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counterair and an airspace control authority for joint airspace control. Normally, the JFC designates the air
component commander as the area air defense commander and airspace control authority, because the three
functions are so integral to one another. Coordination and integration with the surface combatants of the joint
maritime component commander performing AMD roles for critical joint bases is also required. With the
support of the component commanders, the area air defense commander develops, integrates, and distributes
a JFC-approved joint area air defense plan. (See to FM 3-01 or ATP 3-01.15 for detailed information about
the planning and integration of AMD.)
7-41. Theater and tactical ADA units provide early warning by employing sensors to detect air and missile
threats and disseminating air defense warnings to U.S. forces, allied or partnered forces, and civilian
populations. C2 elements disseminate air defense early warnings through various communication networks
and nodes, to include submitting an incoming threat or an all-clear message to the network. (See FM 3-01
for more detailed information on early warning tasks associated with AMD operations.)
7-42. Army forces in maritime environments should assume their land operations are being observed by the
enemy and not assume that AMD protection extends to their AO, especially when separated by extended
distances and vast bodies of water. Larger air threats entering friendly space can be detected early, and
identified, processed, and defeated as part of the air component’s roles and responsibilities to the JFC. There
remains a requirement to find (including detect, identify, and be prepared to defeat) UASs, which could be
launched from naval or commercial vessels or other land masses. Sensors, which include long-range and
short-range radars, optical devices, wireless, and audible alert systems face challenges detecting smaller
tactical UASs at sufficient ranges to mitigate effects. (See ATP 3-01.81 for more information regarding
counter-UAS planning and execution.)
7-43. The JFC normally designate JSAs and designates forces to provide the security of base, base clusters,
and lines of communications. Various types of security forces can secure the JSA and lines of
communications, including dedicated Army forces, coalition partners, and host-nation forces. Bases and base
clusters can be noncontiguous with each other even on relatively small islands, and they may be separated
by extended distances and vast bodies of water.
7-44. Army commanders can be assigned roles as an area commander, base cluster commander, or base
commander, all of which facilitate base defense in support of land and other Service forces. Base threats may
include special operations forces, naval gunfire, long-range surface-to-surface fires, and manned and
unmanned aircraft. Security forces should be able to coordinate for indirect and joint fire support, have a high
degree of tactical mobility, and a reasonable span of C2. (See JP 3-10 for more information on the joint
requirements for base defense and securing lines of communication. See ATP 3-37.10 for more information
on the techniques of establishing and securing bases.)
7-45. Threat employment of CBRN weapons can deny access to key terrain containing ports, airfields, or
staging areas for either friendly or enemy forces until decontamination is complete or until the land
component commander assumes the risk of operating in a contaminated environment. Army forces should
understand the threat’s intent, weapons capabilities, and weapons effects. The threat may range from artillery
or rockets to theater ballistic missiles. Delivery tactics could include overt or covert means (for example,
special operations forces), state-sponsored terrorism, or other asymmetric methods. Contamination
mitigation minimizes the time required to return personnel and mission-essential equipment to a
mission-capable state as part of an overall contamination mitigation plan for the JOA. (See ATP 3-11.32 for
more detailed information about CBRN and contamination mitigation techniques during security operations.)
7-46. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units detect, identify, conduct onsite evaluations, render safe, and
conduct exploitation, disposal, or other disposition of explosive ordnance, including weapons of mass
destruction. They advise commanders on improvised explosive devices and other explosive hazard threats,
including the most effective way to defeat the devices. They also directly support requirements to render safe
explosive hazards that put the use of ports, airfields, and other critical infrastructure at risk. EOD units can
support remediation of areas that ensure access to clear aerial ports of debarkation and seaports of debarkation
facilities and other facilities that support seaports. (See JP 3-42 for a more detailed discussion on the joint
integration and Army roles for ordnance. See ATP 4-32 for detailed information on the techniques of EOD.)
7-47. Islands identified as key terrain for operations typically require additional engineer support to harden
existing key infrastructure or construct new infrastructure to meet the JFC’s requirements for airfields, ports, |
3-0 | 190 | Chapter 7
and survivability positions. Construction equipment, personnel, and supplies often require specific
transportation coordination and prioritization as critical assets for movement by air or sea. Remote locations
that do not have immediate access to organic engineer support require either locally procured or contracted
construction capabilities or manually constructed survivability positions that are concealed as best as possible
from enemy observation as part of survivability measures. (See FM 3-34 for fundamentals and planning
considerations on the employment of general and combat engineer capabilities. See ATP 3-37.34 for specific
techniques and considerations on protective positions, camouflage, and enhancing survivability.)
SECURITY OPERATIONS IN MARITIME ENVIRONMENTS
7-48. The JFC designates the area commander for base and lines of communication security, and most of
the security tasks are typically the responsibility of land force commanders. Collaborative planning and
integration between ground forces providing base security and naval and air forces providing sea lines of
communications security is crucial to maintaining freedom of navigation for combat operations. Army forces
provide security support to all bases within their designated JOA. Brigade combat teams (BCTs), military
police brigades, and maneuver enhancement brigades are suitable for this function. This responsibility can
include bases commanded by organizations that are not part of the area commander’s forces, such as
multinational allies or other joint services. The JFC may institute standard force protection policies for all
commands and bases within an AOR to ensure unity of effort.
7-49. A joint force land component commander (JFLCC) may be designated as the joint security coordinator
by the JFC, with other unified action partner forces assigned to support security plans for the JOA. The joint
security coordinator coordinates the overall protection of the joint security area in accordance with JFC
directives and priorities. This ensures the requirements and priorities are coordinated with the area air defense
commander. The joint security coordinator typically establishes a joint security coordination center. The staff
of this center may be part of the JFLCC headquarters, or this function may be delegated to a subordinate unit,
and it normally includes representatives from all components operating in the JSA to assist in meeting joint
security requirements.
7-50. Every island with a base, regardless of size, requires the same level of comprehensive planning to
ensure sufficient protection in the event there are no reinforcements immediately available when conflict
commences. Army forces should anticipate direct enemy attacks by small units or special operations ground
forces, attack aircraft, and indirect fires. Commanders must ensure that base defense measures are adequate
to detect and defeat small-unit operations (including Level I or Level II threats) well before crisis or conflict.
Dispersion mitigates effects of long-range fires and attack aircraft, but dispersion on small islands is not
always possible. Construction, reinforcement, and caching supplies may be the primary option to offset this
vulnerability, but they are necessary everywhere within range of threat capabilities.
7-51. Successful security of key terrain and infrastructure depends on an integrated and aggressive plan
consisting of dedicated security forces and responsive sustainment and protection forces (including medical,
ADA, and engineer). The theater army synchronizes the base security plans, integrates them into the overall
JFC’s intent, and allocates additional forces for securing sustainment nodes and command posts, key terrain,
or critical infrastructure necessary for combat operations. Remote island bases have the same security
planning considerations, but they vary in their tactical application based on the environment. These
considerations include, but are not limited to—
(cid:122) Defense against sea-based attacks, such as enemy special operations forces or naval fires.
(cid:122) The integration and application of coastal-based indirect fire systems and fire support planning.
(cid:122) Integrated planning for aviation support, including movement and protection of forward arming
and refueling points.
(cid:122) Coastal and harbor security support and integration of host-nation or local security forces.
(cid:122) Integration of coastal barrier systems, sea-based obstacles, and sea-based or harbor mines.
(See JP 3-10 for more information on joint security coordination command posts. See ADP 3-37 for more
information regarding the fundamentals of protection and protection planning.) |
3-0 | 191 | Army Operations in Maritime Environments
DEFEAT COMPONENTS OF ENEMY ANTIACCESS AND AREA
DENIAL AND ENABLE JOINT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
7-52. Army forces support joint defeat of enemy integrated air defense, fires and strike complexes,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, and integrated C2 networks to enable success during joint operations. AMD
and fire support are two of the Army’s critical contributions to these efforts, enabling ground, naval, and air
forces to maintain access to the various regions of an operational environment.
PROVIDE THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
7-53. Friendly ADA forces may protect maritime access points, such as shipping channels or ports, to enable
the flow of combat power and theater sustainment. Considerations for employing ADA capabilities during
AMD operations in a maritime environment are—
(cid:122) Defeat enemy air and missile threats encountered in strategic and tactical operations, including
medium-range, short-range, and close-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; UASs; rockets,
artillery, and mortars; tactical air-to-surface missiles; and fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft.
(cid:122) Integrate and maintain tactical data linkages to other Service and multinational forces conducting
AMD operations in the JOA, weapons systems, sensors, effectors, and C2 nodes at each echelon.
(cid:122) Provide early warning for air and missile attacks and disseminate attack warnings.
(cid:122) Provide extended-range surveillance of the airspace and detect, acquire, track, classify,
discriminate, and identify aerial objects from near-ground level to high altitudes in difficult terrain
and in adverse weather conditions.
(cid:122) Contribute to airspace management and control functions by identifying, coordinating, integrating,
and deconflicting Army assets in the JOA airspace.
7-54. The number and dispersion of critical assets across numerous islands may exceed the ability of
available ADA forces to defend against the air and missile threats. The employment of passive AMD
measures by tactical formations is critical to their survivability, particularly on remote islands that may not
have access to sufficient active ADA capabilities or reinforcement from a neighboring island chain. Access
to early warning networks with over-the-horizon and redundant communications increases reaction time and
further mitigates risks for remote locations primarily using passive defense measures. (See FM 3-01 for more
detailed information on planning considerations associated with AMD operations.)
FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS
7-55. In a maritime environment, Army forces are likely to conduct two complex forms of forcible entry
operations: airborne or air assault and amphibious landing. Forcible entry operations seize and hold
lodgments against armed opposition to set conditions for follow on operations. To set favorable conditions
for success during forcible entry, commanders and staffs must—
(cid:122) Visualize the entry location and understand the impact of other domains on forcible entry
operations.
(cid:122) Control air and maritime areas to protect the force and preserve lines of communications leading
up to and during the entry.
(cid:122) Disrupt enemy influence during entry.
(cid:122) Isolate the lodgment from reinforcement by enemy forces.
(cid:122) Maintain access to the lodgment throughout the duration of operations to build and sustain combat
power.
(cid:122) Manage the lodgment to integrate other supporting operations.
(cid:122) Seize and maintain the initiative to achieve surprise throughout the entry operations.
7-56. The JFC decides whether to conduct the forcible entry as a concurrent or integrated operation.
Concurrent forcible entry operations occur when a combination of amphibious assault, airborne, air, or
ground assault forcible entry operations are conducted simultaneously, but as distinct operations with
separate AOs and objectives. Integrated forcible entry operations occur when amphibious assault, airborne
assault, air assault, and ground forcible entries are conducted simultaneously within the same AO against |
3-0 | 192 | Chapter 7
mutually supporting objectives. Large island land masses would likely involve integrated forcible entry
involving U.S. Marines and potentially allied or partner forces. Smaller archipelagic island chains could
require concurrent forcible entries that enable security operations or subsequent main and supporting efforts
against larger objectives.
7-57. Forcible entry operations by ground, sea, or air all use the same phasing model to facilitate coordination
and synchronization. These phases are preparation and deployment, assault, stabilization of the lodgment,
introduction of follow-on forces, and termination or transition operations. Planning for forcible entry also
includes planning for—
(cid:122) Movement planning over extended lines of communications over water.
(cid:122) Information collection against an enemy with layered and integrated early warning.
(cid:122) Management of transitions when lines of communications and networks are extended over water.
(cid:122) Insertion of special operations forces.
(cid:122) Ensuring air superiority over the joint landing area.
(cid:122) Coordination for initial and reinforcing entry forces for the initial assault and main assault.
(cid:122) Establishment and operation of any potential intermediate staging bases.
(cid:122) Lodgment security, organization, and expansion from shore to an island interior.
(See JP 3-18 for more detailed discussion and information about Army forces roles, responsibilities, and
planning considerations for joint forcible entry operations.)
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
7-58. Planning for an amphibious operation is continuous, and it requires collaborative, parallel, and detailed
planning by all participating forces. The organization of any amphibious operation should be sufficiently
flexible to meet the planned objectives in each phase of the operation and account for unforeseen
developments. Sound planning provides for unity of effort through unity of command, centralized planning
and direction, and decentralized execution. JFCs may decide to establish a functional component command
to integrate planning and reduce JFC span of control. This improves the efficiency of information flow,
weapons systems management, component interaction, unity of effort, or control over the scheme of
maneuver. Regardless of approach, the JFC designates command relationships for the commanders of the
amphibious task force and landing forces. The designation of the supported and supporting role of the
amphibious force commanders is important, as it establishes main and supporting efforts and prioritizes
resources.
7-59. Opposed landings in a maritime environment are one of the most difficult and dangerous military
operations, so achieving the element of surprise should be pursued by all available means. Overt activities
that threaten the element of surprise should be kept to a minimum and conducted as close as practical to the
arrival of joint fire support assets in the JOA. Deception operations may facilitate surprise if they portray a
course of action the enemy expects or a timeline for execution different than planned. Deception operations
are a necessity during assault breaching of a defended beachhead. Large lane sizes demand large numbers of
weapons and multiple aircraft passes to clear zones prior to the assault. This may draw immediate attention
to the landing force unless alternate lanes are brought under fire as well
7-60. The landing force typically consists of maneuver, protection, and tactical echelon sustainment forces.
The JFC designates the landing forces commander. If Army forces are part of the landing force, they must
be task-organized with appropriate combat and sustainment capabilities to support the landing force. Army
forces also provide intra-theater ship-to-shore transport, including landing craft, cargo handling, logistics,
traffic control, and engineering capabilities.
Note. If the JFC organizes planning along functional lines, functional component commanders
normally exercise OPCON over their parent Services’ forces and tactical control (TACON) over
other Services’ forces attached or made available for tasking.
7-61. Setting conditions prior to the execution of any amphibious operation is critical. Enabling operations
that set conditions include supporting and pre-landing operations. These require detailed integration at all |
3-0 | 193 | Army Operations in Maritime Environments
echelons and highly synchronized employment of Army and joint capabilities that can reinforce success and
ensure landing force survivability under conditions where reinforcement or support may not be readily
available. Planning for forcible entry also includes planning for—
(cid:122) Force concealment as part of a larger joint military deception operation.
(cid:122) Maritime clearance of mines in the vicinity of transportation lanes, landing beaches, and shore-
based sustainment nodes.
(cid:122) Maritime and hydrographic reconnaissance for landing beaches and sea approach lanes.
(cid:122) Accurate prediction of weather and tidal conditions.
(cid:122) Seabasing of supporting aviation resources, such as aeromedical evacuation or attack aviation.
(cid:122) Assault breaching and beach clearance of anti-landing obstacles, which may include mines.
(cid:122) Status of civil and local national inhabited areas, to both conceal landing forces and prevent
civilian casualties.
7-62. Pre-landing operations take place between the commencement of the action phase (arrival of the
amphibious force into the operational area) and the ship-to-shore movement. There is rarely a clear transition
between support and pre-landing operations, and this must be planned for and clearly communicated across
echelons prior to execution. Some planning considerations during this phase include—
(cid:122) Obstacle clearance (including perimeter and main barrier minefields and the engineer and beach
barriers that canalize landing forces) and marking usable sea and shore channels for follow-on
forces.
(cid:122) Integration of naval fire support.
(cid:122) Integration of air support, including electromagnetic warfare and airspace between the landing
force and amphibious task force.
(cid:122) Clearance of fires on landing areas.
(cid:122) Ammunition and fuel expenditure prior to landing.
(cid:122) Loss and recovery of equipment prior to landing.
(cid:122) Loss of personnel and recovery of casualties prior to landing.
(cid:122) Resupply and rearming schedule for amphibious and landing forces.
(cid:122) Landing force requirements to support other forces prior to and after the landing assault.
(cid:122) Organization and location of reserve in a similar manner as the assault force.
7-63. During an amphibious operation, a subsidiary landing outside the designated landing area is normally
conducted by elements of the amphibious task force to support the main landing. Subsidiary landings should
be planned and executed by commanders with the same precision as the main landing. Amphibious
re-embarkation for follow-on operations may require additional support from specialized units or other
Service forces and additional logistics support to replace lost or damaged equipment and depleted supplies.
For tactical echelons, combat rubber raiding craft can provide flexibility to amphibious operations, including
movement to reconnaissance objectives and subsidiary landings sites, movement of forces inland from a
coast along waterways, or recovery of casualties to support vessels. Additionally, Army planning must
account for casualties and the continued medical treatment of patients, potential for CBRN decontamination,
requirement to transport remains or provide mortuary services, transportation and transfer of enemy
detainees, and logistics to support basic sustenance ashore. (See JP 3-02 for more information about the
fundamentals of planning and executing joint amphibious operations. See MCTP 13-10M for more detailed
information and considerations on amphibious embarkation. See ATP 3-17.2 for tactical considerations on
movement from ship to shore and the C2 of shore and beach parties.)
SUSTAIN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS IN MARITIME
ENVIRONMENTS
7-64. Setting and sustaining a maritime theater includes RSOI of personnel and equipment and the protection
of forward-positioned forces critical to the security of key strategic assets, such as theater AMD, airfields,
ports, and sea lanes. Army watercraft are essential to sustainment in maritime environments as they are
designed to perform missions specifically related to intratheater movement of combat power and sustainment. |
3-0 | 194 | Chapter 7
While capable of deploying over strategic distances, Army watercraft are not strategic lift platforms, but they
are a critical link between strategic lift and land-oriented tactical movements. Army and Navy engineering
assets are critical to the establishment and maintenance of port facilities.
ESTABLISH PROTECTED RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION
7-65. During armed conflict in a maritime operational environment, theater opening and RSOI vary to meet
mission requirements of the JFC. The theater engineer command is responsible for developing and
maintaining the necessary infrastructure (including ports and roadways) that support RSOI and follow-on
operations. Multiple islands requiring multiple ports will increase the demand for specialized engineer and
sustainment formations to construct, develop, maintain, and operate them.
7-66. Rather than gaining efficiencies from a consolidated location, the theater army may be required to
support multiple JSAs and RSOI sites. Using multiple RSOI locations increases the overall signal,
sustainment, protection, and maneuver requirements for the theater. An often-overlooked component of
RSOI is the mandatory combat training that needs to be conducted. TSC personnel do not conduct this
training; a maneuver force must provide the personnel. More RSOI locations require more trainers.
7-67. Multiple JSAs and JOAs will likely require the theater army to request additional signal assets to
support the theater signal brigade as they develop the necessary C2 architecture to support operations. Both
the strategic signal brigade and the tactical signal brigade will require significant augmentation to support
the theater and JOA communications network. Army forces maintain coastal, harbor, and inland waterway
defense while accounting for extended deployment times. Critical protection, firepower, and mobility assets
may also be disbursed across numerous islands in the AOR and in the JOA, requiring detailed coordination
and reconfiguration of loads prior to embarkation.
Note. Given the varying nature of islands and maritime environments where Army forces may
operate, there are many scenarios where RSOI take place outside the JOA, and onward movement
for Army forces may occur just prior to the execution of a forcible entry operation to an island.
This may also change from island to island, depending on the enemy situation.
7-68. In a maritime environment, reception, staging, and integration activities may need to occur prior to
onward movement into a JOA. The process of securing and uploading unit basic loads, addressing life support
for personnel, or reconfiguring underway must occur prior to debarking directly into combat. Units that
require extensive support for staging, including maintenance or cross-loading of supplies critical to
survivability (Class IV and Class V items), may require an intermediate staging base outside the JOA before
continuing on to their debarkation point. Additionally, units may execute onward movement out of sequence
from reception, staging, and integration. Units may need to conduct integration during embarkation or during
a reconfiguration at an intermediate base outside the JOA.
7-69. RSOI may occur from sea bases. Seabasing is the deployment, assembly, command, projection,
sustainment, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases
within the operational area (JP 3-02). Seabasing provides Army forces with the ability to conduct certain
functions and tasks at sea without dependence on infrastructure ashore, and it minimizes the need for
stockpiles ashore while positioning joint forces for immediate employment. Seabasing requires detailed
collaborative planning between joint forces, but it can provide a secure base of operations with C2 capability,
and it minimizes the requirements ashore for an initial port and airfield to support missions. (See JP 3-02 for
more information on considerations for planning and executing staging operations from sea bases.)
CONDUCT THEATER SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS
7-70. Theater sustainment in a maritime environment is a highly collaborative process. When directed to
provide management of common sustainment functions that include other Services, the TSC leads the joint
sustainment planning board. Army forces provide theater and port opening functions for joint forces to
maintain strategic and operational reach. Theater sustainment plans must account for—
(cid:122) Maritime movement of Army pre-positioned stocks (APS).
(cid:122) Joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS). |
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(cid:122) Intertheater transportation by joint assets.
(cid:122) Intratheater transportation for personnel during and after RSOI.
(cid:122) Classes of supply and access to field services.
(cid:122) Field and sustainment maintenance in remote locations.
(cid:122) Distribution.
(cid:122) Operational contract support.
(cid:122) General engineering (ports and airfields).
(cid:122) Sustaining and mitigating impact of limited island infrastructure.
(cid:122) Mortuary affairs.
7-71. Bringing APS ashore requires detailed planning as part of the movement control and sustainment
planning boards at the TSC and Army field support battalions. APS are positioned strategically, and they are
not designated to any specific unit. Floating stocks may be discharged in support of armed conflict and require
detailed early planning. In a maritime environment, the sustainment demands and maintenance footprint for
an APS download operation may quickly exceed the capabilities of a small island port. The APS download
has significant considerations for suitable, deep draft port facilities and infrastructure, support equipment,
host-nation and coalition approval for port access, maintenance personal, and detailed force protection and
security plans. The demand for maintenance and support personnel and security forces is significant, and it
requires additional sustainment planning. APS download operations typically require a TSC or division-level
C2 node and additional protection assets to mitigate their vulnerability to enemy attacks. (See ATP 3-35.1
for more information on planning for APS stocks in combat operations.)
7-72. JLOTS is a key enabler to combat operations in maritime environments. It is typically coordinated and
controlled by the TSC. JLOTS allows heavy forces to be moved from ship to shore when there are no modern
deep-water ports available, such as on various smaller atolls or when ports are not available due to combat
damage or volume of shipping. The strategic flexibility provided by JLOTS requires detailed coordination
and frequent training as a Navy and Army warfighting skill set before conflict occurs. This family of systems
includes vulnerable assets that facilitate the ship-to-shore movement of necessary supplies and the
administration of personnel supporting JLOTS. The offshore petroleum distribution system, elevated
causeway system, pier systems, roll on/roll off discharge facilities, and the administration architecture
associated with JLOTS employment are highly vulnerable, lack protection or early warning systems, and are
unable to quickly displace in the event of enemy attack. If a JFC is considering using a JLOTS, the command
should take measures to reduce its vulnerability. (See JP 4-01.6 for more detailed information about JLOTS.)
7-73. Because of the constraints imposed on ground movement in maritime operational environments, it is
critical that the TSC integrates into the JFC’s transportation board and working groups to prioritize and
execute transportation operations during armed conflict. This board and working group direct the planning
and coordination of modal operations, intermodal operations, movement control, and theater distribution.
Surface transportation normally requires a pre-planned transition from watercraft to motor transport at the
shoreline for the movement of supplies and personnel in-shore. Naval forces provide essential causeway,
sealift, and logistics over-the-shore support to land forces when ports may be austere, damaged, or non-
existent. Naval forces may be responsible for downloading supplies from vessels and delivering them to port
operations for release to Army forces. Commanders may task Army forces to assist with downloading and
uploading equipment and supplies from ships and boats. Naval construction capabilities provide port
construction such as warehouses, storage facilities and explosive ordnance disposal to locate and dispose of
mines along ports and channels.
7-74. Army watercraft provide additional sealift and sustainment capabilities to the JFC and JFLCC as part
of inter-island transportation support. Given the limited availability of these critical assets, most of which are
highly vulnerable to attack from enemy antiship systems, some Army equipment and forces may be
prioritized lower than other Service equipment and forces for transportation into and around the AOR. Army
watercraft operations depend on host-nation access and infrastructure improvement to enable both maneuver
forces and follow-on sustainment. Army units assigned to maritime environments with organic tactical
combat rubber raiding craft can also provide a tactical means of intra-island and possibly inter-island
resupply. This can reduce the burden for operational assets, providing increased access to restrictive littoral
terrain, a reduced signature for targeting, and flexibility to operational and tactical commanders. (See |
3-0 | 196 | Chapter 7
FM 4-01 for more information about Army transportation planning, command relationships, and overall
capabilities to the joint force. See ATP 4-15 for more a more detailed discussion about the techniques of
planning for and employing Army watercraft.)
7-75. Commercial shipping organizations may provide movement assets, but they require increased planning
and support due to a lack of organic protection systems. The theater army’s contribution to transportation
during combat operations in a maritime environment may be to protect lighterage operations. Lighterage is
the process in which small craft are used to transport cargo or personnel from ship-to-shore using amphibians,
landing craft, discharge lighters, causeways, and barges (JP 4-01.6). It can also transfer equipment and
personnel between ships or for intratheater transport. Lighterage includes landing craft and modular
causeway systems, such as ferries. To facilitate port operations at joint intermediate staging bases, Army
forces provide and operate float utility watercraft, such as harbor and ocean-going tugs, pusher tugs, floating
cranes, barges, floating causeways, and roll-on/roll-off discharge facilities. Once sustainment assets are
positioned to support specific tactical operations, it is difficult and time consuming to reposition them when
priorities shift.
7-76. For inter-theater and intra-theater air transportation operations by fixed-wing assets, the TSC is
responsible for consolidating, prioritizing, and processing aerial resupply requests. A division or corps
aviation officer determines consolidation and synchronization of rotary-wing movement based on the
commander’s priorities. Intra-theater rotary-wing movement in a JOA requires aircrews trained and equipped
for deck landing and overwater flight operations.
7-77. Army forces provide operational medical support to the joint force. Although military medical forces
are afforded protection under the law of armed conflict from being directly targeted, the geographic
constraints associated with providing medical support to forces on islands, in likely proximity to combatant
forces or key terrain, coupled with the effects of long-range fires, increases risks to medical forces and
facilities. Hardening of medical care facilities in exposed locations, like on small or remote islands, is crucial
to maintaining hospital survival. Additionally, threats from nonstate actors upon medical facilities and
capabilities may require increased protection measures. Units may need to rely on ship-based medical
facilities during initial operations, which requires joint planning and coordination. Higher-level care facilities
also place an increased demand on certain classes of supply, which may be difficult to transport, have special
storage requirements (for example, refrigeration), and be difficult to off-load in remote island locations. (See
FM 4-0 for more information on the Army's operational medical support to the joint force.)
7-78. The lethality of large-scale combat operations can devastate both the social fabric and the economic
viability of small islands where construction assets may be limited even before conflict occurs. Early
establishment of base security and maintaining viable governance may largely depend on the repair of critical
port and airfield infrastructure. A JTF commander may use either operational contract support or request
military engineers to repair facilities during combat operations (or improve their survivability prior to combat
operations).
7-79. In the Arctic, base infrastructure materials across the region need to have high thermal efficiency,
long-term durability, tolerance to repeated freeze and thaw cycles, and resistance to permafrost degradation.
Infrastructure in many austere locations has already deteriorated due to extreme environmental factors. It can
also complicate force sustainment operations as roadways, seaports, and airfields are potentially rendered
inoperable by ice, snow, seasonal thaws, and freeze cycles. Class IV construction material resupply for arctic
use may have long lead times. Therefore, infrastructure to be used by military units deployed to arctic areas
should be inspected as soon as possible to identify deterioration and inadequate systems. |
3-0 | 197 | Chapter 8
Leadership During Operations
Success ultimately rests on small things, lots of small things. Leaders have to have a feel
for small things – a feel for what is going on in the depths of an organization where small
things reside.
General Colin Powell
This chapter describes basic doctrine for combat leadership. It begins with a discussion
of the art of command, and it describes the impact of a commander’s competence,
presence, decision making during operations, and risk acceptance. It then describes the
role of commanders in driving the operations process. The chapter concludes with a
discussion on how leaders adapt their formations for missions while developing junior
leaders and teams.
THE ART OF COMMAND AND THE COMMANDER
8-1. The commander’s chief responsibilities during operations are to develop effective tactics and to lead
and direct the unit in executing them. Soldiers want and willingly follow leaders who win. The most important
quality for commanders or other leaders, however, is competence. Good leaders understand tactics, the
abilities of their own and enemy units, what is possible in any situation. Combined arms competence is the
combat commander’s greatest contribution to winning. Effective commanders lead and inspire their
subordinates to fight and win based upon that competence, while ensuring unity of purpose and unity of
effort. They do this through a combination of processes, the staffs and subordinate leaders they empower,
and their personal example and influence. While the commander is the primary leader of a formation, all
leaders play an important role in carrying out their higher echelon commander’s intent as they provide
command and control (C2) to their own subordinates during operations.
8-2. Commanders and their subordinate leaders determine success or failure through the decisions they
make, the examples they set, the actions they inspire, and their will to win. The commander is the focal point
for the employment of staff processes that inform the judgment critical for rapid, effective decision making.
Commanders must possess the confidence and skill to rapidly make difficult decisions, accepting risk to
create and exploit fleeting opportunities. They conceive and implement sound operational and tactical
solutions with the speed and force necessary to win. They also seek staff officers and subordinates who are
proficient at their specialties and use them to make the unit tactically effective.
8-3. Commanders have a moral responsibility to ensure their units are prepared for combat. They prepare
them through realistic training that reinforces individual and small-unit task and battle drill proficiency,
collective proficiency in the execution of mission essential tasks under the most demanding conditions, and
the development of staffs able to integrate the warfighting functions and joint capabilities in combined arms
approaches against enemy forces. Commanders resource training and protect subordinates’ training time.
They establish the command climate within their unit, direct staff and subordinates during operations, and
continually assess all aspects of their performance. They build trust, develop their subordinates’ competence
and confidence, encourage subordinate commanders to think critically, and demand that they demonstrate
initiative within the commander’s intent. Lastly, they prepare subordinates to assume responsibility one and
two echelons above their current assignment so that they can effectively assume control of the larger
formation when required to because of casualties or lost communications.
8-4. Commanders make decisions informed by judgment grounded in their experience, expertise, intuition,
and self-awareness. Judgment is the single most important leadership attribute applicable to selecting the
critical time and place to act, assigning missions, prioritizing, managing risk, and allocating resources. |
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Thorough knowledge of military science, a strong ethical sense, and an understanding of enemy and friendly
capabilities across domains form the basis of the judgment required of commanders. Judgment becomes more
refined as commanders become more experienced, and good judgment becomes even more essential in
ambiguous or uncertain operational environments. Self-awareness and experience help commanders become
more expert about assessing situations and receiving assistance from their staffs. Self-awareness is required
to assess one’s self and to earn the trust of those one commands. Judgment allows commanders to distinguish
between risk acceptance essential to successful operations and potentially disastrous rashness. The
commander’s judgment and experience help shape information requirements and staff priorities during
operations. Subordinate commanders and staffs collaborate to provide the most relevant information in the
most effective format for the commander to make sound decisions.
APPLYING THE ART OF COMMAND
8-5. Command is more art than science because it requires commanders exercise their judgment, leverage
their experience, and use their intuition when leading their units. Commanders apply the art of command by
providing leadership, delegating authority, allocating resources, and making decisions. Subordinates
operating within the commander’s intent facilitate unity of effort to create and exploit relative advantages.
Higher echelon leaders provide subordinate echelons access to information and the authority to use Army
and joint multidomain capabilities through delegation. Leaders delegate appropriate authority to subordinates
based on an assessment of their competence, talents, and experience.
COMMANDER PRESENCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD
One of the most valuable qualities of a commander is a flair for putting himself in the right
place at the right time.
Field Marshal Sir William Slim
8-6. Commanders provide leadership in combat to inspire their Soldiers, especially in challenging
situations. Command presence is the influence commanders have on those around them, through their
physical presence, communications, demeanor, and personal example. Commanders establish command
presence through personal interaction with subordinates, either physically or virtually through C2 systems,
and demonstrating their character, competence, dignity, strength of conviction, and empathy prior to and
throughout operations.
8-7. Commanders go where they can best influence operations, assess units, and improve unity of effort.
Where commanders place themselves on the battlefield is one of the most important decisions they can make.
Commanding forward allows commanders to effectively assess and manage the effects of operations on their
formations through face-to-face interactions. It allows them to gather information about actual combat
conditions, but it must be balanced against the requirement to be where the best overall situational awareness
can be maintained for the entire formation. As far as operational conditions allow, leadership should be
exercised up front at critical times and places without interfering with subordinate leader prerogatives,
becoming unreachable by other elements of the unit, or making it simpler for the enemy to target multiple
echelons of leadership in one place.
8-8. At the battalion level and below, commanders lead by personal example, acquire much information
themselves, and communicate face to face with those they direct. Typically, they position themselves well
forward to influence the main effort during different phases of an operation. However, even at these levels,
commanders cannot provide direct leadership for their whole unit given the challenges of maintaining
continuous communications when units are dispersed or in contested electromagnetic environments.
8-9. At higher levels, echeloned command posts are central to effective C2. During operations, commanders
must assess the situation up front as often as possible without being disruptive to the focus of subordinate
commanders. They deliberately plan and organize their C2 approach to mitigate their loss of broad situational
understanding during battlefield circulation by the development of subordinate commanders, and staff
officers empowered to make decisions on the commander’s behalf to exploit opportunities and respond to
changing circumstances without needing to ask permission. |
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8-10. Commanders convey importance and focus the efforts of the command by how they communicate,
regardless of where they are physically located. A calm and authoritative tone of voice generates a sense of
presence, as does a crisp and efficient manner of providing guidance; both require practice to master. No
matter their location, effective commanders encourage their troops, sense their morale, and inspire through
personal example. Commanders balance the risk of commanding forward with necessity to build trust by
depending upon subordinates to accurately report and demonstrate initiative in their portion of an area of
operations (AO). Lieutenant General Eichelberger’s actions to identify and address problems faced by the
32d Infantry Division in Buna in 1942 provide an effective example of commanding forward.
Commanding Forward—LTG Eichelberger at Buna
In autumn 1942, U.S. forces were attempting to establish positions from which to drive
the Japanese from New Guinea and the adjacent islands. The 32d Infantry Division
was to eliminate Japanese positions near the village of Buna. By the end of November,
however, the division had made little progress, and General Douglas MacArthur sent
Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, I Corps commander, there to correct the
situation. Eichelberger’s instructions were to “remove all officers who won’t fight [and]...
if necessary, put sergeants in charge of battalions and corporals in charge of
companies.”
Eichelberger and his staff arrived on 2 December and were disturbed by what they
observed: Soldiers were suffering from a number of tropical diseases. Rations were
scant. There was little discipline or military courtesy. Morale was low. Organization was
very poor. Only a few Soldiers were at the front line; many were in the rear areas, sent
there initially to recover from illness or injury, but now under no one’s effective control.
Fearing the jungle, Soldiers were afraid to patrol and, consequently, did not know the
location of Japanese positions. Leadership at all levels was ineffective.
Eichelberger moved quickly to address these problems. He had supplies flown in and
distributed so that Soldiers became better fed, clothed, and medically treated. He
stopped offensive operations for two days to reestablish effective C2. Patrols were sent
out nightly, and Japanese positions identified. Several commanders, including the
division commander, were replaced with officers who could instill a more disciplined
and aggressive attitude. Eichelberger was frequently near the front, wearing his rank
openly to show his Soldiers their commander was present. In addition to demonstrating
to his men that he was willing to share the same risks, Eichelberger was able to
observe battlefield conditions personally, leading to better commander’s visualization.
By 3 January 1943, after a series of resolute—albeit costly—attacks, the 32d Infantry
Division had overcome organized resistance at Buna. Eichelberger’s actions reversed
the tide of battle in the theater. From a collection of demoralized units, he created a
fighting force that stopped the Japanese advance.
8-11. Physical presence allows commanders to gain firsthand appreciation for the situation that they can
rarely gain any other way. Face-to-face discussions in their own or subordinate command posts and forward
presence allow commanders to see things that may not be conveyed by C2 systems. Forward presence
demonstrates a willingness to share danger and hardship, and it provides an opportunity to motivate
subordinates. Commanders should avoid putting their subordinates at additional risk when they are forward,
however, since the enemy is likely to quickly target senior commanders when their location becomes obvious.
The same consideration applies to their own command posts, which should disperse their footprint and
reposition often enough to complicate enemy targeting. The following factors, common to all levels of
command, may influence where commanders position themselves:
(cid:122) The need to understand the situation.
(cid:122) The need to make decisions. |
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(cid:122) The need to communicate.
(cid:122) The need to motivate subordinates.
8-12. Commanders delegate authorities to subordinate leaders for the conduct of operations based upon their
judgment of their capabilities. This allows the commander to be elsewhere, potentially in a location that
permits broader perspective and understanding. It also enables faster decision making in contested
environments than if both leaders were in the same location, and it prevents the need for continuous
communication. Continuous communication allows enemy forces to detect and target commanders,
subordinates, and command posts. It should be avoided whenever possible. Exercising a mission command
approach to C2 and delegating the broadest possible authorities to subordinate leaders empowers them to
exploit opportunities and conduct more effective distributed operations.
COMMANDER’S INTENT
8-13. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of an operation and the desired
objectives and military end state (JP 3-0). The commander’s intent succinctly describes what constitutes
success for the operation. It facilitates unity of effort as it allows subordinates to understand what is expected
of them, what constraints apply, and most importantly, why the mission is being conducted. Understanding
why a mission is conducted is important both in maintaining unity of effort and in bolstering the morale and
will of subordinates. Soldiers who understand why they are called upon for a specific mission, and how that
mission aligns with the higher echelon commander’s intent and concept of operations, are more committed
to the success of that specific mission.
8-14. Commanders communicate their intent two echelons down to ensure subordinates understand the
boundaries within which they may exercise initiative while maintaining unity of effort. They likewise
understand the commander’s intent two echelons above them. A clear and concise commander’s intent should
be easily remembered and understood even without an order. Commanders collaborate with subordinates to
ensure their commander’s intent is understood. Soldiers who understand the commander’s intent are more
able to exercise disciplined initiative in unexpected situations than those who do not.
INITIATIVE
The fog of war works both ways. The enemy is as much in the dark as you are. BE BOLD!
General George S. Patton
8-15. Leaders at every echelon exercise initiative as they follow orders and adhere to a course of action or
scheme of maneuver. When the enemy does something unexpected, or a new threat or opportunity emerges
that offers a greater chance of success, subordinate leaders take action to adjust to the new situation and
achieve their commander’s intent. Disciplined initiative requires a bias towards action rather than waiting on
new orders. The mission command approach to C2 demands subordinates exercise initiative in the absence
of orders, when current orders no longer apply, or when an opportunity or new threat presents itself. The
cumulative effect of multiple subordinate commanders, leaders, and individual Soldiers exercising initiative
produces agility in Army formations. It enables Army forces to seize the operational initiative as they pose
multiple dilemmas on the enemy.
8-16. Commanders and subordinate leaders develop subordinates capable of exercising effective initiative
during both training events and operations. Leaders create opportunities during training events in which
subordinates must take action on their own. Commanders must foster a climate that encourages initiative
during training, before the unit is committed to combat. Accepting risk and underwriting good faith mistakes
establishes a unit culture that allows subordinates to learn and gain the experience they need to operate under
their own responsibility. Endurance requires that the burdens of combat leadership be shared between leaders
at each echelon, which is not possible without a leadership culture that demands disciplined initiative.
DISCIPLINE
8-17. Discipline underpins the effective application of initiative during operations. For many parts of an
operation, the benefits of exercising disciplined initiative outweigh the cost in synchronization. At other
times, when synchronization or a specific process is critical to successful execution, ill-advised initiative can |
3-0 | 201 | Leadership During Operations
be costly. Neither commanders nor subordinates are independent actors when exercising initiative.
Subordinates consider at least two factors when deciding how to exercise initiative, assessing each in terms
of the circumstances affecting it:
(cid:122) Whether the benefits of the action outweigh the risk of desynchronizing the overall operation.
(cid:122) Whether the action will further attainment of the desired end state.
(See ADP 6-0 for more information on disciplined initiative.)
ACCEPTING RISK TO CREATE AND EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES
8-18. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent to all military operations. The pace and tempo of large-scale
combat operations demands a high level of expertise for commanders and staffs. Commanders delegate risk
acceptance to subordinates through their commander’s intent and other guidance. Based on this guidance,
refined as necessary by the commander and staff as the situation changes, leaders accept risk during
operations by massing effects in one area while taking economy of force measures in other areas to create
opportunities that can be exploited. Understanding how much or what kind of risk to accept requires the
ability to accurately see friendly and enemy forces and an operational environment in the context of a
particular situation. Leaders and staff officers who are competent in all aspects of their specialties assist the
commander in weighing the risk of various decisions and courses of action, balancing short-term versus long-
term risk to the mission and the force. This analysis, coupled with imagination and the courage to act boldly,
provides opportunities that outweigh the risk incurred. Successful commanders are aware of the effects of
cumulative risk over time, and therefore they continuously assess it throughout an operation.
8-19. Opportunities to exploit a relative advantage are fleeting during large-scale combat operations against
a capable enemy that adapts quickly. Delaying action while setting optimal conditions, waiting for perfect
intelligence, or achieving greater synchronization may end up posing a greater danger than swift acceptance
of significant risk now. Leaders’ judgment of risk must be thoroughly informed by their understanding of
their operational environment, particularly how actions in other domains impact their forces and how their
forces can generate effects outside the land domain. Leaders maintain a common operational picture with
their counterparts in higher and lower echelons, since any risk accepted at one echelon may impose additional
risk at other echelons. (See paragraphs 8-47 and 8-48 for further discussion on communicating with
subordinates.)
8-20. Contingency planning enables commanders to swiftly decide and act when the unexpected occurs. By
considering multiple enemy courses of action, available friendly capabilities, and developing appropriate
branch and sequel plans, the staff and the commander develop a deeper appreciation for how an operation
could unfold and build flexibility into their plans. Contingency planning also guards against confirmation
bias, where situational cues are interpreted in ways that match preconceived ideas. Effective planning
expands understanding of a situation and operational environment, allowing the commander and staff to be
better postured to rapidly decide, adjust, or simply be proactive.
8-21. Commanders designate commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) linked to decision
points during operations and the execution of branch and sequel plans developed during contingency
planning. CCIRs help subordinate leaders prioritize allocation of information collection assets and other
limited resources, including time. Detailed contingency planning and the development of CCIRs ensure that
commanders and staffs are proactive rather than reactive in responding to enemy activity. CCIRs potentially
become irrelevant as the situation changes; therefore, commanders, staffs, and other leaders must regularly
review and update CCIRs to ensure relevance throughout the conduct of operations. This is a forcing function
for questioning earlier assumptions made during planning that may no longer be valid. (See ADP 2-0 and
ADP 6-0 for more detailed descriptions of what constitutes CCIR.)
8-22. Commanders and staffs remain alert to exceptional information during operations. Exceptional
information results from an unexpected event or opportunity, or a new threat, which directly affects the
success of operations. It would have been a CCIR if it had been foreseen. Identifying exceptional information
requires initiative from subordinates, shared understanding of the situation, a thorough understanding of the
commander’s intent, and the exercise of judgement based on experience. |
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COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING DEGRADED OR DENIED COMMUNICATIONS
8-23. U.S. adversaries, including Russia and China, have demonstrated the ability to contest communications
in the electromagnetic spectrum and degrade friendly C2. Degraded connectivity to a secure communications
network poses risks to situational understanding, C2, and ultimately mission accomplishment. Army forces
must be prepared to continue operations and achieve mission objectives when out of contact with higher
echelons or adjacent units. They should assume intermittent rather than continuous connectivity during the
course of operations. A mission command approach to C2 empowers subordinate leaders to act within the
commander’s intent with degraded communications, reporting their new situation when able to do so.
8-24. Exercising C2 with degraded connectivity does not begin when communications break down or when
a crisis develops. It must be trained and rehearsed as part of an overall cultural norm designed to make
friendly forces more difficult to detect. Commanders ensure that staffs are trained on analog and manual C2,
and that units have rehearsed reliable primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communications plans.
During extended periods of communication breakdown, C2 becomes more difficult as shared understanding
of a situation deteriorates over time. To maintain C2 with degraded communication, personnel should be
trained and proficient in—
(cid:122) Employing all available C2 systems.
(cid:122) Operating dispersed command posts.
(cid:122) Maintaining an other-than-digital common operational picture (COP).
(cid:122) Managing information with analog processes.
(cid:122) Monitoring communications channels and crosstalk across echelons.
(cid:122) Maintaining manual running staff estimates.
(cid:122) Conducting command post battle drills.
8-25. Army forces improve readiness for degraded communications by decreasing vulnerabilities and
preparing appropriately. Units decrease their vulnerability through electromagnetic protection, including
emission control, electromagnetic masking, electromagnetic hardening, and electromagnetic security. (See
FM 3-12 for more information on electromagnetic protection.) Units practice degraded communications
during training and rehearsals, including those that involve allies, and they use the mission command
approach to C2 during garrison events. Ultimately, the solution to degraded communications is mission
command and training. Even under severely degraded conditions, Army forces continue to make decisions
and act in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen
opportunities arise.
8-26. All leaders must be prepared to take action and make timely decisions when communication is not
possible. The commander responsible for a decision may not be available to make that decision for a variety
of reasons, such as jammed communications, the loss of a command post, or being killed by the enemy. In
all cases, the senior leader able to communicate must be ready to take charge and make the best decisions
possible based on available information so operations can continue. The actions of Navy pilots in a degraded
communications environment during the battle of Midway demonstrated the effectiveness of exercising
disciplined initiative. |
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Initiative in the Absence of Orders – Naval Bombers at Midway
On 4 June 1942, American naval aviators, acting on initiative and without
communications from higher echelon headquarters, struck a major blow in the Pacific
War at the Battle of Midway. The Japanese First Air Fleet, known as Kido Butai,
launched a massive raid against Midway Island, causing significant damage. The
American carriers Hornet, Enterprise, and Yorktown launched unsynchronized strikes
against Kido Butai by several different air groups. Once aloft these carrier groups were
soon beyond radio range of their ships and had to rely on prior intelligence, intuition,
and luck to find the enemy.
Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, commander of Torpedo 8 (Hornet), believed
his air group commander was leading the group on an incorrect heading. He broke
formation and led his squadron on another course. They found Kido Butai and
attacked, but the entire squadron was shot down because it had no fighter cover. The
torpedo bombers of Torpedo 6 (Enterprise) followed Waldron’s squadron and also
suffered heavy losses without scoring a hit. The dive bombers of Bombing 6
(Enterprise) and Scouting 6 (Enterprise) had launched earlier in the day and arrived at
their designated coordinates without finding the enemy. Lieutenant Commander
Clarence McClusky, commander of Bombing 6, could not radio back to the Enterprise
for further orders. Exercising disciplined initiative, he began to search the area despite
running low on fuel and found a Japanese destroyer, which he followed to Kido Butai
just as Japanese fighters completed the destruction of Torpedo 8 and Torpedo 6. The
Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft guns were entirely focused on the low altitude
attacks from the torpedo bombers, leaving them vulnerable to a high-altitude dive-
bombing run. McClusky ordered an attack by Bombing 6 which, by chance, occurred
at the same time as Bombing 3 (Yorktown) arrived on the scene. The resulting action
by two squadrons acting on their own initiative to carry out the mission fatally damaged
three Japanese carriers, the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu, which sank later in the day,
putting the formerly outnumbered Americans at a 3:1 advantage in aircraft carriers.
The performance of commanders like Waldron and McClusky, out of contact with
higher commands and acting on their own initiative, led to victory at Midway.
DRIVING THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
8-27. Commanders employ the operations process to incorporate coalition and joint partners, empower
subordinate initiative, and to ensure authorities and risk acceptance are delegated to the appropriate echelon
required for the situation. Staffs and subordinate headquarters earn the commander’s trust by providing
relevant information, anticipating needs, and directing supporting actions. (See ADP 5-0 for more
information on the operations process and FM 6-0 for more on the role of commanders in operations.)
8-28. The major components of the operations process are planning, preparing, executing, and continuously
assessing the operation. Planning normally begins upon receipt of orders from a higher echelon headquarters
and continues through the execution of the operation. The commander and staff continually assess operations
and revise the plan through fragmentary orders. Commanders, assisted by their chiefs of staff or executive
officers, drive the preparation for an operation by allocating time, prioritizing resources, and supervising
preparation activities such as rehearsals to ensure their forces are ready to execute operations. During
execution, commanders and staffs focus their efforts on translating plans into direct action to achieve
objectives in accordance with higher commander’s intent. (See figure 8-1 on page 8-8 for a graphic depiction
of the operations process.) |
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Figure 8-1. The operations process
UNDERSTAND
8-29. An operational environment includes portions of the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace
domains encompassing the area of operations and area of interest, understood through three dimensions—
human, physical, and information. Understanding how capabilities employed from each of the domains
influence outcomes in the three dimensions is foundational to success during operations. Commanders
communicate that understanding to subordinates. Commanders collaborate with their staffs, other
commanders, and mission partners to accurate frame the operational environment encompassing the mission
objectives. Commanders must be comfortable with a certain degree of uncertainty and ambiguity within an
operational environment—delaying action while seeking perfect understanding may prevent a unit from
exploiting a fleeting opportunity or make it vulnerable to enemy attack.
8-30. Commanders, supported by their operations and intelligence staff sections, direct the collection of
information and allocate capabilities from as many domains as possible. They use operational and mission
variables, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and running estimates to help understand how
capabilities in each domain affect operations on land and vice versa. Competent commanders circulate
throughout their AORs as often as possible, collaborating with subordinate commanders and leaders while
observing the situation for themselves. Subordinates often possess a deeper or more nuanced sense of the
local situation or aspect of an operation than commanders. Direct exposure to conditions on the ground often
allows them to detect trouble or opportunity before a higher echelon staff member does. Maintaining shared
understanding is therefore a dynamic, ongoing process, since situations change as operations progress.
VISUALIZE
8-31. Commanders visualize a desired end state and potential solutions to solve or manage identified
problems. Commanders look up, out, and down as they develop their visualization of an operational
environment, relying on information and observations from superior and adjacent commanders, their staffs,
and subordinate commanders. An operational approach may require capabilities provided by external
organizations, and the effects delivered may be dependent on conditions in other domains.
DESCRIBE
8-32. Commanders describe their visualization to staffs and subordinate commanders to facilitate shared
understanding and purpose. Through collaboration and dialogue, commanders ensure subordinates
understand the visualization well enough to plan and conduct operations. Commanders continue to refine
their visualization throughout the planning and execution of an operation and balance frequent |
3-0 | 205 | Leadership During Operations
communication of this updated visualization with the need to provide sufficient time and freedom of
maneuver to subordinate leaders. Commanders’ descriptions of their visualizations should account for
interdependencies among various domains and the desired end states within those domains.
DIRECT
8-33. Commanders direct action to achieve results and lead forces to mission accomplishment. Decision
making and timely sharing of information ensures friendly forces reach a position of advantage relative to
the enemy. Commanders who are able to sense, understand, decide, act, and assess faster and more effectively
than enemy commanders can impose multiple dilemmas, requiring enemy forces to dedicate resources and
combat power which otherwise might further their objectives. Creating and maintaining this state of decision
dominance depends on the actions of the commander, informed by a knowledgeable and integrated staff.
Communications systems and other technologies can help enable decision dominance, but leaders must take
care to ensure they do not become overly reliant on technical solutions that may not always be available.
LEAD
8-34. Leadership is the most decisive element of combat power. Effective leadership can compensate for
deficiencies, while poor leadership can negate advantages. Commanders lead by personal example, the
quality of the guidance they provide throughout the operations process, and the actions they take during the
execution of operations. They focus on the decisions only they can make. Operations encompassing the
employment of capabilities from multiple domains demand rapid adjustments based on brief windows of
opportunity. Tactical patience is required to develop the conditions that create those opportunities over time.
When making or changing decisions, the commander’s will and personal presence provides the moral impetus
for necessary action in a timely manner. Friction is inherent in all military operations, and leadership exerted
by commanders and their subordinate leaders is what overcomes it.
ASSESS
8-35. Commanders, supported by their staffs, assess the situation before execution and throughout operations
to understand conditions and determine what decisions they must or are likely to make. They compare the
state of current operations to what was anticipated or planned, remain alert to variance from expectations,
and watch for information indicating an emerging threat or opportunity. Continuous assessment helps
commanders anticipate and adapt their forces to changing circumstances, enabling friendly forces to counter
unexpected threats or exploit opportunities. Effective commanders encourage cross talk and dialogue
between superior, subordinate, and adjacent staffs, and they conduct dialogue between commanders to share
observations and maintain situational understanding. They continuously review assumptions and cumulative
risk. Commanders must not be overly fixated on what is happening or may happen on the ground in the
physical dimension. Not assessing the relevant events occurring in other domains, or not considering the
information or human dimensions, increases the odds that enemy forces can achieve surprise.
ADAPTING FORMATIONS FOR MISSIONS AND TRANSITIONS
8-36. The conduct of successful operations requires leaders and units that are able to anticipate changes and
quickly adapt their formations, dispositions, or activities to meet those changes. Anticipating and adapting to
changes begins with commanders, but all leaders help create agile and adaptive units, develop subordinates,
inspire resilience in their people, and maintain mission focus in the face of adversity.
8-37. Changing conditions and transitions may impact the teamwork and cohesion of a formation; both
require adaptation and leader attention. Some examples include—
(cid:122) Task organization changes.
(cid:122) New or changing guidance.
(cid:122) Periods of intense privation and fatigue.
(cid:122) Mission transitions.
(cid:122) Mission failures or setbacks.
(cid:122) Reconstitution. |
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The example of VII Corps actions during the Gulf War demonstrate how teamwork and cohesion allow units
to rapidly adapt and act when situations quickly change.
Crosstalk in the Desert—VII Corps in the Gulf War
On the morning of 17 January 1991, the day after the start of U.S. Central Command’s
major air operation against Iraq, the VII Corps commander, Lieutenant General
Frederick Franks, was with the 1st Infantry Division as it honed tank and Bradley
gunnery skills in the desert of Saudi Arabia. While there, he received a spot report from
Brigadier General John Landry, Corps Chief of Staff, over the radio: “55 Iraqi tanks
have crossed the Kuwaiti Border, heading southwest toward Hafir al-Batin and are
engaging Egyptian coalition forces in what may be the beginnings of an Iraqi
preemptive strike.”
Within seconds, Colonel Johnnie Hitt, commander of the Corps’ 11th Aviation Brigade,
entered the net indicating that he had monitored the report and alerted two Apache
battalions that could respond in 30 minutes if necessary. At the same time, Colonel
Don Holder, commander of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Corps unit closest
to the reported enemy, called to notify Franks that he had issued orders for the entire
regiment to occupy blocking positions in the area and to make contact with the enemy
force with air and ground scouts. Those were the immediate and correct actions taken
by commanders as a result of monitoring the command network and having the
confidence to act—confidence developed through training, teamwork, and trust among
the key players of the VII Corps team.
8-38. Commanders are responsible for developing subordinate leaders and units that are capable of adapting
to the environment and the dynamic nature of operations. Training is the primary opportunity to do so, and
all leaders must work to be experts at training formations and developing subordinates during that training.
Successful adaptation and leader development depends on a command climate and learning environment that
encourages subordinates at all levels to become subject matter experts, think independently, and take the
initiative. Using a mission command approach, leaders foster a sense of shared commitment and involvement
in decision making. (See FM 6-22 for more information on leader development in a learning environment.)
Leaders help establish the conditions for subordinate adaptation by—
(cid:122) Developing leadership experience.
(cid:122) Fostering shared understanding.
(cid:122) Communicating with staff and subordinates.
(cid:122) Developing teams.
DEVELOPING LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE
Judgment comes from experience and experience comes from bad judgment.
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley
8-39. Commanders and leaders develop subordinates when they prepare and then challenge them with
greater responsibility, authority, and accountability. They prepare their subordinates to succeed at the next
level of responsibility, since during combat many subordinates will be required to move up and replace more
senior leaders who become casualties, usually with no warning. It is the individual professional responsibility
of all leaders to develop their subordinates. (See FM 6-22 for more information on leader development.)
8-40. Commanders and leaders may develop their subordinates by observing them in training, accepting
subordinates’ risk taking when the consequences of failure are not decisive, and providing accurate feedback.
Leaders allow subordinates to accept risk on their behalf. They ensure subordinates make analytic risk
decisions as time and circumstances allow, while informing their higher echelon command of the risks they
are accepting. During training, leaders may allow subordinates to accept excessive tactical risk as a teaching |
3-0 | 207 | Leadership During Operations
point to ensure they learn what types of risk are acceptable, which are not, and how to better assess risk. This
sort of coaching helps leaders gain trust in their subordinates’ judgment and initiative, and it builds
subordinates’ trust in their leader. During operations, leaders intervene when subordinates accept risk that
exceeds the potential tactical benefits to the mission. Leaders inform subordinates, either at the time of the
decision (if time permits) or in an after-action review, of the residual risk accepted and why. They ensure
that risk management does not become risk aversion.
8-41. Inculcating risk acceptance goes hand in hand with accepting mistakes made in good faith.
Subordinates who learn from bad decisions become better leaders, and commanders who underwrite those
mistakes create a command climate where subordinates learn and gain the experience required to thrive under
hardship. Leaders reinforce the importance of a bias towards action by highlighting the value of simply
making a decision during operations, including imperfect decisions. Even so, commanders do not repeatedly
underwrite subordinates’ mistakes resulting from repeated lack of judgment or an inability to learn. Nor do
they tolerate repeated errors of omission or inaction where subordinates fail to exercise initiative. Leaders
act to ensure subordinates learn from mistakes. Methods of doing this include—
(cid:122) Publicly discussing a mistake as part of an after-action review, including one made by the leader,
to determine a better way to achieve the same purpose.
(cid:122) Correcting a subordinate directly, in situations when there is no time for an after-action review or
to enable better shared understanding by the entire team.
(cid:122) Correcting the systemic problem that enabled the mistake.
8-42. Commanders prepare their subordinates to take
their place when required, and they use training events Commanders and leaders at all levels are in
and professional development sessions to reinforce the control of their subordinates during a battle
value and necessity of exercising bold, appropriate only to the extent that they can
initiative. In addition to allowing progress over time, this communicate. The senior leader able to
prepares leaders to quickly assume greater communicate with the majority of a formation
in a fight needs to quickly take charge when
responsibilities immediately during combat. If an
it becomes apparent that the normal chain of
echelon of command is destroyed or otherwise made
command is no longer functional. This
mission ineffective during combat operations, a
requires leaders to be prepared to operate
subordinate leader must assume command as quickly as
on radio nets and other C2 systems two
possible. This may include elements of a subordinate levels up when the need arises.
echelon commander and staff assuming the
responsibilities of a higher echelon headquarters.
8-43. Self-awareness enables leaders to recognize their strengths and weaknesses and then to take
appropriate action. Leaders develop self-awareness through self-critique and self-regulation during training
and operations. They actively seek feedback, adapt to change, and possess the humility to accurately examine
their own experiences, performance, judgment, and decision making. Under rapidly changing conditions,
leaders’ self-awareness is a critical factor in making accurate assessments of changes and their own personal
capabilities to operate effectively in those conditions.
FOSTERING SHARED UNDERSTANDING
8-44. Shared understanding enables a mission command approach to C2. Commanders communicate their
intent two echelons down, and leaders look two echelons up to gain an understanding of the commander’s
intent, priorities of effort, and desired end state for operations. Commanders ensure understanding of their
intent during continuous dialogue with their subordinates. When relayed in an environment of mutual trust
and shared understanding, the commander’s intent frees commanders to move about the battlefield knowing
their subordinates understand the end state and what must be done to achieve it, even as conditions change.
Such climates allow leaders to operate knowing subordinates accurately and promptly report both positive
and negative information. Prompt and accurate reporting is critical in maintaining the tempo of decentralized
operations by dispersed forces along multiple axes.
8-45. Establishing shared understanding begins with leaders who educate and train themselves and their
subordinates in applicable allied, joint, and Army doctrine and common tasks, techniques, and procedures.
Training develops the teamwork, trust, and shared understanding that commanders need to exercise mission |
3-0 | 208 | Chapter 8
command and that forces need to achieve unity of effort. This is especially important when units are task-
organized and have different command structures than they had prior to an operation.
8-46. Coalition, joint, and Army C2 systems can enable distributed operations in a permissive environment.
Some systems, however, will be degraded by enemy or other action to a point that they may not be usable.
In these instances, the previously developed shared understanding enables subordinate leaders to take
effective action on their own while still working towards their commander’s end state. (See paragraphs 8-23
through 8-26 for more information on degraded communications and leadership.)
COMMUNICATING WITH STAFF AND SUBORDINATES
More than 50 percent of battle command in VII Corps was non-electric. That’s because we
were a team forged together quickly during deployment. We practiced using intent.
Commanders talked to each other. We were inside each other’s heads.
Lieutenant General Frederick Franks
8-47. Written orders continue to have an indispensable place in exercising C2, particularly before operations
commence and during their early stages. Clearly written orders promote consistency of approach in all areas
of C2, and they provide a common frame of reference from which to depart. During operations, oral
communications tend to be more important than written communications, for reasons of time and because of
the importance of personal interaction while leading. Face-to-face communication is the most effective
method, because humans use more than words to express themselves and understand each other. It is,
however, impossible to communicate face-to-face with all subordinates during engagements and battles.
Operations at the BCT level and below during close combat are largely dependent upon rapid, efficient
tactical radio communications. The military bearing of leaders when interacting in person, and the tone of
voice they use during communications when not in person, have significant impacts on their subordinates.
8-48. Effective leaders take positive steps that encourage, rather than impede, communications among and
with their subordinates and staff members. They make themselves available for dialogue, and they are open
to new information. Leaders who react rashly to new information, or who create barriers to communication,
whether intentional or not, decrease the chances that they will receive the timely information needed to make
critical decisions, and they may hinder the initiative of subordinates. Failure to properly receive and act on
new information leads to mission failure.
DEVELOPING TEAMS
8-49. Successful operations require shared understanding across domains and effective teamwork with the
joint and multinational organizations operating in those domains. Developing teams requires continuous
effort. It begins during home station activities and continues throughout preparation for and execution of
operations. Leaders may serve with unfamiliar subordinate units or serve under an unfamiliar higher echelon
headquarters, and they may have their task organization change multiple times during execution. To
effectively understand capabilities and lead across domains, Army leaders must also build trust with elements
of the joint force and Army units they may never see to effectively employ their capabilities. They need to
interact effectively with host-nation, allied, and partner nation forces, along with interagency and
intergovernmental partners, to ensure unity of effort when bringing to bear effects controlled by those outside
the joint force.
8-50. Operational requirements may cause units to deploy with different command structures than those used
at home station. Often they will not have trained with the higher echelon headquarters that employs them.
Collaboration and dialogue across echelons can mitigate these potential obstacles to team building. Through
these interactions, commanders gain insight into the needs of unfamiliar organizations while also sharing
their own vision and understanding.
8-51. By circulating among subordinate units, commanders can assess readiness, get to know new units in
the task organization, and personally motivate Soldiers. Leaders also visit and build productive personal
relationships with civilian leaders in other agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the local population
in their AOs. Knowledge gained during these visits enables commanders to maintain situational
understanding and continuously update their visualization prior to and during execution. |
3-0 | 209 | Leadership During Operations
8-52. Different levels of training and cultures among organizations can pose challenges to building teams.
Army leaders apply their understanding of different cultures and agencies to place military efforts in context
and to serve on civil-military teams. To help build partnerships, commanders strive to have partners—
(cid:122) Represented, integrated, and actively involved in planning and coordinating activities.
(cid:122) Share an understanding of the situation and problems to solve.
(cid:122) Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goals.
(cid:122) Work for unity of effort toward achieving common goals.
8-53. Successful operations require leaders working with partners to develop a shared understanding of the
environment and a common commitment to solutions. Achieving unity of effort requires Army leaders to
have a high degree of cultural understanding and social skills. Without such understanding and skills, leaders
may fail to collaborate with diverse partners.
8-54. Quality leader development and training is required to grow and develop leaders capable of success
during operations. Deliberate investment in the abilities of individual leaders, teams, and units is foundational
to prosecuting those operations successfully across the competition continuum. (See FM 6-0 for more
information on C2, FM 6-22 for more information on leader development, FM 7-0 for more information on
training, and ATP 6-22.6 for more information on Army team building.) |
3-0 | 211 | Appendix A
The Principles of War
The art of war owns certain elements and fixed principles. We must acquire that theory,
and lodge it in our heads—otherwise, we will never get very far.
Frederick the Great
This appendix discusses the traditional principles of war. It then discusses the
principles of joint operations.
THE TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF WAR
A-1. The nine principles of war represent the most important physical, human, and information factors that
affect the conduct of operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The principles are not a
checklist. While considered in all operations, they do not apply in the same way to every situation. Rather,
they summarize characteristics of historically successful operations. Applied to the study of past campaigns,
major operations, battles, and engagements, the principles of war are powerful analysis tools. Joint doctrine
adds three principles of operations to the nine traditional principles.
A-2. Originally derived from J.F.C. Fuller’s published works for the British army, the principles have
essentially remained the same over the last century, standing the test of analysis, experimentation, and
practice in war. Fuller is not the only influence on the U.S. Army’s theory of victory, which is the sum of
over two centuries of experience and study on the art of war and warfare. Eastern and Western military
theorists have often debated constants in the nature of war, and the principles of war as currently described
are informed by many points of view. Though the theories of victory and operational concepts have evolved
to meet the demands of military operations throughout the decades, the principles have stayed relevant. Fuller
ended his work in 1926 with a valuable maxim. Quoting Napoleon Bonaparte, he wrote, “The whole art of
war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious
attack.” Fuller closed his 1926 work, The Foundations of the Science of War, by summarizing the quote in
three bold words: GUARD, MOVE, HIT.
A-3. In Army doctrine, a principle is a comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central
importance that guides how an organization approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations
(ADP 1-01). Principles apply to the conduct of operations in general and to specific organizations or
functions. The principles of war are just one example. The nine traditional principles are organized
deliberately, enabling a practitioner to begin with actions on the objective and cognitively work backwards
to through the process of organizing forces and activities to accomplish their mission. The principles are—
(cid:122) Objective.
(cid:122) Offensive.
(cid:122) Mass.
(cid:122) Economy of force.
(cid:122) Maneuver.
(cid:122) Unity of command.
(cid:122) Security.
(cid:122) Surprise.
(cid:122) Simplicity. |
3-0 | 212 | Appendix A
OBJECTIVE
A-4. When undertaking any mission, commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected
outcome and impact. The ultimate military purpose of war is the defeat of the enemy’s armed forces and will
to fight by the use of organized violence or the threat of violence. The principle of objective drives all military
activity toward that end, with the least possible employment of resources on secondary considerations. This
requires a clear vision of the desired end state. Army commanders need to appreciate the political purpose
that war aims to achieve, and they need to understand how military conditions contribute to national policy
objectives. Commanders cannot separate the objective from the considerations of restraint and legitimacy.
Without these considerations, military actions can make strategic objectives unobtainable.
A-5. Below the strategic level, objective means ensuring all actions contribute to the goals of the higher
echelon headquarters. The attainment of intermediate objectives must be direct, quickly and economically
contributing to the ultimate end state. Commanders designate objectives that are decisive to accomplishing
the mission. These become the basis for all subordinate plans. Actions that do not contribute to achieving the
objective should be avoided. Conversely, determining and denying enemy forces their objectives narrow
options for enemy commanders to freely maneuver and exploit emerging opportunities. Denying enemy
forces their objectives while achieving the friendly objective is the ultimate purpose of all operations.
OFFENSIVE
A-6. The principle of offensive suggests that offensive action, or maintaining the initiative, is the most
effective and decisive way to pursue and attain a clearly defined common objective. This is fundamentally
true across all levels of warfare. When it is necessary to defend, commanders and staffs maintain an
aggressive mindset that seeks to attack the enemy throughout the depth of its formations and sets the
conditions for offensive action. The offense ensures that a force captures and holds the initiative, maintains
freedom of action, and achieves results. It permits political and military leaders to initiate operations on their
own terms, impose their will on the enemy, set favorable conditions for battle, exploit vulnerabilities, and
react rapidly to changing situations or emerging developments. No matter the echelon, the side that retains
the initiative through offensive action forces its opponent to react, rather than act.
A-7. The offensive applies to the operations and activities Army forces conduct in each domain. An
operational approach focused only on land can be defeated by opponents exploiting an offensive approach in
the other domains. Likewise, an offensive approach should extend to the human and information dimensions
of an operational environment Commanders and staffs maintain an offensive mindset during competition,
crisis, and armed conflict.
MASS
A-8. Integrating all the elements of combat power and synchronizing their application against a decisive
point achieves mass. Mass can be achieved in any of the domains and is mostly tied to the destroy defeat
mechanism. Massing effects against one or more decisive points in one or more domains is typically an
element of convergence. Concentrating forces, which should be done for only as long as necessary to avoid
providing the enemy lucrative targets, is typically necessary to achieve favorable ratios during close combat.
The massing of effects, together with the proper application of the other principles of war, may enable
numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive campaign and battle outcomes. Mass, like objective, implies
that it is best to minimize the use of resources on secondary efforts. The massing of effects at any echelon to
produce a desired effect on enemy forces is crucial to enabling maneuver.
A-9. Denying enemy forces the ability to mass at the time or place of their choosing is another consideration
for applying the principle of mass. Forcing enemy forces to maintain distributed operations, rather than
massing effects or forces as they require for success, can keep an enemy force from achieving its objectives,
reorganizing, or consolidating gains.
ECONOMY OF FORCE
A-10. A commander must employ available combat power in the most efficient way possible, and there is
seldom enough combat power available to enjoy a favorable correlation of forces everywhere. Economy of |
3-0 | 213 | The Principles of War
force, a reciprocal of mass, demands the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It requires
deliberately accepting risk in selected areas to achieve relative superiority—or overwhelming effects—in
others. Economy of force involves the discriminating employment and distribution of forces. Commanders
never leave any subordinate element without a purpose. The allocation of available combat power to tasks
such as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations is measured to achieve mass
elsewhere. Accepting risk through economy of force creates opportunities to exploit.
MANEUVER
A-11. Maneuver is coordinated movement and fire in relation to enemy forces to put them at a disadvantage
with the least cost to friendly forces. Firepower, mobility, protection, and leadership enable maneuver.
Intelligence focuses–and sustainment enables–maneuver over distance and time. In the strategic sense,
maneuver has three interrelated characteristics: flexibility, mobility, and maneuverability. Flexibility must
characterize thought, plans, and operations to maintain the initiative during changing conditions with an
adaptive enemy. Flexibility enhances rapid reaction to unforeseen circumstances. Mobility is the capacity to
respond rapidly in crisis, move across strategic distances, and move to a position to conduct operational- and
tactical-level maneuver.
A-12. Tactically, maneuver is about moving forces and firepower into better positions relative to enemy
forces to gain a compelling advantage: the ability to destroy enemy forces unless they reposition while
making friendly forces more difficult to fix and destroy. It contributes to seizing, retaining, and exploiting
the initiative and preserving freedom of action. Maneuver allows commanders to concentrate and disperse
forces to keep enemy forces off balance and out of position. Conversely, limiting enemy maneuver keeps
them in positions of disadvantage, ideally leading to their eventual destruction or defeat at the time and place
of the friendly commander's choice.
UNITY OF COMMAND
A-13. This principle ensures that all efforts focus on a common goal. Unity of command means that a single
commander coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. Cooperation may produce
coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority is the most effective way to achieve unity
of effort. Ultimately a single commander is responsible for an objective at each echelon. Diffusing
responsibility otherwise creates misunderstandings during the stress of combat. Commanders deny enemy
forces unity of command by destroying or disrupting enemy C2, taking action to isolate enemy echelons, and
exploiting boundaries between enemy formations. This makes coordination of forces, collaboration of
planning, and cohesive operations more challenging for enemy commanders. Denying enemy forces unity of
command is crucial to denying them the ability to exploit emerging tactical opportunities.
A-14. The joint, interagency, and multinational nature of operations creates situations where the commander
does not directly control all organizations in the area of operations (AO). Achieving unity of effort under
such conditions becomes the goal, which requires coordination and collaboration among forces-even though
they may not be part of the command structure-toward a commonly recognized objective.
SECURITY
A-15. Security enhances freedom of action by protecting and preserving combat power while reducing
friendly vulnerability to surprise. Every Army formation is responsible for its own security. The application
of the principle of security does not suggest over-cautiousness or avoidance of risk but rather the
unwillingness to cede any advantages to the enemy unnecessary. Security is closely related to the operational
imperative that friendly forces operate under the assumption that they are under observation and always in
contact with enemy forces. Security relies on gaining and maintaining enemy contact on friendly terms, and
it is directly related to the principle of surprise. Preventing surprise by maintaining contact with enemy forces
enhances security and denies them opportunities to seize the initiative.
A-16. At the strategic level, security requires active and passive measures to protect Army forces from
espionage, subversion, and strategic intelligence collection. At the tactical level, it is essential to protection
and the preservation of combat power. Security results from the protective measures commanders take to
prevent surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, or sabotage. |
3-0 | 214 | Appendix A
SURPRISE
A-17. Surprise results from taking actions for which an enemy or adversary force is unprepared. It is a
powerful, but temporary, combat multiplier. It is not essential to take adversary or enemy forces completely
unaware; it is only necessary that they become aware too late to react effectively. When done well, surprise
can decisively shift the balance of combat power in favor of friendly forces. Concealing capabilities and
intentions is difficult. Rapid advances in strategic surveillance, information gathering, and data skimming, as
well as the pervasiveness of social and mass media compound the difficulty of large-scale marshalling and
movement of manpower and equipment.
A-18. Factors that contribute to surprise include speed of movement, employment of combat power the
enemy does not expect, operations security, and variations in tactics that create ambiguity. Commanders can
create surprise using changes to tempo, size of forces, direction or location of a main effort, and timing.
Deception can aid in the probability of achieving surprise, and at the tactical level it is best practiced by
showing enemy forces what they expect to see until the last possible moment and then doing something
different. Proactive friendly reconnaissance and security measures deny enemy forces opportunities to
surprise friendly forces.
SIMPLICITY
A-19. Guidance, plans, and orders should be as simple and direct as possible. Objectives and operations must
be presented in clear, concise, understandable terms. At the tactical level, simplicity of plans and instructions
contribute to successful operations and reduce the chances for misunderstanding and confusion. All factors
being equal, a simple plan executed promptly is preferred to a complex plan executed too late. Simple plans
allow better understanding and troop leading at all echelons, and they also permit branches and sequels to be
easily nested, understood, and executed. Joint, interagency, and multinational operations place a premium on
simplicity, accounting for differences in language and culture that can inherently complicate integration.
Simple plans and orders minimize the confusion inherent in command posts during operations. The more
complicated a plan is, the more vulnerable it is to friction. Simplicity addresses the fog and friction of war,
helps commanders and their staffs to maintain shared understanding, and accounts for the nature of war as a
human endeavor.
PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS
A-20. Joint doctrine adds three principles of operations (perseverance, legitimacy, and restraint) to the
traditional nine principles of war to account for operations other than conventional large-scale combat, such
as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. The additional principles are relevant to how the joint force uses
combat power across the competition continuum, particularly during limited contingency. Like the traditional
principles, these three do not apply equally across all joint operations but can be universally important and
directly relate to the laws of armed conflict. The additional principles are—
(cid:122) Restraint.
(cid:122) Perseverance.
(cid:122) Legitimacy.
(See JP 3-0 for more detailed information on the principles of joint operations.)
RESTRAINT
A-21. The purpose of restraint is to prevent the unnecessary use of force when better methods of achieving
the objective exist. Restraint informs legitimacy.
A-22. Destructive force can have a negative military and political consequences in some contexts. Therefore,
judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balance of security, the
conduct of military operations, and national objectives. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved,
thereby damaging the legitimacy of friendly forces and potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the adversary.
Sufficiently detailed rules of engagement from a commander tailored to the specific circumstances of the
operation can facilitate appropriate restraint. |
3-0 | 215 | The Principles of War
PERSEVERANCE
A-23. The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to achieve national objectives.
Perseverance recognizes that enduring outcomes may require enduring commitment of forces.
A-24. Perseverance involves preparation for measured, protracted military operations in pursuit of national
objectives. Some joint operations may require years to reach the desired end state. The underlying causes of
the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and
persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives is essential to success. This frequently involves diplomatic,
economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts. Army leaders contribute to
perseverance by managing the expectations of seniors and subordinates while setting reasonable objectives
to achieve over time.
LEGITIMACY
A-25. The purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral authority during the conduct of operations. It
is relevant across the competition continuum and the range of military operations. Legitimacy, a decisive
factor in the application of information in the operational environment, is based on the actual and perceived
legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various perspectives of interested audiences. These
audiences can include our national leadership and domestic population, governments, civilian populations,
and nations and organizations around the world.
A-26. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the coalition and host
government, particularly when the host or partner government's legitimacy is decisive to the operation. All
actions must be considered in the light of competing strategic and tactical requirements, and exhibit fairness
in dealing with competing factions where appropriate. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives
agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation and to the
perception of fairness in dealing with various factions. Restricting the use of force, restructuring the type of
forces employed, protecting civilians, and ensuring the disciplined conduct of the forces involved may
reinforce legitimacy. |
3-0 | 217 | Appendix B
Command and Support Relationships
Nothing is more important in war than unity in command.
Napoleon Bonaparte
This appendix describes command and support relationships for joint, Army, and
multinational forces.
COMMAND
B-1. Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort. Inherent
in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates, including the
authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Command is exercised in
both the administrative and operational branches of the chain of command, although the specific authorities
differ. Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve
themselves of the responsibility for the accomplishment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the
extent of authority is specified by the establishing authority, directives, and law. (See JP 1, Volume 2 for
more information on command.)
SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
B-2. A support relationship is established by a common superior commander between subordinate
commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. The support
relationship is used by the Secretary of Defense to establish and prioritize support between and among
combatant commanders (CCDRs), and it is used by joint force commanders (JFCs) to establish support
relationships between and among subordinate commanders. (See JP 1, Volume 2 for more information on
support.)
CHAIN OF COMMAND
B-3. The President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority and control of the armed forces through two
distinct branches of the chain of command, as described in JP 1, Volume 2: the operational and administrative
branches. The operational branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the CCDRs
for missions and forces assigned to combatant commands. The administrative branch runs from the President
through the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments.
B-4. The typical operational chain of command extends from the CCDR to a joint task force (JTF)
commander, then to a functional component or Service component commander. JTFs comprise forces from
more than one Service placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the JTF. Within their commands,
CCDRs and JTF commanders establish joint command relationships among forces as described in paragraphs
B-7 through B-12.
B-5. Under joint doctrine, each Unified Command includes a Service component command that provides
administrative control (ADCON) for Service forces assigned to that Unified Command. A Service component
command consists of the Service Component headquarters and all Service Forces assigned to the Unified
Commander. Army doctrine distinguishes between the Army component of a combatant command and Army
components of other joint forces. Under Army doctrine, Army Service component command (ASCC) refers
to the Army component assigned to a combatant command. There is only one ASCC within a combatant
command’s area of responsibility. The Army components of all other joint forces are called ARFORs. An
ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a
combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational |
3-0 | 218 | Appendix B
command. (FM 3-94) It consists of the senior Army headquarters and all Army forces that the CCDR
subordinates to the JTF or places under the control of a multinational force commander. The ARFOR
becomes the conduit for ADCON functions specified in unit deployment orders. (See FM 3-94 and JP 3-0
for more information on ARFOR.)
JOINT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
B-6. JP 1, Volume 2 specifies and details four types of joint command relationships. They are—
(cid:122) Combatant command (command authority) (COCOM).
(cid:122) Operational control.
(cid:122) Tactical control.
(cid:122) Support.
COMBATANT COMMAND (COMMAND AUTHORITY)
B-7. COCOM is the command authority over assigned and allocated forces vested only in commanders of
combatant commands or as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense in the Unified Command
Plan and cannot be delegated or transferred. COCOM only extends to those forces assigned or allocated to
the combatant command by the Secretary of Defense. COCOM is established in federal law by Section 164,
Title 10, United States Code (USC). Normally, the CCDR exercises this authority through subordinate JFCs,
Service components, and functional component commanders. COCOM includes the directive authority for
logistics.
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
B-8. The authority to exercise OPCON is exclusively derived from COCOM authority. Forces provided by
the Services and attached to a combatant command are typically in an OPCON command relationship.
OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving—
(cid:122) Organizing and employing commands and forces.
(cid:122) Assigning tasks.
(cid:122) Designating objectives.
(cid:122) Giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish missions.
B-9. OPCON normally includes authority over all aspects of operations and joint training necessary to
accomplish missions. It does not include directive authority for logistics or matters of administration,
discipline, internal organization, or unit training. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional
responsibilities and operational areas of subordinate JFCs. In two instances, the Secretary of Defense may
specify adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON in an establishing directive: when
transferring forces between CCDRs or when transferring members or organizations from the military
departments to a combatant command. Adjustments will be coordinated with the participating CCDRs.
TACTICAL CONTROL
B-10. TACON is inherent in OPCON. TACON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any
echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling
and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or
task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and
logistics support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise
specified in the establishing directive.
JOINT SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
B-11. Support is a command authority in joint doctrine. A superior commander establishes a supported and
supporting relationship between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect,
complement, or sustain another force. Designating supporting relationships is important. It conveys priorities
to commanders and staffs planning or executing joint operations. Designating a support relationship does not |
3-0 | 219 | Command and Support Relationships
provide authority to organize and employ commands and forces, nor does it include authoritative direction
for administrative and logistic support. (See figure B-1 for a depiction of joint command relationships. See
table B-1 for a listing of joint doctrine support categories.)
Note. The joint command relationship of ‘Support’ is distinct from Army support relationships.
See paragraphs B-23through B-28 for a discussion of Army support relationships.
Figure B-1. Joint command relationships
Table B-1. Joint support categories
Category Definition
General support Support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular
subdivision thereof (JP 3-09.3).
Mutual support That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their
assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their
inherent capabilities (JP 3-31).
Direct support A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to
answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance (JP 3-09.3).
Close support The action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently
near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the
supporting action (JP 3-31).
B-12. Support is, by design, somewhat vague but very flexible. Establishing authorities ensure both
supported and supporting commanders understand the authority of supported commanders. JFCs often
establish supported and supporting relationships among components. An Army headquarters designated as
the land component may be the supporting force during some campaign phases and the supported force in |
3-0 | 220 | Appendix B
other phases. A joint support relationship is not used when an Army commander task-organizes Army forces
in a supporting role. When task-organized to support another Army force, Army forces use one of four Army
support relationships.
OTHER AUTHORITIES
B-13. Some authorities exist outside joint command relationships. These authorities include—
(cid:122) Administrative control.
(cid:122) Coordinating authority.
(cid:122) Direct liaison authorized.
Administrative Control
B-14. Administrative control is direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in
respect to administration and support (JP 1, Volume 2). This includes organization of Service forces, control
of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness,
mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the
subordinate or other organizations.
Coordinating Authority
B-15. Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating
specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more military departments, two or more joint force
components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual granted coordinating
authority can require consultation between the agencies involved, but that person does not have the authority
to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred
to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through
which command may be exercised. (See JP 1, Volume 2 for more information on coordinating authority.)
Direct Liaison Authorized
B-16. Direct liaison authorized is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to
directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command
(JP 1, Volume 2). Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations, and it always
carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct
liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.
ARMY COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
B-17. Army command relationships are similar but not identical to joint command authorities and
relationships. Differences stem from the way Army forces task-organize internally and the need for a system
of support relationships between Army forces. Another important difference is the requirement for Army
commanders to handle the administrative support requirements that meet the needs of Soldiers. These
differences allow for flexible allocation of Army capabilities within various Army echelons.
ARMY COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
B-18. Table B-2 lists the Army command relationships and authorities typically associated with each.
Command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between units. The type of command
relationship often relates to the expected longevity of the relationship between the headquarters involved,
and it quickly identifies the degrees of operational and administrative control that the gaining and losing
Army commanders provide. Army command relationships include:
(cid:122) Organic.
(cid:122) Assigned.
(cid:122) Attached. |
3-0 | 221 | Command and Support Relationships
(cid:122) OPCON. (See paragraphs B-8 and B-9.)
(cid:122) TACON. (See paragraph B-10.)
Table B-2. Army command relationships
Then the inherent responsibilities are:
Authorities
Unless
CDR can
If modified,
Are Establish/ impose on
relation- Have May be ADCON assigned Provide maintain Have gaining unit
ship command task- responsi- position liaison communica priorities further
relationship organized bility establish
is— or AO to— -tions command
with— by— goes -ed by—
by— with— or support
through
relationship
—
of—
Attached;
Organic Organic Organic OPCON;
Organic Organic HQ Organic HQ N/A N/A
HQ HQ HQ TACON; GS;
GSR; R; DS
Attached;
Gaining Gaining Gaining OPCON;
Assigned Gaining HQ Gaining HQ N/A N/A
HQ HQ HQ TACON; GS;
GSR; R; DS
As Attached;
Unit to
Gaining Gaining required Gaining OPCON;
Attached Gaining HQ Gaining HQ which
HQ HQ by gaining HQ TACON; GS;
attached
HQ GSR; R; DS
Parent unit
and gaining
As As required
unit; gaining OPCON;
Gaining required by gaining Gaining
OPCON Gaining HQ unit may Parent HQ TACON; GS;
HQ by gaining HQ and HQ
pass GSR; R; DS
HQ parent HQ
OPCON to
lower HQ
As As required
Gaining required by gaining Gaining TACON; GS
TACON Gaining HQ Parent HQ Parent HQ
HQ by gaining unit and HQ GSR; R; DS
HQ parent HQ
ADCON administrative control GSR general support—reinforcing
ASCC Army Service component command HQ headquarters
AO area of operations N/A not applicable
CDR commander OPCON operational control
DS direct support R reinforcing
GS general support TACON tactical control
Organic
B-19. Organic forces are those assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. For
example, a brigade engineer battalion is an organic unit in a brigade combat team (BCT). The Army
establishes organic command relationships through organizational documents such as tables of organization
and equipment and tables of distribution and allowances. If temporarily task-organized with another
headquarters, organic units return to the control of their organic headquarters after completing the mission.
Assigned
B-20. Army assigned units remain subordinate to the higher echelon headquarters for extended periods,
typically years. Assignment is based on the needs of the Army, and it is formalized by orders rather than
organizational documents. Although force tailoring or task-organizing may temporarily detach units, they
eventually return to either their headquarters of assignment or their organic headquarters. An Army |
3-0 | 222 | Appendix B
headquarters is typically responsible for executing the ADCON responsibilities for subordinate Army units
under its command unless modified by a higher headquarters.
Attached
B-21. Attached units are temporarily subordinated to the gaining headquarters, often for months or longer.
They return to their parent headquarters (assigned or organic) when the reason for the attachment ends. The
Army headquarters that receives another Army unit through assignment or attachment assumes responsibility
for certain ADCON requirements, and particularly sustainment, that normally extend down to that echelon,
as specified by directives or orders. For example, when an Army division commander attaches an air defense
battery to a BCT, the brigade commander assumes responsibility for unit training, maintenance, resupply,
and unit-level reporting for that battalion.
B-22. Army commanders normally place a unit OPCON or TACON to a gaining headquarters for a given
mission, lasting perhaps a few days. OPCON lets the gaining commander task-organize and direct forces.
TACON does not let the gaining commander task-organize the unit. Neither OPCON nor TACON affects
ADCON responsibilities.
ARMY SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
B-23. Table B-3 lists Army support relationships. Army support relationships are not a command authority
and are more specific than the joint support relationships. Commanders establish support relationships when
subordination of one unit to another is inappropriate. If a unit has an established command relationship with
a headquarters, a support relationship is unnecessary as the command relationship already grants the gaining
commander all the authorities required. Commanders assign a support relationship when—
(cid:122) The support is more effective if a commander with the requisite technical and tactical expertise
controls the supporting unit, rather than the supported commander.
(cid:122) The echelon of the supporting unit is the same as or higher than that of the supported unit. For
example, the supporting unit may be a brigade, and the supported unit may be a battalion. It would
be inappropriate for the brigade to be subordinated to the battalion, hence the use of an Army
support relationship.
(cid:122) The supporting unit supports several units simultaneously. The requirement to set support
priorities to allocate resources to supported units exists. Assigning support relationships is one
aspect of command and control (C2).
B-24. Army support relationships allow supporting commanders to employ their units’ capabilities to achieve
results required by supported commanders. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported
and supporting relationship between two units—as in direct support—to a broad level of support extended to
all units under the control of the higher echelon headquarters—as in general support. Support relationships
do not alter ADCON. Any transfer of ADCON responsibilities should be specified in the order establishing
the support relationship. |
3-0 | 223 | Command and Support Relationships
Table B-3. Army support relationships
Then the inherent responsibilities are:
Authorities
a CDR can
Are
Have impose on
If relation- command May be Receives assigned Provide Establish/ Have gaining
ship is— relation- task- sustain- position or liaison maintain priorities unit further
organiz- ment an area of communica- establish
ship to— command
ed by— from— operations tions with— ed by—
with— or support
by—
relation-
ship by—
Parent HQ;
Direct Parent Parent Supported Supported Supported
Parent HQ supported See note.
support HQ HQ HQ HQ HQ
HQ
Parent HQ; Reinforced
Parent Parent Reinforced Reinforced Not
Reinforcing Parent HQ reinforced HQ; then
HQ HQ HQ HQ applicable
HQ parent HQ
Reinforced Reinforced Parent
General
Parent Parent HQ and as HQ and as HQ; then Not
support– Parent HQ Parent HQ
HQ HQ required by required by reinforced applicable
reinforcing
parent HQ parent HQ HQ
As As required
General Parent Parent Not
Parent HQ Parent HQ required by by parent Parent HQ
support HQ HQ applicable
parent HQ HQ
Note. Commanders of units in direct support may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and
elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.
CDR commander HQ headquarters
B-25. For the Army, direct support is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific
force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. A unit
assigned a direct support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but it is positioned
by and has priorities of support established by the supported unit. (Joint doctrine considers direct support a
mission rather than a support relationship.) A field artillery unit in direct support of a maneuver unit is
concerned primarily with the fire support needs of only that unit. The commander of a unit in direct support
recommends position areas and coordinates for movement clearances where the unit can best support the
maneuver commander’s concept of the operation.
B-26. General support is that support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular
subdivision thereof. Units assigned a general support relationship are positioned and have priorities
established by their parent unit. A field artillery unit assigned in general support of a force has all of its fires
under the immediate control of the supported commander or his designated force field artillery headquarters.
B-27. Reinforcing is a support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit. Only
like units (for example, artillery to artillery) can be given a reinforcing mission. A unit assigned a reinforcing
support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but it is positioned by the reinforced
unit. A unit that is reinforcing has priorities of support established by the reinforced unit, then the parent unit.
For example, when a direct support field artillery battalion requires more fires to meet maneuver force
requirements, another field artillery battalion may be directed to reinforce the direct support battalion.
B-28. General support—reinforcing is a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as
a whole and to reinforce another similar type unit. A unit assigned a general support—reinforcing support
relationship is positioned and has its priorities established by its parent unit and secondly by the reinforced
unit. For example, an artillery unit that has a general support—reinforcing relationship supports the force as
a whole and provides reinforcing fires for other artillery units. |
3-0 | 224 | Appendix B
OTHER RELATIONSHIPS
B-29. Several other relationships established by higher echelon headquarters exist with units that are not in
command or support relationships. These relationships are limited or specialized to a greater degree than the
command and support relationships, and they may be detailed in a command’s implementing directives.
These limited relationships are not used when tailoring or task-organizing Army forces. Use of these
specialized relationships helps clarify certain aspects of OPCON or ADCON. (See table B-4 for a listing of
other relationships.)
Table B-4. Other relationships
Relationship Operational use Established by Authority and limitations
TRO TRO is an authority The CCDR identified TRO allows the CCDR to provide
exercised by a in the “Forces for guidance on operational
combatant commander Unified Commands” requirements and training priorities,
over assigned RC memorandum. The review readiness reports, and
forces not on active CCDR normally review mobilization plans for RC
duty. Through TRO, delegates TRO to forces. TRO is not a command
CCDRs shape RC the ASCC. relationship. ARNG forces remain
training and readiness. under the command and control of
Upon mobilization of their respective State Adjutant
the RC forces, TRO is Generals until mobilized for Federal
no longer applicable. service. USAR forces remain under
the command and control of the CG,
USARC until mobilized.
TRA TRA is an authority for Higher commander. TRA includes responsibility for all
a designated facets of command that enable
commander to give commanders to accomplish their
direction to an mission. It does not include those
attached unit for leader installation command authorities
development, vested in the Army Senior
individual and Commander.
collective training, and
unit readiness.
DIRLAUTH Allows planning and The parent unit Limited to planning and coordination
direct collaboration headquarters. This is between units.
Note. See also between two units a coordination
paragraph B-16. assigned to different relationship, not an
commands, often authority through
based on anticipated which command may
tailoring and task be exercised.
organization changes
Aligned Informal relationship to Theater army and Normally establishes information
facilitate planning parent command. channels for coordination between
between a theater the gaining theater army and Army
army and other Army units that are likely to be committed
units identified in to that area of responsibility.
operations and
exercises in a specific
combatant command.
ASCC Army Service component command RC Reserve Component
ARNG Army National Guard TRO training and readiness oversight
CCDR combatant commander USAR United States Army Reserve
CG commanding general USARC United States Army Reserve Command
DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized |
3-0 | 225 | Command and Support Relationships
Training and Readiness Oversight
B-30. Training and readiness oversight (known as TRO) is the authority that CCDRs may exercise over
assigned Reserve Component forces when not on active duty or when on active duty for training. As a matter
of Department of Defense policy, this authority includes—
(cid:122) Providing guidance to Service component commanders on operational requirements and priorities
to be addressed in military department training and readiness programs.
(cid:122) Commenting on Service component program recommendations and budget requests.
(cid:122) Coordinating and approving participation by assigned Reserve Component forces in joint
exercises and other joint training when on active duty for training or performing inactive duty for
training.
(cid:122) Obtaining and reviewing readiness and inspection reports on assigned Reserve Component forces.
(cid:122) Coordinating and reviewing mobilization plans (including post-mobilization training activities
and deployability validation procedures) developed for assigned Reserve Component forces.
(See JP 1, Volume 2 for more information on training and readiness oversight.)
Training and Readiness Authority
B-31. Training and readiness authority (known as TRA) is the discrete authority, granted by a higher echelon
commander, for a designated commander to give direction to an attached unit for leader development,
individual and collective training, and unit readiness (to include maintenance, manning, and equipping). It
also includes responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned and attached personnel,
and all facets of command that enable unit commanders to accomplish their missions. It does not include
those installation command authorities vested in the Army senior commander. The commander executing
training and readiness authority has a responsibility to coordinate unit readiness with the applicable
installation Army senior commander.
Aligned
B-32. Alignment is an informal relationship between a theater army and other Army units identified for use
in the area of responsibility of a specific geographic combatant command. Alignment helps focus unit
exercises and other training on a particular region. This may lead to establishment of direct liaison authorized
between the aligned unit and a different ASCC. Any modular Army force may find itself included in an
expeditionary force package heading to a different combatant command. Therefore, Army commanders
maintain a balance between regional focus and global capability.
MULTINATIONAL COMMAND AND SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
B-33. Army forces routinely serve in multinational operations, and echelons above brigade headquarters may
form the core of a multinational headquarters. As such, it is important that Army commanders and staffs
understand multinational command structures and authorities.
B-34. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or
more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of the coalition or alliance. An alliance is the
relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives
that further the common interests of the members. Alliances have standing headquarters, organizations, and
standardized agreements for the conduct of operations. Examples include NATO and the Combined Forces
Command, Korea. Operations conducted with units from two or more allies are referred to as combined
operations.
B-35. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for a common action, and a coalition
is formed for a limited purpose and time. Coalitions are formed by different nations with specific objectives,
usually for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Operations
conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations. (See
FM 3-16 for further details on multinational operations.) |
3-0 | 226 | Appendix B
COMMAND AUTHORITY
B-36. The Army and joint force have doctrinal definitions for command and support relationships. However,
these definitions and authorities only apply to U.S. forces. In multinational operations, each nation determines
the authority it will delegate to multinational commanders for the employment of their forces. The nations
involved also establish national caveats. Command authority for a multinational force’s command is normally
negotiated between the participating nations, and it can vary from nation to nation. Command authority is
specified in the implementing agreements, and it may include aspects of OPCON, TACON, support
relationships, and coordinating authority. A clear and common understanding of what authorities are
specified in the implementing agreement is essential to operations. This is particularly important when similar
terms have different meanings to the various participants.
B-37. In many cases, coordinating authority may be the only acceptable means of accomplishing a
multinational mission. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an
authority by which C2 may be exercised. Normally, it is more applicable to planning than to operations. Use
of coordinating authority requires agreement among participants, as the commander exercising coordinating
authority does not have the authority to resolve disputes.
MULTINATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
B-38. All multinational operations have two chains of command regardless of structure or authority. The first
is a national chain of command extending back to national capitals. The second is the multinational chain of
command constructed by the United Nations, alliance, or coalition. As unity of command is all but impossible
given parallel national chains of command, multinational commanders strive for unity of effort. In doing so,
multinational commanders develop a high level of mutual trust and comfort with other national contingents.
B-39. United Nations forces, alliances, and coalitions create command structures that meet the needs,
diplomatic realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. No single command structure fits
the needs of all alliances, United Nations forces, and coalitions; however, the basic structures for
multinational operations fall into one of four types:
(cid:122) Integrated.
(cid:122) Lead nation.
(cid:122) Parallel.
(cid:122) Combination
B-40. Regardless of how a multinational force is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces
normally establishes a national component, often called a national command element, to ensure effective
administration of its forces. The logistic support element of this component is referred to as the national
support element.
Integrated Command Structure
B-41. Integrated commands have representative members from the member nations in the command
headquarters. Multinational commands organized under an integrated command help ensure the capabilities
of member nations are represented and employed properly.
Lead Nation Command Structure
B-42. A lead nation command structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control
of one nation. The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff
arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity.
Parallel Command Structures
B-43. Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. The multinational force
leaders must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be
accomplished through the use of coordination centers. Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single
multinational force command, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if possible. |
3-0 | 227 | Command and Support Relationships
Combination Command Structure
B-44. In a combination command structure, the lead nation concept and a parallel command structure exist
simultaneously in a coalition. This occurs when two or more nations are the controlling elements for a mix
of international forces. This structure is more desirable than the parallel command structure, but an effort to
achieve a total lead-nation concept for unity of command is preferred.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND AUTHORITIES
B-45. NATO is an example of a multinational organization with agreed upon structure and authorities. When
planning and conducting operations as part of NATO, it is particularly important for leaders to understand
the command relationships and the specified authorities, whether they are attached to a NATO command or
receiving NATO capabilities. It is also important to understand that NATO terms and acronyms are similar
to U.S. acronyms at times, but they often describe different authorities than joint and Army terms. NATO
has five command relationships:
(cid:122) Full command (FULLCOM).
(cid:122) Operational command (OPCOM).
(cid:122) OPCON.
(cid:122) Tactical command (TACOM).
(cid:122) TACON.
(See table B-5 on page B-12 for a listing of NATO treaty organization command relationships. See Allied
Tactical Publication 3.2.2 and AJP-3 for additional discussion of the authorities for each command
relationship.) |
3-0 | 228 | Appendix B
Table B-5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization command relationships
Authority FULLCOM OPCOM OPCON TACOM TACON
May further OPCOM OPCOM OPCON TACOM TACON
delegate
OPCON OPCON TACOM TACON
command
TACOM TACOM TACON
authority
TACON TACON
Task-organize X X
the assigned
element
Assign missions X X X (limited)
to the assigned
element
Assign tasks to X X X X (limited)
the assigned
element for the
purpose of
which it has
been assigned
Coordinate X X X X X
movement, local
defense, and
force protection
Planning and X X X X X
coordination
Administrative X
and logistic
responsibility
FULLCOM full command TACOM tactical command
OPCOM operational command TACON tactical control
OPCON operational control
Full Command
B-46. FULLCOM is the military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates.
It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The
term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in the national
sense. NATO or coalition commanders do not have FULLCOM over the forces assigned to them, since, in
assigning forces to NATO, nations delegate only OPCOM or OPCON.
Operational Command
B-47. OPCOM in NATO is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate
commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate OPCON and TACON as the
commander deems necessary. It does not necessarily include responsibility for administration or logistics.
Operational Control
B-48. OPCON in NATO is the authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces so that
commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks, which are usually limited by function, time, or
location, and to deploy assigned units, and to retain or assign TACON of those units. It does not include
authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. By itself, it does not include
administrative or logistics control. For forces allocated under OPCON, the gaining commander may not break |
3-0 | 229 | Command and Support Relationships
up the organizational integrity of the force for separate employment. Under OPCON forces assigned may
only be employed within certain constraints such as function, time, or location imposed by the higher echelon
authority.
Tactical Command
B-49. TACOM in NATO is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under that
command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. Under TACOM the gaining
commander may only allocate to the assigned force a specific task consistent for the accomplishment of the
mission and purpose assigned by the higher commander. Under TACOM the assigned force is allocated for
specific tasks, and it is normally allocated for a limited period. This prevents the gaining commander from
employing the assigned force in a role or manner not intended by the higher commander. When the task is
complete or the specific timeframe expires, the TACOM relationship with the gaining force ends.
Tactical Control in NATO
B-50. TACON in NATO is the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers
necessary to accomplish missions or assigned tasks. TACON is generally used to indicate those units that
will be located in another unit or formation’s assigned geographic boundaries, where the gaining unit
becomes responsible for coordination aspects within the shared AO. The gaining commander has authority
to coordinate local defense, including force protection and terrain allocation. |
3-0 | 231 | Appendix C
Contested Deployments
The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of
his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place
and the right time.
Carl von Clausewitz
This appendix discusses unit considerations for conducting deployment operations
contested by a peer threat. It begins with an overview and a discussion of threat
capabilities that can affect force projection. It then covers considerations when moving
from home station to port of embarkation, when in transit from port of embarkation to
port of debarkation, and when conducting reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration (RSOI) in a theater of operations. The appendix further expands upon the
homeland as a specific operational area where homeland defense and defense support
of civil authorities (DSCA) missions will likely be conducted as other units deploy. It
concludes with considerations for training and preparation that Army leaders can
incorporate into preexisting exercises or conduct as separate events.
FORCE PROJECTION AND THREAT CAPABILITIES
C-1. Army forces cannot expect to deploy without being challenged by the threat. For decades, U.S. military
forces conducted uncontested and generally predictable deployments from home stations to operational
theaters because threat actors lacked the capability to significantly affect deploying units at home station or
while in transit to a theater of operations. This is no longer the case. Peer threats possess the capability and
capacity to observe, disrupt, delay, and attack U.S. forces at any stage of force projection, including while
still positioned at home stations in the United States and overseas. Commanders and staffs must therefore
plan and execute deployments with the assumption that friendly forces are always under observation and in
contact.
C-2. A peer threat’s ability to impact U.S. military operations prior to arrival in an operational area extends
beyond directly targeting unit personnel and equipment. The Army relies on various interdependent
infrastructures, the majority of which it does not own or operate, making its domestic operations heavily
reliant on external resources. This includes the use of civilian transportation infrastructure to move from
installations to ports of embarkation, and it also includes home station military dependencies on civilian
infrastructure for power, communications, fuel, water, and other life support.
C-3. During armed conflict, Army forces should expect deployments to be contested by enemy actions in
all domains. Army forces will require greater emphasis on protection functions to conserve combat power
and should expect to provide forces to support homeland defense and DSCA operations. Defending U.S.
territory against attacks by state and non-state actors through an active, layered defense while simultaneously
seeking to project forces in a conflict with a peer enemy requires coordination across organizations, agencies,
and jurisdictions at the local, state, and federal levels.
C-4. Threat actions to contest a deployment are most visible during crisis and armed conflict, but they can
also occur during competition. Army forces deploy globally as part of operations during competition to meet
national objectives, assure allies and partners, and deter adversary malign actions. Adversary abilities to
disrupt these deployments create risks that leaders must assess and mitigate during movement planning and
execution. While a conventional attack on U.S. forces conducting operations during competition is unlikely,
the greater the perceived danger to their vital national interests, the greater the chance a peer threat will
contest U.S. military force projection. Leaders account for this intensified risk during planning and conduct |
3-0 | 232 | Appendix C
training to improve their units’ resilience and ability to mitigate risk, coordinate with appropriate partner
organizations, and respond effectively.
C-5. While a threat’s use of lethal capabilities to target the U.S. homeland or deploying forces is unlikely
before a crisis or the commencement of armed conflict, it may choose to use other methods to surveil and
disrupt Army forces during competition. Russia, China, and other threats possess wide-ranging capabilities
to conduct cyberspace attacks, disrupt space capabilities, and conduct information warfare to influence the
perceptions and behavior of target audiences. Attribution for these malign activities is challenging.
Adversaries take steps to deliberately obscure the source of these activities, and they take full advantage of
the ambiguity provided by operating below the threshold of armed response. Cyberspace attacks can be used
to compromise government, private sector, and military capabilities, potentially targeting military
dependencies on civilian infrastructure. Disruption of space capabilities can be used to hamper
communication and navigation capabilities of both military forces and the civilian infrastructure they rely
upon. Information warfare, including dissemination of or support for disinformation and misinformation, can
be used to attempt to fracture bonds among elements of society. This may include seeking to create or
exacerbate divisions between the military, government, private sector, and the public, both nationally and in
local municipalities.
C-6. Peer threats use a variety of means to understand and predict U.S. and allied force projection, including
open source and cyberspace collection. Army leaders should understand threat collection capabilities to
reduce the chance of effective detection. Different ways threat forces are able to collect on a division’s
deployment are described in this notional scenario.
Notional Threat Open Source and Cyberspace Collection
A division has received prepare to deploy orders. Division leaders considered this
deployment routine, and they failed to address operations security or force protection
at home station during the planning process. As a result, threat forces are able to
understand many details of the pending deployment through open-source and
cyberspace collection.
Threat intelligence agencies read aircraft tail numbers arriving and departing from air
bases that typically support division operations, analyzing observations posted by
hobbyists to assess likely missions and cargo. They also analyze publicly available
movement contracts for taking unit equipment from fort to port. Increased availability
of rental residences near the installation indicates that Soldiers are invoking
deployment clauses in their leases, and decreased availability of personal storage
units indicates Soldiers are storing their belongings for a deployment. Commercially
available applications and databases that track food ordering, cell phone presence and
activity, and other data are used to show a continued staff presence after normal
business hours at the division headquarters.
As the deployment gets closer, Soldier and family member social media posts increase
in volume and provide information about upcoming deployment timelines and
locations. Threat agents go through financial transactions and credit card data stored
on accessible servers to better understand specific unit and key leader timelines and
vulnerabilities. Threat agents also comb through Soldier and family member personal
data collected as part of application and device user agreements. Some of this data,
normally sold for advertising purposes, was purchased through shell companies on the
open market. Other credit, banking, and identity data was illegally obtained on the dark
web or through other illicit methods.
C-7. Threat forces will conduct information warfare operations to slow or otherwise degrade force
projection. These campaigns can vary in scope and size, and may target local communities, Service members, |
3-0 | 233 | Contested Deployments
Department of Defense (DOD) Civilians, contractors, and Soldiers’ family members. This includes, but is
not limited to—
(cid:122) Targeted threats through social media, email, or other means designed to frighten and distract
deploying Soldiers and their families.
(cid:122) Cyberspace attacks against Soldier and family member banks and credit agencies, cutting off or
disrupting access to personal funds.
(cid:122) Cyberspace attacks against civilian infrastructure (including transportation, supply, fuel, and
navigation) used to support military operations.
(cid:122) Targeted strikes against defense communications infrastructure to disrupt communications
between units, installations, and other unified action partners that assist in deployment.
(cid:122) Disinformation dissemination and misinformation support designed to—
(cid:131) Undermine the legitimacy of, or otherwise reduce support for, U.S. Government action.
(cid:131) Incite civil unrest in local communities and along rail and road lines of communications that
deploying forces need or plan to use to reach ports of embarkation.
(cid:131) Reduce trust in future official communications, from government, law enforcement, or
military officials, by releasing disinformation that appears genuine but contains incorrect or
confusing information.
C-8. Threat information warfare operations can be conducted at a very low cost compared to conventional
warfare methods, and they have global reach. At low levels, they can be used to hamper military deployments.
With sufficient scale or precision, they have the potential to completely halt effective unit deployment
operations. Targeted disinformation and threats delivered via social media to the family members of every
Soldier in a unit could potentially be devastating without prior planning, preparation, and trust building.
C-9. Commanders and their staffs must understand the potential effects of adversarial disinformation
operations on units and leaders. Targeted adversary or enemy activities in the information dimension could
rapidly degrade the performance of Soldiers, impacting their readiness. It could also degrade civilian
performance and affect the critical infrastructure they manage. Leaders combat this through public
communications both prior to and during deployment operations, coordination with relevant public affairs
personnel, and Service member and family preparation. This preparation can include incorporating response
strategies for disinformation dissemination into exercises and other training.
C-10. As U.S. forces transition from competition to crisis or armed conflict, threat actors will increase the
intensity and lethality of their tactics. This could include infrastructure sabotage by pre-positioned agents,
cyber or information attacks broader in scope (such as targeting an oil pipeline supplying a large region rather
than only a specific port), or long-range precision strikes using a variety of munitions. Concurrently, they
posture for, and may eventually escalate through, nonlethal and lethal actions of increasing intensity to
improve stand-off and prevent power projection from the U.S. homeland and other basing and staging areas.
Threat actors may also strike transport vessels along sea lines of communication while these vessels are en
route to a seaport of debarkation.
C-11. Peer threats may choose to support proxy forces or influence unwitting groups, including irregular
forces, saboteurs, sympathetic civil organizations, and criminals. These groups may be used to prevent timely
deployment operations by denying access to roads or facilities with crowds, protests, or looting. Use of these
forces may also allow for direct action against U.S. targets while masking culpability. Threat actors may
design these activities to affect the economy and global trade in addition to the political-military balance in
the United States or overseas. Additionally, other state and non-state actors may exploit the situation with
attacks in pursuit of their own objectives. These attacks may be conducted within the United States or allied
nations, in the theater into which Army forces are preparing to deploy, or in other, unrelated regions.
C-12. Leaders anticipate adversary activities in all domains while preparing for or conducting deployment
operations. Disruptions may not be preventable. They can, however, be mitigated through training,
preparation, and coordination with unified action partners. Effective mitigation in planning, preparation, and
execution ensures the Army provides the required forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs) and other joint
force commanders (JFCs). (See AR 525-93 for Army deployment policies and responsibilities.) |
3-0 | 234 | Appendix C
FORT TO PORT
C-13. As part of the strategic support area, home station installations, Reserve Centers, National Guard
Armories, and other designated points of origin are where force projection begins. They present targets that
enemy forces may attack to delay, disrupt, and degrade force flow into theater. Additional vulnerabilities are
present along all routes of movement, and at all potential sea and aerial ports of embarkation. Army forces
at all echelons must comprehensively assess emerging threat capabilities that will impede deployment in a
contested environment. To the greatest extent possible, formations should account for being under constant
observation through strict operations security, including the safeguarding of information on specific
deployment timelines and locations and maintaining dispersion of critical assets. The effects of attacks on
critical military, national, or private infrastructure could halt or delay unit deployment operations before units
have departed the United States.
C-14. Contested deployments are a national issue, and they require coordination with a large number of
civilian unified action partners to overcome the challenges peer threats can create. However, moving Army
forces from military installations to ports of embarkation is also a local and regional challenge. When routine
deployment is not possible, installations and units should have a plan to mitigate deployment disruptions.
C-15. Deployment disruption mitigation planning requires collaboration between the deploying unit, the
installation, appropriate federal, state, and local agencies (both government and law enforcement), and U.S.
Army Reserve and National Guard elements. Installations are responsible for building these relationships and
understanding how threats will likely affect their local areas. Installations do this by modifying their threat
working groups to incorporate relevant military, government, and other local and regional stakeholders. The
working group shares information about threats that promote civil unrest, cyber threats that impact critical
transportation infrastructure, and other threat activities that impact deployment operations. Key planning and
training considerations are—
(cid:122) The local, state, and federal authorities able to mitigate deployment disruptions.
(cid:122) Coordination and relationship building with local, state, and federal civilian law enforcement
agencies to ensure effective movement control from fort to port.
(cid:122) Understanding about critical infrastructure vulnerable to sabotage and unsuited for the movement
of heavy equipment along surface lines of communication, both road and rail.
(cid:122) Planning to use alternate railheads and marshalling yards and multiple lines of communication to
reach ports of embarkation.
(cid:122) Developing alternate surface transportation options to deliver unit equipment to a sea port of
embarkation when rail service is degraded or disrupted.
(cid:122) Establishment of fuel, maintenance, and rest locations along lines of communications.
(cid:122) Implementation of a communication plan that informs the public while maintaining operations
security.
(cid:122) Establishing specific cyber defenses for systems and associated data used to support movement.
C-16. Having an understanding of the requirements and developing mitigation plans to move from the
installation to the assigned port of embarkation can help overcome threat activities that could stop or hinder
deployments. An example of this is using Army heavy equipment transportation systems (known as HETS)
to move tanks, using contract carriers to move other tracked vehicles, and convoying wheeled vehicles to a
seaport of embarkation if rail transportation from the installation is degraded or disrupted.
C-17. To effectively implement a mitigation plan, deploying units and the installation must have an
understanding of the capabilities of civilian infrastructure (such as weight limitations on routes from the
installation to the port). This includes using data from, and potentially requires coordination with, the Military
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command about rail lines and roads designated as part of the strategic
rail and highway corridor networks. Planners must consider the security of critical nodes and terrain along
projected routes and conduct prior coordination with local and state authorities for security. Existing
adversary capabilities that could be used to target civilian infrastructure were exercised during EXERCISE
JACK VOLTAIC 3.0, conducted in 2020. |
3-0 | 235 | Contested Deployments
Adversary Impacts on Civilian Infrastructure
Exercises and research projects provide insight into how peer threats could disrupt the
deployment of Army forces by targeting civilian infrastructure. In the Army Cyber
Institute’s EXERCISE JACK VOLTAIC 3.0, military, interagency, municipal, state, and
commercial partners collaborated to assess interdependencies and available actions
by different stakeholders in response to such targeting.
During the scenario, the movement of military equipment was disrupted by a
combination of traffic delays; social media-incited protests; port access manipulation;
the manipulation of rail and vessel cargo manifests; natural gas and electrical
disruptions; and, ultimately, interference with the weight distribution for the automated
load plan for a ship in port (causing it to tip and dump containers into the shipping
channel).
None of the measures, taken individually, prevented movement of unit equipment from
reaching the destination by the required delivery date. Taken together, however, the
actions caused cascading effects that challenged Army unit and installation leaders,
port officials, and state and municipal government and law enforcement personnel.
C-18. Units establish and maintain an accurate common operational picture (COP) when subordinate or
supported units and equipment are en route to ports of embarkation. This includes maintaining visibility of
friendly forces and potential threat actions. It also encompasses awareness of partner civilian and military
entities supporting the deployment, including law enforcement, mobilized reserve component units, and air
and rail activities.
C-19. Deploying units and installations coordinate with agencies at ports of embarkation to take action should
an adversary’s efforts impact deployment operations. This coordination can help Army forces rapidly adjust
to emerging circumstances. Unit and installation personnel that manage deployments must rapidly develop
new transportation plans if needed, using previously developed branch plans as a start point.
C-20. When load planning, Army leaders and staffs must work with transportation authorities to ensure
sufficient enabling forces are paired with combat arms forces during transit. Army leaders, working with
transportation officials, develop methods to effectively load combat-configured forces in a manner that
maximizes available deck space on the transport vessel while making these units operationally relevant upon
arrival. Generally, it is desirable for tactical units to be configured as company teams or battalion task forces
with the requisite supporting enablers to allow immediate employment.
C-21. In most circumstances when threat actions have not significantly degraded port operations, the port
support activity stevedores load Army equipment once it arrives at the port of embarkation for transport to
the operational theater. In these circumstances, Army forces effectively lose physical control of this
equipment until it arrives in theater. Prior to departure for the port, Army forces coordinate with
transportation and port officials to ensure that unit containers, rolling stock, and other unit equipment sets are
loaded in ways to balance requirements for transport efficiency, combat readiness upon offloading, and risk
to readiness if a transport vessel or craft is destroyed en route.
PORT TO PORT
C-22. Ports of embarkation in the strategic support area, whether in the United States or overseas, are likely
targets of cyberspace attack, space capability degradation or denial, and other impacts designed to reduce
capabilities or capacity as U.S. forces conduct deployment operations into other theaters. During armed
conflict, enemy forces have the range and capacity to target ports with long-range fires, special operations
forces, and other capabilities.
C-23. Port authorities open, close, and manage port operations based on their pre-existing requirements, not
based on what is necessarily most advantageous to a given unit’s deployment requirements. This might
include requirements for other Army forces, the joint force, or other government or commercial entities |
3-0 | 236 | Appendix C
designated as priorities for a period of time. Early, frequent, and detailed coordination with port authorities
helps mitigate potential disruptions to deployment operations. Installations and units incorporate port
officials into deployment readiness exercises and other training events to improve mutual understanding and
effectiveness.
C-24. Adversary actions may directly or indirectly cause port officials to close their port or reduce operations.
If this occurs, and if authority is granted to use another port, commanders consider the impacts to both their
unit and the broader military effort, and to civilian requirements, before recommending or deciding to move
assets to another port of embarkation. Port operations conducted by other government agencies or civilian
officials may take priority over those that Army forces need to conduct based on current local, state, or
national requirements. Additionally, other ports may become congested or disrupted by the time Army forces
arrive. Adhering to the original plan while adapting to challenges at the port is generally less disruptive to
the overall deployment effort than moving to another port.
C-25. Depending on the level of conflict and assessed threat to their interests, peer enemies may attempt to
disrupt or destroy unit equipment while in transit. If all of a unit’s equipment is placed on one transport this
could lead to the catastrophic loss of land component capability for the JFC. Spreading unit equipment across
multiple transport ships increases the likelihood that some will arrive and be available for employment. While
this is not the most efficient or expeditious method to transport Army equipment, it helps ensure that the JFC
receives some employable level of Army tactical and operational capability.
C-26. During armed conflict, Army forces conduct additional protection activities based on enemy
capabilities. Effective targeting by enemy lethal and nonlethal effects will drive protection and mitigation
actions for unit personnel and equipment. Army forces maybe called on to provide additional protection
capabilities to support port authorities. Unit commanders and staffs should balance protection requirements,
both at the port and in-transit, against requirements to get as many critical capabilities to the required
operational theater as quickly as possible and requirements to have combat-ready units arrive at ports of
debarkation for employment by JFCs.
C-27. Whether conducting operations at a port during competition, crisis, or armed conflict, Army forces
coordinate with the relevant authorities to mitigate potential complications at the port. This includes—
(cid:122) Coordinating for products that provide a general layout of the port and flow of port operations.
(cid:122) Obtaining an understanding of transport ship loading.
(cid:122) Understanding port authority structure and decision making.
(cid:122) Understanding reliance of the port on local infrastructure to conduct operations and identifying
potential redundancies (for example, if power is lost can port gantry cranes load containers).
(cid:122) Planning to train Soldiers on port equipment, such as material handling equipment.
C-28. Additional considerations for port-to-port transport are the use of unit personnel to improve, monitor,
and maintain equipment readiness while in transit. Units should anticipate execution of vehicle maintenance
at the port, and leaders may place a limited number of unit personnel on a transport vessel to ensure enabling
and combat arms equipment is ready for immediate employment upon arrival in theater.
RSOI DURING CONTESTED DEPLOYMENTS
C-29. Historically, even during armed conflict, Army forces enjoyed high degrees of sanctuary in rear areas
to receive and organize forces before moving them forward. However, the long-range strike capabilities of
peer adversaries mean that sanctuary to conduct unimpeded RSOI operations in rear areas can no longer be
assumed. It is likely that strikes by peer threats will degrade or destroy port and other transportation
infrastructure vital to U.S force projection. This could cause Army forces to arrive in a disaggregated manner
and disrupt RSOI operations. While integrating U.S. forces in theater could be challenging, Army planners
must also consider host-nation requirements for logistics infrastructure. The host nation’s response to an
attack on its infrastructure, including its military mobilization, can affect freedom of movement for U.S.
forces. All of these challenges may require JFCs to alter their operational plans or stay in a defensive posture
for an extended period until sufficient combat power is built to enable offensive operations.
C-30. The theater army has primary responsibility for conducting RSOI for the entire joint land force. Army
equipment may arrive in a piecemeal fashion across numerous ports. Commanders must establish secure |
3-0 | 237 | Contested Deployments
communications across the distributed footprint, which allows staff coordination for unit personnel to meet
their equipment and facilitate ship offloading. Units provide port support teams with the right personnel and
capabilities to expedite port operations, such as licensed vehicle operators and communications. This helps
ensure ports of debarkation are not congested with disabled equipment or frustrated cargo. If some unit
equipment is lost in transit due to destruction of transport vessels, some tactical unit personnel may be
temporarily held at theater facilities to facilitate re-equipping efforts or be otherwise retasked by the
combatant command or theater army commander.
C-31. If ports are unavailable, are severely degraded, or do not have the draft required for deep draft strategic
sealift vessels, the JFC may consider joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations. JLOTS provides the
JFC with a limited capability to discharge strategic sealift ships. JLOTS requires a significant amount of lead
time to build the needed conditions for successful operations, and it entails significant risk that strategic
leaders will need to balance against its potential benefits. (See Chapter 6 of this publication or JP 4-01.6 for
more information on JLOTS.)
C-32. After reception is complete, staging occurs. Staging during force projection contested by a peer threat
requires understanding of threat standoff and friendly protection capabilities. Units must disperse and seek
concealment to improve survivability. Operation plans (OPLANs) should take into account the need for
expanded assembly areas to increase distances between vehicles and between unit assembly areas. As
deploying units assemble, efforts focus on preparing for future operations and integrating into the joint force.
Theater-specific training requirements may need to be conducted while afloat or at home station prior to
movement to the theater to minimize staging timelines.
C-33. Onward movement during contested deployments requires units to execute movement and sustainment
along multiple, dispersed routes. Road, rail, and other lines of communication must be assessed and classified
for use by arriving forces. Units can avoid aggregation, enhance survivability, and achieve balance by
directing personnel, equipment, materiel, and information flow at a rate that can be accommodated at every
point along the entire network, from origin to destination. Key to the onward movement process is speed of
movement to rapidly get combat power to the operational area for employment.
C-34. To facilitate rapid onward movement and overcome the likely degradation of Global Positioning
System (known as GPS) and other enabling transportation technology, units conduct convoy briefs, have
paper maps, and conduct detailed route planning. This helps prepare Soldiers for the unique considerations
of the host-nation transportation infrastructure, and it mitigates vulnerability to threat attacks. Theater-level
personnel may augment or conduct separate briefings to share information about current conditions and threat
tactics.
C-35. RSOI concludes with integration. Effective and efficient integration operations can reduce force
vulnerability by ensuring units quickly assess vulnerabilities and counter potential threats to forces,
infrastructure, and information systems as they transfer capabilities to an operational commander’s force.
When forces are fully integrated, operational control (OPCON) is transferred to the gaining unit. (See Chapter
4 and ATP 3-35 for additional information on RSOI operations.)
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL
AUTHORITIES
C-36. While Army forces are preparing to deploy during crisis response or armed conflict against a peer
threat, other units may be tasked to support homeland defense or DSCA. The circumstances that lead to
national authorities directing the deployment of Army forces may also necessitate operations to
simultaneously defend the U.S. homeland or support civil authorities. Additionally, the act of deploying
forces may incite enemy attacks on the homeland, causing some forces to be mobilized for homeland defense
or DSCA while others deploy forward to the operational theater. Homeland defense is the protection of United
States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and
aggression or other threats as directed by the President (JP 3-27). Defense support of civil authorities is
support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD Civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component
assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the
affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC status) in response to requests for |
3-0 | 238 | Appendix C
assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic
activities, or from qualifying entities for special events (DODD 3025.18).
C-37. Homeland defense and DSCA operations are conducted in a complex operational environment that
contains layers of different jurisdictions (federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local), many agencies and
organizations, the private sector, and several allies and multinational partners. Interorganizational
coordination and synchronization with governmental and nongovernmental entities may assume a level of
importance not matched in most overseas theaters of operations. Within the same city, Army forces may be
simultaneously conducting different missions, each with distinct authorities and requirements. This could
include adjacent units conducting—
(cid:122) Deployment preparation activities.
(cid:122) Homeland defense missions as directed by U.S. Northern Command or U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command.
(cid:122) DSCA in support of the Department of Homeland Security or other organizations.
C-38. Changes in an operational environment based on threat action or other circumstances may cause
changes to planned and ongoing operations. Army forces preparing to deploy to another theater may be tasked
to support U.S. Army North instead. Additionally, units conducting DSCA may be required to transition to
homeland defense, or vice versa. Commanders and staffs must remain agile to ensure they understand the
responsibilities and authorities for different missions, remaining in constant contact with other unified action
partners to ensure shared understanding. Depending on mission requirements and available personnel, this
may include agency representatives, liaison officers, and staff representatives able to collaborate, share
information, analyze ongoing activities, and participate in planning.
HOMELAND DEFENSE
C-39. When conducting homeland defense missions, U.S. Army North has been designated to serve as the
land component command for U.S. Northern Command. Depending on the threat, defending critical
infrastructure and maintaining force projection capability for joint and Army forces will require significant
augmentation and cross-command integration. Commercial infrastructure plays a critical role in enabling the
communications systems that directly support operations. This infrastructure may be damaged to the point
that military and supporting operations are adversely affected.
C-40. Protection functions are essential during any operation, and they take on specific importance during
homeland defense. Protection during homeland defense includes measures and activities not only conducted
for use by the joint force, but also for commercial, law enforcement, and government partners. These
protection functions can be supported through a number of activities. Planning for these operations should
include deception, mobility, dispersion, systems resiliency and redundancy, protective construction, warning
and surveillance, and operations security. Additional coordination will be required if Army units are tasked
to provide these capabilities for government and commercial partners or to build upon existing capabilities
so that partners can conduct them themselves.
C-41. Army forces support joint force and national efforts to provide the latest relevant information to the
American public while maintaining operations security, and they will also counter disinformation posted on
social media and distributed through other means. Timely, relevant, and effective responses are critical to
mission accomplishment when a peer threat is using high volumes of disinformation to achieve its objectives.
Unit commanders and other leaders follow their supported command’s public affairs guidance and act in a
supporting role to local, state, and federal agencies.
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES
C-42. Army support of civil authorities is vital to enabling other units that are deploying under contested
conditions. The range of DSCA responses by Army forces includes support provided by the Regular Army,
activated Army Reserve, and the National Guard in Title 32 United States Code (USC) or Title 10 USC
status. Even in the absence of orders or in uncertain and chaotic situations, units providing support in the
homeland enable core DSCA activities to provide support for domestic disasters, provide support for
domestic CBRN incidents, provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement, and provide other
designated domestic support. Domestic military operations are constrained by statute and policy to a greater |
3-0 | 239 | Contested Deployments
degree than military operations conducted abroad, and units should become familiar with requisite
authorities.
C-43. Homeland defense and DSCA operations may also be conducted in a wide range of circumstances not
tied to the preparation or execution of force projection to another operational theater. This can include
responses to both external and internal threats, natural or manmade disasters, support to law enforcement,
and other activities. (See DODD 3025.18, JP 3-27, JP 3-28, and ADP 3-28 for more information on DSCA
and homeland defense.)
TRAINING AND PREPARATION CONSIDERATIONS
C-44. Training and preparation to conduct deployment operations contested by threat forces will stress joint
and unified action partner interoperability and coordination. The Army and other unified action partners
conduct joint deployment exercises whenever possible, develop information and intelligence sharing
architectures, and collaborate during other preparation activities. Preparing for a contested deployment,
defending the homeland, and executing DSCA operations are not primary considerations for most Army
units. However, when preparing for large-scale combat operations, units should augment their training plans
to help prepare for deployments contested by threat forces and related activities. Examples include—
(cid:122) Conduct deployment readiness exercises that include port authority, law enforcement, and other
stakeholder participation from municipal, state, federal, and commercial organizations.
(cid:122) Conduct a road march to a training center rotation from an Army installation to simulate extended
convoy operations and test maintenance capability of Army equipment and personnel.
(cid:122) Conduct tabletop exercises with members of the installation threat working group to discover gaps
in planning and build a cohesive team.
(cid:122) Conduct training with local communities to test the ability of the installation and local law
enforcement to handle demonstrations that may occur due to misinformation.
(cid:122) Conduct training to improve Soldier and family member awareness of likely threat information
warfare actions and potential response strategies.
(cid:122) Coordinate to ensure installation and unit threat working groups, emergency response centers, and
cyber security measures are expanded to account for critical civilian dependencies, including
reliance on civilian infrastructure.
(cid:122) Establish and test a primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (known as PACE)
communication plan among key Army units, installations, armories, and unified action partners
that facilitate deployment operations.
(cid:122) Identify requisite command and logistics nodes along primary and alternate routes to ports of
embarkation, across multiple modes of transportation if appropriate.
(cid:122) Prepare numerous road march plans to compensate for degraded or disrupted lines of
communications.
(cid:122) Maintain port overview packages for likely ports of embarkation.
(cid:122) Build and implement an installation strategic communication plan that informs the public while
maintaining operations security.
(cid:122) Prepare Soldiers and family members for extended periods of no direct connectivity during initial
stages of crisis or armed conflict to maintain operations security.
(cid:122) Create plans for direct communication between Army installations and family members during
the initial stages of a crisis or armed conflict to help mitigate the effects of threat disinformation
and answer family questions.
(cid:122) Ensure ready access to relief funds and supplies for dependents in case of threat attacks against
financial institutions.
(cid:122) Work with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to build relationships and understand
requirements if later tasked to conduct homeland defense or DSCA. |
3-0 | 241 | Source Notes
This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it
lists the page number followed by the paragraph number. All websites accessed on 23
August 2022.
1-1 “War is thus an act…”; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 75.
1-3 “We don’t maintain…” Ronald Reagan, “Radio Address to the Nation on the Observance of
Armed Forces Day.” (21 May 1983). Available at
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/radio-address-nation-observance-armed-
forces-day.
1-5. “[We] now need another…” Barbara W. Tuchman, “Generalship,” Parameters, The US Army
War College Quarterly: Parameters, Volume 2, Number 1 (1972). Available at
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol2/iss1/18/.
1-16 “Since men live upon…”: Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 16.
2-1 “If you know the enemy and know yourself…” Sun Tzu quoted in Thomas R. Phillips, ed.,
Roots of Strategy (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985), 50.
2-9 Systems Warfare and Sanctuary: Eastern Ukraine, 2014. Vignette adapted from Army
University Press staff, unpublished text, 2017.
2-12 “[S]eparate ground, air…”; Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Special Message to the Congress on
Reorganization of the Defense Establishment, 3 April 1958.” Available at
https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/eisenhowers/quotes.
3-1 “There are not more …”; Sun Tzu, quoted in Thomas R. Phillips, ed., Roots of Strategy
(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985), 28.
3-2 “The art of war…”; Infantry in Battle by The Infantry Journal Inc. (Washington, DC, 1939),
1.Available at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-
books/infantry-in-battle.pdf.
3-13 Second Nagorno Karabakh War: September–November 2020. Vignette adapted from
Phillip Andrews, “Lessons from the Nagorno-Karabakh 2020 Conflict” (Center for Army
Lessons Learned Catalog). August 2021.21-655. https://call2.army.mil/docs/doc18162/21-
655.pdf (accessed on 16 August 2022): 1, 3-5. Edward Erickson. The 44-Day War in
Nagorno-Karabakh: Turkish Drone Success or Operational Art? (Military Review. August
2021.) Available at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/img/Online-
Exclusive/2021/erickson/Erickson-the-44-day-war.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2022): 11.
Matthew Santaspirt and Luke Shabro, host. “Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second
Nagorno-Karabakh War.” (The Convergence: An Army Mad Scientist Podcast, episode 317, 1
April 2021.) Available at https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/317-top-attack-lessons-learned-
from-the-second-nagorno-karabakh-war/.
4-1 “In all history…”; Dwight D. Eisenhower on the formation of NATO. Available at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-opening-the-nato-meetings-paris.
4-5 Failure to Prepare for War: Philippines, 1941. Vignette adapted from Louis Morton, The
Fall of the Philippines (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1993), 14–15, 18, 32–
33, 35–36, 43–45, 48, 50, 457, 467, 560–561. Available at
https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-2-1/CMH_Pub_5-2-1.pdf. |
3-0 | 242 | Source Notes
4-9 “There is only…”; Winston Churchill, quoted in Field Marshall Alan Francis Brooke in
Diaries, 1939-1946. Available at
https://kingscollections.org/catalogues/lhcma/collection/a/br60-001/br60-05/br60-05-
1?id=1022&asId=as1.
4-10 Successful Engagement: State Partnership Program. Vignette adapted from the State
Partnership Program website, https://www.nationalguard.mil/leadership/joint-staff/j-
5/international-affairs-division/state-partnership-program/.
4-12 Liberia: OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE. Vignette adapted from
https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/16-22.pdf.
5-1 “The 1930’s…”; John F. Kennedy, Radio and television address to the American people on
the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, 22 October 1962. Available at
https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/historic-speeches/address-during-the-cuban-
missile-crisis.
5-7 Effective Response: OPERATION PAUL BUNYAN. Vignette adapted from Joint Chiefs
of Staff briefing folder “Korea–Operation Paul Bunyan” of the Presidential County Files for
East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, 1974–77, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Available at
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0324/1553751.pdf. Reed R. Probst
Negotiating with the North Koreans: the U.S. Experience at Panmunjom, 16 May 1977, U.S.
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA. Available at
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA042858.pdf.
5-10 Deployment Friction: Task Force Ironhorse in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.
Vignette adapted from Christopher D. Croft and Kelvin D. Crow, “Creatively Deploying the
Heavy Division: Getting the 4th Infantry Division to Iraq in 2003,” Army University Press
website, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/Browse-Books/iBooks-and-
EPUBs/Deploying-the-Heavy-Division/.
5-15 Crisis Response: Baghdad Embassy Attack. Combined Arms Doctrine Doctorate staff,
unpublished text, 2021.
5-16 “In the midst…”; Barbara Tuchman, Guns of August (New York: Ballantine Books, 1962),
485.
6-1 “The art of war…”; Ulysses S. Grant, statement to John Hill Brinton at the start of his
Tennessee River campaign, early 1862, in John H. Brinton, Personal Memoirs of John H.
Brinton, Major and Surgeon U.S.V., 1861–1865 (1914; reproduced Carbondale, IL: Southern
Illinois University, 1996), 239.
6-23 Defeat of the North Korean People’s Army, September 1950. Vignette adapted from
Department of Defense, Headquarters X Corps, War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite
15 August to 30 September 1950 (1950), 1–2. Available at
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll11/id/1569/rec/2; and Department
of Military Art and Engineering, United States Military Academy Operations in Korea (West
Point, NY: Department of Military Art and Engineering, United States Military Academy,
1953), II-1–II15. Available at
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll11/id/1330/rec/19.
6-26 Disintegration of Egyptian Defense: 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Vignette adapted from
George W. Gawrych, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory (Combat
Studies Institute: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 5–14, 27–36, 59–
65, 68. Available at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA323718.pdf. Historical Evaluation and
Research Organization, Analysis of Factors that have Influenced Outcomes of Battles and
Wars: A Data Base of Battles and Engagements, Vol. VI (report prepared for the U.S. Army
Concepts and Analysis Agency, June 1983), 203–221. Available at
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/b087722.pdf.
6-31 “Even in the defensive position...” Carl von Clausewitz, On War translated and edited by
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 357.
6-40 “For I am convinced...” General Donn A. Starry, Press On! Selected Works of General Donn
A.Starry Volume 1: Selected, edited, edited, annotated, and with an introductory essay by |
3-0 | 243 | Source Notes
Lewis Sorley (Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, First Printing, September 2009), 249. Available at
https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/a507478-Press-On-General-Starry-
Works-Vol-1-Sorley.pdf.
7-1 “The basic objectives…”; Chester W. Nimitz, “Employment of Naval Forces: Who
Commands Sea Commands Trade,” Monthly NEWSLETTER (March 1948). Available at
https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/title-
list-alphabetically/e/employment-of-naval-forces.html.
7-6 Faulty Assumptions—Defeat Across Multiple Domains in Malaya. Malaya and Singapore:
Faulty Assumptions—Defeat Across Multiple Domains, Army University Press Staff,
Unpublished text, 2017.
7-7 “Amphibious warfare requires…”; Henry K. Hewitt, quoted in JP 3-02.
7-10 “A landing on…”; Basil H. Liddell Hart, quoted in Vice Admiral George Carroll Dyer, The
Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Volume 1
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 318. Available at
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/FMFRP%2012-109-
I%20%20The%20Amphibians%20Came%20to%20Conquer%20-%20Vol%20I.pdf.
8-1 “Success ultimately…”; Colin Powell, It Worked for Me (New York: HarperCollins
Publishing, 2014), 18.
8-2 “One of the most…”; William Joseph Slim, Unofficial History (New York: Orion Publishing
Group, 1962. Reprinted by Pen & Sword Books), 156.
8-3 Commanding Forward—LTG Eichelberger at Buna. Vignette adapted from Thomas M.
Huber, “Eichelberger at Buna: A Study in Battle Command,” in Studies in Battle Command
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1995),
123-128. Available at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-
institute/csi-books/battles.pdf.
8-4 “The fog of…”; George S. Patton, quoted in Pat Williams, The Paradox of Power (Anderson,
IN: Warner Press, 2002), 168.
8-7 Initiative in the Absence of Orders – Naval Bombers at Midway. Vignette adapted from
The Battle of Midway Including the Aleutian Phase, June 3 to June 14, 1942, Strategical and
Tactical Analysis. Richard W. Bates Naval War College 1948, Available at
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA003054.pdf. “Battle of Midway, 4-7 June 1942.” Naval
History and Heritage Command. Available at https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-
topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1942/midway.html. H-072-1: Torpedo
Squadron 8's TBF Avenger Detachment in the Battle of Midway. Samuel J. Cox, Director
NHHC, May 2022. Available at https://www.history.navy.mil/about-
us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-072/h-072-1.html.
8-10 Crosstalk in the Desert—VII Corps in the Gulf War. Vignette adapted from TRADOC
Pam 525-100-1 [obsolete], Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Operations JUST
CAUSE and DESERT STORM (Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, TRADOC, 1992), 28. Available at
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll9/id/690.
8-10 “Judgment comes from…”; Simon Bolivar Buckner, as quoted by Omar N. Bradley in
“Leadership: An Address to the US Army War College, 07 Oct. 71,” Parameters 1, no. 3
(1972): 8. Available at
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=parameters.
8-12 “More than 50…”; Frederick Franks, “Battle Command: A Commander’s Perspective,”
Military Review (May-June 1996): 4–25. Available at
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p124201coll1/id/438/.
A-1 “The art of war…”; Frederick the Great, Unterhaltungen mit Friedrich dem Grossen.
Memoiren und Tagebücher von Heinrich de Catt, edited by Reinhold Koser, Leipzig, 1884.
B-1 “Nothing is more important...”. Napoleon Bonaparte, quoted in T.R. Phillips, Roots of
Strategy (Lanham, MD: Stackpole Books, 1985), 427. |
3-0 | 244 | Source Notes
C-1 “The end for which a soldier is...”. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 95.
C-2 Notional Threat Open Source and Cyberspace Collection. Combined Arms Doctrine
Doctorate staff, unpublished text, 2021.
C-5 Adversary Impacts on Civilian Infrastructure “Jack Voltaic 3.0”; Jack Voltaic 3.0: Cyber
Research Report (West Point, NY: Army Cyber Institute). Available at
https://cyber.army.mil/Research/Jack-Voltaic/. |
3-0 | 245 | Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and
joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent publication for
terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A2 antiaccess
AAMDC Army air and missile defense command
AD area denial
ADA air defense artillery
ADCON administrative control
ADP Army doctrine publication
AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AJP Allied joint publication
AMD air and missile defense
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
APS Army pre-positioned stocks
AR Army regulation
ASCC Army Service component command
ASOS Army support to other Services
ATP Army techniques publication
BCD battlefield coordination detachment
BCT brigade combat team
C2 command and control
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR combatant commander
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CCP combatant command campaign plan
CFLCC coalition forces land component commander
COCOM combatant command (command authority)
COP common operational picture
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
FDO flexible deterrent option
FID foreign internal defense |
3-0 | 246 | Glossary
FM field manual
FRO flexible response option
FULLCOM full command
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JLOTS joint logistics over-the-shore
JOA joint operations area
JP joint publication
JSA joint security area
JTF joint task force
MCRP Marine Corps Reference Publication
MCTP Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
MDTF multi-domain task force
METT-TC (I) mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations, and informational considerations
MIB-T military intelligence brigade-theater
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NKPA North Korean People’s Army
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OPCOM operational command
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SFA security force assistance
SFAB security force assistance brigade
SHORAD short-range air defense
STANAG standardization agreement
TACOM tactical command
TACON tactical control
TEC theater engineer command
TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data
TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSC theater sustainment command
UAS unmanned aircraft system
U.S. United States
USAFFE United States Army Forces in the Far East
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USC United States Code
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command |
3-0 | 247 | Glossary
SECTION II – TERMS
administrative control
Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration
and support. (JP 1, Volume 2)
adversary
A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may
be envisaged. (JP 3-0)
*agility
The ability to move forces and adjust their dispositions and activities more rapidly than the enemy.
air domain
The atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon
operations become negligible. (JP 3-30)
antiaccess
Action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to prevent an enemy force from entering an
operational area. (JP 3-0)
area defense
A type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain
for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. (ADP 3-90)
area denial
Action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force’s freedom of
action within an operational area. (JP 3-0)
area of influence
An area inclusive of and extending beyond an operational area wherein a commander is capable of
direct influence by maneuver, fire support, and information normally under the commander’s
command or control. (JP 3-0)
area of interest
That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent to it, and
extending into enemy territory. (JP 3-0)
area of operations
An operational area defined by a commander for the land or maritime force commander to accomplish
their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0)
area reconnaissance
A type of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or
enemy activity within a prescribed area. (ADP 3-90)
area security
A type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and
activities within a specific area. (ADP 3-90)
ARFOR
The Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a
combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational
command. (FM 3-94)
attack
A type of offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both.
(ADP 3-90) |
3-0 | 248 | Glossary
battle
A set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement.
(ADP 3-90)
breach
A synchronized combined arms activity under the control of the maneuver commander conducted to
allow maneuver through an obstacle. (ATP 3-90.4)
civil preparation of the environment
The continuous development of civil knowledge within an area of operations to help commanders
identify capabilities within civil society that can be integrated with operations for stability and security
activities. (FM 3-57)
civil reconnaissance
A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the
environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. (JP 3-57)
clearing
A mobility task that involves the elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is usually performed
by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire. (ATP 3-90.4)
close combat
Warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets.
(ADP 3-0)
*close operations
Tactical actions of subordinate maneuver forces and the forces providing immediate support to them,
whose purpose is to employ maneuver and fires to close with and destroy enemy forces.
close support
The action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported
force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action. (JP 3-31)
combat power
The total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an
enemy at a given time. (JP 3-0)
combined arms
The synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each
element was used separately or sequentially. (ADP 3-0)
command and control warfighting function
The related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of
combat power. (ADP 3-0)
commander’s intent
A clear and concise expression of the purpose of an operation and the desired objectives and military
end state. (JP 3-0)
common operational picture
(Army) A display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s
requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command.
(ADP 6-0)
contingency plan
A branch of a campaign plan that is planned based on hypothetical situations for designated threats,
catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions. (JP 5-0)
*conventional warfare
A violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions of nation-states. |
3-0 | 249 | Glossary
consolidate gains
Activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a
sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities.
(ADP 3-0)
*convergence
An outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains and echelons
against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against a system, formation,
decision maker, or in a specific geographic area.
countermobility
A set of combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural and man-made obstacles to
prevent the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver. (ATP 3-90.8)
cover
(Army) A type of security operation done independent of the main body to protect them by fighting to
gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body.
(ADP 3-90)
crisis
An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military
forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or
military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve
national and/or strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)
*cyberspace domain
(Army) The interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data,
including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, embedded processors and
controllers, and relevant portions of the electromagnetic spectrum (ADP 3-0)
decisive point
Key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a
marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 5-0)
*deep operations
Tactical actions against enemy forces, typically out of direct contact with friendly forces, intended to
shape future close operations and protect rear operations.
defeat
To render a force incapable of achieving its objectives. (ADP 3-0)
defeat in detail
Concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating the
entire force at once. (ADP 3-90)
defeat mechanism
A method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition.
(ADP 3-0)
defense support of civil authorities
Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD Civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD
component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC status) in
response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement
support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (DODD 3025.18)
defensive operation
An operation to defeat an enemy attack, retain key terrain, gain time, and develop conditions favorable
for offensive or stability operations. (ADP 3-0) |
3-0 | 250 | Glossary
deployment
The movement of forces into and out of an operational area. (JP 3-35)
depth
The extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results. (ADP 3-0)
destroy
A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is
reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform
any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-90-1)
direct liaison authorized
That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an
action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. (JP 1, Volume 2)
direct support
A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to
the support force’s request for assistance. (JP 3-09.3)
*direct support
(Army) A support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to
answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance.
*disintegrate
To disrupt the enemy’s command and control, degrading the synchronization and cohesion of its
operations.
*dislocate
To employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage in one or more domains, rendering the
enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant.
*domain
A physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting
capabilities and skills.
electromagnetic reconnaissance
The detection, location, identification, and evaluation of foreign electromagnetic radiations (energy).
(JP 3-85)
electromagnetic warfare
Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic
spectrum or to attack the enemy. (JP 3-85)
end state
The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 3-0)
*endurance
The ability to persevere over time throughout the depth of an operational environment.
enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADP 3-0)
engagement
A tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelon maneuver forces. (JP 3-0)
essential element of friendly information
A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise,
lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy
detection. (ADP 6-0) |
3-0 | 251 | Glossary
exploitation
(Army) A type of offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to
disorganize the enemy in depth. (ADP 3-90)
fires warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the adversary or
enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations. (ADP 3-0)
fixing force
A force designated to supplement the striking force by preventing the enemy from moving from a
specific area for a specific time. (ADP 3-90)
force projection
The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States, or another
theater in response to requirements for military operations. (JP 3-0)
force tailoring
The process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of
a joint force commander. (ADP 3-0)
forcible entry
Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition or forcing access into a
denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-18)
foreign internal defense
Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in
any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)
forward passage of lines
Occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving toward the enemy.
(ADP 3-90)
friendly force information requirement
Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting
capabilities. (JP 3-0)
gap
A ravine, mountain pass, river, or other terrain feature that presents an obstacle that may be bridged.
(ATP 3-90.4)
general support
Support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.
(JP 3-09.3)
*general support—reinforcing
(Army) A support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce
another similar type unit.
guard
A type of security operation done to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while preventing
enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (ADP 3-90)
homeland defense
The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure
against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. (JP 3-27)
*human dimension
Encompasses people and the interaction between individuals and groups, how they understand
information and events, make decisions, generate will, and act within an operational environment. |
3-0 | 252 | Glossary
*informational considerations
Those aspects of the human, information, and physical dimensions that affect how humans and
automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon, and are impacted by information.
information collection
An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets and as
well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future
operations. (FM 3-55)
*information dimension
The content and data that individuals, groups, and information systems communicate and exchange, as
well as the analytics and technical processes used to exchange information within an operational
environment.
integration
The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a
whole. (JP 1, Volume 1)
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil
considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. (ATP 2-01.3)
intelligence warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil
considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment. (ADP 3-0)
interagency coordination
The planning and synchronization of efforts that occur between elements of Department of Defense
and participating United States Government departments and agencies. (JP 3-0)
interoperability
The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and
strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)
interorganizational cooperation
The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States
Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military
forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the
private sector. (JP 3-08)
*irregular warfare
(Army) The overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across
multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an
adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.
isolate
To separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its
vulnerability to defeat. (ADP 3-0)
joint force
A force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating
under a single joint force commander. (JP 3-0)
joint operations
Military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command
relationships with each other, which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 3-0)
joint security area
A specific area to facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting lines of communications that
support joint operations. (JP 3-10) |
3-0 | 253 | Glossary
land domain
The area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime
domain in the landward segment of the littorals. (JP 3-31)
large-scale combat operations
Extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a
campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives. (ADP 3-0)
leadership
The activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the
mission and improve the organization. (ADP 6-22)
*lethality
The capability and capacity to destroy.
levels of warfare
A framework for defining and clarifying the relationship among national objectives, the operational
approach, and tactical tasks. (ADP 1-01)
lighterage
The process in which small craft are used to transport cargo or personnel from ship-to-shore using
amphibians, landing craft, discharge lighters, causeways, and barges. (JP 4-01.6)
lodgment
A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, makes
the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent
operations. (JP 3-18)
main effort
A designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission
success. (ADP 3-0)
maritime domain
The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the
littorals. (JP 3-32)
meeting engagement
A combat action that occurs when a moving force, incompletely deployed for battle, engages an enemy
at an unexpected time and place. (ADP 3-90)
military engagement
Contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and
those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to
build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence.
(JP 3-0)
mobile defense
A type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a
decisive attack by a striking force. (ADP 3-90)
mobility
A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while
retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. (JP 3-36)
mobility tasks
Those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of obstacles to enable freedom of movement
and maneuver. (ATP 3-90.4)
mobilization
The process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought to a state of
readiness for war or other national emergency. (JP 4-05) |
3-0 | 254 | Glossary
movement and maneuver warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage
over the enemy and other threats. (ADP 3-0)
movement to contact
(Army) A type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and to establish or regain
contact. (ADP 3-90)
*multidomain operations
The combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative
advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force
commanders.
multinational operations
A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually
undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)
mutual support
That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their
position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 3-31)
*national strategic level of warfare
The level of warfare at which the U.S. government formulates policy goals and ways to achieve them
by synchronizing action across government and unified action partners and employing the instruments
of national power.
offensive operation
An operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population
centers. (ADP 3-0)
operation
A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1, Volume 1)
operational approach
A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the
mission. (JP 5-0)
operational environment
The aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)
operational framework
A cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the
application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations.
(ADP 1-01)
operational level of warfare
The level of warfare in which campaigns and operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to
achieve operational objectives to support achievement of strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)
operational reach
The distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 3-0)
passage of lines
An operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s combat positions
with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. (JP 3-18) |
3-0 | 255 | Glossary
peace operations
Multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all
instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape
the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate
governance. (JP 3-07.3)
*physical dimension
The material characteristics and capabilities, both natural and manufactured, within an operational
environment.
principle
A comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an
organization approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations. (ADP 1-01)
priority intelligence requirement
The intelligence component of commander’s critical information requirements used to focus the
employment of limited intelligence assets and resources against competing demands for intelligence
support. (JP 2-0)
*protection warfighting function
The related tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards
to preserve combat power and enable freedom of action.
pursuit
A type of offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the
aim of destroying it. (ADP 3-90)
*rear operations
Tactical actions behind major subordinate maneuver forces that facilitate movement, extend
operational reach, and maintain desired tempo.
rearward passage of lines
Occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving away from the enemy.
(ADP 3-90)
reception
The process of receiving, offloading, marshalling, accounting for, and transporting of personnel,
equipment, and materiel from the strategic and/or intratheater deployment phase to a sea, air, or surface
transportation point of debarkation to the marshalling area. (JP 3-35)
reconnaissance
A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about
the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological,
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 2-0)
reconnaissance in force
A type of reconnaissance operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and
reactions or to obtain other information. (ADP 3-90)
reconstitution
(Army) An operation that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat
effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. (ATP 3-94.4)
redeployment
The transfer or rotation of forces and materiel to support another commander’s operational
requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization
stations for reintegration and/or out-processing. (JP 3-35)
*reinforcing
A support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit. |
3-0 | 256 | Glossary
*relative advantage
A location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an opportunity
to progress towards or achieve an objective.
relief in place
An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by
the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned
zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit. (JP 3-07.3)
reserve
That portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement to be
available for a decisive movement. (ADP 3-90)
retrograde
(Army) A type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy.
(ADP 3-90)
route reconnaissance
A type of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain
from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. (ADP 3-90)
screen
A type of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (ADP 3-90)
seabasing
The deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, sustainment, and re-employment of
joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the operational area. (JP 3-02)
*sector
An operational area assigned to a unit in the defense that has rear and lateral boundaries and
interlocking fires.
security cooperation
All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security
relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation
military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United
States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. (JP 3-20)
security force assistance
The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of
foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)
security forces
Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state. (JP 3-22)
security operations
Those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate warning of enemy
operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to
the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their protected forces.
(ADP 3-90)
security sector reform
A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it
provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 3-07)
*setting the theater
The broad range of activities continuously conducted to establish conditions for the successful
execution of operations in a theater. |
3-0 | 257 | Glossary
simultaneity
The execution of related and mutually supporting tasks at the same time across multiple locations and
domains. (ADP 3-0)
situational understanding
The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships
among the operational and mission variables. (ADP 6-0)
*space domain
The area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible.
special reconnaissance
Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or
diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or
operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces.
(JP 3-05)
stability mechanism
The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that
support establishing a lasting, stable peace. (ADP 3-0)
stability operation
An operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national
power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-0)
staging
Assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining materiel in
preparation for onward movement. (JP 3-35)
striking force
A dedicated counterattack force in a mobile defense constituted with the bulk of available combat
power. (ADP 3-90)
*support area operations
The tactical actions securing lines of communications, bases, and base clusters that enable an echelon’s
sustainment and command and control.
supporting distance
The distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and
prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation. (ADP 3-0)
supporting effort
A designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort. (ADP 3-0)
supporting range
The distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the
maximum range of the second unit’s weapons systems. (ADP 3-0)
survivability
(Army) A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand hostile
actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.
(ATP 3-37.34)
sustainment warfighting function
The related tasks and system that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extended
operational reach, and prolong endurance. (ADP 3-0)
synchronization
The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat
power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0) |
3-0 | 258 | Glossary
tactical level of warfare
The level of warfare at which forces plan and execute battles and engagements to achieve military
objectives. (JP 3-0)
tactics
The employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other.
(ADP 3-90)
task-organizing
The act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to
meet a unique task or mission. (ADP 3-0)
tempo
The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. (ADP 3-0)
*theater strategic level of warfare
The level of warfare at which combatant commanders synchronize with unified action partners and
employ all elements of national power to fulfill policy aims within the assigned theater in support of
the national strategy.
threat
Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States
forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADP 3-0)
troop movement
The movement of Soldiers and units from one place to another by any available means. (ADP 3-90)
understanding
In the context of decision making, knowledge that has been synthesized and had judgment applied to
comprehend the situation’s inner relationships, enable decision making, and drive action. (ADP 6-0)
unified action
The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and
nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1, Volume 1)
unity of effort
Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily
part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action.
(JP 1, Volume 2)
warfighting function
A group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish
missions and training objectives. (ADP 3-0)
*zone
An operational area assigned to a unit in the offense that only has rear and lateral boundaries.
zone reconnaissance
A type of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all
routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. (ADP 3-90) |
3-0 | 259 | References
All websites accessed 23 August 2022.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended user of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. May 2022.
FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 09 March 2021.
FM 1-02.2. Military Symbols. 18 May 2022.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
Most Department of Defense publications are available online: https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
Most joint publications are available online: https://www.jcs.mil/.
DODD 3025.18. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). 29 December 2010.
JP 1, Volume 1. Joint Warfighting. 29 June 2020.
JP 1, Volume 2. The Joint Force. 19 June 2020.
JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 26 May 2022.
JP 3-0. Joint Campaigns and Operations. 18 June 2022.
JP 3-01. Countering Air and Missile Threats. 21 April 2017.
JP 3-02. Amphibious Operations. 04 January 2019.
JP 3-03. Joint Interdiction. 26 May 2022.
JP 3-05. Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. 22 September 2020.
JP 3-07. Joint Stabilization Activities. 11 February 2022.
JP 3-07.3 Peace Operations. 01 March 2018.
JP 3-08. Interorganizational Cooperation. 12 October 2016.
JP 3-09.3. Close Air Support. 10 June 2019.
JP 3-10. Joint Security Operations in Theater. 25 July 2019.
JP 3-13.3. Operations Security. 06 January 2016.
JP 3-13.4 Military Deception. 14 February 2017.
JP 3-16. Multinational Operations. 01 March 2019.
JP 3-18. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 27 June 2018.
JP 3-20. Security Cooperation. 23 May 2017.
JP 3-22. Foreign Internal Defense. 17 August 2018.
JP 3-27. Homeland Defense. 10 April 2018.
JP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 29 October 2018.
JP 3-29. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 14 May 2019.
JP 3-30. Joint Air Operations. 25 July 2019.
JP 3-31. Joint Land Operations. 03 October 2019. |
3-0 | 260 | References
JP 3-32. Joint Maritime Operations. 08 June 2018.
JP 3-35. Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 31 March 2022.
JP 3-36. Joint Air Mobility and Sealift Operations. 04 January 2021.
JP 3-42. Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 09 September 2016.
JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 13 November 2014.
JP 3-57. Civil-Military Operations. 9 July 2018.
JP 3-60. Joint Targeting. 28 September 2018.
JP 3-68. Joint Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 26 May 2022.
JP 3-85. Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations. 22 May 2020.
JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 04 February 2019.
JP 4-01.6. Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore. 03 February 2017.
JP 4-05. Joint Mobilization Planning. 23 October 2018.
JP 5-0. Joint Planning. 01 December 2020.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Unless otherwise indicated, most Army publications are available online at https://armypubs.army.mil.
ADP 1. The Army. 31 July 2019.
ADP 1-01. Doctrine Primer. 31 July 2019.
ADP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-05. Army Special Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-07. Stability. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-19. Fires. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-37. Protection. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 July 2019.
ADP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.
ADP 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 31 July 2019.
ADP 6-22. Army Leadership and the Profession. 31 July 2019.
AR 10-87. Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units.
11 December 2017.
AR 525-93. Army Deployment and Redeployment. 22 October 2019.
ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 01 March 2019.
ATP 3-01.15/MCTP 10-10B/NTTP 3-01.8/AFTTP 3-2.31. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Air and Missile Defense. 14 March 2019.
ATP 3-01.81. Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques. 13 April 2017.
ATP 3-01.94. Army Air and Missile Defense Command Operations. 20 April 2016.
ATP 3-05.1. Unconventional Warfare at the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Level.
09 April 2021.
ATP 3-05.2. Foreign Internal Defense. 19 August 2015.
ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B. Urban Operations. 21 July 2022.
ATP 3-07.31. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations. 02 May 2019.
ATP 3-09.13. The Battlefield Coordination Detachment. 24 July 2015. |
3-0 | 261 | References
ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 10-10E.8/NTTP 3-011.37/AFTTP 3-2.46. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense.
13 May 2016.
ATP 3-11.37/MCRP 10-10E.7/NTTP 3-11.29/AFTTP 3-2.44. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Reconnaissance and
Surveillance. 31 March 2021.
ATP 3-13.3. Army Operations Security for Division and Below. 16 July 2019.
ATP 3-17.2/MCRP 3-20. B. 1 [3-21.1B]/NTTP 3-02.18/AFTTP 3-2.68. Airfield Opening:
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airfield Opening. 27 October 2018.
ATP 3-34.81/MCWP 3-17.4. Engineer Reconnaissance. 01 March 2016.
ATP 3-35. Army Deployment and Redeployment. 23 March 2015.
ATP 3-35.1. Army Pre-Positioned Operations. 21 April 2022.
ATP 3-37.10/MCRP 3-40D.13. Base Camps. 27 January 2017.
ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C. Survivability Operations. 16 April 2018.
ATP 3-57.20/MCRP 3-33.1C. Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Humanitarian
Assistance. 15 February 2013.
ATP 3-60. Targeting. 07 May 2015.
ATP 3-72/MCRP 10-10E.9/NTTP 3-72.1/AFTTP 3-2.65. (U) Operations in a Nuclear Environment.
07 March 2022.
ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8. (CUI) Combined Arms Mobility. 10 June 2022.
ATP 3-90.8/MCTP 3-34B. (U) Combined Arms Countermobility. 30 November 2021.
ATP 3-90.40. Combined Arms Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. 29 June 2017.
ATP 3-90.97. Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations. 29 April 2016.
ATP 3-90.98/MCTP 12-10C. Jungle Operations. 24 September 2020.
ATP 3-90.99/MCTP 12-10D. Desert Operations. 07 April 2021.
ATP 3-91. Division Operations. 17 October 2014.
ATP 3-92. Corps Operations. 07 April 2016.
ATP 3-93. Theater Army Operations. 27 August 2021.
ATP 3-94.4 Reconstitution Operations. 05 May 2021.
ATP 3-96.1. Security Force Assistance Brigade. 02 September 2020.
ATP 4-15. Army Watercraft Operations. 3 April 2015.
ATP 4-32. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations. 12 May 2022.
ATP 4-94. Theater Sustainment Command. 28 June 2013.
ATP 4-98. Army Field Support Brigade. 30 June 2021.
ATP 5-0.1. Army Design Methodology. 01 July 2015.
ATP 6-0.5. Command Post Organization and Operations. 01 March 2017.
ATP 6-22.6. Army Team Building. 30 October 2015.
ATP 7-100.3. Chinese Tactics. 09 August 2021.
FM 2-0. Intelligence. 06 July 2018.
FM 3-01. U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 22 December 2020.
FM 3-04. Army Aviation. 06 April 2020.
FM 3-05. Army Special Operations. 09 January 2014.
FM 3-07. Stability. 02 June 2014.
FM 3-09. Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations. 30 April 2020.
FM 3-11. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations. 23 May 2019.
FM 3-12. Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare. 24 August 2021. |
3-0 | 262 | References
FM 3-13.4. Army Support to Military Deception. 26 February 2019.
FM 3-14. Army Space Operations. 30 October 2019.
FM 3-16. The Army in Multinational Operations. 08 April 2014.
FM 3-18. Special Forces Operations. 28 May 2014.
FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013.
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. 13 May 2014.
FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 18 December 2020.
FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 20 October 2016.
FM 3-53. Military Information Support Operations. 4 January 2013.
FM 3-55. Information Collection. 03 May 2013.
FM 3-57. Civil Affairs Operations. 28 July 2021.
FM 3-63. Detainee Operations. 2 January 2020.
FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense. Volume 1. 22 March 2013.
FM 3-94. Armies, Corps, and Division Operations. 23 July 2021.
FM 3-96. Brigade Combat Team. 19 January 2021.
FM 4-0. Sustainment Operations. 31 July 2019.
FM 4-01. Army Transportation Operations. 03 April 2014.
FM 5-0. Planning and Orders Production. 16 May 2022.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 16 May 2022.
FM 6-05/MCRP 3-30.4/NTTP 3-05.19/AFTTP 3-2.73/USSOCOM Pub 3-33. Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces
Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence. 25 January 2022.
FM 6-22. Leader Development. 30 June 2015.
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare. 07 August 2019.
FM 7-0. Training. 14 June 2021.
MARINE CORPS PUBLICATION
Most Marine Corps publications are available online:
https://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/MCPEL.
MCTP 13-10M. Amphibious Embarkation. 14 January 2021. Available at
https://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/MCPEL/Electronic-Library-
Display/Article/2472180/mctp-13-10m/.
NATO PUBLICATIONS
Unless otherwise indicated, NATO documents are available at https://nso.nato.int/nso/nsdd/main/list-
promulg.
Most Standardization Agreements are available on the NATO Standardization Office website (user
registration required): https://nso.nato.int/nso/.
AJP-01. Allied Joint Doctrine. 28 February 2017.
AJP 3. Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations. 11 February 2019.
STANAG 2199. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. 15 December 2016.
UNITED STATES LAW
Most acts and public laws are available at http://uscode.house.gov/.
Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces. Section 164. Commanders of combatant commands:
assignment; powers and duties. |
3-0 | 263 | References
Title 22, United States Code. Foreign Relations and Intercourse. Section 2151. Foreign Assistance
Act.
Title 22, United States Code. Section 2751. Arms Export Control Act.
Title 32, United States Code. National Guard.
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CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, TRADOC, 1992. Available
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5/international-affairs-division/state-partnership-program/.
Tuchman, Barbara W. “Generalship,” Parameters, The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters,
Volume 2, Number 1 (1972). Available at
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol2/iss1/18/.
Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. New York: Ballantine Books. 1962.
Williams, Pat. The Paradox of Power. Anderson, IN: Warner Press, 2002.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD)
website at https://armypubs.army.mil/.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. |
3-0 | 267 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
methods during crisis, 5-4– transition to, 4-101–4-110
A
5-8
Army air and missile defense
accepting risk to create and
agility, 3-8–3-11 command, 4-78
exploit opportunities, 8-18–
defined, 3-8
Army command and support
8-22
air, 2-69–2-70 relationships, B-17–B-32
account for being under
air and missile defense, Army command relationships,
constant observation and all
provide theater, 7-52–7-53 B-18–B-22
forms of enemy contact,
3-56–3-68 air and missile threats, counter, Army echelons, 2-79–2-94
6-54–6-62
account for constant enemy Army echelons during
observation, 3-62–3-65 air domain, 1-93–1-96 competition, roles of, 4-55–
defined, 1-93 4-96
achieving convergence, 3-22–
3-26 aligned, B-32 Army echelons during crisis,
activities, joint, 2-55–2-57 amphibious operations, 7-58– 5--52–5-63
to achieve strategic goals, 7-63 Army field support brigade,
4--5–4-8 antiaccess, defined, 2-48 4--85
to control escalation, 5-7 antiaccess and area denial, Army force posture, 2-77–2-78
to counter a United States
defeat enemy, 7-52–7-62 Army forces, challenges for,
response, 4-9
approaches, defeating, 1--15–1-22
to mitigate U.S. deterrence,
6-79–6-86
5--8 Army forces in the theater,
to preclude United States anticipate, plan, and execute exercise command and
access to a region, 4-10– transitions, 3-85–3-90 control over, 4-64–4-65
4--11 applying, defeat mechanisms, Army operations, 1-1–1-8
adapting formations for 6-106–6-132 in maritime environments,
missions and transitions, mutual support, 6-39–6-44 7-1–7-79
8-36–8-54 the art of command, 8-5– Army strategic contexts, 1-65–
8-26
administrative control, defined, 1-77
the operational framework,
B-14 Army support relationships,
7--27–7-34
provide, 4-60 B-23–B-28
arctic region, 7-7–7-9
advantages, human, during Army support to the joint force
armed conflict, 6-32 area defense, defined, 6-187 during crisis, 5-15–5-19
human, during crisis, 5-14 area denial, defined, 2-49
Army-specific considerations,
information, during armed
area of influence, defined, maritime environment, 7-18–
conflict, 6-31
3-137 7-21
information, during crisis,
area of interest, defined, 3-138 art of command, and the
5-13
physical, during armed area of operations, assigning, commander, 8-1–8-4
conflict, 6-25–6-30 7-30 applying, 8-5–8-26
physical, during crisis, defined, 3-129 assess, 8-35
5-11–5-12 area reconnaissance, defined, assigned, B-20
relative, 5-10–5-14 6-138
assigned areas, 3-128–3-132
advantages during armed area security, defined, 6-150
assigning, joint operations area
conflict, relative, 6-24–6-32
ARFOR, defined, B-5 within an area of
adversary, activities to shape a armed conflict, 1-72–1-73 responsibility, 7-28
crisis, 5-5–5-6 and large-scale combat area of operations, 7-30
methods during operations, 6-1–6-171 land areas, 6-38
competition, 4-4–4-11
enemy approaches to, 6-8– assistance, humanitarian, 4-54
6-23 |
3-0 | 268 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
attached, B-21–B-22 operational, B-47 competition or armed conflict,
attack, defined, 6-230 tactical, B-49 transition to, 5-64–5-68
unity of, A-13–A-14
authorities, other, B-13–B-16 conduct large-scale combat
command and control, during operations, 6-89
B degraded or denied
conduct theater sustainment
battle, defined, 1-63 communications, 8-23–8-26 operations, 7-70–7-78
establish in maritime
battlefield coordination conflict, contingency planning
environments, 7-36
detachment, 4-82–4-83 for, 4-67-4-70
establish on land, 6-36–
breach, defined, 6-169 6-53 conflict type determination,
brigade combat teams, 2-90– exercise over Army forces 4-106
2-91 in the theater, 4-64–4-65 considerations unique to the
during competition, 4-96 of deep, close, and rear maritime environment, 7-10–
brigades, 5-62 operations, 3-160–3-162 7-21
during transition to post- command and control, consolidate gains,
conflict competition, warfighting function, 2-3–2-5 continuously, 3-93–3-95
6-265–6-267 defined, 2-3 defined, 1-74
multifunctional and command and support during armed conflict, 6-98–
functional, 2-92–2-94 considerations, 6-105
build allied and partner multinational, B-33–B-50 consolidating gains, 1-74–1-77
capabilities and capacity, command and support during competition, 4-97–
4-16–4-17 relationships, B-1–B-50 4-102
during crisis, 5-63
C command authority, B-36–B-37
contested deployments, C-1–
chain of command, B-3–B-5 command relationships, Army,
C-44
B-18–B-22
challenges, for Army forces,
joint, B-6–B-16 contingency plan, defined, 4-67
1-15–1-22
overcoming, 1-23–1-25 command relationships and contingency planning for crisis
authorities, North Atlantic and conflict, 4-67-4-70
chaotic, war is, 1-32
Treaty Organization, B-45– control, operational, B-8–B-9,
characteristics, defense, 6-179 B-50 B-48
offense, 6-222
command structure, control, strategic lines of
warfare, 1-35
combination, B-44 communications and key
China, 6-15–6-23 integrated, B-41 terrain, 6-69–6-74
civil preparation of the lead nation, B-42
control, tactical, B-10, 50
environment, defined, 4-70 multinational, B-38–B-44
conventional, and special
clearing, defined, 6-170 command structures, parallel,
operations forces
B-43
close operations, 3-147–3-151 integration, 2-63–2-65
defined, 3-147 commander, art of command
conventional warfare, 1-37–
during armed conflict, and, 8-1–8-4
1-39
6-240–6-244 commander presence on the defined, 1-37
in maritime environments, battlefield, 8-6–8-12
convergence, 3-12–3-14
7-32
commander’s intent, 8-13–8-14 achieving, 3-22–3-26
combat power, 2-15–2-31 defined, 8-13 defined, 3-12
defined, 2-15
common operational picture, coordinating authority, B-15
combatant command 3-52–3-55
coordination, interagency,
(command authority), B-7 defined, 3-52
4-30–4-35
combatant commander daily communicating with staff and
corps, 2-87–2-88
operational requirements, subordinates, 8-47–8-48
during transition to post-
4-59
competition, activities, 4-36– conflict competition,
combination command 4-54 6-261–6-262
structure, B-44 adversary methods during, roles during competition,
combined arms, 1-50–1-53 4-4–4-11 4-90–4-91
defined, 1-50 below armed conflict, 1-68 roles during crisis, 5-56–
command, B-1 roles of Army echelons 5-60
during, 4-55–4-96
chain of, B-3–B-5 counter air and missile threats,
full, B-46 6-54–6-62 |
3-0 | 269 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
countering weapons of mass enemy forces in detail, physical, 1-107–1-100
destruction, 4-53 3-101–3-105
dimensions, 1-106–1-117
countermobility, defined, 6-162 defend and control key terrain,
diplomatic mission, United
countermobility operations, during armed conflict, 6-63– States, 4-32–4-33
6-162–6-164 6-74
direct, 8-33
in maritime environments,
country team, 4-34–4-35
7-37–7-38 direct liaison authorized,
cover, defined, 6-151 defined, B-16
defense, by forward-stationed
create and exploit relative forces, 6-64–6-68 direct support, defined, B-25
physical, information, and characteristics of, 6-179 discipline, 8-17
human advantages in pursuit enemy, 6-223–6-227
disintegrate, 6-121–6-123
of decision dominance, protection support to the,
defined, 3-112
3-69–3-74 7-39–7-47
crisis, 1-69–1-71 purpose and conditions for, disintegration,
adversary methods during, 6-173–6-178 operational-level, 6-124–
5-4–5-8 support of civil authorities, 6-128
Army echelons during, C-42–C-43 tactical-level, 6-129–6-132
5-53–5-63 transition to, 6-252–6-254 dislocate, 6-112–6-116
Army support to the joint defense support of civil defined, 3-110
force during, 5-15–5-19 authorities, homeland division, 2-89, 5-61
contingency planning for, defense and, C-36–C-43 roles during competition,
4-67-4-70 defensive, operational 4-92–4-95
defined, 1-69
framework considerations, divisions during transition to
transition to, 4-101–4-110
6-191–6-217 post-conflict competition,
cyberspace, 2-73–2-74 operations, 6-172–6-219 6-263–6-264
domain, 1-101–1-105
defensive operation, defined, domain, air, 1-93–1-96
cyberspace domain, defined, 1-44 cyberspace, 1-101–1-105
1-101 defensive operations, types of, defined, 1-82
D 6-186–6-190 interdependence, 2-68–
2-76
decisive point, defined, 3-105 degraded communications, land domain, 1-83–1-87
command and control
deep operations, 3-142–3-146 maritime, 1-88–1-92
during, 8-23–8-26
defined, 3-142 space, 1-97–1-100
during defensive denied communications, domains, 1-82–1-105
operations, 6-194–6-198 command and control
during offensive operations, during, 8-23–8-26 driving the operations process,
8-27–8-35
6-235–6-239 deployment, 5-31–5-32
in maritime environments, defined, 5-31 E
7-31
depth, 3-32–3-36 echelons, Army, 2-79–2-94
deep, close, and rear defined, 3-32 integrating, 6-45–6-49
operations, 3-140–3-160
describe, 8-32 economy of force, A-10
command and control of,
3-160–3-162 designate, weight, and sustain electromagnetic
the main effort, 3-91–3-92 reconnaissance, defined,
defeat, components of enemy
designating a joint security 6-143
antiaccess and area denial,
6-75–6-86 area, 7-29 electromagnetic warfare,
defined, 3-101 destroy, 6-108–6-111 defined, 2-40
enemy antiaccess and area defined, 3-109 employment of forces, initial,
denial, 7-52–7-63 determination, conflict type, 5-49
mechanisms, 3-106–3-114 4-103 enable joint offensive
defeat in detail, defined, 3-104 develop, leaders, 4-24 operations, 7-52–7-63
defeat mechanisms, defined, developing, leadership enabling operations, 6-133–
3-106 experience, 8-39–8-43 6-171
applying, 6-106–6-132 teams, 8-49–8-54 end state, defined, 2-55
defeating, antiaccess and area dimension, human, 1-115– endurance, 3-27–3-31
denial approaches, 6-79– 1-117 defined, 3-27
6-86 information, 1-111–1-114 |
3-0 | 270 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
enemy antiaccess and area forcible entry operations, 7-55– information collection, defined,
denial, defeat components 7-56 1-80
of, 6-75–6-86 joint, 6-87–6-88
information dimension, 1-111–
enemy antiaccess and area foreign internal defense, 4-47– 1-114
denial, defeat in maritime 4-49 defined, 1-111
environments, 7-52–7-63 defined, 4-47
information warfare, 2-40–2-44
enemy approaches to armed fort to port, C-13–C-21
informational considerations,
conflict, 6-8–6-23
forward passage of lines, defined, 1-119
enemy courses of action defined, 6-159
initial employment, of forces,
unique to the maritime
forward-stationed forces, 5-49
environment, 7-14–7-17
defense by, 6-64–6-68 of forward-stationed forces,
enemy defense, 6-223–6-227 initial employment of, 4-110 4-110
enemy integrated fires fostering shared initiative, 8-15–8-16
command, 6-76–6-78 understanding, 8-44–8-46
instruments of national power,
enemy offense, 6-180–6-185 foundations of operations, 1-1– defined, 1-56
engagement, defined, 1-63 1-119 integrated command structure,
essential element of friendly friendly force information B-41
information, defined, 3-41 requirement, defined, 3-40 integrated fires command,
establish command and full command, B-46 enemy, 6-76–6-78
control, in maritime functional brigades, 2-92–2-94 integrating echelons, 6-45–
environments, 7-36 fundamentals of operations, 6-49
on land, 6-36–6-53
3-1–3-166 integration, 3-15–3-17
establish protected reception, conventional and special
G
staging, onward movement, operations forces, 2-63–
and integration, 7-65–7-69 gap, defined, 6-171 2-65
execute operation plans, general support—reinforcing, defined, 3-15
prepare to, 4-22–4-23 defined, B-28 of forces, 5-45–5-48
exercise command and control generating and applying intelligence preparation of the
over Army forces in the combat power, 2-1–2-94 battlefield, defined, 3-43
theater, 4-64–4-65 guard, defined, 6-152 intelligence warfighting
exploitation, defined, 6-231 function, 2-9–2-10
H defined, 2-9
extended deep area, 3-123–
3-126 homeland defense, C-39–C-41 interagency coordination,
during offensive operations, and defense support of civil 4-30–4-35
6-234 authorities, C-36–C-43 defined, 2-61
extended deep operations, human advantages, 6-32 interdependence, domain,
6-192–6-193 during competition, 4-29 2-64–2-76
during crisis, 5-14 joint, 2-66–2-67
F
human dimension, 1-115– interoperability, 4-18–4-19
field army, 2-84–2-86 1-117 defined, 4-18
defined, 1-115
firepower, 2-19–2-21 interorganizational cooperation,
fires warfighting function, human endeavor, war as, 1-31 defined, 2-62
defined, 2-11 humanitarian assistance, 4-54 irregular warfare, 1-40–1-41
fixing force, defined, 6-188 I defined, 1-40
force posture, Army, 2-77–2-78 isolate, 6-117–6-120
imperatives, 3-37–3-97
defined, 3-111
force projection, 5-20–5-51
implementing dispersion, 3-66–
and threat capabilities, C-1– isolation, 2-50–2-51
3-68
C-12
J
impose multiple dilemmas on
defined, 5-20
the enemy, 3-80–3-84 joint command relationships,
force protection, 4-107
information, 2-22–2-25 B-6–B-16
force tailoring, defined, 4-71
information advantages, 6-31 joint force, considerations in a
forces, initial employment of, during competition, 4-28 maritime environment, 7-11–
5-49 during crisis, 5-13 7-13
forcible entry, defined, 6-81 defined, 2-55 |
3-0 | 271 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
operating as part of the, overcoming challenges, defined, 6-188
6-33–6-105 1-23–1-25
mobility, 2-26–2-28
joint forcible entry operations, levels of warfare, 1-54–1-64 defined, 2-26
6-87–6-88 defined, 1-54
mobility operations, 6-165–
joint interdependence, 2-66– littoral regions, 7-5–7-6 6-171
2-67
lodgment, defined, 6-87 mobility tasks, defined, 6-166
joint operations, and activities,
mobilization, 5-27–5-30
M
2-55–2-57
defined, 5-27
defined, 2-55 main battle area operations,
movement and maneuver
principles of, A-19–A-26 6—206–6-208
warfighting function, 2-6–2-8
joint operations area, assigning main effort, 3-163
defined, 2-6
within an area of defined, 3-91
movement to contact, defined,
responsibility, 7-28 maintain the theater, 4-61–4-62
6-229
joint roles of limited scope and make initial contact with the
multidomain operations, 1-9–
duration, perform, 4-66 smallest element possible,
1-14
joint security area, 3-121– 3-75–3-79
defined, 1-9
3-122 maneuver, A-11–A-12 the Army’s operational
defined, 3-121
maritime, 2-75–2-76 concept, 3-1–3-4
designating a, 7-29
maritime domain, 1-88–1-92 multi-domain task force, 4-86–
joint support relationships,
defined, 1-88 4-87
B-11–B-12
maritime environment, multifunctional brigades, 2-92–
K considerations unique to the, 2-94
key terrain, control, 6-69–6-74 7-10–7-21 multinational, command and
defend and control during enemy courses of action support considerations,
armed conflict, 6-63–6-74 unique to, 7-14–7-17 B-33–B-50
defend and control in a joint force considerations in command structure, B-38–
maritime environment, a, 7-11–7-13 B-44
7-37–7-38 operational considerations operations, 2-58–2-60
for, 7-35–7-79
multinational operations,
L overview of the, 7-1–7-21
defined, 2-58
land areas, assigning, 6-38 physical characteristics of
mutual support, 3-133–3-135
the, 7-2–7-9
land domain, 1-83–1-87 applying, 6-39–6-44
planning and operational
defined, 1-83 defined, 3-133
framework, 7-22–7-33
large-scale combat operations,
planning considerations for N
1-46–1-49
a, 7-23–7-26
conduct, 6-89 national strategic level of
defined, 1-46 maritime environments, Army warfare, defined, 1-56
operations in, 7-1–7-79
preparation for, 4-12–4-24 nature of war, 1-29–1-32
sustain, 6-90–6-97 mass, A-8–A-9
noncombatant evacuation
sustain in maritime mechanisms, defeat and operations, 4-108–4-109
environments, 7-63–7-78 stability, 3-106–3-114
North Atlantic Treaty
lead, 8-34 meeting engagement, defined, Organization command
lead nation command 6-229 relationships and authorities,
structure, B-42 methods of warfare, 1-36–1-41 B-45–B-50
leaders, train and develop, military engagement, 4-39– nuclear deterrence, 4-53
4-24 4-40
O
leadership, 2-17–2-18 defined, 4-39
defined, 2-17 military intelligence objective, A-4–A-5
during operations, 8-1–8-54 brigade-theater, 4-75–4-76 offense, characteristics, 6-222
leadership experience, mission, variables, 1-118– enemy, 6-180–6-185
developing, 8-39–8-43 1-119 purpose and conditions for,
6-221
legitimacy, A-25–A-26 missions, adapting formations
transition to, 6-218–6-219
lethality, defined, 1-23 for, 8-36–8-54
offensive, A-6–A-7
mobile defense, 6-188–6-189 |
3-0 | 272 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
operational framework operations, amphibious, 7-58– operations during crisis,
considerations, 6-233– 7-63 5-1–5-3
6-251 Army, 1-1–1-8
P–Q
operations, 6-220–6-267 close, 3-147–3-151
offensive operation, defined, close, during armed conflict, parallel command structures,
1-43 6-240–6-244 B-43
conduct theater passage of lines, 6-159–6-161
offensive operations, types of,
sustainment, 7-67–7-79 defined, 6-159
6-228–6-232
deep, 3-142–3-146
peace operations, defined,
onward movement, 5-43–5-44 deep during defensive
4--102
opening the theater, 5-26 operations, 6-194–6-198
deep during offensive perseverance, A-23–A-24
operating as part of the joint
operations, 6-235–6-239 physical advantages, 6-25–
force, 6-33–6-105
during armed conflict, 6-1– 6-30
operational, variables, 1-118– 6-267 during competition, 4-27
1-119 during competition below during crisis, 5-11–5-12
operational approach, 3-100– armed conflict, 4-1–4-110
physical characteristics of the
3-118 during competition
maritime environment, 7-2–
and operational framework, overview, 4-1–4-3
7-9
3-98–3-166 enabling, 6-133–6-171
defined, 3-100 extended deep, 6-192– physical dimension, 1-107–
6-193 1-110
operational areas, set and
forcible entry, 7-55–7-56 defined, 1-107
support, 4-63
foundations of, 1-1–1-119 planning and operational
operational command, B-47
fundamentals of, 3-1–3-166 framework, maritime
operational concept, joint, 2-55–2-57 environment, 7-22–7-33
multidomain operations, large-scale combat, 1-46–
planning considerations,
3-1–3-4 1-49
support area operations,
operational considerations for a main battle area, 6-206– 3-157–3-158
maritime environment, 7-35– 6-208
political purpose, war, 1-30
7-79 multidomain, 1-9–1-14
multinational, 2-58–2-60 port to port, C-22–C-28
operational control, B-8–B-9
offensive, 6-220–6-267 post-conflict competition,
in North Atlantic Treaty
rear, 3-152–3-159 transition to, 6-255–6-267
Organizations, B-48
rear during defensive
preclusion, 2-48–2-49
operational environment, operations, 6-215–6-217
defined, 1-78 rear during the offense, preparation for large-scale
understand the, 3-47–3-55 6-245–6-251 combat operations, 4-12–
understanding an, 1-78–119 security, 5-9 4-24
operational framework, 3-127– security area, 6-199–6-205 prepare to transition and
3-166 security in maritime execute operation plans,
applying in maritime environments, 7-48–7-51 4-22–4-23
environments, 7-27–7-34 sustain large-scale combat presence on the battlefield,
defined, 3-127 in maritime 8-6–8-12
environments, 7-63–7-78
operational framework principle, defined, A-2
tenets of, 3-6–3-36
considerations, defensive,
principles of joint operations,
6-191–6-217 operations during crisis, 5-1–
A-19–A-26
offensive, 6-233–6-251 5-68
overview of, 5-1–5-3 principles of war, 1-33–1-34,
operational level of warfare,
A-1–A-26
1-58–1-61 operations process, driving the,
defined, 1-58 8-27–8-35 principles of war, traditional,
A-1–A-19
operational reach, defined, opportunities, accepting risk to
3-33 create and exploit, 8-18– priority intelligence
8-22 requirement, defined, 3-44
operational requirements,
combatant commander daily, organic, B-19 protect forward-stationed
4-59 other authorities, B-13–B-16 forces, 4-20–4-21
operational-level disintegration, other relationships, B-29–B-32 protection, during transit, 5-33–
6-124–6-128 5-38
overview, maritime
support to the defense,
environment, 7-1–7-21
7-39–7-47 |
3-0 | 273 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
protection warfighting function, retrograde, defined, 6-190 simplicity, A-19
2-14
risk, 3-115–3-118 simultaneity, defined, 3-20
defined, 2-14
accepting to create and situational understanding,
provide theater air and missile exploit opportunities, defined, 3-49
defense, 7-53–7-54 8-18–8-22
space, 2-71–2-72
purpose, for the defense, roles of Army echelons during
space domain, 1-97–1-100
6-173–6-178 competition, 4-55–4-96
defined, 1-97
for the offense, 6-221
route reconnaissance, defined,
special operations forces, and
pursuit, defined, 6-232 6-139
conventional forces
R Russia, 6-9–6-14 integration, 2-63–2-65
rear operations, 3-152–3-159 S special reconnaissance,
defined, 3-152 sanctuary, 2-52–2-53 defined, 6-141
during defensive stability, transition to, 6-252–
screen, defined, 6-153
operations, 6-215–6-217 6-254
during the offense, 6-245– sector, defined, 3-131
stability mechanism, defined,
6-251 security, A-15–A-16
3-114
in maritime environments,
security area operations,
7-33–7-34 stability mechanisms, 3-106–
6-199–6-205
3-114
rearward passage of lines,
security assistance, 4-44
defined, 6-159 stability operation, defined,
security cooperation, 4-41– 1-45
reception, 5-40–5-41
4-52
defined, 5-40 staff, communicating with,
defined, 4-41
8-47–8-48
reception, staging, onward
security force assistance,
movement, and integration, staging, defined, 5-42
4-45–4-46
5-39–5-48 strategic contexts, Army, 1-65–
defined, 4-45
reception, staging, onward 1-77
security force assistance
movement, and integration, strategic environment, 2-32–
brigades, 4-88–4-89
during contested 2-53
deployments, C-29–C-35 security forces, defined, 4-45
strategic framework, 3-119–
reception, staging, onward security operations, 6-147– 3-126
movement, and integration, 6-156
strategic lines of
establish protected, 7-64– defined, 6-149
communications, control,
7-68 in maritime environments,
6-69–6-74
7-48–7-51
reconnaissance, 6-134–6-146
strategic signal brigade, 4-79–
defined, 6-134 security sector reform, defined,
4-80
4-50
reconnaissance in force,
support to, 4-50–4-52 strategic support area, 3-120
defined, 6-140
see the enemy, 3-43–3-46 striking force, defined, 6-188
reconstitution, defined, 6-95
see yourself, 3-40–3-42 subordinates, communicating
redeployment, defined, 5-51
with, 8-47–8-48
see yourself, see the enemy,
reinforcing, defined, B-27
and understand the support area operations,
relative advantage, defined, operational environment, 3-156–3-157
1-12 3-38–3-55 defined, 3-156
relative advantages, 5-10–5-14 set, and maintain the theater, planning considerations,
during armed conflict, 6-24– 4-61–4-62 3-158–3-159
6-32 operational areas, 4-63 support operational areas, 4-63
during competition, 4-25–4- the theater, 4-13–4-15 support relationships, B-2
29
setting the theater, defined, Army, B-23–B-28
relief in place, defined, 6-158 4-13 joint, B-11–B-12
reserve, 3-165–3-166 shared understanding, 3-50– support to security sector
defined, 3-165 3-51 reform, 4-50–4-52
during armed conflict, fostering, 8-44–8-46 supporting distance, defined,
6-209–6-214
signal command (theater), 3-135
restraint, A-21–A-22 4-79–4-80 |
3-0 | 274 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
supporting effort, defined, theater sustainment command, U
3-164 4-73–4-74
uncertain, war, 1-32
surprise, A-17–A-18 theater sustainment
understand, 8-29–8-30
survivability, 2-29–2-31 operations, conduct, 7-69– and manage the effects of
defined, 2-29 7-79 operations on units and
sustain large-scale combat threat capabilities, and force soldiers, 3-96–3-97
operations, 6-90–6-97 projection, C-1–C-12 the operational
in maritime environments, threat methods, 2-39–2-53 environment, 3-47–3-55
7-63–7-78 threats, 2-35–2-38 understanding, an operational
sustainment, defined, 5-50 environment, 1-76–117
traditional principles of war,
defined, 3-48
sustainment warfighting A-1–A-19
function, 2-12–2-13 unified action, and Army
train, leaders, 4-24
defined, 2-12 forces, 2-54–2-94
training, and preparation defined, 2-54
synchronization, 3-18–3-21
considerations, C-44
defined, 3-18 United States diplomatic
and readiness authority,
mission, 4-32–4-33
systems warfare, 2-45–2-47 B-31
and readiness oversight, unity of command, A-13–A-14
T
B-30 unity of effort, defined, 2-54
tactical command, B-49
transit, protection during, 5-33–
V
tactical control, B-10 5-38
in the North Atlantic Treaty variables, mission, 1-118–
transition, prepare to, 4-22–
Organization, B-50 1-119
4-23
operational, 1-118–1-119
tactical level of warfare, 1-62– back to competition, 5-65–
1-64 5-67 visualize, 8-31
defined, 1-62 to armed conflict, 5-68
W
tactical-level disintegration, to competition or armed
6-129–6-132 conflict, 5-64–5-68 war, and warfare, 1-26–1-77
to crisis and armed conflict, human endeavor, 1-31
tactics, defined, 1-62 4-103–4-110 inherently chaotic, 1-32
task-organizing, 6-50–6-53 to defense and stability, nature of, 1-29–1-32
defined, 6-50 6-252–6-254 political purpose, 1-30
teams, developing, 8-49–8-54 to offense, 6-218–6-219 principles of, 1-33–1-34
to post-conflict competition, principles of, A-1–A-26
tempo, defined, 3-11
6-255–6-267 uncertain, 1-32
tenets, of operations, 3-6–3-36
transition to post-conflict warfare, and war, 1-26–1-77
tenets and imperatives, 3-5– competition, brigades during, characteristics of, 1-35
3-97 6-265–6-267 conventional, 1-37–1-39
theater, opening the, 5-26 transition to post-conflict information, 2-40–2-44
set and maintain, 4-61–4-62 competition, corps during, irregular, 1-40–1-41
levels of, 1-54–1-64
theater armies during transition 6-261–6-262
methods of, 1-36–1-41
to post-conflict competition, transition to post-conflict national strategic level of,
6-257–6-260 competition, divisions during, 1-56
theater army, 2-83 6-263–6-264 operational level of, 1-58–
assigned forces, 4-72-4-89 transition to post-conflict 1-61
theater army roles, during competition, theater armies systems, 2-45–2-47
competition, 4-56–4-58 during, 6-257–6-260 tactical level of, 1-62–1-64
theater strategic level of,
theater army roles, during transitions, adapting formations
1-57
crisis, 5-53–5-55 for, 8-36–8-54
warfighting function, command
theater aviation elements, 4-77 troop movement, defined,
and control, 2-3–2-5
6-157
theater engineer command,
defined, 2-1
4-81 types, of offensive operations,
fires, 2-11
theater fires command or 6-228–6-232 intelligence, 2-9–2-10
of defensive operations,
element, 4-84 movement and maneuver,
6-186–6-190
theater strategic level of 2-6–2-8
warfare, theater strategic protection, 2-14
level of warfare, 1-57 sustainment, 2-12–2-13 |
3-0 | 275 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
warfighting functions, 2-1–2-14 X–Y–Z zone reconnaissance, defined,
weapons of mass destruction, zone, defined, 3-130 6-137
countering, 4-53 |
3-0 | 277 | FM 3-0
01 October 2022
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
MARK F. AVERILL
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2224402
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve. To be distributed in |
3-98 | 1 | FM 3-98
RECONNAISSANCE AND
SECURITY OPERATIONS
JANUARY 2023
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 3-98, dated 1 July 2015. |
3-98 | 2 | This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil), and the Central Army Registry site |
3-98 | 3 | *FM 3-98
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-98 Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 10 January 2023
RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS
Contents
Page
PREFACE................................................................................................................... vii
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... ix
Chapter 1 CAVALRY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .......... 1-1
Section I – Operational Overview .......................................................................... 1-1
Historical Roles of Cavalry Units ............................................................................... 1-1
Current Role .............................................................................................................. 1-3
Section II – Understanding the Operational Environment .................................. 1-6
Section III – Shape the Operational Environment ................................................ 1-7
Section IV – Cavalry Employment in Large Scale Combat Operations ......................... 1-8
BCT Planning Considerations for the Cavalry Units ................................................. 1-9
General Employment of Cavalry Units .................................................................... 1-10
Brigade Operations Officer and Squadron Employment ........................................... 1-11
Section V – Organizations .................................................................................... 1-18
Brigade Combat Team ............................................................................................ 1-18
Cavalry Squadrons .................................................................................................. 1-21
Air Cavalry Squadron .............................................................................................. 1-21
Air Cavalry Troop ..................................................................................................... 1-22
Cavalry Troops ........................................................................................................ 1-22
Armored Company .................................................................................................. 1-24
Weapons Troop ....................................................................................................... 1-24
Scout Platoon .......................................................................................................... 1-25
CBRN Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon .................................................. 1-25
Chapter 2 THREATS .................................................................................................................. 2-1
Section I − Understanding the Threat.................................................................... 2-1
Irregular Forces ......................................................................................................... 2-2
State and Nonstate Threats....................................................................................... 2-3
Section II − Threat Capabilities, Tactics, and Techniques .................................. 2-4
Physical Dimension ................................................................................................... 2-5
Cognitive and Informational Dimension ..................................................................... 2-5
Countering Adaptations and Retaining the Initiative ................................................. 2-5
Section III − Reconnaissance Disruption, Tactics, and Techniques ...................... 2-5
Overview Enemy Reconnaissance and Security Operations ............................................. 2-7
Counterreconnaissance ............................................................................................. 2-7
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-98, dated 1 July 2015. |
3-98 | 4 | Contents
Understand Being Matched ...................................................................................... 2-8
Chapter 3 MISSION COMMAND ............................................................................................... 3-1
Section I – Mission Command for Reconnaissance and Security ..................... 3-1
Principles of Mission Command ................................................................................ 3-1
Exercise of Command and Control ........................................................................... 3-2
Section II – Command and Control ....................................................................... 3-4
Operations Process................................................................................................... 3-4
Commanders and Staffs Collaborate to Plan, Prepare, Execute, and Assess ....... 3-16
Section III – Integrating Processes ..................................................................... 3-27
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ............................................................... 3-27
Targeting ................................................................................................................. 3-27
Timely Reporting and Assessment ......................................................................... 3-28
Update the Collection Plan ..................................................................................... 3-29
Screen Reports ....................................................................................................... 3-30
Correlate Reports to Requirements ........................................................................ 3-30
Assessments ........................................................................................................... 3-30
Chapter 4 RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ....................................................................... 4-1
Section I – Reconnaissance Fundamentals, Methods, Management .................... 4-1
Reconnaissance Fundamentals ................................................................................ 4-1
Commander’s Reconnaissance Guidance ............................................................... 4-3
Reconnaissance Techniques .................................................................................... 4-3
Reconnaissance Methods ......................................................................................... 4-4
Reconnaissance Management ................................................................................. 4-6
Reconnaissance Assets and Capabilities ................................................................. 4-6
Surveillance ............................................................................................................... 4-7
Section II – Reconnaissance Types ...................................................................... 4-8
Zone Reconnaissance .............................................................................................. 4-9
Area Reconnaissance ............................................................................................. 4-13
Route Reconnaissance ........................................................................................... 4-15
Reconnaissance in Force ....................................................................................... 4-18
Special Reconnaissance ......................................................................................... 4-18
Section III – Reconnaissance Handover ............................................................. 4-19
Planning Considerations ......................................................................................... 4-19
Execution and Tasks ............................................................................................... 4-20
Special Operations Forces Reconnaissance Handover ......................................... 4-23
Chapter 5 SECURITY OPERATIONS ....................................................................................... 5-1
Section I – Security Basics .................................................................................... 5-1
Security ..................................................................................................................... 5-1
Security Fundamentals ............................................................................................. 5-2
Commander’s Security Guidance ............................................................................. 5-4
Section II – Counterreconnaissance ..................................................................... 5-4
Section III – Security Types ................................................................................... 5-5
Screen ....................................................................................................................... 5-7
Guard ...................................................................................................................... 5-12
Cover ....................................................................................................................... 5-28
Area Security ........................................................................................................... 5-36
Section IV – Transition Planning ......................................................................... 5-41
Battle Handover ...................................................................................................... 5-41
Passage of Lines (Forward and Rearward) ............................................................ 5-43
Relief in Place ......................................................................................................... 5-47 |
3-98 | 5 | Contents
Change of Mission ................................................................................................... 5-48
Chapter 6 STABILITY ................................................................................................................ 6-1
Section I – Principles and Framework ................................................................... 6-1
Conflict Transformation ............................................................................................. 6-1
Unity of Effort ............................................................................................................. 6-1
Legitimacy and Host-Nation Ownership .................................................................... 6-2
Building Partner Capacity .......................................................................................... 6-2
Stability Framework ................................................................................................... 6-2
Section II – Operations During Stability Tasks..................................................... 6-3
Cavalry Unit’s Role .................................................................................................... 6-5
Support During Stability Tasks .................................................................................. 6-5
Sustainment ............................................................................................................... 6-8
Interdependent Capabilities ....................................................................................... 6-8
Section III – Army Stability Operations Tasks .................................................... 6-10
Reconnaissance and Security Stability Tasks......................................................... 6-10
Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development ............................................... 6-13
Chapter 7 SUSTAINMENT ......................................................................................................... 7-1
Section I – Overview ................................................................................................ 7-1
Section II – Planning ............................................................................................... 7-1
Planning Fundamentals and Procedures .................................................................. 7-2
Logistics ..................................................................................................................... 7-3
Personnel Services .................................................................................................... 7-4
Support Areas ............................................................................................................ 7-7
Echelons Above Brigade Sustainment Support ........................................................ 7-8
Section III – Considerations ................................................................................... 7-9
Sustainment of Reconnaissance Operations ............................................................ 7-9
Sustainment of Security Operations ........................................................................ 7-10
Stability Operations ................................................................................................. 7-11
Section IV – Special Considerations ................................................................... 7-11
Attachments ............................................................................................................. 7-11
Detachments ........................................................................................................... 7-11
Appendix A ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE CONSIDERATIONS ............................................ A-1
Appendix B ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) FORMAT AND INSTRUCTIONS ....... B-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1
INDEX ................................................................................................................ Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Reconnaissance and security in offensive, defensive, and stability operations .......... 1-9
Figure 1-2. Brigade reconnaissance cell ...................................................................................... 1-12
Figure 1-3. Squadron in its own area of operations ..................................................................... 1-13
Figure 1-4. Squadron in BCT deep area of operations ................................................................ 1-14
Figure 1-5. Squadron operating across another battalion’s area of operations ........................... 1-15
Figure 1-6. Squadron conducting reconnaissance in the brigade area of operations ................. 1-17
Figure 1-7. ABCT Cavalry units and enablers (shaded) .............................................................. 1-19 |
3-98 | 6 | Contents
Figure 1-8. IBCT Cavalry units and enablers (shaded) ............................................................... 1-20
Figure 1-9. SBCT Cavalry units (shaded) .................................................................................... 1-20
Figure 1-10. Air Cavalry squadron ............................................................................................... 1-22
Figure 3-1. CCIR and EEFI breakdown ......................................................................................... 3-7
Figure 3-2. Reconnaissance tempo ............................................................................................. 3-11
Figure 3-3. Development of guidance for reconnaissance and security tasks ............................ 3-15
Figure 3-4. BCT information collection timeline ........................................................................... 3-18
Figure 3-5. Priority intelligence requirement breakdown ............................................................. 3-20
Figure 4-1. IBCT zone reconnaissance graphics ........................................................................ 4-12
Figure 4-2. SBCT area reconnaissance ...................................................................................... 4-15
Figure 4-3. SBCT route reconnaissance mission ........................................................................ 4-17
Figure 4-4. Reconnaissance handover ........................................................................................ 4-21
Figure 4-5. Reconnaissance handover between squadron and combat aviation brigade .......... 4-22
Figure 4-6. Reconnaissance handover, follow-on battalion continues mission ........................... 4-23
Figure 5-1. SBCT stationary screen mission ............................................................................... 5-10
Figure 5-2. ABCT advance guard mission ................................................................................... 5-15
Figure 5-3. IBCT Cavalry squadron stationary flank guard ......................................................... 5-17
Figure 5-4. Moving flank guard mission ....................................................................................... 5-19
Figure 5-5. 4-10 Cavalry task organization .................................................................................. 5-20
Figure 5-6. Moving flank guard, simultaneous deployment into zone ......................................... 5-21
Figure 5-7. Squadron guard operation on phase line New York ................................................. 5-22
Figure 5-8. Visual contact during moving flank guard operation ................................................. 5-23
Figure 5-9. Security force crossing the LD separately to establish a flank screen ...................... 5-25
Figure 5-10. Security force continuing to cross LD separately to establish a flank screen ......... 5-26
Figure 5-11. Movement to contact technique during moving flank security mission ................... 5-27
Figure 5-12. Zone reconnaissance technique during moving flank security mission .................. 5-28
Figure 5-13. Reinforced SBCT performing advanced cover ........................................................ 5-31
Figure 5-14. Reinforced ABCT performing flank cover ................................................................ 5-32
Figure 5-15. Reinforced ABCT performing defensive cover ........................................................ 5-35
Figure 5-16. Cavalry squadron conducting area security ............................................................ 5-37
Figure 5-17. Convoy security organization .................................................................................. 5-39
Figure 5-18. Forward passage of lines ........................................................................................ 5-44
Figure 5-19. Rearward passage of lines ...................................................................................... 5-45
Figure 6-1. Stability tasks............................................................................................................. 6-11
Figure 7-1. Process for evacuation of the wounded ...................................................................... 7-6
Tables
Table 1-1. Squadron employment comparisons .......................................................................... 1-16
Table 3-1. Available reconnaissance and security information collection capabilities ................ 3-22
Table 4-1. Dedicated reconnaissance units and types of reconnaissance operations ................. 4-9 |
3-98 | 7 | Contents
Table 5-1. Typical echelon of security forces for a given operation at echelon ............................. 5-7
Table 5-2. Moving flank guard movement method comparison ................................................... 5-18
Table 5-3. Typical command and support relationships for cover operations ............................. 5-29 |
3-98 | 9 | Preface
FM 3-98 provides doctrinal guidance and direction for Cavalry organizations and reconnaissance and security
organizations. This field manual establishes the foundation for the development of tactics and procedures in
subordinate doctrine publications. This publication applies across the range of military operations. The focus
of this field manual is Cavalry formations within the units listed below; however, all maneuver formations
must be able to conduct reconnaissance and security operations.
* Armored brigade combat team Cavalry squadron (ABCT).
* Infantry brigade combat team Cavalry squadron (IBCT).
* Stryker brigade combat team Cavalry squadron (SBCT).
* Battalion scout platoons.
* Combat aviation brigade air Cavalry squadron.
* Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance platoons.
* Engineer reconnaissance platoons.
The principal audiences for FM 3-98 are commanders, leaders, and staffs responsible for the planning,
execution, or support of reconnaissance and security operations as well as instructors charged with teaching
reconnaissance and security operations.
Commanders ensure that their decisions and the actions of their units comply with applicable United States,
international, and host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders ensure that their Soldiers operate according
to the law of land warfare and the rules of engagement. (Refer to FM 6-27 for more information.)
FM 3-98 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-98 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with
an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which FM 3-98 is the proponent publication are
boldfaced in the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent
publication follows the definition.
FM 3-98 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 3-98 is the United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. The preparing agency
is the Doctrine and Collective Training Division, United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. Send
your comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) to Commander, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Doctrine and
Collective Training Division, ATTN: ATZK-TDD, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5410; by email
to [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. |
3-98 | 11 | Introduction
FM 3-98 provides the commander and staff of Cavalry formations with doctrine relevant to Army and joint
operations. This publication explains how effective reconnaissance and security operations generate depth,
allow commanders reaction time and maneuver space, fight for information and collect information through
stealth, protect forces against surprise, ease the forward movement of follow-on forces, and provide
commanders with flexibility and adaptability. The doctrine in this publication is applicable across offensive,
defensive, and stability operations. This publication provides doctrinal guidance for all formations assigned
to the Armored brigade combat team, the Infantry brigade combat team, and the Stryker brigade combat
team. The following is a summarization of each chapter of this manual:
* Chapter 1 addresses the role of Cavalry in offensive, defensive, and stability operations and
Cavalry organizations.
* Chapter 2 addresses peer and near peer threats, threat reconnaissance, and security tactics.
* Chapter 3 discusses the updated concepts of command and control relating to commanders’
reconnaissance and security guidance, the operations process, an understanding of the threat,
potential threat groups, and threat characteristics.
* Chapter 4 discusses the fundamentals of reconnaissance, types of reconnaissance operations, and
a reconnaissance handover.
* Chapter 5 discusses the fundamentals of security operations, counterreconnaissance, and the types
of security operations.
* Chapter 6 discusses reconnaissance and security stability planning, stability principles and
frameworks, and stability tasks.
* Chapter 7 describes considerations for planning and executing sustainment operations.
To comprehend FM 3-98, the reader must understand the operational art, the principles of war, and the links
between the operational and tactical levels of war described in JP 1, Volume 2, JP 3-0, and ADP 3-0. The
reader should understand how the offensive, defensive, stability, and defense support of civil authorities’
tasks describe carry over and affect the conduct described by each task (in ADPs 3-07, 3-28, and 3-90).
Readers should understand the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and how that process
relates to the Army’s military decision-making process and troop leading procedures described in ADP 5-0.
The reader must also comprehend the concepts associated with mission command and command and control
as described in ADP 6-0. Reviewing these publications assists the reader in understanding FM 3-98.
While doctrine provides leaders at all echelons with authoritative principles to consider before, during, and
after execution of reconnaissance and security operations, FM 3-98 is not a substitute for common sense,
professional military judgment, and leaders’ imperatives to act aggressively. As in any combat operation,
success during offensive, defensive, and stability operations depends mainly on leaders and Soldiers who are
tough, disciplined, and competent and who take the initiative consistent with the mission, commander’s
intent, and the principles outlined within this manual. |
3-98 | 13 | Chapter 1
Cavalry Organizations and the Operational Environment
Reconnaissance and security operations are essential to the execution of offensive,
defensive, and stability operations. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) conduct
reconnaissance and security operations to develop the situation and identify, create, and
preserve options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Reconnaissance and security operations allow BCTs to achieve positions of relative
advantage. Effective reconnaissance and security operations confirm or deny the
commander’s and staff’s initial understanding and visualization of the tactical and
operational situation. Reconnaissance and security operations develop the intelligence
picture for the BCT so the commander can describe, direct, lead, and make effective decisions.
Reconnaissance and security operations provide a continuous flow of combat
information and intelligence that assist commanders with uncertainty, make contact
under favorable conditions, identify opportunities, prevent surprise, and make timely
decisions. Reconnaissance and security operations provide BCT commanders with
freedom of movement and action to create advantageous conditions for future
operations to seize, retain, and exploit initiative.
SECTION I – OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW
1-1. Reconnaissance operations allow commanders to understand the situation, visualize the battle, and
make decisions. Security operations provide commanders with reaction time and maneuver space to make
decisions and protect the force from anticipated and unanticipated dangers. Reconnaissance and security
operations answer commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), mitigate risk, identify enemy
weaknesses, and isolate the enemy from sources of strength.
1-2. Cavalry units conduct reconnaissance and security operations in close contact with enemy
organizations and civilian populations. Cavalry organizations employ appropriate combinations of mounted
and dismounted tactics and to fight for information and develop the situation based upon the mission variables
of METT-TC (I): mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil
considerations, and informational considerations.
HISTORICAL ROLES OF CAVALRY UNITS
1-3. Armies have used Cavalry forces to capitalize upon their significant advantage in mobility, making
them well suited for long-range reconnaissance and security operations. The Cavalry forces’ fighting ability
make them well suited for shaping subsequent fights and giving the commander time to make decisions.
Reconnaissance and security operations provide commanders the ability to concentrate forces at decisive
points while protecting against surprise. A decisive point is key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function
that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute
materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Cavalry continues to play key roles, such as—
* Conducting reconnaissance operations to detect enemy weaknesses and strengths.
* Conducting security operations to provide early warning and maneuver space.
* Covering retreats.
* Countering enemy reconnaissance forces. |
3-98 | 14 | Chapter 1
* Counterattacking enemy infantry attacks.
* Administering the decisive blow through isolation and pursuit.
1-4. For example, the operations of the newly organized Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac during
the Gettysburg campaign were an essential factor in the Union’s success in that pivotal battle. At Gettysburg,
the Union Army employed an effective Cavalry force that worked directly for the commanding General of
the Army. Below is information that highlights an example of a historical role that Cavalry units have played
on the battlefield.
Shaping the Battlefield with Cavalry: Gettysburg, the First Day
In June 1863, as General Robert E. Lee led his Army of Northern Virginia through the
Shenandoah Valley into Maryland and Pennsylvania, almost one half of the confederate
cavalry forces under Major General J.E.B. Stuart were conducting independent
operations. The absence of Stuart and his reconnaissance and security force would
disadvantage Lee as he concentrated his forces in south central Pennsylvania near the
town of Gettysburg.
The Union Army of the Potomac moved north in several columns, screened by its cavalry.
The westernmost column benefited from the protection of Brigadier General John Buford’s
Cavalry division, a combined arms force. On 29 June, this formation moved to a nexus of
roads near Gettysburg, leaving one of its brigades to cover the Catoctin Mountain passes
to protect the army’s flank. After a brief encounter with Confederate forces, Buford led his
remaining two brigades and one battery of artillery into Gettysburg the following day. He
bypassed initial contact to focus on his reconnaissance objective—the location and actions
of Lee’s army.
Aware of a Confederate concentration of forces to his west but lacking detailed
information, Buford dispatched scouts to conduct area reconnaissance west and north of
Gettysburg. They reported completely and accurately the locations and lines of march for
all three corps of Lee’s army. Buford immediately transmitted the collected information to
General Meade and made recommendations to the Union Army commander. Buford’s
reports allowed Meade to understand and visualize the terrain surrounding Gettysburg
before occupation. Based on his scouts’ reports, Buford deployed his division to cover the
primary approaches to the town from the north and west. He also ensured local security
by implementing martial law, the arrest of a suspected spy, and the prohibition of alcohol
sales to his soldiers. Buford understood his mission to delay the Confederates and deny
them access to the heights overlooking the town so the Army of the Potomac could occupy
that position.
Having pinpointed and identified their lines of march and probable objective (Gettysburg),
Buford undertook preparations to delay the Confederate forces (after identifying their
advance) as long as possible. He prepared his two brigades to cover a seven-mile arc
outside the town stretching from the west to the northeast. His main effort focused on the
Chambersburg Pike that reached Gettysburg from the west where the closest Confederate
forces were encamped. A series of ridgelines crossed the road, and Buford used these to
add depth to his position. His main position lay upon McPherson Ridge, where he deployed
much of one brigade, which he supported with his artillery battery. A series of picket lines
and small four- to five-man patrols occupied the ridgelines forward of this position to a
depth of nearly two miles. At their most advanced point along Whistler’s Ridge, Buford’s
pickets laid only a half mile from their Confederate counterparts. In Gettysburg’s
Lutheran Seminary, Buford established his signals officer in the high cupola, which
permitted observation of the town and its surroundings.
Buford’s operations lay in complete contrast to those undertaken by the Confederates.
When a North Carolina brigade approached Gettysburg and discovered the Union
Cavalry in the town, its commander withdrew and reported the contact to his division and
corps commanders. Neither officer considered the enemy’s presence in Gettysburg to be |
3-98 | 15 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
significant and determined to evict them the following day. They lacked detailed
information of Buford’s force, and they were under orders not to trigger a general
engagement before the arrival of the rest of Lee’s army. A thorough reconnaissance of
Gettysburg might have provided a more realistic assessment of the Union position. With
much of the Confederate Cavalry on detached service, they were not available to locate
and track the movements of the Army of the Potomac, much less conduct a deliberate
reconnaissance of Gettysburg thus depriving Lee of vital information.
In the early hours of 1 July, Confederate Major General Henry Heth led elements of his
division down the Chambersburg Pike toward Gettysburg. Heth’s forces quickly
encountered Buford’s forward picket line. Large numbers of Confederate skirmishers
deployed to engage the pickets, while an artillery battery provided fire support. Buford’s
pickets withdrew slowly, keeping the enemy engaged and unable to make a rapid advance.
Buford reinforced his forward lines causing further delays for the Confederate advance.
Buford’s actions caused the Confederates to deploy their brigades prematurely to prepare
for a general assault and commence an artillery bombardment of the Union positions.
Confederate deployment allowed the Army of the Potomac the opportunity to gain
positions of tactical advantage and retain initiative.
Buford and his division set conditions for Meade’s success. As more U.S. formations
arrived on the field, other Union forces relieved Buford’s division. Buford’s actions
ensured that the Army of the Potomac secured the high ground. Over the next two days,
General Lee’s army would shatter itself in repeated attacks upon these heights.
Reconnaissance operations to identify Confederate forces and key terrain, along with
security operations delaying Confederate advances and protecting the main body, proved
decisive at The Battle of Gettysburg.
CURRENT ROLE
1-5. The fundamental purpose of the U.S. Army’s Cavalry is to set conditions for successful operations of
their higher headquarters. These roles are not necessarily missions themselves but translate into mission
statements. Cavalry units conduct the following to set conditions for successful operations:
* Enable combat operations.
* Provide accurate and timely information to the operations process.
* Operate as combined arms air-ground teams.
* Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
* Preserve combat power and achieve economy of force.
* Facilitate movement and transitions.
* Fight for information.
ENABLE COMBAT OPERATIONS
1-6. Reconnaissance and security operations are essential to all successful operations. BCTs conduct
continuous reconnaissance and security operations mainly through their organic Cavalry organizations. BCTs
must defeat adaptive and determined enemies as well as consolidate tactical gains. Effective reconnaissance
and security operations improve situational understanding and enable commanders to—
* Identify or create options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
* Achieve situational understanding.
* Visualize operations in the context of mission variables of METT-TC (I).
* Develop the situation through action in close contact with enemy and civilian populations.
* Execute operations with higher degrees of flexibility, adaptability, synchronization, and integration.
* Understand the tactical, human, and political dynamics within an area of operations. |
3-98 | 16 | Chapter 1
PROVIDE ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION TO THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
1-7. Accurate and timely reporting allows the BCT to seize and retain the initiative and to concentrate
combat power at the right time and place. The BCT commander requires accurate and timely information on
enemy, terrain, and the civilian population as they affect the mission. To understand, visualize, describe,
direct, lead, and assess combat operations, the BCT commander relies on information collection units and
capabilities, including national intelligence sources, military intelligence units, special purpose
reconnaissance, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), aviation, electromagnetic warfare, cyberspace operation
platforms, and any unit in contact. These units and capabilities support intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB), the operations process, and adjustments during operations. During IPB, the staff considers
how the adversary or enemy utilizes cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to achieve their
objective. The commander and staff’s best means of visualizing and understanding their area of operations,
if battlefield circulation is not possible, is through reconnaissance operations.
1-8. Commanders require timely and accurate information during the execution of operations to maneuver
and direct combat operations against the enemy. The primary source of information for the commander
during battle is the reconnaissance and security organization—the Cavalry.
1-9. Cavalry units—
* Detect and counter enemy tactical deception efforts.
* Provide a capable means of assessing terrain.
* Operate actively not passively. Cavalry not only finds the enemy but can also develop the situation
and force the enemy to reveal more information including enemy intentions and fighting ability.
* Disseminate relevant information immediately to commanders.
* Develop recommendations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
* Answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
* Shape the battlefield.
1-10. A key task for the Cavalry is to shape the battlefield. In this context, shaping is to set conditions for
the success of the supported commander’s plan through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain.
Shaping occurs in all domains and can have physical, cognitive, and informational effects. For example, in
security operations the Cavalry may vary the engagement and disengagement criteria of their battle positions
to shape an advancing enemy formation into the supported commander’s chosen engagement area. In
reconnaissance operations, the Cavalry may use different levels of aggressiveness on different avenues of
approach to shape the enemy’s decision-making regarding where to array their defense. Shaping the
battlefield is rarely a specified task but is an implied task that occurs during all operations. Cavalry
commanders must balance the implied shaping effect with the achievement of specified reconnaissance and
security tasks.
1-11. To shape the battlefield, the Cavalry commander must understand the supported commander’s scheme
of maneuver and decision points. However, the supported commander may not have completed their plan
before the Cavalry commences their reconnaissance or security operation. Therefore, the Cavalry commander
must be prepared to extrapolate the desired shaping effect from the available information, as well as be
prepared to adapt their plan during execution.
1-12. The desired shaping effect may change which type of reconnaissance or security the commander
selects. For example, a Cavalry commander may elect to conduct a guard rather than a screen to maximize
their ability to shape the enemy’s avenue of approach. Commanders must also consider the shaping effect
when creating reconnaissance and security guidance. In particular, varying engagement and disengagement
criteria is key to shaping enemy maneuver effectively.
OPERATE AS COMBINED ARMS AIR-GROUND TEAMS
1-13. Cavalry organizations are combined arms teams that, when paired with aviation units, form air-ground
maneuver teams that utilize appropriate combinations of mounted, dismounted, and aerial operations to
accomplish their mission. Air-ground operations are the simultaneous or synchronized employment of
ground forces with aviation maneuver and fires to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The organization is
equipped, organized, and trained to identify enemy locations to improve the BCT’s situational awareness and |
3-98 | 17 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
to provide the BCT with security. Cavalry units must move continually and at times rapidly to positions of
relative advantage to observe and fight. Cavalry units require organized, integrated, and synchronized support
from all warfighting functions to ensure effective reconnaissance and security operations.
1-14. Cavalry units employ all available combat power to answer the commander’s PIRs. While the enemy
seeks to protect or conceal vital information and key assets, Cavalry units overcome these efforts and fight
for information within their capabilities to develop the situation rapidly and report the specific details of the
tactical situation accurately. Air-ground teams allow reconnaissance efforts to develop the situation in
multiple domains to maximize information collection and assist the commander in visualizing and
understanding the area of operations. Combined arms air-ground operations answer PIR, create options, and
develop the situation to set conditions for a reconnaissance handover or decisive engagement.
1-15. Effective air-ground operations are built upon relationships, mutual trust, and a common understanding
of the operational environment, operation, and mission. Air-ground operations require detailed planning,
coordination, and synchronized employment of ground, air maneuver, and fire to achieve the commander’s
objectives to ensure freedom of movement and action.
1-16. Aviation assets are an integral member of the combined arms team that significantly increases the
relative combat strength of Cavalry squadrons. These limited assets must be utilized effectively to help
achieve the commander’s intent. BCTs must know their capabilities, employ them appropriately, and
synchronize their operation to accomplish the mission.
PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE
1-17. The BCT’s Cavalry squadron develops the situation by fighting for information to buy the time and
space required for an effective response to enemy actions. The Cavalry squadron conducts reconnaissance
operations to develop the situation forward or to the flanks of the main body to prevent the BCT commander
from fighting at a disadvantage. The Cavalry squadron conducts security operations to provide the
commander with maneuver space so they can respond to unanticipated enemy actions or developments within
the BCT’s area of operations. Security operations provide the commander with time to assess the situation,
determine a course of action, issue orders, make continuous assessments, issue additional fragmentary orders,
and maneuver.
PRESERVE COMBAT POWER AND ACHIEVE ECONOMY OF FORCE
1-18. Cavalry organizations provide security for the BCT main body to protect and preserve the combat
power of the BCT. In offensive operations, effective Cavalry operations prevent the premature deployment
and loss of critical combat power. In defensive operations, an effective Cavalry operation provides early
warning, destroys enemy reconnaissance forces, and fixes the lead elements of enemy organizations within
the capabilities of the respective Cavalry organization.
1-19. Economy of force is the employment and distribution of forces to allocate the maximum possible
combat power on primary efforts (JP 3-0). The Cavalry’s flexible capabilities allow the commander to
conserve their BCT’s combat power to use at a time and place of their choosing. Based on METT-TC (I),
when augmented with additional combat power, the BCT’s Cavalry organizations can provide the BCT with
a critical capability based on the economy of force principle of joint operations.
FACILITATE MOVEMENT AND TRANSITIONS
1-20. Cavalry units assist movement and transitions by executing reconnaissance and facilitating
coordination and contact between units. Scout platoons occupy contact points, passage points, and coordinate
with higher and adjacent units to ensure seamless transitions and cross-unit coordination.
1-21. Effective reconnaissance operations ease transitions in plans, phases, and priorities of effort for the
BCT and mitigate information gaps between units. Reconnaissance operations assist commanders in
employing the most appropriate forms of maneuver to envelop, turn, dislocate, and ultimately defeat enemy forces.
1-22. Transitions mark a change of focus and priorities between phases or between the ongoing operation
and execution of a branch or sequel. The shift in priority between offense, defense, and stability operations |
3-98 | 18 | Chapter 1
involves a transition. Cavalry units are instrumental in providing the commander with information to make
transitions as seamless as possible. They provide protection for the main body transitioning from offense to
defense. However, Cavalry units are vulnerable to enemy threats, unanticipated changes to the situation, and
the danger of relaxing discipline and safety standards during their own and higher transitions. As a result,
commanders should establish clear conditions for mission execution.
FIGHT FOR INFORMATION
1-23. The information friendly forces seek is generally of equal importance to the enemy who will act to
protect the vital information. In addition, Cavalry units can satisfy some threat-based intelligence
requirements only by learning from the enemy’s reactions. While preserving their freedom of maneuver,
Cavalry units overcome these efforts and fight for information within their capabilities to develop the
situation rapidly and to report accurately the specific details of the tactical situation.
SECTION II – UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-24. BCTs develop an understanding of operational variables (political, military, economic, social,
information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT], and mission variables of
METT-TC (I) through reconnaissance and information collection to enhance situational awareness and an
understanding of competing interests. The G-2 or S2 is responsible for defining the cyberspace and the
electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE), which enables the BCT commander and staff to visualize
both friendly and enemy cyberspace and EW assets through the three layers of cyberspace and the EMS.
Understanding competing interests within the area of operations allows the commander and staff to frame
specific problems. BCTs seek to understand motivations and to recognize that each interest has multiple
perspectives. To operate effectively under conditions of complexity and in close contact with enemies and
populations, BCTs consider political interests from multiple perspectives.
1-25. Understanding interests requires analysis of the operational (PMESII-PT) and mission variables of
METT-TC (I) within a particular region. To communicate effectively, BCTs must develop an understanding
of the local audience’s cultural communication techniques. BCTs must understand the most important aspect
of cultural communication is how the population receives the information rather than how the unit transmits
the information. Determination of valued interests within an area provides options for BCTs to establish
programs that incentivize cooperation leading to mission accomplishment. Comprehension of interests allows
for understanding to implement disincentives that seek to coerce and persuade adversaries, enemies, and
neutral parties who have interests counter to the objectives of the brigade and higher. The understanding and
acknowledgement of interests frame information operations in future operations.
1-26. Efforts to understand interests begin before deployment. Country studies, analysis of the social
demographics, constructs of local, sub-national, and national governance, and understanding of key
personalities and organizations within a brigade’s future area of operation provide a baseline knowledge to
increase situational awareness and identify potential areas of friction before a brigade deploys. BCTs consider
the elements of PMESII-PT within their area of operations to gain understanding of the interests and
motivations particular to enhance situational awareness. Unified action partners, Army Special Operations
Forces (SOF), and other joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations are key
resources all units use to develop situational understanding during shaping efforts leading to a sustainable
security environment. The military information support operations assets organic and attached to the BCT
can assist in conducting adversary, information message analysis, and exploitation. The military information
support operations staff planner can obtain division or higher-level military information support operations
support to counter the adversary information activities as necessary. Analysis of these considerations allows
informed leaders to identify information gaps and develop courses of action that increase situational
understanding within their area of operation.
1-27. BCTs conduct information collection through reconnaissance operations focused on information
requirements to bridge information gaps. Gaps identified during IPB develop into information requirements
through continuous reconnaissance. BCTs define and collect information requirements that develop
situational understanding of the interests within a particular area by focusing civil considerations within the
construct of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. BCTs employ a range of |
3-98 | 19 | Cavalry Organizations and
the Operational Environment
integrated capabilities to understand the cultural implications of conducting military operations among
indigenous populations and institutions. The BCT or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer (S-9)
develops plans, policies, and programs to further the relationship between the BCT and the civil component
in the assigned area of operations. The S-9 provides a mechanism for civil-military coordination,
collaboration, and communication within the BCT area of operations. Chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) staff elements work with the brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) to analyze the CBRN
threat in the operational environment. The BCT may meet gaps in understanding the CBRN threat with
taskings to the CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon.
1-28. Commanders and staffs consider culture and pillar organizations that influence the civil considerations
of the operational environment. Culture is the shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts
members of a society use to cope with the world and each other. Pillar organizations are organizations or
systems on which the populace depends for support, security, strength, and direction. Examination of culture
provides insight to the motivations and interests of people and organizations. Consideration of culture is
imperative to successful shaping operations that set conditions for future success. A thorough understanding
of group and individual interests allow for informed and viable courses of action that seek to shape the
environment favorably and contribute to positive outcomes and objectives within the brigade’s area of operations.
1-29. Host-nation security organizations and political partners provide invaluable insight into values, beliefs,
and interests. These organizations are composed of the people they secure and govern; their native fluency
in the customs, courtesies, cultures, beliefs, interests, and ideals provide the partnering BCT with cultural
perspective and intelligence that develops their understanding of the operational environment. Close, positive
relationships with host-nation partners breed trust, which lead to an understanding of the operational environment.
SECTION III – SHAPE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-30. Commanders and staffs consider the competitive environment of their area of operations in order to
seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and set conditions for future success. Different political entities and
personalities, tribal dynamics, religious interests, economic motivations, sources of security, and potential
havens of refuge for adversaries contribute to the competitive nature of the operational environment.
Furthermore, not all interests are parallel and mutually supportive of the objectives and end state for a
particular region. Shaping the environment requires BCTs to develop situational understanding and influence
personalities and organizations through engagement to achieve specific objectives. BCTs also persuade and
empower other personalities and organizations to modify behaviors and actions consistent with friendly
forces’ intent and objectives, and conduct limited offensive operations to maintain initiative. Shaping is an
enduring process throughout all operations and is not separated by phases.
1-31. Commanders actively seek to understand the competitive interests within their area of operations and
to understand how local interests influence desired outcomes and objectives. Some interests and motivations
support the BCT’s objectives and others conflict, counter, and disrupt supportive efforts to the desired end
state. BCTs must have a thorough understanding of the threat to identify conflicting interests and information
collection requirements developed through reconnaissance and security operations. BCTs actively seek
answers to information gaps through the development of information requirements that are satisfied through
active reconnaissance operations within a given area. Through information collection and analysis, staffs
develop options for the commander to inform the population, influence various actors, seize opportunities,
and maintain initiative.
1-32. Analysis of the motivations and interests of personalities and organizations provide insight to future
psychological operations activities seeking to modify behaviors counter to friendly force objectives.
Supporting efforts empower key influencers and organizations and persuade neutral audiences to bolster
legitimacy and secure vital interests and objectives. BCTs use coercive efforts to counter adversary and
enemy information activities and isolate adversaries from their support base to begin the psychological
breakdown of enemy organizations. BCTs shape conditions for objectives that are in line with host-nation
government interests.
1-33. The BCT’s shaping activities derive success from how effectively they persuade the populace and
empower the host-nation government. All efforts focus on bolstering the legitimacy of the rule of law and
the host nation’s ability to provide for effective governance. Persuasion and empowerment demand |
3-98 | 20 | Chapter 1
engagement strategies that deliver connections and relationships with pillar organizations and individuals
who control and influence the local community. Engagements secure common and clearly defined goals and
ideals that provide a common reference point for future engagements and activities. Engagements seek to
reinforce the authority of legitimate leaders and pillars and restore or solidify confidence in host-nation
security forces, governance, and the rule of law. Persuasive efforts utilize a compelling narrative that justifies
and explains friendly actions while delegitimizing motivations and behaviors of adversaries and those entities
opposing positive gains within the area of operations. Additionally, persuasive efforts specifically target
neutral or fringe entities with the goal of tipping neutrality to a favorable alliance.
1-34. Shaping the operational environment requires understanding the competing dynamics within the
BCT’s area of operations. Commanders and staffs gain an understanding through analysis of mission and
operational variables enhanced and developed through information collection and both reconnaissance and
security operations. Understanding and analysis are continuous tasks not bound by phase or operation.
SECTION IV – CAVALRY EMPLOYMENT IN LARGE SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
1-35. Commanders and staffs at the BCT, division, and corps level determine the reconnaissance
requirements for the operation. The commander issues reconnaissance-planning guidance early to ensure that
reconnaissance operations can precede the mission and identify options to seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative. Reconnaissance operations often begin before the course of action analysis completion so that the
Cavalry unit can inform the planning effort. For division Cavalry operations at echelons above brigade
(EAB), refer to appendix A.
1-36. Reconnaissance and security are vital operations performed in conjunction with other operations
during offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Not only reserved for the Cavalry squadron, the BCT
should incorporate reconnaissance and security into all aspects of operations. Figure 1-1 illustrates how
reconnaissance and security is fundamental to all aspects of decisive operations. |
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