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4-02 | 210 | Appendix F
Table F-7. Medical sustainment control measures (continued)
Construct example and
Control Measure Main Icon (Field A)
symbol translation
U.S. Class VIII
A sustainment distribution point
control measures symbol for
medical supply
LEGEND:
AAD – Air Assault Division BCT – Brigade Combat Team MND – Multinational Division
ABD – Airborne Division BDE – Brigade SPT – Support
BN – Battalion MED – Medical
F-7. The symbols below (Table F-8) portray the different types of AHS units and elements. This table also
depict how to use modifiers and amplifiers, affording the opportunity to show additional information about
the main icon and display specific equipment such as medical beds.
Table F-8. AHS unit or element symbols
Title Symbol Amplifier Definition
Medical Command ++ 18th Medical Command
(Deployment Support) xxxx (Deployment Support); United
States Indo-Pacific Command
18MEDCOM [DS]
USINDOPACOM
Medical Brigade (Support) X 1st Medical Brigade (Support);
18th Medical Command
++
(Deployment Support)
1MEDBDE [SPT]
18MEDCOM [DS]
Medical Battalion II 261st Medical Battalion,
(Multifunctional) Multifunctional; 44th Medical
Brigade (Support)
261MMB
MF 44MEDBDE [SPT]
Hospital Center II 9th Hospital Center; 1st Medical
(240-bed) 3 Brigade (Support) w/ 240-Bed
9HOSP CTR Capability
240-BED 1MEDBDE[SPT]
Combat Support Hospital
(248-bed)
II 47th Combat Support Hospital;
3
62nd Medical Brigade (Support),
47CSH w/ 248-Bed Capability
248-BED 62MEDBDE[SPT] |
4-02 | 211 | Army Health System Symbols
Table F-8. AHS unit or element symbols (continue)
Title Symbol Amplifier Definition
Field Hospital I 32-Bed, 586th Field Hospital;
(32-bed) 3 531st Hospital Center, w/ 32-Bed
586FLD HOSP Capability
32-BED 531HOSP CTR
Hospital Augmentation 24-Bed, 534th Hospital
Detachment Augmentation Detachment,
3
(Surgical, 24-bed) 534SURGICAL Surgical; 627th Hospital Center,
w/ 24-Bed Capability
24-BED 627HOSP CTR
Hospital Augmentation 32-Bed, 433rd Hospital
Detachment Augmentation Detachment,
3
(Medical, 32-bed) 433MEDICAL Medical; 32nd Hospital Center,
w/ 32-Bed Capability
32-BED 32HOSP CTR
60-Bed, 431st Hospital
Hospital Augmentation
3
Detachment 431ICW
Augmentation Detachment, ICW;
16th Hospital Center, w/ 60-Bed
(ICW, 60-bed) 60-BED 16HOSP CTR Capability
Forward Resuscitative and
Surgical Detachment (FRSD) 250th FRSD; 62nd Medical
250FRSD Brigade (Support)
Forward Surgical Team (FST) 62MEDBDE [SPT]
120-Bed, 319th Medical
Medical Detachment 319MINIMAL CARE Detachment, Minimal Care; 531st
(Minimal Care, 120-bed)
120-BED 531HOSP CTR
Hospital Center, w/ 12-Bed
Capability
Hospital Augmentation Team 3 499th Medical Detachment, Head
& Neck; 1st Medical Brigade
(Head and Neck) 499HEAD NECK
(Support)
1MEDBDE [SPT]
I
575th Medical Company, Area
Medical Company 2 Support; 56th Medical Battalion,
575MCAS
(Area Support) Multifunctional, w/ 40-Bed
40-BED 56MMB capability
I 20-Bed, C Company, 82nd
Brigade Support Medical 2 82BSB Brigade Support Battalion; 505th
Company 505ABB Parachute Infantry Regiment;
(Airborne) 20-BED 82ABD 82nd Airborne Division, w/ 20-
Bed Capability |
4-02 | 212 | Appendix F
Table F-8. AHS unit or element symbols (continue)
Title Symbol Amplifier Definition
I
Brigade Support Medical 2 47BSB C Company, 47th Brigade
Support Battalion; 2nd Brigade
Company 2BDE
Combat Team; 1st Armored
(Armor) 20-BED 1AD Division, w/ 20-Bed Capability
I
2
101BSB
C Company, 101st Brigade
Brigade Support Medical
Company 1BDE Support Battalion; 2nd Brigade
(Infantry) 20-BED SPT 1ID Combat Team; 1st Infantry
Division, w/ 20-Bed Capability
I C Company, 296th Brigade
Brigade Support Medical 2 296BSB Support Battalion; 1st Stryker
Company 1SBCT Brigade Combat Team; 7th
(Stryker) 20-BED 7ID Infantry Division, w/ 20-Bed
Capability
I
6 GSAB C Company, 6th General Support
Medical Company Aviation Battalion; 101st Combat
101CAB
(Air Ambulance) Aviation Brigade; 101st Airborne
101AAD Division (Air Assault)
I 560th Medical Company, Ground
Medical Company Ambulance; 168th Medical
(Ground Ambulance) 560MCGA Battalion, Multifunctional, w/ 24
24 M997 168MMB M997 Capability
I
464th Dental Company, Area
Dental Company 464DCAS Support; 421st Medical Battalion,
(Area Support) 421MMB Multifunctional; 30th Medical
Brigade (Support)
30MEDBDE [SPT]
I
582MLC 582nd Medical Logistics Company;
61st Medical Battalion,
Medical Logistics Company 61MMB
Multifunctional; 1st Medical
1MEDBDE (SPT) Brigade (Support)
248th Medical Detachment,
248MDVSS
Medical Detachment Veterinary Service Support; 261st
(Veterinary Service Support) 261MMB Medical Battalion, Multifunctional;
V 44MEDBDE (SPT) 1st Medical Brigade (Support) |
4-02 | 213 | Army Health System Symbols
Table F-8. AHS unit or element symbols (continue)
Title Symbol Amplifier Definition
85th Medical Detachment, Combat
Medical Detachment
and Operational Stress Control;
(Combat and Operational 85COSC 61st Medical Battalion,
Stress Control)
61MMB Multifunctional
255th Medical Detachment,
Medical Detachment
255PM Preventive Medicine; 56th Medical
(Preventive Medicine)
Battalion, Multifunctional
56MMB
95th Medical Detachment, Blood
Support; 168th Medical Battalion,
95BLOOD
Medical Detachment Multifunctional; 65th Medical
(Blood Support) 168MMB Brigade (Support)
65MEDBDE (SPT)
24th Medical Detachment,
Medical Detachment
Optometry; 261st Medical
24OPTO
(Optometry)
Battalion, Multifunctional
261MMB
++
6th Medical Logistics Management
Medical Logistics
6MLMC Center; 18th Medical Command
Management Center
(Deployment Support)
18MEDCOM (DS)
++
1st Area Medical Laboratory; 18th
Area Medical Laboratory 1AML Medical Command (Deployment
Support)
LAB 18MEDCOM (DS)
F-8. The symbols below (Table F-9 on page F-10) portray the different vehicle and ship types. It also
depicts how to use modifiers and amplifiers, affording the opportunity to show additional information about
the main icon and display specific equipment and vehicle types (M997, M113, M1133). |
4-02 | 214 | Appendix F
Table F-9. AHS vehicle symbols
Title Symbol Amplifier Definition
1
(1) 4-Litter, M997; Equipped with a
Wheeled Vehicle
M997 4-LITTER ground ambulance Medical
Ambulance (M997) Equipment Set (MES); Assigned to
GRND AMB MES
2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry
(High Mobility (Cross
2/327 101AAD Battalion, 101st Airborne Division
Country)
(Air Assault)
1
Wheeled Vehicle
M997 2-LITTER (1) 2-Litter, Wheeled Vehicle
Ambulance Ambulance (Civilian); Paramedic
PARAMEDIC
(Limited Cross Country) on board
Armored Personnel Carrier 1
Ambulance (M113) (1) 4-Litter, M113; Equipped with a
M113 4-LITTER
ground ambulance MES; Assigned
GRND AMB MES to 1st Battalion, 37th Armor
Armored Multi-Purpose
Regiment 1st Armored Division
Vehicle (Medical 1/37 1AD
Evacuation)
1
(1) 4-Litter, M1133; Equipped with
Armored Wheeled
a ground ambulance MES;
M1133 4-LITTER
Ambulance (M1133) Assigned to 1st Battalion 17th
GRND AMB MES Stryker Infantry Battalion; 2nd
(High Mobility (Cross
Country) 1/17SBCT 7ID Stryker Brigade Combat Team; 7th
Infantry Division
Table F-9. AHS vehicle symbols (continue)
Title Symbol Amplifier Definition
1 One (1) 4-Litter, HH-60M
MEDEVAC helicopter; Equipped
HH-60M 4-LITTER with an air ambulance MES;
Rotary wing, in flight
AIR AMB MES Assigned to 3rd General Support
Aviation Battalion (GSAB), 25th
3/25GSAB
Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB)
1
One(1) 2-Litter, HH-60M
HH-60M 2-LITTER MEDEVAC helicopter; Equipped
Rotary wing, on ground with an air ambulance MES;
AIR AMB MES
Assigned to 2nd GSAB, 227th
2/227GSAB CAB
1
One (1) 73-Litter, C-130;
C130 74-LITTER Equipped with an aeromedical
Fixed wing, in flight
AEROMED EVAC EQUIP evacuation equipment kit;
Assigned to USAF
USAF |
4-02 | 215 | Army Health System Symbols
1
One (1) 36-Litter, 54 ambulatory,
C17 36L / 54A
C-17; Equipped with an
Fixed wing, on ground
AEROMED EVAC EQUIP aeromedical evacuation
equipment kit; Assigned to USAF
USAF
1
USS COMFORT One (1) 500-Bed, USN Hospital
Ship (USS Comfort); Assigned to
500-BED
the USN
USN
Military Noncombatant
(Hospital Vessel)
1
USS MERCY One (1) 500-Bed, USN Hospital
AH 500-BED Ship (USS Mercy); Assigned to
the USN
USN
2
Civilian/Merchant (Hospital MERCY SHIP Two (2) 80-Bed, Civilian operated
Ship) 80-BED hospital ships
CIVILIAN |
4-02 | 217 | Glossary
This glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army
and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 4-02
is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other
terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ABCANZ American, British, canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (Armies)
ADCON adminstrative control
AE aeromedical evacuation
AHLTA-T Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application-Theater
AHS Army Health System
AML area medical laboratory
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
AR Army regulation
ARCP Army Recovery Care Program
ASCC Army Service Component Command
BCT brigade combat team
BH behavioral health
CA civil affairs
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR combatant commander
COCOM combatant command (command authority)
CONUS continental United States
COSC combat and operational stress control
CP command post
CSH combat support hospital
DA Department of the Army
DA Pam Department of the Army pamphlet
DD Department of Defense
DHA Defense Health Agency
DMC distribution management center
DMLSS Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support
DNBI disease and nonbattle injury
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive |
4-02 | 218 | Glossary
DODI Department of Defense instruction
EA executive agent
EAB echelons above brigade
ESC expeditionary sustainment command
FHP force health protection
FM field manual
FRSD forward resuscitative surgical detachment
FST forward surgical team
GC Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War
GCC geographic combatant command
GPW Geneva convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
GWS Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
HHD headquarters and headquarters detachment
HQ headquarters
HSS health service support
IPB intelligence prepartion of the battlefield
JFC joint force commander
JOMIS Joint Operational Medicine Information System
JP joint publication
LSCO large-scale combat operations
MCC Mobile Computing Capability
MCP main command post
MEDBDE (SPT) medical brigade (support)
MEDCoE Medical Center of Excellence
MEDCOM (DS) medical command (deployment support)
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MEDLOG medical logistics
MHS Military Health System
MLMC medical logistics management center
MMB medical battaliion (multifunctional)
MSAT Medical Situational Awareness in the Theater
MTF medical treatment facility
MWD military working dog
NATO North Atlantic Teaty Organization
NCO noncommissioned officer
OCP operational command post
OE operational environment
OEH occupational and environmental health
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan |
4-02 | 219 | Glossary
OPORD operation order
POI point of injury
POW prisioner of war
S-1 battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operation staff officer
S-4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-6 battalion or brigade signal staff officer
S-9 battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SIMLM single integrated medical logistics manager
SOP standard operating procedure
STANAG standardization agreement
TACON tactial control
TC2 Theater Composite Health Care System Cache
TCCC tactical combat casualty care
TLAMM theater lead agent formedical material
TM technical manual
TMDS Theater Medical Data Store
TOE table of organization and equipment
TOL Triad of Leadership
TRAC2ES Transporation Command Regulating and Command Control Evacuation
System
TSC theater sustainment command
TSOP tactical standard operating procedures
U.S. United States
USAF United States air Force
USAMEDCOM United States Army Medical Command
USN United States Navy
SECTION II – TERMS
*Army Health System
A component of the Military Health System that is responsible for operational management of the
health service support and force health protection missions for training, predeployment, deployment,
and postdeployment operations. The Army Health System includes all mission support services
performed, provided, or arranged by the Army Medicine to support health service support and force
health protection mission requirements for the Army and as directed, for joint, intergovernmental
agencies, coalition, and multinational forces.
*casualty evacuation
The movement of casualties aboard nonmedical vehicles or aircraft without en route medical care.
Also called CASEVAC
casualty collection point
A location that may or may not be staffed, where casualties are assembed for evacuation to a medical
treatment facility. (ATP 4-02.2) |
4-02 | 220 | Glossary
*combat and operational stress control
A coordinated program of actions taken by military leadership to prevent, identify, and manage
reactions to traumatic events that may affect exposed organizations and individuals during unified land
operations. Also called COSC.
*combat lifesaver
A nonmedical Soldier of a unit trained to provide enhanced first aid as a secondary mission.
comprehensive dental care
The dental treatment to restore and/or maintain a Soldier’s optimal oral health, function, and aesthetics
(ATP 4-02.19).
*continuity of care
Attempt to maintain the role of care during movement at least equal to the care provided at the
preceding facility.
*definitive care
Care or treatment which returns an ill or injured Soldier achieving maximum medical improvement.
*definitive treatment
The final role of comprehensive care provided to return the patient to the highest degree of mental and
physical health possible. It is not associated with a specific role or location in the continuum of care; it
may occur in different roles depending upon the nature of the injury or illness.
emergency dental care
The care given for the relief of oral pain; diagnosis and treatment of infections; control of life-
threatening oral conditions (hemorrhage, cellulitis, or respiratory difficulties); and treatment of trauma
to teeth, jaws (maxilla/mandible), and associated facial structures is considered emergency care (ATP
4-02.19).
*emergency medical treatment
The immediate application of medical procedures to the wounded, injured, or sick by specially trained
medical personnel.
en route care
The care required to maintain the phased treatment initiated prior to evacuation and the sustainment of
the patient’s medical condition during evacuation. (ATP 4-02.2)
*essential care
The absolutely necessary initial, en route, resuscitative, and surgical care provided to save, stabilize,
and return as many Soldiers to duty as quickly as possible.
essential dental care
The dental care necessary to intercept potential emergencies to prevent lost duty time and preserve
fighting strength (ATP 4-02.19).
*first aid (self-aid/buddy aid)
Urgent and immediate lifesaving and other measures which can be performed for casualties (or
performed by the victim themself) by nonmedical personnel when medical personnel are not
immediately available.
*force health protection
(Joint) Measures to promote, improve, or conserve the behavioral and physical well-being of Service
members to enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health
hazards. Also called FHP. (JP 4-02) (Army) Force health protection are measures that promote,
improve, or conserve the behavioral and physical well-being of Soldiers comprised of preventive and
treatment aspects of medical functions that include: combat and operational stress control, dental
services, veterinary services, operational public health, and laboratory services. Enabling a healthy and
fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. |
4-02 | 221 | Glossary
*health service support
(Joint) All services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve,conserve, or restore the
mental or physical well-being of personnel. Also called HSS. (JP 4-02) (Army) Health service
support is support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medicine to promote,
improve, conserve, or restore the behavioral and physical well-being of personnel by providing direct
patient care that include medical treatment (organic and area support) and hospitalization, medical
evacuation to include medical regulating, and medical logistics to include blood management.
inpatient
A person admitted to and treated within a Role 3 and 4 hospital and who cannot be returned to duty
within the same calendar day. (ATP 4-02.10)
lines of patient drift
Natural routes along which wounded Soldiers may be expected to go back for medical care from a
combat position. (ATP 4-02.2)
mass casualty
Any number of human casualties produced across a period of time that exceeds available medical support
capabilities. (JP 4-02)
medical evacuation
The timely and effective movement of the wounded, injured, or ill to and between medical treatment
facilities on dedicated and properly marked medical platforms with en route care provided by medical
personnel. Also called MEDEVAC. (ATP 4-02.2)
medical regulating
The actions and coordination necessary to arrange for the movement of patients through the roles of care
and to match patients with a medical treatment facility that has the necessary health service support
capabilities, and available bed space. (JP 4-02)
*medical treatment facility
(Joint) A facility established for the purpose of furnishing medical and/or dental care to eligible
individuals. (JP 4-02) (Army) Medical treatment facility refers to any facility established for the
purpose of providing medical treatment. This includes battalion aid stations, Role 2 facilities,
dispensaries, clinics, and hospitals.
nontransportable patient
A patient whose medical condition is such that he could not survive further evacuation to the rear without
surgical intervention to stabilize his medical condition. (ATP 4-02.2)
operational dental care
The dental care provided for deployed Soldiers in theater consisting of emergency dental care and
essential dental care (ATP 4-02.19)
operational public health
The application of public health practices and conduct of public health-related activities within a
geographic area where military operations are conducted by TOE units. (AR 40-5)
outpatient
A person receiving medical/dental examination and/or treatment from medical personnel and in a status
other than being admitted to a hospital. Included in this category is the person who is treated and retained
(held) in a medical treatment facility (such as a Role 2 facility) other than a hospital. (ATP 4-02.10)
*patient
A sick, injured or wounded individual who receives medical care or treatment from medically trained
personnel. |
4-02 | 222 | Glossary
patient estimate
Estimates derived from the casualty estimate prepared by the personnel staff officer/assistant chief of
staff, personnel. The patient medical workload is determined by the Army Health System support
planner. Patient estimate only encompasses medical casualty. (ATP 4-02.55)
patient movement
The act of moving a sick, injured, wounded, or other person to obtain medical and/or dental treatment.
(ATP 4-02.2)
public health
The science and practice of promoting, protecting, improving, and, when necessary, restoring the health
of individuals, specified groups, or the entire population. As applied in the operational setting it is the
preservation, maintenance, and restoration of health in Army populations through the anticipation,
prediction, identification, surveillance, evaluation, prevention, and control of DNBI. (AR 40-5)
*return to duty
A patient disposition which, after medical evaluation and treatment when necessary, returns a Soldier
for duty in his unit.
stabilized patient
A Patient whose airway is secured, hemorrhage is controlled, shock treated, and fractures are
immobilized. (JP 4-02)
*tailgate medical support
An economy of force device employed primarily to retain maximum mobility during movement halts or
to avoid the time and effort required to set up a formal, operational treatment facility (for example,
during rapid advance and retrograde operations). (Currently the proponent is FM 4-02 but will be moved
to ATP 4-02.3 when revised).
theater evacuation policy
A command decision indicating the length in days of the maximum period of non-effectiveness that
patients may be held within the command for treatment, and the medical determination of patients that
cannot return to duty status within the period prescribed requiring evacuation by the first available
means, provided the travel involved will not aggravate their disabilities or medical condition. (ATP 4-
02.2).
*triage
The process of sorting casualties based on need for treatment, evacuation, and available resources. |
4-02 | 223 | References
All URLs were accessed on 30 July 2020.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
Unless otherwise indicated, Army doctrinal publications are available online at:
https://armypubs.army.mil/. Most joint publications are available at
https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctine-Pubs/.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, June 2020.
These publications are available online at: https://armypubs.army.mil/.
ADP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols (Change 1), 14 August 2018.
FM 1-02.1, Operational terms, 21 November 2019
These publications are available online at: https://medcoe.army.mil/borden-3-textbooks-of-military-
medicine
Military Medical Ethics, Volumes I and II, 2003.
The Emergency War Surgery Handbook, Fifth Edition, 2018.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
This document is available at https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/afpmb/technical_guidance.html/
Armed Forces Pest Management Board Technical Guide No. 3, Feral Animal Risk Mitigation in
Operational Areas, 01 August 2020.
GENEVA CONVENTIONS
These documents are available online at:
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Geneva_conventions-1949.html.
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, 12 August 1949.
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949.
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949.
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS
These documents are available online at: http://nso.nato.int (Requires account registration).
STANAG 2060, Identification of Medical Materiel for Field Medical Installations, Edition 5, 30 April
2014 (AMedP-1.5, Edition A, Version 1, April 2014).
STANAG 2087, Forward Aeromedical Evacuation, Edition 7, 23 April 2018 (AAMedP-1.5, Edition
A, Version 1 April 2018).
STANAG 2132, Documentation Relative to Initial Medical Treatment and Evacuation, Edition 3,
11 June 2013 (AMedP-8.1, Edition A, Version 2, September 2016). |
4-02 | 224 | References
STANAG 2228, Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support, Edition, Version 1, 11 September 2019
(AJP-4.10, Edition C).
STANAG 2454, Road Movements and Movement Control—AMovP-1(A), Edition 3, 27 January 2005.
STANAG 2931, Orders for the Camouflage of Protective Medical Emblems on Land in Tactical
Operations, Edition 4, 19 January 2018 (ATP-79, Edition B, Version 1, January 2018).
STANAG 2939, Minimum Requirements for Blood, Blood Donors and Associated Equipment,
Edition 6, 3 September 2018. (AMedP-1.1, Edition A, Revision, September 2018).
STANAG 3204, Aeromedical Evacuation, Edition 9, 6 July 2020 (AAMedP-1.1, Edition B, Version 1,
July 2020).
AMERICAN, BRITISH, CANADIAN, AUSTRALIAN, AND NEW ZEALAND PUBLICATIONS AND
STANDARDS
These documents are available online at: https://wss.apan.org/cda/abcanz-armies/default.aspx
(Requires account registration).
Standard 815, Blood Supply in the Area of Operations, Edition 1, 21 October 1991.
Standard 2108, ABCA Medical Professional Credentialing/Privileging, 19 October 2015.
UNITED STATES CODE
These documents are available online at: https://uscode.house.gov/.
Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces.
Title 32, United States Code, National Guard.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
These documents are available online at: http://www.afhsc.mil/policy
These publications are available online at: https://www.esd.whs.mil/Directives/.
DODD 2060.02, DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy, 27 January 2017).
DODD 2310.01E, DOD Defense Detainee Program, 18 September 2020.
DODD 2311.01, DOD Law of War Program, 2 July 2020.
DODD 3000.05, Stabilization, 13 December 2018.
DODD 3025.18 Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), 29 December 2010
DODD 5100.01, Functions of Department of Defense and Its Major Components, 21 December 2010.
DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, 6 July 2012.
DODD 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, 29 December
2016.
DODD 6200.04, Force Health Protection, 9 October 2004.
DODD 6400.04E, DOD Veterinary Public and Animal Health Services, 27 June 2013.
DODD 6490.02E, Comprehensive Health Surveillance, 8 February 2012.
DODI 2000.30, Global Health Engagement (GHE) Activities, 12 July 2017
DODI 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities, Change 1, 23 June 2014
DODI 2310.08E, Medical Program Support for Detainee Operations, 5 September 2019.
DODI 5101.15, DOD Medical Materiel Executive Agent (MMEA) Implementation Guidance, (Change
2), 2 May 2012.
DODI 6420.01, National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI), 20 March 2009.
DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health, 19 June 2019
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
These publications are available online at: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/. |
4-02 | 225 | References
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013.
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 January 2017.
JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 14 May 2019.
JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, 13 November 2014.
JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, 11 December 2017.
MULTI-SERVICE PUBLICATIONS
These publications are available online at: https://armypubs.army.mil
AR 40-905/SECNAVINST 6401.1B/AFI 48-131, Veterinary Health Services, 29 August 2006.
AR 190-8/OPNAVINST 3461.6/AFJI 31-304/MCO 3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997.
ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C, Survivability Operations, 16 April 2018.
ATP 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Health Service Support in a CBRN Environment, 15 March 2016.
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare, 7 August 2019.
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 13 May 2014.
TM 4-02.70/Navy Medical Publication-5120/Air Force Manual 41-111_IP, Standards for Blood Banks
and Transfusion Services, 2 May 2014. (This publication is currently not available online).
TM 8-227-3/Navy Medical Publication-5101/Air Force Manual 41-119(I), The Technical Manual of
AABB (Formerly American Association of Blood Banks), 1 December 2014. (This publication
is currently not available online.
TM 8-227-11/NAVMED P-5123/AFI 44-118, Operational Procedures for the Armed Services Blood
Program Elements, 1 September 2007.
TM 8-227-12/NAVMED P-6530/AFH 44-152_IP, Armed Services Blood Program Joint Blood
Program Handbook, 1 December 2011.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
These publications are available online at: https://armypubs.army.mil/
ADP 1, The Army, 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-0, Operations, 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-07, Stability, 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense, 31 July 2019.
ADP 4-0, Sustainment, 31 July 2019.
ADP 6-0, Mission Command, Command and Control of Army Forces, 31 July 2019.
AR 40-3, Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Care, 23 April 2013.
AR 40-5, Army Public Health Program, 12 May 2020.
AR 40-7, Use of U.S. Food and Drug Administration-Regulated Investigational Products in Humans
Including Schedule I Controlled Substances, 19 October 2009.
AR 40-35, Preventive Dentistry and Dental Readiness, 21 July 2016.
AR 40-66, Medical Record Administration and Healthcare Documentation, 17 June 2008.
AR 40-400, Patient Administration, 8 July 2014.
AR 71-32, Force Development and Documentation, Consolidated Policies, 20 March 2019.
AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, 10 December 2017.
ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 1 March 2019. |
4-02 | 226 | References
ATP 3-21.20, Infantry Battalion, 28 December 2017.
ATP 3-91, Division Operations, 17 October 2014.
ATP 3-92, Corps Operations, 7 April 2016.
ATP 3-93, Theater Army Operations, 26 November 2014.
ATP 4-02.1, Army Medical Logistics, 29 October 2015.
ATP 4-02.2, Medical Evacuation, 12 July 2019.
ATP 4-02.3, Army Health System Support to Maneuver Forces, 9 June 2014.
ATP 4-02.5, Casualty Care, 10 May 2013.
ATP 4-02.8, Force Health Protection, 9 March 2016.
ATP 4-02.10, Theater Hospitalization, 14 August 2020
ATP 4-02.19, Dental Services, 14 August 2020
ATP 4-02.43, Army Health System Support to Army Special Operations Forces, 17 December 2015.
ATP 4-02.46, Army Health System Support to Detainee Operations, 12 April 2013.
ATP 4-02.55, Army Health System Support Planning, 30 March 2020.
ATP 4-25.12, Unit Field Sanitation Teams, 30 April 2014.
ATP 4-25.13, Casualty Evacuation, 15 February 2013.
ATP 4-94, Theater Sustainment Command, 28 June 2013.
ATP 5-19, Risk Management, 14 April 2014.
ATP 6-22.5, A Leader’s Guide to Soldier Health and Fitness, 10 February 2016.
DA PAM 40-11, Army Public Health Program, 18 May 2020.
FM 3-0, Operations, 6 October 2017.
FM 3-07, Stability, 2 June 2014.
FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, 17 April 2019.
FM 3-63, Detainee Operations, 2 January 2020.
FM 3-94, Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations, 21 April 2014.
FM 4-0, Sustainment Operations, 31 July 2019.
FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 5 May 2014.
FM 6-99. U.S. Army Report and Message Formats, 19 August 2013
TC 4-02.1, First Aid, 5 August 2016.
This publication is available online at: https://liw.logsa.army.mil/etmapp/#/etm/search
TM 1-1500-345-23, Painting and Marking of Army Aircraft, 7 July 2015.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) website:
http://armypubs.army.mil and DD forms are available on the Executive Services Directorate (ESD)
website: http://www.esd.whs.mil/Directives/forms/. SFs are available on the U.S. General Services
Administration (GSA) website: http://www.gsa.gov/portal/forms/type/SF.
DA Form 2664-R, Weight Register
DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DD Form 1380, Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Card (Available through normal supply
channels.)
DD Form 1934, Geneva Conventions Identity Card for Medical and Religious Personnel Who Serve in
or Accompany the Armed Forces (Available through normal supply channels.) |
4-02 | 227 | References
SF 600 (Chronological Record of Medical Care).
WEB SITES
Joint Trauma System clinical practice guidelines for MWDs,
http://jts.amedd.army.mil/index.cfm/PI_CPGs/cpgs.
The Performance Triad Website, https://p3.amedd.army.mil/.
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Clinical Practice Guidelines, https://www.healthquality.va.gov.
Web-based portal clinical decision support tool for travel, www.travax.com.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
None. |
4-02 | 229 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number unless indicated otherwise.
2-119—125, 2-129—136, 2- Tables 4-2, 4-3, Part Two Intro,
C
139, 2-140, 3-38, 4-15, 5-4, 7-5, 7-1, Chapter 10 Intro, Appendix
combat support hospital, 1-30, 1-
7-6, 12-2, 12-4—6, Appendix C C Intro, C-2—4, C-7, C-8, C-14,
42, 2-110, 2-123, 9-8, 9-10, 10-
Intro, C-12. Table F-8 C-18, C-21
5, 10-8, 10-9, 10-12, 10-14, 12-
medical brigade (support), Chap 2 Military Health System, Part One
16, 12-18, 12-19, F-6, Table 4-6
Intro, Figure 2-7, 2-20, 2-26— Intro, 12-20, E-9, E-14
D 28, , 2-27, 2-35, 2-40, 2-85, 2-
O
detained personnel, Table 1-2, 86—98, 2-100, 2-101, 2-103, 2-
2-113, 2-117, 2-131, 3-39, 3-43, 104, 2-106, 2-111, 2-113—115, operational public health, 1-10, 1-
4-44, D-18 2-117—119, 2-121—123, 2- 41, 2-37, 2-40, 2-77, 2-78, 2-
131, 2-133, 2-134, 4-51, 4-53, 109, 2-122, 2-134, 2-148, Table
E 5-4, 12-2, 12-3, 12-6, Appendix 4-6, 4-49, Part Two Intro,
eligibility for care, 1-50, 1-53, 2- C Intro, Table C-3, X12, C-17— Chapter 5 Intro, 5-3—5, Table
31, 2-81, 2-114 19, Table F-8 5-1, 10-1, Table 10-1, C-1, C-8,
C-15, C-16, C-22, C-23, D-18
expeditionary sustainment medical command (deployment
command, 2-16, 2-18, 2-21, 2- support), 1-42, Chap 2 Intro, P
24, 2-27, 12-3 Figure 2-4, 2-16, 2-18—20, 2-
principles of the Army Health
24—26, 2-35—39, 2-40, 2-43,
F 2-44, 2-47, 2-48, 2-53. 2-54, 2- System, 1-22, 1-23, 1-50, 2-
114, 3-2, 3-51, Chapter 5 Intro
forward resuscitative and surgical 56—60, 2-62, 2-63, 2-65, 2-66,
detachment, 1-26, 1-42, 1-44, 2-78, 2-80, 2-82—86, 2-97, 2- R
2-115, 2-118, 2-175, 4-12, 4-14, 110, 2-115, 2-119, 2-121, 2-
return to duty, 1-28, 1-39, 1-41,
4-41, 4-48, 10-2, A-10, Table F- 122, 2-131, 2-139, 2-144, Table
Table 6-2, 6-19, Table 7-1, 8-7,
8 4-6, 4-5, 4-27, 4-31—34, 4-46,
8-9, Table 10-1, 11-5, 11-6, C-
4-51—54, 12-3, 12-6, 12-21,
H Appendix C Intro, Table C-3, C- 8, E-15
hospital center, 1-30, 1-42, 2-110, 11, C-12, C-17, C-18, Tables C- roles of care, 1-20, 1-30, 1-32, 2-
2-123, 9-8, 9-10, 10-5, 10-8, 3, F-8 163, 2-172, 2-176, Table 6-2, 8-
10-13, 10-15, 10-17, 10-18, 10- medical command and control, 1- 5, 8-12, 10-1, 11-1, 11-2, 11-19
22, 10-27—31, 10-34, 12-16, 7, 1-23, 1-51, 2-28, 2-32—34,
T
12-18, 12-19, Tables 10-4, 10- Table 2-1, 2-37, 2-120, 2-144,
5, F-1 2-167, Table 4-6, 4-43, 4-51, tactical combat casualty care, 1-
12, 1-14, 1-15, 1-35, 1-57, 2-
Part Two Intro, 10-28, A-2,
I 148, 3-42, 4-20, 4-46, 4-48, 6-
Appendix C Intro, C-2, C-7, C-
institutional force, 2-163, 2-166, 2- 14, C-16. C-21 10, Table 6-2, 6-14, Table 10-1,
168—170, B-22, E-4—6, E-11 10-1, A-10, C-23
medical functions, 1-7—10, 1-23,
theater sustainment command, 2-
M 1-31, 1-56, Chapter 2 Intro, 2-
16, 2-18, 2-21—24, 2-26, 2-27,
18, 2-25, 2-32, Table 2-1, 2-65,
medical battalion (multifunctional), 2-38, 2-41, 12-3
2-68, 2-113, 2-119, 2-120, 2-
Chap 2 Intro, 2-28, 2-35, 2-40,
123, 2-130, 2-150, 2-161, 4-15, |
4-02 | 231 | FM 4-02
17 November (cid:21)(cid:19)20
(cid:37)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:50)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:72)(cid:70)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:29)(cid:3)
(cid:45)(cid:36)(cid:48)(cid:40)(cid:54)(cid:3)(cid:38)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:48)(cid:38)(cid:38)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:57)(cid:44)(cid:47)(cid:47)(cid:40)(cid:3)(cid:3)
(cid:42)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:56)(cid:81)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:3)
(cid:38)(cid:75)(cid:76)(cid:72)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:73)(cid:73)(cid:3)
(cid:50)(cid:73)(cid:73)(cid:76)(cid:70)(cid:76)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:29)(cid:3)
(cid:46)(cid:36)(cid:55)(cid:43)(cid:47)(cid:40)(cid:40)(cid:49)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:48)(cid:44)(cid:47)(cid:47)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:3)
(cid:36)(cid:71)(cid:80)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:87)(cid:85)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:86)(cid:86)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:87)
(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:82)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:72)(cid:70)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)
2031403
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: (cid:55)(cid:82)(cid:3) (cid:69)(cid:72)(cid:3) (cid:71)istributed in |
3-01.44 | 1 | FM 3-01.44
Short-Range Air Defense
Operations
JULY 2022
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. |
3-01.44 | 2 | This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil), and the Central Army Registry site |
3-01.44 | 3 | FM 3-01.44
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-01.44 Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 21 July 2022
Short-Range Air Defense Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE.................................................................................................................... iii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... v
Chapter 1 AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE .................................................................................. 1-1
Air and Missile Defense Overview ............................................................................. 1-1
Air and Missile Defense Principles ............................................................................ 1-3
Air and Missile Defense Employment Tenets............................................................ 1-4
Command and Control of Air and Missile Defense Forces ....................................... 1-6
Positive and Procedural Methods of Airspace Control .............................................. 1-7
Chapter 2 SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE FUNDAMENTALS ............................................... 2-1
Overview .................................................................................................................... 2-1
Role of Short-Range Air Defense .............................................................................. 2-1
Short-Range Air Defense Battalion Organizations .................................................... 2-2
Short-Range Air Defense in Support of Army Operations ......................................... 2-4
Short-Range Air Defense in the Division ................................................................... 2-5
Short-Range Air Defense in Support of the Brigade Combat Team ......................... 2-5
Short-Range Air Defense Command and Control ..................................................... 2-6
Short-Range Air Defense Planning, Preparing and Execution .................................. 2-6
Chapter 3 THREATS TO BE COUNTERED BY SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE .................. 3-1
Threat Overview ........................................................................................................ 3-1
Threat Set .................................................................................................................. 3-2
Threat Application ...................................................................................................... 3-5
Chapter 4 PLANNING FOR SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS ......................... 4-1
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4-1
Air and Missile Defense Planning .............................................................................. 4-2
Command and Support Relationships ....................................................................... 4-2
Short-Range Air Defense Battalion Planning ............................................................ 4-4
Short-Range Air Defense Battery Planning ............................................................... 4-8
Chapter 5 PREPARING FOR SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS ...................... 5-1
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 5-1
Coordination .............................................................................................................. 5-1
Reconnaissance ........................................................................................................ 5-2
Defense Design ......................................................................................................... 5-3
Rehearsals ................................................................................................................ 5-6
Training ...................................................................................................................... 5-6
Orders and Appendices ............................................................................................. 5-7
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. |
3-01.44 | 4 | Contents
Chapter 6 EXECUTING SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS ............................... 6-1
Decisive Action and General Short-Range Air Defense Considerations .................. 6-1
Offensive Operations ................................................................................................ 6-2
Defensive Operations................................................................................................ 6-4
Appendix A SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS .................................. A-1
Appendix B ORDERS AND AIR DEFENSE APPENDIX ............................................................. B-1
Appendix C AIR INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD ............................. C-1
Appendix D REHEARSALS ......................................................................................................... D-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1
INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. HIMAD and SHORAD force positioning across the areas of operation ...................... 1-2
Figure 1-2. AMD employment tenets ............................................................................................. 1-5
Figure 2-1. Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense battalion ............................................................ 2-2
Figure 2-2. Avenger battalion ........................................................................................................ 2-3
Figure 2-3. Indirect Fire Protection Capability-Avenger battalion .................................................. 2-4
Figure A-1. Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense system .............................................................. A-1
Figure A-2. Avenger ....................................................................................................................... A-3
Figure A-3. Stinger man-portable air defense system ................................................................... A-4
Figure A-4. Sentinel ....................................................................................................................... A-5
Figure A-5. Land-based Phalanx Weapon System ....................................................................... A-6
Figure A-6. RAM Warn system ...................................................................................................... A-7
Figure A-7. Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control shelter ......................................... A-8
Figure B-1. Air defense operation order ........................................................................................ B-3
Figure B-2. Fragmentary order example ........................................................................................ B-5
Figure B-3. Air defense appendix .................................................................................................. B-6
Figure C-1. Example of air avenues of approach, based on terrain aspect .................................. C-3
Figure D-1. Rehearsal methods ..................................................................................................... D-3
Figure D-2. Rehearsal timeline ...................................................................................................... D-6
Tables
Table 3-1. UAS groups .................................................................................................................. 3-2
Table 3-2. Air, missile, and electromagnetic warfare/cyberspace threats ..................................... 3-6
Table 4-1. Air defense artillery support relationships matrix .......................................................... 4-4
Table 4-2. Example of a SHORAD battalion decision support matrix ........................................... 4-7 |
3-01.44 | 5 | Preface
Field manual 3-01.44 provides guidance for short-range air defense (SHORAD). The manual describes how
SHORAD is planned, coordinated, integrated, synchronized, and executed. It is not intended to provide
prescriptive solutions for air defense. The manual provides general guidance and allows commanders the
versatility to employ SHORAD forces as they deem necessary. Emerging SHORAD systems will be included
as they begin to be fielded in the future.
The target audience for this publication encompasses leaders at all levels from the corps commander to the
air defense artillery (ADA) team chief. It will also aid the joint force commander in planning and executing
air and missile defense (AMD) operations throughout the battlefield and can be beneficial for sensor
employment, collection management, target development and force application.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates must ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels must ensure
their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of armed conflict and applicable rules of engagement
(ROE). See FM 6-27.
FM 3-01.44 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in the
glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent
publication follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms. Most ADA and
AMD terms are spelled out throughout the manual, instead of using acronyms, to support readability and
understanding by non-ADA personnel.
FM 3-01.44 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States,
and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The Commandant, United States Army Air Defense Artillery School is the proponent of FM 3-01.44. The
United States Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill is the preparing agency. Send written comments
and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publication and Blank Forms) to
Directorate of Training and Doctrine, 700 McNair Avenue, Suite 128 ATTN: ATSF-DD, Fort Sill, OK
73503; by email to [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form
2028. |
3-01.44 | 7 | Introduction
The current strategic environment–with revanchist Russia and revisionist China–is typified by continuous
competition among great powers which challenges the security environment and operational deterrence.
Subsequently, today’s operational environment is such that the joint force may face air parity, or even
localized air overmatch, and an overmatch of surface-to-surface fires during large-scale combat operations.
These realities make joint and Army forces vulnerable to air attacks by fixed and rotary-wing aircraft,
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), cruise missiles, and rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) munitions.
SHORAD systems are required to mitigate or defeat low-altitude surveillance and attacks by these aerial
threats. SHORAD consists of dedicated ADA and non-dedicated air defense capabilities to defend critical
fixed and semi-fixed assets and maneuvering forces. Dedicated refers to ADA systems operated and manned
by 14-series Soldiers whose primary mission is to defeat air and missile threats. Non-dedicated refers to
contributions that Army forces, other than ADA, provide in the execution of AMD operations, primarily to
defend themselves when dedicated systems are not available.
FM 3-01.44 provides supported commanders and SHORAD commanders and leaders with basic-level
SHORAD planning and employment doctrine to defeat aerial threats in any environment where SHORAD
systems are deployed. Adherence to the SHORAD planning, preparation, and execution methods outlined in
this publication will help to ensure the AMD scheme of employment effectively enables maneuver force
freedom of action and requisite defense of other critical assets, such as airfields, power plants, and major
headquarters.
FM 3-01.44 contains six chapters and supporting appendices.
* Chapter 1 provides an overview of Army AMD. It identifies the role of ADA and describes the
AMD principles and employment tenets. It then addresses command and control (C2) of ADA
forces.
* Chapter 2 introduces the SHORAD role, organizations, and C2, and discusses SHORAD support
of large-scale combat operations in Army operations. It concludes with a brief discussion of
SHORAD planning, preparations, and execution—preludes to further in-depth discussions in
chapters 4, 5, and 6.
* Chapter 3 summarizes the air threats to be countered by SHORAD. It addresses the generic
capabilities of UASs, manned rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, RAM, and cruise and tactical air-
to-surface missiles. It also briefly discusses the electromagnetic and cyberspace threats. The
chapter concludes with a presentation on air threat employment.
* Chapter 4 addresses the SHORAD operations planning processes. It begins with an overview of
AMD planning and continues with descriptions of command and support relationships. The
chapter emphasizes planning at the SHORAD battalion level, describing actions in each step of
the military decision-making process, and at the SHORAD battery, using troop leading
procedures.
* Chapter 5 discusses the SHORAD preparatory actions for an operation, considered primarily from
the SHORAD battery and platoon perspectives. It highlights the continuous need for coordination
with supported maneuver units or fixed and semi-fixed assets. It continues with discussions of
reconnaissance and defense design, and concludes with brief presentations on rehearsals (further
discussed in appendix D), training, and ADA orders (see appendix B).
* Chapter 6 presents the roles and contributions of the SHORAD battery and platoon in executing
offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The defensive operations section includes a
discussion of the National Capital Region as part of homeland defense.
* Appendix A presents descriptions of the current SHORAD weapon systems, sensors, and
supporting C2 capabilities. |
3-01.44 | 8 | Introduction
* Appendix B addresses orders that SHORAD leaders use in planning, preparing, and executing
operations. Formats and examples are provided for each.
* Appendix C discusses the steps in developing an air intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB), focusing on its application to SHORAD forces.
* Appendix D provides guidelines to support SHORAD leaders in planning for, preparing, and
conducting rehearsals. |
3-01.44 | 9 | Chapter 1
Air and Missile Defense
This chapter provides an overview of air and missile defense (AMD). It discusses AMD
within the context of the joint counterair framework, the AMD foundational principles
and employment tenets, and AMD positive and procedural methods of airspace control.
The chapter also addresses the role and capabilities of the Army’s dedicated AMD
force, air defense artillery (ADA), and C2 considerations for ADA forces. For more
information on AMD, see JP 3-01 and FM 3-01.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OVERVIEW
Air and missile defense is the direct [active and passive] defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or
reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets (JP 3-01).
AMD is embedded in, and will be used consistently throughout this document to refer to, the defensive
counterair portion of the joint counterair operational framework. Though not specifically addressed in the
AMD definition, AMD implies an interdependency of capabilities across the services and, often, with
multinational forces. AMD is complemented by attack operations and C2 control capabilities. Attack
operations destroy or neutralize enemy aircraft, missile launch platforms, and supporting infrastructure before
and after launch. C2 capabilities enable and link the planning and execution activities of the offensive and
defensive systems.
AMD, as noted in the definition above, consists of two operational elements: active AMD and passive
AMD. Active AMD are direct defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of air
and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. Passive AMD are all measures, other than active AMD,
taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and
critical assets. These measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion,
hardening, and the use of protective construction (JP 3-01). Passive actions are the commander's first line of
defense.
The Army's dedicated AMD force is ADA. Air defense artillery is weapons and equipment for actively
combating air targets from the ground (JP 3-01); more precisely, ADA is the dedicated Army systems,
personnel, and forces that provide active, land-based defense against air and missile attacks. ADA forces
execute AMD operations. ADA consists of high-to-medium altitude air defense and short-range air defense
(SHORAD) systems and forces. Current high-to-medium altitude air defense systems in a theater of
operations are Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. Current SHORAD systems are the
Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD), Avenger, Land-based Phalanx Weapon System, and
Sentinel radar. Figure 1-1 on page 1-2, presents the positioning of high-to-medium altitude air defense and
SHORAD system forces across the areas of operation. While Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense are generally considered to be operational-level systems and M-SHORAD, Avenger, Land-based
Phalanx Weapon System, and Sentinel tactical level, these designations are scenario and situational
dependent. |
3-01.44 | 10 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-1. HIMAD and SHORAD force positioning across the areas of operation |
3-01.44 | 11 | Air and Missile Defense
Note: Dashes around indirect fire protection capability units indicate that the indirect fire
protection capability systems have not been fielded. Fielding is projected to begin in the near term.
The role of ADA is to deter and defeat the range of aerial threats to assure allies, ensure operational
access, and defend critical assets and deployed forces in support of Army operations. AMD operations span
the range of military operations. AMD capabilities in executing AMD operations are─
* Defeat the full range of enemy air and missile threats encountered in current and future geo-
strategic, operational, and tactical fights. The threat spectrum encompasses ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, UASs, RAM, tactical air-to-surface missiles, and fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft.
* Integrate with Army, joint, interorganizational, and multinational elements. ADA forces establish
and maintain linkages to other service and multinational forces conducting AMD operations. This
includes the ability to integrate across multiple weapon systems, sensors, effectors, and C2 nodes
at echelon.
* Provide early warning. ADA forces provide early warning by employing sensors to detect air and
missile attacks and disseminating attack warnings to at-risk forces and, where appropriate, at-risk
civilian populations.
* Enhance situational awareness. ADA sensors provide extended range surveillance of the airspace
and detect, acquire, track, classify, discriminate, and identify aerial objects from near-ground level
to high altitudes, in difficult terrain and in adverse weather conditions.
* Contribute to airspace control. Army airspace control functions involve identifying, coordinating,
integrating, deconflicting, and regulating the Army need for and use of joint airspace. Army
airspace control ensures that airspace users are synchronized in time, space, and purpose
interdependently with joint and multinational forces.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE PRINCIPLES
Armed with a thorough understanding of the operational environment that is further focused through
the lens of current mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations (METT-TC) conditions, commanders apply AMD principles when planning active AMD
operations. The AMD principles are mass, mix, mobility, integration, flexibility, and agility. Mass, mix,
mobility, and integration are traditional principles that have stood the test of time. Flexibility and agility are
inherent considerations for how ADA forces organize and operate on future battlefields (FM 3-01).
* Mass is the concentration of combat power sufficient to achieve the commander's intent. Mass,
when applied to AMD, is achieved by allocating enough AMD firepower to successfully defend
the force or the asset against aerial attack or surveillance. To mass AMD combat power in one
area, commanders may have to accept risks in other areas of the battlefield.
* Mix is the employment of a combination of weapons and sensors to protect the force and assets
from the threat. Mix offsets the limitations of one system with the capabilities of another and
complicates the situation for the attacker. Proper mix causes the enemy to adjust tactics. Enemy
tactics designed to defeat one system may make the enemy vulnerable to another system. For
instance, an enemy aircraft flying low to avoid Patriot may be vulnerable to engagement by an
Avenger system.
* Mobility is a quality or capability of military forces, which permits them to move from place to
place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-36). M-SHORAD is capable
of matching the cross-country mobility of maneuvering forces. Avenger systems can move with
and maintain defense of the maneuver force's semi-fixed assets. Mobility of SHORAD increases
their survivability as well as that of their supported assets.
* Integration is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates
by engaging as a whole (JP 1). Integration constitutes the combination of ADA and joint counterair
forces, systems, functions, processes, and information acquisition and distribution required to
efficiently and effectively perform the mission. Integration combines separate systems, |
3-01.44 | 12 | Chapter 1
capabilities, or functions in such a way that they can operate singly or in concert without adversely
affecting individual elements.
* Flexibility is the employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for
conducting operations (ADP 3-0). Flexibility enables adaptive forces, facilitates collaborative
planning and decentralized execution, and fosters individual initiative. The AMD principle of mix
discusses the combination of ADA systems as task force tailored formations. The principle of
flexibility is applied in AMD terms primarily by building METT-TC informed task organizations.
* “Agility is the ability of friendly forces to react faster than the enemy” (ADP 3-90). For AMD, at
the platoon level, it is the ability to leverage digital capabilities (e.g., air picture) to maneuver to
defeat an air and missile threat. At the battalion level, it is the use of continuous air IPB and digital
systems to employ forces to defeat the threat by operating inside the enemy's decision space.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE EMPLOYMENT TENETS
While commanders should always start AMD employment planning by applying the principles
described above, they should also strive to adhere to employment tenets when planning and positioning their
ADA resources. The tenets are desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations and are
directly related to how assets should be employed. There are seven tenets (figure 1-2 on page 1-5).
* Mutual Support. Weapons are positioned so that the fires of one weapon can engage targets within
the dead zone of the adjacent weapon. For guns, this dead zone is usually small. For missiles, the
dead zone may be large, and mutual support is a critical element. Mutual support can also cover
nonoperational weapons or weapons at lower states of readiness. Mutual support, when applied to
sensors has the same connotation; that is, sensors are deployed to cover the dead zone of adjacent
sensors.
* Overlapping Fires and Overlapping Coverage. Weapons are positioned so that their engagement
envelopes overlap. Because of the many altitudes, directions, and ranges from which the enemy
can attack or conduct surveillance operations, defense planners must apply mutual supporting and
overlapping fires vertically and horizontally. Overlapping coverage is the positioning of sensors
such that their coverage does not leave any seam in the defense that might be used by incoming
threats. Overlapping fires and overlapping coverage should be planned during defense design.
* Balanced Fires. Weapons are positioned to deliver an equal volume of fires in all directions. This
is necessary for AMD in an area where the terrain does not canalize the threat or when the avenues
of approach are unpredictable. Balanced fires is a desired characteristic of defense design against
cruise missiles and other air threats.
* Weighted Coverage. Weapons coverage is combined and concentrated toward the most likely
threat air avenues of approach or directions of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a commander
may risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly protected to weight coverage toward
another direction. Weighted coverage and balanced fires are not mutually achievable, requiring
the defense designer to give up most aspects of one to achieve the other.
* Early Engagement. Early engagement generally requires extending the defense away from the
defended asset. Sensors and weapons are positioned so they can engage the threat before ordnance
release or detection of friendly forces. Early engagements enable destruction of enemy platforms
over enemy forces and unoccupied areas, thereby reducing the possibility of friendly collateral
damage and fratricide. As with weighted coverage, early engagement is achieved at the expense
of balanced fires.
* Defense in Depth. Sensors and weapons are positioned so that the threat is exposed to a
continuously increasing volume of fire as it approaches the friendly protected asset or force.
Defense in depth decreases the probability that attacking missiles, aircraft, or RAM will reach the
defended asset or force.
* Resilience. Resilience is the quality of the defense to maintain continuity of operations regardless
of changes in or unanticipated tactics by enemy air or losses of critical air and missile defense
components (FM 3-01). ADA planners must plan for defense design adjustment based on ADA
system attrition. Resilience is a key determinant when considering which tenet (or tenets) to use
in maintaining the defense. |
3-01.44 | 13 | Air and Missile Defense
Figure 1-2. AMD employment tenets |
3-01.44 | 14 | Chapter 1
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
FORCES
Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1). Command of AMD forces
and the control of AMD fires are derived from separate authorities. Army commanders exercise command.
However, because AMD fires occur in the airspace, they are controlled by the area air defense commander.
The area air defense commander is the component commander with the preponderance of air defense
capability and the required command, control, and communications capabilities who is assigned by the joint
force commander to plan and execute integrated air defense operations (JP 3-01). This complex C2
environment results in the following set of conditions, which characterize nearly all AMD operations:
* AMD operations are inherently joint and interdependent.
* Army AMD operations require an integrated and networked C2 system.
* Command of ADA forces is exercised by Army commanders.
* Control of Army AMD fires is exercised in accordance with JFC directives and by delegated
authorities.
AMD operations are inherently joint and interdependent. The joint force commander depends on the
Army to execute AMD of critical assets from the land within the context of a larger joint counterair mission,
which includes offensive and defensive operations. As the primary land-based AMD force to the larger joint
defensive counterair effort, ADA forces depend on other service capabilities to provide space-, air-, and land-
based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to detect, track, provide early warning of air and missile
threats, and cue ADA weapon systems to effectively counter these threats. The combination of Army AMD
capabilities brought to the joint counterair effort, coupled with the support required of other services, make
AMD operations inherently joint and interdependent.
Army AMD operations require an integrated and networked C2 system. ADA forces' dependence on
other service capabilities, as well as on each other, requires that all contributing systems (or sensor and
shooter components) be networked and integrated to the greatest extent possible to facilitate a shared
understanding of the operational environment for the air domain. Current capabilities are somewhat limited
in the extent to which they are able to network and integrate due to their unique system interfaces. These
capabilities rely on joint tactical data links to share track data and coordinate engagements. To overcome the
system-centric limitations to integration, the Army is developing a comprehensive and common networked
C2 capability package that will leverage all relevant external data links for full joint integration.
Command of ADA forces is exercised by Army commanders. Although AMD operations are
inherently joint and interdependent, the command of ADA forces is always retained by Army commanders
and cannot be delegated. Command of ADA forces includes the authority and responsibility for effectively
using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and
controlling forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.
Control of Army AMD fires is exercised in accordance with JFC directives and by delegated
authorities. Control of AMD engagements is executed through various personnel and agencies that
collectively constitute the engagement authorities in the kill chain. An engagement authority is an authority
vested with a joint force commander that may be delegated to a subordinate commander, that permits an
engagement decision (JP 3-01). The joint force commander appoints an area air defense commander and
delegates the responsibility for planning and coordinating air operations, as well as authorizing engagements,
to this commander. The area air defense commander may further delegate these responsibilities to a regional
or sector air defense commander. The area air defense commander normally has operational control of their
service's component forces and tactical control or direct support of the other forces made available for tasking.
Tactical control and the near-real-time exercise of the kill chain are generally applied to high-to-medium
altitude air defense units, but not to SHORAD units. For more information on controlling authorities, see FM
3-01. |
3-01.44 | 15 | Air and Missile Defense
POSITIVE AND PROCEDURAL METHODS OF AIRSPACE
CONTROL
Positive and procedural methods of airspace control facilitate the use of airspace to enable AMD fires.
Positive control is a method of airspace control that relies on positive identification, tracking, and detection
of aircraft within an airspace, conducted with electronic means, by an agency having the authority and
responsibility therein (JP 3-52). Procedural control is a method of airspace control which relies on a
combination of previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures (JP 3-52). Examples of these orders
and procedures include air defense warning conditions, rules of engagements (ROE), published identification
criteria, and weapons control status.
ALERT STATES
An alert state is a condition that prescribes the amount of resources required to achieve ready to fire
and desired radar emissions, and which specifies manning requirements and equipment configurations (FM
3-01). Alert states are METT-TC dependent and are determined by the senior ADA commander in
coordination with the area air defense commander and regional or sector air defense commander.
AIR DEFENSE WARNING CONDITION
An air defense warning condition is an air defense warning given in the form of a color code
corresponding to the degree of air raid probability with yellow standing for when an attack by hostile aircraft
or missiles is probable; red for when an attack by hostile aircraft or missiles is imminent or is in progress;
and white for when an attack by hostile aircraft or missiles is improbable (JP 3-01).
AMD procedural controls are used to posture units based on the assessed threat. The area air defense
commander establishes the baseline air defense warning condition for the joint force during the planning
stage. A condition may be different for an air threat and a missile threat. Subordinate AMD commanders may
issue higher, but not lower, conditions for their region or sector.
Local air defense warnings—DYNAMITE, LOOKOUT, and SNOWMAN—are also used to alert
forces to potential attacks at the local level. They should be incorporated into local tactical standard operating
procedures, explaining what response the supported force desires when a local air defense warning condition
is broadcast.
* DYNAMITE: Aircraft or missiles are inbound or attacking now. Response is immediate. As a
general rule, a DYNAMITE status should be assumed when an air threat is within 15 kilometers
of the division or brigade combat team's (BCT) area of operations (AO).
* LOOKOUT: Aircraft or missiles are in the area of interest but are not yet threatening, or if
inbound, there is time to react. As a general rule, a LOOKOUT status should be assumed when an
air threat is within 30 kilometers of the division or BCT AO.
* SNOWMAN: No aircraft or missiles pose a threat at this time. Aircraft and missiles are monitored
but not broadcast over the early warning net.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered (JP 3-84). The joint force commander approves the theater rules.
These established rules enable the area air defense commander to retain control of the air battle by prescribing
the exact conditions under which engagements may take place. ROE apply to all warfare participants in the
theater and are disseminated to all echelons. There are six AMD ROE categories: right of self-defense,
identification criteria, fire control orders, weapons control status, levels of control, and modes of control.
* Right of self-defense. Commanders at all echelons must take whatever action is necessary to
protect their forces and equipment against air or missile attack. When under attack, the right of
self-defense is inherent to all ROE and weapons control procedures (JP 3-01). |
3-01.44 | 16 | Chapter 1
* Identification criteria. The employment of ADA weapon systems requires early identification of
friendly, neutral, or hostile aircraft and missiles to maximize extended-range engagements and
avoid fratricide. The problem of distinguishing friendly, neutral, and hostile aerial objects, while
employing various weapon systems against the enemy, is a highly complex task; the same type of
aircraft may be flown by friendly and enemy countries. The area air defense commander and the
airspace control authority establish measures and procedures within the airspace control system to
positively identify all airborne assets and permit the execution of AMD operations. These
measures and procedures reduce delays in operations and prevent fratricide. Positive identification
of tracks is normally the preferred method of operation. Positive identification is an identification
derived from observation and analysis of target characteristics including visual recognition,
electronic support systems, non-cooperative target recognition techniques, identification friend or
foe systems, or other physics-based identification techniques (JP 3-01). Procedural identification
separates airspace users by geography, altitude, heading, time, and/or maneuver. Generally, some
combination of positive and procedural identification is used.
* Fire control orders. Fire control orders are commands that are used to exercise control over
engagements on a case-by-case basis and can be transmitted electronically or verbally. They are
given to direct or inhibit firing by surface-to-air weapons units based on the ROE and rapidly
changing tactical situation (JP 3-01). There are three primary orders: engage, hold fire, and cease
engagement or cease fire. Engage in air and missile defense, a fire control order used to direct or
authorize units and/or weapon systems to attack a designated target (JP 3-01). Hold fire is an
emergency fire control order used to stop firing. If technically possible, missiles already in flight
must be prevented from intercepting (JP 3-01). Hold fire is primarily used to effect friendly
protection or avoid intercepts on neutral tracks. Cease engagement or cease fire directs units to
stop the firing sequence against a designated target; however, units may continue to track, and
missiles already in flight are permitted to continue to intercept (JP 3-01). Cease fire is normally
issued to preclude engagement of the same track by two or more weapon systems.
* Weapons control status. A weapons control status is an air and missile defense control measure
declared for a particular area and time by an area air defense commander, or delegated subordinate
commander, based on the rules of engagement that establish conditions under which fighters and
surface air defense weapons are permitted to engage threats (JP 3-01). Weapon control statuses
(weapons hold, weapons tight, and weapons free) prescribe the relative control of AMD fires.
Weapons hold is the most restrictive status; units may fire only in self-defense or when ordered
by a proper higher authority. Weapons tight is the normal status; units may only fire on targets
identified as hostile in accordance with current ROE. Weapons free is the least restrictive status;
it is used to indicate when any target not positively identified as friendly, in accordance with the
current ROE [and law of armed conflict], may be engaged (JP 3-01).
* Levels of control. Levels of control describe the AMD commander/echelon permitted to authorize
engagement of an air or missile threat (JP 3-01). Engagement authorization is normally vested
with the area air defense commander at theater level and can be delegated to as low as an ADA
team leader when the mission and threat environment demands such. Different levels of control
may be established for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UASs, fixed-wing aircraft, and rotary-
wing aircraft.
MODES OF CONTROL
There are three modes of control: centralized, decentralized, and autonomous. In the centralized mode,
a higher echelon must authorize target engagements by the firing units (positive control). In decentralized, a
higher echelon monitors unit actions, making direct target assignments on a management-by-exception basis.
The authority to which decentralization is authorized makes decisions based upon ROE (procedural control).
Autonomous operations are initiated when a firing unit has lost all communications (voice, data link, and
tactical chat) to higher headquarters. The fire unit makes decisions based upon the latest published ROE
(procedural control). The mode of control selected will depend upon the capabilities of the C2 system and
weapons employed and both the friendly and enemy air situations. |
3-01.44 | 17 | Air and Missile Defense
STATES OF READINESS
States of readiness are alert postures for crews and systems that are tailored to the level of threat and
warning. They are expressed as numbers, ranging from the highest state (state 1) to the lowest state (state 5).
State 1, for instance, would be in effect when crews were engaging or would expect to imminently engage
aerial threats; state 5 would be in effect for crews that were performing maintenance on their equipment,
redeploying, or on crew rest. States 2 through 4 identify varying times to prepare for engagements; they are
generally expressed in minutes. The time factors for these states often vary by system and will be expressed
in a unit’s standard operating procedures (SOP). |
3-01.44 | 19 | Chapter 2
Short-Range Air Defense Fundamentals
This chapter discusses the role of SHORAD and its capabilities, how SHORAD
battalions and batteries are organized, and how they fit within divisional and brigade
operational constructs in support of Army operations. Finally, this chapter provides
commanders an overview and general guidance on how SHORAD organizations and
capabilities integrate into combined arms operations, allowing flexibility to employ
forces as they deem necessary.
OVERVIEW
Short-range air defense is defined as capabilities that provide air defense against low-altitude air
threats. (FM 3-01). The expanded definition of SHORAD is those dedicated ADA and non-dedicated air
defense capabilities which enable movement and maneuver by destroying, neutralizing, or deterring low
altitude air threats to defend critical fixed and semi-fixed assets and maneuvering forces.
SHORAD is comprised of dedicated and non-dedicated air defense capabilities. Dedicated air defense
capabilities are provided by ADA branch formations manned by school-trained ADA Soldiers. Dedicated
emphasizes the ADA organizations' primary mission: provide active air defense effects. Non-dedicated refers
to contributions that Army forces, other than ADA, provide in the execution of AMD operations; the primary
consideration is to defend themselves when dedicated systems are not available. Non-dedicated air defense
is commonly referred to as combined arms for air defense (known as CAFAD). For more information on
combined arms for air defense, see ATP 3-01.8.
Current dedicated SHORAD systems are the M-SHORAD, Avenger, Land-based Phalanx Weapon
System, Sentinel, and Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control. The enduring indirect fire
protection capability is in development and initial capabilities will be fielded in the near term. It will replace
Avenger and the Land-based Phalanx Weapon System. Indirect fire protection capability will defend theater-
and corps-level fixed sites and division semi-fixed sites against cruise and tactical air-to-surface missiles,
UASs, and RAM. Threat details are provided in chapter 3.
Note: Land-based Phalanx Weapon System is used in lieu of counter-rocket, artillery and mortar
(known as C-RAM) system throughout this document. It is one of the two current weapon systems
in the Indirect Fire Protection Capability-Avenger battalion.
ROLE OF SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE
The role of SHORAD is to defeat low-altitude air threats and provide directed early warning to
supported maneuver forces and other designated critical assets in support of Army and joint operations. The
low-altitude air threats consist of UASs, rotary-wing aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft, cruise missiles, and RAM.
Threat details are provided in chapter 3.
SHORAD forces operate primarily at the tactical and operational levels. Tactical-level air defense
operations support the overall objectives of the divisions, BCTs, and maneuver task forces. At this level,
SHORAD forces include M-SHORAD, Avenger, and eventually indirect fire protection capability systems.
SHORAD forces protect the maneuver forces and critical fixed and semi-fixed assets from air threats, thus
reducing casualties and allowing the combat forces the freedom to maneuver and to conduct aggressive,
sustained operations. They also provide early warning by employing sensors to detect air, missile, and RAM |
3-01.44 | 20 | Chapter 2
attacks and disseminating attack warnings. At the operational level, SHORAD functions as a part of an ADA
task force. The task force may include a mix of M-SHORAD, Avenger, Land-based Phalanx Weapon System,
and Stinger systems, integrated with Patriot or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense forces, which may be
used to provide early warning and defend fixed sites. SHORAD forces may also establish and maintain
tactical data linkages to other service and multinational forces, where available and appropriate, to enhance
defenses.
SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE BATTALION ORGANIZATIONS
SHORAD battalions are organized with different weapon and sensor systems based on their primary
intended missions. M-SHORAD battalions are assigned or organic to divisions. Avenger battalions are
deployed at theater, corps, and division levels. Indirect fire protection capability-Avenger battalions are
normally assigned at the theater or corps level. SHORAD battalion headquarters provide C2, administrative,
and logistical support for SHORAD battalions and batteries regardless of type. Logistical support must be
focused to ensure sufficient resupply of SHORAD mission essential equipment and all classes of supplies
throughout the battlefield.
An M-SHORAD battalion (figure 2-1) is currently composed of one headquarters and headquarters
battery, three M-SHORAD batteries, a man-portable air defense system battery, and one maintenance
company. It is fielded to the active Army divisions; however, in the future, it will also be fielded to Army
National Guard divisions. M-SHORAD battalions provide a maneuverable and survivable air defense
capability in direct support of BCTs and their subordinate maneuver battalions (when so missioned) against
rotary wing- and fixed-wing aircraft and UASs. A battalion's major items of equipment are the M-SHORAD
systems, Sentinel radars, and Forward Area Air Defense C2. The M-SHORAD system is mounted on a
Stryker vehicle and contains multiple weapon sub-systems, on-board radars, and a Forward Area Air Defense
C2 link.
Figure 2-1. Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense battalion
Avenger battalions (figure 2-2 on page 2-3) include a headquarters and headquarters battery, three
Avenger firing batteries with two firing platoons each, and a maintenance detachment. Avenger pure
battalions exist in both the Active Army and Army National Guard. Avenger battalions provide dedicated
SHORAD defense from air threats. Avenger battalions include Avenger weapon system, Sentinel radars, and |
3-01.44 | 21 | Short-Range Air Defense Fundamentals
Forward Area Air Defense C2. The Avenger is a Stinger missile-based, vehicle mounted air defense system
carrying up to eight Stinger missiles in a ready-to-fire configuration. The Avenger system can be slewed on
radar cue to the direction of an approaching air threat. The Stinger missile can also be removed from the
Avenger and fired in a man-portable configuration if desired or necessary. The Sentinel, AN/MPQ-64,
provides persistent air surveillance and fire control quality data.
Figure 2-2. Avenger battalion
Avenger batteries are in pure Avenger battalions fielded in the Army National Guard, Composite
Patriot-Avenger battalions, and indirect fire protection capability Avenger battalions. The battery consists of
a headquarters section, two platoons with six Avengers each, four to eight Sentinel radars (depending upon
the type battalion), and Forward Area Air Defense C2 systems. Avenger batteries normally defend critical
assets at theater, corps, division, and BCT levels. Batteries generally deploy with their parent battalion or as
separate batteries and are employed as batteries or platoons.
The indirect fire protection capability-Avenger battalion (figure 2-3 on page 2-4) consists of a
headquarters and headquarters battery, two indirect fire protection capability intercept batteries, an Avenger
battery, and a maintenance company. The indirect fire protection capability-Avenger battalion is normally
assigned at the theater or corps level. The intercept batteries defend fixed assets and ground forces from RAM
threats in support areas. RAM Warn system provides early warning of impending RAM attacks through a
network with capabilities internal to the intercept batteries and external to supported elements. |
3-01.44 | 22 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-3. Indirect Fire Protection Capability-Avenger battalion
The intercept batteries are equipped with interceptors, sensors, and C2 systems. Engagement and
intercept of RAM threats are performed by the Land-based Phalanx Weapon System, a fast reacting, short-
range, fixed emplacement system that detects and destroys incoming RAM in the air before they hit ground
targets. The Land-based Phalanx Weapon System is comprised of a radar slewed, 20-millimeter Gatling gun
with automatic ammo handling system, and search and track radar antennas; two 60-kilowatt generator sets
with a power distribution enclosure; and a chiller for cooling the weapons. All components are integrated on
a flatbed semitrailer. It is also capable of providing early warning without conducting an intercept. Sentinel
radars and Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars also provide data for both engagement and early warning.
The sensors can classify and aid in the identification of air objects, facilitating situational awareness in
proximity to a defended area and reducing the potential of fratricide incidents. In addition, the Lightweight
Counter Mortar Radar, supplemented with data extracted from other Army sensors, determines predicted
points of impact for RAM munitions, enabling in-time warnings to at-risk forces and areas through the RAM
Warn system. Sensor data is available through the Forward Area Air Defense C2 nodes.
SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE IN SUPPORT OF ARMY
OPERATIONS
Operations are conducted to support all four Army strategic roles: operations to shape, operations to
prevent, large-scale ground combat operations, and operations to consolidate gains.
* "Operations to shape consist of various long-term military engagements, security operations and
deterrence missions, and actions intended to assure friends, build partner capacity and capability,
and promote regional stability" (FM 3-0). SHORAD battalions plan and participate in building the
capabilities of partner SHORAD forces. SHORAD battalions participate in multinational
exercises to further coordination and interoperability.
* Operations to prevent "include all activities to deter an adversary's undesirable actions. They are
typically conducted in response to activities that threaten unified action partners and require the
deployment or repositioning of credible forces in a theater to demonstrate the willingness to fight
if deterrence fails" (FM 3-0). Deployed SHORAD units, with other AMD forces, support the
deterrence of an adversary's use of air capabilities to gain its objectives. SHORAD units are also |
3-01.44 | 23 | Short-Range Air Defense Fundamentals
critical elements in preventing an enemy's ability to successfully attack geopolitical sites and
infrastructure in the homeland. SHORAD systems are emplaced in the National Capital Region,
encompassing Washington, D.C. and some surrounding areas, to protect against air threats.
* "Large-scale combat operations require the execution of multiple tasks synchronized and
converged across multiple domains to create opportunities to destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and
isolate enemy forces" (FM 3-0). SHORAD battalions may operate as part of ADA battalion task
forces or independently in support of maneuver, fixed, and semi-fixed assets designated by a
division, corps, or higher commander. See chapter 6 for more information on the execution of
SHORAD operations.
* Consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set
the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other
legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). During transition, SHORAD assets provide air defense for
maneuver, fixed, and semi-fixed assets; an air picture to the supported team; and security.
SHORAD supports the specific mission of the supported commander against air threats. SHORAD
employment should remain flexible to support dynamic changes to the mission or task organization. While
SHORAD employments are facilitated by principles and tenets, there are no set deployment directives.
Fundamentally, SHORAD deployments, like all AMD deployments, are governed by operational needs with
considerations of requirements, anticipated operational environment/threat, and the availability of ADA
resources.
SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE IN THE DIVISION
A SHORAD battalion may be organic or assigned to the division. If not an organic element, the
battalion may be apportioned or placed in a command or support relationship (see Chapter 4). SHORAD
provides air defense of the division commander's designated critical assets.
Planning for SHORAD operations in the division is initiated by the SHORAD battalion commander
and staff upon receipt of the mission from the division commander. The AMD element works for the
SHORAD battalion commander and advises the commander and staff of division plans and operations.
SHORAD battalion commander works with the AMD element and protection cell in identifying and planning
the defense of critical assets and other protection requirements. The battalion commander advises the division
commander and staff on AMD operations. The AMD element prepares the AMD portion of the fires
annex/plan in coordination with the commander. The AMD element synchronizes AMD plans and
requirements with other divisional staff elements, such as the fires cell and logistics sections. AMD cell
personnel also collaborate with the battalion staff in integrating ADA organizations placed in support of the
division or that are operating in the division's AO. For more information on the divisional AMD element, see
FM 3-01.
SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE IN SUPPORT OF THE BRIGADE
COMBAT TEAM
A SHORAD battery is generally placed in a support relationship with a BCT. SHORAD platoons may
be further task organized to support the brigade's maneuver formations. The SHORAD battery provides
dedicated air defense capabilities to the BCT augmented by the BCT's combined arms for air defense (known
as CAFAD) capabilities. SHORAD batteries have habitual training relationships with BCTs within a
division, but they will be task organized by the SHORAD battalion when conducting operations to support
the division's plan.
In support of the BCT and battalion task force, the battery or platoon maneuvers with the defended
force, deterring and defeating air attacks. The SHORAD mission is defined by the BCT or battalion task
force commander, who assigns air defense priorities. The SHORAD battery commander and platoon leaders
develop their plans to allocate SHORAD systems to protect the designated priorities. The SHORAD unit
commanders execute this plan in accordance with orders and published ROE.
The air defense airspace management (ADAM)/brigade aviation element (known as the BAE) cell is
the primary Army airspace control element for the BCT. ADA personnel in the cell facilitate the BCT's |
3-01.44 | 24 | Chapter 2
awareness of the air environment. ADA personnel advise the BCT commander and staff of air engagements,
coordinate for or with supporting ADA task-organized units, and assist in coordinating the airspace to enable
rapid, unimpeded engagements. ADAM cell personnel maintain continuous contact with the SHORAD
battery commander, ensuring that the commander is aware of the BCT's plans and that battery operations are
synchronized with those of the BCT. The ADAM cell, in coordination with the SHORAD battery commander
and executive officer, develops the air defense appendix of the fires annex for the BCT operation plan or
order.
SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL
The Forward Area Air Defense C2 system-of-systems is fielded to SHORAD units and consists of
common hardware, software, communications equipment, and shelters to meet the C2 and engagement needs
of SHORAD battalions. Forward Area Air Defense C2 supports the AMD mission by providing near-real-
time early warning and cueing information, correlated air track and C2 information, and intelligence
assessments to higher, adjacent, and subordinate SHORAD units. Computer displays allow commanders to
access the air picture, situation reports, enemy assessments, and friendly forces. The Forward Area Air
Defense C2 system has the capability to interface with other Army C2 systems through the Air and Missile
Defense Workstation. The Air and Missile Defense Workstation is integrated in Forward Area Air Defense
C2-equipped battalions at the ADA battery and battalion command posts, as well as in the Air Defense
Planning and Control System at divisions. The Forward Area Air Defense C2 provides air situational
awareness to the supported force and alerts and cues SHORAD weapons. The Forward Area Air Defense C2
systems support Land-based Phalanx Weapon System batteries by receiving and correlating sensor inputs
and then alerting the intercept system and the sense and warn elements of an impending RAM attack.
SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE PLANNING, PREPARING AND
EXECUTION
SHORAD planning is a continuous process which occurs at all levels of command. The area air defense
commander at the theater level publishes the area air defense plan which provides critical planning
information to include identification criteria, weapon control statuses, air defense warnings and self-defense
criteria. The area air defense plan establishes a baseline from which further planning can occur and is
regularly modified via the publication of subsequent orders and special instructions. The SHORAD air
defense plan at the BCT and battalion level is developed using the subordinate area air defense plans and
AMD orders from the SHORAD unit's higher headquarters. As the plan is being developed, the SHORAD
commander begins preparing the unit for the mission. Preparation includes reconnaissance and defense
design (which considers selection and occupation of position), crew and unit rehearsals and drills, and
continuous coordination with the supported element and the parent ADA unit. Chapters four, five and six
address planning, preparing, and execution in detail.
SHORAD operations are baselined on centralized planning and decentralized execution. This is driven
by both the typical organization of SHORAD battalions (in the divisional construct, SHORAD batteries are
task organized under separate BCTs) and the reality that SHORAD weapon systems can often be located
many miles from their parent headquarters. Decentralized execution of SHORAD operations places
engagement decisions at the individual crew and weapons system. This increases the likelihood that a hostile
aircraft or missile will be engaged as soon as it comes within range of an ADA weapon system. |
3-01.44 | 25 | Chapter 3
Threats to be Countered by Short-Range Air Defense
This chapter summarizes the air threats facing Army and joint forces that SHORAD
must counter. The summaries are generic threat capability descriptions. The threats to
be countered are UASs, manned helicopters, manned fixed-wing aircraft, RAM, cruise
missiles, and tactical air-to-surface missiles. In addition to air threats, SHORAD forces
must contend with electromagnetic and cyberspace attacks as well as ground attacks
by enemy forces, common threats to all Army and joint forces.
THREAT OVERVIEW
In the past, U.S. forces have enjoyed relative advantages over their adversaries with superior
capabilities in the air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace domains. However, adversaries of the past have
become near-peer threats, able to challenge U.S. operations in all of these domains. U.S. adversaries have
closely observed emerging U.S. capabilities and have focused their capabilities and approaches that create or
exploit U.S. vulnerabilities while avoiding U.S. strengths.
Today's air threats continue to evolve in capability and quantity, with a trend toward a greater
investment in UASs, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. Within the last decade, the air and missile arsenals
of today's adversaries have become more robust, diverse, and complex. Newer missile and some indirect fire
threats can maneuver in various stages of flight. Not only do our adversaries have access to the increasingly
sophisticated ballistic missiles, but they also have a growing array of cruise missiles, UASs, and RAM. Many
of these are increasingly available on the world market. Additionally, traditional air threats will still exist in
the world of tomorrow. Helicopters continue to pose a significant lethal hazard for ground forces. Fixed-wing
aircraft continue to evolve as expensive but highly capable weapon systems. All of these air and missile
threats must be addressed by Army and joint AMD forces within the context of anti-access/area denial
operations and of defeating increasingly sophisticated countermeasures, electromagnetic attack, and
cyberspace efforts.
The threat will attempt to develop an overmatch in an area to mitigate the capabilities of the U.S. force.
One area of possible overmatch is advanced electromagnetic attack, in which a threat system jams or spoofs
across the electromagnetic spectrum in an attempt to hamper an ADA system's ability to detect or engage a
threat platform or projectile. As the ADA force becomes more network centric, a sophisticated cyberspace
attack could potentially hamper the AMD network's ability to support the detection, identification, or
engagement of a target. Another tactic is a complex integrated attack which is designed to overwhelm defense
of a site by employing different capabilities. A complex integrated attack is a synchronized attack of a
friendly asset by a mix of air and missile threats arriving near-simultaneously from different directions,
altitudes, and range (FM 3-01). This mix may include any or all air and missile threats. Complex integrated
attacks will likely be supported by enemy activities in other domains, such as jamming efforts in the
cyberspace domain, as noted above, and special operations forces' attacks in the land domain.
Threat special operations forces can attack from any direction; ADA systems have a limited force
protection capability, large perimeters, and vulnerability to special operations force attacks if force protection
is not coordinated with and supplemented by the supported unit.
Potential adversaries are investing in anti-access strategies and area-denial capabilities to counter the
U.S. ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish
assigned missions. The concept of anti-access/area denial is to control the access into and movement within
a region. Preclusion is the combination of anti-access and area denial methods that seeks to influence the
ability of an enemy, outside the region, to introduce forces into the theater and sustain combat power. |
3-01.44 | 26 | Chapter 3
THREAT SET
The emerging air and missile threat set is diverse and complex, encompassing a wide range of air and
indirect fire threats to be countered by SHORAD. The air threats are UASs, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft,
cruise missiles, and tactical air-to-surface missiles. The indirect fire threat consists of RAM.
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
An unmanned aircraft system is that system whose components include the necessary equipment,
network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft (JP 3-30). Threat UASs are categorized in groups (1-
5), typically based on weight, operating altitude, and speed. Groups 1 through 3 (table 3-1) are considered to
be small UASs and are particularly dangerous due to the challenges which they present to friendly sensor
systems for detection and identification and for weapon systems to consistently defeat them given their low
and slow kinematic profile. These UASs are the targets for SHORAD systems.
Table 3-1. UAS groups
Speed / Altitude Characteristics
Group 1 Normally operates below 1,200 Generally hand-launched.
Micro / Mini feet AGL at speeds less than 100 Real time video and control.
UAS knots Small payloads; focus on reconnaissance, surveillance, and
intelligence operations.
Operates within LOS of user (limited range).
Group 2 Normally operates below 3,500 Launched in unimproved areas by a small number of personnel.
feet AGL at speeds less than 250
Small Tactical Medium range and endurance.
knots
Payload focus: reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence
operations; may add weapons.
Requires LOS to ground control station.
Group 3 Normally operates below 18,000 Launched in unimproved areas by a small number of personnel.
feet MSL at speeds less than 250
Tactical Range and endurance vary significantly.
knots
Payload focus: reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence
operations; may add weapons.
Requires larger logistics footprint than Groups 1 and 2.
Group 4 Normally operates below 18,000 Can be used both strategically and tactically.
Persistent feet MSL at any speed Requires a runway for launch and recovery.
Extended range and endurance.
Payloads: reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence operations, and
ASM weapons.
Operates at medium-to-high altitudes.
Group 5 Normally operates higher than Strategic-level asset.
Penetrating 18,000 feet MSL at any speed Requires an improved runway for launch and recovery.
Greatest range, endurance, and airspeed.
Payloads: suite of optics for targeting and weaponry for
engagements.
Operates at medium-to-high altitudes.
Logistics footprint similar to that of a manned aircraft.
AGL above ground level LOS line of sight UAS unmanned aircraft system
ASM air-to-surface munition MSL mean sea level
UASs include drones, characterized by preprogrammed flight paths and patterns, and remotely piloted
vehicles generally controlled by ground-based operators. Some UASs may implement both drone and
remotely piloted flight control types. Each can perform a variety of missions, ranging from reconnaissance
and battlefield surveillance to attack and electromagnetic warfare. UASs have extensive commercial
applications and, as a result, are readily available and arguably the most developed system in many armies
around the world. |
3-01.44 | 27 | Threats to be Countered by Short-Range Air Defense
Due to the prolific use of unmanned systems, commercial off-the-shelf UASs are readily available and
can be weaponized with relative ease. There are over 1,000 current and developing UAS programs worldwide
today. UASs are typically comprised of a control element, communication systems, support elements, an
unmanned aircraft, a payload or pod, and a human element.
UASs serve as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms for target detection,
identification, and location; weapon targeting; target designation; and battle damage assessment. State-of-
the-art sensors and data links provide real-time targeting for fire support systems, maneuver forces, and
aircraft. UASs equipped with laser designators provide immediate targeting assistance and terminal guidance
of munitions. UAS platforms also can serve as a means for weapons delivery or may themselves serve as the
weapon, and have been used extensively to attack high payoff targets without endangering pilots.
UASs have relatively low radar cross sections, low speed, and low thermal signatures, thus making
them difficult to detect, track, and engage. They may enter a friendly area of operations from multiple
directions. Mission-dictated flight profiles take full advantage of terrain, increasing system survivability and
optimizing coverage. Flight altitudes for UASs vary by their size and mission. UASs conducting intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance missions operate at altitudes consistent with their sensor systems. They
normally fly at altitudes safe from small arms fire; UASs which SHORAD forces may encounter can stand
off and detect from up to 25 kilometers.
MANNED ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT
Most countries maintain helicopter fleets to support military operations. While the majority of
helicopters can be armed to perform a variety of roles, the attack helicopter poses the greatest threat to
maneuver forces. The versatility and survivability of helicopters make them ideal for use in most combat
areas.
Threat ground force commanders rely primarily on helicopters to fulfill direct air support requirements.
Helicopters can perform a variety of missions, including reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target
acquisition; weapon targeting; target designation; battle damage assessment; troop insertion; and target
attack. Hovering and low-flying helicopters, taking full advantage of terrain masking, are difficult to acquire
and target.
An especially challenging ingress technique is nap-of-the-earth flying, in which a helicopter hovers at
a masked point, dashes to the next mask point, and hovers again. This technique is challenging because of
short exposure times and varying between near-zero Doppler and moderate Doppler velocities.
Improvements in fire control and weapon capabilities enable helicopters to search, acquire, and fire at ground
targets from longer standoff ranges, thus increasing their survivability and effectiveness.
MANNED FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
Air power remains essential to virtually every type of military operation, and it will continue to play a
role in future conflicts despite the emergence of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. There are more than
40,000 operational military aircraft today; some 10,000 were produced during the Cold War era and are
currently in third world inventories. Over 50 countries have an aviation industry of some kind, and over 20
countries design their own aircraft.
Manned fixed-wing combat aircraft are highly flexible and can perform a variety of missions in
offensive and defensive operations: air interdiction, strategic attack, suppression of enemy air defense, close
air support, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Fixed-wing aircraft can employ a variety of
munitions, including bombs, guns, rockets, cruise missiles, and tactical air-to-surface missiles. Integrated
navigation/bombing computers and related mission equipment provide new combat aircraft with a precision-
strike capability, day or night and in bad weather.
New aircraft incorporate such features as radar warning receivers, on-board jammers, chaff, flares, and
a lower radar cross section to improve survivability and mission success rate. In addition, the proliferation of
fixed-wing aircraft throughout the world increases the probability that opposing forces may employ the same
type of aircraft in a conflict; this exacerbates the already challenging problem of identification. |
3-01.44 | 28 | Chapter 3
ROCKETS, ARTILLERY, AND MORTARS
RAM are traditional indirect fire threats to ground forces. These systems vary in size and effect.
Rockets and artillery are usually fired from towed or self-propelled platforms while mortars are frequently
transported by dismounted crews.
Rockets are unguided projectiles that generally fly ballistic trajectories with a short boost phase and
unpowered flight. The most common type of warhead is high explosive with a point detonating fuse. Rockets
are commonly fired from self-propelled platforms known as multiple rocket launchers. Multiple rocket
launchers may fire large volleys of rockets (20 to 40) with multiple launchers being used in a volley. Rockets
come in many calibers such as 57-millimeter, 68-millimeter, 80-millimeter, 81-millimeter, 107-millimeter,
120-millimeter, 122-millimeter, and 127-millimeter, and have ranges of 10 to 40 kilometers. Their high rate
of fire, potential short reaction time, and volume of fire make them a stressing threat. Hybrid and irregular
forces have used rockets as harassing fire, with improvised firing methods and delays to limit counterfire
effects.
Artillery and mortar rounds are also unpowered and traditionally fly ballistic trajectories, though
emerging artillery rounds may have maneuvering capabilities. All known armies throughout the world have
some form of artillery. The most common artillery calibers are 122-millimeter, 152-millimeter, and 155-
millimeter. Unless using rocket assisted projectiles, artillery systems are generally limited to 20 to 30
kilometers. The most common mortar calibers are 60 to 120-millimeter, but include many variants, such as
81-millimeter, 82-millimeter, 100-millimeter, and 160-millimeter.
CRUISE MISSILES
Cruise missiles can travel at low-to-high supersonic or high subsonic speeds, are self-navigating, and
can fly non-ballistic trajectories at very low to very high atmospheric altitudes. Cruise missiles are reliable,
accurate, survivable, and lethal. They can be launched from the land, air, or sea. Today's cruise missile can
hit a target with remarkable accuracy; tomorrow's smarter, maneuverable, more accurate missile will pose a
far greater threat.
Cruise missiles pose serious threats because of technological advancements and their operational
characteristics. The incorporation of new technologies in airframe and warhead design, propulsion systems,
and guidance systems has contributed to vastly improved systems. The increased use of composite materials
in airframe construction has created stronger and lighter airframes. A range of low observable and stealth
technologies has reduced their radar cross sections. The use of air-breathing turbojet and turbofan engines
has given cruise missiles a longer range and the capability to fly at high, subsonic speeds and altitudes lower
than 50 meters above ground level. Their flight paths can be programmed using sophisticated guidance
systems, such as the Global Positioning System, inertial navigation systems, and terrain contour matching.
Their guidance systems contribute to overall accuracy, optimize surprise, and help avoid air defenses. A
terminal guidance seeker increases accuracy to less than 10 meters. A wide array of warheads, including
individually targetable submunitions, allows targeting of both soft and hard targets. Operationally, they are
difficult to detect, can fly indirect routes at low altitudes to avoid heavily defended areas, and can attack from
any direction.
TACTICAL AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES
Tactical-air-to-surface missiles are air-launched, precision-guided munitions designed to strike ground
targets. They are ideal against targets such as bridges that are difficult to destroy with conventional dumb
bombs. Tactical air-to-surface missiles are an extremely lethal threat because of their versatility and pinpoint
accuracy.
Most variants employ radio-command, laser, anti-radiation homing, or electro-optical guidance
systems. Missiles that employ anti-radiation homing systems are referred to as anti-radiation missiles; they
represent the greatest threat to radars such as those employed by SHORAD forces. |
3-01.44 | 29 | Threats to be Countered by Short-Range Air Defense
ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE AND CYBERSPACE
Electromagnetic warfare and cyberspace threats are continuously present throughout the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels of warfare. Electromagnetic warfare consists of the threat's ability to detect
U.S. emitters (radar and communications) and then deny, degrade, disrupt, or destroy those emitters and other
electromagnetic spectrum dependent devices.
The most common form of tactical electromagnetic attack is electromagnetic jamming. Jamming
consists of an emitter radiating electromagnetic energy to prevent a radar receiver from discerning the
expected return from the background noise or a radio from receiving voice or data. Advanced jamming
techniques allow the threat to project false location, speed, and altitude creating confusion for radar operators.
Regional powers, peer states, and transnational terrorist organizations have personnel with capabilities
of conducting cyberspace attacks on installations and sites. Cyberspace attacks are expected against C2
nodes, theater and tactical data and voice networks, information systems, radars and their tracking and
targeting systems, and missile guidance packages. The threat is expected to use cyberspace attacks in
conjunction with physical attacks as part of a larger campaign. Cyberspace threats can prevent target
detection, tracking, and engagement of threat munitions and platforms.
THREAT APPLICATION
Air threat employment against U.S. ground forces will vary from country to country. This employment
will be driven by threat equipment, capability, organizational structure, military-political goals, and such
other factors as terrain, weather, time, and friendly air defenses likely encountered.
By understanding air threat proliferation and equipment, the commander can make assumptions on
how a threat may employ air assets to interdict U.S. operations. The following information describes the type
of threat that may be associated with anti-access and area denial and large-scale combat operations.
Potential adversaries are investing in anti-access strategies and area-denial capabilities to counter the
U.S. ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish
assigned missions. Entry forces in an anti-access and area denial environment may deploy in an air inferiority
or air parity environment. The threat will use all available aerial assets against lucrative targets such as air
and sea ports, assembly areas, and supply points in the areas of debarkation. The challenge to the SHORAD
commander during this phase will be UASs conducting reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target
acquisition operations supporting targeting of troop and logistical concentrations by low-altitude attack
aircraft and missiles.
As U.S. forces buildup, threat UASs will focus on locating unit movements, gathering information on
unit sizes and strengths, and determining their follow-on movements. Information obtained by
reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition will be relayed back to commanders who
can be expected to use any attack means necessary to inflict maximum casualties, inhibit momentum, and
destroy forces. These aerial attack systems could be rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, cruise missiles, lethal
UASs, or combinations thereof in synchronized attacks.
The threat can counter large-scale combat operations with a myriad of aerial platforms. UASs will
provide the threat commander the necessary information to determine friendly unit locations, movements,
and objectives. Air and RAM strikes will be generated from the information collected about such targets as
maneuver forces, forward arming and refueling points, C2 nodes, artillery assets, and reserve troop
concentrations. Lethal UASs can be effective in disabling C2 nodes or destroying armored vehicles. Cruise
missiles could be used against logistics concentrations, C2 nodes, or with sub-munitions for area denial.
Helicopters could be used to attack forward elements and the flanks of the advancing maneuver forces to
slow their tempo, cause confusion, and thereby inflict maximum casualties. Attack helicopters constitute the
most widespread and capable air threat to ground forces in the close battle.
Threat ground forces, especially special operations forces, are a constant danger to AMD assets as they
are considered to be critical targets. Ground forces can attack from any direction against SHORAD units
which have limited force protection capabilities, large perimeters, and are quite vulnerable if force protection
is not coordinated with and complemented by the supported unit. |
3-01.44 | 30 | Chapter 3
During friendly offensive operations, threat forces will attempt to use their maneuver and fire support
assets to regain the initiative. UASs will conduct reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target
acquisition operations to support targeting and maneuver. Helicopters will be used as either dedicated attack
assets or armed utility helicopters. Helicopter assets can be used in attack, air insertion, or reconnaissance.
Helicopters in the attack will usually consist of at least two or more (taking full advantage of cover and
concealment) with the mission of disrupting friendly operations. Helicopters in the reconnaissance role will
operate in the same manner as UASs to support artillery targeting and maneuver. In some cases, helicopters
will be used in conjunction with threat armored forces to deter friendly penetrations. Threat fixed-wing
aircraft usage may be limited but cannot be counted out.
During defensive operations, friendly forces are the most vulnerable to the full spectrum of threat aerial
platforms. The enemy will attempt to use aerial platforms to monitor friendly forces for targeting. The number
one challenge to the SHORAD platoon will be to deny the enemy's use of air reconnaissance, intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition assets. An enemy will use UASs, helicopters, and possibly fixed-wing
aircraft to determine the locations of friendly artillery, C2 nodes, ADA assets, logistical sites, and troop
concentration areas. Once these sites are located, threat forces will likely disrupt or destroy these sites with
the use of RAM, air attacks, and air insertion.
Artillery and rockets will be the enemy's preferred weapons against U.S. forces and ADA assets. These
weapons are usually numerous, inexpensive, survivable, and highly effective. UASs will be employed to
provide targeting data and attack critical assets. Attacks by helicopters and fixed-wing are less likely due to
the low survivability of these systems. Enemy air-insertion operations will be conducted by either fixed-wing
assets or helicopters and probably during the hours of limited visibility.
SUMMARY
The air, missile, and RAM threats, as standalone systems or complemented by electromagnetic
warfare/cyberspace and other capabilities in the land and space domains, create formidable challenges to
SHORAD systems and the Army and joint forces that SHORAD units defend. Table 3-2 provides a summary
of these threats, their primary targets, and their capabilities and trends.
Table 3-2. Air, missile, and electromagnetic warfare/cyberspace threats
System Targets Capabilities Trends
Category
Unmanned Assembly areas, Multi-mission – More missions – decoy,
Aircraft logistical areas, reconnaissance, suppression of enemy air
Systems C2 centers (seeing) surveillance, and target defenses, and
acquisition; electromagnetic electromagnetic attack
(Groups 1-3)
Troop movements warfare; attack
Standoff range in excess
(seeing)
Range up to 125 kilometers; of 25 kilometers
C2 centers (jamming) altitude near-ground to 17+
Detection to 40
Maneuver kilometers (dependent on kilometers; all weather,
formations/systems group) day/night
(attacking) Standoff/detection to 25
Perch and stare ability
kilometers (dependent on
group) Low radar signature
Payloads – daylight Low thermal signature
television, cameras, missiles,
laser designators,
retransmitters |
3-01.44 | 31 | Threats to be Countered by Short-Range Air Defense
Table 3-2. Air, missile, and electromagnetic warfare/cyberspace threats (continued)
System Targets Capabilities Trends
Category
Helicopters Troops/armored Multi-role – attack; Modular upgrades to
vehicles reconnaissance, surveillance, airframes
and target acquisition;
Convoys Expanded night/adverse
electromagnetic warfare
weather capability
C2 centers
Combat diameters out to 460
Improved fire control
kilometers; terrain
systems/engagement
masking/hovering
capability – at greater
Payloads – daylight TV, ranges
cameras, missiles, laser
Improved
designators, retransmitters
countermeasures
Fixed-Wing Ports Multi-role – close air support; Multi- versus single-
Aircraft Assembly/logistical reconnaissance, surveillance, mission aircraft
and target acquisition;
areas Greater use of standoff
electromagnetic attack;
C2 centers interdiction; strategic attack;
and precision
Geo-political/ suppression of enemy air Reduced radar and
population centers defenses infrared signatures
Maneuver force Precision strike Integrated
electromagnetic attack
vehicles/ formations Equipment – missiles, rockets,
bombs, submunitions, guns Proliferation increases
identification challenges
Rockets, Troops/armored Variable payload Extended ranges
Artillery, and vehicles Saturation of airspace Improved accuracy
Mortars Fixed/semi-fixed
Mass fires Greater lethality
sites
Easily moved/relocated
Cruise High-value 30-3,000 kilometer range Increased number of land
Missiles military/industrial 360-degree threat; very low attack variants
complexes
radar signature Reduced radar signatures
Airports and
Air, sea, or ground launched Improved accuracy and
seaports
increased range
Warheads – conventional,
Logistical areas
weapons of mass destruction,
C2 centers submunitions
Maneuver force
concentrations
Tactical Air- Armored vehicles >100 kilometer range Improved accuracy and
to-Surface Radars Supersonic speeds (Mach 3) lethality
Missiles Lock-on-after-launch or
Bridges or other Extremely accurate
loitering
point targets
Radio-command, laser, anti-
Dual/tri mode seekers –
ADA sites radiation, or electro-optical
increased reliability and
guidance
all weather capability |
3-01.44 | 32 | Chapter 3
Table 3-2. Air, missile, and electromagnetic warfare/cyberspace threats (continued)
System Targets Capabilities Trends
Category
Electromagnetic C2 nodes Disrupt data and voice Cyberspace attacks in
Warfare and Tactical data and communications conjunction with physical
Cyberspace voice information, Locate C2 nodes for attacks
networks, and targeting Expanded attempts to
systems penetrate networks for
Disrupt targeting and
data collection and
Theater data and guidance systems
exploitation
voice information,
Electromagnetic warfare
networks, and Growing sophistication of
techniques, such as
systems threats
interception and spoofing, to
ADA radars gain information on planning Increased exposure of
and operations tactical systems to
ADA tracking and
cyberspace threats as
targeting systems Radar jamming
office systems are
Missile and UAS Electromagnetic pulse to combined with tactical
guidance systems incapacitate electronic systems
systems
ADA air defense artillery C2 command and control UAS unmanned aircraft system |
3-01.44 | 33 | Chapter 4
Planning for Short-Range Air Defense Operations
“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week” –
GEN George S. Patton
Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired
future and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning
helps commanders create and communicate a common vision with their staffs,
subordinate commanders, and unified action partners. This chapter describes the
SHORAD operation planning processes. Though the depth and scope of planning
varies by echelon, all SHORAD planning is baselined on the military decision-making
process (MDMP); IPB process; criticality, vulnerability, and threat methodology; and
troop leading procedures (TLP).
INTRODUCTION
Planning is a balance between the science of the staff planner and the art of the commander. All
planning is based on imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future. Planning cannot predict exactly
what the effect of the operations will be, how enemies will behave, or how civilians will respond to the
friendly force or the enemy. Nonetheless, the understanding and learning that occur during the planning
process have great value. Planning activities occupy a continuum ranging from conceptual to detailed. The
conceptual end will focus on understanding the operational environment and the problem, determining the
desired end state, establishing objectives, and sequencing the operation in broad terms. On the other end,
detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. It works out
the scheduling, coordination, synchronizing and directing the force.
Fundamental to the development of SHORAD plans are three Army integrating processes: MDMP,
IPB, and TLP. These processes are augmented by the AMD criticality, vulnerability and threat methodology.
Descriptions of the MDMP, IPB, TLP, and criticality, vulnerability and threat methodology follow; specific
application of each to SHORAD planning is presented in the SHORAD battalion and battery planning
sections.
The MDMP is an iterative planning methodology, used at battalion level and above, to understand the
situation and mission, develop a course of action (COA), and produce an operation plan or order. The MDMP
combines the conceptual and detailed aspects of planning and integrates the activities of the commander,
staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners throughout the planning process. The MDMP helps leaders
apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand situations,
develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. See FM 6-0 for more information.
The IPB is a collaborative staff effort led by intelligence personnel to develop and sustain an
understanding of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. IPB begins in planning and continues
throughout the operations process. IPB products are developed and continuously updated to facilitate
situational understanding and assist commanders and staffs in identifying relevant aspects within the AO and
area of interest that can affect mission accomplishment. See ATP 3-01.16 for information on AMD IPB
techniques.
TLP is a dynamic process used by company-level and smaller unit leaders to plan and prepare for
operations. TLP extend the battalion and higher level MDMP to the small-unit level and enable small-unit
leaders, such as SHORAD section and team chiefs, to maximize available planning time. SHORAD unit TLP
are also considered in the development of a supported unit's MDMP. See ADP 5-0 for more information. |
3-01.44 | 34 | Chapter 4
The criticality, vulnerability, and threat methodology is a tool used to assist in the allocation of ADA
forces to mission requirements. It begins with an understanding of the supported commander's air defense
protection priorities, determined in accordance with the unit's scheme of maneuver, projected threats, and
terrain where the operation will take place. Protection priorities may include units, such as the main effort
BCT or division artillery; a semi-fixed asset, such as a forward arm and refuel point; or events, such as a river
crossing or passage of lines. The importance of each asset is analyzed with respect to its criticality to the
mission, vulnerability, and likelihood of being surveilled or attacked. These high value assets are incorporated
into a protection prioritization list, normally identified by phase of operation.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE PLANNING
The basis for all AMD planning is the area air defense plan. The area air defense plan is the theater-
level plan that delineates AMD guidance and directs efforts in support of the joint force commander's
operation plan. The area air defense commander develops the area air defense plan, supported by
representatives from the Army air and missile defense command and other service commands. The joint force
commander approves the plan. From the area air defense plan and the airspace control plan, defense designers
will extract identification criteria, specific instruction for implementation of the rules of engagement, airspace
coordinating measures, air defense measures, air defense warnings, and self-defense criteria, and, as
applicable, coordinate the integration of multinational AMD elements.
Army AMD planning is conducted at all echelons, from the Army air and missile defense command to
ADA batteries and platoons. At each level of command, planning begins with the receipt of a mission from
higher headquarters and culminates in the issuance of an operation plan or order. Planning for SHORAD
operations must key on developing an air defense scheme of maneuver that defeats air threats before they
can accomplish their missions. Because enemy air operations are often part of an integrated air attack plan,
air defense planning at all levels must support the higher echelon plan. Simultaneously, the planning of
SHORAD operations must be fully integrated with the supported force's plan to enable the maneuver force's
freedom of action. Without this integration, the air defense effort is not unified, the chances of fratricide
increase, and mission success decreases.
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
Command and support relationships provide the basis for unity of effort and are essential to successful
mission accomplishment. Command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit
commanders and identify the degree of control of the gaining commander. Command responsibility and
authority varies depending on the type of command relationships between units. Army support relationships
define specific arrangements and responsibilities between supporting and supported units. Establishing clear
command and support relationships are fundamental to organization of any operation.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
There are five types of command relationship: organic, assign, attach, operational control, and tactical
control. For additional discussion of these relationships, see ADP 5-0.
* Organic are those assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed in
its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the
operating forces for the Navy (JP 1). Organic SHORAD forces, for instance, have command
relationships with all other organic forces organized with its headquarters.
* Assign is to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively
permanent and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the
primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel (JP 3-0). Assigned
SHORAD forces have command relationships with the gaining unit, are assigned positions by that
unit's commander, and have priorities established by that commander or by a subordinate
commander if so delegated.
* Attach is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively
temporary (JP 3-0). Attached SHORAD forces have command relationships with the gaining ADA
unit and are assigned positions and have priorities established by that unit's commander. Attached |
3-01.44 | 35 | Planning for Short-Range Air Defense Operations
units are subject to limitations specified in the attachment order. The attachment order should
clearly state the administrative and support responsibility of the gaining unit to the attached unit.
When a SHORAD unit is attached, the supported force provides administrative and logistical
support to it.
* Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate
forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating
objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission (JP 1). A
commander is provided another unit to accomplish specific missions or tasks that are usually
limited by function, time, or location. When operational control is the appropriate command
relationship, it should only be maintained for brief periods of time. Also, it should never be
assigned when the parent unit has the capability to exercise effective control. Operational control
does not of itself include administrative or logistical control. Control of administrative or logistical
support must be specified in the order for operational control. Command relationships, positions,
and priorities are established by the gaining ADA unit.
* Tactical control is the authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of
movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks
assigned (JP 1). The gaining ADA unit establishes command relationships, positions, and
priorities.
SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
The four support relationships are direct support, general support, reinforcing, and general support-
reinforcing (see figure 4-1 on page 4-4). Support relationships alone may not be sufficient to ensure properly
resourced and maintained units. Prior coordination between commanders and supported unit staffs is
necessary to ensure subordinate units can operate independently of the parent unit when necessary.
* Direct Support. A SHORAD unit with a direct support mission provides dedicated air defense for
a specific element of the force which has none. The SHORAD unit provides close and continuous
support and coordinates its movement and positioning with the supported unit.
* General Support. A SHORAD unit with a general support mission provides air defense for the
force as a whole. It is not committed to any specific element of the force. This relationship is
commonly used to protect corps- and division-level assets.
* Reinforcing. A SHORAD unit with a reinforcing mission augments the coverage of another ADA
unit or strengthens the defense of the force. Reinforcing SHORAD units are positioned to protect
one or more of the reinforced units' priorities as specified by supported ADA unit commanders.
* General Support-Reinforcing. A SHORAD unit with a general support-reinforcing mission
provides support for the force as a whole and augments the coverage of another ADA unit. The
supporting units must coordinate with the augmented ADA units to reinforce the coverage of
assets in the AO. |
3-01.44 | 36 | Chapter 4
Table 4-1. Air defense artillery support relationships matrix
DIRECT GENERAL GENERAL
SUPPORT
ISSUE SUPPORT SUPPORT REINFORCING
REINFORCING
Who establishes The supported The ADA commander The supported The ADA commander
priorities? commander. who established the commander. who established the
support relationship. support relationship.
Who positions ADA The ADA commander The ADA commander The ADA commander The ADA commander
fire units? with the approval of in coordination with with approval of in coordination with
the support local ground reinforced ADA the reinforced ADA
commander. commander. commander. commander.
Who coordinates for The supported The ADA commander The reinforced ADA ADA commander who
terrain used by ADA commander. who established the commander. established the
fire units? support relationship. support relationship.
With whom should The supported unit. As required. As required and the As required and the
liaison be reinforced ADA unit. reinforced ADA unit.
established?
With whom should The supported unit. As required. As required and the As required and the
communications be reinforced ADA unit. reinforced ADA unit.
established?
ADA air defense artillery
SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE BATTALION PLANNING
The SHORAD battalion commander and staff use the MDMP process to develop the air defense plan.
The plan is developed in parallel with the battalion's next higher headquarters. In the following discussions,
the next higher headquarters is a division. During garrison operations, prior to receipt of mission, the
SHORAD battalion intelligence staff officer (S-2) must develop a comprehensive database of known threat
aircraft and missile systems (to include UASs) and train all S-2 section personnel on how the enemy normally
fights with those systems. The division assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) may not have personnel
with expertise on the enemy air threat and may rely on the SHORAD battalion S-2 to provide that expertise
during mission planning.
MDMP Step 1–Receipt of mission. SHORAD battalion planning begins with the receipt of a mission
from the division. The SHORAD battalion commander receives the division commander's guidance and
develops supporting guidance to lead the staff's planning effort. The SHORAD battalion commander is
directly responsible to the division commander for the division's air defense plan and integrates air defense
planning with the division staff (through the AMD section) throughout the MDMP. Additionally, if there is
a corps ADA brigade unit, such as a Patriot battery, placed in support of the division, the SHORAD battalion
commander addresses that unit in the division plan and scheme of maneuver. The SHORAD battalion
commander depends on the AMD section in the division for accurate and timely information during this stage
of planning. If the situation permits, the battalion commander may move to the planning cell, at the division
main operations center, to best influence the planning cycle during the deliberate decision-making process.
If the hasty decision-making process is being used, the battalion commander relies on the division AMD
section to keep informed.
* At this stage, commanders provide guidance to their staffs based upon their visualization of the
operation. Planning guidance conveys the essence of the commander's visualization, including a
description of the operational approach. Effective planning guidance reflects how the commander
sees the operation unfolding. The commander's planning guidance broadly describes when, where,
and how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the
higher commander's intent. Broad and general guidance gives the staff and subordinate leader's
maximum latitude; it lets staffs develop flexible and effective options.
* Commanders modify planning guidance based on staff and subordinate unit inputs and changing
conditions during different stages of planning and throughout the operations process. Based on the
commander's initial planning guidance, the staff can issue an initial warning order (WARNORD)
to the SHORAD batteries, which includes, at a minimum, the type of operation, the general
location of the operation, the initial timeline and any movement or reconnaissance to initiate. |
3-01.44 | 37 | Planning for Short-Range Air Defense Operations
* Each planning staff is different and habitual associations between the ADA battalion and batteries
and their supported formations are critical to successful planning and execution of the missions.
MDMP Step 2–Mission analysis. During this step, the staff analyzes all aspects of the mission and the
higher headquarters’ plan. The battalion commander focuses on the mission and the specific roles of the
battalion. The commander and staff review the division’s protection prioritization list and analyze which
assets can be defended with the available SHORAD units. The resulting linkage of SHORAD forces to
designated assets constitutes the protected asset list. The end products are the unit's restated mission,
commander's initial guidance, mission analysis brief, intelligence estimate, and WARNORD.
* Upon receipt of a WARNORD or mission, the SHORAD battalion S-2 conducts an IPB which
includes air avenues of approach. The battalion S-2 provides the SHORAD battalion's air IPB for
inclusion in the G-2's comprehensive IPB products. To predict how the enemy will use aerial
platforms, the S-2 must develop refined IPB products. This process consists of four steps: define
the battlefield environment, describe the battlefield effects, evaluate the threat, and determine
potential threat COAs.
* The S-2 leads the staff in the development of the battalion's IPB, which directly supports the
decision-making process. Every commander and staff member needs to understand and apply IPB
during the planning process. In an immature theater, detailed threat information may not be
available. Consequently, a doctrinal template and decision support template must be produced in
the absence of real time data. Regardless of the maturity of the AO, IPB goals are the same; the
S-2 must help the commander and the staff visualize the battlefield in time and space. Working
with the battalion operations staff officer (S-3) and other staff members, the S-2 must identify
enemy fixed- and rotary-wing air avenues of approach into the division's AO as well as developing
air named area of interest (NAI) for detecting enemy aircraft/missiles in-bound to targets in the
division AO. When a change of mission is received and situation permitting, the S-2 should
accompany the battalion commander to the division main, for instance, to assist in the deliberate
decision-making process. The S-2's presence at that location makes IPB refinements immediate,
and also allows the S-2 to work directly with the G-2 to ensure receipt of the most current
information. See Appendix C for more information on the air IPB.
* The S-3 uses the criticality, vulnerability, and threat methodology to determine the allocation of
SHORAD units to the division's critical assets. After reviewing all assets on the protection
prioritization list, the S-3 considers and ranks the importance of each based upon how critical they
are to the commander's mission, how vulnerable they are to damage and reparability, and how
likely they are to be targeted by air and missile threats.
* The battalion logistics staff officer (S-4) plans for fuel and ammunition resupply, maintenance and
medical care for all units. The S-4 coordinates with the division G-4 (known as assistant chief of
staff, logistics) and logistic support units, such as the brigade support battalions of the BCTs which
the SHORAD batteries are supporting, for common sustainment needs such as food, fuel, and
equipment maintenance. The S-4 will also plan for the deployment of battalion maintenance
contact teams to support the specific SHORAD equipment needs of the deployed batteries.
* The commander develops the commander's intent for the mission and planning process and issues
guidance to the staff on potential COAs for the staff to develop. The commander's intent contains
the overall mission purpose, acceptable risk, resulting end state, prevailing AMD tenets, and any
additional information that will serve to guide the staff. Immediately after the commander gives
the planning guidance, the staff can send subordinate units a WARNORD that contains, at a
minimum, the approved mission statement, the commander's intent, changes to task organization,
unit AO sketch or overlay, commander's critical information requirements, risk guidance, specific
priorities, and an updated operational timeline.
MDMP Step 3–COA development. As a prelude to COA development, the commander briefs the
division commander and staff on the proposed air defense protected assets to support the division’s mission
and division commander’s intent. Upon acceptance, or with directed changes, the SHORAD commander
begins to size (task organize) and allocate SHORAD forces to the designated assets. Based on the mission,
IPB results and the commander's intent and guidance, the staff will begin developing courses of action. Each
COA must meet the following screening criteria: |
3-01.44 | 38 | Chapter 4
* Feasible: the COA allows mission accomplishment within the established time, space and resource
limitations.
* Acceptable: the COA balances cost and risk with the advantage gained.
* Suitable: the COA can accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's intent and
planning guidance.
* Distinguishable: each COA must differ significantly from the others.
* Complete: the COA must describe all subordinate operations that lead to mission accomplishment.
MDMP Step 4–COA analysis. COA analysis enables commanders and staffs to identify difficulties or
coordination problems as well as probable consequences of planned actions for each COA being considered.
During this step, the staff wargames the developed COAs. The wargaming process should begin with all staff
members having a thorough understanding of the S-2's updated IPB. The S-2 uses NAIs from the division G-
2's IPB to follow major enemy maneuver actions. The S-2 then integrates the aerial terrain analysis with this
ground IPB. The S-2 identifies key points where the enemy will attempt to penetrate and or exploit and where
aircraft may likely be used to best support the enemy's objective. The S-2 will then display the analysis using
a decision support template, which is a drawing showing the G-2's condensed situation template with a terrain
analysis and the appropriate ground and air avenues of approach, NAIs, target areas of interest, and decision
points. The decision support template must show activities in time and space through the entire AO.
* The SHORAD battalion staff then analyzes the battalion's response to the S-2's anticipated enemy
courses of action, focusing on developing a synchronized air defense response to the enemy's main
air attack and ensuring the battalion has an integrated response, from early warning to engagement,
for each COA. Contingency operations COAs must consider the reaction of the civilian
population, refugee control, and collateral damage. The SHORAD battalion staff needs supported
maneuver force graphics to pinpoint maneuver units which have the best potential to be in the
vicinity of the enemy's main effort. Next, the staff discusses each contingency. The staff conducts
a session to visualize the upcoming battle based on potential enemy actions, develops decision
points, and identifies them on the decision support template. Anything can happen in an operation,
and the potential decision points are thus limitless. However, the staff must assess friendly
capabilities versus enemy intentions to determine what COAs the enemy will most likely adopt
and identify these as decision points.
* The decision support matrix is the principal planning tool which allows the staff to visualize the
battlefield, courses of action, and develop a synchronized response to varied enemy actions. The
decision support matrix captures the ADA and the maneuver commanders' intents. An example of
a battalion decision support matrix is shown in table 4-2 on page 4-7. The event row depicts
activities/actions of the supported maneuver force; the intelligence row focuses on activities that
require air defense responses. |
3-01.44 | 39 | Planning for Short-Range Air Defense Operations
Table 4-2. Example of a SHORAD battalion decision support matrix
DECISION
POINT 1 2 3 4 5
UAS activity VIC Enemy squad-sized Maneuver element Forward units Engage enemy
PL Illinois. elements VIC PL VIC air NAI 2 reports report intense main body VIC PL
EVENT
Nebraska. enemy aircraft artillery fires Nebraska.
moving west along focused on friendly
AAA2 air defense assets
along AAA1 VIC PL
Delaware
Ground scouts Air defense radars Possible SEAD Probable SEAD Scouts report
report enemy UAS indicate a probable mission is underway; mission is rotary wing aircraft
INTEL
activity VIC PL FARP VIC PL hostile aircraft underway. VIC air NAI 1,
Illinois. Nebraska. imminent. along AAA1;
enemy air assault
imminent.
DS to 1st Bde. ADW: Yellow ADW: Red ADW: Red ADW: Red
ADW: Yellow WCS: WPNS WCS: WPNS TIGHT WCS: WPNS WCS: WPNS
WCS: WPNS TIGHT TIGHT FREE
ALPHA Btry LADW: Dynamite
TIGHT LADW: Lookout SOR: 1 LADW: Dynamite LADW: Dynamite
LADW: Lookout SOR: 2 Cross PL Main. SOR: 1 SOR: 1
SOR: 3 Cross PL Ohio. Cross PL Red.
Div main effort.
DS to 2d Bde. ADW: Yellow ADW: Red ADW: Red ADW: Red
ADW: Yellow WCS: WPNS WCS: WPNS TIGHT WCS: WPNS WCS: WPNS
BRAVO Btry WCS: WPNS TIGHT LADW: Dynamite TIGHT FREE
TIGHT LADW: Lookout SOR: 1 LADW: Dynamite LADW: Dynamite
LADW: Lookout SOR: 2 Cross PL Main. SOR: 1 SOR: 1
SOR: 3 Cross PL Ohio. Cross PL Red.
Div spt effort.
DS to 3d Bde. ADW: Yellow ADW: Red
ADW: Yellow WCS: WPNS WCS: WPNS TIGHT
CHARLIE Btry WCS: WPNS TIGHT LADW: Dynamite
TIGHT LADW: Lookout SOR: 1
LADW: Snowman SOR: 2
SOR: 3
Division Reserve.
GS to division. ADW: Yellow ADW: Red
ADW: Yellow WCS: WPNS WCS: WPNS TIGHT
DELTA Btry WCS: WPNS TIGHT LADW: Dynamite
TIGHT LADW: Lookout SOR: 1
LADW: Snowman SOR: 2
SOR: 3
Continue sensing Continue sensing Continue sensing Prepare for Occupy ALT
forward of PL forward of PL forward of PL passage of lines. positions; continue
BN Sensors
Ohio. MAIN. Delaware. sensing NAI's
1&2. |
3-01.44 | 40 | Chapter 4
Table 4-2. Example of a SHORAD battalion decision support matrix (continued)
DECISION POINT 1 2 3 4 5
COMMENTS A&B Btrys: Counter-recon Screening force Expect main body Provide dedicated
battle begins. battle begins. to follow artillery air defense for
Prep to cross LD.
Div trigger to cross prep. four bridges in
C&D Btrys:
LD. division sector.
Provide air
C Btry: move fwd
defense of assets
with div reserve.
in the div rear.
AAA air avenue of approach LADW local air defense warning
ADW air defense warning LD line of departure
ALT alternate NAI named area of interest
BDE brigade PL phase line
BN battalion SEAD suppression of enemy air defense
BTRYS batteries SOR state of readiness
DIV division SPT support
DS direct support UAS unmanned aircraft system
FARP forward arming and fueling point VIC vicinity
FWD forward WCS weapons control status
GS general support WPNS weapons
MDMP Step 5–COA comparison. COA comparison is an objective process to evaluate all COAs
independent of each other and against set evaluation criteria approved by the commander. The staff compares
the strengths and weaknesses of each to identify the one that offers the best possibilities to accomplish the
mission. The staff identifies its preferred COA. The staff then delivers a decision briefing to the commander,
including the following:
* Commanders' intent of higher and next higher commanders.
* Status of the force.
* Current IPB.
* COAs considered, including the assumptions used, a summary of the wargame for each COA, the
advantages and disadvantages of each COA and finally, the recommended COA.
MDMP Step 6–COA approval. After the decision briefing the commander selects the COA to best
accomplish the mission. After approving a COA, the commander issues the final planning guidance, a refined
commander's intent and any additional guidance on priorities for defense, prepares orders, and directs and
supervises rehearsals. Based on the commander's decision and final planning guidance, the staff issues an
additional WARNORD to the batteries.
MDMP Step 7–Orders production, dissemination, and transition. Time permitting, the battalion
commander and staff meet with the battery commanders to brief them on the commander's concept and the
decision support matrix. After this briefing, the battery commanders backbrief the battalion commander. The
battalion commander allocates sufficient time for the battery commanders to plan and prepare their units;
generally, one-third of the time is reserved for battalion planning and two-thirds for battery planning and
preparation. If time is constrained, this process may be abbreviated or modified.
The SHORAD battalion commander develops an air defense operations order for the battalion and an
air defense appendix to the fires and protection annexes (in conjunction with the AMD section) for the
division operation order (OPORD). The operations order serves as a directive to subordinate units to relay
the commander's orders. It is intended to coordinate the activities of all organizations participating in the
specified mission. The staff prepares, coordinates, authenticates, reviews, publishes and distributes written
operations order and plans. Each section of the staff will contribute to the main body or a specific annex,
containing information pertinent to its field of expertise. Appendix D describes the formats of ADA orders.
SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE BATTERY PLANNING
Air defense mission accomplishment depends upon battery commanders and platoon leaders carrying
out mission-type orders on a constantly changing battlefield. Battery and platoon planning is an interactive |
3-01.44 | 41 | Planning for Short-Range Air Defense Operations
process. SHORAD battery employment must support the higher ADA plan to defeat the threat.
Simultaneously, battery commanders and platoon leaders must integrate their operations into the supported
asset's operation plans. Without this coordination of effort, the chances of fratricide of friendly air increase
and mission success for both the battery and supported asset decreases. The discussions that follow focus on
a SHORAD battery placed in direct support of a BCT.
The battery may be employed as a separate task-organized unit, as a subordinate element of its parent
battalion, or as part of an ADA task force defending maneuvering forces; maneuver force semi-fixed assets
such as assembly areas, refuel or rearm points, bridge crossing; or the more fixed assets such as air bases.
Coordination and support requirements will vary accordingly. However, regardless of the type of asset, the
battery receives its initial mission from the SHORAD battalion (or task force) and then coordinates with the
supported asset for additional information and direction. For instance, the battery commander and executive
officer work with the BCT staff and synchronize their supporting air defense plan with the BCT's scheme of
maneuver, developing an operations order and decision support matrix for the battery and an air defense
appendix to the BCT operations order. The battery commander is responsible for ensuring the battery
provides the required protection to the BCT and its subordinate elements. When the platoons are placed in
support of maneuver battalions, or maneuver battalion task forces, the platoon leaders receive their guidance
from the battery commander and support the maneuver formations' planning, developing air defense
operations orders and appendices.
The battery commander and platoon leaders use TLPs in developing their plans. SHORAD battery and
platoon planning is part of the supported unit MDMP process and not separated from or independent of it.
The battery executive officer is typically the ADA officer participating in a BCT's MDMP process. The ADA
platoon leader participates in the maneuver force's MDMP process.
Though presented as sequential steps, the execution of the TLP steps, presented below, may vary
depending upon METT-TC. Much of the following discussion is expressed in terms of the battery operating
as a task-organized unit, coordinating directly with the supported BCT. If operating as part of its parent
battalion or a task force, most of the planning and coordination would be conducted with the battalion or task
force. Though platoon leaders are not specified in TLP steps below, they take actions similar to those of the
battery commander, coordinating with the battery commander and the supported maneuver formation.
TLP Step 1–Receive the mission. The battery commander meets with the SHORAD battalion
commander and S-3 to receive the battery mission. The battalion commander briefs the battery commander
on the battalion's mission and commander's intent and the battery's overall mission in support of the
designated asset. As the battery is to be employed as a task-organized unit, the battalion commander reviews
command and support relationships to ensure an understanding of authorities. A battery employed as a task-
organized unit in defense of a BCT is generally placed in direct support.
* The battery commander meets with the battalion S-2 to discuss the air IPB for the battalion's AO
and any specific data on air activity around the BCT which the battery will defend (see Appendix
C for the air IPB procedures and considerations). The commander needs to know the types of air
threats that the battery may face, the capabilities and doctrinal tactics of these threats, projected
air bases or launch sites, and potential air avenues of approach. The commander and S-2 conduct
a general terrain analysis of low-level approaches, those approaches formed by terrain,
navigational aids, like rivers and roads, and attack profiles that lead into the target area. Severely
restricted or restricted terrain is analyzed in terms of threat aircraft service ceilings. UAS
employment is analyzed based on loiter time and surveillance range and flight range and time.
After identifying when and where enemy aerial platforms are expected to approach and to be
employed, the commander makes predictions on enemy activities by comparing what the enemy
can do with what he has and intends to do. By mentally "wargaming" enemy intentions, the
commander refines the NAIs generated by the staff during the initial staff analysis and IPB. NAIs
are tools to know when, where, and what to look for. Analysis of activities or events within them
confirms or denies predicted enemy intentions on the situation template.
* The battery may be placed in support of a BCT or a fixed asset, or it may be attached to or reinforce
an ADA unit. The battery commander coordinates with the commander of the supported maneuver
force or fixed-asset to receive the operation plan and critical assets to be defended (generally
referred to as a protection prioritization list). A BCT typically has multiple assets requiring |
3-01.44 | 42 | Chapter 4
protection, such as the maneuver battalions, the brigade command post, the brigade ammunition
resupply point, and a bridge crossing site. A fixed-site asset will also have multiple subordinate
elements within its area that require protection, vice the entire site; on an airfield, these may
include the control tower, aircraft hangars, and the base operations center.
TLP Step 2–Issue warning order. The initial WARNORD alerts the platoon leaders to the upcoming
mission. The WARNORD addresses, at a minimum, movement time, platoon task organizations,
commander's location, and support relationships. The commander ensures that the platoon leaders understand
the commander's intent.
TLP Step 3–Make a tentative plan. The commander considers the intelligence, operational, logistical,
and security requirements in the battery plan. The battery commander identifies key items requiring
coordination and acceptance by the supported commander.
* The commander checks with the battalion S-2 for the latest air IPB information. The commander
also coordinates with the supported BCT's or asset's S-2 and S-3 personnel to review the latest
ground intelligence assessments and obtain any information on air activity. The commander
should be cognizant of planned friendly air operations as well as past, current, or potential enemy
air actions. Additionally, when in support of a BCT, the commander should be briefed on the
BCT's current and upcoming plans.
* The battery commander reviews the supported commander's protection prioritization list and
drafts a protected asset list. This initial list proposes which assets can be defended by the battery,
considering the AMD principles and tenets of employment. The battery commander meets with
the BCT commander and staff (or those of another supported asset) and briefs them on the
proposed list. The battery commander identifies the amount of defense the battery can provide to
the defended assets and recommends the sensors to be employed. The platoons are task organized
to meet the levels of protection required for the cited assets. The BCT commander approves the
list or requests adjustments. The battery commander will agree to the adjustments or advise the
BCT commander of potential risks to the mission if such adjustments were made. At the
conclusion of the briefing, the protected asset list is confirmed.
* Based on the identified NAIs in the BCT's area, the commander identifies target areas of interest,
geographic areas where the battery can delay, disrupt, destroy, or influence the enemy activity or
course of action. The commander develops a decision support template to determine the most
likely courses of enemy action. The decision support matrix is developed by the battery
commander to illustrate the scheme of maneuver to counter the enemy's COAs.
* The battery generally relies on the BCT's brigade support battalion for feeding, Army-common
supplies and repair parts, maintenance of common Army equipment, and petroleum products. The
battery must rely on its parent battalion for air defense-specific maintenance and resupply. Contact
teams and "push packages" may be positioned with the battery to provide on-site support.
Contractor technical support may also be provided if available. Resupply of ammunition requires
emphasis. The commander coordinates with the SHORAD battalion S-4 to identify where
potential resupply points will be established and the method of resupply-pick-up or deliver.
* The commander must be cognizant of the BCT's security plan and by-pass criteria for enemy units
to determine how the battery needs to operate with respect to any security consideration. This will
require further coordination once the battery arrives on site. The commander must also consider
any requirements for force protection support from the asset. For instance, if there is a need for an
air defense sensor to be placed outside the secured area of the asset, the sensor and crew may
require some protection from enemy ground forces beyond that which the battery is capable of
providing.
* The battery commander briefs the battalion commander on the plan, as time and the situation
permits. The battalion commander will provide any additional guidance or updates on the
battalion's and division's plan.
* The battery commander briefs the key battery and platoon leaders on the plan. The commander
restates the battery's mission; addresses the assets to be defended; presents the plan of defense, to
include platoon responsibilities and positions; identifies the key battery locations; and provides
the movement order (start points and times, routes, and release points). |
3-01.44 | 43 | Planning for Short-Range Air Defense Operations
TLP Step 4–Initiate movement. The battery begins its movement from the port of debarkation,
assembly area, or other start point to the BCT's location. The deployment considers route suitability and the
terrain to be negotiated. Reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position (also known as RSOP)
procedures, in accordance with the battery's standard operating procedures, are initiated.
TLP Step 5–Conduct reconnaissance. A leader's reconnaissance is conducted to verify the plan. The
battery commander and platoon leaders must determine if the tentative map-selected locations will allow
immediate occupation for accomplishment of the mission. Ground reconnaissance verifies whether the terrain
provides good natural concealment; has access roads for primary and alternate routes into the position;
provides good observation, fields of fire, and areas of search; and has firm ground that will support the weight
of the equipment.
* Coordination is effected with the supported commanders to ensure that there is no conflict in
positioning the battery and platoons’ shooters and sensors.
* A back-brief takes place on terrain that offers visibility to the battery or platoon AO. This sequence
will allow the commander and platoon leaders to further adjust the plan as necessary to
synchronize platoon fires, identifying dead spaces and defense weaknesses (ground and air).
TLP Step 6–Complete the plan. The battery commander briefs the BCT commander and staff on the
air defense plan. The commander ensures that requested support has been identified and acted upon by the
BCT. After final approval of the plan by the BCT commander, the battery commander briefs the battalion
commander of any adjustments to the initial battery plan.
TLP Step 7–Issue order. The battery commander issues the order to the battery and platoon leaders.
The platoon leaders, in turn, brief their subordinate leaders. The plan may be issued in hard copy, digitally,
or verbally. If time permits, hard copies or digital versions are transmitted. Verbal transmission may be
required when time is limited.
TLP Step 8–Supervise and refine. The battery commander and platoon leaders conduct back briefs
with their subordinates immediately after the order has been issued to ensure the mission, intent, and tasks to
subordinate units are understood. |
3-01.44 | 45 | Chapter 5
Preparing for Short-Range Air Defense Operations
Following the planning of the operation, the next step prepares a SHORAD unit to
execute that operation. Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and
Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation (ADP 5-0). A SHORAD
battery may operate as part of an ADA task force or as a separate unit supporting a
designated asset, with its platoons assigned to defend elements within that asset. This
chapter focuses on the SHORAD battery and platoons as separate units and their
preparatory considerations and actions in support of a BCT and its subordinate
maneuver battalions. For information on SHORAD units operating as part of an ADA
task force, see FM 3-01.
INTRODUCTION
The time that is left between finalizing the planning (with a commander's decision including the
commander's intent and concept of operations) and the actual start of the execution of the operation
determines how extensively and thorough the preparation can be performed. Therefore, the SHORAD battery
commander needs to develop and communicate the commander's intent for preparation activities succinctly
but with sufficient detail to ensure that the concept is understood by the battery and platoon leaders.
All activities during the preparation phase are to validate the planning results by selecting and assessing
positions for sensors, weapon systems, headquarters and C2 nodes, and routes and areas for such sites and
their supporting elements (for example, maintenance areas). In addition, a visual inspection of all terrain
aspects, in the actual and predicted weather conditions, will contribute to validating an adversary's projected
COAs and the commander's own developed COAs. All validating results from this preparation phase are
used to review, refine, and adjust, as necessary, the initial plans and develop more detailed taskings for the
subordinate and supporting units.
The need for continuous coordination between the SHORAD battery and its supported unit or asset,
the SHORAD battalion, adjacent ADA units, and other air control elements cannot be overemphasized. Initial
coordination conducted during the planning phase is a prelude to that which must be performed throughout
the preparatory phase and subsequent execution of the operations.
COORDINATION
During planning, coordination of efforts between the SHORAD unit and the supported asset is
established by the integration of the SHORAD battery commander into the BCT's operational planning
process. The battery commander and platoon leaders continue interacting with their supported counterparts
to advise them of the air defense capabilities they will bring in support, the current and projected air threat
situation, and the local air defense posture. Commanders share and synchronize plans, commanders' intents,
and operational concepts. SHORAD leaders must be cognizant of the friendly and enemy ground situation,
while the supported commanders must be informed of the air environment and pertinent air defense
directives. Situational information must identify who is operating where, when, and in what strength.
SHORAD commanders must advise the supported commanders of any logistical support requirements, other
than SHORAD-system specific items, and potential needs for force protection beyond the inherent
capabilities in the SHORAD unit. The more frequent and thorough the interplay between the supported and
supporting commanders, the more likely the potential for mission success. |
3-01.44 | 46 | Chapter 5
The battery commander must be in constant communications with the supported unit's air defense
airspace management cell, in the case of a maneuver BCT, maneuver enhancement brigade, field artillery
brigade, combat aviation brigade, division artillery, or with other ADA personnel (if present) in a fixed site's
operations center, such as a base defense operations center. The air defense airspace management cell or its
counterpart is the conduit for air defense information within the supported asset. Cell ADA personnel keep
the battery commander informed of current and future brigade operations. The battery commander, in turn,
advises the supported asset of the SHORAD unit's on-going operations, capabilities, and limitations. The
battery commander develops the air defense plan for the supported unit and coordinates with the air defense
airspace management cell to ensure that the plan is nested with supported unit's operation plan.
The ADAM cell or operations center personnel may also be aware of another AMD unit or units
operating within the asset's area and will so advise the SHORAD battery commander. The battery commander
should coordinate with that commander to synchronize and ensure mutually supporting operations.
RECONNAISSANCE
Reconnaissance provides information about the AO. Preparation activities begin with a reconnaissance
of the route to the area. The available preparation time and resources will determine to a large extent how
(extensive and detailed) the reconnaissance activities can be performed and therefore influence the choice of
reconnaissance type. There are three types of reconnaissance: map, aerial, and ground.
MAP RECONNAISSANCE
Map reconnaissance is the fastest way to conduct a reconnaissance and will always precede any other
type of reconnaissance. When geographical limitations hamper physical reconnaissance, map reconnaissance
is the only way. The positions of SHORAD sensors and weapon systems are plotted on a map and represent
the best locations for providing air defense. Detailed physical and digital maps will provide specific
information on terrain, buildings, roads, rivers, forest, and other terrestrial and man-made features. The most
current and detailed digital and physical maps can be requested from the unit's space element. Overlapping
current imagery and terrain data, space elements can provide the most accurate maps possible even if the
ground topography has changed due to a recent battle or geographic event. The platoon leader must consider
the AMD employment guidelines and tenets, weather, and mission variables in this initial reconnaissance.
Alternate positions should be identified at this time. After the weapon positions are plotted on a map,
check points and primary and alternate routes are selected and plotted. The platoon leader identifies a
reconnaissance route by conducting a map reconnaissance to the proposed area. Positions selected by map
reconnaissance must be confirmed by additional reconnaissance if the tactical situation allows.
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
If time is limited and an aircraft is available, the battery commander or the reconnaissance officer
(generally a platoon leader) can see the terrain. Aerial reconnaissance provides the fastest way to see the
terrain, but is likely unavailable to SHORAD leaders. Even when available, aerial reconnaissance has
significant limitations. For example, fields of fire, ground conditions, and local threat cannot be determined
from the air. In addition, aircraft activity, to include that of UASs, may expose friendly interest in a particular
area.
GROUND RECONNAISSANCE
Ground reconnaissance is an on-site examination of the terrain. A ground reconnaissance is the most
accurate and desirable type of reconnaissance, though the slowest method. The route can be evaluated for
road worthiness, obstacles, choke points, and key terrain. Firing positions, fields of fire, and air avenues of
approach can be analyzed. However, ground reconnaissance is time-consuming and dangerous. Covering the
distances over potential routes and checking alternate positions takes time. The small reconnaissance party
could be subjected to threat observation en route or at the objective area.
Map reconnaissance is an important part of the preparation of the actual ground reconnaissance. The
reconnaissance party will benefit from a detailed and thorough map reconnaissance. |
3-01.44 | 47 | Preparing for Short-Range Air Defense Operations
Ground reconnaissance is performed to select the best SHORAD positions, march routes, start points,
release points, checkpoints, sensor positions, and communications sites. The SHORAD battery commander
or platoon leader should coordinate with the local maneuver commander and the supported element S-3 to
determine what areas maneuver units plan to occupy, or, when in support of a fixed asset, with the on-site
commander and base defense operations center to identify the best locations for SHORAD weapon systems
and sensors. Mutual agreement must be established to make the best use of the available terrain.
The reconnaissance officer prepares for a ground reconnaissance by, at a minimum:
* Selecting personnel and equipment to conduct the reconnaissance and assigning tasks to the
reconnaissance party personnel. The unit SOP establishes the normal composition and
responsibilities of the party.
* Determining in detail the elements, positions, areas, routes, and related terrain considerations.
* Determining the priority order of the elements to be emplaced and setting up the timeline
accordingly.
* Determining the products that must be developed as a result of this reconnaissance; products
should include a list of sensor and weapon locations, sketches of these locations, sketches of the
areas and routes, and identification of restrictive terrain locations.
* Coordinating instructions on C2, communications, and rendezvous locations with team members
and higher headquarters (SHORAD battalion or battery). The higher unit and/or supporting unit
can order a backbrief on previous reconnaissance in the area.
* Developing and issuing a reconnaissance plan/order with all of the above information.
As soon as preparations are complete, the reconnaissance party leaves. It ensures that the selected
primary route meets equipment requirements (height, weight, width, and slope to be traversed), is passable,
and avoids possible ambush locations. Road guides are positioned, as required.
As the reconnaissance party approaches the new location, the team leader must ascertain if the tentative
map-selected locations will allow immediate occupation for accomplishment of the mission. Ground
reconnaissance verifies whether the terrain provides good natural concealment; has access roads for primary
and alternate routes into the position; provides good observation, fields of fire, and sectors of search; and has
firm ground that will support the weight of the equipment.
DEFENSE DESIGN
Defense design for ADA is a strategy for defense based on a compiled list of tasks required to protect
against air and missile threats in support of operations. SHORAD units are positioned to best protect the
designated assets against the projected air threats in accordance with detailed defense designs. Sensor and
weapon system placements are selected to maximize surveillance, tracking, and engagements. In designing
a defense, sensors are positioned to provide surveillance and fire control tracking capability sufficient to
protect assigned assets and prevent gaps in the coverage. Weapon systems and teams are positioned to
optimize the defense of the defended assets, enabling lethal coverage over the assigned assets and extending
firepower through as much of the defense coverage area as possible.
The AMD employment tenets and the latest intelligence assessments inform the defense design.
Considerations for the defense design should also include the quantity, capabilities, and potential locations
of combined arms for self-defense teams. Interspersing these teams with SHORAD systems will further
enhance defenses.
SELECTING POSITIONS
Site selection begins upon receipt of a movement order. Careful consideration must be given to ensure
that the selected positions for the sensors, launchers, and C2 nodes are oriented in the direction of the
expectant air threats, are capable of maintaining required communications with the battery and supported
asset's C2 elements, and, above all, can collectively provide the required defense. The need for dispersion of
equipment, camouflage throughout the site, appropriate deception measures, and operational security must
also be addressed. |
3-01.44 | 48 | Chapter 5
Sensors must be carefully placed to ensure optimal surveillance of the area. Their positioning is
generally the first consideration in establishing a defense. Sentinels have a 360-degree capability to detect
and classify aerial threats. Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars in Land-based Phalanx Weapon System units
provide 360-degree detection of RAM threats. See ATPs 3-01.48 and 3-01.60, respectively, for more
information on positioning Sentinel and the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar.
Considerations in selecting launcher positions are dependent upon the type of SHORAD weapon to be
emplaced, asset to be defended, and the threat types. Positions should have clear observation and primary
and secondary fields of fire, communications with the platoon command post and early warning sources, and
available cover and concealment to facilitate survivability. Launchers positioned to counter potential rotary-
and fixed-wing threats are generally near projected air avenues of approach. These positions may require
adjustments if UASs are also a threat, as UASs can surveil or attack from any direction.
* M-SHORAD and Avenger systems and Stinger man-portable air defense (hereafter referred to
simply as Stinger) teams require frequent movements once they commence engagements, as the
firing signature of their missiles discloses their positions. Units should have primary, alternate,
and supplementary positions with planned routes between them. A primary position is one from
which the M-SHORAD, Avenger, or Stinger weapon system intends to accomplish its tactical
mission. An alternate position is one to which the system moves when the primary position
becomes untenable or unsuitable for carrying out the assigned mission. The primary positions
should generally be near the plotted positions in the original defense design, at distances
determined by clear line-of-sight, security, and survivability considerations; if not near the plotted
positions, the defense may need to be redesigned. Communications must also be maintained with
the other squads in the platoon.
* The Land-based Phalanx Weapon System's limited mobility and emplacement requirements may
restrict its positioning options. Its position should be close to, but set back from, the perimeter of
the base or other static asset which it defends. Its communication requirements include a linkage
to the base defense operations center.
The primary consideration in selecting the headquarters or C2 node site is the ability to communicate
with the supported asset and higher- and lower-echelon SHORAD units. Dependent upon terrain and the
locations of the other SHORAD and supported asset's elements, the headquarters or C2 node should be
positioned where it can best control the SHORAD units and communicate with the supported element. Other
considerations for the site selection include available cover and concealment, alternate entrance and exit
routes, and defensibility against ground attacks.
After selecting the positions, the platoon leader ensures the ground guides know exactly where all the
vehicles and equipment should be emplaced. Preparation should include marking the location of each major
piece of equipment. Everyone at the new position is given the new challenge and password, information on
any known enemy activity in the area, and the approximate arrival time, location, and order of vehicles for
the main party.
If time is limited and the unit must move before the reconnaissance party returns, road guide positions
are selected, and Soldiers necessary for these tasks are included in the reconnaissance team. Actual inspection
of the chosen routes and positions on the ground is desirable to confirm selections made from the map, or to
make necessary adjustments in plans.
Key leaders provide the results of the reconnaissance and relay appropriate instructions for the
movement of the main body. The platoon sergeant organizes the vehicles as ordered by the platoon leader.
Platoon vehicles use movement techniques dictated by the factors of METT-TC; tactics, techniques, and
procedures; and the unit SOP.
OCCUPYING POSITIONS
The occupation of positions should be coordinated with the supported unit to avoid mutual interference.
When the mission-configured platoon arrives at the position, all vehicles move off the road into the position,
without halting and without closing the interval between vehicles. The unit SOP should state the requirements
and the priorities for occupying positions. |
3-01.44 | 49 | Preparing for Short-Range Air Defense Operations
The first consideration is emplacing the sensor or sensors. Sensors are emplaced on terrain that
provides the best, longest range line-of-sight in all directions. Sentinels should be positioned within the
supported asset's AO along likely enemy air avenues of approach to surveil, detect, and provide early
warning. Sentinel should not be collocated with any command post due to an enemy's ability to target
emission signatures. The Sentinel's rotating antenna must remain clear of obstructions while operating to
optimize the radar tracking range and air picture reliability. The Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar should
be emplaced on a hill, rooftop, or flat plain. Any radar's performance is degraded when placed near
obstructions, such as buildings, trees, vehicles, or power lines. The radars should be emplaced no closer than
1,000 meters from one another, and operating frequencies should be separated as much as possible.
The SHORAD platoon leader uses the ADA employment tenets to position launchers in accordance
with METT-TC. The most important tenets for the M-SHORAD platoon leader to consider are normally
early engagement, weighted coverage, and defense in depth. The Avenger platoon leader stresses mutual
support, or overlapping coverage when possible, to enhance engagement opportunities. If fixed-wing aircraft
are considered a major threat, the platoon may weight coverage to the most likely air avenue(s) of approach.
The Land-based Phalanx Weapon System platoon leader positions the system launchers in pairs with mutual
support if possible, or overlapping fires between pairs as a minimum, for RAM engagements given the
relatively short range of the Land-based Phalanx Weapon System. The Land-based Phalanx Weapon Systems
should be emplaced inside the perimeter, but no closer than 500 meters from the perimeter when possible.
Gun system emplacement requires relatively flat (±5-percent slope) on hard-packed ground or pad. During
emplacement, the unit will perform gun system mapping to ensure that no coverage areas are in the "no fire
zone." Stinger teams are generally positioned along the most likely air avenues of approach. Care must be
taken in positioning M-SHORAD, Avenger, Stinger systems to avoid placing them near terrain features easily
recognized from the air. Positions are more vulnerable to enemy fires once spotted near an identifiable object.
When all squads have reported that they are in position and capable of providing coverage of their
assigned sectors, the platoon leader will report the platoon "ready for action" to the supported force
commander. Once in place, SHORAD units should implement passive defense measures, such as camouflage
and protective works, and continuously improve them as long they remain at a location. Crew chiefs begin
improving positions as dictated by the SOP or additional orders. Position improvements include:
* Using camouflage nets and supplementing them where possible with indigenous materials (for
example, branches, leaves, and snow). These materials should be from the vicinity of the squad so
they will blend naturally into the surroundings.
* Preparing deliberate fighting positions.
* Providing cover for M-SHORAD and Avenger systems by having the vehicles dug in, hull down,
for protection from blast, fragmentation, and small arms. Engineer support is required and should
be requested through the supported unit. If such support is not available, the vehicles should be
placed in defilade positions.
* Developing alternate and supplementary positions. Work is initiated as early as possible.
A total security plan is then placed in effect. Positioning SHORAD units with maneuver forces or on
installations allows the units to take advantage of security measures and the security forces of those assets.
However, regardless of those added forces, the platoon must provide its own local security. This includes
establishing observation points, positioning automatic weapons overlooking the main avenue of approach
and alternate routes into the position, and initiating other security positions around the area to preclude gaps
in the perimeter. A sector of fire, with a primary target line, is assigned to each squad, and communications
are established with all the positions. Range cards should be prepared. At a minimum, range cards should
indicate ranges to critical points on all likely avenues of approach, dead spaces, and likely targets (air and
ground). Obstacles enhance security by blocking, disrupting, or canalizing enemy attacks. All obstacles must
be coordinated with the supported asset's S-3 and the engineer officer. Other measures taken should also be
integrated with the ground defense plan of the supported asset. Emission control measures should be
developed and initiated, when directed, to reduce the electromagnetic signatures of the sensors and command
posts. |
3-01.44 | 50 | Chapter 5
REHEARSALS
Units conduct combat rehearsals to gain agility, ensure synchronization, increase individual and team
initiative, and improve the proficiency of a force. Rehearsals are a critical part of the preparation and
supervision steps in troop-leading procedures and occur throughout troop-leading steps. Commanders and
leaders can determine the validity and suitability of their plan's concept of the operation, in addition to
identifying any shortcomings in the concept not previously recognized, while performing their rehearsals.
Rehearsals allow leaders and their Soldiers to practice key aspects of the concept of operation. These
actions help Soldiers orient themselves to their environment and other units before executing the operation
and build a lasting mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation. Rehearsals are the
commander's tool to ensure subordinate leaders understand the commander's intent and the concept of
operations.
SHORAD units and leaders participate in the supported asset's rehearsals as well as conduct their own
rehearsals. The challenge for SHORAD leaders and Soldiers is to understand the SHORAD rehearsal plan
and schedule as well as the supported asset rehearsal plan and schedule. The rehearsal execution section
addresses rehearsal sequences and SHORAD rehearsal execution considerations as well as the supported
asset's rehearsal plan and schedule. During final coordination, the supported force conducts its briefing and
rehearsal. Following the supported force rehearsal, a SHORAD rehearsal is conducted. The leaders should
then update their air defense plans (or decision support matrix) based on changes from the various rehearsals
and concept of support for critical logistics.
Planning and preparations are crucial to successful rehearsals. Rehearsal goals must be clearly defined
and achievable, and individual responsibilities for conducting rehearsals must be identified.
Appendix D provides rehearsal guidelines for SHORAD leaders and their staff; it focuses on preparing
SHORAD commanders and leaders to plan for and conduct effective rehearsals. Rehearsal preparations are
addressed with a focus on checklists to make rehearsal execution run smoothly. The rehearsal execution
section addresses rehearsal sequences and SHORAD rehearsal execution considerations. Each type of
rehearsal is defined, followed by SHORAD considerations.
TRAINING
Training is a fundamental part of preparations and the means to the successful conduct of rehearsals
and, ultimately, missions. SHORAD commanders must maintain vigorous training programs that sustain
individual Soldier skills and team proficiency.
Training is the cornerstone of readiness. To achieve and maintain a high degree of readiness, SHORAD
units should train in the most efficient and effective manner possible. SHORAD leaders should focus their
unit training efforts to maximize training proficiency. Evaluating, assessing, recording, and reporting unit
training proficiency and training readiness requires they have a firm understanding of the training
fundamentals in ADP 7-0.
SHORAD gunnery tables provide guidance for individual and collective training and the required
certifications. Gunnery tables are prescriptive while still allowing flexibility in selecting standardized
engagements from a menu to enable achievement of training objectives within the scope of the commander's
intent. Gunnery is a continuous process based on the unit's mission set and proficiency level to build and
maintain lethal sections and formations. Gunnery must be incorporated into training at all levels with the
necessary frequency and repetition to enable mastery.
SHORAD leaders must focus their units' efforts to optimize available time, ensuring units train the
right tasks to meet mission requirements. Commanders look for every opportunity to coach and teach their
subordinates. They give their subordinate leaders the commander's intent and the resources—including
time—to plan, prepare, and conduct the training necessary to develop unit proficiency. Commander
involvement makes a quantitative and qualitative difference in unit training and leader development.
Training should also be conducted with supported and supporting units. Leaders and Soldiers should
understand the supported unit's plans and ensure that SHORAD operations are closely coordinated with and
integrated into them. In addition, conducting collective training with supporting sustainment units will |
3-01.44 | 51 | Preparing for Short-Range Air Defense Operations
facilitate successful and expedited execution of such tasks as resupply, rearming, refueling, and medical
evacuation.
ORDERS AND APPENDICES
To execute a plan, the SHORAD commander, staff, and subordinate leaders must have a thorough
understanding of the different types of ADA orders, annexes, and appendices received and those to be issued.
The commander and subordinate leaders must be able and trained to organize the thoughts and concepts that
were collaboratively developed and convey them in a concise and informative manner to their subordinates
and any supporting units.
Appendix B discusses the different types of orders and appendices that the SHORAD leader and staff
use. Formats and examples are also included. |
3-01.44 | 53 | Chapter 6
Executing Short-Range Air Defense Operations
This chapter addresses the types of operations that SHORAD forces conduct in
decisive actions. It focuses on the roles and contributions of the SHORAD battery and
platoon in offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Each operation is introduced,
and general SHORAD considerations for each follow. The various types of each
operation are then addressed, with more focused discussions of SHORAD in each. The
generic term “SHORAD” is henceforth used throughout this chapter to refer to
dedicated SHORAD systems, batteries, platoons, and teams in general. The specific
SHORAD weapon, sensor, or unit is cited when the discussion only applies to that
element.
DECISIVE ACTION AND GENERAL SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE
CONSIDERATIONS
Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability
operations or defense support of civil authority tasks (ADP 3-0). The simultaneity of decisive action varies
by echelon and span of control. At lower echelons, an assigned task may require all the echelon's combat
power to execute that task in one operation. For example, a SHORAD platoon, by its very nature, provides
defense of a designated supported unit or asset in any type operation, but does not have sufficient capacity to
support a force in two simultaneous operations.
SHORAD batteries, platoons, squads, and teams are placed in support of designated assets and
positioned where they can best conduct their primary mission-deterring, denying, or defeating air threats-
regardless of type operation. SHORAD considerations are presented for offensive, defensive, and stability
operations in the following sections. There is no discussion of defense support of civil authority tasks, as
these tasks are conducted by all Soldiers, regardless of branch or echelon.
In conducting decisive actions, SHORAD leaders must advise supported units on active and passive
AMD resources and procedures, especially those assets without dedicated ADA protection. SHORAD leaders
inform these supported elements of the locations of the SHORAD weapons and their capabilities, AMD
warning terms and procedures, passive defense measures that should be initiated and enhanced, and self-
defense actions that all units can execute, irrespective of the presence or absence of dedicated SHORAD
units. Continuous coordination is required.
There are three primary ROE which are applicable to SHORAD units and non-dedicated air defense
elements (known as combined arms for air defense [CAFAD]) in the tactical fight: the right of self-defense,
hostile criteria, and weapons control status.
* The right of self-defense is never denied. Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and
obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.
Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander, military members may exercise individual self-
defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When individuals are assigned
and acting as part of a unit, individual self-defense should be considered a subset of unit self-
defense. As such, unit commanders may limit individual self-defense by members of their unit.
* The exact criteria enabling the fire unit to declare a target hostile may vary with the tactical
situation. Some considerations in determining if a target is hostile are it is attacking friendly
elements; violating airspace coordinating measures; visually identified as hostile; and responding
improperly, or not at all, to identification, friend or foe (known as IFF) interrogation. |
3-01.44 | 54 | Chapter 6
Weapons control status. SHORAD weapons are generally placed in weapons tight. See para 1-17 for
a description of weapons tight and the other two control statuses. Reconstitution efforts are considered for
each type of offensive and defensive operation. SHORAD commanders must plan and implement
reorganization and regeneration measures for subordinate forces that have suffered attrition from enemy
attacks. See FM 4-0 for additional information on reconstitution.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
An offensive operation is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain,
resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). The offense is the ultimate means commanders have of
imposing their will on enemy forces. Maneuver forces conduct offensive tasks to defeat and destroy enemy
forces as well as gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers. Commanders seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative when conducting the offense. Taking the initiative from an enemy force requires
conducting offensive operations, even in the defense.
SHORAD forces do not generally conduct offensive tasks. However, M-SHORAD, Avenger, and
Stinger units enable offensive operations by providing defense against enemy air surveillance and attacks.
Land-based Phalanx Weapon System units do not have the mobility to support offensive operations. Air
defense tasks to enable offensive operation include:
* Planning air defense coverage to provide freedom of maneuver for forces and their critical assets,
to include denying surveillance by threat UASs.
* Developing air aspects of the IPB in conjunction with the S-2.
* Developing air defense priorities protecting forward based infrastructure, such as lines of
communications and command nodes, from aerial attack.
* Planning early warning and surveillance.
* Maneuvering to maintain air defense coverage.
M-SHORAD is the predominant air defense weapon system in offensive operations. M-SHORAD's
mobility, survivability, and shoot-on-the move capability make it extremely effective in defense of
maneuvering forces and other assets that have the potential to move forward rapidly, such as reserves,
artillery, and maneuver support elements.
Understanding the supported unit's scheme of maneuver is the first step in providing adequate air
defense. Air defense priorities are established to ensure the effective and continuous support for the offensive
operation. The M-SHORAD or Avenger battery commander and the supported force's S-3 develop and
recommend priorities to the supported commander. Command or support relationships between SHORAD
units and other units are directed by the S-3 in coordination with the SHORAD commander.
The SHORAD battery commander must weigh the main effort and preserve the supported force's
ability to maneuver. Because movements to contact are characterized by rapid and aggressive action, the
commander should task-organize for maximum flexibility and plan for decentralized execution. Since the
lateral movement may be to the left or to the right, the commander must read the battlefield, analyzing the
terrain throughout the entire route of march and looking for key indicators to determine what the enemy is
doing. The battalion S-2 will keep the commander informed of changes in intelligence assessments. The
battalion S-4 will keep the commander updated on maintenance, ammunition, and fuel status as well as
projected resupply. Decision support, synchronization, and execution matrices are tools commanders use to
aid their flexibility and reaction time to contingencies and plan branches and sequels.
SHORAD systems (except for Land-based Phalanx Weapon System) displace frequently, whether
deployed in forward or rear areas. They move to support the maneuver force plan in response to mission
changes. They also move to enhance survivability.
There are four types of offensive operations: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.
For more information on offensive operations, see ADP 3-90. |
3-01.44 | 55 | Executing Short-Range Air Defense Operations
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and to establish
or regain contact (ADP 3-90). The goal of a movement to contact is to make initial contact with a small
element while retaining enough combat power to develop the situation and mitigate the associated risk.
Commanders conduct a movement to contact when an enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to
conduct an attack. A movement to contact may result in a meeting engagement. Meeting engagements are
combat actions that occur when an incompletely deployed force engages an enemy at an unexpected time
and place.
In a movement to contact, forces deploy from assembly areas in attack formations that facilitate
movement and mass sufficient combat power to ensure decisive victory. Commanders adjust their tempo
appropriately as they anticipate closing with enemy forces. They decide where their forces can deploy into
formations that facilitate the initial contact and still provide freedom of action for the bulk of their forces.
M-SHORAD platoons are integrated with the maneuvering forces. M-SHORAD platoons must be able
to posture themselves quickly to counter any enemy surveillance or attack efforts. They are positioned based
on the maneuver force's type of travel (for example, deliberate movement when contact with enemy forces
is likely) and formation. M-SHORAD systems will generally be placed behind the lead elements of the
supported force during movement to provide overwatch of enemy air avenues of approach. Air defense
coverage is extended forward of the lead elements.
Avengers may be deployed with the covering force, along the flanks, or in overwatch positions of the
maneuver force. Avenger fire units are light-skinned vehicles and should not be integrated into the maneuver
force when contact is expected. The Avenger may be positioned on the maneuver force flank and rear where
it is best suited to defend enemy air avenues of approach. Positioning of the Avenger fire units is dependent
on METT-TC factors. The battery commander or platoon leader makes a decision based on preventing enemy
aircraft from successfully observing or attacking the vulnerable moving elements.
During the movement, the Avenger platoon will be employed to protect the supported unit's critical
assets, such as the maneuver formations executing the main effort, artillery units, and C2 elements. The
Avenger can be used to provide coverage for choke points along the march route or to defend the maneuver
force as it moves prior to contact. The platoon leader should position the squads and teams so that two-thirds
of the weapon system's effective range extends in front of the maneuver force, if possible.
Stinger teams may also be involved. They may be used to augment Avengers at choke points but will
primarily be used to protect C2, maneuver support, and fire support assets. Stinger teams must be careful not
to get caught up in the direct fire fight. Once contact has been initiated, teams need to assume overwatch
positions.
ATTACK
Attack is a type of offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain,
or both (ADP 3-90). Attacks incorporate coordinated movement supported by fires. They may be part of
either decisive or shaping operations. An attack differs from a movement to contact because in an attack
commanders know at least part of an enemy's dispositions. A commander may describe an attack as hasty or
deliberate, depending on the time available for assessing the situation, planning, and preparing. A commander
may decide to conduct an attack using only fires, based on an analysis of the mission variables. In a hasty
attack, the commander must move quickly to gain the advantage. Speed and violence of action can overcome
lack of preparation. A deliberate attack is much more thoroughly planned and prepared.
Hasty attacks are not based on detailed planning, but the commander must anticipate and plan for them
as much as possible. They are conducted to catch the enemy off-guard. The maneuver commander can use
assets available and synchronize all available support and combat multipliers provided they can be committed
without significant delay. Hasty attack plans are disseminated through fragmentary orders. The use of
standard operating procedure and battle drills are critical for effective execution of hasty attacks.
The success of SHORAD units in a hasty attack will depend on thorough prior planning. Prior to the
mission, on-order M-SHORAD, Avenger, and Stinger positions, aerial areas of interest along suspected
enemy air avenues of approach, and decision and execution matrices must be developed. SHORAD platoon |
3-01.44 | 56 | Chapter 6
leaders plan their schemes of maneuver based on the maneuver force scheme of maneuver and designated
priorities. Unit SOPs and battle drills, combined with rapid, aggressive execution, aid in mission
accomplishment.
The deliberate attack requires more time for detailed IPB and detailed preplanned positions throughout
the entire zone. For a deliberate attack, SHORAD coverage must be extensive and well-coordinated. This
requires a thorough IPB analysis that includes–
* Ground and air avenues of approach.
* Aerial attack profiles.
* Probable enemy aviation attack locations.
* Aerial surveillance positions and routes.
From the IPB, the SHORAD platoon leaders develop and use system-specific graphic control measures
and those directed by the supported unit to control M-SHORAD, Avenger, and any Stinger team movements.
All movements are conducted to support the supported unit's scheme of maneuver. During an attack, M-
SHORAD systems are normally positioned to support the main effort. Avengers are positioned to protect
maneuver support, C2, and fire support assets. The M-SHORAD or Avenger platoon leader must, however,
retain the flexibility to shift and redirect platoon fires in support of the entire zone of action.
An attack may require a forward passage of lines through a stationary force. In a passage of lines, the
stationary force's SHORAD units protect the passage lanes. The attacking force's SHORAD units accompany
the passing units. Airspace coordinating measures and weapons control measures must be planned and
disseminated by either the division AMD cell or brigade ADAM cell. Similar procedures apply for rearward
passage of lines.
EXPLOITATION
Exploitation is a type of offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to
disorganize the enemy in depth (ADP 3-90). Exploitations seek to disintegrate enemy forces to the point
where they have no alternative but to surrender or retreat.
Exploitation follows any successful attack and is conducted to take advantage of the success. A M-
SHORAD platoon may move with the main body (exploitation force), or it may be task organized to provide
support for both the exploitation force and the logistics elements. Avenger and Stinger elements are used to
keep maneuver force lines of communications open and protect key logistics facilities and C2 posts. C2 is
critical to support constantly moving units.
PURSUIT
Pursuit is a type of offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape,
with the aim of destroying it (ADP 3-90). There are two variations of the pursuit: frontal and combination.
A pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. However, if enemy resistance breaks down and enemy
forces begin fleeing the battlefield, any type of offensive operation can transition into a pursuit. Pursuits
entail rapid movement and decentralized control.
The pursuit is oriented on the enemy rather than on terrain objectives. Since penetration occurs deep
in the enemy rear, the same caution as in a movement to contact must be practiced. M-SHORAD maneuvers
with the pursuing forces, normally traveling at their flanks. Avengers are generally positioned at the rear of
a maneuvering force to defend the maneuver support, C2, fire support, and maneuver reserve forces.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and
develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). The purpose of the defense is
to create conditions for the offense that allow Army forces to regain the initiative. The inherent strengths of
the defense are the defender's ability to occupy positions before an attack and use the available time to
improve those defenses. A defending force stops improving its defensive preparations only when it |
3-01.44 | 57 | Executing Short-Range Air Defense Operations
retrogrades or begins to engage enemy forces. Defensive operations are conducted to identify or create enemy
weaknesses that allow for the opportunity to begin offensive operations.
In the defense, the maneuver commander prioritizes requirements for air defense coverage based on
mission analysis, IPB, and METT-TC. Priority for air defense in the defense may be to the main battle
positions, C2 elements, or logistics assets. The SHORAD platoon leader must clearly understand where its
supported force's effort will be weighted. Based on these considerations, the platoon leader will develop a
coverage plan to support the defensive concept of operations.
Artillery and rockets will be used extensively against SHORAD-defended assets. They are usually
numerous, inexpensive, survivable and highly effective. UASs will be employed to provide targeting data.
UASs are extremely effective in this role due to their small size, low radar cross section, and standoff
capability. In addition to RAM and UASs, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft continue to present formidable
threats to a defense.
SHORAD engagements of air threats are executed locally (decentralized) by team chiefs and section
chiefs in accordance with the air defense warning, weapons control status, and ROE. SHORAD engagement
decisions are made and executed locally within the ROE. Identification authority is also exercised at the local
level. The identification friend or foe capability assists SHORAD team and section chiefs in the identification
of potential targets. Positive visual identification is required for all aircraft prior to engagement.
To combat aerial targets, SHORAD fire units are assigned sectors of fire and primary and secondary
target lines.
* Sector of fire is that area assigned to a unit, a crew-served weapon, or an individual weapon within
which it will engage targets as they appear in accordance with established engagement priorities
(FM 3-90-1). Sectors of fire are specified by left and right limits in azimuth.
* Primary target line is an azimuth assigned to a weapon system or unit along which the system fire
control personnel and or gunners focus their attention (FM 3-01). Primary target lines are
established along the centerline of the assigned sector of fire to assist in the distribution of fires
when defending against multiple targets that are attacking from different directions. Primary target
lines are typically aligned with air avenues of approach.
* Secondary target line is a pre-planned alternative target line used to shift the orientation of fires
to assure all likely threat avenues of approach are adequately defended (FM 3-01). Secondary
target lines allow mutual support and overlapping coverage. Secondary target lines are planned in
advance to allow the proper positioning of equipment to accommodate both primary and secondary
target line requirements.
The platoon leader designates sectors of fire and primary and secondary target lines after reviewing
fire unit positions to ensure that all aerial targets threatening the protected asset can be engaged. Each fire
unit concentrates its fires on the most threatening aerial target within its assigned sector or closest to its
primary target line. Controls provide efficient fires and reduce the probability of simultaneous engagements
from two or more systems.
The SHORAD platoon leader uses the AMD employment tenets to position launchers in accordance
with METT-TC. The M-SHORAD platoon leader may initially position the M-SHORADs for early
engagements. The Avenger platoon leader stresses mutual support, or overlapping coverage when possible,
to enhance engagement opportunities. If fixed-wing aircraft are considered to be a major threat, the platoon
may weight coverage to the most likely air avenue(s) of approach. The Land-based Phalanx Weapon System
platoon leader positions launchers in pairs with mutual support if possible, or overlapping fires between pairs
as a minimum, for RAM engagements given the relatively short range of the system.
Early warning of enemy air surveillance or attack is facilitated by Sentinel and the other Land-based
Phalanx Weapon System sensors which are positioned to extend sensor detection over the defended area.
Warnings are transmitted by audio or visual means to units or assets in the actual zone of danger and not the
entire base or AO, unless area coverage is directed by the supported commander.
In addition to enabling focused early warning of friendly personnel, the Land-based Phalanx Weapon
System sense function alerts the intercept systems for engagements of incoming RAM munitions. The Land- |
3-01.44 | 58 | Chapter 6
based Phalanx Weapon System's intercepts require acquisition and tracking of incoming rounds that have
predicted point of impact within the designated protected area.
There are three types of defensive operations: area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. For more
information on defensive operations, see ADP 3-90. In addition, defense of the homeland by SHORAD
elements is discussed.
AREA DEFENSE
Area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to
designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADP 3-90). The focus of an
area defense is on retaining terrain where the bulk of a defending force positions itself in mutually supporting,
prepared positions. SHORAD forces in an area defense are generally more focused on protecting designated
fixed or semi-fixed assets, rather than denying access to terrain.
In defensive situations, SHORAD commanders support established battle positions based on the IPB,
METT-TC, and the maneuver commander's scheme of maneuver. These positions need to be planned and
prepared in depth to provide decisive fires against enemy air attacks. During preparation of the defense, air
defense priority normally goes to the unit preparing positions and obstacles. Once the defensive positions are
prepared, priority may shift to C2 and maneuver support assets. When maneuver is required, priority shifts
to the maneuvering elements. In each situation, SHORAD assets focus on the main air avenues of approach.
If M-SHORADs or Avengers are tasked to provide coverage for the maneuver force reserves, they should be
positioned along identified enemy air avenues of approach that influence the reserves' initial positions, as
well as routes to their defensive positions.
SHORAD systems will be used in areas that maximize their significant capabilities but minimize their
exposure to the direct fire fight. M-SHORADs and Avengers are most suited for early engagement of UASs.
They may initially be positioned with counter-reconnaissance forces or along enemy air avenues of approach
that allow the enemy surveillance of defensive positions and preparations. For more information on
countering UASs, see ATP 3-01.81.
Actual positioning of SHORAD systems should be based on the air IPB, the commander's priorities
for the air defense, and the location of the supported unit's assets. Avengers, for instance, could be positioned
as far as 3,000 meters apart; however, the distance between systems is dependent upon line-of-sight and
METT-TC considerations. M-SHORAD and Avenger systems may be prioritized for engineer effort and
dug-in to maximize survivability.
The M-SHORAD guns and the Avenger's machinegun are capable weapons that may be used by their
crews to defend their position against ground attacks, as well as to engage air targets as required. The
supported commander may also task the M-SHORAD or Avenger platoon to defend a portion of the asset's
perimeter. Care must be taken if this task is assigned to ensure that their positions do not now weaken or
create gaps in the defense against air threats. If they do, the battery commander or platoon leader must so
advise the supported commander.
Air defense may be allocated to reserve or counterattack forces, C2 and logistics facilities, and fire
support units. If the supported unit is defending against an enemy main attack, air defense risks may be taken
in the rear area to achieve the mass and early engagement needed to defeat the likely attack helicopter threat.
If defending against a supporting attack, more Avenger and Stinger teams may be allocated to static assets in
the unit's rear. The ADA plan must be flexible enough, however, to quickly mass against the attack helicopter
threat should the enemy's main effort shift and occur in the supported unit's sector.
Since Land-based Phalanx Weapon System units can designate the grid for the point of origin of RAM
fires sooner than other sources, collocation of Land-based Phalanx Weapon System leaders in a base defense
operation center or supported unit's operation center is a tactical procedure that helps Land-based Phalanx
Weapon System units more rapidly synchronize positive identification and clearance of fires. The platoon
leader can interact with the base commander or supported unit commander for engagement authorization.
While some units collocate Land-based Phalanx Weapon System leaders with base defense operation centers
or protection cells, operational experience suggests the best mission command practice is to collocate a sense
and warn leader in the portion of the supported unit's operation center where intelligence, surveillance, and |
3-01.44 | 59 | Executing Short-Range Air Defense Operations
reconnaissance and fires decisions are made. This facilitates positive identification with UASs and results in
rapid clearance of fires. The warning function can be triggered as easily from the operation center as from a
base defense operation center or protection cell; however, synchronization with intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance and fires is typically more difficult from a base defense operation center or protection
cell than from the unit's operation center.
MOBILE DEFENSE
Mobile defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the
enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADP 3-90). The mobile defense focuses on defeating or
destroying enemy forces by allowing them to advance to a point where they are exposed to a decisive
counterattack by a striking force. A fixing force supplements the striking force by holding attacking enemy
forces in position, by canalizing attacking enemy forces into ambush areas, and by retaining areas from which
to launch the striking force. The key aspects of supporting mobile defense are mobility and survivability. The
moving elements in a mobile defense will be the most vulnerable to attack and surveillance.
Counterintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are critical because the plan relies on surprise.
M-SHORAD units may accompany the striking force, protecting it against enemy air attacks. Avenger units
and Stinger teams may support the fixing force by engaging aerial surveillance and attack platforms from
pre-positioned locations. Both have limited mobility and survivability; they cannot keep pace with
mechanized forces on the move and lack suitable protection. Avengers and Stinger teams will generally be
emplaced to defend the security force and the more critical static assets of the supported unit (for example,
the C2 elements).
RETROGRADE
A retrograde is a transitional operation. It is always part of a larger scheme of maneuver designed to
regain the initiative and defeat the enemy.
Depending on the size and the mission of the covering force, the SHORAD plan may allocate some air
defense to the covering force, assuming that the covering force's mission is to not to destroy the lead elements
of the enemy force. M-SHORAD can maneuver with the covering force and provide the required protection
against air threats. Avenger and Stinger are adept at providing over watching fires of a covering force that is
used as a screening force providing information. Since the covering force units are typically not the air
defense priority, the covering force units normally rely on passive air defense.
HOMELAND DEFENSE
Homeland defense is the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and
critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President (JP
3-27). This calls for defending U.S. territory against attack by state and non-state actors through an active,
layered defense that aims to deter and defeat aggression abroad and simultaneously protect the homeland.
The Army supports this strategy with capabilities in forward regions of the world, geographic approaches to
U.S. territory, and within the U.S. homeland. During homeland defense, Army forces work closely with
federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private agencies.
SHORAD units play a significant role in the National Capital Region, which includes Washington,
D.C. and parts of Maryland and Virginia. The air defense mission is to provide C2 and air defense to detect,
deter, divert, and, if necessary, destroy enemy air threats, thereby allowing freedom of action for national
senior leaders. The joint air defense operations center, a multi-service military capability, provides C2 of the
ground-based air defense weapon systems, supported by sensors and a warning system.
STABILITY OPERATIONS
A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other
instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). This |
3-01.44 | 60 | Chapter 6
may involve establishing civil security or control, or reverting to offensive or defensive operations. Offensive
and defensive operations may be necessary to defeat enemies that oppose a stability operation.
Army forces work with and through host-nation authorities in cases where the host nation can meet
most or all of the population's requirements. Army forces operating in a failed state may need to work with
civilian organizations to restore capabilities to support the local population.
Stability operations are inherently complex and place great demands on small units. SHORAD leaders
must develop interpersonal skills, such as cultural awareness, negotiating techniques, and learn critical
language phrases, while maintaining warfighting skills.
SHORAD support to stability tasks is identical to that in conducting offensive and defensive tasks.
While each stability task is different, air defense coordination, planning, and execution to meet the mission
requirements of the maneuver commander remain the same. The ability of SHORAD commanders to stabilize
a crisis is directly related to their perceived ability to defend the supported force and civilian critical assets,
as necessary. |
3-01.44 | 61 | Appendix A
Short-Range Air Defense System Descriptions
This appendix presents brief descriptions of SHORAD system capabilities: M-
SHORAD, Avenger, Stinger, Sentinel, Land-based Phalanx Weapon System, and
Forward Area Air Defense C2. SHORAD systems are generally considered to be
tactical-level systems. However, this designation is scenario and situational dependent.
Avenger defending the National Capital Region, for instance, is conducting a strategic
mission.
MANEUVER SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE
A-1. M-SHORAD (figure A-1) provides air defense protection of Stryker and Armor BCT maneuvering
forces against fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UASs throughout the range of military operations. It
employs a mix of sensors and weapons. A mix of different sensors provides the capability to detect, identify
and track a variety of aerial objects, including fast moving targets and small signature objects. A mix of
different, selectable weapons enables the M-SHORAD gunner to precisely match munitions to targets,
increasing efficiency and effectiveness against targets of all types.
Figure A-1. Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense system
A-2. The M-SHORAD system consists of a digitized Stinger Vehicle Universal Launcher, four Multi-
Mission Hemispheric Radars, maneuver and Forward Area Air Defense C2 systems, and associated fire
control, power generation, and related components on a Stryker vehicle. The launcher mounts four Stinger
missiles, a 30-milimeter cannon, a 7.62-milimeter coaxial machine gun, and sensor system with electro-
optical and infrared cameras for target acquisition and general situational awareness. The Multi-Mission
Hemispheric Radars are small, fixed-position, active electronically-scanned array radars positioned on the
front and back of the Stryker. The radars detect, track, and identify low-altitude air targets up to 360 degrees |
3-01.44 | 62 | Appendix A
using onboard acquisition and tracking sensor capability, including under obscured, day and night conditions.
The radars can also “stare” at a specific track while continuing to scan. M-SHORAD is integrated with
Forward Area Air Defense C2 and is interoperable with the Sentinel radar. The maneuver C2 system allows
M-SHORAD to integrate into maneuver forces.
AVENGER
A-3. The Avenger weapon system (figure A-2 on page A-3) is a mobile lightweight, day or night, limited
adverse weather fire unit employed to counter enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
efforts and low-level fixed and rotary-wing threats. The fire unit consists of two turret-mounted standard
vehicle mounted launchers, carrying Stinger infrared homing, fire-and-forget missiles; a M3P .50 caliber
machinegun; and a sensor package. The Avenger turret provides the gunner with unobstructed fields of view
rotating through 360 degrees in azimuth. The fire unit is mounted on a high mobility multipurpose wheeled
vehicle.
A-4. The Avenger sensor package aids in the acquisition and identification of air tracks. The package
includes an optical sight, forward-looking infrared radar, laser range finder, identification friend or foe, and
a fire control computer. The optical sight is a driven reticle heads-up display which allows the gunner to
manually acquire targets through the turret canopy and to aim the missiles. The forward-looking infrared
radar provides enhanced acquisition capability in various environments: night, smoke, rain, background
clutter, and haze. The laser range finder is used to determine if the target is within the normal performance
range of the missile. The identification friend or foe aids the gunner in the identification of targets; it
distinguishes aircraft as positive friend, possible friend, or unknown.
A-5. The Avenger mounts eight Stinger missiles, four in each launcher. Should the Avenger system or turret
malfunction, the missile can be converted to a man-portable configuration by removing it from one of the
Avenger missile pods. A grip stock and battery coolant unit is attached to the launch tube, and the Stinger
becomes a ready-weapon. See paragraphs A-7 and A-8 for discussion of man-portable Stinger.
A-6. Avenger links to the Forward Area Air Defense C2 for air battle management, early warning and
cueing, and aids for track identification. The Avenger system is air transportable by cargo helicopters (CH-
47 and CH-53) and C-130, C-17, and C-5 aircraft. For more information on Avenger, see ATP 3-01.64. |
3-01.44 | 63 | Short-Range Air Defense System Descriptions
Figure A-2. Avenger
MAN-PORTABLE STINGER
A-7. Stinger (figure A-3 on page A-4) is a shoulder-fired, infrared radiation homing, heat-seeking, guided
missile system that tracks to the target through proportional navigation. It is designed to counter low-level
fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and UASs. The Stinger components are a missile housed in a fiberglass launch
tube; a permanently attached, hinged, open sight assembly located atop the launch tube, a grip stock with an
identification friend or foe antenna; and a battery coolant unit. For more information on the Stinger system,
see ATP 3-01.18.
A-8. To assist the gunner in aircraft identification, the identification friend or foe antenna is unfolded and
the identification friend or foe cable is connected. Interrogation of aircraft is accomplished by pressing the
interrogate switch located at the rear of the grip stock. Stinger is a "fire-and-forget" system. This means that,
immediately after firing, the gunner removes and discards the coolant unit from its receptacle, folds and stows
the identification friend or foe antenna, unlatches the latch mechanism located at the forward end of the grip
stock, and removes the grip stock from the launch tube. The gunner can now ready another missile round for |
3-01.44 | 64 | Appendix A
engagement or opt to seek cover after launch. The grip stock is reused continually until failure. After firing,
the gunner has no control over the missile and is required only to observe the missile's flight trajectory to the
target.
Figure A-3. Stinger man-portable air defense system
SENTINEL
A-9. The Sentinel radar (figure A-4 on page A-5) is an X-Band, pulse-Doppler phased array radar that
provides 360-degree curing and target identification. It’s extremely low noise design and Doppler signal
processing result in exceptional ability to detect small, low-flying targets in clutter. It can acquire, track, and
classify cruise missiles, UASs, and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The Sentinel can detect and classify
rotary-wing aircraft, including hovering rotary-wings, at ranges beyond firing unit's maximum weapon
detection and engagement range in a severe electronic countermeasures environment. Targets can be detected
and tracked in all weather, day or night, under the most extreme battlefield conditions. Sentinel's air defense
interrogator provides improved identification friend or foe to aid in positive identification and preventing
fratricide. Due to its three-dimensional pencil beam and frequency-agile mode of operation, the Sentinel is
difficult to detect and locate accurately, improving its survivability.
A-10. The Sentinel radar is towed by a heavy high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle with a mounted
10-kilowatt generator in the rear of the vehicle. Sentinel is capable of 24-hour operations and can be located
within 10 kilometers of the forward line of own troops if the mission and situation so dictate. It should have
a clear field of view (360 degrees), be positioned to ensure overlapping coverage with adjacent radars such
that their search areas do not leave any seam in the defense that might be used by incoming threats, and
should be placed away from power sources of similar radiating frequency bands to avoid interference.
A-11. Sentinel is air transportable by medium-lift rotary-wing aircraft for the high mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicle variant, and by transport fixed-wing aircraft for the medium tactical vehicle variant. For
more information on the Sentinel system, see ATP 3-01.48. |
3-01.44 | 65 | Short-Range Air Defense System Descriptions
Figure A-4. Sentinel
LAND-BASED PHALANX WEAPON SYSTEM
A-12. The Land-based Phalanx Weapon System is a fast reacting, short-range system used to detect incoming
rockets and mortars, provide focused early warning, and destroy inbound rockets and artillery and mortar
projectiles in the air before they hit their ground targets. The intercept system has an integral sensor for
targeting and a multi-barrel gun system to destroy RAM threats. For more information, see ATP 3-01.60.
A-13. The Land-based Phalanx Weapon System (figure A-5 on page A-6) consists of a trailer-mounted close-
in weapon system. The close-in weapon system is a 20-millimeter Gatling gun, with six gun barrels, separate
search-and-track radars, and forward-looking infrared radar. The gun system is capable of firing at a
selectable rate of 3,000 to 4,500 rounds per minute, with an advanced K -band radar to provide autonomous
u
target detection and engagement. Using the K -band radar, the Land-based Phalanx Weapon System detects
u
threats early in flight and hands them over to the track mode only when those targets are determined to
threaten the area protected by the system. Two 60-kilowatt generators mounted on the trailer supply power
to the entire system. |
3-01.44 | 66 | Appendix A
Figure A-5. Land-based Phalanx Weapon System
A-14. The Land-based Phalanx Weapon System leverages ADA and field artillery sensors to provide alerting
and cueing of incoming threats. The Sentinel radar and AN/TSQ-50 Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars are
organic to the Land-based Phalanx Weapon System formation. The Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar is
operated as either a counterfire sensor (Special Operations Command mode) or in the counter-RAM mode.
It provides 360-degree surveillance and about 7.5-kilometer range. In either mode, the Lightweight Counter
Mortar Radar detects RAM fire, and predicts the suspected points of origin and impact. In the counter-RAM
mode, the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar utilizes either the local area network or high-speed radios to
send this data to the Forward Area Air Defense C2 to be used for track confirmation/correlation, cueing of
other sensors, and countermeasures (by relaying data to friendly artillery and air assets). The Land-based
Phalanx Weapon System also pulls data from the AN/TSQ-53 Firefinder radar while Firefinder is executing
is primary counterfire mission. In addition, the AN/TPQ-36/37/46 counterbattery radar found in forward
operating bases with field artillery units may be tied into the sensor network.
A-15. The RAM Warn system (figure A-6 on page A-7) capability provides localized RAM early warning
and impact point prediction and can be used within Land-based Phalanx Weapon System units or as an
independent warning capability. RAM Warn system uses local sensors and a network of broad area sensors,
as available, to sense attacks and disseminates warnings using audio and visual methods, both outdoors and
indoors. Warnings are limited to the zone of danger, not to an entire base or AO unless directed by the
supported asset commander. Emplacement considerations in positioning RAM Warn system components
include the size of the defended area, heavy traffic areas, designated logistical arrival and departure points,
and dead space areas. |
3-01.44 | 67 | Short-Range Air Defense System Descriptions
Figure A-6. RAM Warn system
A-16. A Forward Area Air Defense C2 variant, with specific counter-RAM modifications, provides the
requisite battle management. It links the weapons, sensors, and warning systems for Land-based Phalanx
Weapon System intercepts. It provides situational awareness to the air and missile defense workstation and
engagement commands to the Land-based Phalanx Weapon System.
FORWARD AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL
A-17. The Forward Area Air Defense C2 system-of-systems (figure A-7 on page A-8) consists of common
hardware, software, communications equipment, and shelters to meet the C2 and targeting needs of SHORAD
battalions. Forward Area Air Defense C2 collects, processes, and disseminates real-time target tracking and
cueing information to all SHORAD weapons and provides C2 for the Land-based Phalanx Weapon System.
A-18. Forward Area Air Defense C2 hardware consists of shelters (Army standard rigid wall and command
post platform shelters) and fire unit components, such as the forward area computer terminal. The terminal
provides Avenger fire units with airspace situational data, engagement commands, and weapon coordination,
status, and control. C2 software provides engagement and force operations functions, air battle management
and situational awareness, low level air picture, and automated integration with Army C2 systems.
A-19. Forward Area Air Defense C2 supports the AMD mission by providing real-time, correlated air tracks
and C2 information, and intelligence assessments to higher, adjacent, and lower units. Computer displays
allow commanders to access the air picture, situation reports, enemy assessments, and friendly forces. The
Forward Area Air Defense C2 system has the capability to interface with joint and NATO C2 systems, as
well as Army C2 systems. The engagement operations subsystem provides a joint air picture via tactical data
links B and J, transmitted using various joint range extension applications protocols.
A-20. The C2 software assists with digitization of the battlefield by providing air situational awareness to
the supported force and alerting and cueing to SHORAD systems. The Forward Area Air Defense C2 systems
support Land-based Phalanx Weapon System units by receiving and correlating sensor inputs and then
alerting the intercept system and the sense and warn elements of an impending RAM attack. |
3-01.44 | 68 | Appendix A
Figure A-7. Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control shelter |
3-01.44 | 69 | Appendix B
Orders and Air Defense Appendix
This appendix presents the types of orders that SHORAD leaders at all echelons use in
planning, preparing, and executing operations. SHORAD leaders must have a thorough
understanding of the orders and appendices they will receive and issue. These orders
allow leaders to organize their thoughts and convey them in a concise and informative
manner to their subordinates.
WARNING ORDER
B-1. WARNORDs give subordinate units advance notice of a contemplated action or order which is to
follow. The purpose is to initiate the troop-leading procedures of subordinate units.
B-2. WARNORDs have no prescribed format. The amount of detail included in a WARNORD is dependent
on the time available, the means of communications available, and the information necessary for subordinate
leaders. As more information becomes available, additional WARNORDs should be issued. WARNORDs
are normally brief oral or written orders. An example WARNORD is depicted below.
WARNING ORDER
Alpha Battery moves night of 5-6 Aug to assembly area Pinto (VIC
YR1016); prepare to advance early 7 Aug to provide air defense
for river crossing over Wart River. 1st Platoon, on order attached
to Bravo Company effective 051900Z. Road movement plan and
OPORD to be issued at 051300Z.
B-3. The following is essential information required in a WARNORD:
* Heading. "Warning Order" stated so that addressee will recognize that orders follow.
* Addressees. To whom the WARNORD pertains.
* Situation. A brief description of the enemy and friendly situation.
* Time and nature of the operation. The time that the mission begins and the mission or probable
mission to be accomplished.
* Movement time. Earliest time to move.
* Operation order (OPORD). The time and place that the OPORD will be issued and who must
attend.
* Special instructions. Any details of early coordination, rehearsals, special equipment
requirements, attachments, environmental considerations, and any other information.
* Acknowledgment. If there is an acknowledgment statement, then an acknowledgment is required
that the WARNORD has been received and understood.
OPERATION ORDER
B-4. The Army's OPORD format standardizes the content and organization of information essential to
clarity and execution of the plan. Leaders at all levels must practice writing and presenting OPORDs. With
a little practice, the time consumed writing and presenting the OPORD will be significantly reduced. |
3-01.44 | 70 | Appendix B
B-5. The five paragraph OPORD tailored for a SHORAD unit should, as a minimum, contain the following
information:
* Situation.
* Mission.
* Execution.
* Sustainment.
* Command and Signal.
B-6. Once developed, the commander should brief subordinate leaders and ensure that the supported
commander is cognizant of the SHORAD plan. In briefing subordinate leaders, the commander begins by
orienting all with maps or suitable graphics. Upon completion of the briefing, the commander conducts a
back-brief to confirm that the leaders understand the order. Figure B-1 on page B-3, presents a sample air
defense OPORD. |
3-01.44 | 71 | Orders and Air Defense Appendix
Figure B-1. Air defense operation order |
3-01.44 | 72 | Appendix B
Figure B-1. Air defense operation order (continued)
FRAGMENTARY ORDER
B-7. A fragmentary order is an abbreviated form of an OPORD used to make changes in missions to units
or to inform them of changes in the tactical situation. Like WARNORDs, these are usually brief oral or
written messages. Mission orders are a form of a fragmentary order that provide experienced leaders with the
essentials of an order: their mission or a change to a previously issued mission. Fragmentary orders may be
oral, written, or graphic; in all instances, they are brief. An example of fragmentary order is presented in
figure B-2 on page B-5. |
3-01.44 | 73 | Orders and Air Defense Appendix
Figure B-2. Fragmentary order example
AIR DEFENSE APPENDIX
B-8. An appendix is an integral part of an order which deals with one aspect of an operation. Its purpose is
to keep the basic text of an order short. Appendices allow the distribution of certain information to key players
in the supported force. The air defense appendix is a sub-element of the Fires annex to an OPORD.
B-9. Many times the senior SHORAD officer supporting a specific force will be required to draft the air
defense appendix to the supported force's OPORD. Appendices may be issued simultaneously with the order
or distributed separately. Unless there is a reason to the contrary, each copy of an order is issued complete
with all annexes. Figure B-3 on page B-6, presents a sample air defense appendix. |
3-01.44 | 74 | Appendix B
Figure B-3. Air defense appendix |
3-01.44 | 75 | Appendix C
Air Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a
specific area. The commander uses the IPB process to understand the battlefield and
the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. This appendix discusses the four
steps in developing an air IPB: define the operational environment, describe
environmental effects on operations, evaluate the threat, and determine threat courses
of action. Discussions are focused on the IPB for SHORAD forces.
STEP 1-DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
C-1. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect
the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Defining the operational
environment results in the identification of significant characteristics that can affect friendly and threat
operations and any gaps in current intelligence holdings.
C-2. During step 1, the intelligence staff must identify those significant characteristics related to the mission
variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations that are relevant to the mission. The intelligence
staff evaluates significant characteristics to identify gaps and initiate information collection. There are four
sub-steps in defining the operational environment: define the air defense AO, define the air defense area of
interest; evaluate current operations, existing databases, and identify intelligence gaps; and initiate collection
of information required to complete the IPB.
C-3. A doctrinal area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime
forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). The air
defense AO defines the area where the SHORAD commander can affect the battle with assigned weapon
systems. The air defense AO is generally identical to the ground AO in width and depth and extends vertically
to the maximum altitude capability of SHORAD systems. It may be much larger than the doctrinal AO for a
commander, in that SHORAD sensors may project coverage well beyond the supported asset's area. Such
longer-range surveillance and detection capabilities are significant contributors to early warning and
protection of the force.
C-4. A doctrinal area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence,
areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). The area of interest is the geographic area
and the airspace above it from which information and intelligence assessments are required to facilitate
planning or successful conduct of the commander's operation. Because the commander and staff need time
to process information and plan and synchronize operations, the commander's area of interest is generally
larger than the AO. It is also larger due to the great distances that air and missile systems can rapidly cover.
The air area of interest will extend vertically to cover the maximum service ceilings or trajectories of aircraft,
UASs, RAM, and missile systems. Horizontally, it will extend to cover the maximum range of aircraft, UASs,
RAM, and missiles plus threat airfields, forward arming and refueling points, navigation aids, and missile
sites. The area of interest extends to the limits from which information must be collected about enemy forces
which could affect friendly forces.
C-5. In evaluating current operations and developing future plans, commanders must identify the types of
friendly and threat information that will affect success or failure of said operation. Not all information will
be available in the time allotted or to the degree required. Information gaps should be identified early and
prioritized based on the commander's initial guidance and intent for intelligence and information collection.
C-6. The intelligence team fills intelligence gaps by initiating collection operations through priority
intelligence requirements, essential elements of friendly information, and requests for information. |
3-01.44 | 76 | Appendix C
Information requests are processed and expedited to ensure required data is available as quickly and as
complete as possible. The SHORAD battalion and the supported asset are generally the two primary sources
of intelligence for SHORAD batteries and platoons. Other AMD units operating in the vicinity of SHORAD
forces may provide relevant data on threat air elements and capabilities.
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATION
C-7. SHORAD leaders and staffs must conduct an in-depth analysis of the effects of terrain and weather on
the enemy and friendly forces to project how a threat may project its air forces and how SHORAD forces
may be positioned to defeat them. Each potential air threat must be considered with respect to the AO and
the area of interest.
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
C-8. Terrain analysis in support of air defense is significantly different from terrain analysis for ground
operations. The nature of airspace does not eliminate the need for terrain analysis because enemy air and
friendly ADA will still attempt to use terrain to their own best advantage. IPB focuses on what impact the
geographic factors have on the ability of threat air to approach, acquire, and engage a target, or deliver
airborne or air assault troops.
C-9. Analysis of the terrain for IPB follows the same principles as ground analysis and uses the military
aspects of terrain observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, and key terrain.
C-10. Observation and fields of fire. Observation and fields of fire relate to the influence of terrain on
reconnaissance and target acquisition. In the IPB context, observation relates to optical and electronic line of
sight. Many battlefield systems require line of sight to effectively operate or acquire and engage targets.
These systems include radios, radars, jammers, direct-fire weapons, and airborne and ground sensors as well
as SHORAD systems. Fields of fire relate to the terrain effects on weapon systems. Airspace must be
analyzed with regard to routes which provide the best protection for air threats entering the target area and
those which provide the best fields of fire once they reach the target area.
C-11. Cover and concealment. Cover and concealment have slightly different applications with respect to air
systems. The following tactics and techniques are considerations of cover and concealment.
* Contour flying is flying a constant altitude above ground level of less than 22.8 meters (75 feet).
This allows for maximum use of terrain masking.
* Popup tactics are the use of a low-altitude approach to the target area. Target acquisition and
engagement is made by popping-up in altitude at a predetermined position or time to minimize
exposure.
* Masking is using terrain to protect an air system from visual and electronic observation or
detection. Electromagnetic warfare supplements natural masking.
* Cover is using terrain to provide protection from direct-fire weapon systems.
* Ground clutter can be characterized as a reduction of electromagnetic signal-to-noise ratio due to
the signature of a background. It is different for each type of terrain or feature.
C-12. Threat aircraft (especially attack helicopters), cruise missiles, and possibly even UASs will use contour
flying, masking, and ground clutter to avoid detection and to provide cover from direct fires. Aircraft will
also use the terrain by loitering on reverse slopes, using pop-up tactics, and by using ground clutter and
vegetation as a backdrop to enhance concealment.
C-13. Obstacles. There are three primary types of obstacles:
* Those which prevent the effective employment of ADA systems.
* Those which restrict contour flight.
* Those which force air threats to employ a particular surveillance or attack profile or route, or to
gain excessive altitude.
C-14. Of particular interest are obstacles and terrain which restrict lateral movement within an avenue of
approach. This will canalize movement or restrict evasive action. Additionally, terrain may stop the
employment of certain air threat systems if the terrain exceeds the system's maximum operating ceiling. |
3-01.44 | 77 | Air Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
C-15. Key Terrain. Key terrain is any locality or area in which the seizure, retention, or control of it will
afford a marked advantage to either combatant. In the aerial dimension, key terrain consists of terrain features
which canalize or constrain air threat systems, and terrain with an elevation higher than the maximum ceiling
of these systems. Additionally, areas that can be used for airfields, missile and UAS launch sites, landing and
drop zones, or forward arming and refueling points also need to be considered as key terrain, since these
areas could be used to support friendly or threat air operations. Terrain can be used as an aid to navigation.
Man-made features are also used as cues to navigate to targets.
C-16. Air avenues of approach. Air avenues of approach are evaluated using the same criteria as for the
ground. A good air avenue of approach will permit maneuver while providing terrain masking from surface-
to-air weapon systems. Some common air avenues of approach are valleys, direct lines from the enemy point
of origin, and river beds. See figure C-1. Consider the following in determining air avenues of approach, both
ingress and egress:
* Type of air threat, attack profile, and ordnance. UASs are small and elusive. They usually fly low.
Altitude can vary. Once in the target area, they may fly an orbit attempting to stay out of
engagement range of ADA. Most surface-launched cruise missiles are terrain following and they
use terrain masking. Cruise missiles can fly indirect routes at low altitudes and can attack or surveil
from any direction. Tactical air-to-surface missiles usually fly direct routes from launch platform
to the target. Rotary-wing aircraft primarily conduct contour flights. They follow ridge lines and
military crests, using the terrain to mask their approach to the target area. Fixed-wing aircraft
usually follow major terrain or man-made features. Depending on range, they may fly a straight
line to the target. Ordnance or payload may affect range and altitude of the air system and thus
influence the selection of avenues of approach. RAM fly ballistic trajectories from the launch point
to the objective.
Figure C-1. Example of air avenues of approach, based on terrain aspect |
3-01.44 | 78 | Appendix C
Note: Air avenue of approach (AAA) 1a and AAA1b are two broad AAAs that come together near
the forward line of own troops; separately or when combined, AAA1 depicts a fixed wing AAA
with a mechanized infantry battalion target. AAA2 is a rotary wing AAA, depicted as an attack
helicopter route with an armor battalion target. AAA3 is a rotary wing AAA, depicted as an air
assault battalion mission attacking the bridge.
* Air threat point of origin and ground control radar positions. When determining air avenues of
approach, the staff looks at the commander's entire area of interest. Analysis begins at the threat
airfield or UAS or missile launch site and works toward the probable enemy objective. This allows
a look at the big picture. The staff considers the range of the air systems and location of navigation
aids and ground-control sites.
* Probable threat objective. Each avenue of approach must end at a target, drop zone, or landing
zone; or within reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, or target acquisition range of a target.
Use a reverse IPB to select potential threat objectives.
* Potential to support maneuver forces. Air assets which are used to achieve ground objectives will
seek to use air avenues of approach coincident with ground avenues of approach. Air assets
attacking deep are not limited to these ground avenues. Missiles and reconnaissance, surveillance,
and target acquisition UASs are not limited by ground corridors.
* Freedom to maneuver within the air avenue. Does the avenue—
Canalize the air system?
Have access to adjacent avenues?
Provide the ability to acquire a target and use available munitions?
Assist in navigation?
* Protection for the air system and pilot. Does the avenue provide—
Terrain masking (cover and concealment)?
For the full use of air system speed?
Protection against radar detection?
Protection from air defense weapon systems and tactical air support?
A standoff orbit location?
A standoff orbit?
* Air threat and pilot capabilities. Can the air system or pilot—
Perform contour flying?
Fly at night?
Fly in all weather conditions?
Range the targets?
WEATHER ANALYSIS
C-17. Air operations are especially susceptible to the effects of weather. Weather analysis for air and air
defense operations is designed to predict the most likely time over target and other considerations based on
weather effects and light data. Many of these considerations are the same factors the intelligence officers use
for ground operations: visibility, obstruction, winds, precipitation, cloud cover, and high temperatures and
humidity.
C-18. Visibility has a significant impact on offensive air operations and reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition. Visibility has the same effects on visually-directed ADA systems and sensors.
C-19. Obscuration. Friendly smoke operations and fires may have an impact on friendly air defense
operations. ADA personnel should coordinate with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and fires
personnel to ensure the likely impacts of smoke operations do not degrade ADA operations. ADA personnel
must know when and where large-scale operations are planned. |
3-01.44 | 79 | Air Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
C-20. High winds will hinder maneuver, close air support, and target engagement, especially in tight air
avenues of approach. Missiles and UASs will be adversely affected in performance and accuracy.
C-21. Precipitation affects aircraft, missile, and UAS performance and reduces the effectiveness of sensors.
Precipitation reduces ADA sensor range.
C-22. Cloud cover and ceilings may restrict operations by setting low operational ceilings and restricting
visibility and target engagement. Low ceilings, overcast, and clouds may restrict visually-directed ADA
weapons' detection and acquisition ranges.
C-23. Extreme temperature and humidity have a severe effect on aircraft and UASs by decreasing combat
range, altitude (particularly rotary-wing aircraft), and ordnance payloads. Rotary-wing aircraft are
particularly affected.
STEP 3-EVALUATE THE THREAT
C-24. Threat evaluation for air operations consists of a detailed study of enemy air capabilities, organization,
and doctrine. There are three steps in evaluating the threat: collect and analyze doctrinal threat data, analyze
threat air capabilities, and conduct target evaluation.
COLLECT AND ANALYZE DOCTRINAL THREAT DATA
C-25. The following are typical questions which should be answered during this step. They must also include
the commander's critical information requirements and priority intelligence requirements.
* What are the major strategic, operational, and tactical objectives of the enemy's air operations?
* Which objectives may be targeted for destruction or suppression?
* Where do friendly air defense assets fit into the enemy's objectives? Do they need to be destroyed
or suppressed for the enemy plan to work? Answers to these two questions may result in
modification to air avenues of approach.
* What is the enemy's air order of battle? How are the assets organized? Knowledge of threat
organization, and who has operational control, will indicate the importance of the AO. For
example, does the threat have mobile, fixed, or both types of launchers?
* Who has tactical control of aircraft at the point of attack?
* How will UASs be used: attack, reconnaissance, surveillance, or battle damage assessment? What
are the associated profiles?
* How does the enemy doctrinally attack? Will the enemy use airborne, air assault, or special
operations forces in conjunction with an air or ground attack? What size are these forces and to
what depth are they used? Will the enemy synchronize the air attack? Does the enemy have the
capability to coordinate an air attack (possibly with varied air platforms that can overmatch
friendly air defense capabilities)?
* What are air system combat ingress and egress speeds?
* Where are the potential missile and UAS launch points? What are the likely targets? What are the
range, endurance, and profile of these systems?
* What are the doctrinal distances for forward arming and refueling points?
* How and where will the enemy attack ground targets for interdiction?
* At what altitude will the enemy approach the target, deliver munitions, and exit the target area?
* How does the enemy employ reconnaissance assets?
* How has the enemy historically fought?
ANALYZE THREAT AIR CAPABILITIES
C-26. ADA intelligence officers evaluate a broad range of order of battle data and threat capabilities to
include the ground force and electromagnetic warfare threats upon SHORAD units. They also evaluate the
answers to the following questions with respect to fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, UASs, RAM, and cruise
missiles. The questions are not inclusive; they are representative of those that will provide relevant and timely
threat information. |
3-01.44 | 80 | Appendix C
* What are the fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft—
Capability to coordinate air-to-ground attacks?
Capability to coordinate air and artillery operations? Are ground forward air controllers used?
Capability for suppression of friendly air defense?
Performance (for example, speed, altitude, airfield restrictions, troop and weapon load
capacity)?
Endurance, range, and ingress and egress altitude and speed?
Levels of combat readiness and sortie generation rate?
Capability to conduct pop-up maneuvers? What is the standoff range?
Target acquisition capability, night and adverse-weather capability, and identification range?
Typical ordnance load (maximum weight, type, load mixture, and level of sophistication)?
Navigational capability? Can it fly at night or in adverse conditions?
Combat radius (with or without external tanks, ordnance, or location of staging bases)?
Expectant loiter time (how long will it have on station over the target area)?
Type, quantity, and quality of training the pilot received?
Pilots' likelihood to conform to doctrine?
Ability of pilots to fly at night or perform contour flying? During peacetime did the pilot
conduct the type of mission expected to be conducted during war?
Type and capability of ordnance? Each type of ordnance should be evaluated for range,
accuracy, release altitude (how high or low must the aircraft fly?), reload and refire time,
number of ordnance available, and guidance modes (how does the pilot acquire and engage?)
Does the ordnance need to acquire and guide? If so, how?
* What is the UAS—
Performance (speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)?
Endurance and range?
Contour flying or terrain limiting factors?
Target acquisition and standoff range?
Sensor package and payload (maximum weight, type, and load mixture)?
Loiter time (how long can the UAS stay on station)?
Visibility effects on acquisition?
Modes of recovery and turnaround time?
Real-time data link capability?
Guidance modes (ground controlled and preprogrammed)?
Crew proficiency?
* What is the RAM—
Type?
Performance (flight time, speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)?
Maximum and minimum lethal ranges?
Warhead size?
Accuracy?
Burn time?
Potential launch site(s)?
Launch types (stationary vehicle, stationary site, moving vehicle)?
* What is the cruise missile—
Performance (flight time, speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)?
Maximum and minimum ranges?
Accuracy? |
3-01.44 | 81 | Air Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Targeting capability and type?
Contour flying capability?
Vulnerability to countermeasures?
Guidance mode?
Warhead type and size?
CONDUCT TARGET VALUE EVALUATION
C-27. The target evaluation must determine what targets are to be labeled as high-value targets. High-value
targets are assets the enemy or friendly commander has deemed as important for the successful
accomplishment of the mission. High-value targets are determined by operational necessity and weapon
system capability.
C-28. Key questions that must be answered with respect to target value include—
* Criticality of each? Impact of its loss on operations?
* Vulnerability of each?
* Recuperability of each?
* Redundancy of capabilities? Can other assets perform the mission or provide the capabilities?
C-29. The responses to these questions will help in shaping the defense. The most critical assets will be
defended with active and passive defense capabilities, while those of less criticality may be defended by
passive defense measures and combined arms for air defense capabilities.
STEP 4-DETERMINE THE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
C-30. To complete step four, determine both the threat air and ground COAs and integrate the results of the
previous three steps into a meaningful conclusion. Given what threat air and missile forces prefer to do and
the effects of the operational environment, what are the enemy's likely objectives and what COAs are
available to the enemy? The intelligence officers develop enemy threat models that depict the threat's air and
missile COAs. They also prepare event templates and matrices that focus information collection on
identifying which COA the threat will likely execute.
C-31. Situation templates are graphic depictions of expected threat dispositions should they adopt a particular
COA. They usually depict the most critical point in the operation as agreed upon by the intelligence officers.
However, the intelligence officers might prepare several templates representing different snapshots in time,
starting with the initial threat array. The situation template integrates air attack and surveillance profiles with
terrain. It focuses on specific air avenues of approach and mobility corridors to determine which avenues are
the most capable of supporting specific attack techniques, profiles, and the most direct routes to landing and
drop zones to protect and ensure the survivability of air threat systems.
C-32. The event template is a guide for collection and reconnaissance and surveillance planning. It depicts
NAIs where the commander expects to see certain activities of tactical significance and is used to confirm or
deny an enemy course of action. The NAIs are based on the terrain constraints of air approach routes to
potential targets and analysis of the enemy's attack and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
profiles. The intelligence officers develop an event matrix to support the event template by providing details
on the type of activity expected in each area, the times the area is expected to be active, and its relationship
to other events on the battlefield. Examples of NAIs include landing and drop zones, forward arming and
refueling points, forward staging areas, aerial choke points, and RAM and UAS launch points.
C-33. The decision support template is an integrated staff product that results from the wargaming of
potential friendly COAs. The decision support template is based on the situation and event templates, event
matrix, and the wargaming of friendly COA results. It should depict—
* Air avenues of approach.
* Airborne and air assault objectives.
* Landing and drop zones and the largest size enemy element which could be employed at the zone.
* Ranges of enemy systems. |
3-01.44 | 82 | Appendix C
* Ranges of friendly air defense systems.
* Target areas of interest.
* Decision points.
C-34. Air target areas of interest and decision points are determined in the same manner as for ground
operations. However, due to the high speeds of air systems, decision points must be placed significantly
farther in advance of the target areas of interest. |
3-01.44 | 83 | Appendix D
Rehearsals
This appendix will provide rehearsal guidelines for SHORAD commanders and
leaders. The information focuses on preparing them to plan for, prepare and conduct
effective rehearsals for their own units, regardless of echelon, and with supported
elements. For additional information on rehearsals, see FM 6-0.
INTRODUCTION
D-1. Each rehearsal type achieves a different result and has a specific place in the preparation timeline. The
first step in rehearsal planning is to determine the type rehearsal the unit will use to practice the operation
prior to execution.
D-2. Regardless of the type of rehearsal used, most successful ones share common rehearsal practices. The
following are some of the best practices commanders and leaders can use to guide their rehearsal planning
and rehearsal execution evaluation:
* The commander or leader establishes a standard for a successful rehearsal.
* Commanders and leaders emphasize critical actions and key events that trigger friendly actions.
* Rehearsal occurs near or on terrain similar to the actual operation terrain.
* Rehearsal occurs under the same conditions (for example, weather and time of day) as expected
during the operation.
* Rehearsals identify problem areas, contingency actions, and enhance coordination.
* Rehearsals include all information from the operations overlay including known and suspected
enemy positions, airspace coordinating measures, and names of key terrain features.
* Rehearsals use the decision support matrix and the decision support template as guides.
* Critical actions in an operation are practiced.
D-3. Rehearsals must be planned, prepared, and executed. The planning section beginning on page D-5
addresses rehearsal planning considerations and recommended responsibilities for ensuring effective
rehearsals. The rehearsal preparation section presents checklists that focus on the responsibilities of the
commander, executive officer, and staff to make rehearsal execution run smoothly. The execution section
identifies commander and staff responsibilities and SHORAD rehearsal step-by-step actions.
REHEARSAL TYPES
D-4. Each rehearsal type achieves a different result and has a specific place in the preparation timeline.
There are four types of rehearsals: the backbrief, combined arms rehearsal, support rehearsal and the battle
drill or SOP rehearsal.
BACKBRIEF
D-5. A backbrief is a briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend to
accomplish their mission. It is used in conjunction with other rehearsals to ensure the operation and rehearsal
standards are met. A subordinate briefs the commander or leader on what the subordinate's orders are and
what the subordinate is supposed to do and why. This briefing allows commanders to clarify the commander's
intent early in subordinate planning and identify any problems in the concept of operations.
D-6. Commanders and leaders should conduct backbriefs with subordinates at the following critical times: |
3-01.44 | 84 | Appendix D
* Immediately after the OPORD has been issued, to ensure the mission, intent, and tasks to
subordinate units are understood.
* After the subordinates have formulated their concept of the operation, but before the subordinate
OPORDs are issued. This is to ensure the subordinate's plans are consistent with the commander's
intent and mission.
D-7. SHORAD commanders and leaders may not have the luxury of face-to-face backbriefs. Commanders
and leaders may have to use other communications means, such as the radio, to get their backbriefs.
Subsequent backbriefs are especially difficult to have face-to-face due to the physical dispersion and
commitment of the various commanders; the SHORAD battalion is especially limited in the ability to gather
battery commanders.
COMBINED ARMS REHEARSAL
D-8. A combined arms rehearsal is a rehearsal in which subordinate units synchronize their plans with each
other. A higher unit's headquarters normally executes a combined arms rehearsal after subordinate units issue
their OPORD. This rehearsal type helps ensure that subordinate commander's plans achieve the higher
commander's intent. When SHORAD commanders choose to conduct a combined arms rehearsal with their
subordinate unit, they must select one (or a combination) of the available rehearsal methods and focus on the
effective execution of the operation.
SUPPORT REHEARSAL
D-9. A support rehearsal helps synchronize each warfighting function with the overall picture. Throughout
preparation units conduct support rehearsals within the framework of a single or limited number of
warfighting functions. SHORAD commanders participate in the supported unit's rehearsal and must
maximize the time they have during this rehearsal. Support rehearsals and combined arms rehearsals
complement preparations for the operation. The following is an example of a sequence the air defender could
use during a rehearsal:
* Point out enemy air avenues of approach, possible aerial enemy targets, landing zones and drop
zones in the units' area and the expected aerial platform that the unit may face.
* Address actions on air attack during the rehearsal's particular critical action(s).
* Point out the locations of ADA assets (fire units, sensors, and ADA command posts).
* Address any synchronization issues necessary to get SHORAD assets in the right place at the right
time.
* Address actions taken to mitigate or defeat air attacks during the rehearsal's particular critical
action(s).
* Address combined arms for air defense.
* Disseminate the early warning plan emphasizing the need to rebroadcast early warning over the
supported unit command nets.
BATTLE DRILL OR STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE REHEARSAL
D-10. Battle drill or SOP rehearsal is a collective action rapidly executed without a deliberate decision
making process. A battle drill or SOP rehearsal ensures that all participants understand a technique or a
specific set of procedures. SHORAD commanders can identify one or more specific procedures and/or
techniques, they consider critical or essential for the success of the operation.
METHODS OF REHEARSAL
D-11. There are several methods for executing rehearsals. These techniques are arranged by the amount of
time and resources needed and available to conduct each method (see figure D-1 on page D-3). The first step
in rehearsal planning is to determine the rehearsal method the unit will use to practice the operation prior to
execution. As listed from left to right in the figure, each successive method takes more time and more
resources. Each method also imparts a different level of understanding to participants. |
3-01.44 | 85 | Rehearsals
Figure D-1. Rehearsal methods
NETWORK REHEARSAL
D-12. The network rehearsal is less desirable because the personal interaction is not possible. The network
rehearsal does have advantages, however. It can be conducted at any time, and it can verify a unit's
communications capabilities. If used, the network rehearsal must focus on the critical actions in an operation.
Lengthy transmissions should be avoided and alternate frequencies should be used to avoid compromising
the unit and the operation. All participants must have reliable communications, OPORD, overlays, maps, and
must understand the rehearsal sequence. The network rehearsal depends heavily on SOPs that establish
procedures for network rehearsal execution.
D-13. Network rehearsals can be executed over wide-area networks or local-area networks. Commanders and
staffs execute network rehearsals by talking through critical portions of the operation over communications
networks in a sequence the commander establishes. The organization rehearses only the critical parts of the
operation. These rehearsals require all information systems needed to execute that portion of the operation.
All participants require working information systems and a copy of the OPORD and overlays. Command
posts can rehearse battle tracking during network rehearsals.
D-14. The network rehearsal will probably be used more at the SHORAD battalion than other rehearsal
techniques. The distances between batteries and the batteries supported unit planning and rehearsal
responsibilities will consume the time necessary to conduct more time-intensive rehearsals at the battalion
level. The Forward Area Air Defense C2 system will depend heavily on network rehearsals to verify
communications systems are operational and let fire units acknowledge receipt of early warning information.
SHORAD commanders should consider using the network rehearsal to augment other rehearsals or involve
more participants. |
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