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3-0 | 88 | Chapter 3
3-149. The positioning of assets and capabilities does not determine whether they are part of the close
operation. For example, some reconnaissance and target acquisition units, while located forward near the line
of contact, may have a purpose that supports deep operations.
3-150. Close operations are inherently lethal because they involve direct fire engagements at relatively short
ranges with enemy forces seeking to mass direct, indirect, and aerial fires against friendly forces. Deep and
rear operations set conditions for the success of close operations. The measure of success of deep and rear
operations is their positive impact on increasing the effectiveness and reducing the cost of close operations.
3-151. Activities are part of close operations if their purpose contributes to defeating committed enemy
forces that are or will be in direct physical contact with friendly forces. The activities that comprise close
operations include—
(cid:122) Maneuver of subordinate formations (including counterattacks).
(cid:122) Close combat (including offensive and defensive operations).
(cid:122) Indirect fire support (including counterfire, close air support, electromagnetic attack, and offensive
space and cyber operations against enemy forces in direct physical contact with friendly forces).
(cid:122) Information collection.
(cid:122) Sustainment support of committed units.
Rear
3-152. Rear operations are tactical actions behind major
subordinate maneuver forces that facilitate movement, Commanders establish rear operations
before they can conduct deep and close
extend operational reach, and maintain desired tempo.
operations.
This includes continuity of sustainment and C2. Rear
operations support close and deep operations. At the
operational level, rear operations sustain current operations and prepare for the next phase of the campaign
or major operation. These operations are distributed, complex, and continuous. At the tactical level, rear
operations enable the desired tempo of combat, assuring that friendly forces have the agility to exploit any
opportunity.
3-153. Rear operations typically include five broad activities: positioning and moving reserves; positioning
and repositioning aviation, fire support, and AMD units; conducting support area operations; securing
sustainment and C2 nodes; and controlling tactical unit movement between the division or corps rear
boundary and units conducting close operations. Rear operations typically include efforts that consolidate
gains to make conditions created by deep and close operations more permanent. All of these activities
compete for limited terrain and lines of communications. Division and corps rear command posts are
generally responsible for rear operations.
3-154. There are several considerations for conducting rear operations. They include—
(cid:122) C2.
(cid:122) Information collection activities to detect enemy forces.
(cid:122) Establishment and maintenance of routes.
(cid:122) Terrain management.
(cid:122) Movement control.
(cid:122) Protection of critical friendly capabilities.
(cid:122) Information activities.
(cid:122) Infrastructure repair and improvement.
(cid:122) Defeating bypassed forces and continuing to consolidate gains.
(cid:122) Minimum-essential stability tasks which are—
(cid:131) Establish civil security.
(cid:131) Provide immediate needs (access to food, water, shelter, and medical treatment).
(cid:122) Coordination with host-nation and multinational governmental organizations.
(cid:122) Adjusting to shifts in the unit and subordinate rear boundaries.
(cid:122) Integration of new units into the division or corps. |
3-0 | 89 | Fundamentals of Operations
3-155. Enemy deep operations often target friendly rear operations because they are often both vulnerable
and essential to friendly mission success. Commanders commit combat power to protect rear operations, but
they balance those requirements against those necessary for successful close and deep operations. Units
involved in rear operations must protect themselves using both passive and active measures. Commanders
and staffs must continuously reevaluate the possibility of more serious threats to rear operations and develop
plans to meet them with minimum disruptions to ongoing close operations.
Support Area Operations
3-156. Support area operations are a critical part of rear operations. Support area operations are the
tactical actions securing lines of communications, bases, and base clusters that enable an echelon’s
sustainment and command and control.
3-157. A support area is where units position, employ, and protect base sustainment assets and lines of
communications required to sustain, enable, and control operations. Support area operations include
sustainment for the echelon and relevant security operations. Support area operations enable the tempo of
deep and close operations. Support area operations require detailed planning to coordinate among the various
units providing sustainment, protection, and security. A maneuver enhancement brigade or BCT typically
provides C2 for support area operations for a division or corps due to the level of security, planning, and
integration required.
Support Area Operations Planning Considerations
3-158. Support area operations require detailed planning. Their security is often an economy of force effort.
Commanders must balance their need to protect rear operations and tempo with the needs of main effort units
committed to close and deep operations.
3-159. Commanders consider several items when conducting support area operations. They include—
(cid:122) Desired tempo.
(cid:122) Enemy maneuver and fires units that threaten current and future support area operations.
(cid:122) Additional forces required to protect the support area.
(cid:122) C2 nodes that will occupy the support area.
(cid:122) Command-support relationships between units in the support area.
(cid:122) Transportation networks (road, rail, inland waterways, and air) into and out of the area.
(cid:122) Protection from enemy indirect fire assets.
(cid:122) Survivability.
(cid:122) Dispersion, terrain management, and defensive responsibilities.
(cid:122) Displacement considerations based upon the overall operation.
(cid:122) Movement control into, through, and out of the support area.
Command and Control of Deep, Close, and Rear Operations
3-160. C2 facilitates the freedom to operate, delegate authority, and lead from any point on the battlefield.
Plans are the initial basis for action, but commanders must expect substantial changes in the course of an
operation and periods of disrupted communications. Leaders allow their subordinates to react to unanticipated
situations through the mission command approach to C2.
3-161. Commanders position command posts where they can best integrate capabilities and synchronize
combat power without incurring too much risk from enemy interference. Commanders often position
command posts and leaders in locations where they anticipate friction, and which are most vital to mission
success. Specific mission requirements will dictate how commanders organize and array their command posts
as well as the networks they establish to communicate during the conduct of operations. (See ATP 6-0.5 for
a detailed discussion of command posts.)
3-162. Staffing, equipping, and organizational concerns vary among echelons of command. In every case,
however, the purpose of C2 is to implement the commander’s will and synchronize operations in pursuit of
the unit’s objectives. Army forces are equipped with a variety of command posts, including main command |
3-0 | 90 | Chapter 3
posts, tactical command posts or their equivalents, rear command posts, and mobile command groups. At the
corps level and below, every echelon of command has a main command post and a tactical command post.
Corps and divisions are also equipped with a rear command post, giving them the flexibility to delegate
specific C2 responsibilities to nodes positioned to control deep, close, and rear areas.
MAIN EFFORT, SUPPORTING EFFORT, AND RESERVE
3-163. Commanders designate a subordinate unit as a main effort when its mission at a given point in time
is most critical to overall mission success. Commanders weight the main effort with additional combat power.
Typically, commanders shift the main effort one or more times during execution. When commanders
designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and resources to maximize combat power.
Commanders establish clear priorities of support, and they shift resources and priorities to the main effort as
circumstances and the commander’s intent require. The unit that directly accomplishes the mission is usually
the main effort when it conducts its mission. Commanders typically designate priority for sustainment to
units that they anticipate to be the main effort. This helps maximize the combat power of a unit before it
becomes the main effort. Shifting a priority of sustainment to the current main effort might be too late to be
effective.
3-164. A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the
main effort (ADP 3-0). Commanders resource supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to
accomplish the mission. Forces often realize success of the main effort through success of supporting efforts.
A main effort in an earlier phase can be a supporting effort for a main effort in a later phase.
3-165. A reserve is that portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the beginning of an
engagement to be available for a decisive movement (ADP 3-90). A reserve is an uncommitted force, and it
does not normally have a full suite of combat multipliers available to it until it is committed. It is the echelon’s
main effort once it is committed. Commanders constitute a reserve and base the size of the reserve on the
level of uncertainty in the current tactical situation. Commanders consider survivability, mobility, and the
most likely mission when positioning their reserve. While commanders can assign their reserve a wide variety
of tasks, through planning priorities, to perform on commitment, a reserve remains prepared to accomplish
other missions. The primary purposes for a reserve are to—
(cid:122) Exploit success.
(cid:122) Counter tactical reverses that threaten the integrity of the friendly force’s operations.
(cid:122) Retain the initiative.
3-166. Once a reserve is committed, units reconstitute a new one whenever possible. When a commander
assigns a unit the mission of being the reserve, the commander gives the unit a list of planning priorities.
Typically a reserve has no more than three planning priorities because of the time it takes to adequately
prepare for each priority. |
3-0 | 91 | Chapter 4
Operations During Competition Below Armed Conflict
In all history, this is the first time that an allied headquarters has been set up in peace to
preserve the peace and not to wage war.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower on the formation of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)
This chapter begins with an overview of how the Army contributes to competition
below the threshold of armed conflict as part of the joint force. It describes methods
employed by adversaries and how Army forces contest adversary activities by
supporting combatant command campaign plans and preparing for large-scale combat
operations with unified action partners. The chapter concludes by discussing how
Army forces consolidate gains and transition to crisis or armedconflict as branches to
joint campaigns.
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS DURING COMPETITION
4-1. Competition below armed conflict occurswhen anadversary’s national interests are incompatible with
U.S. interests, and that adversary is willing to actively pursue them short of open armed conflict. While
neither side desires, at least initially, to use military force as the primary method to achieve its goal, the
adversary is willing to employ national instruments of power, including military force, below the threshold
of actual armed conflict to achieve its aims. The resulting tension between the two sides creates potential for
violent escalation when one side challenges the status quo.
4-2. Operations during competition are intended to deter malign
Army forces are successful during
adversary action, set conditions for armed conflict on favorable
competition when they deter
terms when deterrence fails, and shape an operational environment
adversary malign action, enable the
with allies and partners in ways that support U.S.strategic interests
attainment of other national
and policy aims. Theater armies support combatant commanders objectives, and maintain the ability
(CCDRs) as they conduct operations to deter adversaries and to swiftly and effectively transition
achieve national objectives. Their operations, conducted as part of to armed conflict when deterrence
a combatant command campaign plan, are conducted over time fails.
and across broad areas without armed conflict. This may include
cooperative training, support to local institutions, construction projects, and a range of other activities. In
many cases, enduring engagement is necessary, especially given the tendency of adversaries to pursue
strategic objectives over long periods of time that do not comport with the shorter political-strategic cycles
found in the U.S. or among many of its allies and partners.
4-3. Army forces contribute to conventional deterrence during competition by preparing for armed conflict,
including large-scale combat operations. This includes assisting allies and partners to improve their military
capabilities and capacity. Preparation for combat operations and demonstrating the interoperability of the
U.S.joint force with allies and partners presents the strongest deterrence to adversaries. Deliberate messaging
that communicates the will and capability to conduct combat operations can amplify the deterrent effect of
physical actions onthe ground. Interoperability, coupled with the demonstrated capabilities and capacity of
Army forces, reinforces a unified approach to defending mutual interests. Even a small contingent of
forward-stationed U.S.Army forces are a challenge to defeat whenoperating with allies and partners. A force
ready for large-scale combat operations contributes to the potency and integration of the other instruments of
national power, provides CCDRscapabilities for graduated responses, and enables the Army to help the joint
force achieve national strategic objectives through competition rather than armed conflict. |
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ADVERSARY METHODS DURING COMPETITION
4-4. To effectively plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations during competition requires a broad
understanding of the strategic environment and common adversary methods and objectives. Adversaries use
a range of techniques to hinder the United States from achieving its objectives during competition and further
their own interests. Forward-positioned Army forces may be able to detect and assess such adversary
activities. By understanding and effectively countering adversary techniques, Army forces can help the joint
force and interagency partners achieve their objectives.
ACTIVITIES TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC GOALS
4-5. Adversaries employ all of their instruments of national power in a combination of ways to pursue
strategic interests without direct military confrontation with the United States. For example, Russia applies
its elements of national power through an approach called “New-Type War” (also labeled “Russian New
Generation Warfare”). This approach allows Russia to achieve many of its strategic goals below the level of
armed conflict and with limited employment of military forces. If coercion through diplomatic, information,
and economic instruments fails, Russia is prepared to employ its conventional military power and proxy
forces as needed. China also relies on a comprehensive use of its instruments of national power. Like Russia,
China seeks to achieve many of its strategic objectives with nonmilitary instruments of national power and
keep military forces in a supporting role that reinforces facts established on the ground with other than overt
military action.
4-6. By using all instruments of national power, an adversary is able to further its interests through a range
of nonmilitary and military activities that may provide advantages over U.S. forces. Examples of nonmilitary
activities include Russia and China's diplomatic efforts to establish security cooperation agreements with
neighboring countries as a way to expand regional influence. Another example is China's use of infrastructure
projects, as part of “The Belt and Road Initiative”, to grow its economic influence. In both examples,
adversaries primarily use nonmilitary means to achieve strategic objectives while weakening U.S. influence
and undermining political-military partnerships between the United States and other countries within these
same regions.
4-7. Adversaries can pursue more aggressive options through military activities that safeguard their
interests abroad, maintain regional stability, and exert influence regionally and globally. These activities may
include controlling or reducing access to certain areas of the global commons, challenging the established
borders of other nations, or using the threat of force to influence the decisions of neighboring countries.
Adversaries may pursue these activities overtly with the use of conventional military forces or covertly
through a combination of proxy forces, unconventional warfare, and information warfare.
4-8. Proxy forces are generally non-state actors aligned with respective state actors, and they perform
activities on behalf of or in accordance with the state actor’s strategic objectives. Examples of proxies include
paramilitary groups, criminal organizations, private civilian organizations, private companies, special interest
groups, and religious groups. Covert methods, such as the use of proxy forces, provide adversaries with
plausible deniability and cost savings in achieving strategic objectives.
ACTIVITIES TO COUNTER A UNITED STATES RESPONSE
4-9. While adversaries desire to further their interests and achieve their goals without U.S. involvement,
they will be prepared to counter a response from the U.S. military. To do this, an adversary may attempt to
prevent or constrain the United States’ ability to project forces to the region and limit U.S. response options
by using the following methods:
(cid:122) Conduct information warfare activities to manipulate the acquisition, transmission, and
presentation of information in such a way that legitimizes the adversary's actions and portrays the
United States as the aggressor.
(cid:122) Conduct preclusion activities through nonlethal means to undermine relationships, raise political
stakes, manipulate public opinion, and erode resolve to constrain or eliminate basing rights,
overflight corridors, logistics support, and concerted allied action. |
3-0 | 93 | Operations During Competition Below Armed Conflict
(cid:122) Isolate the United States from allies and partners by fostering instability in critical areas and among
relevant actors to increase U.S. operational requirements.
(cid:122) Create sanctuary from U.S. and partner forces through international law and treaty agreements,
monitoring and attacking partner forces from across international borders, and using proxy forces.
(cid:122) Conduct systems warfare by executing cyberspace attacks against critical force projection and
sustainment infrastructure nodes to delay or disrupt the United States’ ability to deploy forces.
Systems warfare approaches include nonattributable attacks on domestic infrastructure and the
employment of networked military capabilities that support isolation and preclusion efforts.
ACTIVITIES TO PRECLUDE UNITED STATES ACCESS TO A REGION
4-10. Adversaries seek to establish conditions that limit or prevent U.S. access to a region, typically in
locations close to their borders. This includes forward positioning of layered and integrated air defenses,
early warning surveillance radars, rocket artillery, electronic warfare capabilities, and counter-space
capabilities. Additionally, adversaries may seek to position intermediate-range ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, and naval surface and subsurface forces to shape
an operational environment in their favor. Positioning systems that support an antiaccess (A2) strategy allows
adversaries to deny or disrupt U.S. access to a region in the event of hostilities while providing leverage
against friendly partner nations with the potential use of force. Furthermore, the positioning of systems
capable of delivering conventional and nuclear munitions creates additional challenges for the United States.
An adversary’s ability to establish, maintain, and demonstrate robust A2 systems bolsters its domestic
narratives while eroding partner nation trust and confidence.
4-11. Friendly forces must assume they are always under observation because of all the means available to
a peer adversary, particularly those available in space and cyberspace. In addition to forward positioning
capabilities that support A2 and area denial (AD) approaches, these adversaries seek understanding of the
disposition, readiness, and activities of U.S. forces within a contested region. Adversary activities include
reconnaissance of U.S. military installations, unit movements, ports of embarkation and debarkation, and
staging areas to identify potential targets for ballistic missiles and long-range fires. Adversaries employ
cyberspace tools to conduct reconnaissance of friendly networks to identify vulnerabilities for possible
exploitation. An adversary may conduct probing actions in the air and maritime domains to test responses by
U.S. and other friendly forces. The intelligence gained through these activities will prepare an adversary for
hostilities in the event a situation escalates to armed conflict. (See the ATP 7-100 series for a detailed
discussion on specific threat capabilities and employment strategies. See Chapters 6 and 7 for specific
examples of how adversaries are likely to employ A2 and AD capabilities in the beginning of a conflict.)
PREPARATION FOR LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
4-12. Army forces that cannot credibly execute operations during armed conflict neither deter adversaries
nor assure allies and other unified action partners. Preparation for large-scale combat operations is therefore
the primary focus of Army conventional forces during competition. While there are multiple forms of armed
conflict, large-scale combat among state actors is the most complex and lethal form of armed conflict, and it
demands significant focus along multiple lines of effort to prepare for it. Some of the activities Army forces
execute to prepare for armed conflict include—
(cid:122) Setting the theater.
(cid:122) Building allied and partner capabilities and capacity.
(cid:122) Improving joint and multinational interoperability.
(cid:122) Protecting forward-stationed forces.
(cid:122) Preparing to transition and execute operation plans (OPLANs).
(cid:122) Training and developing leaders for operations in specific theaters.
SET THE THEATER
4-13. Setting the theater is the broad range of activities continuously conducted to establish conditions
for the successful execution of operations in a theater. Setting the theater never ends. It is conducted to |
3-0 | 94 | Chapter 4
enhance an operational environment in ways favorable to friendly forces and occurs during competition,
crisis, and armed conflict. While setting the theater occurs across each strategic context, its importance is
greatest during competition because that is when the most time is available. Army forces must set the theater
during competition to enable quick transitions during crisis and conflict, when time favors the aggressor.
Army forces use military engagements, security cooperation, and other activities to assess and understand
the current conditions within the theater and execute specific theater setting activities to enable joint forces
and other unified action partners.
4-14. Setting the theater requires a comprehensive approach among unified action partners and bilateral or
multilateral diplomatic agreements that allow U.S. forces access to ports, terminals, airfields, and bases in
the area of responsibility (AOR) to support future operations. This includes but is not limited to theater
opening; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); establishing networks; classifying
routes; and other operational activities that set the conditions for operations in the AOR. Information
activities are a significant part of setting the theater. They enable decision making, protect friendly
information, inform domestic and international audiences, and influence foreign audiences, while helping to
counter adversary information warfare.
4-15. Setting the theater is a continuous activity for all staff sections and warfighting functions. It involves
significant sustainment, air and missile defense (AMD), engineering, information collection, intelligence,
and communications focused on setting conditions to counter known or potential threats to U.S. interests
across the AOR. All warfighting functions, functional areas, and branches that comprise staffs and commands
conduct preparation of the operational environment to address unique considerations for setting the theater
within their respective areas of expertise (for example, civil preparation of the environment and joint
intelligence preparation of the operational environment). (For more information about the land component's
roles and responsibilities for setting the theater in conflict, refer to JP 3-31 and JP 3-35. For additional
information about the subordinate Army tasks and activities associated with setting the theater, refer to
ATP 3-93 and FM 4-0. See paragraphs 4-61 and 4-62 of this publication for considerations unique to theater
armies and Chapter 7 for theater-setting considerations in a maritime environment.)
BUILD ALLIED AND PARTNER CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITY
4-16. Army forces fight as part of a joint and multinational force. The United States cannot achieve its
security interests without the cooperation of treaty allies, partner nations, and other unified action partners.
Helping partner nations build, rebuild, or maintain their national security institutions is a critical step in
maintaining regional stability, and it is ultimately less expensive than requiring U.S. forces to do so.
Additionally, by maintaining partner-nation security institutions, the Army helps add to the aggregate force
that is available to potentially deter adversary forces or counter them if they choose to pursue their goals
through armed conflict. Forward-stationed U.S. Army forces, by themselves, generally do not enjoy favorable
combat power ratios with peer adversaries. Allies and other partners provide the bulk of forces initially able
to conduct operations during armed conflict. This combined force capability enhances deterrence for both
the partner nation and the United States. (See paragraphs 4-39 through 4-52 for more information on how
Army forces help build allied and partner capabilities.)
4-17. Combined training and exercises with partners play a key role in building allied and partner capabilities
and shaping an operational environment. Such events are the most overt and visible means of demonstrating
friendly capabilities, interoperability, and will. Exercises also help set the theater. Multinational forces that
maintain high levels of combat readiness provide the credibility essential to assure partners and deter
adversaries. Combined exercises build relationships and mutual respect among allies and other multinational
partners, identify systems and processes to employ partner capabilities effectively, and reveal shortfalls to be
improved upon. Training exercises occur at all echelons of command, from tactical units to large, combined
task forces. The application of lessons learned during these exercises is key to improving multinational
interoperability during competition. An example of a failure to prepare for large-scale combat operations
occurred in the Philippines in 1941. |
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Failure to Prepare for War: Philippines, 1941
During the summer of 1941 the United States Army took steps to prepare for potential
armed conflict with Japan. The War Department created the United States Army
Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) and recalled General Douglas MacArthur to active
duty to serve as the commanding general. The War Department provided USAFFE
with the priority for equipment and reinforcements within the Pacific Theater of
Operations to support General MacArthur’s defensive plans.
By December 1941, USAFFE had made significant strides, but had not done enough
to effectively prepare for armed conflict. When Japan’s forces attacked the Philippines
on 8 December 1941, ten hours after their attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, USAFFE
was short personnel, supplies, and equipment. Aside from a provisional tank group,
most forces were ill equipped and possessed obsolete weapons and vehicles. The
Philippine armed forces, whose readiness was also a USAFFE responsibility, were
even less prepared than U.S. forces. They lacked modern weapons, effective logistics
systems, and training. The War Department and USAFFE attempted to make up for
these shortcomings by distributing supplies from pre-positioned stocks on the islands
of Corregidor and the Bataan Peninsula to both U.S. and Philippine units stationed
throughout the archipelago.
The Far East Air Force was equally unprepared. It lacked early warning systems and
anti-aircraft artillery. Planned survivability improvements to airfields were incomplete,
leaving aircraft exposed on flight lines and parking aprons. As a result, the Far East Air
Force lost over half of its aircraft by the conclusion of the first day of the war, most of
which were destroyed on the ground.
Although the U.S. and Philippine forces mounted a fierce resistance for nearly six
months, Japan eventually isolated the defenders in the Bataan Peninsula and on the
island of Corregidor with naval and air forces. In the absence of friendly air and naval
support, the U.S. and Philippine forces were unable to receive reinforcements,
resupply, or conduct an evacuation. As a result, the U.S. and Philippine forces in the
Bataan Peninsula fell to Japan’s forces in April 1942, and the remaining forces on
Corregidor and the surrounding islands surrendered in May 1942.
INTEROPERABILITY
4-18. The ability of Army forces to fight as a cohesive whole, integrated with the joint force, allies, and
partners, is vital to maximizing combat power and creating a deterrent effect in a theater. Interoperability is
the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic
objectives (JP 3-0). An Army formation that is interoperable with joint and multinational partners is
substantially more capable than one that is not. Interoperability with any unified action partner is essential to
effective operations. Interoperability standards and procedures must be trained, tested, and refined during
competition; it is too late to seek interoperability once a crisis or armed conflict begins.
4-19. Interoperability starts with mutual understanding across echelons throughout a multinational force.
Effective interoperability includes understanding technical challenges and developing methods to bridge
gaps, understanding the tactical capabilities of each member in the multinational force, and integrating
partners into a unified operational approach. During competition, the theater army or a delegated command
is responsible for building the infrastructure that enables this. Communication is primarily achieved through
liaison teams, understanding staff processes, and ensuring adequate access to partner nation command and
control (C2) systems (within the limits of national caveats). Understanding foundational interoperability
requirements like NATO doctrine; American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (known as
ABCANZ) Armies Program interoperability standards; and Combined Forces Command (in the Republic of |
3-0 | 96 | Chapter 4
Korea) processes is critical to communicate and interoperate with allied forces. It is essential that these
requirements and standards are incorporated into routine training and exercise planning at all echelons to
build the required interoperable readiness needed in a time of crisis or conflict. (See FM 3-16 for more
information on multinational operations and interoperability.)
PROTECT FORWARD-STATIONED FORCES
4-20. Peer threats possess reconnaissance and surveillance, fires; special operations forces; and other
capabilities that can range forward-stationed Army forces and place them at risk. The protection of Army
forces forward, under the assumption that deterrence is not guaranteed, is essential. Army forces implement
procedures and conduct necessary activities to ensure they, and the elements of the joint or partner force they
protect, can endure an initial attack with little early warning. This includes preparation for threat attacks from
any domain that is informed by understanding what holds friendly forces at risk and how a threat may attack.
An adversary could attack using capabilities from domains other than land, either to set conditions on the
ground or as a means of escalation designed to limit friendly options. Preparation by Army forces therefore
includes planning and integration with other elements of the joint force. Coordination for Army and joint
capabilities that are able to protect friendly forces during armed conflict and enable them to endure until they
can be supported is critical to establishing deterrence.
4-21. The demonstrated ability of Army forces to withstand an adversary’s initial attack adds to the
integrated deterrence effect on adversaries and may dissuade them from escalation. Host-nation capabilities
may constitute a significant part of force protection and forward defense, so they must be integrated into
theater protective efforts. Forward deployed forces that cannot be adequately protected or quickly
repositioned during adversary escalation to armed conflict should be relocated to more defensible locations.
PREPARE TO TRANSITION AND EXECUTE OPERATION PLANS
4-22. Army forces at every echelon prepare to execute OPLANs that they are expected or likely to support.
The foundation for this is active, continuous information collection and intelligence analysis. Higher
echelons, such as the theater army and corps, identify initial targets and the required Army and joint
capabilities needed to attack those targets in the initial stages of an armed conflict. They likewise consider
whether general defense plans that provide guidance for subordinate unit immediate action during the early
stages of a conflict initiated with few indications or warnings are necessary or prudent.
4-23. Preparation to execute OPLANs must extend to all echelons and partners. Lower tactical echelons train
tactical tasks related to the parts of an OPLAN they support or execute. Units conduct deployment rehearsals
and emergency deployment readiness exercises to improve response times and validate plans. Rehearsals
with unified action partners build mutual understanding and improve interoperability. Units conduct thorough
reconnaissance of all lines of communications, infrastructure, avenues of approach, assembly areas, and
potential firing points or battle positions. Leaders and Soldiers should walk the actual terrain that
engagements and battles could be fought on and, when possible, they should use this terrain for rehearsals.
A shared understanding of OPLANs, terrain, and adversaries down to the lowest tactical echelon will allow
an effective transition to armed conflict.
TRAIN AND DEVELOP LEADERS
4-24. Leaders prepare themselves, their subordinates, and their organizations for operations in specific
combatant command AORs. When developing expertise in specific regions, units become familiar with
applicable OPLANS and coordinate with the theater army, the assigned military intelligence brigade-theater
(MIB-T), and other theater army-assigned units as appropriate. This regionally specific readiness augments
ongoing training and leader development activities conducted across the force. (See Chapter 8 for a detailed
discussion on the role of leadership during operations.)
RELATIVE ADVANTAGES DURING COMPETITION
4-25. During competition, Army forces seek relative advantages at the theater strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. Relative advantages are advantages that Army forces provide the joint force commander (JFC)
in relation to a specific adversary, and they are always contextual. They are necessary to deter adversaries, |
3-0 | 97 | Operations During Competition Below Armed Conflict
assist the joint force in promoting U.S. interests, and set conditions to conduct operations during crisis and
armed conflict. These advantages augment unified action partner activities, and they address Service-specific
issues identified during combatant command campaign development. Identifying, achieving, and maintaining
these advantages helps the Army employ combat power effectively during crisis and armed conflict. A
relative advantage is temporary. Adversaries quickly adapt to counter advantages (especially technological
ones) once they are created or employed, and they seek to reduce or eliminate their effectiveness.
4-26. Understanding advantage relative to an adversary requires understanding the adversary’s capabilities
and will, friendly capabilities and will, and the operational environment within the theater. It further requires
understanding of the interrelated influences of each dimension in an operational environment, including how
physical, human, and information factors affect each other in a specific context. Changes in one dimension
often have outcomes in the other two and in more than one physical domain.
PHYSICAL ADVANTAGES DURING COMPETITION
4-27. Due to the expected tempo of operations, a sufficient number of Army forces comprised of the right
capabilities must be forward stationed to provide CCDRs with a credible deterrent force and the ability to
respond, when necessary, to adversary actions. Physical advantage encompasses combat power and the
correlation of forces: the ability to deliver effects, superior range, and the ability to concentrate superior
capabilities at the right places and times. Examples of activities that create physical advantages during
competition include—
(cid:122) Working with allies to conduct a deployment exercise of a theater-tailored unit to improve its
OPLAN integration and interoperability.
(cid:122) Surveying a potential assembly area with a forward engineer support team to determine if the area
is of sufficient size to accommodate a properly dispersed Army formation.
(cid:122) Hardening facilities against attack and rehearsing drills in response to potential adversary courses
of action.
(cid:122) Maintaining stocks of key supplies and equipment (Army pre-positioned stocks [APS]) in or near
areas of concern to accelerate deployment of forces during crises or armed conflict.
INFORMATION ADVANTAGES DURING COMPETITION
4-28. Information activities play a key role during competition. They include Army support to the combatant
command and unified action partner strategic messaging. Coordinating with interagency and other unified
action partners helps to develop and deliver coherent messages that counter adversary disinformation. Army
forces reinforce strategic messaging by maintaining and demonstrating U.S. Army readiness for operations.
Examples of relative information advantages are—
(cid:122) Identifying targets and conducting target development on threat capabilities.
(cid:122) Setting the conditions for convergence by developing methods to penetrate adversary computer
networks.
(cid:122) Discrediting adversary disinformation by helping the JFC inform domestic and international
audiences through Army and joint information activities.
(cid:122) Promoting the purpose and outcomes of multinational exercises and training events.
(cid:122) Continuously monitoring the operational environment to detect changes to adversary methods or
narratives.
HUMAN ADVANTAGES DURING COMPETITION
4-29. The institutional depth and professionalism of U.S. Army personnel contribute to the morale and will
of partner security forces as Army forces interact across all ranks and echelons. Army formations serve as a
professional force operating under the rule of law as guests in a specific region to facilitate the
accomplishment of mutual military training goals. This can be a powerful advantage over adversaries who
seek to extract concessions, including financial and informational gains, from other countries or groups. This
bond of trust forms the foundation of the U.S. alliance system, and it is the primary means to ensure the |
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security of the United States and its partners. Examples of activities that help achieve human advantages
include—
(cid:122) Training U.S. and partner nation forces in multinational exercises at combat training centers.
(cid:122) Routine interaction with allies and other unified action partners that builds and maintains human,
technical, and procedural interoperability through agreed-to standards.
(cid:122) Hosting international officers at U.S. professional military education programs and sending U.S.
officers to international military schools.
(cid:122) Sustained presence by theater-aligned advisor teams that builds relationships and promotes
interoperability over time.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
4-30. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities usually involve a combination of
military forces and capabilities separate from, but integrated with, the efforts of interagency participants.
These actions are coordinated by diplomatic chiefs of mission and country teams. Understanding their roles
and relationships is critically important. The Department of State is responsible for the diplomatic instrument
of national power. Chiefs of mission are the final approval authorities for all U.S. military activities that occur
in the nation they are responsible for, and they have the authority to modify the execution of planned activities
during competition. (See JP 5-0 for more information on country-specific plans.)
4-31. Activities that occur during competition encompass a wide range of actions where the military
instrument of national power supports and is subordinate to the other instruments of national power.
Competition overseas generally requires cooperation with international organizations (for example, the
United Nations) and government entities in other countries to protect and enhance mutual national security
interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations.
UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC MISSION
4-32. U.S. diplomatic missions include representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically
present in the country. Chiefs of missions are the principal officers in charge of diplomatic missions. They
are often, but not always, ambassadors. They oversee all U.S. government programs and interactions with
and in a host nation. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President and reports through
the Secretary of State, ensuring all in-country activities serve U.S. interests and regional and international
objectives.
4-33. The United States maintains different types of diplomatic missions in different countries. Some
countries have only a consulate, many have only an embassy, and others have an embassy and a number of
consulates. Typically, Army elements conducting security cooperation activities coordinate with diplomatic
mission officials, even in nations with only a consulate. Relationships with consular offices are determined
on a case-by-case basis. The same entities and offices existing in an embassy are present or liaised at
consulates. (See FM 3-22 for a detailed explanation of this role in relation to Army operations.)
COUNTRY TEAM
4-34. The country team is the point of coordination within the host country for the diplomatic mission. The
members of the country team vary depending on the levels of coordination needed and the conditions within
that country. The country team is made up of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or
agency, as directed by the chief of mission. The team may include the senior defense official or defense
attaché, the political and economic officers, and any other embassy personnel desired by the ambassador.
4-35. The country team informs various organizations of operations, coordinates elements, and ensures unity
of effort. Military engagement with a host country is coordinated through the Defense Attaché Office or
Office of Security Cooperation at the embassy or consulate. However, several other attachés and offices may
also be integral to security cooperation activities, programs, and missions. The country team provides the
foundation of local knowledge and interaction with the host-country government and population. As
permanently established interagency organizations, country teams represent the single point of coordination,
integration, and synchronization of security cooperation activities supported by combatant commands and |
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the theater army. It is incumbent upon the theater army, with the approval of the combatant command, to
work with and inform the country team of recommendations for military engagement, security cooperation,
and deterrence activities that involve Army forces across all domains.
COMPETITION ACTIVITIES
There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.
Attributed to Winston Churchill
4-36. Competition involves activities conducted under numerous programs within a combatant command.
The CCDR uses these activities to improve security within partner nations, enhance international legitimacy,
gain multinational cooperation, and influence adversary decision making. Competition activities include
obtaining access for U.S. forces, maintaining sufficient forward-based presence within a theater to influence
conditions in the strategic environment, and mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis or armed conflict.
At any time during competition, but especially during times of heightened tension, leaders must take great
care to ensure Army forces avoid activities that accidently provoke crisis or armed conflict. Army forces, as
directed by the theater army, must stay within an activity level that meets the CCDR’s intent for readiness
without unintentionally increasing tensions.
4-37. Activities that occur during competition are directly tied to authorities provided in various titles of the
United States Code and approved programs, and they are integrated and synchronized with the Department
of State, other government agencies, country teams, and ambassadors’ plans and objectives. The Department
of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) help produce the joint regional
strategy to address regional goals, management, and operational considerations. Each country team develops
both an integrated country strategy and a country development cooperation strategy to address joint mission
goals and coordinated strategies for development, cooperation, security, and diplomatic activities. Working
with the Department of State and various country teams, the CCDR develops country-specific security
cooperation plans, which are codified in the country-specific security cooperation section of the combatant
command campaign plan (CCP). Some CCPs include regional country plans, posture plans, and theater
distribution plans that facilitate synchronization of resources, authorities, processes, and timelines to
favorably affect conditions within the CCDRs’ AORs.
4-38. Army forces execute activities during competition that support joint force campaigning goals, satisfy
interagency requirements, and set the necessary conditions to employ Army combat power during crisis and
armed conflict. The theater army works with the CCDR to develop objectives for the employment of Army
forces in theater and develops support plans to address Army-specific activities. Army forces provide security
cooperation capabilities across any given theater of operations by conducting military engagement, security
cooperation, nuclear deterrence, counter-weapons of mass destruction activities, and humanitarian assistance.
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
4-39. Military engagement is contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces
of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities
or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain
influence (JP 3-0). Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but it also extends to
interaction with domestic civilian authorities. Army forces will also routinely communicate with
nongovernmental organizations, either directly or indirectly, to ensure expectations and roles are understood.
4-40. CCDRs and Army senior leaders seek out partners and communicate with adversaries to discover areas
of common interest and tension. This increases the knowledge base for subsequent decisions and resource
allocation. Such military engagements can reduce tensions and may prevent conflict, or, if conflict is
unavoidable, they may allow the United States to enter into conflict with greater access and stronger alliances
or coalitions. Army forces support military engagement through deliberate interactions with unified action
partners at the junior Soldier through senior leader levels. The State Partnership Program provides a good
example of how powerful military engagement can be. |
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Successful Engagement: State Partnership Program
The State Partnership Program supports the security cooperation objectives of CCDRs
by developing enduring relationships with partner countries and carrying out activities
to build partner capacity, improve interoperability, and enhance U.S. access and
influence while increasing the readiness of U.S. and partner forces to meet emerging
challenges. The program links a state’s National Guard with the partner nation’s
military, security forces, and disaster response organizations in a cooperative
relationship.
Since the program’s inception in 1993 with the three Baltic Republics, it has expanded
to encompass partnerships with 89 nations. Most of the earliest State Partnership
Program partner countries in Europe have gone on to become U.S. allies in NATO,
and many of them credit the State Partnership Program and their National Guard
partners with helping make that possible. By building enduring relationships based on
mutual trust and support, the State Partnership Program has expanded the pool of
aligned global security providers and improved the capabilities of both U.S. Army units
and partner nation militaries across the world.
SECURITY COOPERATION
4-41. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to
build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner
nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United
States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations (JP 3-20). These efforts
may include Army forces participating in joint and multinational exercises and employing regionally aligned
forces. Conducting security cooperation is one of the Army’s primary stability tasks.
4-42. Security cooperation is governed by the Foreign Assistance Act (22 United States Code [USC], 2151)
and the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC, 2751) addressing DOD interactions with other nations. The
Department of State is the lead agency for security sector assistance. All DOD security cooperation programs
must nest with Department of State security sector guidance. (See JP 3-20 for more information on joint
security cooperation and FM 3-22 for additional details on Army support to security cooperation.)
4-43. Commanders and staffs conduct security cooperation to develop allied and other friendly military
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, to improve information exchange and intelligence
sharing, to provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access, and to mitigate conditions that could
lead to a crisis. Multiple types of security cooperation activities can often occur simultaneously with
overlapping purposes. These activities include security assistance, security force assistance (SFA), foreign
internal defense (FID), and support to security sector reform efforts.
Security Assistance
4-44. Security assistance is a group of programs the U.S. Government uses to provide defense articles,
military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales. Security
assistance programs are typically focused on the transfer of defense articles and services to eligible foreign
governments, the provision of training and education to foreign military personnel, and the sale of
construction services in support of partner nations’ military establishments. Military education and training
exchanges are invaluable for building interoperability and fostering trust over time between U.S. Army and
partner personnel.
Security Force Assistance
4-45. Security force assistance is the Department of Defense activities that support the development of the
capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20). Security forces |
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are duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state (JP 3-22). Consistent
with Department of Defense (DOD) policy for SFA, the Army develops, maintains, and institutionalizes the
capabilities of its personnel to support efforts to organize, train, equip, rebuild or build, and advise foreign
security forces and relevant supporting institutions. SFA activities are conducted primarily to assist partner
nations to build their capacity to defend against external and transnational threat actors. Security force
assistance brigades (SFABs) are Army organizations focused specifically on this mission. (See paragraphs
4-88 through 4-89 and ATP 3-96.1 for information on SFABs.)
4-46. SFA and security assistance are different. Security assistance is a broader set of programs that includes
training, but also includes equipment transfers, sales, and other programs. SFA works in conjunction with
security assistance programs while focusing specifically on building the capacity and capability of foreign
security forces and their supporting institutions.
Foreign Internal Defense
4-47. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or
international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to
free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its
security (JP 3-22). FID includes the actions of both nonmilitary organizations and military forces.
4-48. FID is a comprehensive approach that supports partner development towards democratic governance
and military deference to civilian rule. These activities may employ the indirect use of military forces along
with diplomatic, informational, and economic means. FID involves the support of a standing host-nation
government and its military or paramilitary forces. The focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the
host-nation’s internal defense and development program to build the capability and capacity of the host nation
to achieve self-sufficiency. FID is an Army special operations forces core activity. (See JP 3-22 and
ATP 3-05.2 for a detailed discussion of foreign internal defense.)
4-49. SFA and FID have much in common because both enable friendly partners’ capacity to provide for
their own defense. While there can be overlap, FID activities are aimed at strengthening a wide range of
functions including both military and civilian governmental institutions against internal threats. SFA
activities improve military and other security forces against both internal and external threats, and they do
not include activities that primarily support other government institutions.
Support to Security Sector Reform
4-50. Security sector reform is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation
to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07). The overall objective is to provide these
services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to
civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public.
4-51. Security sector reform is an umbrella term that includes integrated activities in support of defense and
armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform;
national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament; demobilizations and
reintegration; and reduction of armed violence. The Army’s primary role is supporting the reform,
restructuring or re-establishing the armed forces and the defense sector across the competition continuum.
4-52. U.S. and partner military forces collaborate with interagency representatives and other civilian
organizations to design and implement security sector reform strategies, plans, programs, and activities. The
Department of State leads and provides oversight for these efforts through the integrated country strategy.
The desired outcome of security sector reform programs is an effective and legitimate security sector firmly
rooted within the rule of law.
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
4-53. U.S. nuclear capabilities are foundational to the deterrence of adversary weapons of mass destruction
use. To ensure the credibility of this deterrent, joint and Army forces must integrate the planning and
operations of nuclear and conventional forces. Further, Army forces must plan, train, and exercise to conduct
operations under the adversary threat or use of weapons of mass destruction in order to deny the adversary |
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any perceived advantage that might result from employing weapons of mass destruction. To do so,
commanders and staffs must continuously assess, protect, and mitigate the effects of adversary chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons use and contamination hazards. They must train under
simulated weapons of mass destruction conditions. When under threat of nuclear attack, commanders must
balance the risk of dispersing forces to mitigate the impact of nuclear effects across their AO against the
ability to concentrate sufficient combat power to achieve objectives. In a chemically contaminated
environment, a commander’s decision-making ability is complicated by the effects on Soldier stamina,
reaction times, and sustainment. Each of these environments requires unique actions to ensure a formation’s
ability to maneuver, fight, and sustain operations. (See ATP 3-90.40 for more information on countering
weapons of mass destruction.)
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
4-54. USAID is the lead U.S. government agency, responsible to the Secretary of State, for administering
civilian foreign aid and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. USAID often works in concert
with Army forces when Soldiers are tasked to provide assistance. It can supplement forces conducting civil
affairs operations that the DOD conducts to build relationships and win the trust, confidence, and support of
local populations. One example of a successful humanitarian assistance operation occurred during an Ebola
outbreak in Liberia in 2014.
Liberia: OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE
In October 2014, a joint force comprised of 3,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and
Marines deployed to Liberia to help contain and eradicate the Ebola virus. The 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault) served as the joint task force (JTF) headquarters during
this operation. The 101st worked with the government of Liberia, the U.S. Embassy,
United States Army Africa, USAID, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and the U.S. Public Health Service. USAID was the lead federal agency.
Army units helped build and supported 17 Ebola treatment centers across Liberia.
Army forces trained 1,500 health care workers, and a logistic system was established
that provided medical supplies and building materials. As a result of the rapid response
and achieving unity of effort, Liberia went from 80 new cases of Ebola a day to being
declared Ebola-free within seven months.
ROLES OF ARMY ECHELONS DURING COMPETITION
4-55. Theater armies, including their assigned theater-echelon commands and brigades, perform essential
functions during competition to achieve national objectives while deterring adversary malign action. Corps,
divisions, and brigade combat teams (BCTs) are crucial to the execution of operations, activities, and tasks
during competition. These forces may support SFA or FID by participating in multinational exercises and
conducting humanitarian and other civil-military operations, development assistance, and training exchanges.
Army forces at corps and lower echelons directly engage with partner forces, governmental and
nongovernmental organizations, and civilian populations to accomplish missions, build rapport, and improve
conditions that promote stability.
Note. The organizations listed in paragraphs 4-56 through 4-96 have critical roles during
competition. Numerous other organizations also provide important contributions.
THEATER ARMY ROLES DURING COMPETITION
4-56. The theater army is the primary Army organization that plans, prepares, and oversees the execution of
activities conducted by Army forces during competition and assesses the results of these activities. It supports
and enables the CCDR’s pursuit and maintenance of operational access critical to achieving advantages |
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throughout an AOR while improving the security capabilities of partner nations. Gaining relative advantages
during competition requires intelligence about the adversary’s capabilities and intent relative to friendly
forces. While adversary intent is more difficult to ascertain, both factors are equally important since capability
plus malign intent represent a larger immediate threat than either factor on its own. This understanding allows
theater army commanders to recommend actions to the CCDR that impede adversary goals or convince
adversaries to seek alternative courses of action more favorable to U.S. interests.
4-57. The theater army integrates Army forces and capabilities with the other instruments of national power
on behalf of the CCDR. It fulfills CCDR requirements while simultaneously fulfilling Service-specific
requirements for Army forces to prepare for large-scale combat operations. It achieves its support to both the
joint force and Army by concentrating on seven functions and by providing oversight or C2 to subordinate
Army organizations during competition. Within each theater army function, there are multiple tasks the
theater army might fulfill to achieve its mission. (See FM 3-94 and ATP 3-93 for an expanded discussion of
each function listed in paragraph 4-58 and the subordinate tasks within each function.)
4-58. During competition, the theater army focuses on enabling the United States, its allies, and other unified
action partners to compete effectively below the threshold of armed conflict in ways directed by the CCDR.
These persistent and regular activities provide assurance to partner nations and deter adversaries. The theater
army does this by focusing on the following functions:
(cid:122) Execute the CCDR’s daily operational requirements.
(cid:122) Provide administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces.
(cid:122) Set and maintain the theater.
(cid:122) Set and support operational areas.
(cid:122) Exercise C2 over Army forces in the theater.
(cid:122) Perform joint roles limited in scope, scale, and duration.
(cid:122) Conduct contingency planning for crisis and armed conflict.
Combatant Commander Daily Operational Requirements
4-59. The theater army translates the CCDR’s plans and requirements into concrete actions by Army forces.
This includes, but is not limited to, the following activities and tasks:
(cid:122) Provide Army support to other Services (ASOS).
(cid:122) Conduct theater security cooperation.
(cid:122) Assess and develop infrastructure.
(cid:122) Develop concept plans and OPLANS.
(cid:122) Maintain threat models and provide intelligence on significant changes in the operational
environment.
Provide Administrative Control
4-60. Administrative control is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations
in respect to administration and support. The exercise of ADCON fulfills a military department’s statutory
responsibilities. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title
10, USC. ADCON includes organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel
management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline,
and other matters not included in the operational missions. The theater army headquarters is responsible for
ADCON of all Army forces in the AOR in both peacetime and wartime. (See AR 10-87 for more information
on ADCON.)
Set and Maintain the Theater
4-61. In addition to the broad requirements in setting a theater, including contributions from all warfighting
functions (outlined in paragraphs 4-13 through 4-15), theater armies have unique requirements for theater
setting met by conducting sustainment preparation of the operational environment. Sustainment preparation
of the operational environment is a continuous shaping activity involving analysis to determine infrastructure,
environmental, or resource factors in the operational environment that impact the Army’s ability to sustain a |
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commander’s OPLAN. Analysis products cover such topics as host-nation support, selection of lines of
communications, determination of operational stock assets, replacement operations, and design of a
distribution network and information technology infrastructure for the theater. In most cases these resources
(including host-nation labor and services) will be shared with partners of other nations in accordance with
negotiated agreements. (See FM 4-0 for more information on sustainment preparation of an operational
environment.)
4-62. The theater army continually analyzes, evaluates, and, when directed, expands APS to rapidly provide
JFCs with needed Army capabilities. APS augment allocated Army rotational forces already serving in a
theater and theater-assigned forces. The tempo and intensity of operations during crisis or armed conflict may
not allow for the timely deployment of all of an apportioned force’s equipment sets from the United States
via strategic airlift or sealift. Depending on the theater, this may require a large and dispersed equipment
force posture based at multiple hardened sites. If needed, a high operational readiness rate will be maintained
for APS that allows Army forces to fall in on the equipment and employ it within a few days of arriving in
theater. The theater army coordinates with Army Materiel Command to maintain and optimize APS. (For
additional information on APS, refer to ATP 3-35.1.)
Set and Support Operational Areas
4-63. Setting and supporting operational areas for the joint force occurs at operational and tactical echelons.
During competition, the theater army helps identify likely joint operations areas (JOAs) for ground forces.
The theater army ensures that the JOA includes bases and base camps needed by forces that primarily operate
in the land domain. (See ATP 3-37.10 for a discussion on base and base camp planning.) Planners must take
a holistic approach to understand the needs of the other Services and address Army requirements. Due to the
large amount of information needed at the tactical echelon to properly set and support JOAs, the theater army
usually needs to develop a multi-year plan that examines potential areas of operations (AOs). The theater
army relies on a large number of low density and high demand units to conduct this tactical level of analysis.
Many of these capabilities reside in the United States Army National Guard or the United States Army
Reserve.
Exercise Command and Control Over Army Forces in the Theater
4-64. The theater army is the Army Service component command (ASCC), and it has the responsibility to
control attached and assigned Army forces within the AOR through ADCON and operational control
(OPCON) or tactical control (TACON). As the Army component of the combatant command, the ASCC is
the ARFOR for the theater. When a subordinate JTF is established containing Army forces, the senior Army
headquarters in that JTF is normally designated as its ARFOR. (See Appendix B for details on command and
support relationships.)
4-65. The theater army initially maintains control of all Army forces assigned to an AOR until control is
passed to a subordinate JTF in a JOA. This control is usually passed from the theater army to the JTF when
the Army force is ready for onward movement and integration into the JTF. As part of controlling Army
forces, the theater army (or other headquarters designated as the ARFOR) maintains ADCON of Army forces
and addresses Service responsibilities such as coordinating ASOS.
Perform Joint Roles of Limited Scope and Duration
4-66. While serving as the ASCC, the theater army has the capability to perform three joint roles for the
CCDR. With augmentation, the theater army can be the theater joint force land component command, a JTF,
or the joint force land component command to a JTF in a JOA. However, these roles can only be performed
in limited scope, scale, and duration, unless the JFC provides significant augmentation.
Contingency Planning for Crisis and Conflict
4-67. A key aspect of combatant command and Service component planning during competition or crisis is
the development of contingency plans. A contingency plan is a branch of a campaign plan that is planned
based on hypothetical situations for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside
of crisis conditions (JP 5-0). Contingency plans are branches to global, regional, functional, and combatant |
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campaign plans that address potential threats that put one or more national interests at risk in ways that
warrant military operations. Contingency plans anticipate the possibility that campaign activities during
competition could fail to prevent aggression, a need to respond to instability in a key state or region, or
response to natural disasters. (See JP 5-0 for more information on contingency planning.)
4-68. The theater army commander and staff assist
the combatant command in developing contingency Theater commanders may direct the development
plans, including developing subordinate plans for of a general defense plan to ensure focused
Army forces as required. Theater army planners preparation for conflict, particularly with regard to
routinely review and update contingency plans to actions friendly forces take when conflict is
ensure they remain feasible. This includes a review imminent, so Army forces understand their
requirements during the opening phase of an
of Army force structure and its relation to joint
enemy attack.
time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).
This relationship is covered in detail under force
tailoring in paragraph 4-71. Army corps and divisions that are regionally aligned to a specific combatant
command may develop subordinate plans as directed. Army corps and divisions train for and rehearse these
plans in Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed exercises, Army Mission Command Training Program exercises, and
other training events. (See ADP 5-0 for doctrine on Army planning.)
4-69. Theater army and select subordinate organizations prepare for operations that could occur in the rear
areas identified during OPLAN development. Planning and preparing for rear area operations facilitates
consolidation of gains during armed conflict. Where possible, the theater army should involve the rear area
command posts of regionally aligned corps and divisions in the development and refinement of plans dealing
with rear areas likely to be part of those units’ AOs. Regionally aligned units that primarily operate in the
rear area must be included in planning and exercises whenever possible.
4-70. Army formations coordinate, rehearse, and support host-nation execution of stability and security
missions. These efforts help minimize the diversion of combat power from other priorities. Civil affairs units
have expertise for analyzing potential civil networks to execute these missions. They identify potential civil
networks through civil preparation of the environment and the civil network development and engagement
process. Civil preparation of the environment is the continuous development of civil knowledge within an
area of operations to help commanders identify capabilities within civil society that can be integrated with
operations for stability and security activities (FM 3-57). This minimizes the requirement for Army forces in
the rear area and facilitates the maintenance or restoration of host-nation governance and legitimacy.
Force Tailoring
4-71. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their
deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADP 3-0). It involves selecting the right force structure
for a joint operation from available units within a combatant command and from the Army force pool.
Commanders then sequence forces into an AO as part of force projection. JFCs request and receive forces
for each campaign phase, adjusting the quantity of Service component forces to match the effort required.
TPFDD documents contain both force composition and force flow requirements, and they are the primary
method by which JFCs tailor their inbound forces. Theater armies tailor forces to meet land force
requirements as determined by JFCs, and they recommend a deployment sequence to meet those
requirements. Force tailoring is continuous. (See JP 3-35 for more information on force tailoring and TPFDD
development.)
THEATER ARMY ASSIGNED FORCES
4-72. Each theater army has assigned or allocated theater-level forces that provide additional support across
the CCDR’s AOR and help the theater army achieve its objectives. Different theaters have different
subordinate forces with distinct command and support relationships based on theater requirements and force
availability. The units listed in paragraphs 4-73 through 4-87 are common theater-level formations that
facilitate operations during competition. |
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Theater Sustainment Command
4-73. The Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) is the Army’s organization for the integration and
synchronization of sustainment in a theater. The TSC connects strategic enablers to tactical formations. It is
a theater-committed asset to each theater army, and it focuses on Title 10, USC support of Army forces for
theater security cooperation and the CCDR’s daily operational requirements.
4-74. TSCs execute sustainment operations through their assigned and attached units while integrating and
synchronizing sustainment operations across an AOR. They have four operational responsibilities to forces
in theater: theater opening, theater distribution, sustainment, and theater closing. The task-organized TSC is
tailored to provide operational-level sustainment support within an assigned AOR. It integrates and
synchronizes sustainment operations for the theater army, including all Army forces forward stationed,
transiting, or operating within an AOR. The TSC coordinates Title 10, USC; ASOS; DOD executive agency;
and lead Service responsibilities across the entire theater. (See ATP 4-94 for more information on the TSC.)
Military Intelligence Brigade-Theater
4-75. The MIB-T is usually assigned to the combatant command with OPCON delegated to the theater army.
It provides mission command for the theater army’s information collection and intelligence analysis
capabilities across all intelligence disciplines, integrating theater and national architectures and data to
support the theater army’s daily operations requirements and preparation for contingency operations. The
theater army headquarters specifically relies on the MIB-T for threat characteristics, intelligence estimates,
threat and civil considerations, data services, intelligence architecture development and maintenance, and
all-source intelligence products. These efforts support theater army planning requirements, including
development of Army plans supporting the CCP and maintenance of OPLANs and contingency plans.
4-76. The MIB-T serves as the intelligence anchor point for deploying forces, providing theater-specific
expertise and support. It maintains a regional intelligence architecture that deploying and theater-aligned
units can access. This allows units to tailor mission planning and training and effectively leverage the broader
intelligence enterprise. The MIB-T’s regional focus provides continuity and cultural context to its analytic
intelligence products. The brigade can collect, analyze, and track the threat characteristics and doctrine of
theater state and non-state actors over many years, providing indications and warnings of changes in an
operational environment. This allows it to create and maintain a valuable database of intelligence regarding
persons of interest and the evolving doctrine and capabilities of regional military forces. (See FM 2-0 for
more information on the MIB-T.)
Theater Aviation Elements
4-77. Theater aviation support is executed by theater aviation brigades, theater airfield operations groups,
and theater aviation sustainment maintenance groups. Each theater aviation brigade can conduct assault or
general support aviation tasks in support of the theater and its subordinate commands, but it requires
augmentation with attack aviation or unmanned aircraft system (UAS) units to conduct attack,
reconnaissance, and security operations. Combat aviation brigades may also support theater aviation
operations with lift, attack, and UAS capabilities. Theater airfield operations groups provide air traffic
services, conduct airfield management operations, and support RSOI requirements for aviation assets. The
theater aviation sustainment group is resourced to provide aviation sustainment maintenance and limited
depot sustainment support throughout the theater AO. (See FM 3-04 for more information on aviation
brigades and groups.)
Army Air and Missile Defense Command
4-78. The Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) is the highest echelon for air defense artillery
units. It is usually under OPCON of the theater army, or land component command if designated, with the
AAMDC commander serving as the theater Army AMD coordinator. The AAMDC is also usually in direct
support of the theater air force, or air component command if designated, with the AAMDC commander
serving as the theater deputy area air defense commander. The AAMDC participates in theater exercises and
integrates with joint and multinational partners in all aspects of AMD operations. It provides assets and
coordinates coverage to protect forward-positioned joint and Army forces, and critical infrastructure, from |
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air, missile, and rocket attack. This protection includes early warning, surveillance, tracking, and defense
against tactical short-range targets through intermediate-range ballistic missiles. (See FM 3-01 and
ATP 3-01.94 for more information on AAMDC planning and execution.)
Signal Command (Theater) or Strategic Signal Brigade
4-79. The theater army is the designated DOD executive agent for setting and supporting the theater
communications and network infrastructure in all AORs. The theater army executes these responsibilities
either through a signal command (theater) or strategic signal brigade assigned to support the AOR. Either
unit provides connectivity to Defense Information Systems Network services up to secret classification. This
connectivity includes establishing and operating the theater network architecture to support all joint and
Army forces operating in an AOR.
4-80. The signal command (theater) or strategic signal brigade provides oversight, leadership, and technical
direction over the theater network and spectrum management support for all Army units across the theater.
It also provides—
(cid:122) Centralized management of data, voice, and video networks, including interfaces with joint,
interorganizational, and multinational systems in the theater.
(cid:122) Enforcement of global cybersecurity policies to support the CCDR and theater army commander.
(cid:122) Oversight of units installing, operating, maintaining, and securing signal support systems and
network interfaces to joint and multinational partner systems in theater.
(cid:122) Establishment of mission priorities to ensure network capabilities are available to meet
commanders’ information requirements.
Theater Engineer Command
4-81. The theater engineer command (TEC) supports the theater army by organizing and directing Army
combat, general, and geospatial engineer assets to improve mobility, enhance survivability, enable force
projection and logistics, build partner capacity, and develop infrastructure. The primary focus of the TEC
during competition is to determine and build the needed infrastructure to facilitate deployment of U.S. forces,
protect forward-stationed U.S. forces, and, where possible, build up the capabilities of allied and partner
nations to withstand an initial assault by a peer threat. Examples of engineer activities the TEC directs are
conducting route analysis and terrain analysis of potential assembly areas for large Army units like BCTs
and identifying needed assets to construct dispersed base clusters in the rear areas to support logistics
operations in the close area. When directed, the TEC also provides C2 for engineers from other Services and
multinational organizations and provides technical oversight (quality assurance and surveillance) assistance
for contracted construction engineers according to the relationships established by the JFC. (See FM 3-34 for
more information on theater engineer commands.)
Battlefield Coordination Detachment
4-82. A battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) is a specialized, regionally focused Army element that
serves as the senior Army operational commander's liaison with the air component. A BCD is co-located
with the joint air operations center (JAOC), combined air operations center, or the Air Force air operations
center.
4-83. The BCD is the Army's interface for systems connectivity to the JAOC and for personnel integration
with their JAOC counterparts. The BCD supports the land component command during large-scale combat
operations. Army corps relay requirements and requests to the land component, who, in turn, relays land
component requirements and requests for joint force air component support through the BCD. The BCD
represents the joint force land component commander throughout the joint air tasking cycle in the JAOC.
(See ATP 3-09.13 for doctrine on the BCD.)
Theater Fires Command or Element
4-84. An Army theater fires command or theater fires element provides C2 of assigned fires capabilities,
serves as the senior organization assigned to a theater army to integrate allocated or assigned fires capabilities,
and executes critical fire support functions. It develops and nominates joint targets across the theater. This |
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support to joint targeting supports the continuous setting of the theater and coalition forces land component
commander (CFLCC), field army (when constituted), and corps operations. The theater fires command or
element ensures the Army’s contribution to the joint targeting process is effectively planned and executed
during competition and crisis and can quickly transition to large-scale combat operations in accordance with
the ground force commander's priorities. (See FM 3-09 for additional information on theater fires commands
and elements.)
Army Field Support Brigade
4-85. The Army field support brigade links strategic resources to tactical units, and it can be assigned in
support of a theater army or a corps. It provides APS readiness, ensuring stocks are maintained for use by
arriving forces during crisis or armed conflict. The execution of APS equipment configuration and handoff
operations are exercised as individual events and also as part of larger exercises, including the DEFENDER
exercise series. Army field support brigades also run logistics civil augmentation programs. These can be
used to provide resources to emerging needs, including theater-wide contract and other support to theater
setting and opening requirements. The relationships developed during competition with potential contract
support organizations can be leveraged to meet sustainment requirements using organizations already in
theater. These and other functions are integral to building and maintaining combat power for large-scale
combat operations by enabling the rapid and effective arrival and employment of Army forces. (See
ATP 4-98 for additional details on the Army field support brigade.)
Multi-Domain Task Force
4-86. The multi-domain task force (MDTF) provides the joint force with a formation capable of employing
long-range precision fires and other effects from multiple domains in support of the commander’s objectives.
It is designed to defeat complex enemy systems through the collection of information and different forms of
lethal and non-lethal fires. When required, it can be task-organized to provide capabilities to the JTF or
component commander. During competition, the MDTF may be forward stationed in a CCDR’s AOR to
employ joint and Army capabilities in support of target development. The MDTF headquarters coordinates
and synchronizes the information collection operations of its assigned formations with other theater and
national assets.
4-87. The MDTF is capable of coordinating and integrating cyberspace electromagnetic activities and space
capabilities with long-range surface fires to deceive, neutralize, or disrupt enemy formations, C2 nodes, and
cyberspace electromagnetic activities. It does so to enable Army and joint forces to penetrate and disintegrate
enemy A2 and AD enabling C2 systems and exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver. The MDTF is
designed to operate in a distributed fashion while retaining the ability to deliver effects that create
opportunities for joint force exploitation. Based upon specific mission variables, the MDTF may be
augmented with capabilities from across the warfighting functions.
Security Force Assistance Brigades
4-88. Security force assistance brigades (SFABs) provide advisors to conduct worldwide SFA operations to
develop the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions in support of
theater security cooperation objectives. Advisors shape an operational environment by strengthening allies
and building lasting partnerships. Advisors increase host-nation capability through joint exercises, and they
remain ready to support the partnered force’s operations and modernization in conjunction with other
instruments of national power. An SFAB improves interoperability by providing teams to advise partner-
nation forces across all warfighting functions. It advises at the battalion, brigade, division, and corps levels.
When the SFAB is consistently employed with a partner nation, it can improve a partner-nation security
force.
4-89. SFABs are regionally aligned to a specified geographic area to cultivate an in-depth knowledge and
experience base capable of addressing the unique concerns of a given theater. The advisors in SFABs, in
conjunction with civil affairs and theater information collection assets, enhance the common intelligence
picture for a CCDR since they have direct knowledge of a partner’s force capabilities and have experience
with their population. When directed, they conduct liaison and support activities to enable multinational
operations during armed conflict. SFABs are uniquely manned and equipped to provide enduring presence |
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in regions of strategic competition to promote interoperability, build partner conventional warfighting
capacity, and set conditions for contingency operations. (See ATP 3-96.1 for additional details on the SFAB.)
CORPS ROLES DURING COMPETITION
4-90. When a corps is present in a CCDR’s AOR, it provides the C2 linkage between subordinate tactical
echelons and theater strategic echelons. For example, V Corps oversees theater-assigned units such as the 2nd
Cavalry Regiment, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, and the 41st Field Artillery Brigade, and it oversees the
employment of the MDTF assigned to U.S. European Command. During competition, it is also normal for
the corps to have an expeditionary sustainment command, operational fires command, expeditionary military
intelligence brigade, and a medical brigade in general support.
4-91. During exercises to prepare for large-scale combat operations, the corps fills one of three roles. The
corps can be designated as tactical land headquarters employing multiple divisions. It may also assume the
role of a joint task force headquarters or land component command headquarters during a contingency
operation or training event, after it undergoes the necessary training and joint augmentation. When the corps
is the land component command headquarters, it also serves as the ARFOR. (See FM 3-94 and ATP 3-92 for
more information on the corps.)
DIVISION ROLES DURING COMPETITION
4-92. Divisions are often the primary interface with various unified action partners during competition. When
regionally aligned, a division with a tailored package of subordinate brigades and other enablers—both
Regular Army and Reserve Component—is allocated to a CCDR to help execute the CCP. Examples of
additional enablers include maneuver enhancement brigades and civil affairs, military intelligence, military
police, CBRN, psychological operations, explosive ordnance disposal, and engineer units.
4-93. A regionally aligned division normally works with multinational partners to conduct security
cooperation over extended periods. By establishing habitual relationships, divisions help assure allies, build
trust with partner nations, and build interoperability with them and other unified action partners. Divisions
help partners build shared situational understanding and partner capacity. They also deter conflict through
the conduct of various activities such as exercises, training, equipping, education, conferences, and military
staff talks. Division support to security cooperation helps shape regional stability by—
(cid:122) Building defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests.
(cid:122) Developing friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
(cid:122) Providing the division and other U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations
to prevent and deter conflict.
(cid:122) Improving readiness to incorporate allied or partner formations.
4-94. Division headquarters provide direct C2 of the brigades tasked to conduct specific operations
supporting security cooperation and interoperability development with partners. They provide training
resources and oversight to brigades at home station. Division headquarters are responsible for leader
development down to the battalion level. They continuously improve the readiness of Army forces over
which they have influence, protecting their time and ensuring that demanding, realistic training is the first
priority.
4-95. Division headquarters provide subject matter expertise to assist brigades as they prepare for missions
or capstone training exercises, to include awareness of NATO or American, British, Canadian, Australian,
and New Zealand (known as ABCANZ) interoperability standards when forces from those nations are
involved. Low density military occupation specialties or specialized units may benefit from the division
consolidation of training events. Divisions have subject matter experts in low density specialties who
develop, implement, execute, and evaluate training programs across several echelons. (See FM 3-94 and
ATP 3-91 for a further discussion of division roles and responsibilities.)
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS DURING COMPETITION
4-96. BCTs provide CCDRs with a combined-arms, close combat force that can operate as part of a division
or a joint task force. During competition, they focus on perfecting tactical tasks in preparation to execute |
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OPLANs for large-scale combat operations. Forward deployed BCTs assess and improve protection
measures against adversary capabilities and promote interoperability with host-nation tactical units. While
most of a rotational brigade’s training occurs in the continental United States and does not involve partner-
nation forces, brigades anticipate and plan how to integrate with host-nation forces. Familiarity with agreed-
to coalition or bilateral interoperability standards helps increase alliance or coalition capability and minimizes
the time necessary for learning during execution. (See FM 3-96 for information on BCTs and FM 3-16 for
information about multinational operations.)
CONSOLIDATING GAINS DURING COMPETITION
4-97. Army forces continuously consolidate gains to maintain an operational environment that is
advantageous to U.S. strategic interests. Experience proves that what Army forces do during competition
helps ensure stability and reduces the potential for manmade crises or armed conflict throughout a region,
even in locations where no previous combat has occurred. Examples of consolidating gains during
competition range from transportation system improvements (including port, airfield, and rail lines of
communications), increasing theater supply stocks, intelligence cooperation, and providing Army medical
personnel to support a combatant command’s humanitarian and civic assistance activities. Army forces
contributing to humanitarian relief efforts with allies and partners help cement existing international
relationships or set conditions for new ones in other places.
4-98. Army forces consolidate gains most effectively by maintaining a persistent or permanent presence in
a theater of operations. This presence enables the cultivation of relationships on a predictable and reliable
basis and provides Army forces a high degree of regular access to allies and partners. The enduring results
of these activities help ambassadors, country teams, and JFCs gain a greater degree of influence with allies
and partners as they pursue mutually beneficial objectives. In addition to this increased influence, Army
consolidating gains activities contribute to joint efforts to support deterrence.
4-99. Consolidation of gains during competition following armed conflict or crisis is significantly different
than during steady-state competition. In areas that have not seen recent armed conflict or a disruptive crisis,
Army forces consolidate gains by reinforcing the success of steady-state competition activities. They do this
by following through on what was begun earlier in consistent ways that provide predictability to allies and
partners. In most cases, these activities will be indistinguishable from other competition activities designed
to build partner capabilities and improve other advantages relative to threat forces.
4-100. Consolidating gains following armed conflict requires significant operations that, if not properly
conducted, could result in a return to crisis or conflict. These efforts include information collection and
intelligence analysis to understand threats, their support from the population, and what options are available
to defeat them. Consolidating gains also includes stability tasks related to providing security, food, water,
shelter, and medical treatment to the population. When appropriate, Army forces then work to restore or
rebuild civil institutions and to transition security and stability tasks to those institutions. (See FM 3-07 and
FM 3-57 for additional details on stability operations and governance.)
4-101. When immediate concerns are addressed after a crisis or armed conflict, the theater army and
supporting forces focus most of their efforts on theater strategic consolidation of gains. They work with the
theater’s other components, the combatant command, interagency partners (primarily the Department of
State), partner nations, and other unified action partners to develop and achieve long-term objectives. In
general, these consolidation of gains activities are less intense and occur over longer periods of time. Army
forces build on the success of past conflicts by conducting targeted engagements with unified action partners.
Examples of this include routine engagements with Republic of Korea, Japanese, and NATO forces by
forward-positioned and rotational units. (See ATP 3-93 for a detailed overview of routine theater army
activities to consolidate gains during competition.)
4-102. Peace operations are a means of consolidating gains. Peace operations are multiagency and
multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power
with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support
reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance (JP 3-07.3). They usually
occur under agreements brokered through organizations like the United Nations or through regional bodies
like the African Union. (See JP 3-07.3 and ATP 3-07.31 for additional details on peace operations.) |
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TRANSITION TO CRISIS AND ARMED CONFLICT
4-103. Transitions are inherently complex and unpredictable because anticipated environmental conditions
can quickly change and alter the perception of strategic leaders who do not have all the information necessary
for clear understanding. A response by one side can result in the perception of escalation by the other, leading
to increased tensions. A crisis requiring a response can also occur because of unforeseen environmental
changes. Transition from competition to crisis or armed conflict is often based on four types of decisions,
resulting actions, and the follow-on associated effects from the initial action. Examples include—
(cid:122) A decision by national command authorities to escalate or initiate armed conflict. Examples
include the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2011 Libya strike, and the 2020 strike against Iranian
General Qasem Soleimani.
(cid:122) A decision by adversaries to escalate or initiate armed conflict. Examples include Hezbollah’s
rocket strikes against Israel in 2006, the Russo-Georgia War in 2008, and the Russian invasions
of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.
(cid:122) A decision by allied nations to escalate or initiate an armed conflict. An example of this is the
1967 Six-Day War that occurred between Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel.
(cid:122) Decisions made in response to a rapid environmental change that neither side planned for but
causes tensions to rise. An example is the change brought to the strategic environment by the 2020
pandemic.
4-104. Army forces and leaders anticipate the potential for conflict in their operational environment. This
is informed by input from the intelligence community and direction from strategic-level leaders. SFABs and
other regionally aligned units have access to sensitive areas and ally and partner leaders. Their access and
robust communications enable them to gain insight on actual conditions on the ground and provide real-time
updates to decision makers during fluid situations. Decisions made before and during the initial stages of a
crisis or armed conflict have significant impact on the decisions made by adversaries and the ultimate
outcome of a particular situation.
4-105. Once a crisis or armed conflict starts, adversaries use all capabilities at their disposal to disrupt the
deployment of Army forces. They will attempt to prevent the Army and the joint force from obtaining the
needed time to deploy and build combat power. This chaos, with its resultant frictions, is the environment
into which Army forces will respond.
CONFLICT TYPE DETERMINATION
4-106. Army forces and leaders need to anticipate the type of conflict the Nation will fight. This is informed
by input from the intelligence community and direction from strategic-level leaders. Decisions made before
and during the initial stages of a crisis or armed conflict have significant impact on the decisions made by
adversaries and the ultimate outcome of a particular situation. The initial decisions or recommendations by
Army strategic leaders impact the ability of the Army to project force in a timely manner.
FORCE PROTECTION
4-107. Indications and warnings in a theater may prompt a decision to mobilize and deploy Army forces in
anticipation of a crisis or armed conflict. Army forces anticipate and react to adversary actions targeting them
where they are located during the initial stages of an operation, whether in the United States or forward
deployed. Adversaries seek to degrade and disrupt the ability of Army forces to deploy. Adversaries may
employ cyberspace attacks to inflict power outages at home station, target transportation networks to delay
shipment of unit equipment, conduct social media attacks on Service or family members, and instigate
protests that lower popular support for Army forces. Insider threats and proxies can conduct acts of terror,
sabotage, subterfuge, and other activities against U.S. forces stationed in the United States and abroad.
Adversaries may immediately employ lethal capabilities against Army forces using their air-, sea-, cyber-,
and space-based capabilities to exploit surprise. Forward stationed forces should be prepared to deploy from
garrison to dispersed locations to prepare a defense against an enemy attack. Force protection during
transition will include physical security measures, operations security, and active information efforts to
counter adversary efforts to misinform and otherwise influence Soldiers, Family members, and supporting
organizations and communities. |
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NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
4-108. A transition to crisis or armed conflict may require a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO).
Army forces conduct NEOs under a wide range of conditions. They may be conducted under relatively stable
conditions or under unstable conditions that involve enemy combatants. Ideally, leaders anticipate a NEO
requirement and are able to execute it prior to crisis or armed conflict. Uncertain adversary intentions and the
threat of violence often create desperation amongst evacuees and local populations and increase the
complexity and risk for forces conducting NEOs.
4-109. Once a NEO is requested, approved, and directed, the CCDR directs forces to conduct evacuation
operations in support of the Department of State and Chief of Mission. NEOs, especially those of significant
scale, will require Army forces that would otherwise be dedicated to other missions. (See JP 3-68 for more
information on NEOs.)
INITIAL EMPLOYMENT OF FORWARD-STATIONED FORCES
4-110. A key strategic decision during competition or crisis is whether forward-stationed units will defend
forward to hold terrain or displace to more advantageous positions. This decision should occur during
competition unless a crisis unfolds in unanticipated ways and forces a decision point. During transition,
forward-stationed Army forces have three courses of action. The JFC can integrate Army forces with
host-nation land component forces as part of a mobile or area defense, assign U.S. Army forces a theater
reserve role, or implement a plan that combines both courses of action. A theater reserve role allows the JFC
to preserve Army combat power for future offensive operations. Army forces may be required to defend key
terrain and infrastructure to allow for receiving deploying forces. Army leaders advise the JFC on the best
ways to use forward-stationed forces based on current conditions in the AO. |
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Operations During Crisis
The 1930’s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and
unchallenged ultimately leads to war.
President John F. Kennedy
This chapter begins with a discussion of the broad trends that occur in the strategic
environment and adversary actions during crisis. It discusses how Army forces provide
options to joint force commanders (JFCs) seeking to obtain relative advantages during
crisis, and how the Army projects forces. It then describes the roles of theater armies,
corps, divisions, and brigades. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
consolidating gains and transitioning back to competition or to armed conflict.
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS DURING CRISIS
5-1. A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces,
or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military
importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives
(JP 3-0). A crisis may be the result of adversary actions or indicators of imminent action, or it may be the
result of natural or human disasters. During a crisis, opponents are not yet using lethal force as the primary
means for achieving their objectives, but the situation potentially requires a rapid response by forces prepared
to fight to deter further aggression. When directed, the Army provides a JFC with capabilities to help deter
further provocation and sufficient combat power to maintain or reestablish conventional deterrence. The
introduction of significant land forces demonstrates the will to impose costs, provides options to joint force
and national leaders, and signals a high level of national commitment. The effects of a persistent presence on
the ground among allied or partner forces cannot be easily replicated with air or maritime power alone.
5-2. Crisis response operations are characterized by high
degrees of volatility and uncertainty. A crisis may erupt with Success during a crisis is a return to a
no warning, or it may be well anticipated. Its duration is state of competition in which the
United States, its allies, and its
unpredictable. Additionally, adversaries may perceive
partners are in positions of increased
themselves in a different context or state of conflict than U.S.,
advantage relative to the adversary.
allied, and partner forces. What is seen by one side as a crisis
Should deterrence fail, Army forces
might be perceived by the other as armed conflict or
are better positioned to defeat enemy
competition. Army leaders must demonstrate flexibility, forces during conflict.
anticipate changes in an operational environment, and provide
JFCs with credible, effective options. This requires trained
forces agile enough to adapt quickly to new situations and commanders and staffs adept at linking tactical
actions to attaining policy objectives.
5-3. Regardless of the capabilities employed, there are generally two broad outcomes from a crisis. Either
deterrence is maintained, and de-escalation occurs, or armed conflict begins. While this requires that Army
forces be prepared for either type of transition, forces deploying during crisis always assume they are
deploying to fight. While Army forces prepare for armed conflict, they avoid sending signals that armed
conflict is inevitable, regardless of what the adversary does, to avoid inadvertent escalation. Generally, senior
leaders at the corps and higher echelons influence those perceptions through public communications in
support of the JFC and national leaders. |
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Note. Army forces also respond to crises related to disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and
defense support to civil authorities when tasked. These crisis contexts and response options are
covered in separate doctrinal publications. See JP 3-28, JP 3-29, ADP 3-07, ADP 3-28, FM 3-07,
and ATP 3-57.20 for more information on these types of crises and associated response options.
ADVERSARY METHODS DURING CRISIS
5-4. A crisis is frequently caused by an adversary acting aggressively to coerce and intimidate its opponents
with the threat of force. Once an adversary crosses a U.S., allied, or partner crisis threshold, it attempts to
shape and control the crisis to limit or prevent a U.S. military response. An adversary’s attempts to control
the situation involves escalating or de-escalating its activities based on an assessment of the situation, which
includes a calculation of risk. Adversary forces conduct a detailed analysis of their available capabilities,
capacity, and operational reach within a theater relative to friendly forces; their overall desired end state; and
their willingness to achieve that end state before deciding to escalate. Even after careful analysis, the way a
situation develops can be unpredictable. Some peer adversaries view conflict as a continuous condition in
which heightened or reduced periods of violence occur and recur. Changing the intensity of their actions,
even when that reduces tension, does not end their campaign to oppose U.S. interests.
ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES TO SHAPE A CRISIS
5-5. As a crisis develops, peer adversaries will attempt to shape the situation to their benefit through
information warfare and preclusion focused on the U.S. joint force. They may use diplomatic, economic, and
information means to divide an opponent’s political leadership from its civilian population. They create
separation by introducing or exacerbating distrust and division between different groups to weaken an
opponent’s political leadership and to create dissatisfaction among an opponent’s civilian population.
Adversaries position military forces in ways to increase uncertainty for opponents and to complicate their
decision making. These activities create conditions for the adversary to exploit situations with minimal
interference from the U.S., allied, or partner military forces.
5-6. Adversaries may use proxy forces to conduct information warfare, unconventional warfare, and
criminal activities, although the balance and utility of these forces in crisis differs from their use during
competition. Proxy forces, whether they are a militant separatist group, private military company, or criminal
network, bring different capabilities to a situation, and the employment of their capabilities shifts as the
strategic context changes. For example, while criminal networks can still accomplish useful tasks in
environments marked by increased levels of violence, they do not have the same level of utility that they did
during competition. Similarly, separatist groups cannot typically operate without significant support from
their sponsor’s military or security services, and that support is likely to be focused elsewhere at the beginning
of a crisis. Despite their limitations, proxy forces provide adversaries with another tool to shape a crisis
situation.
ACTIVITIES TO CONTROL ESCALATION
5-7. Peer adversaries may attempt to control the escalation of a crisis to avoid armed conflict with the
United States by initiating actions to prevent or counter a U.S. response. These actions may focus on allies
or partners using diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments. Adversary measures include
setting fait accompli conditions on the ground designed to make military responses either too expensive to
employ or too late to affect the political situation. An adversary also has other options to control escalation,
which include accelerating its operational timelines, employing information warfare, increasing support to
proxy forces, and increasing the number of forward deployed units in the region. Adversary forces may also
initiate crises in other theaters to distract U.S. forces and diffuse their response in the area of greatest interest.
In extreme cases, an adversary may conduct a limited attack in response to U.S. reactions to the activities
that precipitated the original crisis. |
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ACTIVITIES TO MITIGATE UNITED STATES DETERRENCE
5-8. As adversary forces plan for operations during a crisis, they consider several key actions to mitigate
U.S. deterrence efforts and to ensure these operations do not interfere significantly with their interests. These
actions may include—
(cid:122) Conducting limited attacks to expose friendly force vulnerabilities. These attacks may also
degrade the deterrence value of deployed forces and destroy credibility among current and
potential partners.
(cid:122) Disrupting or delaying the deployment of Army and joint forces through cyberspace attacks and
denial of space capabilities.
(cid:122) Exploiting gaps in national interests among the United States, partner nations, and potential
partners by attacking weaker countries with whom the United States has no treaty obligations to
defend.
(cid:122) Conducting deception operations to conceal their real intent.
(cid:122) Increasing the use of proxy forces to coopt, coerce, or influence the local population,
organizations, and governments within a crisis region.
(cid:122) Creating multiple dilemmas for the United States by attacking or threatening the use of force
against potential partner nations in regions outside of the crisis region.
(cid:122) Impacting the will of the public through information warfare, including cyberspace attacks.
(cid:122) Threatening the use of nuclear weapons to prevent intervention by the United States, allies, and
partners.
OPERATIONS SECURITY
5-9. Operations security is vital to the success of operations
The protection of friendly forces
during crisis. Continuously employing the operations security
requires an understanding of threat
process generates measures and countermeasures to limit an
reconnaissance and surveillance,
adversary’s ability to discern friendly intent, knowing that capabilities in an operational
friendly forces are always under observation and at risk of environment. Protection is an outcome
detection. Operations security is a function of how tasks and based in large part on how operations
activities are conducted and how individual Soldiers and units are conducted at the individual and
are successful in meeting the directed standards. Army units in unit level. No single system or
capability can protect a formation on
a joint operations area (JOA) exercise strict operations security
its own.
to protect friendly information and protect the network against
cyberspace attacks. They do this by ensuring no use of personal
electronic devices, minimizing electromagnetic emissions, and limiting communications on command and
control (C2) information systems to the maximum possible extent. This protects Soldiers from social media
and other information-related attacks and limits the information available to adversaries that can be used to
target family members. It also makes it more difficult for adversaries to identify units and their locations and
reduces the incentive for adversary forces to strike targets they view as lucrative enough to risk conflict to
destroy. Stress caused by adversary social media attacks during crisis is potentially circumvented by avoiding
social media altogether, since the combined effects of a disinformation campaign could degrade Soldier
performance and morale far more than not having access to personal devices and media accounts. Operations
security is a continuous activity at every echelon down to the individual Soldier level.
RELATIVE ADVANTAGES
5-10. During crisis, Army forces capitalize on the knowledge and experiences gained and use the systems,
processes, and infrastructure developed while setting the theater to respond to adversary aggressions or
threats. While this preparation and experience provide Army forces, allies, and other coalition forces with a
good starting point in mature theaters, the transition into crisis will most likely be chaotic, and it will present
Army leaders with unforeseen challenges that require rapid response. Army forces therefore build upon the
information, human, and physical advantages gained during competition to mitigate friction, deter
adversaries, and when necessary, transition into armed conflict. |
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PHYSICAL ADVANTAGES DURING CRISIS
5-11. Achieving physical advantage during crisis consists of working with host-nation forces to form a
credible defense and ensuring the survivability of allied forces in theater. If there is key or decisive terrain,
Army forces and host-nation partners may seek to deter adversaries by setting a defense of that ground early
in a crisis. Army forces in theater assume conflict is imminent and take all available measures to protect
against attack in every domain where an attack could occur.
5-12. During crisis, Army combat power will likely be limited initially to a small number of forward-
stationed forces, those forces that can draw Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) rapidly, and forces used to
threaten adversary forces with forcible entry into their area of operations (AO). This combat power will most
likely be used in a defensive posture until the JFC receives enough land forces to make offensive operations
feasible. The intent should be to increase the combat power of Army forces to a point where they can credibly
threaten adversary forces with offensive operations. Ideally, this will deter further enemy action. If, however,
deterrence fails, this force facilitates armed conflict that will terminate on terms favorable to U.S. interests.
In well-developed theaters, Army combat power will likely be forward stationed and integrated with partner
forces as a key part of their defensive plans. This credible land force, capable of disrupting or significantly
degrading an adversary’s initial attack, maximizes the deterrent potential of Army forces.
INFORMATION ADVANTAGES DURING CRISIS
5-13. Two key information activities are protecting friendly information and degrading the threat’s ability to
communicate, sense, make effective decisions, and maintain influence with relevant actors and populations.
An example is the use of strategic messaging to undermine the credibility of an adversary by exposing
violations of international law and showing that adversary narratives are false. Achieving information
advantages is a commander-driven, combined arms activity that employs capabilities from every warfighting
function. During crisis, commanders lead their staffs to refine information activities based upon plans and
processes developed during competition. Examples include commanders and staffs focusing on the
challenges and tasks of establishing a mission-partner environment, building or modifying an intelligence
architecture, and creating or refining common operating procedures with allies and other partners.
HUMAN ADVANTAGES DURING CRISIS
5-14. While enduring relationships with alliance and coalition partners may be in place at the theater strategic
level as a crisis develops, at the operational and tactical levels it is likely that units have less experience
operating with one another. Forces deploying into a theater may have experience working with the security
forces of partner nations if they were regionally aligned or worked together in a professional military
education or training setting, but most will not have such experience. This requires leaders who have worked
with joint and multinational partners to focus their staffs on the most critical interoperability tasks necessary
for effective coalition operations. It also requires awareness of the difficulty in fully understanding situations
when dealing with other cultures. Employing the liaison networks built by the theater army during
competition will enable simultaneous in-theater training exercises with the deployment of Army forces. This
facilitates early shared understanding, helping leaders and subordinate units integrate with allied and partner
forces in the most expeditious and efficient manner possible while also signaling determination to
adversaries. Demonstrated readiness for combat operations and interoperability among U.S., allied, and
partner forces helps to upset adversary risk calculations and deter further aggression.
ARMY SUPPORT TO THE JOINT FORCE DURING CRISIS
5-15. The military supports unified action partners during crisis by providing flexible deterrent and response
options. A flexible deterrent option (FDO) is a planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making
by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully
tailored to create a desired effect. A flexible response option (FRO) is a military capability specifically task-
organized for effective reaction to an enemy threat or attack and adaptable to the existing circumstances of a
crisis. FDOs and FROs occur across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (known as DIME)
instruments of national power, and they are not just confined to the military. They are most effective when
integrated and implemented in a nearly simultaneous manner. Examples of simultaneous FDO and FRO |
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actions are shown in figure 5-1. (See JP 5-0 for additional examples of diplomatic, economic, information,
and joint force FDOs and FROs.)
Figure 5-1. Simultaneous flexible deterrent and response option examples
5-16. Determining what threat and enemy forces perceive as important will inform U.S. understanding of
their desired end state, associated courses of action, and employment of forces. This allows strategic leaders
to determine the appropriate amount of military force to apply in concert with diplomatic, information, and
economic activities to prevent adversaries from achieving their objectives. Examples of Army contributions
that can deploy rapidly to support joint flexible deterrent and response options are contained in table 5-1 on
page 5-6. |
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Table 5-1. Potential Army contributions to joint flexible deterrent and response options
Army contribution examples to joint flexible deterrent options
Command and control headquarters—establishment of a field army or deployment of a corps or division.
Air defense to protect key infrastructure and population centers from theater ballistic missiles.
Additional personnel to expand the capability of theater-assigned headquarters.
Intelligence assets to support situational understanding, targeting, and information activities.
Deploying a security force assistance brigade to establish liaison capability or conduct security force
assistance.
Building or expanding infrastructure and increasing sustainment capacity to facilitate reception, staging,
onward movement, and integration.
Army contribution examples to joint flexible response options
Airborne or air assault units positioned to conduct joint forcible entry.
A brigade combat team drawing Army pre-positioned stocks.
Port opening to receive the joint force.
Multi-domain task force to respond to adversary antiaccess and area denial activities.
Special operations forces to conduct foreign internal defense, direct action, or special reconnaissance.
Civil affairs to enable civil-military operations and interorganizational cooperation.
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units for response to weapons of mass destruction
employment.
5-17. While FDOs are primarily intended to prevent a crisis from developing or worsening, FROs are
designed to preempt or respond to attacks against U.S. interests. FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented
actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict, and they can be initiated
before or after unambiguous warning of threat action. In comparison, FROs can be employed in response to
aggression by adversaries, and they are intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide
range of actions carefully tailored to produce desired effects. FDOs and FROs must be deliberately tailored
in terms of timing, efficiency, and effectiveness to avoid undesired effects, such as eliciting an armed
response should adversary leaders perceive that friendly FDOs or FROs are being used as preparation for a
preemptive attack.
5-18. FDOs and FROs serve three basic purposes. First, they provide a visible and credible message to
adversaries about U.S. will and capability to resist aggression. Second, they position U.S. forces in a manner
that facilitates implementation of the operations or contingency plan should armed conflict occur. Third, they
provide options for joint and national senior leaders. They allow for measured increases in pressure to avoid
unintentionally provoking combat operations, and they enable decision makers to develop the situation to
gain a better understanding of adversary capabilities and intentions. FDOs and FROs are elements of
contingency plans executed to increase deterrence in addition to, but outside the scope of, the ongoing joint
operations. The key goals of FDOs and FROs are—
(cid:122) Communicate the strength of U.S. commitment to treaty obligations and regional peace and
stability.
(cid:122) Confront adversaries with unacceptable costs for their possible aggression.
(cid:122) Isolate adversaries from regional neighbors and attempt to split adversary coalitions.
(cid:122) Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the theater of operations without precipitating
an armed response from adversaries.
(cid:122) Develop the situation and better understand adversary capabilities and intentions.
5-19. Leaders exercise restraint and carefully calculate risk before recommending an increase in Army forces
to address a crisis. Peer adversaries have global capabilities, and they can create multiple dilemmas for U.S.
forces by escalating a crisis horizontally in a different theater. Surging forces in one region may address a
crisis, but it potentially creates opportunities for adversaries or enemies in another region. Leaders must
anticipate second- and third-order effects on other combatant commands and the risk to the homeland when |
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forces are committed to address a specific crisis. An example of an effective response operation occurred in
Korea in 1976.
Effective Response: OPERATION PAUL BUNYAN
On 18 August 1976, a North Korean platoon-sized force attacked a small element of
U.S. and South Korean Army forces conducting a routine tree trimming detail in the
Joint Security Area, a location set aside for military talks and jointly secured by forces
from both the U.S.-led United Nations Command and North Korea. The North Koreans
murdered two U.S. officers and wounded five South Korean soldiers, escalating the
already tense security arrangement.
Leaders assessed that the act was an attempt to dissuade American support for the
U.S. military presence in South Korea. U.S. leaders considered multiple response
options. Although some advocated for a swift and lethal response, the U.S.-led alliance
implemented a course of action designed to avoid escalation but demonstrate allied
cohesion and resolve.
Three days after the attack, dozens of U.S. and South Korean forces reoccupied the
same site where the unprovoked attack occurred and cut down the tree. As a show of
force and coalition readiness, hundreds of U.S. and South Korean soldiers provided
overwatch for the work detail. Army forces also deployed attack helicopters and
prepared artillery for use if necessary. This show of force was part of a larger joint
response option. President Ford ordered U.S. forces to Defense Condition Three,
deployed strategic bombers, and deployed a U.S. aircraft carrier.
The operation de-escalated the situation while bringing attention to North Korea’s
malign activity, further isolating North Korea from the international community. The
operation compelled the North Koreans to admit they regretted the incident, and they
agreed to separate forces in the joint security area. The response resolved the incident
with stronger international support for the United Nations’ mission and a stronger bond
between U.S. and South Korean forces.
FORCE PROJECTION
5-20. The demonstrated ability to project Army forces into an operational area is an essential element of
conventional deterrence. Army forces depend almost entirely upon joint lift capabilities for deployment.
Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States, or
another theater in response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0).
5-21. During a crisis, ground forces provide a JFC with more enduring options than forces primarily
concentrated in or transiting other domains. Army forces are capable of occupying ground indefinitely. They
must be sustained just like other Services, but the Army’s ability to maintain persistent presence is far greater
because of the nature of operations on land. The potentially close physical proximity of ground forces to
adversary forces provides the JFC with greater understanding and can help the JFC dictate the tempo of
operations.
5-22. Army forces achieve persistent presence by deploying forces into a theater to support forward-stationed
U.S. forces, or those of allies or partners. These forces are likely already executing operations directed in
response to provocations, indications, or warnings that hostile activities may commence. At the direction of
the JFC, Army forces execute tasks, activities, and operations designed to deter further malign activity and
set conditions for success should deterrence fail. The forward presence or projection of Army formations into
a theater provides capabilities that create tactical and operational dilemmas for threat forces, enabling the
JFC to seize and retain the initiative. Prompt deployment of land forces in the initial phase of a crisis can |
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preclude the need to deploy larger forces later, and it assures allies and other partners. Effective early
intervention can also deny adversaries the time necessary for them to set conditions in their favor.
5-23. Deployment alone does not guarantee success. Achieving successful deterrence involves convincing
adversaries that the deployed force is able to markedly reduce the adversary force’s chance of success during
armed conflict. Adversaries measure the ability of Army forces to conduct operations during armed conflict
through careful observation of how well those forces are prepared to conduct large-scale combat operations
and the capabilities those forces introduce into a specific context as part of the overall joint response.
5-24. As Army forces prepare to respond to a crisis, the JFC conducts a final review of deploying forces,
ensuring they are deployed in the proper sequence and are able to be task-organized effectively for the
anticipated mission. Threat forces are likely to detect force projection activities using space and cyberspace
capabilities, human intelligence, and open-source collection efforts. Planners should anticipate adversary
forces using all available means to contest the deployment of forces, beginning from home station, during
transit, and upon arrival in theater. Therefore, operations security, dispersion of forces, deception operations,
and physical security are critical planning considerations. Senior commanders and planners must understand
the risks and shape deployments to satisfy both speed and operational readiness. (See Chapter 3 for more
information on force tailoring and Appendix C for further discussion on contested deployments.)
5-25. Force projection is particularly important during crisis, as Army forces have an unknown amount of
time to shape a developing situation. It can occur, however, in any context. Forces projected forward during
competition to conduct exercises, bolster allies and partners, and conduct other activities are under
observation. Adversaries assess the speed and efficiency of these routine deployments, which can have a
deterrent effect. Given the fluid nature of a crisis, force projection may continue well after a crisis has
transitioned to armed conflict. Sound force projection planning encompasses—
(cid:122) Opening the theater.
(cid:122) Mobilization.
(cid:122) Deployment.
(cid:122) Protection during transit.
(cid:122) Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI).
(cid:122) Initial employment of forces.
(cid:122) Sustainment.
(cid:122) Redeployment.
OPENING THE THEATER
5-26. During the transition to crisis or armed conflict, Army forces open the theater to receive deploying
forces. Army forces execute existing plans to establish and open air, sea, and rail terminals. Distribution
systems and intermediate staging bases may be established where required. Higher echelon (including
theater, corps, and division enablers) and rapidly deployable C2 elements begin to integrate with host-nation
forces as quickly as possible to set the conditions for RSOI of follow-on tactical forces. This includes
coordination with the forces of other supporting nations to assure effective distribution of services, facilities,
and supplies to all deploying units across the alliance or coalition. During theater opening, designated arriving
forces draw available APS. This provides the JFC with increased capacity and capability during the initial
stages of a crisis or armed conflict. Army forces must be prepared for combat while conducting theater
opening operations. The first deploying units require the capability to defend themselves while they provide
reaction time and maneuver space for follow-on forces.
MOBILIZATION
5-27. Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are
brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency (JP 4-05). During mobilization, the Army
focuses its efforts on filling joint manning documents to augment combined and joint task force (JTF)
headquarters, land component headquarters, and Army units designated for deployment. During crisis,
strategic leaders may decide to mobilize select portions of the U.S. Army National Guard and U.S. Army
Reserve to provide key capabilities to JFCs. During armed conflict, it is likely that strategic leaders will |
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remove some or all mobilization limitations, enhancing the Army’s ability to respond to an aggressive act by
an enemy with the necessary capabilities. An example of a limitation that is lifted for armed conflict would
be ordering a full mobilization of the Army National Guard or Army Reserve in lieu of a selected reserve
call up or partial mobilization.
5-28. Despite the rapid response and expeditionary capabilities of the joint force, no amount of expeditionary
capability can overcome the challenges posed by physical distance. Most Army forces tasked to respond to
a crisis have a delay between notification and the time they assemble at the location from which to deploy.
For active-duty formations this time period is generally days or weeks, and for Army National Guard or
Army Reserve forces this time period is generally weeks to months. The mobilization process takes longer
for units with large amounts of equipment and personnel.
5-29. Some units are directed to maintain higher levels of readiness or maintain a prepared-to-deploy status.
This higher state of readiness primarily includes units in the immediate response force. The immediate
response force provides the Army with the ability to provide combatant commanders (CCDRs) with land
capabilities of limited capacity to rapidly respond to a crisis.
5-30. For most Army forces, mobilization operations begin at home station. As a general rule, once
mobilized, it takes at least 30 to 45 days for most Army forces stationed within the United States to deploy
to a theater when their equipment is shipped via strategic sealift. This planning timeline is the same whether
the United States is involved in a crisis or armed conflict due to the fixed speed of moving Army equipment
over civilian transportation infrastructure. However, if a threat force inflicts significant damage across the
strategic support area during armed conflict, these timelines may be further extended. This timeframe does
not include RSOI upon arrival overseas. Additional time may also be required if the joint force is not able to
provide sufficient capacity to protect land, sea, and air lines of communications or sufficient sea and airlift is
not available for simultaneous movement of multiple large units. (See Appendix C for more information on
deployments contested by threat forces.)
DEPLOYMENT
5-31. Deployment is the movement of forces into and out of an operational area (JP 3-35). Proper planning
establishes what, where, and when forces are needed to achieve objectives. How the JFC intends to employ
forces is the foundation of the deployment structure and timing. For example, a JFC may deploy a combat-
ready brigade combat team (BCT) or division early in a crisis to stabilize a situation or secure ports for
follow-on forces, accepting risks to the movement efficiency of follow-on forces. Corps and division staffs
examine all deployment possibilities and conduct parallel planning.
5-32. Most Army equipment travels via strategic sealift. It will take weeks or months for the equipment to
arrive in theater. Commanders and planners must not underestimate the joint deployment challenges of
operating against peer adversary forces with robust air, maritime, space, and cyberspace capabilities.
Commanders and planners must envision what they want the force to look like upon arrival in theater and
then backwards plan with the assumption that some of it may not arrive as planned or even at all. The
objective of deployment planning is to synchronize deployment activities to facilitate effective execution of
operations in an operational area. Successful deployment planning requires knowledge of a unit’s deployment
responsibilities, an understanding of deployment, and an appreciation of the link between deployment and
employment. (See ATP 3-35 for a discussion of these deployment phases and planning in detail.) The steps
used in deployment planning are—
(cid:122) Analyze the mission.
(cid:122) Structure forces.
(cid:122) Refine deployment data.
(cid:122) Prepare the force.
(cid:122) Schedule movement.
An example of deployment friction and unit actions to overcome it occurred in 2003. |
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Deployment Friction: Task Force Ironhorse in OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM
In 2003, Task Force Ironhorse initially shipped its unit equipment sets to Turkey as
called for in the initial invasion operations order. However, the equipment sets had to
be rerouted through the Suez Canal and Kuwait after Turkey did not allow the use of
its territory for the invasion of Iraq. The task force concept of operations called for
tailored force packages that would allow rapid employment upon arrival in Turkey.
However, tailoring the force packages precluded the ability of U.S. Transportation
Command to maximize the available square footage of strategic sealift ships. This
degraded the ability of the JFC to receive additional assets. Additionally, the refusal of
Turkey forced the task force commander, Major General Odierno, to rapidly develop
new courses of action for forces tailored for an operation that was no longer feasible.
Though friction occurred due to the extreme change in conditions, the unit adapted. It
did this while constantly interfacing with organizations at the strategic and theater
strategic levels. Major General Odierno also ensured that all leaders of his task force
were integrated into the plan as it changed. As a result of these efforts, Task Force
Ironhorse had personnel staged in Kuwait, prepared for the new conditions facing them
when their equipment finally arrived in Kuwait.
PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT
5-33. The U.S. Army Installation Management Command is a critical protection enabler during unit
predeployment activities through the fort-to-port movement of Army forces. This command manages most
Army installations, and garrison commanders ensure the protection of forces as they deploy. Installation
provost marshals protect deploying unit assets as they prepare to deploy with police and security guards. In
addition, installation safety, medical, and information management personnel protect the force during
deployment preparation and execution. Corps and division staffs coordinate closely with installation staffs to
identify information and assets that need protection, and they apply appropriate protection and security
measures consistent with their collective threat analysis.
5-34. Threats may attempt to impede or prevent unit deployments. This creates a requirement for
coordination of the physical security of deploying unit personnel and equipment as they move to ports of
embarkation. Physical security is required for personnel and equipment while awaiting transport at ports of
embarkation, during movement, and after arrival at ports of debarkation. Planning for physical security
remains a focus in unit staging areas, along routes upon which units and supplies move, and for tactical
assembly areas prior to onward movement into AOs.
5-35. U.S. Transportation Command and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
administer a defense transportation security program to provide standardized transportation security
measures and procedures, constant oversight, and central direction in coordination with other Department of
Defense (DOD) activities and port authorities. Commanders plan for protection measures for their units and
equipment from home station to the port of embarkation, while Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command coordinates for security within the port.
5-36. Corps and division staffs ensure that all contract processes for transportation movements meet DOD
security requirements. They coordinate with the installation transportation officer in the continental United
States at home station or the movement control team outside the continental United States and authorized
railroad or commercial truck carriers on guard and escort matters. Some government and commercial carriers
provide limited security measures to protect in-transit equipment and supplies. These measures include the
use of contract security personnel and secure transfer facilities to safeguard unit assets.
5-37. If the corps or division staff determines that carrier security measures are insufficient given the threat,
corps and division headquarters have a number of options for increasing the protection and security of
deploying units and their associated equipment and supplies. These options include directing subordinate |
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units to provide Soldiers to guard equipment and supplies throughout the deployment process. Commanders
can also direct units to have Soldiers carry certain sensitive items as part of their individual loads throughout
the deployment process.
5-38. Corps and division commanders submit protection plans before their arrival overseas through the
respective ARFOR or the theater army headquarters to the CCDR responsible for all military forces in the
AOR within which deploying forces will operate. These plans should align with the guidance developed by
the CCDR, who coordinates and approves various deploying unit protection plans.
RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION
5-39. RSOI is the process that delivers combat power to the JFC in a theater of operations or a JOA. RSOI
is the responsibility of the theater army and its associated theater sustainment command (TSC). During crises
involving a peer adversary, RSOI must occur rapidly in as many dispersed locations as possible to complicate
adversary targeting. It is a theater-level process, with careful coordination required between units, theater
sustainment personnel, host-nation support, and commercial entities. Effective RSOI matches personnel with
their equipment, minimizes staging and sustainment requirements while transiting these ports of debarkation,
and begins onward movement as quickly as possible. Deploying units need to understand and implement
previously developed plans to accomplish integration and maintain combat readiness upon their arrival. (See
JP 3-35 and ATP 3-35 for a discussion of factors and considerations associated with the conduct of RSOI.)
Reception
5-40. Reception is the process of receiving, offloading, marshalling, accounting for, and transporting of
personnel, equipment, and materiel from the strategic and/or intratheater deployment phase to a sea, air, or
surface transportation point of debarkation to the marshalling area (JP 3-35). As the initial step of introducing
combat power on the ground, reception determines success or failure of the RSOI operation. Efficiency
imparts speed, which requires well-understood plans flexible enough to overcome friction.
5-41. The theater army or a designated sustainment unit (typically the assigned TSC) implements reception
from strategic lift activities at or near designated air and seaports of debarkation. While the reception plan
for each theater varies, reception capacity should at least equal planned strategic lift delivery capability. At a
minimum, the theater army considers the impact of joint C2, movement control, and port operations while
planning. Additionally, commanders and their staffs consider dispersion, air and missile defense (AMD), and
other security measures when planning and conducting reception operations based on the vulnerability to
enemy special-purpose forces and long-range fires.
Staging
5-42. Staging is assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining materiel
in preparation for onward movement (JP 3-35). Staging is the part of the RSOI operation that unites unit
personnel with their equipment and prepares them for onward movement and employment by the JFC. During
staging, deploying forces have limited mission capability and are generally not self-sustainable. Most units
require extensive maintenance, supply, protection, and life support while staging. In some cases, their
equipment must be reconfigured following transport on ships or aircraft.
Onward Movement
5-43. Onward movement is the process of moving forces and sustainment from reception facilities and
marshalling or staging areas to tactical assembly areas or other operating areas. Many external factors
influence onward movement. They include the availability of transportation assets and the requirements of
their future higher echelon headquarters. These factors determine the sequence in which units move from
their staging areas onward to their respective AOs. Plans for the movement of a corps or division headquarters
and its attached and supporting divisions or brigades into an AO maintain a balance between security and
flexibility.
5-44. Corps and division commanders rely heavily on their staffs and integrating cells to finish coordinating
their movement plans to their projected AOs with all necessary military and civilian agencies. The logistics
distribution network may be operated by the U.S. military, the host nation, or by a combination of military |
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and civilian agencies. The appropriate staff cells and elements consider the number of suitable routes and lift
assets available to meet the movement requirements of subordinate units. Other considerations include—
(cid:122) Construction of routes.
(cid:122) Road and route improvement and maintenance.
(cid:122) Repair of bridges and culverts.
(cid:122) Clearance of obstacles, including explosive hazards.
(cid:122) Bridging rivers or dry gaps.
(cid:122) Establishment of security along routes.
(cid:122) Placement of convoy support centers.
(cid:122) Traffic control to permit freedom of or restriction of civilian movement along routes.
(cid:122) Communications architecture.
(cid:122) Requirements of allies and other partners moving at the same time as U.S. forces.
Integration of Forces
5-45. In the context of RSOI, integration is the coordinated transfer of units into an operational commander’s
force prior to mission execution. It can start as soon as the JFC and the new unit are aware of the mission.
The JFC may provide initial and periodic situational updates to the inbound unit throughout the force
projection process. The JFC may have training requirements for the deploying unit that it must accomplish
before and upon arrival in the theater. Integration occurs across all warfighting functions. Generally, the more
time a unit has to integrate before conducting operations, the better the unit will perform. However, the
situation may require rapid integration. Therefore, commanders balance the risks to mission and force when
determining the tempo of unit integration.
5-46. When a deploying unit replaces another unit, a relief in place occurs during integration. During crisis
integration of deploying forces will probably involve augmentation of U.S. and host-nation forces already in
position, and not require a relief in place, although establishing liaison with units on the flanks is required.
Regardless of the circumstance, the command of combat-ready units is transferred to the receiving
commander during integration. Integration is complete when the CCDR, other JFC, or land component
commander establishes positive control over arriving units. This usually occurs in forward assembly areas
when those units are capable of performing missions.
5-47. If the deploying division or brigade is the first U.S. force into a JOA, there may be a need to deploy an
advance party task-organized with security, protection, logistics, and engineering support capabilities. As
part of the unit movement preparations, the advance party is resourced from the division, brigade, attached
assets, or it is provided by outside units. This is particularly true if the predeployment site survey determines
that the AO does not have sufficient infrastructure to support division or brigade operations. Changes in the
number of available forces as deployment proceeds will also increase the number of units present and change
disposition of units and the dimensions of AOs. In circumstances demanding more experienced leadership,
it may be necessary for the deputy commander and a select staff to lead this advance party. They set the
groundwork for the rest of the unit by performing face-to-face coordination with local military or civilian
leaders.
5-48. Unit deployment operations end when all deploying elements complete their RSOI within the assigned
JOA. The specifics of RSOI reflect the specific circumstances of the operational and mission variables
prevailing in that JOA. (See JP 3-35 for information on joint RSOI requirements.)
INITIAL EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES
5-49. The initial employment of Army forces during a crisis will most likely be as part of FDOs or FROs.
This employment may represent the opening stages of a joint operation or a show of force demonstration.
The objective of this early employment is to deter an adversary from further aggression, expand the theater
to receive follow-on Army and joint forces, and form a credible defense with host-nation forces to prevent
adversary gains. Without a robust theater infrastructure, a large number of forward-stationed forces, or a
robust APS inventory that enables rapid deployment, Army forces can only provide limited support to partner |
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forces. While immediate support may be limited, even limited support could prove decisive when it is obvious
that additional capabilities are quickly moving into the theater to address initial shortfalls.
SUSTAINMENT
5-50. Sustainment is central to force projection, and sustainment preparation of an operational environment
is the basis for sustainment planning. Corps, division, and brigade planners focus on identifying the resources
available in an operational area for use by friendly forces and ensuring access to them. The theater army is a
key partner in providing this information to deploying units. A detailed estimate of requirements allows
planners to advise the commander of the most effective method of providing adequate and responsive
support, while minimizing the vulnerable sustainment footprint. There is no fundamental difference in
sustainment preparation of an operational environment during competition, crisis, or armed conflict, except
that sustainment activities intensify as Army forces respond to crisis and prepare for armed conflict, since
time available decreases and requirements from risks to units on the ground increase exponentially. Proper
sustainment permits the Army to project force over time and through the necessary depth of an AO. (See
FM 4-0 for more information on sustainment.)
REDEPLOYMENT
5-51. Redeployment is the transfer or rotation of forces and materiel to support another commander’s
operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization
stations for reintegration and/or out-processing (JP 3-35). National strategic leaders determine the appropriate
time for the redeployment of Army forces. Usually, redeployment of Army forces does not occur until
tensions reduce and conditions permit the transition of security and stability responsibilities to other
legitimate authorities.
ARMY ECHELONS DURING CRISIS
5-52. All Army echelons have considerable responsibilities when responding to a crisis. Each conducts
reconnaissance, liaison, and troop preparation. As units deploy, they may send leaders and staffs to other
headquarters and to ports and airfields to refine their understanding of requirements and the situation on the
ground. Deploying units can expect their leaders to be called to outside planning meetings early in the process
and for special training needs to emerge even as units are busy with other preparations for movement. Units
can expect to receive individual replacements or augmentees and a number of attachments based on task
organization.
THEATER ARMY ROLES DURING CRISIS
5-53. The theater army commands all Army forces in the AOR until the CCDR attaches selected Army forces
to a subordinate JTF. Until another organization can assume the role, the theater army initially divides its
responsibilities between the Army component (the ARFOR) in the JOA or theater of operations and Army
forces operating in other parts of the AOR. This may require force tailoring by the theater army to develop
the initial request for forces, followed by additional task organization as forces arrive in the AOR. The theater
army is able to perform as a JTF or combined forces land component command headquarters for limited
contingency operations and during the initial period of a crisis. It requires rapid augmentation to conduct
continuous operations in either case.
5-54. As the Service component command, the theater army remains responsible to Headquarters,
Department of the Army for service-specific requirements within the AOR during a crisis. This falls under
the ADCON chain of authority. This authority establishes a hierarchy for Army support to deployed forces
without modifying the operational chain of command that runs from the CCDR through subordinate JFCs.
For example, theater army commanders may—
(cid:122) Lead RSOI operations for arriving forces.
(cid:122) Complete collective training, theater orientation, and theater acclimation.
(cid:122) Manage force modernization of Army forces before their employment in the JOA. |
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5-55. During joint operations sustainment is a Service responsibility except as specified by executive agency
requirements, DOD directives, CCDRs’ lead Service designations, or inter-Service support agreements.
CCDRs direct theater army commanders to provide Army support to other Services (ASOS) to agencies or
multinational forces when required. However, shared sustainment responsibility or common-user logistics is
more effective, especially for joint operations. Directive authority for logistics is the additional authority
available to CCDRs to eliminate duplicative or overlapping sustainment responsibilities. The theater army
coordinates with the combatant command staff to determine joint sustainment requirements, identify
responsibilities, and enable commanders to exercise sustainment C2. (See ATP 3-93 for additional details on
the theater army.)
CORPS ROLES DURING CRISIS
5-56. During crisis, the corps headquarters may deploy into an operational area as a tactical headquarters
with subordinate divisions and brigades. Corps typically deploy an early entry command post, comprising
selected personnel from within the headquarters, to provide C2 of arriving forces. Should crisis become
armed conflict, large-scale combat operations may require the corps headquarters to function under the
command of a multinational force land component or become subordinate to a field army equivalent
established as part of a multinational coalition.
5-57. Corps headquarters plan for all phases of an operation from mobilization to redeployment. Corps
operations require planners to consider all functions and capabilities required to gain and maintain positions
of relative advantage and the capabilities threat forces can use against friendly forces. Understanding the
planning and execution timelines of various capabilities is critical when considering the integration of those
capabilities into the overall plan. The corps headquarters is responsible for—
(cid:122) Understanding the threat.
(cid:122) Integrating information collection and intelligence analysis into the next higher echelon’s
processes and systems.
(cid:122) Establishing liaison with its higher headquarters and planning reconnaissance of its initial
assembly areas, routes, and forward assembly areas.
(cid:122) Assigning subordinate units areas of operations.
(cid:122) Identifying multiple routes from the points of debarkation through assembly areas to staging areas.
(cid:122) Establishing an initial concept of operations.
(cid:122) Planning to consolidate gains.
(cid:122) Coordinating cyberspace attack mitigation, including distributed denial of service, malicious
software, or system intrusion.
(cid:122) Planning and preparing for communication denial and degradation.
(cid:122) Planning for dispersion of subordinate units along routes and within assembly areas.
5-58. Per the deployment order and operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order, the corps staff plans task
organization and employment of subordinate units, integration and synchronization of operations, massing
of effects, allocation of resources, and determination of priorities. The corps staff provides the primary Army
interface to manage the time-phased force and deployment list for all its assigned forces. The corps
determines when its command posts will arrive at a port of debarkation in relation to the arrival of protection,
sustainment, and maneuver units.
5-59. A corps commander can influence, but not dictate, the tailoring of subordinate units. The CCDR,
theater army, supporting combatant commands, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S. Army Forces
Command all make decisions concerning the composition and deployment sequence of the corps. A corps
commander can, however, organize and prepare the corps command posts for efficient and effective
movement throughout a deployment. By selecting personnel with the right skill sets and providing them the
right mix of equipment, the commander, chief of staff, and assistant chief of staff, operations, match corps
C2 capabilities with mission requirements.
5-60. Assigning initial staging areas, movement routes, and subsequent assembly areas in uncertain threat
conditions requires a calculated balance between force protection and building combat power. Staging areas
for subordinate division and separate brigade elements should be large enough for divisions and separate |
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brigades to disperse elements into company-sized tactical formations while they are performing maintenance
checks, loading munitions, ensuring crew readiness, and preparing to move to forward positions. These plans
may change frequently as new forces arrive, and they will need to be modified for every stage of deployment.
(See ATP 3-92 for additional details on corps operations.)
DIVISION
5-61. The division headquarters performs many of the same activities as the corps headquarters. The division
headquarters fulfills its primary role as a tactical headquarters staffed, trained, and equipped to command two
to five BCTs and other subordinate brigades and battalions. One or more of these brigades may be allied
formations. Upon deployment into a theater, a division may undergo significant task organization in
preparation for its assigned roles during operations. Initially, during crisis, a division conducts defensive,
security, and stability tasks in support of joint operations. The primary role of a division during crisis is to
demonstrate credible coercive force as a combined arms formation. Divisions should expect to conduct short
notice training exercises with multinational partners and perform other activities that demonstrate capabilities
as part of crisis response. In an immature theater, a division headquarters should be prepared to accommodate
the command structure of the next higher echelon until that echelon’s systems are in place. (See ATP 3-91
for additional details on division operations.)
BRIGADES
5-62. During crisis, brigades provide strategic leaders and JFCs with an alternative to deploying a corps or
division. If strategic leaders or the joint force require a credible and rapidly deployable deterrent during an
escalating crisis, they may decide to deploy a BCT, functional brigade, multifunctional brigade, or a
combination thereof as part of a FDO or FRO. To conduct an effective FDO or FRO a brigade could be given
prepare-to-deploy orders or conduct emergency deployment readiness exercises. Other options include
moving brigades operating in a theater to dispersed locations with improved survivability that are
advantageous for defense or integrating these forces into the area or mobile defensive plans of partner nations.
If there is no corps or division present in the theater, the theater army provides C2 of the brigade. An example
of a BCT rapidly deployed as an FRO occurred in 2019 in Iraq.
Crisis Response: Baghdad Embassy Attack
On 31 December 2019, during a time of heightened tensions with Iran, an initial wave
of 750 paratroopers from the 82d Airborne division assigned to the immediate response
force deployed to Baghdad to provide additional security. This deployment was in
response to an attack that occurred on the U.S. embassy 18 hours earlier. The
remainder of the Soldiers in the brigade deployed within days. In total, 3,000 Soldiers
provided additional security at the embassy for almost two months. While forward
deployed, the Soldiers continued training to demonstrate readiness, and they were
postured to rapidly respond at the CCDR’s direction.
CONSOLIDATING GAINS
5-63. During and after crisis response, Army forces consolidate gains to deny adversary forces the means to
extend the crisis or create a similar crisis in the future. This will often entail maintaining an enhanced force
posture in a JOA for a period of time to demonstrate U.S. willingness to defend allies and partners. Army
forces continue to support improvements to host-nation capabilities through a security cooperation plan
designed to make them less vulnerable to future crisis. If an adversary directly targets partner forces, or acts
through a proxy, the United States must be prepared to reconstitute the partner’s forces as quickly as possible.
The ability of Army forces to reconstitute partner nation forces is especially important to JFCs since, in many
areas, only the Army has the capacity to conduct a comprehensive security cooperation program. Many allies
and partners rely primarily on their armies and do not have robust navies or air forces. Consolidating gains |
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during and after crisis response creates enduring change that reinforces deterrence against adversaries and
improves relative advantages for U.S., allied, and partner forces.
TRANSITION TO COMPETITION OR ARMED CONFLICT
In the midst of war and crisis nothing is as clear or as certain as it appears in hindsight.
Barbara Tuchman
5-64. There are two outcomes of a crisis—a de-escalation to competition or an escalation to armed conflict.
Transitions are typically points of friction. Commanders emphasize information collection prior to and during
transitions to maintain a detailed understanding of the threat and continuously assess the situation in order to
position their forces to retain the initiative.
TRANSITION BACK TO COMPETITION
5-65. During a crisis, partner nation security forces and government institutions may suffer losses that reduce
capability and capacity due to the actions of adversary or proxy forces. Army forces may be tasked to execute
security cooperation programs to help restore or maintain partner nation capabilities and capacity as a means
to consolidate gains. Army forces seek to restore partner security forces and government institutions as
quickly as possible to maintain popular support. Doing so reduces the need for large numbers of U.S. forces
to deploy in the future or be maintained in theater to support or enable a partner nation’s security. A quick
recovery also highlights the strength of the alliance or bilateral relationship of a partner nation with the United
States. (See Chapter 4 for more information on partner nation capabilities and capacity.)
5-66. Army forces use products developed from the civil preparation of the environment to help rebuild
partner-nation security forces. Army forces work with partner nations to do this and do not act unilaterally.
The security force assistance brigade (SFAB) and civil affairs units are the ideal core for this effort, but all
types of Army units may contribute. When the effort is large and there is a need for additional subject matter
expertise, or there is a need to reconstitute host-nation conventional forces, additional Army forces may be
required. (See JP 3-20 and FM 3-57 for more details on security cooperation and civil affairs operations.)
5-67. Army forces may help the JFC exploit favorably resolved crises to establish new patterns of behavior
for a theater. While crises are generally uncertain and volatile, their resolution and resulting transition back
to competition provide opportunities to capitalize on changes in an operational environment. Army forces
support joint efforts to create and reinforce changes that benefit the United States and its allies and partners
in competition and provide improved relative advantages that assist in deterring future adversary malign
behavior.
TRANSITION TO ARMED CONFLICT
5-68. Army forces responding to a crisis are prepared for and expect to fight. This saves time during the
transition and requires an understanding of the OPLAN or likely concept of operations as early as possible.
Forward-positioned forces reposition into battle positions or tactical assembly areas and take all available
measures to protect themselves from attack in every domain as they prepare for combat. When located with
allied or partner units, Army forces synchronize their activities to ensure unity of purpose and mutual support.
Depending upon the enemy and distance from the United States, Army forces should expect to receive little
support in the opening stages of a conflict and plan accordingly. |
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Operations During Armed Conflict
The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you
can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on.
Ulysses S. Grant
Section I of this chapter introduces large-scale combat operations and the ways in
which they vary. It addresses topics applicable to both offensive and defensive
operations, including enemy methods, relative advantages, integrating with the joint
force, defeat mechanisms, and enabling operations. Section II describes defensive
operations. Section III describes offensive operations. Section IV describes transition
to post-conflict competition and stability operations.
SECTION I – ARMED CONFLICT AND LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
6-1. Armed conflict encompasses the conditions of a strategic relationship in which opponents use lethal
force as the primary means for achieving objectives and imposing their will on the other. The employment
of lethal force is the defining characteristic of armed conflict, and it is the primary function of the Army.
Lethality’s immediate effect is in the physical dimension—reducing the enemy’s capability and capacity to
fight. However, the utility of lethal force extends into the information and human dimensions where it, along
with the other instruments of national power, influence enemy behavior, decision making, and will to fight.
6-2. During armed conflict, operations usually reflect combinations of conventional and irregular warfare
approaches. Leaders apply doctrine for large-scale combat operations during limited contingencies that
require conventional warfare approaches. Irregular warfare includes counterinsurgency and unconventional
warfare, which other publications specifically address. The initial actions of large-scale combat operations
will likely overlap with actions initiated during competition and crisis. For example, while some units are
engaged in offensive or defensive operations, other units may be completing non-combat evacuations while
in contact with enemy forces. (See FM 3-24 for detailed information about counterinsurgency. See
ATP 3-05.1 for more information about unconventional warfare.)
6-3. Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of
forces committed, conducted as campaigns aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives through
the application of force. Large-scale combat on land occurs within the framework of a larger joint campaign,
usually with an Army headquarters forming the base of a joint force headquarters. These operations typically
entail high tempo, high resource consumption, and high casualty rates. Large-scale combat introduces levels
of complexity, lethality, ambiguity, and speed to military activities not common in other operations.
6-4. Large-scale combat operations occur in circumstances usually associated with state-on-state conflict,
and they encompass divisions and corps employing joint and Army capabilities from multiple domains in a
combined arms manner. Irregular warfare activities often complement large-scale combat operations, with
conventional, irregular, and special operations forces conducting operations close to each other. This
proximity requires cooperation between friendly forces of all types to ensure success. In other cases, irregular
warfare occurs largely in a secondary joint operations area (JOA) or another theater of operations. When this
occurs, the combatant commander (CCDR) ensures sufficient coordination of operations to support unity of
purpose at the national level.
6-5. Successful large-scale combat operations defeat enemy armed forces while establishing control over
land and populations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. They may capitalize on superior military
capability to quickly overwhelm a weaker enemy and consolidate gains as part of a rapid campaign. Large |
3-0 | 130 | Chapter 6
scale combat operations against more capable enemy forces are likely to be of longer duration, lasting months
or longer.
6-6. Army forces may execute large-scale combat operations in a supporting, enabling, or advisory role,
instead of constituting the bulk of ground maneuver forces. One example was OPERATION INHERENT
RESOLVE, beginning in 2014, during which a U.S.-led combined joint task force supported Iraqi Security
Forces and Syrian Democratic Forces in defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. In these cases, U.S.
forces applied large-scale combat operations tactics in support of a partner force.
6-7. The characteristics of large-scale combat operations vary based on many factors, including the enemy.
When fighting against a less capable enemy, the U.S. joint force may have significant advantages in most
domains. The principal concerns during such operations include how to win rapidly at minimal cost,
consolidate gains, and transition responsibility for an area to legitimate authorities. When fighting against a
peer enemy, able to contest the joint force in all domains, the operational environment becomes much more
difficult. Integrated air defense and long-range fires systems; cyberspace and electronic warfare capabilities;
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities (CBRN); and global reconnaissance and
surveillance networks can create parity or significant enemy advantages in one or more domains, particularly
early during a conflict and when operating close to its own borders. To succeed, the U.S. joint force must
create its own relative advantages, preserve combat power, and rapidly exploit what opportunities it creates.
Commanders must assume risk to create opportunity and sequence their operations because they cannot
defeat enemy forces in a single decisive battle.
ENEMY APPROACHES TO ARMED CONFLICT
6-8. Although peer enemies mainly seek to obtain their strategic objectives during competition, they will
engage in armed conflict if they view that the rewards are worth the risk. Once engaged in armed conflict,
peer enemies employ combinations of threat methods to render U.S. military power irrelevant whenever
possible and inflict unacceptable losses on the United States, its allies, and its partners. Russia and China
employ their instruments of national power and military capabilities in distinct ways.
RUSSIA
6-9. The Russian view of war is that it is often undeclared, fought for relatively limited policy objectives,
and occurs across all domains. Russian leaders assess that modern conflicts are characterized by a destructive
and rapid initial period of war that is more decisive than in the past. Additionally, Russia considers that
non-nuclear strategic precision-guided weapons can achieve strategic effects on par with nuclear weapons.
Doctrinally, Russia plans to employ nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks when those attacks
threaten Russian sovereignty.
6-10. During armed conflict, Russia seeks to exert simultaneous pressure in all domains. Russian strategies
intend to increase the costs of confrontation and make the objectives of the United States and its allies
politically and economically unsupportable. Russia’s objective is to weaken U.S. national will to continue a
conflict by inflicting highly visible and embarrassing losses on U.S. forces.
6-11. Russian forces intend to win conflicts with massed and precision fires. Russian forces will attempt to
set the operational conditions so that deployment of U.S. forces is ultimately counter to U.S. interests. If the
U.S. does deploy forces, Russian goals are centered on creating constraints that prevent success of the United
States’ campaign. Russian methodologies focus on four key areas:
(cid:122) Disrupt or prevent understanding of the operational environment. Russian information warfare
activities manipulate the acquisition, transmission, and presentation of information in a way that
suits Russia’s preferred outcomes.
(cid:122) Target stability. Russia may foster instability in key areas and among key groups so that regional
security conditions do not support U.S. operational requirements.
(cid:122) Disaggregate partnerships. Russia acts upon U.S. allies and partners to reduce the ability of the
United States to operate in its preferred combined, joint, and interagency manner.
(cid:122) Prevent access. Russia employs pre-conflict activities to deny access to U.S. forces, using
nonlethal means initially and transitioning to lethal means if necessary. It seeks to undermine |
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relationships, raise political stakes, manipulate public opinion, and attack resolve to constrain or
deny basing rights, overflight corridors, logistics support, and concerted allied action.
6-12. As it applies instruments of national power, Russia integrates military forces and other means at
selected times and locations to achieve desired objectives as part of its overall campaign. It uses offensive
and defensive tactics and techniques that include acts of crime and terrorism. These actions can also be
employed to manipulate population perceptions and dissuade support to U.S. military forces or other
institutions. When necessary, Russia uses acts of physical violence, psychological operations, and different
means of manipulating information to gain influence and develop voluntary or coerced cooperation in a target
population. Concurrently, it uses indirect means to progressively degrade U.S. combat power and
infrastructure resources and to otherwise psychologically influence the political, social, economic, military,
and information variables of the operational environment.
6-13. Russian tactical-level units operate as combined arms forces to exploit the effects of both precision
strikes and massed fires. Against lesser opponents, Russian forces employ deep maneuver when possible to
defeat an enemy’s will to resist early in a conflict. In other cases, they mass capabilities in pursuit of more
limited objectives while fixing their adversary along a broad front. Regardless of the situation, a basic
principle of Russian military actions is to use the effects of strike actions to create the conditions for military
success.
6-14. Russia prefers to employ all available national elements of power prior to using maneuver forces, and
after force-on-force operations begin, it will continue to employ these integrated national capabilities to
support tactical maneuver. Russian forces also employ denial and deception (maskirovka) to mask the true
intent of their operation. To execute tactics, Russian units apply intelligence methods and decision making,
that are scientifically based, to—
(cid:122) Understand the conditions of an operational environment that will impact operations.
(cid:122) Determine the tactical functions required and calculate the required allocation of combat power
needed to accomplish a mission in a specific time and location.
(cid:122) Understand the psychological and cognitive issues among competing friendly forces, aggressor
forces, the local population, and other actors in an operational environment.
CHINA
6-15. China considers three aspects in the country’s view of conflict: comprehensive national power,
deception, and the Three Warfares. Comprehensive national power is made up of hard power and soft power.
Hard power includes military capability and capacity, defense industry capability, intelligence capability, and
related diplomatic actions such as threats and coercion. Soft power includes such things as economic power,
diplomatic efforts, foreign development, global image, and international prestige. China views
comprehensive national power as a vital measure of its global status. Ultimately, all forms of conflict—
military, diplomatic, or other—must enhance China’s comprehensive national power. (For more information
on China’s comprehensive national power, see ATP 7-100.3.)
6-16. Deception plays a critical role in every part of the Chinese approach to conflict. People’s Liberation
Army planners employ stratagems to achieve their deception goals. Stratagems describe the enemy’s mindset,
focusing on how to achieve the desired perceptions by the opponent, and then they prescribe ways to exploit
those perceptions.
6-17. China’s strategic approach to conflict employs Three Warfares designed to support and reinforce the
People’s Liberation Army’s traditional military operations. Though these approaches are called warfares,
they are universally nonlethal and do not involve direct combat operations. If a battle must be fought, the
Three Warfares are designed to unbalance, deceive, and coerce opponents to influence their perceptions in
ways that create advantage. The Three Warfares are—
(cid:122) Public opinion warfare.
(cid:122) Psychological warfare.
(cid:122) Legal warfare.
6-18. Public opinion warfare is China’s high-level information campaign designed to set the terms of
political discussion. China views this effort as capable of seizing the initiative in a conflict before any shots |
3-0 | 132 | Chapter 6
are fired by shaping public discourse, influencing political positions, and building international acceptance
of Chinese interests.
6-19. China’s psychological warfare is broadly similar to U.S. military information support operations in
that it is intended to influence the behavior of a given audience. Psychological warfare is the deliberate
manipulation of psychological reactions in target audiences, designed to create and reinforce attitudes and
behaviors favorable to China’s objectives and guide adversary behavior towards China’s preferred outcomes.
6-20. Legal warfare for China is the setting of legal conditions for victory—both domestically and
internationally. Legal warfare seeks to unbalance potential opponents by exploiting international or domestic
law to hinder their military operations, to create legal justification for People’s Liberation Army operations
worldwide, and to support Chinese interests through a valid legal framework. It guides how the People’s
Liberation Army trains to treat prisoners of war, detainees, and civilians, and it guides how the People’s
Liberation Army abides by international legal conventions, codes, and laws.
6-21. During armed conflict, China employs systems warfare in combination with the other threat methods,
such as preclusion, isolation, and sanctuary. China employs these threat methods throughout all domains and
at all levels of warfare. Systems warfare involves—
(cid:122) Bypassing enemy systems’ areas of strength, thus gaining a combat advantage by approaching
them asymmetrically.
(cid:122) Developing systems that excel at exploiting perceived weaknesses in enemy systems, thereby
offsetting their strengths by undermining the systems’ ability to perform assigned missions.
(cid:122) Undermining international alliances through diplomatic efforts.
(cid:122) Conducting cyberspace attacks to disable air or seaports.
(cid:122) Using special operations forces to undermine civilian morale through covert operations.
Note. China uses the term “special operations forces” to identify their special forces units per
ATP 7-100.3. Russian doctrine uses the term “special purpose forces” for their special forces units.
For brevity, this manual uses “special operations forces” to describe special forces units employed
by an adversary or enemy.
6-22. Although many actors on the world stage have embraced the concepts of systems warfare, including
Russia, China has woven the idea into every aspect of their warfighting capabilities and methods. The systems
warfare concept consists of two basic ideas: creating purpose-built operational systems that combine key
capabilities under a single command, and the use of these operational systems to asymmetrically target and
exploit vulnerable components of an opponent’s system. The People’s Liberation Army believes that by
effectively destroying, isolating, neutralizing, or offsetting key capabilities, it can degrade the enemy’s will
and ability to resist enough to achieve victory.
6-23. At the tactical level, systems warfare centers largely on targeting high-value battlefield systems such
as radars, command and communications nodes, field artillery and air defense systems, and critical logistics
support means. China relies on heavy employment of long-range fires at maximum standoff distance to target
friendly joint enablers and command and control (C2) nodes. Examples of tactical system warfare include
using heavy rocket artillery to defeat or destroy enemy radars and artillery systems, electronic warfare to
suppress or neutralize enemy command and communications networks, and deception operations to target
enemy leaders’ situational understanding.
RELATIVE ADVANTAGES DURING ARMED CONFLICT
6-24. Army leaders must anticipate enemy advantages and have a plan to overcome them. Army forces avoid
attacking directly into enemy strengths. They best overcome enemy advantages by creating their own
advantages to exploit in pursuit of assigned objectives. Army formations most effectively achieve overmatch
through the integration and synchronization of joint and multinational capabilities employed from positions
in multiple domains that create cascading dilemmas and defeat the enemy’s operational approach. |
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PHYSICAL ADVANTAGES
6-25. Friendly forces require physical advantages to defeat enemy forces and occupy land areas, exert control
over lines of communications, and protect the physical infrastructure used to attain information and human
advantages. Throughout armed conflict, leaders seek physical advantages that include—
(cid:122) Position.
(cid:122) Range.
(cid:122) Speed of movement.
(cid:122) Technologically superior capabilities.
(cid:122) Terrain and weather.
6-26. Positional advantage occurs when one force’s location facilitates its ability to exploit an enemy
weakness. For example, a force positioned to attack the flank of an enemy defense oriented in a different
direction is an advantage because it causes enemy forces to reposition and negates some of the benefits of a
prepared defense. Gaining this advantage typically requires maneuver and involves assuming risk to a
formation or in another part of the assigned area.
6-27. Friendly forces may enjoy a range advantage, particularly when employing joint capabilities. Superior
range can enable the delivery of effects for which an enemy force has no immediate answer. Range advantage
can also apply to distances friendly forces can move relative to enemy forces, particularly when friendly
forces can do so quickly.
6-28. A higher speed of movement relative to enemy forces creates an advantage when leaders exploit it to
move faster than enemy forces can effectively react or reposition. Speed of movement enables most other
physical advantages—when employed with judgment. Speed mitigates risk and affords protection when units
are closing with enemy forces while in range of enemy fires capabilities. The faster a unit closes with the
enemy, the shorter the exposure. However, focusing on speed without applying judgment can cause units to
blunder into enemy engagement areas and suffer heavy losses.
6-29. Leaders exploit technological advantages while directing course of action development and schemes
of maneuver. New technological advantages do not always have to be new pieces of equipment. Using old
technology or combining Army and joint capabilities in new and novel ways is often effective in gaining
advantages.
6-30. Terrain and weather often provide advantages, especially in terms of mobility and countermobility.
Leaders use high-speed avenues of approach to increase the speed of movement. They use severely restrictive
terrain to reduce the mobility of enemy armored formations. In the offense, leaders use terrain to conceal
their movement. In the defense, they use reverse slopes to provide cover and concealment. In the offense or
defense, rain helps infantry reduce the noise of dismounted movement through wooded areas. Limited
visibility periods help conceal battle positions and friendly movements from enemy reconnaissance efforts.
INFORMATION ADVANTAGES
6-31. Information advantages invariably overlap with and emanate from physical and human advantages. To
gain an information advantage, units first require a physical or human advantage. Army forces create and
exploit information advantages by acting through the physical and human dimensions of an operational
environment. Leaders combine information advantages with other advantages to understand the situation,
decide, and act faster than enemy forces. Examples of information advantages during armed conflict
include—
(cid:122) The ability to access enemy C2 systems to disrupt, degrade, or exploit enemy information.
(cid:122) Opportunities created by deception operations to achieve surprise and thwart enemy targeting.
(cid:122) The ability to mask electromagnetic signatures.
(cid:122) The ability to integrate and synchronize friendly forces in denied or degraded environments
through use of redundant communications.
(cid:122) The ability to rapidly share information with domestic and international audiences to counter
enemy malign narratives. |
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(cid:122) The ability to inform a wide range of audiences to maintain legitimacy and promote the friendly
narrative.
(cid:122) The ability to rapidly share and analyze information among commanders and staffs to facilitate
decisions and orders.
HUMAN ADVANTAGES
6-32. Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central to war. Army
formations are principally designed to achieve objectives through the threat or employment of lethal force,
which has a psychological effect. Understanding an enemy force’s tolerance for casualties and the political
and social will to endure them is important to understanding the level of effort required to prevail against
enemy forces in large-scale combat operations. Leaders do everything possible in the physical and
information dimensions to reduce the enemy’s will to fight. During armed conflict, human advantages
include—
(cid:122) Political and national will that supports strategic objectives.
(cid:122) Experienced, well-trained formations.
(cid:122) Leadership well versed in the mission command approach to C2.
(cid:122) Adherence to the law of war.
(cid:122) Unit cohesion and Soldiers with the mental and physical stamina for combat.
(cid:122) The trust of the host-nation population.
(cid:122) Confidence in a sustainment system that provides the best possible medical treatment and adequate
supplies.
(cid:122) Interoperability and mutual trust between allies and host-nation partners.
OPERATING AS PART OF THE JOINT FORCE
6-33. The Army always fights as part of a joint force, and usually as part of a multinational coalition during
large-scale combat operations. Because combatant commanders (CCDRs) often assign the senior Army
commander as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC), it is imperative that Army leaders from
the JFLCC to brigade level understand the integration of operations on land with those in the other domains
for the joint force.
6-34. The Army supports the joint force by providing the capabilities and capacity to apply sustained
combined arms landpower through movement, close combat, and fires at whatever scale is necessary to defeat
enemies on land. It does this by employing capabilities from the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace
domains in support of ground operations on land and employing ground-based capabilities to enable
operations in the other domains.
6-35. Army forces’ contributions to the joint force extend well beyond Army support to other Services
(ASOS) through a variety of actions. They include—
(cid:122) Establish C2 on land.
(cid:122) Counter air and missile threats that deny air and maritime freedom of action with land-based
systems.
(cid:122) Defend and control key terrain.
(cid:122) Defeat components of enemy antiaccess (A2) and area denial (AD).
(cid:122) Conduct large-scale combat operations.
(cid:122) Sustain large-scale combat operations.
(cid:122) Consolidate gains.
ESTABLISH COMMAND AND CONTROL ON LAND
6-36. Establishing C2 on land requires a land component command that assigns land areas and properly
defines command and support relationships between subordinate forces. A commander assigns land areas
and command and support relationships based on the mission and the commander’s concept of operations. A
commander also considers the level of joint support available when assigning land areas and task-organizing |
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forces. Army forces establish C2 of land areas at the direction of the joint force commander (JFC), normally
the JFLCC. A JFLCC is the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint
task force (JTF) responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of
assigned, attached, or other available land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; and
accomplishing assigned missions. C2 across the width and depth of the land component commander’s
assigned areas requires access to strategic communications. Therefore, commanders plan for the movement
and placement of strategic communications systems in C2 nodes. (See JP 3-31 and FM 3-94 for more
information on the JFLCC.)
6-37. In addition to their assigned missions, Army forces generally consider four key issues. They are the
assignment of subordinate land areas, the concept of mutual support between subordinates, the integration of
echelons in terms of time, space, and purpose, and the proper task organization of the land force.
Assigning Land Areas
6-38. The JFC typically assigns a land area of operations (AO) to the land component command. A land AO
does not typically encompass the entire land operational area of the JFC’s joint operations area (JOA), but
the size, shape, and positioning should be adequate for the JFLCC to accomplish the mission and protect the
forces under the JFLCC’s control. In the assigned land AO, the JFLCC establishes an operational framework
for the AO that assigns responsibilities to subordinate ground force commanders and allocates capabilities to
fulfill those responsibilities. Based on the situation, the land component command assigns areas (AO, zone,
or sector) to subordinate tactical echelons. Figure 6-1 on page 6-8 reflects a baseline doctrinal template for
depths and frontages by echelon. (See Chapter 2 for more information on considerations for how to assign
areas to subordinate echelons.)
Note. Political constraints, geography, ally and partner dynamics, forces available, the types of
operations being conducted, and the enemy all influence the appropriate AO size for each echelon. |
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Figure 6-1. Doctrinal template of depths and frontages |
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Applying Mutual Support
6-39. Commanders consider mutual support when task-organizing forces, assigning land areas, and
positioning units. A high degree of mutual support between units provides flexibility and options to
commanders and creates multiple dilemmas for enemy forces. When units can support each other,
commanders have more options to combine capabilities from all warfighting functions and across all
domains. Commanders and staffs assess supporting range of capabilities between units to understand their
options with respect to mutual support and reducing the vulnerability of friendly forces to defeat in detail.
Air capabilities and indirect fires have long ranges that provide options for increasing the supporting range
between units.
6-40. Supporting distance depends on the mobility of the formation, the terrain, and the enemy situation.
When units operate outside weapons ranges, they may be able to maneuver from supporting distances to
enable each other. Infantry units may be able to maneuver a short supporting distance to enable an armored
formation in severely restrictive terrain. A combat aviation brigade may be in supporting distance to aid an
infantry brigade isolated from the rest of the division. When units must operate in a widely distributed
manner, commanders and staffs position reserves so that they can maneuver in support of multiple formations
depending on the situation.
6-41. Units are not within supporting distance regardless of their proximity to each other if they cannot
communicate or are fixed by enemy forces. When units share a common operational picture (COP), relative
proximity is less important than the ability to coordinate maneuver and fires. Exploiting the advantage of
mutual support requires that units synchronize maneuver and fires more effectively than enemy forces do.
6-42. Large-scale operations involving both conventional and special operations forces require the
integration and synchronization of conventional and special operations efforts. The JTF commander must
consider the different capabilities and limitations of both conventional and special operations forces,
particularly in the areas of C2 and sustainment. Exchanging liaison elements between conventional and
special operations staffs further integrates efforts of all forces concerned. (For more information on
coordinating conventional and special operations forces, see FM 6-05.)
6-43. Commanders assign subordinate units noncontiguous areas when the situation requires, either because
the intent is to move along dispersed axes of advance or to minimize detection in locations like rear areas.
When this occurs, the higher headquarters retains responsibility for the risk associated with the unassigned
areas and mitigates that risk with capabilities it controls. As long as friendly forces have the initiative and
can force the enemy to react, large units operating in non-contiguous areas are able to protect their lines of
communication and can provide advantages at acceptable risk. However, risk to non-contiguous forces
increases quickly the longer they become static, particularly in their rear areas. Large AOs with limited
numbers of forces, and maritime environments where operations occur across groups of small islands are
conditions that require non-contiguous assigned areas.
6-44. Joint capabilities can mitigate risk when subordinate units operate in noncontiguous areas of operations
beyond supporting range or supporting distance of other ground forces. However, depending on joint
capabilities outside an Army commander’s direct control entails the risk that those capabilities may not be
available due to enemy activity, weather, or higher JFC priorities. (See Chapter 3 for more information on
mutual support. See Chapter 8 for more information on non-contiguous assigned areas in maritime
environments.)
Integrating Echelons
6-45. Describing echelon roles and responsibilities in
time, space, and purpose makes operations more cohesive Providing proper focus enables subordinate
through the depth of an operational area where enemy initiative while allowing higher headquarters
formations and irregular forces are intermingled with to employ their limited capabilities to
friendly forces. Intermingling of forces increases greatest effect.
complexity and make it difficult to retain unity of effort
between echelons. Commanders and staffs integrate the operations of all echelons to ensure that they accrue
advantages and accomplish objectives. |
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6-46. Echelons maneuver subordinate formations to defeat enemy forces. Mission success demands that
higher echelons provide support to subordinate operations. During large-scale combat operations, brigade
combat teams (BCTs) and divisions generally focus on defeating enemy maneuver formations. Corps and
higher echelons generally focus on defeating enemy integrated air defense systems and portions of the
enemy’s integrated fires command according to the JFC plan and priorities.
6-47. BCTs need the time and space to defeat lead enemy security operations and maneuver echelons.
Divisions provide time and protection for subordinate formations by disintegrating the cohesion of follow-
on forces, reserves, and short- and mid-range fires that threaten close and rear operations. Divisions maneuver
brigades in close operations against enemy maneuver forces. Divisions employ attack aviation and close air
support to enable their operations and employ rear operations to sustain tempo and operational reach.
Focusing on enemy maneuver forces does not prevent BCTs and divisions from attacking components of the
enemy’s integrated air defense or fires capabilities. Corps routinely require divisions to attack priority enemy
capabilities that are in the division’s assigned area or area of influence.
6-48. Corps maneuver divisions and set conditions by employing joint capabilities, including space and
cyberspace effects, to defeat enemy mid- and long-range fires, air and missile defense capabilities, and their
associated networks and sensors. Additionally, corps disrupt the movement of subsequent maneuver
formations. Corps ensure division rear areas do not expand beyond their capacity to control, and they continue
to expand division initial efforts to consolidate gains. The land component command provides mutual support
to other components and maintains unity of effort on land with unified action partners. Land component
command assessments ensure that tactical actions are having the desired effects in the physical, information,
and human dimensions. They ensure that command narratives match the tactical situation, and that tactical
actions reinforce command narratives. (See Figure 6-2 for a notional depiction of echelon roles and
responsibilities in terms of time, space, and purpose.)
6-49. Higher headquarters actively aid their subordinate formations in their fights, not merely attaching or
assigning them with additional capabilities. Commanders and staffs actively avoid becoming so narrowly
focused on their echelon’s roles and responsibilities that they allow their subordinate formations to fail. |
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Figure 6-2. Notional roles and responsibilities in terms of time, space, and purpose at different
echelons. |
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Task-Organizing
6-50. Commanders task organize their forces to ensure they are capable of fulfilling their roles,
responsibilities, and purpose. Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment
package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0). Considerations when
task-organizing a force include the mission, training, experience, unit capabilities, sustainability, the
operational environment, and the enemy threat. Task-organizing allocates assets to subordinate commanders
and establishes command and support relationships. Task-organizing can be continuous, as commanders
reorganize units for subsequent missions during the course of operations. The ability of Army forces to
task-organize increases agility of formations. It lets commanders configure their units to best use available
resources. It also allows Army forces to match unit capabilities to tasks. The ability of sustainment forces to
tailor and task-organize ensures commanders have freedom of action to change with mission requirements.
6-51. The task organization of a formation supports C2 and formalizes command and support relationships
between units. An effective task organization—
(cid:122) Facilitates the commander’s intent and concept of operations.
(cid:122) Ensures unity of command and synchronization of efforts through proper use of command and
support relationships.
(cid:122) Retains flexibility with the concept of operations.
(cid:122) Ensures flexibility to meet unforeseen events and support future operations.
(cid:122) Weights the main effort.
(cid:122) Exploits enemy vulnerabilities.
(cid:122) Allocates resources with minimum restrictions on their employment.
(cid:122) Adapts to conditions imposed by changing variables.
(cid:122) Maintains or creates effective combined arms teams.
(cid:122) Offsets limitations and maximizes the potential of all available forces.
(cid:122) Provides mutual support among subordinate units to the greatest extent possible.
6-52. Units organize and reorganize their forces based on the tasks their higher headquarters assign
throughout the course of an operation. Commanders ensure that each subordinate echelon has sufficient
combat power assigned, attached, or in support to accomplish its missions. The allocation of supporting joint
and Army capabilities takes into account main and supporting efforts by phase of an operation and other
factors, like where to accept risk with economy of force efforts to create opportunities elsewhere.
6-53. Task organization changes place burdens on subordinate units, no matter how agile they may be.
Before changing task organization, leaders consider less disruptive options, such as changes in support
relationships and priorities of support.
COUNTER AIR AND MISSILE THREATS
6-54. Enemy air and missile capabilities are a significant threat to Army forces. They increase risk to
formations building combat power in assembly areas, to forces transiting lines of communications, and forces
conducting rear operations. While able to attack friendly forces during offensive operations, they are
particularly dangerous to command posts and any units detected while in static positions. Defeating enemy
air and missile threats is necessary to create opportunities for offensive maneuver. However, the employment
of maneuver forces that cause forward-positioned enemy air and missile capabilities to displace can
complement counter-air operations.
6-55. Counter-air is a theater mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to establish and
maintain a desired degree of control of the air by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, both
on the ground and in the air. These operations may include the use of Army manned or unmanned aircraft
and long-range fires, maneuver forces, special operations, space operations, cyberspace operations, and
electromagnetic warfare capabilities.
6-56. Defensive counter-air operations are all defensive measures within the theater designed to neutralize
or destroy enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace. Defensive counter-air
encompasses active and passive defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of |
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hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. The goal of defensive counter-air operations,
in concert with offensive counter-air operations, is to provide an area from which forces can operate while
protected from air and missile threats. Defensive counter-air operations must be integrated and synchronized
with offensive counter-air operations and all other joint force operations. The area air defense commander,
when established by the JFC, is responsible for defensive counter-air planning and operations.
6-57. The JFC designates an area air defense command with the authority to plan, coordinate, and integrate
overall joint force defensive counter-air operations through the joint air operations center. Together they
establish an integrated air defense system. With the support of the component commanders, the area air
defense command develops, integrates, and distributes a JFC-approved joint area air defense plan.
6-58. Friendly forces conduct air and missile engagements in accordance with guidelines and rules
established by the area air defense commander, who is normally the joint force air component commander.
A joint force air component commander is from the service with the most air assets and the capability to plan,
task, and control joint air operations in an AO, typically the Air Force or Navy.
6-59. The Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) is the Army’s lead organization for Army air
and missile defense (AMD) forces in a theater. The AAMDC commander, as the theater army AMD
coordinator, assists the ARFOR commander and the area air defense commander in the planning and
coordination of the critical asset list and the creation of the defended asset list.
6-60. Army air defense artillery (ADA) forces conduct AMD operations for the joint force. Army forces may
attack to seize key terrain for the emplacement and employment of theater air and missile defense systems
by the JFC to defeat portions of the enemy air and missile capabilities. Forward deployed or early entry ADA
forces defend critical assets against air attack while the JFC builds combat power.
6-61. The critical asset list identifies the most critical assets requiring protection, and it serves as the
foundation for a defended asset list, which allocates available ADA forces. Integration with joint or
multinational AMD components in the JOA can mitigate some shortages of AMD systems. Short-range air
defense (SHORAD) provides air defense against low-altitude air threats for key joint and Army assets,
primarily amphibious landing sites, ports, airfields, command posts, and crossing sites. Integrated C2 across
all ADA echelons enables the most efficient allocation of limited SHORAD and early warning assets.
High-to-medium altitude AMD forces defend joint and Army forces against ballistic missile threats.
6-62. When planning, positioning, and determining how often ADA units are required to conduct
survivability moves, units take into account the range of enemy indirect fires and the ability of enemy forces
to identify ADA unit signatures. Maneuver units may be required to defend ADA units against ground attack.
(See JP 3-01 for more information on countering air and missile threats. See FM 3-01 for more information
about Army AMD operations.)
DEFEND AND CONTROL KEY TERRAIN
6-63. The joint force has enduring requirements that include defending allies with forward-stationed forces,
controlling strategic lines of communications to enable the deployment of combat power, and controlling the
key terrain required during joint forcible entry operations. The contributions of Army forces both protect and
enable the other members of the joint force, which in turn enable greater freedom of action and opportunities
for operations on land. (See Section II of this chapter for information on defense during large-scale combat
operations.)
Defense by Forward-Stationed Forces
6-64. Armed conflict often occurs after a long period of competition and is likely to begin with some form
of enemy aggression against a U.S. ally or partner, an attack on forward-stationed U.S. forces, or both.
Forward-stationed forces whose combat mission involves defending as part of an allied effort may be required
to conduct mobile or area defenses or retrogrades or reposition to tactical assembly areas where they can
prepare for their role in future operations. Advisor teams from the theater-aligned security force assistance
brigade (SFAB) may embed alongside threatened partners, providing real-time tactical intelligence and
access to U.S. capabilities. Commanders and staffs ensure defending forces have the appropriate priority for
Army and joint fires. Operation plans (OPLANs) and supporting subordinate plans identify main defensive |
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positions, security areas, force requirements, the locations of tactical assembly areas, and other planned
locations. Building on preparations made during competition, units occupy these positions and, when able,
they make improvements to overhead cover, concealment, communications, and fields of fire. Friendly forces
hinder enemy detection efforts by combining real preparations with preparations of fake positions. Defensive
preparations during competition, particularly the establishment of survivability positions, preserve combat
power when enemy preparatory fires commence with little or no warning.
6-65. Forward-stationed forces that have a mission to reposition at the outset of armed conflict require
familiarization and understanding of routes and future positions. They acquire this during competition. As
part of rehearsals, units exercise alert and recall procedures, load plans, ammunition draws and distributions,
tactical road marches, and passages of lines with the actual units that they would pass through. Leaders ensure
rehearsals reflect combat conditions as much as possible, and they pay attention to details such as limited
visibility movements, secure radio communications with allies, and in-transit maintenance plans.
6-66. Army forces, especially those stationed in forward locations or tasked to protect critical joint
capabilities, continuously improve the survivability of their positions. Whenever possible, leaders ensure that
key capabilities are mobile, and they take active measures to complicate their targeting during competition
and crisis by moving them irregularly, using camouflage, digging in when stationary, and maintaining
dispersion. Unit standards and discipline, inculcated and habituated with a protection mindset during training,
determine success or failure during the opening phases of a conflict.
6-67. Depending upon what a specific OPLAN says or a situation dictates, some forward-stationed forces
may reposition to tactical assembly areas to conduct specific tasks or preserve combat power. They may
conduct these operations in or out of contact, and leaders must plan and rehearse them to be successful. When
they involve rearward passage of lines through allied forces, units participate in rehearsals using the same
procedures and secure communications planned for actual execution to maintain operations security.
6-68. When bypassed by enemy maneuver forces, commanders of forward-positioned forces take the
initiative to stay in the fight. They seek to defeat elements of enemy follow-on forces. They make every
attempt to disrupt enemy sustainment and long-range fires capabilities conducting deep strikes against
friendly forces. These operations are most successful when supported by local populations. (See paragraphs
6-159 through 6-161 for more information on passages of lines. See paragraph 6-190 for more information
on retrograde operations.)
Control Strategic Lines of Communications and Key Terrain
6-69. Controlling strategic lines of communications and key terrain is essential to the joint force’s ability to
project sustain combat power. Russia and China can contest joint operations across the globe, from the
strategic support area in the continental U.S., along air, land, and maritime shipping lanes, to intermediate
staging bases, and forward to tactical assembly areas. Because strategic lines of communications usually
include key land areas, Army forces play a critical role in defending them.
6-70. Enemies integrate conventional and irregular warfare capabilities to disrupt lines of communications
from the strategic support area to the close area. Enemy air, space, cyberspace, and missile capabilities are
able to range targets anywhere in the world. Enemies can employ espionage or surrogates to attack
infrastructure and populations in the continental United States. Enemy surface and subsurface maritime
capabilities, in conjunction with unconventional approaches, will disrupt maritime lines of communications.
Enemy medium- and long-range fires will contest the ability of Army forces to move combat power into
forward tactical assembly areas.
6-71. Army forces control key staging areas such as airfields, railheads, and ports. They employ survivability
methods and techniques appropriate to the situation to harden their positions. Depending on the operational
and mission variables, these areas may be vulnerable to enemy cyberspace attacks and other methods of
information warfare, espionage, terrorist attacks, special operations forces, ballistic missile attacks, and
weapons of mass destruction.
6-72. Although the other Services are responsible to secure the air and maritime lines of communications,
Army forces may secure some land areas, especially in vicinity of airfields and ports. Aircraft and ships must
displace at irregular intervals to complicate enemy targeting, which in turn complicates planning
requirements when Army forces are required to provide protection or other forms of support. Securing key |
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terrain for use by other Services is important, even when it initially reduces combat power available for other
purposes. Enabling other Services helps ensure the flow of Army forces into theater.
6-73. During armed conflict, joint operations to enforce sanctions or conduct blockades may require Army
forces to control critical maritime choke points from land. Army capabilities, such as unmanned aircraft
systems (UASs), long-range precision fires, AMD, attack aviation, electromagnetic warfare, inform and
influence activities, security force assistance, and area security provide the joint force with options. (See
JP 3-32 for more information on sea control.)
6-74. During offensive operations, commanders economize security of rear areas and protection of lines of
communications to weight the main effort. To mitigate risk, commanders cooperate within the joint force
and with multinational and other unified action partners for support. Allies and partners, in particular, can
provide security capacity, situational awareness, and expertise in interacting with local populations, relieving
Army forces of area security operations better suited to host-nation forces.
DEFEAT COMPONENTS OF ENEMY ANTIACCESS AND AREA DENIAL
6-75. Enemy A2 and AD approaches deny friendly force protection and freedom of action. Enemies pursue
A2 and AD approaches with lethal means that significantly increase the risk to forward-stationed forces and
the ability to deploy and stage additional forces into tactical assembly areas. Understanding the structure and
function of the enemy’s integrated fires command helps friendly forces disintegrate the cohesion of enemy
A2 and AD approaches and create exploitable opportunities for the joint force to conduct offensive
operations.
Enemy Integrated Fires Command
6-76. An integrated fires command is a dedicated combination of C2 structures and organic and attached
joint fire support units. The integrated fires command exercises centralized C2 of all allocated, dedicated fire
support assets retained by its level of command. This can include aviation, artillery, naval gunfire, and
surface-to-surface missile units from different commands and services. It also exercises C2 over all
reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition assets dedicated to its support. An integrated
fires command is tasked to engage designated operational and strategic targets. Integrated fires commands
are typically associated with campaign-level headquarters. However, there are circumstances where an
integrated fires command may be formed at the theater level. For example, the theater could have two separate
campaigns, requiring a centralization of critical fire support assets at theater level to achieve the strategic or
theater campaign objectives. Enemy forces integrate air and missile defense capabilities with the integrated
fires command in different ways depending on their capabilities and the situation. Figure 6-3 on page 6-16
illustrates a notional theater-level integrated fires command. |
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Figure 6-3. Fires assets of a notional theater-level integrated fires command
6-77. The integrated fires command executes all fire support tasks for the supported command. The
integrated fires command is designed to—
(cid:122) Exploit precision and massed fires through carefully integrated ground and air fire support.
(cid:122) Minimize the amount of time from target acquisition to engagement.
6-78. An integrated fires command and its component systems have key vulnerabilities that Army forces can
target when supporting joint force operations. Like any military system, it requires sustainment capabilities
and other support that Army forces can detect and attack. It has electromagnetic signatures that enable
detection from friendly joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) from all domains. Enemy
networks depend on C2 nodes Army forces can target. Perhaps most importantly, systems within an
integrated fires command are comprised of land-based capabilities, including sensors, fires capabilities, and
C2 nodes, all of which Army forces can attack.
Defeating Antiaccess and Area Denial Approaches
6-79. Defeating enemy A2 and AD approaches requires continuous effort, best facilitated by
forward-stationed forces positioned and protected before hostilities commence. This allows air and naval
capabilities to stage closer to joint force targets, increasing the number of sorties they conduct. It allows
Army forces and the rest of the forward-postured joint force to retain the terrain and facilities necessary for |
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the introduction of additional friendly forces into theater. Preserving forward-stationed forces and retaining
critical terrain inside a theater during the opening stages of a conflict provides depth and operational reach
of the joint force.
6-80. A2 and AD are two different enemy approaches that the joint force typically expects to encounter. The
joint force often considers them as part of the same challenge because retaining or regaining access to
geographic areas requires a cohesive joint approach through all domains. Defeating A2 and AD requires a
multidomain approach that includes Army forces retaining or seizing critical terrain to establish the depth
necessary for defeating enemy forces.
6-81. Commanders defeat enemy A2 and AD approaches by employing multiple attacks through multiple
domains. Complementary and reinforcing networked A2 and AD capabilities are resilient against a single
line of attack. An enemy operating near its border is able to reconstitute forces and capabilities from homeland
sanctuaries. Maneuvering the right capabilities within range to attack critical vulnerabilities might incur too
much risk when all threat systems are operating at full capability. Therefore, leaders destroy or isolate the
most exposed parts of the enemy’s systems over time, degrading them enough to support maneuver and create
other opportunities to exploit. Destruction, isolation, and dislocation of various parts of an enemy integrated
fires complex or air defense system can all contribute to its disintegration.
6-82. The main physical components of enemy A2 and AD systems are sensors, firing platforms, networks,
C2, sustainment, and the forces securing them. Army forces attack these components as part of a joint
operation that integrates all available capabilities. The JFLCC requests joint effects to support Army forces.
The JFLCC may request space capabilities to detect enemy systems, offensive space operations for specific
effects, and offensive cyberspace operations or electromagnetic capabilities to attack an enemy’s networks
(See FM 3-12 for information on offensive cyberspace operations.)
6-83. The JFLCC is responsible for integrating joint capabilities and synchronizing their employment and
effects to achieve convergence in order to enable subordinate maneuver. Achieving convergence is a key part
of the approach to defeating enemy A2 and AD.
6-84. Army forces request space and cyberspace effects to disrupt A2 and AD C2 networks and create other
effects. Army formations synchronize cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare effects against the enemy’s
network, disrupting human and automated communications between sensors, firing units, and command
posts. When Army planners identify a requirement, they request space and cyberspace effects according to
unit procedures. They must understand the planning and preparation timelines required for the effects they
are requesting. For example, initiating cyberspace effects takes time, and it should be part of initial OPLAN
development and revisions. Many cyberspace effects can take months to generate, even though they can be
delivered rapidly once developed. This is a challenge for Army echelons whose planning horizons during
combat are measured in terms of hours and days. Therefore, it is important that Army leaders anticipate
desired cyberspace effects well in advance of when they will need to integrate them. (See FM 3-12 for more
information on requesting cyberspace effects. See FM 3-14 for more information on space operations.)
6-85. Army forces employ combinations of defeat mechanisms to attack components of an enemy’s A2 and
AD system within the overall intent of degrading and ultimately defeating its ability to function cohesively.
Subordinate echelons align their operations and objectives with conditions set by the land component
command and act rapidly to exploit them. This combination of attacks and objectives ultimately defeats the
enemy’s preferred operational approach and renders the enemy force vulnerable to follow-on operations by
the JFC. Commanders use deliberate and dynamic targeting to create opportunities to attack the enemy and
create redundancies for friendly forces. (See JP 3-60 and ATP 3-60 for more information on dynamic and
deliberate targeting processes.)
6-86. Commanders must account for the possibility that enemy forces are able to regenerate some or all of
their capabilities, in some cases by repositioning forces from elsewhere. Commanders and staffs continually
assess enemy A2 and AD systems and maintain enough combat power to defeat enemy regeneration efforts
to avoid surprise and preserve friendly freedom of action. Defeating enemy A2 and AD approaches typically
enables joint forcible entry operations and the movement of friendly forces from aerial ports of debarkation
and seaports of debarkation to their tactical assembly areas. |
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JOINT FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS
6-87. Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition or
forcing access into a denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission (JP 3-18). A
forcible entry operation may be the JFC’s opening move to seize the initiative. Forcible entry operations may
be used to conduct operational movement and maneuver to attain positional advantage or as part of a
deception.
6-88. Commanders design their forcible entry operations to seize and hold a lodgment against armed
opposition. A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when
seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space
for subsequent operations (JP 3-18). This requires friendly forces to be combat loaded and prepared for
immediate combat operations prior to their arrival on the ground in the lodgment area. A force defends the
perimeter of a lodgment until it has sufficient forces to break out and conduct offensive operations.
CONDUCT LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
6-89. During large-scale combat operations, Army forces conduct offensive, defensive, and stability
operations to defeat enemy forces. Defeat of enemy forces in close combat is normally required to achieve
campaign objectives and national strategic goals after the commencement of hostilities. Divisions and corps
are the formations central to the conduct of large-scale combat operations, as they are organized, trained, and
equipped for the deep, rear, and support operations that enable subordinate success during close combat. The
ability to prevail in ground combat is a decisive factor in breaking an enemy’s will to continue a conflict.
Conflict resolution requires the Army to conduct sustained operations with unified action partners as long as
necessary to achieve national objectives. Section II and Section III of chapter 6 describe how Army forces,
as part of a joint force, conduct defensive and offensive operations during large-scale combat.
SUSTAIN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
6-90. Large-scale combat operations require greater sustainment than other types of operations. Their high
tempo and lethality significantly increase maintenance requirements and expenditure of supplies,
ammunition, and equipment. Large-scale combat incurs the risk of mass casualties, which increase
requirements for health service support, mortuary affairs, and large-scale personnel and equipment
replacements. Large-scale combat operations demand a sustainment system to move and distribute a
tremendous volume of supplies, personnel, and equipment. (See FM 4-0 for more information on
sustainment.)
6-91. Army sustainment is a key enabler of the joint force on land. Army forces provide sustainment to other
elements in the joint force according to the direction of the JFC. The JFC has the overall responsibility for
sustainment throughout a theater, but the JFC headquarters executes many of its sustainment responsibilities
through the TSC. When directed, Army sustainment capabilities provide the bulk of Army support to other
services through executive agency, common-user logistics, lead Service, and other common sustainment
resources. (See JP 4-0 for more information on joint sustainment. See ADP 4-0 for more information on the
Army sustainment roles and responsibilities.)
6-92. Capabilities from other domains enable sustainment of Army forces. Air sustainment capabilities
provide responsive sustainment for high priority requirements. Maritime-enabled sustainment supports large-
scale requirements. Space- and cyberspace-enabled networks facilitate rapid communication of sustainment
requirements and precise distribution.
6-93. Successful sustainment operations strike a balance between protecting sustainment capabilities and
providing responsive support close to the forward line of troops. A well-planned and executed logistics
operation permits flexibility, endurance, and application of combat power. Plans must anticipate and mitigate
the risk posed by enemy forces detecting and attacking friendly sustainment capabilities. Sustainment
formations pursue operations security, survivability, and protection with the same level of commitment as all
other forces. While most rear and support operations are economy of force endeavors when allocating combat
power in divisions and corps, the continuity and survivability of those operations are vital to deep and close
operations. |
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6-94. Dispersion of assets and redundancy help protect sustainment formations. Dispersing sustainment
formations makes it less likely that enemy long-range fires can destroy large quantities of material.
Dispersion also creates flexibility, as several nodes can execute the sustainment concept without a single
point of failure. However, dispersed sustainment operations complicate C2 and can be less efficient than a
massed and centralized approach. Commanders balance the risk between dispersion and efficiency to
minimize exposure to enemy fires while maintaining the ability to enable the supported formation’s tempo,
endurance, and operational reach.
6-95. Commanders must plan for the possibility of heavy losses to personnel, supplies, and equipment. Even
with continuous and effective sustainment support, units may rapidly become combat ineffective due to
enemy action. Commanders at all levels must be prepared to conduct reconstitution efforts to return
ineffective units to a level of effectiveness that allows the reconstituted unit to perform its future mission.
Reconstitution is an operation that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of
combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources (ATP 3-94.4).
6-96. Reconstitution is a significant combined arms operation, and the actions involved in reconstitution
transcend normal day-to-day force sustainment actions. Reconstitution is a command decision, typically
made two echelons above the unit being reconstituted, and it is conducted across all warfighting functions,
using existing systems and units to accomplish. No resources exist solely to perform reconstitution.
Reconstitution requires the full support of commanders and staffs at all echelons to achieve the necessary
results commensurate with future mission success. Reconstitution efforts following a CBRN attack present
even greater challenges. If units cannot decontaminate equipment, commanders must assess the risk to the
mission and personnel in continuing operations with or without contaminated equipment. (See ATP 3-94.4
for more information on reconstitution.)
6-97. Maneuver commanders, at the combatant command, ASCC, field armies, corps, or division echelons,
direct reconstitution as an operation. Command guidance should address the timing, location, degree to which
the unit is reconstituted, and the training required before the reconstituted unit resumes operations. As a
general consideration, the more degraded or combat ineffective a unit becomes, the greater the sustainment
effort and amount of individual and collective training the unit will require to return it to combat
effectiveness. (See FM 4-0 for more information on supplying reconstitution.)
CONSOLIDATE GAINS DURING ARMED CONFLICT
6-98. Army forces consolidate gains for the joint force by making temporary advantages more enduring.
Consolidating gains is not a phase, but rather an imperative that achieves the ultimate purpose of campaigns
and operations. Army forces consolidate gains continuously during the conduct of operations, with varying
emphasis by each echelon over time. Consolidating gains initially focuses on the exploitation of tactical
success to ensure enemy forces cannot reconstitute any form of resistance in areas where they were initially
defeated. A small unit consolidating on an objective and preparing for enemy counterattacks can be the first
part of a larger effort to consolidate gains.
6-99. Unity of purpose for consolidating gains starts at the theater strategic level, where leaders plan and
coordinate the resources necessary to achieve the JFC’s desired end state. They provide subordinate echelons
a shared visualization of the security conditions necessary for the desired political or strategic end state.
Achieving the desired end state generally requires a whole-of-government effort with unified action partners
within and outside of the theater of operations. At the operational and tactical levels, land component
commands and corps exploit division tactical success by maintaining contact with enemy remnants, bypassed
forces, and the capabilities that enemy forces could militarize to protract the conflict. Friendly forces employ
lethal and nonlethal capabilities to defeat remaining enemy forces in detail. Commanders direct information
activities to reduce the will of those forces to resist and the local population to support them.
6-100. Conducting detainee operations plays a significant role in consolidating gains. Failure to secure
defeated enemy forces quickly gives them the opportunity to break contact, recover the will to fight, and then
reorganize resistance with whatever means remaining available to them. Capture of defeated enemy units and
individuals separated or disorganized by friendly action is therefore critical. Large numbers of detainees may
place a tremendous burden on operational forces as tactical forces divert combat power to process and secure
them. Additionally, friendly forces must account for the detention of irregular forces and criminal actors that |
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take advantage of a lack of civil security and civil control. Leaders assess the threat posed by irregular forces
and criminal actors to determine whether or not these groups warrant detention by friendly forces. (See
FM 3-63 for more information on detainee operations.)
6-101. Army forces must deliberately plan and prepare for consolidating gains because it is resource
intensive and requires significant coordination with unified action partners. Planning for consolidating gains
includes an assessment of operational risk, available combat power, changes to task organization, and
additional assets required to achieve the desired end state. Assets might include—
(cid:122) Additional forces to provide area security tasks.
(cid:122) Host-nation, partner, and allied security forces.
(cid:122) ISR assets.
(cid:122) Engineers.
(cid:122) Military police.
(cid:122) Explosive ordnance disposal units.
(cid:122) Medical units.
(cid:122) Logistics units.
(cid:122) Civil affairs units.
(cid:122) Psychological operations units.
(cid:122) CBRN units.
6-102. Operations to consolidate gains can take many forms. These operations can include—
(cid:122) Offensive operations. Forces conduct offensive operations to complete the defeat of fixed or
bypassed enemy forces.
(cid:122) Area security. Forces conduct security tasks to defeat enemy remnants, proxy or insurgent forces,
and terrorists; control populations and key terrain; and secure routes, critical infrastructure,
populations, and activities within an assigned area.
(cid:122) Stability operations. Forces execute minimum-essential stability operations tasks and ensure the
provision of essential governmental services (in support of host nation or in place of the host
nation), emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. These may include
military governance.
(cid:122) Influence local and regional audiences. Commanders communicate credible messaging to specific
audiences to prevent interference and generate support for operations or the host nation.
(cid:122) Defensive operations. Establish security from external threats. Commanders ensure sufficient
combat power is employed to prevent physical disruption from threats across the various domains
seeking to reverse or subvert the military gains made by friendly forces.
(cid:122) Detainee operations. Commanders and staffs must consider detainee operations prior to a conflict,
during, and after large-scale combat operations have ceased. Detainee operations have long-lasting
operational and strategic impacts.
6-103. Determining when and how to consolidate gains at the operational level and applying the necessary
resources at the tactical level requires clear understanding about where to accept risk during an operation.
Failure to consolidate gains generally leads to failure in achieving the desired end state, since it represents a
failure to follow through on initial tactical successes and cedes the initiative to determined enemies seeking
to prolong a conflict. Security is necessary for transition of responsibility to a legitimate governing authority
and the successful completion of combat operations. Army forces integrate the capabilities of all unified
action partners and synchronize their employment as they consolidate gains.
6-104. Although operations to consolidate gains may at times be economy of force efforts, they are critical
to the long-term success of the joint force’s operation. Enemy forces will continue to challenge Army gains
even after their forces are defeated to gain time for a favorable political settlement, set conditions for a
protracted resistance, and alter the nature of the conflict to gain relative advantages. Enemy forces will
execute information warfare, exploit cultural seams, challenge security, encourage competition for resources,
promote conflicting narratives, support religious divides, and create alternatives to legitimate authority. As
long as enemy forces have a will to resist, they will continue to attempt to undermine friendly gains. |
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6-105. Consolidating gains requires a significant commitment of combat power in addition to the combat
power being employed to maintain tempo and pressure on enemy main body forces. When available, Army
forces rely on host-nation forces better suited for operations that involve close interaction with local
populations. When a host nation or an ally is unable to provide support, Army forces are responsible for
consolidating gains. During large-scale combat operations, corps should plan for a division and a division
should plan for a BCT to conduct operations with the purpose of consolidating gains.
APPLYING DEFEAT MECHANISMS
6-106. As described in Chapter 2, defeat mechanisms are broad means by which commanders visualize and
describe how they plan to defeat enemy forces. Defeat mechanisms have interactive and dynamic
relationships constrained only by the resources available and imagination. Defeat mechanisms are most
useful for commanders at the division-level and above to develop operational and strategic approaches to
defeat enemy forces. For commanders at the brigade combat team-level and below, the defeat mechanisms
may offer limited utility. Defeat mechanisms are not tactical tasks, and commanders at the lower tactical
echelons do not develop or employ defeat or stability mechanisms.
6-107. Once developed, defeat mechanisms help commanders and staffs determine tactical options for
defeating enemy forces in detail. Commanders translate defeat mechanisms into tactics and describe them in
the concept of operations. Commanders use tactics to apply friendly capabilities against enemy forces in the
most advantageous ways from as many domains as possible. Understanding how tactics support each of the
defeat mechanisms improves tactical judgment. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on tactics.)
DESTROY
6-108. Destruction and the threat of destruction lies at the core of all the defeat mechanisms and makes
them compelling in a specific context. It is the defeat mechanism with the most enduring effect. A commander
can achieve the destruction of smaller units with massed fires. However, destruction is the most
resource-intensive outcome to achieve on a large scale. Commanders use destruction as a defeat mechanism
when—
(cid:122) Enemy forces are not vulnerable to other means.
(cid:122) The tactical situation requires the use of overwhelming combat power.
(cid:122) The risk of loss is acceptable.
(cid:122) It is necessary to set conditions for other defeat mechanisms.
6-109. The physical effects of destruction have significant implications in the information and human
dimensions. The destruction of enemy capabilities sends the message that enemy forces may be overmatched,
and defeat is imminent. Casualties and the loss of life have negative psychological impacts that can either
embolden or degrade enemy morale and will to fight. Typically, significant death and destruction degrade
enemy morale and will. The joint force can sometimes achieve similar results with modest and precise
applications of combat power. However, modest applications of combat power may prolong the joint force’s
ability to achieve a decisive outcome. Excessive destruction of infrastructure can create a humanitarian crisis
and create civilian casualties or suffering that undermines domestic and international support for military
operations, so commanders must exercise judgment appropriate to each operational context. For moral, legal,
and pragmatic reasons, commanders should take precautions to avoid death and destruction unnecessary for
operational success, and they must always comply with the law of armed conflict.
6-110. At the operational level, physical destruction is rarely feasible or acceptable as the overarching
defeat mechanism. Operational-level commanders choose elements of enemy forces that must be destroyed
to enable the other defeat mechanisms. They synchronize Army, joint, and unified action partner capabilities
to destroy critical components of enemy warfighting systems, such as sensors, long-range fires capabilities,
C2 nodes, supply depots, and critical infrastructure.
6-111. At the tactical level, the lower the echelon the more central destruction is to its operation. Corps and
divisions destroy enemy formations and critical capabilities to enable tactical success. They destroy enemy
surveillance, reconnaissance, C2, fires, maneuver, protection, and sustainment capabilities. They destroy
these capabilities to limit the effectiveness of enemy offensive or defensive schemes and preserve friendly |
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combat power. At brigade echelons and below, units close with and destroy weapon systems, combat
platforms, and personnel to render enemy forces incapable of resistance.
DISLOCATE
6-112. Dislocate as a defeat mechanism renders an enemy’s position ineffective and, ideally, irrelevant.
Dislocation can enable surprise. It forces enemy forces to react to the unexpected, and it imposes new
dilemmas on enemy decision makers. If the dislocation that occurs is great enough, enemy forces may
reconsider their risk assessment and conclude that they must surrender or reposition because their position
no longer offers a reasonable expectation of success. More commonly, dislocation will force an enemy to
make major changes to its dispositions and give up considerable ground.
6-113. The challenge of dislocation is that enemy leaders likely understand the value of the position desired
by the friendly force, and they have made efforts to protect it. Therefore, to maneuver forces into positions
that are so advantageous they render the enemy dispositions ineffective, commanders must often make use
of deception and assume considerable risk.
6-114. Dislocation extends into the human and information dimensions. Combinations of physical
maneuver and information activities can undermine the confidence of decision makers and their forces.
Deception operations that enable surprise can present enemy forces with dilemmas they did not expect, and
they may incite them to question other assumptions they made about friendly courses of action. For example,
an enemy force preparing a defense that believes terrain and weather will protect its flank is surprised when
friendly forces maneuver there during an attack. Not only is the geographic position and orientation of the
enemy defense rendered ineffective, but so too is the confidence of the force. The force may begin to question
its leadership while it adjusts its dispositions under the pressures of time and friendly contact.
6-115. At the operational level, commanders dislocate the enemy by posturing friendly forces in multiple
assembly areas that do not make any single course of action obvious, and then they threaten maneuver along
multiple axes of advance that exceed the enemy force’s ability to mass effects. While dislocation alone is
unlikely to cause enemy forces to lose the will to fight, it creates favorable conditions for the combination of
other defeat mechanisms. It can overwhelm enemy networked air defense and integrated fires systems, and
it can enable a tempo of offensive operations from which enemy defenses cannot recover.
6-116. At the tactical level, vertical and horizontal envelopments and turning movements are common
forms of maneuver that can precipitate dislocation. While these tactics can create rapid success, they may
come with significant risk to rear areas and flanks, operational reach, and maintaining the momentum
required to achieve objectives in accordance with a specific timeline. These tactics are most often successful
against enemy units operating at or beyond the limit of their supporting capabilities, adjacent units, or
reserves. Essentially, the friendly force assesses that it can achieve an advantageous position and exploit it
faster than supporting enemy forces can react. The defeat of North Korean forces in 1950 illustrates the
relationship between the defeat mechanisms of destroy and dislocate. |
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Defeat of the North Korean People’s Army, September 1950
In early August 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) advance had driven
U.S. and Republic of Korea forces back into the southeastern portion of the Korean
peninsula and threatened to push them into the sea. To stop the advance of the NKPA,
U.S. and Republic of Korea forces held a defensive perimeter, approximately 140 miles
wide, along the Naktong and Nam Rivers. Over the next few weeks, NKPA and friendly
forces engaged in heavy fighting with attacks and counterattacks occurring along the
entire perimeter, as the NKPA attempted to break through the defensive line.
Throughout this period of the war, the NKPA held the initiative against U.S. and
Republic of Korea forces, but by mid-September the initiative shifted to friendly forces.
On 15 September, while United Nations and NKPA forces were decisively engaged in
the south, the U.S. X Corps conducted a two-division amphibious landing at Inchon,
on the west coast of Korea, north of Seoul. This operational-level turning movement,
code-named OPERATION CHROMITE, occurred 150 miles behind enemy lines and
caught the NKPA completely by surprise. In the following days, X Corps captured the
Seoul-Suwon area and severed NKPA lines of communications.
In conjunction with the amphibious landing, the U.S. Eighth Army launched a major
counteroffensive against the twelve NKPA divisions opposing it in the south. With the
support of United Nations’ air power, the Eighth Army penetrated the enemy’s forward
defenses at multiple places and advanced northwest to link up with the X Corps. The
combined actions by X Corps and Eighth Army left an estimated force of eight NKPA
divisions isolated in southwestern Korea. Outflanked, unable to resupply or reinforce,
and facing strong pressure in its close and rear areas, the NKPA began to collapse.
Some NKPA units and individuals began to retreat, and their initial retreat quickly
turned into a rout. Those NKPA units unable to retreat were destroyed or captured by
friendly forces. By the end of September, the NKPA ceased to exist as an organized
fighting force in South Korea.
ISOLATE
6-117. Isolating an enemy force separates it from its physical, information, or human sources of support. It
involves denying the enemy force access to resupply of personnel and equipment, access to intelligence, and
shared understanding with adjacent units and higher echelon headquarters. Isolation denies enemy ground
forces access to capabilities from other domains, forcing them to operate only in a limited area of the land
domain with the resources they have on hand.
6-118. At the operational level, it is difficult to achieve complete isolation of an enemy force not already
physically separated from the enemy main body. Even limited access to air, ground, and maritime lines of
communications can sustain a prepared and determined enemy force for long periods. However,
operational-level commands can employ capabilities to temporarily isolate units or critical capabilities from
the rest of an enemy formation in one or more domains. This enables defeat of the enemy in detail, or it sets
conditions for operations in other domains. Operational headquarters conduct activities that physically and
psychologically isolate enemy leaders from their formations and other sources of support. This may include
disrupting communications networks or access to space and cyberspace capabilities for a specific enemy
echelon or conducting influence activities to lessen local support for national objectives. When an enemy
force includes elements from different nations, it is possible to isolate one or more of them physically or by
informational means. Exploiting differences in national aims or cultural divisions degrades the enemy’s
overall effectiveness.
6-119. At the tactical level, physically blocking lines of communications, controlling key terrain, fixing
supporting units, and encircling an enemy force are tactics that support the achievement of isolation. |
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Electromagnetic attack capabilities help tactical leaders deny enemy forces access to reliable
communications, and they can play a major role in creating psychological isolation. Destroying enemy
command posts at one echelon can isolate that echelon’s subordinate formations from the next higher
echelon, temporarily causing significant disruption to coherent C2.
6-120. While isolation on its own may not cause defeat, it increases the vulnerability of enemy forces to
destruction, dislocation, and disintegration. It can also reduce the will to fight and increase the probability of
uninformed decision making, which then amplifies the effects of the other defeat mechanisms.
DISINTEGRATE
6-121. To disintegrate is to attack the cohesion of the whole and involves preventing components of an
enemy formation or capability from fulfilling their role as part of the overall effort. Disintegration causes the
formation or capability to function less effectively, creating vulnerabilities that the friendly force can exploit.
Disintegration is most effective when created by a combination of the other three defeat mechanisms, and it
includes both physical and cognitive effects on enemy forces. Disintegration is typically temporary and
causes enemy forces to adapt. Creating more lasting effects requires forces that are ready to exploit the
opportunity provided by disintegration. Commanders ensure they have sufficient combat power for
exploitation, and they synchronize their exploitation efforts with the temporal effects of disintegration.
6-122. Disintegration sets conditions for achieving operational level objectives. Destruction, isolation, and
dislocation all focus on relatively limited parts of a larger enemy force in specific geographic areas, whereas
the effects of disintegration can have repercussions throughout the depth and breadth of the enemy’s
echelons. Effective disintegration can cause collapse of coherent organized resistance for operationally
significant periods.
6-123. To disintegrate an enemy formation or capability, commanders need only to disrupt or
desynchronize enemy forces to the degree required for achieving the desired end state. In this sense,
disintegration provides a measure of economy the other defeat mechanisms do not. Commanders do not need
to create decisive effects at a single point in space, time, or domain. Even modest impacts on a combination
of objectives across multiple domains can produce the necessary effects over time.
Operational-Level Disintegration
6-124. Operational-level echelons disintegrate large enemy formations and their capabilities by attacking
their individual components. Attacking operational-level C2 infrastructure impacts all enemy functions, and
it is the most direct way to cause disintegration. Degrading enemy communications using a combination of
lethal fires, electromagnetic attack, and joint-enabled offensive cyberspace operations disrupts an enemy
force’s ability to synchronize operations. Deception compounds and accelerates the effects the other defeat
mechanisms contribute towards disintegration.
6-125. Army forces disintegrate the components of integrated air defenses, long-range fires systems, and
C2 networks to enable friendly freedom of action. The requirement to disintegrate these systems does not
end with forcible entry operations or the start of offensive operations. Because these systems are resilient,
disintegrating them relies on assessing them throughout the duration of a campaign.
6-126. Enemy systems that enable A2 and AD approaches have vulnerabilities that include sensors,
communications links to firing platforms, and dependencies on space-based global navigation satellite
systems and the electromagnetic spectrum. The data and processors that facilitate detection and fire mission
transmission can be an exploitable vulnerability. Commanders can employ joint fires capabilities to destroy
enemy long-range surface-to-surface and surface-to-air systems, which are difficult to replace. Friendly
forces that have penetrated enemy defensive echelons can further disintegrate enemy integrated fires systems
with direct fire or the threat of being overrun. While enemy forces reposition, their effectiveness is degraded.
6-127. Army forces can disintegrate enemy maneuver formations by converging joint capabilities in ways
that interdict main supply routes, mobility corridors, and transportation infrastructure such as bridges, rail
heads, airfields, ferries, and tunnels. These actions affect enemy repositioning and rapid reaction to friendly
operations. Commanders can focus on the destruction of the best-trained and equipped enemy forces in a
particular formation, which may disrupt the cohesion of the larger formation and lower its morale. |
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6-128. Enemy operations depend on sustainment systems in the same way friendly operations do.
Destroying or disrupting supply depots, logistics convoys, fuel facilities, and sustainment units can render
the enemy formations they sustain incapable of achieving their intended objectives. Even limited attacks on
enemy sustainment capabilities can delay their operations, degrade their combat power, and make them
vulnerable to early culmination.
Tactical-Level Disintegration
6-129. Senior tactical echelons disintegrate enemy forces by attacking vulnerabilities that make them less
able to employ a combined-arms approach to operations. Disrupting enemy communications with
electromagnetic attacks or physical attacks against C2 nodes are means of doing this. Commanders use
deception to create uncertainty and slow enemy decisions. They conduct reconnaissance and security
operations and maintain operations security to prevent enemy forces from developing an accurate picture of
friendly dispositions and courses of action.
6-130. Army forces employ forms of maneuver that avoid the enemy force’s main effort and enable friendly
forces to decisively engage enemy forces without becoming fixed targets for long-range fires. Seeking or
creating assailable flanks creates opportunities for exploitation in depth, forcing enemy forces to fight from
unfavorable terrain or in directions they did not anticipate. Penetrations, envelopments, and turning
movements are forms of maneuver well suited for doing this. Because enemy forces can anticipate the most
favorable friendly forms of maneuver, their preparations focus on denying them. Therefore, friendly courses
of action require sufficient combat power employed with a combination of stealth, speed, deception, and risk
acceptance to be successful.
6-131. Disrupt, degrade, neutralize, reduce, isolate, delay, suppress, deny, fix, bypass, and deceive are
examples of common tasks and effects that leaders combine to disintegrate enemy tactical echelons. Leaders
use these tasks to limit enemy freedom of maneuver, impose friction on enemy operations, and disrupt enemy
synchronization.
6-132. A combined-arms approach helps retain sufficient combat power and the mobility necessary to
exploit the opportunities disintegration provides. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War illustrates the importance of a
combined-arms approach to achieving disintegration. |
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Disintegration of Egyptian Defense: 1973 Arab-Israeli War
After the destruction of its air force and defeat of its ground forces by Israel in the 1967
Six Day War, Egypt reorganized its armed forces in preparation for what it saw as the
inevitable next conflict. With help from the Soviet Union, it acquired a modern
integrated air defense system and anti-tank guided missile systems to counter the
Israeli air and armor forces that had been a large factor in its defeats in three previous
wars. These new capabilities gave the Egyptian army the opportunity to surprise the
potent Israeli Defense Forces air-ground team, which it exploited in 1973.
In a well-planned and rehearsed operation, Egyptian forces rapidly assaulted across
the Suez Canal, penetrated Israeli Defense Force defensive positions, and established
a deliberate defense after a short advance. The Israeli counterattack with aircraft and
an armored brigade was defeated with heavy losses from surface-to-air missiles and
anti-tank guided missile systems, respectively. The losses were a shock to the
previously undefeated Israeli air and armor forces, which needed to quickly
reconstitute and adapt to a very different operational environment than 1967. The
Israeli Army recognized that a mounted, tank-only approach was not going to defeat
well-trained infantry with modern long-range anti-tank missiles. Only a combined arms
approach to close combat would be effective, so it quickly task-organized infantry units
into the armored brigades.
Once the task-organized brigades penetrated Egyptian first echelon defenses and
cleared key objectives, the Israeli Army was able to disrupt and ultimately defeat the
integrated air defense system by destroying vulnerable launchers and radars with
direct fire. The Israeli action forced the remaining integrated air defense systems to
displace further into Egypt. With the integrated air defense system effectively defeated,
the Israeli air force maneuvered unimpeded in support of its ground forces and
contributed to the complete tactical defeat of the Egyptian army.
The success of the Israeli Defense Force combined approach to operations later in the
war sharply contrasts with the failure of its hasty and unbalanced initial counterattack.
The Israeli Defense Force’s success is also an example of how ground forces enabled
operations in the air domain, which in turn were able to enable the ground forces.
Lastly, the Israeli Defense Force operational approach took advantage of the
integrated air defense system’s critical vulnerabilities, which included dependence
upon relatively fixed positions. Disintegration of the integrated air defense system did
not occur until the Israeli Defense Force was able to create and then exploit
opportunities on the ground through hard fought close combat.
ENABLING OPERATIONS
6-133. Enabling operations set friendly conditions required for most operations. Commanders direct
enabling operations to support the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability operations and defense
support to civil authorities tasks. The execution of enabling operations alone does not directly accomplish
the commander’s end state, but enabling operations must occur to complete the mission. Examples of
enabling operations are—
(cid:122) Reconnaissance.
(cid:122) Security.
(cid:122) Troop movement.
(cid:122) Relief in place.
(cid:122) Passage of lines. |
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(cid:122) Countermobility.
(cid:122) Mobility.
RECONNAISSANCE
6-134. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,
information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance
occurs continuously in all domains. Reconnaissance identifies terrain characteristics, obstacles to mobility,
the disposition of enemy forces, and the relevant characteristics of the civilian population. It facilitates
mobility and prevents surprise. Reconnaissance prior to unit movements and occupation of assembly areas is
critical to protecting friendly forces and preserving combat power. Units perform reconnaissance to make
contact with enemy forces on favorable terms. Leaders at every echelon emphasize the importance of
reporting and rapidly updating digital and analog systems. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on
reconnaissance.)
6-135. There are seven fundamentals of successful reconnaissance operations. They are—
(cid:122) Ensure continuous reconnaissance.
(cid:122) Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.
(cid:122) Orient on reconnaissance objectives.
(cid:122) Report all required information rapidly and accurately.
(cid:122) Retain freedom of maneuver.
(cid:122) Gain and maintain enemy contact.
(cid:122) Develop the situation rapidly.
6-136. There are five types of reconnaissance operations. They are—
(cid:122) Zone reconnaissance.
(cid:122) Area reconnaissance.
(cid:122) Route reconnaissance.
(cid:122) Reconnaissance in force.
(cid:122) Special reconnaissance.
6-137. Zone reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain
detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries
(ADP 3-90). Commanders assign a zone reconnaissance when they need additional information on a zone
before committing other forces.
6-138. Area reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed
information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (ADP 3-90). This area may consist
of a single location, such as a town, a ridgeline, a forest, an airhead, a bridge, an installation, or any other
critical operational feature such as obstacles. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on area reconnaissance.)
6-139. Route reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a
specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (ADP 3-90).
The route may be a road, highway, trail, mobility corridor, avenue of approach, or axis of advance. The
reconnaissance effort provides new or updated information on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge
classifications, and enemy, adversary, and civilian activity along the route. (See ATP 3-34.81 for more
information on route reconnaissance, route classification, and the classification of features along routes.)
6-140. A reconnaissance in force is a type of reconnaissance operation designed to discover or test the
enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information (ADP 3-90). Battalion-sized task
forces or larger organizations usually conduct a reconnaissance in force. Commanders assign this operation
when an enemy force is operating within an area, and they cannot obtain adequate information about the
enemy force by other means.
6-141. Special reconnaissance is reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation
in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information |
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of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional
forces (JP 3-05). Special reconnaissance provides an additional capability for commanders and supplements
other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions.
6-142. During the conduct of any variation of reconnaissance, the commander may require information
about a specific aspect of the area of operations (AO). To obtain this information the commander may direct
a specific focus task which typically requires the use of an organization uniquely trained and equipped for
the mission. Focus tasks include electromagnetic, engineer, CBRN, and civil reconnaissance.
6-143. Electromagnetic reconnaissance is the detection, location, identification, and evaluation of foreign
electromagnetic radiations (energy) (JP 3-85). Electromagnetic reconnaissance supports information
collection at brigade and higher echelons using assigned electromagnetic warfare personnel and capabilities.
Information obtained through electromagnetic reconnaissance assists the commander with situational
understanding and can support signals intelligence activities. Electromagnetic reconnaissance may result in
electromagnetic protection modifications or lead to an electromagnetic attack against enemy capabilities.
(For more information on electromagnetic reconnaissance see FM 3-12.)
6-144. Engineer reconnaissance obtains information about the infrastructure, terrain, or threat. This may
include data on obstacles, gap crossing sites, airfields, bridges, tunnels, roads, and trails. Engineer units do
not have designated reconnaissance teams. Engineer reconnaissance is directed and task-organized based on
mission requirements using assets that would otherwise support other engineer missions. (For more on
engineer reconnaissance see ATP 3-34.81.)
6-145. CBRN reconnaissance includes missions to obtain information on suspected or confirmed chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear threats and hazards in an assigned area. CBRN reconnaissance identifies
indicators of enemy CBRN production or employment and indicators related to civilian or industrial facilities
that could be weaponized or produce hazards when damaged or destroyed. (For more on CBRN
reconnaissance see ATP 3-11.37.)
6-146. Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific
civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events
(JP 3 57). Civil reconnaissance verifies or refutes civil information, supports operational environment
assessments, and detects and monitors changes in the civil component. It is conducted over time through
routine engagement and patterned civil observance using active and passive sensors, virtual sensors, and
other means. (For more information on civil reconnaissance see FM 3-57.)
SECURITY OPERATIONS
6-147. Units may perform security tasks to the front, flanks, or rear of their main body, and they must be
aware of enemy threats in all domains relevant to their assigned area. The main difference between the
performance of security and reconnaissance tasks is that security tasks orient on the force, area, or facility
being secured, while reconnaissance tasks orient on enemy forces and terrain. Security tasks are supporting
efforts. The ultimate goal of security operations is to protect main body forces from surprise and deny enemy
freedom of action to collect on friendly forces. The protected force may not always be a military force; it can
also be the civilian population, civil institutions, and civilian infrastructure in the unit’s assigned area.
6-148. There are a number of general considerations when performing security operations. These apply to
all security tasks, but they are most applicable to the performance of screen, guard, and cover tasks. The
screen, guard, and cover tasks share many common control measures, starting with boundaries defining the
security area. The main body unit establishes the security area. For a security force operating to the front of
the main body, the lateral boundaries of the security area are normally an extension of the lateral boundaries
of the main body. The security force’s rear boundary is normally the battle handover line. (See ADP 3-90 for
additional information on common security control measures for security operations.)
6-149. Security operations are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate
warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within
which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their
protected forces (ADP 3-90). The four types of security operations are area security, cover, guard, and screen. |
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6-150. Area security is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of
communications, and activities within a specific area (ADP 3-90). The security force may be protecting the
civilian population, civil institutions, and civilian infrastructure with a unit’s assigned area.
6-151. Cover is a type of security operation done independent of the main body to protect them by fighting
to gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADP 3-90).
A force tasked to cover may do so offensively or defensively.
6-152. Guard is a type of security operation done to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while
preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADP 3-90). Units performing
a guard cannot operate independently. They rely on fires and functional and multifunctional support assets
of the main body. A force tasked to guard may do so offensively and defensively.
6-153. Screen is a type of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force
(ADP 3-90). Screens provide less protection than guards or covers. Screen missions are defensive in nature
and accomplished by establishing a series of observation posts and patrols to ensure observation of the
assigned area. The screen force gains and maintains enemy contact consistent with the operation order and
destroys or repels enemy reconnaissance units by conducting counter-reconnaissance.
6-154. The screen, guard, and cover security operations provide increasing levels of combat power and
increasing levels of security for the main body. Area security preserves freedom to move reserves, position
fire support means, protect C2 systems, and conduct sustainment operations. Commanders balance the
combat power employed for security against the requirements of the main and supporting efforts.
6-155. All maneuver forces are capable of conducting security operations. All Army BCTs conduct security
operations as part of their mission-essential task list, while maneuver enhancement brigades, when properly
task-organized, support theater army, corps, and divisions by conducting screens and area security throughout
its assigned area of operations. Habitual support relationships with attachments and established standard
operating procedures facilitate unity of effort and efficiency during security operations spanning multiple
echelons of divisions and corps.
6-156. Successful security operations in any domain depend on properly applying five fundamentals. These
fundamentals are—
(cid:122) Provide early and accurate warning.
(cid:122) Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
(cid:122) Orient on the protected force, area, or facility.
(cid:122) Perform continuous reconnaissance.
(cid:122) Maintain enemy contact.
(See ADP 3-90 for additional information on the conduct of security operations.)
TROOP MOVEMENT
6-157. Troop movement is the movement of Soldiers and units from one place to another by any available
means (ADP 3-90). Units perform troop movements using different methods, such as dismounted foot
marches, mounted marches using tactical vehicles, or air, rail, and water means in various combinations. The
method employed depends on the situation, the size and composition of the moving unit, the distance the unit
must cover, the urgency of execution, and the condition of the troops. It also depends on the availability,
suitability, and capacity of the different means of transportation. Troop movements over extended distances
have extensive sustainment considerations.
RELIEF IN PLACE
6-158. A relief in place is an operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is
replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and
the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3). Units have three techniques
for conducting a relief: sequentially, simultaneously, or staggered. A sequential relief occurs when each
element in the relieved unit is relieved in succession, from right to left, left to right, front to rear, or rear to
front. A simultaneous relief occurs when all elements are relieved at the same time. A staggered relief occurs |
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when each element is relieved in a sequence determined by the tactical situation, not its geographical
orientation. Simultaneous relief takes the least time to execute but is more easily detected by enemy forces.
Sequential or staggered reliefs can occur over a significant amount of time. These three relief techniques can
occur regardless of the operational theme in which the unit is participating. (See ADP 3-90 for more
information about relief in place.)
PASSAGE OF LINES
6-159. A passage of lines is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another
force’s combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (JP 3-18). There
are two types: a forward passage of lines and a rearward passage of lines. A forward passage of lines occurs
when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving toward the enemy (ADP 3-90). A rearward
passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving away from the
enemy (ADP 3-90).
6-160. Units perform a passage of lines to continue their attacks or perform counterattack, retrograde, and
security tasks that involve advancing or withdrawing through other units’ positions. A passage of lines
potentially involves close combat. It involves transferring the responsibility for an AO between two units.
That transfer of authority usually occurs when roughly two thirds of the passing force have moved through
one or more passage points. The headquarters directing the passage of lines is responsible for determining
when the passage of lines starts and ends. If not directed by higher authority, the stationary unit commander
and the passing unit commanders determine—by mutual agreement—the time to pass responsibility for an
area. They disseminate this information to the lowest levels of both organizations.
6-161. Units have several reasons for conducting a passage of lines. These reasons include to—
(cid:122) Sustain offensive tempo and avoid culmination.
(cid:122) Maintain the viability of the defense by transferring responsibility from one unit to another.
(cid:122) Transition from the performance of delay or security tasks by one force to a defending unit.
(cid:122) Relieve a unit for another mission or task.
(See ADP 3-90 for more information on passage of lines.)
COUNTERMOBILITY OPERATIONS
6-162. Countermobility is a set of combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural and
man-made obstacles to prevent the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver (ATP 3-90.8). The primary
purposes of countermobility are to shape enemy movement and maneuver and to prevent the enemy from
gaining a position of advantage. Countermobility is conducted to support forces operating along the range of
military operations. Countermobility directly supports offensive and defensive operations.
6-163. In support of offensive operations, countermobility activities isolate objectives and prevent enemy
forces from repositioning, reinforcing, and counterattacking. They enable flank protection as operations
progress into the depth of enemy defenses or as an integrated economy-of-force effort to provide general
flank security. In support of defensive operations, countermobility activities disrupt enemy attack formations
and assist friendly forces in defeating the enemy in detail, to channel attacking enemy forces into an
engagement area or areas throughout the depth of the defense, and to protect the flanks of friendly
counterattack forces.
6-164. The conduct of countermobility activities typically requires engineers and includes proper obstacle
integration with the maneuver plan, adherence to obstacle emplacement authority, and positive obstacle
control. Combined arms obstacle integration synchronizes countermobility into the concept of operations.
Because most obstacles have the potential to prevent the freedom of movement and maneuver to both friendly
and enemy forces, it is critical that commanders weigh the risks and evaluate the trade-offs of employing
different types of obstacles. Countermobility activities include—
(cid:122) Siting obstacles.
(cid:122) Constructing, emplacing, or detonating obstacles.
(cid:122) Marking, reporting, and recording obstacles.
(cid:122) Maintaining obstacle integration. |
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(See ATP 3-90.8 for more information on countermobility.)
MOBILITY OPERATIONS
6-165. Freedom to move and maneuver within an operational area is essential to applying combat power.
Most operational environments and enemy forces present numerous challenges to movement and maneuver.
Leaders overcome these challenges through the integration of combined arms mobility.
6-166. Mobility tasks are those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of obstacles to enable
freedom of movement and maneuver (ATP 3-90.4). There are six primary mobility tasks:
(cid:122) Conduct breaching.
(cid:122) Conduct clearing (of areas and routes).
(cid:122) Conduct gap crossing.
(cid:122) Construct and maintain combat roads and trails.
(cid:122) Construct and maintain forward airfields and landing zones.
(cid:122) Conduct traffic management and enforcement.
6-167. Mobility tasks enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield. Effective
execution of mobility tasks depends on information collection and intelligence. Breaching and gap crossing
in support of maneuver are primarily conducted using combat engineer units, often during close combat.
6-168. Gap crossing, clearing, and the construction of combat roads and trails, forward airfields, and landing
zones primarily support movement and require combat and general engineering units. Mobility tasks in
support of movement are not normally conducted under fire, although the threat of fire is always present.
6-169. A breach is a synchronized combined arms activity under the control of the maneuver commander
conducted to allow maneuver through an obstacle (ATP 3-90.4). A successful obstacle breach is a
synchronized and rehearsed combined arms activity under the control of the maneuver unit. Breaching is a
mission undertaken to penetrate an obstacle. Breaching facilitates penetrations through enemy reinforcing
obstacles covered with direct and indirect fire.
6-170. Clearing is a mobility task that involves the total elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is
usually performed by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire (ATP 3-90.4). It is generally
accomplished by destroying, altering, or removing obstacles.
6-171. A gap is a ravine, mountain pass, river, or other terrain feature that presents an obstacle that may be
bridged (ATP 3-90.4). Gaps will exist in an operational environment and present a significant challenge to
movement and maneuver. A gap crossing is the projection of combat power across a linear obstacle (a wet
or dry gap).
SECTION II – DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Even in the defensive position awaiting the enemy assault, our bullets take the offensive.
So the defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed
blows.
Carl von Clausewitz
6-172. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, hold key terrain, or
develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Although offensive operations are usually required to
achieve decisive results, it is often necessary, even advisable, to defend. Defensive operations alone do not
normally achieve a decision unless they are sufficient to achieve the overall political goal, such as protecting
an international border.
PURPOSE AND CONDITIONS FOR THE DEFENSE
6-173. One purpose of defending is to create conditions for the offense that allows Army forces to regain
the initiative. Other reasons for conducting the defense include— |
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(cid:122) Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to an enemy force.
(cid:122) Attritting or fixing an enemy force as a prelude to the offense.
(cid:122) Countering enemy action.
(cid:122) Accepting risk in one area to create offensive opportunities elsewhere.
6-174. There are many potential conditions for defensive operations. They include—
(cid:122) Enemy aggression initiating armed conflict requires forward-stationed friendly forces to defend to
buy time and conserve combat power until reinforced.
(cid:122) Offensive operations culminate and the commander needs to build combat power while countering
enemy offensive operations.
(cid:122) A unit is assigned an economy of force defensive role as a supporting effort.
(cid:122) The higher echelon headquarters directs a mission to defend an area, population, key
infrastructure, or other key terrain in support of the overall course of action.
(cid:122) U.S. forces accomplish all objectives and transition to a defense to deter future enemy aggression.
6-175. The key to a successful corps or division defense is a concept of operations that allows defensive
forces to break the enemy’s momentum and seize the initiative. Surprise is as important in defense as in
offense, and the defensive concept should avoid obvious dispositions and techniques. When executing a
defense, commanders orchestrate combat power from all available domains to synchronize effects at a
decisive place and time that results in the enemy’s defeat. Commanders decide where to concentrate combat
power and where to accept risk. Success may require that a defending unit exploit opportunities to seize the
initiative, such as a spoiling attack or counterattack.
6-176. Time is often the most important resource for defending forces. The enemy chooses the time and
location for its attack, so the amount of time friendly units have to prepare a defense is often unknown and
usually inadequate. Defending corps and divisions must have a sense of urgency to complete their planning,
coordinating, rehearsing, and conducting information collection. Their subordinate units need time to develop
engagement areas by preparing battle positions, pre-positioning sustainment assets, and emplacing obstacles.
Taken together this means that strict adherence to priorities of work and priorities of effort is critical to time
management.
6-177. Defending commanders seek to create more time to prepare an effective defense. A corps or division
commander may task-organize and resource a security force for employment in the security area to guard or
cover main battle area forces as a means to create additional preparation time and prevent surprise.
Commanders may also launch spoiling attacks, raids, or feints to disorganize enemy preparations and gain
more time to prepare. A defender continually attacks enemy forces in depth with joint and Army fires and
aviation to attrit the enemy force and disrupt its scheme of maneuver. Friendly conventional and special
operations forces can slow an enemy attack by complicating the enemy force’s movements and supply.
Uncertainty as to when or where enemy forces will attack requires a commander to maintain a larger reserve.
6-178. A successful defense requires the integration and synchronization of all available assets. The
defending commander assigns missions, allocates forces (including the reserve), and apportions functional
and multifunctional support and sustainment resources within the construct of main and supporting efforts.
The commander determines where to concentrate defensive efforts and where to accept risks based on the
results of intelligence preparation of the battlefield. This determination includes accounting for the enemy’s
reconnaissance and surveillance efforts and the vulnerability of friendly troop concentrations to massed
enemy fires. Commanders strive to counter enemy attacks by accounting for its capabilities in each domain
that can influence friendly forces.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSE
6-179. Successful defenses share some important characteristics. They include—
(cid:122) Disruption—deceiving or destroying enemy reconnaissance forces, breaking up combat
formations, separating echelons, and impeding an enemy force’s ability to synchronize its
combined arms.
(cid:122) Flexibility—developing plans that anticipate a range of enemy actions and allocate resources
accordingly. |
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(cid:122) Maneuver—achieving and exploiting a position of physical advantage over an enemy force.
(cid:122) Mass and concentration—creating overwhelming combat power at specific locations to support
the main effort.
(cid:122) Depth—engaging multiple enemy echelons, enemy long-range fires, sustainment, and C2.
(cid:122) Preparation—preparing the defense before attacking enemy forces arrive.
(cid:122) Security—conducting security, protection, information activities, operations security, and
cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare tasks.
(See ADP 3-90 for more information on the characteristics of the defense.)
ENEMY OFFENSE
6-180. Enemy tactics, capabilities, and probable courses of action all inform defensive planning. Defending
commanders must see the terrain and their own forces from the enemy perspective in all relevant domains to
anticipate both threat courses of action and friendly weaknesses that an enemy force could exploit. Defending
commanders identify probable enemy objectives and possible enemy avenues of approach to achieve them.
Understanding enemy capabilities in all domains is critical to devising the most effective friendly defensive
schemes. Identifying enemy limitations helps determine opportunities to exploit friendly advantages.
6-181. At the initiation of offensive operations, enemy forces seek to disrupt and destroy friendly C2, apply
overwhelming firepower, and rapidly penetrate friendly rear areas. They use information warfare to attack
information systems, deceive, and protect their own information systems. Enemy forces use electronic attack
and long-range strikes against C2 systems, information collection systems, air defense systems, and aircraft.
The enemy’s goal is to weaken or destroy the joint force’s decision-making, air and missile defense, and air
combat capabilities, which creates opportunities for enemy forces to achieve early decisive success.
6-182. A key to an enemy force’s ability to achieve early dominance is to strike first. General considerations
that influence the enemy force’s decision to initiate offensive operations include when the enemy determines
the joint force is unprepared for an attack, when the enemy identifies a weakness in the joint force that it can
exploit, or when the enemy is fully prepared and can commit to operations at any time. The enemy’s decision
is tied to factors that provide them with the greatest opportunity to win the first battle, which they believe
greatly improves their chances for success in later operations.
6-183. An enemy force seeks to establish early advantages in the air, space, and cyberspace domains to set
conditions for dominance in the maritime and land domains. An enemy force aims to prevent the joint force
from introducing additional forces into the conflict region and to disrupt the friendly logistics systems
enabling forward-positioned forces. Enemy forces concentrate their long-range attacks on C2 nodes, logistics
bases, and assembly areas to disrupt the joint force’s defensive operations and to degrade the joint force’s
ability to prepare for offensive operations.
6-184. When enemy leaders commit forces into ground combat during offensive operations, they typically
attempt to conceal the location of their main effort with multiple fixing attacks on the ground, allowing them
to isolate friendly forward units. Enemy forces use fires and electronic attack to disrupt critical friendly
command posts, radars, and fire direction centers.
6-185. Generally, enemy forces seek to reinforce success, massing capabilities at a vulnerable point to
achieve large force-ratio advantages to enable a rapid penetration of friendly defenses. Enemy leaders use
mobile forces to exploit a penetration rapidly to the maximum possible depth to make the overall friendly
defensive position untenable. Enemy forces seek advantages in both volume and range of fires to
simultaneously mass fires at the point of penetration to enable rapid closure and breakthrough, fix other
friendly elements along the forward line of own troops, and target key friendly C2 and logistics nodes along
the depth of the defense. Enemy forces prefer to use fires to fix, move around friendly battle positions when
possible, and move through destroyed units when necessary. Enemy forces seek to maneuver tactically to a
depth that achieves operational objectives in support of their overall strategic purpose. Enemy forces employ
reconnaissance, electronic warfare, information warfare, and other capabilities at their disposal to both enable
and exploit initial tactical gains. These are likely to include chemical weapons. (See figure 6-4 on page 6-34
for an illustration of a notional enemy offensive operation.) |
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Figure 6-4. Notional enemy offensive operation
TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-186. There are three types of defensive operations. These operations have significantly different concepts
and present different problems. Units consider each independently when planning and executing the defense.
Although the names of these types convey the overall aim of a selected operation, most defenses at division
and higher echelons combine elements of all three types. The types of defensive operations are—
(cid:122) Area defense.
(cid:122) Mobile defense.
(cid:122) Retrograde.
AREA DEFENSE
6-187. An area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access
to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADP 3-90). The variations
of an area defense include defense of a linear obstacle, perimeter defense, and reverse slope defense. The
purpose of an area defense is to retain the terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in
mutually supporting prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between these |
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positions and focus their fires into engagement areas. Units may supplement these fires with a possible
counterattack. Units at all echelons can conduct an area defense, and Army forces may have maritime
engagement areas. They may use an area defense to transition to offensive operations, retrograde operations,
or stability operations. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on area defense.)
MOBILE DEFENSE
6-188. A mobile defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of
the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADP 3-90). The mobile defense focuses on defeating
or destroying enemy forces by allowing them to advance to a point where they are exposed to a decisive
counterattack by a striking force. The striking force is a dedicated counterattack force in a mobile defense
constituted with the bulk of available combat power (ADP 3-90). A fixing force is a force designated to
supplement the striking force by preventing the enemy from moving from a specific area for a specific time
(ADP 3-90). The fixing force is used to hold attacking enemy forces in position, to turn attacking enemy
forces into ambush areas, and to retain areas from which to launch the striking force.
6-189. A mobile defense requires assigned areas of considerable depth. Units shape the battlefield causing
an enemy force to overextend its lines of communications, expose its flanks, and dissipate its combat power.
Likewise, units must be able to move their forces into a position where they can defeat an attacking force.
Divisions and larger formations normally execute mobile defenses. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on
mobile defense.)
RETROGRADE
6-190. A retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the
enemy (ADP 3-90). The three variations of the retrograde are delay, withdraw, and retirement. An enemy
force may compel these operations, or units may execute them voluntarily, such as when a security force
executes a rearward passage of lines through a main battle area. In either case, the higher echelon
headquarters executing the retrograde must approve the operation before its initiation. A retrograde is not
conducted in isolation; it is a transitional operation. It is part of a larger maneuver scheme designed to
preserve combat power for future operations. Forward-stationed forces should be prepared to execute
retrograde operations as part of a multinational force when outnumbered during the early part of a conflict.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK CONSIDERATIONS
6-191. In the defense, commanders typically retain the deep and rear areas, but they divide the close area
into two distinct portions: the security area and main battle area. Commanders use this approach to
synchronize operations, including those in air, space and cyberspace, to defeat an enemy force throughout its
depth. Figure 6-5 on page 6-36 depicts friendly defensive operations across a notional operational
framework. |
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Figure 6-5. Notional operational framework during defensive operations
EXTENDED DEEP OPERATIONS
6-192. Operational- and strategic-level deep operations are typically outside an assigned land AO for a
corps or division, but parts fall within the senior Army formation’s area of interest and area of influence.
During defensive operations, Army forces may request JFC or other strategic effects against strategic
infrastructure or sanctuary areas that are enabling enemy offensive operations.
6-193. Strategic leaders may task Army long-range fires, cyberspace, space, and other global capabilities
to support attacking targets in the extended deep area to set conditions for friendly defensive operations.
Long-range artillery and ground-based missile capabilities can range enemy long-range missile batteries,
manufacturing and economic nodes, critical infrastructure such as airfields and ports, strategic
communications nodes, and strategic sustainment and reserve locations. Special operations forces, either
unilaterally or combined with indigenous forces, can attack vulnerable targets, influence populations, and
motivate or support established networks, such as local militias and resistance groups, to gather valuable
information, oppose enemy forces, and weaken popular support to enemy offensive operations.
Friendly-backed indigenous forces, or guerilla forces, can also damage or degrade critical infrastructure to
disrupt enemy sustainment activities.
DEEP OPERATIONS DURING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-194. Deep operations are essential to the effectiveness of the defense. The commander uses them to attrit,
isolate, disrupt, and disorganize attacking formations and to create windows of opportunity in which to act
decisively against lead enemy echelons. Deep operations are the commander’s means of ensuring success in
the main battle area by limiting the enemy’s options, disrupting the enemy’s ability to mass fires against |
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friendly battle positions and denying the ability of subsequent echelons to support the lead echelon.
Commanders use rocket artillery, rotary-wing aviation, UASs, special operations forces, space and
cyberspace capabilities, electromagnetic warfare, and influence activities to conduct deep operations.
Commanders request joint fires to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s long-range capabilities before
they are in direct contact with Army forces. The battlefield coordination detachment, as the senior Army
operational commander’s liaison with the air component, serves a central role in relaying requests for joint
fires to the joint air operations center. (See JP 3-03 for information on interdiction.)
6-195. Deep operations begin to disrupt the cohesion of the enemy attack as early as possible, before the
enemy closes with maneuver forces in the security area. Psychological effects degrade the will of enemy
forces to fight, interfere with enemy decision making, and disrupt enemy attacks as they begin, especially
when combined with attacking C2 nodes, fires, and other key capabilities. Deception to conceal the location
and disposition of defending forces and limit the effectiveness of enemy fires delays the enemy’s ability to
mass effects. Army forces in the defense conduct deep operations to—
(cid:122) Isolate enemy forces in the security area and main battle area from follow-on echelons.
(cid:122) Disrupt the enemy’s ability to support committed forces with fires and logistics.
(cid:122) Guard against interference with the commitment of friendly reserves.
(cid:122) Attrit sufficient enemy combat power to achieve favorable force ratios in the main battle area.
(cid:122) Transition to the offense.
6-196. As part of conducting deep operations, corps and division commanders maintain a current
intelligence picture of enemy forces throughout their area of interest. They coordinate for and integrate effects
created by special operations core activities to achieve operational and strategic objectives and disrupt enemy
forces, capabilities, and infrastructure that support enemy offensive operations. Commanders also ensure that
deep operations remain focused on setting conditions for forces in the security and main battle areas while
avoiding becoming overly fixated on close operations.
6-197. As enemy formations approach the forward line of troops, leaders monitor enemy movements,
determine which elements of the enemy force are most threatening, and attack high-payoff targets, including
enemy long-range fires, air defense systems, logistics assets, and C2 nodes. The commander uses
reconnaissance and security forces and fires to disrupt the enemy approach and delay enemy second echelon
forces and reserves in ways that desynchronize the enemy attack. When available, commanders employ
offensive space and cyberspace capabilities in combination with electromagnetic attacks to disrupt enemy
communications and hinder the enemy’s ability to adapt. Deep operations in the defense may also seek to
suppress enemy air defenses to enable friendly air capabilities, including air interdiction and close air support,
to operate in the security area and main battle area.
6-198. Commanders synchronize deep operations among subordinate echelons through the use of fire
support coordination measures. Coordinated fire lines are permissive fire support coordination measures that
commanders can use for rapid engagement of targets while simultaneously providing flexibility for friendly
forces. In the defense, the corps establishes a coordinated fire line with subordinate divisions, so that the
corps can target critical enemy capabilities with surface-to-surface fires beyond where the divisions need to
focus in their own close and deep areas.
SECURITY AREA OPERATIONS
6-199. During the defense, the security force occupies an assigned area far enough forward of the forward
edge of the battle area to protect main battle area units from surprise. Security forces provide early warning
to give main battle area units time to reposition forces against enemy maneuver and to mitigate the effects of
enemy medium-range fires.
6-200. Commanders have the option of employing a screen, guard, or cover in a security area, depending
on the mission variables. When deciding which option to use, commanders consider the following:
(cid:122) The depth, breadth, and terrain of the security area relative to number of forces available.
(cid:122) The capabilities of the security force relative to the threat it faces, particularly its mobility.
(cid:122) The amount of time the commander needs the security force to provide forces in the main battle
area. |
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6-201. Commanders determine the location, orientation, and depth of the security area based on the terrain
available and the purpose of the defense. Units identify enemy avenues of approach and named areas of
interest. The depth of the security area determines the time available to react to approaching enemy forces.
Occupying a deep security area allows the security force to destroy enemy reconnaissance assets without
compromising critical observation posts or positions. It prevents enemy forces from easily penetrating the
security area and prevents gaps when observation posts or units displace or are lost. Security forces cover
less depth along a broad front because they have fewer resources to position in depth and potentially fewer
opportunities to exploit terrain. Shallow security areas may require units to task-organize and resource their
security forces to perform guard operations that provide more reaction time for the main body.
6-202. The task organization of the security force depends on its role in the overall concept for defense.
Covering forces and guard forces require more reinforcement than screening forces. Fires, engineers,
aviation, and other attachments increase the ability of guard or covering forces to slow and disorganize the
enemy, degrade the enemy’s security forces, and gain additional time for the defending commander.
6-203. Commanders determine when to occupy security areas based on their assessment of all possible
enemy courses of action and the preparation required in the main battle area. They allow enough time for
their security force to move and establish its positions. The mission variables influence how these security
forces deploy and occupy positions. Commanders may push forward to establish a security area, or they may
establish one along a current forward line of troops while preparing the main battle area further to the rear,
depending upon the favorability of the terrain and enemy dispositions.
6-204. Information collection capabilities enable the performance of security tasks. Commanders focus
their collection on named areas of interest to detect and track enemy forces. Data and reporting from UASs,
intelligence operations, ground sensors, and national assets can expand the areas under surveillance, provide
early warning, and cue security forces. Rotary-wing aircraft detect and report enemy forces at extended
ranges with sensors. This permits security force units on the ground to concentrate their forces on likely
enemy avenues of approach, named areas of interest, targeted areas of interest, and restrictive terrain that
degrades sensor performance. Commanders employ their information collection assets to detect enemy force
movements, which provides time to reposition security forces and employ assets to counter enemy actions.
6-205. The security force’s rear boundary is normally the battle handover line. Handover of the battle from
forces in the security area to forces in the main battle area requires close coordination to avoid confusion and
fratricide. The security force must retain freedom to maneuver to conduct a rearward passage of lines. Main
battle area forces establish contact points, passage lanes, and routes through the main battle area. Control of
indirect fires passes to main battle area units as the security force moves through the passage lanes. Typically,
battalion-sized units of a security force hand the battle over to the brigades through which they pass.
Regardless of size or echelon, they must be able to alert the main battle area commander that the enemy is
approaching on particular avenues of approach and keep the enemy’s leading units under observation. After
passage, security area forces move where directed and begin preparing for subsequent operations.
MAIN BATTLE AREA OPERATIONS
6-206. The main battle area is where the commander intends to deploy the bulk of the unit’s combat power
and defeat an attacking enemy force. The commander positions forces in the main battle area to block enemy
penetrations, choosing terrain that puts enemy forces at the greatest possible disadvantage. Commanders
assign sectors to subordinate forces in the main battle area as a means of controlling subordinate maneuver
unit operations. Defensive sectors should align with major enemy avenues of approach. The force responsible
for the most dangerous sector is typically the main effort. Commanders employ their reserves in the main
battle area to halt an enemy attack, to destroy penetrating enemy formations, or to counterattack to regain the
initiative.
6-207. Restrictive terrain, choke points, and natural obstacles such as rivers usually favor an area defense
oriented on key terrain and avenues of approach. Open, less restrictive terrain usually favors a mobile defense,
which orients on the enemy. Most defenses at the division and corps levels offer opportunities for a
combination of mobile and area defense. Corps and division commanders maintain situational awareness
about close operations in the main battle area while maintaining focus on deep operations to prevent enemy
forces from reinforcing or effectively supporting their forward echelons. |
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6-208. Spoiling attacks and counterattacks can be used to disrupt enemy forces and prevent them from
massing combat power or exploiting success in the main battle area. Future operations cells conduct
contingency branch and sequel planning to counter potential enemy penetrations of the main battle area,
typically by repositioning forces and establishing decision points for committing the reserve.
RESERVE
6-209. Commanders base the size of their reserve on the level of uncertainty about the enemy force’s
capabilities and intentions. A commander’s concept of operations describes the size, composition, location,
and priorities of planning for the reserve. The more uncertainty that exists, the larger the reserve is. The
purpose of the reserve during the defense is to maintain a hedge against uncertainty and counter enemy
success, usually by blocking a penetration or enveloping it from a flank. When planning a defense,
commanders cannot typically be strong everywhere, and therefore they accept risk about unlikely enemy
courses of action. A reserve mitigates the risk the commander assumes. Commanders may use reserves to
counterattack enemy vulnerabilities, such as exposed flanks or support units, or to defeat isolated parts of the
enemy forward echelon. In some cases, a commander must use the reserve to reinforce battle positions in the
main battle area to hold critical terrain, block penetrating enemy forces, or to react to threats against the
division or corps rear area. Units position their reserve force for maximum flexibility.
6-210. Commanders determine the reserve’s planning priorities based on their estimate of the situation.
Commanders of brigades or larger formations normally retain about one quarter of their force in reserve,
though the percentage depends on the scheme of maneuver and the commander’s level of uncertainty. Higher
levels of uncertainty require a larger reserve.
6-211. Timing is critical to counterattacks. Commanders must anticipate the circumstances requiring
commitment of their reserve and rehearse its commitment to the main battle area. Rehearsals help validate
the reserve’s response plan and increase the speed with which it can respond. Commanders make the decision
to commit a reserve promptly, with sound understanding of the movement and deployment timelines from
its assembly area to the main battle area in existing terrain and weather conditions. If committed too soon,
reserves may not have the desired effect or be in a good position for commitment against a more dangerous
situation later. Committed too late, the reserve may not be able to influence the situation enough to meet the
overall intent. Movement control and air defense in the rear area is vital to getting the reserve into the battle
on time and in good order.
6-212. Reserves may be air or ground maneuver units or a combination of the two. They should be
task-organized with combined arms capabilities and given priority for the employment of joint capabilities.
Commanders take the strengths and weaknesses of the reserve into account and plan accordingly. For
example, employing an air assault force provides a formation that can respond rapidly to a threatened area or
rapidly threaten an enemy flank after seizing key terrain. Once committed, however, it has limited mobility
and sustainment capabilities.
6-213. The mobility and lethality of attack aviation makes it one of the most responsive and effective types
of reserves. It can rapidly counterattack enemy armored penetrations. Despite its effectiveness, attack
aviation should never be the only reserve element due to the potential impacts of weather and the risk incurred
by not having enough aviation available for other critical roles, such as enabling security area operations.
6-214. Once commanders commit a reserve, they immediately begin to constitute another one from
uncommitted forces or from forces in less threatened areas. When selecting the new reserve, commanders
consider what capabilities would be most effective in the situation and the likely locations where it would be
employed.
REAR OPERATIONS DURING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-215. Rear operations maintain freedom of action in the security and main battle areas and prevent
culmination. The rear command post enables this freedom of action by planning and directing sustainment,
conducting terrain management, providing movement control, and providing area security of the rear area.
Rear operations ensure prompt delivery of commodities in high demand during defensive operations,
particularly ammunition. Depending on the enemy situation, commanders commit maneuver units to secure
rear operations, although all forces conducting rear operations must maintain local security and conduct |
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survivability tasks. Leaders must consider the terrain, protection, and sustainment requirements for higher
headquarters or joint enablers that may be located in the rear area. (See FM 3-94 for more information on the
rear command posts.)
6-216. Because rear operations divert combat power from other priorities, commanders must weigh the
need for this diversion against other potential consequences, and they must be prepared to assume risk based
upon both mission analysis and running estimates. Assuming risk may be as simple as suspending all but
critical operations in the rear area for a time, so that units operating in the rear area can concentrate on self-
defense at critical junctures.
6-217. Leaders mitigate vulnerabilities associated with command posts, support areas, staging areas, and
transportation operations by doing everything possible to limit enemy detection, harden critical nodes, and
counter enemy attacks before they can inflict significant losses. Effective counter-UAS operations are critical
to countering enemy reconnaissance attempting to identify high-payoff friendly targets. Electromagnetic
protection, limited offensive space control operations, dispersion, and repositioning capabilities within the
rear area to complicate enemy targeting, particularly of critical C2 nodes, is very important during the defense
when a division or corps is relatively static for extended periods of time. (See ATP 3-01.81 for more
information on counter-UAS operations.)
TRANSITION TO OFFENSE
6-218. The ultimate goal of defensive operations is to defeat the enemy’s attacks and transition, or threaten
to transition, to the offense. Units must deliberately plan for transitions to identify and establish the necessary
friendly and enemy conditions for a successful transition. As friendly forces meet their defensive objectives,
forces consolidate and reorganize for offensive operations or prepare to facilitate forward passages of lines
for fresh formations. Units should do everything possible to prevent enemy forces from reinforcing their
forward echelons, consolidating, or reorganizing while friendly forces prepare for follow-on operations.
6-219. Commanders transition to the offense when they assess they have enough combat power to maintain
pressure on the enemy. They do not wait for perfect conditions, and they sometimes must push tired
formations to attack because the opportunity to complete the defeat of enemy formations reduces the risk of
future casualties fighting the same enemy formations after they have recovered. Commanders continuously
assess the effects of battle on their formations relative to their opponents, and they let that assessment guide
how hard they pursue enemy forces and how high of a tempo they sustain. (See ADP 3-90 for additional
information on the defense.)
SECTION III – OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
For I am convinced that one cannot win, especially outnumbered, without attacking. But
to attack on today’s battlefield requires craft and cunning—a concept of offense that we’ve
perhaps only begun to understand.
General Donn A. Starry
6-220. The key to successful offensive operations is to achieve all desired objectives prior to culmination.
This requires the force in the offense to have some combination of relative advantage in the physical,
information, or human dimensions. Typically, offensive operations require advantages in multiple domains,
but commanders may achieve those advantages through deception operations and surprise rather than the
physical means of combat power alone.
PURPOSE AND CONDITIONS FOR THE OFFENSE
6-221. The purpose of the offense is to defeat or destroy enemy forces and to gain control of terrain,
resources, or population centers. Offensive operations take something from an enemy force. They are
characterized by aggressive initiative on the part of subordinate commanders, by rapid shifts of the main
effort to create and exploit opportunity, by momentum, and by the deepest, most rapid possible destruction
of enemy defensive schemes and the capabilities that enable them. |
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE
6-222. The high risk, tempo, and physical toll of offensive operations require high levels of unit training,
morale, and cohesion. Successful offenses share these characteristics:
(cid:122) Audacity—the ability to assume risk to create opportunity with bold action.
(cid:122) Concentration—orchestrating forces or effects to create and exploit opportunity. (Concentrating
effects is called “mass.”)
(cid:122) Surprise—taking action that catches enemy forces off guard.
(cid:122) Tempo—maintaining a pace of operations that is faster than the enemy’s, but not so fast that it
cannot be sustained for as long as necessary to achieve all assigned objectives.
(See ADP 3-90 for more information on the characteristics of the offense.)
ENEMY DEFENSE
6-223. The purposes of enemy defensive operations are to set military conditions to resume offensive
operations or defend until the enemy achieves a favorable political outcome. The enemy employs two types
of defenses generally, a maneuver defense and an area defense. A maneuver defense trades terrain for the
opportunity to destroy portions of an opponent’s formation and render the opponent’s combat system
ineffective. In an area defense, the enemy denies key areas to friendly forces. In most situations against a
peer or superior opponent, enemy forces are willing to surrender terrain to preserve their major combat forces,
since the loss of those forces threatens the survival of the enemy’s state or regime. Figure 6-6 on page 6-42
depicts a notional enemy maneuver defense. |
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Figure 6-6. Notional enemy maneuver defense
6-224. The enemy establishes a defensive system on favorable terrain and employs capabilities throughout
the depth of the battlefield. The enemy’s goal is to resist the joint force’s ability to attack in depth by creating
layered standoff that makes integrated action between ground forces and the rest of the U.S. joint force
impossible. In the disruption zone, enemy forces attack the joint force with long-range fires and limited
objective attacks by ground forces to preempt or disrupt the joint force’s planned attack. Enemy forces
employ aviation, artillery, and ballistic missiles in long-range attacks against the joint force’s C2 systems,
long-range fires capabilities, attack helicopters, logistics bases, and assembly areas. The enemy uses special
operations forces, guerilla forces, and proxy forces in limited objective attacks to harass and disrupt the
friendly forces’ preparations for offensive operations.
6-225. In the main battle zone, the enemy force designs its defensive system to defeat penetrations of its
main defensive lines and envelopments by the joint force’s ground, airborne, or air assault forces. Along its
defensive lines, the enemy attempts to slow and disrupt friendly forces with a combination of obstacles,
prepared positions, electronic warfare, and favorable terrain. The enemy’s basic goal is to fix friendly forces
with maneuver units and destroy them with massed fires in a layered defensive approach. The layered
approach starts with identifying friendly units with long-range air, space, and cyberspace capabilities and
then targeting them with fires before they are in range to maneuver during close combat. Ideally, they would
attrit friendly forces to the point that they lack the combat power to exploit any initial successes they achieve.
6-226. Enemy forces continuously improve positions in ways that make attacks against them more costly
and allow enemy forces to commit the minimum amount of ground combat power forward. Enemy forces |
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use deception, dispersion, and repositioning to avoid easy acquisition by friendly information collection
systems. Enemy forces typically employ significant reserves to counterattack penetrations and attempted
envelopments. Integrated air defense systems arrayed in depth provide protection and freedom of movement
for enemy maneuver units and fires systems.
6-227. Forward-positioned enemy forces focus on providing observed fires for long-range
surface-to-surface systems and fixing friendly forces long enough to be engaged effectively by those systems.
Enemy forces are likely to conduct a maneuver defense, whenever they are able, by using a series of
subsequent battle positions to achieve depth. An enemy commander seeks to use fires and obstacles to prevent
decisive engagement of the defending ground forces as they reposition, while causing friendly forces to move
as slowly as possible under continuous fire. An enemy force can be expected to employ significant electronic
warfare, reconnaissance, surveillance (including UASs), and cyberspace capabilities as part of this defensive
effort. Peer enemies can employ chemical weapons, and some can employ tactical nuclear weapons, to
prevent the culmination of their defending forces.
TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-228. The types of offensive operations describe the general sequence of the offense and recommended
formations. The purpose discriminates one from another. The four types of offensive operations are—
(cid:122) Movement to contact.
(cid:122) Attack.
(cid:122) Exploitation.
(cid:122) Pursuit.
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
6-229. Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and to
establish or regain contact (ADP 3-90). It creates favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. Units
conduct a movement to contact when the enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an
attack. Forces conducting a movement to contact seek to make contact with the smallest friendly force
feasible. A movement to contact may result in a meeting engagement. A meeting engagement is a combat
action that occurs when a moving force, incompletely deployed for battle, engages an enemy at an unexpected
time and place (ADP 3-90). If friendly forces make contact with an enemy force, they have five options:
attack, defend, bypass, delay, or withdraw.
ATTACK
6-230. An attack is a type of offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures
terrain, or both (ADP 3-90). Attacks incorporate coordinated maneuver. An attack is different from a
movement to contact since knowledge of the enemy’s disposition enables units to synchronize and employ
combat power more effectively. There are four variations of attacks:
(cid:122) Ambush.
(cid:122) Counterattack.
(cid:122) Raid.
(cid:122) Spoiling attack.
EXPLOITATION
6-231. An exploitation is a type of offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is
designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (ADP 3-90). Exploitations seek to disintegrate enemy forces to
the extent that they have no alternative but surrender or retreat. Division and higher echelon headquarters
normally plan exploitations as branches or sequels to current operations. |
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PURSUIT
6-232. A pursuit is a type of offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to
escape, with the aim of destroying it (ADP 3-90). Pursuits entail rapid movement and decentralized control.
Any offensive operation can transition into a pursuit if enemy resistance breaks down and enemy forces flee.
Generally, a pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. There are two types of pursuits:
(cid:122) Frontal.
(cid:122) Combination.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK CONSIDERATIONS
6-233. Within the context of the higher echelon commander’s operational framework and the general
phasing scheme, commanders must design attacks that defeat enemy forces across all echelons, while
enabling subordinate disciplined initiative. When designing attacks, commanders divide the task of defeating
an enemy force and maintain an integrated approach through deep, close, and rear operations. Commanders
account for air, space, cyberspace, and when relevant, maritime capabilities across the operational
framework. Figure 6-7 illustrates friendly offensive operations across a notional operational framework.
Figure 6-7. Notional operational framework during offensive operations
EXTENDED DEEP AREA DURING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-234. The extended deep area is an important part of any formation’s area of interest because it contains
enemy capabilities that can inflict damage on friendly forces and affect friendly forces’ operational reach and
endurance. Enemy strategic C2 nodes and long-range fires capabilities, including ground-based missiles and
aviation assets, are generally located in the extended deep area out of the corps or division’s AO. The situation |
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in the extended deep area influences future operations, and it may become part of an assigned area when
offensive operations progress, forward boundaries advance, and units move around the battlefield.
Commanders integrate the effects and activities of special operations forces and partner irregular forces in
extended deep areas. Army forces request joint effects in the deep area, and they may be tasked by the JFC
to employ long-range fires against targets in the extended deep area. Disrupting enemy decision making or
destroying enemy long-range fires capabilities limits the enemy’s ability to mount a coordinated defense and
can destroy enemy forces reconstituting or preparing for counterattacks.
DEEP OPERATIONS DURING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-235. Deep operations focus on parts of an assigned area that are not in direct fire contact with the main
body of the formation but may be in the future. At division and corps, which have assigned and attached
long-range fires capabilities, the deep area extends beyond the forward line of troops to a distance that
corresponds with the ability of Army and joint capabilities to reach. Divisions and corps integrate special
operations forces, depending on C2 relationships, with deep operations to degrade the enemy’s will to fight,
destroy high-payoff targets, and disrupt enemy defensive infrastructure and sustainment. Special operations
forces operating in deep areas require control measures to synchronize actions and mitigate risk.
6-236. Commanders use graphic control measures in the deep area to delineate responsibility for targets,
employment of fires, axes of advance, and future ground objectives. Forward boundaries, coordinated fire
lines, fire support coordination lines, kill boxes, and restricted fire areas are all coordination measures that
commanders use to integrate deep operations among echelons.
6-237. Commanders synchronize joint and organic lethal and nonlethal effects in the deep area to disrupt
enemy echelons, neutralize reserves, and destroy key capabilities including counterbattery radars and fires
systems that can impact close operations. For example, a commander may combine massed fires against the
enemy reserve with military information support operations, attacking that unit’s resupply operations to
psychologically isolate it from the main body and erode its will to fight.
6-238. Corps and divisions may use their indirect fires capabilities to support close operations and to
conduct deep operations. Commanders employ reconnaissance and security forces, both air and ground, to
make initial contact, detect targets, and facilitate fires in support of deep operations. They may shift priority
of fires from deep to close operations in support of the main effort.
6-239. Commanders may also employ reconnaissance and security forces to conduct deep operations.
Commanders may task-organize dedicated security forces to make contact with the smallest possible ground
formations and to develop the situation before the main body can be decisively engaged. Normally an
attacking unit does not need extensive forward security forces; most attacks are launched from positions
already in contact with the enemy, which reduces the usefulness of a separate forward security force. An
exception occurs when the attacking unit is transitioning from the defense to an attack, and it had previously
established a forward security area as part of the defense.
CLOSE OPERATIONS
6-240. Close operations occur where forces at divisions and lower echelons maneuver and where forces at
the BCT and lower echelons conduct most direct fire engagements. BCTs and lower echelon formations
destroy or render enemy forces combat ineffective through movement and fires during close operations. Close
combat at the BCT-level and below relies heavily on the warfighting skill and determination of leaders and
small-unit teams. Battle drills and creating effects from massed indirect fire play a critical role in success
during close combat, since immediate action or reaction can determine success and failure.
6-241. When commanders achieve their initial objectives in the close area, they transition to the next phase
of the operation, or they execute a branch or sequel should the situation require a change to the original plan.
A branch may require friendly forces to defeat a counterattacking enemy force on the division’s flank with
joint capabilities or reserves. When commanders defeat most enemy defensive forces, they may transition
some of their focus to consolidating gains. For example, when lead friendly echelons fix and bypass enemy
forces to maintain momentum, follow-on friendly forces must defeat the bypassed enemy forces to prevent
them from disrupting friendly lines of communications, negatively influencing local populations, or breaking |
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out. Commanders initiate operations to consolidate gains as early as possible, while still in close proximity
to enemy units, to mitigate the risks those enemy units breaking contact could generate later.
6-242. Close operations require graphic control measures to synchronize the application of combat power,
to ensure integration of subordinate units, to maintain maximum pressure on the enemy, and to mitigate the
risk of fratricide within the friendly force. There is no arbitrary benefit to minimizing or maximizing the
number of graphic control measures for a particular operation. The optimum number of graphics depends on
the mission variables. Having many graphics provides options and agility to the plan, and this can be
especially helpful in air-ground coordination or facilitating rapid changes of direction. Leaders balance the
complexity of control measures. They should be simple enough for bold execution and detailed enough to
enable agility and adaptation based on the situation. The best approach for employing control measures is to
ensure they maximize subordinate unit freedom of action and prevent subordinate units from having more
tasks than they can reasonably accomplish.
6-243. Commanders adjust the employment of graphic control measures according to the situation, but they
always consider the range and speed of subordinate unit capabilities and their overall operational tempo. As
units move forward, rear boundaries typically require corresponding shifts to ensure the unit’s assigned area
does not exceed its area of influence. BCTs have limited ability to control long lines of communication, and
their tempo and endurance is affected by time and distance of resupply, casualty evacuation, and other
sustainment considerations. Division boundaries require similar considerations, with the added complexity
of displacing division C2 nodes to support operations. Moving a division C2 node requires careful planning
to maintain continuous C2 of subordinate formations and avoid unnecessary tactical pauses.
6-244. Commanders and staffs maintain situational awareness about adjacent friendly and enemy units in
their area of interest. Although commanders and staffs have a plan for where a zone of attack will be and can
use it to create initial boundaries and other graphic control measures, enemy forces operate independently of
them. This means that while friendly forces have some constraints or restrictions in terms of employing
capabilities outside of their assigned area, enemy forces do not. This requires friendly forces to understand
what enemy capabilities outside their assigned area can influence friendly operations and closely coordinate
responses with friendly units to the flanks and rear.
REAR OPERATIONS DURING THE OFFENSE
6-245. Rear operations encompass a wide range of activities directly controlled through the rear command
post of a corps or division. Rear operations include sustainment operations, support area security, risk
mitigation of areas not assigned to subordinate units, terrain management, movement control, coordinating
and synchronizing protection capabilities, consolidating gains, and conducting stability operations as
required. Corps and division reserves typically occupy positions in the rear area before their commitment,
and they must receive priority of movement through the rear area when they are repositioned or committed.
Rear operations contribute to the operational reach, tempo, freedom of action, endurance, and momentum of
the whole formation.
6-246. Rear operations must adapt to the forward progress of the attacking divisions or BCTs. This may
require moving support units, the rear command post, and sustainment activities forward as an attack
progresses. The rear command post typically assumes responsibility for much of the new land area gained by
the attacking forces. The division rear command post must be prepared to assume responsibility for the land
areas left by forward-moving forces. In particular, it must be ready to control and repair routes, manage
terrain for follow-on support units, and assure that the division reserve can move without obstruction. These
activities may also require the rear command post to direct the reduction of explosive ordnance threatening
critical infrastructure or key resources.
6-247. Tactical units move through rear areas on their way to being integrated into corps or division
operations. These units report through the rear command post and occupy assembly areas designated by the
rear command post until they are able to integrate with the main command post, should they be employed as
part of close or deep operations. Long-range fires, ADA, CBRN decontamination, aviation, and reserve units
occupy assembly areas and other positions in the rear area. Their requests for fires and other enablers, their
use of ground and airspace, and their other operations are coordinated through the rear command post, unless
otherwise directed by the main command post. |
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6-248. Commanders typically economize combat power reserved to protect their rear operations. Bypassed
enemy forces, enemy special operations forces, and irregular forces pose a significant threat to rear
operations. Typically, divisions assign a BCT to provide security and consolidate gains in rear areas.
Maneuver enhancement brigades, with augmentation, employ a tactical combat force to defeat Level III
threats throughout the support areas, including major sustainment nodes and main supply routes. (See JP 3-10
for more information on threat levels.)
6-249. Rear operations play a key role during transitions. For example, a transition between defense and
offense increases the amount of fuel, maintenance, and movement support required for operations. A
transition to stability operations requires greater humanitarian aid supplies, force protection and construction
material, and contract support.
6-250. When required, commanders conduct reconstitution operations in the rear area, where enemy direct
fire contact is unlikely. While reconstitution operations are dominated by sustainment factors, they are not
the exclusive responsibility of sustainment units. All warfighting functions contribute to an effective
reconstitution.
6-251. As stability becomes a greater focus of operations, commanders must assess the resources available
against the mission to determine how best to conduct the minimum-essential stability operations tasks and
what risk they can accept. The land component commander can establish a civil affairs task force to operate
in the rear area and form a transitional military authority or support civil administration that facilitates the
ultimate consolidation of gains in support of the desired strategic end state. The purpose of the civil affairs
task force is to concentrate stability operations in an AO under a commander’s main effort. Additionally,
commanders may require Soldiers from all branches to conduct civil security related tasks such as transitional
public security tasks until local security forces are able to conduct these tasks. The speed with which
transition from U.S. forces to local authorities occurs is dependent on the ability to plan and control elements
aimed at developing and legitimizing governance at the tactical and operational levels. (See FM 3-57 for
more information regarding the civil affairs task force.)
TRANSITION TO DEFENSE AND STABILITY
6-252. When offensive operations culminate before enemy forces are defeated, friendly forces rapidly
transition to the defense. Commanders may deliberately transition to the defense when enemy forces are
incapable of fully exploiting an opportunity, or when they believe they can build combat power to resume
the offense before enemy forces can react effectively. Depending on where culmination occurs, friendly
forces may have to reposition forces on defensible terrain and develop a form of defense and scheme of
maneuver based on an assessment of the mission variables.
6-253. Successful offensive operations end because Army forces have achieved their assigned objectives.
A successful offense can also require a transition to a defensive posture dominated by stability operations
and a strategic environment moving toward post-conflict political goals. These operations have the goal of
transitioning responsibility for security and governance to legitimate authorities other than U.S. forces.
6-254. As a transition to stability operations occurs, leaders focus on stability tasks and information
activities to inform and influence populations and conduct security force assistance. Effective collaboration
with diplomatic and humanitarian organizations enhances the ability to achieve stability mechanisms. Army
forces play a key role in enabling the joint force to establish and conduct military governance until a civilian
authority or government is given control of their assigned areas.
TRANSITION TO POST-CONFLICT COMPETITION
6-255. Army forces conclude armed conflict by establishing conditions that are favorable to the United
States on the ground. Army forces support these conditions throughout armed conflict by consolidating gains
and prosecuting operations with desired end state in mind. As hostilities end, stability tasks dominate
operations with the purpose of transitioning responsibilities to legitimate authorities in a secure environment.
Army forces provide the joint force with the option of establishing a military transitional government before
transitioning full governing responsibility to host-nation or other provisional governments. |
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6-256. Standards for transitioning governance responsibility depend on the credibility, capability, and
capacity of the governing organization to maintain the favorable conditions established during armed conflict.
Strategic leaders determine the broad conditions for transition at the outset of operations and refine them
based on how the situation changes. Army forces play a key role in understanding the host-nation culture,
understanding critical infrastructure, assisting strategic leaders in the development of realistic transition goals
and timings, and determining the duration and scale of U.S. commitments required to maintain stability.
THEATER ARMIES DURING TRANSITION TO POST-CONFLICT COMPETITION
6-257. Theater armies play a key role in transition to post-conflict competition. Unlike JTFs that are created
for limited durations, theater armies maintain a continuous, long-term focus on theater strategy and relevant
national interests. A theater army anticipates and requests the additional forces, functional capabilities, and
resources required to support transition. Theater requirements will change as combat operations reduce and
focus on stability tasks increase. Theater armies refine logistic estimates, update security cooperation plans,
request engineer units capable of infrastructure development, refocus civil affairs requirements, improve
communications infrastructure, and address any other critical requirements.
6-258. Enabling legitimate authorities requires coordination with unified action partners, as well as a
favorable attitude among the population towards friendly forces supporting the effort. The theater army’s
goal is to replace U.S. combat forces with host-nation or other provisional authorities.
6-259. Security force assistance (SFA) is a key component of any plan to transition. SFA requires trained,
educated professional officers and noncommissioned officers as trusted advisors to partner-nation security
forces. A theater army supports JFCs in integrating conventional forces and special operations forces into
SFA plans that support transition and sustainable political outcomes.
6-260. The theater army engages other regional actors to assist in promoting the stability of the region and
managing the transition. In most cases, successful transition requires the theater army to retrograde
equipment, close the JOA, coordinate for the redeployment of Army forces, and manage a long-term security
cooperation plan. Relationships with regional leaders help to facilitate these requirements and provide
stability for local populations.
CORPS DURING TRANSITION TO POST-CONFLICT COMPETITION
6-261. Corps play a key role in transitioning from combat to stability-focused operations. As part of this,
consolidate gains activities may require the Army corps to employ forces to perform these tasks:
(cid:122) Establish area security throughout the entire corps AO. This includes offense and defense tasks to
destroy or neutralize remaining threats and protect the civilian population and infrastructure.
(cid:122) Conduct stability tasks necessary to create conditions that allow for the eventual transition to a
legitimate authority.
(cid:122) Conduct security force assistance to build the capability and capacity of foreign security forces.
(cid:122) Dissuade enemies and adversaries from reinitiating hostile or disruptive operations and persuading
them to abide by sanctions, laws, or international dictates.
(cid:122) Coordinate and influence the assumption of responsibility by host-nation or other authorities.
(cid:122) Synchronize psychological actions aligned with friendly unit activities (including deeds, words,
and images) to favorably influence civilian attitudes toward friendly security forces and the
eventual transition to legitimate authority.
6-262. As large-scale combat operations conclude in a corps AO, the corps continues to adjust its
operational framework to meet the increasing demand on stability tasks, while maintaining a posture that
prevents enemy forces from reconstituting their forces and operations. Operations primarily focus on
providing area security in high threat areas, followed by the performance of stability tasks in lower threat
areas. During transition, corps will likely conduct simultaneous offense, defense, and stability operations. |
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DIVISIONS DURING TRANSITION TO POST-CONFLICT COMPETITION
6-263. During transition, divisions will likely conduct simultaneous offense, defense, and stability
operations. Divisions must sustain those forces in combat operations concurrently with stability operations.
In addition, division support assets must be prepared to displace from established support areas, through areas
where security may not yet be established, to new support areas to better support those forces in combat
operations prior to area security being established.
6-264. Divisions perform the stability tasks necessary to create conditions within an AO that allow for
transition to a legitimate civilian authority or a unified action partner to act as a transitional authority.
Divisions also manage brigades as they conduct SFA to build the capability and capacity of foreign security
forces. Finally, divisions dissuade adversaries from reinitiating hostile or disruptive operations and persuade
them to abide by sanctions, laws, or international dictates.
BRIGADES DURING TRANSITION TO POST-CONFLICT COMPETITION
6-265. Task-organized BCTs perform most area security tasks, and they facilitate the accomplishment of
most stability tasks in concert with unified action partners. Army forces take specific actions upon
culmination of large-scale combat operations. These actions include—
(cid:122) Consolidation.
(cid:122) Establishing area security.
(cid:122) Conducting stability tasks.
6-266. The transition from large-scale combat operations to area security tasks entails risk. Units shifting
focus from combat to consolidation are vulnerable to counterattack. Historical evidence suggests a force is
most vulnerable after a hard-fought win. Commanders and staffs should plan for a quick transition and stress
the importance of local security. (See FM 3-90-1 for additional information on consolidation.)
6-267. Forces first perform minimum-essential stability tasks, and then they maintain or reestablish a stable
operational environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. BCTs further develop and reassess situations, perceptions, and
opportunities through continuous information collection to maintain positive momentum to achieve
additional gains. |
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Army Operations in Maritime Environments
The basic objectives and principles of war do not change. The final objective in war is the
destruction of the enemy’s capacity and will to fight, and thereby force him to accept the
imposition of the victor’s will. This submission has been accomplished in the past by
pressure in and from each of the elements of land and sea, and during World War I and II,
in and from the air as well. The optimum pressure is exerted through that absolute control
obtained by actual physical occupation. This optimum is obtainable only on land where
physical occupation can be consolidated and maintained.
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, United States Navy
This chapter describes Army operations in a predominantly maritime environment. It
begins with a discussion of the unique characteristics and challenges posed by maritime
regions. It continues with a discussion of maritime planning considerations, and it
concludes with a description of a potential operational approach for a maritime
environment.
SECTION I – OVERVIEW OF THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT
7-1. Previous conflicts have proven the
critical role of land forces in maritime Although the Pacific Theater of World War II is often
associated with dramatic battles fought by U.S. Navy and
theaters. In almost all cases it is land that
Marine Corps, U.S. Army forces provided considerable
makes a maritime area important to a
combat power to the theater. Most of the 22 divisions that
combatant commander. Land masses near served in the Pacific endured 100 to 300 days of continuous
or surrounded by water create maritime combat during the island-hopping campaign. Several units
choke points, enable force projection in and spent over 500 days in the war against Imperial Japanese
forces. The Americal Division spent over 600 days in combat.
out of maritime areas, and contain the
Casualties for Army forces exceeded 85,000 killed, captured,
majority of the world's population. The
wounded, or missing in action. The 77th Infantry Division
ultimate objective of conflict is typically not
alone sustained 9,212 casualties in 208 days of combat.
control over vast expanses of open water, During battles that included Guadalcanal, New Guinea, the
but rather the land and people who control Philippines, and Okinawa, Army forces provided both combat
it. Planning and training for the unique power and critical sustainment to a complex campaign that
spanned from Alaska to Australia.
considerations of operations in these
environments is critical, as is an integrated
planning approach with the rest of the joint force. A maritime operational environment adds coordination and
synchronization requirements for Army echelons that typically operate and train in land operational
environments. Army and joint force planning must reflect an understanding of the dynamic nature of the
threats and constraints to land forces in maritime regions. Army movement and maneuver between land
masses is almost entirely dependent on joint capabilities. Control of critical land masses is essential to the
sustainment and protection of joint operations in a maritime operational environment. This interdependence
has been historically crucial to success during armed conflicts against peer threats in maritime theaters, and
it continues to be crucial in the foreseeable future.
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MARITIME
ENVIRONMENT
7-2. Habitable land masses vary in size and geology. They include land masses as large as Australia to
small islets that make up larger atoll systems, such as the Marianas islands in Micronesia or Alaska’s Aleutian
Islands chain. Regardless of their size, not all islands are suitable for extended occupation without externally |
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provided water and other supplies. While most islands are natural, formed by tectonic or volcanic action,
manmade islands created for military and other purposes are also found within certain regions, such as the
South China Sea. Maritime land masses include a variety of environmental conditions. Islands throughout
Southeast Asia are predominantly jungle and savanna regions. Islands throughout the Baltic, Arctic, and sub-
Arctic regions may experience prolonged periods of extreme cold weather. Mountainous terrain can be found
on jungle, Arctic, and desert islands. Each island can contain unique environmental planning considerations
that can affect the way Army forces are resourced and employed. (See ATP 3-90.97 for more information on
cold weather environments. See ATP 3-90.98 for more information on operations in jungle environments.
See ATP 3-90.99 for more information on operations in desert environments.)
7-3. Currently, 22 nations in the world are recognized as archipelagic states, and these unique maritime
nations can include several cultures, religions, languages, and geopolitical histories within their own
territorial boundaries. Regional influences, littoral urbanization, external actors, regional geopolitical
perspectives, and local economic conditions may change from island to island, even when those islands
comprise a single country. Commanders and staffs must understand these complex factors to influence
outcomes in the human and information dimensions of an operational environment. Corps, divisions, or even
brigades may have an area of operations (AO) that spans several islands, each with a unique culture and
history.
7-4. In a predominantly maritime environment, any land that can be occupied to attain a physical position
of relative advantage by friendly or enemy forces can become key terrain. The largely maritime domains
challenge planners to account for operational reach and the impact of space and time on reinforcement of
existing forward-stationed forces and allies. The distance between bases throughout the maritime regions
hinders mutually supporting operations and sustainment from supporting echelons in the theater. Remoteness
and distance increases vulnerability to amphibious raids by enemy special operations forces and attacks from
long-range aircraft or missiles, and it increases the risk of physical isolation by air and naval forces.
LITTORAL REGIONS
7-5. Maritime environments include littoral regions, divided into two segments: seaward and landward.
Seaward segments include the area from open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support
operations ashore. Landward segments are those areas inland from the shore that can be supported and
defended directly from the sea. Maritime littoral regions are divided into five categories:
(cid:122) Enclosed and semi-enclosed seas—bodies of water surrounded by a landmass and connected to
either an ocean or another enclosed sea by a connecting body of water, such as a strait.
(cid:122) Islands—single land masses surrounded by a body of water.
(cid:122) Archipelagoes—groups of islands.
(cid:122) Open seas—unenclosed bodies of water, typically outside of territorial boundaries.
(cid:122) Marginal seas—portions of open seas or oceans that bound land masses such as peninsulas,
islands, and archipelagos.
7-6. Operations in these environments require information concerning tides in the local area, average wave
heights, and daily wind forecasts, as tides and winds may unexpectedly impact wave heights. Tidal flow and
currents impact operations for small or shallow draft vessels. Tidal changes can also affect vehicle mobility
when crossing unimproved beachheads or operations without causeways or engineer support. Extreme
weather plus the corrosive effects of salt water can rapidly degrade the maintenance readiness of equipment
already at the extent of long logistics lines of communications.
ARCTIC REGION
7-7. The Arctic region is significantly influenced by maritime considerations. The Artic encompasses part
of the areas of responsibility of three different geographic combatant commands, eight countries, and all time
zones. There are two primary transit routes through the Arctic: the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea
Route. The Arctic is a geopolitically competitive region and a potential area for armed conflict. There are
various international partnerships and alliances within the region, with overlapping relationships complicated
by international disputes about maritime boundaries. The Arctic presents a harsh and demanding maritime,
land, and air environment for military operations. Extreme temperatures, long periods of darkness and |
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extended daylight, high latitudes, seasonally changing terrain, and rapidly changing weather patterns define
Arctic conditions, and they all have impacts on the operational and mission variables. The variability of the
physical terrain and weather exposes military forces and capabilities to increased levels of risk.
7-8. The Arctic is not challenging solely due to extreme cold temperatures. Ground mobility is typically
most favorable during the winter months. Summer poses significant challenges for most vehicles moving off
road, while the most challenging period is the spring thaw when ground movement becomes impossible
across large swaths of territory. Regardless of season, air and sea mobility are critical enablers for military
operations. Thawing permafrost affects infrastructure across the region. Lacking the climate moderating
effect of the warm Gulf Stream, the North American Arctic hosts a much harsher environment than the
European Arctic. The warming of the Arctic has led to longer windows of reduced ice conditions over a
larger area. Long-term trends indicate a more consistently navigable Arctic, potentially affecting the mobility
of Army and threat forces during armed conflict.
7-9. Operations in the Arctic region get more complicated when roadways, seaports, and airfields can
become unusable depending on seasons. The loss or change of sea ice can open new waterways and increase
transit through the region. This could require additional forces, equipment capability, and infrastructure
investments to secure the U.S. homeland, allied partners and infrastructure, or the northern avenues of
approach during armed conflict.
CONSIDERATIONS UNIQUE TO THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT
7-10. Threats to Army forces in a maritime theater include those in any other type of theater. Additionally,
commanders and staffs must take into account unique joint and enemy courses of action in planning and
executing operations in a maritime environment.
JOINT FORCE CONSIDERATIONS IN A MARITIME ENVIRONMENT
7-11. The heavily interdependent nature of joint operations means that the defeat of one part of the joint
force puts the other parts at significant risk. The failure of Army forces to retain key terrain or protect air and
naval bases while preserving their own combat power could result in the loss of air and maritime superiority,
which in turn could lead to the ultimate defeat in detail of unsupported Army forces in an entire area of
responsibility (AOR).
7-12. Army forces require a joint common operational picture (COP) of friendly forces and their operations,
including those of allies and partners, in all domains. An inaccurate joint or partner COP could cause flawed
assumptions and situational understanding that decreases effective decision making.
7-13. As with other environments, planning land operations in maritime environments should address
relevant factors affecting friendly and enemy operations. The products and tools typically gathered to plan
and portray the unique characteristics of a maritime environment include riverine and coastal navigation
charts or tidal reports and observations from local fishing communities. Additional characteristics to consider
include—
(cid:122) Coastal terrain and soil compositions.
(cid:122) Commerce and trade along navigable waterways.
(cid:122) Maritime-specific infrastructure.
(cid:122) Navigable bodies of water.
(cid:122) Population densities and variations along shores and near navigable waterways.
(cid:122) Tidal flow, surf conditions, and current directions.
(cid:122) Natural obstacles adjacent to terrain (including sandbars, shoals, mud flats, and dunes).
ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION UNIQUE TO THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT
7-14. Enemy forces have the ability to take multiple actions unique to the maritime environment to hinder
joint operations. They use capabilities from all domains to interdict lines of communications between the
strategic support area and forward-positioned Army forces, putting forces at risk of isolation and beyond the
supporting distance from other joint force elements. Enemy forces target shipping that carries the bulk of |
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Army heavy equipment into theater and the pre-positioned equipment already in theater as part of their
preclusion and isolation approaches. While Army forces can take measures to protect equipment already in
theater, they are dependent upon the other Services for the protection of people, equipment, and supplies in
transit.
7-15. Threats may employ asymmetric tactics to reinforce
their area denial (AD) approaches throughout a region, Defeating enemy forces before they
capitalizing on the vulnerability of isolated friendly locations can generate superior combat power
lacking adequate protection. Locations that cannot be and expand lodgments is critical.
reinforced or supported by other elements of the joint force are
particularly vulnerable. Attacks by enemy special operations and naval forces are difficult for Army forces
to detect and counter without proper positioning and preparation. Anticipating possible enemy courses of
action in one region that would support a broad theater-wide outcome should drive friendly priorities of
planning and preparation.
7-16. Enemy forces may use proxy forces to destabilize regional partners, further delaying Army forces from
safely accessing basing and lines of communications. Proxy forces can facilitate enemy reconnaissance,
surveillance, and disruption of joint operations. They can also affect access to sea-lanes and airports for
transportation, hindering the resupply of island bases, and limiting the ability to reinforce forward-positioned
friendly forces through attacks on bases and base clusters.
7-17. Enemy surface-to-surface and surface-to-air fires systems are critical to the layered defense and early
warning systems necessary to attack forward-positioned friendly forces with little warning. These systems
simultaneously prevent reinforcement or support of those friendly forces. Enemies position robust and
integrated air and missile defenses, early warning surveillance radars, and electronic warfare capabilities that
range elements of the U.S. joint force put them at risk during competition, crisis, and conflict. Enemy medium
range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, and air and naval forces also put friendly forces at
risk. This combination of systems warfare approaches threatens land-based forces even when they do not
directly target them, since land-based forces require the support of air and maritime forces for sustainment,
early warning, and protection.
ARMY-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS
7-18. Commanders and staffs account for multiple considerations
Forward-based Army forces in
when planning and executing operations in a maritime
range of adversary fires require
environment. Counter-reconnaissance by Army forces on an
significant hardening for
island requires a 360-degree approach to avoid surprise.
survivability against enemy ballistic
Responding to threats requires highly mobile capabilities that missiles, aircraft, naval fires, and
mass effects against enemy forces quickly. Although threats can cyberspace attacks. Forward-based
approach from any direction to achieve surprise, there are Army forces can defend critical joint
constraints in terms of where enemy forces are able to land during infrastructure when properly
an amphibious or air assault and range constraints that might positioned and prepared.
cause aircraft to favor certain approaches. Intelligence preparation
of the battlefield requires an understanding of air and maritime avenues of approach and their relationship to
a particular land mass or grouping of land masses.
7-19. Army forces positioned at existing bases within the range of adversary long-range fires establish
primary and alternate survivability positions for themselves while providing air and missile defense (AMD)
and local security to airbases and ports. They may also be required to defend against amphibious assaults,
and airborne or air assault operations by enemy forces seeking to control a particular land area or destroy
critical infrastructure. Army forces operating on islands with austere infrastructure and resources require
significant sustainment during prolonged operations.
7-20. Land areas able to accommodate significant military forces in strategically or operationally important
areas are scarce in maritime environments, and what is available is already a known point for enemy planners.
This makes surveillance of friendly activities simpler, affecting the ability to achieve surprise or avoid being
surprised. It also makes the process of enemy observation, information collection, and subsequent targeting |
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faster and more effective. The implications, with regard to friendly forces concealing and protecting
themselves, are significant.
7-21. The British defeat in Malaya is a historical example of a poorly executed defense at both the operational
and tactical levels. It also is an example of a peer threat exploiting superior planning, leadership, and
aggressive action across multiple domains to overcome numerical inferiority against a defending force.
Faulty Assumptions—Defeat Across Multiple Domains in Malaya
On 8 December 1941, Imperial Japanese forces launched the invasion of Malaya from
their strongholds in French Indochina. Japanese intelligence suggested that General
Yamashita’s 70,000 troops were outnumbered nearly 2 to 1, so he concluded that only
a bold, rapidly executed attack with aggressive, well-trained troops would ensure
victory. The British Empire was decisively engaged in North Africa, the battle of the
Atlantic, and the defense of the home islands. While it deployed additional ground,
naval, and air units to Singapore, the combination of time, distance, and demands in
other theaters made further reinforcement unlikely. Those forces that arrived before
the commencement of hostilities had little time to train or prepare for operations against
an opponent of unknown quality in an unfamiliar environment.
The allied defense of Malaya rested on several false assumptions. First, allied forces
assumed there would be sufficient warning of an attack, which in turn, would allow for
adequate air and naval reinforcements. The few major naval reinforcements (the
battleship Prince of Wales and battle cruiser Repulse) were sunk, and the aircraft
rapidly lost against a qualitatively superior Japanese air arm. The Allies assumed that
the dense jungle terrain would impede enemy ground movement and simplify defense
of the peninsula; but it actually hindered the defenders more than the Japanese. They
assumed the enemy main effort would come from the sea, which was the most heavily
fortified part of their defense. It did not. They assumed their air force to be superior to
that of the Japanese. It was not. They also assumed that the British and
Commonwealth troops were better trained than the Japanese Army. They were not.
These beliefs cost the Allies and provided an opportunity for the Japanese forces.
The Japanese launched a successful night amphibious assault on the northern coasts
of Malaya and advanced south along the eastern coast. They also made simultaneous
landings in Thailand, just north of the Malaya border, and sent units south into the
interior and along the west coast. The Allies attempted to slow the Japanese advance
with prepared positions along the roads and by destroying bridges, but the Japanese
repeatedly bypassed or enveloped static positions by moving off the roads and
conducting amphibious landings. On 10 December, Japan sank the last major allied
naval units and achieved air supremacy.
By 27 January 1942, allied forces had retreated across the strait onto the island of
Singapore. Japan subsequently invaded Singapore on 7 February and completed its
conquest on the 15th. In just over two months, Yamashita’s 25th Army of 70,000 troops
decisively defeated a defending force of over 140,000 soldiers at the cost of just under
10,000 casualties. Yamashita’s use of speed, maneuver, and surprise allowed him to
dictate the operational tempo of the invasion. He ably exploited opportunities provided
by the Japanese air and naval forces while generating his own with aggressive
maneuver on the ground. The simultaneous presentation of multiple dilemmas across
the air, maritime, and land domains led to the largest surrender of British forces in
history. (See figure 7-1 for a map of operations in Malaya.) |
3-0 | 184 | Chapter 7
Figure 7-1. Operations in Malaya
SECTION II – MARITIME ENVIRONMENT PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL
FRAMEWORK
Amphibious warfare requires the closest practicable cooperation by all the combatant
services, both in planning and execution, and a command organization which definitively
assigns responsibility for major decisions throughout all stages of the operation...
Admiral Henry K. Hewitt
7-22. Planning for operations in maritime environments requires commanders and staffs carefully consider
the operational environment. Commanders and staffs need to consider that applying an operational
framework in a maritime environment is significantly different than applying an operational framework to a
land operation. |
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PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR A MARITIME ENVIRONMENT
7-23. Planning for operations on land in maritime environments requires a high level of complex detail to
coordinate the movement and landing of troops, equipment, and supplies by air and surface means. The
success of Army operations in the maritime environment are uniquely dependent on unity of effort and
integrated, collaborative planning with joint headquarters and subordinate echelons.
7-24. The joint force commander (JFC) for major maritime operations is typically a senior naval officer. The
JFC ensures unity of effort across the joint force and ensures the task and purpose of Army operations nest
with the overall joint operational concept. Despite the physical distances and relative isolation typically
associated with land operations in a largely maritime environment, Army commanders must maintain
situational understanding through joint collaboration to ensure their operations or activities do not have a
negative effect on other operations or units. This includes maintaining situational awareness during
movement, which requires direct and continuous integration of Army personnel into the command and
control (C2) nodes of Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force units. This may also include integration with
multinational amphibious or maritime units.
7-25. Army corps, divisions, and brigades supporting or reporting to JFCs must understand the joint planning
process and contribute to it even as they conduct parallel planning using Army processes with their
subordinate echelons. This directly contributes to the successful execution of operations across an extended
battlefield, where long distances and sporadic network connectivity affect the situational awareness and
synchronization of forces. (See JP 5-0 for additional information on planning and execution of the joint
planning process.)
7-26. Planning for operations in maritime environments requires collaboration between Army forces and
other relevant components of the joint force command and integration across warfighting and joint functions
at each echelon. Ideally, planning should be conducted by commanders and their staffs in the same location,
which in some cases may be aboard a ship or in the air. When this is not practical, the exchange of liaison
officers facilitates planning functions. Planning efforts—particularly in crisis situations—are conducted in
parallel and collaboratively across the involved echelons and Services. This is crucial for any assault
operation conducted across extended maritime distances. Integrated planning is facilitated by using
operational planning teams formed around planners from functional areas that include subordinate and
supporting command liaison officers. Aligning Army warfighting function cells with the joint functions
enables integrated planning.
APPLYING THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
7-27. Applying the operational framework in maritime environments requires commanders and staffs to
consider the impacts of maritime surface areas and integration with maritime forces. It also requires a
different appreciation about what constitutes deep, close, and rear operations in relation to each other. The
physical separation of forces by bodies of water affects considerations of mutual support since many
operations are likely to involve noncontiguous AOs. Army echelons may have responsibilities for
information collection of maritime surface areas and for providing fires into maritime and littoral regions in
support of other Services. Army forces may be required to defend against enemy amphibious assaults,
requiring tactical level coordination with Navy and Marine Corps forces. Army forces may also conduct
amphibious landings or airborne and air assault operations over water in support of joint operations.
Operations that were previously considered close, such as forcible entry, can extend into a deep area based
on distance between islands or sea bases. Tactical support areas may be separated by extended distances and
require the use of watercraft or other joint capabilities to support tactical level sustainment or tactical
maneuver forces to secure sea lines of communications.
ASSIGNING A JOINT OPERATIONS AREA WITHIN AN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
7-28. The Unified Command Plan designates the AOR. Within that AOR, a larger maritime environment
might have several joint operations areas to facilitate C2 and resource prioritization. For example, United
States Indo-Pacific Command may designate a JOA for operations in the South China Sea and a JOA for
operations in Korea. Both JOAs require unique C2, movement and maneuver, sustainment, intelligence, fires,
and protection planning and resources. This also includes the designation of an appropriate land component |
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headquarters and staff to facilitate joint integration specific to that JOA and the particular Army operations
within it. A JOA is established for operations within an AOR that is specialized or limited in its scope or
duration, and a JFC directs military operations as a joint task force (JTF).
DESIGNATING A JOINT SECURITY AREA
7-29. Within the JOA, the JFC designates numerous joint security areas (JSAs). In a maritime environment,
JSAs can be separated by considerable distances, and they probably will not be with areas that are actively
engaged in combat. A theater army headquarters or theater sustainment command (TSC) may be required to
conduct theater sustainment operations from a single designated JSA or from multiple locations, depending
on mission requirements. Army forces may also be designated to secure the JSA and critical intermediate
staging bases. (See JP 3-10 for additional information on planning and execution of operations in the JSA.)
ASSIGNING AN AREA OF OPERATIONS
7-30. An AO is the operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces. The JFC assigns
land areas of operations. The designation of subordinate AOs in a maritime environment enables freedom of
action, maintains tempo, and maximizes available combat power. Larger island land masses may allow Army
forces to operate with a contiguous AO, with the unit boundaries directly adjacent to each other. Smaller
archipelagic island chains may require a noncontiguous AO and may even leave some islands within a
designated AO completely unoccupied by friendly forces depending on the operational requirements and
threat. Figure 7-2 illustrates a notional corps area of operations with significant maritime aspects.
Figure 7-2. Notional corps area of operation with maritime aspects |
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Deep Operations in Maritime Environments
7-31. Deep operations in a maritime environment may focus on defeating enemy antiaccess (A2) and AD
capabilities to set conditions for joint offensive operations using information collection, special operations
forces, and fires. They may also focus on reconnaissance and security activities in support of joint defensive
operations using the same capabilities. In either situation, Army intelligence capabilities support operations
in the extended deep area, enabling the JFC to understand and visualize the operational environment before
shaping with fires or maneuver forces in subsequent operations. Army fires assets may also be designated in
a support role to other component commands, providing suppression of enemy air defense for aerial attack
of island-based enemy forces or surface fires to defeat enemy naval forces. Joint forcible entry operations, to
include the amphibious landing of Army forces, may seize key terrain to begin or exploit the disintegration
of an enemy A2 or AD approach in a specific joint operations area (JOA).
Close Operations in Maritime Environments
7-32. Close operations in a maritime environment may
Seizure or defense of key terrain may be
appear much the same as a traditional land-based
necessary for placement of surface-to-
approach discussed in Chapter 6. Seizing key terrain surface or surface-to air-fires capabilities to
requires Army forces to conduct offensive operations, enable other component commands.
which can include airborne, air assault, and amphibious
assaults. Close operations also include defense of islands and island-based nodes that facilitate joint
operations, such as airfields and ports. Given the isolated nature of some forward-deployed Army forces
critical to the success of joint operations, those forces may be required to conduct defensive operations for
extended periods until additional forces arrive. Sustainment planning should assume isolation for periods of
several weeks or more.
Rear Operations in Maritime Environments
7-33. Rear operations in a maritime environment include those necessary to set and sustain the theater and
facilitate combat operations for the joint force. These operations include conducting protected reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and conducting theater sustainment. RSOI could occur
thousands of miles away from where a unit would be employed in combat. These operations require increased
joint integration during the planning process to ensure prioritization of critical joint resources and to mitigate
risk to vulnerable and extended air and sea lines of communications.
7-34. Sustainment and protection operations are associated with support areas, enabling the building and
preservation of combat power. While forces positioned on land masses have their own support areas, large
expanses of water may require waterborne or airborne transportation for the staging and movement of
personnel and equipment between various echeloned support areas. Support areas may be sea based or land
based on islands, connected by sea or air lines of communications. These strategic and tactical support areas
are critical assets that can be vulnerable to enemy attack, and they typically require increased security
considerations, such as anti-submarine and theater AMD.
SECTION III – OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A MARITIME
ENVIRONMENT
A landing on a foreign coast in the face of hostile troops has always been one of the most
difficult operations of war.
Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart
7-35. In a predominantly maritime JOA, naval and air components are typically the key components of the
JFC’s operational approach. Army forces develop a nested operational approach that reflects and supports
the JFC plan. This section details what Army forces consider to successfully nest their operational approach
with the joint force. (See ATP 5-0.1 for a more detailed discussion on the Army’s recommendations for
developing operational approaches. See JP 5-0 for a more detailed discussion of the joint operations planning
processes.) |
3-0 | 188 | Chapter 7
ESTABLISH COMMAND AND CONTROL
7-36. Given the size of an AOR for most maritime environments and the distance between land areas, there
may be multiple active JOAs, each with separate headquarters. Maritime environments impose significant
challenges for theater army signal and sustainment architecture. Subordinate ARFORs rely on maritime and
space capabilities to overcome these challenges.
DEFEND AND CONTROL KEY TERRAIN
7-37. Friendly forces are stationed or positioned in dispersed forward positions in maritime theaters, and
often have been there for decades to facilitate joint operations throughout a maritime theater. Their locations
are typically key or even decisive terrain, which requires that Army forces must also be able to defend and
control that terrain. Their ability to do so is a function of survivability that depends on active and passive
defense measures, reinforcement with critical weapons systems, hardening and camouflaging of command
posts, securing critical C2 networks, sustainment, and the employment of protection-oriented land forces.
Providing active and passive AMD, to include early warning, reduces the effectiveness of enemy long-range
fires or attack. Forward-positioned forces must be prepared to fight outnumbered and from exposed terrain,
specifically islands, for as long as is required. This increases the need for security throughout the AOR and
forward-positioned sustainment capabilities. Army forces enhance the protection of their own less mobile
assets by continually improving the survivability of their positions.
7-38. Retaining critical island terrain through an effective defense, one that includes counterreconnaissance
and security operations, is vital for the success of the JFC’s objectives to deny enemy forces a relative
advantage. Retaining key land masses enables joint freedom of action for operations in the air and maritime
domains, since land-based capabilities can maintain a persistent physical presence that lessens requirements
on air and naval forces to secure avenues of approach. Defeating enemy C2 systems is key to defeating
layered standoff, A2 weapons, early warning, and enemy reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. The
ability to maintain key terrain for access and security enables the JFC to employ key long-range fires and
protection capabilities. This enables regional access during armed conflict critical for maritime freedom of
navigation and air superiority. Denying enemy access to limited terrain, sea channels, airspace, and
cyberspace by occupying key terrain is crucial to creating an advantage. As there is no easy exfiltration from
an exposed island base or maneuver to positions outside of enemy fires ranges, the physical reinforcement of
bases may be critical to the success of Army forces in enabling joint force success.
PROTECTION SUPPORT TO THE DEFENSE
7-39. The ability to protect and augment the security of the other Services is critical in maritime theaters
because of the relative isolation of the forces they position forward and the exposure of those forces to threat
capabilities that could be employed with few indications or warnings. The following tasks directly support
theater setting and are critical to the success of joint maritime operations:
(cid:122) AMD, to include counter-unmanned aircraft systems (UASs).
(cid:122) Littoral defense.
(cid:122) Area security (base and base cluster defense).
(cid:122) Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense.
(cid:122) Explosive ordnance disposal support.
(cid:122) General, combat, and geospatial engineering support.
7-40. Ground-based theater-level AMD assets are typically operational control (OPCON) to the Army air
and missile defense command (AAMDC) for the JOA. The AAMDC is assigned to the theater army and
generally placed in support of the area air defense commander. Army short-range air defense (SHORAD)
units are assigned or attached to theater, corps, or division commands, and are OPCON to air defense artillery
(ADA) commanders at these echelons. Army forces provide security for designated high priority assets,
including layering SHORAD assets into the security plan as part of a defended asset list. The JFC normally
delegates authority to the joint force air component commander, as the area air defense commander, for
engagements of air and missile threats. When the JFC organizes the joint force, in addition to a joint force
air component commander, the JFC also normally designates an area air defense commander for defensive |
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