, infrastructure, terrain and weather
effects, and society oriented. However, security operations cannot be divorced from reconnaissance missions
as one of the fundamentals of security is to perform continuous reconnaissance.
5-2. Security operations prevent enemy reconnaissance assets from determining friendly locations,
strengths, and weaknesses. Every tactical echelon requires a specially trained organization that can execute
security missions to preserve freedom of action for the main body.
SECURITY
5-3. Security operations provide information about the enemy and terrain while preserving the combat
power of friendly forces. Security operations provide information about the size, composition, location, and
the enemy forces’ direction of movement. Information collected by the squadron gives the main body
commander time to react and maneuver to prepare for future operations or to deploy to engage the enemy.
Security prevents the enemy from surprising the main body, which allows the commander to preserve the
combat power of maneuver forces and mass effects and combat power at the decisive point in time. (Refer
to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)
5-4. Security along a common boundary with another friendly unit is the responsibility of the unit assigned
to that zone or sector. Liaison with the protected force is critical during security operations. Constant
communication and liaison ensures both the security force and the protected force remain informed of the
full situation and maintains synchronized operations. |
3-98 | 102 | Chapter 5
SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS
5-5. The fundamentals of security, similar to the fundamentals of reconnaissance, provide a framework for
security operations. Reconnaissance operations, because they are continuous throughout all operations to
develop the situation through information collection, are essential to successful security operations. The
fundamentals of security are applicable to each type of security. The method in which each type of security
achieves the fundamentals is different. This is important to understand when determining which type of
security operation the security force should conduct. The following fundamentals guide security operations.
5-6. Provide early and accurate warning. The security force provides early warning by detecting the enemy
force quickly and reporting information accurately to the main body commander. The security force operates
at varying distances from the main body based on the mission variables of METT-TC (I). The earlier the
security force detects the enemy and answers PIRs, the more time the main body has to assess the changing
situation and react. Therefore, the security force should operate as far away from the protected force as the
mission variables allow without opening seems or gaps that the enemy could exploit.
5-7. Provide reaction time and maneuver space. The security force operates at a distance from the main
body and offers resistance to enemy forces to provide the main body with enough reaction time and maneuver
space to respond effectively to likely enemy actions. The commander determines the amount of time and
space required to respond effectively from information provided by the IPB process and the main body
commander’s guidance regarding time the main body requires to react to enemy courses of action based on
the mission variables of METT-TC (I). This includes providing time to the protected force to allow them to
execute decision point to maximize firepower at their decisive point. The security force that operates farthest
away from the main body and offers more resistance provides more time and space to the main body. The
security force attempts to hinder the enemy’s advance by acting within its capabilities and mission constraints.
5-8. Orient on the protected force, area, or facility to be secured. The security force focuses all its actions
on protecting and providing early warning to the secured force or facility. The security force operates between
the main body and known or suspected enemy units. The security force must move as the main body moves
and orient on its movement. The security force commander must know the main body’s scheme of maneuver
to keep the security force between the main body and the enemy. The value of terrain occupied by the security
force hinges on the protection it proves to the main body commander. This fundamental serves as a
counterbalance to the expectations that are implicit in “provide early and accurate warning.”
5-9. Perform continuous reconnaissance. Implicit in this fundamental is that the squadrons need to prioritize
answering brigade PIRs to facilitate decisions to allow the commander to achieve a position of relative
advantage. Therefore, the security force aggressively and continuously seeks the enemy and reconnoiters key
terrain. Terrain information focuses on the security force’s possible use by the enemy or the friendly force,
either for offensive or defensive operations.
5-10. Maintain enemy contact. Once the security force makes enemy contact, it does not break contact unless
the main force commander specifically directs them to do so. By using depth, recon management, and
utilizing different methods of reconnaissance, the security force is able to maintain contact with one asset
while allowing others to displace. The security force must continuously collect information on the enemy’s
activities to assist the main body in determining potential and actual enemy courses of action and to prevent
the enemy from surprising the main body. This requires the security force to maintain continuous visual
contact, to be able to use direct and indirect fires, and to maneuver freely, which requires the security force
to have depth in space and time. In specific circumstances, electronic contact could be sufficient to “maintain
enemy contact.” However, if the enemy is in obstacle contact, and there are no assets able to observe that
contact, then this fundamental has not been achieved.
5-11. The following vignette highlights a Cavalry squadron’s use of security fundamentals to protect a BCT’s
flank during combat operations. |
3-98 | 103 | Security Operations
3-7 CAV Security Mission at Objective Lions 2003
U.S. military action in Iraq during March and April 2003 focused upon reaching the nation’s
capital in Baghdad and eliminating the resistance of Saddam Hussein’s combat forces. By early
April, the 3rd Infantry Division had reached the city’s outskirts from the south. Its subordinate
BCT began to seize key objectives on the outskirts of the urban area. Baghdad International
Airport, designated as OBJECTIVE LIONS, constituted one of these objectives. Its seizure would
ensure a steady flow of supplies, easing a difficult, logistical effort to support the division.
On 3 April, the 1st BCT commenced operations to seize the airport. The divisional Cavalry
squadron, 3-7 Cavalry (known as CAV), moved to provide flank security against any threat
from the north or west, centering its position on the intersection of Highways 1 and 10.
Highways 1 and 10 were 2 of the main arteries feeding into Baghdad. The squadron established
a screen that consisted of a series of checkpoints to interdict movement.
Initially, the squadron’s positions began to attract enemy attention, but activity dropped during
the evening and nighttime hours. The early hours of 4 April, however, witnessed a steady
increase in hostile combat operations. By 0435, 3-7 CAV positions had already destroyed
several T-72 tanks and other armored vehicles. The Iraqis also sought to pass through the
screen, using a combination of buses, pickup trucks, and an array of civilian vehicles to carry
combatants through the squadron’s positions. These efforts constituted part of a larger Iraqi
effort to prevent the capture of Baghdad International Airport. However, 3-7 CAV employed a
mix of direct fire, close air support and artillery and all Iraqi efforts to reach the airport failed.
As the attacks finally diminished, the squadron received reports from observation posts of a
battalion of Iraqi tanks 3 kilometers north of the screen. The squadron planned an attack while
aircraft and artillery hammered the suspected target. Low visibility conditions hampered efforts
to observe the effects of the bombardment. Therefore, Apache troop received instructions to
move forward and conduct a damage assessment.
The troop’s lead platoon advanced cautiously in a staggered column. The platoon leader noted
a berm and the possible location of enemy tanks. The platoon leader reported this information
just before several gunners in the platoon began to engage hostile vehicles that were positioned
behind the berm and spaced at intervals of 50 meters. The berm had protected the enemy
platforms from significant damage from the air and artillery attacks.
The Cavalry troop quickly engaged the tanks, which received support from Iraqi mortars,
artillery, and ADA. As the firefight escalated, the troop directed artillery upon the enemy
positions and withdrew. Later, the troop was found to have destroyed much of an Iraqi
Republican Guard battalion, including 16, T-72 tanks in an action lasting approximately
15 minutes. The Cavalry squadron’s flank security mission had succeeded, blocking all Iraqi
attempts to interfere with the seizure of Baghdad International Airport. |
3-98 | 104 | Chapter 5
Security Fundamentals
Provide early and accurate warning
The ability of Apache troop and the observation posts to directly observe Iraqi tanks north of
the screen provided situational awareness to 3-7 CAV and ultimately 1st BCT, 3rd Infantry Division.
Provide reaction time and maneuver space
The ability of Apache troop and the observation posts to identify a battalion of Iraqi tanks north
of the screen provided the squadron with ample time to plan an attack while aircraft and
artillery engaged the suspected targets.
Orient on the force or facility to be secured
3-7 CAV protected the flank of 1st BCT, 3rd Infantry Division, ensuring that the seizure of
Baghdad International Airport occurred without interference. The squadron did so by
operating between the BCT and the threat of Iraqi intervention from the north.
Perform continuous reconnaissance
The combination of checkpoints and the forward movement of Apache troop ensured continuous
monitoring of the surrounding area. It was through this troop’s actions that the Iraqi tank force
was located and destroyed.
Maintain enemy contact
The checkpoints provided a means of monitoring the surrounding area and maintaining contact
once the Iraqis sought to penetrate the screen. In most cases, the troop maintained contact
through a mix of observation posts and direct fire engagements employed through the
squadron’s combat power mix of tanks and Bradleys. Additionally, when aircraft identified a
tank force north of the screen, the troop maintained contact through the application of air
strikes and artillery, followed by the dispatch of Apache troop to ascertain the impact of
this bombardment.
COMMANDER’S SECURITY GUIDANCE
5-12. The BCT commander’s guidance should consist of the security focus, duration, and engagement and
disengagement criteria. In providing this guidance, the commander describes, shapes, and prioritizes the
intended vision of the security effort supporting the overall scheme of maneuver and the specific roles of the
Cavalry unit. As with the commander’s reconnaissance guidance, this guidance and the importance of
accomplishing the mission must be understood at echelon. (Refer to chapter 3 of this manual for detailed
information about the commander’s security guidance.)
SECTION II – COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
5-13. Counterreconnaissance is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander
to counter enemy reconnaissance efforts. (Refer to ADP 3-90 for more information.) The purpose of
counterreconnaissance is to destroy, defeat, or repel all enemy reconnaissance elements within capabilities
and following engagement criteria. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission, but a component of all
types of security operations. Counterreconnaissance denies the enemy commander the ability to conduct
reconnaissance and develop their situational understanding. Successfully countering enemy reconnaissance
is the first and possibly most important step to ensure the BCT can successfully execute its mission.
5-14. Counterreconnaissance is an inherent task in all security operations. Counterreconnaissance keeps
enemy reconnaissance forces from observing the main body by defeating or blocking them. Units organize
to defeat enemy reconnaissance forces without requiring reinforcement. Additionally, units consider enemy
reconnaissance capabilities to determine if additional maneuver or sustainment assets are required.
5-15. The counterreconnaissance plan should address how to acquire and defeat enemy reconnaissance
elements. The intelligence section provides key input into the planning process. The intelligence section
identifies avenues of approach into the unit’s sector, which type of enemy reconnaissance elements the unit
expects in the sector, and when they are most likely to move into the sector. The commander of the squadron
or counterreconnaissance force uses this information to formulate the counterreconnaissance plan and to task |
3-98 | 105 | Security Operations
units to execute it. Often, the counterreconnaissance plan requires a unit to conduct a screen mission to
acquire, identify, and defeat enemy reconnaissance forces.
5-16. The counterreconnaissance force must be task organized to accomplish its mission with the enemy.
Whatever option the commander employs, the counterreconnaissance fight should be firmly controlled,
monitored at the higher headquarters level, coordinated early, and thoroughly rehearsed. An effective
counterreconnaissance fight suppresses the enemy reconnaissance effort, forcing the enemy to attack without
information about the friendly force disposition.
SECTION III – SECURITY TYPES
5-17. Leaders categorize security operations in terms of the degree of security provided and the amount of
combat power required. (Refer to ADP 3-90 for more information.) The four primary types of security
operations are—
* Screen.
Stationary.
Moving (flank and rear).
* Guard.
Advance guard (stationary and moving).
Flank guard (stationary and moving).
Rear guard.
* Cover.
Offensive cover (advance and flank).
Defensive cover (front, flank, and rear).
* Area security.
Route security.
Convoy security.
5-18. The four types of security operations provide varying levels of protection to the protected force and
are dependent upon the size of the unit conducting the security operation. Screen operations provide early
warning to the main body. Guard operations prevent enemy observation and direct fire on the main body.
Cover operations protect the main body from enemy observation and effective direct fire. Area security
protects friendly installations, routes, units, and facilities within a prescribed area. All types of security
operations provide protection and early warning to the protected force, which in turn, provides reaction time
and maneuver space to the commander and preserves freedom of action. Commanders should consider the
following when assigning a security mission and employing a security force:
* Force or area to secure.
* Location and orientation of the security area.
* Initial location and types of observation posts, if applicable.
* Time allocated to establish the security operation.
* Criteria for transitioning from the security operation to BCT decisive operations.
* Task organization and augmentation of security forces.
* Level of protection and minimum warning time requirements.
* Threat considerations, such as the smallest enemy element allowed passage without engagement
or the threat’s capability to influence main body activities. |
3-98 | 106 | Chapter 5
Note. Local security is a priority of work and the responsibility of all units as a force protection measure.
Local security is the low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the
enemy (ADP 3-90). Local security involves avoiding detection or deceiving the enemy regarding
friendly actions, positions, and intentions. Local security includes finding enemy forces in the
immediate vicinity and knowing as much about their positions and intentions as possible. Units
use active and passive measures to provide local security. Active patrolling and continuous
reconnaissance are active measures that provide local security. Passive measures include using
camouflage, movement control, noise and light discipline, proper communication procedures,
ground sensors, night vision devices, and daylight sights.
5-19. Security operations are extremely important when engaged in large-scale combat operations. The
historic Arracourt vignette below demonstrates how incorporating security and applying security fundamentals
in battle can lead to victory.
Applying Security Fundamentals at Arracourt
In September 1944, the 4th Armored Division constituted part of an operation intended to cross
the Moselle River and isolate the city of Nancy. This operation concluded with elements of the
4th Armored Division playing a significant role in disrupting German rear area elements and
reinforcements to Nancy. The division then transitioned into an exploitation mission, heading
further east into Lorraine and creating more havoc for German efforts to mount a coherent defense.
The threat posed by the American armored division led the Germans to counterattack with
elements drawn from the Fifth Panzer Army on 18 September. Part of their objective lay in
destroying the scattered U.S. armored forces in and around the town of Arracourt. The German
action triggered a series of fast moving and freewheeling engagements. These encounters
placed the 4th Armored Division at a disadvantage. The Germans employed superior tanks,
practiced infiltration tactics, and benefited from ground fog that protected them from allied
aircraft. However, despite these advantages, the Germans suffered a significant defeat at
Arracourt. They were generally out maneuvered and outfought by aggressive American, small
unit tactics.
American armored teams employed basic security measures to offset the initial surprise of the
German attack. C Company, 37th Tank Battalion, for example, employed outposts to provide
early warning of enemy activity. One of these outposts reported the noise of an enemy column
shortly before midnight on the 18th. The outpost dispatched a patrol to investigate. When it
identified tank tracks, a second patrol followed the tracks and pinpointed the German tanks in
a bivouac position. The patrol directed artillery fire onto the enemy tanks and adjusted onto a
nearby crossroads through which the tanks had to move as they retired.
The following morning another C Company outpost reported contact with German forces. This
outpost included a tank section and a smaller outpost further forward. The latter remained in
contact with the tank section via a landline. The smaller outpost provided the tank section with
early warning of approaching vehicles. Armed with this information, the American tank section
quickly destroyed two of the German tanks as soon as they came into view.
In this instance, C Company demonstrated the fundamentals of security. Outposts provided
early and accurate warning of approaching enemy armor. The outposts provided reaction time
and maneuver space that permitted the tank section to maneuver and destroy two enemy tanks.
Positioned between the enemy and the main body of C Company, the outposts were oriented on
the force to be secured. In each case, the outposts were able to perform continuous
reconnaissance by reporting and tracking hostile movements. In the first example, the outpost
maintained enemy contact using foot patrols that were able to track the enemy armor column
and direct indirect fire upon it. |
3-98 | 107 | Security Operations
5-20. Cavalry squadrons organize and equip to perform screen, guard, and area security operations. Cavalry
squadrons participate in a cover operation as part of a larger element with external assets task organized to
the squadron and perform guard operations with combined arms augmentation. Usually, commanders assign
security operations (screen, guard, cover) at EAB to BCTs. Table 5-1 shows typical sizes of security forces
at various echelons in relation to their operation.
Table 5-1. Typical echelon of security forces for a given operation at echelon
Security Mission
Echelon Screen Advance Guard Flank or Rear Cover
Guard
Battalion task force Scout platoon
Brigade combat team Company team Battalion task force Reinforced combined
arms battalion or
battalion task force
Division Cavalry squadron, Reinforced Cavalry Reinforce Cavalry Reinforced brigade
combined arms squadron or brigade squadron, combined combat team
battalion, or battalion combat team arms battalion, or
task force battalion task force
Corps Combat aviation Division, armored Division, armored Reinforced division or
brigade (CAB), brigade combat brigade combat armored brigade
combined arms team, Stryker brigade team, Stryker brigade combat team
battalion, battalion combat team combat team,
task force combined arms
battalion, battalion
task force
Echelons above CAB, armored Reinforced division or CAB, armored Reinforced division or
corps (joint force land brigade combat corps brigade combat corps
components or team, Stryker brigade team, or Stryker
numbered Army) combat team brigade combat team
SCREEN
5-21. Screen is a type of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force
(ADP 3-90). Screen operations provide less protection than guards or covers. Screen operations are defensive
in nature. The screen force uses a series of observation posts and patrols to ensure observation of the assigned
sector. The screen force gains and maintains enemy contact consistent with the security fundamentals. The
screen force conducts counterreconnaissance to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance units. The depth of
the screen is critical to allow a reconnaissance handover from one element to another without displacement
from established observation posts. Friendly forces use depth to conduct counterreconnaissance to delay,
impede, and harass the enemy with indirect fires causing them to deploy early while preventing enemy forces
from identifying, penetrating, and exploiting the screen.
5-22. Screen missions are appropriate when operations have created extended flanks; gaps exist between
major subordinate maneuver units, or when required to provide early warning over gaps not considered
critical enough to require security in greater strength. The BCT commander maximizes the security effort
where contact is expected.
5-23. A unit may conduct a screen in all directions for a stationary, protected force within supporting range
of indirect fire assets. Units perform a screen to the flanks or rear, but not in front of a moving force. Zone
reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force, and guard are missions given to units in front of a moving force.
BCT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-24. When planning the screen, the Cavalry squadron commander or maneuver battalion commander
considers the number of routes required, the number of observation posts or patrols needed (depth, width, |
3-98 | 108 | Chapter 5
duration, and orientation of the screen), the time needed to occupy the observation posts and to establish the
screen, and the ability of indirect fire assets to range NAIs and TAIs to provide security to the protected force.
Both BCT and squadron commanders and staffs consider conditions to facilitate reconnaissance handover or
battle handover with the BCT. The commanders consider the time required to conduct the handover along
with the time and distance needed for subordinate elements to maneuver to subsequent positions.
5-25. A rearward passage of lines is similar in concept to a forward passage of lines. A rearward passage of
lines continues the defense or retrograde operation and maintains enemy contact while allowing for recovery
of security or other forward forces. A unit may or may not conduct rearward passage of lines under enemy
pressure. Usually, the stationary unit assumes control of the area of operations forward of the battle handover
line (BHL) after two-thirds of the passing force’s combat elements move through the passage points. A battle
handover line is a designated phase line where responsibility transitions from the stationary force to the
moving force and vice versa (ADP 3-90). Cavalry squadrons and security forces conduct extensive
coordination enabling rearward passage of lines, especially while under fire. Passage of lines may occur
during any reconnaissance or security operation. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)
5-26. Attack and reconnaissance aviation units screen forward, to the flanks, or to the rear of a stationary
main body and to the flanks or to the rear of a moving main body. The ACS is able to provide the maximum
amount of reaction time and maneuver space when conducting screens, across either a wide frontage or
operating in-depth with manned-unmanned teams at the ACT or squadron level. Aviation units conduct zone
reconnaissance forward of a moving body. Aviation units conduct continuous reconnaissance to gain contact
with the enemy force unless the supported commander directs otherwise.
5-27. Based on the BCT commander’s security guidance and intent, a screening aviation unit impedes and
harasses the enemy with organic and supporting fires. Within its capabilities, the unit destroys or repels
enemy reconnaissance elements without decisively engaging. Upon enemy contact, the aviation unit reports
the enemy location, maintains contact with the enemy force, and uses its maneuverability and fires to develop
the situation. The BCT provides priority of fires to the aviation unit so it does not have to rely on its own
direct fire weapons and risk becoming decisively engaged. Aviation units do not bypass enemy forces without
the permission or direction of the main body commander.
5-28. Attack and reconnaissance aviation units maneuver to the enemy’s flanks and rear to locate and exploit
enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses and to conduct offensive engagements, such as hasty attack operations.
However, commanders must weigh the benefit of aviation units conducting an offensive operation against
the benefit of retaining aviation units in a reconnaissance and security role.
GENERAL DESCRIPTIONS OF A SCREEN
5-29. Screens, even for a stationary protected force, are active operations of which stationary, observation
posts and surveillance assets are only a part of the overall mission. A screen requires employment of mounted
and dismounted patrols, aerial reconnaissance, and observation posts positioned over extended distances
in-depth. Inactivity in a stationary screen yields identifiable and exploitable gaps for the threat.
5-30. The BCT commander provides purpose and guidance to the Cavalry squadron commander. The BCT
commander states why the screen is important to the BCT mission and how it fits into the scheme of maneuver
of the BCT mission.
5-31. Depth provides the BCT commander with more time to react to approaching enemy ground units and
allows for a reconnaissance handover from one element to another with minimal displacement. Depth
prevents the threat from easily identifying and penetrating the screen, prevents gaps from occurring when
observation posts displace, and facilitates the destruction of enemy reconnaissance elements without
compromising critical observation posts. A unit employs depth by positioning observation posts and other
information collection assets between the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and the rear boundary of the
security force.
5-32. The wider the area to secure, the less the security force can take advantage of increased depth, because
it has fewer forces to position in-depth. Once the BCT determines the width and depth of the security area,
the initial screen, and probable avenues of approach, the security force orients on the protected force, area,
or facility. |
3-98 | 109 | Security Operations
5-33. Maneuver of the screen elements to subsequent positions is event-driven. The approach of an identified
and specified threat element that answers PIRs, relief by a friendly unit, or movement of the protected force
may dictate displacement. Collapsing the screen, executed by well-rehearsed drills performed at all levels,
provides security, and maintains contact for the unit as it displaces. The BCT commander can place a time
requirement on the duration of the screen if the intent is to provide a higher level of security to the BCT or to
provide a tentative period for subordinate unit planning and follow-on missions.
SCREEN TASKS
5-34. Execution considerations guide screen planning. Execution considerations for a screen include the
following and are conducted within capability:
* Maintain continuous observation of all avenues of approach that affect the main body’s mission.
* Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy, defeat, or disrupt all enemy reconnaissance elements
according to engagement criteria. Allow no enemy ground element to pass through the screen
undetected and unreported.
* Locate and identify the lead elements that indicate the enemy’s main attack, as prescribed in the
enemy’s order of battle based upon the IPB (when facing an echeloned enemy force).
* While displacing, determine the direction of enemy movement, maintain contact, and report
threat activities.
* Maintain contact with the protected force and other forces operating on its flank.
* Detect and report all enemy elements attempting to pass through the screen, both ground and
aerial, and provide the protected force commander early warning of enemy activities.
* Maintain contact with enemy forces, and report activity in the assigned area.
5-35. To enhance the effectiveness and depth of the screen, the squadron’s subordinate elements conduct
reconnaissance handover or battle handover to pass contact from one element to another. In this way, the
methods of reconnaissance management (cueing, mixing, and redundancy) and task organization maintain
threat contact and protect the main effort following the commander’s intent.
STATIONARY SCREEN
5-36. A squadron executing a stationary screen mission (see figure 5-1, page 5-10) requires the following guidance:
* General trace of screen and time it should be established.
* Commander’s security guidance.
* Information collection plan.
* Width of the screened sector.
* Identity of screened force.
* Rear boundary of the screening force.
* Possible follow-on missions.
5-37. The tasks required of a screening unit are minimal compared to other security missions. Therefore, the
screening force may have a wide frontage. Usually, units deploy abreast with troops established in-depth.
5-38. A PL placed along identifiable terrain graphically indicates the FLOT and can serve as an LOA. When
screening forward of the BCT, this PL represents the forward line of the screening unit troops. A boundary
depicts the rear limit of the screen. The screening force is responsible for the area between the screened force
and the rear screen boundary. The boundary may serve as a BHL or a reconnaissance handover line. The
screening force uses other PLs to control forward and backward displacements of subordinate units of the
screening force and to aid in reporting and orientation. The screening force designates sectors to control lateral
movement of subordinate units. |
3-98 | 110 | Chapter 5
Figure 5-1. SBCT stationary screen mission
5-39. Given the higher commander’s guidance (security objective, focus, duration, and engagement criteria),
commanders and staffs consider the following during planning:
* Location of the initial screen.
* Movement or maneuver to occupy the screen.
* Assigned area of operations for subordinate elements.
* Air and ground integration.
* Surveillance and acquisition assets.
* Fires.
* Protection.
* Command and control.
* Sustainment.
* Control of displacement to subsequent positions.
* Reconnaissance handover between screening elements. |
3-98 | 111 | Security Operations
INITIAL SCREEN
5-40. The BCT establishes the general location of the initial screen. To prevent fratricide, the squadron or
screening unit adjusts closer to the protected force only with coordination. The initial screen often represents
the FLOT. The initial screen is a restrictive control measure requiring coordination when units move beyond
it to conduct aerial surveillance or ground reconnaissance. If operations forward of the screen are required,
the commander establishes a PL to designate the security unit LOA. Key considerations include determining
fields of fire and observation, requirements to observe specific NAIs or TAIs, and the range of supporting
indirect fire assets.
5-41. With permission from the BCT, the squadron or screening unit can adjust the initial screen to meet
these considerations. Time available and the threat situation determine the method of occupying the screen.
AREAS OF OPERATION FOR SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS
5-42. The squadron or screening unit commander designates areas of operations for subordinate elements to
include responsibility for NAIs and TAIs. The commander positions attack and reconnaissance aviation, UAS
or ground-based sensors, and SIGINT systems to provide additional depth. Reduced depth is the trade-off
when screening extended frontages. The commander may assign specific terrain to attack and reconnaissance
aviation units and UASs, which should not be along critical high-speed avenues of approach. The
commander’s plans include reconnaissance management (cueing, mixing, and redundancy) to maximize
coverage and effectiveness. Commanders specify how to adjust ground observation posts or positions to
compensate for the absence of visual observation with aerial assets, such as in adverse weather.
5-43. Attack and reconnaissance aviation and UASs, or attached, manned aviation assets may conduct
reconnaissance forward, to the rear, or on the flanks of ground elements to add depth and extend the
capabilities of the ground screen. Aerial assets patrol along exposed flanks or in gaps between ground
observation posts, augment the surveillance of NAIs, and add redundancy and depth within the sector. Aerial
reconnaissance units extend a ground screen or provide an independent screen to protect ground forces.
Aviation assets provide continuous observation of threat elements allowing ground forces to displace to
subsequent positions.
5-44. Using its own or the BCT’s organic surveillance and acquisition assets, such as UASs and ground
sensors, the screening unit develops a plan to provide early warning on the probable avenues of approach.
Nonorganic, higher assets, such as Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems, provide earlier
acquisition information to cue unit assets.
Note. Most probable avenues of approach are not necessarily the high-speed avenues of approach.
The factors of METT-TC (I) influence the most probable avenues of approach.
5-45. BCT assets aid the squadron or screening unit when it is collapsing the screen and is most vulnerable,
and they assist with regaining contact with the threat when contact is lost. If the squadron screens extended
frontages, these assets can operate in an economy of force role by conducting periodic surveillance on less
probable areas the threat may use and by maximizing ground combat power along probable avenues of approach.
5-46. Fires planning include the integration of direct and indirect fires, attack aviation, and close air support.
The commander’s intent drives the screen’s purpose, which is to report, disrupt, delay, or destroy specific
elements of the threat’s formations. The staff plans targets at chokepoints along probable avenues of approach
in areas where the threat movement may be restricted or severely restricted, such as those areas with natural
or manufactured obstacles. Commanders designate engagement areas to focus fires along likely threat
avenues of approach where the fires have the greatest likelihood of achieving the desired effects. The higher
headquarters must clearly identify the command and support relationship of supporting artillery available to
the screening force. Annex D of the OPORD articulates the fire support tasks and communication means
(including voice and digital), additional fire support coordination measures, and planned position areas for artillery.
5-47. Engineers provide mobility, countermobility, and survivability capabilities for specific tasks, such as
improvement of roads and trails for mobility, emplacement of obstacles, and observation post survivability.
Reserve obstacles are planned and prepared but are not executed until time or event criteria are met. |
3-98 | 112 | Chapter 5
Generally, engineers use rapidly emplaced obstacle systems, which meet the commander’s intent during
screening operations. Situational obstacles disrupt and delay the threat, in conjunction with fires, to protect
elements of the screening unit and main body.
COMMAND AND CONTROL AND SUSTAINMENT
5-48. Commanders position themselves and their command posts to support command and control forces
over extended distances and to maintain communications and digital linkages with higher headquarters and
subordinate elements. Initial and subsequent locations of the command posts integrate into the BCT
communications plan to ensure continuous digital connectivity. BCT and squadron commanders place
themselves in positions that maximize their ability to command their units and gain situational awareness.
5-49. Prepare sustainment assets for operations in both time and space. Units screening forward or to the
flanks of the BCT may require support from the closest battalion. Priorities and sources of support are
determined early in the planning process to allow the supporting sustainment unit time to conduct planning,
coordinate with adjacent units, and position assets to provide sustainment to the screening units.
5-50. The screen’s scheme of maneuver, engagement, and disengagement criteria nested within the BCT
plan defines the conditions or time criteria triggering transition. PLs and checkpoints control transition.
Transition of a screening unit is a decision point that marks a shift from security operations to offensive or
defensive operations.
Note. As stated earlier in chapter 4, the BCT or squadron commander may establish additional
routes as a control measure to conduct transitions while maintaining freedom of maneuver and
controlling maneuver forces without slowing or congestion of one single route (see
paragraph 4-70, page 4-16).
MOVING SCREEN (FLANK AND REAR)
5-51. A squadron or screening unit executes a moving screen by implementing movement techniques. The
screen movement relies upon time and distance factors associated with the BCT’s movement.
Responsibilities for a moving flank screen begin at the front of the BCT’s lead combat element, and ends at
the rear of the protected force excluding front and rear security forces. The screening unit, typically the
Cavalry squadron, may conduct moving flank screens or screen the rear of the BCT.
5-52. As with a stationary screen, PLs, checkpoints, contact points, and lateral boundaries aid to orient and
control the screening unit’s movement. The LD, which is the same for the protected force, initiates the screen
mission and becomes the rear boundary of the moving screen.
5-53. The planning considerations discussed earlier for stationary screens apply to a moving screen.
However, emphasis may shift because the BCT is moving. As the BCT force moves, the screening unit
occupies a series of successive screens, regulating movement to maintain the time and distance factors the
main body commander desires. As with the stationary screen, integrating attack and reconnaissance aviation
units and UASs into the screen affords increased flexibility, fires platforms, and sensors to the mission.
Note. Cavalry units do not conduct a moving screen to the front of a stationary force or a stationary
screen in front of a moving force. They could conduct an advance guard, reconnaissance in force,
or zone reconnaissance to the front of a moving force.
GUARD
5-54. Guard is a type of security operation done to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while
preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADP 3-90). Units conducting
a guard cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and functional and multifunctional support
assets of the main body. A commander assigns a guard operation when the BCT expects contact or has an
exposed flank that requires greater protection than a screen can provide. The guard force conducts
reconnaissance, attacks, defends, delays, and screens as needed to provide reaction time and maneuver space |
3-98 | 113 | Security Operations
to the protected force. A commander may assign a guard operation to protect a stationary or moving force. There are
three types of guard operations—
* Advance guard.
* Flank guard.
* Rear guard.
5-55. A Cavalry squadron, maneuver battalion, or BCT performs guard operations. A guard force operates
within the range of the main body’s indirect fire weapons. A guard force accomplishes all the tasks of a
screen, but then deploys over a narrower front to permit the concentration of combat power. Squadron-sized
elements or higher generally conduct guard operations due to the protection and assets required. A BCT
conducts guard for the division and corps.
5-56. Staffs consider augmenting the guard force based on the anticipated threat and tasks for the guard force.
Dependent on the BCT type, the guard force has different combat power capabilities than the parent force it
protects. Additionally, BCT commanders consider and plan for the integration of assets and enablers across
all warfighting functions.
5-57. The guard force differs from a screen in that the guard force contains sufficient combat power to defeat,
cause to withdraw, or fix lead threat elements before they can engage the protected force and forces the
enemy main body to deploy early. A guard force is appropriate when contact is expected, there is an exposed
flank or a threat to the rear, the protected force is conducting a retrograde operation, or there is a requirement
for greater protection than a screen provides.
5-58. Attack and reconnaissance aviation units supporting a guard operation accomplish all the tasks of a
screen, zone reconnaissance, and hasty attack mission. Units place emphasis on the early development of the
situation along the main body’s axis of advance. Early contact with the enemy may cause enemy forces to
deploy prematurely providing opportunity to the main body to counterattack a vulnerable enemy force. Aerial
assets support the guard force by screening between and in front of battle positions as they are established.
Aviation reconnoiters the area between the guard or cover force and the main body, assists in maintaining
contact between the security force and the main body, and protects the flank guard force to allow it to
concentrate on its security or battle position tasks. When supporting a moving force, aviation units
reconnoiter along the flanks of advancing ground units by conducting any type of reconnaissance to
successive screen areas, observation posts, or battle positions.
GUARD TASKS
5-59. BCTs, maneuver battalions, and squadrons conduct the following guard tasks within capability:
* Detect and report all enemy elements attempting to pass through the guard, both ground and aerial
and provide the protected force commander early warning of enemy activities.
* Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy or defeat all enemy reconnaissance elements according
to engagement criteria.
* Maintain contact with the protected force and other forces operating on its flanks.
* Maintain observation of avenues of approach that affect the protected forces missions.
* Locate and identify the lead elements that indicate the enemy’s main attack, as prescribed in the
enemy’s order of battle based upon the IPB (when facing an echeloned enemy force).
* While displacing, determine the direction of enemy movement, maintain contact, and report
threat activities.
* While displacing, impede and harass the enemy to provide the protected force commander with
additional time and maneuver space.
* Cause the enemy main body to deploy prematurely.
* Maintain contact with enemy forces and report activity in the assigned area.
* Deny ground observation, and prevent direct fire contact on the protected forces.
* Deny the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and objective of the main body. |
3-98 | 114 | Chapter 5
5-60. Following are additional tasks if encounter turns into a meeting engagement:
* Destroy enemy reconnaissance and lead elements of the main body.
* Determine the location of enemy assailable flanks.
* Fix enemy forces to allow the main body to maneuver around the enemy strengths or
through weaknesses.
5-61. Staffs consider whether subordinate units conducting a guard operation require augmentation to
execute their mission. Additionally, squadron commanders and staffs analyze requirements and notify the
BCT commander of those tasks they cannot accomplish. The protected force commander then task organizes
more augmentation or provides guidance on the prioritization of tasks.
BCT PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS
5-62. BCT commanders, or higher echelon commanders in the case of a TF or reconnaissance and security
BCT conducting a guard, may augment the guard force with internal and external assets. Attack and
reconnaissance aviation assists the guard force by gaining contact with enemy forces and reporting the
enemy’s composition, disposition, and strength. Aerial assets can maneuver and assist in destroying enemy
ground forces over large areas to weaker sections to maintain the guard. Aerial assets can be a quick reaction
force to destroy enemy ground forces and reinforcements through Army attack aviation that canalize the
enemy towards areas that the guard force fires plan supports. Indirect fire considerations are the same as in a
screen, though the guarding unit may have more indirect fire assets at their disposal. BCT engineers conduct
countermobility and survivability tasks to assist the guard force.
ADVANCE GUARD (STATIONARY AND MOVING)
5-63. An advance guard for a stationary BCT deploys forward and defends the main body. Once the unit
makes contact, they continue to defend or delay within the area of operations consistent with the BCT
commander’s intent.
5-64. An advance guard for a moving force is offensive in nature, finding and defeating enemy units along
the axis of advance. Units conducting an advance guard provide for the uninterrupted movement of the
protected force. The advance guard engages in offensive tasks and movement to contact as needed to
accomplish the mission. If the advance guard encounters enemy forces beyond its capability, the advance
guard transitions to a defense to protect the BCT, continues reconnaissance to develop the situation, and
prepares to pass elements of the main body forward. If the BCT is advancing as part of a division advance
along widely separated axes, the advance guard moves with the main effort based on the factors of
METT-TC (I). The supporting effort provides its own security (see figure 5-2). |
3-98 | 115 | Security Operations
Figure 5-2. ABCT advance guard mission
Organization of Forces
5-65. An advance guard performs continuous reconnaissance along the main body’s axis of advance,
maintains continuous observation of enemy avenues of approach (when stationary), and destroys or repels
enemy reconnaissance and security forces. An advance guard defeats, disrupts, or fixes enemy ground forces
before they can engage the main body with direct fires. In coordination with the protected force commander,
the advance guard commander clarifies the interval between the advance guard and the main body. The
advance guard maintains the interval from the protected force and leads the main body within the protected
force commander’s intent. The advance guard guides the main body through gaps in the enemy force to take
advantage of opportunities.
Integration of Enablers
5-66. In planning and conducting an advance guard, the BCT commander and staff considers the factors of
METT-TC (I). BCT and squadron staffs conduct collaborative and individual planning considering the
missions and the area of operations assigned to subordinate units. The staff plans fires to support the
maneuver plan and integrates aerial assets to enhance the capability of the advance guard to find, fix, and
defeat enemy reconnaissance assets. The staff must integrate engineer assets to provide mobility,
countermobility, and survivability support. Staffs deliberately plan for the positioning of command and |
3-98 | 116 | Chapter 5
control nodes to support advance guard operations and the positioning of support and sustainment assets to
allow seamless logistical support to maintain the momentum of the advance guard.
5-67. Additionally, the BCT commander identifies a unit to serve as a reserve for the advance guard. A
reserve is that portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement to
be available for a decisive movement (ADP 3-90). By allocating forces to field a reserve, the commander
preserves the freedom to exploit opportunity or reinforce friendly elements as required. For a BCT conducting
a guard, the reserve is a maneuver company from one of the maneuver battalions. If the Cavalry squadron is
performing a guard, BCTs consider providing a maneuver company from a maneuver battalion to serve as
the squadron reserve so the squadron does not place a reconnaissance asset in a reserve role.
FLANK GUARD
5-68. A flank guard protects an exposed flank of the main body. In performing this operation, the flank guard
operates beyond the assigned zone or sector of the protected force. The flank guard’s responsibility begins at
the trail element of the advance guard or at the lead combat element of the main body. The flank guard ends
at the rear of the protected force or lead element of the rear guard. The higher commander tasking the flank
guard specifies the boundary. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)
Stationary Flank Guard
5-69. A flank guard for a stationary force performs zone or area reconnaissance when establishing the initial
security line positions allowing the flank guard to become familiar with the terrain they will defend. Upon
reaching their initial positions, the flank guard establishes a defense and goes through the steps of engagement
area development. Once the flank guard makes contact, they continue to defend or delay when necessary,
according to the commander’s intent. As with the advance guard, the commander must allocate forces to
serve as a reserve (see figure 5-3). |
3-98 | 117 | Security Operations
Figure 5-3. IBCT Cavalry squadron stationary flank guard
Moving Flank Guard
5-70. Units must consider many factors for the organization security force of a moving flank guard, which
is similar to organizing an advance guard. The BCT establishes conditions for reconnaissance and security
operations by enabling the security force with aviation support, joint and organic fires, and additional
intelligence collection. This may include partnering with and access to joint and national-level intelligence
assets (see paragraph 3-91, page 3-20). The security force commander designates roles to each subordinate
unit, in coordination with the protected force commander. For example, if a Cavalry squadron is tasked to
provide a moving flank guard for a BCT, the security force commander is the squadron commander and the
protected force commander is the BCT commander. The moving flank guard maintains a large enough
interval from the protected force and protects the main body within the protected force commander’s intent.
5-71. As part of the planning and execution phase, the security force commander decides on one of the two
methods of execution. These methods are based on how the main body crosses the LD. The security force
should not make its own penetration of the line of contact when facing prepared enemy defenses. To do so
may prevent or significantly delay the security force in the assumption of the flank guard.
5-72. In the first method, the security force crosses the LD separately from the main body and deploys to
perform the mission. This method keeps the two forces from interfering with one another and is faster. This
method is appropriate when another force has penetrated the line of contact or the main body is not in contact
with the enemy. |
3-98 | 118 | Chapter 5
5-73. In the second method, the security force crosses the LD with the main body and then deploys out into
the zone. This method is appropriate when the division makes its own penetration of the enemy defenses
along the line of contact. The security force may follow the lead battalion TF of the protected force through
the gap and deploy when the situation permits. Alternatively, the security force follows the combat elements
of the lead brigade. This method is slower but provides security for the security force before it begins their
flank guard mission.
5-74. The security force regulates movement along the route of advance by the pace of the protected force,
distance to the objective, and the enemy situation. There are three methods of movement that the security
force may use:
* Successive bounds.
* Alternate bounds.
* Continuous marching.
5-75. Table 5-2 summarizes these methods. If the protected force stops, the security force occupies blocking
positions. As the speed of the main body changes, the security force changes movement methods. The
security force commander must not allow the security force to fall behind the main body or present a lucrative
target by remaining stationary along the route.
Table 5-2. Moving flank guard movement method comparison
Method Considerations Advantages Disadvantages
• Enemy contact likely Most secure Slowest
• Main body slow
Successive Bounds • Bound by troops in
succession or
simultaneously
• Enemy contact likely More secure than Slower than continuous
• Main body slow continuous marching, marching, less secure than
Alternate Bounds faster than successive successive bounds
• Troops bound from rear
bounds
to front
• Enemy contact not likely Fastest Least secure
• Main body fast
Continuous Marching • Troops remain in march
column on route, air
screen on flank
5-76. The moving flank guard is an incredibly complex operation requiring detailed planning. A moving
flank guard has many of the same considerations as the moving flank screen; however, while conducting a
moving flank guard, the unit occupies a series of battle positions along the axis of advance. The security unit
also occupies a series of observation posts forward of the battle positions and those observation posts are
either designated by the security force commander or delegated to subordinate commanders. The tasks for
the moving flank guard include maintaining continuous surveillance of enemy avenues of approach,
reconnoitering the zone between the main body and the flank guard’s position, maintaining contact with the
lead combat elements of the main body, defeating enemy reconnaissance forces, and defeating, disrupting,
or fixing enemy ground forces before they can engage the main body with direct fire.
5-77. The lead element of the security force performs a critical three-fold mission. They must maintain
contact with the protected force, reconnoiter the zone between the main body and the security force route of
advance, and reconnoiter the security force route. The lead element performs zone reconnaissance to
accomplish these three tasks. The speed of the protected force determines how thoroughly to perform
reconnaissance. Planners must consider METT-TC (I) during the planning phase to identify their formations’
lead unit capabilities to determine if augmentation is required. When the zone exceeds the organic capability
of the lead element (typically 10 kilometers for an armored Cavalry troop in open terrain), units augment the
lead element with additional forces to ensure the lead element maintains contact with the protected force,
does not become over tasked, and can match the tempo of the protected force. During planning, the staff |
3-98 | 119 | Security Operations
conducts course of action analysis to determine whether the task assigned to the lead element exceeds the
capabilities of the unit. The lead element does not reconnoiter the battle positions or occupy them unless
required when contact is made; follow-on elements reconnoiter their assigned battle positions before occupation.
Note. If available, air Cavalry forces are well suited to maintain contact with the main body and
to perform reconnaissance forward of the security force lead troop if available. However, there is
inherent risk involved when ground forces rely on aviation assets to maintain communications
with the main body on their behalf.
5-78. The remainder of the security force maneuvers along the route of advance and occupies battle positions
as necessary. Criteria for the route are the same as in a moving flank screen. Troop or company-sized battle
positions are designated parallel to the axis of the main body, outside the route of advance, and along avenues
of approach into the security force. Follow-on elements reconnoiter assigned battle positions before
occupation. Scouts occupy observations posts along a screen line forward of the battle positions.
5-79. Since the squadron is moving in one direction and orienting in another, the security force commander
plans control measures that facilitate this dual orientation. The commander may assign an objective for
orientation or to secure the flank of the main body objective. One set of control measures control the security
effort, and another set of control measures control movement in parallel to the protected force (see figure 5-4).
Figure 5-4. Moving flank guard mission |
3-98 | 120 | Chapter 5
5-80. The security force’s combat trains move with the flank guard force. The field trains move with the
BSB or the nearest brigade.
5-81. If the security force anticipates being overextended, the commander informs the main body commander
and recommends one of the following courses of action:
* Reinforce the flank guard.
* Reduce the area of operations.
* Screen a portion of the area and guard the rest.
5-82. Figures 5-5 and 5-6, figure 5-7, page 5-22, and figure 5-8, page 5-23 demonstrate a moving flank guard
operation. The scenario highlights the tasks, actions, and considerations in regard to a moving flank guard
operation.
Moving Flank Guard Scenario
The 4th Infantry Division, which consists of a division headquarters, two SBCTs, one ABCT, a combat aviation
brigade, a sustainment brigade, and a division artillery are conducting an attack against a defending enemy
brigade. The 3rd ABCT (3/4 Infantry Division) is the division decisive effort with the task to seize
OBJECTIVE KING. The ABCT commander tasks the organic Cavalry squadron (4-10 CAV) to conduct a
moving flank guard along PL NEW YORK (LOA) between PL COWBOYS (LD) and PL STEELERS (LOA) to
enable freedom of maneuver of the 3/4 Infantry Division main body.
The 4-10 CAV augments with the following additional forces to support the moving flank guard mission: an
armor company, an air attack and reconnaissance troop, an artillery battery, an air defense platoon, a CBRN
reconnaissance platoon, and a TUAS platoon. Figure 5-5 depicts the task organization.
Figure 5-5. 4-10 Cavalry task organization |
3-98 | 121 | Security Operations
Upon receiving the mission from brigade, the squadron planners begin collaborative and parallel planning
with the BCT staff and augments liaison officers. Based on the threat, the squadron works to mask its forces,
minimize the electromagnetic signature, and ensure proper coverage of counter-UAS systems. The squadron
prepares to react to all forms of contact with the enemy, but primarily focuses on direct fire, aerial, and
electromagnetic contact. The squadron commander task organizes the three reconnaissance troops with one
tank platoon each from D/4-10 CAV and one Avenger section from 1/C/5-5 ADA. To execute the moving flank
guard, the squadron commander directs the squadron to move separately from the main body and execute
successive bounds as they move along their route of advance.
Alpha Troop, 4-10 CAV is the lead troop to cross the LD and has the three-fold mission, which is to maintain
contact with the main body, to reconnoiter the zone between the main body and the squadrons’ route of
advance, and to reconnoiter the squadron’s route. Alpha Troop conducts zone reconnaissance accomplishing
the three tasks for the squadron as seen in figure 5-6.
Figure 5-6. Moving flank guard, simultaneous deployment into zone
Bravo Troop, Charlie Troop, and Charlie Company 1-68 Armor move into their designated area of operations
across the eastern flank of the main body. Simultaneously, the squadron main command post, along with the
artillery battery, move to their predetermined locations. Alpha troop continues to bound and clear throughout
the zone moving north to tie in the screen, oriented east. The artillery battery has preplanned and designated
rectangular position areas throughout the squadron’s area of operations to cover all engagement areas. |
3-98 | 122 | Chapter 5
Bravo and Charlie Troops move into their assigned boundaries and maneuver to PL NEW YORK, which is the
LOA. The troops identify and establish battle positions oriented toward the anticipated direction from which
the enemy will attack. They have continuous observation to the east between the ground observation posts,
TUAS, and the attack reconnaissance troop allowing the troops to conduct engagement area development. The
artillery battery and Charlie Company 1-68 Armor have moved north and are prepared to defend if the enemy
attacks from the east. Troops are arrayed in defensive positions between PL KENTUCKY and PL NEW YORK
(LOA) using the TUAS and attack reconnaissance troop to screen east to observe NAIs 101, 102, and 103 (see
figure 5-7).
Figure 5-7. Squadron guard operation on phase line New York
The squadron has established their moving flank guard. The troops maneuver their elements to protect the
main body from direct fire. The squadron uses preplanned positions to maintain observation of designated
NAIs. The TUAS platoon moving from east to west through NAI 103 observes an enemy reconnaissance unit.
The squadron made the decision to use fires, air, and armor to defeat the enemy reconnaissance force as they
move into engagement area two as seen in figure 5-8. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.