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2-0 | 58 | Chapter 2
2-38. Table 2-6 lists several operational aspects and intelligence, threat, and other OE considerations
associated with the cyberspace domain.
Table 2-6. Cyberspace domain operational aspects and intelligence and other considerations
Cyberspace domain
The cyberspace domain is the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunication networks, computer systems, embedded processors and controllers, and relevant portions of the electromagnetic spectrum
(FM 3-0). Cyberspace is not constrained by geography; it is an extensive and complex global network of wired and wireless links connecting
nodes that reach across every domain. Friendly, enemy, adversary, and host-nation networks, communications systems, computers, cellular
phone systems, social media, and technical infrastructure are all part of cyberspace. The cyberspace domain is congested, contested, and
critical to successful operations. (See FM 3-12.)
Operational aspects Army intelligence considerations Threat and other OE considerations
• Army intelligence must—
▪Leverage the intelligence architecture, including
intelligence from the intelligence and
cyberspace communities about the cyberspace
domain.
▪Collaborate, participate in exercises, and build
intelligence relationships with U.S. Cyber
Command, other Services, CCMDs, and UAPs.
• Space domain depends on the land,
maritime, air, and space domains. ▪Understand USCYBERCOM, Army, joint,
• CO use links and nodes located in these and other Service cyberspace and EW
domains and perform functions to gain capabilities.
access and create effects, first in ▪Build an understanding of and integrate with Threat capability examples:
cyberspace and then in other domains. unique Army cyberspace capabilities and • Information warfare intent and objectives
• Space operations depend on organizations such as ARCYBER, in the cyberspace domain. (This can
cyberspace; space capabilities provide ARCYBER G-2, and the Cyber Military have global effects.)
critical portions of cyberspace bandwidth. Intelligence Group. • Offensive CO against friendly forces.
• Inherently joint, interorganizational, ▪ Build an electromagnetic order of battle in • Defensive cyberspace capabilities.
multinational, and often a shared conjunction with the cyberspace community. • Cyberspace infrastructure with
resource with signal and intelligence • Support other Services, CCMDs, and UAPs: specifications and nodes.
units and organizations. ▪Support all measures to counter threat • EW capabilities, to include meaconing,
• Army forces conduct CO and supporting information warfare, misinformation, and jamming, and decoys.
activities as part of both Army and joint disinformation in the cyberspace domain, as • Disruption of friendly space capabilities.
operations. authorized. Other OE examples:
• Commanders and staffs use cyberspace ▪Support cyberspace domain target • Cyberspace (nonground)
and EW capabilities to gain situational development on certain threat capabilities, communications, including cellular
awareness and understanding of the as appropriate. coverage.
enemy. ▪Support the joint identification of threats to • Cyberspace providers and ground
• Cyberspace and EW capabilities enable key friendly cyberspace capabilities, as infrastructure, including power
decision making, protect friendly appropriate. generation and networks.
information, and inform and influence • Provide Army forces— • Computer, information technology, and
audiences. ▪Coordinated electromagnetic spectrum associated commercial advancements.
• To achieve an information advantage, actions, in terms of signals intelligence. • Other associated emerging technologies
the commander and staff must integrate ▪Support to EW activities. such as nano computers and quantum
EW activities and CO: computing.
▪Ensures command and control and ▪Support to CO and cybersecurity.
maintains operations security. • Team with ARCYBER to exploit cyberspace
▪Slows or degrades enemy decision capabilities as part of intelligence support and
information collection.
making and targeting.
• Team with Army EW units to exploit EW
capabilities as a part of intelligence support
and information collection.
• Conduct signals intelligence surveys.
Note. Challenges in terms of authorities,
coordination, and deconfliction between Title 10
and Title 50 statute operations can occur. (See
paragraphs B-71 through B-74.)
ARCYBER United States Army Cyber Command FM field manual
CCMD combatant command OE operational environment
CO cyberspace operations UAP unified action partner
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command
EW electromagnetic warfare |
2-0 | 59 | Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
DIMENSIONS
2-39. Understanding the human, information, and physical dimensions of each domain assists commanders
and staffs in assessing and anticipating the impacts of their operations. Operations reflect the reality that war
is an act of force (in the physical dimension) to compel (in the information dimension) the decision making
and behavior of enemy forces (in the human dimension). Actions in one dimension influence factors in the
other dimensions. Intelligence analysts can categorize information and intelligence related to the human,
information, and physical dimensions across all domains by the following elements for each threat entity:
intent, capability, access, resources, and expertise. Understanding this interrelationship enables decision
making about how to create and exploit advantages in one dimension and achieve objectives in the others
without causing undesirable consequences. (See figure 2-4.) (See FM 3-0 for doctrine on the dimensions.)
Figure 2-4. Interrelationships between the human, information, and physical dimensions |
2-0 | 60 | Chapter 2
2-40. Table 2-7 list several operational and intelligence considerations associated with the human dimension.
Table 2-7. Operational and intelligence considerations for the human dimension
The human dimension encompasses people and the interaction between individuals and groups, how they understand information and events,
make decisions, generate will, and act within an operational environment (FM 3-0).
Operational considerations (not all-inclusive) Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
• Impossibility of isolating the human dimension from the information
Discussion:
and physical dimensions.
• The will to fight emerges from the complex interrelationship of
• Activities and effects within the human dimension. They are challenging,
culture, emotion, and behavior.
but not impossible, to understand, collect against, make predictions
• Military objectives are achieved by influencing that interrelationship.
about, and support operational planning. Human thinking, will, intent, and
• Influencing that interrelationship occurs by affecting attitudes, behavior are complex.
beliefs, motivations, and perceptions.
• Intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities conducting
• The commander and staff identify relevant actors and predict their information collection in and against the human dimension. For
behaviors. example, PAI research, OSINT, HUMINT, and identity activities can
• By understanding the operational environment, including relevant make important contributions to understanding important aspects of
actors, the commander and staff attempt to influence relevant the human dimension; however, Army forces ultimately use an all-
actors’ behaviors, decision making, and will through physical and source approach.
informational means. • IWFTs, including warning intelligence, intelligence preparation of
Human advantage: the operational environment, situation development, and
intelligence support to targeting. They assist in accounting for
• A human advantage occurs when a force holds the initiative in
aspects within the human dimension.
terms of training, morale, perception, and will.
• Center of gravity analysis, functional analysis using critical factors, the
• A human advantage enables friendly morale and will, degrades
outside-in thinking analytic technique, and thorough analysis of relevant
enemy morale and will, and influences popular support.
actors. They are critical in assisting intelligence analysts in understanding
• Examples include— the human dimension.
▪Soldier competence. • Operational variables, civil considerations (within the mission
▪The force’s health and physical fitness. variables), and a crosswalk of both operational and mission
variables. They assist intelligence analysts in considering the
▪A cultural affinity and good relations with the local population.
human dimension.
FM field manual OSINT open-source intelligence
HUMINT human intelligence PAI publicly available information
IWFT intelligence warfighting function task
2-41. Table 2-8 lists several operational and intelligence considerations associated with physical dimension.
Table 2-8. Operational and intelligence considerations for the physical dimension
The physical dimension is the material characteristics and capabilities, both natural and manufactured, within an operational environment
(FM 3-0).
Operational considerations (not all-inclusive) Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
Discussion:
• War is conducted with physical mechanisms. • Impossibility of isolating the physical dimension from the human
and information dimensions.
• Each domain is inherently physical.
• Existence of most of the threat and other operational environment
• The physical dimension includes space orbits, terrain, weather,
considerations in table 2-2 on page 2-10 within the physical
military formations, electromagnetic radiation, and weapons systems
dimension.
and their ranges.
• Activities and effects within the physical dimension. They are
• Physical activities create effects in the human and information
easier, although not easy, to understand, collect against, and
dimensions.
predict compared to threat and other relevant actor aspects of the
• The electromagnetic spectrum is one of the physical mechanisms
human and information dimensions.
that occurs across all domains.
• Proficiency of intelligence disciplines and complementary
Physical advantage:
capabilities in conducting information collection in the physical
• A physical advantage occurs when a force holds the initiative in dimension.
terms of the number and combinations of capabilities, quality of
• IWFTs, including warning intelligence, IPOE, situation
capabilities, or geographic positioning.
development, and intelligence support to targeting. They must
• Finding multiple physical advantages is typically the goal of most consider the physical dimension.
tactical operations: occupation of key terrain, physical isolation of the
• A relatively complete list of threat and other operational
enemy, and destruction of enemy units.
environment aspects. This list within the physical dimension is
• A physical advantage results in superior combat power. quite extensive.
• A physical advantage creates human and information advantages.
FM field manual IWFT intelligence warfighting function task
IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment |
2-0 | 61 | Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
2-42. Table 2-9 list several operational and intelligence considerations associated with the information
dimension.
Table 2-9. Operational and intelligence considerations for the information dimension
The information dimension is the content and data that individuals, groups, and information systems communicate and exchange, as well as the
analytics and technical processes used to exchange information within an operational environment (FM 3-0).
Operational considerations (not all-inclusive) Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
Discussion:
• Connects humans to the physical world. Information transits through • Impossibility of isolating the information dimension from the human
all domains. and physical dimensions.
• Information—true, false, or in between—is used by friendly, enemy, • Activities and effects within the information dimension. They are
adversary, and neutral actors to influence perceptions, decision challenging, but not impossible, to understand, collect against, make
making, and behaviors. predictions about, create intelligence products, conduct intelligence
• The effective employment of information depends on the audience, assessments, and support operational planning.
message, and method of delivery. • Intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities conducting
• Social media can enable the swift mobilization of people and information collection in and against the information dimension. For
resources around ideas and causes. example, PAI research, OSINT, and identity activities can make
• Disinformation can significantly and negatively affect emotions, important contributions to the intelligence effort; however, Army
perceptions, decision making, and behaviors. forces ultimately use an all-source approach.
• Information enables decision making and combat power. • IWFTs, including warning intelligence, IPOE, situation
• The information dimension is key to seizing, retaining, and exploiting development, and intelligence support to targeting. They must
the initiative and consolidating gains. account for aspects within the information dimension.
Information advantage: • Support to protecting information and disrupting threat
communications. This is not that difficult.
• An information advantage is the operational benefit derived when—
▪Friendly forces understand and exploit informational • Support to deception. This is more difficult, while support to
influencing behaviors and countering misinformation and
considerations to achieve information objectives.
disinformation are very difficult.
▪Denying the threat’s ability to achieve information objectives.
• Functional analysis with critical factors, the operational variables,
• Army forces employ human and physical aspects to gain information civil considerations (within the mission variables), and a crosswalk
advantages. of the operational and mission variables. They assist intelligence
• Most types of information advantage result from intrinsic human and analysts in considering the information dimension.
physical aspects of Army operations. • Content, data, and processes that individuals, groups, and
• An information advantage can occur in terms of— information systems use to communicate; the technical processes
▪Collecting more and better information. and analytics used to exchange information; and how relevant
▪Using relevant information more effectively. actors and populations communicate. Intelligence analysts should
highlight these.
▪Effective communications and protecting information.
• Importance of analyzing relevant actors, information processes,
▪Disrupting the threat’s communications. communications means and nodes, and computer hardware and
▪Conducting deception. software—among other aspects.
▪Influencing relevant actors’ behavior.
FM field manual OSINT open-source intelligence
IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment PAI publicly available information
IWFT intelligence warfighting function task
OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES
2-43. The operational and mission variables are tools that assist commanders and staffs in refining their
understanding of the domains and dimensions of an OE. Commanders and staffs analyze and describe an OE
in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information,
infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). The operational variables assist leaders in
understanding the land domain and its interrelationships with information, relevant actors, and capabilities
in the other domains.
2-44. Commanders analyze information categorized by the operational variables in the context of the
missions they are assigned. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to
refine their understanding of the situation and visualize, describe, and direct operations. The mission variables
are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations—each of which has informational considerations—those aspects of the human, information,
and physical dimensions that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon,
and are impacted by information (FM 3-0). The mission variables are represented as METT-TC (I). (See
FM 5-0 for doctrine on the operational and mission variables.) |
2-0 | 62 | Chapter 2
Note. METT-TC (I) represents the mission variables that leaders use to analyze and understand a
situation in relationship to the unit’s mission. The first six variables are not new. However, the
pervasiveness of information and its applicability in different military contexts requires leaders to
continuously assess various aspects of information during operations. Because of this, I has been
added to the METT-TC mnemonic. Informational considerations, expressed as a parenthetical
variable, is an important component of each variable of METT-TC that leaders must understand
in developing an understanding of a situation and the relevant portions of the OE. (See FM 3-0.)
INTELLIGENCE AND UNDERSTANDING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
2-45. Understanding the domains and dimensions of an OE requires aggressive information collection and
thorough intelligence analysis across echelons—from the joint level, where there are sophisticated
capabilities, to the lowest tactical echelon. However, analyzing and understanding the domains and
dimensions of an OE are not an end in and of themselves; information from the domains and dimensions
must also feed the operational and mission variables. This ultimately results in the commander and staff
reaching adequate situational understanding and visualizing, describing, and directing operations. Figure 2-5
concisely illustrates how to understand an OE and continuously focus and refine information from the
domains and dimensions to support operations.
Figure 2-5. Understanding an operational environment |
2-0 | 63 | Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
2-46. Understanding an OE is complex. The intelligence staff and intelligence analysis contribute to
analyzing and describing the relevant aspects of the domains and dimensions through the operational and
mission variables specific to a unit’s mission. Through participation with the entire staff, the intelligence staff
leads and/or performs an important role in—
⚫ Understanding the domains and dimensions in time and space and identifying OE changes,
including their causes and impacts.
⚫ Identifying how human behaviors and beliefs and information impact the physical dimension of
operations.
⚫ Identifying one or more centers of gravity, depending on the echelon and situation.
⚫ Functional analysis.
⚫ Developing adversary and enemy threat models and identifying strengths and vulnerabilities
across all domains.
⚫ Identifying possible friendly and enemy windows of opportunity across the domains and
dimensions to create effects and possibly reach an advantage. Note. The intelligence staff must
view the OE from friendly and enemy perspectives and any significant neutral and other actors.
⚫ Determining how, when, and where to leverage friendly capabilities across the domains to find
and exploit friendly windows of opportunity.
⚫ Assisting the commander to visualize operations and impacts on the OE.
⚫ Framing and planning COAs and decisions during the MDMP.
2-47. The intelligence staff, primarily through continuous intelligence analysis and IPOE, assists the
commander and staff in focusing on and understanding the relevant aspects of an OE and determining in
which domains those relevant aspects reside. This allows the commander and staff to discount irrelevant
aspects of the OE. Identifying significant aspects of the OE (a substep to step 1 of IPOE) and describing
environmental effects on operations (step 2 of IPOE) are crucial in ensuring the operational and mission
variables are properly considered during the MDMP. The following also support the commander and staff’s
understanding of an OE:
⚫ Understanding domain capabilities and how they are employed and understanding the various
aspects of the dimensions are critical in synchronizing intelligence activities, to include
modifying the intelligence architecture.
⚫ In turn, intelligence synchronization supports effective collection management and intelligence
collection, which result in more focused and relevant information within the operational and
mission variables.
⚫ Leveraging specialized and detailed intelligence from the intelligence enterprise is crucial to the
effort.
⚫ Collaborating with each staff section and across the intelligence enterprise provides additional
depth to understanding each domain and its interdependencies.
⚫ Accessing joint target system analysis (TSA) and joint target development products can be
useful when trying to understand domain capabilities and interdependencies.
⚫ Army forces, especially when preparing for armed conflict during competition, must conduct
Army analysis of threat systems through a federated target production effort.
⚫ The following IWFTs also support understanding an OE (see appendix B):
▪ Conduct pre-mission analysis of the OE.
▪ Provide warnings.
▪ Provide intelligence support to targeting (including target value analysis).
▪ Perform situation development. |
2-0 | 64 | Chapter 2
2-48. Figure 2-6 illustrates several ways that intelligence supports understanding an OE.
Figure 2-6. How intelligence supports understanding an operational environment
SECTION III – FUNDAMENTALS OF OPERATIONS
2-49. Understanding operational doctrine starts with understanding the higher-level doctrinal concepts in
FM 3-0. Intelligence professionals must understand these fundamental concepts as well as how the
intelligence warfighting function nests within them. In this manner, intelligence professionals can use the
correct terminology and proper concepts in their dealings with the supported commander and staff and fellow
intelligence professionals. This ensures the credibility of the professionals and the intelligence warfighting
function.
2-50. The primary purpose of intelligence is to effectively support operations. Intelligence professionals
must understand intelligence fundamentals and basic Army operational doctrine to provide effective and
flexible intelligence support. This also assists intelligence professionals in understanding how commanders
and staffs integrate and synchronize intelligence into operations as well as ensuring they are an effective
part of the combined arms team. |
2-0 | 65 | Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
ARMY OPERATIONS
2-51. The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained
land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. It supports four strategic
roles for the joint force. Army forces shape OEs, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during
large-scale combat, and consolidate gains. The Army fulfills its strategic roles by providing forces for joint
campaigns that enable the integrated deterrence of adversaries outside of conflict and the defeat of enemies
during conflict or war.
2-52. Army forces achieve objectives through the conduct of operations. An operation is a sequence of
tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1, Volume 1). Operations vary in many ways.
They occur in all types of physical environments, including urban, subterranean, desert, jungle, mountain,
maritime, and arctic. Operations vary in scale of forces involved and duration. Operations change various
conditions in the human, information, and physical dimensions of an OE and how these dimensions
interrelate.
2-53. The complex environment in which operations occur demands leaders who understand both the science
and art of operations. Understanding the science of operations—such as combat power ratios, weapons
ranges, and movement tables—assists leaders in improving synchronization and reducing risk. However,
there is no way to eliminate uncertainty, and leaders must exercise operational art to make decisions and
assume risk. Intangible factors, such as the impact of leadership on morale, using shock effect to defeat enemy
forces, and supportive populations, are fundamentally human factors that can overcome physical
disadvantages and often decide the outcomes of an operation.
2-54. Army forces must be prepared for the most demanding and dangerous types of operations. Army forces
contribute to conventional deterrence through their demonstrated capability, capacity, and will to wage war
on land in any environment against any opponent. Credible combat forces with lethal capabilities make the
other instruments of national power more potent, and they assist in deterring the enemy’s escalation of
violence during other types of operations. (See FM 3-0 for doctrine on Army operations.)
2-55. Effective and flexible intelligence support assists the Army with the challenges and complexity
associated with a broad variety of and significant differences between the types of Army operations and the
OE factors that affect those operations. Army commanders, staffs, and the intelligence warfighting function
must leverage the intelligence enterprise and fight for intelligence to grapple with these issues. While
intelligence is complex and threats, especially peer threats, can counter at least some of the intelligence
capabilities and collection assets, Army commanders and staffs can overcome these issues. Every Army
echelon can mitigate these challenges through the commander owning the intelligence effort, effective staff
integration, and creative and adaptive information collection to overcome existing information collection
gaps. Together, these aspects of fighting for intelligence ensure success, whether the operation is a large-
scale combat operation, foreign humanitarian operation, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, or a
noncombatant evacuation.
MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS
2-56. Multidomain operations is the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create
and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf
of joint force commanders (FM 3-0). Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available
combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at the least cost. Multidomain operations are the
Army’s contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum. Below the threshold of armed
conflict, multidomain operations are how Army forces accrue advantages and demonstrate readiness for
conflict, deterring adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, they are how Army forces
close with and destroy the enemy, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations
and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes. |
2-0 | 66 | Chapter 2
2-57. Leaders must understand the interdependencies between their own assigned forces and the forces or
capabilities provided by others to generate the complementary and reinforcing effects of combined arms
approaches. Army forces employ joint and other unified action partner capabilities to the extent they are
available. However, because peer threats can contest the force in all domains, Army forces must be prepared
to conduct operations when some or all joint capabilities are unavailable to support mission accomplishment.
2-58. Army forces employ organic capabilities in multiple domains, and they continuously benefit from air
and maritime strategic transportation and space and cyberspace capabilities that they do not control, including
global positioning, satellite communications, and joint ISR. Lower echelons may not always notice the
opportunities created by higher echelons or other forces that operate primarily in other domains; however,
leaders must understand how the absence of those opportunities affects their concepts of operations, decision
making, and risk assessment. Like all operations, Army intelligence is and has been inherently multidomain
in terms of the intelligence process.
RELATIVE ADVANTAGE
2-59. During operations, small advantages can have significant impacts on the outcome of a mission,
particularly when they accrue over time. Therefore, creating and exploiting relative advantages are necessary
for all operations, and they become even more critical when opposing sides are evenly matched. A relative
advantage is a location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an
opportunity to progress towards or achieve an objective (FM 3-0). Commanders seek and create relative
advantages to exploit through action, and they continually assess the situation to identify ways to expand
opportunities. Army forces must accurately see themselves, see the enemy or adversary, and understand their
OE before they can identify and exploit windows of opportunity to reach a relative advantage; this is one
way that intelligence is critical to operations.
2-60. Army leaders are accustomed to creating and exploiting relative advantages through the combined-
arms approach that traditionally focuses on capabilities from the land, maritime, and air domains. The
proliferation of space and cyberspace capabilities further requires leaders who understand the advantages
those capabilities create in their OE. The ability to integrate space, counterspace, and cyberspace capabilities
(which can vary by echelon) expands options for creating advantages to exploit. Multidomain operations
fracture the coherence of threat operational approaches by destroying, dislocating, isolating, and
disintegrating their interdependent systems and formations, and by exploiting the opportunities these
disruptions provide to defeat enemy forces in detail.
2-61. Army forces combine maneuver and targeting methods to defeat enemy formations and systems. Army
forces employ maneuver to close with and destroy enemy formations in close operations. Targeting priorities
support fires and other key capabilities to disintegrate enemy networks and systems. The commander and
staff must consider the various situational understanding-related requirements and targeting-related
intelligence requirements and prioritize them accordingly.
Note. Generally, a thorough situational understanding is necessary to conduct effective targeting.
Leaders execute the targeting process to create advantages that enable freedom of maneuver and
exploit the positional advantages created by maneuver. Targeting is a key means for leaders to
integrate the joint capabilities required to create depth in the OE and protect friendly formations.
WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY, RELATIVE ADVANTAGES, AND INTELLIGENCE
2-62. Reaching a position of relative advantage across multiple domains does not just happen. Friendly forces
must find and exploit a window of opportunity to reach a relative advantage. This effort is closely related to
planning and creating desired effects (through lethal and nonlethal means) during operations. These windows
of opportunity could be considered subtasks of or a main task to reaching a position of relative advantage. Both
a position of relative advantage and a window of opportunity are doctrinal concepts and not concrete graphic
planning measures such as named areas of interest (NAIs) or decision points. However, a creative staff should
be able to graphically portray a window of opportunity through a series of related existing graphic planning
measures like NAIs, decision points, target areas of interest (TAIs), and engagement areas. |
2-0 | 67 | Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
2-63. Identifying a possible window of opportunity (in time, location, domains, and possibly dimensions),
planning operations, and controlling operations to exploit the window of opportunity requires focused
intelligence analysis. Therefore, Army forces require timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to
understand threat characteristics, capabilities, objectives, and COAs across domains when relevant to the
mission. Intelligence initially drives the combinations of defeat mechanisms that commanders and staffs pursue
as they employ friendly force capabilities, sometimes precisely in time and space, against enemy forces.
2-64. During IPOE, each staff element provides input, ensuring a sufficiently broad view of the OE.
Subsequently, the IPOE effort assists in identifying windows of opportunity to exploit threat vulnerabilities.
For example, the air defense artillery staff element’s input to IPOE about enemy IADS capabilities and
vulnerabilities may present the friendly commander with a possible window of opportunity. The gaps
identified during initial IPOE and the requirements developed during the subsequent steps of the MDMP
would drive information collection requirements to confirm the window of opportunity, support further
planning, and support the exploitation of the window of opportunity. (See ATP 2-01.3 for IPOE doctrine.)
2-65. Besides IPOE, building a relatively complete situational understanding (supported by intelligence
situation development) across all domains and dimensions is required to see opportunities, seize the initiative,
and exploit enemy vulnerabilities at a window of opportunity. Seeing and understanding when and how to
isolate portions of the OE in one or more domains must be supported by the intelligence warfighting function
across echelons and include leveraging the intelligence enterprise. (See figure 2-7.) Friendly forces may not
be able to continually maintain an adequate level of situational understanding to exploit every window of
opportunity. In these situations, friendly forces must either accept a greater degree of risk or wait until they
can rebuild an adequate level of situational understanding to exploit a window of opportunity.
Figure 2-7. Finding windows of opportunity by building situational understanding
2-66. During large-scale combat operations against a peer threat, ground-force commanders may be required
to conduct tactical activities, such as a deliberate attack, to open a window of opportunity for further
exploitation by the joint force. For example, the destruction of specific enemy IADSs within a time window
and at specific locations may allow friendly joint suppression of enemy air defense operations. This, in turn,
may allow a deep strike that could result in the destruction of key enemy capabilities and lead to a relative |
2-0 | 68 | Chapter 2
advantage. Figure 2-8 depicts a scenario based on this example of a window of opportunity and exploiting
the window of opportunity.
Figure 2-8. Window of opportunity and exploiting the window of opportunity (example)
LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
2-67. The Army is manned, equipped, and trained to operate in all operational scenarios or categories,
starting with the most lethal conditions first—large-scale combat against a peer threat. Large-scale combat
operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted
as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives (ADP 3-0). During ground combat,
they typically involve operations by multiple corps and divisions and include substantial forces from the joint
and multinational team. Large-scale combat operations often include both conventional and irregular forces
on both sides. Chapter 4 discusses large-scale combat operations as part of armed conflict.
2-68. The Army provides the joint force commander (JFC) significant and sustained landpower and
intelligence capabilities. Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and
exploit control over land, resources, and people (ADP 3-0). The Army supports the joint force by providing
capabilities and capacity to apply sustained combined arms landpower. Those capabilities include maneuver,
fires, special operations, intelligence, EW, cyberspace operations, space operations, sustainment, and area
security. Army forces assist JFCs in gaining and maintaining the initiative, defeating enemy forces on the
ground, controlling territory and populations, and consolidating gains to establish conditions for a political
settlement favorable to U.S. interests.
2-69. The JFC applies Army capabilities to neutralize sophisticated enemy forces and capabilities by
systematically destroying key nodes and capabilities essential to the enemy’s ability to continue fighting
and/or legitimizing its messaging. The joint force requires Army special operations forces and conventional
Army units that are proficient in combined arms operations and capable of employing capabilities across
multiple domains in complementary ways. By aggressively engaging the enemy, Army forces enable joint
force freedom of action. Army intelligence capabilities are an integral part of joint ISR across all unified
action partners. (See FM 6-05 for doctrine on special operations forces and conventional force integration.)
COMBINED ARMS AND COMBAT POWER
2-70. Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater
than if each element was used separately or sequentially (ADP 3-0). Leaders combine arms in complementary
and reinforcing ways to protect capabilities and amplify their effects. Confronted with a constantly changing
situation, leaders create new combinations of capabilities, methods, and effects to pose new dilemmas for |
2-0 | 69 | Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
adversaries. The combined arms approach to operations during competition, crisis, and armed conflict is
foundational to exploiting capabilities from all domains and dimensions.
2-71. Complementary capabilities compensate for the vulnerabilities of one system or organization with the
capabilities of a different one. Infantry protects tanks from enemy infantry and antitank systems, while tanks
provide mobile protected firepower for the infantry. Ground maneuver can make enemy forces displace and
become vulnerable to joint fires, while joint fires can disrupt enemy reserves and C2 to enable operations on
the ground. Cyberspace and space capabilities and EW can prevent enemy forces from detecting and
communicating the location of friendly land-based fires capabilities, and Army fires capabilities can destroy
enemy ground-based cyberspace nodes and EW platforms to protect friendly communications.
2-72. Reinforcing capabilities combine similar systems or capabilities to amplify the overall effects a
formation brings to bear in a particular context. During urban operations, for example, infantry, aviation, and
armor units working in close coordination reinforce the protection, maneuver, and direct fire capabilities of
each unit type while creating cascading dilemmas for enemy forces. Army artillery can be reinforced by close
air support, air interdiction, and naval surface fire support. This greatly increases both the mass and range of
fires available to a commander. Space and cyberspace capabilities used to disrupt enemy communications
can reinforce a brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) ground-based jamming effort to increase the disruption to
enemy C2. Military information support operations can amplify the effects of physical isolation on an enemy
echelon, making it more vulnerable to friendly force exploitation.
2-73. The organic composition, training, and task organization of Army units set conditions for effective
combined arms. Throughout operations, commanders assess the OE and adjust priorities, change task
organization, and request capabilities to create exploitable advantages, extend operational reach, preserve
combat power, and accomplish missions.
2-74. Combat power is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can
apply against an enemy at a given time (JP 3-0). To generate combat power and apply it against enemy forces,
Army forces integrate capabilities and synchronize warfighting functions—groups of tasks and systems
united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADP 3-0).
The intelligence warfighting function is synchronized with the other warfighting functions to generate each
dynamic—leadership, firepower, information, mobility, and survivability—of combat power (see FM 3-0).
(See figure 2-9.)
Figure 2-9. Generating combat power
2-75. The warfighting functions provide an intellectual organization for common critical capabilities
available to commanders and staffs at all echelons and levels of warfare. Warfighting functions are not
confined to a single domain; they typically include capabilities from multiple domains. Warfighting functions
are not branch-specific. Although some branches, staff sections, and types of units have a role or purpose
that mainly aligns with a warfighting function, each warfighting function is relevant to all types of units. |
2-0 | 70 | Chapter 2
2-76. Through the warfighting functions, well sustained units can move and maneuver to bring combat power
to bear against the enemy. Joint and Army indirect fires complement and reinforce organic firepower in
maneuver units. Survivability is a function of protection tasks, the protection inherent to Army platforms,
and schemes of maneuver that focus friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. Intelligence determines
how and where to best apply combat power against enemy weaknesses. C2 enables leadership, the most
important qualitative aspect of combat power.
2-77. Intelligence professionals must understand the value of their role within the combined arms approach
to generating combat power through the dynamics of leadership, firepower, information, mobility, and
survivability. The combined arms approach creates complementary and reinforcing effects by employing
the warfighting functions, which are primarily synchronized by the C2 warfighting function. In this manner,
the intelligence warfighting function plays a key role in combined arms. To a large extent, understanding
the OE, planning operations, controlling ongoing operations, and conducting operational assessments begin
with intelligence. Effective intelligence staff activities and intelligence operations result from intelligence
synchronization, careful planning, and tailoring the use of intelligence capabilities and the intelligence
architecture specifically for that unit’s operation.
MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS: THE ARMY’S OPERATIONAL
CONCEPT
2-78. The Army’s operational concept is multidomain operations. Multidomain operations are how Army
forces contribute to and operate as part of the joint force. Army forces, enabled by joint capabilities, provide
the lethal and resilient landpower necessary to defeat threat standoff approaches and achieve joint force
objectives.
2-79. The employment of joint and Army capabilities, integrated across echelons and synchronized in a
combined arms approach, is essential to defeating threats able to contest the joint force in all domains. Army
forces integrate land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities that facilitate maneuver to create
human, information, and physical advantages that JFCs exploit across the competition continuum.
Commanders and staffs require the knowledge, skills, attributes, and intelligence to integrate capabilities
rapidly and at the necessary scale appropriate to each echelon.
2-80. During competition, theater armies strengthen landpower networks, set the theater, and demonstrate
readiness for armed conflict through the C2 of Army forces supporting the command campaign plan. During
crisis, theater armies provide options to combatant commanders (CCDRs) as they facilitate the flow and
organization of land forces moving into theater. During armed conflict, theater armies enable and support the
joint force land component commander’s (JFLCC’s) employment of land forces. The JFLCC provides C2 of
land forces and allocates joint capabilities to its corps and other subordinate tactical formations.
2-81. Corps integrate joint and Army capabilities at the right tactical echelons and employ divisions to
achieve JFLCC objectives. Divisions, enabled and supported by corps, defeat enemy forces, control land
areas, and consolidate gains for the joint force. Defeating or destroying enemy capabilities that facilitate the
enemy’s preferred layered standoff approaches is central to success. For example, ground-force commanders
may be required to conduct tactical activities, such as a deliberate attack, to shape the environment to gain a
position of relative advantage for activities, such as joint fires, within the other domains. Ultimately,
operations by Army forces both enable and are enabled by the joint force.
2-82. Because uncertainty, degraded communications, and fleeting windows of opportunity characterize OEs
during combat, multidomain operations require a disciplined initiative cultivated through a mission command
culture. Leaders must have a bias for action and accept that some level of uncertainty is always present.
Commanders who empower leaders to make rapid decisions and accept risk within the commander’s intent
enable formations at echelon to adapt rapidly while maintaining unity of effort. (See ADP 6-0 for doctrine
on the mission command approach.) |
2-0 | 71 | Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
Multidomain Task Force
The multidomain task force (MDTF) is one way that Army units integrate capabilities across
domains to assist in achieving joint force objectives. An MDTF is an Army brigade-sized task
force designed to coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and employ cross-domain fires to
neutralize enemy A2 and AD strategies. MDTF operations allow more options for the joint
force and a greater degree of freedom of maneuver. The MDTF has the following MI
capabilities:
• The MDTF S-2 is the principal staff officer for intelligence and synchronizes the intelligence
warfighting function.
• The multidomain effects battalion (MDEB) provides sensing and intelligence support, target
development, and delivery and synchronization of nonlethal effects to the MDTF. The
MDEB provides mission C2, planning, analysis, execution as well as company-level staff
support functions.
▪ The MDEB S-2 section performs IPOE to assist the commander and staff’s
visualization, planning, decision making, and nonkinetic effects employment.
▪ The MDEB has an organic MI company that answers the commander’s intelligence
requirements and conducts SIGINT collection and technical analysis, OSINT,
intelligence PED, and intelligence analysis to support multidomain operations. The MI
company also coordinates with the fires cell for target development across the strategic
contexts to create a relative advantage. (See ATP 2-19.1-1 and ATP 3-93.)
Note. All Army units conduct multidomain operations, not just MDTFs.
2-83. Army intelligence supports all aspects of multidomain operations across all echelons—from the
CCDR and staff to the Army maneuver battalion commander and staff. Joint intelligence supports critical
joint force objectives such as neutralizing enemy integrated air defenses, destroying long-range surface-to-
surface fires systems, denying enemy access to a designated area, disrupting enemy C2, protecting friendly
networks, conducting military deception, or disrupting an enemy’s ability to conduct information warfare.
These operations are enabled by precise and detailed joint intelligence on threat capabilities and
vulnerabilities across all domains. Seeing and understanding when and how the joint force isolates portions
of the OE in one or more domains are important to Army operations.
2-84. Army intelligence is inherently multidomain, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational through the intelligence enterprise. The Army synchronizes with unified action partners to
provide effective and flexible intelligence across multiple domains and to reduce operational uncertainty.
Through the Army IWFTs, intelligence professionals across the echelons support how commanders and
staffs plan, make decisions, and control operations in and across the various domains and dimensions. Using
the various tools and processes discussed under understanding an OE, the intelligence staff strives to
support continuous situational understanding to allow Army units to see opportunities, seize the initiative,
and exploit enemy vulnerabilities to open windows of opportunity and reach positions of relative advantage.
2-85. The optimal mix of leveraging partner, national, and joint capabilities and conducting aggressive
Army information collection are necessary to defeat threat A2 and AD capabilities and support friendly
long-range precision fires. Emerging Army deep sensing capabilities will assist in improving Army lethality
at a greater depth. Deep sensing is the employment of capabilities beyond the division coordinated fire
line to collect data and information that supports targeting, situational understanding, or decision
making. |
2-0 | 72 | Chapter 2
TENETS OF OPERATIONS
2-86. The tenets of operations are desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations; they
are directly related to how the Army’s operational concept should be employed. Commanders use the tenets
of operations to inform and assess COAs throughout the operations process. The extent to which an operation
exhibits the tenets provides insight into the probability of success. The tenets of operations are agility,
convergence, endurance, and depth.
2-87. The Army provides forces capable of transitioning to combat operations, fighting for information,
producing intelligence, adapting to unforeseen circumstances, and defeating enemy forces (agility). Army
forces employ capabilities from multiple domains in a combined arms approach that creates complementary
and reinforcing effects through multiple domains, while preserving combat power to maintain options for the
JFC (convergence). Creating and exploiting relative advantages require Army forces to operate with
endurance and in depth. Endurance enables the ability to absorb the enemy’s attacks and press the fight over
the time and space necessary to accomplish the mission. Depth applies combat power throughout the OE,
securing successive operational objectives and consolidating gains for the joint force. Table 2-10 lists several
intelligence considerations for the tenets of operations.
Table 2-10. Intelligence considerations for the tenets of operations
Tenet of operations Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
• Intelligence preparation of the operational environment:
Agility is the ability to move forces and adjust their ▪Terrain and weather analysis.
dispositions and activities more rapidly than the enemy ▪Careful consideration of threat capabilities in conjunction with threat
(FM 3-0). Agility requires sound judgment and rapid characteristics and threat models.
decision making, often gained by creating and exploiting ▪Situation templates.
information advantages. Agility requires leaders to ▪Event templates and associated event matrices.
anticipate needs or opportunities and trained formations • Collection management.
to change direction, tasks, or focus as quickly as the • Support to rapid decision making and risk management.
situation requires. Change can include a transition
• Input to decision support templates and to branches and sequels.
between phases of an operation or the requirement to
• Support to information advantage activities.
adapt to a new opportunity or hazard.
• Support to identifying windows of opportunity and relative advantages.
• Continuous updates to the CIP and intelligence portion of the COP.
• Intelligence preparation of the operational environment:
▪Significant civil considerations.
Convergence is an outcome created by the concerted ▪Detailed situation templates. For example, templating threat logistics and lines
employment of capabilities from multiple domains and of communications.
echelons against combinations of decisive points in any ▪Event templates and associated event matrices.
domain to create effects against a system, formation, ▪High-value targets.
decision maker, or in a specific geographic area (FM 3-0).
• Understanding the domains and dimensions through pre-mission analysis of the
Its utility derives from understanding the interdependent
operational environment.
relationships among capabilities from different domains
• Collection management and effectively using intelligence handover lines.
and combining those capabilities in surprising, effective
• Input to decision support templates.
tactics that accrue advantages over time. When
• Support to functional analysis and center of gravity analysis.
combined, the complementary and reinforcing nature of
each friendly capability present multiple dilemmas for • Support to information advantage activities.
enemy forces and produce an overall effect that is greater • Support to identifying windows of opportunity and relative advantages.
than the sum of each individual effect. The greater the • Support to targeting:
extent to which forces achieve convergence and sustain it ▪Analyzing threat systems and conducting target value analysis.
over time, the more favorable the outcome. ▪Developing target intelligence folders.
▪Conducting subsequent target development.
• Continuous updates to the CIP and intelligence portion of the COP.
Endurance is the ability to persevere over time • Intelligence preparation of the operational environment: Careful consideration
throughout the depth of an operational environment and templating (situation and event templates) of threat activities in the rear area
(FM 3-0). Endurance enhances the ability to project (friendly operational framework).
combat power and extends operational reach; it is about • Collection management.
resilience and preserving combat power while continuing • Counterintelligence primary mission areas (not the same as force protection;
operations for as long as is necessary to achieve the see paragraphs 1-66 through 1-68).
desired outcome. During competition, Army forces • Input to protection activities.
improve endurance by setting the theater across all • Input to security operations.
warfighting functions and improving interoperability with • Input to decision support templates.
allies and other unified action partners. Endurance stems • Support to targeting.
from organizing, protecting, and sustaining a force. • Continuous updates to the CIP and intelligence portion of the COP. |
2-0 | 73 | Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
Table 2-10. Intelligence considerations for the tenets of operations (continued)
Tenet of operations Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
• Intelligence preparation of the operational environment:
Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or
purpose to achieve definitive results (ADP 3-0). While the ▪Terrain and weather analysis.
focus of endurance is friendly combat power, the focus of ▪Detailed situation templates, especially in the deep area (friendly operational
depth is enemy locations and dispositions across all framework).
domains. Commanders achieve depth by understanding ▪Event templates and associated event matrices.
the strengths and vulnerabilities of the enemy’s echeloned ▪High-value targets.
capabilities and then attacking them throughout their • Understanding the domains and dimensions through pre-mission analysis of the
dispositions simultaneously and sequentially. Although operational environment.
simultaneous attacks through all domains in depth are not • Collection management and effectively using deep sensing.
possible in every situation, leaders seek to expand their
• Input to decision support templates.
advantages and limit enemy opportunities for sanctuary
• Support to targeting, especially deep operations and long-range precision fires.
and regeneration. Leaders describe the depth they can
• Support to information advantage activities.
achieve in terms of operational reach.
• Continuous updates to the CIP and intelligence portion of the COP.
ADP Army doctrine publication COP common operational picture
CIP common intelligence picture FM field manual
IMPERATIVES OF OPERATIONS
2-88. Imperatives are actions Army forces must take to defeat enemy forces and achieve objectives at an
acceptable cost. They are informed by the OE and the characteristics of the most capable threats that Army
forces can encounter. The imperatives of operations include—
⚫ See yourself, see the enemy, and understand the OE.
⚫ Account for being under constant observation and all forms of enemy contact.
⚫ Create and exploit relative human, information, and physical advantages in pursuit of decision
dominance.
⚫ Make initial contact with the smallest element possible.
⚫ Impose multiple dilemmas on the enemy.
⚫ Anticipate, plan, and execute transitions.
⚫ Designate, weight, and sustain the main effort.
⚫ Consolidate gains continuously.
⚫ Understand and manage the effects of operations on units and Soldiers.
2-89. Table 2-11 lists several intelligence considerations for the imperatives of operations.
Table 2-11. Intelligence considerations for the imperatives of operations
Imperative Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
• Applicable to most intelligence warfighting function tasks.
• Understanding the domains and dimensions through pre-mission analysis of the
OE in conjunction with cultural intelligence and civil information.
See yourself, see the enemy, and understand the OE.
• Intelligence preparation of the OE: enemy COA development.
Commanders visualize OEs in terms of factors that are
• Collection management.
relevant to decision making. OEs are dynamic and
• Functional analysis and center of gravity analysis (corresponds to defeat
contain vast amounts of information that can overload C2
mechanisms [see FM 3-0]).
systems and impede decision making. Commanders
• Collaboration with the entire staff to facilitate situational and shared understanding of
simplify information collection, analysis, and decision
friendly and threat strengths and vulnerabilities and potential impacts across the OE.
making by focusing on how they see themselves, see the
• Assisting the commander and staff in understanding friendly combat power in
enemy, and understand the OE. These three categories
relation to the threat correlation of forces analysis.
of factors are interrelated, and leaders must understand
• Advising the commander on intelligence requirements development.
how each one relates to the others in the current context.
• Developing and maintaining a running estimate and the CIP.
• Input to the military decision-making process.
• Support to security operations and protection activities. |
2-0 | 74 | Chapter 2
Table 2-11. Intelligence considerations for the imperatives of operations (continued)
Imperative Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
• Considering threat collection across all domains and dimensions and integrating
that into the planning and execution of operations.
• Multidisciplined intelligence threat assessments and associated countermeasure
recommendations.
• Counterintelligence primary mission areas.
• Intelligence preparation of the OE:
▪Modified combined obstacle overlays.
▪Observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles,
Account for being under constant observation and all
and cover and concealment (OAKOC=military aspects of terrain).
forms of enemy contact.
Air, space, and cyberspace capabilities increase the ▪Considering the forms of contact, including influence. (See paragraphs 8-30
likelihood that threat forces can gain and maintain and 8-31.)
continuous visual and electromagnetic contact with Army ▪Terrain analysis.
forces. Enemy forces possess a wide range of land-, ▪Terrestrial and space weather analysis, with an emphasis on weather effects,
maritime-, air-, and space-based intelligence, surveillance, in conjunction with the Air Force staff weather officer.
and reconnaissance capabilities that can detect U.S. ▪Line of sight analysis.
forces. Leaders must assume they are under constant ▪Electromagnetic reconnaissance.
observation from one or more domains and continuously
▪Identifying enemy reconnaissance objectives.
ensure they are not providing lucrative targets for the
• Support to counterreconnaissance, including counter-unmanned aircraft system
enemy to attack.
operations.
• Input to essential elements of friendly information.
• Support to counterspace operations.
• Support to deception operations.
• Input to obscuration operations.
• Input to the various forms of security across all security operations and activities,
including electromagnetic emission control measures, unit dispersion
techniques, operations security, information security, and physical security.
Create and exploit positions of physical, information,
and human advantage in pursuit of decision
dominance. • Intelligence preparation of the OE:
The employment of lethal forces is based on the premise ▪Situational understanding of domain and dimension interrelationships.
that destruction and other physical consequences compel
▪Identifying enemy decision makers (with supporting identity intelligence), C2
enemy forces to change their decision making and
networks with capabilities and vulnerabilities, objectives and intent, and
behavior, ultimately accepting defeat. The type, amount,
possible key decision points.
and ways in which lethal forces compel enemy forces
• Collection management.
varies, and this depends heavily on enemy forces, their
capabilities, goals, and the will of relevant populations. • Support to the military decision-making process.
Understanding the relationship between physical, • Support to identifying windows of opportunity and relative advantages.
information, and human factors enables leaders to take • Support to information advantage activities.
advantage of every opportunity and limit the negative
effects of undesirable and unintended consequences.
Make initial contact with the smallest element
possible.
Army forces are extremely vulnerable when they do not
sufficiently understand the disposition of enemy forces and
become decisively engaged on terms favorable to enemy
• Intelligence preparation of the OE: COA development.
forces. To avoid being surprised and incurring heavy losses,
• Collection management.
leaders must set conditions for making enemy contact on
• Support to rapid development of situational understanding.
terms favorable to the friendly force. Leaders should
• Input to information collection—cueing, redundancy, and mix considerations
anticipate when and where to make enemy contact, the
across domains and dimensions.
probability and impact of making enemy contact, and
actions to take on contact. Quickly applying multiple
capabilities against enemy forces while preventing the bulk
of the friendly force from being engaged itself requires
understanding the forms of contact. |
2-0 | 75 | Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
Table 2-11. Intelligence considerations for the imperatives of operations (continued)
Imperative Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
Impose multiple dilemmas on the enemy.
Imposing multiple dilemmas on enemy forces complicates
their decision making and forces them to prioritize among
• Intelligence preparation of the OE:
competing options. This is a way of seizing the initiative and
making enemy forces react to friendly operations. ▪Situational understanding of domain and dimension interrelationships.
Simultaneous operations encompassing multiple domains— ▪Identifying enemy C2 networks with capabilities and vulnerabilities.
conducted in depth and supported by deception—present ▪COA development.
enemy forces with multiple dilemmas. Employing ▪Event templates and associated event matrices.
capabilities from multiple domains degrades enemy • Support to the military decision-making process.
freedom of action, reduces enemy flexibility and endurance,
• Support to targeting.
and disrupts enemy plans and coordination. The application
• Support to deception efforts.
of capabilities in complementary and reinforcing ways
creates more problems than an enemy commander can
solve. This erodes enemy effectiveness and the will to fight.
Anticipate, plan, and execute transitions.
• Input to information collection.
Transitions mark a change of focus in an operation.
• Collection management with emphasis on collection transitions.
Leaders plan transitions as part of the initial plan or parts
• Input to the military decision-making process.
of a branch or sequel. They can be unplanned and cause
• Input to consolidating gains, branches, and sequels.
the force to react to unforeseen circumstances.
• Continuous updates to the CIP and intelligence portion of the COP.
Transitions can be part of progress toward mission
accomplishment, or they can reflect a temporary setback. • Support to assessments, including measures of performance and effectiveness.
Designate, weight, and sustain the main effort.
Commanders frequently face competing demands for
limited resources. They establish priorities to resolve • Intelligence preparation of the OE with emphasis on terrain analysis.
these demands by designating, weighting, and sustaining • Assisting the commander and staff in understanding friendly combat power in
the main effort. They provide the main effort with the relation to the threat correlation of forces analysis.
appropriate resources and support necessary for its • Support to identifying defeat mechanisms.
success. When designating a main effort, commanders • Collection management.
consider augmenting a unit’s task organization and giving • Support to information collection.
it priority of resources and support. The commander • Input to the military decision-making process.
designates various priorities of support, such as for air • Support to targeting.
and missile defense, close air support and other fires, • Continuous updates to the CIP and intelligence portion of the COP.
information collection, mobility and countermobility, and
sustainment.
Consolidate gains continuously.
Leaders add depth to their operations in time and purpose
when they consolidate gains. Commanders consolidate
gains at the operational and tactical levels as a
strategically informed approach to current operations,
• Collection management.
considering the desired political outcome of the conflict.
• Counterintelligence primary mission areas.
During competition and crisis, commanders expand
• Support to security operations and protection activities.
opportunities created from previous conflicts and activities
• Evaluating time windows for effects to appear within the OE.
to sustain enduring U.S. interests, while improving the
• Support to stability activities or operations.
credibility, readiness, and deterrent effect of Army forces.
During large-scale combat operations, commanders • Continuous updates to the CIP and intelligence portion of the COP.
consolidate gains continuously or as soon as possible,
deciding whether to accept risk with a more moderate
tempo during the present mission or in the future as large-
scale combat operations conclude.
Understand and manage the effects of operations on
units and leaders.
Continuous operations rapidly degrade the performance of
people and the equipment employed, particularly during
combat. In battle, Soldiers and units are more likely to fail
• Engagement with intelligence staff members.
catastrophically than gradually. Commanders and staffs
• Focusing on training to improve combat effectiveness.
must be alert to small indicators of fatigue, fear, indiscipline,
• Staff member recuperation.
and reduced morale; they must take measures to deal with
• Military intelligence unit engaged leadership.
these indicators before their cumulative effects drive a unit
to the threshold of collapse. Staffs and commanders at
higher echelons must consider the impact of prolonged
combat on subordinate units. This causes efficiency to drop,
even when physical losses are not great.
C2 command and control FM field manual
CIP common intelligence picture OE operational environment
COA course of action U.S. United States
COP common operational picture |
2-0 | 76 | Chapter 2
OPERATIONAL APPROACH AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
2-90. An operational approach provides the logic for how tactical tasks ultimately achieve the desired end
state. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations. Sound operational approaches balance risk
and uncertainty with friction and chance. The operational approach provides the basis for detailed planning,
allows leaders to establish a logical operational framework, and assists in producing an executable order.
(See ADP 3-0 and ADP 5-0 for doctrine on operational art and planning, respectively.)
2-91. An operational framework organizes an area of geographic and operational responsibility for the
commander and provides a way to describe the employment of forces. The framework illustrates the
relationship between close operations, operations in depth, and other operations in time and space across
domains. As a visualization tool, the operational framework bridges the gap between a unit’s conceptual
understanding of the environment and its need to generate detailed orders that direct operations.
OPERATIONAL APPROACH
2-92. Through operational art, commanders develop their operational approach—a broad description of the
mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). An operational
approach is the result of the commander’s visualization of what needs to be done in broad terms to solve
identified problems. It is the main idea that informs detailed planning. When describing an operational
approach, commanders—
⚫ Consider ways to defeat enemy forces in detail and potential decisive points. Defeat in detail is
concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating
the entire force at once (ADP 3-90).
⚫ Employ combinations of defeat mechanisms to isolate and defeat enemy forces, functions, and
capabilities.
⚫ Assess options for assuming risk.
2-93. Table 2-12 lists several operational and intelligence considerations for operational approach.
Table 2-12. Operational and intelligence considerations for operational approach
Operational approach Operational and intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
Defeating enemy forces in detail
Armed conflict implies the need to defeat enemy forces. • Understanding the commander’s intent.
Defeat is to render a force incapable of achieving its • Evaluating enemy forces in the context of all the relevant domains and
objectives (ADP 3-0). When used as a task or effect in dimensions of an operational environment.
operations, defeat provides the commander maximum • Understanding threat functions, capabilities, and echelonment.
flexibility to accomplish the mission. Senior leaders assign • Understanding how the enemy may employ capabilities.
defeat as a task when the situation is still developing, or • Identifying enemy strengths and vulnerabilities.
when the commander on the ground, by virtue of • Comparing enemy vulnerabilities to friendly advantages to identify decisive
experience and proximity to the problem, is uniquely points (key terrain, key events, critical factors or functions) to achieve
capable of deciding how to employ lethal force to convergence.
accomplish objectives.
• Defeat mechanisms:
Defeat mechanisms ▪Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force
Defeat mechanism is a method through which friendly combat-ineffective until reconstituted (FM 3-90).
forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition ▪Dislocate is to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage in one
(ADP 3-0). Army forces at all echelons commonly use
or more domains, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps
combinations of the four defeat mechanisms. Applying
even irrelevant (FM 3-0).
more than one defeat mechanism simultaneously creates
▪Isolate is to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its
multiple dilemmas for enemy forces and complementary
effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat (ADP 3-0).
and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single
mechanism. Commanders may have an overarching ▪Disintegrate is to disrupt the enemy’s command and control, degrading the
defeat mechanism or combination of mechanisms that synchronization and cohesion of its operations (FM 3-0).
accomplish the mission, with supporting defeat • Providing information to confirm/deny if friendly actions created the desired
mechanisms for components of an enemy formation or effects and met the commander’s requirement.
warfighting system. Defeat mechanisms can guide the • Conducting functional analysis and center of gravity analysis.
subordinate development of tactical tasks, purposes, and • Providing intelligence support to targeting.
effects in operations, facilitating control and initiative. • Providing intelligence support to combat assessment: battle damage
assessment, physical damage assessment, and functional damage assessment. |
2-0 | 77 | Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
Table 2-12. Operational and intelligence considerations for operational approach (continued)
Operational approach Operational and intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
• Stability mechanisms:
▪Compel refers to using, or threatening to use, lethal force to establish control
and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with
mandates, agreements, or civil authority.
Stability mechanisms ▪Control involves imposing civil order.
A stability mechanism is the primary method through ▪Influence refers to altering the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior
which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain of foreign, friendly, neutral, and threat audiences through messages,
conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable presence, and actions.
peace (ADP 3-0). As with defeat mechanisms, ▪Support establishes, reinforces, or sets the conditions necessary for the
combinations of stability mechanisms produce instruments of national power to function effectively.
complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish • Conducting pre-mission analysis of the operational environment in conjunction
the mission more effectively than single mechanisms. with cultural intelligence and civil information.
• Performing intelligence preparation of the operational environment.
• Using measures of performance and effectiveness to assess operations.
• Considering the instruments of national power.
• Considering the operational variables and civil considerations.
• Leaders considering risk across the domains. Accepting risk in one domain may
Risk create opportunities in other domains.
Commanders accept risk on their own terms to create
• G-2/S-2s recommending risk assumptions to friendly forces based on threat forces.
opportunities and apply judgment to manage those
• Commanders determining how to impose risk on enemy forces.
hazards they do not control. Risk is an inherent part of
• Presenting multiple dilemmas and increasing the number and severity of
every operation and cannot be avoided. Commanders
hazards with which enemy forces must contend.
analyze risk in collaboration with subordinates to assist in
• Providing commanders data to assess risk. Intelligence is necessary to assess
determining the risk level and type and how to mitigate
and assume risk.
the risk. When considering how much risk to accept with a
• Continuous situation development.
course of action, commanders consider risk to the force
• Providing intelligence support to protection.
against the probability of mission success during current
and future operations. They assess options in terms of • Considering human and information factors that govern how friendly and enemy
weighting the main effort, economy of force, and physical forces and other relevant actors assess costs and benefits and calculate risk.
loss based on what they have been tasked to do. • Waiting for near-perfect intelligence and synchronization. This may increase risk
or close a window of opportunity.
ADP Army doctrine publication FM field manual
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
2-94. The strategic framework accounts for factors in the strategic environment and the connection of
strategic capabilities to operational- and tactical-level operations. It includes the strategic support area, joint
security area, extended deep area, and assigned operational area.
2-95. The strategic framework has importance in terms of joint operations and Army operational-level
operations. For most Army operations, understanding the Army operational framework in the context of the
strategic framework, is important. (See figure 2-10 on page 2-34). (See FM 3-0, JP 3-0, and JP 3-10.)
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
2-96. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly
visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the
concept of operations (ADP 1-01). Commanders build their operational framework on their assessment of
the OE, including all domains and dimensions. They may create new models to fit the circumstances, but
they generally apply a combination of common models according to doctrine. The three models commonly
used to build an operational framework are—
⚫ Assigned areas.
⚫ Deep, close, and rear operations.
⚫ Main effort, supporting effort, and reserve.
Note. Commanders may use any operational framework model they find useful, but they must
remain synchronized with their higher-echelon headquarters’ operational framework. (FM 3-0
provides a detailed discussion on each model.) |
2-0 | 78 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-10. The Army operational framework in the context of the strategic framework
2-97. Intelligence professionals must understand and properly use the doctrinal terminology, concepts, and
considerations for the operational framework. Table 2-13 lists several intelligence considerations for the three
operational framework models.
Table 2-13. Intelligence considerations for operational framework
Operational framework models Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
• Interrelationships of domains and dimensions and
associated impacts.
An area of operations is an operational area • Enemy capabilities in each domain.
defined by a commander for the land or maritime • Higher-echelon and adjacent-unit information collection
force commander to accomplish their missions and capabilities.
protect their forces (JP 3-0). • Evaluation of time windows for effects to appear within
the area of operations.
Assigned areas
• Intelligence handover lines, as appropriate.
A zone is an operational area assigned to a unit in
the offense that only has rear and lateral boundaries • Location of NAIs, EAs, and TAIs.
(FM 3-0).
A sector is an operational area assigned to a unit in • Location of NAIs, EAs, and TAIs.
the defense that has read and lateral boundaries • Location of friendly battle positions supported by
and interlocking fires (FM 3-0). information collection capabilities.
Within assigned areas, commanders organize their operations in time, space, and purpose by synchronizing deep, close, and rear operations.
Across all operations, the G-2/S-2 must determine how to support consolidating gains optimally to capitalize on tactical successes.
• Synchronizing the intelligence effort with close and rear
areas, including the use of intelligence handover lines.
• Setting conditions for future close operations.
• Targeting and disintegrating enemy structures and
Deep operations are tactical actions against enemy systems, including the high-value targets needed for
forces, typically out of direct contact with friendly the close fight.
Deep operations
forces, intended to shape future close operations • Disrupting enemy freedom of action, coherence, and
and protect rear operations (FM 3-0). tempo.
• Support to deception.
• Support to electromagnetic warfare.
• Integrating intelligence between special operations
forces and conventional forces. |
2-0 | 79 | Multidomain Operations and Intelligence
Table 2-13. Intelligence considerations for operational framework (continued)
Operational framework models Intelligence considerations (not all-inclusive)
Close operations are tactical actions of subordinate
maneuver forces and the forces providing immediate • Information collection supporting the maneuver of
Close operations support to them, whose purpose is to employ subordinate formations.
maneuver and fires to close with and destroy enemy • Identifying enemy reserve assets.
forces (FM 3-0).
• Support to security operations and protection activities.
• Identifying bypassed forces.
Rear operations are tactical actions behind major • IPOE, support to protection, and situation development
subordinate maneuver forces that facilitate in order to support possible threats to the rear area, for
Rear operations
movement, extend operational reach, and maintain example, enemy special operations forces, air assaults,
desired tempo (FM 3-0). terrorists, partisan forces, stay-behind forces, air
attacks, cyberspace attacks, long-range fires, and
chemical attacks.
When supporting the main effort, supporting effort, and the reserve, intelligence synchronization across echelons is critical. The information
collection effort must be synchronized across all operations to reduce the possibility of collection gaps.
• Terrain analysis.
A main effort is a designated subordinate unit • Collection assets available.
Main effort whose mission at a given point in time is most critical • Threat use of denial and deception.
to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). • Location of EAs, NAIs, and TAIs.
• Location of enemy counterattack forces and reserve.
A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit
• Collection assets available.
Supporting effort with a mission that supports the success of the main
• Location of enemy counterattack forces and reserve.
effort (ADP 3-0).
• Terrain analysis to determine optimal location for the
placement of the reserve to support main and
A reserve is that portion of a body of troops that is supporting efforts.
withheld from action at the beginning of an • Collection assets available before and during
Reserve
engagement to be available for a decisive commitment.
movement (ADP 3-90). • Location of enemy counterattack forces and reserve.
• Positioning of collection assets to exploit main and
supporting effort successes.
ADP Army doctrine publication JP joint publication
EA engagement area NAI named area of interest
FM field manual TAI target area of interest
IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment |
2-0 | 81 | Chapter 3
Integrating the Intelligence Warfighting Function
SECTION I – INTEGRATING AND SYNCHRONIZING INTELLIGENCE
3-1. Leadership is the most essential dynamic of combat power, and it is the commander who provides
purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the unit or organization. Leaders
must be able to thoroughly understand the given mission, current situation, and how the OE may impact the
mission. Therefore, leaders must integrate and synchronize intelligence into operations. This facilitates
understanding an OE and assists in determining when and where to employ capabilities against adversaries
and enemies.
3-2. Leaders must provide their formations, including the intelligence warfighting function, direction,
guidance, and a sense of purpose. To do this, leaders must be knowledgeable of intelligence fundamentals,
the intelligence process, the intelligence warfighting function, intelligence capabilities, the intelligence
architecture, and how they can be leveraged to support the operations process.
3-3. Commanders and staffs at all levels synchronize intelligence with the other warfighting functions to
maximize their ability to simultaneously visualize the OE and accomplish the required tasks and activities.
The effective use of intelligence capabilities enhances the capability of the combined arms team to create and
concentrate combat power and minimize risk.
3-4. The integration and synchronization of the warfighting functions, including the intelligence
warfighting function, are important for mission success. While the intelligence warfighting function is
somewhat complex, its integration is doctrinally no different than the integration of the other warfighting
functions and no less important. Figure 3-1 illustrates the integration of the intelligence warfighting function,
accomplished through planning methodologies, integrating processes, and a unit’s battle rhythm.
Figure 3-1. Integrating and synchronizing the intelligence warfighting function |
2-0 | 82 | Chapter 3
SECTION II – THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER AND STAFF
3-5. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1, Volume 2). C2 is fundamental
to the art and science of warfare. (See FM 6-0.) No single specialized military function, either by itself or
combined with others, has a purpose without it. Commanders are responsible for C2. Through C2,
commanders provide purpose and direction to integrate all military activities toward a common goal—
mission accomplishment. Staffs support commanders in making and implementing decisions and in
integrating and synchronizing combat power. Competent staffs multiply a unit’s effectiveness. (See
figure 3-2.)
Figure 3-2. Exercising command and control to accomplish the mission
THE COMMANDER
3-6. The commander drives intelligence, intelligence drives operations, and operations must support
information collection; this relationship is continuous. Due to the fog and friction of war, including the efforts
of determined and adaptive threat forces, commanders must fight for intelligence and then share it across
echelons and with adjacent units. The commander, based on recommendations from the intelligence staff,
tailors intelligence capabilities and intelligence operations to support the mission. The force-tailoring and
specific task organization establish an ordered command and support structure with technical channels for
intelligence operations.
3-7. Similar to the relationship with subordinate units and the rest of the staff, commanders provide the
intelligence staff guidance and continuous feedback throughout operations (see also figure 3-2) by—
⚫ Providing direction.
⚫ Providing their understanding, visualization, and description of the problem.
⚫ Directing through clearly stated intelligence requirements and priorities.
⚫ Leading and making decisions.
⚫ Continuously assessing the operation through collaboration with the G-2/S-2 during the
execution of operations.
⚫ Emphasizing the importance or close cross-staff collaboration, especially with the G-3/S-3, fire
support coordinator/chief of fires, and G-6/S-6. |
2-0 | 83 | Integrating the Intelligence Warfighting Function
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
A commander’s critical information requirement is specific information identified by the
commander as being essential to facilitate timely decision making (JP 3-0). There are two
CCIR categories: PIRs and friendly force information requirements (also called FFIRs).
CCIRs directly influence decision making and facilitate the successful execution of
operations. As discussed in paragraph 1-34, the intelligence warfighting function focuses on
answering intelligence requirements comprising PIRs, targeting intelligence requirements,
and other intelligence requirements. The commander approves and prioritizes all intelligence
requirements, which drive every aspect of the intelligence process—information collection,
including collection management; intelligence PED; intelligence analysis; intelligence
production; and dissemination and integration.
3-8. The commander’s involvement and interaction enable the intelligence staff to assess how to more
effectively produce intelligence to meet the commander’s requirements. The commander’s involvement also
assists the staff in synchronizing the unit’s information collection effort with the operation. The commander
and staff should also consider some unique aspects of the intelligence warfighting function:
⚫ Operational uncertainty. Intelligence does not eliminate uncertainty entirely; to succeed,
commanders must take risks.
⚫ Driving IPOE. Make it a full staff effort. Focus the staff on those aspects of the OE that are
important to the mission (commander’s focus and priorities for analysis).
⚫ Resourcing. Resource and prioritize the intelligence warfighting function appropriately. For
example, adequate network capability and access are critical in meeting the commander’s needs.
⚫ Prioritization. Prioritize finite resources and capabilities by focusing collection and analysis on
key decisions and targeting through intelligence requirements and other means.
⚫ Continuous collection. Information collection must be continuous. Start as early in the
operations process, as feasible, and effectively transition to the next operation.
⚫ Tailoring intelligence. Clearly state what (in terms of priorities, format, and style) is needed
across the various intelligence products, especially IPOE products, the intelligence running
estimate, and the intelligence portion of the common operational picture (COP).
3-9. Building from this list, table 3-1 provides an extensive list of considerations to assist commanders and
staffs in ensuring the intelligence warfighting function is effectively integrated into operations.
Note. Table 3-1 is not intended as a checklist, a set of mandatory actions, or an all-encompassing
list of considerations.
Table 3-1. Commander and staff considerations
An effective staff team. Build the team and foster a collaborative environment that encourages critical thinking, candor, and
cooperation.
Risk. Accept necessary risks and some operational uncertainty. Intelligence cannot eliminate uncertainty. Commanders
determine the necessary risks inherent in any operation.
Guidance. Broadly and clearly share the commander’s guidance and visualization of the operation and the OE. Ensure the right
aspects of the domains and dimensions are accounted for in the operational variables and the mission variables.
Driving IPOE. Initial guidance, key participation, and periodic oversight are extremely valuable in ensuring a thorough IPOE.
Owning intelligence requirements. Personally engage in developing and approving intelligence requirements that drive operations
and targeting.
Enabling information collection. In nondoctrinal terms, information collection is the fight before the fight. Demand effective
collaboration between the G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, and rest of the staff to plan and control information collection. Allocate maneuver,
fires, and other capabilities to enable information collection and intelligence analysis and production, when necessary. Resource
the reconnaissance and surveillance network and intelligence operations sufficiently, to include providing adequate network
capability (for example, relays, bandwidth, and access).
Maximizing collection. Facilitate detailed planning on the use of organic, assigned, and attached collection, PED, and processing
capabilities such that they can be thought of as information collection pacing items. It is also important to fully leverage supporting
collection assets, external PED and analysis, and intelligence from national-level and allied and partner intelligence organizations. |
2-0 | 84 | Chapter 3
Table 3-1. Commander and staff considerations (continued)
Allocating adequate time for information collection and intelligence analysis. Sometimes, operational necessity dictates
timelines. However, sometimes, it is worth the time (tactical patience) to allow for thorough information collection, analysis, and
the production of effective intelligence products.
Owning the intelligence architecture. Emphasize its importance and facilitate teamwork between the G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2,
G-6/S-6, G-9/S-9, CEMA officer, space operations officer, and other staff members. An effective intelligence architecture is
crucial. The architecture connects each intelligence capability from national and multinational partner, joint, and higher-level
Army echelons as well as from organic and supporting intelligence collection, intelligence PED, and all-source capabilities across
the area of operations, including all command posts.
The common operational picture and intelligence products. Provide clear guidance to the G-2/S-2 on the intent and standard for
maintaining the threat portion of the common operational picture and the expectation for answering intelligence requirements.
Sharing with allied and partner forces. Ensure the intelligence staff completes information sharing coordination before the
operation and shares appropriately throughout the entire operation.
Prioritizing battle damage assessment. Prioritize the battle damage assessment effort and ensure a thorough staff analysis is
completed for battle damage assessment.
Guiding transitions. Transitions can be very tricky for the intelligence warfighting function. Early and clear guidance is integral
to effectively transitioning the intelligence warfighting function.
CEMA cyberspace electromagnetic activities IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment
G-2/S-2 division or corps/battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer PED processing, exploitation, and dissemination
G-3/S-3 division or corps/battalion or brigade operations staff officer OE operational environment
G-6/S-6 division or corps/battalion or brigade signal staff officer
G-9/S-9 division or corps/battalion or brigade civil affairs
operations staff officer
THE STAFF
3-10. This general discussion focuses on the staff and its participation in the intelligence warfighting
function. Chapter 5 discusses intelligence staff activities. The staff is a key component of the C2 warfighting
function. In addition to executing its specialized staff tasks, the staff’s primary responsibilities include
supporting the commander; assisting subordinate commanders, staffs, and units; and informing units and
organizations outside the headquarters.
SUPPORTING THE COMMANDER
3-11. Staffs support the commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the OE; making and
articulating decisions; and directing, leading, and assessing military operations. Staffs also support the
commander by—
⚫ Making recommendations and preparing plans and orders for the commander.
⚫ Producing timely and relevant information and analysis and using knowledge management to
extract that information from the vast amount of available information.
⚫ Battle tracking the ongoing operation to ensure information collection tasks are executed or
adjusted as the situation dictates.
⚫ Seeing and understanding when windows of opportunity to achieve a relative advantage open
and close, and by alerting and providing recommendations to the commander when decision
criteria are met.
⚫ Monitoring and providing recommendations to adjust the plan or tasks when the situation
changes and the anticipated decisions are no longer relevant.
PARTICIPATING IN THE INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
3-12. The entire staff is part of the intelligence warfighting function. The rest of the staff (other than the
intelligence staff) has the same obligation to participate in key intelligence processes, meetings, and working
groups just as the intelligence staff is obligated to fully engage in other warfighting function processes,
meetings, and working groups. |
2-0 | 85 | Integrating the Intelligence Warfighting Function
3-13. The intelligence staff cannot be experts in all aspects of the OE and threat capabilities. Staff members
must know certain aspects of the OE and threat capabilities related to their warfighting function or specialty.
Important activities require the entire staff to participate; this ensures the intelligence warfighting function—
⚫ Facilitates a real understanding of the many important aspects of the OE (especially when,
where, and how the threat will employ capabilities).
⚫ Assists the commander and staff’s visualization.
⚫ Supports in developing friendly COAs and recommending the best COA to the commander.
⚫ Assists in synchronizing combat power within the operation.
⚫ Supports targeting (through lethal and nonlethal means).
3-14. Some of the most important intelligence processes and activities requiring the rest of the staff’s
participation, discussed in section III, includes—
⚫ IPOE, led by the intelligence staff, especially initial IPOE during step 2 (mission analysis) of the
MDMP.
⚫ Collection management (the basis for information collection planning), led by the intelligence
staff, and information collection processes.
⚫ Any intelligence working groups, if held.
⚫ The information collection working group, if held.
SECTION III – STAFF TEAMWORK
3-15. Teamwork within a staff and between staffs produces the staff integration necessary to synchronize
operations. A staff works efficiently with complete cooperation from all staff sections. In addition to being
highly knowledgeable in their own fields, operations processes, and procedures, all staff members must be
familiar with the duties and responsibilities of other staff sections to coordinate and achieve results for the
commander. A force operates effectively in cooperation with all headquarters. Commanders and staffs
contribute to foster this positive climate during training and sustain it during operations. However, frequent
personnel changes and augmentations to their headquarters add challenges to building and maintaining a
team. While all staff sections have clearly defined functional responsibilities, none can operate effectively in
isolation; therefore, coordination is critical. Commanders ensure staff sections are properly equipped and
manned. This allows staffs to efficiently work within their headquarters and with their counterparts in other
headquarters. Commanders ensure staff integration by developing the unit’s battle rhythm, to include
synchronizing various meetings, working groups, and boards.
3-16. Staff teamwork works in both directions. The intelligence staff must fully participate in and bring its
unique perspectives, knowledge, and expertise to support the rest of the staff across the planning
methodologies, integrating processes, working groups, and other staff functions. Conversely, the same is true
of the rest of the staff supporting intelligence processes; tasks; working groups, if established; and functions.
It is important to remember that the commander and staff are part of the intelligence warfighting function.
Some of the support provided by the rest of the staff to the intelligence staff includes—
⚫ Sharing unique perspectives, knowledge, and expertise with the intelligence staff at key times
within certain intelligence tasks.
⚫ Supporting ancillary and specialized information collection capabilities (see paragraph 3-35) and
intelligence-related missions and operations (see paragraph 3-41).
3-17. Certain intelligence tasks are far more effective when the rest of staff, especially key members,
participates with the intelligence staff at key times in certain intelligence tasks. The value of staff participation
applies primarily to IPOE and collection management; it also applies to a lesser extent to pre-mission analysis
of the OE, situation development, intelligence support to targeting, and support to operational assessments.
Staff members contribute warfighting function/specialty knowledge and expertise as well as perspectives that
differ from the intelligence staff’s—all of which are invaluable. This comprehensive staff participation is
similar to the staff participation necessary to adequately conduct targeting, support protection, or any number
of other staff tasks. Despite pervasive time constraints that hinder participation in key intelligence tasks, the
lack of staff participation during initial IPOE, mission analysis, or collection management puts a unit’s
mission at risk. |
2-0 | 86 | Chapter 3
3-18. Table 3-2 lists those staff members whose contributions to key intelligence tasks enable the
effectiveness of the intelligence warfighting function. The list is not all-inclusive; staff members vary based
on the echelon and specific unit.
Table 3-2. Staff support to the intelligence warfighting function
IPOE, situation development, and Collection management
Staff section
intelligence support to targeting input participation
• Based on staff expertise, assist the • Based on staff expertise, develop
intelligence staff in analyzing and information requirements, as needed; assist
developing— the collection management team in—
▪Modified combined obstacle overlays. ▪Developing or refining indicators and
▪Civil considerations products. SIRs.
▪Threat objectives and the desired end ▪ Matching collection assets to SIRs.
All staff sections: Provide subject matter state. ▪ Developing NAIs and active time.
expertise to assist the intelligence staff in the ▪NAIs. ▪Planning the use of technical collection,
following tasks. ▪High-value targets, which become high- biometric, forensic, and document and
payoff targets. media exploitation capabilities.
▪Possible threat decision points. ▪Planning the use of ancillary collection
• Assist the intelligence staff in deciding assets from associated warfighting
what key aspects to add to the intelligence function or specialty knowledge.
portion of the common operational picture • Assist the G-3/S-3 in developing the final
and intelligence running estimate. Annex L (Information Collection).
• Provides operational experience.
• Assists in determining—
▪Friendly and enemy TAIs. • Develops threat C2 indicators, SIRs, and
▪Friendly and enemy engagement areas. NAIs.
▪Enemy time phase lines. • Develops threat reconnaissance,
surveillance, and security operations
G-3/S-3: Provides subject matter expertise on • Assists the entire staff in determining how indicators, SIRs, and NAIs.
the art and science of military operations, the threat might integrate and synchronize • Develops threat maneuver unit indicators,
including reconnaissance, surveillance, and its operations. SIRs, and NAIs.
security operations. Evaluates IPOE products • Develops threat C2 models, intent,
• Refines—
to ensure they support friendly COA vulnerabilities, and templating.
development and analysis. Plans and directs • Provides threat reconnaissance, ▪Friendly TAIs.
information collection based on collection surveillance, and security operations ▪Friendly engagement areas.
management. models; intent; vulnerabilities; and ▪Enemy time phase lines.
templating. • Effectively integrates and synchronizes
• Provides threat maneuver unit models, (feasible and supported) reconnaissance,
intent, vulnerabilities, and templating. surveillance, and security operations into
• Assists the staff in developing relative the collection management plan.
combat power matrices for friendly and
enemy forces.
• Provides threat logistics models, intent,
vulnerabilities, and templating. • Develops threat logistics and
• Templates threat supply/resupply supply/resupply indicators, SIRs, and NAIs.
G-4/S-4: Provides subject matter expertise on
routes/points. • Conducts logistics planning for technical
sustainment operations.
Note. Threat logistic activities and lack of collection and document and media
activities can be a good indicator of threat exploitation.
intent and future threat operations/COAs.
G-6/S-6: Provides subject matter expertise on
friendly communications systems and assists • Provides threat communications systems
the G-2/S-2 in identifying and evaluating models, intent, vulnerabilities, and Develops threat communications systems
friendly communications systems’ templating, including networks and nodes. indicators, SIRs, and NAIs.
vulnerabilities to cyberspace and • Conducts line-of-sight analysis.
electromagnetic attack. |
2-0 | 87 | Integrating the Intelligence Warfighting Function
Table 3-2. Staff support to the intelligence warfighting function (continued)
IPOE, situation development, and Collection management
Staff section
intelligence support to targeting input participation
• Integrates civil knowledge gained from
unified action partners working with
indigenous populations and institutions.
• Conducts ASCOPE (areas, structures,
capabilities, organizations, people, and
• Develops civil considerations and local
events) analysis.
population attitudes, “atmospherics,”
• Conducts PMESII-PT (political, military,
indicators, SIRs, and NAIs.
economic, social, information,
• Determines the local population’s impact
infrastructure, physical environment, and
on information collection.
time) analysis.
G-9/S-9: Provides subject matter expertise on • Recommends the use of developed and
• Provides civil considerations overlays with
civil affairs operations. engaged civil network as part of collection.
critical civilian infrastructure status and
• Manages the civil information collection
capabilities, and areas of cultural
plan.
significance (protected targets).
• Directs civil reconnaissance, civil
• In collaboration with unified action partners
engagement, and civil network
and the staff judge advocate, identifies
development within the operational area.
restricted fires requirements (persons and
places) for the commander.
Note. Refugees, displaced persons, and
evacuees can have a major impact on
friendly and threat operations.
• Develops threat fires indicators, SIRs, and
• Provides threat fires capabilities, models, NAIs.
intent, vulnerabilities, and templating. • Shares the high-payoff target list, target
Chief of fires/Deputy fires support • Assists in determining— synchronization matrix, attack guidance
coordinator/Fires support officer: Provides ▪Friendly TAIs. matrix, and target selection standards.
subject matter expertise on fires. • Ensures incorporation of
▪Friendly electromagnetic attack.
counterfire/counterbattery radar systems in
▪Enemy time phase lines. the collection management plan.
• Refines friendly TAIs.
• Performs checks and balances between
IPOE, subsequent operational planning,
and collection management to account for
all aspects of protection.
• Provides threat rear-area capabilities, • Develops threat rear-area capabilities
models, intent, vulnerabilities, and indicators, SIRs, and NAIs.
Chief of protection: Provides subject matter templating. In this situation, threat rear- • Plans biometric and forensic capabilities
expertise on all aspects of the protection area capabilities are threat capabilities, and identity activities as part of collection
warfighting function. units, and systems that could be used in management.
the friendly rear area to disrupt friendly • Shares the friendly critical and defended
operations. These threat capabilities can asset lists.
include terrorists, bypassed forces, stay-
behind forces, special purpose forces, or
many other threats to the friendly rear
area.
• Provides threat ADA models, intent,
Air and missile defense officer: Provides
vulnerabilities, and templating.
subject matter expertise on ADA and assists
• Determines threat air avenues of Develops threat ADA indicators, SIRs, and
the G-2/S-2 in determining the locations of
approach. NAIs.
ADA assets and potential areas of
• Identifies threat missile capabilities and
employment.
flight characteristics.
• Develops threat close air support
Air LNO (senior member of the tactical air
indicators, SIRs, and NAIs.
control party): Provides subject matter
• Provides threat close air support • Shares airspace control orders, restricted
expertise on air and space capabilities and
capabilities models, intent, vulnerabilities, operations zones, and aerial ISR taskings.
limitations as well as applies and integrates
and templating. • Operates and maintains the joint air
joint capabilities to generate multidomain
• Provides access to Air Force intelligence request net.
effects throughout an OE in direct support of
products. • Advises the staff on preparing air support
the ground commander’s intent and
requests.
guidance.
• Transmits requests for ISR support. |
2-0 | 88 | Chapter 3
Table 3-2. Staff support to the intelligence warfighting function (continued)
IPOE, situation development and Collection management
Staff section
intelligence support to targeting input participation
Aviation officer: Provides subject matter
Provides threat attack helicopter, air assault,
expertise on Army aviation assets and Develops threat attack helicopter, air assault,
and UAS (including UAS swarms)
operations, ranging from attack aviation, lift, and UAS (including UAS swarms) indicators,
capabilities, models, intent, vulnerabilities,
UASs, and fixed-wing assets at the theater SIRs, and NAIs.
and templating.
army, corps, division, and brigade levels.
• Provides threat engineer models, intent,
vulnerabilities, and templating, including
obstacle locations and mobility systems.
Engineer officer: Provides subject matter • Conducts terrain analysis and assists in
expertise on mobility/countermobility and determining—
Develops threat engineer indicators, SIRs,
assists the G-2/S-2 in developing enemy ▪Mobility corridors.
and NAIs.
obstacle plans for the enemy situation ▪Military aspects of terrain (observation
template. and fields of fire, avenues of approach,
key terrain, obstacles, and cover and
concealment [also called OAKOC])
factors.
• Provides threat CBRN capabilities, models,
CBRN officer: Provides subject matter
intent, vulnerabilities, and templating.
expertise on CBRN and assists the G-2/S-2 Develops threat CBRN indicators, SIRs, and
• Provides threat triggers for using CBRN.
in determining the locations of CBRN assets NAIs.
• Provides threat CBRN terrain and weather
and potential areas of employment.
considerations.
CEMA section: Provides subject matter
• Provides threat cyberspace and EW
expertise on information pertaining to • Develops threat cyberspace and EW
models, intent, vulnerabilities, and
doctrine, tactics, and equipment of enemy indicators, SIRs, and NAIs.
templating.
cyberspace and EW forces, and access to • Plans friendly cyberspace and EW
• Copartners to develop and maintain the
cyberspace and EW capabilities for operations collection requirements.
enemy electromagnetic order of battle.
information collection.
CEMA officer: Provides subject matter • Provides threat EW models, intent, • Develops threat EW indicators, SIRs, and
expertise on ground-based, airborne, and vulnerabilities, and templating. NAIs.
functional EW employment considerations. • Conducts line-of-sight analysis. • Plans friendly EW capabilities collection.
• Develops threat explosive ordnance
Explosive ordnance disposal officer:
(including improvised explosive devices)
Provides subject matter expertise on the Provides threat explosive ordnance (including
indicators, SIRs, and NAIs.
detection, identification, recovery, evaluation, improvised explosive devices) models, intent,
• Plans foreign ordnance and weapons
rendering safe, and final disposal of explosive vulnerabilities, and templating.
technical intelligence collection, when
ordnance.
needed.
• Provides threat information warfare
• Develops threat information warfare
Information operations officer: Provides models, intent, vulnerabilities, and
indicators, SIRs, and NAIs.
subject matter expertise on shaping templating.
• Assists the collection management team in
operational activities in and through the • Predicts threat themes and messaging in
accounting for the information dimension,
information dimension. conjunction with the intelligence staff.
when needed.
• Provides information overlays.
• Develops threat deception indicators, SIRs,
Military deception officer: Provides subject
and NAIs.
matter expertise on coordinating military Provides threat deception models, intent,
• Assists the collection management team in
deception assets and operations and vulnerabilities, and templating.
accounting for the information dimension,
influencing enemy decision makers.
when needed.
• Develops threat collection indicators, SIRs,
and NAIs, in coordination with
Operations security officer: Provides counterintelligence personnel.
Provides threat collection models, intent,
subject matter expertise on the development, • Assists the collection management team in
vulnerabilities, and templating, in coordination
organization, and administration of an accounting for the information dimension,
with counterintelligence personnel.
operations security program. when needed.
• Shares essential elements of friendly
information.
• Develops threat psychological operations
Psychological operations officer: Provides indicators, SIRs, and NAIs.
Provides threat psychological operations
subject matter expertise on synchronizing • Assists the collection management team in
models, intent, vulnerabilities, and templating.
MISO support to operations. accounting for the information dimension,
when needed. |
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Table 3-2. Staff support to the intelligence warfighting function (continued)
IPOE, situation development and Collection management
Staff section
intelligence support to targeting input participation
• Provides threat space models, intent,
Space operations officer: Provides subject vulnerabilities, and templating. • Develops threat space indicators, SIRs,
matter expertise on the space domain and • Provides space weather effects on and NAIs.
adversary space/counterspace capabilities operations. • Provides space weather effects on
and effects within the OE. • Provides threat counterspace capabilities, operations.
characteristics, and employment.
Staff judge advocate: Provides subject
Provides legal considerations to minimize Provides legal considerations to minimize
matter expertise on all types of legal matters
unnecessary collateral damage or injury to unnecessary collateral damage or injury to
and provides support and advice to the
the civilian population. the civilian population.
commander and staff.
• Identifies health threats faced by friendly
and enemy forces (injuries, diseases,
environmental, weapons effects,
physiologic and psychological stressors).
Command surgeon or medical support • Provides details on the local population’s • Develops SIRs, NAIs, and indicators
officer: Provides subject matter expertise on medical care and health factors, related to host nation medical facilities.
all medical or medical-related matters and including— • Develops SIRs, NAIs, and indicators
provides support and advice to the ▪Changes to access for medical care. related to medical-health threats.
commander and staff. ▪Sanitation issue. • Provides medical evacuation procedures
and methods.
▪Portable water supply.
▪Effects of significant health factors, for
example, insects, diseases, and other
issues.
• Produces a religious area analysis and
Chaplain: Provides religious, moral, and subsequently a religious impact
ethical advisement to the commander and assessment.
staff in areas that potentially impact the unit • Provides religious demographics, time Develops SIRs, NAIs, and indicators related
both externally and internally. (specific holidays or time of day), and to religious factors (religious, human, and
Note. Chaplains and unit ministry teams do practices. ideological) of the OE.
not collect information that would violate their • Conducts sacred sites analysis (with the
status as noncombatants. staff judge advocate) and determine
religious impact on operations.
• Promotes coordination, synchronization,
and cooperation among its parent unit and
LNO: Provides subject matter expertise from higher-echelon headquarters and
its assigned headquarters. interagency, coalition, host-nation,
Coordinates face-to-face, which is invaluable
Note. This only occurs when the LNO is adjacent, and subordinate organizations,
to sharing various collection details.
authorized security access to the IPOE and as required.
collection management processes. • Coordinates face-to-face, which is
invaluable to sharing a different
perspective on IPOE and IPOE products.
ADA air defense artillery IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment
C2 command and control ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear LNO liaison officer
CEMA cyberspace electromagnetic activities MISO military information support operations
COA course of action NAI named area of interest
EW electromagnetic warfare OE operational environment
G-2/S-2 division or corps/battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer SIR specific information requirement
G-3/S-3 division or corps/battalion or brigade operations staff officer TAI target area of interest
G-4/S-4 division or corps/battalion or brigade logistics staff officer UAS unmanned aircraft system
G-6/S-6 division or corps/battalion or brigade signal staff officer
G-9/S-9 division or corps/battalion or brigade civil affairs operations
staff officer |
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SECTION IV – THE OPERATIONS PROCESS AND INTELLIGENCE
3-19. Commanders employ the operations process to incorporate coalition and joint partners, empower
subordinate initiative, and ensure authorities and risk acceptance are delegated to the appropriate echelon for
the situation. Staffs and subordinate headquarters earn the commander’s trust by providing relevant
information, anticipating needs, and directing supporting actions. Close interaction between the commander
and the G-2/S-2 and the other staff is essential as the staff supports unit planning and preparation.
Commanders direct the intelligence warfighting function through their relationship with the G-2/S-2, the rest
of the intelligence staff, and the MI unit commander.
3-20. As shown in figure 3-3, the major activities of the operations process are—
⚫ Plan. Planning normally begins upon receipt of orders from a higher-echelon headquarters and
continues through the execution of the operation.
⚫ Prepare. Commanders, assisted by their chiefs of staff or executive officers, drive the
preparation for an operation by allocating time, prioritizing resources, and supervising
preparation activities, such as rehearsals, to ensure their forces are ready to execute operations.
⚫ Execute. During execution, commanders and staffs focus their efforts on translating plans into
direct action to achieve objectives in accordance with the higher commander’s intent.
⚫ Continuously assess. The commander and staff continually assess operations and revise the plan
through fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs).
Figure 3-3. The operations process
ARMY PLANNING METHODOLOGIES
3-21. Integrated planning—from conceptual to detailed planning—is critical to Army operations. Planning
requires the integration of both conceptual thinking and detailed analysis. Army leaders employ several
methodologies for planning, determining the appropriate mix based on the scope and understanding of the
problem, time available, and availability of a staff. The Army planning methodologies, detailed in FM 5-0,
include—
⚫ Army problem solving.
⚫ ADM.
⚫ The MDMP.
⚫ Rapid decision-making and synchronization process (RDSP).
⚫ Troop leading procedures (TLP). |
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3-22. Perfect knowledge and assumptions about the future do not occur. The commander and staff cannot
predict with precision how enemies will react or how other actors will respond during operations.
Nonetheless, the understanding and learning that occur during planning are valuable. Even if units do not
execute the plan exactly as envisioned, planning results in an improved understanding of the situation that
facilitates future decision making. Planning and plans assist leaders in—
⚫ Building situational understanding.
⚫ Identifying and developing solutions to problems.
⚫ Understanding, describing, and accepting risk.
⚫ Directing, coordinating, and synchronizing action.
⚫ Task-organizing the force and prioritizing efforts.
⚫ Anticipating events.
3-23. The intelligence staff has a critical role in all activities of the operations process, especially in planning
and the integrating processes (see section V). The G-2/S-2 supports the commander’s ability to understand
the OE and visualize operations by—
⚫ Leading the IPOE process and portraying the enemy and other relevant aspects of the OE
throughout the MDMP.
⚫ Developing the information collection plan (in coordination with the G-3/S-3).
⚫ Producing the intelligence portion of the COP.
⚫ Updating the intelligence running estimate.
⚫ Developing other intelligence products and reports.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS
3-24. Although the five Army planning methodologies are important, the MDMP is the one most often
applied from theater army to BCT levels during armed conflict. The military decision-making process is an
iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and
produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). The MDMP begins with the receipt of the mission and
combines the conceptual and detailed components of planning. Commanders use the MDMP to visualize the
OE and the threat, build plans and orders for extended operations, and develop orders for short-term
operations within the framework of a long-range plan. (See FM 5-0.)
3-25. During the MDMP, the intelligence staff leads the IPOE effort and provides all-source intelligence
products and tools. Besides IPOE, the intelligence staff uses products developed during pre-mission analysis
of the OE and begins to develop some of the early intelligence support to targeting and collection
management products and tools. The staff tailors the all-source intelligence products and tools to the
commander’s requirements, the situation, and the mission. The commander and staff require the following
products throughout planning:
⚫ Line of communications overlays.
⚫ Broadcast and communications networks.
⚫ Combined information overlays.
⚫ Electromagnetic orders of battle.
⚫ Hazards overlays (that accurately depict the affected areas).
⚫ Modified combined obstacle overlays (also called MCOOs) and terrain effects matrices.
⚫ Weather trends and current and forecasted weather effects on friendly and enemy capabilities.
⚫ Weather effects matrices and other weather tactical decision aids.
⚫ Civil considerations overlays (addressing factors such as demographics, political alignments,
religions and sects, network diagrams, and link and node overlays).
⚫ Threat characteristics.
⚫ Threat models.
⚫ Broad set of possible threat COAs. |
2-0 | 92 | Chapter 3
⚫ Threat situation templates (covering at least the most likely and most dangerous threat COAs).
⚫ Event templates and matrices.
⚫ Other relevant threat and civil consideration templates.
⚫ Analysis of threat systems products.
⚫ High-value target (HVT) lists, which facilitate or are used to develop high-payoff target lists
(HPTLs).
⚫ Target value analysis and other intelligence support to targeting products.
Note. Possible products are limited only by the intelligence staff’s initiative and creativity as
balanced against time available.
3-26. Table 3-3 outlines intelligence support to the MDMP.
Table 3-3. Intelligence support to the military decision-making process
Step 1—Receipt of mission Intelligence support to step 1
• Begin parallel planning and collaborate with higher, lower, and adjacent intelligence
organizations to facilitate the IPOE process.
• Focus activities on the mission variables.
• Identify gaps in intelligence holdings.
• Use intelligence reach to collect updated or additional enemy, terrain and weather, and civil
considerations data.
• In coordination with the Air Force staff weather officer, update the weather estimate.
• In coordination with the cyberspace electromagnetic warfare officer and CEMA section,
• Alert the staff and other key participants.
update the effects of the EMS and cyberspace domain, including information from products
• Gather the tools.
that portray the physical network and logical network layers.
• Update running estimates.
• Coordinate with the G-3/S-3, G-6/S-6, and the CEMA section to address the information
• Conduct the initial assessment.
dimension and cyberspace domain. When feasible, coordinate with the JFC information
• Issue the commander’s initial guidance.
planning cell.
• Issue the initial WARNORD.
• Develop and submit initial requests for information based on intelligence gaps.
• Work with the operations staff to initiate the movement of collection assets, as needed, to
position them for future collection.
• If needed, work with the operations staff to revise ongoing information collection or initiate
limited preliminary information collection, which is published as Annex L (Information
Collection) to WARNORD #1.
• Continually update target packets and the enemy situation.
• Update the intelligence running estimate.
Step 2—Mission analysis Intelligence support to step 2
• Analyze the higher headquarters’ plan or
order.
• Perform initial IPOE.
• Determine specified, implied, and essential
• Identify gaps in the higher headquarters information collection plan and IPOE.
tasks.
• Lead the staff through the IPOE process. Consolidate the staff’s IPOE products into a set of
• Review available assets and identify
coherent and holistic IPOE products.
resource shortfalls.
• Begin collection management by identifying specified and implied intelligence tasks from the
• Determine constraints.
higher headquarters order.
• Identify critical facts and develop
• Develop the initial collection management plan and support the initial information collection
assumptions.
plan (WARNORD, fragmentary order, or OPORD).
• Begin a risk assessment.
• Use pertinent intelligence from higher echelons.
• Develop initial CCIRs and EEFIs.
• Assist in determining the area of operations and area of interest.
• Develop the initial information collection plan.
• Develop initial information requirements (with staff).
• Update plan for the use of available time.
• In coordination with the G-3/S-3, recommend initial PIRs to the commander.
• Develop initial themes and messages.
• Assist in developing initial operations security vulnerabilities and EEFIs.
• Develop a proposed problem statement.
• Include weather (which includes space) and EMS effects on the enemy’s warfighting function
• Develop a proposed mission statement.
capabilities.
• Present the mission analysis briefing.
• Include key considerations for threat cyberspace operations, including the identification of
• Develop and issue the initial commander’s
key aspects of the cyberspace domain.
intent.
• Develop and issue initial planning guidance.
• Develop COA evaluation criteria.
• Issue a WARNORD. |
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Table 3-3. Intelligence support to the military decision-making process (continued)
Step 2—Mission analysis Intelligence support to step 2 (continued)
• Analyze the higher headquarters’ plan or
MCOO and terrain (with engineer officer): Does the overlay—
order.
• Identify restricted or severely restricted terrain?
• Perform initial IPOE.
• Identify mobility corridors (air and ground)?
• Determine specified, implied, and essential
tasks. • Identify infiltration lanes and landing and pickup zones?
• Review available assets and identify • Identify key or decisive terrain?
resource shortfalls. • Define defensible terrain?
• Determine constraints. • Identify terrain that supports survival and evasion of personnel executing their isolated
• Identify critical facts and develop Soldier guidance?
assumptions. • Identify aspects within the information dimension (and their interrelationship with the human
• Begin a risk assessment. dimension), such as communications means and networks (telephone networks [landline,
cellular, satellite, and voice over internet protocol]; internet; radio; television; newspapers
• Develop initial CCIRs and EEFIs.
and other printed material; social media; cyber cafes; threat and neutral narratives; threat
• Develop the initial information collection plan.
and neutral actor vulnerabilities to information advantage activities; and friendly
• Update plan for the use of available time.
vulnerabilities to threat information warfare activities).
• Develop initial themes and messages.
Situation templates: Do the situation templates—
• Develop a proposed problem statement.
• Include all committed and reinforcing forces as well as combat multipliers?
• Develop a proposed mission statement.
• Focus at least two levels down in detail (or as command dictates), including all threat
• Present the mission analysis briefing.
warfighting functions?
• Develop and issue the initial commander’s
• Graphically portray threat characteristics, vulnerabilities and peculiarities, activities, and
intent.
capabilities for each COA?
• Develop and issue initial planning guidance.
• Event templates and matrices (unrefined): Do the event templates identify and focus on NAIs,
• Develop COA evaluation criteria.
time phase lines, time distance analysis, critical actions, or threat DPs?
• Issue a WARNORD.
Step 3—COA development Intelligence support to step 3
• Ensure IPOE products are deliberately integrated into COA development. Critical products
include the MCOO, civil considerations products, threat objectives, threat models (including
• Assess relative combat power. HVTs), situation templates, and event templates.
• Generate options. • Integrate information and intelligence received from the initial information collection effort.
• Array forces. • Ensure weather and EMS effects on the warfighting function capabilities are deliberately
• Develop a broad concept. integrated into COA development.
• Assign headquarters. • Refine and prioritize situation templates, event templates, and matrices.
• Develop COA statements and sketches. • Update HVTs for targeting by lethal and nonlethal methods.
• Conduct COA briefing. • Take an active part in analyzing combat power by providing all available information on
• Select or modify COAs for continued current threat forces and the situation.
analysis. • Provide information on threat vulnerabilities while analyzing relative combat power.
• Consider as many possible COAs as time permits, starting with the most likely and including
the worst case (most dangerous).
Step 4—COA analysis (war game) Intelligence support to step 4
As the enemy commander—
• Use the enemy situation template as a starting point and the event template and matrix as
guides to develop critical enemy DPs in relation to friendly COAs.
• Project enemy reactions to friendly actions and project enemy losses.
• Capture the results of each enemy action and counteraction as well as corresponding
friendly and enemy strengths and vulnerabilities.
As the command’s senior intelligence officer—
• Identify new information requirements.
• Gather the tools.
• Recommend PIRs that correspond to DPs and refine PIRs with the LTIOV.
• List all friendly forces.
• Redefine enemy COAs based on developed DPs and the situation template.
• List assumptions.
• Develop critical enemy DPs in relation to friendly COAs.
• List known critical events and DPs.
• Fight as an uncooperative enemy to develop DPs and project enemy losses.
• Select the war-gaming method.
• Address all relevant enemy activities.
• Select a technique to record and display
• Assist in developing target selection standards and the attack guidance matrix from war-
results.
gamed COAs.
• War-game the operations and assess the
• Recommend changes to the information collection plan.
results.
• Based on the war game, refine the situation and event templates with corresponding DPs,
• Conduct a war-game briefing (optional).
TAIs, and HVTs, including NAIs.
• Refine the event matrix with TAIs and HVTs.
• Participate in the targeting process.
• Link NAIs to TAIs.
• Display the scheme of information collection during the war game.
• Assists the G-3/S-3 in developing the decision support template.
• Consider the effects of enemy and friendly COAs on local population attitudes and
behaviors. |
2-0 | 94 | Chapter 3
Table 3-3. Intelligence support to the military decision-making process (continued)
Step 5—COA comparison Intelligence support to step 5
• Ensure incorporation of the recommended PIRs in the tasking of subordinate units and the
requests to higher and lateral echelons.
• Coordinate with supporting information collection organizations and G-2/S-2s to ensure the
information collection plan is understandable and executable. When executed, the plan
• Conduct analysis of advantages and
should enable a rapid and seamless transition between current and future operations.
disadvantages.
• Modify the initial set of intelligence requirements developed during mission analysis to reflect
• Compare COAs.
war-gaming results.
• Conduct a COA decision briefing.
• Include weather and EMS effects on specific warfighting function capabilities’ analysis of
advantages and disadvantages for each COA.
• Clearly delineate intelligence requirements.
• Ensure the synchronization of all available collection assets.
Step 6—COA approval Intelligence support to step 6
• Recommend PIRs (including the LTIOV) and the supporting information collection plan.
• Implement, refine, or rework the intelligence running estimate, Annex B (Intelligence), and
the information collection plan based on the commander's acceptance, modification, or
rejection of the staff's recommendation.
• Upon COA approval, the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3 coordinate with supporting information
collection resources to ensure the scheme of information collection supports the approved
COA.
• Refine the weather estimate.
Commander approves a COA. • Collaborate with the G-3/S-3 to ensure staffs at all levels understand the following:
▪Scheme of information collection.
▪EEFIs.
▪Collection tasks.
▪Analysis and production priorities.
▪Intelligence control measures: target handover, reconnaissance handover, and reporting
responsibilities.
▪Procedures for tasking and reporting.
Step 7—Orders production,
Intelligence support to step 7
dissemination, and transition
• The G-2/S-2 plans cell, assisted by the intelligence cell, develops Annex B (Intelligence) to
the OPORD and assists the G-3/S-3 in producing Annex L (Information Collection).
• The G-2/S-2 plans cell assists other staff members in preparing the enemy or information
collection aspects of their annexes. Paragraph 3 (Coordinating Instructions) of Annex B
(Intelligence) explains measures for handling captured personnel, documents, and materiel.
• Produce and disseminate orders. • The G-2/S-2 reviews the OPORD and Annex B (Intelligence) for accuracy and completeness
• Transition from planning to operations. as well as compatibility with foreign disclosure policy or guidelines.
• The G-2/S-2 forwards Annex B (Intelligence) to the G-3/S-3 for incorporation and
dissemination into the OPORD.
• The collection manager, supported by the intelligence cell, develops requests for information
(intelligence production); with G-2/S-2 approval, the manager forwards the requests to the
next higher echelon and adjacent units.
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment
CEMA cyberspace electromagnetic activities JFC joint force commander
COA course of action LTIOV latest time information is of value
DP decision point MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
EEFI essential element of friendly information NAI named area of interest
EMS electromagnetic spectrum OPORD operation order
G-2/S-2 division or corps/battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer PIR priority intelligence requirement
G-3/S-3 division or corps/battalion or brigade operations staff officer TAI target area of interest
G-6/S-6 division or corps/battalion or brigade signal staff officer WARNORD warning order
HVT high-value target |
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SECTION V – INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTEGRATING PROCESSES
3-27. An integrating process consists of a series of steps that incorporate multiple disciplines to achieve a
specific end. Integrating processes begin in planning and continue during preparation and execution.
Commanders and staffs use the integrating processes to synchronize specific functions throughout the
operations process. The intelligence staff supports the integrating processes by providing detailed and
relevant all-source intelligence on the various aspects of the threat, terrain and weather, civil considerations,
and other significant aspects of the OE. (See ADP 5-0 for doctrine on the integrating processes.)
3-28. Key integrating processes include—
⚫ IPOE.
⚫ Information collection.
⚫ Targeting.
⚫ Risk management.
⚫ Knowledge management.
Note. IPOE is not discussed in this section. See paragraphs 3-15 through 3-17 for a discussion of
the importance of the entire staff’s collaborative involvement, see paragraphs 3-25 and 3-26 for a
discussion of IPOE in the context of the MDMP, and see paragraphs 5-42 through 5-61 for a
detailed discussion of IPOE in the context of the intelligence staff.
INFORMATION COLLECTION
Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of
sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current
and future operations (FM 3-55). FM 3-55 discusses information collection capabilities, including human or
automated sensors and assets directed to collect information that enables better decision making and expands
an understanding of the OE.
Information collection is an integrated operations and intelligence function (see figure 3-4 on
page 3-16). Collection management drives information collection. Therefore, collection management teams
must understand information collection, as well as the art of effectively integrating collection management
into information collection and the operations process.
Information collection provides commanders and staffs with detailed and timely intelligence, which
assists them in gaining situational understanding of the threat and OE. Commanders and staffs accomplish
situational understanding by answering intelligence requirements in time and space and identifying any
threats to mission accomplishment. The intelligence staff provides commanders with predictive assessments
(accounting for the domains and dimensions, as illustrated in figures 2-5 and 2-6 on pages 2-18 and 2-20,
respectively) of the enemy, terrain and weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the OE.
(See FM 3-55 and ATP 2-01 for doctrine on information collection.)
Note. The intelligence warfighting function’s contributions to information collection include
collection management and intelligence operations. However, intelligence PED and intelligence
analysis are integral to information collection. |
2-0 | 96 | Chapter 3
Figure 3-4. Intelligence contribution to information collection
Conduct information collection is an IWFT. The collection management team must understand the
basics, nuances, and complexities associated with conducting the information collection tasks, discussed in
detail in appendix B, not just collection management:
⚫ Conduct collection management.
⚫ Direct information collection.
⚫ Execute collection.
⚫ Conduct intelligence-related missions and operations. |
2-0 | 97 | Integrating the Intelligence Warfighting Function
CONDUCT COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
3-33. Collection management is commander driven. The collection management team, with assistance from
the rest of the staff—especially the operations staff—manages intelligence requirements for the commander,
prepares the collection management plan, and coordinates with the operations staff to maintain integration
and synchronization as the information collection effort progresses. Chapter 5 discusses collection
management extensively.
3-34. This discussion focuses on those aspects of collection management that require extensive staff cross-
collaboration and coordination with and cooperation between the intelligence staff and other members of the
staff (see also paragraph 3-41):
⚫ Using ancillary collection assets during information collection.
⚫ Executing technical collection during tactical operations and the complementary capabilities.
Using Ancillary Collection Assets
3-35. The G-2/S-2 and collection manager, in coordination with the rest of the staff, develop the collection
management plan using primary collection assets (whose mission is to perform one of the four primary means
of information collection: reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence operations, and security operations),
ancillary collection assets, and nonmilitary information sources. Ancillary collection assets are those units
and systems tasked to perform information collection while also performing another mission during
operations. They are sometimes referred to as nontraditional assets. Examples of ancillary collection assets
include but are not limited to—
⚫ Target acquisition radars.
⚫ Air defense system sites.
⚫ Logistics convoys.
⚫ Military police performing security and mobility support.
⚫ Helicopter battalions.
⚫ Sniper teams.
⚫ Civil affairs (CA) teams (unless already performing civilian reconnaissance).
⚫ Special reconnaissance teams (unless performing strategic reconnaissance).
⚫ Joint terminal attack controllers.
⚫ Fire support teams.
⚫ Army space control systems, if available.
3-36. The entire staff must cooperate with the G-2/S-2 and collection management team and perform detailed
coordination to reasonably recommend these ancillary collection assets to the G-3/S-3 and operations staff
for tasking and inclusion in Annex L (Information Collection) of the order. To ensure successful information
collection, the tasking should be detail-oriented since the assets may be unfamiliar with information
collection techniques and procedures. After tasking, staff control of these ancillary collection assets is
important. (See ATP 2-01.)
Executing Technical Collection
3-37. The tactical execution of technical collection involves collaboration and detailed coordination across
the staff. Technical collection and the evacuation of captured materiel for subsequent exploitation are usually
not performed by the MI unit. Therefore, other types of units and logistical elements are heavily involved in
technical collection activities.
Note. Commanders should not overlook the importance of technical collection in supporting
TECHINT and DOMEX. In some situations, technical collection can provide valuable information
and intelligence to support operations. |
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DIRECT INFORMATION COLLECTION
The operations staff integrates collection assets through a deliberate and coordinated effort across all
warfighting functions. Tasking and directing information collection are vital in controlling limited collection
assets. During tasking and directing information collection, the staff recommends cueing, redundancy, and
mix, as appropriate. Staffs task information collection by issuing warning orders (WARNORDs),
FRAGORDs, and operation orders (OPORDs). They direct collection assets by continuously monitoring the
operation. Staffs retask to refine, update, or create new requirements. Tasking and directing information
collection include two tasks:
⚫ Develop the information collection plan.
⚫ Execute, evaluate, and update the information collection plan.
3-39. Using intelligence handover lines is a flexible means of directing information collection, as well as
analysis, to support key decisions and/or targeting. An intelligence handover line is a control measure
between two friendly units used to pass responsibility for the conduct of information collection against
a specific enemy force. Chapter 8 discusses intelligence handover lines.
EXECUTE COLLECTION
Executing collection focuses on requirements tied to the execution of tactical missions
(reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence operations, and security operations) based on the intelligence
requirements. Collection activities acquire information about the threat and the AO, and they provide that
information to intelligence processing and exploitation elements. Typically, collection activities begin soon
after receipt of mission and continue throughout preparation and execution of the operation. They do not
cease at the conclusion of the mission but continue as required. This allows the commander to focus combat
power, execute current operations, and prepare for future operations simultaneously. (FM 6-0 lists G-3/S-3
responsibilities.)
CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE-RELATED MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
The associated intelligence tasks (for example, provide intelligence support to personnel recovery)
facilitate the conduct of reconnaissance and surveillance. These tasks also include specialized missions (such
as exploitation of a sensitive site) that provide intelligence and information outside the traditional information
collection construct. Conduct intelligence-related missions and operations includes six tasks:
⚫ Establish a mission intelligence briefing and debriefing program.
⚫ Conduct intelligence coordination.
⚫ Support site exploitation.
⚫ Conduct explosive ordnance disposal support.
⚫ Provide intelligence support to personnel recovery.
⚫ Conduct identity activities.
Note. The conduct intelligence-related missions and operations task emphasizes the importance
of staff collaboration during collection management.
TARGETING
3-42. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to
them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting is an integral part of the
operations process that organizes the commander and staff’s efforts to integrate and synchronize fires into
operations. Targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal actions.
3-43. Targeting encompasses many processes, all linked and logically guided by the joint targeting cycle.
Units may use the Army targeting methodology or the joint targeting cycle, as appropriate (according to the
organizational echelon), to integrate and synchronize capabilities, across warfighting functions and
information advantage activities, into operations to create the desired effects in time and space. The targeting |
2-0 | 99 | Integrating the Intelligence Warfighting Function
team recommends targeting guidance to the commander, develops targets, selects targets for attack, and
coordinates, integrates, and assigns organic or allocated joint, interagency, and multinational fires to specific
targets and target systems. (See FM 3-60.)
Target
A target is an entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible
engagement or other action (JP 3-60). Targets include an array of mobile and stationary
forces, equipment, and capabilities that span the human, information, and physical
dimensions. Threats can use targets to conduct operations. A target’s importance is
determined by its potential contribution to achieving the commander’s objectives or otherwise
accomplishing assigned tasks or reaching an effect. Targets are continuously refined or
adjusted as an operation unfolds.
TARGETING WITHIN MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS
3-44. Targeting is a complex and multidisciplined effort that requires coordinated interaction among many
groups. Army forces meet a diverse array of challenges and contribute to national objectives across a range
of operational categories, including large-scale combat operations, limited contingency operations, crisis
response, and support to security cooperation. While most operations conducted by Army forces occur either
below the threshold of armed conflict or during limited contingencies, Army readiness focuses on large-scale
combat operations.
3-45. Army forces conduct operations to support joint campaigns, which mostly occur as part of a larger
coalition operation. Leaders must understand the interdependencies between their own assigned forces and
the forces or capabilities provided by others to generate the complementary and reinforcing effects of
combined arms approaches. Army forces employ joint and other unified action partner capabilities to the
extent these capabilities are available. However, because peer threats can contest the force in all domains,
Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations when some or all joint capabilities are unavailable to
support mission accomplishment.
3-46. Army forces employ organic capabilities in multiple domains, and they continuously benefit from
maritime and air strategic transportation and space and cyberspace capabilities that they do not control,
including global positioning, satellite communications, and ISR. Lower echelons may not always notice the
opportunities created by higher echelons or other forces that operate primarily in other domains; however,
leaders must understand how the absence of those opportunities affects their concept of operations, decision
making, and risk assessment.
TARGETING PRINCIPLES
3-47. Targeting proceeds from the commander’s objectives to an assessment of the results achieved throughout
an operation. Participants in the targeting process should adhere to these targeting principles for creating the
desired effects while diminishing undesired or adverse collateral effects. The targeting principles are—
⚫ Focused. Targeting focuses on achieving the commander’s objectives. The function of targeting
is efficiently achieving the commander’s objectives within the parameters set at the operational
level—directed limitations, the rules of engagement or the rules for the use of force, the law of
war, and other guidance given by the commander. Every nominated target must contribute to
attaining the commander’s objectives.
⚫ Effects-based. Targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal
actions or capabilities. Target analysis encompasses all possible means to create desired effects,
drawing from all available capabilities. The art of targeting seeks to create desired effects with
the least risk and time and resource expenditures. |
2-0 | 100 | Chapter 3
⚫ Interdisciplinary. Targeting is a command function that requires the participation of many
disciplines, including all unit staff elements, other organizations, and multinational partners, to
plan, prepare, execute, and assess targeting tasks.
⚫ Systematic. A targeting methodology is a rational and iterative process that systematically
analyzes, prioritizes, and assigns assets against targets to create those effects that will contribute
to achieving the commander’s objectives. During the operation, if the desired effects are not
created, targets may be considered again in the process or operations may have to be modified.
TARGETING MEMBERS
3-48. Targeting team members are competent experts in doctrine and the processes and procedures
associated with operations and targeting. The team understands existing authorities and critical staff
capabilities that enable the creation and assessment of effects to support the commander’s intent.
Furthermore, the team understands its targeting duties and requirements enough to coordinate both vertically
and horizontally. Team members have the flexibility to recognize changes in the OE and make timely
coordination to affect targeting. Key targeting personnel may not exist at all echelons. The key targeting
personnel within the intelligence staff include but are not limited to the—
⚫ G-2/S-2.
⚫ United States Air Force (USAF) staff weather officer (SWO).
⚫ Intelligence targeting team officer.
⚫ Collection manager.
⚫ Analysis and control element (ACE) or brigade intelligence support element (BISE) chief.
⚫ Field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO).
THE TARGETING PROCESS THROUGH THE ARMY TARGETING METHODOLOGY
3-49. Across the Army strategic contexts, the number of possible targets far exceeds the number of resources
available to acquire and create desired effects. It is critical for the higher echelon to provide adequate
guidance and anticipate the likely requirements for subordinate echelons. Targeting is a top-down driven
process with a substantial need for bottom-up refinement. This applies to any circumstance requiring lead
time or insertion into supporting planning or execution cycles. The importance of what targets to attack and
with what available capabilities must be planned and prioritized. The decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A)
Army targeting methodology is how the Army performs the targeting process. D3A is a flexible, repeatable
four-function process, not designed to be time-constrained or rigidly sequential. (See figure 3-5.)
Figure 3-5. Decide, detect, deliver, and assess Army targeting methodology |
2-0 | 101 | Integrating the Intelligence Warfighting Function
3-50. The targeting process provides an effective method for matching friendly force capabilities against
enemy targets to achieve the commander’s desired effects and objectives. There are two general ways to
frame the D3A Army targeting methodology:
⚫ During planning and the MDMP, the staff uses the targeting methodology as a process to
assist in product development and visualization. The staff applies the methodology to analyze
the commander’s guidance to determine the right targets, at the right place, at the right time.
During the MDMP, the staff can make these decisions and apply the required assets to create
desired effects. The staff can further discuss the methodology by developing COAs and war-
gaming them. The staff also applies the methodology to assessment requirements and the
analysis needed to facilitate future decisions.
⚫ As an integrating process during execution, the targeting methodology enables the staff to
apply targeting products (HPTLs, target selection standards [TSS], attack guidance matrices
[AGMs], information collection synchronization matrices, and target synchronization matrices)
to facilitate operations. The staff makes decisions continuously, adjusts detection methods or
locations, and revises delivery options based on changes to threat COAs.
RISK MANAGEMENT
3-51. Risk management is the Army’s primary process for identifying hazards and controlling risks during
operations. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and mitigate risks and make decisions that
balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). The chief of protection (or S-3 in units without a protection
cell), in coordination with the safety officer, integrates risk management into the MDMP. The intelligence
staff participates in the overall risk management process and integrates risk management into collection
management when recommending tasks for collection assets. (See ATP 5-19 for risk management doctrine.)
3-52. Commanders must focus and use intelligence to explicitly understand the lethality of large-scale
combat operations, preserve their combat power, and mitigate operational risk, when possible, to achieve the
end state. Using intelligence to see and understand within each domain can reduce risk to the friendly force
and enhance success in chaotic and high-tempo operations.
3-53. Intelligence provides the commander the ability to detect adversary activities, predict enemy
intentions, understand and track enemy capabilities across all domains, inform decisions, and provide realistic
assessments of operational and tactical risks. During situation development, analysts determine the
significance of collected information and its significance relative to predicted threat COAs. Through
predictive analysis, the staff templates threat activity or trends that present opportunities or risks to the
friendly force. This support assists the commander and staff in deciding when and where to concentrate
sufficient combat power to defeat the threat while mitigating risks.
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
3-54. Knowledge management is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding,
learning, and decision making (ADP 6-0). The purpose of knowledge management is aligning people,
process, and tools within the organizational structure and culture to achieve a shared understanding. This
alignment improves collaboration and interaction between leaders and subordinates and information sharing
with subordinate units, higher-echelon headquarters, and unified action partners. (See ATP 6-01.1 for
knowledge management doctrine.)
3-55. The intelligence staff participates in both the unit’s overall knowledge management effort and its own
staff knowledge management effort. Managing knowledge within the unit and the intelligence staff is critical
to providing effective intelligence support. Important aspects of knowledge management include—
⚫ Using the intelligence process with fundamentally sound procedures to ensure the right
intelligence gets to the right users at the right time in a useable format, and the intelligence is
integrated into operations, to include targeting, as appropriate.
⚫ Ensuring the right focus and fundamentally sound procedures are used to avoid information
overload and inundating the commander and staff with too much information and intelligence. |
2-0 | 102 | Chapter 3
⚫ Ensuring the intelligence staff is data literate according to Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence (DA G-2) standards.
⚫ Avoiding circular reporting, which is receiving the same reports and information from sources
other than the original source. Circular reporting can result in erroneous intelligence analysis and
negatively affect the commander’s decisions and the staff’s control of operations.
⚫ Protecting against threat misinformation, disinformation, deception, and collection
countermeasures by emphasizing the use of all-source intelligence. The commander and staff
can use single-source intelligence and combat information, but they must understand the risk of
threat deception.
SECTION VI – COMMAND NODES AND CELLS AND BATTLE RHYTHM
3-56. Command nodes and cells and battle rhythm are important to C2. Effective C2 requires continuous,
and often immediate, close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff. To
promote this, commanders organize their staffs and other components of the C2 system into command posts
(CPs) to assist them in effectively conducting operations. CPs provide a physical location for people,
processes, and networks to directly assist commanders in understanding, visualizing, describing, directing,
leading, and assessing operations. Across the CPs, commanders establish a battle rhythm as a procedural way
to organize the activities within their headquarters and throughout the force. The battle rhythm is a deliberate
daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities that assist in synchronizing current and future operations.
COMMAND NODES AND CELLS
3-57. Intelligence operations are distributed across and support redundant and functionally integrated
command nodes—main CPs and tactical CPs (which include support area CPs) and mobile command groups.
Each command node retains the capacity to execute C2 of the warfighting functions synchronized with higher
and lower echelons of command.
3-58. Intelligence personnel not assigned to intelligence cells in main CPs assist the G-2/S-2 in managing
intelligence operations from across the battlefield. This generally includes intelligence personnel assigned to
integrating cells in tactical CPs in addition to mobile command groups at the corps and division echelons.
(See FM 6-0 for staff roles and responsibilities.)
Note. This publication provides information on intelligence cell structures based on modified
tables of organization and equipment and force design updates. Commanders can task-organize
based on mission requirements.
COMMAND POSTS
3-59. A command post is a headquarters, or a portion there of, organized for the exercise of command and
control (FM 6-0). Corps, division, and BCT headquarters can employ a main CP, tactical CP, and mobile
command group. Additionally, a corps and division can use a rear area CP. Each CP has specific functions
by design that assist commanders in understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing
operations. The following includes CP functions common to all CPs:
⚫ Conduct knowledge management, information management, and foreign disclosure.
⚫ Build and maintain situational understanding.
⚫ Control operations (by coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating).
⚫ Assess operations.
⚫ Coordinate with internal and external organizations.
⚫ Perform CP administrative activities. |
2-0 | 103 | Integrating the Intelligence Warfighting Function
Main Command Post
3-60. A main command post is a portion of a unit headquarters containing the majority of the staff designed
to command and control current operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations (FM 6-0).
The main CP is the unit’s principal CP, serving as the primary location for plans, analysis, sustainment
coordination, and assessments. It includes representatives from all staff sections and information and C2
systems to conduct operations. At certain echelons, the main CP can act as a JTF, JFLCC, or a coalition
forces land component commander.
3-61. The main CP is larger, has more staff members, and is less mobile than the tactical CP. It operates at
both operational and tactical levels and as a fully functional, stand-alone CP. All battalion and above units
are resourced with a main CP that includes an executive officer or chief of staff, as appropriate, to supervise
the staff. The main CP conducts all meetings (which may include working groups, cells, and boards) required
to achieve mission requirements.
3-62. Main CP general functions include—
⚫ Controlling operations.
⚫ Receiving reports from subordinate units and preparing reports required by higher headquarters.
⚫ Planning operations, including branches and sequels.
⚫ Integrating intelligence into current operations and plans.
⚫ Synchronizing the targeting process.
⚫ Planning and synchronizing sustainment operations.
⚫ Assessing the progress of operations.
Tactical Command Post
3-63. A tactical command post is a portion of a unit headquarters designed to command and control
operations as directed (FM 6-0). It relies on the main CP for planning, detailed analysis, and coordination as
well as for certain functions remaining with the main CP that require intelligence reach. The tactical CP is
connected digitally to the main CP, mobile command group, higher headquarters, and all subordinate unit
headquarters, including joint and multinational partner intelligence organizations. The tactical CP can support
the entire range of missions at that echelon, but it does not have the same longevity and capacity as the main
CP. Additionally, the tactical CP should prepare to be able to communicate in a denied, degraded, and
intermittent low-bandwidth environment.
3-64. A tactical CP intelligence cell—
⚫ Supports current operations.
⚫ Ensures the tactical CP remains informed of the current enemy situation.
⚫ Makes recommendations related to the operation.
3-65. A tactical CP intelligence cell accomplishes these tasks by continually communicating and
collaborating with the main CP intelligence cell and supported unit headquarters. The structure of a tactical
CP is organic to the unit’s mission. In most situations, the structure is designed based on unit SOPs and
mission variables (METT-TC [I]). The echelon determines the proper location of the tactical CP relative to
the forward line of own troops.
Mobile Command Group
3-66. The mobile command group is the commander’s mobile CP. The commander selects key personnel
based on mission variables to staff the mobile command group. These key personnel often represent those
staff sections—typically maneuver, fires, and intelligence—that can immediately affect current operations.
3-67. The intelligence representative to the mobile command group must be integrated with echelons above
brigade organizations, the main and tactical CPs, and subordinate commands through the intelligence
architecture. The mobile command group intelligence officer— |
2-0 | 104 | Chapter 3
⚫ Assists the commander in interpreting intelligence reports and coordinating intelligence
operations with the main and tactical CPs.
⚫ Informs the commander of the intelligence running estimate and intelligence readiness.
Rear Area Command Post
3-68. Based on the situation, threat, size of the rear area, and the number of units in the rear area, corps and
division commanders may form a rear area CP to assist in controlling operations. The rear area CP includes
the support area as a subset of the rear area. The rear area CP enables corps and division commanders to
exercise C2 over disparate functionally focused elements operating in rear areas that may exceed the effective
span of control of the maneuver enhancement brigade or corps and division main CPs.
3-69. The rear area CP is not a separate section in a unit’s table of organization and equipment. When
commanders form a rear area CP, they do so from the personnel and equipment in the main and tactical CPs.
It normally collocates with the maneuver enhancement brigade, which provides the rear area CP with signal
connectivity, sustainment, security, and workspace.
3-70. Rear area CP functions include—
⚫ Planning and directing sustainment.
⚫ Terrain management.
⚫ Movement control.
⚫ Area security.
⚫ Current and future operations.
⚫ Providing the situational awareness of the deep, close, and security fights.
⚫ Assisting the main CP with information flow from higher, lower, and lateral units.
⚫ Coordinating with the host-nation, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations,
and other stakeholders, as required.
⚫ Issuing orders.
COMMAND POST CELLS
3-71. Commanders organize CP cells based on the situation. A command post cell is a grouping of personnel
and equipment organized by warfighting function or by planning horizon to facilitate the exercise of
command and control (FM 6-0). Staff elements comprising personnel and equipment from staff sections form
CP cells, which are typically organized as integrating and functional cells. (See figure 3-6.) These CP cells
provide staff expertise, communications, and information systems that work together to assist the commander
in planning and controlling operations.
Figure 3-6. Command post cells |
2-0 | 105 | Integrating the Intelligence Warfighting Function
Note. Resourcing for CP cells is different at each echelon. Specific information can be found in
the doctrinal publications for each echelon.
Integrating Cell
3-72. Integrating cells coordinate and synchronize forces and warfighting functions within a specified
planning horizon. A planning horizon is a point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning
efforts to shape future events (ADP 5-0). The three planning horizons are short-, mid-, and long-range; they
are associated with the following cells, respectively:
⚫ Current operations integration cell (COIC): The COIC is the focal point for the execution of
current operations. This involves assessing the current situation while regulating forces and
warfighting functions according to the commander’s intent and concept of operations. All staff
sections are represented in the COIC either permanently or on call. Intelligence personnel
assigned to the COIC ensure all relevant intelligence regarding the enemy and other threats,
terrain and weather, and civil considerations are integrated into the COP. The COIC—
▪ Issues, monitors, evaluates, directs, and controls the execution of orders.
▪ Conducts limited short-range planning and coordinates this effort within the functional cells.
▪ Continually updates IPOE.
▪ Conducts regular operations and assessment briefings.
▪ Maintains and displays the COP.
▪ Conducts shift changes, assessments, and other briefings as required.
⚫ Future operations cell: The future operations cell focuses on adjustments to the current
operation—including the positioning or maneuvering of forces in depth—that facilitate the
continuation of the current operation.
⚫ Plans cell: The plans cell (responsible for mid- to long-range planning operations) develops
plans, orders, branches, and sequels using the MDMP to prepare for operations beyond the scope
of the current order. The plans cell oversees military deception planning. The G-5 leads the plans
cell and oversees planning for future operations. The intelligence planner—
▪ Assists in developing plans, orders, branches, and sequels.
▪ Monitors the common intelligence picture (CIP) and COP.
▪ Stays abreast of current operations by coordinating with the COIC.
▪ Coordinates with the ACE, BISE, or equivalent intelligence analysis element to produce
intelligence products required for planning and orders production.
Functional Cell
3-73. Functional cells coordinate and synchronize forces and activities by warfighting function. Organizing
staff sections among CP functional cells expands the commander’s ability to exercise C2 and makes the C2
system more resilient. The functional cells in a CP are intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires,
protection, and sustainment. Chapter 5 discusses the intelligence staff and the intelligence functional cell.
BATTLE RHYTHM
3-74. A headquarters’ battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings (to include working groups and boards),
briefings, and other activities synchronized by time and purpose. The battle rhythm is a deliberate daily cycle
of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations (FM 6-0). The
chief of staff or executive officer oversees the unit’s battle rhythm and ensures activities are logically
sequenced so the output of one activity informs another activity’s inputs. This is important not only within
the headquarters but also in the unit’s battle rhythm as it nests with the higher-echelon headquarters. |
2-0 | 106 | Chapter 3
3-75. Understanding the purpose and potential decisions of each meeting and activity is equally important.
This understanding allows members of the staff and subordinate commanders to provide appropriate input to
influence decisions. The battle rhythm enables—
⚫ A commander’s decision making.
⚫ A routine for staff interaction and coordination.
⚫ Interaction between the commander and staff.
⚫ Staff synchronization across time, space, and purpose.
⚫ Planning by the staff.
3-76. In conjunction with the integrating processes, working groups—groupings of predetermined staff
representatives who meet to provide analysis, coordinate, and provide recommendations for a particular
purpose or function (FM 6-0)—are important in integrating and synchronizing intelligence into operations.
Effective integration and synchronization require the entire staff’s full participation in the information
collection working group as well as the intelligence staff’s full participation in the other working groups,
especially the targeting, CEMA, and protection working groups.
3-77. EMS actions, as discussed in paragraph 1-103, provide a good example of the criticality of detailed
staff coordination and effective working groups. Coordinating and deconflicting SIGINT collection, EW
operations, and spectrum management connect to executing optimal information collection, CEMA
integration, targeting, and information advantage activities. The intelligence and CEMA staffs must
collaborate with the rest of the staff and across working groups, especially the CEMA and targeting working
groups.
3-78. Working groups address various subjects depending on the situation and echelon. Brigade and battalion
headquarters have fewer working groups than higher echelons. Working groups may convene daily, weekly,
monthly, or intermittently depending on the subject, situation, and echelon. Typical working groups, at corps
and division headquarters, scheduled within the unit’s battle rhythm include—
⚫ Assessment. ⚫ Knowledge management.
⚫ Civil-military operations (CMO). ⚫ Protection.
⚫ CEMA. ⚫ Sustainment.
⚫ Information collection. ⚫ Targeting.
⚫ Information operations. ⚫ Airspace control.
Note. Time permitting, some units conduct a targeting coordination board that unites key members
of the CEMA, information collection, targeting, and other working groups to obtain the
commander’s validation and approval of targeting within current and future operations. |
2-0 | 107 | Chapter 4
Army Strategic Contexts and Intelligence
SECTION I – OVERVIEW
4-1. The Army is a globally engaged, regionally responsive force that provides a full range of capabilities
to CCDRs. The Army provides the joint force with the capability and capacity for the application of
landpower. Army forces meet a diverse array of challenges and contribute to national objectives across a
wide range of operational themes, including large-scale combat operations, limited contingency operations,
crisis response, military engagement, and support to security cooperation. The Army also provides a broad
range of organizations, units, and capabilities to support theater operations.
4-2. Combatant commands develop theater campaign plans that rely on the operational themes as well as
campaign and operations activities. When a situation forces a branch to the campaign plan, it may eventually
lead to armed conflict. In these situations, the full capability of the intelligence enterprise supports the
combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and
consolidate gains to ultimately return to competition.
4-3. Army intelligence is an inherent part of any joint and multinational combined arms team; intelligence
activities conducted facilitate successful joint operations. The intelligence enterprise supports the joint force
across the competition continuum through the aggressive execution of information collection and intelligence
production. A portion of the Army intelligence force is designated to support the joint force. (See figure 4-1.)
Figure 4-1. Joint competition continuum aligned with the Army strategic contexts |
2-0 | 108 | Chapter 4
ARMY STRATEGIC CONTEXTS
4-4. Army doctrine describes the strategic situation through three contexts—competition, crisis, and armed
conflict—in which Army forces conduct operations (see figure 4-1 on page 4-1). Therefore, the rest of this
publication uses the Army strategic contexts as a major doctrinal construct to discuss intelligence. Supporting
Army forces, as part of unified action, across the strategic contexts require an effective intelligence
warfighting function that is continuously vigilant and flexible. The Army synchronizes its intelligence effort
with unified action partners to achieve unity of effort and meet the commander’s intent. Intelligence unity of
effort is critical in accomplishing the mission. The character of effective and flexible intelligence support
transitions across the Army strategic contexts.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
4-5. Effective intelligence support assists in identifying and creating exploitable advantages in the OE. It is
important to note—some peer threats view themselves in continual conflict, whether war in the traditional
sense has begun. Intelligence professionals must consider this peer threat perspective and seek advantages to
provide commanders with options against the threat across the strategic contexts. The intelligence staff must
also understand how intelligence warfighting function capabilities support the tenets and imperatives of
operations across the strategic contexts—doing so optimizes the integration of operations and intelligence.
While some intelligence tasks and activities are specific to certain strategic contexts, many of the tasks and
activities span across all three strategic contexts. Commanders and staffs must collaborate with the
intelligence staff to adequately address the planning, collection and PED, storage and safeguarding, and
analysis of intelligence and associated contextual data during each Army strategic context.
4-6. The intelligence staff must coordinate with the rest of the staff continuously. This coordination ensures
the first imperative of operations—see yourself, see the enemy, and understand the OE—is always at the
forefront of synchronizing operations and intelligence and identifying advantages against threat forces.
Threat forces seek advantages in multiple domains and dimensions to overwhelm U.S. forces’ ability to react.
At times, these advantages are not readily identified because threat activities, windows of opportunity, and
friendly efforts to exploit those windows and reach an advantage occur over extended time windows (in some
situations, over decades). Successful intelligence operations must remain agile and flexible to continuously
monitor OE changes and friendly and enemy strategic and operational effects, so the commander and staff
can adjust forces and capabilities when needed.
Long-Term Situational Understanding Challenges
The broad nature of the Army strategic contexts and long-duration time windows are
challenges to Army commanders and staffs. While many aspects of the theater are inherently
national- and joint-level activities, the Army also has an important role. The effort to provide
continuous situational understanding across the strategic contexts and account for all
domains and dimensions is carefully focused through the operational variables (PMESII-PT)
and pre-mission analysis of the OE. Focusing a large volume of information and intelligence
down to a manageable amount of relevant information is time-consuming and requires
detailed analysis. Often, there are limitations on the conduct of information collection during
competition—and sometimes during crisis. Despite these challenges, Army commanders and
staffs must support the planning and execution of flexible deterrent and response options as
well as defeat and stability mechanisms to achieve desired end states. Gaps and problems
with gaining situational understanding during competition can result in an even greater
challenge as friendly forces transition into crisis and armed conflict. |
2-0 | 109 | Army Strategic Contexts and Intelligence
4-7. Intelligence support is inherently difficult and is often discussed throughout this manual as fighting for
intelligence. Fighting for intelligence applies as much to intelligence support to Army units and organizations
during competition (including long-term situational understanding) or crisis as it does to intelligence support
to a division conducting offensive operations during a large-scale combat operation. Each strategic context
discussion in this chapter concludes with a fighting for intelligence discussion. (See paragraphs 1-120 through
1-125 for a discussion on the concept of fighting for intelligence.)
SECTION II – COMPETITION BELOW ARMED CONFLICT
4-8. Competition exists when two or more state or nonstate adversaries have incompatible interests but
neither seeks armed conflict. Nation-states compete using all instruments of national power to gain and
maintain advantages that assist them in achieving their goals. Low levels of lethal force can be part of
competition. Adversaries often employ cyberspace capabilities and information warfare to destroy or disrupt
infrastructure, interfere with government processes, and conduct activities in a way that does not cause the
United States and its allies to respond with force. Competition provides military forces—
⚫ Time to prepare for armed conflict.
⚫ Opportunities to assure allies and partners of resolve and commitment.
⚫ Time and space to set the necessary conditions to prevent crisis or armed conflict.
ADVERSARY METHODS
4-9. Conducting effective operations during competition requires a broad understanding of the strategic
security environment and common adversary methods and objectives. During competition, adversaries seek to
further their own interests using a variety of methods to hinder the United States from achieving its objectives.
Therefore, the intelligence staff must understand adversary methods and their associated goals and desired
effects. This knowledge assists the intelligence warfighting function in integrating and synchronizing with the
other warfighting functions to generate combat power and apply it against adversary actions.
Note. Peer threats conduct activities over prolonged time windows, so peer threat objectives,
advantages, and effects may not be recognized immediately. In some situations, these advantages
and effects may be observed slowly over expanded timeframes and eventually lead to crisis and
possibly armed conflict. fragment
ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC GOALS
4-10. By using a range of military and nonmilitary activities, peer threats use all instruments of national
power to further their interests. The adversary’s use of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military
activities shapes the OE to the adversary’s advantage well before armed conflict. Adversaries operate
aggressively in the space or cyberspace domains during competition and crisis to influence the OE and deter
or degrade friendly operations. Adversaries target foreign audiences to promote strategic messages on the
international stage. At times, these messages are not legitimate or correct; the adversary’s intent is to get the
messages out first, outside of the friendly forces’ ability to effectively counter these messages. Analyzing the
possibility of threat and friendly forces leveraging a window of opportunity to gain or maintain human,
information, and physical advantages is an important aspect of intelligence support during competition.
ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES TO COUNTER A U.S. RESPONSE
4-11. An adversary may attempt to prevent or constrain the United States’ ability to project forces to the
region and limit U.S. response options by using the following methods:
⚫ Conduct information warfare activities to manipulate the acquisition, transmission, and
presentation of information in a manner that legitimizes adversary actions and portrays the
United States as the aggressor. |
2-0 | 110 | Chapter 4
⚫ Conduct preclusion activities through nonlethal means to undermine relationships, raise political
stakes, manipulate public opinion, and erode resolve to constrain or eliminate basing rights,
overflight corridors, logistics support, and concerted allied actions.
⚫ Isolate the United States from allies and partners by fostering instability in critical areas and
among relevant actors to increase U.S. operational requirements.
⚫ Create sanctuary from U.S. and partner forces through international law and treaty agreements,
monitoring and attacking partner forces from across international borders and using proxy forces.
⚫ Conduct systems warfare by executing cyberspace attacks against critical force projection and
sustainment infrastructure nodes to delay or disrupt the United States’ ability to deploy forces.
Systems warfare approaches include nonattributable attacks on domestic infrastructure and the
employment of networked military capabilities that support isolation and preclusion efforts.
ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES TO PRECLUDE U.S. ACCESS TO A REGION
4-12. Establishing favorable conditions by shaping an OE is critical to the United States’ success and the
adversary’s success. Adversaries seek to establish conditions that limit or prevent U.S. access to a region,
typically in locations close to either adversary borders or U.S. allied-partner borders. This includes but is not
limited to—
⚫ Forward positioning of layered and integrated air defenses, long-range fires, and other A2
capabilities.
⚫ Positioning of systems capable of delivering conventional and nuclear munitions.
⚫ Positioning of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
⚫ Positioning of fixed-wing aircraft.
⚫ Positioning of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs).
⚫ Positioning of naval surface and subsurface forces.
⚫ Early warning surveillance radars.
⚫ Rocket artillery.
⚫ Conducting offensive cyberspace activities against friendly C2, infrastructure, and sustainment
capabilities.
⚫ EW capabilities.
⚫ Counterspace capabilities.
4-13. Adversaries seek exploitable advantages in the OE; therefore, U.S. forces should expect that
adversaries are observing them, including U.S. forces’ intentions and activities across all echelons within
CONUS and outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Security activities and CI considerations for
all echelons are important, ranging from technology protection and force modernization security to tactical
unit deployments and exercises. Adversaries may reach and exploit advantages in terms of intelligence
collection and then use the intelligence to cause grave harm to U.S. interests and operations.
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
4-14. Operations during competition—
⚫ Deter malign adversary action.
⚫ Set conditions to support friendly operations and the effective use of various capabilities should
deterrence fail.
⚫ Shape an OE with allies and partners in ways that support U.S. strategic interests and policy aims.
4-15. Preparation for armed conflict is the primary focus of Army conventional forces during competition.
Operations during competition focus on—
⚫ Setting the theater.
⚫ Building allied and partner capabilities and capacity.
⚫ Improving joint and multinational interoperability.
⚫ Protecting forward-stationed forces. |
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⚫ Preparing to transition and execute operation plans (OPLANs).
⚫ Training and developing leaders for operations in specific theaters.
⚫ Promoting and protecting U.S. national interests and influence.
⚫ Building partner capacity and partnerships.
⚫ Recognizing and countering adversary attempts to gain positions of relative advantage across the
domains and dimensions.
4-16. Competition activities are continuous within an area of responsibility (AOR). Army forces participate
in and conduct numerous other activities to support the CCDR’s theater campaign plan. These activities
include developing intelligence, countering weapons of mass destruction, providing support to humanitarian
efforts, achieving information advantages, and organizing and participating in combined training and
exercises. The CCDR uses these activities to improve security within partner nations, enhance international
legitimacy, gain multinational cooperation, and influence adversary decision making. This cooperation
includes exchanging information and sharing intelligence, obtaining access for U.S. forces in peacetime and
crisis, and mitigating conditions that could lead to crisis and armed conflict.
4-17. The theater army and subordinate Army forces perform the following major activities during
competition:
⚫ Execute flexible deterrent options and flexible response options.
⚫ Set the theater across warfighting functions, including in terms of preparing for intelligence
operations and intelligence staff activities during crisis and armed conflict.
⚫ Tailor Army forces.
⚫ Project the force. (See appendix C.)
4-18. Other competition activities include but are not limited to—
⚫ Exchanging information and sharing intelligence with unified action partners.
⚫ Assisting allies and partners to improve their military capabilities and capacity.
⚫ Medical support.
⚫ Cooperative training.
⚫ Supporting local institutions.
4-19. Operations during competition consist of various long-term military engagements, security
cooperation, and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions. Typically, these operations also occur to support
the CCDR’s theater campaign plan or theater security cooperation plan. CCDRS use these plans as tools to
organize, integrate, and execute joint operations.
CONSOLIDATING GAINS
4-20. Experience proves that Army force activities conducted during competition assist in ensuring stability
and reduce the potential for man-made crises or armed conflict throughout a region, even in locations where no
previous combat has occurred. During competition, Army forces may consolidate gains from previous conflicts
for many years as JFCs seek to maintain relative advantages against a specific adversary and sustain enduring
political outcomes. Examples of consolidating gains during competition include but are not limited to—
⚫ Increasing theater supply stocks.
⚫ Developing and revising detailed contingency plans and perfecting tactical tasks to execute
OPLANs for large-scale combat operations.
⚫ Promoting interoperability with host-nation units. This consideration includes intelligence
agreements, exercises, interoperability agreements with unified action partners, and expedited
means to revise intelligence sharing agreements, when necessary.
⚫ Promoting and facilitating civil-military integration and interorganizational cooperation between
unified action partners and indigenous populations and institutions responsible for executing
governance.
⚫ Infrastructure improvement. This consideration includes constant revisions and measures to
improve the survivability of the intelligence architecture within the theater. |
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⚫ Assessing and improving protection measures against adversary capabilities.
⚫ SIGINT surveys and other intelligence surveys and assessments within the theater.
⚫ Leveraging Army engagements during the execution of foreign assistance, which includes
humanitarian and civic assistance.
FIGHTING FOR INTELLIGENCE
4-21. Intelligence is integral in supporting operations during competition. Often, this intelligence support is
expressed as setting the theater among Army intelligence professionals. Continuous monitoring of the OE to
determine changes that may lead to an escalation of hostilities must occur to give decision makers adequate
warnings to determine and execute optimal deterrent and response actions. The intelligence staff must
establish a baseline intelligence architecture to meet a broad range of requirements, to include ensuring
information is available to support decision making if the strategic context transitions to crisis and armed
conflict. Intelligence must be continuously developed to ensure Army and other joint forces are prepared to
meet the multitude of scenarios that could possibly drive change and escalate conflict. If the situation does
escalate, intelligence support must be able to focus on critical stability and defeat mechanisms for subsequent
activities and operations.
4-22. Intelligence products assist the commander in countering actions by adversaries that challenge the
security of forward-stationed units and the stability of a nation or region and are contrary to U.S. interests.
Intelligence provides the commander and staff with the ability to—
⚫ Detect indicators of imminent threat activities and understand enemy intentions.
⚫ Track enemy activities and capabilities across the domains and dimensions.
⚫ Understand how the threat is attempting to gain and/or maintain positions of relative advantage.
⚫ Make informed decisions and realistic assessments of operational and tactical risks.
⚫ Support targeting.
⚫ Support information advantage activities.
4-23. Support to contingency plan development, which is treated as a branch to the campaign plan, is a vital
activity during competition. Different situations within an AOR can cause a branch to the campaign plan,
including regional instability, armed aggression, natural or man-made disasters, or humanitarian crises.
Intelligence assists in identifying these potential situations and participates in developing plans to mitigate
these scenarios.
4-24. Intelligence databases also have an important role in setting the theater from an intelligence
perspective. Managing and creating unclassified and classified databases provide interoperable and
collaborative environments for Army and joint forces, national agencies, and multinational organizations.
Databases facilitate intelligence analysis, reporting, production, dissemination, sustainment, and intelligence
reach. Within each theater, the development and validation of databases generally occur in a top-down
manner, with significant support from regionally aligned forces and special operations forces. This allows
units to maintain, populate, and continually update a thorough and accurate set of databases during
subsequent Army strategic contexts. However, there may be instances when regionally aligned forces must
develop and populate an authoritative database of threat signatures and associated contextual information, in
conjunction with joint forces and the DIA. This is particularly true when an area quickly transitions from
competition to crisis. In some scenarios, each echelon below theater army must prepare to establish localized
intelligence databases during any strategic context. Unit SOPs should outline the requirements for managing,
formatting and standardization, indexing and correlation, normalization, storage, security protocols, and
associated applications.
Note. It is critical for commands to update intelligence databases continually with actual and
potential threat information to maximize the value of intelligence products and reports. |
2-0 | 113 | Army Strategic Contexts and Intelligence
Two Key Aspects of Building Databases and Intelligence to Support
Crisis and Armed Conflict
Intelligence enterprise units and organizations should carefully use a federated analytical
approach in developing and maintaining authoritative databases of threat indicators and key
capability signatures and associated contextual information across all the domains and
dimensions.
Army intelligence units and organizations, in coordination with the intelligence enterprise,
should use a federated analytical approach in analyzing threat systems similarly to joint TSA.
Note. Army analysis of threat systems is not conducted to joint standards and is not captured
in the same format as joint TSA and target development. When working as part of or to
support the joint force, Army forces perform joint TSA and conduct target development to joint
standards.
SECTION III – CRISIS
4-25. Crisis is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens,
military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic,
or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national
and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0). During crisis, armed conflict has not yet occurred, but it is either
imminent or a distinct possibility that requires a rapid response by forces prepared to fight if deterrence fails.
A crisis can be long in duration, but it can also reflect a near-simultaneous transition to armed conflict.
Leaders do not assume that a crisis provides additional time for a transition to armed conflict. Crisis is
different from crisis response, which can result from a natural or human disaster.
ADVERSARY METHODS
4-26. When conducting activities in an OE, peer threats seek to gain or maintain advantages against opponents.
As a crisis develops, a peer threat uses information warfare and preclusion to shape the situation. This may
include the adversary escalating or de-escalating its activities based on an assessment of the situation, which
includes a calculation of the risk. During crisis, adversary methods include but are not limited to—
⚫ Shaping a crisis.
⚫ Controlling escalation.
⚫ Mitigating U.S. deterrence.
ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES TO SHAPE A CRISIS
4-27. Peer threats shape a crisis to their benefit by seeking to exploit real or perceived advantages, which
can be local, regional, and/or global. Peer threats use information warfare and preclusion to gain an
information advantage against U.S. messaging and further isolate U.S forces and capabilities from allies.
4-28. Units and organizations, at and across echelons, conduct continuous information collection (including
ISR within the joint force) to gain situational understanding of threat activities, capabilities, intent, and COAs.
Threat forces seek to employ capabilities and conduct operations faster than friendly forces can act to gain
and maintain a position of relative advantage. Threat forces can gain this advantage by finding a window of
opportunity where friendly forces are either denied or delayed by specific circumstances from using the
dynamics of combat power (leadership, firepower, information, mobility, survivability). |
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ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES TO CONTROL ESCALATION
4-29. Peer threats may attempt to control the escalation of a crisis to avoid armed conflict with the United
States by initiating actions to prevent or counter a U.S. response. These actions may focus on the United
States and its allies by using the instruments of national power. These actions may include creating conditions
on the ground designed to make U.S. military responses either too expensive to employ or too late to affect
the political situation. A peer threat may also—
⚫ Accelerate its operational timeline.
⚫ Employ information warfare.
⚫ Increase support to proxy forces.
⚫ Increase the number of forward deployed units in the region.
⚫ Initiate crisis in other theaters to distract U.S. forces and diffuse U.S. response in the area of
greatest interest.
Note. In extreme situations to control escalation, an adversary may conduct a limited attack in
response to U.S. reactions to the activities that precipitated the original crisis.
ADVERSARY ACTIVITIES TO MITIGATE U.S. DETERRENCE
4-30. As an adversary plans for operations during crisis, there are several key actions the adversary considers
to mitigate U.S. deterrence efforts and ensure U.S. operations do not significantly interfere with adversary
interests. These actions may include—
⚫ Conducting limited attacks to expose friendly force vulnerabilities. These attacks may also
degrade the deterrence value of deployed forces and destroy credibility among current and
potential partners.
⚫ Disrupting or delaying the deployment of Army and joint forces through cyberspace attacks and
denial of space capabilities.
⚫ Exploiting gaps in national interests among the United States, partner nations, and potential
partners by attacking weaker countries whom the United States has no treaty obligations to defend.
⚫ Conducting deception operations to conceal real intent.
⚫ Increasing the use of proxy forces to coopt, coerce, or influence the local population,
organizations, and governments within a crisis region.
⚫ Creating multiple dilemmas for the United States by attacking or threatening the use of force
against potential partner nations in regions outside of the crisis region.
⚫ Impacting the will of the public through information warfare, including cyberspace attacks.
⚫ Threatening the use of nuclear weapons to prevent intervention by the United States, allies, and
partners.
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
4-31. A crisis can result from one or a multitude of events/actions such as adversary actions/indicators of an
imminent action or natural or human disasters. Examples of events/actions that can lead to a crisis include
but are not limited to—
⚫ Aggressive behavior by an adversary to coerce and intimidate an opponent with the threat of
force.
⚫ The presence of indicators foreshadowing a military coup or change of political power.
⚫ Increased dissemination of disinformation or misinformation targeted toward a country’s
population and the international community.
⚫ Disease outbreak.
⚫ Build-up of military forces at an international border.
⚫ Failed elections.
⚫ Famine. |
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4-32. Although an opponent has not yet used lethal force as its primary means of achieving objectives, crisis
can escalate to armed conflict. Combat power derived from the intelligence warfighting function, in
conjunction with the other warfighting functions, is critical in providing credible lethal capabilities to assist
in deterring further provocation and compelling an adversary to cease aggressive action.
4-33. Some peer threats view conflict as a continuous condition in which sharpened or reduced periods of
violence occur and recur. Additionally, adversaries may perceive themselves in a different context or state of
conflict than U.S., allied, and partnered forces—what is viewed by one side as crisis might be perceived by
the other side as armed conflict or competition.
4-34. Changing the intensity of its actions, even when that intensity reduces tension, does not end an
adversary’s campaign to oppose U.S. interests. Intelligence professionals must continuously assess the OE
and demonstrate flexibility in determining adversary actions, the changes they cause, and how information
and intelligence can be used to de-escalate the situation or further prepare U.S. and allied partners for armed
conflict. Regardless of the capabilities employed, there are generally two broad outcomes from a crisis:
⚫ Deterrence is maintained and de-escalation occurs.
⚫ Armed conflict begins.
CONSOLIDATING GAINS
4-35. During and after a crisis response, Army forces consolidate gains to deny adversary forces the means
to extend the crisis or create a similar crisis in the future. This often entails maintaining an enhanced force
posture in a joint operations area for a time to demonstrate U.S. willingness to defend allies and partners.
Continuous intelligence operations to support U.S. forces, allies, and partners are essential during any crisis.
Commanders must emphasize information collection before and during the transition from competition to
crisis to maintain a detailed understanding of the threat and continuously assess the situation, positioning
their forces to retain the initiative.
4-36. During these transitions, threat forces attempt to exploit perceived vulnerabilities by conducting lethal
and nonlethal activities against U.S. forces, allies, and partners. The threat’s use of disinformation and
misinformation can be used to shape threat narratives to justify ongoing or pending actions, including the use
of force. Commanders and staffs should focus on potential threat and friendly strengths, vulnerabilities, and
advantages across the domains and dimensions. Continuous information collection and intelligence analysis
are critical in ensuring flexible deterrent and/or flexible response options.
FIGHTING FOR INTELLIGENCE
4-37. Operations during crisis place increasing demands on the intelligence warfighting function. The
intelligence staff increases its knowledge of the threat and the specific OE, focuses the commander and staff
with relevant information and intelligence, and expands various intelligence capabilities as part of the
intelligence architecture. With the shift from competition to crisis, the theater army shifts to refining
contingency plans and preparing estimates for the phased increase of ground forces and capabilities. During
crisis, intelligence operations focus on the following:
⚫ Support theater openings in terms of finding and exploiting advantages.
⚫ Gain and maintain situational understanding of threat intent and COAs, activities, and the nature
of those activities and effects across the theater.
⚫ Provide support to noncombatant evacuation operations, when needed.
⚫ Provide support to targeting and prepare for targeting during armed conflict.
⚫ Provide support to force projection and prepare for the possibility of a contested deployment.
⚫ Provide support to information advantage activities, as appropriate.
⚫ Provide support to protection activities.
⚫ Provide focused analysis of the domains and human, information, and physical dimensions, then
properly focus that into analysis of the operational variables.
⚫ Provide support to identify and implement flexible deterrent and response options and follow-on
activities and operations. |
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⚫ Significantly modify the intelligence architecture to prepare for the possibility of armed conflict.
⚫ Set conditions to reset theater intelligence and the intelligence architecture.
4-38. The intelligence staff must understand threat intent and COAs as well as ongoing activities in terms of
the threat’s perspective, which often includes an extended time window. Leveraging the intelligence
enterprise, including allies and partners, assists in understanding the threat’s perspective. This situational
understanding is essential in gaining and maintaining advantages against the threat’s use of the five broad
peer threat methods—information warfare, systems warfare, preclusion, isolation, and sanctuary (see
paragraph 2-21).
4-39. Truly understanding the OE across the domains and dimensions, including important interrelationships,
significantly increases the likelihood that commanders and staffs can accurately predict when, where, and how
the threat will conduct actions. When commanders and staffs can predict threat actions, friendly force
capabilities can be used to quickly gain positions of relative advantage. However, intelligence is rarely perfect.
When commanders and staffs have a lower level of situational understanding, it is important to develop and rely
on detailed indicators of possible threat intent and COAs and continually track those indicators.
SECTION IV – ARMED CONFLICT
4-40. Armed conflict encompasses the conditions of a strategic relationship in which opponents use lethal
force as the primary means for achieving objectives and imposing their will on the other. The employment
of lethal force is the defining characteristic of armed conflict, and it is the primary function of the Army.
Entering and terminating armed conflict are political decisions. Army forces may enter conflict with some
advanced warning during a prolonged crisis or with little warning during competition. How well Army forces
are prepared to enter an armed conflict ultimately depends on decisions and preparations made during
competition and crisis. Army forces provide landpower to the joint force and conduct limited contingency or
large-scale combat operations to ensure enduring political outcomes favorable to U.S. interests.
Note. Large-scale combat operations are the focus of Army readiness and reflect the most intense
and destructive form of armed conflict. Therefore, the rest of this section will focus on large-scale
combat operations.
WARFARE
4-41. The object of war is to impose a nation or group’s will on its enemy in pursuit of policy objectives.
Regardless of the specific objectives, the decision to wage war represents a major policy decision and changes
how Army forces use military capabilities. The nature of war, its principles, and its elements remain
consistent over time. However, warfare, the conduct and characteristics of war, reflects changing means and
contexts. The Army’s multidomain operations concept accounts for the constant nature of war and the
changing character of warfare. Its balanced approach guides how Army forces operate across the competition
continuum given the prevailing characteristics of anticipated OEs now and in the near future.
4-42. There are several important aspects of warfare discussed in FM 3-0. These aspects include the methods
of warfare. There are many different methods of warfare, depending on the situation and actors, but they
generally fall into two broad categories:
⚫ Conventional warfare is a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions of
nation-states (FM 3-0). Conventional warfare is generally executed by two or more military
forces through armed conflict. It is commonly known as conventional warfare because it means
to fight enemy forces directly, with comparable military systems and organizations.
⚫ Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and nonmilitary
capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than
military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional
warfare (FM 3-0). Irregular warfare may include the use of indirect military activities to enable
partners, proxies, or surrogates to achieve shared or complementary objectives. |
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4-43. Offensive, defensive, and stability operations are inherent elements of conventional and irregular
warfare. Divisions and higher echelons typically perform some combination of all three elements in their
operations simultaneously. However, the lower the echelon, the more likely it is for that formation to be
focused on one element at a time. The three types of operations differ:
⚫ An offensive operation is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of
terrain, resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). Offensive operations are how commanders
impose their will on an enemy. The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and
exploiting the initiative to gain a physical and psychological advantage. Offensive operations
typically include a sudden action directed toward enemy vulnerabilities, capitalizing on speed,
surprise, and shock.
⚫ A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces,
and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). Typically, the
defense cannot achieve a decisive victory. However, it sets conditions for a counteroffensive or a
counterattack that enables forces to regain the initiative. Defensive operations are a counter to an
enemy offensive action, and they seek to destroy as many of the enemy forces as possible.
Defensive operations preserve control over land, resources, and populations, and they protect
lines of communications and critical capabilities against attack. Commanders can conduct
defensive operations in one area to free forces for offensive operations elsewhere.
⚫ A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with
other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide
essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian
relief (ADP 3-0). These operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government,
or a military government. Stability involves coercive and constructive action.
Note. Offensive, defensive, and stability operations are important doctrinal constructs across many
of the Army intelligence doctrinal publications.
LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
4-44. Large-scale combat on land occurs within the framework of a larger joint campaign, usually with an
Army headquarters forming the base of a joint force headquarters. These operations typically entail high
tempo, high resource consumption, and high casualty rates. Large-scale combat introduces levels of
complexity, lethality, ambiguity, and speed to military activities not common in other operations.
4-45. During large-scale combat operations, Army forces should expect deployments to be contested by
enemy actions in all domains. In a contested deployment, the first challenge during large-scale combat
operations is defeating a network of sophisticated A2 and AD systems. Enemy forces will attempt to deny
U.S. and multinational forces access to the AO by contesting U.S. and multinational forces in each of the
domains and dimensions of the OE. The joint force may even have to fight for intelligence to identify threat
locations, strengths, and vulnerabilities to gain an initial lodgment.
4-46. Once joint and Army forces achieve an initial lodgment, they must be prepared to immediately conduct
tactical operations. As a lodgment is formed, the threat will likely employ a variety of new capabilities to
deny friendly forces freedom of maneuver. Friendly forces must be prepared to operate quickly across each
domain and dimension. These multidomain efforts must entail joint synchronization, Service
interdependencies, and the cross-domain convergence of capabilities at a time and place to create an
operational advantage. Army forces must account for constant enemy observation, including the threat from
cyberspace, space-based, and unmanned systems that saturate the OE. Army forces take measures to defeat
the enemy’s ability to effectively mass effects while creating exploitable advantages to mass effects against
enemy capabilities and formations. |
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4-47. The challenge for and requirements on the intelligence warfighting function from deployment to initial
lodgment and subsequent operations are substantial. Developing effective collection management plans and
tasking collection assets (in depth and with redundancy) are essential. Intelligence support identifies windows
of opportunity to counter the threat’s capabilities and enable the joint force to maintain freedom of action
and gain positions of relative advantage. (The advantage can be a human, information, or physical advantage.)
(See appendix C for intelligence support to force projection operations.)
ADVERSARY METHODS
4-48. Although peer threats mainly seek to obtain their strategic objectives during competition, they will
engage in armed conflict if they view the rewards are worth the risk. During armed conflict, peer threats
employ combinations of threat methods to render U.S. military power irrelevant whenever possible and inflict
unacceptable losses on the United States, its allies, and its partners. Peer threats use diplomatic, economic,
informational, and military means to facilitate meeting their objectives.
CHINA
4-49. China considers three aspects in the country’s view of conflict:
⚫ Comprehensive national power comprises hard power (military capability and capacity,
defense industry capability, intelligence capability, and related diplomatic actions such as threats
and coercion) and soft power (economic power, diplomatic efforts, foreign development, global
image, and international prestige). Ultimately, all forms of conflict must enhance China’s
comprehensive national power.
⚫ Deception is essential to China’s tactics to achieve desired perceptions by its opponents. These
perceptions are ultimately exploited to further China’s objectives. Central to deception is having
opponents make decisions not based on what is occurring in an OE. When doing so, opponents
are faced with making decisions and conducting actions regarding situations or circumstances in
which China has already set the conditions to have an advantage.
⚫ The Three Warfares are designed to unbalance, deceive, and coerce opponents to influence
their perceptions in ways that create advantage. The Three Warfares are universally nonlethal,
do not involve direct combat operations, and are designed to support and reinforce the traditional
military operations of the People’s Liberation Army. The Three Warfares are—
▪ Public opinion warfare—China’s high-level information campaign designed to set the
terms of political discussion.
▪ Psychological warfare—the deliberate manipulation of psychological reactions in targeted
audiences designed to create and reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to China’s
objectives and guide adversary behavior toward China’s preferred outcomes.
▪ Legal warfare—the setting of legal conditions to unbalance potential opponents by
exploiting international or domestic law in order to hinder their military operations, create
legal justification for People’s Liberation Army operations worldwide, and support Chinese
interests through a valid framework.
4-50. During armed conflict, China employs systems warfare in combination with the other threat methods,
such as preclusion, isolation, and sanctuary. China employs these threat methods throughout the domains and
at all levels of warfare. Systems warfare involves—
⚫ Bypassing enemy systems’ areas of strength, gaining a combat advantage by approaching them
asymmetrically.
⚫ Developing systems that excel at exploiting perceived vulnerabilities in enemy systems, thereby
offsetting their strengths by undermining their systems’ ability to perform assigned missions.
⚫ Undermining international alliances through diplomatic efforts.
⚫ Conducting cyberspace attacks to disable air or seaports.
⚫ Using special operations forces to undermine civilian morale through covert operations. |
2-0 | 119 | Army Strategic Contexts and Intelligence
4-51. At the tactical level, systems warfare centers largely on targeting high-value battlefield systems such
as radars, command and communications nodes, field artillery and air defense systems, and critical logistics
support means. (For Chinese tactics, see ATP 7-100.3 and FM 3-0.)
RUSSIA
4-52. Russian forces seek to shape the OE to gain and maintain relative advantages across the domains and
dimensions. Russia seeks to do this by synchronizing capabilities and their effects simultaneously to
overwhelm U.S. and allied force capabilities and capacity and weaken the United States’ national will to
continue a conflict. (For Russian tactics, see FM 3-0.)
4-53. Russian goals are centered on creating constraints that prevent success of the United States’ campaign
by using methods that focus on four key areas:
⚫ Disrupt or prevent understanding of the OE. Russian information warfare activities
manipulate the acquisition, transmission, and presentation of information in a manner suitable to
Russia’s preferred outcomes.
⚫ Target stability. Russia may foster instability in key areas and among key groups so regional
security conditions do not support U.S. operational requirements.
⚫ Disaggregate partnerships. Russia acts upon U.S. allies and partners to reduce the United
States’ ability to operate in its preferred combined, joint, and interagency manner.
⚫ Prevent access. Russia employs preconflict activities to deny access to U.S. forces, using nonlethal
means initially and transitioning to lethal means if necessary. Russia seeks to undermine
relationships, raise political stakes, manipulate public opinion, and attack resolve to constrain or
deny basing rights, overflight corridors, logistics support, and concerted allied action.
4-54. Similar to U.S. forces, Russian forces operate combined arms forces to exploit the effects of both
precision strikes and massed fires. Russian forces also—
⚫ Employ all available national elements of power both before employing conventional warfare
and maneuver forces and after employing conventional warfare.
⚫ Employ deep maneuver against lesser opponents, when possible, to defeat an enemy’s will to
resist early in a conflict.
⚫ Mass capabilities in pursuit of more limited objectives while fixing their adversary along a broad
front.
⚫ Employ denial and deception to mask the true intent of operations.
⚫ Use the effects of strike actions to create the condition for military success.
⚫ Apply intelligence methods and decision making that are scientifically based to—
▪ Understand the conditions of an OE that will impact operations.
▪ Determine the tactical functions required and calculate the required allocation of combat
power needed to accomplish a mission in a specific time and location.
▪ Understand the psychological and cognitive issues among competing friendly forces,
aggressor forces, the local population, and other actors in an OE.
CONSOLIDATING GAINS
4-55. During armed conflict, Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains throughout an operation.
This is part of defeating the enemy in detail to accomplish overall policy and strategic objectives. From a
small unit perspective, consolidating gains can be actions on the objective and preparing for enemy
counterattacks, while from a theater army perspective, it can be incorporating partner-nation forces into
ongoing operations. From the intelligence perspective, intelligence support to consolidating gains often
focuses on situational understanding, warning intelligence, support to force protection, identity activities, and
cultural understanding; it also assists in determining termination criteria or when it is operationally acceptable
to transition from large-scale combat operations to post-conflict competition. |
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4-56. Consolidating gains initially focuses on the exploitation of tactical success to ensure enemy forces
cannot reconstitute any form of resistance in areas where they were initially defeated, or that enemy forces
have not successfully conducted a deception operation to create a friendly force vulnerability or achieve a
position of relative advantage. While the deep and close areas of the operational framework are important,
the rear area has a special importance during consolidating gains due to bypassed, stay-behind, or infiltrated
enemy forces; airborne, air assault, or special operations forces; terrorist cells; guerilla, partisan, or insurgent
forces; the use of chemical weapons; or an effective combination of these forces and capabilities can
significantly degrade friendly force operations. The impact of these types of threat operations can create
crippling logistics, C2, civil population, and worldwide and U.S. public opinion issues.
4-57. Army forces must continuously consolidate gains to make temporary gains enduring. Like many
activities, success is far more likely when the intelligence effort is carefully integrated and synchronized with
operations. Typical operational functions and their reporting intelligence requirements include—
⚫ Locating bypassed enemy forces, bypassed or abandoned munitions and weapons, and stay-
behind special purpose and proxy forces.
⚫ Populace and resource control measures.
⚫ Reestablishing law and order.
⚫ Providing humanitarian assistance.
⚫ Restoring key infrastructure.
4-58. When consolidating gains during armed conflict, the role of intelligence is vital in assessing relevant
aspects of the OE, including but not limited to—
⚫ Detecting both positive and negative trends.
⚫ Discrediting disinformation and misinformation.
⚫ Determining the effectiveness of friendly operations.
⚫ Identifying actions that could threaten hard-won gains.
⚫ Assisting with the difficult transitions between offensive, defensive, and stability operations and
the transition to post-conflict competition.
TRANSITIONS BETWEEN OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, AND STABILITY OPERATIONS
4-59. A main goal of defensive operations is defeating the enemy’s attacks and transition, or threaten to
transition, to the offense. Units must deliberately plan for transitions to identify and establish the necessary
friendly and enemy conditions for a successful transition. As friendly forces meet their defensive objectives,
forces consolidate and reorganize for offensive operations or prepare to facilitate forward passages of lines
for fresh formations. Units should do everything possible to prevent enemy forces from reinforcing their
forward echelons, consolidating, or reorganizing while friendly forces prepare for follow-on operations.
4-60. Intelligence is critical to supporting the commander and staff as they—
⚫ Assess when they have enough combat power to maintain pressure on the enemy.
⚫ Identify opportunities to complete the defeat of enemy formations in order to reduce the risk of
future casualties fighting the same enemy formations after recovery.
⚫ Assess the effects of battle on enemy forces relative to their own unit.
4-61. When offensive operations culminate before enemy forces are defeated, friendly forces rapidly
transition to the defense. Commanders may deliberately transition to the defense when enemy forces are
incapable of fully exploiting an opportunity, or when they believe they can build combat power to resume
the offense before enemy forces can react effectively. Depending on where culmination occurs, friendly
forces may have to reposition forces on defensible terrain and develop a form of defense and scheme of
maneuver based on an assessment of the mission variables (METT-TC [I]).
4-62. Successful offensive operations end because Army forces have achieved their assigned objectives. A
successful offense can also require a transition to a defensive posture dominated by stability operations and
a strategic environment moving toward post-conflict political goals. These operations have the goal of
transitioning responsibility for security and governance to legitimate authorities other than U.S. forces. |
2-0 | 121 | Army Strategic Contexts and Intelligence
4-63. As a transition to stability operations occurs, leaders focus on stability operations tasks and information
advantage activities to inform and influence populations and conduct security force assistance. Effective
collaboration with diplomatic and humanitarian organizations enhances the ability to achieve stability
mechanisms. Army forces play a key role in enabling the joint force to establish and conduct military
governance until a civilian authority or government is given control of its assigned areas.
TRANSITION TO POST-CONFLICT COMPETITION
4-64. Army forces conclude armed conflict by establishing conditions favorable to the United States; they
consolidate gains and prosecute operations with this desired end state. As hostilities end, stability operations
tasks dominate operations with the purpose of transitioning responsibilities to legitimate authorities in a secure
environment. Army forces provide the joint force with the option of establishing a military transitional
government before transitioning full governing responsibility to host-nation or other provisional governments.
4-65. Standards for transitioning governance responsibility depend on the credibility, capability, and
capacity of the governing organization to maintain the favorable conditions established during armed conflict.
Strategic leaders determine the broad conditions for transition at the outset of operations and refine them
based on how the situation changes. Army forces play a key role in understanding the host-nation culture,
understanding critical infrastructure, assisting strategic leaders in developing realistic transition goals and
timings, and determining the duration and scale of U.S. commitments required to maintain stability.
4-66. In some situations, operations may rapidly transition from large-scale combat operations to stability
operations with the requirement to maintain continuous security while grappling with a new and very different
set of challenges. Army units and organizations may modify their task organizations and priorities to meet
additional tasks associated with stability operations. Some of the typical tasks associated with stability
operations include the following: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services,
support to governance, support economic and infrastructure development, and conduct security cooperation.
4-67. This transition is very complex and difficult for the intelligence warfighting function. Intelligence must
support all six tasks; it must often support combatting terrorism, arms control, counterinsurgency,
counterdrug operations, and foreign internal defense in a larger context. Essential to intelligence support
during the transition to the enable civil authority phase of operations is determining how intelligence units
can support enabling the sustainability of civil authority. During these operations, intelligence staffs and units
have a different focus, organize in a different manner, and perform unique tasks:
⚫ Many unique aspects of the OE—such as sociocultural factors, regional and local politics, and
financial intelligence—become important.
⚫ For special operations forces, integration and interoperability with conventional forces become
critical. (See FM 6-05.)
⚫ Fusion centers and other unique analytical centers are formed.
⚫ Certain aspects of operations—such as counter-improvised explosive devices, counterterrorism,
and screening local hires—become more important.
FIGHTING FOR INTELLIGENCE
4-68. Of all the Army strategic contexts, armed conflict creates the greatest challenge for the intelligence
warfighting function, and large-scale combat operations against a peer threat is the most challenging form of
armed conflict. The demands of large-scale combat operations consume all staff elements to provide the
necessary support in the level of detail and at the tempo—the relative speed and rhythm of military operations
over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0)—these types of operations require. During large-scale
combat, intelligence support is continually conducted to provide commanders and staffs the detailed
knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and tactics to plan for
and execute operations during unified action. An intense focus on the critical elements of intelligence
support—such as supporting the commander and staff’s understanding, visualization, and ability to direct
operations as well as assisting to drive the unit’s battle rhythm—is required. Chapter 8 details the roles and
techniques associated with fighting for intelligence during large-scale combat operations. |
2-0 | 123 | PART TWO
Major Intelligence Activities
The doctrinal concepts in part I—intelligence and operational fundamentals—are
important to fully understand the content in part II, which discusses major intelligence
activities—intelligence staff support (chapter 5) and intelligence operations
(chapter 6). Chapters 5 and 6 further set the foundation to understand the specifics of
fighting for intelligence, which is discussed in detail in part III.
Chapter 5
Intelligence Staff Support
SECTION I – OVERVIEW
5-1. Staffs support commanders in making and implementing decisions and in integrating and
synchronizing combat power. Competent staffs multiply a unit’s effectiveness. They provide timely and
relevant information and analysis, make estimates and recommendations, prepare plans and orders, assist in
controlling operations, and assess the progress of operations for the commander. A staff primarily—
⚫ Supports the commander.
⚫ Assists subordinate commanders, staffs, and units.
⚫ Informs units and organizations outside the headquarters.
5-2. Effective intelligence support is multifaceted, and the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff are ultimately
responsible for providing intelligence support to the commander and staff. The complexities of collecting
against and conducting analysis on a determined and adaptive, threat that is technologically capable across
all domains, creates challenges for the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff. Other complexities that can challenge
the intelligence staff include but are not limited to—
⚫ A multitude of factors within the OE (across the human, information, and physical dimensions).
⚫ Sophisticated intelligence capabilities.
⚫ The intelligence architecture.
⚫ Time constraints during the execution of the intelligence process.
⚫ The many requirements to support multidomain operations.
5-3. This chapter discusses how the intelligence staff provides intelligence support to the commander and
staff, including—
⚫ Intelligence staff composition and responsibilities.
⚫ Key IWFTs.
⚫ Situational understanding, the CIP, and the COP. |
2-0 | 124 | Chapter 5
5-4. Figure 5-1 shows important aspects of fighting for intelligence from the context of the intelligence
process, with emphasis on the commander’s role in driving the intelligence warfighting function and the
G-2/S-2’s role in synchronizing intelligence.
Figure 5-1. Military intelligence activities
SECTION II – INTELLIGENCE STAFF COMPOSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES
5-5. The first aspect of understanding intelligence staff support is understanding the intelligence staff’s
composition and responsibilities, which differ by echelon but are also similar across echelons. The G-2/S-2
organizes its staff, provides focus, assigns tasks, and synchronizes the entire intelligence effort. However,
the discussions about staff responsibilities interrelate with preceding discussions about staff teamwork, the
operations process, integrating processes, and leveraging intelligence and collaborating with higher,
subordinate, and adjacent units and organizations. |
2-0 | 125 | Intelligence Staff Support
INTELLIGENCE STAFF COMPOSITION
5-6. The composition of the intelligence staff differs significantly across echelons—from theater army to
BCT levels. The G-2/S-2 organizes its staff, to include the supporting intelligence analytical element, to meet
the various requirements resulting from the conduct of operations. The higher the echelon, the more personnel
within the intelligence staff and the more sophisticated the structure. Generally, certain functions are common
across echelons and drive the organization of the intelligence staff. Forming permanent instead of ad hoc
teams or sections is preferable because of the skills and proficiency necessary to perform those functions.
Although there are intelligence staff elements in other CP cells, most of the intelligence staff sections reside
in the main CP intelligence cell. Additional staff integration occurs through cross-functional working groups
such as the information collection, protection, and targeting working groups.
5-7. The intelligence functional cell commonly includes the following:
⚫ The G-2X/S-2X.
⚫ Collection management.
⚫ Targeting.
⚫ The ACE or BISE (at the BCT level [see ATP 2-19.4]).
⚫ IEW maintenance and intelligence sustainment.
⚫ Intelligence communications.
⚫ The USAF SWO or staff weather team, when augmented.
Notes. Higher headquarters may augment the intelligence cell with additional capabilities to meet
mission requirements.
This chapter discusses the intelligence staff, to include the supporting intelligence analytical
element as a critical element of the intelligence staff. Intelligence analytical elements are either
attached, under OPCON, DS, or in another support relationship to the headquarters and
headquarters company or other headquarters that includes the staff at that echelon. For example,
at the division level, the division ACE is controlled by the division G-2.
INTELLIGENCE STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
5-8. Staff members have specific duties and responsibilities associated with their area of expertise. They
must be ready to advise the commander and other senior leaders about issues pertaining to their area of
expertise without advanced notice. However, regardless of their career field or duty billet, all staff sections
share a common set of duties and responsibilities, to include—
⚫ Managing information within their area of expertise.
⚫ Building and maintaining running estimates.
⚫ Conducting staff research.
⚫ Analyzing problems.
⚫ Performing IPOE.
⚫ Developing information requirements.
⚫ Advising and informing the commander.
⚫ Providing recommendations.
⚫ Preparing plans, orders, and other staff writing, including recommendations on Annex A (Task
Organization).
⚫ Exercising staff supervision.
⚫ Performing risk management.
⚫ Assessing operations.
⚫ Conducting staff inspections and assistance visits.
⚫ Performing staff administrative procedures. |
2-0 | 126 | Chapter 5
5-9. The intelligence staff is primarily responsible for providing the commander and staff with intelligence
on the threat, terrain, weather and weather effects, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the
OE. Other intelligence staff responsibilities include but are not limited to—
⚫ Enabling an effective intelligence process:
▪ Plan, establish, and revise an intelligence architecture in close collaboration with the
G-6/S-6 and other staff members.
▪ Leverage data, information, and intelligence to provide the best intelligence support
possible.
▪ Lead collection management, which drives information collection. Develop a draft of
Annex L (Information Collection) of the order to assist the G-3/S-3.
▪ Ensure ongoing information collection—collecting the information needed for anticipated
decisions and intelligence requirements.
▪ Use knowledge management techniques to optimize intelligence support.
▪ Answer requests for information (RFIs) from higher, subordinate, and adjacent units.
▪ Disseminate intelligence to higher, subordinate, and adjacent units and organizations.
⚫ Determining and requesting foreign disclosure office/representative support to facilitate
collaboration with unified action partners and allies.
⚫ Facilitating an understanding of the OE, with the greatest emphasis on the threat, terrain,
weather and weather effects, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the OE:
▪ Conduct pre-mission analysis of the OE, including analysis of threat capabilities and the
population (especially information dimension effects) across the domains and dimensions.
▪ Lead IPOE and produce the various IPOE products.
▪ Analyze and evaluate civil considerations in close collaboration with the G-9/S-9.
▪ Facilitate the USAF SWO or staff weather team in effectively providing forecasts and
weather effects on friendly and enemy capabilities.
Note. Commanders, supported by their staffs, must develop and maintain the best possible
understanding of their OE, including the domains, dimensions, and the operational and mission
variables. (See paragraph 2-31 for means to understanding the OE.) Figures 2-5 and 2-6 on pages
2-18 and 2-20, respectively, illustrate the inclusion of the domains, dimensions, and the
operational and mission variables into staff activities and analysis, specifically the intelligence
staff’s responsibility to provide the commander and staff with intelligence on the threat, terrain,
weather and weather effects, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the OE.
⚫ Supporting all forms of planning and assessments, to include targeting and the other integrating
processes:
▪ Write Annex B (Intelligence) of the order.
▪ Provide intelligence support to targeting (through lethal and nonlethal means).
▪ Provide intelligence support to CA units executing operations with unified action partners
and regional and local populations and institutions.
▪ Provide intelligence support to psychological operations, operations security (OPSEC),
military deception, and other information advantage activities.
▪ Provide intelligence support to risk management.
▪ Provide intelligence support to knowledge management.
⚫ Supporting the conduct of operations and the commander’s decisions:
▪ Answer intelligence requirements and provide advice.
▪ Perform situation development, maintain the intelligence running estimate, and develop the
CIP and the intelligence portion of the COP.
▪ Provide support to protection and sustainment (including specific requirements in the rear area).
▪ Provide support to combat assessment. |
2-0 | 127 | Intelligence Staff Support
⚫ Supporting security programs, to include the following:
▪ Supervise command and personnel security programs.
▪ Evaluate physical security vulnerabilities to support staff sections, particularly the
operations and signal staffs.
▪ Perform staff planning and supervise the special security office, when applicable.
The G-2/S-2
The G-2/S-2 leads the intelligence staff and has responsibility for what the intelligence staff
does and does not accomplish. The G-2/S-2 is the primary advisor to the commander and
staff on the intelligence warfighting function. Additionally, the G-2/S-2 has staff responsibility
for the USAF SWO.
Successful intelligence support is based on the successful execution of the intelligence process,
which the G-2/S-2 enables through intelligence synchronization. However, the G-2/S-2, as one
person, must depend on its staff to provide effective intelligence support to the unit and facilitate
situational understanding and effective targeting.
The G-2/S-2 is not responsible for the conduct of intelligence operations by the MI unit beyond
conducting collection management. (See ATP 2-01.) The MI unit commander is responsible
for the conduct of intelligence operations by the MI unit. Chapter 3 discusses the roles of the
G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, collection manager/collection management team, and MI unit
commander/MI unit related to intelligence operations.
Notes. Due to the nature and fluidity of large-scale combat operations, commanders will have to
make decisions with imperfect intelligence. Intelligence that is too late for commanders to make
timely decisions results in a loss of the initiative and lost battles and engagements.
As much as possible, the intelligence staff depends on thorough and disciplined all-source
analysis. All-source analysis reduces the possibility of error, bias, deception, disinformation, and
misinformation by considering multiple sources of information and intelligence. However, when
necessary, the commander and staff may have to depend on either single-source intelligence or
combat information without all-source intelligence analysis or verification.
The cyberspace domain and the information dimension require specialized expertise from outside
the traditional military staff, such as industry and academia. Intelligence support to the cyberspace
domain and the information dimension often requires specific authorities, moves at a high tempo,
and requires close coordination with higher-level friendly military cyberspace activities and
sometimes with nonmilitary cyberspace activities.
SECTION III – KEY INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION TASKS
5-10. Chapter 1 describes how the intelligence warfighting function supports operations through a broad
range of doctrinal tasks referred to as IWFTs. The intelligence staff is responsible for some of those tasks,
MI units are responsible for other tasks, and both the intelligence staff and MI unit have shared responsibility
for some tasks. Figure 5-2 on page 5-6 illustrates key IWFTs from an understanding the OE perspective; this
section discusses the most important IWFTs from the intelligence staff’s perspective. Appendix B provides
a detailed discussion of the IWFTs. |
2-0 | 128 | Chapter 5
Figure 5-2. Key intelligence tasks that support understanding the operational environment
PLAN, ESTABLISH, AND REVISE AN INTELLIGENCE
ARCHITECTURE
5-11. As discussed in chapter 1, the intelligence architecture has an important role in providing intelligence
support. The G-2/S-2 and the intelligence staff plan, establish, and revise the intelligence architecture in close
collaboration with higher-level and subordinate G-2/S-2s and the MI unit commander and staff at that
echelon. Additionally, the intelligence staff must coordinate with key members of the staff, especially the
G-6/S-6 and G-3/S-3. (See chapter 8 for the intelligence architecture during large-scale combat operations.) |
2-0 | 129 | Intelligence Staff Support
5-12. The intelligence architecture consists of more than a unit’s organic collection capabilities, systems,
and personnel. It also includes all elements of the intelligence network and associated communications
architectures (including the PACE communications plan) to enable intelligence operations and support to
mission requirements. (See FM 6-02 for doctrine on PACE planning.)
PLANNING
5-13. Planning the intelligence architecture is inseparable from long-range planning for future intelligence
operations. The intelligence staff can neither perform long-range planning without carefully considering the
intelligence architecture nor plan an intelligence architecture without carefully considering long-range
planning. The intelligence architecture is connected directly to the types and methods of intelligence support
necessary for future operational plans. This planning is roughly equivalent to developing a blueprint for a
house that is based on a larger plan to build a housing area in that area. The unit cannot count on using
intelligence capabilities during an operation if those capabilities are not accounted for in the intelligence
architecture and supported by a larger communications plan. Once the intelligence architecture is in place
and the unit is conducting operations, periodic changes are necessary; these changes are called revisions.
5-14. When developing the intelligence architecture, the intelligence staff collaborates with the MI unit staff
to consider the personnel, organizations, systems, and procedures necessary for developing intelligence,
including those required for intelligence operations. It is critical for the intelligence staff to collaborate with
the commander and staff as early as possible and throughout planning to ensure the intelligence architecture
is adequately planned and established as soon as possible.
5-15. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff also ensure the higher-headquarters linkage to the unit and
subordinate unit requirements are adequately integrated into their intelligence architecture to enable effective
information collection, PED, and analysis and production to support mission requirements. This ensures the
intelligence architecture supports the necessary operational and technical connections between collection
assets, control elements, PED capabilities, analytical cells, and various CPs to enable an effective information
flow of intelligence to commanders and staffs and access (both inward and outward) across the intelligence
enterprise. The intelligence architecture must also account for all complementary capabilities and
intelligence-related missions and operations employed by the unit.
ARCHITECTURE DETAILS
5-16. The intelligence staff portrays the intelligence architecture in a series of planning products that map
the operational and technical aspects of the interoperability between the many components of the architecture.
The planning products include but are not limited to the different—
⚫ Intelligence capabilities. Chapter 7 provides a list of organic and supporting general intelligence
collection and all-source intelligence capabilities by echelon; each general intelligence collection
capability comprises specific collection assets (platforms and collectors) with specific technical
collection capabilities and associated PED. The intelligence staff must compile a list of all
appropriate general intelligence capabilities that are part of the architecture, which must address
bandwidth requirements, preparing for operations, collecting the required information, and the
associated PED. The intelligence staff must then assess all applicable general intelligence
capabilities to list the specific intelligence capabilities required for the architecture.
⚫ Communications means. Collection assets operate through many different communications
means, which include formal message traffic, databases, product libraries, chat rooms,
intelligence dissemination systems, and various voice methods.
⚫ Technical networks. Technical networks are those information management and information
system connections that enable resource and information sharing. Intelligence architecture
products capture not only networks and their technical specifications but also how architecture
elements relate and interoperate with each other. Intelligence personnel disseminate and access
information and intelligence on several networks, including NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS,
coalition networks, and intelligence broadcast systems.
⚫ Tactical considerations. The intelligence architecture should address likely tactical
considerations such as mission tasks, technical control means, tipping and cueing, IEW and other
maintenance, security measures, and medical support. |
2-0 | 130 | Chapter 5
COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
Collection management is, in intelligence usage, the process of converting intelligence requirements
into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection
sources or agencies, monitoring results, and retasking, as required (JP 2-0). Collection management includes
ensuring information collection, intelligence reach, RFIs, and requests for collection result in adequate
information, combat information, and intelligence to support operations. (See ATP 2-01.)
Note. In the Army, tasking authority derives from the commander and resides with the G-3/S-3.
Within Army operations, neither the collection manager, G-2/S-2, nor intelligence staff members
have tasking authority. To retask an asset, the G-2/S-2 must closely collaborate with the G-3/S-3,
as well as address information collection issues within the COIC so intelligence is continually
ready to support decision making, targeting, and other aspects of operations. It is important for the
collection manager, ACE or BISE chief, and the appropriate G-3/S-3 representative to quickly
work through information collection issues.
Collection management is the primary driver for overall information collection planning, as discussed
in paragraph 3-30. The overlap of collection management and information collection planning occurs in the—
⚫ Development of the collection management plan.
⚫ Use of intelligence handover lines and other graphic measures.
⚫ Feasibility and details of employing ground reconnaissance.
⚫ Planning of fires and sustainment to support the information collection effort.
The following are inherent in conducting collection management:
⚫ Intelligence reach and RFIs.
⚫ Monitoring available collection assets and assessing their ability to provide the required
information.
⚫ Recommending adjustments to new requirements or locations of collection assets, if required.
⚫ Collection orchestration, as part of the operational-level model.
COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
5-20. During any phase of military operations, CCIRs are critical to the commander’s decisions and staff
control. The intelligence warfighting function focuses on answering intelligence requirements. Both collection
management and intelligence analysis are driven by PIRs, targeting intelligence requirements, and other
intelligence requirements that subsequently drive the development of specific information requirements (SIRs).
SIRs assist in tasking or requesting collection assets to collect information that results in effective intelligence
that answers the commander’s requirements.
5-21. Collection management supports the intelligence analysis process and intelligence analysis supports
the collection management process and both must account for PED activities. These activities must be
synchronized, and analysts within both activities must collaborate closely to enable the intelligence
warfighting function. Intelligence analysis sets the stage for collection management, which includes
developing information requirements that later result in intelligence requirements that drive effective
information collection. This enables intelligence analysts to answer the commander’s intelligence
requirements. The intelligence staff conducts collection management in collaboration with the operations
staff to collect, process, and analyze information that affects operations. (See ATP 2-33.4 for doctrine on
intelligence analysis.) |
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COLLECTION MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
The collection management functions—requirements management, mission management, and
execution management—provide a useful way of viewing collection management as a whole. They also
provide a potential means of structuring the collection management team and filling positions. These
functions divide those processes and tasks associated with collection management to assist the collection
management team in collaborating with and synchronizing information collection across the staff, various
echelons, and other units and organizations.
Army and joint doctrine have their own doctrinal models for the collection management functions. The
Army developed its model (except for execution management) based on its tactical-level point of view; the
joint force developed an operational-level model. Similar to the intelligence process, each model represents
a framework that guides thought; they are not prescriptive. Units can use either the Army or joint model
based on whichever is most useful to their needs. (See ATP 2-01.)
A Tactical-Level Model
Collection management teams consider the commander’s information collection guidance, information
requirements (which become intelligence requirements), IPOE outputs, and intelligence analysis in the
context of friendly operations in order to develop an effective collection management plan. During collection
management, the three functions effectively divide the collection management effort, ensuring its success.
(See figure 5-3.)
Figure 5-3. Collection management using the Army tactical-level model
An Operational-Level Model
JP 2-0 describes the distinct functions of collection requirements management (CRM), collection
operations management (COM), and collection orchestration in a joint intelligence context and provides some
useful and detailed techniques associated with these functions. Units can adapt this joint operational-level
model to Army operations with some modifications. For example, units can use this model at higher echelons
during inherently joint operations or during operations that require significant interactions with a joint
headquarters. |
2-0 | 132 | Chapter 5
At the appropriate echelons, Army collection orchestration is the integration, synchronization, and
optimization of the intelligence process and operations, including national and theater collection integration;
all-domain, multidiscipline collection strategy development; and the end-to-end synchronization of CRM,
COM, reconnaissance, DOD ISR mission management, and PED.
Note. Collection orchestration outside of the operational-level model for collection management
belongs to the G-3/S-3, who has overall responsibility for information collection and tasking
collection assets to conduct information collection.
In the joint operational-level model, collection management teams also consider the commander’s
information collection guidance, information requirements (which become intelligence requirements), IPOE
outputs, and intelligence analysis in the context of friendly operations to develop an effective collection
management plan. The most significant modification required to use this model for Army operations is
accounting for the G-3/S-3’s information collection requirements. (See figure 5-4.) The G-3/S-3—
⚫ Integrates information collection during plans and operations in coordination with the rest of the staff.
⚫ Is the only staff officer with tasking authority from the commander.
⚫ Can authenticate all plans and orders and synchronize all warfighting functions in time, space, and
purpose.
Figure 5-4. Collection management using the joint operational-level model
COLLECTION MANAGEMENT PROCESS
Conducting the complex and detailed tasks associated with collection management is inherent in the
collection management process. Based on the commander and staff’s participation, the collection
management team, in close coordination with the operations staff, performs the five tasks of the collection
management process—each discussed in detail in ATP 2-01:
⚫ Develop requirements.
⚫ Develop the collection management plan.
⚫ Support tasking and directing. |
2-0 | 133 | Intelligence Staff Support
⚫ Assess collection.
⚫ Update the collection management plan.
The collection management tasks are continuous but not necessarily sequential; they are the basis for
creating, tasking, and executing the information collection plan. (See figure 5-5.) This is accomplished
through the challenging balance of—
⚫ Developing requirements that effectively support operations during requirements management.
⚫ Developing recommendations to task collection assets, including associated details such as the where,
when, and how for that collection, and coordinating with those assets or their C2 element to ensure an
effective information collection effort throughout the entire operation during mission management.
⚫ Ensuring a continuous integrated and synchronized information collection effort through timely
and flexible adjustments to collection throughout the operation during execution management.
Figure 5-5. The collection management process
Effective collection management focuses on answering intelligence requirements by analyzing these
requirements, planning collection based on tasks to collection assets, and then assigning these tasks in an
order. The collection management plan synchronizes and coordinates collection assets and PED in the overall
concept of operations, and positions and tasks collection assets so they can collect the right information, shift
priorities as the situation develops, or execute a branch or sequel.
Note. Concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units
cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to
achieve the end state (ADP 5-0).
THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CONTINUUM
5-31. There is far more to intelligence analysis than simply IPOE. Intelligence analysis must support the
commander’s decisions, situational understanding, ADM, the MDMP, information advantage activities,
targeting, planning and executing deception operations, force protection considerations, and continuous
operational assessments. In any operation, friendly and enemy forces will endeavor to set conditions to
develop positions of relative advantage. Setting these conditions begins with pre-mission analysis of the OE,
which provides relevant knowledge about the OE that is incorporated into the ADM and then used later
during other intelligence analysis tasks. (See figure 5-6 on page 5-12.) |
2-0 | 134 | Chapter 5
Figure 5-6. The intelligence analysis continuum
5-32. During the MDMP, the intelligence staff leads IPOE and conducts continuous intelligence analysis to
understand the OE and the options it presents to friendly and threat capabilities. For example, threat databases
and signatures developed during pre-mission analysis of the OE assist in assessing threat capabilities and
vulnerabilities during IPOE. This information facilitates decision making during the MDMP and provides a
common understanding on how friendly forces may gain positions of relative advantage across multiple
domains and dimensions. This is essential when determining how best to mitigate sophisticated threat A2
and AD systems, IADSs, deception, information warfare, systems warfare, the EMS and EW, UASs, robotic
capabilities, and long-range fires capabilities, as well as accounting for civil considerations in the OE.
5-33. Based on relevant aspects of the OE (determined during IPOE), including the domains and dimensions,
the commander and staff continuously assess information, operations, and changes in the OE. Warnings
intelligence, situation development, intelligence support to targeting, and intelligence support to information
advantage activities assist the commander and staff in further shaping the OE to facilitate mission success.
The continuous assessment of collected information also mitigates risk to friendly forces while identifying
opportunities to leverage friendly capabilities to open a window of opportunity. |
2-0 | 135 | Intelligence Staff Support
LEVERAGE DATA, INFORMATION, AND INTELLIGENCE
5-34. Several areas in this publication mention leveraging and collaborating across the intelligence enterprise
and intelligence architecture but in different contexts. This task is an inherent part of intelligence support and
pertains to every other task in this chapter. An echelon does not collect all the information it needs, and an
intelligence staff does not conduct all the intelligence analysis and production it needs to support the
commander and staff. Every echelon uses data, information, and intelligence from higher, lower, and adjacent
intelligence staffs and elements.
5-35. Information outside of military sources can be valuable, especially for the operational variables
(PMESII-PT) and civil considerations. Academia, industry, and non-DOD information can be especially
valuable, as well as PAI, in providing critical insight and awareness across all domains and dimensions,
especially the human and information dimensions. Allies and other multinational partners have unique
collection capabilities and valuable intelligence, including insight into specific regions and ongoing tensions.
The joint force and other Services have unique and specialized data, information, and intelligence on many
areas, especially within the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains (including ES data and
information). Generally, higher-level Army echelons have more time, resources, and a broader context to
produce intelligence; lower-level echelons may often have a more detailed and timelier picture of the enemy
they face in the close area. Optimizing the task of leveraging data, information, and intelligence and
effectively collaborating across echelons are both an art and the application of science.
CONDUCT PRE-MISSION ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
5-36. To perform IPOE and the other important intelligence tasks that support operations, the intelligence staff
must conduct a significant amount of analysis before receipt of mission. The intelligence staff cannot wait until
receipt of mission to start intelligence analysis. As discussed in chapter 2, there are several tools and processes,
some led by the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff, that assist the commander and staff in understanding the OE.
Intelligence analysis plays an important role in facilitating this understanding; therefore, the analytical effort
must start as early as possible. As operational planning occurs in terms of theater campaign plans, contingency
plans, and other planning (such as the ADM), the intelligence staff provides intelligence support, which is
connected to facilitating an understanding of the OE through sequential analysis and developing various
intelligence products. The result is an ever-increasing level of operational focus:
⚫ Analysis and products that account for the different aspects of the domains and dimensions,
including their interrelationships. Note. While considering the domains and dimensions, these
intelligence products may not be structured based on the domains and dimensions.
⚫ Analysis and products that account for the operational variables and how they interrelate.
⚫ Analysis and products that specifically address a threat; localized terrain; weather and weather
effects; civil considerations, including cultural aspects of the OE; and other significant aspects of
that area to prepare the staff for the MDMP, including IPOE.
DOMAINS AND DIMENSIONS (GENERAL INTELLIGENCE)
5-37. During competition, for those units and organizations without much operational or geographic focus,
the intelligence staff must first understand a threat and the regional civilian population and other significant
factors (for example, destabilizing natural disasters across a region). Using the domains and dimensions as a
framework provides a helpful context and checklist to ensure the intelligence staff’s holdings are as complete
as possible and to build a comprehensive understanding of the OE. Information and intelligence usually flow
first from the U.S. IC, academia, DIA, the theater army G-2 and military intelligence brigades-theater
(MIB-Ts), and other higher-echelon intelligence units and organizations (such as MDTFs [see paragraph 2-
82]) in various forms. Some of this information and intelligence is or can be databased and some cannot. As
this occurs, it is useful for intelligence staffs to practice their intelligence skills and compile or create
intelligence products to further build their knowledge and proficiency as analysts. Analyzing and describing
threat force capabilities, and even the whole of a threat government, are especially valuable in preparing for
potential future operations. Producing these products should also assist intelligence staffs in finding
information and intelligence gaps. |
2-0 | 136 | Chapter 5
5-38. During crisis and armed conflict with a specific operational or geographic focus, as time and the
situation allows, producing general intelligence products on the threat and regional civilian population is of
value. The greater the level of understanding of the OE at the general or holistic level, the better the
understanding of the OE for a specific mission.
OPERATIONAL VARIABLES (INTELLIGENCE FOR CONTINGENCY AND FUTURE PLANS)
5-39. The next level of operational focus is moving from generalized analysis, information, and intelligence
to analysis, information, and intelligence specific to a contingency, possible operation, or known future
operation. This can include the employment of ADM. In these instances, the joint force may perform joint
IPOE, and higher-level Army echelons may perform a rather broad IPOE. However, lower-level Army
echelons that have not received a mission do not perform IPOE yet. Another important aspect of intelligence
support at this point during competition is analysis of threat systems, which is different from joint TSA. Joint
intelligence and higher-level Army intelligence, even when not structured based on the operational variables,
directly address one or more of the operational variables. This joint intelligence and higher-level Army
intelligence flow to lower-level units and organizations.
5-40. The operational variables provide a second useful checklist, along with the domains and dimensions,
to judge the completeness of intelligence products and information and intelligence gaps. The operational
variables assist the commander and staff in understanding important factors, within and across the domains
and dimensions, in a more focused manner and relevant to Army operations. At all echelons, intelligence
staffs must practice their intelligence skills and compile or create intelligence products (focusing on one or
more operational variables) to further build their knowledge and proficiency as analysts.
THREAT, TERRAIN, WEATHER, AND CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS (PREPARING FOR THE
MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS)
5-41. After contingency or other future plans are established, the next level of operational focus is preparing
for receipt of mission, which starts the MDMP. Data, information, and intelligence focused on a specific
threat (including the human and information dimensions), as well as localized terrain, weather and weather
effects, and civil considerations (including the human and information dimensions) are invaluable to
successfully performing IPOE. Beyond compiling data, information, and intelligence from other sources,
conducting analysis and developing intelligence products for these categories are very similar to performing
steps 2 and 3 of the IPOE process. While all aspects of building as much data, information, and intelligence
are important, it is especially crucial to prepare detailed threat characteristics, models, and capabilities
(considering the dimensions and domains), as much as possible, before receipt of mission.
PERFORM INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Notes. IPOE should not be confused with joint IPOE. IPOE is used during Army operations; joint
IPOE is used by joint headquarters and joint units. JP 2-0 describes joint IPOE differently than the
conduct of the Army’s IPOE.
Intelligence preparation of the operational environment is the systematic process of analyzing
the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of
interest to determine their effect on operations. IPOE was previously known as intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (IPB). FM 2-0 has changed the term from IPB to IPOE to better
reflect the multidomain aspects of the OE within the name of the process. However, IPB has
already accounted for and discussed the domains and dimensions of the OE across its four steps;
therefore, there is no change to the definition of IPOE, which matches the definition of IPB, and
there is no change to the four steps of IPB, now IPOE. Despite the name change, readers should
still refer to ATP 2-01.3. |
2-0 | 137 | Intelligence Staff Support
5-42. IPOE allows commanders and staffs to start from a mission-focused holistic approach to analyze the
OE to support the mission. The approach—
⚫ Describes all relevant aspects of the OE that may impact friendly, threat, and neutral forces.
⚫ Considers all relevant domains and dimensions that may impact friendly and threat operations.
⚫ Identifies windows of opportunity to leverage friendly capabilities against threat forces to reach
a position of relative advantage (human, information, or physical).
⚫ Allows commanders to leverage positions of relative advantage at a time and place most
advantageous for mission success with the most accurate information available.
5-43. IPOE results in intelligence products used during the MDMP to assist in developing friendly COAs
and decision points for the commander. Additionally, the conclusions reached and the products (which are
included in the intelligence estimate) developed during IPOE are critical in planning information collection
and conducting targeting. When discussing IPOE, it is natural to discuss the various IPOE products; however,
the following outcomes of the IPOE process are as important as developing IPOE products:
⚫ Collaboration across the staff and with the commander.
⚫ Effective consideration of the range of possible threat COAs and capabilities (not just the most
dangerous and most likely).
⚫ Careful analysis and detailed consideration of the terrain, weather, and significant mission and/or
operational variable considerations.
⚫ A fair and accurate portrayal of the threat during COA development and analysis (war game).
5-44. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff lead the staff effort, but IPOE must include the entire staff—at least
during key portions of the process. Often IPOE’s success is either set or not set, depending on what has
occurred before IPOE. This intelligence effort applies the IWFTs of—
⚫ Plan, establish, and revise an intelligence architecture.
⚫ Leverage data, information, and intelligence.
⚫ Conduct pre-mission analysis of the OE.
MISSION FOCUS
5-45. Upon receipt of a WARNORD or mission (or in anticipation of a mission), the commander and staff draw
relevant information categorized by the operational variables and filter it into the mission variables
(METT-TC [I]) used during mission analysis. During IPOE, the staff focuses on the relevant aspects of the OE
regarding the staff’s warfighting function. The staff focuses primarily on the mission variables of enemy, terrain
and weather, and civil considerations. However, based on the staff’s echelon, type of OE, type of operation, and
changes in the OE, the staff may need to account for other significant aspects of the OE.
5-46. To be effective, IPOE must—
⚫ Consider all domains and dimensions.
⚫ Define the commander’s AOI by its geographic boundaries and across all domains to focus
collection and analysis within the AOI.
⚫ Describe how the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations will affect friendly and
threat operations. This subtask involves the commander and the entire staff collaborating to
determine these effects. No matter how complex, the staff must thoroughly consider the civil
considerations (including information) that are significant to the mission.
⚫ Include relevant aspects of the OE that relate to relative advantages and defeat or stability
mechanisms.
⚫ Support each step of the MDMP with IPOE products.
⚫ Consider the operational framework. (See chapter 2.)
⚫ Facilitate the commander’s ability to visualize the desired end state and a broad concept of how
to shape current conditions into that end state.
⚫ Support the commander in directing the intelligence effort.
⚫ Facilitate understanding threat characteristics and threat goals, objectives, and COAs. |
2-0 | 138 | Chapter 5
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT PROCESS STEPS
5-47. The IPOE process consists of the following four steps:
⚫ Define the OE.
⚫ Describe environmental effects on operations.
⚫ Evaluate the threat.
⚫ Determine threat COAs.
Note. Although there are four steps to the IPOE process, IPOE must seamlessly combine with pre-
mission analysis of the OE; the leveraging of data, information, and intelligence; and situation
development to serve as a continuous effort, with all staff members providing support to the
intelligence warfighting function. Continuous analysis and assessments are necessary to maintain
situational understanding of the OE in constant flux.
Step 1—Define the Operational Environment
5-48. An OE for any specific operation comprises more than the interacting variables that exist within a
specific physical area. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (such
as politics, economics) that affect OE conditions and operations. Thus, each commander’s OE is part of a
higher commander’s OE. Defining the OE results in the identification of—
⚫ Significant characteristics of the OE that can affect friendly and threat operations.
⚫ Gaps in current intelligence holdings.
5-49. Step 1 is important because it assists the commander in defining relevant aspects of the OE in time and
space. This is equally important when considering characteristics of the domains and dimensions of the OE.
Aspects of the OE may act simultaneously across the battlefield but may only factor in friendly or threat
operations at specific times and locations.
5-50. During step 1, the intelligence staff must identify those significant characteristics related to the mission
variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that are relevant to the mission. The staff
evaluates significant characteristics to identify gaps and initiate information collection. The staff then justifies
the analysis to the commander. Failure to identify or misidentifying the effect these variables may have on
operations at a given time and place can hinder decision making and result in developing an ineffective
information collection strategy. During step 1, the AO, AOI, and area of influence must also be identified
and established.
5-51. Understanding friendly and threat forces is not enough; other factors, such as culture, languages, tribal
affiliations, and operational and mission variables, can be equally important. Identifying the significant
characteristics of the OE is essential in identifying the additional information needed to complete IPOE. Once
approved by the commander, this information becomes the commander’s initial intelligence requirement,
which focuses the commander’s initial information collection effort and the remaining IPOE process steps.
5-52. Additionally, where a unit will be assigned and how its operations will synchronize with other
associated operations must be considered. For example, the intelligence staff should be forming questions
about where the unit will deploy within the entire theater and the specific logistics requirements to handle
the operation’s contingency plans.
Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations
5-53. During step 2 of the IPOE process, the staff describes how significant characteristics affect friendly
operations. The intelligence staff also describes how terrain, weather, civil considerations, and friendly forces
affect threat forces. This evaluation focuses on the general capabilities of each force until the development
of threat COAs in step 4 of IPOE and friendly COAs later in the MDMP. The entire staff determines the
effects of friendly and threat force actions on the population. |
2-0 | 139 | Intelligence Staff Support
5-54. If the intelligence staff does not have the information required to form conclusions, it uses assumptions
to fill information gaps—always careful to ensure the commander understands when assumptions are used
in place of facts to form conclusions.
Step 3—Evaluate the Threat
5-55. The purpose of evaluating the threat is to understand how a threat can affect friendly operations.
Although threat forces may conform to some of the fundamental principles of warfare that guide Army
operations, these forces have obvious, as well as subtle, differences in how they approach situations and
problem solving. Understanding these differences is essential to understanding how a threat force will react
in each situation.
5-56. Threat evaluation does not begin with IPOE. The intelligence staff conducts threat evaluations and
creates threat models during the pre-mission analysis of the OE. Using this information, the intelligence staff
refines threat models, as necessary, to support IPOE. When analyzing a well-known threat, the intelligence
staff may be able to rely on previously developed threat models. When analyzing a new or lesser-known
threat, the intelligence staff may have to evaluate the threat and develop threat models during the MDMP’s
mission analysis step. When this occurs, the intelligence staff relies heavily on the threat evaluation
conducted by higher headquarters and other intelligence agencies.
5-57. In situations where the mission is not oriented on a threat force, intelligence analysis and intelligence
products may focus on terrain, weather, and civil considerations. (An example of this type of situation is a
natural disaster.) However, IPOE must consider potential hazards and threats, such as terrorism, to any
operation, as well as how friendly forces are under constant observation and contact by peer threats.
Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action
5-58. During step 4, the intelligence staff identifies and develops possible threat COAs that can affect
accomplishing the friendly mission. The staff uses the products associated with determining threat COAs to
assist in developing and selecting friendly COAs during the COA steps of the MDMP. Identifying and
developing valid threat COAs minimize the potential of surprise to the commander by an unanticipated threat
action and support the development of important branches and sequels.
5-59. Failure to fully identify and develop valid threat COAs may lead to the development of an information
collection strategy that does not provide the information necessary to confirm what COA the threat has taken,
potentially resulting in friendly forces being surprised and possibly defeated. When needed, the staff should
identify all significant civil considerations (those identified as OE significant characteristics) to portray the
interrelationship of the threat, friendly forces, and population activities.
5-60. The staff develops threat COAs in the same manner friendly COAs are developed. ADP 5-0 provides
a model for developing valid threat COAs that are suitable, feasible, acceptable, unique, and consistent with
threat doctrine or patterns of operation. Although the intelligence staff has the primary responsibility for
developing threat COAs, it needs assistance from the rest of the staff to present the most accurate and
complete analysis to the commander.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT PRODUCTS
5-61. While there are other important IPOE process outcomes, the development of several IPOE products is
also important. These products assist in driving subsequent steps of the MDMP, targeting, collection
management, protection, risk management, other processes, and the conduct of IPOE at lower echelons.
While not all inclusive, figure 5-7 on page 5-18 shows the flow of common products across IPOE’s four
steps. |
2-0 | 140 | Chapter 5
Figure 5-7. Common intelligence preparation of the operational environment products
PROVIDE WARNINGS
5-62. Across the range of military operations, various collection assets provide early warnings of threat action.
As analysts screen incoming information and message traffic, they provide the commander with advanced
warnings of threat activities or intentions that may change the basic nature of the operation. These warnings
enable the commander and staff to quickly reorient the force to unexpected contingencies and to shape the OE.
5-63. Analysts can use analytic techniques and their current knowledge databases to project multiple
scenarios and develop indicators as guidelines for providing warning intelligence. An indicator is, in
intelligence usage, an item of information that reflects the intention or capability of an enemy and/or
adversary to adopt or reject a course of action (JP 2-0). Analysts project future events and identify event
characteristics that can be manipulated or affected. Characteristics that cannot be manipulated or affected
should be incorporated into unit SOPs as warning intelligence criteria. (See ATP 2-01 and ATP 2-01.3 for
doctrine on indicators.) |
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PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGETING
5-64. Commanders and staffs need timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to support the
targeting effort, which includes the selection, prioritization, execution, and assessment of targets. Therefore,
the intelligence support to targeting effort must be resourced, carefully planned, and supported by a large
portion of the intelligence architecture. Intelligence support to targeting occurs across most of the intelligence
warfighting function. While all intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities support targeting, the
effort is ultimately focused by the close collaboration between the all-source intelligence analysis element
(whether dedicated to targeting or ad hoc), the collection management element, and various targeting and
fires elements, including the target development working group, if applicable. Certain staff elements,
including the USAF SWO, CEMA officer, and space operations officer, also have an important role.
Intelligence support to targeting includes support to planning (target development), identifying (target
detection), and assessing the effect of those operations (combat assessment).
5-65. Characteristics that best describe the intelligence support to targeting effort include deliberate
planning, collaboration across intelligence enterprise echelons, and precise intelligence to target threat
capabilities at the right time and place to open windows of opportunity to achieve positions of relative
advantage. Unfortunately, providing precise intelligence is challenging because threats, especially peer
threats, make it difficult to collect on and analyze threat systems. Intelligence analysis to predict threat COAs
(considering terrain and weather effects), provide intelligence specific to a location and time, and accurately
assess the employment of capabilities is difficult. Intelligence support to targeting includes tracking highly
mobile targets and simultaneously engaging targets, including targets in complex terrain (such as
subterranean and urban areas and jungle and mountainous terrain) and targets across multiple domains and
dimensions (for example, targeting threat information systems).
5-66. The intelligence warfighting function provides support during D3A—from developing plans through
the MDMP and executing the operation after the MDMP. The targeting process is continuous and so is
intelligence support to targeting. Just like IPOE, intelligence support to targeting is based on the data,
information, and intelligence that result from planning, establishing, and revising the intelligence
architecture; conducting pre-mission analysis of the OE; and leveraging data, information, and intelligence.
While not all-inclusive, figure 5-8 illustrates intelligence support to targeting before receipt of mission and
during and after the MDMP.
Figure 5-8. Intelligence support to targeting over time |
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DECIDE
5-67. During the MDMP, targeting becomes more focused based on the commander’s guidance and intent.
Once the commander determines objectives, the intelligence staff must continuously review them with
respect to the threat and the changing situation to ensure they remain relevant to the commander’s intent.
Intelligence provides the commander with an understanding of the threat in terms of probable intent,
objectives, strengths, vulnerabilities, and COAs (at a minimum, most likely and most dangerous).
Additionally, intelligence analysts recommend objectives based on enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities,
centers of gravity, and likely COAs.
5-68. The decide function of the targeting methodology provides the overall focus and sets priorities for
information collection and attack planning. Decide, the most important targeting function, requires close
interaction between the intelligence, plans, operations, CEMA, fire support, space, and legal. The intelligence
staff analyzes threat systems and their components to make a recommendation for generating the
commander’s intended effect on the target, although the fire support officer, in collaboration with the G-3/S-
3, makes the final decision. The intelligence input is based primarily on the AGM, determining the most
effective friendly means available to produce the commander’s desired effect on the target. The decide
function draws heavily on the staff’s knowledge of the threat, a detailed IPOE (which occurs simultaneously),
and a continuous assessment of the situation. Targeting priorities are addressed for each phase or critical
event of an operation.
5-69. During the targeting meeting, the collection management team advises the targeting working group on
the ability of available collection systems to acquire and identify HPTs, track HPTs, and support BDA on
HPTs. The team assists the working group, as needed, in revising the intelligence architecture to disseminate
target-related intelligence to attack systems in near real time. The targeting working group further refines
event templates and associated event matrices (developed during IPOE) into targeting matrices, which
provide the level of detail the collection management team requires to focus information collection to support
targeting. The team uses targeting matrices, IPOE products, and TSS to divide HPTs into collection functions
(acquire and identify, track, and support BDA), SIRs, NAIs and TAIs, and specific collection tasks. (See
figure 5-9.) (See ATP 2-01, ATP 2-01.3, and ATP 2-33.4.)
Figure 5-9. High-payoff target to specific information requirements |
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DETECT
5-70. The COIC is primarily responsible for directing the execution of the information collection effort to
detect HPTs identified during the decide function. The intelligence cell (with the COIC) must focus its
intelligence analysis efforts to support both situation development and the targeting effort. Therefore, close
coordination between the intelligence cell and the FSE is critical. Key staff members in this effort include
the G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, information operations officer, FAIO, targeting officer, fire support coordinator, and
fire support officer.
5-71. The collection manager directs the information collection synchronization effort, focusing on PIRs and
target intelligence requirements. The collection manager ensures the information collection plan supports the
finalized targeting plan. The collection management team, in coordination with the targeting team (or
intelligence targeting officer), develops collection strategies to satisfy PIRs and targeting intelligence
requirements. The collection management team may have to differentiate collection tasks to support the
acquire and identify or track collection function when a collection asset cannot perform both collection
functions. This is a major challenge during large-scale combat operations at which time the concept of
persistent surveillance is often not possible. National technical means may have to serve as an intermittent
form of surveillance, in conjunction with Army collection assets, to acquire and identify and track HPTs and
may be one of the primary means to detect targets in the space and cyberspace domains. Some collection
assets provide actual targetable information while information from other collection assets requires PED to
produce valid targets.
5-72. The target priorities developed in the decide function are used to expedite the processing of targets.
The collection management team—
⚫ Plans for synchronized collection, focusing on the proper HPT at each phase in the COA.
⚫ Plans collection to satisfy that set of SIRs, if BDA is required to support the COA.
⚫ Plans and arranges, when possible, direct dissemination of targeting intelligence from the
collector to the targeting cell or the appropriate fires element.
5-73. During operations, the collection management team—
⚫ Monitors the execution of the collection management plan.
⚫ Uses the information collection matrix to ensure collection assets focus on the proper HPTs (and
their associated NAIs and TAIs).
⚫ Alerts the appropriate fires element as targets of opportunity present themselves.
⚫ Cross-cues collection assets to support the targeting effort.
5-74. When detecting an HPT, the information is quickly disseminated to the FAIO to determine if the target
meets the commander’s attack guidance, the target’s priority, and if the target complies with TSS. To ensure
target-related intelligence is disseminated quickly, the FAIO is normally collocated in the intelligence cell
with communications to the FSE/fires cell. The intelligence cell also supports targeting through other means
in conjunction with the CEMA cell, space operations officer, and the rest of the staff. The FAIO coordinates
with the intelligence cell and disseminates target-related intelligence directly to the FSE/fires cell. If the
target meets the commander’s attack guidance and targeting priorities, it is actioned in accordance with the
commander’s intent. In those instances when the situation dictates developing a new HPT, or when the staff
assesses a significant change to an existing HPT, subsequent target development must occur. HPTs have the
potential to change by targeting cycle, phase, activating event, or other criteria directed by the commander.
When subsequent target development is necessary, the targeting information is forwarded for intelligence
analysis and the target development process must occur quickly. Upon identifying a target specified for
attack, analysts pass the target to the FSE/fires cell or the appropriate staff proponent, who directs the desired
prosecution of effects against the target. (See ATP 2-01, ATP 2-01.3, and ATP 2-33.4.)
DELIVER
5-75. During the deliver function, the intelligence staff analyzes threat systems and their components to make
a recommendation for generating the commander’s intended effect on the target although the fire support
officer, in collaboration with the G-3/S-3, makes the final decision. The intelligence input is based primarily
on the AGM—determining the most effective friendly means available to produce the commander’s desired |
2-0 | 144 | Chapter 5
effect on the target. During the deliver function, the collection management team cues collectors to continue
tracking targets during its engagement. Preplanned or cued BDA collection and reporting assist in
determining if the engagement produced the desired effects; if not, continued tracking supports immediate
reengagement. (See ATP 2-01, ATP 2-01.3, and ATP 2-33.4.)
ASSESS
5-76. Intelligence supports the assessment function by determining if targeting actions have met the desired
effects and if reattack is necessary to perform essential fires tasks and achieve the commander’s intent for
fires. Intelligence support to combat assessment relates to specific targets by completing physical damage
assessments and functional damage assessments. During the assess function, the collection management team
continuously assesses the information collection effort and compares ongoing actions to the collection
management plan and the original intent. As operations progress and the situation deviates from the plan, it
is important to ensure information collection supports all requirements. If the staff’s assessment reveals that
some requirements are not answered, the collection management team must reevaluate the collection
management plan. Then the team and staff must provide input on adjustments to the collection effort,
retasking, or the development of new tasks. The collection management team and current operations track
the situation relative to those requirements to determine the completion of the collection task, the
effectiveness of targeting and resulting effects on the target, continued synchronization with other operations
or emerging collection opportunities, and most critically, the requirements for target reattack, if required.
5-77. The assess function is nested in the overall continuous assessment of operations within the operations
and intelligence processes. Assessments are directly connected to the commander’s decisions throughout the
conduct of operations. Planning for assessment identifies key aspects of the operation that the commander
directs be closely monitored and identifies where the commander wants to make the decisions. Intelligence
has a major role in assessments.
5-78. The assess function is performed through combat assessment—the determination of the overall
effectiveness of force employment during military operations (JP 3-60). Operational assessments are
normally conducted only at echelons above brigade. Combat assessment is composed of three related
elements: BDA, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack recommendations.
PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFORMATION
ADVANTAGE
5-79. Chapter 2 discusses the OE dimensions; human, information, and physical advantages; and positions
of relative advantage in accordance with FM 3-0. Initially, commanders and staffs should maintain a balanced
outlook and approach to reaching human, information, and physical advantages. While not entirely new in
execution, the recent doctrinal articulation of identifying and reaching advantages within and across
dimensions can be somewhat complex. For example, most information advantages result from human and
physical advantages, and several considerations to apply lethal and nonlethal means to reach a targeting effect
span across all three dimensions. Additionally, most information advantages result from human and physical
factors that are activities intrinsic to Army operations.
5-80. In many instances, especially during competition and crisis, commanders and staffs must understand
many relevant aspects of the OE, including friendly and enemy capabilities and factors across the domains
and dimensions, to conduct operations and activities to reach an information advantage. Additionally,
commanders and staffs must understand and appreciate the complex interrelationship between the human,
information, and physical dimensions from a friendly, threat, and other actors’ perspective. Units and
intelligence organizations should leverage the Army Cyber Command G-2 and the Cyber Military
Intelligence Group, the JFC information planning cell, and the Deputy Director for Global Operations for
assistance in developing information advantage-specific support requirements.
5-81. Intelligence support to information advantage includes the following:
⚫ Support to understanding the OE, including the domains and dimensions.
⚫ Understanding threat information warfare capabilities and ongoing activities so friendly forces
can preempt with their own messaging. |
2-0 | 145 | Intelligence Staff Support
⚫ IPOE.
⚫ Situation development.
⚫ Collection management.
⚫ Support to all information aspects of targeting.
⚫ Support to countering misinformation and disinformation efforts, including OSINT support.
⚫ Support to determining protection and security activities to mitigate threat activities.
⚫ Many aspects of CI, including technology protection.
FM 2-0 modified the IWFTs to support information
advantage:
• ART 2.4.2, Provide Intelligence Support to Information Operations,
from FM 2-0, dated 06 July 2018, has been deleted.
• ART 2.4.2, Provide Intelligence Support to Information Operations,
subtasks have been captured under IWFT 2.2.5, Provide Intelligence
Support to Unique Missions. Some of the subtasks include—provide
intelligence support to public affairs, military information support
operations, CEMA, cybersecurity, OPSEC, and military deception.
(See appendix B.) (ART Army tactical task)
PERFORM SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
5-82. The intelligence staff performs continual situation development once IPOE is completed to support the
unit’s MDMP. Situation development involves the logical next steps of taking IPOE and MDMP results and
continuing to support the commander and staff in terms of understanding, visualizing, and decision making—
except for support to targeting, which is a separate task. IPOE products are converted into threat-tracking
intelligence products as well as into the development of standard intelligence products that support situational
understanding and a unit/organization’s battle rhythm. Analysts continually produce current intelligence to
answer the commander’s requirements; update and refine IPOE products, as needed; and support transitions
to the next phase of an operation, branch, or sequel.
5-83. While IPOE initially shapes the development of situation development products, performing situation
development is different from performing IPOE. Situation development products are more useful when key
staff members collaborate with the intelligence staff. There are several standard doctrinal intelligence
products associated with this task. Different units should freely modify these doctrinal products or develop
their own, as long as they meet the doctrinal intent of providing relevant and timely support to the commander
and staff. Some of these intelligence products include—
⚫ Event templates and associated event matrices. (See ATP 2-01.3.)
⚫ Intelligence estimates. (See ATP 2-33.4.)
⚫ Intelligence running estimates. (See ATP 2-33.4.)
⚫ INTSUMs. (See ATP 2-33.4.)
⚫ Graphic INTSUMs. (See ATP 2-33.4.)
⚫ Intelligence reports. (See ATP 2-33.4.)
⚫ Periodic intelligence reports. (See ATP 2-33.4.)
⚫ BDA charts.
⚫ Visualization products (according to the commander’s preference).
5-84. The intelligence staff can develop these products in digital, hardcopy, and/or acetate formats,
depending on the echelon; various C2 and intelligence systems; DDIL communications environments; and
the unit’s PACE plan. Performing situation development at any echelon also depends on how commanders
and staffs decide to share, integrate, and synchronize the CIP and COP across echelons. |
2-0 | 146 | Chapter 5
SECTION VI – SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING, THE COMMON
INTELLIGENCE PICTURE, AND THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE
5-85. As an operation progresses, the intelligence staff facilitates the commander and staff’s situational
understanding through as timely and accurate situation development as possible. Information collection at
and across echelons results in combat information and the dissemination of data and information to
intelligence elements for analysis and the production of intelligence. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff
perform many activities to integrate and synchronize intelligence collection, PED, and intelligence analysis
at and across echelons, including collection management. Each echelon performs information collection and
also collaborates across echelons to share data, information, and intelligence, which can be maintained at or
accessed by that echelon.
5-86. The fog and friction of operations and information collection, as well as time constraints, can
significantly challenge the intelligence staff. As this occurs, the intelligence staff provides continuous
intelligence products, within the capabilities of intelligence analysis systems, including the COP, to facilitate
the commander and staff’s situational understanding. The COP is the most important operational product
used to establish a shared understanding between echelons. The intelligence staff provides the intelligence
portion of the COP to the rest of the staff for integration into the COP. However, the G-2/S-2 ultimately
succeeds or fails—not by producing any particular intelligence product or CIP; the G-2/S-2 succeeds by
providing the commander what the commander needs, with respect to accurate intelligence, when the
commander needs it.
5-87. Concurrent with producing intelligence, the intelligence staff collaborates across echelons to maintain
a shared or common interpretation of threat locations, capabilities, objectives and intent, COAs, strengths,
and vulnerabilities. While the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff’s primary responsibility is to their commander
and staff, they must also continually collaborate and share products, such as the CIP and intelligence portion
of the COP across echelons. This open collaboration—usually up and down at least one echelon and with
adjacent units—and a common intelligence interpretation result in better intelligence for each echelon’s
commander and staff and supports a shared operational understanding between echelons. Figure 5-10 depicts
the complex and intense effort to both support the commander and staff and collaborate across echelons with
other intelligence staffs to support a common interpretation.
5-88. There are several areas where friction occurs while providing the commander and staff with
intelligence to drive decision making and targeting and have a common interpretation between echelons:
⚫ The commander can disagree with the analysis. After providing the commander with the logic, if
the commander still disagrees, the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff must adopt the commander’s
analysis while still considering other possible threat actions to support branches and sequels.
⚫ The higher- or lower-level or adjacent-unit G-2/S-2 or representative can disagree with the
intelligence interpretation of many threat aspects of the situation.
⚫ Commanders across echelons can have a very different understanding, including their
interpretation of the threat situation.
⚫ Communications between echelons can be degraded, intermittent, and limited.
5-89. The intelligence warfighting function works through this friction and then resets the CIP, as needed.
Resetting a common interpretation of the situation and building a new CIP are necessary as commanders
make decisions, operations transition, or echelons start a new MDMP and IPOE. |
2-0 | 147 | Intelligence Staff Support
Figure 5-10. The effort to support the commander and maintain common intelligence across
echelons and laterally
THE COMMON INTELLIGENCE PICTURE
5-90. The common intelligence picture is a single, identical display of relevant, instructive, and contextual
intelligence information regarding enemy, adversary, and neutral force disposition, and supporting
infrastructures derived from all sources at any level of classification, shared by more than one command, that
facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to enhance situational awareness and decision
making (JP 2-0). For Army purposes, the CIP is viewed as a single display or any combination of displays
and products that—
⚫ Support the commander and staff’s situational understanding.
⚫ Allow the development of the intelligence portion of the COP.
⚫ Assist collaboration between echelons to support a common interpretation of key aspects of the
threat.
Note. In most instances, current technology and systems do not support a single CIP
accomplishing all that is mentioned above. Therefore, the CIP can be any combination of the
intelligence products discussed under situation development (see paragraph 5-83) as well as
overlays, either digital or acetate. |
2-0 | 148 | Chapter 5
5-91. The CIP relies on constant intelligence synchronization and continuing assessments. Specifically, the
CIP is based on—
⚫ Data, information, and intelligence from multiple echelons, organizations, and agencies.
⚫ Leveraging the intelligence enterprise.
5-92. The commander often directs how information and intelligence should be displayed on the CIP; the
G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff should ensure the information and intelligence are tailored to the commander’s
requirements. The following include some key aspects of the CIP:
⚫ The CIP is derived from—
▪ All intelligence disciplines, complementary capabilities, and ancillary collection assets.
▪ Threat and civil considerations information across all domains and dimensions of the OE.
⚫ The CIP is driven by unit SOPs and collaboration up and down one echelon.
5-93. G-2/S-2s must consider the following (not all-inclusive) when developing the CIP:
⚫ Commander’s requirements.
⚫ The unit’s mission.
⚫ CIP classification.
⚫ Echelon of CIP development.
⚫ CIP management procedures.
⚫ Available intelligence architecture and bandwidth.
⚫ Types of information to be displayed.
⚫ How information is to be displayed.
⚫ Dissemination and ingestion methods and procedures.
⚫ Reporting timelines.
5-94. The CIP focuses on describing the OE, the threat, and threat COAs. This product should have both a
visual and textual component. If organized appropriately, both components will convey a clear and relevant
threat narrative consistent with operational terminology. Intelligence staffs must exercise high control over
the threat narrative to ensure consistency, which supports the commander and staff’s situational
understanding. Chapter 8 discusses developing the CIP during large-scale combat operations.
INTELLIGENCE PORTION OF THE COMMON OPERATIONAL
PICTURE
5-95. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff carefully consider what aspects of the CIP to disseminate to the
operations staff as the intelligence portion of the COP. The common operational picture is a display of
relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on
common data and information shared by more than one command (ADP 6-0). Although the COP is ideally a
single display, it may include more than one display and information in other forms, such as graphic
representations or written reports, automatic updates, and overlays, often digitally stored in a common
database. The intelligence portions of the COP are those messages and overlays relating to threats, terrain
and weather, and civil considerations in the common database. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff ensure the
common database reflects the most current information and intelligence available to maintain the timeliness,
accuracy, and relevancy of the intelligence portion of the COP.
5-96. The commander and staff must account for and mitigate any limitations in the COP based on the C2
system and technology used to generate the COP. The threat situation and civil considerations portions of the
COP, while updated by the intelligence staff regularly, are sometimes limited to displaying somewhat latent
and composite locations and threat force dispositions. Somewhat latent indicates that in most situations, those
locations were captured at a specific time and are not automatically updated. Composite indicates that in
some situations, those locations were captured across multiple dates/times. The intelligence portion of the
COP may also require further explanation from the intelligence staff or other intelligence products due to the
complexity of the threat situation and mission variables. |
2-0 | 149 | Intelligence Staff Support
5-97. With the complexity of the OE, the intelligence staff must be prepared to—
⚫ Validate and maintain the threat portions of the COP in a timely and flexible manner.
⚫ Collaborate with the rest of the staff to ensure the appropriate operational and mission variables
are displayed.
⚫ Effectively display the multiple types and layers of information the commander requires.
5-98. A COP is key to achieving and maintaining shared situational understanding in all domains and making
effective decisions faster than the threat. The difficulty of maintaining a COP in a multinational environment
varies based on training levels, language differences, level of data sharing, technical compatibility of systems,
restrictions based on classification, and other national caveats.
5-99. The COP facilitates collaborative planning and assists commanders at all echelons in achieving shared
situational understanding. The COP must consider relevant factors in domains affecting the operation as well
as provide and enable a common understanding of the interrelationships between actions and effects through
the human, information, and physical dimensions. Shared situational understanding allows commanders to
visualize the effects of their decisions on other elements of the force and the overall operation. |
2-0 | 151 | Chapter 6
Intelligence Operations
SECTION I – OVERVIEW
6-1. MI unit collection operations (intelligence operations) follow the Army’s framework for exercising
C2—the operations process. The major C2 activities conducted during operations are planning, preparing,
executing, and continuously assessing. Intelligence commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations
process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to direct, lead, and assess intelligence
operations.
6-2. Through intelligence operations, MI collection personnel and systems collect information about
capabilities, activities, disposition, and all other threat characteristics within the OE. Intelligence
professionals follow the guidance outlined by the intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities to
ensure all tasks are accomplished successfully and in accordance with intelligence regulations and policies.
6-3. MI collection personnel are trained and certified. MI sensors operated by MI personnel can be directed
to collect information. These MI collection capabilities are distinct from other Army information collection
capabilities, such as reconnaissance or surveillance. The distinction is required because intelligence
collection must comply with all applicable U.S. laws and policy. (See appendix D.) Additionally, certain
intelligence disciplines require specific training and certifications to conduct intelligence operations.
SECTION II – INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BASED ON INFORMATION
COLLECTION
6-4. Information collection is the Army doctrinal construct for synchronizing and integrating the planning
and employment of sensors and assets to collect information. The intelligence warfighting function’s
contributions to information collection include collection management and intelligence operations. Chapter 5
discusses how collection management, through the intelligence process, nests within information collection.
To understand intelligence operations, intelligence professionals must also understand information collection
and how intelligence operations nest within it (under the execute collection task).
INFORMATION COLLECTION AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
6-5. Intelligence operations is one of the four primary tactical tasks and missions the Army conducts as part
of information collection. (See figure 6-1 on page 6-2.) The other three are reconnaissance, surveillance, and
security operations.
Note. When necessary, maneuver units conduct offensive operations to collect information. This
entails commanders assuming risk to determine threat characteristics in the OE. (See chapter 8.) |
2-0 | 152 | Chapter 6
Figure 6-1. Intelligence operations as a primary tactical task
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
6-6. Intelligence operations are driven by the need to answer questions and fill requirements crucial to the
conduct of the supported force’s overall operation. Units conducting intelligence operations follow the
operations process. Collection activities acquire information and provide that information to intelligence
analytical elements. Using products developed for the commander and staff, the G-3/S-3 and G-2/S-2 develop
the information collection plan based on the commander’s intent and concept of operations. The information
collection plan is synchronized with current and future operations throughout the MDMP, especially during
COA analysis (war game).
6-7. After the supported unit staff develops information collection tasks and assigns a collection mission to
an MI unit, and the collection manager develops the information collection plan, the MI unit begins
intelligence operations to support information collection through the execute collection task. The collection
management team updates the information collection plan continuously based on post-collection and post-
exploitation to determine if the collection satisfied the intelligence requirements. This effort is complex, and
there is significant overlap between the supported unit intelligence staff and the MI unit. Therefore, the
supported unit staff and the MI unit must collaborate closely and early-on during planning and throughout to
the completion of operations.
6-8. Executing collection focuses on requirements connected to the execution of tactical missions based on
the intelligence requirements. Intelligence informs commanders and staffs of where and when to look for—
⚫ The way: Reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations.
⚫ The means: Ranges from national and joint collection capabilities to individual Soldier
observations and reports.
⚫ The end: Intelligence that supports the commander’s decision making.
⚫ The result: The successful execution and assessment of operations depend on the effective
synchronization and integration of the information collection effort. |
2-0 | 153 | Intelligence Operations
Collection Management, Intelligence Operations, and Collaboration
The success of intelligence operations depends on the G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, collection manager,
and MI unit commander (or their representatives) closely collaborating through some complex
and interrelated tasks:
• The G-3/S-3 tasks information collection, inside Annex L (Information Collection) of the
unit order, based on the collection management plan.
• The collection management team, directed by the G-2/S-2, leads the development of the
collection management plan.
• The MI unit must coordinate with and provide information to the collection management
team during the development of the collection management plan; this is a team effort.
• The MI unit staff plans operations and produces an order, including tasks to all collection
assets, based on the supported unit order, including Annex L (Information Collection).
• The G-2/S-2 and the MI unit commander must collaborate on and share responsibility for
some other tasks related to intelligence operations such as maintaining the intelligence
architecture, performing coordination, and planning IEW maintenance.
• The MI unit must immediately coordinate with the G-2/S-2 or collection manager, who in
turn coordinates with the G-3/S-3, if there is a need to diverge from Annex L (Information
Collection) tasks.
RECONNAISSANCE
6-9. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities and resources of an
enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, or other
characteristics of a particular area, by visual observation or other detection methods (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance
produces information about the AO. It identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to
movement, and the disposition of enemy forces and civilians so commanders can maneuver forces freely to
gain and maintain the initiative. All units and personnel conduct reconnaissance; successful and effective
units combine three methods to perform reconnaissance: dismounted, mounted, and aerial. Units primarily
tasked to conduct reconnaissance with tailored and specialized capabilities include air cavalry and attack
helicopter units, ground cavalry and scout units, chemical reconnaissance elements, engineer reconnaissance
teams, and special operations forces. Chapter 8 discusses the types of reconnaissance. (See FM 3-55.)
SURVEILLANCE
6-10. Surveillance involves observing an area to collect information; the focus and tempo of this collection
effort derive primarily from the commander’s intent and guidance. Surveillance involves observing the threat
and local populace in an NAI or TAI. Surveillance may be a stand-alone mission or part of a reconnaissance
mission (particularly area reconnaissance). Surveillance is tiered and layered with technical assets that collect
information; it is passive and continuous. (See FM 3-55.)
6-11. Surveillance tasks can be performed by—
⚫ A variety of assets (in the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains).
⚫ Means (Soldiers and systems such as artillery and air defense radars).
⚫ Mediums (throughout the EMS).
SECURITY OPERATIONS
6-12. Security operations are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate
warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within
which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their
protected forces. (ADP 3-90). Security operations are enabling operations that occur during all operations.
(See FM 3-55.) Commanders usually conduct enabling operations as part of their objectives or supporting
efforts. The security force uses a combination of reconnaissance and surveillance assets to accomplish its
mission. Chapter 8 discusses the types of security operations. (See FM 3-55.) |
2-0 | 154 | Chapter 6
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, THE COLLECTION MANAGER,
AND THE REST OF THE SUPPORTED UNIT STAFF
6-13. The supported commander and staff plan and assess information collection at each echelon. Typically,
an MI unit supports theater army, corps, division, and BCT echelons. In these cases, the MI unit collaborates
closely with the supported commander and staff to plan, prepare, execute, and assess intelligence operations.
Additionally, the MI unit usually serves as the means of C2 for any attached or supporting intelligence
capability at that echelon. This collaboration ensures each echelon integrates and synchronizes intelligence
operations from the theater strategic down to the tactical levels. For this reason, both the supported staff and
MI unit staff members must thoroughly understand all aspects of the intelligence architecture, including the
following capabilities:
⚫ Collection.
⚫ PED.
⚫ Intelligence analysis activities.
⚫ Technical channels.
⚫ Procedures for IEW maintenance and other support.
COLLECTION MANAGER
6-14. If not already identified, designating a collection manager as part of the intelligence staff is vital to the
success of intelligence support. The collection manager, working in conjunction with the G-2/S-2 and the
rest of the staff, leads representatives from each staff section through the collection management process.
(See ATP 2-01 for doctrine on the collection manager and collection management team.)
6-15. Collection managers—
⚫ Collaborate with each staff section to understand and validate all intelligence requirements.
⚫ Determine communications needs and procedures.
⚫ Understand the sustainment needs of all available collection assets.
⚫ Ensure collection times are relevant and purposeful.
⚫ Assisted by the intelligence and operations staffs, ensure all tasked collection and PED
requirements are nested and synchronized to answer intelligence requirements.
6-16. Regardless of the echelon, collection managers focus support on three distinct roles:
⚫ Synchronizing collection to support current operations.
⚫ Ensuring effective management and technical control across the intelligence disciplines and
complementary capabilities.
⚫ Planning support to future operations.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSET INTEGRATION
6-17. Joint ISR collection assets are important to Army tactical operations. In many situations, joint ISR
collection is available to tactical units, providing they are not in movement and have connectivity, either
through a broadcast dissemination system or within various intelligence databases. Although planning
information collection starts with organic and supporting Army collection assets, Army units may receive a
joint ISR asset through joint apportionment and allocation. The joint ISR process typically requires
significant prior planning and approval. This is unlikely when the joint force is trying to gain access to an
AO or within a highly contested OE. However, in certain situations, when an Army unit is the main effort,
joint apportionment and allocation are possible.
6-18. In order to receive joint apportionment and allocation, the theater army and corps intelligence staff
must determine what joint assets are available by collaborating and conducting coordination early in the joint
planning process. The staff must also understand the various joint ISR scheduling and collection management
tracking mechanisms, such as the air tasking order. Additionally, the staff must establish and integrate fire
support coordination, air space coordinating measures, and other important coordination means, as well as
plan the appropriate relationship and control means for the joint ISR assets. |
2-0 | 155 | Intelligence Operations
STAFF CAPABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
6-19. Intelligence operations are complex. The staff must know and consider the practical capabilities and
limitations of all unit organic and allocated assets. Capability considerations include the following:
⚫ Range. Range deals with the collector’s ability to provide target coverage. It is important for the
staff to consider mission range (duration and distance) and the sensor range (how close the collection
asset must be to the target to collect against it).
⚫ Communications. The staff considers communications requirements from the asset to the CP. The
staff determines the ability to maneuver, including transit and required collection time on specific
NAIs and TAIs.
⚫ Day and night effectiveness. The staff considers factors such as available optics and any effects
of thermal crossover.
⚫ Battery/Power source life. The staff considers how long the asset can collect and how often the
battery/power source will have to be replenished to continue collection.
⚫ Bandwidth. The staff considers available bandwidth and prioritizes requirements to ensure
information can be continuously transmitted and accessed.
⚫ Expendability of asset. The staff must consider the necessity to recover the collection asset or if
it is expendable. What is the risk associated with emplacing and recovering the asset?
⚫ Technical characteristics. Each asset must consider time factors (such as set-up and tear-down
times) for task accomplishment. Other technical characteristics include—
▪ Specific environmental threshold sensitivities for each collection asset that adversely affect
or prohibit the effective use of both its platform and sensor (including factors such as
terrain, weather, and soil composition).
▪ Environmental effects on the collection asset (including factors such as urban or rural terrain
and soil composition).
▪ Whether the asset can continue to operate despite EA.
⚫ Reporting timeliness. Each asset is assigned an earliest time and a latest time information
reporting is of value according to the information collection plan and its supporting matrix. Other
timeliness factors include—
▪ How the asset transmits data/information in near real time, or how the asset should be
recovered to collect the data.
▪ The established reporting criteria for each collection asset.
▪ How long it takes to disseminate collected information to each requester.
⚫ Geolocation accuracy. Accuracy implies reliability and precision. The asset must be capable of
locating a target accurately enough to engage it with precision-guided munitions.
⚫ Durability. Durability includes factors such as—
▪ Weather effects on the employment of the collection asset (platform and sensor payload).
▪ EMS effects on the employment of the collection asset.
▪ Whether the prime mover can traverse restricted terrain.
⚫ Detecting threat activity. The staff considers whether the collection asset can detect the expected
threat activity and whether the threat can deceive the collection capability.
⚫ Performance history. Experienced staff officers must know which information collection
capabilities are typically reliable to meet the commander’s information requirements. Readiness
rates, responsiveness, and accuracy, over time, may raise one collector’s reliability factor.
⚫ Intelligence PED. The staff considers whether the unit has the intelligence PED capacity, time,
and architecture required to support planned and projected intelligence operations. Intelligence
PED is required to conduct responsive intelligence operations to support dynamic maneuver and
fire support missions. The following includes some considerations to optimize intelligence PED:
▪ Collect. To accomplish the mission, PED units and elements must have the capability to
receive collection from systems.
▪ Process. The processing and fusion of collected data transform a larger volume of data into
information and convert that information into a useable format. |
2-0 | 156 | Chapter 6
▪ Exploit. PED personnel and systems quickly analyze the processed information to add
operational context to the information and identify specific relevance to the mission.
▪ Disseminate. PED personnel and systems issue reports and products to provide combat
information and related intelligence to commanders and operational elements. This
reporting facilitates subsequent single-source and all-source intelligence, analysis, targeting,
cueing of other collectors, and decision making.
SECTION III – INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES
6-20. There are guidelines for conducting successful intelligence operations. They are not checklists; rather,
they describe ways to employ collection assets and develop the situation based on the commander’s guidance.
Mirroring the fundamentals of reconnaissance, these guidelines support efforts that result in timely collection
and reporting of the accurate, relevant information needed to produce intelligence. The supported unit staff
and MI unit staff must determine which guidelines to emphasize based on the situation. The following
includes the intelligence operations guidelines:
⚫ Maintain readiness.
⚫ Ensure continuous intelligence operations.
⚫ Orient on requirements.
⚫ Provide mixed and redundant coverage.
⚫ Gain and maintain sensor contact.
⚫ Report information rapidly and accurately.
⚫ Provide early warning.
⚫ Retain freedom of movement.
MAINTAIN READINESS
6-21. MI unit readiness is a continuous priority through predeployment, deployment, and post deployment.
Readiness is a key element during planning. The readiness of MI unit personnel and equipment impacts how
MI capabilities can be leveraged to support an operation during planning. MI unit readiness also impacts the
collection of information required to refine plans and issue orders and for operational execution.
6-22. As part of prepare, readiness focuses on—
⚫ Training. MI commanders and leaders must establish a training plan focused on intelligence
tasks and functions. This ensures MI personnel are prepared to conduct individual and collective
tasks to support the unit’s mission and are knowledgeable of equipment and other collection
assets and databases. During training, recognizing opportunities to prepare for conventional
force and special operations force (as well as joint and interagency) interdependence,
interoperability, and integration can produce great dividends during operations. MI commanders
and leaders that seize opportunities to collaborate with special operations and other intelligence
organizations increase their understanding of each other’s capabilities and facilitate
interdependence, interoperability, and integration during operations. The Military Intelligence
Training Standard (also known as MITS) series of publications—TC 2-19.400, TC 2-19.401,
TC 2-19.402, TC 2-19.403, TC 2-19.404, and TC 2-19.405—provide information on MI
training.
⚫ Maintenance. This recurring event ensures intelligence assets are properly maintained and
prepared to conduct information collection. For example, during planning, MI leaders should
consider the availability of equipment maintainers and facilities for table of organization and
equipment-based and commercial-off-the-shelf systems that may require dedicated field service
representatives to provide repair and maintenance.
⚫ Equipment status. The commander is ultimately responsible for equipment status. The status of
collection assets must be monitored and reported to the appropriate staff elements. |
2-0 | 157 | Intelligence Operations
⚫ Augmentation. Whether in the reset-train-ready stage or preparing for a specific mission, it is
necessary for MI units to identify and report any additional personnel or resources necessary to
accomplish the mission. This often involves additional collection assets or specialized personnel
such as linguists or technical experts.
⚫ Sustainment. This involves the identification of outside resources, including the logistics, fuel,
and protection necessary for mission success.
ENSURE CONTINUOUS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
6-23. Commanders direct the conduct of information collection activities before, during, and after the
execution of all operations. Commanders depend on intelligence to know where, when, and how best to
employ forces during all military operations. Typically, collection activities begin soon after receipt of
mission and continue throughout the preparation and execution of the overall operation. Collection activities
do not cease after the operation concludes but continue as required:
⚫ Before execution of the overall operation, intelligence operations focus on filling information
gaps about all relevant aspects of the OE.
⚫ During execution, intelligence operations focus on providing commanders with updated
information that verifies the threat’s composition, disposition, and intention as the operation
progresses. This allows commanders to verify which COA the threat is actually adopting and
determine if the plan is still valid based on actual events in the AO. Commanders can then make
decisions, as needed, including adjustment decisions (those that modify the order to respond to
unanticipated opportunities or threats).
⚫ After execution, intelligence operations focus on maintaining contact with threat forces to
collect the information necessary for planning subsequent operations and protecting the friendly
force. In stability operations, intelligence operations often focus on relevant aspects of the AO
and AOI and on the civil considerations designated by the commander.
ORIENT ON REQUIREMENTS
6-24. Commanders prioritize intelligence operations primarily by providing their guidance and intent early
in planning. G-2/S-2s assist commanders in—
⚫ Identifying and updating their PIRs.
⚫ Ensuring PIRs are tied directly to the concept of operations and decision points.
⚫ Focusing PIRs on their most critical needs (because of limited collection assets).
⚫ Ensuring PIRs include the latest time information is of value (also called LTIOV) or the event by
which the information is required.
⚫ Approving requests for intelligence collection requirements beyond a unit’s capabilities.
⚫ Aggressively seeking the results of higher-echelon intelligence operations as well as the answers to
information requirements across all echelons through intelligence reach.
6-25. Commanders assign information collection tasks based on a unit’s collection capabilities. Therefore,
commanders ensure the tasks they assign do not exceed the collection and analytical ability of their unit.
When not using organic assets, commanders use previously established relationships to optimize effective
operations as a combined arms team, when possible.
PROVIDE MIXED AND REDUNDANT COVERAGE
6-26. Commanders integrate their assets’ capabilities to provide mixed and redundant coverage of critical
locations identified during planning. The layering of collection assets through cueing, redundancy, and
mixing assists in successfully answering requirements. Maximum efficiency in information collection is
achieved when all collection assets are carefully employed together. The appropriate mix of collection assets
assists in satisfying as many different requirements as possible. It also reduces the likelihood the unit will
favor or rely on one particular unit, discipline, or system. The intelligence and operations staffs collaborate
to balance requirements, available capabilities, and areas to be covered. Commanders and staffs continuously
assess results to determine any changes in critical locations requiring this level of coverage. |
2-0 | 158 | Chapter 6
GAIN AND MAINTAIN SENSOR CONTACT
6-27. Once a unit conducting intelligence operations gains sensor contact, it maintains that contact unless
directed otherwise or the survival of the unit is at risk. In intelligence operations, gaining and maintaining
sensor contact occur when the collection asset can observe or receive a signal or is observable from a person
or object. Sensor contact is critical in signals intercept and imagery collection missions.
REPORT INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY
6-28. Collection assets acquire and report timely and accurate information on all relevant aspects of the OE
within the AOI. Collection assets report exactly what they observe and, if appropriate, what they do not
observe. Seemingly unimportant information may be extremely important when combined with other
information. Negative reports may be as important as reports of threat activity. To ensure collection assets
report information rapidly, the intelligence staff collaborates with the signal staff to ensure communications
plans incorporate collection asset communications requirements. The collection manager must establish a
PACE communications plan for each collection asset and ensure it has been tested as information may
quickly lose its value. Indicators and SIRs should be written such that they can be answered over the radio
by a simple spot report in SALUTE format from the collection asset.
PROVIDE EARLY WARNING
6-29. Commanders and staffs position collection assets to provide early warning of threat action.
Commanders use intelligence operations as part of their information collection effort to ascertain the threat
COA and timing. They then orient these assets to observe these locations for indicators of threat actions.
Timely and complete reporting is essential to providing early warning.
RETAIN FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
6-30. Collection assets require battlefield mobility to successfully accomplish their missions. These assets
do not engage in close combat in the execution of their collection tasks. The criticality of collection assets
makes their survival the utmost consideration. If these assets are decisively engaged, collection stops, and
personnel immediately execute the necessary battle drills. The collection asset leader’s initiative and
knowledge of the terrain, weather, and threat reduce the likelihood of decisive engagement and assist in
maintaining freedom of movement. The IPOE process can identify anticipated areas of likely contact.
SECTION IV – CONDUCTING INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
6-31. Intelligence unit planning begins with receipt of mission, identifying information collection tasks in
an order or plan. The unit then deliberately plans, prepares, and executes the mission in close coordination
with the supported unit collection manager and other staff members to satisfy specific requirements. During
the execution of intelligence operations, collection assets and supporting PED elements process, exploit, and
disseminate intelligence reports and combat information. The staff continually assesses the effectiveness of
the information collection plan to support the operations process. Combat information identified by the
G-2/S-2 is immediately disseminated to the commander.
APPLYING THE OPERATIONS PROCESS IN INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS
6-32. The operations process describes the sequence of activities performed by any military unit to
accomplish a mission. (See ADP 5-0.) MI units conduct the same sequence of activities (plan, prepare,
execute, and assess) to accomplish the tasks assigned to them. MI units follow the operations process to
conduct intelligence operations the same way maneuver units do to conduct their operations. However, the
conduct of intelligence operations requires collaboration and close coordination with the supported unit
intelligence staff. (See figure 6-2.) |
2-0 | 159 | Intelligence Operations
Figure 6-2. Intelligence support
PLAN
6-33. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and
determining effective ways to bring that future about (ADP 5-0). It results in a plan or order that
communicates the commander’s intent, understanding, and visualization of the operation to subordinates,
focusing on desired results.
Mission Planning
6-34. Mission planning begins when the MI unit receives or anticipates a new mission. This can come from
an order issued by higher headquarters or derived from an ongoing operation. The MI unit relies on
established SOPs to articulate individual and collective responsibilities during planning. The SOPs identify
the participants, their responsibilities, and the tools or products required to produce intelligence.
6-35. Upon mission receipt, the supported unit’s order and annexes must be examined to identify specified
and implied tasks and constraints contained in the order’s annexes. The MI unit commander and leaders
should review Annex B (Intelligence), Annex D (Fires), Annex F (Sustainment), Annex H (Protection),
Annex L (Information Collection), and Annex S (Special Technical Operations) to the base OPORD, as well
as all supporting appendixes and tabs.
Military Intelligence Unit Commander
6-36. During planning, the MI unit commander uses specified and implied tasks, the supported unit’s
commander’s guidance and staff assessments, and the information collection plan. This allows the MI unit
commander to tailor planning considerations, which include but are not limited to—
⚫ Determining the amount and type of equipment required and available for the mission.
⚫ Determining and requesting the augmentation of personnel and equipment, including required
PED support to conduct single-discipline and multidiscipline intelligence operations.
⚫ Determining and requesting the augmentation of personnel for complementary capabilities.
⚫ Determining the communications (network and voice) and connectivity architecture,
requirements, and limitations to support the mission.
⚫ Coordinating with other units to support the MI unit’s mission, including but not limited to—
▪ Medical personnel to establish casualty evacuation procedures.
▪ The fire support officer to coordinate fire support. |
2-0 | 160 | Chapter 6
▪ The airspace coordinator if using airborne intelligence systems.
▪ Supported units to ensure the required mission, communications, logistics, and life support
are available for the MI element/personnel.
▪ Maneuver units to coordinate terrain management where MI personnel are expected to
operate.
▪ Adjacent MI unit commanders to identify threat information and coordinate and deconflict
operations.
⚫ Observing subordinate execution of TLP by section, platoon, and company leaders.
⚫ Identifying language requirements and requesting augmentation, as appropriate.
⚫ Identifying intelligence contingency funds requirements. (See AR 381-141.)
⚫ Identifying IEW maintenance support and procedures before deployment. During deployment,
this requires continuous assessment, especially when there are few or no organic IEW
technicians and facilities.
Troop Leading Procedures
6-37. During planning, MI unit leaders below the MI battalion level conduct TLP to prepare for intelligence
operations. The troop leading procedures are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a
mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation (ADP 5-0). These procedures enable leaders to
maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and preparing their units for an operation.
TLP are also supported by risk management. It is important for MI unit leaders to collaborate with both their
higher MI unit (when applicable) and the supported unit throughout the entire TLP process.
6-38. The TLP and the MDMP are similar but not identical. Commanders with a coordinating staff use the
MDMP (see table 3-3 on page 3-12); company-level and smaller units use the TLP (see figure 6-3).
6-39. TLP consist of eight steps. The sequence of the TLP steps is not rigid. Leaders modify the sequence to
meet the mission, situation, and available time. Some steps are performed concurrently while others may be
performed continuously throughout the operation.
Step 1—Receive the Mission
6-40. MI leaders analyze mission objectives and current capabilities to accomplish the assigned mission,
assess any possible issues (personnel, equipment, or maintenance) that could limit mission support, and raise
any issues to the MI commander and supported that could hinder mission accomplishment unit.
Step 2—Issue a Warning Order
6-41. MI leaders of elements supporting a mission issue a WARNORD to participating elements and
personnel as soon as possible (usually within an hour after receipt of mission). This ensures subordinate
leaders have key information needed to maximize preparation time. The MI unit may have to issue multiple
WARNORDs due to additional information or changes to the supported unit’s WARNORD. The initial
WARNORD should include a task organization (provides the detailed task organization for the mission:
formation, personnel, and equipment) and timeline (provides a schedule of all preparatory tasks from receipt
of mission to the start of collection).
Step 3—Make a Tentative Plan
6-42. MI leaders create a tentative plan based on the supported unit’s WARNORD that attempts to meet
mission requirements and remain within the framework of the commander’s intent. MI leaders ensure—
⚫ MI personnel and elements have all available information to complete the mission.
⚫ Soldiers are prepared to execute any tasks assigned to them and their section/element.
⚫ All equipment and vehicles are prepared for the mission, inventoried, and operational. |
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