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3-01.44 | 86 | Appendix D
MAP REHEARSAL
D-15. A map rehearsal is normally the easiest technique to set up since it requires only maps and graphics
for current operations; however, it is time consuming. The map rehearsal has many variations. The most
common is to use a large scale map and operations overlay laid on a table with the participants seated around
the map.
D-16. Markers (such as cardboard cutouts, self-sticking note pads) are used to track each unit as it moves and
each event as it occurs. Participants are responsible for representing their scheme of maneuver with the
markers.
D-17. This method requires the least terrain of all rehearsals. An optimal site overlooks the terrain where the
unit will execute the operations.
SKETCH-MAP REHEARSAL
D-18. This method uses a large scale sketch-map of the operations overlay and key terrain features; the sketch
is used in the same manner as the map. A technique is to draw this sketch on the side of a tracked vehicle.
Yet another option is to move to an area overlooking the operations terrain and have the participants use their
own maps and overlays to follow the rehearsal. This technique has the added advantage of familiarizing the
participants to the terrain. The sketch map technique is one of the two most commonly used rehearsal
techniques (the other is the map rehearsal).
D-19. The procedures for this rehearsal are the same as for a terrain-model rehearsal (see paragraph D-22)
except the commander uses a sketch map in place of a terrain model. Sketch-map rehearsals take less time
than terrain-model rehearsals but more time than map rehearsals.
DIGITAL TERRAIN MODEL REHEARSAL
D-20. Digital terrain models are virtual representations of the AO. The time it takes to create the digital three-
dimension model depends on the amount of available data on the terrain being modeled. An accurately
constructed terrain model helps subordinate leaders visualize the commander's intent and concept of
operations.
D-21. This type of rehearsal is best suited to small units, such as SHORAD batteries and platoons. However,
with a suitable local area network, a wider audience can view the graphics.
TERRAIN-MODEL REHEARSAL
D-22. The terrain-model rehearsal takes less time and fewer resources than a full-dress or reduced-force
rehearsal. Like the digital terrain-model, an accurately constructed model helps subordinate leaders visualize
the commander's intent and concept of operations. When possible, place the terrain model where it overlooks
the actual terrain of the AO. However, if the situation requires more security, place the terrain model on a
reverse slope within walking distance of a point overlooking the AO. The model's orientation coincides with
that of the terrain.
D-23. Integrating air defense information into a supported unit's terrain model is critical. Ensuring the enemy
air avenues of approach, possible enemy aerial targets, potential landing zones, and weapons engagement
ranges are depicted is crucial to ensuring all participants understand the enemy air capabilities.
KEY LEADER REHEARSALS
D-24. A key leader rehearsal involves only key leaders of the organization and its subordinate units. Terrain
requirements can be the same as for a full-dress rehearsal, even though there are fewer participants. The
commander decides the level of leader involvement. The selected leaders then rehearse the plan while
traversing the actual or similar terrain. This technique is useful to rehearse fire control orders and rules of
engagement for an engagement area during defensive operations. A key leader rehearsal may be used to
prepare key leaders for a full-dress rehearsal. |
3-01.44 | 87 | Rehearsals
D-25. SHORAD battalion and batteries use this type of rehearsal rather than a full dress rehearsal as distances
between batteries, platoons, and fire units likely preclude the gathering of all Soldiers and systems other than
at home station or as the first rehearsal when time and resources are available. However, SHORAD units will
participate in their supported assets' full-dress and key leader rehearsals and need to ensure all aspects of air
defense are considered and integrated into these rehearsals.
FULL-DRESS REHEARSAL
D-26. A full-dress rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the operation. Every Soldier and
system is involved in a rehearsal over terrain and weather conditions at least similar to that expected in the
operation. A full-dress rehearsal helps Soldiers clearly understand what commanders expect of them.
D-27. Full-dress rehearsals consume more time than any other rehearsal method. For batteries and platoons,
full-dress rehearsals most effectively ensure all units in the operation understand their roles. However, as
noted above, SHORAD battalions generally do not conduct full-dress rehearsals given the distances between
subordinate units, though the battalion, batteries, and platoons will participate in their supported assets' full-
dress rehearsals.
OTHER REHEARSALS
D-28. Each unit should plan rehearsals for the Soldiers to practice techniques and procedures associated with
mission essential requirements. The following rehearsals apply to combat operations tasks:
* Operation center drills. Combat requirements should be anticipated and rehearsed in the form of
operation center and command post drills. The shift officer in charge is the rehearsal director.
Examples of these battle drills include the OPORD, WARNORD, and fragmentary order receipt
and dissemination; casualty evacuation; and resupply.
* Engagement drills. SHORAD fire units and sensors should rehearse their engagement drills in
their assigned position or in terrain similar to their expected position. This allows them to adapt
their operations to the existing conditions.
* Movement. SHORAD fire units and sensors should rehearse the movement techniques they expect
to use in an operation. These rehearsals will occur with supported units as well to synchronize all
the moving pieces in an operation. These rehearsals are especially useful in breaching and
obstacle-crossing operations.
REHEARSAL PLANNING
D-29. Rehearsal planning is crucial in every operation. A hasty rehearsal is less effective than a deliberately
planned and resourced rehearsal.
D-30. Rehearsal time allotment must be considered up front. The SHORAD commander or leader decides
which type of rehearsal to prepare for based on the planning and timeline work completed during the planning
process. The most effective rehearsals are those that are planned from the receipt of the first WARNORD
until rehearsal execution. Time lines are the most effective tool to aid in allocating time for events.
D-31. When considering the total amount of time available and the 1/3-2/3 rule (1/3 of the time allocated to
the higher headquarters and 2/3 to subordinate organizations), the rehearsal planner can determine the type
of rehearsal the unit can afford to perform. In order for rehearsals to be mutually beneficial, the SHORAD
leader should plan a rehearsal window that allows subordinates enough time to develop their own plans.
D-32. Figure D-2 on page D-6, illustrates the level of planning and time line development necessary to
determine when rehearsals can and should occur. This figure does not consider, however, the supported unit
time line which will significantly complicate the process. |
3-01.44 | 88 | Appendix D
Figure D-2. Rehearsal timeline
D-33. Commanders and executive officers plan rehearsals. They address rehearsal planning consideration
and identify responsibilities for ensuring effective rehearsals.
D-34. Commanders provide certain information as part of the commander's guidance during the initial
mission analysis. They may revise the following information when they select a course of action:
* Type of rehearsal and rehearsal method.
* Key events to rehearse (prioritized) and the time allocated for each event.
* Location and attendees.
* Enemy courses of action to be portrayed.
D-35. The executive officer ensures all rehearsals are included in the organization's timeline. The executive
officer's responsibilities include:
* Publishing the rehearsal time and location in the operation or WARNORD.
* Conducting any staff rehearsals.
* Determining rehearsal products, based on type, method and mission variable. |
3-01.44 | 89 | Rehearsals
REHEARSAL PREPARATION
D-36. Once the decision has been made on the type of rehearsal and when and where it will occur, preparation
begins. Everyone involved in executing or supporting the rehearsal has responsibilities during preparation.
D-37. Commanders provide the requisite guidance for the rehearsal. They identify and prioritize key events,
allocate time for each event, and review the completeness of unit's organization, readiness of personnel and
equipment, and the unit's level of preparation.
D-38. The executive officer is the rehearsal director. Through wargaming and coordination with the
commander, the executive officer—
* Coordinates and allocates time for key events requiring rehearsal.
* Establishes rehearsal time limits per the commander's guidance and mission variables.
* Verifies rehearsal site preparation, appropriate markings and associated training aids and parking
areas.
* Determines the method for controlling the rehearsal and ensuring its logical flow.
D-39. The headquarters' staff conducting the rehearsals—
* Develop an operation order with the necessary overlays.
* Deconflict all subordinate unit graphics.
* Publish composite overlays at the rehearsal.
* Nominate a recorder.
D-40. Subordinate leaders complete their planning; this planning includes—
* Complete unit operation orders.
* Identify issues derived from the higher headquarters' operation order.
* Provide a copy of their unit operation order with graphics to the higher headquarters.
* Perform personal preparation similar to that of the commander.
* Ensure they and their subordinates bring all necessary equipment.
D-41. Preparatory actions vary for each rehearsal method. The following example depicts those actions
required during a terrain-model rehearsal.
* When the commander choses the terrain model technique, the site must be prepared to replicate
the operations graphic and fire control measures and terrain features. To aid the preparation, the
operations center should maintain a terrain model and sand table kit.
* The size of the terrain model or the time available may necessitate using additional personnel for
preparation. The size of the terrain model can vary from a table-top arrangement (sandbox) to a
model where the participants actually review a scaled-down version of the terrain. A terrain model
large enough to allow the key leaders to walk over a scaled-down version of the terrain helps
participants to visualize the battlefield.
* The first step in creating an accurate terrain model is to prescribe the scale. This is easily
accomplished by walking off several steps per kilometer or using some other form of
measurement. For example, if the zone of attack is 10 kilometers by 6 kilometers, the builder of
the terrain model could assign one step per kilometer and walk off the scale of the terrain model.
* The second step is to lay down selected grid lines based on the tactical map. With the grid lines
established, the builder has a handy reference to measure the size and locations of the terrain
features. This simple step greatly increases the accuracy of the terrain model and ensures that the
terrain features are the proper scale.
* The terrain model should depict all required information shown on the operations overlay and
situation map to include key terrain features, enemy positions (known and suspected), and airspace
coordinating measures. Place an arrow on the terrain map to depict north for orientation. Label all
phase lines, numbered hills, and objectives with their appropriate names. The terrain should mirror
the operations and enemy overlays and include the air portion of the IPB. Once the terrain model
is complete, position a map and operations overlay behind or at the side of the model as a point of
reference. |
3-01.44 | 90 | Appendix D
REHEARSAL EXECUTION
D-42. During the rehearsal execution, the commander, executive officer, subordinate leaders, recorder and
staff from the conducting headquarters have specific responsibilities before, during, and after a rehearsal.
Before a rehearsal, the rehearsal director states the commander's expectations and orients the participants on
the details of the rehearsal. During the rehearsal, participants rehearse their roles to ensure that they
understand how their actions impact an operation. After a rehearsal, participants ensure that they understand
any changes to the operation order and to any coordination required.
D-43. Commanders command the rehearsal just as they command an operation. They maintain the focus and
level of intensity, allowing no potential for confusion by subordinates. An effective rehearsal validates the
synchronization (the what, when, and where) of tasks that subordinate units will perform to execute the
operation and achieve the commander's intent.
D-44. The executive officer—as the rehearsal director—ensures each unit accomplishes its tasks at the right
time and cues the commander to upcoming decisions. The executive officer's script is the execution matrix
and the decision support template. The executive officer as the rehearsal director—
* Starts the rehearsal time.
* Initiates a formal roll call.
* Ensures everyone brings the necessary equipment, including organizational graphics, and
previously issued orders.
* Validates the task organization; link-ups must be complete or on schedule, and personnel and
materiel must be on hand.
* Ensures synchronization of the operational framework being used.
* Synchronizes the timing and contribution of each participant.
* Ensures that the most important events receive the most attention.
* Keeps within time constraints.
D-45. The operations officer (S-3)—
* Portraits the friendly scheme of maneuver.
* Ensures subordinate unit actions comply with the commander's intent.
D-46. The intelligence officer (S-2) portrays the enemy forces and other variables of the operational
environment during rehearsals. The S-2 bases actions on the enemy course of action that the commander
selected during the planning process. The S-2—
* Provides participants with current intelligence assessments.
* Portrays the best possible assessment of the enemy course of action.
* Communicates the enemy's presumed concept of operation, desired effects, and end state.
* Explains other factors of the operational environment that may hinder or complicate friendly
actions.
* Communicates the key civil considerations of the operation.
D-47. The logistics officer (S-4)—
* Presents the logistics support concept.
* Identifies critical sustainment shortfalls.
* Communicates the transportation support identified for supply distribution and other sustainment
actions.
D-48. Subordinate leaders, using an established format, effectively brief their units' actions and
responsibilities as well as record changes on their copies of the graphics or operation order.
D-49. The recorder is normally a representative from the S-3. During the rehearsal, the recorder captures all
coordination made during execution and notes any unresolved problems. At the end of the rehearsal, the
recorder presents any unresolved problems for resolution, restates any changes directed by the commander,
and estimates when a fragmentary order codifying the changes will follow. |
3-01.44 | 91 | Rehearsals
D-50. The rehearsal director frees the commander to command and participate rather than run a rehearsal.
While the SHORAD battalion conducts its rehearsal, the SHORAD battery and platoons should also rehearse
with their leaders and with the supported unit. Final changes are made to the execution matrix following
rehearsals, and WARNORDs are issued to reflect any necessary changes.
D-51. The following example outlines a step-by-step process for conducting a rehearsal:
* Step 1. Start at the appointed time and conduct a formal roll call. Ensure everyone brings
binoculars, maps, and necessary equipment.
* Step 2. Ensure the rehearsal director orients the map, sketch-map, or terrain model to the actual
ground. Generally describe and point out the overall AO and explain the markers used on the
terrain model.
* Step 3. Brief the time line. Designate the rehearsal start time. For example, have the rehearsal
begin by depicting the anticipated situation one hour before leaving the line of departure. Set the
time interval to be used to start and track the rehearsal: in effect, specify a ten-minute interval to
equate to one hour of real time during operation.
* Step 4. Highlight the ground rules and incorporate ground rules into the unit SOP. Include who
controls the rehearsal, who actually walks the terrain, how the rehearsal will be controlled, and
when staff officers brief.
* Step 5. The S-3 (or executive officer at battery level) reads the mission statement, the commander
reads the commander's intent, and the S-3 or executive officer lays out the friendly situation as it
currently exists, using the map, sketch-map, or terrain model.
* Step 6. The S-2 (or executive officer at battery level) briefs the current enemy situation. The S-2
then briefs the most likely enemy course of action (the enemy situation should already be set up
on the map or terrain model). The S-2 also briefs the status of the reconnaissance and surveillance
plan, for example, citing the most recent early warning tracks.
* Step 7. The S-3 (or executive officer at battery level) briefs friendly maneuver unit dispositions at
the rehearsal start time, including sensor positions. Other staff officers brief their subordinate unit
positions at the start time, as well as any particular points of emphasis.
* Step 8. The commander gives appropriate commands. Battery commanders and or platoon leaders
tell when they occupy positions and anticipate an air attack. The executive officer talks for any
staff section not present and ensures all actions listed on the synchronization matrix or decision
support template are addressed at the proper time or event. Avoid re-wargaming except as
absolutely necessary to ensure subordinate unit commanders fully understand the plan. If the staff
has developed an order that addresses contingencies, there is little need to re-wargame the
operation at the rehearsal site.
* Step 9. The S-2 (or executive officer at the battery level) portrays the enemy. The S-2 section
describes the enemy's most likely and most dangerous courses of action (situation template),
pointing out enemy air avenues of approach, possible aerial targets, landing and drop zones in the
unit’s area, reconnaissance routes, objectives, security force composition and locations, probable
main force objectives, likely chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack times and
locations, and the commitment of reserves. The S-2 must be specific by tying enemy actions to
specific terrain or friendly unit actions. The walk-through should be an accurate portrayal of an
event template.
* Step 10. Terminate the first phase of the rehearsal after the desired end state (from the
commander's intent) is achieved. In the defense, this is usually after the decisive action, such as
destruction of the air threat or withdrawal of the enemy.
* Step 11. When it becomes obvious that additional coordination is required to ensure success of the
operation, try to immediately accomplish it. This coordination is one of the key points of the
rehearsal. Make sure it is clearly understood by all participants and captured by the recorder and
all changes to the published operation order are in effect. As soon as possible, the S-3 (or executive
officer at the battery level) should collect the verbal fragmentary orders and incorporate as written
changes to the operation order.
* Step 12. After the initial review of the base order, recheck the situation at the initial decision point.
State the criteria for a decision to change the plan. |
3-01.44 | 92 | Appendix D
* Step 13. Go to the next decision point and ensure that the criteria have been met. Repeat step 12.
(Repeat step 13 for all decision points).
* Step 14. Key sustainment items need to be briefed, including the plans for casualty evacuation
(routes, ambulance exchange point locations, refuel on the move, Class IV and V resupply points,
forward logistics bases, planned locations and effective times, logistics release points,
displacement times and locations for support areas, and prisoner of war collection points). These
items should be integrated into the rehearsal at the appropriate times. Summarizing these actions
at the end of the rehearsal adds to the value of the rehearsal as a coordination tool.
* Step 15. After the rehearsal is complete, the recorder should restate any changes, coordination or
clarifications directed by the commander, and estimate the time that a written fragmentary or
operation order, to codify the changes, will be issued.
* Step 16. The commander should stress any points needing additional emphasis. The commander
should consider reiterating the commander's intent (purpose, method, and end state) to remind all
participants that the goal is to accomplish the mission. |
3-01.44 | 93 | Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and
joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent publication for
other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAA air avenue of approach
ADA air defense artillery
ADAM air defense airspace management
ADP Army doctrine publication
AMD air and missile defense
AO area of operations
ATP Army techniques publication
BCT brigade combat team
C2 command and control
COA course of action
DA Department of the Army
DOD Department of Defense
FM field manual
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
JP joint publication
M-SHORAD maneuver short-range air defense
MDMP military decision-making process
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations
OPORD operation order
NAI named area of interest
RAM rocket, artillery, and mortar
ROE rules of engagement
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
SHORAD short-range air defense
SOP standard operating procedure
TLP troop leading procedures
UAS unmanned aircraft system |
3-01.44 | 94 | Glossary
WARNORD warning order
SECTION II – TERMS
air and missile defense
Direct [active and passive] defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of
hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets. Also called AMD. (JP 3-01)
air defense artillery
Weapons and equipment for actively combating air targets from the ground. Also called ADA. (JP 3-
01)
air defense warning condition
An air defense warning given in the form of a color code corresponding to the degree of air raid
probability with yellow standing for when an attack by hostile aircraft or missiles is probable; red for
when an attack by hostile aircraft or missiles is imminent or is in progress; and white for when an
attack by hostile aircraft or missiles is improbable. Also called ADWC. (JP 3-01)
alert state
A condition that prescribes the amount of resources required to achieve ready to fire and desired radar
emissions, and which specifies manning requirements and equipment configurations. (FM 3-01)
area defense
A type of defensive operations that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain
for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. (ADP 3-90)
area of interest
That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and
extending into enemy territory. Also called AOI. (JP 3-0)
area of operations
An operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough
to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 3-0)
assign
To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or
where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or
greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. (JP 3-0)
attach
The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary.
(JP 3-0)
attack
A type of offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both.
(ADP 3-90)
command and control
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1)
complex integrated attack
A synchronized attack of a friendly asset by a mix of air and missile threats arriving near-
simultaneously from different directions, altitudes, and ranges. (FM 3-01)
consolidate gains
Activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a
sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities.
(ADP 3-0) |
3-01.44 | 95 | Glossary
decisive action
The continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense
support of civil authorities tasks. (ADP 3-0)
defensive operation
An operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable
for offensive or stability operations. (ADP 3-0)
engage
In air and missile defense, a fire control order used to direct or authorize units and/or weapon systems
to attack a designated target. (JP 3-01)
engagement authority
An authority vested with a joint force commander that may be delegated to a subordinate commander,
that permits an engagement decision. (JP 3-01)
exploitation
A type of offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the
enemy in depth. (ADP 3-90)
flexibility
The employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting
operations. (ADP 3-0)
homeland defense
The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure
against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. Also called HD.
(JP 3-27)
integration
The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a
whole. (JP 1)
mobile defense
A type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a
decisive attack by a striking force. (ADP 3-90)
mobility
A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place
to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. (JP 3-36)
movement to contact
A type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact. (ADP
3-90)
offensive operation
An operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population
centers. (ADP 3-0)
operational control
The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing
and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Also called OPCON. (JP 1)
operational environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called OE. (JP 3-0) |
3-01.44 | 96 | Glossary
organic
Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed in its table of organization
for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the operating forces for the Navy. (JP
1)
planning
The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective
ways of bringing that future about. (ADP 5-0)
positive control
A method of airspace control that relies on positive identification, tracking, and direction of aircraft
within an airspace, conducted with electronic means by an agency having the authority and
responsibility therein. (JP 3-52)
positive identification
An identification derived from observation and analysis of target characteristics including visual
recognition, electronic support systems, noncooperative target recognition techniques, identification
friend or foe systems, or other physics-based identification techniques. Also called PID. (JP 3-01)
primary target line
An azimuth assigned to a weapon system or unit along which the system fire control personnel and or
gunners focus their attention. (FM 3-01)
procedural control
A method of airspace control which relies on a combination of previously agreed and promulgated
orders and procedures. (JP 3-52)
pursuit
A type of offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the
aim of destroying it. (ADP 3-90)
resilience
The quality of the defense to maintain continuity of operations regardless of changes in or
unanticipated tactics by enemy air or losses of critical air and missile defense components. (FM 3-01)
rules of engagement
Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations
under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 3-84)
secondary target line
A pre-planned alternative target line used to shift the orientation of fires to assure all likely threat
avenues of ingress are adequately defended. (FM 3-01)
sector of fire
That area assigned to a unit, crew-served weapon, or an individual weapon within which it will engage
targets as they appear in accordance with established engagement priorities. (FM 3-90-1)
short-range air defense
Capabilities that provide air defense against low-altitude air threats. Also called SHORAD. (FM 3-01)
stability operation
An operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national
power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-0)
tactical control
The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or
maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Also called
TACON. (JP 1) |
3-01.44 | 97 | Glossary
unmanned aircraft system
That system whose components include the necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an
unmanned aircraft. Also called UAS. (JP 3-30)
weapons control status
An air and missile defense control measure declared for a particular area and time by an area air
defense commander, or delegated subordinate commander, based on the rules of engagement that
establish the conditions under which fighters and surface air defense weapons are permitted to engage
threats. Also call WCS. (JP 3-01) |
3-01.44 | 99 | References
All websites accessed on 01 March 2022.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users for this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. May 2022.
FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 21 November 2019.
FM 1-02.2. Military Symbols. 18 May 2022.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: https://www.jcs.mil/doctrine.
JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.
JP 3-0. Joint Campaigns and Operations. 18 June 2022.
JP 3-01. Countering Air and Missile Threats. 21 August 2017.
JP 3-27. Homeland Defense. 10 April 2018.
JP 3-30. Joint Air Operations. 25 July 2019.
JP 3-36. Joint Air Mobility and Sealift Operations. 4 January 2021.
JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 13 November 2014.
JP 3-84. Legal Support. 2 August 2016.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil/.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.
ADP 7-0. Training. 31 July 2019.
ATP 3-01.8. Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense. 29 July 2016.
ATP 3-01.16. Air and Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 31 March 2016.
ATP 3-01.18. Stinger Team Techniques. 23 August 2017.
ATP 3-01.48. Sentinel Techniques. 4 March 2016.
ATP 3-01.60. Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Operations. 10 May 2013.
ATP 3-01.64. Avenger Battalion and Battery Techniques. 10 March 2016.
ATP 3-01.81. Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques. 13 April 2017.
FM 3-0. Operations. 6 October 2017.
FM 3-01. U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 22 December 2020.
FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense Volume 1. 22 March 2013.
FM 4-0. Sustainment Operations. 31 July 2019.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 16 May 2022. |
3-01.44 | 100 | References
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare. 7 August 2019.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD)
website at https://armypubs.army.mil/.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. |
3-01.44 | 101 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
41, 6-42, 6-43, 6-47, 6-49, A-1,
A C
A-2
ADA forces,1-3, 1-4, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, combined arms for air defense, 2-
modes of control, 1-17, 1-18
1-9, 1-10, 4-6 2, 2-16, 6-4, C-29, D-9
O
air and missile defense, 1-1, 1-6, counterair effort, 1-8
1-17, 4-7, 4-8, 5-6, A-16 operational control, 1-11, 4-10, C-
cyberspace, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-25, 3-
air threat, 1-15, 1-16, 2-1, 2-4, 2- 37 25
5, 2-8, 2-12, 2-13, 3-2, 3-6, 3- cyberspace attacks, 3-27 operational elements, 1-2
29, 3-32, 4-8, 4-12, 4-25, 5-4, operations process, 4-4, 4-13
5-17, 5-19, 6-2, 6-32, 6-43, 6- D
49, 6-51, C-7, C-10, C-13, C- decentralized control, 6-27 S
14, C-15, C-16, C-31, D-51 defensive counterair, 1-1, 1-8 sector air defense commander, 1-
alert state, 1-13 11, 1-13
digital terrain-model, D-22
AMD employment tenets, 5-18, 6- sensors, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 2-5, 2-11,
35 E 3-10, 4-27, 4-29, 5-2, 5-8, 5-13,
AMD principles, 1-5, 4-27 engagement authority, 1-11 5-17, 5-19, 5-20, 5-27, 5-30, 6-
35, 6-51, A-1, A-14, A-15, A-16,
area air defense commander , 1- engagement operations, A-19
C-3, C-10, C-18, C-20, D-9, D-
7, 1-11, 1-13, 1-15, 1-17, 2-20,
G 28
4-7
ground defense plan, 5-30 Stryker, 2-7, A-1, A-2
area air defense plan, 2-20, 4-7
ground forces, 2-10, 3-2, 3-18, 3- U
attack operations, 1-1
28, 3-32, 3-33, 4-27
Avenger, 1-3, 1-5, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6, 2- unified action, 2-12
8, 2-9, 2-10, 5-21, 5-28, 5-29, H unmanned aircraft systems (UAS),
6-7, 6-9, 6-16, 6-16, 6-17, 6-18, high value asset, 4-6 1-4, 1-17, 2-3, 2-4, 2-7, 3-2, 3-
6-21, 6-23, 6-26, 6-28, 6-35, 6- 6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 3-11, 3-
40, 6-41, 6-42, 6-43,6-44, 6-47, I 30, 3-31, 3-32, 3-34, 3-35, 3-36,
6-49, 6-51, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, identification criteria, 1-12, 1-17, 4-12, 4-24, 5-10, 5-21, 6-7, 6-
A-18 2-20, 4-7 31, 6-41, 6-45, A-1, A-7, A-9, C-
4, C-12, C-15, C-16, C-20, C-
B M 21, C-23, C-25, C-26, C-32
ballistic missile, 1-1, 1-2, 1-4, 1- Maneuver-Short Range Air
W
17, 3-2, 3-15 Defense (M-SHORAD), 1-3, 1-
battle drills, 6-20,6-21, D-4, D-10, 5, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 5-21, 5-28, weapons control status, 1-12, 1-
D-28 5-29, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 6-15, 6-21, 17, 6-4, 6-32
6-23, 6-26, 6-28, 6-35, 6-40, 6- |
3-01.44 | 103 | FM 3-01.44
21 July 2022
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
MARK F. AVERILL
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2219406
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve. Distributed in |
3-0 | 1 | FM 3-0
OPERATIONS
OCTOBER 2022
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 3-0, dated 6 October 2017. |
3-0 | 2 | Foreword
The United States Army has always served to protect the Nation and preserve the peace. Historically, this has always meant
preparing for and, when necessary, fighting and winning our Nation’s wars. The Army must always be ready to fight and win. In
this era of great power competition, the Army must always campaign aggressively to protect our national interests.
We are living in very challenging times. There is not a time in recent history that is so potentially dangerous. Russia, our acute
threat, is conducting an unprovoked war on the sovereign country of Ukraine. Our pacing challenge, China, with an economy
nearly equal in size to ours, is building a world-class military to challenge us and threatening its neighbors, including Taiwan. As
we focus on China and Russia, we cannot take our eyes off our other persistent threats: North Korea, Iran, and violent extremists.
In addition, we are still dealing with the challenges of COVID and unprecedented natural disasters throughout the country. Despite
all these challenges and threats, we continue to advance in the Army’s greatest transformation in over 40 years, as we pivot from
decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to large-scale combat operations.
Every 40 years the Army experiences a major transformation. In 1973, the Arab–Israeli War drove Army senior leaders and
General Don Starry to relook the lessons learned in that conflict to counter the Soviet Union. Those efforts resulted in whatwe
know today as Air-Land Battle. In 1991, the Army and the joint force executed that doctrine with great efficacy in OPERATION
DESERT STORM, quickly liberating Kuwait. We are at a similar inflection point with lessons learned coming in from the 2nd
Nagorno-Karabakh War and the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War. These lessons have and continue to shape our transformational war
fighting concept of multidomain operations. Multidomain operationsstarted as an operating concept, and now we are solidifying
it into doctrine. This concept is shaping the Army and transforming our people, readiness, and modernization efforts to meet
current and future challenges and define the Army of 2030.
FM 3-0 demonstrates the first principles of speed, range, and convergence of the cutting-edge technologies needed to achieve
future decision dominance and overmatch against our adversaries. It reflects the vital role the Army plays as the force that joint
force commanders need to hold critical terrain, assure allies and partners, defeat the most dangerous enemies in close combat
anywhere in the world, and consolidate gains to achieve enduring strategic outcomes for the Nation. Two critical elements of
multidomain operations, space and cyberspace capabilities, have been employed by Army forces for more than two decades, but
never during conflict with opponents capable of effectively contesting the U.S. joint force in space or cyberspace. Air and maritime
capabilities have long enabled successful operations on land, but it has been decades since air-ground integration and close
cooperation between land and naval forces have been effectively challenged by a threat.
FM 3-0 remains rooted in the principles of war and reinforces the offensive mindset. It provides a simple definition of multidomain
operations that applies at all echelons. The new operational environment model helps leaders visualize the five domains and
understand their interrelationship through the physical, information, and human dimensions. FM 3-0 introduces new tenets and
imperatives and provides an operational framework that helps echelons better organize forces in terms of time, space, and purpose.
It describes operations in the context of competition, crisis, and armed conflict. It also addresses the unique considerations for
applying landpower in maritime environments and the unique demands of, and requirements for, combat leadership.
Success demands competent leaders who apply doctrine with judgment. Therefore, I challenge you all to learn and then assess
doctrine during training and operations. Engage about it in professional discourse and make it better. That is how the Army will
fight and win in the future.
People first, winning matters, and we remain Army strong!
JJAAMMEESS CC.. MMCCCCOONNVVIILLLLEE
GGEENNEERRAALL,, UUNNIITTEEDD SSTTAATTEESS AARRMY |
3-0 | 3 | *FM 3-0
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-0 Department of the Army
Washington, D(cid:17)C(cid:17), 01 October 2022
Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE..................................................................................................................... v
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... ix
Chapter 1 FOUNDATIONS OF OPERATIONS ......................................................................... 1-1
Army Operations........................................................................................................1-1
Multidomain Operations.............................................................................................1-2
Challenges for Army Forces......................................................................................1-3
Lethality: Overcoming Challenges.............................................................................1-5
War and Warfare.......................................................................................................1-6
Understanding an Operational Environment...........................................................1-16
Chapter 2 GENERATING AND APPLYING COMBAT POWER ............................................... 2-1
Warfighting Functions................................................................................................2-1
Combat Power...........................................................................................................2-3
Strategic Environment...............................................................................................2-6
Unified Action and Army Forces..............................................................................2-12
Chapter 3 FUNDAMENTALS OF OPERATIONS ...................................................................... 3-1
Section I – Multidomain Operations: The Army’s Operational Concept ............ 3-1
Section II – Tenets and Imperatives ...................................................................... 3-2
Tenets........................................................................................................................3-2
Imperatives................................................................................................................3-8
Section III – Operational Approach and Operational Framework ..................... 3-18
Operational Approach..............................................................................................3-18
Strategic Framework...............................................................................................3-21
Operational Framework...........................................................................................3-23
Chapter 4 OPERATIONS DURING COMPETITION BELOW ARMED CONFLICT ................. 4-1
Overview of Operations During Competition.............................................................4-1
Adversary Methods During Competition....................................................................4-2
Preparation for Large-Scale Combat Operations......................................................4-3
Relative Advantages During Competition..................................................................4-6
Interagency Coordination..........................................................................................4-8
Competition Activities................................................................................................4-9
Roles of Army Echelons during Competition...........................................................4-12
Consolidating Gains During Competition................................................................4-20
Transition to Crisis and Armed Conflict...................................................................4-21
DISTRIBUTIONRESTRICTION:Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.
*This publicationsupersedesFM 3-0, dated 06 October 2017. |
3-0 | 4 | Contents
Chapter 5 OPERATIONS DURING CRISIS .............................................................................. 5-1
Overview of Operations During Crisis.......................................................................5-1
Adversary Methods During Crisis.............................................................................5-2
Operations Security...................................................................................................5-3
Relative Advantages.................................................................................................5-3
Army Support to the Joint Force During Crisis.........................................................5-4
Force Projection........................................................................................................5-7
Army Echelons During Crisis..................................................................................5-13
Consolidating Gains................................................................................................5-15
Transition to Competition or Armed Conflict...........................................................5-16
Chapter 6 OPERATIONS DURING ARMED CONFLICT ......................................................... 6-1
Section I – Armed Conflict and Large-Scale Combat Operations ...................... 6-1
Enemy Approaches to Armed Conflict......................................................................6-2
Relative Advantages During Armed Conflict.............................................................6-4
Operating as Part of the Joint Force.........................................................................6-6
Applying Defeat Mechanisms.................................................................................6-21
Enabling Operations................................................................................................6-26
Section II – Defensive Operations ....................................................................... 6-31
Purpose and Conditions for the Defense................................................................6-31
Characteristics of the Defense................................................................................6-32
Enemy Offense.......................................................................................................6-33
Types of Defensive Operations...............................................................................6-34
Defensive Operational Framework Considerations................................................6-35
Transition to Offense...............................................................................................6-40
Section III – Offensive Operations ....................................................................... 6-40
Purpose and Conditions for the Offense.................................................................6-40
Characteristics of the Offense.................................................................................6-41
Enemy Defense.......................................................................................................6-41
Types of Offensive Operations...............................................................................6-43
Offensive Operational Framework Considerations.................................................6-44
Transition to Defense and Stability.........................................................................6-47
Transition to Post-Conflict Competition...................................................................6-47
Chapter 7 ARMY OPERATIONS IN MARITIME ENVIRONMENTS ......................................... 7-1
Section I – Overview of the Maritime Environment ............................................. 7-1
Physical Characteristics of the Maritime Environment..............................................7-1
Considerations Unique to the Maritime Environment...............................................7-3
Section II – Maritime Environment Planning and Operational Framework ....... 7-6
Planning Considerations for a Maritime Environment...............................................7-7
Applying the Operational Framework........................................................................7-7
Section III – Operational Considerations for a Maritime Environment .............. 7-9
Establish Command and Control............................................................................7-10
Defend and Control Key Terrain.............................................................................7-10
Defeat Components of Enemy Antiaccess and Area Denial and Enable Joint
Offensive Operations..............................................................................................7-13
Sustain Large-Scale Combat Operations in Maritime Environments.....................7-15
Chapter 8 LEADERSHIP DURING OPERATIONS ................................................................... 8-1
The Art of Command and the Commander...............................................................8-1
Applying the Art of Command...................................................................................8-2
Driving the Operations Process................................................................................8-7
Adapting Formations for Missions and Transitions...................................................8-9
Appendix A THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR ..................................................................................... A-1 |
3-0 | 5 | Contents
Appendix B COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS ..................................................... B-1
Appendix C CONTESTED DEPLOYMENTS ............................................................................... C-1
SOURCE NOTES ................................................................................ Source Notes-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1
INDEX ................................................................................................................ Index-1
Figures
Introductory figure. FM 3-0 logic chart .............................................................................................. x
Figure 1-1. Operational categories and the spectrum of violence ................................................. 1-2
Figure 1-2. Levels of warfare ........................................................................................................ 1-12
Figure 1-3. Army strategic contexts and operational categories .................................................. 1-14
Figure 1-4. Domains and dimensions of an operational environment.......................................... 1-17
Figure 2-1. Notional U.S. European Command preclusion example ........................................... 2-10
Figure 2-2. Notional U.S. Indo-Pacific Command preclusion example ........................................ 2-11
Figure 2-3. Examples of operations and activities ....................................................................... 2-13
Figure 3-1. Convergence ................................................................................................................ 3-4
Figure 3-2. The operational framework in the context of the strategic framework ....................... 3-23
Figure 3-3. Notional corps area of operations with noncontiguous divisions ............................... 3-26
Figure 3-4. Notional corps deep, close, and rear areas with contiguous divisions ...................... 3-28
Figure 5-1. Simultaneous flexible deterrent and response option examples ................................. 5-5
Figure 6-1. Doctrinal template of depths and frontages ................................................................. 6-8
Figure 6-2. Notional roles and responsibilities in terms of time, space, and purpose at different
echelons. ................................................................................................................... 6-11
Figure 6-3. Fires assets of a notional theater-level integrated fires command ............................ 6-16
Figure 6-4. Notional enemy offensive operation .......................................................................... 6-34
Figure 6-5. Notional operational framework during defensive operations ................................... 6-36
Figure 6-6. Notional enemy maneuver defense ........................................................................... 6-42
Figure 6-7. Notional operational framework during offensive operations .................................... 6-44
Figure 7-1. Operations in Malaya ................................................................................................... 7-6
Figure 7-2. Notional corps area of operation with maritime aspects .............................................. 7-8
Figure 8-1. The operations process ............................................................................................... 8-8
Figure B-1. Joint command relationships .......................................................................................B-3 |
3-0 | 6 | Contents
Tables
Introductory table. New and modified terms .................................................................................... xii
Table 1-1. Principles of war ........................................................................................................... 1-8
Table 5-1. Potential Army contributions to joint flexible deterrent and response options .............. 5-6
Table B-1. Joint support categories ............................................................................................... B-3
Table B-2. Army command relationships ....................................................................................... B-5
Table B-3. Army support relationships ........................................................................................... B-7
Table B-4. Other relationships ....................................................................................................... B-8
Table B-5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization command relationships ....................................... B-12
Vignettes
Systems Warfare and Sanctuary: Eastern Ukraine 2014 .............................................................. 2-9
Second Nagorno Karabakh War: September–November 2020 .................................................. 3-13
Failure to Prepare for War: Philippines, 1941 ................................................................................ 4-5
Successful Engagement: State Partnership Program ................................................................ 4-10
Liberia: OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE ............................................................................ 4-12
Effective Response: OPERATION PAUL BUNYAN ..................................................................... 5-7
Deployment Friction: Task Force Ironhorse in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM ....................... 5-10
Crisis Response: Baghdad Embassy Attack ............................................................................... 5-15
Defeat of the North Korean People’s Army, September 1950 ..................................................... 6-23
Disintegration of Egyptian Defense: 1973 Arab-Israeli War ........................................................ 6-26
Faulty Assumptions—Defeat Across Multiple Domains in Malaya ................................................ 7-5
Commanding Forward—LTG Eichelberger at Buna ...................................................................... 8-3
Initiative in the Absence of Orders – Naval Bombers at Midway ................................................... 8-7
Crosstalk in the Desert—VII Corps in the Gulf War ..................................................................... 8-10
Notional Threat Open Source and Cyberspace Collection ............................................................ C-2
Adversary Impacts on Civilian Infrastructure ................................................................................. C-5
This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil) and the Central Army Registry site
(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard). |
3-0 | 7 | Preface
FM 3-0 expands on the Army’s capstone doctrine for multidomain operations described in ADP 3-0. It
describes how Army forces contribute landpower to the joint force and integrate joint capabilities into
operations on land to achieve military objectives and fulfill policy aims. FM 3-0 focuses on large-scale
combat operations and their relationship to the full range of military operations that support joint
campaigning.
FM 3-0 is applicable to all members of the profession of arms: leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians. The
principal audience for FM 3-0 is commanders, staffs, and leaders of theater armies, corps, divisions, and
brigades. This manual provides the foundation for training and Army education system curricula and future
capabilities development across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, facilities, and policy (known as DOTMLPF-P).
To comprehend the doctrine contained in FM 3-0, readers must first understand the Army’s mission,
organization, and roles described in ADP 1. They must understand the operations process, operational art,
and warfighting functions (command and control [C2], intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver,
protection, and sustainment) described in ADP 3-0. Readers must understand the tactics described in
ADP 3-90 and stability operations covered in ADP 3-07. They should also understand irregular warfare,
described across multiple manuals, including ADP 3-05, FM 3-05, FM 3-18, and FM 3-24.
Army leaders must understand joint doctrine and use it when communicating and coordinating directly with
the joint force. JP 3-0 establishes the baseline operations doctrine for the joint force.
When conducting multinational operations, commanders use the allied or other appropriate doctrine
according to the situation. Readers must be familiar with FM 3-16 to understand multinational operations.
AJP-01 establishes the capstone doctrine for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operations.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with all applicable
United States, international, and host-nation laws and regulations, and all applicable international treaties and
agreements. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of armed
conflict and applicable rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27 for more information on the law of war.) They
also adhere to the Army Ethic as described in ADP 6-22.
FM 3-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are presented in
italics and bold font in the text and marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. When first defined in the text,
a term for which FM 3-0 is the proponent publication is boldfaced and italicized, and the definition is
boldfaced. When first defining other proponent definitions in the text, the term is italicized, and the number
of the proponent publication follows the definition.
The proponent of FM 3-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the
Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and
recommendations by e-mail to [email protected] on DA Form
2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army
Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-MCD (FM 3-0), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort
Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. |
3-0 | 9 | Acknowledgements
The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works.
Excerpts reprinted by permission from On War by Carl von Clausewitz. Edited and translated by Peter
Paret and Michael E. Howard. Copyright © 1988 by Princeton University Press.
Quote reprinted by permission from “Generalship” by Barbara W. Tuchman. Copyright © 1972 by The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, Volume 2, Number 1.
Excerpts reprinted by permission from Roots of Strategy. Edited by Thomas R. Phillips, Brigadier
General, Retired. Copyright © 1985 by Stackpole Books. All rights reserved.
Quote reprinted by permission from Guns of August by Barbara W. Tuchman. Copyright © 1962/1990
Tuchman Estate. All rights reserved.
Quote reprinted by permission from It Worked for Me: In Life and Leadership by Colin Powell.
Copyright © 2014 by HarperCollins Publishing. All rights reserved.
Quote reprinted by permission from Unofficial History by William Slim. Copyright © 1959 by
Field-Marshal Sir William Slim. Reprinted by Pen & Sword Books Limited. All rights
reserved. |
3-0 | 11 | Introduction
This version of FM 3-0 establishes multidomain operations as the Army’s operational concept. Conceptually,
multidomain operations reflect an evolutionary inflection point, building on the incremental changes in
doctrine as the operational environment has changed over the last forty years. In practice, however, these
conceptual changes will have revolutionary impacts on how the Army conducts operations in the coming
decades. The 2017 version of FM 3-0 introduced many multidomain considerations and ideas. This version
of FM 3-0 codifies the multidomain approach to operations in terms of the combined arms employment of
capabilities from multiple domains. The multidomain operations concept draws from previous Army
operational concepts, including AirLand Battle, Full Spectrum Operations, and Unified Land Operations.
General Donn A. Starry’s description of the “extended battlefield” and the associated concept of AirLand
Battle helped visualize the battlefield of the time—a battlefield now also extended into the maritime, space,
and cyberspace domains. AirLand Battle demanded the integration of air and ground capabilities to attack
enemy second echelon forces at extended ranges. Today, multidomain operations require integration of Army
and joint capabilities from all domains to defeat the enemy’s integrated fires complexes and air defense
systems so that maneuver forces can exploit the resulting freedom of action. The ability to maneuver to seize
or retain key terrain and exert control over resources and people for as long as is necessary to achieve tactical,
operational, and strategic objectives makes ground forces foundational to joint force success. During
competition and crisis, forward-stationed Army forces holding key land areas provide “stand-on” capabilities
that counter adversary standoff approaches, reduce risk to joint force projection, deter adversary aggression,
and achieve national and joint objectives. During conflict, maneuvering ground forces with the right
capabilities ultimately enable operations in the other domains.
Full Spectrum Operations accounted for the operations that Army forces conducted outside the bounds of
armed conflict. This version of FM 3-0 updates this material for the present by describing how Army forces
operate during competition below armed conflict and during crisis. It goes a step further than Full Spectrum
Operations by describing how these operations set conditions for success during armed conflict.
Unified Land Operations emphasized the integration and synchronization of Army, joint, and other unified
action partners during operations. The 2017 version of FM 3-0 updated unified land operations and shifted
the Army’s readiness focus from counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations. It incorporated
elements of the multidomain operations concept, particularly the operational environment and its
considerations. This version of FM 3-0 retains the focus on large-scale combat operations. It also builds on
the importance of integrating joint and multinational capabilities and expands the combined arms approach
with a focus on creating complementary and reinforcing effects with capabilities from multiple domains. By
deliberately looking beyond traditional methods of integration generally focused on one or two domains,
Army forces can expand opportunities for the joint force and create more dilemmas for the enemy.
The nature of war remains unchanged. The model for understanding an operational environment, specifically
the physical, information, and human dimensions, reinforces the Clausewitzian idea that war is an act of force
to compel the enemy’s will. In other words, physical action can influence human perceptions, behavior, and
decision making. Although there are new capabilities in space and cyberspace, Army forces use them just as
they employ any other capability—to accomplish missions on land.
The logic chart for this manual is shown in the introductory figure on page x. The logic chart begins with
identifying the methods used by peer threats to contest the joint force and how the joint force and Army
forces counter those approaches through multidomain operations. Multidomain operations are the Army’s
contribution to unified action, conducted by Army echelons in an operational environment consisting of five
domains and three dimensions, and the strategic contexts of competition, crisis, and armed conflict. It
concludes with a description of multidomain operations through guiding principles of war, tenets, and
imperatives that enable Army forces to accomplish missions, defeat enemy forces, and meet objectives. |
3-0 | 12 | Introduction
Introductory figure. FM 3-0 logic chart
FM 3-0 contains eight chapters and three appendixes: |
3-0 | 13 | Introduction
Chapter 1 describes the challenges faced by Army forces and how multidomain operations help resolve
them. It describes the Army’s vision of war and warfare, the strategic contexts in which Army forces conduct
operations, and the operational environment, including the domains and dimensions.
Chapter 2 describes how the synchronization of warfighting functions generates combat power to apply
against enemy forces. It then describes threats and their methods, and how Army forces counter these threat
methods through unified action and joint capabilities.
Chapter 3 explains multidomain operations in detail, describing the tenets and imperatives of operations. It
then highlights key elements of an operational approach and the operational framework.
Chapter 4 describes how Army forces operate during competition to set conditions for armed conflict and
counter adversary malign behavior.
Chapter 5 describes how Army forces provide options during crisis to prevent armed conflict while
continuing to fulfill political aims.
Chapter 6 describes how Army forces operate during armed conflict, with a focus on how to enable the joint
force and integrate capabilities from all domains in large-scale combat operations.
Chapter 7 describes how Army forces operate in the unique conditions of maritime environments.
Chapter 8 describes the role of commanders and leaders in the demanding conditions of large-scale combat
operations.
Appendix A provides an overview of the principles of war.
Appendix B describes command and support relationships.
Appendix C describes considerations for when enemy forces contest deployment.
The introductory table on page xii outlines changes to Army terminology reflected in FM 3-0. |
3-0 | 14 | Introduction
Introductory table. New and modified terms
Term Action
agility New term and definition
close operations New term and definition
conventional warfare New term and definition
convergence New term and definition
conventional warfare New term and definition
cyberspace domain New term and definition
deep operations New term and definition
disintegrate FM 3-0 becomes proponent and modifies
term.
dislocate FM 3-0 becomes proponent and modifies
term.
domain New term and definition
endurance New term and definition
human dimension New term and definition
informational considerations New term and definition
information dimension New term and definition
irregular warfare New Army-specific definition
lethality New term and definition
multidomain operations New term and definition
national strategic level of warfare New term and definition
physical dimension New term and definition
protection warfighting function FM 3-0 becomes proponent and modifies
term.
rear operations New term and definition
relative advantage New term and definition
sector New term and definition
setting the theater New term and definition
space domain FM 3-0 becomes proponent and modifies
term.
support area operations New term and definition
theater strategic level of warfare New term and definition
zone New term and definition |
3-0 | 15 | Chapter 1
Foundations of Operations
War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.
Carl von Clausewitz
This chapter describes the range of military operations and the Army’s focus on
readiness to conduct large-scale combat operations. It describes how Army forces meet
challenges and conduct multidomain operations as part of a joint and multinational
force. Beginning with the Army’s view of war and warfare, this chapter describes key
concepts that help leaders understand an operational environment.
ARMY OPERATIONS
1-1. The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained
land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. It supports four strategic
roles for the joint force. Army forces shape operational environments, counter aggression on land during
crisis, prevail during large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. The Army fulfills its strategic roles
by providing forces for joint campaigns that enable integrated deterrence of adversaries outside of conflict
and the defeat of enemies during conflict or war. The strategic roles clarify the overall purposes for which
Army forces conduct multidomain operations on behalf of joint force commanders (JFCs) in the pursuit of a
stable environment and other policy objectives. Fulfilling policy objectives requires national-level leaders to
orchestrate all instruments of national power throughout the entire government and coalition, in a manner
commensurate with national will. (See JP 3-0 for more information on joint campaigns and deterrence. See
ADP 3-0 for more information on the Army’s strategic roles.)
1-2. Military operations on land are foundational to operations in other domains because almost all
capabilities, no matter where employed, are ultimately based on or controlled from land. While any particular
domain may dominate military considerations in a specific context, conflicts are usually resolved on land
because that is where people live and make political decisions and where the basis of national power exists.
1-3. Army forces achieve objectives through the conduct of operations. An operation is a sequence of
tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1, Volume 1). Operations vary in many ways.
They occur in all kinds of physical environments, including urban, subterranean, desert, jungle, mountain,
maritime, and arctic. Operations vary in scale of forces involved and duration. Operations change factors in
the physical, information, and human dimensions of an operational environment.
1-4. The complex environment in which operations occur demands leaders who understand both the science
and art of operations. Understanding the science of operations—such as combat power ratios, weapons
ranges, and movement tables—helps leaders improve synchronization and reduce risk. However, there is no
way to eliminate uncertainty, and leaders must exercise operational art to make decisions and assume risk.
Intangible factors, such as the impact of leadership on morale, using shock effect to defeat enemy forces, and
supportive populations are fundamentally human factors that can overcome physical disadvantages and often
decide the outcomes of an operation. (See ADP 3-0 for more information on the art and science of operations.)
1-5. Army forces meet a diverse array of challenges and contribute to national objectives across a wide
range of operational categories, including large-scale combat operations, limited contingency operations,
crisis response, and support to security cooperation. (See figure 1-1 on page 1-2 for a depiction of operational
categories and the spectrum of violence.) |
3-0 | 16 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-1. Operational categories and the spectrum of violence
1-6. Most operations occur on the lower end of the spectrum of violence, and their objectives do not reach
the level of vital national interests or national survival. These operations typically shape operational
environments in ways that stabilize global security and facilitate conditions that are generally favorable to
the United States. They provide valuable options to JFCs because they achieve objectives best supported by
persistent presence, often at relatively low cost.
1-7. While the overwhelming majority of operations conducted by Army forces occur either below the
threshold of armed conflict or during limited contingencies, the focus of Army readiness is on large-scale
combat operations. The United States always retains the option to employ greater levels of force when less
coercive methods are ineffective, and when a vital interest or national survival is at stake. This requires Army
forces to be prepared for the most demanding and dangerous types of operations. Army forces contribute to
conventional deterrence through their demonstrated capability, capacity, and will to wage war on land in any
environment against any opponent. Credible combat forces make the other instruments of national power
more potent, and they help deter the enemy’s escalation of violence during other types of operations.
1-8. Credible combat forces are those able to overcome the advantages peer threats generate within a
specific regional context. Enemies typically initiate their aggression under conditions optimal for their
success, requiring U.S. forces to respond at a disadvantage. U.S. combat operations typically involve force
projection over long distances, providing advantages for enemy forces operating closer to their bases of
support. Enemies typically have a degree of popular support cultivated through decades of propaganda and
isolation from the free flow of information. This increases the enemy's will to fight and can make local
populations hostile to U.S. forces and objectives. Although a combatant command and theater army may
accrue a variety of advantages as they set the theater and prepare for armed conflict during periods of
competition, Army forces are typically faced with challenges they have to overcome at the onset of hostilities
and throughout the conduct or armed conflict.
MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS
1-9. Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to
create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate
gains on behalf of joint force commanders. Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all
available combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost. Multidomain operations are
the Army’s contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum. Below the threshold of
armed conflict, multidomain operations are how Army forces accrue advantages and demonstrate readiness
for conflict, deterring adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, they are how Army
forces close with and destroy the enemy, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control
populations and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes.
1-10. Army forces conduct operations in support of joint campaigns which for the most part occur as part of
a larger coalition operation. Leaders must understand the interdependencies between their own assigned
forces and the forces or capabilities provided by others to generate the complementary and reinforcing effects |
3-0 | 17 | Foundations of Operations
of combined arms approaches. Army forces employ joint and other unified action partner capabilities to the
degree they are available. However, because peer threats can contest the force in all domains, Army forces
must be prepared to conduct operations when some or all joint capabilities are unavailable to support mission
accomplishment.
1-11. All operations are multidomain operations. Army forces employ organic capabilities in multiple
domains, and they continuously benefit from air and maritime strategic transportation and space and
cyberspace capabilities that they do not control, including global positioning, satellite communications, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Lower echelons may not always notice the opportunities
created by higher echelons or other forces that operate primarily in other domains; however, leaders must
understand how the absence of those opportunities affects their concepts of operations, decision making, and
risk assessment.
1-12. During operations, small advantages can have
Army forces must accurately see themselves,
significant impacts on the outcome of the mission,
see the enemy or adversary, and understand
particularly when they accrue over time. Creating and
their operational environment before they can
exploiting relative advantages are therefore necessary identify or exploit relative advantages.
for all operations, and they become even more critical
when opposing sides are evenly matched. A relative
advantage is a location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an
opportunity to progress towards or achieve an objective. Commanders seek and create relative advantages
to exploit through action, and they continually assess the situation to identify ways to expand opportunities.
(See paragraphs 1-106 through 1-117 for more information on physical, information, and human advantages.)
1-13. Army leaders are accustomed to creating and exploiting relative advantages through the
combined-arms approach that traditionally focuses on capabilities from the land, air, and maritime domains.
The proliferation of space and cyberspace capabilities further requires leaders who understand the advantages
those capabilities create in their operational environment. The ability to integrate and synchronize space and
cyberspace capabilities at the most effective tactical echelon expands options for creating advantages to
exploit.
1-14. Multidomain operations fracture the coherence of
threat operational approaches by destroying, dislocating, Some combination of maneuver and
isolating, and disintegrating their interdependent systems and attrition is typically necessary to achieve
formations, and exploiting the opportunities these disruptions victory during armed conflict. This is
provide to defeat enemy forces in detail. Army forces reflected in the defeat mechanisms
therefore require timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive which encompass both ideas.
intelligence to understand threat characteristics, capabilities,
objectives, and courses of action. Intelligence initially drives what combinations of defeat mechanisms
commanders pursue as they employ the capabilities of their forces in space and time against enemy forces.
Army forces combine maneuver and targeting methods to defeat enemy formations and systems. Army forces
employ maneuver to close with and destroy enemy formations in close operations. Targeting generally sets
priorities for information collection, fires, and other key capabilities to disintegrate enemy networks and
systems. Leaders execute the targeting process to create advantages that enable freedom of maneuver and
exploit the positional advantages created by maneuver. Targeting is a key way for leaders to integrate the
joint capabilities required to create depth in the battlefield and protect friendly formations.
CHALLENGES FOR ARMY FORCES
We don’t maintain a strong military force to conquer or coerce others. The purpose of our
military is simple and straightforward: We want to prevent war by deterring others from
the aggression that causes war.
President Ronald Reagan
1-15. The joint force deters most adversaries from seeking to achieve strategic objectives through direct
military confrontation with the United States. As a result, adversaries pursue their objectives indirectly
through malign activities and armed conflict targeting others in ways calculated to avoid war with the United
States. These activities include subversive political and legal strategies, establishing physical presence on the |
3-0 | 18 | Chapter 1
ground to buttress resource claims, coercive economic practices, supporting proxy forces, and spreading
disinformation. However, several adversaries have both the ability and the will to conduct armed conflict
with the United States under certain conditions, which requires Army forces to be prepared at all times for
limited contingencies and large-scale combat operations.
1-16. Global and regional adversaries apply all
instruments of national power to challenge U.S. The notion of integrated deterrence goes beyond
preventing armed conflict. It includes preventing
interests and the joint force. Militarily, they have
adversaries from increasing the scope and intensity
extended the battlefield by employing
of their malign activities conducted below the
network-enabled sensors and long-range fires to
threshold of armed conflict
deny access during conflict and challenge friendly
forces’ freedom of action during competition.
These standoff approaches seek to—
(cid:122) Counter U.S. space, air, and naval advantages to make the introduction of land forces difficult and
exploit the overall joint force’s mutual dependencies.
(cid:122) Increase the cost to the joint force and its partners in the event of armed conflict.
(cid:122) Hold the joint force at risk both in the U.S. and at its overseas bases and contest Army forces’
deployment from home station to forward tactical assembly areas overseas.
1-17. Adversaries increase risk to the U.S. joint force in order to raise the threshold at which the United
States might respond to a provocation with military force. By diluting the joint force’s conventional
deterrence, adversaries believe they have greater freedom of action to conduct malign activities both within
and outside the U.S. homeland. Adversaries exploit this freedom of action through offensive cyberspace
operations, disinformation, influence operations, and the aggressive positioning of ground, air, and naval
forces to support territorial claims. Adversaries employ different types of forces and capabilities to attack
private and government organizations, threaten critical economic infrastructure, and disrupt political
processes, often with a degree of plausible deniability that reduces the likelihood of a friendly military
response. Conducting these activities in support of policy goals threatens allied cohesion, weakens responses,
and creates additional opportunities. (See paragraphs 2-40 through 2-44 for description of enemy information
warfare.)
1-18. Threat standoff approaches intensify other friendly challenges. These challenges include—
(cid:122) Gaining and maintaining support of allies and partners.
(cid:122) Maintaining the continuous information collection needed to determine composition, disposition,
strength, and activities of enemy forces.
(cid:122) Integrating and synchronizing intelligence at all echelons, distributed across large operational
areas with diverse requirements.
(cid:122) Preparing forward-stationed forces to fight and win while outnumbered and isolated.
(cid:122) Protecting forward-positioned forces and those moving into a theater.
(cid:122) Minimizing vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction.
(cid:122) Maintain C2 and sustainment of units distributed across vast distances in noncontiguous areas and
outside supporting ranges and distances.
(cid:122) Maintaining a desirable tempo while defeating fixed and bypassed enemy forces.
(cid:122) Defeating threat information and irregular warfare attacks against the United States and strategic
lines of communications.
1-19. Army forces prepare to conduct operations in contested theaters prior to and during armed conflict,
including in the United States. Army forces must account for being under constant observation and the
threat’s ability to gain and maintain contact in all domains, wherever they are located. Army forces must be
ready to deploy on short notice to austere locations and be capable of immediately conducting combat
operations. During the initial phases of an operation, Army units may find themselves facing superior threats
in terms of both numbers and capabilities. The first deploying units require the capability to defend
themselves and continuously collect information on threat activities, as they provide reaction time and
freedom of maneuver for follow-on forces. Army units with limited joint support may have to defend while
at risk from enemy long-range fires. Forward-stationed forces may defend critical terrain with other coalition
forces to delay enemy offensive operations. Some forward-stationed forces may defend joint bases to mitigate |
3-0 | 19 | Foundations of Operations
the impact of enemy attacks against strategic and operational lines of communications. In both cases,
forward-stationed Army forces must be prepared to fight while relatively isolated in the early stages of an
enemy attack.
1-20. The likelihood of the enemy force’s use of massed long-range fires and weapons of mass destruction
increases during large-scale combat operations—particularly against command and control (C2) and
sustainment nodes, assembly areas, and critical infrastructure. To survive and operate against massed long-
range fires and in contaminated environments, commanders ensure as much dispersion as tactically prudent.
Army forces seek every possible advantage using dispersion, deception, counterreconnaissance, terrain,
cover, concealment, masking, and other procedures to avoid detection and mitigate the impact of enemy fires.
In the offense, Army forces maneuver quickly along multiple axes, concentrating only to the degree required
to mass effects, and then dispersing to avoid becoming lucrative targets for weapons of mass destruction and
enemy conventional fires. Although dispersion disrupts enemy targeting efforts, it increases the difficulty of
both C2 and sustainment for friendly forces. Success demands agile units that are able to adjust dispositions
rapidly, assume risk, and exploit opportunities when they are available.
1-21. The high tempo of large-scale combat operations creates gaps and seams, generating both opportunities
and risks as enemy formations disintegrate, disperse, or displace. After generating sufficient combat power
for offensive operations, friendly forces may intermingle with or fix and bypass enemy formations. This
requires follow-on and supporting units to protect themselves and to defeat enemy remnants in detail within
the rear area as part of consolidating gains.
1-22. Army forces deploying from the United States and elsewhere face a wide range of threats that are
difficult to counter without joint support. The disruptive effects of enemy action may occur at unit home
stations, ports of embarkation, while in transit to the theater, and upon arrival at ports of debarkation. Army
forces may not have the capability, or the authority, to preempt these attacks, although counterintelligence
may aid in early identification of threats. The threat’s ability to contest the deployment of forces may degrade
combat power available to forward forces and cause unit personnel and equipment to arrive in piecemeal
fashion at ports of debarkation. (See Appendix C for more information on deployments contested by threat
forces.)
LETHALITY: OVERCOMING CHALLENGES
1-23. Army forces overcome challenges posed by threats and the environment with credible formations able
to employ lethal capabilities. Lethality is the capability and capacity to destroy. Employing and threatening
the employment of lethal force lies at the core of how Army forces achieve objectives and enable the rest of
the instruments of national power to achieve objectives.
1-24. Lethality is enabled by formations maneuvering into positions of relative advantage where they can
employ weapon systems and mass effects to destroy enemy forces or place them at risk of destruction. The
speed, range, and accuracy of weapon systems employed by a formation enhance its lethality. The demands
of large-scale combat rapidly deplete available stockpiles and require forces to retain large reserves of
ammunition, weapons, and other warfighting capabilities. Leaders multiply the effects of lethal force by
employing combinations of capabilities through multiple domains to create, accrue, and exploit relative
advantages—imposing multiple dilemmas on enemy forces and overwhelming their ability to respond
effectively. Overcoming challenges in the operational environment further requires lethal Army forces that
employ all available capabilities to—
(cid:122) Continuously cultivate landpower networks with allies and partners to facilitate interoperability.
(cid:122) Be demonstrably prepared for large-scale combat operations to deter conflict on land.
(cid:122) Employ capabilities in a combined arms manner to create exploitable opportunities.
(cid:122) Maneuver, mass effects, and preserve combat power to defeat threats to other Service components
of the joint force.
(cid:122) Defend forward-positioned critical joint infrastructure and key terrain.
(cid:122) Conduct offensive operations to create and exploit opportunities and achieve objectives.
(cid:122) Consolidate gains during competition, crisis, and armed conflict to enable sustainable political
outcomes. |
3-0 | 20 | Chapter 1
1-25. The effective employment of Army forces depends on leaders who understand war, warfare, and the
environment within which military forces fight. Gaps in understanding are often causes of failures to achieve
sustainable political outcomes with military means.
WAR AND WARFARE
[W]e now need another voice of wisdom to tell us, “Technology is not enough.” War is not
one big engineering project. There are people on the other side—with strengths and will
that we never bothered to measure. As a result of that omission we have been drawn into
a greater, and certainly more ruinous, belligerent action than we intended. To fight without
understanding the opponent ultimately serves neither the repute of the military nor the
repute of the nation.
Barbara W. Tuchman
1-26. War is a state of armed conflict between different nations, state-like entities, or armed groups to achieve
policy objectives. Wars are fought between nations locally, regionally, or on a global scale. Wars are fought
within a nation by a central government against insurgent, separatist, or resistance groups. Armed groups in
semiautonomous regions also fight wars to achieve their objectives. Wars range from intense clashes between
large military forces—sometimes backed by an official declaration of war—to more subtle hostilities that
intermittingly breach the threshold of violence.
1-27. The object of war is to impose a nation’s or group’s will on its enemy in pursuit of policy objectives.
Regardless of the specific objectives, the decision to wage war represents a major policy decision and changes
how Army forces use military capabilities. The nature of war, its principles, and its elements remain
consistent over time. However, warfare, the conduct and characteristics of war, reflects changing means and
contexts.
1-28. The Army’s multidomain operations concept accounts for the constant nature of war and the changing
character of warfare. Its balanced approach guides how Army forces operate across the competition
continuum given the prevailing characteristics of anticipated operational environments now and in the near
future. Doctrine for the conduct of operations begins with a view of war and warfare that includes the—
(cid:122) Nature of war.
(cid:122) Principles of war.
(cid:122) Characteristics of warfare.
(cid:122) Methods of warfare.
(cid:122) Offense, defense, and stability.
(cid:122) Large-scale combat operations.
(cid:122) Combined arms.
(cid:122) Levels of warfare.
(cid:122) Army strategic contexts.
(cid:122) Consolidating gains.
(See Chapter 3 for more information on the multidomain operations concept.)
THE NATURE OF WAR
1-29. While the term war has multiple uses depending on the context (for example, the war on drugs or the
war on poverty), it is the threat or use of violence to achieve political purposes that distinguishes war in the
military context from other human activities. This distinction accounts for three elements of the Army’s view
of war. War is—
(cid:122) Fought to achieve a political purpose.
(cid:122) A human endeavor.
(cid:122) Inherently chaotic and uncertain. |
3-0 | 21 | Foundations of Operations
Note. War, by definition, includes at least two opposing sides. However, not all violence for
political gain causes a war. For example, in the current security environment China imposes low
levels of violence and new types of violence (including space and cyberspace attacks against
government, economic institutions, private industry, and infrastructure) that do not trigger
significant military responses. In these cases, China sees itself in a state of war with its adversaries,
but its adversaries do not. Such a disparity in perspective is dangerous for those nations opposing
China that may endure low levels of violence for long periods, while slowly ceding interests until
it is too late to respond effectively. Responding to such situations requires a comprehensive
government approach supported by joint and Army forces.
Political Purpose
1-30. All U.S. military operations share a common purpose—to
achieve or contribute to national policy objectives. As a principle Objective—to direct every military
of war, objective reinforces the proper relationship between operation toward a clearly defined,
military operations and policy. War must always be subordinate decisive, and attainable goal—is a
principle of war.
to policy and serve a political end. In conjunction with political
leaders, military leaders develop strategies to achieve the desired
policy outcomes. Policy outcomes often relate to the nation’s ability to influence, control, or secure
populations, civil infrastructure, natural resources, and access to global commons in all domains. (See
Appendix A for a discussion of the principles of war.)
Human Endeavor
1-31. War is shaped by human nature and the complex interrelationships of cognition, emotion, and
uncertainty. National sentiments are often targets to be affected or manipulated by one or both sides. Values
and ethics are some of the cognitive factors that motivate both the cause for going to war and restrictions in
the conduct of war. Fear, passion, camaraderie, grief, and many more emotions affect the resolve of a war’s
participants. They affect the behavior of combatants, including how and when leaders decide to persevere
and when to give up. Individuals react differently to the stress of war; an act that may break the will of one
enemy may only serve to stiffen the resolve of another. Human will, instilled through commitment to a cause
and leadership, is the driving force of all action in war. The human dimension infuses war with its intangible
moral factors. (See paragraphs 1-115 through 1-117 for more information on the human dimension.)
Inherently Chaotic and Uncertain
1-32. War is inherently chaotic and uncertain due to the clash of wills and intense interaction of innumerable
factors. Orders are misunderstood, enemy forces do the unexpected, units make wrong turns, unforeseen
obstacles appear, the weather changes, and units consume supplies at unexpected rates. This friction affects
all military operations, and it must be anticipated by leaders. The chaotic nature of war makes discerning the
precise cause and effect of actions difficult, impossible, or delayed. The unintended effects of operations are
difficult to anticipate and identify. Such chaos imposes a great deal of uncertainty on all operations and drives
the importance of leaders who are skilled at assuming risk.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
1-33. From a U.S. military perspective, war involves nine principles, collectively and classically known as
the principles of war. The nine principles of war represent the most important factors that affect the conduct
of operations, and they are derived from the study of history and experience in battle. (See table 1-1 on page
1-8 for a concise listing of the principles of war.)
1-34. The principles of war capture broad and enduring fundamentals for the employment of forces in
combat. They are not a checklist that guarantees success. Rather, they summarize considerations commanders
and their staffs account for during successful operations, applied with judgment in specific contexts. While
applicable to all operations, they do not apply equally or in the same way to every situation. (For more
information on the principles of war, see Appendix A.) |
3-0 | 22 | Chapter 1
Table 1-1. Principles of war
Maneuver: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal.
Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Surprise: Strike at a time and place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.
Economy of force: Expend minimum-essential combat power on secondary efforts to allocate the maximum
possible combat power on the main effort.
Mass: Concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive
results.
Unity of command: Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.
Security: Prevent the enemy from achieving surprise or acquiring unexpected advantage.
Simplicity: Increase the probability that plans can be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated
plans and orders.
CHARACTERISTICS OF WARFARE
1-35. Warfare, the conduct and characteristics of war, is affected by changes in technology, national policy,
operational concepts, public opinion, and many other factors. Warfare may retain similarities over time, but
it inevitably also has great variations. Rapid advances in, and the proliferation of, air, space, and cyberspace
capabilities with military applications are changing warfare. Space technology enables persistent overhead
surveillance and global communications, navigation, timing, missile warning, and environmental monitoring.
Cyberspace technology is integrated into most military capabilities, and it enables near-instantaneous
communications and information sharing, creating both opportunities and vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by both sides during competition, crisis, and conflict.
METHODS OF WARFARE
1-36. Although the nature and principles of war reflect the continuity of war, the conduct of warfare, like
dynamic operational environments, reflects wide variation. Therefore, depending on the situation, strategic
actors pursue their objectives in war through different methods of warfare. There are many different methods,
but they generally fall into two broad categories: conventional and irregular. Each method of warfare serves
the same strategic purpose—to defeat an enemy—but they take fundamentally different approaches to
achieving their purpose. Both methods share one characteristic, which is that they involve the use of lethal
force to achieve a political end. Warfare rarely fits neatly into any of these subjective categories, and it almost
always entails a blend of both methods over the course of a conflict.
Note. These broad categories describe the overall approaches to warfare. Other categories attempt
to describe the dominant means used in a particular application, for example “information
warfare,” “cyber warfare,” or “anti-submarine warfare,” In these cases, the terms “warfare,”
“operations,” and “activities” are often used interchangeably. |
3-0 | 23 | Foundations of Operations
Conventional Warfare
1-37. Conventional warfare is a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions of
nation-states. Conventional warfare is generally carried out by two or more military forces through armed
conflict. It is commonly known as conventional warfare because it means to fight enemy forces directly, with
comparable military systems and organizations. A nation-state’s strategic purpose for conducting
conventional warfare is to impose its will on an enemy government and avoid imposition of the enemy
government’s will on it and its citizens. Joint doctrine refers to conventional warfare as “traditional” because
it has been understood that way in the West since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which reserved, for the
nation-state alone, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. However, irregular warfare has a longer history,
and it has been just as common as the “traditional” method of warfare in some societies.
1-38. Conventional warfare normally focuses on defeating enemy armed forces, enemy warfighting
capabilities, and controlling key terrain and populations to decisively influence an enemy government’s
behavior in favorable ways. During conventional warfare, enemies engage in combat openly against each
other and generally employ similar capabilities. Conventional war may escalate to include nation-state use
of weapons of mass destruction. Like the other branches of the armed forces, the Army is organized, trained,
and equipped primarily to conduct or deter conventional warfare, especially its most lethal manifestation—
large-scale combat operations.
1-39. Conventional deterrence creates the paradox that although combat-ready forces reduce the probability
of large-scale combat, they increase the frequency of adversaries pursuing irregular warfare and malign
activity short of armed conflict to achieve objectives. The tradeoff is acceptable because conducting irregular
warfare with forces prepared for large-scale ground combat incurs less risk than conducting large-scale
ground combat with forces unprepared to do so.
Irregular Warfare
1-40. Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military
capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military
domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.
Irregular warfare may include the use of indirect military activities to enable partners, proxies, or surrogates
to achieve shared or complementary objectives. The main objective of irregular warfare varies with the
political context, and it can be successful without being combined with conventional warfare (for example,
the Cuban Revolution). While it often focuses on establishing influence over a population, irregular warfare
has also historically been an economy of force effort to fix enemy forces in secondary theaters of conflict or
to cause enemy leaders to commit significant forces to less critical lines of effort. Two characteristics
distinguish irregular warfare from conventional warfare:
(cid:122) The intent is to erode a political authority’s legitimacy and influence or to exhaust its resources
and will—not to defeat its armed forces—while supporting the legitimacy, influence, and will of
friendly entities engaged in the struggle.
(cid:122) The nonmilitary instruments of power are more prominent because the military instrument of
power alone is insufficient to achieve desired objectives.
1-41. JFCs can employ most Army forces and capabilities during irregular warfare. Certain forces and
capabilities are irregular warfare focused (for example Army special operations forces), in that they are
specifically designed and organized for irregular warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in
conventional warfare (for example as combat advisors to host-nation forces). Other forces are irregular
warfare capable, in that they are primarily designed and organized for conventional warfare, but they can
also be employed effectively in irregular warfare. Historically, the overwhelming majority of Army forces
employed to conduct irregular warfare have been conventional forces.
OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND STABILITY
1-42. Offense, defense, and stability are inherent elements of conventional and irregular warfare. Divisions
and higher echelons typically perform some combination of all three elements in their operations
simultaneously. However, the lower the echelon, the more likely it is for that formation to be focused on one
element at a time. |
3-0 | 24 | Chapter 1
1-43. An offensive operation is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain,
resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). Offensive operations are how commanders impose their will
on an enemy. The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain
a physical and psychological advantage. Offensive operations typically include a sudden action directed
toward enemy weaknesses, capitalizing on speed, surprise, and shock. The offense compels an enemy force
to react, creating new or larger weaknesses the attacking force can exploit. (See ADP 3-90 for a detailed
discussion of the offense.)
1-44. A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, retain key terrain, gain time, and
develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). Normally the defense cannot
achieve a decisive victory. However, it sets conditions for a counteroffensive or a counterattack that enables
forces to regain the initiative. Defensive operations are a counter to an enemy offensive action, and they seek
to destroy as many of the enemy forces as possible. Defensive operations preserve control over land,
resources, and populations, and they protect lines of communications and critical capabilities against attack.
Commanders can conduct defensive operations in one area to free forces for offensive operations elsewhere.
(See ADP 3-90 for a detailed discussion of the defense.)
1-45. A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other
instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). These
operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government. Stability
involves coercive and constructive action. (See ADP 3-07 for more information on stability operations.)
LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
1-46. The focus of Army readiness is on large-scale
combat operations. Large-scale combat operations are The Army is manned, equipped, and trained to
extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and operate in all operational scenarios or
size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign categories, starting with the most lethal
conditions first—large-scale combat against a
aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives
peer threat.
(ADP 3-0). During ground combat, they typically
involve operations by multiple corps and divisions, and
they typically include substantial forces from the joint and multinational team. Large-scale combat operations
often include both conventional and irregular forces on both sides.
1-47. Conflicts encompassing large-scale combat operations are more intense and destructive than limited
contingencies, often rapidly amassing heavy casualties. Peer threats employ networks of sensors and long-
range massed fires that exploit electromagnetic signatures and other detection methods to create high risk for
ground forces, particularly when they are static. Army forces must account for constant enemy observation,
including the threat from unmanned systems that saturate the operational environment. Army forces take
measures to defeat the enemy’s ability to effectively mass effects while creating exploitable advantages to
mass effects against enemy capabilities and formations.
1-48. Urban areas are high risk areas that are a factor in many operational environments. Avoiding urban
areas during large-scale combat through deception or other means is ideal, but generally not possible.
Commanders may conduct urban operations because they provide a tactical, political, or economic advantage,
or when not doing so threatens the joint campaign. Army forces conduct large-scale combat operations in
urban areas either as specific, unique operations, or more typically, as one of a larger series of operations in
a joint campaign. Urban operations focus on the threat to or within the urban area and allow other forces to
conduct operations elsewhere. Conducting operations in dense urban terrain is complex and resource
intensive. Combined arms operations that integrate joint capabilities, allies and partners, and conventional
and irregular forces are essential to success. Commanders voice concern to higher headquarters when they
do not have sufficient forces for the task issued, and they must arrange their forces and operations according
to purpose, time, and space to accomplish the mission. Success in defeating enemy forces in large urban areas
typically requires the ability to isolate them from physical, information, and human support. (See ATP 3-06
for more information on urban operations.) During large-scale combat operations, Army forces focus on the
defeat and destruction of enemy ground forces as part of the joint team, and they contribute to the defeat of
forces in other domains. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces in all types of terrain, exploit |
3-0 | 25 | Foundations of Operations
success, and break the enemy’s will to resist. Army forces attack, defend, perform stability tasks, and
continuously consolidate gains to accomplish objectives that support a desirable political outcome. Corps
and divisions are the formations central to the conduct of large-scale combat. The ability to prevail in ground
combat is a decisive factor in breaking an enemy’s capability and will to continue a conventional conflict.
Conflict resolution requires Army forces to consolidate gains with unified action partners as long as necessary
to accomplish national objectives.
1-49. Planning for large-scale combat operations must account for possible enemy use of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and allied retaliatory response options. Planning must
also account for toxic industrial hazards caused by combat operations. Enemy employment of CBRN
weapons and the allied response would affect all domains, but they present disproportionate effects in the
land domain. Some adversaries plan for the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons by incorporating
them into their doctrine and training, and they maintain delivery systems for their employment on the
battlefield. Furthermore, the use of these weapons does not terminate a conflict and may cause it to escalate.
Units must be prepared to operate in, around, and through contaminated environments. This is fundamental
to deterring adversaries from employing weapons of mass destruction. CBRN considerations should inform
both operational planning and force readiness. (See FM 3-11 for doctrine on operating in a CBRN
environment, and see ATP 3-72 for more information operations in a nuclear environment.)
COMBINED ARMS
1-50. Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater
than if each element was used separately or sequentially (ADP 3-0). Leaders combine arms in complementary
and reinforcing ways to protect capabilities and amplify their effects. Confronted with a constantly changing
situation, leaders create new combinations of capabilities, methods, and effects to pose new dilemmas for
adversaries. The combined arms approach to operations during competition, crisis, and armed conflict is
foundational to exploiting capabilities from all domains and their dimensions.
1-51. Complementary capabilities compensate for the vulnerabilities of one system or organization with the
capabilities of a different one. Infantry protects tanks from enemy infantry and antitank systems, while tanks
provide mobile protected firepower for the infantry. Ground maneuver can make enemy forces displace and
become vulnerable to joint fires, while joint fires can disrupt enemy reserves and C2 to enable operations on
the ground. Cyberspace and space capabilities and electromagnetic warfare can prevent enemy forces from
detecting and communicating the location of friendly land-based fires capabilities, and Army fires
capabilities can destroy enemy ground-based cyberspace nodes and electromagnetic warfare platforms to
protect friendly communications.
1-52. Reinforcing capabilities combine similar systems or capabilities to amplify the overall effects a
formation brings to bear in a particular context. During urban operations, for example, infantry, aviation, and
armor units working in close coordination reinforce the protection, maneuver, and direct fire capabilities of
each unit type while creating cascading dilemmas for enemy forces. Army artillery can be reinforced by close
air support, air interdiction, and naval surface fire support, greatly increasing both the mass and range of fires
available to a commander. Space and cyberspace capabilities used to disrupt enemy communications can
reinforce a brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) ground-based jamming effort to increase the disruption to enemy
C2. Military information support operations can amplify the effects of physical isolation on an enemy
echelon, making it more vulnerable to friendly force exploitation.
1-53. The organic composition, training, and task organization of Army units set conditions for effective
combined arms. Throughout operations, commanders assess the operational environment and adjust
priorities, change task organization, and request capabilities to create exploitable advantages, extend
operational reach, preserve combat power, and accomplish missions.
LEVELS OF WARFARE
1-54. The levels of warfare are a framework for defining and clarifying the relationship among national
objectives, the operational approach, and tactical tasks (ADP 1-01). While the various methods of warfare
are ultimately expressed in concrete military action, the four levels of warfare—national strategic, theater |
3-0 | 26 | Chapter 1
strategic, operational, and tactical—link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives as shown in
figure 1-2.
Figure 1-2. Levels of warfare
1-55. The levels of warfare distinguish four broad overlapping activities—providing national direction and
creating national strategy (national strategic), conducting continuous theater campaigning (theater strategic);
planning and conducting campaigns and major operations (operational); or planning and executing
operations, battles, engagements, and actions (tactical). Some commanders act at more than one level of war.
For example, a combatant commander (CCDR) formulates theater strategy and designs the campaign plan.
A land component commander assists a CCDR in campaign design and may lead a field army during major
operations. The levels of warfare are conceptual, without finite limits or boundaries. They do, however,
correlate to specific activities and responsibilities. They help commanders visualize the relationships and
actions required to link strategic objectives, military operations at various echelons, and tactical actions.
Among the levels of warfare, planning horizons, methods, and products differ greatly. Without this context,
tactical operations become disconnected from operational end states and strategic objectives. There are skills
and practices related to strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical level that differ from each other
and are enhanced by specific training and education.
National Strategic Level of Warfare
1-56. The national strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which the U.S. government
formulates policy goals and ways to achieve them by synchronizing action across government and
unified action partners and employing the instruments of national power. The instruments of national
power are all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives, expressed as
diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. The national strategic level of warfare focuses on
developing global strategy and providing global strategic direction. Strategic direction provides context,
tasks, and purpose for the employment of the instruments of national power. The specifics of strategic |
3-0 | 27 | Foundations of Operations
direction address long-term, emerging, and anticipatory issues or concerns that may quickly evolve due to
rapidly changing circumstances. Strategic direction is always evolving and adapting.
1-57. The theater strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which combatant commanders
synchronize with unified action partners and employ all elements of national power to fulfill policy
aims within the assigned theater in support of the national strategy. Based on strategic guidance, CCDRs
with assigned areas of responsibility and staffs—with input from subordinate commands, including theater
armies and supporting commands and agencies—update their strategic estimates and develop theater
strategies. A theater strategy is an overarching construct outlining a combatant commander’s vision for
integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power
to achieve national strategic objectives. The theater strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means within the
limitations established by the budget, global force management processes, and strategic guidance. The theater
strategy serves as the basis for development of the combatant command campaign plan (CCP).
Operational Level of Warfare
1-58. The operational level of warfare is the level of warfare in which campaigns and operations are planned,
conducted, and sustained to achieve operational objectives to support achievement of strategic objectives
(JP 3-0). The operational level links the employment of tactical forces to the achievement of strategic
objectives.
1-59. The operational level of warfare generally is the realm of combatant commands and their Service or
functional components and subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquarters and their Service or functional
components. This includes the theater army headquarters as the Army Service component to a combatant
command and any other echelon operating as an ARFOR, JTF headquarters, or land component command.
The focus at this level is on operational art—the design of campaigns and operations by integrating ends,
ways, and means, while accounting for risk. (See ADP 3-0 for more information on operational art.)
1-60. Actions at the operational level of warfare usually involve broader aspects of time and space than
tactical actions. The theater army’s activities continuously support the CCDR in shaping the operational and
strategic situation. Operational-level commanders need to understand the complexities of the operational
environment and look beyond the immediate situation. Operational-level commanders seek to create the most
favorable conditions possible for subordinate commanders by preparing for future events.
1-61. The operational level of warfare demands leaders with a unique set of skills. Because the operational
level is fundamentally about linking tactical action to strategic objectives, leaders must understand both
strategy and tactics. They must have some expertise in the capabilities and operations of all Services and
components and those of allies and partners. Leaders at the operational level must be able to assess large,
complex operational environments and be expert planners. They must understand the application of
warfighting functions on a large scale and how this application differs from application at the tactical level.
The elements of operational art help operational leaders understand, visualize, and describe their campaigns
and major operations. (See ADP 3-0 for details on the elements of operational art.)
Tactical Level of Warfare
1-62. The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which forces plan and execute battles and
engagements to achieve military objectives (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on tactics—the
employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other (ADP 3-90).
Operational-level headquarters determine objectives and provide resources for tactical operations.
Tactical-level commanders plan and execute operations to include battles, engagements, and small-unit
actions.
1-63. Tactical-level combat operations rise to the level of battles or engagements. A battle is a set of related
engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement (ADP 3-90). Battles can affect
the course of a campaign or major operation, and they are typically conducted by corps and divisions over
the course of days or months. An engagement is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelon
maneuver forces (JP 3-0). Engagements are typically conducted at brigade echelons and below. They are
usually short, executed in minutes or hours. |
3-0 | 28 | Chapter 1
1-64. The strategic and operational levels of warfare provide the context for tactical operations. Without this
context, tactical operations devolve into a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Likewise, tactical
operations inform strategic and operational objectives, ensuring that those objectives remain tethered to
reality and adjust, when necessary, according to the situation. Strategic and operational success is a measure
of how the achievement of objectives in one or more battles contributes to winning a major operation or
campaign. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on tactics.)
ARMY STRATEGIC CONTEXTS
1-65. Joint doctrine describes the strategic environment in terms of a competition continuum. Rather than a
world either at peace or at war, the competition continuum describes three broad categories of strategic
relationships—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. Each relationship is
defined as between the United States and another strategic actor relative to a specific set of policy aims.
Cooperation, competition, and even armed conflict commonly go on simultaneously in different parts of the
world. Because of this, the needs of CCDRs and Army component commanders in one area are affected by
the strategic needs of others. (See JP 3-0 for more information about the joint competition continuum.)
Note. This manual uses “competition” to mean “competition below armed conflict.”
1-66. Although combatant commands and theater armies campaign across the competition continuum, Army
tactical formations typically conduct operations within a context dominated by one strategic relationship at a
time. Therefore, Army doctrine describes the strategic situation through three contexts in which Army forces
conduct operations:
(cid:122) Competition below armed conflict.
(cid:122) Crisis.
(cid:122) Armed conflict.
1-67. The Army strategic contexts generally correspond to the joint competition continuum and the
requirements of joint campaigns. Because cooperation is generally conducted with an ally or partner to
counter an adversary or enemy, Army doctrine considers it part of competition. Army doctrine adds crisis to
account for the unique challenges facing ground forces that often characterize transition between competition
and armed conflict. (See figure 1-3 for an illustration of Army strategic contexts.)
Figure 1-3. Army strategic contexts and operational categories
Competition Below Armed Conflict
1-68. Competition below armed conflict exists when two or more state or non-state adversaries have
incompatible interests, but neither seeks armed conflict. Nation-states compete with each other using all
instruments of national power to gain and maintain advantages that help them achieve their goals. Low levels |
3-0 | 29 | Foundations of Operations
of lethal force can be a part of competition below armed conflict. Adversaries often employ cyberspace
capabilities and information warfare to destroy or disrupt infrastructure, interfere with government processes,
and conduct activities in a way that does not cause the United States and its allies to respond with force.
Competition provides military forces time to prepare for armed conflict, opportunities to assure allies and
partners of resolve and commitment, and time and space to set the necessary conditions to prevent crisis or
conflict. Examples of competition include return of forces to Europe (known as REFORGER) exercises
conducted during the Cold War, security assistance provided to Ukraine since 2014, and Pacific Pathways
activities to improve readiness in the Indo-pacific region. (See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of Army
forces during competition.)
Crisis
1-69. A crisis is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens,
military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic,
or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national
and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0). Commanders have to consider the possibility that overt military action
may escalate a crisis towards armed conflict. The use of space and cyberspace capabilities provides other
options that are less likely to cause escalation. The context of crisis is relative to an adversary, which is
different from crisis response, which can result from a natural or human disaster. During crisis, armed conflict
has not yet occurred, but it is either imminent or a distinct possibility that requires rapid response by forces
prepared to fight if deterrence fails.
Note. A crisis can be long in duration, but it can also reflect a near-simultaneous transition to
armed conflict. Leaders do not assume that a crisis provides additional time for a transition to
armed conflict.
1-70. Army forces contribute to joint operations, seeking to deter further provocation and compel an
adversary to de-escalate aggression and return to competition under conditions acceptable for the United
States and its allies or partners. Through rapid movement and integration with the joint force, Army forces
help signal the readiness and willingness to prevail in combat operations. When authorized, Army forces can
inform or influence perceptions about an operation’s goals and progress to amplify effects on the ground
during a crisis; however, commanders ensure their message aligns with reality and that their narratives are
truthful and credible.
1-71. Army forces help the joint force maintain freedom of action and associated positions of relative
advantage through the activities they conduct and their presence on the ground. They operate in a way that
disrupts adversary risk calculations about the cost of acting contrary to U.S. national interests, compels de-
escalation, and fosters a return to competition conditions favorable to the United States. If deterrence fails to
end a crisis, Army forces are better postured for operations during armed conflict. Examples of crisis include
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, North Korean missile and rocket
provocations in 2017-2018, and the Russian attacks into Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. (See Chapter 5 for a
detailed discussion of Army forces during crisis.)
Armed Conflict
1-72. Armed conflict occurs when a state or non-state actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy
its interests. Armed conflict can range from irregular warfare to conventional warfare and combinations of
both. Entering into and terminating armed conflict is a political decision. Army forces may enter conflict
with some advanced warning during a prolonged crisis or with little warning during competition. How well
Army forces are prepared to enter into an armed conflict ultimately depends upon decisions and preparations
made during competition and crisis.
1-73. At the onset of armed conflict, forward-positioned Army forces may defend key terrain or
infrastructure while seeking opportunities to gain the initiative or reposition to more favorable locations with
partner forces. Army forces help JFCs gain and maintain the initiative, defeat enemy forces on the ground,
control territory and populations, and consolidate gains to establish conditions for a political settlement
favorable to U.S. interests. Army forces provide landpower to the joint force and conduct limited contingency |
3-0 | 30 | Chapter 1
or large-scale combat operations to ensure enduring political outcomes favorable to U.S. interests. Examples
of armed conflict include the Vietnam War, OPERATION DESERT STORM, and OPERATION
INHERENT RESOLVE. (See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of Army forces conducting operations
during armed conflict. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of Army forces in large-scale combat in maritime
environments.)
CONSOLIDATING GAINS
1-74. Army commanders must exploit successful operations by continuously consolidating gains during
competition, crisis, and armed conflict. Consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any initial
operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition
of control to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part
of competition, and it is necessary for achieving success across the range of military operations. Successful
consolidation of gains requires a realistic and pragmatic assessment of strategic conditions, ally and partner
legitimacy, friendly and adversary relative advantages, and the viability of a sustainable political outcome.
Operations to inform and influence foreign audiences also play a key role in achieving lasting outcomes.
1-75. During competition, Army forces may consolidate gains from previous conflicts for many years as
JFCs seek to maintain relative advantages against a specific adversary and sustain enduring political
outcomes. U.S. forces in Europe, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Middle East remained in place for
decades to consolidate gains made in earlier conflicts. Army forces also consolidate gains by continuously
developing multinational interoperability and readiness for large-scale combat operations.
1-76. During armed conflict, Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains throughout an operation as
part of defeating the enemy in detail to accomplish overall policy and strategic objectives. Early and effective
consolidation activities are a form of exploitation performed while other operations are ongoing, and they
enable the achievement of lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time span. Tactical units consolidating
on an objective can be the first step in consolidating gains. In some instances, Army forces will be the lead
for integrating forces and synchronizing activities to consolidate gains. In other situations, Army forces will
be in support of allies and partners. Army forces may consolidate gains for a sustained period over large land
areas. Military governments in occupied territories stabilize civilian populations. Military authorities may
temporarily govern areas until populations are stable enough for transition to legitimate civilian authorities.
This transition of control to civil authorities reduces demands on combat power.
1-77. While Army forces must continuously consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating gains
becomes the overall focus of Army forces when large-scale combat operations have concluded. During
competition, Army forces may consolidate gains from previous conflicts for many years as JFCs seek to
maintain relative advantages against a specific adversary. During crisis, Army forces seek to consolidate
whatever gains are made relative to a specific adversary so that the crisis does not occur again.
UNDERSTANDING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war
have always been decided—except in the rarest of cases—either by what your army can do
against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by fear of what the fleet makes it
possible for your army to do.
Sir Julian Corbett
1-78. An operational environment is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that
affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). For Army forces,
an operational environment includes portions of the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains
understood through three dimensions (human, physical, and information). The land, maritime, air, and space
domains are defined by their physical characteristics. Cyberspace, a manmade network of networks, transits
and connects the other domains as represented by the dots shown in figure 1-4. |
3-0 | 31 | Foundations of Operations
Figure 1-4. Domains and dimensions of an operational environment
Note. Joint doctrine describes the components of an operational environment as the physical areas
of the land, maritime, air, and space domains; the information environment (which includes
cyberspace); the electromagnetic spectrum; and other factors. (See JP 2-0 and JP 5-0 for more
information on describing and analyzing an operational environment from a joint perspective.)
1-79. The operational environment model aids in accounting for the totality of factors, specific
circumstances, and conditions that impact the conduct of operations. This understanding enables leaders to
better identify problems; anticipate potential outcomes; and understand the results of various friendly, enemy,
adversary, and neutral actions and the effects these actions have on achieving the military end state. A
description of an operational environment includes all the factors that the commander and staff need to
capture and understand to inform the conduct of operations.
1-80. Knowledge of the operational environment is the precursor to effective action. Obtaining knowledge
about an operational environment requires aggressive and continuous intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and security operations to acquire information. Information collected from multiple sources
and analyzed becomes intelligence that answers commanders’ intelligence requirements. Using all available
relevant information to determine how the operational environment affects operations is essential to
understanding which courses of action are the most feasible, suitable, and acceptable. Throughout the course
of operations, commanders and staffs rely on an integrated information collection effort to develop an
accurate picture of their operational environment. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and
integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets and as well as the processing, exploitation, and
dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55).
1-81. An operational environment is the totality of factors that affect what occurs in an assigned area. These
factors include actors, events, or actions that occur outside the assigned area. How the many entities behave
and interact with each other is difficult to discern. No two operational environments are the same, and all of
them continually change. Changes result, in part, from opposing forces and actors interacting, learning, and
adapting. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes determining the relationship |
3-0 | 32 | Chapter 1
between cause and effect challenging, and it contributes to the uncertain nature of war and human
competition. This requires that commanders, supported by their staffs, develop and maintain the best possible
understanding of their operational environment. Several tools and processes assist commanders and staffs in
understanding their operational environment. They include—
(cid:122) Domains.
(cid:122) Dimensions.
(cid:122) Operational and mission variables (detailed in FM 6-0).
(cid:122) Running estimates (described in ADP 5-0).
(cid:122) Army design methodology (described in ATP 5-0.1).
(cid:122) The military decision-making process (described in ADP 5-0).
(cid:122) Building intelligence knowledge (described in FM 2-0).
(cid:122) Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (described in ATP 2-01.3).
(cid:122) Sustainment preparation of the operational environment (described in FM 4-0).
DOMAINS
1-82. Within the context of an operational environment, a domain is a physically defined portion of an
operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills. Each military
Service and branch trains and educates its leaders to be experts about operations in a primary domain,
although each Service has some capability in each of the domains, and each develops shared understanding
of how to integrate capabilities from different domains. Land operations require mastery of terrain and ground
maneuver. Cyberspace operations require mastery of digital information systems and computer code. Space,
air, and maritime operations likewise require specific capabilities and skills, which manifest themselves in
separate Services within the joint force. Although most domains align with the skills developed in a particular
Service, no Service focuses entirely upon or exerts total control of that single domain during operations. Joint
commanders assign responsibilities and task-organize based on mission requirements. However, the domains
present very different conditions of warfare and require the specialized warfighting skills developed by the
different Services and subcomponents within each of the
Services. Army leaders do not need to understand all the Understanding the strengths and
technical components of what the joint force does in other dependencies of joint capabilities in
each domain is fundamental to a
domains, but they do need to understand the complementary
multidomain, combined arms approach
and reinforcing ways in which they can request and employ
to operations.
those capabilities and methods in support of operations on
land. (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of convergence.)
Land Domain
1-83. The land domain is the area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with
the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals (JP 3-31). Variations in climate, terrain, and the
diversity of populations have a far greater impact on operations in the land domain than in any other domain.
The most distinguishing characteristic of the land domain is the human dimension. Humans transit the
maritime, air, and space domains, but they ultimately live, make political decisions, and seek conflict
resolution on land.
1-84. The nature of combat on land is unique due to the impacts of terrain on all warfighting functions and
the application of combat power. For example, terrain provides forces opportunities for evading detection
and increasing survivability. It also provides enemy forces the same opportunities. Although technology
increases the range of capabilities, complex terrain causes opposing forces to fight at close ranges. Land
combatants routinely come face-to-face with one another in large numbers in a wide variety of operational
environments containing all types of terrain and potentially nuclear, biological, and chemically degraded
environments. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army forces close with and
destroy or capture them through close combat. Close combat is warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire
fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets (ADP 3-0). The outcome of battles and
engagements depends on the ability of Army forces to close with enemy forces and prevail in close combat. |
3-0 | 33 | Foundations of Operations
1-85. Land-based domain capabilities are able to use or alter the terrain, operate in all forms of weather, and
operate among populations. Land capabilities extend operational reach and provide options for enabling joint
operations. Long-range artillery provides the joint force with a fires capability that is more survivable in some
circumstances than air and maritime fires. Land-based electromagnetic capabilities are capable of jamming
enemy communications and C2 systems. Land-based air and missile defense (AMD) capabilities, enabled by
space and cyberspace capabilities, provide protection for Army and joint forces.
1-86. The other four domains depend, in some way, on land. Airfields, ports, servers, ground control stations
and land-based radars support or enable operations in other domains. Most cyberspace capabilities and all
the electricity that powers them depend on land-based networks. The energy that fuels air, space, and most
maritime platforms comes from locations on land.
1-87. Operations on land depend on capabilities from other domains. Air lift, sea lift, cyberspace networks,
and all non-land based examples of ISR and fires enable operations on land. (See JP 3-31 for information on
joint land operations.)
Maritime Domain
1-88. The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above
these, including the littorals (JP 3-32). It overlaps with the land domain in the seaward segment of the littoral.
Maritime capability may be viewed as global, regional, territorial, coastal, and self-defense forces. Only a
few navies are capable of sustained employment far from their countries’ shores. However, whether or not
their navies are capable of global power projection, most maritime nations also maintain air forces capable
of conducting operations over the adjacent maritime domain. This air capability, combined with land-based
long-range fires, greatly impacts operations in the maritime domain.
1-89. The Navy and its partners employ five functions in a combined arms approach to provide a unique
relative advantage for the joint force. These functions are deterrence, operational access, sea control, power
projection, and maritime security.
1-90. Maritime forces move strategic fires capabilities globally, conceal strategic capabilities below the
surface of the ocean, transport personnel and equipment over vast distances, and sustain maritime operations
for long periods. Maritime forces depend on or require support from the joint force to—
(cid:122) Protect maritime capabilities from enemy interdiction.
(cid:122) Protect ports.
(cid:122) Secure geographic choke points.
(cid:122) Influence populations.
(cid:122) Mitigate long timelines associated with maritime movement.
(cid:122) Compensate for the limited number of available maritime platforms.
(cid:122) Mitigate the inability to replace ships lost during a conflict.
1-91. Army forces rely on maritime capabilities for deployment and sustainment. Additionally, maritime
fires and AMD complement and reinforce land-based systems. Army forces assist maritime forces with sea
control, projecting power ashore to neutralize threats or control terrain in the landward portion of the littorals.
Army long-range fires, attack aviation, AMD, and cyberspace capabilities contribute to local and regional
maritime superiority.
1-92. For intratheater operations, Army watercraft provide a capability to move maneuver formations and
sustain operations in a maritime environment. Army watercraft systems support joint and combined seabasing
and joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS). In some circumstances, Army watercraft capabilities can mitigate
enemy antiaccess (A2) or area denial (AD) approaches by providing access to shallow coastal waters, rivers,
and narrow inland waterways where mature ports or road networks are unavailable. (See JP 3-32 for
information on joint maritime operations.)
Air Domain
1-93. The air domain is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its
effects upon operations become negligible (JP 3-30). The speed, range, and payload of aircraft, rockets, |
3-0 | 34 | Chapter 1
missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles operating in the air domain directly and significantly affect operations
on land and sea. Likewise, advances in AMD, electromagnetic warfare, directed energy, and cyberspace
capabilities increasingly contest freedom of maneuver in the air.
1-94. Control of the air and control of the land are often interdependent requirements for successful
campaigns and operations. Control of the air provides a significant advantage when attacking strategically
valuable targets at long ranges. However, control of the land is necessary for operating secure airfields and
protecting other key terrain that enables air operations. The desired degree of control of the air may vary
geographically and over time from no control, to parity, to local air superiority, to air supremacy, all
depending upon the situation and the JFC’s approved concept of operations.
1-95. Army forces rely on the Air Force and other joint and multinational air capabilities for ISR, strategic
attack, close air support, interdiction, personnel recovery, communications, sustainment, and mobility. Air
platforms are unencumbered by terrain, but they are vulnerable to detection and interdiction. Effectiveness
of air platforms can be contingent upon weather conditions. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance cannot
always detect enemy capabilities concealed by vegetation or terrain. The number of sorties air platforms can
conduct depends on having control of airfields and their proximity to targets.
1-96. Army aviation provides ground commanders and the joint force with land-focused air capabilities.
Joint force commanders and land component commanders establish control measures to enable Army forces
to operate unimpeded in the air domain, coordinated when necessary with air capabilities from the other
Services. Army aviation (including fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft) provides reconnaissance
and surveillance, fires, intelligence, communications, and movement capabilities to Army, joint, and
multinational forces. Army rotary-wing aviation uses terrain to protect it from enemy detection. Army forces
also have aerial ISR capabilities that support security operations, targeting, delivering precision fires, and
information collection. Army land-based AMD capabilities provide protection against enemy air and missile
attack. (See JP 3 30 for more information on joint air operations.)
Space Domain
1-97. The space domain is the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects
become negligible. Like the air, land, and maritime domains, space is a physical domain in which military,
civil, and commercial activities are conducted. The U.S. Space Command (known as USSPACECOM) has
an area of responsibility that surrounds the earth at altitudes equal to, or greater than, 100 kilometers (54
nautical miles) above mean sea level. It has responsibility for planning and execution of global space
operations, activities, and missions.
1-98. Proliferation of advanced space technology provides access to space-enabled technologies to a global
audience. Some adversaries have their own space capabilities, while commercially available systems allow
almost universal access to some level of space-enabled capability with military applications.
1-99. Space capabilities provide information collection; early warning; target acquisition; electromagnetic
warfare; environmental monitoring; satellite-based communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing
information for ground forces. Activities in the space domain enable freedom of action for operations in all
other domains, and operations in the other domains can create effects in and through the space domain.
1-100. Army forces rely on space-based capabilities to enable each warfighting function and effectively
conduct operations. Commanders and staffs require an understanding of space capabilities and their effects
and the ability to coordinate activities between involved agencies and organizations. Commanders cannot
assume that U.S. forces will have unconstrained use of space-based capabilities, including data
communications. Therefore, Army forces must be prepared to operate under the conditions of a denied,
degraded, and disrupted space domain. (See FM 3-14 for doctrine on Army space operations.)
Cyberspace Domain
1-101. For Army forces, the cyberspace domain is the interdependent networks of information
technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunication networks,
computer systems, embedded processors and controllers, and relevant portions of the electromagnetic
spectrum. Cyberspace is an extensive and complex global network of wired and wireless links connecting |
3-0 | 35 | Foundations of Operations
nodes that permeate every domain. Cyberspace networks cross geographic and political boundaries to
connect individuals, organizations, and systems around the world. Cyberspace allows interactivity among
individuals, groups, organizations, and nation-states. Friendly, enemy, adversary, and host-nation networks,
communications systems, computers, cellular phone systems, social media, and technical infrastructures are
all part of cyberspace. Cyberspace is congested, contested, and critical to successful operations.
1-102. Cyberspace is dependent on the land, maritime, air, and space domains. Cyberspace operations use
links and nodes located in these domains and perform functions to gain access and create effects first in
cyberspace and then, as needed, in the other domains. Virtually all space operations depend on cyberspace,
and a critical portion of cyberspace bandwidth can only be provided via space operations. These
interrelationships are important considerations during planning.
1-103. Army forces conduct cyberspace operations and supporting activities as part of both Army and joint
operations. Because cyberspace is a global communications and data-sharing medium, it is inherently joint,
interorganizational, multinational, and often a shared resource, with signal and intelligence organizations
maintaining significant equities.
1-104. Commanders can use cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to gain situational
awareness and understanding of the enemy through reconnaissance and sensing activities. These
reconnaissance and sensing activities augment and enhance the understanding a commander gains from other
forms of information collection and intelligence processes. Cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare
capabilities enable decision making and protect friendly information. They are a significant means for
informing and influencing audiences.
1-105. Leaders maintain situational understanding of friendly electromagnetic signatures to assess
vulnerabilities. By protecting friendly information systems and signals from disruption or exploitation by an
adversary or enemy, a commander can ensure C2 and maintain operations security. Conversely, a commander
might use cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to slow or degrade an enemy’s
decision-making processes by disrupting enemy sensors, communications, or data processing. To achieve an
information advantage, a commander must plan early to integrate cyberspace operations and electromagnetic
warfare activities into the overall scheme of maneuver. (See FM 3-12 for more details on cyberspace.)
DIMENSIONS
1-106. Understanding the physical, information, and human dimensions of each domain helps commanders
and staffs assess and anticipate the impacts of their operations. Operations reflect the reality that war is an
act of force (in the physical dimension) to compel (in the information dimension) the decision making and
behavior of enemy forces (in the human dimension). Actions in one dimension influence factors in the other
dimensions. Understanding the interrelationship enables decision making about how to create and exploit
advantages in one dimension and achieve objectives in the others without causing undesirable consequences.
Physical Dimension
1-107. The physical dimension is the material characteristics and capabilities, both natural and
manufactured, within an operational environment. While war is a human endeavor, it occurs in a material
environment, and it is conducted with physical things. Each of the domains is inherently physical. Terrain,
weather, military formations, electromagnetic radiation, weapons systems and their ranges, and many of the
things that support or sustain forces are part of the physical dimension. Activities or conditions in the physical
dimension create effects in the human and information dimensions.
1-108. The electromagnetic spectrum is one of the material characteristics that crosses all the domains. It
consists of a range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity divided into 26
alphabetically designated bands. The electromagnetic spectrum is relevant in the land, maritime, and air
domains because capabilities in those domains depend on electromagnetic spectrum-enabled
communications and weapon systems. The electromagnetic spectrum plays a key role in the ability to detect
enemy forces that can be identified by their electromagnetic signatures. Conversely, friendly forces must take
efforts to mask their electromagnetic signatures to degrade enemy surveillance and reconnaissance efforts. |
3-0 | 36 | Chapter 1
1-109. A physical advantage occurs when a force holds the initiative in terms of a combination of
quantitative capabilities, qualitative capabilities, or geographical positioning. Physical advantages are most
familiar to tactical forces, and they are typically the immediate goal of most tactical operations. Finding
enemy forces, defeating enemy forces, and seizing land areas typically requires the creation and exploitation
of multiple physical advantages, including occupation of key terrain, the physical isolation of enemy forces,
and the destruction of enemy units. While this dominates tactical operations, leaders understand that physical
advantages both complement and are complemented by human and information advantages.
1-110. Examples of physical advantage include favorable geography, superior equipment, quantity of
resources, and favorable combat power ratios. Superior equipment and favorable geography provide options
for seizing the initiative. Superior combat power allows friendly forces to engage enemy forces on favorable
terms. The exploitation of physical advantages reduces an enemy force’s capacity to fight, creating
information and human advantages. Physical advantages implicitly communicate a message that can
influence enemy forces’ will to fight, sway popular support, and influence enemy risk calculus.
Information Dimension
1-111. The information dimension is the content, data, and processes that individuals, groups, and
information systems use to communicate. Information systems include the technical processes and
analytics used to exchange information. The information dimension contains the information itself, including
text and images. It also includes the flow or communication pathways of information. Information exchange
may be in the form of electromagnetic transmission, print, or speech. The information dimension connects
humans to the physical world.
1-112. Information transits through all domains in some way or another, whether in electromagnetic
transmissions through cyberspace, radar data collected by a destroyer, leaflets dropped from aircraft, social
media messaging, books, or satellite photography collected in and transmitted from space. Information,
whether true, false, or somewhere in between, is used by friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral actors to
influence the perceptions, decision making, and behavior of individuals and groups. Effective employment
of information depends on the audience, message, and method of delivery.
1-113. Information is available globally in near-real time. The ability to access information—from
anywhere, at any time—broadens and accelerates human interaction, including person to person, person to
organization, person to government, and government to government. Social media enables the swift
mobilization of people and resources around ideas and causes, even before they are fully understood.
Disinformation creates malign narratives that can disseminate quickly and instill an array of emotions and
behaviors among groups, ranging from disinterest to violence. From a military standpoint, information
enables decision making, leadership, and combat power; it is also a key component of combat power
necessary for seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative and consolidating gains.
1-114. An information advantage is the operational benefit derived when friendly forces understand and
exploit the informational considerations of the operational environment to achieve information objectives
while denying the threat’s ability to do the same. Army forces employ human and physical aspects of the
operational environment to gain information advantages. Most types of information advantage result from
physical and human factors or activities intrinsic to the operations Army forces conduct. The side possessing
better information and using that information more effectively to understand and make decisions has an
information advantage. A force that effectively communicates and protects its information while preventing
the enemy from doing the same has an advantage. A force that uses information to deceive and confuse an
opponent has an advantage. Using information to influence relevant actor behavior more effectively than an
adversary or enemy is another information advantage.
Human Dimension
1-115. The human dimension encompasses people and the interaction between individuals and
groups, how they understand information and events, make decisions, generate will, and act within an
operational environment. The will to act and fight emerges from the complex interrelationship of culture,
emotion, and behavior. Influencing these factors—by affecting attitudes, beliefs, motivations, and
perceptions—underpins the achievement of military objectives. |
3-0 | 37 | Foundations of Operations
1-116. Commanders and staffs identify relevant actors and anticipate their behavior. Actors are individuals,
groups, networks, and populations. Relevant actors are actors who, through their behavior, could substantially
impact campaigns, operations, or tactical actions. From this understanding, commanders develop ways to
influence relevant actor behavior, decision making, and will through physical and informational means.
1-117. A human advantage occurs when a force holds the initiative in terms of training, morale, perception,
and will. Human advantages enable friendly morale and will, degrade enemy morale and will, and influence
popular support. Examples of human advantages include leader and Soldier competence, morale of troops,
and the health and physical fitness of the force. Forces with a cultural affinity to the population in which they
operate are also a form of a human advantage. For Army forces, the mission command approach to C2 is a
significant human advantage that enhances the friendly decision cycle. (See ADP 6-0 for more information
on mission command.)
OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES
1-118. The operational and mission variables are tools to assist commanders and staffs in refining their
understanding of the domains and dimensions of an operational environment. Commanders and staffs analyze
and describe an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political,
military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as
PMESII-PT). The operational variables help leaders understand the land domain and its interrelationships
with information, relevant actors, and capabilities in the other domains.
1-119. Commanders analyze information categorized by the operational variables in the context of the
missions they are assigned. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to
refine their understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct operations. The mission
variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations, each of which have informational considerations. The mission variables are represented as
METT-TC (I). (See FM 5-0 for more information on operational and mission variables.) Informational
considerations are those aspects of the human, information, and physical dimensions that affect how
humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon, and are impacted by information.
(See FM 5-0 for more details about informational considerations.)
Note. METT-TC (I) represents the mission variables leaders use to analyze and understand a
situation in relationship to the unit’s mission. The first six variables are not new. However, the
pervasiveness of information and its applicability in different military contexts requires leaders to
continuously assess its various aspects during operations. Because of this, “I” has been added to
the METT-TC mnemonic. Information considerations are expressed as a parenthetical variable
because they are not an independent consideration, but an important component of each variable
of METT-TC that leaders must understand when developing understanding of a situation. |
3-0 | 39 | Chapter 2
Generating and Applying Combat Power
If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know
Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.
Sun Tzu
Army forces integrate capabilities and synchronize warfighting functions to generate
combat power and apply it against enemy forces. Successful application of combat
power requires leaders to understand the enemy and understand friendly capabilities.
A broad understanding of the strategicenvironment and threat methods provides a basis
for understanding specific enemy situations. Leaders must understand how Army
forces enable joint operations through multiple domains and the basic roles of Army
echelons. They must also understand how the joint force enables the Army to integrate
capabilities through all domains to generate more effective landpower.
WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS
A warfighting functionis a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders
use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADP 3-0). The warfighting functions are—
(cid:122) Command and control(C2).
(cid:122) Movement and maneuver.
(cid:122) Intelligence.
(cid:122) Fires.
(cid:122) Sustainment.
(cid:122) Protection.
The purpose of warfighting functions is to provide an intellectual organization for common critical
capabilities available to commanders and staffs at all echelons and levels of war. Warfighting functions are
not confined to single domain, and they typically include capabilities from multiple domains. Warfighting
functions are not branch specific. Although some branches, staff sections, and types of units have a role or
purpose that mainly aligns with a warfighting function, each warfighting function is relevant to all types of
units.
THE COMMAND AND CONTROLWARFIGHTING FUNCTION
The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable
commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power (ADP 3-0).The primary purpose of
the C2warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other warfighting functions (movement
and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection) effectively at each echelon, and to apply
combat power to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.
The C2 system includespeople, processes, networks, and command posts. All elements of the system
are critical in supporting effective decision making and the tempo required to defeat enemy forces. C2
supports the creation and exploitation of information advantages through the activities of developing
situational understanding, decision making, and operating networks.
C2synchronizes the systems and capabilities that comprise the other warfighting functions. Strategy,
operational art, planning, operational approaches, operational frameworks, risk assessment, and decision |
3-0 | 40 | Chapter2
making are all part of C2. C2reflects leader action and how Army forces achieve unity of effort and unity of
purpose during operations. (See ADP 6-0for more information on C2.)
THE MOVEMENT AND MANEUVERWARFIGHTING FUNCTION
The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and
employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADP 3-0). Direct
fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes
tasks associated with force projection. Movement is necessary to position and disperse the force as a whole
or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver directly gains or exploits positions of relative advantage.
Commanders use maneuver for massing effects to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum.
Effective maneuver requires some combination of reconnaissance, surveillance, and security
operations to provide early warning and protect the main body of the formation. Every Soldier on the
battlefield is a potential sensor that makes key contributions to information collection and the development
of intelligence. Effective maneuver requires close coordination of fires and movement. Movement and
maneuver contribute to the development of information advantages through the positioning of units able to
employ capabilities in close proximity to the enemy, as well as by physically establishing the facts on the
ground that an enemy or adversary cannot refute.
Maneuver requires sustainment. The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include
routine transportation of personnel and materiel that support operations, which falls under the sustainment
warfighting function.
THE INTELLIGENCEWARFIGHTING FUNCTION
The intelligence warfighting functionis the related tasks and systems thatfacilitate understanding the
enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment
(ADP3-0). Intelligence involves analyzing information from all sources, which includes the other
warfighting functions, and conducting operations to collect information. The integration of intelligence into
operations facilitates understanding of an operational environment and assists in determining when and where
to employ capabilities against adversaries and enemies. Intelligence likewise facilitates responses by Army
forces to other situations, such as public health crises and events precipitating noncombatant evacuation. The
intelligence warfighting function provides support to force generation, situational understanding, targeting
and information operations, and information collection. The intelligence warfighting function fuses the
information collected through reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations.
Commanders drive intelligence and intelligence drives operations. Army forces execute intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) through the operations and intelligence processes, with an emphasis
on intelligence analysis and information collection.
Timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence enables decision making, tempo, and agility
during operations. Due to the fog and friction of warfare, commanders must fight for intelligence and share
it with adjacent units and across echelons. (See ADP 2-0 for additional information on the intelligence
warfighting function.)
THE FIRESWARFIGHTING FUNCTION
The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all
domains against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations
(ADP3-0). These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and joint
forces and other unified action partners. The fires warfighting function does not entirely encompass, nor is it
wholly encompassed by, any particular branch or function. Many of the capabilities that contribute to fires
also contribute to other warfighting functions, often simultaneously. For example, an aviation unit may
simultaneously execute missions that contribute to the movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence,
sustainment, protection, and C2 warfighting functions. Space and cyberspace capabilities can provide
commanders with options to defeat, destroy, disrupt, deny, or manipulate enemy networks, information, and
decision making. (See ADP 3-19for additional information on the fires warfighting function.) |
3-0 | 41 | Generating and Applying Combat Power
THE SUSTAINMENTWARFIGHTING FUNCTION
The sustainment warfighting functionis the related tasks and system that provide support and services
to ensure freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). Sustainment
employs capabilities from all domains and enables operations through each domain. Sustainment determines
the limits of depth and endurance during operations. Sustainment demands joint and strategic integration,
and it should be meticulously coordinated across echelons to ensure continuity of operations and that
resources reach the point of employment.
Sustainment employs an integrated network of information systems linking sustainment to operations.
As a result, commanders at all levels see an operational environment, anticipate requirements in time and
space, understand what is needed, track anddeliver what is requested, and make timely decisions to ensure
responsive sustainment. Because the situation is always changing, sustainment requires leaders capable of
improvisation. Because sustainment operations are often vulnerable to enemy attacks, sustainment
survivability depends on active and passive measures and maneuver forces for protection. (See ADP 4-0and
FM 4-0for more information on sustainment.)
THE PROTECTIONWARFIGHTING FUNCTION
The protection warfighting function is the related tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or
mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve combat power and enable freedom of action.
Protection encompasses everything that makes Army forces hard to detect and destroy. Protection requires
commanders and staffs to understand threats and hazards throughout the operational environment, prioritize
their requirements, and commit capabilities and resources according totheir priorities. Commanders balance
their protection efforts with the need for tempo and resourcing the main effort. They may assume risk in
operations or areas that may be vulnerable, but that are considered low enemy priorities for targeting or
attack. Commanders account for threats from space, cyberspace, and outsidetheir assigned area of operations
(AO) as they develop protection measures. Protection results from many factors, including operations
security, dispersion, deception, survivability measures, and the way forces conduct operations. Planning,
preparing, executing, and assessing protection is a continuous and enduring activity. Defending networks,
data, and systems; implementing operations security; and conducting security operations contribute to
information advantages by protecting friendly information. Prioritization of protection capabilities is
situationally dependent and resourceinformed. (See ADP 3-37for additional information on protection.)
COMBAT POWER
Combat poweris the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can
apply against an enemy at a given time (JP 3-0). It is the ability to fight. The complementary and reinforcing
effects that result from synchronized operations yield a powerful blow that overwhelms enemy forces and
creates friendly momentum. Army forces deliver that blow through a combination of five dynamics. The
dynamics of combat power are—
(cid:122) Leadership.
(cid:122) Firepower.
(cid:122) Information.
(cid:122) Mobility.
(cid:122) Survivability.
All warfighting functions contribute to generating and applying combat power. Well sustained units
able to move and maneuver bring combat power to bear against the opponent. Joint and Army indirect fires
complement and reinforce organic firepower in maneuver units. Survivability is a function of protection
tasks, the protection inherent to Army platforms, and schemes of maneuver that focus friendly strengths
against enemy weaknesses. Intelligence determines how and where to best apply combat power against
enemy weaknesses. C2enables leadership, the most important qualitative aspect of combat power. |
3-0 | 42 | Chapter2
LEADERSHIP
Leadership is the most essential dynamic of combat power. Leadership is the activity of influencing
people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the
organization (ADP 6-22). It is the multiplying andunifying dynamic of combat power, and it represents the
qualitative difference between units. Leadership drives C2 butis also dependent upon it. The collaboration
and shared understanding inherent in the operations process prepare leaders for operations, expand shared
understanding, hone leader judgment, and improve the flexibility that leaders apply to the other dynamics of
combat power against enemy forces.
Commanders communicate their will to their formations through leadership. Sound leadership
manifests as an unrelenting will to accomplish the mission, the ability to understand and adapt to changing
conditions, and the motivation to persevere through hardship. Leadership inspires individuals to push past
their perceived breaking point, and to fight for their unit and fellow Soldiers under the most difficult
circumstances. It provides the intangible qualitative difference in how much combat power a formation can
generate against enemy forces. (See ADP 6-22for information on leadership.)
FIREPOWER
Firepower is the primary source of lethality, and it is essential to defeating an enemy force’s ability
and will to fight. Leaders generate firepower through direct and indirect fires, using mass, precision, or,
typically, a combination of the two. Intelligence enables the identification and selection of targets and
objectives for the application of lethal force. Movement and maneuver enable the positioning of fires
capabilities where they can be most lethal.
Firepower facilitates maneuver by suppressing enemy fires and disrupting or preventing the movement
of enemy forces. Firepower exploits maneuver by neutralizing enemy forces when they react, destroying
equipment and people, and degrading the will of enemy forces to fight.
Leaders increase firepower by using capabilities
from all domains in combinations that overwhelm an enemy Large-scale combat operations can
force's ability to effectively respond. This is ammunition consume corps and division ammunition
intensive. Discretion may require leaders to reserve limited stocks in 72to 96 hours, particularly those
numbers of precision munitions for specific, important required for cannons, rockets, and
targets, while they rely on conventional unguided munitions mortars.
against enemy units and area targets. Large-scale combat
requireslarge reserves of both precision and unguided munitions and the sustainment capacity to move them
to forward locations. Air, maritime, space, and cyberspace-based fires enhance the firepower of ground
forces. Similarly, ground-based firepower complements firepower from other domains. A multidomain
approach to firepower requires understanding the techniques for controlling and integrating joint fires. This
includes requesting and integrating space and cyberspace capabilities, electromagnetic attack capabilities,
and air capabilities.
INFORMATION
Information contributes to the disruption and destruction of enemy forces. It is central to the application
and amplification of combat power. It enables decision making and influences enemy perceptions, decision
making, and behavior. Information, like leadership, provides a qualitative advantage to friendly combat
power when it can be acted upon more quickly and effectively than the enemy.
Army forces collect data and information for analysis and process it to understand situations, make
decisions, and direct actions that apply combat power against enemy forces. Army forces must fight for
information about enemy forces while protecting their own information. Friendly counterintelligence,
counterreconnaissance, and security operations prevent enemy access to friendly information. Offensively,
commanders fight for information about enemy forces and terrain through continuous reconnaissance and
surveillance and offensive tasks such as movement to contact or reconnaissancein force.
Army forces also use information to enhance the effects of destructive or disruptive physical force to
create psychological effects that disrupt morale, cause human error, and increase uncertainty. Using |
3-0 | 43 | Generating and Applying Combat Power
information to manipulate shock and confusion amplifies the psychological effects of lethality and other
dynamics of combat power.
Employing information to confuse, manipulate, or deceive can induce threats to act in ways that make
them more vulnerable to destruction by Army forces. Employing information creatively can enable Army
forces to achieve surprise, cause enemy forces to misallocate or expend combat power, or mislead them as
to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces.
MOBILITY
Mobility is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place
while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-36). Mobility encompasses the capability of
a formation to move and apply capabilities in specific terrain under specific conditions relative to enemy
forces. Exploiting mobility requires intelligence of an enemy force’s disposition, composition, strength, and
course of action. This understanding allows leaders to assess their mobility in relation to adversary or enemy
forces. Maneuver and fires increase relative mobility by fixing enemy units, reducing obstacles, and
providing obscuration.
The environment impacts mobility and the level of combat power a unit can produce. For example, an
armored brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) mobility is limited in dense jungle or urban terrain, but it increases
in steppes, in deserts, and on modern roads. Weather affects mobility when it degrades route conditions, or
when it increases risks to fixed-and rotary-wing aviation operations. Space-based environmental monitoring
provides real-time understanding of the impacts of weather on terrain and mobility. Enemy forces also
influence conditions that affect mobility. For example, enemy standoff approaches can isolate land forces
operating on islands in maritime environments by destroying maritime transportation capabilities and
denying friendly air support.
Mobility is a function of how quickly units can move in specific terrain under specific conditions. At
the tactical level, Army forces exploit mobility to conduct information collection, posture forces in
advantageous locations, position fires to range enemy forces, and move classes of supply around an AO.
During offensive operations, mobility enables forces to concentrate and then disperse rapidly, achieve
surprise, attack enemy forces in unexpected locations, exploit opportunity, and evade enemy fires. During
defensive operations, mobility enables counterattacks and the ability to rapidly shift resources between fixed
positions. The ability to conduct gap crossings and passage of lines are other operations that can facilitate
mobility.
SURVIVABILITY
Survivability is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand
hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission
(ATP3-37.34). It represents the degree to which a formation is hard to kill. Survivability is relative to a unit’s
capabilities and the type of enemy effects it must withstand, its ability to avoid detection, and how well it can
deceive enemy forces. Survivability is also a function of how a formation conducts itself during operations.
For example, an infantry BCT’s survivability against indirect fire is contingent on it not being detected, being
dispersed, digging in, and adding overhead cover when stationary. An armor BCT’s survivability is a function
of logistics, security,and avoiding situations that constrain its mobility or freedom of action.
Leaders assess survivability as the ability of a friendly force to withstand enemy effects while
remaining mission capable. Armor protection, mobility, tactical skill, avoiding predictability, and situational
awareness contribute to survivability. Enforcement of operations security techniques and avoiding detection
while initiating direct fire contact on favorable terms also increases survivability. Situational awareness
regarding the nine forms of contact and minimizing friendly signatures contributes to survivability.
To increase survivability, units employ air defense systems, reconnaissance and security operations,
modify tempo, take evasive action, maneuver to gain positional advantages, decrease electromagnetic
signatures, and disperse forces. Dispersed formations improve survivability by complicating targeting and
making it more difficult for enemy forces to identify lucrative targets. Tactical units integrate procedures for
the use of camouflage, cover, concealment, and conducting electromagnetic protection—including noise and
light discipline. During large-scale combat operations, survivability measures may include radio silence, |
3-0 | 44 | Chapter2
communication through couriers, or alternate forms of communication. Space-based missile warning systems
provide early warning of adversary artillery and missile attacks, allowing friendly forces to seek cover.
Application of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense measures increase
survivability in CBRN environments. (See ATP 3-37.34for more information on survivability.)
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The central challenge to U.S. security is the reemergence of long-term, greatpower competition with
China and Russia as individual actors and as actors working together to achieve common goals. China uses
its rapidly modernizing military, information warfare, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring
countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to its advantage. Concurrently, Russia seeks veto authority over
nations on its periphery in terms of its governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to subvert the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and to change European and Middle East security and economic
structures to its favor.
In addition to China and Russia, several other states threaten U.S. security. North Korea seeks to
guarantee survival of its regime and increase its leverage. It is pursuing a mixture of CBRN, conventional,
and unconventional weapons and a growing ballistic missile capability to gain coercive influence over South
Korea, Japan, and the United States. Similarly, Iran seeks dominance over its neighbors by asserting an arc
of influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony. Iran uses state-sponsored terrorist activities,
a network of proxies, and its missile capabilities to achieve its objectives.
While states are the principal actors on the global stage, non-state actors also threaten the strategic
environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Terrorists, transnational criminal organizations,
threat cyber actors, and other malicious non-state actors have transformed global affairs with increased
capabilities of mass disruption. Terrorism remains a persistent tactic driven by ideology and enabled by
political and economic structures.
THREATS
A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm
United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). Threats faced by Army
forces are,by nature,hybrid. They include individuals, groups of individuals, paramilitary or military forces,
criminal elements, nation-states, or national alliances. In general, a threat can be categorized as an enemy or
an adversary:
(cid:122) An enemyisa party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADP 3-0).
An enemyis also a combatant under the law of war.
(cid:122) An adversaryis a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which
the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). Adversaries pursue interests that compete with those
of the United States and are often called competitors.
Army forces are organized, trained, and equipped
primarily for large-scale combat operations against peer Peer threats generate tactical, operational,
threats. Army units supporting combatant commanders and strategic challenges that may constitute
(CCDRs) where no peer threat exists focus on other an existential threat to the United States and
missions, but they can alter their priorities to support its allies.
large-scale combat operations when necessary. Peer
threats are adversaries or enemies with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple
domains worldwide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage. Peer threats
possess roughly equal combat power to U.S. forces in geographic proximity to a conflict area. Peer threats
may also have a cultural affinity with specific regions, providing them relative advantages in the human and
information dimensions.
Peer threats employ strategies that capitalize on their advantages to achieve objectives. When these
objectives are at odds with the interests of the United States and its allies, conflict becomes more likely. Peer
threats prefer to achieve their goals without directly engaging U.S. forces in combat. They often employ
information warfare in combination with conventional and irregular military capabilities to achieve their
goals. They exploit friendly sensitivity to world opinion and attempt to exploit American domestic opinion |
3-0 | 45 | Generating and Applying Combat Power
and sensitivity to friendly casualties. Peer threats believe they have a comparative advantage because of their
willingness to endure greater hardships, casualties, and negative public opinion. They also believe their
ability to pursuelong-term goals is greater than that of the United States.
Peer threats employ capabilities from and across multiple domains against Army forces, and they seek
to exploit vulnerabilities in all strategic contexts. During conflict, peer threats seek to inflict significant
damage across multiple domains in a short amount of time. They seek to delay friendly forces long enough
to achieve their goals and end hostilities before friendly forces can decisively respond.
THREAT METHODS
Peer threats use various methods to render U.S. military power irrelevant whenever possible. Five
broad peer threat methods, often used in combination during conventional or irregular conflicts, and below
the threshold of conflict, include—
(cid:122) Information warfare.
(cid:122) Systems warfare.
(cid:122) Preclusion.
(cid:122) Isolation.
(cid:122) Sanctuary.
Information Warfare
In the context of the threat, information warfare refers to a threat’s orchestrated use of information
activities (such as cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations) to achieve
objectives. Operating under a different set of ethics and lawsthan the United States, and under the cloak of
anonymity, peer threats conduct information warfare aggressively and continuously to influence populations
and decision makers. They can also use information warfare to create destructive effects during competition
and crisis. During armed conflict, peer threats use information warfare in conjunction with other methods to
achieve strategic and operational objectives.
Note. Threat forces use the term electronic warfare, which differs from U.S. doctrine’s use of
electromagnetic warfare. Electronic warfare consists of the measures threats conduct to control or
deny friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the threat. For U.S.
forces, electromagnetic warfare is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and
directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-85).
Threats seek to employ information warfare to attack or disrupt in depth, including within the
continental United States, viewing it as a low-cost and low-risk activity. A cyberspace attack may disrupt
U.S. infrastructure that impedes deployment of forces, or a disinformation campaign can reduce morale and
the will to fight. In some situations, threats use proxies for information warfare to achieve policy aims without
having to incur the risks associated with employing military forces or official government entities.
Peer threats typically have fewer policy and legal restrictions than U.S. forces on how they employ
information warfare, giving them an initial advantage. They exploit the nature of open societies while
restricting their population’s access to information. They often obscure their activities to prevent detection
or attribution.
Peer threats are free to sow disinformation among U.S. and allied populations while at the same time
strictly limiting access to and manipulating the information their own populations receive. They employ all
available means to influence a wide range of audiences, including both civilian and military and domestic
and international, in support of their goals. Information warfare is a means to exploit shared cultural norms,
historical grievances, and a self-serving interpretation of international law to limit U.S. military options and
degrade U.S. political will. Peer threats use diverse means to conduct information warfare, and these means
may include—
(cid:122) Cyberspace operations.
(cid:122) Perception management. |
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(cid:122) Deception.
(cid:122) Electronic warfare.
(cid:122) Physical destruction.
(cid:122) Political warfare.
(cid:122) Legal warfare.
(cid:122) Proxies and non-state actors.
Peer threats systematically and continuously combine all of these means to create specific effects
within the human, information, and physical dimensions of an operational environment. Peer threats use
misinformation, disinformation, propaganda, and information for effect to create doubt, confuse, deceive,
and influence U.S. and partner decision makers, forces, and target audiences. They also use information
warfare to destroy essential network-based capabilities, such as economic infrastructure, private and
government communications, and electrical grids. This use of information warfare is not merely disruptive.
It can result in the loss of immense resources and human life, depending on the scale and duration of the
attack. (See FM 3-53for a discussion of threat information categories.)
Systems Warfare
Systems warfare is the identification and isolation or destruction of critical subsystems or components
to degradeor destroy an opponent’s overall system. Peer threats view the battlefield, their own instruments
of power, and an opponent’s instruments of power as a collection of complex, dynamic, and integrated
systems composed of subsystems and components. They use systems warfare to attack critical components
of a friendly system while protecting their own system. Simple examples of attacking critical components
are adversary use of electronic warfare to disable the links between unmanned aircraft system (UAS)
controllers and the aircraft in a specific area, and the emplacement of layered integrated air defense systems
from a position of sanctuary to prevent the integration of opposing airpower with ground operations.
Peer threats believe that a qualitatively or quantitatively weaker force can defeat a superior force, if
the weaker force can dictate the terms of combat. Peer threats believe that the systems warfare approach
allows them to move away from the conventional approach to combat. Systems warfare makes it unnecessary
to match an opponent system-for-system or capability-for-capability. Peer threats seek to locate the critical
components of the opposing combat system, determine patterns of interaction and dependencies among
components, and identify opportunities to exploit this connectivity.
Systems warfare approaches work in concert with other approaches, and they manifest themselves at
the tactical level in terms of integrated fires complexes characterized by surface-to-surface and surface-to-
air systems enabled by long-range ISRcapabilities. They generally represent one means by which adversaries
achieve preclusion at the strategic and operational levels, and they are adversaries’ preferred means for
destroying friendly forces at the tactical level. An example of systems warfare occurred in Ukraine in 2014. |
3-0 | 47 | Generating and Applying Combat Power
Systems Warfare and Sanctuary: Eastern Ukraine, 2014
During the Russia-Ukraine conflict, an attack on Ukrainian forces demonstrated the
lethality of the modern battlefield and the impact created by the threat’s use of
sanctuary and systems warfare. In July 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine moved
several mechanized brigades into a position near the Russian border to prevent the
illegal movement of military equipment across the frontier to rebels in eastern Ukraine.
Early on the morning of 11 July, soldiers at the position noticed a drone orbiting above
them for some time. Not long after the drone disappeared, rockets fired from 9A52-4
Tornado multiple launch rocket systems located in Russian territory began landing on
one of the brigades. Reporting indicated that the UAS was cued by other systems that
located civilian cell phones in the assembly area.
The barrage lasted four minutes. Rockets carrying a mixture of high explosive, cluster,
and thermobaric munitions impacted the unit’s position. Cannon rounds followed the
rockets with devastating effect. The Ukrainian units took heavy losses. One battalion
was virtually destroyed, and others were rendered combat ineffective due to heavy
losses in vehicles and personnel. Casualties quickly overwhelmed army and local
medical facilities. In the days that followed, rocket and cannon strikes continued,
disrupting the Ukrainian army’s ability to defend that region of eastern Ukraine.
The lethality of the attacks was enabled by a sophisticated real-time targeting system
that used inexpensive unmanned aircraft systems for ISR, target acquisition, and fire
control. Rockets were likely fired from within a town in Russian territory, hampering
potential Ukrainian military responses due to the sanctuary provided by both an
international border and proximity to civilian noncombatants. Additionally, Russia
extended its integrated air defense system, located within Russian territory, over the
conflict zone in Ukraine. This action denied Ukraine’s ability to use its air power, which
separated Ukraine’s air capability from its ground forces. Without air power for close
air support and counter-UAS operations, the Ukrainian ground forces were left
vulnerable to the sophisticated targeting systems used by Russian and pro-Russian
forces.
Over the following months and years, Ukraine military forces adapted. In 2022, Russia
began an unprovoked conventional attack along multiple axes throughout Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces responded effectively. They exercised a more disciplined and efficient
use of the electromagnetic spectrum, complicating Russian detection efforts. Ukrainian
forces also defended in more mobile, dispersed formations, providing fewer lucrative
targets for Russian fires.
Preclusion
To preclude is to keep something from happening by taking action in advance. Peer threats use a wide
variety of actions, activities, and capabilities to preclude a friendly force’s ability to shape an operational
environment and mass and sustain combat power. Antiaccess (A2) and area denial (AD) are two strategic
and operational approaches to preclusion. Antiaccessis an action, activity, or capability, usually long-range,
designed to prevent an enemy force from entering an operational area (JP 3-0). For example, A2 activities
prevent or deny forces the ability to project and sustain forces into a desired area. The employment of A2
capabilities against Army forces begins in the continental United States and extends throughout the strategic
support area into a theater. Peer threats have the means to disrupt the United States’ force projection capability
at home station. These means include ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and space, cyberspace, and
information warfare capabilities. |
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Area denialis anaction, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force’s
freedom of action within an operational area (JP 3-0). Usually adversaries do not design area denial to keep
friendly forces out, but rather to limit their freedom of action and ability to accomplish their mission within
an operational area. Threat forces pursue AD using long-range fires, integrated air defense systems, electronic
warfare, CBRN, manmade obstacles, and conventional ground maneuver forces. Figure 2-1 and figure 2-2
depict employment of A2 and AD approaches in different types of theaters. For illustration purposes, A2 and
AD reach are tied to specific capabilities. However, adversary forces can use different actions, activities, or
capabilities in an A2 or AD approach.
Figure 2-1. Notional U.S. European Command preclusion example |
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Figure 2-2. Notional U.S. Indo-Pacific Command preclusion example
Isolation
Isolation is the containment of a force so that it cannot accomplish its mission. Peer threats will attempt
to isolate U.S. forces in several ways. Some examples include—
(cid:122) Attacking political bonds with allies and partners.
(cid:122) Preventing or limiting communications to and in an AO.
(cid:122) Interdicting or severing lines of communication to block support or reinforcement of
forward-positioned units.
(cid:122) Deceiving friendly forces about the current situation and their role in the operational environment.
(cid:122) Deceiving the public about the current situation to reduce its support of friendly operations that
counter threat goals.
(cid:122) Exploiting inadequate friendly understanding of an operational environment or cultural affinity in
an area or region.
(cid:122) Blocking support or reinforcement of forward-positioned units through direct and indirect fires.
(cid:122) Using economic coercion.
(cid:122) Preventing friendly access and overflight. |
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During competition, peer threats may attempt to isolate friendly forces using disinformation campaigns
and the threat of aggression. During crisis, peer threats seek to isolate U.S. forward-positioned forces and
prevent their support from the United States or elsewhere in theater. During armed conflict, enemy forces
identify isolated friendly forces using a variety of capabilities and rapidly attempt to destroy them through
long-range, massed, and precision fires.
Sanctuary
Sanctuary is the positioning of threat forces beyond the reach of friendly forces. It is a form of
protection derived by some combination of political, legal, and physical boundaries that restricts freedom of
action by a friendly force commander. Peer threats will use any means necessary, including sanctuary, to
protect key capabilities from destruction, particularly by air and missile capabilities. Peer threats will also
protect their key interests, whether these interests reside in their homeland or in another country. To create a
sanctuary that protects key interests, adversaries employ combinations of both physical and nonphysical
means toprotect key interests, including—
(cid:122) International borders.
(cid:122) Complex terrain.
(cid:122) Hiding among noncombatants and culturally sensitive structures.
(cid:122) Counterprecision techniques, including camouflage, concealment, and deception.
(cid:122) Countermeasures, including decoys, hardened and buried facilities, integrated air defense systems,
and long-range fires.
(cid:122) Information warfare.
(cid:122) Threatening attacks against the U.S. homeland, possibly using including weapons of mass
destruction.
(cid:122) International law, treaties, and treaty agreements.
(cid:122) Internal population information control (by denying the internet or jamming external radio and
television).
Most means of sanctuary cannot protect an entire enemy force for an extended time. Therefore, a threat
will seek to protect selected elements of its forces for enough time to gain the freedom of action necessary to
pursue its strategic or diplomatic goals. Threat forces seek to protect their conventional forces, advanced
aircraft, and extended-range fires systems. Many peer threats invest in long-range rocket and missile systems,
such as the Russian Smerch 9A52 and Chinese PHL-03, capable of counterfire at extreme ranges to allow
sanctuary behind international borders. Improved air defense systems, including counter ballistic missile
systems, often provide protection for these advanced fires capabilities.
UNIFIED ACTION AND ARMY FORCES
[S]eparate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be
involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated
effort.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower
To counter threats and protect national interests worldwide, the Armed Forces of the United States
operate as a joint force in unified action. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or
integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve
unity of effort (JP 1, Volume 1).Unity of effortis coordination and cooperation toward common objectives,
even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product
of successful unified action (JP 1, Volume 2). Army forces, as part of unified action, conduct operations in
support of the joint force, with multinational allies and partners, and in coordination with other agencies and
organizations. The Army’s contribution to unified action is multidomain operationswhich seek to employ all
available capabilities in unexpected combinations that create and exploit relative advantages.Leaders must
be capable of employing all unified action partners to the greatest extent possible, including conventional
forces, special operations forces, allies, partner-nation forces, territorial defense forces, and any other
organization or individual whose efforts can legally be harnessed to help achieve objectives. |
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JOINT OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES
Single Services may perform tasks and missions to support Department of Defense (DOD) objectives.
However, the DOD primarily employs two or more Services (from two military departments) in a single
operation from, in, and across multiple domains, particularly in combat, through joint operations. Joint
operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified
command relationships with each other, which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces (JP 3-0). A joint
forceis a force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military departments operating
under a single joint force commander (JP 3-0). Joint operations exploit the advantages of interdependent
Service capabilities in multiple domains through unified action. Joint planning integrates military power with
other instruments of national power (including diplomatic, economic, and informational) to achieve a desired
military end state. The end stateis the set of requiredconditions that defines achievement of the commander’s
objectives (JP 3-0). Joint planning connects the strategic end state to the joint force commander’s (JFC’s)
campaign design and ultimately to tactical missions. JFCs use campaigns and major operations to translate
their operational-level actions into strategic results.
The joint force is organized, trained, and equipped for sustained large-scale combat anywhere in the
world. The capabilities to conduct large-scale combat operations enable a wide variety of other operations
and activities. In particular, opportunities exist prior to large-scale combat to shape an operational
environment to prevent, or at least mitigate, the effects of war. Characterizing the employment of military
capabilities (including people, organizations, and equipment) as one or another type of military operation has
several benefits. For example, the Army can develop publications that describe the nature, tasks, and tactics
associated with specific types of diverse operations, such as counterinsurgency and peace operations.
Doctrine categorizes joint operations and activities by their focus, as shown in figure 2-3. In some
cases, the title covers a variety of missions, tasks, and activities. Many activities are accomplished by Army
forces and do not constitute joint operations, such as tasks associatedwith security cooperation. Nonetheless,
most of these occur under a joint “umbrella,”because they contribute to achievement of CCDRs’ campaign
objectives.
Figure 2-3. Examples of operations and activities
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
Multinational operationsisa collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two
or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). While each nation
has its own interests and often participates within the limitations of national caveats, all nations bring value
to an operation. Each nation’s force has unique capabilities, and each usually contributes to an operation’s
legitimacy in terms of international or local acceptability. Army forces should anticipate that most operations
will be multinational and plan accordingly. (See FM 3-16for more information on multinational operations.) |
3-0 | 52 | Chapter2
Multinational operations present challenges and demands. These include culture and language issues,
unresolved policy issues, technical and procedural interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of
respective forces, the authorities required for sharing of information and intelligence, and rules of
engagement. Commanders analyze the particular requirements of a mission in the context of friendly force
capabilities to exploit the multinational force’s advantages and compensate for its limitations. Establishing
effective liaison with multinational partners through embedded teams, collaborative systems, and leader
contact is critical to establishing a common operational picture (COP) and maintaining situational
understanding.
Multinational operations also present many opportunities. Having multinational forces as part of an
operation provides internationallegitimacy that helps isolate adversary or enemy forces. They may provide
cultural awareness, foreign language skills, and affinities with populations that help with understanding the
environment, conducting stability tasks, and transitioning to legitimate authorities. Allies and partners often
operate with different authorities to employ key capabilities in space, cyberspace, and the information
dimension of an operational environment. Lastly, multinational allies and partners bring additional forces to
an operation, and they often possess capabilities U.S. Army forces may lack.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION
Interagency coordination is a key part of unified action. Interagency coordinationis the planning and
synchronization of efforts that occur between elements of Department of Defense and participating United
States Government departments and agencies (JP 3-0). Army forces conduct and participate in interagency
coordination using established liaison, personal engagement, and planning processes.
Unified action may require interorganizational cooperation to build the capacity of unified action
partners. Interorganizational cooperationis the interactionthat occurs among elements of the Department of
Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal
agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental
organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). Interorganizational cooperation includes civil-military
integration. (See FM 3-57for more information on civil-military integration.)
CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION
Army forces integrate conventional and special operations forces to create complementary and
reinforcing effects during operations. The mission and operational environment drive the command and
support relationships between conventional and special operations forces during an operation. Regardless of
C2 and support arrangements, both types of forces integrate and synchronize operations to increase
effectiveness, promote interdependence, provide mutual support, limit the redundant use of resources, and
reduce the risk of fratricide.
During large-scale combat, conventional forces contribute mass across all warfighting functions
required to defeat enemy forces. Special operations forces complement conventional forces by performing
their core activities:
(cid:122) Civil affairs operations.
(cid:122) Countering weapons of mass destruction.
(cid:122) Counterinsurgency.
(cid:122) Counterterrorism.
(cid:122) Direct action.
(cid:122) Foreign humanitarian assistance.
(cid:122) Foreign internal defense.
(cid:122) Hostage rescue and recovery.
(cid:122) Military information support operations.
(cid:122) Security force assistance
(cid:122) Special reconnaissance.
(cid:122) Unconventional warfare. |
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(cid:122) SOF contributions during deep and extended deep operations are often critical to setting conditions
for conventional close and rear operations.
(cid:122) SOF contributions during deep and extended deep operations are often critical to setting conditions
for conventional close and rear operations.
Because operations often include conventional and irregular forces from multinational partners,
commanders must consider how they will maintain unity of effortwithout direct command authority. Security
force assistance brigades (SFABs) provide the ability to partner with conventional allies and partners. Special
operations forces enhance unity of effort by integrating irregular forces through security force assistance,
foreign internal defense, and unconventional warfare. (See ATP 3-96.1 for more information on security
force assistance brigades. See FM 6-05 for more information on integrating conventional forces and special
operations forces.)
JOINT INTERDEPENDENCE
Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities to
maximize complementary and reinforcing effects of both. The degree of interdependence varies with specific
circumstances.
The Army depends on the other Services for strategic and operational mobility, joint fires, and other
key enabling capabilities. The Army supports the other Services, combatant commands, and unified action
partners with ground-based indirect fires and air and missile defense (AMD), defensive cyberspace
operations, electromagnetic warfare, communications, intelligence, rotary-wing aircraft, logistics, and
engineering. The Army’s ability to set and sustain a theater of operations is essential to allowing the joint
force freedom of action. The Army establishes, maintains, and defends vital infrastructure. It also provides
the JFC with unique capabilities, such as port and airfield opening, logistics, CBRN defense, and reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration of forces (RSOI).
DOMAIN INTERDEPENDENCE
The Army provides forces and capabilities from all domains to the joint force. Army forces employ
joint capabilities from all domains to complement and reinforce their own capabilities. Understanding domain
interdependences helps leaders better mitigate friendly vulnerabilities while creating and exploiting relative
advantages. Successful operations in an environment where the enemy can contest every domain requires
continuous joint integration down to the lowest tactical echelons.
Air
Land capabilitiesenable air operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include—
(cid:122) Fixing enemy ground forces for destruction from the air.
(cid:122) Providing air-delivered fires through rotary-wing and UAS platforms.
(cid:122) Controlling, securing, and defending airports and airfields.
(cid:122) Securing land-based C2 nodesfor air operations.
(cid:122) Destroying enemy surface-to-air systems.
(cid:122) Employing surface-to-air fires.
(cid:122) Integrating all-source intelligence to identify threats to friendly air capabilities.
(cid:122) Providing logistics supportto other Service components.
Air capabilities enable land operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include—
(cid:122) Providing air-to-ground fires.
(cid:122) Providing offensive and defensive depth through air interdiction and strategic attack.
(cid:122) Protecting ground forces from air attack.
(cid:122) Employing airborne platforms for information collection.
(cid:122) Providing aerial movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.
(cid:122) Employing airborne electromagnetic warfare platforms. |
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Space
Land capabilitiesenable space operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include—
(cid:122) Destroying enemy space ground stations, ground links, and launch sites with surface-to-surface
fires.
(cid:122) Securing ground links and launch sites.
(cid:122) Securing bases and C2 nodes for units controllingspace capabilities.
(cid:122) Securing bases and C2 nodes from which to launch attacks against enemy space capabilities.
Space capabilities enable land operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include—
(cid:122) Enabling geolocation and timing-dependent technology, including global positioning systems and
precise and accurate fires.
(cid:122) Enabling a global C2 network through satellite communications.
(cid:122) Enhancing situational understanding by providing meteorological, oceanographic, and space
environmental factors and detailed imagery of land areas and enemy dispositions on land.
(cid:122) Deceiving, disrupting, degrading, denying, or destroying enemy space systems.
(cid:122) Conducting navigation warfare to disrupt enemy use of positioning, navigation, and
timing-enabled devices.
(cid:122) Enabling theater missile warning and other warning intelligence.
Cyberspace
Land capabilitiesenable cyberspace operations in multiple ways. These include—
(cid:122) Securing critical cyberspace infrastructure including data storage facilities, wired network
transport, ground-based repeaters, and terminals.
(cid:122) Conducting information activities that protect and defend joint communications networks and
data.
(cid:122) Conducting physical attacks against enemy cyberspace-based capabilities and infrastructure on
land.
(cid:122) Defeating enemy forces collecting information through cyberspace.
Cyberspace capabilities enable land operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include—
(cid:122) Enabling secure global communications and a shared COP.
(cid:122) Supporting decision making and logistics.
(cid:122) Facilitatinghigh-volume data storage and knowledge management.
(cid:122) Networking sensors and fires platforms.
(cid:122) Attacking enemy networks including C2, integrated air defense systems, and integrated long-range
fires systems.
(cid:122) Enabling rapid communicationto audiences through social media and other applications.
(cid:122) Enablingtargeted influence operations.
Maritime
Land capabilitiesenable maritime operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include—
(cid:122) Attacking land-based threats to maritime capabilities, including enemy air bases,
surface-to-surface fires, and sensors.
(cid:122) Protecting ports and defending land areas that control maritime choke points.
(cid:122) Denying maritime areas with surface-to-surface fires and surface-to-air fires.
(cid:122) Integrating joint all-source intelligenceto identify threats to maritime capabilities.
(cid:122) Providing directed logistics support to maritime oriented forces operating from land.
Maritime capabilities enable land operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include— |
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(cid:122) Increasing operational reach and lethality through long-range fires systems and information
collection.
(cid:122) Providing access to otherwise inaccessible land areas.
(cid:122) Providing and protecting transportation of units, equipment, and supplies on a large scale, over
strategic distances.
(cid:122) Integrating with all-source intelligence.
(cid:122) Preventing enemy forces from using sea lines of communications and supply routes.
(cid:122) Attacking enemy maritime threats to landforces.
ARMY FORCE POSTURE
The Army postures forces in a way that
balances the need for sustainable readiness with the Although U.S. Army forces have the ability to
need for responsiveness. Forward-stationed and respond rapidly to regional and global crisis, the
rotational forces provide CCDRs with support to ability to build and project large-scale combat
operations during competition and rapid response power can take months.
during crisis. These forces are usually small in
number and may be vulnerable if the situation rapidly escalates to armed conflict. Forces based in strategic
support areas allow for unit training and a sustainable readiness cycle. These forces are part of the Army’s
global response capability, or they are in support of regional contingency plans that typically have
deployment timelines that occur over months.
Army Reserve Components support a wide variety of domestic and global Army operations. Although
they constitute about half of the Army’s organized units, they provide about 80 percent of the Army’s
sustainment units, over 70 percent of maneuver support units, a fourth of the Army’s mobilization base
expansion capability, and most of its civil affairs capacity. The Army Reserve Components are also the
Army’s major source of trained individual Soldiers for strengthening headquarters and filling vacancies in
the Regular Army during a crisis. Reserve Components provide a key resource for reconstitution operations
during armed conflict. It is critical for planners to understand that Reserve Components forces have
mobilization requirements that take time and typically have deployment time limits that must factor into force
management and contingency plans. (See ADP 1for more information on Army reserve forces. See Chapter
6 for more information on reconstitution. See Chapter 5 for information on reserve mobilization.)
ARMY ECHELONS
The Army operates through the use of echelons to ensure manageable spans of control for leaders.
Echelons generally correspond to a particular level of warfare, but they may contribute to two or more levels
depending on the situation.
Generally, higher echelons (for example, divisions and higher) have greater experience in their
command teams and staffs. They have the expertise and perspective to coordinate large-scale operations and
complex or politically sensitive tasks. They retain control of scarce resources so that they can employ them
at the right time and place. This often includes joint air, space, maritime, and cyberspace capabilities. Higher
echelons generally employ these critical capabilities to set conditions for lower echelon success and to weight
the main effort appropriately. Higher echelons maneuver subordinate formations and use capabilities from
all domains to shape the environment and create and exploit relative advantages. Generally speaking, the
joint force commanddegrades enemy strategic capabilities to enable forcible entry and sustained operations.
The land component command sets the theater, defeats enemy long- and mid-range fires, provides
operational-level sustainment, and apportions joint capabilities to corps. Corps, operating as tactical
formations, defeat enemy mid-range fires, employ joint capabilities to set conditions for divisions to
maneuver, and maintain the tempo of operations through sustainment and other rear operations. Divisions
defeat enemy short-range fires, mass effects on enemy forward echelons, and synchronize BCT maneuver in
close combat with enemy forces. BCTs conduct close operations to defeat and destroy enemy forces during
battles and engagements.
Generally, subordinate echelons (for example, brigades and lower) contribute to the overall mission
by executing tasks and fulfilling the purpose assigned to their unit. They provide awareness to the higher |
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echelon with their proximity to the current situation at the point of execution. While higher echelons provide
broad perspective, subordinate echelons provide tactical fidelity. Combining the higher echelon perspective
with the perspectives of subordinates creates the shared situational understanding that fosters disciplined
initiative. Shared situational understanding does not require all leaders to agree. Instead, leaders use
differences of opinion to frame the problem, assess operations, understand risk, and guide information
collection.
The focus of echelons changes across strategic contexts as do their responsibilities for integrating
multidomain capabilities into operations. Their broad roles are listed in paragraphs 2-79through 2-94. (See
Chapters 4, 5, and 6for descriptions of each strategic context and more detailed information on echelon roles
and responsibilities.)
Theater Army
The theater army’s mission is the most diverse and complex of any Army echelon. The theater army
headquarters is tailored to a specific CCDR with the ability to conduct both operational and administrative
C2 over Army forces theater wide. It provides enabling capabilities appropriate to theater conditions, such as
theater intelligence, theater sustainment, theater signal, theater fires, theater information activities, civil
affairs, engineer, and theater medical. In theaters without assigned field armies, corps, or divisions, the theater
army assumes directresponsibility across warfighting functions for its tactical commands. The theater army
is the Army Service component command to a geographic combatant command. The seven functions
performed as the Army Service component command are—
(cid:122) Execute the CCDR’s daily operational requirements.
(cid:122) Provide administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces.
(cid:122) Set and maintain the theater.
(cid:122) Set and support operational areas.
(cid:122) Exercise C2 of Army forces in the theater.
(cid:122) Perform joint roles of limited scope, scale, and duration.
(cid:122) Plan and coordinate for the consolidation of gains in support of joint operations.
(See FM 3-94 and ATP 3-93 for additional information on theater army administrative and operational
requirements.)
Field Army
A field army is constituted to meet specific requirements. A field army may consist of a headquarters
battalion with subordinate companies and special troops, a variable number of attached corps, an attached
expeditionary sustainment command, a variable number of divisions normally attached to corps, and other
attached functional and multifunctional brigades.
When required, a field army is an operational headquarters that provides C2 over multiple corps.
During operations, forces are assigned or attached to the field army. Although it may employ subordinate
units during operations, these units are provided by external Army, joint, and multinational sources based on
the situation and the field army’s role and mission. When constituted, a field army is tailored to mission
requirements and designed to perform operational ARFOR tasks; it is the Army component to the JFC to
which it is assigned.
The field army provides additional operational capacity to a CCDR facing peer adversaries in its AOR.
The field army is tailored based on the capabilities of the peer adversary. As the adversary’s capabilities
change, so do those of the field army. When constituted, the field army provides Army, joint, and
multinational forces with a headquarters capable of performing in a variety of ways across the range of
military operations. Field armies are most likely to be employed in theaters where peer adversaries have the
capability of conducting large-scale combat. These regions include the U.S. European Command and U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command. |
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Corps
The corps is the most versatile echelon above brigade due to its ability to operate at both the tactical
and operational levels. While it is organized, staffed, trained, and equipped to fight as a tactical formation,
the corps may be called upon to become a joint and multinational headquarters for conducting operations.
When operating as the senior Army headquarters under a joint task force (JTF), the corps will serve as the
ARFOR. The corps can also serve as the coalition forces land component commander (CFLCC) when
properly augmented with joint and multinational personnel. If the corps is uncommitted to specific CCDR
requirements, it focuses on building and sustaining readiness to prevail in large-scale combat operations. The
roles of the corps include acting as the—
(cid:122) Senior Army tactical formation in large-scale combat, commanding two to five Army divisions
together with supporting brigades and commands.
(cid:122) ARFOR (with augmentation) within a joint force for campaigns and major operations when a field
army isnot present.
(cid:122) JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency
operations.
(cid:122) CFLCC (with significant augmentation) commanding Army, Marine Corps, and multinational
divisions together with supporting brigades and commands when a field army is not present.
During large-scale combat operations, a corps headquarters normally functions as a tactical
headquarters under a joint or multinational land component. The corps is the echelon best positioned and
resourced to achieve convergence with Army and joint capabilities. (See FM 3-94 and ATP 3-92 for more
information about Army corps.)
Division
The division is the Army’s principal tactical warfighting formation during large-scale combat
operations. Its primary role is to serve as a tactical headquarters commanding brigades. A division conducts
operations in an AO assigned by its higher headquarters—normally a corps. It task-organizes its subordinate
forces according to the mission variables to accomplish its mission. A division typically commands between
two and five BCTs, a mix of functional and multifunctional brigades, and a variety of smaller enablingunits.
The division is typically the lowest tactical echelon that employs capabilities from multiple domains to
achieve convergence during large-scale combat operations. Winning battles and engagements remains the
division’s primary purpose. During limited contingencies, it can organize itself to serve in multiple roles. The
roles of the division include acting as a—
(cid:122) Tactical headquarters.
(cid:122) ARFOR headquarters (with significant augmentation).
(cid:122) CFLCC (with significant augmentation).
(cid:122) JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation).
(See FM 3-94and ATP 3-91for more information about Army divisions.)
Brigade Combat Teams
A BCT is the Army’s primary combined arms, close-combat maneuver force. BCTs maneuver against,
close with, and destroy enemy forces. BCTs seize and retain key terrain, exert constant pressure, and break
the enemy’s will to fight. They are the principal ground maneuver units of a division or a JTF. Divisions seek
to employ BCTs in mutually supporting ways to the greatest extent possible. However, BCTs must be capable
of fighting isolated from higher echelon headquarters and adjacent units during periods of degraded
communication and when operations are widely distributed.
There are three types of BCT: the infantry BCT, the armored BCT, and the Stryker BCT. Depending
on the tactical situation, these three types of organizations are augmented with additional Army and joint
capabilities to help them accomplish their missions. (See FM3-96for more information on Army BCTs.) |
3-0 | 58 | Chapter2
Multifunctional and Functional Brigades
Theater armies, corps, and divisions are task-organized with an assortment of multifunctional and
functional brigades to support their operations. These brigades add capabilities such as intelligence, attack
and reconnaissance aviation, fires, protection, contracting support, or sustainment. The theater army may
tailor subordinate corps and divisions with combinations of multifunctional brigades.
Multifunctional brigades provide a variety of functions in support of operations. Normally, they are
attached to a corps or division, but they may be under the command of a joint or multinational headquarters.
Multifunctional brigades include combat aviation brigades, field artillery brigades, sustainment brigades, and
maneuver enhancement brigades.
A functional brigade provides a single function or capability. These brigades can provide support to a
theater, corps, or division, depending on how each is tailored. Functional brigade organization varies
extensively. Examples of functional brigades include SFABs, air defense artillery (ADA) brigades, civil
affairs brigades, expeditionary military intelligence brigades, and engineer brigades. |
3-0 | 59 | Chapter 3
Fundamentals of Operations
There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to
more melodies than can ever be heard.
There are not more than five primary colors, yet in combination they produce more hues
than can ever been seen.
There are not more than five cardinal tastes, yet combinations of them yield more flavors
than can ever be tasted.
Sun Tzu
This chapter describes the Army’s operational concept, multidomain operations. It
provides an overview of multidomain operations and describes it in terms of tenets,
imperatives, an operational approach, a strategic framework, and an operational
framework.
SECTION I – MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS: THE ARMY’S OPERATIONAL
CONCEPT
3-1. The Army’s operational concept is
multidomain operations. Multidomain operations Multidomain operations are the combined arms
are how Army forces contribute to and operate as employment of all joint and Army capabilities to
create and exploit relative advantages that
part of the joint force. Army forces, enabled by joint
achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and
capabilities provide the lethal and resilient
consolidate gains on behalf of joint force
landpower necessary to defeat threat standoff
commanders.
approaches and achieve joint force objectives.
3-2. The employment of joint and Army
capabilities, integrated across echelons and synchronized in a combined arms approach, is essential to
defeating threats able to contest the joint force in all domains. Army forces integrate land, maritime, air,
space, and cyberspace capabilities that facilitate maneuver to create physical, information, and human
advantages joint force commanders exploit across the competition continuum. Commanders and staffs
require the knowledge, skills, and attributes to integrate capabilities rapidly and at the necessary scale
appropriate to each echelon.
3-3. During competition, theater armies strengthen landpower networks, set the theater, and demonstrate
readiness for armed conflict through the command and control (C2) of Army forces supporting the CCP.
During crisis, theater armies provide options to combatant commanders (CCDRs) as they facilitate the flow
and organization of land forces moving into theater. During armed conflict, theater armies enable and support
joint force land component commander (JFLCC) employment of land forces. The JFLCC provides C2 of
land forces and allocates joint capabilities to its corps and other subordinate tactical formations. Corps
integrate joint and Army capabilities at the right tactical echelons and employ divisions to achieve JFLCC
objectives. Divisions, enabled and supported by the corps, defeat enemy forces, control land areas, and
consolidate gains for the joint force. Defeating or destroying enemy capabilities that facilitate the enemy’s
preferred layered stand-off approaches are central to success. Ultimately, operations by Army forces both
enable and are enabled by the joint force. |
3-0 | 60 | Chapter 3
3-4. Because uncertainty, degraded communications, and fleeting windows of opportunity characterize
operational environments during combat, multidomain operations require disciplined initiative cultivated
through a mission command culture. Leaders must have a bias for action and accept that some level of
uncertainty is always present. Commanders who empower leaders to make rapid decisions and to accept risk
within the commander’s intent enable formations at echelon to adapt rapidly while maintaining unity of
effort. (See ADP 6-0 for a detailed description of mission command.)
SECTION II – TENETS AND IMPERATIVES
3-5. There are no absolute rules for warfare. However, given analysis of the current strategic environment
and assessments of the best ways to employ Army forces, doctrine emphasizes tenets and imperatives for
operations that improve their prospects of success without dictating how exactly to solve a tactical or
operational problem.
TENETS
The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and
conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice. Mission, terrain,
weather, dispositions, armament, morale, supply, and comparative strength are variables
whose mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern. Thus, in battle, each
situation is unique and must be solved on its own merits.
From Infantry in Battle
3-6. The tenets of operations are desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations, and
they are directly related to how the Army’s operational concept should be employed. Commanders use the
tenets of operations to inform and assess courses of action throughout the operations process. The degree to
which an operation exhibits the tenets provides insight into the probability for success. The tenets of
operations are—
(cid:122) Agility.
(cid:122) Convergence.
(cid:122) Endurance.
(cid:122) Depth.
3-7. The Army provides forces capable of transitioning to combat operations, fighting for information,
producing intelligence, adapting to unforeseen circumstances, and defeating enemy forces. Army forces
employ capabilities from multiple domains in a combined arms approach that creates complementary and
reinforcing effects through multiple domains, while preserving combat power to maintain options for the
joint force commander (JFC). Creating and exploiting relative advantages require Army forces to operate
with endurance and in depth. Endurance enables the ability to absorb the enemy’s attacks and press the fight
over the time and space necessary to accomplish the mission. Depth applies combat power throughout the
enemy’s formations and the operational environment, securing successive operational objectives and
consolidating gains for the joint force. |
3-0 | 61 | Fundamentals of Operations
AGILITY
3-8. The ability to act faster than the enemy is critical for
success. Agility is the ability to move forces and adjust Leaders seek to understand, decide,
their dispositions and activities more rapidly than the and act or react faster than the enemy
enemy. Agility requires sound judgment and rapid decision to gain a relative advantage and control
making, often gained through the creation and exploitation of the terms and tempo of the battle. They
information advantages. Agility requires leaders to anticipate ensure formations are flexible enough to
needs or opportunities, and it requires trained formations able adapt to changing conditions and can
move more quickly than the enemy.
to change direction, tasks, or focus as quickly as the situation
During competition, Army forces provide
requires. Change may come in the form of a transition
senior leaders flexibility and options
between phases of an operation or the requirement to adapt to
through their presence, access, and
a new opportunity or hazard.
influence.
3-9. The time available to create and exploit opportunities
against adaptive threats is usually limited. Agile units rapidly recognize an opportunity and take action to
exploit it. Speed of recognition, decision making, movement, and battle drills enable agility. During armed
conflict, this often requires units to change their location and disposition rapidly. Units must be able to
employ capabilities and then rapidly task-organize them again for movement or new tasks while remaining
dispersed for survivability. C2 and sustainment nodes must maintain a level of functionality on the move and
be able to rapidly emplace and displace in order to reduce the probability of enemy detection. Nodes that are
critical to success and susceptible to enemy detection and destruction are most vulnerable, and they must be
the most agile.
3-10. Below the threshold of armed conflict, security force assistance teams and forward-stationed and
rotational forces provide agility to the CCDR because they are able to perform a wide variety of missions
and create options for the combatant command. These forces expand situational awareness through their
presence and access to key land areas and populations. Their influence assures allies and partners, and they
improve interoperability and agility of the multinational force.
3-11. Agility helps leaders influence tempo. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations
over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). It implies the ability to understand, decide, act, assess, and
adapt. During competition, commanders act quickly to control events and deny enemy forces relative
advantages. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders can change the dynamics of a crisis
and restore favorable conditions. During armed conflict, commanders normally seek to maintain a higher
tempo than enemy forces do. A rapid tempo can overwhelm an enemy force’s ability to counter friendly
actions, and it can enable friendly forces to exploit a short window of opportunity.
CONVERGENCE
3-12. Convergence is an outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities from multiple
domains and echelons against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against
a system, formation, decision maker, or in a specific geographic area. Its utility derives from
understanding the interdependent relationships among capabilities from different domains and combining
those capabilities in surprising, effective tactics that accrue advantages over time. When combined, the
complementary and reinforcing nature of each friendly capability presents multiple dilemmas for enemy
forces and produces an overall effect that is greater than the sum of each individual effect. The greater degree
to which forces achieve convergence and sustain it over time the more favorable the outcome.
3-13. Convergence occurs when a higher echelon and its
subordinate echelons create effects from and in multiple Convergence creates exploitable
domains in ways that defeat or disrupt enemy forces long opportunities that enable freedom of
enough for friendly forces to effectively exploit the action and mission accomplishment.
opportunity. Convergence broadens the scope of mass,
synchronization, and combined arms, by applying combat power to combinations of decisive points, instead
of just one, across time, space, and domains. Convergence is a way to balance the principles of mass,
objective, and economy of force, massing combat power on some parts of the enemy force while employing
different techniques against other decisive points to create cumulative effects the enemy cannot overcome. |
3-0 | 62 | Chapter 3
3-14. Convergence requires the synchronization of specific targets and broad objectives by the senior tactical
echelon below the land component command. The degree to which a formation achieves convergence in an
operation depends on how well leaders are able to—
(cid:122) Develop an understanding of the enemy system, its capabilities, requirements, decision processes,
and vulnerabilities through effective surveillance that provides mixed, redundant, and overlapping
coverage.
(cid:122) Determine the desired overall effect or opportunity and the individual effects and objectives that
precipitate the opportunity.
(cid:122) Integrate Army and joint capabilities at the echelons where they are most effective.
(cid:122) Consider all domains and redundant methods of attack to increase the probability of success.
(cid:122) Synchronize the employment of each capability and echelon to generate simultaneous, sequential,
and enduring effects against the enemy system.
(cid:122) Assess the individual effects and the probability that the desired overall effect has been achieved.
Commanders prepare to re-attack or adapt a course of action if the desired effect is not achieved,
or if other opportunities emerge.
(cid:122) Assume risk and rapidly exploit the opportunities convergence provides.
(See figure 3-1 for a simplified illustration of convergence. See JP 3-60 for more information about targeting.)
Figure 3-1. Convergence
Integration
3-15. Convergence requires the integration of the capabilities at the echelons where their employment is
most effective. Integration is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that
operates by engaging as a whole (JP 1, Volume 1). Commanders generally integrate Army capabilities |
3-0 | 63 | Fundamentals of Operations
through task organization and support relationships. Commanders allocate the employment of joint
capabilities to subordinate echelons; integrating these capabilities requires an understanding of joint
processes. The degree to which commanders effectively integrate joint and Army capabilities at all echelons
directly influences success during operations.
3-16. Military forces comprise a wide variety of components that leaders must arrange into a coherent and
effective whole. Army leaders integrate—
(cid:122) Joint capabilities.
(cid:122) Multinational, interagency, and interorganizational capabilities.
(cid:122) Echelons and staffs.
(cid:122) Different types of units to achieve a combined arms approach.
3-17. Almost every leader activity, in some way, orients on integrating parts of the force to achieve unity of
purpose and unity of effort. There are many intellectual tools leaders use to facilitate integration. Common
ones include—
(cid:122) The joint and Army targeting processes (which includes working groups, boards, and other
activities to help integrate joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] and fires).
(cid:122) Mission analysis to integrate the activities of multiple staff proponents.
(cid:122) The nesting concept advocated for in the mission command approach to C2 that helps lower
echelons integrate their purpose with higher echelons.
(cid:122) Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) for new forces entering an
operation.
(cid:122) Engagement area development to integrate all weapons systems into a defense.
Synchronization
3-18. Once leaders have integrated the right capabilities, they must synchronize their employment and
effects. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce
maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0).
3-19. Understanding the following factors enables leaders to determine when to initiate employment of a
capability and how to adapt to changes in the operational environment during execution:
(cid:122) The desired overall effect over time.
(cid:122) How the individual effects complement each other over time.
(cid:122) The time it takes each capability or formation to generate its individual effects from the start of
employment.
(cid:122) Whether each individual effect is enduring, simultaneous, or sequenced with the other effects.
(cid:122) The consequences of an individual effect not occurring at the planned time.
3-20. Individual effects can be enduring, simultaneous, or sequential. Enduring effects provide a continuous
impact on the threat until they are no longer necessary. Enduring effects can have a debilitating effect on
enemy forces, but they may require significant resources to sustain. Simultaneity is the execution of related
and mutually supporting tasks at the same time across multiple locations and domains (ADP 3-0).
Simultaneous effects, the result of attacking enemy forces in multiple domains at the same time and across
the depth of the enemy’s echelons, can have a paralyzing effect on enemy decision making and the
effectiveness of the enemy’s most critical systems for a limited period of time. They can degrade enemy
reactions and facilitate the path to eventual culmination and defeat. Sequencing effects against a threat can
create successive dilemmas and opportunities for deception when enemy forces begin to expect a pattern.
3-21. Leaders synchronize actions and effects through C2 and the operations process. The mission,
commander’s intent, and concept of operations form the basis for detailed synchronization. Commanders
determine the degree of control necessary to synchronize operations. They balance synchronization with
agility and initiative, but they never surrender the initiative for the sake of synchronization. Excessive
synchronization can lead to too much control, which limits the initiative of subordinates and undermines
mission command. |
3-0 | 64 | Chapter 3
Achieving Convergence
3-22. Achieving convergence requires detailed, centralized planning and mission orders that enable
decentralized execution. Redundant and resilient communications enable synchronized action. However,
leaders must anticipate degraded communications and be prepared to rely on mission orders, accept risk, and
make decisions to accomplish the mission. During execution, leaders seek to maintain the conditions of
convergence through rapid transitions, adjusting priorities, shifting the main effort, or adapting to maintain
momentum. Longer periods of convergence allow for greater opportunities to expand advantages and achieve
objectives.
3-23. Leaders must understand the various processes for requesting joint capabilities and integrating them
with ground maneuver. Air, space, and cyberspace tasking cycles operate on different time horizons and have
different requirements for requesting effects. These cycles may vary depending on the theater and the
situation. Whenever possible, leaders anticipate requirements for these effects during planning and provide
ample time for the joint force to generate them. Leaders may request effects on shorter timelines, but they
should not make them essential to mission success.
3-24. During competition, the theater army establishes conditions for convergence that enable deterrence,
provide options during crisis, and enable success at the outset of armed conflict. Intelligence, sustainment,
positioning of forces, and other activities to set the theater facilitate situational understanding, decision
making, integration, and synchronization during armed conflict. The theater army requests cyberspace and
space effects through the combatant command to ensure there is enough time to integrate and synchronize
these capabilities. The theater army balances the use of these capabilities during competition with the need
to preserve them for use by Army formations during crisis or armed conflict. When armed conflict occurs in
a theater, the theater army continues to facilitate convergence by providing capabilities to the land component
command and shaping the operational environment outside the joint operational area.
3-25. During armed conflict, the land component command apportions joint capabilities to subordinate
echelons. Corps integrate joint capabilities with ground maneuver at the appropriate echelon where forces
employ them to achieve convergence and achieve objectives. The advantages provided by maritime, air,
space, and cyberspace capabilities will not be available all the time, so tactical echelons must be ready to
exploit their effects when generated. (See FM 3-14 for more information on space effects. See FM 3-12 for
more information on cyberspace effects.)
3-26. Convergence is most effective when its effects accrue and create a cycle of expanding opportunity.
Employing multiple and redundant methods of attack increases the probability of success by avoiding
dependence on a single method of detecting, tracking, and attacking. Success causes enemy forces to react
and activate more of their capabilities, creating another opportunity in one or more domains. The corps and
its subordinate echelons align their operations on land with the opportunities created by the effects generated
by the other components of the joint force, preserving combat power to maximize their ability to exploit the
opportunities convergence presents.
ENDURANCE
3-27. Endurance is the ability to persevere over time throughout the depth of an operational
environment. Endurance enhances the ability to project combat power and extends operational reach.
Endurance is about resilience and preserving combat power while continuing operations for as long as is
necessary to achieve the desired outcome. During competition, Army forces improve endurance by setting
the theater across all warfighting functions and improving interoperability with allies and other unified action
partners.
3-28. Endurance reflects the ability to employ combat power
anywhere for protracted periods in all conditions, including Leaders account for the requirement to
environments with degraded communications, chemical, preserve combat power while sustaining
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) contamination, people, systems, and formations over the
and high casualties. Endurance stems from the ability to time and distance necessary throughout
organize, protect, and sustain a force, regardless of the the depth of an area of operations.
distance from its support area and the austerity of the |
3-0 | 65 | Fundamentals of Operations
environment. Endurance involves anticipating requirements and making the most effective and efficient use
of resources.
3-29. As forces fight through successive engagements, maintaining mutual support among units helps
prevent them becoming isolated, being defeated in detail, and culminating early. Protection prevents or
mitigates enemy effects and preserves combat power, postponing culmination and prolonging effective
operations. One way Army forces preserve combat power is by maintaining dispersion to the greatest degree
possible. Leaders can mass combat power from dispersed positions and generate the desired effects without
concentrating forces any more than is necessary. During operations, commanders and staffs integrate,
synchronize, and simultaneously apply protection capabilities.
3-30. Leadership and tactics contribute to endurance. Plans that allow for different units to be the main effort
using follow and support or follow and assume techniques prevent early culmination in the units first
committed to close combat. Realistically determining what tempo friendly forces can maintain given enemy
resistance, weather, and physical distances and the impact they have on Soldiers, leaders, and equipment
increases endurance over time. Schemes of maneuver that avoid enemy strengths and preserve combat power
are less likely to negatively affect morale.
3-31. Sustainment operations are essential to endurance. Using all methods for continuously delivering
sustainment through land, maritime, and air capabilities improves endurance. When possible, sustainment
units employ a space- and cyberspace-enabled communications network to transmit sustainment
requirements and coordinate the delivery of materiel or services. However, leaders must anticipate degraded
communications and combine analog systems for communication with predictive analysis and disciplined
initiative to ensure commanders can maintain acceptable tempo for as long as necessary.
DEPTH
3-32. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results (ADP 3-0).
While the focus of endurance is on friendly combat power, the focus of depth is on enemy locations and
dispositions across all domains. Commanders achieve depth by understanding the strengths and
vulnerabilities of the enemy’s echeloned capabilities, then attacking them throughout their dispositions in
simultaneous and sequential fashion. Although simultaneous attacks through all domains in depth are not
possible in every situation, leaders seek to expand their advantages and limit enemy opportunities for
sanctuary and regeneration. Leaders describe the depth they can achieve in terms of operational reach.
3-33. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military
capabilities (JP 3-0). Staffs assess operational reach based on available sustainment, the range of capabilities
and formations, and courses of action compared with the intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities and
courses of action. This analysis helps the commander understand the limits on friendly operations, the risks
inherent in the mission, and likely points in time and space for transitions.
3-34. Below the threshold of armed conflict, the theater army creates depth by improving the infrastructure
for force projection and by improving interoperability with multinational forces to the degree required by
operation plans (OPLANs) and contingency operations. It also adds depth to its operations by expanding
influence with allies and partners, populations, and other relevant actors through joint exercises, sustained
forward positioning of advisor teams, and forward basing of combat formations.
3-35. During armed conflict, the JFLCC creates depth by facilitating access to Army and other joint
capabilities, especially space and cyberspace capabilities that improve the protection of tactical formations
and degrade enemy integrated air defense systems. The JFLCC also requests that the JFC influence the
extended deep area in support of land operations. The corps directs fires into its deep area to defeat enemy
long-range fires, disrupt enemy sustainment and C2, separate maneuver echelons, and shape the success of
future close operations. Special operations forces operating in the extended deep area can detect targets and
enable the employment of joint fires to support conventional operations.
3-36. Leaders enhance the depth of their operations by orchestrating effects in one dimension to amplify
effects in the others. For example, a commander might decide to destroy an elite enemy formation first
because it undermines the confidence of the enemy’s other units. Commanders exploit this through
information activities to reduce the will of other enemy forces to fight. |
3-0 | 66 | Chapter 3
IMPERATIVES
3-37. Imperatives are actions Army forces must take to defeat enemy forces and achieve objectives at
acceptable cost. They are informed by the operational environment and the characteristics of the most capable
threats Army forces can encounter. Imperatives include—
(cid:122) See yourself, see the enemy, and understand the operational environment.
(cid:122) Account for being under constant observation and all forms of enemy contact.
(cid:122) Create and exploit relative physical, information, and human advantages in pursuit of decision
dominance.
(cid:122) Make initial contact with the smallest element possible.
(cid:122) Impose multiple dilemmas on the enemy.
(cid:122) Anticipate, plan, and execute transitions.
(cid:122) Designate, weight, and sustain the main effort.
(cid:122) Consolidate gains continuously.
(cid:122) Understand and manage the effects of operations on units and Soldiers.
SEE YOURSELF, SEE THE ENEMY, AND UNDERSTAND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
3-38. Commanders visualize operational environments in terms of the factors that are relevant to decision
making. Operational environments are dynamic and contain vast amounts of information that can overload
C2 systems and impede decision making. Commanders simplify information collection, analysis, and
decision making by focusing on how they see themselves, see the enemy, and understand the operational
environment. These three categories of factors are interrelated, and leaders must understand how each one
relates to the others in the current context.
3-39. As part of the operations process, Army leaders use different methodologies to understand and weigh
options. These methodologies include the Army design methodology, the military decision-making process,
and the rapid decision-making and synchronization process. Each methodology provides a process that allows
commanders and staffs to see themselves, see the enemy, and understand the operational environment. (See
ADP 5-0 and FM 5-0 for more information on Army planning methodologies.)
See Yourself
3-40. Commanders develop an understanding of their forces relative to mission requirements, enemy
capabilities, and impacts from the operational environment. This understanding helps to inform current and
potential future advantages relative to enemy forces, allowing staffs to develop and adapt courses of action
that exploit advantages and mitigate disadvantages. Commanders and staffs maintain this understanding of
their forces through running estimates, subordinate commander updates, and friendly forces information
requirements (known as FFIRs): A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and
staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). Friendly force
information requirements identify the information the commander considers most important to make critical
decisions during the execution of operations. The operations officer manages friendly force information
requirements for the commander.
3-41. Leaders attempt to see themselves from the enemy perspective, in part by understanding essential
elements of friendly information. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly
operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the
operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection (ADP 6-0).
3-42. Leaders see their formation in relation to their mission and in the broader context of the higher
command, adjacent unit, and all domains. Part of “seeing yourself” is understanding how land-based
operations enable operations in the other domains, and how capabilities from all domains can enable
operations on land. (See paragraphs 2-66 through 2-67 for a discussion of joint interdependence.) |
3-0 | 67 | Fundamentals of Operations
See the Enemy
3-43. Commanders see the enemy in terms of its combat power, advantages, and intentions within the
operational environment and broader strategic context. Commanders develop their understanding of enemy
forces from their individual knowledge, experience, and judgment honed through self-study, training, and
education. From this base of knowledge commanders and staffs build shared understanding of enemy forces
and environment through intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield
is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil
considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (ATP 2-01.3).
3-44. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield provides commanders with awareness of information gaps
about enemy forces and the operational environment. Staffs translate these gaps into information
requirements and assist the commander in determining priority intelligence requirements. A priority
intelligence requirement is the intelligence component of commander’s critical information requirements
used to focus the employment of limited intelligence assets and resources against competing demands for
intelligence support (JP 2-0). More importantly, priority intelligence requirements (known as PIRs) identify
information about the threat and operational environment that a commander considers most important to
making decisions in a specific context. Intelligence about civil considerations may be as critical as
intelligence about enemy forces in some cases. The intelligence officer, in coordination with the rest of the
staff, manages priority intelligence requirements for the commander.
3-45. Enemy forces attempt to hide from, deceive, disrupt, and deny friendly collection efforts to prevent
friendly forces from perceiving the enemy’s true intentions. This requires commanders plan to develop the
situation through action and fight for information. Information collection operations may require the
commander to assume significant risk to determine enemy dispositions and anticipate enemy intentions.
3-46. Leaders do not limit their understanding of the enemy to those forces in their assigned area. Enemy
forces are capable of employing capabilities from great distances and multiple domains. Leaders must be
aware of those capabilities so they can take appropriate action. (See paragraphs 3-75 through 3-79 for more
information on making enemy contact.)
Understand the Operational Environment
3-47. Leaders view the operational environment in terms of domains, dimensions, operational variables, and
mission variables that are relevant to their decisions. The most difficult aspect of an operational environment
to understand is how the different factors interact to affect operations.
3-48. Understanding is, in the context of decision making, knowledge that has been synthesized and had
judgment applied to comprehend the situation’s inner relationships, enable decision making, and drive action
(ADP 6-0). Understanding is judgment applied to knowledge in the context of a particular situation.
Understanding is knowing enough about a situation to make an informed decision. Judgment is based on
experience, expertise, and intuition—and it informs what decision to make.
Situational Understanding
3-49. Successful operations demand timely and effective decisions based on the information available. As
such, commanders and staffs seek to build and maintain situational understanding throughout an operation.
Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to
determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). Situational
understanding allows commanders to make effective decisions and enables commanders and staffs to assess
operations accurately. Commanders and staffs continually strive to maintain their situational understanding
and work through periods of uncertainty, accepting that they cannot eliminate them. They train their staffs
and subordinates to function in uncertain environments.
Shared Understanding
3-50. A critical challenge for commanders, staffs, and unified action partners is creating common
understanding of an operational environment, an operation’s purpose, its challenges, and the approaches to |
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solving those problems. Shared understanding of the situation, which requires effective flow of information
between echelons, forms the basis for unity of effort and subordinate initiative.
3-51. Effective decentralized execution depends on shared understanding. Shared understanding starts with
Army doctrine and leader development that instill a common approach to the conduct of operations, a
common professional language, and a common understanding of the principles of mission command. It is
this shared understanding that allows even hastily task-organized units to operate effectively. Commanders
and staffs actively create shared understanding throughout the operations process (of planning, preparation,
execution, and assessment). They collaboratively frame an operational environment and its problems, and
then they visualize approaches to solving those problems. (See ADP 6-0 for a more detailed description of
shared understanding.)
Common Operational Picture
3-52. A common operational picture (COP) is key to achieving and maintaining shared situational
understanding in all domains and making effective decisions faster than the threat. The common operational
picture is a display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s
requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command (ADP 6-0).
Although the COP is ideally a single display, it may include more than one display and information in other
forms, such as graphic representations or written reports.
3-53. The COP facilitates collaborative planning and helps commanders at all echelons achieve shared
situational understanding. The COP must account for relevant factors in domains affecting the operation, and
it provides and enables a common understanding of the interrelationships between actions and effects through
the physical, information, and human dimensions. Shared situational understanding allows commanders to
visualize the effects of their decisions on other elements of the force and the overall operation.
3-54. Command posts draw on a common set of shared and relevant information to create a digital COP.
Units always maintain an analog COP in the event that the digital COP is compromised. During large-scale
combat operations, communications are likely to be degraded or denied during the course of operations.
Army forces maintain shared situational understanding by updating physical maps and graphics, and using
rehearsed and reliable primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (known as PACE) communication
plans. Command posts are typically responsible for maintaining the digital and analog COP. Units develop
standard operating procedures (known as SOPs), reporting timelines, and battle rhythm events to ensure the
COP is accurate, relevant, and current.
3-55. The difficulty of maintaining a COP in a multinational environment varies based on training level,
language differences, level of data sharing, technical compatibility of systems, restrictions based on
classification, and other national caveats. Unified action partners may not have the technical capability or
compatible systems to create and share a digital COP. Commanders must recognize and plan for this
possibility by using alternate methods, such as liaison officers, messengers, and voice communication.
ACCOUNT FOR BEING UNDER CONSTANT OBSERVATION AND ALL FORMS OF ENEMY
CONTACT
3-56. Air, space, and cyberspace capabilities increase the
likelihood that threat forces can gain and maintain That which can be detected can be
targeted for attack and killed.
continuous visual and electromagnetic contact with Army
forces. Enemy forces possess a wide range of space-, air-,
maritime-, and land-based ISR capabilities that can detect U.S. forces. Leaders must assume they are under
constant observation from one or more domains and continuously ensure they are not providing lucrative
targets for the enemy to attack.
3-57. Leaders consider nine forms of contact in multiple domains. They are—
(cid:122) Direct: interactions from line-of-sight weapon systems (including small arms, heavy machine
guns, and antitank missiles).
(cid:122) Indirect: interactions from non-line-of-sight weapons systems (including cannon artillery, mortars,
and rockets). |
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(cid:122) Non-hostile: neutral interactions that may degrade or compromise military operations (including
civilians on the battlefield).
(cid:122) Obstacle: interactions from friendly, enemy, and natural obstacles (including minefields and
rivers).
(cid:122) CBRN: interactions from friendly, enemy, and civilian CBRN effects (including chemical attacks,
nuclear attacks, industrial accidents, and toxic or hazardous industrial materials).
(cid:122) Aerial: interactions from air-based combat platforms (including attack helicopters, armed
unmanned aircraft systems [UASs], air interdiction, and close air support).
(cid:122) Visual: interactions from acquisition via the human eye, optical, or electro-optical systems
(including ground reconnaissance, telescopic, thermal, and infrared sights on weapons and sensor
platforms such as unmanned aircraft systems and satellites).
(cid:122) Electromagnetic: interactions via systems used to acquire, degrade, or destroy using select portions
of the electromagnetic spectrum (including radar, jamming, cyberspace, space, and
electromagnetic systems).
(cid:122) Influence: interactions through the information dimension intended to shape the perceptions,
behaviors, and decision making of people relative to a policy or military objective (including
through social media, telecommunications, human interaction, and other forms of
communication).
3-58. In all contexts, direct, indirect, non-hostile, CBRN, and aerial contacts are sporadic. However, Army
forces are typically in continuous visual, electromagnetic, and influence contact with adversaries. Army
forces are under persistent visual surveillance by space and other capabilities. Army forces and individuals
are in constant electromagnetic contact with adversaries who persistently probe and disrupt individual, group,
and Army capabilities dependent on space and cyberspace. Army forces are subject to adversary influence
through disinformation campaigns targeting Soldiers and their family and friends through social media and
other platforms.
3-59. During competition, adversary forces employ multiple methods of collecting on friendly forces to
develop an understanding of U.S. capabilities, readiness status, and intentions. They do this in and outside
the continental United States. They co-opt civilians and employ space-based surveillance platforms to
observe unit training and deployment activities. They also penetrate networks and gain access to individual
and group cyberspace personas to create options for future intimidation, coercion, and attack. Soldiers and
their families should use telecommunications, the internet, and social media in ways that do not make them
or their units vulnerable to adversary surveillance.
3-60. During armed conflict, enemy networked land-, maritime-, air-, and space-based capabilities enable
threats to detect and rapidly target friendly forces with fires. Forces that are concentrated and static are easy
for enemy forces to detect and destroy. Dispersing forces has multiple survivability benefits. It increases
opportunities to use cover and concealment to reduce probability of detection. In the event the enemy detects
elements of the friendly force, dispersion acts as a form of deception, helping to conceal the intentions of the
friendly force. Leaders only concentrate forces when necessary and balance the survivability benefits of
dispersion with the negative impacts dispersion has on mission effectiveness. In addition to dispersion,
leaders integrate and synchronize deception, operations security, and other actions to thwart enemy detection
efforts. (See JP 3-13.3 and ATP 3-13.3 for detailed information on operations security. See FM 3-13.4 for
more information on deception.)
3-61. Command posts are extremely vulnerable to detection from air and space, as well as in the
electromagnetic spectrum. Army forces must ensure their command posts are difficult to detect, dispersed to
prevent a single strike from destroying more than one node, and rapidly displaceable. Once a command post
is detected it has only a few minutes to displace far enough to avoid enemy indirect fire effects. Leaders
should focus command posts on the minimum functions necessary to retain their mobility and do everything
possible to avoid detection. When the risk of enemy fires is high, commanders consider making their
operations more decentralized, dispersing command post nodes into smaller component nodes, and greater
dispersion of electromagnetic signatures. Use of existing hardened structures and restrictive terrain to conceal
headquarters equipment and vehicles, instead of tents organized in standard configurations, are options
commanders have to improve command post survivability. |
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Account for Constant Enemy Observation
3-62. Enemy forces possess a wide range of space-, air-, maritime-, and land-based reconnaissance and
surveillance capabilities that can detect U.S. forces. To counter these robust and persistent capabilities
requires counterintelligence efforts and the disciplined application of operations security.
3-63. Enemy forces employ UASs in large numbers and with a diverse array of capabilities. Leaders account
for enemy capabilities and likely reconnaissance objectives as they develop their counter-UAS plan. Leaders
implement techniques and procedures for countering enemy UASs based on their organic capabilities,
attached capabilities, and the mission variables.
3-64. Leaders combine multiple measures, including deception, to make it more difficult for enemy forces
to detect friendly forces. These measures include—
(cid:122) Counterreconnaissance, including counter-UAS operations.
(cid:122) Cover and concealment, both natural and manmade.
(cid:122) False battle positions and deception obstacles.
(cid:122) Obscuration.
(cid:122) Dispersion.
(cid:122) Noise and light discipline.
(cid:122) Limited visibility operations, particularly for sustainment functions and large unit movements.
(cid:122) Electromagnetic emission control and masking, to include social media and personal
communication discipline.
3-65. Because Army forces employ an increasing number of capabilities that emit electromagnetic radiation
that enemies can target, leaders must apply emission control measures, balancing the risks to the force with
the risks to the mission. As risk to the force increases, leaders increase their emission control measures. There
may be times that the risk of friendly emissions being detected and targeted is assessed as too high, causing
Army forces to use methods of communications with no electromagnetic signature. Understanding threat
systems, their capabilities, and their disposition supports effective planning and the execution of emission
control measures including—
(cid:122) Minimizing length and frequency of radio transmissions.
(cid:122) Dispersing formations and command posts.
(cid:122) Using lowest effective power settings.
(cid:122) Establishing and enforcing the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communication
plan.
(cid:122) Using remote antennas.
(cid:122) Using brevity codes, pro-word execution matrices, and communications windows.
(cid:122) Using secure landlines.
(cid:122) Using directional antennas.
(cid:122) Using data-burst transmissions.
(cid:122) Using proper encryption and equipment configuration.
(cid:122) Moving command posts and formations.
(cid:122) Masking emissions using terrain and manmade structures.
(cid:122) Recognizing and reporting jamming of Global Positioning System, radar, and satellite
communications.
(cid:122) Employing deceptive emitters.
Implementing Dispersion
3-66. Leader efforts to preempt and mitigate enemy detection are essential, but they cannot eliminate the risk
of enemy massed and precision fires, including CBRN and weapons of mass destruction. To improve
survivability from enemy indirect fires, Army forces maintain dispersion and remain as mobile as possible
to avoid presenting themselves as lucrative targets to the enemy’s most capable systems. When mission |
3-0 | 71 | Fundamentals of Operations
demands require units to remain static for more than short periods of time, those units must dig in to increase
survivability. (See ATP 3-37.34 for information on survivability positions.)
3-67. Commanders have options for achieving dispersion. At the operational level, commanders maintain
dispersion by employing multiple staging areas and multiple lines of communications. At the tactical level,
commanders maintain dispersion by increasing the distance between subordinate formations and among the
elements in those formations. In the attack, they use multiple routes and longer march intervals between
formations to the objective and only concentrate forces enough to mass effects or generate favorable force
ratios during close combat. In the defense, forces occupy areas away from prepared defensive positions until
contact is imminent to prevent their detection and destruction by enemy deep fires. Defending forces also
maximize dispersion by using terrain and employing the maximum supporting ranges and distances within
acceptable risk criteria.
3-68. When concentrating forces is unavoidable or necessary, units remain concentrated at the lowest level
and for the shortest time possible and then rapidly disperse. When the desired level of dispersion is not
achievable, commanders place greater emphasis on imposing multiple, simultaneous dilemmas on enemy
forces as they move within range of enemy weapons systems. This can reduce the risk of enemy forces
efficiently massing their effects. Commanders also use speed and violence of action when dispersion is not
possible to minimize exposure in high-risk areas.
Second Nagorno Karabakh War: September–November 2020
During the six-week war, Azerbaijan exploited its technological advantage with lethal
efficiency against Armenian forces. Azerbaijan used its UASs, in conjunction with
Israeli loiter munitions and modified old Soviet AN-2 planes, to defeat Armenia’s older
air defense systems. Azerbaijani forces flew the remotely piloted AN-2s to trigger
engagements from Armenia’s air defense systems, while Azerbaijan’s UASs and loiter
munitions remained at higher altitudes undetected or out of range. When the air
defense systems engaged targets, Azerbaijan pinpointed the air defense systems
locations and destroyed those systems with UASs, loiter munitions, or indirect fires.
Azerbaijan’s tactics caused Armenia’s air defense network to collapse, and Azerbaijan
gained local air superiority over the battlefield.
With air superiority, Azerbaijan placed Armenian forces under continuous surveillance
with its UASs. In addition, Azerbaijani forces had infiltrated special operations forces
to conduct surveillance of Armenian positions. Armenian forces were unable to remain
hidden, and Azerbaijan began destroying Armenian tanks, artillery, and vehicles at a
significant rate. Although battle damage assessments vary, multiple sources reported
that Azerbaijan destroyed hundreds of Armenian tanks, armored fighting vehicles,
artillery systems, multiple launch rocket systems, and air defense systems. The
inability to hide and fear of destruction had a demoralizing effect on Armenian soldiers.
CREATE AND EXPLOIT RELATIVE PHYSICAL, INFORMATION, AND HUMAN ADVANTAGES IN
PURSUIT OF DECISION DOMINANCE
3-69. The employment of lethal force is based on the premise that destruction and other physical
consequences compels enemy forces to change their decision making and behavior, ultimately accepting
defeat. The type, amount, and ways in which lethal force compels enemy forces varies, and this depends
heavily on enemy forces, their capabilities, goals, and the will of relevant populations. Understanding the
relationship between physical, information, and human factors enables leaders to take advantage of every
opportunity and limit the negative effects of undesirable and unintended consequences.
3-70. Actions taken focused on one dimension can create advantages in the other dimensions. The physical
dimension dominates tactical actions and the employment of destructive force to compel an outcome.
Physical actions, particularly the employment of violence, usually generate cognitive effects in the human |
3-0 | 72 | Chapter 3
dimension. Information dimension factors inform and reflect the interaction between human and physical
factors. The information dimension deals with how relevant actors and populations communicate what is
happening in the physical and human dimensions. The human dimension is where perceptions, decision
making, and behavior is determined, and is therefore the dimension that ultimately determines human will.
Commanders combine, reinforce, and exploit advantages through all the dimensions, expanding them as they
accrue over time. (See Chapter 1 for more information about physical, information, and human advantages.)
3-71. During competition and crisis, Army forces set conditions for armed conflict and physically exhibit
combat readiness through training and exercises which is communicated by various means to create a
deterrent effect in the human dimension. During armed conflict, tactical leaders typically focus on generating
physical advantages and the immediate physical and cognitive effects they produce. However, leaders
maintain awareness of the overall purpose of physical effects, ensuring they commit combat power to
necessary objectives that produce advantageous results in all dimensions. At the strategic level, leaders focus
more heavily on the information and human impacts of physical effects and how to convert them into
desirable policy outcomes.
3-72. Successful military operations often depend on a commander's ability to gain and maintain the
operational initiative by achieving decision dominance—a desired state in which a force generates decisions,
counters threat information warfare capabilities, strengthens friendly morale and will, and affects threat
decision making more effectively than the opponent. Decision dominance requires developing a variety of
information advantages relative to that of the threat and then exploiting those advantages to achieve
objectives. Commanders employ relevant military capabilities from all warfighting functions to create and
exploit decision dominance.
3-73. Decision dominance is aspirational, situationally dependent, and always relative to an opponent. The
goal is to understand, decide, and act faster and more effectively than the threat. It is not absolute speed that
matters, but speed relative to the threat. Commanders can achieve this by interfering with an enemy force's
C2 while enhancing, protecting, and sustaining their own C2. An advantage need not be large. A small
advantage exploited repeatedly can contribute decisively to the success of Army forces. The ability and desire
to generate a higher tempo does not mean commanders should act when the situation calls for waiting. The
aim is meaningful—not merely rapid—action. A decision to act is meaningful only if the resulting actions
by friendly forces create an advantage relative to the threat.
3-74. Adversaries and enemies pursue their own relative advantages, typically in asymmetric ways, while
continually attempting to achieve decision dominance over friendly forces. Because threat forces adapt, and
situations evolve, decision dominance is relative and transitory. Commanders therefore continuously make
assessments to determine which forms of relative advantage are most important to pursue over time.
MAKE INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE SMALLEST ELEMENT POSSIBLE
3-75. Army forces are extremely vulnerable when they do not sufficiently understand the disposition of
enemy forces and become decisively engaged on terms favorable to enemy forces. To avoid being surprised
and incurring heavy losses, leaders must set conditions for making enemy contact on terms favorable to the
friendly force. They anticipate when and where to make enemy contact, the probability and impact of making
enemy contact, and actions to take on contact. Quickly applying multiple capabilities against enemy forces
while preventing the bulk of the friendly force from being engaged itself requires an understanding of the
forms of contact.
3-76. During armed conflict at the tactical level,
commanders seek to gain and maintain contact with the Units seek to make contact using sensors
enemy using the smallest element possible, enabling rapid or unmanned systems first to minimize
development of situational understanding, and using risk to Soldiers and key capabilities.
maneuver and fires to attack enemy forces in the most
advantageous way. Judicious employment of all available reconnaissance and security capabilities is the most
effective way to make direct contact with the smallest possible friendly force. Friendly forces should attempt
to make contact with sensors and unmanned systems first, incorporating them into their movement
techniques. Employment of UAS and other platforms activates enemy systems and enables their detection
without creating risks to manned friendly reconnaissance and maneuver forces. After detecting an enemy |
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capability, Army forces cue intelligence platforms from other domains to improve their understanding of
enemy force dispositions and engage those forces on advantageous terms.
3-77. Identifying enemy locations may not provide enough information for Army forces to discern enemy
intentions. Commanders develop the situation through action when they deliberately place forces in contact.
Small maneuver forces are often the most effective way to compel enemy forces to react and show their
intentions. Leaders exercise tactical patience and set conditions for success. They synchronize maneuver with
complementary and reinforcing capabilities through the depth of an operational environment to generate
situational awareness and detect opportunities to exploit. By combining friendly speed with multiple
dilemmas, it is possible to rapidly disintegrate the coherence of an enemy formation before it can effectively
respond.
3-78. Using capabilities from multiple domains, such as air and ground, commanders cause threat systems
to activate or emit electromagnetic signals that reveal their capabilities and the locations of their critical
nodes, such as sensors, shooters, and command posts. During competition, commanders and staffs use this
information to improve understanding, update target lists, and refine plans for attacking threat vulnerabilities.
By doing this, commanders and staffs set conditions for success during armed conflict.
3-79. There are situations in which it is not advisable to make contact with the smallest possible element.
When commanders are confident they have superior forces, have the element of surprise, and know the
enemy’s disposition and course of action, they make contact with as much combat power as possible to
maximize surprise and shock effect against enemy forces.
IMPOSE MULTIPLE DILEMMAS ON THE ENEMY
3-80. Imposing multiple dilemmas on enemy forces complicates their decision making and forces them to
prioritize among competing options. It is a way of seizing the initiative and making enemy forces react to
friendly operations. Simultaneous operations encompassing multiple domains—conducted in depth and
supported by deception—present enemy forces with multiple dilemmas. Employing capabilities from
multiple domains degrades enemy freedom of action, reduces enemy flexibility and endurance, and disrupts
enemy plans and coordination. The application of capabilities in complementary and reinforcing ways creates
more problems than an enemy commander can solve, which erodes both enemy effectiveness and the will to
fight.
3-81. Deception contributes to creating multiple dilemmas, achieving operational surprise, and maintaining
the initiative. Deception efforts by tactical formations seek to delay enemy decision making until it is too late
to matter, or to cause an enemy commander to make the wrong decision. Deception requires an understanding
of how to surprise enemy forces; time to plan, prepare, execute, and assess a deception operation; and the
ability to properly resource the deception effort.
3-82. Deception inhibits effective enemy action by increasing the time, space, and resources necessary to
understand friendly courses of action. Well-executed deception begins a cumulative effect on enemy
decision-making cycles, and it can cause inaction, delay, misallocation of forces, and surprise as enemy forces
react to multiple real and false dilemmas. Attempts to mislead enemy forces are fundamental to all courses
of action development wherever possible. While commanders and staffs integrate deception as part of course
of action development, they take operations security measures to obscure friendly intentions, make enemy
forces account for multiple friendly courses of action for as long as possible, and ensure that enemy forces
do not become aware of the deception effort. (See JP 3-13.4 and FM 3-13.4 for more information on military
deception.)
3-83. Forcible entry operations and envelopments into locations offset from how enemy defenses are
oriented can create multiple dilemmas by dislocating enemy forces’ prepared operational approach or
exceeding their capability to respond. The capability to project power across operational distances presents
enemy forces with difficult decisions about how to array their forces in time and space. Rapid tactical
maneuver to exploit a penetration or envelopment defeats enemy attempts to reposition integrated fires
networks or integrated air defense systems, which in turn are typically less effective when moving.
3-84. Creating multiple dilemmas requires recognizing exploitable opportunities. Understanding enemy
dispositions, systems, and vulnerabilities, and the characteristics of the terrain and population, informs |
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situational understanding and course of action development. Employing mutually supporting forces along
different axes to strike from unexpected directions creates dilemmas, particularly when Army and joint forces
simultaneously create effects against enemy forces in multiple domains. Commanders seek every opportunity
to make enemy forces operate in different directions at the time and locations of their choosing. Commanders
are not limited to destructive means for imposing multiple dilemmas on the enemy. For example, they can
employ psychological operations and civil affairs capabilities to influence and garner the support of civilian
populations. This creates a dilemma for enemy forces who must react and divert resources to counter passive
or active resistance.
ANTICIPATE, PLAN, AND EXECUTE TRANSITIONS
3-85. Transitions mark a change of focus in an operation. Leaders plan transitions as part of the initial plan
or parts of a branch or sequel. They can be unplanned and cause the force to react to unforeseen
circumstances. Transitions can be part of progress towards mission accomplishment, or they can reflect a
temporary setback. Common transitions are—
(cid:122) Between competition, crisis, and armed conflict.
(cid:122) Between operations dominated by offense, defense, and stability.
(cid:122) Between types of offense or defense.
(cid:122) Between phases of an operation.
(cid:122) Between branches and sequels of a campaign or major operation.
(cid:122) Between command posts during emplacement, movement, and displacement of one or more nodes.
(cid:122) Shifts of the main effort, supporting effort, and reserve between units.
(cid:122) Task organization changes.
(cid:122) Passing responsibility for enemy units crossing unit or echelon boundaries.
(cid:122) Passing terrain responsibility between units.
(cid:122) Transferring responsibility for security and governance to legitimate authorities.
(cid:122) Change in mission from combat operations to reconstitution.
(cid:122) Moving forces in and out of theater.
(cid:122) Changes in the environment that cause a reframe of the mission or change in the purpose of the
operation.
3-86. Transitions are critical planning responsibilities for commanders. They anticipate key transitions and
issue planning guidance to their staffs. Staffs in turn suggest to their commanders when transitions may be
necessary. Staffs monitor current operations and track conditions that require transition. Transitions are
typically points of friction or opportunities, and leaders assign subordinate leaders specific responsibilities
wherever transitions occur, for example, during passage of lines, at wet gap crossings, at contact points, and
along unit boundaries.
3-87. Effective transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution, so the force can
maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. Risks increase during transitions, so commanders establish
clear conditions for their execution. Commanders establish decision points to support successful transitions
during operations. The ability of echelons below brigade to execute battle drills mitigates some of the risks
higher echelons face during transitions.
3-88. A transition occurs for several reasons. An unexpected change in conditions may require commanders
to direct an abrupt transition. In such cases, the overall composition of the force remains unchanged despite
sudden changes in mission, task organization, and rules of engagement. Typically, task organization evolves
to meet changing conditions; however, transition planning must also account for changes in mission.
Commanders continuously assess the situation, re-task, re-organize, and cycle their forces in and out of close
combat to retain operational initiative. Commanders seek to shift priorities or the main effort without
necessitating operational pauses that make friendly forces more vulnerable to enemy action.
3-89. Commanders identify potential transitions during planning and account for them throughout execution.
Transition planning and preparation should include— |
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(cid:122) Forecasting when and how to transition.
(cid:122) Arranging tasks to facilitate transitions.
(cid:122) Creating a task organization that anticipates transitions.
(cid:122) Rehearsing critical transitions, such as the transition from defense to offense.
(cid:122) Ensuring the force understands changes to rules of engagement during mission transitions.
(cid:122) Understanding potential unintended consequences and the risk they pose to successful transition.
3-90. Commanders and staffs account for the time required to plan, prepare, execute, and assess transitions,
accounting for likely friction due to the environment, degraded communications, and enemy action.
Assessment ensures that commanders measure progress toward such transitions and take appropriate actions
to prepare for and execute them.
DESIGNATE, WEIGHT, AND SUSTAIN THE MAIN EFFORT
3-91. Commanders frequently face competing demands for limited resources. They resolve these competing
demands by establishing priorities. One way in which commanders establish priorities is by designating,
weighting, and sustaining the main effort. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at
a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). Commanders provide the main
effort with the appropriate resources and support necessary for its success. When designating a main effort,
commanders consider augmenting a unit’s task organization and giving it priority of resources and support.
The commander designates various priorities of support, such as for air and missile defense (AMD), close
air support and other fires, information collection, mobility and countermobility, and sustainment.
Commanders and staffs anticipate sustainment requirements of the main effort as it shifts throughout the
operation, and they position supplies and capabilities according to the situation. Commanders must balance
forward positioning of sustainment assets with the need for freedom of action and operational reach when
weighting the main effort.
3-92. Commanders shift resources and priorities as circumstances require. While there can be only one main
effort at any given time, commanders may shift the main effort several times during an operation to increase
the endurance of the overall force. They should allow time for the shift of support priorities prior to
designating a unit as the main effort, since shifting the main effort may require movement of resources and
the positioning of supporting capabilities.
CONSOLIDATE GAINS CONTINUOUSLY
3-93. Leaders add depth to their operations in terms of time and purpose when they consolidate gains.
Commanders consolidate gains at the operational and tactical levels as a strategically informed approach to
current operations with the desired political outcome of the conflict in mind. During competition and crisis,
commanders expand opportunities created from previous conflicts and activities to sustain enduring U.S.
interests, while improving the credibility, readiness, and deterrent effect of Army forces. During large-scale
combat operations, commanders consolidate gains continuously or as soon as possible, deciding whether to
accept risk with a more moderate tempo during the present mission or in the future as large-scale combat
operations conclude. (See paragraphs 6-98 through 6-105 for more information on consolidating gains during
armed conflict.)
3-94. The multidomain aspects of an operational environment place increased strain on the ability of military
forces to create enduring change, particularly in the human and information dimensions. The size, scale, and
scope of an assigned area of operations (AO) may reduce the duration of effects, just as they dilute the potency
of combat power. The speed and pervasiveness of enemy disinformation campaigns is a constant challenge
that contests Army forces’ ability to change human will and behavior. The need to fix and bypass some
enemy forces during operations designed to penetrate or envelop enemy echelons may leave significant
enemy threats in rear areas and jeopardize gains made during offensive operations. Commanders therefore
continuously assess when and how they will consolidate gains as they develop the situation.
3-95. Consolidating gains at every echelon leads to better transitions out of armed conflict and into
post-conflict competition. It serves as a preventative against the rise of an insurgency by those wishing to
prolong the conflict. |
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UNDERSTAND AND MANAGE THE EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS ON UNITS AND SOLDIERS
3-96. Continuous operations rapidly degrade the performance of people and the equipment they employ,
particularly during combat. In battle, Soldiers and units are more likely to fail catastrophically than gradually.
Commanders and staffs must be alert to small indicators of fatigue, fear, indiscipline, and reduced morale,
and they must take measures to deal with these before their cumulative effects drive a unit to the threshold
of collapse. Staffs and commanders at higher echelons must take into account the impact of prolonged combat
on subordinate units, which causes efficiency to drop, even when physical losses are not great. Leaders
consider the isolation Soldiers experience when not being able to remain connected with family and friends
via social media and other platforms for extended periods. Well-trained, physically fit Soldiers in cohesive
units retain the qualities of tenacity and aggressiveness longer than those who are not.
3-97. Although all units experience peaks and valleys in combat effectiveness, well-trained, cohesive units
under effective leaders have increased endurance and higher effectiveness than units that lack training and
effective leaders. Leaders develop resilient subordinates. Staffs and commanders need to take this variance
in performance into account in their planning by matching units to missions, rotating units through difficult
tasks to permit recuperation, and by basing their expectations of a unit’s performance on accurate awareness
of its current capabilities. Historically, during conflicts where tactical units are in contact with enemy forces
on a continuous basis for weeks or more at a time, commanders and staffs at echelons above brigade rotated
subordinate units out of enemy contact to reorganize, rest, and train on a regular basis. Continuously assessing
the combat effectiveness of subordinate formations is necessary to inform such decisions in the future.
SECTION III – OPERATIONAL APPROACH AND OPERATIONAL
FRAMEWORK
3-98. The operational approach provides the logic for how tactical tasks ultimately achieve the desired end
state. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations. Sound operational approaches balance risk
and uncertainty with friction and chance. The operational approach provides the basis for detailed planning,
allows leaders to establish a logical operational framework, and helps produce an executable order. (See ADP
3-0 for more information on operational art. See ADP 5-0 for more information on planning.)
3-99. An operational framework organizes an area of geographic and operational responsibility for the
commander and provides a way to describe the employment of forces. The framework illustrates the
relationship between close operations, operations in depth, and other operations in time and space across
domains. As a visualization tool, the operational framework bridges the gap between a unit’s conceptual
understanding of the environment and its need to generate detailed orders that direct operations.
OPERATIONAL APPROACH
3-100. Through operational art, commanders develop their operational approach—a broad description of
the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). An
operational approach is the result of the commander’s visualization of what needs to be done in broad terms
to solve identified problems. It is the main idea that informs detailed planning. When describing an
operational approach, commanders—
(cid:122) Consider ways to defeat enemy forces in detail and potential decisive points.
(cid:122) Employ combinations of defeat mechanisms to isolate and defeat enemy forces, functions, and
capabilities.
(cid:122) Assess options for assuming risk.
DEFEATING ENEMY FORCES IN DETAIL
3-101. Armed conflict implies the need to defeat enemy forces. Defeat is to render a force incapable of
achieving its objectives (ADP 3-0). When used as a task or effect in operations, defeat provides maximum
flexibility to the commander in how to accomplish the mission. Senior leaders assign defeat as a task when
the situation is still developing, or when the commander on the ground, by virtue of experience and proximity
to the problem, is uniquely capable of deciding how to employ lethal force to accomplish objectives. As a
task, defeat is appropriate for theater strategic and operational-level echelons, but it is often too vague for |
3-0 | 77 | Fundamentals of Operations
tactical echelons below corps level, where more specific outcomes or a higher level of destruction might be
necessary to ensure the overall defeat of enemy forces. As a purpose or an effect, defeat is often used to
describe the ultimate outcome of an operation.
3-102. Defeat inevitably leads to transition. Strategic defeat occurs when an enemy’s political leadership
and national will acquiesce to the friendly political will, and the situation transitions to a more desirable form
of competition below armed conflict. Operational defeat occurs when enemy forces no longer have the will
or ability to pursue military objectives, and the friendly force has achieved most or all of its objectives. At
the tactical level, an attacking force defeats an enemy defense when it causes enemy forces to transition to a
retrograde and cease defending friendly objectives. A defending force defeats an enemy attack when it causes
enemy forces to culminate and transition to the defense before achieving their objectives.
3-103. When U.S. forces possess overwhelming advantages across all domains, the JFC is able to attack all
elements of the enemy force with a high degree of simultaneity. Simultaneity disrupts the enemy’s C2 system
and rapidly disintegrates each component of the threat warfighting system at the same time. However, peer
threats, by definition, possess a scale and quality of warfighting capability that is too extensive to attack at
once. When fighting a peer threat, commanders identify weaknesses between enemy units or in enemy
formations and warfighting systems that provide opportunities to defeat them in detail.
3-104. Defeat in detail is concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather
than defeating the entire force at once (ADP 3-90). Traditionally, commanders of a smaller force use this
technique to achieve success against a larger enemy force. However, defeat in detail also applies to operations
that focus effort on a specific enemy function, capability, echelon, domain, or dimension.
3-105. Defeat in detail requires leaders to evaluate enemy forces in the context of all the relevant domains
and dimensions of an operational environment. Commanders must understand the various parts of an enemy
force and its vulnerabilities, and then discern the best ways to project combat power against those
vulnerabilities. By comparing enemy weaknesses to friendly advantages, leaders begin to see opportunities
and formulate options. Sometimes enemy vulnerabilities and friendly advantages intersect at a single place
and time in a way that is decisive to mission accomplishment. That single place and time is a decisive point—
key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked
advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Decisive points help
commanders select clear, conclusive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to achieving an end state
through convergence or other means.
DEFEAT AND STABILITY MECHANISMS
3-106. A defeat mechanism is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against
enemy opposition (ADP 3-0). Army forces at all echelons commonly use combinations of four defeat
mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. Applying more than one defeat mechanism
simultaneously creates multiple dilemmas for enemy forces and complementary and reinforcing effects not
attainable with a single mechanism. Commanders may have an overarching defeat mechanism or
combination of mechanisms that accomplish the mission, with supporting defeat mechanisms for components
of an enemy formation or warfighting system. Defeat mechanisms can guide subordinate development of
tactical tasks, purposes, and effects in their operations, facilitating control and initiative.
3-107. During competition, commanders take actions that set conditions for the future application of defeat
mechanisms and demonstrate the capability to impose the defeat mechanisms on enemy forces. These
activities include posturing forces, penetrating enemy networks, and conducting exercises with allies and
partners.
3-108. Commanders determine the speed and degree to which a defeat mechanism must impact an enemy
force or warfighting system. Although rapid defeat is typically desirable, it may be more feasible or
acceptable to take a gradual approach to completing a defeat. Rendering an enemy incapable of achieving its
objectives does not usually require total annihilation. To determine the degree of impact on the enemy force,
commanders consider causing only minor degradation to a threat warfighting system or unit when it is
sufficient to prevent the enemy from achieving its objective. This preserves friendly combat power and
applies the economy of force principle. In other cases, especially main efforts against determined peer threat
forces, commanders typically require a significant portion of an enemy’s force be destroyed. |
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3-109. When commanders destroy, they apply lethal force against an enemy capability so that it can no
longer perform its function. Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-
ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it
cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-90-1).
Destruction and the threat of destruction lie at the core of all the defeat mechanisms and make them more
compelling. The other mechanisms work when friendly action has caused enemy forces to face a grim reality:
their ability to fight and relative advantages are degraded, and their options are to surrender, withdraw, or be
destroyed.
3-110. Dislocate is to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage in one or more domains,
rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. Typically, the impact of
dislocation increases when the friendly force exploits advantages in multiple domains. Commanders often
achieve dislocation through deception and by placing forces in locations where enemy forces do not expect
them. Achieving dislocation requires an understanding how enemy forces are oriented and how quickly they
can shift. Envelopments and turning movements enable physical dislocation. Deception can create and
enhance psychological effects of dislocation.
3-111. Isolate means to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and
increase its vulnerability to defeat (ADP 3-0). Isolation can encompass multiple domains and can have both
physical and psychological effects detrimental to accomplishing a mission. Isolating an enemy force from
the electromagnetic spectrum increases the effects of physical isolation by reducing its ability to
communicate and degrading its situational awareness. The ability of an isolated unit to perform its intended
mission generally degrades over time, decreasing its ability to interfere with an opposing force’s course of
action. When commanders isolate, they deny enemy forces access to capabilities that enable them to
maneuver at will in time and space.
3-112. Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control, degrading the
synchronization and cohesion of its operations. Disintegration prevents enemy unity of effort and leads to
a degradation of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. It attacks the cohesion of enemy formations and
their ability to employ combined arms approaches and work effectively together. Commanders can achieve
disintegration by targeting enemy functions essential to the threat’s ability to act as a whole. They often
achieve disintegration by specifically targeting an enemy’s command structure, communications systems,
the linkages between them, and the capabilities they control. Disintegration can be achieved through the
employment of the other three defeat mechanisms in combination, particularly when directed toward systems
like integrated fires commands and integrated air defense systems heavily dependent upon C2 and sensor
nodes.
3-113. Cyberspace, space, and electromagnetic warfare capabilities can help disintegrate enemy formations
by degrading communications and disrupting the quality of enemy information and decisions. Separating
enemy reserves and follow-on echelons from the main body with maneuver forces or fires is a physical way
to isolate echelons, achieve favorable force ratios, and destroy those echelons. This in turn disintegrates the
coherence of an enemy’s attack or defense. Destroying enemy sustainment capability separates enemy fires
and maneuver from fuel and ammunition and delays resupply operations.
3-114. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order
to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0). As with defeat mechanisms,
combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the
mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. The four stability mechanisms are
compel, control, influence, and support:
(cid:122) Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect
behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.
(cid:122) Control involves imposing civil order.
(cid:122) Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign, friendly,
neutral, and threat audiences through messages, presence, and actions.
(cid:122) Support establishes, reinforces, or sets conditions necessary for the instruments of national power
to function effectively. |
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RISK
3-115. Commanders accept risk on their own terms to create opportunities and apply judgment to manage
those hazards they do not control. Risk is an inherent part of every operation and cannot be avoided.
Commanders analyze risk in collaboration with subordinates to help determine what level and type of risk
exists and how to mitigate it. When considering how much risk to accept with a course of action, commanders
consider risk to the force against the probability of mission success during current and future operations.
They assess options in terms of weighting the main effort, economy of force, and physical loss in the context
of what they have been tasked to do.
3-116. Leaders consider risk across all domains. Accepting risk in one domain may create opportunities in
other domains. For example, the risk of seizing an airfield puts ground forces at risk, but it creates an
opportunity to receive reinforcements and supplies that extend operational reach. During combat against an
enemy with capabilities comparable to that of the United States, the greatest opportunity may come from the
course of action with the most risk. An example of this is committing significant forces to a potentially costly
frontal attack that fixes the bulk of enemy forces in place to set the conditions for their envelopment by other
forces. Another is taking a difficult but unexpected route to achieve surprise. Accepting significant risk is
necessary when seeking to create an advantage where none exists otherwise.
3-117. The unrealistic expectation of avoiding all risk is detrimental to mission accomplishment. While
each situation is different, commanders avoid undue caution or commitment of resources to guard against
every perceived threat. Waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization may increase risk or close a
window of opportunity. Mission command requires that commanders and subordinates accept risk, exercise
initiative, and act decisively, particularly when the outcome is uncertain.
3-118. Commanders determine how to impose risk on enemy forces. Viewing the situation through the
enemy’s perspective, commanders seek to create multiple dilemmas and increase the number and severity of
hazards with which enemy forces must contend. Leaders consider the human and information factors that
govern the manner in which enemy forces assess costs and benefits and calculate risk. Commanders disrupt
this risk calculation when they increase perceived costs to enemy forces and reduce the perception of potential
benefits. Commanders do this by imposing dilemmas on enemy forces, not based on what a U.S. or allied
leader views as a problem, but on what an enemy commander views as detrimental. Some dilemmas are
universally accepted as costly, but others are cultural or personal. Commanders rely on military intelligence
and experience to develop this level of situational understanding.
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
3-119. The strategic framework accounts for factors in the strategic environment and the connection of
strategic capabilities to operational- and tactical-level operations. The strategic framework includes four
areas:
(cid:122) Strategic support area.
(cid:122) Joint security area.
(cid:122) Extended deep area.
(cid:122) Assigned operational area.
(See figure 3-2 on page 3-23 for a depiction of the operational framework in the context of the strategic
framework.)
STRATEGIC SUPPORT AREA
3-120. The strategic support area describes the area extending from a theater of operations to a base in the
United States or another CCDR’s area of responsibility. It contains those organizations, lines of
communications, and other agencies required to support deployed forces. It also includes the airports and
seaports supporting the flow of forces and sustainment into a theater. Finally, a strategic support area may
contain key operational capabilities, such as cyberspace assets, that are employed from outside an operational
area but create effects inside it. Most friendly nuclear, space, and cyberspace capabilities and important
network infrastructure are controlled and located in the strategic support area. |
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JOINT SECURITY AREA
3-121. A joint security area is a specific area to facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting lines
of communications that support joint operations (JP 3-10). The joint security area (JSA) is inside, or
immediately adjacent to, an operational area where significant forces and sustainment from two or more
services are positioned to conduct or support operations. Joint security on land includes bases,
mission-essential assets, lines of communications, and convoy security. A senior Army commander is often
designated with responsibility for joint security operations on land.
3-122. The size of a JSA varies considerably and is highly dependent on the size of the operational area,
mission-essential assets, logistics support requirements, threats, or scope of the joint operation. The JSA may
be included in, be separate from, or be adjacent to the rear areas of the joint force land component commander.
During large-scale combat operations JSAs typically are separate from land component or field army rear
areas and associated support areas. (See JP 3-10 for more information on JSAs.)
EXTENDED DEEP AREA
3-123. The extended deep area is comprised of operational and strategic deep areas. These areas typically
do not fall within the land component command’s AO, but they are part of its area of interest because enemy
capabilities and vulnerabilities in the extended deep area can have significant impacts on the outcomes of
operations. Extended deep areas are typically the purview of the joint force headquarters or another
combatant command. Typically, the joint force air component command (known as the JFACC) is the
supported command in extended deep areas. Army forces may be tasked to support it with long-range
precision fires.
3-124. Operational deep areas are generally inside the area of interest and immediately beyond the land
component’s initially assigned AO. These areas may or may not be within the boundaries of a joint operations
area (JOA) or a theater of operations. Operational deep areas are often beyond the feasible movement of
conventional forces without significant support from the joint force.
3-125. Operational deep areas contain enemy supporting formations and capabilities for their main forces.
Enemy forces can generate significant combat power from these areas, and the capabilities that reside there
are often vital to their conduct of operations. In most campaign designs, operational objectives for friendly
forces reside initially in the operational deep area.
3-126. Strategic deep areas are beyond the feasible range of movement for conventional ground forces or
policy prohibits their operations. These areas are where the CCDR, other combatant commands, and national
agencies can employ strategic intelligence capabilities, joint fires, special operations forces, and space and
cyberspace capabilities. Many enemy space, cyberspace, and information warfare capabilities reside in
strategic deep areas across international boundaries and outside the JOA, and they often comprise multiple
areas of influence. (See figure 3-2 for a depiction of the operational framework.) |
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Figure 3-2. The operational framework in the context of the strategic framework
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
3-127. The operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly
visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the
concept of operations (ADP 1-01). Commanders build their operational framework on their assessment of
the operational environment, including all domains and dimensions. They may create new models to fit the
circumstances, but they generally apply a combination of common models according to doctrine. The three
models commonly used to build an operational framework are—
(cid:122) Assigned areas.
(cid:122) Deep, close, and rear operations.
(cid:122) Main effort, supporting effort, and reserve.
Note. Commanders may use any operational framework models they find useful, but they must
remain synchronized with their higher echelon headquarters’ operational framework.
ASSIGNED AREAS
3-128. The JFC assigns land forces an operational area within a joint organizational construct. The land
component or ARFOR commander subdivides their AO into subordinate assigned areas to best support the
desired scheme of maneuver. Commanders assign areas to subordinates based on a range of factors, including
the mission, friendly forces available, enemy situation, and terrain. An assigned area that is too large for a
unit to effectively control or exceeds a unit’s area of influence increases risk, allows sanctuaries for enemy
forces, and limits joint flexibility. An assigned area that is too small constrains maneuver, limits opportunities
for dispersion, and creates congested lines of communication. Most operations involve a combination of
contiguous and noncontiguous assigned areas. Large areas with small forces typically conduct noncontiguous
operations which place greater demands on C2 and sustainment. Commanders retain responsibility for any
area not assigned to a subordinate unit. Within their assigned area, units use control measures to assign |
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responsibilities, prevent fratricide, facilitate C2, coordinate fires, control maneuver, and organize operations.
To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders designate targeting priorities, effects, and
timing within their assigned areas. There are three types of assigned areas that a land component or ARFOR
commander uses:
(cid:122) Area of operations.
(cid:122) Zone.
(cid:122) Sector.
3-129. An area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for the land or maritime force
commander to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). An area of operations is defined
by its boundaries. Within their AO, units integrate assigned and supporting capabilities, synchronize
warfighting functions, and generate combat power against enemy forces to accomplish the mission.
Responsibilities for an AO include—
(cid:122) Terrain management.
(cid:122) Information collection, integration, and synchronization.
(cid:122) Civil affairs operations.
(cid:122) Movement control.
(cid:122) Clearance of fires.
(cid:122) Security.
(cid:122) Personnel recovery.
(cid:122) Airspace management.
(cid:122) Minimum-essential stability operations tasks which are—
(cid:131) Establish civil security.
(cid:131) Provide immediate needs (access to food, water, shelter, and medical treatment).
Commanders can add, remove, or adjust AO responsibilities based on the situation and mission variables.
Note. A land AO by definition does not include a volume of airspace to control. Airspace control
authorities delegate airspace control to Army commanders based on the situation. All commanders
must be prepared to enable or coordinate airspace management. (See JP 3-52 and FM 3-52 for
more information on airspace control.)
3-130. A zone is an operational area assigned to a unit in the offense that only has rear and lateral
boundaries. The non-bounded side of a zone is open towards enemy forces. A higher echelon headquarters
uses fire support coordination and maneuver control measures such as a limit of advance and a coordinated
fire line to synchronize its deep operations with those of a subordinate unit. Zones allow higher headquarters
to adjust deep operations without having to change unit boundaries. This gives greater flexibility to the higher
headquarters for controlling deep operations, allowing subordinate units to focus on close and rear operations.
Units treat everything behind the forward line of troops as an AO with its associated responsibilities. Units
can subdivide a zone into subordinate AOs, zones, or sectors.
3-131. A sector is an operational area assigned to a unit in the defense that has rear and lateral
boundaries and interlocking fires. The non-bounded side of a sector is open towards the enemy. A higher
echelon headquarters uses fire support coordination and maneuver control measures such as battle positions
and trigger lines to synchronize subordinate units. Higher headquarters are responsible to synchronize
employment of combat power forward of the main battle and security areas or coordinated fire line. Higher
headquarters use sectors to synchronize and coordinate subordinate force engagement areas and allow for
mutually supporting fields of fire, which do not require deconfliction between adjacent units. Units treat
everything behind the forward line of troops as an AO with its associated responsibilities. Units can subdivide
a sector into subordinate areas of operations, zones, or sectors.
3-132. While there are many other control measures that enable terrain management (for example, position
areas for artillery or tactical assembly areas) only AOs, zones, and sectors are part of the assigned area model.
Commanders and staffs use AOs when the operation requires a higher level of control. Zones are best for
front line units conducting high tempo offensive operations characterized by direct fire contact with the |
3-0 | 83 | Fundamentals of Operations
enemy and a fluid forward line of troops. Sectors are best for front line units conducting a defense, making
it easier for a higher headquarters to conduct deep operations and for subordinate units to have mutually
supporting fires.
Mutual Support
3-133. Commanders and staffs consider mutual support when considering how large an area to assign
subordinates. Mutual Support is that support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their
assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP 3-31).
In Army doctrine, mutual support is a planning consideration related to force disposition, not a command
relationship. Mutual support has two aspects: supporting range and supporting distance.
3-134. When two units are mutually supporting, their assigned areas are generally contiguous with each
other. Units with non-contiguous areas are generally not mutually supporting. Supporting range is the
distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range
of the second unit’s weapons systems (ADP 3-0). Supporting range depends on available weapons systems,
and it is normally the maximum range of the supporting unit’s indirect fire weapons, although certain
capabilities employed via space and cyberspace can be used at much longer ranges. Terrain, visibility, and
weather may limit the supporting range. If one unit cannot effectively or safely fire in support of another, the
first may not be in supporting range even though its weapons have the required range. At higher echelons,
communications are also a consideration. If two units cannot effectively coordinate the use of indirect fire,
then they may not be considered in supporting range of each other. Figure 3-3 on page 3-26 illustrates a
notional corps assigned area with noncontiguous AOs.
3-135. Supporting distance is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come
to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation
(ADP 3-0). These factors affect supporting distance:
(cid:122) Terrain and mobility.
(cid:122) Distance.
(cid:122) Enemy capabilities, including those employed from the space, cyberspace, air, and maritime
domains.
(cid:122) Friendly capabilities, including those employed from the space, cyberspace, air, and maritime
domains. (See Chapter 6 for a greater discussion of mutual support.)
Note. Contiguous boundaries do not imply units are capable of mutual support or that their
subordinate units have contiguous assigned areas. Therefore, mutual support between adjacent
units and subordinate units must be part of commander dialogue to ensure the formation is
assuming risk deliberately and at the right echelon. |
3-0 | 84 | Chapter 3
Figure 3-3. Notional corps area of operations with noncontiguous divisions
Area of Influence and Area of Interest
3-136. Operational environments are larger than the associated assigned area. They influence and are
influenced by factors outside unit boundaries. To account for these factors commanders typically consider
areas of influence and areas of interest relative through all domains and dimensions.
3-137. An area of influence is an area inclusive of and extending beyond an operational area wherein a
commander is capable of direct influence by maneuver, fire support, and information normally under the
commander’s command or control (JP 3-0). The ranges of a unit’s maneuver and fires capabilities typically
define its area of influence; however, commanders consider all forms of contact they can make with enemy
forces when visualizing their area of influence. A unit’s area of influence contracts or expands based on the
capabilities allocated by the higher headquarters and adjusts as the unit repositions its capabilities on the
battlefield. An area of influence is normally larger than its associated assigned area, but it is smaller than its
area of interest. Units typically have areas of influence that overlap with adjacent unit assigned areas. A unit
might desire to collect information on or strike enemy forces traversing through an adjacent unit assigned
area. This situation requires control measures to enable friendly forces to maintain pressure on enemy forces
while mitigating the risk of fratricide. Understanding an area of influence helps commanders and staffs plan
branches and sequels to the current operation in preparation for operations outside of the current assigned
area.
3-138. An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas
adjacent to it, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). This visualization tool enables commanders and
staffs to understand the impact of threats outside their assigned area and how their operation is progressing
along with their adjacent and higher units. An area of interest includes those aspects of the domains from
which enemy forces can employ capabilities that jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. The area of
interest can shift according to the situation. For example, Army forces track the location of enemy AMD, |
3-0 | 85 | Fundamentals of Operations
artillery, and armored formations outside the assigned area whose movement or employment may impact
current and future operations. The area of interest also includes adjacent and other friendly forces whose
actions or inactions of friendly forces could affect operations.
3-139. Commanders consider all forms of contact possible with enemy forces and update their area of
interest as the situation develops, including the effects of enemy influence and disinformation. An area of
interest surrounds an assigned area, extending forward and to the flanks of the assigned area, and overlapping
with adjacent unit assigned areas. Depending on the operation, it may also extend rearwards, especially when
enemy forces contest operational and strategic lines of communications. A unit’s area of interest is especially
important for helping leaders assess risks and maintain situational awareness of factors that will become
important as operations progress. It is particularly important that the area of interest account for human,
information, and physical dimension factors across all domains.
DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR OPERATIONS
3-140. Within assigned areas, commanders organize their
operations in terms of time, space, and purpose by Commanders balance combat power
synchronizing deep, close, and rear operations. An echelon’s between requirements for deep, close,
focus in time, space, and purpose—not necessarily their and rear operations while weighting the
physical location—determines whether they are deep, close, main effort to accomplish the mission.
or rear operations. This model assists commanders and staffs
in synchronizing capabilities that reside outside of their unit’s assigned area, (for example, from air, space,
and cyberspace) with operations inside their assigned areas. The degree of convergence that a corps can
achieve to set conditions for its subordinate divisions depends on its ability to synchronize close, deep, and
rear operations among its subordinate echelons and with the joint force.
3-141. Divisions and higher echelons typically align their deep, close, and rear operations to corresponding
areas, due to the scale of forces and physical considerations involved. This facilitates their C2 of forces spread
over wide distances whose physical locations do not correspond to the location and purpose of their effects.
Typically, divisions and corps assign command posts to enable control of these areas. For example, a division
may position an artillery battery in a position area for artillery located in the rear area but employ its fires in
support of close operations. In this case, the rear command post might control the battery’s sustainment and
protection, but the division main command post will control its priorities for providing indirect fire support.
At brigade echelons and below, differentiating between close, deep, and rear may have less utility during
large-scale combat operations because of the high tempo, narrow focus, and short planning horizons. At every
echelon, however, commanders must understand the relationship among these operations and their combined
impact on mission accomplishment. (See FM 3-94 for more information about deep, close, and rear areas.)
Figure 3-4 on page 3-28 illustrates notional corps deep, close, and rear areas for a corps AO with contiguous
divisions.
Note. The symmetry of figure 3-4 on page 3-28 provides the simplest way for understanding the
operational framework which is a mental model. Applying the model to real situations results in
significant variations. |
3-0 | 86 | Chapter 3
Figure 3-4. Notional corps deep, close, and rear areas with contiguous divisions |
3-0 | 87 | Fundamentals of Operations
Deep
3-142. Deep operations are tactical actions against
Successful deep operations disintegrate
enemy forces, typically out of direct contact with friendly
the structures and systems that enable
forces, intended to shape future close operations and
enemy operational approaches, isolate
protect rear operations. At the operational level, deep
enemy close operations from sources of
operations influence the timing, location, and enemy forces support, and make enemy forces
involved in future battles. At the tactical level, deep vulnerable to defeat in detail.
operations set conditions for success during close operations
and subsequent engagements.
3-143. At both the operational and tactical levels, the principal effects of deep operations focus on an enemy
force’s freedom of action and the coherence and tempo of their operations. Deep operations strike enemy
forces throughout their depth and prevent the effective employment of reserves, C2 nodes, logistics, and
long-range fires. Deep operations are inherently joint, since many of the capabilities employed by or in
support of Army formations are provided by a joint headquarters or Service component.
3-144. Several activities are typically conducted as part of deep operations. They include—
(cid:122) Deception.
(cid:122) ISR and target acquisition.
(cid:122) Interdiction (by ground or air fires, ground or aerial maneuver, cyberspace forces, special
operations forces, or any combination of these).
(cid:122) Long-range fires against enemy integrated air defense systems, sustainment nodes, fires
capabilities, and echeloned follow-on maneuver formations.
(cid:122) Electromagnetic warfare.
(cid:122) Offensive cyberspace operations and space operations.
(cid:122) Military information support operations.
3-145. Not all activities focused forward of the line of contact are deep operations. Counterfire, for example,
primarily supports close operations, even though the targets attacked may be located at great distances from
the forward line of troops.
3-146. Deep operations require detailed planning. Because of the relative scarcity of resources with which
to perform these activities, deep operations focus on the enemy vulnerabilities and capabilities most
dangerous to the next close operation. Attacks must employ enough combat power to achieve the desired
result. This is critical when—as is frequently the case—maintaining momentum in close operations depends
on successful prosecution of deep operations.
Close
3-147. Close operations are tactical actions of
subordinate maneuver forces and the forces providing Seizing and defending contested land
areas require close operations.
immediate support to them, whose purpose is to employ
maneuver and fires to close with and destroy enemy
forces. Until enemy forces are defeated or destroyed in close operations, they retain the ability to fight and
hold ground. At the operational level, close operations comprise the efforts of large tactical units—corps and
divisions—to win current battles by closing with and defeating enemy forces after setting favorable terms to
do so. At the tactical level, close operations comprise the efforts of smaller tactical units to win current
engagements through movement combined with direct and indirect fires while physically in contact with the
enemy forces they intend to destroy and defeat. Close operations concentrate overwhelming combat power
at the right time and place to create and then exploit windows of opportunity to achieve assigned objectives.
3-148. Close operations include the deep, close, and rear operations of their subordinate maneuver
formations. For example, divisions and separate brigades conduct corps close operations. Brigade combat
teams (BCTs) are the primary forces conducting division close operations. |
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