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3-14 | 119 | References
All Web sites were accessed on 7 October 2019.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, July 2019.
ADP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, 14 August 2018.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
National Security Strategy, December 2017. Documents is available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
National Space Policy, 28 June 2010. Documents is available at:
https://www.space.commerce.gov/policy/national-space-policy/
2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2013. Documents is available at:
https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/info/references/army_strategic_planning_guidance.pdf
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
CJCSM 3130.03A, Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance, 4 February 2019.
https://jsportal.sp.pentagon.mil/sites/Matrix/DEL/CJCSJS%20Directives%20Limited/CJCSM%2031
30.03A.pdf
DODD 3100.10, Space Policy, 18 October 2012.
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Directives/issuances/dodd
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online from the Joint Doctrine Education and Training Electronic
Information System (JDEIS) webpage at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/
JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 October 2013.
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 January 2017.
JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 10 April 2019.
JP 3-13, Information operations, 27 November 2012.
JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, 8 February 2012.
JP 3-14, Space Operations, 10 April 2018.
JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 31 January 2018.
JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, 10 January 2018.
JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 28 September 2018.
JP 5-0, Joint Planning, 16 June 2017.
JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations, 20 March 2012.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil
ADP 1-01, Doctrine Primer, 31 July 2019. |
3-14 | 120 | References
ADP 2-0, Intelligence, 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-0, Operations, 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-19, Fires, 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-37, Protection, 31 July 2019.
ADP 4-0, Sustainment, 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 31 July 2019.
ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 31 July 2019.
AR 5-22, The Army Force Modernization Proponent System, 28 October 2015.
AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, 29 September 2000.
AR 600-3, The Army Personnel Development System, 16 September 2019.
AR 900-1, Department of the Army Space Policy, 21 April 2017.
ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 1 March 2019.
ATP 2-22.7, Geospatial Intelligence, 26 March 2015.
ATP 5-19, Risk Management, 14 April 2014.
FM 3-27, Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense Operations, 31 March 2014.
FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 5 May 2014.
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare, 7 August 2019.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Most NATO document is available on the NATO Standardization Office website:
https://nso.nato.int/nso/nsdd/listpromulg.html
AJP-3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, 8 April 2016.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
No Forms Entries.
REFERENCE FORMS
Forms are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil
DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. |
3-14 | 121 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number, unless otherwise indicated.
A Denied, degraded, and disrupted Integrated broadcast service, 1-16, 1-
space operational environment, 1- 38, 3-117
Administrative control, 3-63, 3-127 45, 1-59, 2-25, 2-55 thru 2-64, 2-89, Intelligence, Information operations,
Advanced extremely high frequency, 2-98, 3-4, 3-23, 3-26, 3-30, 4-3, 4- cyber, electronic warfare, and
3-35, 3-64 6, 4-40, 4-46, 4-48, 4-50, 4-66 thru space, 1-41 thru 1-43
Air and missile defense, 1-38, 3-84, 3- 4-69 Intelligence preparation of the
89, 3-91, 4-10, 4-46, 4-63, 5-47 battlefield, pg. vii, 1-9, 1-23, 3-29,
Antiaccess, pg. vii, 1-5, 1-38, 1-39, 1- E 3-96, 3-97, 5-17, 5-35, 6-1 thru 6-6,
44, 1-45, 1-48, 2-48 thru 2-55, 3-2, 6-8, 6-15, 6-17, 6-18, 6-22 thru 6-
3-26, 4-66 Electromagnetic environment, 1-32, 25
Appendix 18 to Annex C, pg. vi, pg. 2-37, 2-38, 2-42, 2-45, 2-56, 2-57,
vii, 1-25, 4-23, 4-39, 5-9, 5-21, pg. 2-75, 3-47, 5-38, 5-72. J
5-9, pg. 6-1, 6-22, A-1 thru A-3, Electromagnetic spectrum, 1-20, 1-
pgs. A-2 thru A-5 36, 1-50, 2-35, 2-37, 2-39, 2-42, 2- Joint friendly force tracking, 1-31, 1-
Area denial, 1-5, 1-38, 1-39, 1-44, 1- 56, 2-57, 2-59, 2-65, 2-66, 2-68, 2- 61
45, 1-48, 2-26, 2-48 thru 2-55, 3-2, 71, 2-74, 2-76, 2-79, 2-97, 3-19, 3- Joint Tactical Ground Stations, 1-22,
3-26, 4-66 25, 3-131, 3-135, 5-10, 6-11 1-61, 3-84, 3-90, 3-129, 4-72
Army design methodology, 5-1, 5-4
Army space core competencies, 1-58
F L
Army space coordination element, 1-
29, 4-21 Frequencies, 2-39 thru 2-41, 2-74 Legal considerations, 1-16, 2-86, 4-6,
Army Space proponent contribution, Friendly force tracking, 1-15, 1-18, 1- 4-24, 4-61, 5-26, 5-31, pg. A-5
3-129 31, 1-61, 2-31, 3-10, 3-14, 3-108 Low Earth orbit, 1-52 thru 1-54, 1-56,
Army space support team, 1-26, 1-59, thru 3-115, 1-29, 3-129, 4-45, 4-50, pg.1-13, 4-30, 6-8
3-120, 3-129, 4-5, 4-11, 4-13, 4-14, 4-56, 4-64, 4-72, 5-59, 6-25
4-21, 4-72, 4-80, pg. 5-9
M
G
B Medium Earth orbit, 1-52, 1-53, pg. 1-
Geosynchronous Earth orbit, 1-52, 1- 13
Bandwidth comparison, pg. 2-8 53, pg. 1-13, 4-30, 6-8 Military decisionmaking process, 1-
Global Broadcast Service, 1-20, 1-30, 23, 2-32, 4-5, 4-22, 5-1, 5-4, 5-12
C 3-64, 3-129, 4-72 thru 5-14, 5-28, pg. 5-4, pgs. 5-6
Global navigation satellite system, 1- thru 5-9, 5-36, 6-4, 6-19
Combined space operations center, 4- 18, 1-19, 1-45, 3-25 thru 3-30, 3- Missile warning, 1-15, 1-26, pg. 1-13,
21, 4-73, pg. 5-3 132, 3-135, 4-29, 4-45 2-5, 2-7, 2-8, 2-24 thru 2-27, 2-30,
Common interactive broadcast, 1-16, Global Positioning System, 1-18, 1- 2-38, 2-46, 2-67, 3-1, 3-38, 3-84
1-38, 3-35 52, pg. 1-13, 2-24 thru 2-31, 2-64, thru 3-94, 3-129, 4-21, 4-45, 4-46,
Common operational picture, 1-31, 3- 2-77, 3-11 thru 3-19, 3-21, 3-23, 3- 4-50, 4-54, 4-56, 4-64, 4-72, pg. 5-
86, 3-92, 3-109 thru 3-117, 4-6, 4- 26, 3-98, 3-101, 3-111, 4-45, 4-46, 3, 5-59, 6-14, 6-17, 6-25, pg. A-3,
8, 4-47, 4-53, 5-54, 3-59 4-50, 4-60, 4-62, pg. 5-3, 5-59, 6- pg. A-4
Consolidated SATCOM System 12, 6-15, 6-21, 6-25, pg. A-3 Mission variables, pg. vii, 2-13, 2-32
Expert, 1-20, 3-49 thru 3-53, 3-63, thru 2-34, 5-2, 5-18, pg. 5-5, 6-4
3-65, 3-79, 3-83, 4-72 H Mobile User Objective System, 1-21,
3-35, 3-39 thru 3-41, 4-44, 3-64, 3-
D Hazard, 2-3, 2-59, 2-61, 2-67 2-77 129, 4-72
High altitude operations, 1-41 thru 1-
Defense Satellite Communications 43, 1-61 N
System, 1-20, 1-21, 3-35, 3-42, 3-
64, 3-70, 3-74 thru 3-77, 3-80, 3-81, I Navigation warfare, 1-19, 1-59, 1-60,
3-129 2-25, 2-85, 2-86, pg.3-1, 3-20, 3-25 |
3-14 | 122 | Index
thru 3-30, 3-129, 3-131, 3-132, 3- 15, 6-17, 6-20, 6-21, 6-25, A-2, pg. 28, 4-54, 4-56, 4-62, 4-64, 4-72, pg.
135, 4-46, 4-56, 4-64, pg. A-4 A-4 A-3, pg. A-4
Commercial satellite Space situation template, pg. 6-3
O communications, 1-20, 1-30, 2-24, Space superiority, pg. vi, 1-8, 2-6
2-26, 2-27, 2-28, 3-31, 3-32, 3-37, Space support element, 1-25, 1-26, 1-
On-orbit assets, 1-21, 2-60, 2-89, 3-7, 3-44 thru 3-47, 3-54, 3-55, 3-64, 3- 59, pg. 4-1, 4-7 thru 4-14, 4-17 thru
3-69, 4-29, 4-75, pg. A-3 129, 6-17, 6-21, pg. A-2 4-23, 4-79, 4-80, 5-12, pg. 5-3, pg.
Operation order, 4-39, 5-24, A-2, pg. Narrowband satellite 5-9, 5-49 thru 5-56, 6-3 thru 6-9, 6-
A-2 communications, 1-20, 1-21, 1-29, 13 thru 6-20, 6-23 thru 6-25, A-2,
Operation plan/planning, 1-59, 2-71, pg. 2-8, 3-35, 3-37, 3-39 thru 3-41, pg. A-2
2-73, 2-74, 3-58, 3-126, 4-7, 4-9, 4- 3-44, 3-52, 3-54, 3-56, 3-70, 3-129 Special Operations Forces, 1-26, 4-65
12, 4-24, 4-31, 4-77, 5-4, 5-10, 5- Protected band satellite
12, 5-27, pg. 5-4, pg. 5-6, 5-27, 6-2, communications, 1-20, 1-30, pg.2- T
A-1, A-3, pg. A-3 8, 3-35, 3-37, 3-43, 3-54, 3-64, 3-
Operational control, 1-27, 3-79, 3- 129 Tactical control, 3-126
126, 3-127 Wideband satellite Tactical exploitation of national
Operational variables, pg. vii, 2-13, 2- communications, 1-20, 1-21, 1-29, capability program, 1-15, 1-33, 1-
19 thru 2-22, 2-32, 2-33 pg. 2-8, 3-35, 3-37, 3-42, 3-44, 3- 34, 3-38, 3-121 thru 3-124
Orbital characteristics, 1-52, pg. 1-13, 45, 3-53, 3-54, 3-64, 3-70, 3-76, 3- Targeting 1-18, 1-19, 1-25, 1-37, 2-
3-88 129, 4-72 24, 2-25, 2-31, 2-35, 2-64, 3-10, 3-
Orbits, 1-51 thru 1-56, pg, 1-13, 2-79, Satellite reconnaissance advanced 14, 3-28, 3-34, 3-38, 3-132, 4-6, 4-
2-93, 3-11, 3-88, 4-30, 5-41, 6-8, 6- notice, 4-45 10, 4-25, 4-26, 4-40, 4-41, 4-45, 4-
15 Satellite operations, 1-15, 1-21, 1-26, 57, 4-59, 4-60, 4-82, 5-10, 5-17, 5-
Overhead persistent infrared, 1-22, 1- 2-25, pg. 3-1, 3-48, 3-55, 3-67, 3-69 30 thru 5-40, 5-43, 5-45, 6-17, 6-21,
36, 1-38, 3-84, 3-89, 3-92, 4-46, 4- thru 3-73, 3-129, 3-138, 4-54 pg. A-4
50 Space capabilities, 1-15 Target activities, 5-30
Space control, vi, 1-15, 1-17, 1-19, 1- Theater event system, 3-84, 3-89 thru
P 26, 1-27, 1-10, 1-45, 1-59, 1-60, 2- 3-91
6, 2-7, 2-24, 2-25, 2-58, 2-81, pg. 3- Theater missile warning, 1-22, 3-84,
Positioning, navigation, and timing, 1- 1, 3-20 thru 3-24, 3-26, 3-28, 3-120, 3-90, 3-92, 4-21, pg. A-3
1, 1-15, 1-18, 1-19, 1-31, 1-49, 3-129, 3-132, 4-54, 4-56, 4-62, 4- Threat, 1-8, 1-44, 1-45, 2-3, 2-44 thru
pg.1-13, 1-60, 2-4, 2-7, 2-8, 2-24 64, 4-82, pg. 5-3, pg. 5-5, 6-2, 6-3, 2-47, 2-49 thru 2-56, 2-59 thru 2-
thru 2-27, 2-29, 2-46, 2-60, 2-64, 2- 6-17, 6-25, pg. A-4 61, 2-65 thru 2-67, 2-77 thru 2-81,
67, 2-85, 2-86, 3-10, 3-25, 3-26, 3- Space control planning team, 1-27, 1- 2-83 thru 2-85, 5-17, 6-6, 6-17 thru
28, 3-36, 3-96, 3-100, 3-111, 3-129, 40, 3-120 6-19, 6-21
4-4, 4-54, 4-56, 4-58, 4-60, 4-62, 4- Space coordinating authority, pg. vi, Training considerations, 4-66 thru 4-
64, 4-69, pg. 5-3, 6-17, pg. A-3 1-28, 4-16, 4-21, 4-77 thru 4-82, pg. 69
A-2, pg. A-4, pg.A-5
Space operational environment, 1-45,
R U
pg. 2-2, pg. 5-5, pg. 5-6
Regional satellite communications Contested, pg. 2-9 Unified command plan, 4-73
support center, 1-20, 3-49, 3-50, 3- Space operations across the joint Unified Land Operations, pg. v, 1-1,
52, 3-54 thru 3-79, 3-83,3-129, 4- model, 2-65 thru 2-76 1-5, 1-8, 1-12, 1-14, 1-18, 1-29, 1-
72 Space planner, 2-3, 2-22, 2-47, 4-23, 46, pg. 2-1, 2-6, 2-18, 2-37, 2-62, 2-
Risk management, 2-59, 2-77, 2-82 4-28, 4-31 thru 4-40, 5-7 thru 5-12, 85, 2-92, 2-103, 2-104, 3-8, 3-26, 3-
thru 2-85, 4-63, 5-17, pg. 5-5 5-14 thru 5-25, 5-29, 5-30, 5-43 138, 4-17, 4-51
Space planning, 1-26, 1-28, 2-83, 2- United States Space Command, 3-58,
88, 4-13, 4-17, 4-37, 4-76, pg. 5-2, 3-61, 3-62, 3-83, 4-73, 4-75, 4-81,
S
5-14, pg. 5-4 pg. 5-3, 6-2, 6-3
Satellite communications System
Space Policy, 2-91
Expert, 3-49 thru 3-53, 4-72, 4-75 Army, vii, 2-91, 2-92, 2-99 thru 2- V
Satellite communications, 1-1, 1-7, 1- 101, 2-102
15, 1-19 thru 1-21, 1-25, 1-29 thru Department of Defense, 2-91, 2-92, Vulnerability, 1-19, 1-40, 2-81, 3-4,
1-31, 1-37, 1-39, 1-49, 1-52, 2-8, 2- 2-97, 2-102 pg. 3-7
24 thru 2-28, 2-30, 2-41, 2-46, 2-60, National, vii, 2-91, 2-92, 2-93, 2-
2-67, 2-85, 2-86, pg. 3-1 3-10, 3-21, 95, 2-102, pg. A-2 W
3-31 thru 3-65, 3-68, 3-72, 3-74 Space segments, 1-49, 2-46, 3-24
thru 3-76, 3-79, 3-83, 3-96, 3-98. 3- Space situational awareness, pg. vi, 1- Warfighting functions, 1-3, 1-11, 1-
100, 3-1021 3-115, 3-129, 3-137, 3- 15, 1-17, 1-26, 1-40, 1-49, 2-5, 2-24 14, 1-47, 1-59, 4-5
138, 4-20, 4-45, 4-46, 4-49, 4-50, 4- thru 2-29, 2-94, 2-95, 3-2, 3-5 thru Fires, 4-59, 4-60
54, 4-56, 4-58, 4-60, 4-62, 4-64, 4- 3-9, 3-21, 3-70, 3-73, 3-78, 3-100, Intelligence, 4-57, 4-58
69, 4-72, 4-75, 5-59, 6-12, 6-14, 6- 3-129, 4-7, 4-8, 4-13, 4-21, 4-27, 4- Command and control, 4-53, 4-54 |
3-14 | 123 | Index
Movement and maneuver, 4-55, 4- 6-8 thru 6-10, 6-13, 6-14, 6-25, pg. 3-42, 3-64, 3-70, 3-74 thru 3-78, 3-
56 A-2 80, 3-81, 3-129, 4-72
Protection, 4-63, 4-64 Staff weather officer, 4-10, 4-46, 5- Wideband Satellite Communications
Sustainment, 4-61, 4-62 47, 6-10, 6-13, 6-25 operations center, 1-21, 1-61, 3-55,
Weather, 1-30, pg. 1-13, 2-13, 2-24, Space, 2-38, 2-77, 2-85, 2-93, 3-21, 3-67, 3-70, 3-71, 3-74 thru 3-83, 3-
2-30, 2-32, 2-77, 2-85, 2-93, 3-1, 3- 3-96 thru 3-102, 4-58, 6-8 thru 6- 129, 3-138
95, 3-99, 3-101 thru 3-103, 4-45, 4- 14, 6-17, 6-25, 6-45, A-2, pg. A-2
46, 4-58, 4-60, 4-62, 4-64, 6-1, 6-4, Wideband Global Satellite
Communications, 1-20, 1-21, 3-35, |
3-14 | 125 | FM 3-14
30 October 2019
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
1929601
DISTRIBUTION: |
3-14 | 126 | -
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...
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3-04 | 1 | FM 3-04
ARMY
AVIATION
APRIL 2020
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 3-04, dated 29 July 2015. |
3-04 | 2 | This publication is available at the Army Publishing
Directorate site (https://armypubs. army. mil),
and the Central Army Registry site (https://atiam. train. army. |
3-04 | 3 | *FM 3-04
Field Manual Headquarters
Department of the Army
No. 3-04
Washington, DC, 06 April 2020
Army Aviation
Contents
Page
PREFACE................................................................................................................... vii
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... ix
Chapter 1 ARMY AVIATION’S ROLE IN UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS ............................... 1-1
Section I – Unified Land Operations ...................................................................... 1-1
Section II – Challenges for Army Aviation ............................................................ 1-1
Section III – Core Competencies of Army Aviation .............................................. 1-2
Provide Accurate and Timely Information Collection ................................................ 1-3
Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space ........................................................... 1-3
Destroy, Defeat, Disrupt, Divert, or Delay Enemy Forces ......................................... 1-4
Air Assault Ground Maneuver Forces ....................................................................... 1-4
Air Movement of Personnel, Equipment, and Supplies ............................................. 1-5
Evacuate Wounded or Recover Isolated Personnel ................................................. 1-6
Enable Command and Control over Extended Ranges and Complex Terrain ......... 1-7
Section IV – Army Aviation in the Operational Framework................................. 1-7
Area of Operations .................................................................................................... 1-7
Close, Deep, Support, and Consolidation Areas ....................................................... 1-8
Decisive, Shaping, and Sustaining Operations ....................................................... 1-10
Main and Supporting Efforts .................................................................................... 1-10
Section V – Operational Environment ................................................................. 1-10
Threat ...................................................................................................................... 1-11
Multi-Domain Extended Battlefield .......................................................................... 1-14
Section VI – Aviation in Deception Planning ...................................................... 1-20
Chapter 2 ARMY AVIATION ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL ............. 2-1
Section I – Operational Framework ....................................................................... 2-1
Section II – Aviation Brigades ................................................................................ 2-2
Combat Aviation Brigade ........................................................................................... 2-2
Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade .................................................................... 2-3
Theater Aviation Brigade ........................................................................................... 2-4
Section III – Enabling Aviation Groups ................................................................. 2-6
Theater Airfield Operations Group ............................................................................ 2-6
Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Group .................................................. 2-7
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-04, dated 29 July 2015. |
3-04 | 4 | Contents
Section IV – Aviation Battalions and Squadrons ................................................. 2-7
Air Cavalry Squadron ................................................................................................ 2-7
Attack Battalion ......................................................................................................... 2-8
Assault Helicopter Battalion ...................................................................................... 2-9
General Support Aviation Battalion ........................................................................... 2-9
Aviation Support Battalion ....................................................................................... 2-10
Security and Support Battalion ............................................................................... 2-11
Airfield Operations Battalion ................................................................................... 2-12
Theater Fixed-Wing Battalion ................................................................................. 2-12
Section V – Aviation Squadron/Battalion Task Forces ..................................... 2-13
Section VI – Command and Support Relationships .......................................... 2-14
Command Relationships ......................................................................................... 2-15
Support Relationships ............................................................................................. 2-17
Section VII – Aviation Command Posts .............................................................. 2-18
Main Command Post............................................................................................... 2-18
Tactical Command Post .......................................................................................... 2-18
Command Post Survivability ................................................................................... 2-19
Section VIII – Aviation Brigade Special Staff ..................................................... 2-19
Aviation Safety Officer............................................................................................. 2-19
Aviation Standardization Officer .............................................................................. 2-19
Unmanned Aircraft System Standardization Operator ............................................ 2-19
Aviation Mission Survivability Officer ...................................................................... 2-20
Aviation Master Gunner .......................................................................................... 2-20
Brigade Aviation Maintenance Officer..................................................................... 2-20
Flight Surgeon ......................................................................................................... 2-20
Medical Operations Officer ..................................................................................... 2-20
Section IX – Brigade Aviation Element ............................................................... 2-20
Organization ............................................................................................................ 2-21
Capabilities .............................................................................................................. 2-21
Section X – Aviation Liaisons .............................................................................. 2-21
Duties ...................................................................................................................... 2-21
Capabilities .............................................................................................................. 2-22
Section XI – Airspace Considerations ................................................................ 2-22
Chapter 3 ARMY AVIATION OPERATIONS ............................................................................ 3-1
Section I – Core Competencies ............................................................................. 3-1
Section II – Movement to Contact ......................................................................... 3-1
Section III – Attack .................................................................................................. 3-3
Attacks Against Enemy Forces in Close Friendly Contact........................................ 3-4
Attacks Against Enemy Forces out of Friendly Contact ............................................ 3-8
Employment Methods ............................................................................................. 3-12
Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures .. 3-14
Rotary-Wing Close Air Support ............................................................................... 3-15
Unique Planning Considerations for Attacks .......................................................... 3-15
Section IV – Reconnaissance .............................................................................. 3-16
Zone Reconnaissance ............................................................................................ 3-17
Area Reconnaissance ............................................................................................. 3-18
Route Reconnaissance ........................................................................................... 3-19
Reconnaissance in Force ....................................................................................... 3-20
Special Reconnaissance ......................................................................................... 3-21
Fundamentals of Reconnaissance .......................................................................... 3-21 |
3-04 | 5 | Contents
Section V – Security .............................................................................................. 3-22
Screen ..................................................................................................................... 3-26
Guard ....................................................................................................................... 3-29
Cover ....................................................................................................................... 3-29
Fundamentals of Security ........................................................................................ 3-29
Section VI – Air Assault ........................................................................................ 3-30
Section VII – Air Movement .................................................................................. 3-34
Internal Load Operations ......................................................................................... 3-35
External Loads ......................................................................................................... 3-35
Unique Planning Considerations for Air Movement ................................................ 3-35
Section VIII – Aeromedical Evacuation ............................................................... 3-36
Provision of En-Route Care ..................................................................................... 3-38
Receipt of the Evacuation Plan from Higher ........................................................... 3-38
Aeromedical Evacuation Mission Planning ............................................................. 3-41
Aeromedical Evacuation Requests ......................................................................... 3-42
Authorization ............................................................................................................ 3-44
Medical Operations Cell .......................................................................................... 3-44
Aerial Casualty Evacuation...................................................................................... 3-45
Section IX – Command and Control Support ..................................................... 3-45
Command, Control, and Communications Aircraft .................................................. 3-46
Unmanned Aircraft System Communications Relay Packages .............................. 3-47
Section X – Personnel Recovery ......................................................................... 3-47
Personnel Recovery Methods ................................................................................. 3-48
Personnel Recovery Officer/Unit Personnel Recovery Representative .................. 3-49
Section XI – Aerial-Delivered Mine Operations .................................................. 3-50
Section XII – Counter-Air Considerations ........................................................... 3-50
Pre-Mission Planning ............................................................................................... 3-51
Operations ............................................................................................................... 3-51
Chapter 4 ARMY AVIATION SUSTAINMENT ........................................................................... 4-1
Section I – Overview ................................................................................................ 4-1
Section II – Maintenance and Logistics ................................................................ 4-1
Field-Level Maintenance ........................................................................................... 4-1
Sustainment-Level Maintenance ............................................................................... 4-2
Battle Damage Assessment and Repair ................................................................... 4-2
Downed Aircraft Recovery Team .............................................................................. 4-2
Supply ........................................................................................................................ 4-3
Operational Contract Support .................................................................................... 4-3
Key Aviation Maintenance Personnel ........................................................................ 4-3
Section III – Operational Reach .............................................................................. 4-6
Force Projection ........................................................................................................ 4-6
Sustaining Operational Tasks.................................................................................... 4-6
Forward Arming and Refueling Point ........................................................................ 4-8
Section IV – Health Service Support ..................................................................... 4-9
Aviation Medicine ...................................................................................................... 4-9
Medical Evacuation ................................................................................................... 4-9
Aerial Casualty Evacuation...................................................................................... 4-10
Medical Logistics ..................................................................................................... 4-10
Section V – Personnel, Legal, and Religious Services ...................................... 4-10
Chapter 5 ARMY AVIATION CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS ............................... 5-1
AH-64D/E Apache Characteristics ............................................................................ 5-1 |
3-04 | 6 | Contents
UH-60/HH-60 L/M Blackhawk Characteristics .......................................................... 5-2
CH-47F Chinook Characteristics .............................................................................. 5-4
MQ-1C Gray Eagle Characteristics ........................................................................... 5-5
RQ-7BV1/V2 Shadow Characteristics ...................................................................... 5-7
C-12 Series Aircraft ................................................................................................... 5-8
UC-35 Aircraft ......................................................................................................... 5-10
AN/MSQ-135 Mobile Tower System ....................................................................... 5-10
AN/TPN-31 Air Traffic Navigation, Integration, and Coordination System ............. 5-11
AN/TSQ-221 Tactical Airspace Integration System ................................................ 5-12
AN/TSQ-198B Tactical Terminal Control System ................................................... 5-13
Appendix A AVIATION OPERATIONS AND PLANNING RESOURCES ................................... A-1
Appendix B RISK MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................. B-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................. Glossary-1
REFERENCES ......................................................................................... References-1
INDEX ................................................................................................................ Index-1
Figures
Figure 1–1. Close, deep, support, and consolidation areas .......................................................... 1-8
Figure 2–1. Operational framework ............................................................................................... 2-1
Figure 2–2. Combat aviation brigade ............................................................................................. 2-2
Figure 2–3. Expeditionary combat aviation brigade ...................................................................... 2-4
Figure 2–4. Theater aviation brigade (general support) ................................................................ 2-5
Figure 2–5. Theater aviation brigade (assault) .............................................................................. 2-5
Figure 2–6. Theater airfield operations group ............................................................................... 2-6
Figure 2–7. Theater aviation sustainment maintenance group ..................................................... 2-7
Figure 2–8. Air cavalry squadron ................................................................................................... 2-8
Figure 2–9. Attack battalion ........................................................................................................... 2-8
Figure 2–10. Assault helicopter battalion ....................................................................................... 2-9
Figure 2–11. General support aviation battalion (CAB) ............................................................... 2-10
Figure 2–12. General support aviation battalion (ECAB) ............................................................ 2-10
Figure 2–13. General support aviation battalion (TAB-GS) ......................................................... 2-10
Figure 2–14. Aviation support battalion ....................................................................................... 2-11
Figure 2–15. Security and support battalion ................................................................................ 2-11
Figure 2–16. Airfield operations battalion .................................................................................... 2-12
Figure 2–17. Theater fixed-wing battalion ................................................................................... 2-13
Figure 2–18. Air cavalry squadron task force .............................................................................. 2-14
Figure 2–19. Attack battalion task force ...................................................................................... 2-14
Figure 2–20. Assault aviation battalion task force ....................................................................... 2-14
Figure 2–21. Common Army airspace coordinating measures ................................................... 2-23
Figure 3–1. Air cavalry squadron conducts movement to contact using MUM-T .......................... 3-2
Figure 3–2. Deliberate attack by an attack weapons team in support of a Stryker battalion
conducting a movement to contact ............................................................................ 3-5
Figure 3–3. Hasty attack by an attack weapons team reacting to troops in contact ..................... 3-6 |
3-04 | 7 | Contents
Figure 3–4. Deliberate attack by an attack company in support of a BCT’s area defense ............ 3-7
Figure 3–5. Hasty attack by an attack weapons team against an enemy force out of contact ...... 3-9
Figure 3–6. Hasty attack by an attack platoon ............................................................................. 3-10
Figure 3–7. Deliberate attack by an attack company to defeat an enemy counter-attack ........... 3-11
Figure 3–8. Deliberate attack by an AB to disrupt enemy mechanized regiment in deep area of
linear area operations ............................................................................................... 3-11
Figure 3–9. Continuous attack ..................................................................................................... 3-13
Figure 3–10. Phased attack ......................................................................................................... 3-14
Figure 3–11. Maximum destruction attack ................................................................................... 3-14
Figure 3–12. Attack element conducts a zone reconnaissance ................................................... 3-18
Figure 3–13. Air cavalry element conducts three simultaneous area reconnaissance missions . 3-19
Figure 3–14. Scout weapons team conducting route reconnaissance ........................................ 3-20
Figure 3–15. Aviation assets conduct flank security in support of a BCT reconnaissance and main
body movement ........................................................................................................ 3-24
Figure 3–16. Aviation assets conduct security in support of Stryker platoon movement ............. 3-25
Figure 3–17. Aviation assets conduct zone reconnaissance in support of a BCT main body
movement ................................................................................................................. 3-25
Figure 3–18. Scout weapons team using MUM-T screens forward of a protected force ............. 3-26
Figure 3–19. Screen movement methods .................................................................................... 3-28
Figure 3–20. Platoon (minus) air assault to seize a small objective ............................................ 3-31
Figure 3–21. Infantry company air assault to seize key terrain in support of a BCT attack ......... 3-32
Figure 3–22. Infantry company air assault to seize an objective ................................................. 3-32
Figure 3–23. Infantry battalion air assault to seize a remote airfield and destroy local enemy
security forces ........................................................................................................... 3-33
Figure 3–24. Infantry BCT air assault to block enemy forces retrograding .................................. 3-33
Figure 3–25. Medical skill-level comparison ................................................................................ 3-38
Figure 3–26. Medical evacuation orders process and medical planner locations ....................... 3-39
Figure 3–27. Example evacuation zones in a noncontiguous area of operations ....................... 3-41
Figure 3–28. Example of medical evacuation request and execution ......................................... 3-43
Figure 5–1. AH-64D/E Apache helicopter ...................................................................................... 5-1
Figure 5–2. UH-60 L/M Blackhawk helicopter ................................................................................ 5-3
Figure 5–3. CH-47F Chinook helicopter ......................................................................................... 5-4
Figure 5–4. MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft ....................................................................... 5-6
Figure 5–5. RQ-7B Shadow unmanned aircraft ............................................................................. 5-7
Figure 5–6. C-12 aircraft ................................................................................................................ 5-9
Figure 5–7. UC-35 aircraft ............................................................................................................ 5-10
Figure 5–8. AN/MSQ-135 mobile tower system ........................................................................... 5-11
Figure 5–9. Air traffic navigation, integration, and coordination system ...................................... 5-12
Figure 5–10. Tactical airspace integration system ....................................................................... 5-13
Figure 5–11. Tactical terminal control system .............................................................................. 5-13 |
3-04 | 8 | Contents
Tables
Table 2–1. Command relationships ............................................................................................. 2-15
Table 2–2. Support relationships ................................................................................................. 2-17
Table 3–1. Screen movement methods ....................................................................................... 3-27
Table 3-2. Primary task and purpose of AE functions ................................................................. 3-37
Table 5–1. AH-64D/E Apache helicopter characteristics ............................................................... 5-1
Table 5–2. UH-60L/M Blackhawk helicopter characteristics ......................................................... 5-3
Table 5–3. CH-47F Chinook helicopter characteristics ................................................................. 5-5
Table 5–4. MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft characteristics ................................................ 5-6
Table 5–5. RQ-7B Shadow unmanned aircraft system characteristics ......................................... 5-8
Table 5–6. C-12 aircraft specifications .......................................................................................... 5-9
Table 5–7. UC-35 aircraft specifications ...................................................................................... 5-10
Table B-1. Aviation risk considerations .......................................................................................... B-1 |
3-04 | 9 | Preface
FM 3-04 is the Army’s capstone doctrinal publication for conducting aviation operations. Its purpose is to
provide the context for employing and integrating Army Aviation into unified land operations. It describes how
Army Aviation forces, as part of the combined arms team, shape operational environments (OEs), prevent
conflict, conduct large-scale combat operations (LSCO), and consolidate gains against a peer threat. FM 3-04
provides a foundation for subordinate training doctrine, professional military education, leader development,
and individual and collective training. Together with ADP 3-0, ADP 3-90, and FM 3-0, this manual provides
the foundation for how Army Aviation forces conduct prompt and sustained LSCO.
FM 3-04 is applicable to all members of the Army Profession: leaders, Soldiers, and Army civilians. The
principle audience for FM 3-04 is commanders, staffs, and leaders at all echelons of the combined arms team.
Army headquarters commanders and staffs serving as joint or multinational task force headquarters should also
refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or
multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this publication.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States,
international, and in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their
Soldiers operate according to the Law of War and rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27.)
FM 3-04 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-04 is the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in the
text and are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which FM 3-04 is the
proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and
the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
FM 3-04 applies to the active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 3-04 is the United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence; the preparing agency is the
Directorate of Training and Doctrine, United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence. Send comments and
recommendations on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and
Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZQ-TDD, Fort
Rucker, Alabama 36362-5263; by e-mail to [email protected]; or submit an
electronic DA Form 2028. |
3-04 | 11 | Introduction
To understand FM 3-04, the reader must understand the doctrinal fundamentals contained in ADP 3-0, ADP 3-
90, ADP 5-0, and ADP 6-0. The reader should also be familiar with the tactics described in FM 3-0, FM 3-90-1,
FM 3-90-2, FM 3-98, and FM 3-99 to understand how Army Aviation integrates with the combined arms team.
This enables them to successfully prosecute operations short of conflict, prevail in LSCO, and consolidate gains
to win enduring strategic outcomes after conflict has concluded.
FM 3-04 describes the core competencies, organizations, operations, sustainment, capabilities, tactics, and
procedures of Army Aviation forces. This manual updates previous doctrine and describes how Army Aviation
forces, as part of the combined arms team, shape OEs, prevent conflict, conduct LSCO, and consolidate gains
against peer competitors. This publication focuses on the employment of Army Aviation through air-ground
operations in support of unified land operations. Additionally, FM 3-04 encompasses not only large-scale
operations, but all aspects of aviation support to unified land operations.
FM 3-04 contains five chapters:
Chapter 1 introduces Army Aviation’s role in unified land operations. It describes the core
competencies of Army Aviation and presents unique aspects of aviation operations throughout
the multi-domain operational environment.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of each of the various organizations and unique staff officers in
Army Aviation. It also provides references for commanders and staffs on command and support
relationships, command post operations, and integration of Army Aviation with joint airspace
users.
Chapter 3 discusses and provides examples of the various missions which may be conducted by
Army Aviation units. It adds discussion of aerial-delivered mine operations and considerations
for aviation operations in a contested airspace environment.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of Army Aviation’s requirements for and contributions to
sustainment operations. It includes expanded discussion of forward arming and refueling points
in the LSCO environment.
Chapter 5 provides basic discussion of the capabilities, requirements, and limitations of each of the
aircraft and unique support systems operated by Army Aviation units. |
3-04 | 13 | Chapter 1
Army Aviation’s Role in Unified Land Operations
SECTION I – UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
1-1. Unified land operations are simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability, or Defense Support of Civil
Authorities’ (DSCA) tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the OE; prevent conflict;
consolidate gains; and win our nation’s wars as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). Army Aviation integrates
into unified land operations by conducting air-ground operations as the aviation maneuver force of the
combined arms team. Air-ground operations (AGO) are the simultaneous or synchronized employment
of ground forces with aviation maneuver and fires to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
Employing the combined and complimentary effects of air and ground maneuver and fires through AGO
presents the enemy with multiple dilemmas: increasing combat power, mission effectiveness, agility,
flexibility, and survivability of the entire combined arms team. AGO ensure that all members of the
combined arms team, whether on the ground or in the air, work toward common and mutually supporting
objectives to meet the higher commander’s intent.
1-2. Effective AGO requires the full integration of aviation and ground maneuver as a combined arms
team. As a key component of the ground scheme of maneuver, Army Aviation achieves interdependence
with ground forces through shared understanding of the operational environment, an integrated or
synchronized scheme of maneuver and fires, clearly defined triggers and conditions for employment,
shared understanding of the commander’s intent, clear command and support relationships, and clearly
defined roles and responsibilities that maximize the capabilities of each element of the combined arms
team, while offsetting the others’ limitations. Although AGO demands integration of aviation tactical tasks
into the ground scheme of maneuver, this does not mean that greater planning times are always required.
More detailed planning and rehearsals are required when the combined arms team is newly formed. Agility,
speed of action, and mission success are significantly enhanced when—
* Effective habitual relationships are established.
* Liaisons are embedded throughout the operations process.
* Procedures are standardized and practiced.
* A common operational picture is maintained.
* Mutual trust is built through effective relationships and shared understanding.
SECTION II – CHALLENGES FOR ARMY AVIATION
1-3. Army Aviation forces must be organized, trained, and equipped to meet worldwide challenges
against a full range of threats; however, readiness to conduct LSCO against a peer threat is the greatest
challenge to our force today. LSCO against a peer threat is incredibly demanding in terms of operational
tempo and lethality. Every domain (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace) may be contested by a
capable adversary who has likely invested significant resources learning from recent United States
operations. State and non-state actors threaten with conventional and unconventional weapons, potentially
including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) weapons
capabilities. The enemy also employs anti-access and area denial tactics which restrict freedom of
maneuver through the use of advanced radar, infrared, and laser air defense systems. On the ground,
support nodes and assembly areas are vulnerable to precession long range fires, threat aviation, and
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) alike.
1-4. Army Aviation must be lethal, survivable, and adaptable in order to provide combat power to the
ground commander in LSCO. See FM 3-0 for more details. |
3-04 | 14 | Chapter 1
Current Lethality Challenges:
Russian Integrated Defense in Depth
Since Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Soviet and Russian military thinkers have
prized area denial tactics. Emerging from World War II, Soviet Deep Battle doctrine
required synchronization of precise ground and air fires with maneuver in order to
mass on critical targets at a decisive moment. Deep Battle endured throughout the
Cold War and continues to influence current Russian doctrine. Russia’s current
concept applies Deep Battle in a defensive nature to protect a critical asset in three
dimensions.
In practice, however, Russia’s current approach employs not a single protective
layer, but multiple mutually-supporting capabilities which include man-portable-,
short-, medium-, and long-range air defense systems; manned and unmanned
aircraft; tube and rocket artillery; ballistic and cruise missiles; direct fire systems; and
information warfare capabilities. The sum of these systems is an integrated network
of combined arms capabilities designed to deter enemy attack or inhibit freedom of
action from the tactical to the strategic levels.
At the tactical level, integrated air defenses attempt to deter or defeat low altitude
rotary wing (RW) and unmanned systems operations. An integrated fires complex
employs artillery systems for counter-fire and fire support, and electronic warfare
(EW) assets seek to disrupt enemy communications and operations.
At the operational level, air defense systems employ a blend of short- and medium-
range missiles alongside long-range precision fires. Attacks target deep critical
assets such as aviation headquarters, tactical assembly areas, and sustainment
sites. Russia’s intent at the operational level is to prevent brigade-sized elements
from effectively concentrating combat power, resupplying, or reorganizing.
At the strategic level, the Russian integrated defense in depth combines lethal and
non-lethal capabilities to target major air and seaports, assembly areas, high-level
headquarters, regional networks and communications, high-performance aircraft, and
surface ships. Cyber and other information warfare elements attempt to disrupt
operations or deny access to information anywhere in the theater through targeted or
mass attacks. This multi-layered network seeks to deter enemy attack by presenting
a prohibitively costly theater of operations; if deterrence fails, it seeks to impede an
enemy force from ever organizing to challenge Russian actions.
SECTION III – CORE COMPETENCIES OF ARMY AVIATION
1-5. As a fully-integrated component of the combined arms team, Army Aviation forces are organized,
trained, and equipped to defeat a full range of threats. Army Aviation forces provide an asymmetric
maneuver advantage through amplified reach, protection, lethality, and situational understanding. Army
Aviation’s inherent mobility, speed, range, flexibility, lethality, precision, and persistent reconnaissance
capabilities provide the combined arms team with multiple options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative
to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage through the following competencies executed
individually, simultaneously, or sequentially across multiple domains. Army Aviation is unique in that, in
addition to its ability to maneuver in the third dimension, it is able to operate in all six warfighting
functions in support of commanders’ missions and objectives. |
3-04 | 15 | Army Aviation’s Role in Unified Land Operations
PROVIDE ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION COLLECTION
1-6. The Army executes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance through the operations and
intelligence process and information collection. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and
integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and
dissemination of systems in direct support (DS) of current and future operations (FM 3-55). A successful
information collection effort results in the timely collection and reporting of relevant and accurate
information, which either supports the production of intelligence or is disseminated as combat information.
1-7. Army Aviation should be utilized in every step of the information collection planning and execution
process. Effective planning for aviation capabilities may enable the combined arms team to determine the
enemy’s intent and answer the commander’s critical information requirements by observation or fighting
for information as required. This enables the commander to confirm or deny an enemy course of action
(COA) and concentrate combat power at the time and place of the maneuver commander’s choice to seize
or retain the initiative.
1-8. Through the conduct of zone, route, and/or area reconnaissance; movement to contact; or
reconnaissance in force (when task-organized), Army Aviation provides the commander with accurate and
timely information on enemy force disposition, composition, strengths, and weaknesses. Army Aviation
also provides information on population patterns of life, ground routes and mobility corridors, dense urban
terrain and infrastructure, and man-made or natural obstacles in order to answer a commander’s priority
intelligence requirements (PIR). In addition to answering PIR, Army Aviation’s speed and flexibility
provide a unique ability to answer friendly force information requirements for forces that are
geographically dispersed increasing shared understanding.
1-9. Army Aviation attack and reconnaissance units conduct reconnaissance as a maneuver force with
manned and unmanned systems maneuvering interdependently. Manned unmanned teaming (MUM-T) is
the integrated maneuver of Army Aviation RW and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to conduct
movement to contact, attack, reconnaissance, and security tasks. MUM-T enables increased depth and
breadth of aviation reconnaissance and maneuver, increased persistence over the reconnaissance objective,
increased ability to gain and maintain enemy contact, increased survivability, and more options to develop
the situation with enhanced maneuver, fires, and command and control (C2).
1-10. Army Aviation assault units may conduct infiltration and extraction of dismounted reconnaissance
elements conducting detailed reconnaissance of designated reconnaissance objectives. They may also
emplace remote sensors on key avenues of approach and terrain features; conduct route, area, and limited
zone reconnaissance; evacuate captured enemy personnel for intelligence exploitation; or conduct
continuous resupply of ground reconnaissance elements to enable continuous maximum reconnaissance
forward.
1-11. The commander can task Army Aviation units and assets with the mission to provide multi-
intelligence sensor data and information from manned and unmanned systems to the Army intelligence
enterprise. Some examples of sensor data include full-motion video, synthetic aperture radar/moving target
indications, and signals intelligence. To meet these requirements, Army Aviation units must be augmented
with the appropriate communications capabilities in order to connect to the larger intelligence architecture.
Signal and military intelligence units coordinate and augment Army Aviation units in order to establish the
necessary communication connections and implement reporting procedures. Together, these units position
the communication systems and processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities at the most
effective locations to ensure sensor data and information are effectively analyzed across the Army
intelligence enterprise.
PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE
1-12. Army Aviation security operations provide the combined arms team early and accurate warning of
enemy activities, reaction time, and maneuver space to prevent surprise, and the ability to rapidly develop
the situation upon gaining enemy contact. |
3-04 | 16 | Chapter 1
1-13. Army Aviation attack and reconnaissance units perform security tasks as part of the combined arms
team. They may operate as a sub-element of a larger combined arms security force conducting screen,
guard, cover, or area security tasks. When properly task-organized, they may conduct screen or guard tasks
as a separate maneuver force in an assigned area of operations (AO). Employing MUM-T enables the
security force to expand the breadth and depth of the screen to maintain continuous surveillance of avenues
of approach, locate lead enemy elements, and maintain enemy contact to enable increased early warning,
reaction time, and space for the main body to develop the situation while preventing early deployment of
friendly forces.
1-14. As the situation develops, Army Aviation attack and reconnaissance units can quickly transition from
the screen to conduct attacks to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance, and/or lead security elements with
the necessary agility, long range acquisition and fires without becoming decisively engaged. Army
Aviation units also support the consolidation of gains by conducting area security tasks for the supported
commander.
DESTROY, DEFEAT, DISRUPT, DIVERT, OR DELAY ENEMY
FORCES
1-15. Army Aviation conducts attacks during the execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations
in support of the combined arms team throughout the depth and breadth of the AO. Army Aviation attacks
to destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay the enemy, who may be either in contact or out of contact with
friendly ground forces. Regardless of whether the enemy is in contact with friendly ground forces or not,
attacks are executed as deliberate or hasty operations.
1-16. Through the integration of MUM-T to support attacks, Army Aviation extends the reach of the
combined arms team through increased acquisition ranges, persistent reconnaissance, enhanced positive
identification, greater capability to maintain enemy contact, greater lethality, precision targeting of high-
value enemy capabilities, extended communications, and real-time battle damage assessment (BDA).
1-17. When enemy forces are in close contact with friendly ground maneuver forces, Army Aviation attack
and reconnaissance units attack to destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay enemy forces to enable the
combined arms team to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. The ground maneuver commander in contact
is responsible for the detailed integration and synchronization of Army Aviation in the overall scheme of
maneuver, and controls the distribution and synchronization of Army Aviation maneuver and fires.
Airspace coordination is required with the appropriate airspace control authority.
1-18. When enemy forces are not in close contact with friendly ground maneuver forces, Army Aviation
attack and reconnaissance units maneuver independently from ground maneuver forces to attack to destroy,
defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay enemy capabilities before they can be brought to bear effectively against
friendly forces. The Army Aviation maneuver commander controls Army Aviation maneuver and fires
within an assigned AO, but the attack is still synchronized and/or integrated with the overall higher ground
scheme of maneuver. Based on the complexity of the targeted enemy force and OE, Army Aviation attacks
against enemy forces out of friendly contact are frequently higher risk operations that require detailed
planning by the supported ground maneuver headquarters for the proper allocation, synchronization and
integration of joint fires, collection assets, and other enabling capabilities.
1-19. When task-organized with adequate ground maneuver forces and fires, Army Aviation can operate as
the tactical combat force (TCF) in the support area to defeat Level I, II, and III threats.
1-20. Army Aviation attacks against enemy forces in or out of contact with friendly ground forces can be
the decisive or shaping operation at the tactical or operational level, and may enable the combined arms
team to maintain initiative or consolidate gains while presenting multiple dilemmas to the enemy.
AIR ASSAULT GROUND MANEUVER FORCES
1-21. Army Aviation conducts air assaults during offensive, defensive, and stability operations throughout
the depth and breadth of the AO. Air assaults are combined arms operations conducted to gain a positional
advantage, envelop, or turn enemy forces that may or may not be in a position to oppose the operation. At |
3-04 | 17 | Army Aviation’s Role in Unified Land Operations
the tactical level, air assault operations emphasize seizing terrain, destroying enemy forces, and interdicting
enemy withdrawal routes.
1-22. Army Aviation assault and heavy lift units, supported by attack and reconnaissance units, rapidly
reposition personnel and equipment to enable the combined arms team to strike over extended distances
and terrain to attack the enemy where and when it is most vulnerable. Air assaults extend the tactical and
operational reach of the combined arms team by overcoming the effects of terrain, achieving surprise, and
isolating, dislocating, or destroying enemy forces by rapidly massing combat power at the maneuver
commander’s time and place of choice.
1-23. The air assault task force (AATF) is the entire combined arms team conducting the air assault. The
AATF commander (normally the ground maneuver brigade or battalion commander whose subordinate
echelon constitutes the main combat force [FM 3-99]) commands the combined arms team through all
phases of the air assault. When task-organized with ground maneuver forces and fires, an Army Aviation
battalion or brigade commander can operate as the AATF commander. The aviation task force commander
(or a designated subordinate leader for air assaults below battalion level) serves as the air mission
commander and commands the aviation forces through all phases of the air assault and follow-on ground
tactical plan. The ground tactical commander is the commander of the largest ground maneuver force
inserted during the air assault and assumes command of the ground tactical force in the landing zone (LZ)
and upon initiation of the ground tactical plan.
1-24. Army Aviation attack and reconnaissance units utilizing MUM-T conduct reconnaissance, security,
and hasty or deliberate attacks against enemy forces in and out of friendly contact under the control of the
air mission commander during the assault and may transition to the control of the ground tactical
commander upon initiation of the ground tactical plan. When task-organized with ground maneuver forces
and fires, Army Aviation battalions, squadrons, or brigades can operate as the AATF.
1-25. Army Aviation provides the combined arms team with the agility, mobility, lethality, and the element
of surprise to rapidly mass combat forces and equipment, regardless of terrain, to seize the initiative by
attacking enemy forces or seizing objectives to exploit tactical and operational opportunities and enemy
forces when most vulnerable.
AIR MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLIES
1-26. Army Aviation assault, general support (GS), heavy lift, and fixed-wing (FW) units conduct air
movement of personnel, leaders, critical supplies, equipment, and systems during the conduct of offensive,
defensive, stability, and DSCA operations throughout the depth and breadth of the AO.
1-27. Army Aviation RW aircraft conduct air movement using both internal and external (sling) loads. The
supported unit provides pickup zone (PZ) and LZ control, load rigging, ground movement, and
certification. Army Aviation FW aircraft conduct air movement with internal loads between improved
airfields to move limited critical personnel and supplies in the AO or area of interest. The loading and
ground movement of critical supplies and personnel for FW operations is typically controlled and executed
through the arrival/departure airfield control group.
1-28. Air movement operations can be conducted in support of a variety of operations, to include—
* Foreign humanitarian assistance.
* Foreign disaster relief.
* Homeland defense.
* Non-combatant evacuation.
* Routine and emergency resupply of combat units.
* Movement of barrier materials and munitions in the defense.
* Movement of fuel, ammunition, and personnel over extended lines of communications (LOCs)
to support the offense.
* Battlefield circulation of key leaders. |
3-04 | 18 | Chapter 1
1-29. Air movement operations reduce risk to ground logistics units through economy of force, enable
operations in areas with limited ground LOCs, allow faster repair and sustainment of combat power, and
support forward positioning of key leaders to exercise mission command.
EVACUATE WOUNDED OR RECOVER ISOLATED PERSONNEL
1-30. As a vital component of the overall health service support (HSS) mission, medical evacuation
(MEDEVAC) provides the linkage between roles of medical care. MEDEVAC is performed by dedicated
platforms (ground or air) with medical professionals capable of providing timely, efficient movement and
en-route care of the wounded, injured, or ill. DA is the sole component directed to provide intra-theater
aeromedical evacuation (AE) in the patient movement system within the Department of Defense. Intra-
theater AE is conducted by Army air ambulance units in support of the joint force while conducting
offensive, defensive, stability, and DSCA operations throughout the depth and breadth of the AO. Army
Aviation brigades and battalions provide oversight of Army medical air ambulance units conducting intra-
theater AE according to combatant commander priorities, theater evacuation policies, and Department of
Defense directives.
1-31. The speed, flexibility, and en-route care capabilities of Army AE provides HSS more options in the
allocation of medical treatment facilities (MTFs) by mitigating the effects of extended distances between
points-of-injury and MTFs, or between MTFs while maintaining a continuum of care. AE is a non-
combatant, humanitarian mission and is provided special protections under the Law of War and the Geneva
Conventions.
1-32. Army Aviation utility, heavy lift, and FW units may conduct casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) when
required in support of the joint force during offensive, defensive, stability, and DSCA operations.
CASEVAC, as a secondary component to the patient movement system, is the unregulated movement of
wounded, injured, or ill personnel using non-medical assets that are dedicated to or designated in support of
CASEVAC operations. Opportune use of non-dedicated platforms is the lowest level of CASEVAC
operations. In contrast to MEDEVAC assets, CASEVAC assets may or may not include the provision of
en-route care, depending on the availability of medical augmentation personnel and equipment. CASEVAC
may include carry-on medical equipment to accompany medical personnel, but the equipment and supplies
are dependent upon availability at the time of the mission. As a non-medical platform, CASEVAC aircraft
retain their legal combatant status in an AO; therefore, use of these assets includes the acceptance of
additional risk to the patient (who is a non-combatant). Without standardized equipment or en-route
medical care, CASEVAC generally lacks the assurance of continuity of care when moving a patient to a
MTF. Even with these limitations, CASEVAC is an essential part of the overall patient movement system,
and may be the first step in moving an injured Soldier from the point of injury. MEDEVAC and
CASEVAC support requires detailed assessment and planning in order to achieve an effective patient
movement plan.
1-33. Army commanders designate, train, and posture their units to effect recovery of isolated personnel.
Personnel recovery (PR) missions are joint operations and may require the employment of the full range of
unified action partner capabilities prior to and during execution. Aviation units are often tasked to support
the recovery of isolated personnel by transporting PR security elements or recovery forces during
immediate, deliberate, or external supported recoveries. This support may also include AE, attack,
reconnaissance, UAS, and C2 support assets to support the PR methods of unassisted, immediate,
deliberate, and external supported recovery.
1-34. Evacuation missions can be conducted in support of a variety of operations, to include foreign
humanitarian assistance, foreign disaster relief, DSCA, non-combatant evacuation, and all combat
operations across the range of military operations and conflict continuum. Evacuation and recovery
operations reduce risk and increase survivability of the combined arms team while enabling greater
freedom of action. |
3-04 | 19 | Army Aviation’s Role in Unified Land Operations
ENABLE COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER EXTENDED RANGES
AND COMPLEX TERRAIN
1-35. Army Aviation enhances C2 by enabling the maneuver commander to better understand, visualize,
describe, direct, lead, and assess operations over extended ranges and in complex terrain. Army Aviation
enhances shared understanding of the OE through—
* Execution of movement to contact, attack, reconnaissance and security operations.
* Accurate and timely reporting via long range communications.
* Dedicated C2 support platforms.
* UAS communications relay packages.
* Distribution of full motion video sensor information.
* Management of controlled airspace through air traffic services (ATS).
* Employment of aviation liaisons.
* Embedded aviation staff elements at brigade and above headquarters.
* Battlefield circulation of key leaders.
1-36. Attack and reconnaissance units conducting movement to contact, attack, reconnaissance, and
security operations reporting via long-range communications and full motion video provide the maneuver
commander with timely and accurate information to enable the commander to understand and visualize the
terrain, friendly and enemy forces. Army Aviation liaisons and embedded staffs assist the maneuver
commander with visualizing and describing how best to employ Army Aviation as a member of the
combined arms team. Use of Army Aviation dedicated C2 support aircraft enables the maneuver
commander to position forward to visualize, direct, lead, and assess ongoing operations. MUM-T enables
the maneuver commander to visualize and assess operations through timely BDA and detailed
reconnaissance throughout the depth of the AO, and across multiple domains.
SECTION IV – ARMY AVIATION IN THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
1-37. To clearly visualize and articulate Army Aviation operations, commanders apply the four
components of the operational framework. This framework is a cognitive tool to develop shared
understanding and describe the commander’s visualization of how Army Aviation operates in time, space,
purpose, and resources while considering the physical, temporal, virtual, and cognitive aspects in an AO,
area of influence, and area of interest. The following four components of the operational framework do not
limit any of the seven core competencies of Army Aviation:
* Commanders assign subordinate units an AO for the conduct of operations.
* Commanders designate close, deep, support, and consolidation areas.
* Commanders establish decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to articulate an operation in
terms of purpose.
* Commanders designate main and supporting efforts to designate shifting and prioritization of
resources.
AREA OF OPERATIONS
1-38. The AO is a designated area that commanders are assigned to conduct operations. From this
designated area, they assign subordinate units smaller AOs based on the commander’s visualization of the
operation. Smaller unit AOs are established with regard to the unit’s ability to influence what happens
within the area. Within the AO, commanders use control measures to coordinate fires and maneuver and
organize operations.
1-39. When task-organized appropriately, Army Aviation battalions or brigades can be assigned an AO and
serve as the maneuver task force headquarters conducting reconnaissance and security operations, or during
offensive or defensive operations in an economy of force. Assigning an AO to an aviation unit streamlines
aviation maneuver and enables detailed integration with supporting assets such as joint fires or FW |
3-04 | 20 | Chapter 1
aviation. When aviation units are assigned their own AO, they accept the following responsibilities for the
duration of the assignment:
* Terrain management.
* Information collection.
* Civil military operations.
* Movement control.
* Clearance of fires.
* Security.
* Personnel recovery.
* Airspace control.
* Minimum essential stability tasks.
1-40. Aviation units typically operate across the entire AO of the supported unit. Maneuver throughout the
AO is governed by phase lines (PLs), airspace control areas, standard use Army Aviation flight routes, or
other control measures which permit simultaneous operations and converging of effects against the enemy.
If an aviation unit is operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) to a supported maneuver
force, the aviation unit operates within that unit’s boundaries unless other coordination is made. The
Aviation unit develops air and ground plans in conjunction with the supported unit. If an aviation unit is not
OPCON or TACON to a supported unit, it must coordinate not only airspace and terrain management but
also locations for forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), command posts (CPs), and radio
retransmission sites.
CLOSE, DEEP, SUPPORT, AND CONSOLIDATION AREAS
1-41. The close, deep, support, and consolidation framework describes the physical arrangement of forces
in time, space, and purpose (figure 1-1).
Figure 1–1. Close, deep, support, and consolidation areas |
3-04 | 21 | Army Aviation’s Role in Unified Land Operations
1-42. Operations in close areas are conducted within a subordinate commander’s AO. These AOs can be
contiguous or non-contiguous. Operations conducted in close areas are usually against enemy forces in
immediate contact and are often the decisive operation (ADP 3-0). Army Aviation executes AGO in the
close area as a member of the combined arms team. Army Aviation can conduct all missions and tasks
when operating in the close area, to include—
* Movement to contact.
* Attack.
* Reconnaissance.
* Screen.
* Air assault.
* Air movement.
* Command and control support.
* Evacuation missions.
1-43. Deep operations involve actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy forces and capabilities
before they can be used effectively against friendly forces. They may set the conditions for success in the
close area or enable future operations. Operations in the deep area might disrupt the movement of
operational reserves; prevent an enemy from employing long-range cannon, rocket, or missile fires; or
attack a high payoff target. Enemy forces in deep areas are not necessarily out of contact in a multi-domain
environment. Deep areas can also include the spaces between non-contiguous AOs or beyond the
designated boundaries of ground maneuver units in contiguous AOs. Fire support coordination measures
are critical considerations when planning and conducting deep operations. For more information on deep
operations, see ATP 3-94. 2.
1-44. Aviation operations in deep areas may include—
* Attacks to destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay enemy forces or high value capabilities that
are out of friendly contact using MUM-T or independent UAS attack-reconnaissance operations.
* Reconnaissance operations by manned and/or unmanned aircraft to obtain combat information to
answer PIR on the terrain, enemy, or civilian populations.
* Air assaults of conventional or special operations forces to seize an objective or key terrain or
destroy an enemy force.
* Insertions of conventional and special operations forces to recover isolated personnel, emplace
sensors, conduct raids, establish special reconnaissance positions, or to conduct partisan linkup.
* Recovery of designated personnel in deep areas.
1-45. A support area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate
the positioning, employment, and protection of sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control
operations (ADP 3-0). In a contiguous AO, the support area extends from the rear boundary of the higher
unit to the rear boundary of the next subordinate unit. In a non-contiguous AO, the commander designates
the support area (ADP 3-0). Army Aviation operations in the support area typically include air movement,
MEDEVAC, and C2 support, but may also include reconnaissance, attacks, and security operations if there
is a threat to the support area. When conducting attacks, reconnaissance, and security operations, Army
Aviation typically operates as a combined arms team with the TCF. If properly task-organized with ground
maneuver or security forces, Army Aviation can operate as the TCF headquarters for the support area.
1-46. The consolidation area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to
facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for freedom of action in the close area and to support the
continuous consolidation of gains (ADP 3-0). During operation plan refinement, the additional Army
Aviation forces of the combined arms team must be forecasted to conduct consolidation of gains activities.
Army Aviation units in the consolidation area provide speed, flexibility, and increased freedom of action
for the commander, thereby enabling decisive operations in the close area. Possible aviation tasks in the
consolidation area span the entire range of core competencies, from attacks against bypassed forces to air
movements, air assaults, or evacuation missions. While a Corp consolidation area is typically assigned to a
division with an organic aviation brigade, a division consolidation area is typically assigned to a
subordinate brigade that is supported by a battalion-sized aviation unit. Commanders must balance the |
3-04 | 22 | Chapter 1
amount of aviation forces assigned to consolidation missions with the need for concentration in the close
and/or deep areas.
DECISIVE, SHAPING, AND SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
1-47. The decisive, shaping, and sustaining framework element lends itself to a broad conceptual
orientation and defines the desired purpose of each component. Decisive operations are those that directly
accomplish the mission (ADP 3-0). The decisive operation is the focal point around which commanders
design an entire operation and accomplish the commander’s intent. Army Aviation forces are often used to
increase the combat power applied to the decisive operation and conducts all missions in DS, GS, TACON
or OPCON to the ground maneuver force tasked with accomplishing the decisive operation. Aviation
operations may be designated as decisive; in this case aviation units are typically task-organized with
ground maneuver forces as the combined arms team maneuver headquarters.
1-48. Shaping operations are operations that establish conditions for the decisive operation through effects
on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain (ADP 3-0). During unified land operations, Army Aviation
conducts all missions and tasks in DS, GS, TACON, or OPCON to the ground maneuver forces tasked with
accomplishing shaping operations. Army Aviation units can also be assigned to accomplish shaping
operations without ground forces. During these operations, Army Aviation units conduct movement to
contact, attacks, reconnaissance, and/or screens to prevent the enemy from gaining a position of relative
advantage. Finally, Army Aviation can conduct shaping operations in support of the joint task force and air
or maritime component commanders.
1-49. Sustaining operations as those operations at any echelon that enable the decisive operation or
shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power (ADP 3-0). Sustaining operations occur
throughout the AO, not just in the support area, and determine how quickly Army forces reconstitute and
exploit success is LSCO. Army Aviation conducts reconnaissance, attack, screen, air movement,
MEDEVAC, and C2 support when in support of a unit tasked with sustaining operations. Army Aviation
units typically are not sustaining operations headquarters.
MAIN AND SUPPORTING EFFORTS
1-50. The use of main and supporting efforts provides prioritization of support and resources among
subordinate units. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is
most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). The designated main effort is typically weighted
heavily with Army Aviation combat power to achieve their mission. Army Aviation units may also be
designated as the main effort during specified phases of an operation when assigned as the maneuver
headquarters operating independently from ground maneuver or task-organized as the maneuver
headquarters of the combined arms team.
1-51. A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the
main effort (ADP 3-0). Commanders provide supporting efforts with the minimum combat power
necessary to accomplish the mission; consequently, supporting efforts may be resourced with less Army
Aviation combat power than the main effort. Army Aviation units may also be designated as the supporting
effort during specified phases of an operation when assigned as the maneuver headquarters operating
independently from ground maneuver or task-organized as the maneuver headquarters of the combined
arms team assigned as a supporting effort.
SECTION V – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-52. To shape the OE, prevent conflict, succeed in LSCO, and consolidate gains, Army Aviation leaders
and units must be enabled with the training, leadership, and technologies necessary to accomplish the
mission. Trained leaders and formations that are fully capable of operating under ambiguous and often
unknowable conditions, equipped with advanced technologies and capabilities, ensure that Army Aviation
remains a unique and asymmetric advantage for the Army and the United States. |
3-04 | 23 | Army Aviation’s Role in Unified Land Operations
1-53. The OE is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). The OE comprises many interrelated
variables which include the physical domains as well as the information environment, the electromagnetic
spectrum, and other more cognitive areas such as global or regional trends. The OE should be expected to
be complex and dynamic, where aspects of it may be unknown and constantly changing. Additionally, the
OE may be analyzed differently from the different levels of warfare. Some aspects of warfare continue to
evolve based on missions, emerging technologies, or the enemy’s capabilities, objectives, or resolve.
However, Army Aviation leaders should anticipate these changes alongside continuities such as the
principles of war, the tenets of unified land operations, and Army Aviation’s core competencies.
1-54. Commanders and staffs initially analyze an OE using the eight operational variables (see FM 6-0).
Leaders employing Army Aviation forces must also understand the unique opportunities and constraints of
aviation operations in the context of the threat and the multi-domain battlefield.
THREAT
1-55. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm
United States forces, United States national interests or the homeland (ADP 3-0). Within the OE, Army
Aviation can expect to encounter a wide range of threats. The intermixing of multiple threat elements,
coupled with the operational and mission variables create a complex and dynamic OE. Threats seek to
disrupt Army Aviation operations through terrain denial, air route interdiction, and intentional disruption of
aviation AOs such as FARPs, LZs, PZs, tactical assembly areas, and airfields.
1-56. Threats can include nation-states, national alliances, paramilitary or military forces, and/or
individuals or groups of individuals. When threats execute their intent to do harm to the United States, they
become enemies. The diversity of threats across the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains to
United States security and vital interests increases the need for Army forces to be prepared to conduct
operations short of conflict as well as succeed during LSCO when required.
PEER THREATS
1-57. Peer threats are competitors or enemies with capabilities to oppose United States forces across
multiple domains world-wide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage.
When preventing conflict with a peer threat fails, Army Aviation must be ready to penetrate enemy systems
throughout the depth of the operational area to enable operational and tactical maneuver. This penetration
and subsequent destruction, dislocation, disintegration, or isolation of enemy capabilities contributes
toward the achievement of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) strategic objectives.
1-58. These adversaries typically employ their resources to attack friendly vulnerabilities using various
combinations of the five broad methods described below. For more on these methods, see FM 3-0.
* Information warfare. Information warfare is a term used to refer to the threat’s use of activities
such as cyberspace operations, EW, deception, or psychological operations to manipulate the
information environment. Peer threats attempt to manipulate or distort information to present
false narratives and disrupt friendly decision making.
* Preclusion. Peer threats take specific actions to preclude certain operations. Examples of
preclusion include employing tactics and systems to prevent friendly entry into an operational
area (anti-access) or to impede friendly freedom of action within an operational area (area
denial).
* Isolation. Peer threats may attempt to isolate friendly forces in various ways in order to prevent
them from accomplishing the mission. Isolation may involve action in a physical domain, or it
may involve space or cyberspace as well. This may be accomplished through denying mobility
with obstacles or CBRNE weapons. It may also be accomplished through preventing or limiting
the flow of information, or by conducting deception operations.
* Sanctuary. Sanctuary refers to a method of putting threat forces beyond the reach of friendly
attack, and is accomplished by some combination of political, legal, and physical boundaries that
restrict friendly freedom of action. Peer threats may exploit air defense networks, complex |
3-04 | 24 | Chapter 1
terrain, dispersion, international borders, or information to protect some or all of their forces for
a specific period of time.
* Systems warfare. Using a systems approach to warfare means the peer threat identifies specific
critical capabilities for attack in order to affect failure in a larger friendly system. Examples of
this might include the use of EW to disrupt UAS operations or CBRNE attacks against specific
ports of entry to prevent friendly forces from flowing into theater.
1-59. Peer threats to aviation include guided or unguided projectiles, anti-aircraft artillery, man-portable air
defense systems (MANPADS), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), EW capabilities, cyber, CBRNE, and
manned or unmanned aircraft. Peer threats present significant challenges to employment of any unmanned
aircraft, or manned aircraft above terrain flight levels. Some peer threat systems and techniques are
described below.
* Anti-access and area denial. Anti-access strategies use long-range capabilities and systems to
prevent the joint force’s penetration into an operational area, while area-denial strategies seek to
hinder subsequent operations within the operational area. Combined, these actions and
capabilities create the effect of standoff, which prevents friendly influence in an AO. Peer threats
employ multi-layered integrated air defense systems (IADS) with long-range precision fires and
other systems to challenge the joint force. Army Aviation is particularly vulnerable to area
denial tactics due to the requirement for large tactical assembly areas and sustainment nodes, and
IADS targeting aircraft during operations.
* IADS. IADS target aircraft during all phases of an operation. These systems traditionally
employ anti-aircraft artillery or SAMs. Anti-aircraft artillery systems provide the capability to
fire-exploding rounds of 20 millimeter or greater which use visual, electro-optical, infrared (IR),
or radar for acquisition and ballistic solutions that can engage aviation systems up to high
altitudes. SAMs are short- to long-range air defense systems using radar and/or electro-
optical/IR acquisition and/or guidance. SAMs are capable of engaging all types of aviation
systems up to high altitudes. SAMs are typically mounted on dedicated platforms, including
stationary sites, wheeled or tracked vehicles, or maritime platforms. SAMs have the potential for
employment as a component of an integrated air defense system with supporting early warning
and acquisition radars providing cueing; however, a number of systems are fielded that can
operate autonomously with on board acquisition and targeting/guidance capabilities. Key to any
IADS is the employment of an integrated radar network with the capability to detect incoming
targets and then employ the appropriate engagement platform at the lowest possible echelon.
* MANPADS. MANPADS are shoulder-fired, point-defense guided missile systems using the IR
or ultra-violet spectrum with IR, ultra-violet, laser, or optical guidance that can engage aviation
systems. MANPADS can be employed dismounted or mounted on ground vehicles, manned and
unmanned aircraft, or maritime platforms, and are generally limited to the operator’s ability to
visually acquire and track aircraft prior to initiating launch. Peer threat maneuver divisions
typically employ MANPADS in a ratio of six MANPADS launchers per maneuver battalion,
plus an additional 18 launchers in the air defense brigade (short range). Response time of a
MANPADS gunner can be significantly reduced if the systems are integrated into the IADS.
* Enemy aircraft. In addition to air-to-air capabilities designed to find and destroy Army aircraft,
FW and RW threat systems may be employed to attack aviation assembly areas, LZ/PZs, and
FARPs with aerial-delivered fires to disrupt aviation maneuver and C2 across the AO. UAS pose
additional unique threats to include reconnaissance and surveillance of Army Aviation ground
and air operations, employment as IEDs against stationary and slow moving aircraft or ground
operations, and hazards to flight in congested areas such as airfields and high use air corridors.
* Cyber and electronic warfare. The Army’s modernized equipment relies heavily on space-
based or internet-connected assets which include navigation, communications, and battle
tracking systems. A space-based global positioning system (GPS) provides critical information
for all warfighting function information systems. Army Aviation employs numerous advanced
systems, many of which may be built into aircraft or ground control stations. Other systems are
critical pieces of C2 equipment in unit CPs. Peer threat capabilities to deny, degrade, disrupt
friendly access to information will greatly hinder the ability to maintain tempo by conducting C2 |
3-04 | 25 | Army Aviation’s Role in Unified Land Operations
of dispersed forces. In addition to disrupting access to information systems, a peer threat may
employ more traditional EW techniques such as meaconing, interference, jamming, or intrusion
(MIJI) on radio systems. Units should utilize appropriate communications security methods to
minimize susceptibility to electronic attacks. For further operations in denied, degraded, or
disrupted space operating environments, refer to FM 3-14 or the Center for Army Lessons
Learned.
* CBRNE. Both state and non-state actors may employ CBRNE attacks as a method to deny
access to a given area or to create mass casualty events for friendly forces. Recent proliferation
of missile technology has enabled many states to acquire delivery systems which can deter
action, deny access to specific regions, or strike friendly locations directly. Army Aviation is
particularly susceptible to CBRNE attacks given its large footprint, vulnerability when on the
ground, and the increased risk conducting CBRNE aviation operations, and the difficulty in fully
decontaminating aircraft after an attack.
* Anti-radiation munitions. Anti-radiation munitions are active homing projectiles designed to
detect and home on a radio emission source. Although initially intended for active engagement
of emitting radar systems, ARMs may be programmed and used to attack emitters employed on
Army Aviation aircraft. Anti-radiation munitions may be employed from threat RW and FW
aircraft, as well as ground and maritime surface platforms to engage aviation systems up to high
altitudes.
* Directed energy. Directed-energy threats include laser designators, laser range finders, and
missile guidance in beam-riding munitions. Directed energy weapons, to include anti-personnel,
anti-sensor, and anti-material, use transmitted energy to disrupt, deny, or destroy an aircraft or
aircrew member. The scope of directed energy weapons ranges from commercial off-the-shelf
handheld laser pointers to high power/frequency acoustic and radio frequency transmitters. The
employment of anti-sensor and anti-material systems is normally for point defense of crucial
equipment or facilities with employment from vehicles or fixed positions.
HYBRID THREATS
1-60. The term hybrid threat captures the complexity and blurring of the traditional elements of conflict. A
hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, or
criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting threat effects (ADP 3-0). The hybrid threat
employs traditional, unconventional, and hybrid strategies to threaten Army Aviation operations in support
of the combined arms team. Hybrid threats to aviation may include IEDs, cyber capabilities, anti-tank
guided missiles, passive detection, and directed energy weapons. Hybrid threats also seek to exploit
constrained rules of engagement (ROEs), weather and environmental limitations, multinational caveats, and
other influencing political factors, while simultaneously disrupting friendly use of precision navigation and
information networks. Coupling traditional and non-traditional threat weapons, hybrid threats constantly
seek to adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to gain asymmetric advantages to overcome
Army Aviation’s overmatch at the point of contact.
1-61. Hybrid threats traditionally employ unguided weapons such as small arms, heavy machine guns (12.
7 to 14. 5 millimeter), rocket propelled grenades, and modified air-to-surface rockets against Army aircraft.
These systems generally have reduced probabilities of hit against aircraft operating at higher altitudes in
more permissive environments. Hybrid threats have fairly limited access to more sophisticated weapons,
but may also employ anti-tank guided missiles, MANPADS or anti-aircraft IEDs. Hybrid threats continue
to seek low-cost commercial capabilities to disrupt/degrade communications, navigation, and precision
munitions employment. In addition to commercial off-the-shelf adaptation, peer and near-peer threats
possess specific capabilities dedicated to jamming and interference. Hybrid threat aviation capabilities may
include military and civilian RW and FW aircraft and military or commercial off-the-shelf UAS. Hybrid
threats may also target aviation forces on the ground with IEDs, direct fire, or indirect fire. |
3-04 | 26 | Chapter 1
MULTI-DOMAIN EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD
1-62. Army forces conduct operations synchronized across multiple domains to converge the effects
necessary to succeed during operations short of conflict, as well as during LSCO. Aviation operations are
inherently multi-domain in nature, and Army Aviation leaders require a thorough understanding of the OE
to identify opportunities and risks related to their operations. Army Aviation’s ability to project power
throughout the physical domains (land, air, and maritime), as well as operate in space and cyberspace are
vital to joint operations.
PHYSICAL DOMAINS
1-63. Army Aviation must be able to fight under all conditions and in any of the physical domains (air,
land, or maritime) as a member of the combined arms team. Understanding and exploiting the unique
capabilities presented by the physical environment, while mitigating risks and limitations, are essential
throughout the operations process.
Expeditionary Operations
1-64. With regard to Army Aviation, expeditionary operations can be considered those operations that
require rapid deployment of a task-organized force via land, air, and/or sea into austere and/or immature
theaters with the requisite mobility, lethality, protection, sustainment, and C2 capability to operate as part
of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and/or multinational team to conduct unified land operations
against peer competitors in LSCO. Army Aviation forces must be prepared to operate as part of the joint
force and overcome anti-access and area denial capabilities in order to open a window of relative
advantage. Specific considerations for expeditionary aviation operations may include—
* Mission sets. Aviation units must be ready to conduct the full range of decisive action
operations up to, and including, LSCO against peer or near-peer threats.
* Duration. Units must be prepared to operate with limited external resupply and sustainment for
days to weeks while conducting continuous operations.
* Unit of employment. The lowest echelon of employment is the company/troop, supported by a
battalion or battalion task force headquarters.
* Operations timeline. Units must be prepared to conduct operations in support of the joint force
within 24 to 72 hours of arrival. This time may be adjusted (more or less) based on mission
variables.
* Unit movement. Units must be prepared to relocate frequently throughout the conduct of
operations for survivability and to remain engaged in the fight. Movement frequency is dictated
by mission variables.
* Split operations. Units must be prepared to conduct split operations depending on mission
variables and unit of employment.
Mountain Operations
1-65. Capabilities. Army Aviation is ideally suited to conduct combat operations in mountainous terrain.
Providing the combined arms team with increased mobility, speed, and range, Army Aviation can
effectively overcome the limitations imposed on traditional ground mounted and dismounted maneuver in
compartmentalized and complex terrain. Mountains provide visual and audio masking that may limit threat
acquisition ranges enabling aviation maneuver forces to achieve greater tactical surprise and protection
from long-range observation and engagements. The use of air assault and air movement operations enable
the combined arms team to rapidly reposition forces and materials at decisive points to retain greater
freedom of action over the enemy while achieving economy of force over large expanses of complex
terrain with limited ground LOCs. The mobility and lethality of attack and reconnaissance helicopters and
UAS provide ground maneuver forces with precise direct fire and persistent reconnaissance beyond ground
inter-visibility lines and in broken terrain, reducing enemy freedom of action and the likelihood of enemy
forces achieving tactical surprise. MEDEVAC capabilities in remote locations with limited or no-road
infrastructure increase the combined arms team’s survivability and freedom of action. Army Aviation’s |
3-04 | 27 | Army Aviation’s Role in Unified Land Operations
over-the-horizon communication capabilities and ability to rapidly reposition ground maneuver leaders
enhance the combined arms team’s ability to perform C2 over extended distances and beyond line of sight
(LOS).
1-66. Limitations. Operations in high, hot mountainous environments can limit aviation maneuver due to
reduced load carrying capacity and maneuver power margins of aircraft. Depending upon the severity of
the altitudes and temperatures, trade-offs may be necessary between aircraft loads (weapons, cargo, and
personnel) and fuel carried, as well as adjustments to TTP which can impact station time, maneuver in the
objective area, LZ and PZ selection, and aircraft ranges. Additionally, trade-offs may require additional
FARP locations and/or more aircraft to complete a mission. Canalizing terrain reduces LOS
communications, may limit the size or freedom of maneuver of aviation formations, and can drive
predictable flight patterns that can be targeted by the enemy. Detailed planning, varying mission timelines,
choosing longer or multiple routes, and employing non-line of sight or communications relay packages on
UAS can mitigate canalizing terrain limitations. Several unique weather factors also influence operations in
mountainous terrain. Unpredictable wind speeds, varying wind directions and frequent up and downdrafts,
combined with high density altitude, low ceilings that obscure terrain, increased frequency of turbulence
and reduced night time illumination due to shadows and terrain masking of the moon or man-made light
sources requires more detailed planning, more experienced crews and adjustments to TTP. Severe cold
weather is also prevalent during the winter in mountainous terrain. Severe cold temperatures, snow, and ice
increase time requirements for aircraft preparation and launch due to deicing and snow removal, increased
maintenance due to cold soaked seals and electronics, and increased flight hazards due to white-out, icing
of blades and wings and loss of visibility due to falling or blowing snow. Aviation operations above 10,000
feet mean sea level for more than an hour, above 12,000 feet for more than 30 minutes, above 14,000 feet
for any period of time, require the use of supplemental oxygen for all Army RW aircraft. Additionally,
depending upon the height of terrain, UAS service ceilings may reduce the height above ground for UAS
operations which can increase their likelihood of visual or audio detection which could compromise the
ground scheme of maneuver while increasing UAS vulnerability to engagement. Finally, all aircraft have
weather restrictions as outlined in Army Regulation 95-1; UAS takeoff and landing operations may be
especially limited due to weather patterns in mountainous areas.
Desert Operations
1-67. Capabilities. Army Aviation provides the combined arms team with enhanced capabilities to operate
in desert environments. The extended sensor, communications, and weapons ranges of attack and
reconnaissance RW and UAS enable long-range engagement of targets and collection of combat
information to confirm or deny the commander’s PIR at the extended visual ranges typically associated
with desert environments. Use of air assaults through the depth of the AO to seize typically limited key
terrain or road networks can enable the combined arms team to counter the advantage of increased enemy
ground maneuver speeds due to open and trafficable terrain afforded in a desert environment. Use of air
movements to reposition supplies, ammunition and fuel over typically extended LOCs enables greater
tempo and agility, while reducing operational risk to ground logistics and maneuver units. Use of aviation
reconnaissance and security operations forward or to the flanks of ground maneuver forces to identify
obstacles, enemy forces and the most suitable routes or axis of advance enables the combined arms team to
maintain the tempo of operations while protecting friendly units through economy of force. These examples
above highlight how Army Aviation’s speed, range, lethality and versatility enable the combined arms team
to gain, maintain and exploit a position of relative advantage in the desert environment.
1-68. Limitations. Blowing dust, sand, high temperatures, reduced visibility, low contrast and extended
observation ranges all present unique challenges to aviation operations in the desert environment. Much
like mountainous environments, extremely high temperatures can reduce the load carrying capacity of
aircraft, requiring trade-offs between fuel, cargo, personnel, and munitions. High temperatures, along with
dust and sand, increase maintenance requirements. The expansion and contraction of seals during extreme
temperature swings increases the frequency of leaks and electronic component failures. Abrasion on rotor
blades and other dynamic surfaces requires more frequent cleaning, and can reduce component life,
especially blades, bearing assemblies and engines. Reduced visibility due to blowing sand, coupled with
low contrast, increases the risk of brown-out during takeoffs and landings, especially in larger formations |
3-04 | 28 | Chapter 1
of aircraft which requires experienced crews and detailed planning in the selection of LZs and PZs. During
degraded visual environment operations, height above terrain and obstacles is more difficult to judge and
may require higher flight altitudes and/or more experienced crews to reduce the likelihood of controlled
flight into terrain or obstacles. Sensors and terminal weapon effects are also impacted by reduced visibility
and surface conditions in the desert environment which may reduce weapon engagement ranges or increase
the amount of munitions expended to achieve target effects.
Jungle Operations
1-69. Capabilities. Much like in mountainous terrain, Army Aviation provides the combined arms team
with a significant mobility and firepower advantage over enemy ground maneuver forces in restricted
terrain that is characterized by dense vegetation, complex hydrography, and jungle canopy. Using air
assault and air movement operations, the combined arms team can rapidly reposition forces to interdict
limited enemy ground routes or seize objectives with less risk due to reduced threat visual and audio
acquisition and direct fire engagement windows. Attack and reconnaissance helicopters and UAS provide
the combined arms team with mobile and responsive reconnaissance and fires to support typically small,
decentralized ground operations in remote locations that may be out of the range of friendly artillery or
against enemy targets that may be more difficult to locate or attack with FW close air support (CAS).
MEDEVAC and air movement of supplies and personnel enables greater flexibility for distributed ground
operations in remote locations, increasing the combined arms team’s freedom of action and ability to
maintain pressure on enemy forces and/or sustained engagement with local populations over larger AOs.
The employment of special patrol or fast-rope insertion and extraction system, hoist, aerial-delivered
resupply, and paradrop capabilities enables Army Aviation to conduct infiltration and extraction of small
teams, casualties, and emergency supplies in remote locations without the benefit of LZs or PZs.
1-70. Limitations. Although dense jungle vegetation reduces enemy observation and direct fires of Army
Aviation while en route, the lack of LZ/PZs, limited improved road infrastructure, and the distributed
nature of small population centers typical of jungle AOs can result in greater predictability for the enemy to
target aviation operations. Pathfinders, detailed LZ/PZ reconnaissance, LZ preparatory fires, attack or
reconnaissance helicopters, and UAS in support of infiltration and extraction and deception operations can
mitigate this risk. The jungle canopy and dense vegetation provide the enemy with greater cover and
concealment, reduce stand-off ranges, and increase the vulnerability aircraft operating at low altitudes.
Jungle canopy and dense vegetation can also negatively affect terminal guidance of precision munitions or
cause early warhead detonation, requiring specialized fusing or greater expenditure of munitions to achieve
target effects. Jungle environments also have unique and dynamic weather patterns that can impact aviation
operations. Higher temperatures and altitudes can reduce aircraft loads which impacts ordnance carried,
aircraft performance, and station time. Frequent rain showers and thunderstorms reduce visibility by
obscuring terrain and obstacles, while increasing possible maintenance actions due to corrosion of aircraft
components and sensitivity of electronics to humidity and visible moisture. Fog and mist in low lying
littoral areas or inland river systems, especially during dawn and dusk, can limit aviation operations at
terrain flight altitudes and reduce sensor and weapon employment ranges. Low ceilings and unpredictable
thunderstorms may also impact the employment of UAS.
Maritime Operations
1-71. Capabilities. Army Aviation provides the combined arms team and joint force with enhanced
capabilities to operate in and from the maritime domain. Army Aviation operates in the maritime domain
by using seabasing as a method of projecting force into the land domain or by using seabasing or land
basing to project combat power in DS of joint forces in the maritime domain. As a force projection
platform, seabasing enables Army Aviation to conduct operations from over the horizon into the land
domain in support of the combined arms team or over water in support of joint naval forces. Using
seabasing to conduct air assaults, air movement, attacks, or MEDEVAC from beyond the horizon into the
land domain allows the combined arms team to overcome anti-access measures prior to seizing and
establishing a lodgment. Based on the depth of anti-access measures, seabasing provides Army Aviation
the ability to expand the options for entry into an AO due to the mobility of the basing platforms and the
inherent speed and range of Army Aviation. When appropriate, continued seabasing after seizing the |
3-04 | 29 | Army Aviation’s Role in Unified Land Operations
lodgment can also serve as an economy of force by reducing the aviation land footprint, sustainment and
force protection requirements. In support of joint or multinational naval forces, using Army Aviation to
conduct reconnaissance and attack operations over water enables the joint or multinational force
commander to defeat small boat and small surface combatant threats, counter piracy and drug threats,
protect individual ships or sea convoys, or attack area denial capabilities in the littorals. This enables the
joint or multinational force commander to maintain open sea LOCs, protect maritime infrastructure (oil
rigs, offshore terminals, and harbors) and shipping, or deny enemy freedom of action in maritime choke
points (straits, sea lanes, and littorals).
1-72. Limitations. Rapidly changing weather conditions, sea state, low visibility, low contrast, and
extended observation ranges over water present challenges to Army Aviation in the maritime environment.
In some maritime areas, high temperatures may cause commanders to make load decisions between fuel,
cargo, passengers, and munitions. Extended operations in a salt water environment results in increased
corrosion of critical parts and will cause increased maintenance requirements. En route, during low light
and low contrast conditions, height above the water is more difficult to judge and may require higher flight
altitudes to reduce the likelihood of controlled flight into the water. Additionally, the size and number of
the seabasing platforms directly impacts the overall size of the aviation force and the number of aircraft that
can operate simultaneously. This can impact the combined arms team’s ability to mass and maintain
adequate aviation tempo in support of operations over land. If area denial measures are robust, stand-off of
seabasing capabilities will require longer routes, reducing station time in the objective unless additional
FARPs are employed on land in the AO. Sea basing also does not currently enable Army Aviation to
employ organic UAS due to launch and recovery limitations. Operating from ships and other maritime
platforms requires specialized deck landing and helicopter egress qualification and proficiency training as
well as overwater flight proficiency, especially during night operations. The storage of munitions on ships
also requires specialized munitions, procedures, training, and safety.
Urban Operations
1-73. Capabilities. Urban areas are primarily the epicenters of human activity and generate much of the
friction in future conflict. Urban operations range from operations in and around small built-up areas,
towns, and small cities, to dense urban terrain. Army Aviation can effectively overcome many of the
limitations imposed on traditional ground mounted and dismounted maneuver in this complex environment.
Army Aviation’s inherent speed, mobility, precision fires, and persistent reconnaissance capabilities
provide the combined arms team with a number of options to reduce the complexity of operations in an
urban environment. The use of Army Aviation to air assault small ground maneuver elements to secure
infrastructure, isolate urban areas, seize limited objectives, kill or capture high value targets, seize key
terrain, or to conduct cordon and search operations reduces the enemy’s freedom of action while
economizing force and reducing risk to ground movements. The use of persistent reconnaissance and
precision fires by attack and reconnaissance RW aircraft and UAS along key LOCs, named areas of
interest, key infrastructure, or in support of small unit mounted and dismounted ground maneuver increases
the combined arms team freedom of action, protects the force, and reduces the enemy’s ability to attain
tactical overmatch at the point of contact. Use of air ambulances equipped with rescue hoists to extract
casualties from secured, compartmented, and congested areas enables the rapid evacuation of casualties,
increasing the ground maneuver force tactical reach while reducing the requirement to secure ground
movement. Using extended-range and non-LOS communications, Army Aviation can provide enhanced C2
capabilities to the combined arms team through the use of UAS communications relay packages or airborne
C2 aircraft to overcome the limitations of ground maneuver LOS communications in urban terrain.
1-74. Limitations. Each urban area is unique, and the challenges to successful aviation operations increase
based on the scale, makeup, and complexity of the urban area. The availability of LZs/PZs are frequently
limited to sports fields, major roads, highway medians, rooftops, transition areas (unimproved open areas),
vacant lots, and urban green spaces. These areas are routinely cluttered with debris or other loose
impediments that can become airborne hazards during landings and takeoffs. The lack of LZ/PZs also
enables easier enemy pattern analysis of aviation operations to emplace ambushes or use IEDs. Significant
vertical obstacles (such as light poles, power lines, and antennas), coupled with the height of adjacent
buildings, may limit approach and departure paths for aircraft, restrict freedom of maneuver in the objective |
3-04 | 30 | Chapter 1
area and limit the number of aircraft that can simultaneously operate in the LZ/PZs requiring greater power
margins to maintain aircraft combat maneuver capabilities. Adjacent buildings and structures also provide
cover and concealment for enemy forces and extend fields of view and fire from above the landing areas.
Roof-top landing areas are typically cluttered with vertical obstructions (such as antennas and building
mechanical systems) that may limit the size of touchdown areas, and based on the quality of the
construction, may or may not be suitable to handle aircraft weights upon landing. The presence of sub-
terrain structures (such as tunnels, subways, and sewers), as well as vast road networks bounded by vertical
structures enables the enemy to rapidly reposition with cover and concealment from observation and fires.
During night operations, high intensity lighting may reduce the effectiveness of using image-intensifying
night vision devices, degrading the ability to acquire obstacles to flight and other aircraft, as well as
limiting target acquisition capabilities for non-forward-looking infrared equipped aircraft. In heavily
industrialized urban areas, power generation plants and other heavy industry can create localized areas of
low to no visibility or layers of obscurants that impact both RW flight and UAS sensor employment.
During attack and reconnaissance operations, high population densities in urban areas allow the hybrid
threat to more easily blend in, increasing the difficulty of positive identification, and increasing the risk of
collateral damage during engagements. Urban landscape surfaces can increase direct fire fragmentation
effects due to less blast and fragmentation absorption of soft surfaces. This may increase target effect but
also increases the danger of ricochets that risk fratricide or collateral damage. During engagements of
structures, shaped-charge warheads on certain missile models are less effective in penetrating structures
and achieving internal blast effects which may require greater expenditure of ordnance to achieve desired
target effect. The prolific use of modern communications provides the enemy with early warning of
operations, limiting the advantage of surprise. Measures to consider for mitigating risk in urban areas
include—
* Detailed technical reconnaissance of landing areas and obstacles.
* Use of UAS conducting persistent reconnaissance.
* Maximizing use of precision munitions.
* Operating during the hours of darkness at higher altitudes.
* Conducting detailed rehearsals of actions on the objective.
* Use of special patrol or fast-rope insertion/extraction systems for small team infiltration and
extraction, using common graphic control measures tailored for floor and room identification in
buildings and increasing flight altitudes are all.
Other Environments
1-75. Pandemic zones. A pandemic zone is a geographical area infected with a pandemic disease. Within
the pandemic environment, Army Aviation can conduct reconnaissance, convoy security, air movement of
medical supplies and construction materials, air movement of medical, survey or security teams,
aeromedical operations, and C2 support. Key considerations when operating in a pandemic zone are the
difficulties associated with decontamination or sterilization of aircraft and ground support equipment and
the limitations imposed on aircrews flying in personal protective equipment.
1-76. Post-Disaster zones. A post-disaster zone is an area that has been struck with a natural,
technological, or sociological disaster. As in a pandemic zone, Army Aviation can provide a wide range of
capabilities to overcome the lack of available road networks and other infrastructure impacted in the
disaster zone. Key considerations include challenges to radio communications with local authorities,
limited availability of host-nation fuel support, damage to airfields and other supporting infrastructure,
limited LZ/PZs due to debris, and deconfliction with other civil or non-governmental aviation operations in
the disaster zone.
1-77. CBRNE environments. Operations in CBRNE environments challenge aviation operations due to
the lack of aircraft pressurization and the difficulty of conducting aircraft decontamination when exposed to
radiological or persistent forms of chemicals or biological agents. Aircrew and support personnel
performance is significantly degraded when operating in full protective posture. Key considerations before
deliberately conducting aviation operations in a CBRNE environment include the following: |
3-04 | 31 | Army Aviation’s Role in Unified Land Operations
* Impact to future mission support due to long duration contamination of aircraft and support
equipment.
* Performance impacts (especially in hot environments) on crews and support personnel.
* Difficulties using night vision devices in addition to CBRNE protective equipment.
* Necessity of segregating or isolating contaminated aircraft, and the impact of maintaining this
equipment.
* Ability to spot decontaminate aircraft and equipment to reduce the hazard of contamination
transfer.
1-78. To minimize the chances of being targeted by CBRNE weapons, commanders should consider tactics
that minimize detection of large fixed sites through camouflage or dispersion, retain mobility and the
ability to rapidly reorganize, and anticipate attacks and adjust mission oriented protective posture
accordingly. FM 3-11 provides more information on CBRNE operations.
CYBER DOMAIN
1-79. The cyber domain consists of interdependent networks of information technology systems and
infrastructures which friendly, adversary, and other entities use transfer information. Computer networks,
cellular phone systems, social media, and other technical infrastructures are all part of cyberspace. Army
Aviation operates many C2 systems through cyberspace, and commanders must protect access to critical
capabilities or information. Commanders should also be aware that any public presence on social media or
other cyberspace platform may be used to help or hinder operations; this presence should be managed
accordingly.
SPACE DOMAIN
1-80. The space domain defined as the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne
objects become negligible (JP-3-14). While Army Aviation forces carry out their tactical operations in the
physical domains, they are critically enabled by space-based position, navigation, and timing capabilities.
In addition, many UAS control systems and other voice or digital communications capabilities utilize
satellite or other non-LOS capabilities in the space domain. Peer competitors have developed capabilities
which may deny, degrade, or disrupt guaranteed access to information via the space domain. As such,
commanders must plan to operate in a degraded or disrupted space operating environment. For instance,
aircrews must be competent when navigating without precise GPS assistance; staffs must understand how
to communicate using minimum time and bandwidth; and commanders at all levels must embrace a mission
command philosophy which prizes decentralized execution and disciplined initiative.
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT AND THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
1-81. Information enables decision making, leadership, and combat power; it is also key to seizing and
retaining the initiative, and to consolidating gains in an OE. The information environment is the aggregate
of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-
13). The information environment has three dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive. The
information environment is global and permeates every OE; it is highly congested and contested. Whenever
Army Aviation supports operations in the information environment, the information operations (IO) officer
and the IO working group provide critical synchronization and execution. Commanders conduct IO to
create effects in the information environment to seize and retain advantage therein. Army Aviation can be
employed to help create these effects. For example, Army Aviation can—
* Attack physical C2 nodes or communications infrastructure.
* Support military information support operations in the delivery of leaflets.
* Conduct a show of force to influence adversary decision making.
1-82. The electromagnetic spectrum is an infinite range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation which
crosses all domains. Peer competitors seek to disrupt friendly access to information through interfering with
or blocking certain transmissions. They may also target Army Aviation units based on their unique |
3-04 | 32 | Chapter 1
electromagnetic transmissions. Consequently, commanders must be aware of the various types of energy
radiating from their C2 systems, aircraft, and sustainment nodes. Commanders must ensure their units take
efforts to mitigate or lessen electromagnetic signatures whenever possible.
SECTION VI – AVIATION IN DECEPTION PLANNING
1-83. As part of the information environment, it is important to consider deception operations, especially
during planning. Aviation contributions to the higher headquarters plan most often consist of standard
tactical tasks conducted for an alternate purpose. Deception planning is an inherent part of nesting
operations with higher echelons. ATP 3-04. 1 addresses deception operations as part of development of the
concept of operations, within company mission planning products to support the higher headquarters,
within the company maneuver planning cell as part of understanding the ground tactical plan, and within
the company protection and contingency mission planning cell.
1-84. In addition to deception planning nested with higher, aviation units routinely incorporate deception
planning at the lowest echelons as part of internal survivability and protection risk mitigation measures.
Examples of deception in routine aviation mission planning include, but are not limited to—
* False landing or pickup zones.
* Deception routes that include flying multiple alternate routes.
* Deception fires that include deception suppression of enemy air defense, feints, or conducting
false task organization movements.
1-85. Deception in aviation mission planning both supports the higher headquarters deception plan and
decreases tactical risk by improving survivability during mission execution. |
3-04 | 33 | Chapter 2
Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
SECTION I – OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
2-1. Army Aviation formations are organized, trained, and equipped to support the combined arms team
at the tactical and operational levels. Figure 2-1 displays typical operational reach for larger aviation
formations. The Army Aviation modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) force structure
consists of four types of brigade-level aviation maneuver organizations and two types of enabling group-
level organizations. Brigade-level aviation maneuver organizations include the—
* Combat aviation brigade (CAB).
* Expeditionary combat aviation brigade (ECAB).
* Theater aviation brigade (assault) (TAB-A).
* Theater aviation brigade (general support) (TAB-GS).
Figure 2–1. Operational framework
2-2. The enabling group-level aviation organizations provide the necessary support and sustainment
operations to ensure the aviation maneuver brigades are capable of completing their missions. These
organizations include the—
* Theater airfield operations group (TAOG).
* Theater aviation sustainment maintenance group (TASMG).
2-3. The battalion- and squadron-level organizations of Army Aviation consist of the—
* Air cavalry squadron (ACS).
* Attack battalion (AB).
* Assault helicopter battalion (AHB).
* General support aviation battalion (GSAB).
* Aviation support battalion (ASB).
* Security and support battalion (SSB).
* Airfield operations battalion (AOB).
2-4. Although the above organizations are multi-functional, given the complexity of the OE and mission
variables requirements, aviation brigades and battalions are usually further task-organized to meet the
requirements of an assigned mission. Task organization is routinely multi-component and can include any
combination of platoons, companies, and battalions organized under the aviation brigade, aviation squadron
task force (ASTF), or aviation battalion task force (ABTF) headquarters. Aviation brigades and |
3-04 | 34 | Chapter 2
squadrons/battalions can also be task-organized with ground maneuver, joint aviation, and other non-
aviation joint and Army units.
SECTION II – AVIATION BRIGADES
2-5. This section provides details of the organization and capabilities of aviation brigades. The three
brigade-sized formations in Army Aviation are—
* CAB.
* ECAB.
* Theater aviation brigade (TAB).
COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE
2-6. The core competencies of the CAB are to—
* Provide accurate and timely information collection.
* Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
* Destroy, defeat, disrupt, or delay enemy forces.
* Air assault maneuver forces.
* Position personnel, supplies, and equipment.
* Evacuate casualties and conduct PR.
* Enable C2 in support of the combined arms team.
2-7. The CAB is organized to synchronize operations of multiple aviation squadrons/battalions or
ASTF/ABTF, ground maneuver battalions, or companies and joint aviation units. The CAB is an Active
Duty or Army National Guard (ARNG) organization.
ORGANIZATION
2-8. The CAB consists of a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), ACS, AB, AHB, GSAB, a
Gray Eagle company equipped with 12 MQ-1C unmanned aircraft (typically a division asset), and an ASB.
Figure 2-2 provides standardized CAB organization.
Figure 2–2. Combat aviation brigade
2-9. The CAB is designed to be modular and tailorable, and may be task-organized as required to support
offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA operations. The CAB is designed to operate as four aviation
maneuver battalions, or battalion/squadron task forces, and one ASB, based on mission variables. The CAB
receives up to two additional aviation battalions/squadrons or task forces without staff augmentation but
requires additional maintenance personnel and equipment.
CAPABILITIES
2-10. The CAB performs the following mission tasks—
* Movement to contact.
* Attack.
* Reconnaissance. |
3-04 | 35 | Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
* Security.
* Air assault.
* Aerial C2.
* Air movement.
* AE.
* Aerial CASEVAC.
* PR.
* Aerial-delivered mine operations.
2-11. The Gray Eagle Company is organic to the CAB and is dependent on the AB for staff planning,
integration, and coordination in joint and combined arms operations. It provides dedicated multi-mission
tactical UAS capability to divisional brigades according to the division commander’s priorities. When
operating as a division asset, the Gray Eagle Company conducts the following tasks:
* Surveillance.
* Zone, route, and area reconnaissance.
* Attack.
* BDA.
* Command and control support.
2-12. When tasked by the division to support the CAB, the Gray Eagle Company maneuvers independently
or with AH-64s from the AB or ACS using MUM-T. MUM-T significantly enhances the survivability;
depth, breadth, and persistence of the reconnaissance effort; and increases lethality by locating and
attacking enemy forces with autonomous or remote fires. When supporting the CAB, the Gray Eagle
Company or subordinate elements conduct the following tasks:
* Zone, route, and area reconnaissance.
* Attack.
* BDA.
* Command and control support.
2-13. A CAB may be required to support the corps or theater-level headquarters in immature theaters until
the arrival of the theater aviation brigade (TAB) and other assets, or to fill gaps in TAB capabilities. TABs
are typically comprised of Army National Guard and Reserve units that may require a period of
mobilization. In the interim, a CAB may be tasked to fulfill the role of higher echelon support. Tasked
mission sets may vary, but likely include shaping, theater establishment, and sustainment operations. Tasks
include, but are not limited to, the following:
* Air movement of personnel and equipment from the port of entry to the support and
consolidation areas.
* Movement of sustainment supplies and repair parts to ensure continuous operations and building
of combat power.
* Battlefield circulation for key leaders, aerial evacuation, air assaults, security, reconnaissance,
and offensive operations for shaping.
2-14. Some higher echelon tasks may be in direct support of the theater or corps, while others may shape
lower echelon operations. These CAB missions may continue until the TAB or other assets arrives in
theater to complete handover and provide support. The CAB may also be expected to conduct simultaneous
mission planning and balance of battle rhythm events with its parent headquarters while providing higher
echelon support or fulfilling the role as a theater aviation brigade. Commander to commander dialogue is
vital to ensure assets are not spread too thin nor reach early culmination while supporting the division and
higher echelons simultaneously.
EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE
2-15. The core competencies of the ECAB are to air assault maneuver forces; position personnel, supplies,
and equipment; evacuate casualties and conduct PR; and enable C2 in support of the combined arms team. |
3-04 | 36 | Chapter 2
When task-organized with an AB/ACS, ECABs also provide accurate and timely information collection,
provide reaction time and maneuver space, and destroy, defeat, disrupt, or delay enemy forces. The ECAB
is an ARNG or United States Army Reserve (USAR) organization.
ORGANIZATION
2-16. The ECAB consists of an HHC, two AHBs, a GSAB, and an ASB. Figure 2-3 provides ECAB
organization.
Figure 2–3. Expeditionary combat aviation brigade
CAPABILITIES
2-17. The ECAB is designed to be modular and tailorable, and is typically task-organized as required to
support offensive, defensive, and stability operations in support of ground maneuver forces or during
DSCA. The ECAB is designed to split into three maneuver battalions or battalion task forces, and one
ASB, based on mission variables. The ECAB receives up to two additional ASTFs/ABTFs without staff
augmentation but requires additional maintenance personnel and equipment. The ECAB performs the
following tasks:
* Air assault.
* Aerial C2.
* Air movement.
* AE.
* Aerial CASEVAC.
* PR.
* Aerial-delivered mine operations.
2-18. When the ECAB is augmented with attack or reconnaissance units, its capabilities are increased.
Appropriate training time, staff, maintenance, and logistics support are critical in the development of these
capabilities prior to conducting operations. When augmented, the ECAB may perform the following
additional tasks:
* Movement to contact.
* Attack.
* Reconnaissance.
* Security.
THEATER AVIATION BRIGADE
2-19. The TAB-GS provides accurate and timely reconnaissance; positions personnel, supplies, and
equipment; evacuates casualties; conducts search and rescue; and enables C2 during DSCA operations. The
TAB-GS is an ARNG or USAR organization.
2-20. The TAB-A augments other aviation brigades or operates autonomously at the theater level to air
assault maneuver forces; position personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuate casualties and conduct PR;
and enable C2. The TAB-A is an ARNG organization. |
3-04 | 37 | Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
ORGANIZATION
2-21. The TAB-GS includes an HHC, six SSBs, and a non-standard GSAB. The TAB-A includes an HHC,
four GSABs, and one ASB. Figure 2-4 and figure 2-5 provide the organizational structure for the TAB-GS
and TAB-A.
Figure 2–4. Theater aviation brigade (general support)
Figure 2–5. Theater aviation brigade (assault)
2-22. Although the TAB-GS headquarters with the GSAB and the ASB has the capability of deploying in
support of global operations, the TAB-GS is a Northern Command asset and typically operates in
decentralized elements from the team to battalion level conducting DSCA.
CAPABILITIES
2-23. The TAB-GS conducts the following tasks:
* Permissive zone, route, and area reconnaissance.
* Air movement.
* AE.
* Aerial CASEVAC.
* Search and rescue.
* Aerial C2.
2-24. The TAB-A is a deployable operational-level organization that typically reinforces other aviation
commands with subordinate battalions and companies or provides theater support autonomously. The TAB-
A may also be task-organized with other aviation units to accomplish other traditional CAB or ECAB
missions and core competencies but requires C2, staff, and maintenance augmentation.
2-25. The TAB-A conducts the following tasks:
* Air assault.
* Air movement.
* AE.
* Aerial CASEVAC.
* Aerial C2.
* PR. |
3-04 | 38 | Chapter 2
2-26. When the TAB-A is augmented with attack or reconnaissance units, its capabilities are increased.
Appropriate training time, staff, maintenance, and logistics support are critical in the development of these
capabilities prior to conducting operations. When augmented, the TAB-A may perform the following
additional tasks:
* Movement to contact.
* Attack.
* Reconnaissance.
* Security.
SECTION III – ENABLING AVIATION GROUPS
2-27. This section provides details of the organization and capabilities of enabling aviation groups. The
two groups in Army Aviation are—
* TAOG.
* TASMG.
THEATER AIRFIELD OPERATIONS GROUP
2-28. The TAOG provides airfield and ATS support to the combined arms team. The TAOG, when
deployed with AOBs, conducts airfield management operations, provides local airspace control for the AO
in a joint environment, and provides oversight, sustainment, and maintenance support to the theater ATS
assets. The TAOG is an Active Duty or ARNG organization.
ORGANIZATION
2-29. The TAOG consists of an HHC and up to three AOBs. Figure 2-6 provides the organizational
structure of a TAOG.
Figure 2–6. Theater airfield operations group
2-30. The TAOG and its subordinate ATS organizations are an enabling component of the modular,
scalable, and tailored Army Aviation force and can support forcible and early entry contingency missions,
as well as sustained theater aviation operations. Air traffic operations are conducted overseas within
contiguous and noncontiguous areas, throughout the range of military operations. The ATS organizations
support DSCA missions in response to natural or man-made disasters, accidents, and incidents within the
United States and its territories.
CAPABILITIES
2-31. The TAOG, the AOB, and the sub-element ATS units are optimized for theater aviation support and
deploy in total or are task-organized by teams based on operational requirements. The TAOG is organized
and equipped to facilitate early deployment by establishing expeditionary airfields in support of Army,
joint, and multinational operations. The TAOG supports reception, staging, onward-movement, and
integration requirements for aviation assets arriving in the operations area, to include operation of heliports
and helipads at seaports and aerial ports of debarkation. |
3-04 | 39 | Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
2-32. The air traffic services standardization element (ATSSE) is a unique organizational design of the
TAOG. This element provides oversight, technical expertise, standardization to Army airfields at theater
level and quality assurance for training and certification of controllers and ATS maintenance personnel. It
develops airspace for restricted areas, transition areas and control zones. The ATSSE serves as the primary
staff coordinator for ATS matters within the theater area. The element is capable of splitting into two teams
for modularity and support of five AOBs employed across a wide geographical area throughout the theater.
THEATER AVIATION SUSTAINMENT MAINTENANCE GROUP
2-33. The TASMG is resourced to provide aviation sustainment maintenance and limited depot
sustainment support at the theater level. The TASMG performs repairs and returns components/end-items
to their supported units or the supply system through the National Maintenance Program. The TASMG is
an ARNG organization.
ORGANIZATION
2-34. The TASMG consists of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, an aviation support company
(ASC), and a group support company. Figure 2-7 provides TASMG organization.
Figure 2–7. Theater aviation sustainment maintenance group
CAPABILITIES
2-35. When deployed, the TASMG is attached to the joint force sustainment headquarters or expeditionary
support command and sets up at a secure location within an AO. It establishes and provides 24-hour, fixed-
base aviation field and sustainment maintenance, logistics, and other essential aviation sustainment support
to aviation units. The TASMG performs field maintenance, depot-level crash and battle damage repair, and
sustainment/depot-level repair of major end items. It also performs sustainment-level maintenance for
aircraft and aviation ground support equipment at fixed-land or sea-based locations. The TASMG assists
deploying aviation operational units with port operations. See ATP 3-04. 7 for more information.
SECTION IV – AVIATION BATTALIONS AND SQUADRONS
2-36. This section provides details of the organization and capabilities of the aviation battalions and
squadrons.
AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON
2-37. As an element of the CAB, the ACS provides accurate and timely information collection, provides
reaction time and maneuver space, and destroys, defeats, delays, diverts, or disrupts enemy forces in
support of the combined arms team. Although the ACS is fully capable of conducting attacks, the
integration of RQ-7B UAS at the troop level makes the ACS the best formation for conducting
reconnaissance, security, and movement to contact as primary missions, with attack operations as a
secondary mission. The ACS typically employs its aircraft in formations as small as Scout weapons teams
(SWTs) of two aircraft to as large as troop or squadron formations. The ACS is an Active Duty
organization. |
3-04 | 40 | Chapter 2
ORGANIZATION
2-38. The ACS consists of a headquarters and headquarters troop, three air cavalry troops (ACTs)
equipped with eight AH-64s and four RQ-7B Shadow unmanned aircraft each, an aviation maintenance
troop (AMT), and a forward support troop. Figure 2-8 provides ACS organization.
Figure 2–8. Air cavalry squadron
CAPABILITIES
2-39. The ACS conducts the following tasks:
* Zone, route, and area reconnaissance.
* Reconnaissance in force (when task-organized).
* Screen.
* Guard and area security (when task-organized).
* Movement to contact.
* Attack.
ATTACK BATTALION
2-40. As an element of the CAB, the AB provides accurate and timely information collection, provides
reaction time and maneuver space, and destroys, defeats, delays, diverts, or disrupts enemy forces in
support of the combined arms team. Although the AB is fully capable of conducting reconnaissance,
security and movement to contact operations, it has less overall reconnaissance capability than the ACS due
to the lack of organic UAS at the company level, unless the Gray Eagle company is released partially or in
total from division control to conduct dedicated MUM-T in support of the AB. The AB typically employs
its aircraft in formations as small as attack weapons teams (AWTs) of two aircraft to as large as company
or battalion formations. The AB is an Active Duty and ARNG organization. The AB also provides staff
planning, integration, and coordination for joint and combined arms operations for the Gray Eagle UAS
company.
ORGANIZATION
2-41. The AB consists of an HHC, three attack companies (ACs) equipped with eight AH-64s each, an
aviation maintenance company (AMC), and a forward support company (FSC) (figure 2-9).
Figure 2–9. Attack battalion |
3-04 | 41 | Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
CAPABILITIES
2-42. The AB conducts the following tasks:
* Attack.
* Zone, route, and area reconnaissance.
* Screen.
* Guard and area security (when task-organized).
* Movement to contact.
* Reconnaissance in force (when task-organized).
ASSAULT HELICOPTER BATTALION
2-43. As a subordinate element of the CAB and ECAB, the AHB air assaults maneuver forces; positions
personnel, supplies, and equipment; conducts CASEVAC; conducts PR; and enables C2 in support of the
combined arms team. The AHB is an Active Duty, ARNG, and USAR organization.
ORGANIZATION
2-44. The AHB consists of an HHC, three assault helicopter companies of 10 UH-60s each, an AMC, and a
FSC. Figure 2-10 provides AHB organization.
Figure 2–10. Assault helicopter battalion
CAPABILITIES
2-45. The AHB conducts the following tasks:
* Air assault.
* Air movement.
* Aerial CASEVAC.
* Aerial C2.
* PR.
* Reconnaissance.
* Aerial-delivered mine operations.
GENERAL SUPPORT AVIATION BATTALION
2-46. The GSAB is a subordinate element of the CAB, ECAB, and TAB. The GSAB air assaults maneuver
forces; positions personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuates casualties; conducts PR; and enables C2 in
support of the combined arms team. The GSAB is an Active Duty, ARNG, and USAR organization.
ORGANIZATION
2-47. The GSAB in the CAB and TAB-A consists of an HHC, a command aviation company (CAC) of 8
UH-60s, a heavy lift company with 12 CH-47s, an air ambulance company of 15 HH-60s, an AMC, a FSC,
and an ATS company. Figure 2-11, page 2-10, provides CAB and TAB-A GSAB organization. |
3-04 | 42 | Chapter 2
Figure 2–11. General support aviation battalion (CAB)
2-48. The GSAB in the ECAB consists of an HHC, a CAC of 8 UH-60s, a heavy lift company with 12 CH-
47s, 2 air ambulance companies of 15 HH-60s each, an AMC, a FSC, and an ATS company. Figure 2-12
provides ECAB GSAB organization.
Figure 2–12. General support aviation battalion (ECAB)
2-49. The GSAB in the TAB-GS consists of an HHC, a CAC of 8 UH-60s, 2 HLCs with 12 CH-47s each,
an air ambulance company of 15 HH-60s, an AMC, and a FSC. Figure 2-13 provides TAB-GS GSAB
organization.
Figure 2–13. General support aviation battalion (TAB-GS)
CAPABILITIES
2-50. The GSAB conducts the following tasks:
* Air movement.
* Aerial FARP support.
* Air assault.
* PR.
* Aerial C2.
* AE.
* Aerial CASEVAC.
* ATS.
AVIATION SUPPORT BATTALION
2-51. The ASB is an element of the CAB, ECAB, and TAB. It provides aviation and ground field
maintenance, network communications, resupply, and medical support. The ASB provides maintenance |
3-04 | 43 | Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
augmentation to aviation battalions when required. The ASB is an Active Duty, ARNG, and USAR
organization.
ORGANIZATION
2-52. The ASB consists of an HHC, a distribution company, an ASC, and a network support company.
Figure 2-14 provides ASB organization.
Figure 2–14. Aviation support battalion
CAPABILITIES
2-53. The ASB performs the following tasks:
* Ground vehicle and aviation maintenance and recovery operations.
* Signal and network support to the CAB for C2.
* Conducts sustainment as a warfighting function for the CAB when functioning as an organic
CAB.
* Provides deployment support to the CAB during embarkation and debarkation.
* Distribution management operations within the aviation brigade.
* Role 1 Army HSS for the aviation brigade.
SECURITY AND SUPPORT BATTALION
2-54. The SSB is an element of the TAB-GS. It is a multi-purpose aviation unit that supports a variety of
federal and state missions in permissive environments by providing accurate and timely reconnaissance
information; positioning personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuating casualties; search and rescue; and
enabling C2 in DSCA operations. The SSB is an ARNG organization.
ORGANIZATION
2-55. The SSB consists of an HHC, three security and support companies of eight UH-72s, and an air
ambulance company of eight UH-72s. Figure 2-15 provides SSB organization.
Figure 2–15. Security and support battalion |
3-04 | 44 | Chapter 2
CAPABILITIES
2-56. The SSB provides a geographically-dispersed readily-available, light-utility aviation capability for
federal or state authorities and combatant commanders. It primarily supports homeland security/defense,
but can also deploy and operate world-wide in permissive environments. The SSB is capable of operating
as a separate battalion, an ABTF, or task-organizing into company or platoon elements to support assigned
missions. The SSB conducts the following tasks in permissive environments only:
* Air movement.
* Reconnaissance and observation in support of counter-narcotic, drug interdiction, and law
enforcement agencies.
* Aerial observation of terrain or man-made features.
* AE.
* Aerial CASEVAC.
* Civil search and rescue operations.
AIRFIELD OPERATIONS BATTALION
2-57. The AOB provides airfield management including airfield operations, flight dispatch services, and
ATS. The AOB is an Active Duty and ARNG organization.
ORGANIZATION
2-58. The AOB consists of a headquarters element, an airfield management element, and an ATS
company. Figure 2-16 provides the organizational structure of an AOB.
Figure 2–16. Airfield operations battalion
CAPABILITIES
2-59. The AOB is capable of deploying to expeditionary or mature theaters to conduct airfield management
and ATS.
2-60. The AOB may relieve CAB ATS companies in place to allow CABs to reposition forward during
offensive operations or during sustained operations when additional airfields are required in the theater.
The AOB conducts ATS and airfield management.
THEATER FIXED-WING BATTALION
2-61. The theater FW battalion provides long-range air movement for inter-theater, intra-theater, and
garrison operations. The theater FW battalion is an ARNG and USAR organization. |
3-04 | 45 | Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
ORGANIZATION
2-62. The theater FW battalion consists of an HHC and three theater aviation companies. One of the
theater aviation companies consists of eight C-12s, while the other two differ based on whether they are
ARNG or USAR. The USAR theater aviation companies consist of four C-12s and four UC-35s, while the
ARNG companies consist of eight C-12s (figure 2-17).
Figure 2–17. Theater fixed-wing battalion
CAPABILITIES
2-63. The theater FW battalion is designed to operate as a separate battalion, an ABTF, or task-organize
into company or platoon elements to support assigned missions. The theater FW battalion conducts the
following tasks:
* Air movement.
* Aerial C2 support.
* Aerial CASEVAC.
SECTION V – AVIATION SQUADRON/BATTALION TASK FORCES
2-64. Army Aviation is a modular force that may task-organize as a mission tailored ASTF/ABTF to
conduct operations. This task organization may be OPCON or attached to cover the length of an operation
or deployment.
2-65. The configuration of the ASTF/ABTF varies widely and is driven by mission variables. In general,
an ASTF/ABTF consists of an aviation squadron/battalion headquarters troop/company with its organic
AMT/AMC (typically augmented) and forward support troop/company, and two to five organic and non-
organic aviation maneuver companies and/or platoons. Based on the requirements of the mission, the
aviation maneuver companies/troops and platoons are typically a tailored mix of attack, reconnaissance,
assault, heavy lift, UAS, and MEDEVAC assets.
2-66. An ABTF that supports an infantry unit conducting frequent air assaults requires more assault and
heavy lift aircraft than an ABTF with other mission requirements. An ASTF/ABTF that supports an armor
unit tasked with a covering force mission typically requires more attack aircraft. During semi-permanent
task organization, the mix of aviation maneuver troops/companies and platoons (and specific numbers and
types of aircraft) is tailored to meet the predominant numbers and types of missions required for the
supported unit. When task-organized as an ASTF/ABTF to accomplish one mission, the ASTF/ABTF is
specifically tailored for the mission.
2-67. Regardless of whether the task organization is OPCON or attached, maintenance (and possibly staff)
personnel and equipment augmentation is required from another aviation maneuver squadron/battalion that
detaches the troop/company or platoon to the ASTF/ABTF. The ASB may also provide additional
maintenance and sustainment equipment and personnel based on mission variables. |
3-04 | 46 | Chapter 2
2-68. Figure 2-18 is an example of an ASTF that is built on an ACS headquarters, AMT (augmented for
task force aircraft) and forward support troop with two organic ACTs, an attached assault helicopter
company (AHC), and forward support MEDEVAC platoon. This depicted ASTF is capable of conducting
sustained reconnaissance, security, movement to contact, MEDEVAC, attack, air movements, or air
assaults.
Figure 2–18. Air cavalry squadron task force
2-69. Figure 2-19 is one example of the composition of an attack-heavy ABTF. The foundation of the
ABTF is built on an AB HHC, AMC (augmented for task force aircraft), FSC, two organic ACs, an
attached Gray Eagle platoon, one AHC, and one forward support MEDEVAC platoon. The depicted ABTF
is capable of conducting attack, movement to contact, MEDEVAC, reconnaissance, security operations, air
movements, or air assaults.
Figure 2–19. Attack battalion task force
2-70. Figure 2-20 is an example of an assault-heavy ABTF. The foundation of the ABTF is built on an
AHB, HHC, AMC (augmented for task force aircraft), a FSC, two organic AHCs, an attached attack
company (AC), one Gray Eagle platoon, a heavy lift platoon, and a forward support MEDEVAC platoon.
The depicted ABTF is capable of conducting greater than a company-sized air assault or air movement,
MEDEVAC, and limited-duration reconnaissance, security, and attack operations.
Figure 2–20. Assault aviation battalion task force
SECTION VI – COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
2-71. Commanders build combined arms organizations using command and support relationships.
Command relationships define command responsibility and authority. Support relationships define the
purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another. Properly-established command
and support relationships are critical to effective AGO. During LSCO, commanders must evaluate
appropriate command or support relationships for each subordinate echelon during each phase of an
operation. These reviews properly enable AGO through all phases of the operation, and best equip
subordinate units to accomplish the commander’s intent. Operations orders placing units under command
of a different headquarters for any length of time must include a detailed summary of the relationship |
3-04 | 47 | Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
between the unit, its new headquarters, and its parent unit. Typically, the smallest element Army Aviation
detaches is a company-sized element with the exception of air ambulance units, which typically operate at
the platoon level. However, elements as small as platoons, teams, and even individual aircraft may be
cross-attached from one aviation formation to another.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
2-72. Command relationships specify superior and subordinate headquarters responsibilities. The type of
command relationship selected corresponds to the duration of the mission and it serves to clarify duties of
gaining and losing headquarters. Table 2-1 provides more information on command relationships. Refer to
FM 3-0 for additional information.
Table 2–1. Command relationships
Then inherent responsibilities:
If
relation-
ship is—
All Can impose
Establish
Have organic Organic Are Provide Have on gained
and
command forces HQ assigned liaison priorities unit further
relation- organize position to— maintain establish- command or
communi-
ship d with or AO ed by— support
cations
with— the HQ by— relationship
with—
of—
Organic Army HQ Organic N/A N/A Organic Attached;
specified HQ HQ OPCON;
in TACON;
organizin GS; GSR;
g R; DS
document
As As ASCC or
OPCON As required
Gaining Gainin Gaining required required Service-
Assigned chain of by OPCON
unit g HQ Army by by assigned
command HQ
HQ OPCON OPCON HQ
Attached Gaining Gaining Gaining Gaining As Unit to Gaining Attached;
unit unit Army HQ unit require which unit OPCON;
d by attached TACON;
GU GS; GSR;
R; DS
OPCON Gaining Parent Parent Gaining As As Gaining OPCON;
unit unit and unit unit require required unit TACON;
GU; GU d by by GU GS; GSR;
may GU and R; DS
pass parent
OPCON unit
to lower
HQ1
TACON Gaining Parent Parent Gaining As As Gaining TACON;GS
unit unit unit unit require required unit GSR; R;
d by by GU DS
GU and
parent
unit
Note. 1 In NATO, the gaining unit may not task-organize a multinational force. (See TACON. ) |
3-04 | 48 | Chapter 2
Table 2–1. Command relationships, continued
ADCON-administrative control HQ-headquarters
AO-area of operations N/A-not applicable
ASCC-Army Service component command NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DS-direct support OPCON-operational control
GS-general support R-reinforcing
GSR-general support–reinforcing TACON-tactical control
GU-gaining unit
ORGANIC
2-73. Organic forces form an essential part of a military organization as a part of its design. A CAB has
five battalions, plus a headquarters company organic to it. If, for example, the AB is task-organized under a
brigade combat team (BCT) headquarters for a temporary mission, it would return to the control of the
CAB upon completion.
ASSIGNED
2-74. Subordinates are assigned in order to place units or personnel in an organization where such
placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls or administers the unit or
personnel for the primary functions of the unit. Due to sustainment, standardization, and safety
requirements, aviation battalions or ASTFs/ABTFs typically remain assigned to their parent CAB. This
relationship includes administrative control unless specifically stated otherwise.
ATTACHED
2-75. Subordinates are attached when the placement of units or personnel in an organization is relatively
temporary. The commander of the unit that receives the attachment is responsible for the sustainment and
logistical support that is beyond the capability of the attached unit. An example of this relationship is an
aviation maneuver company attached to a sister aviation battalion to form an ASTF/ABTF. The gaining
headquarters normally assumes administrative control requirements, particularly sustainment unless stated
otherwise.
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
2-76. OPCON is a command relationship that gives a commander authority over subordinate forces to
organize and employ those forces, designate objectives, assign tasks, and give direction regarding
accomplishment of the mission. The commander exercising OPCON authority has no responsibility for
logistical sustainment of the supporting unit. A CAB may place an ABTF or company-sized unit OPCON
to a ground force for a specific mission requirement, usually of limited and short duration where no
enduring sustainment is required.
TACTICAL CONTROL
2-77. TACON is a command relationship that gives a commander authority over assigned or attached
forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, which is limited to and is
usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.
Notably, only the parent unit may further task-organize a unit that has been assigned TACON to another
headquarters. The CAB frequently employs TACON during stability operations for short duration
operations requiring a high degree of AGO, such as area security or air assaults. |
3-04 | 49 | Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
2-78. Support relationships are DS and GS. The aviation brigade or an ABTF may employ utility and
heavy lift assets in a GS role to conduct aerial sustainment by the movement of personnel and equipment,
or air ambulance assets when area coverage of multiple units and AOs is required. An ABTF is
traditionally employed as DS to a brigade or higher headquarters. Table 2-2 depicts support relationships.
DIRECT SUPPORT
2-79. DS is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to
answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. Army Aviation units may operate in a DS
relationship allowing operations to be coordinated directly with the supported ground unit expediting
synchronization and improving effectiveness of the relationship. DS is typically the relationship established
when an ABTF is supporting a brigade or higher headquarters for an extended duration. This enables the
CAB to effectively sustain the ABTF and maintain the appropriate levels of safety, standardization, and
mission oversight.
GENERAL SUPPORT
2-80. GS is support that is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision
thereof. Army Aviation units may be placed in GS of several units. They receive GS missions from their
parent headquarters based upon support priorities established by the higher commander. When Army
Aviation units operate in a GS role, the ground maneuver unit must request support from the parent higher
headquarters of the aviation force.
Table 2–2. Support relationships
If Then inherent responsibilities—
relation
Have May be Receive Are Provi Establis Have Can
-ship
comman task- sustain- assigned de h and priorities impose on
is— d organize ment position liaiso maintai establishe gained
relation- d by- from- or an AO n to- n d by- unit further
ship with- by- commun support
ications relationshi
with- p of-
Direct Parent unit Pare Parent Supporte Support Parent Supporte See note1
support1 nt unit d unit ed unit unit; d unit
unit supported
unit
Reinforc- Parent unit Pare Parent Reinforced Reinforce Parent Reinforce Not
ing nt unit unit d unit unit; d unit; applicabl
unit reinforced then e
unit parent
unit
General Parent unit Pare Parent Parent Reinfor Reinforce Parent Not
support- nt unit unit ced unit d unit and unit; then applicabl
reinforcing unit and as as reinforced e
required required unit
by by parent
parent unit
unit
General Parent unit Pare Parent Parent As As Parent unit Not
support nt unit unit require required applicabl
unit d by by parent e
parent unit
unit
Note. 1 Commanders of units in direct support may further assign support relationships between their subordinate
units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.
AO-area of operations |
3-04 | 50 | Chapter 2
SECTION VII – AVIATION COMMAND POSTS
2-81. Aviation units typically operate from a main command post and a tactical command post while
conducting operations. Throughout planning, preparation, and execution, it is crucially important that
commanders and staffs consider the survivability of each of these C2 nodes.
MAIN COMMAND POST
2-82. The main command post is a facility containing the majority of the staff designed to control current
operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations (FM 6-0). It contains the necessary
enablers to execute the operations process and to control current operations. See FM 6-0 or ATP 6-0. 5 for
more on CPs and CP survivability. The main CP is the primary C2 structure for the brigade and battalion.
Its primary missions are to control operations, maintain situational understanding, inform the commander’s
decisions, and prepare and publish orders and plans. It also provides detailed analysis, planning, and
coordination for the tactical CP. The commander operates from the main CP when not operating from the
tactical CP, command vehicle, or an aircraft; however, when the commander operates from a forward
position, the unit executive officer or deputy commander leads operations in the main CP. The main CP’s
primary functions include the following:
* Communicates and informs subordinate, higher, and adjacent units.
* Informs and assists the commander and subordinate commanders.
* Prepares and issues fragmentary orders, operation orders, operational plans, intelligence
summaries, intelligence reports, and situation reports.
* Operates on a 24-hour basis.
* Conducts future planning continuously.
* Maintains running estimates continuously.
* Maintains situational understanding and a common operational picture across the Army
warfighting functions.
* Receives, evaluates, and processes combat information from subordinate units and higher
headquarters.
* Maintains the necessary products to further the commander’s situational understanding.
* Processes information into intelligence.
* Performs limited video exploitation or Phase 1 processing, exploitation, and dissemination for
UAS and AH-64 sensor data.
* Conducts fire support planning.
* Conducts airspace control planning and coordination.
* Coordinates terrain management.
* Coordinates and tracks sustainment requirements (logistics, air and ground maintenance
capabilities, and status).
* Makes recommendations to the commander.
* Plans and orchestrates briefings, debriefings, and rehearsals.
* Coordinates with Division joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC) in order to plan and
execute air operations in division-assigned airspace.
* Provides a CAB liaison officer (LNO) to the JAGIC.
* If assigned or attached to a tactical corps command post, provides liaison and coordinates
directly with the integration centers within the corps current operations cell.
TACTICAL COMMAND POST
2-83. The tactical command post is a facility containing a tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed
to control portions of an operation for a limited time (FM 6-0). The tactical CP is established to enhance C2
of current operations. It can be deployed to higher or subordinate headquarters to facilitate parallel planning |
3-04 | 51 | Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
or when extended distances preclude operation from the CP. The tactical CP must communicate with
higher headquarters, adjacent units, employed subordinate units, and the main CP. The tactical CP relies on
the main CP for planning, detailed analysis, and coordination.
2-84. The tactical CP is fully mobile and small in size to facilitate security and frequent hasty
displacement. Its organizational layout, personnel, and equipment is mission variable dependent and should
be detailed in the unit standard operating procedures (SOPs).
2-85. While the operations section is responsible for the tactical CP, the tactical CP is normally comprised
of the command group, and personnel from the intelligence, operations, and fires staff cells. Augmentation
may include the standardization officer, aviation mission survivability officer, aviation safety officer,
aviation LNO, and the personnel staff officer and/or logistics staff officer (if the main CP is displacing).
COMMAND POST SURVIVABILITY
2-86. CP survivability is crucial to the success of any mission. During LSCO, commanders may direct
frequent relocations of CPs in order to prevent detection, ensure survivability, and remain postured to
support ground maneuver forces. Depending on threat and operational tempo, commanders must tailor their
CPs to consider a balance between effectiveness and survivability. Dispersion, reduced size, redundant
systems and processes, and enhanced mobility all provide potential increases to CP survivability.
2-87. Aviation CPs are faced with the challenge of requiring significant amounts of equipment and space
to effectively conduct operations. Commanders and staffs must consider what equipment is absolutely
mandatory to conduct effective operations, how each piece of equipment is moved, and what options may
exist to minimize signature. Examples of minimizing signature include—
* Dispersed or camouflaged elements are harder to detect.
* Parking aircraft away from dusty areas minimizes their signature when taking off or landing.
* Enforcing light discipline makes the CP harder to locate.
* Displacing frequently makes the unit harder to track.
SECTION VIII – AVIATION BRIGADE SPECIAL STAFF
2-88. Aviation brigades have a variety of unique special staff to assist the commander and other staff
members in performing their functional responsibilities. Below is a description of key personnel found in
the brigade headquarters. For more information about aviation brigade staff positions, see the Force
Management System website.
AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER
2-89. The aviation safety officer is the primary advisor to the commander and staff on all matters
pertaining to aviation and ground safety. The aviation safety officer monitors and conducts hazard analysis
of plans, training, operations, and unit functional areas to advise commanders on recommended corrective
actions, policies, objectives, and priorities to improve performance. This is a CW5 MTOE position.
AVIATION STANDARDIZATION OFFICER
2-90. The aviation standardization officer is the primary advisor to the commander for the aircrew training
program. The standardization officer is unique to aviation units in that he or she monitors and provides
assistance to the commander in the development and implementation of aircrew training programs and
standardized execution of unit mission essential tasks. This is a CW5 MTOE position.
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM STANDARDIZATION OPERATOR
2-91. The UAS standardization operator is senior advisor to the brigade commander and command staff on
all brigade UAS operations, personnel, and system statuses. This position requires a SFC MTOE position in
the CAB who is a qualified IO and selected by the unit commander. The standardization operator is |
3-04 | 52 | Chapter 2
qualified and current in at least one of the UAS assigned to the unit. The standardization operator provides
technical supervision of the UAS program for the brigade along with assisting the brigade SP with
supervision and maintenance of the aircrew training program.
2-92. The standardization operator provides oversight and updates for all assigned UAS at all levels to the
brigade commander and command staff. He or she administers training and evaluation in specified
standardization operator duties as described in the aircrew training module and Training Circular (TC) 3-
04. 11. He or she is also responsible for providing guidance, mentorship, training, and evaluations to all
assigned operators and IOs in the designated unmanned aircraft per approved aircrew training tasks. The
standardization operator maintains the brigade’s UAS standardization program and conducts inspections for
assigned battalion, company, and troop UAS programs to include IO continuation training. Additional
information can be found in AR 95-1, UAS training modules, and associated TCs.
AVIATION MISSION SURVIVABILITY OFFICER
2-93. The aviation mission survivability officer is the primary advisor to the commander on the aviation
mission survivability program. This program encompasses combat survivability and combat aviation
mission analysis and planning. Combat survivability includes aircraft survivability equipment and
countermeasures, characterizing threat capabilities and limitations affecting the vertical scheme of
maneuver, and the combat TTPs of aviation forces. This is a CW5 MTOE position.
AVIATION MASTER GUNNER
2-94. Assigned to the CAB tactical command post, the aviation master gunner is the primary advisor to the
commander for aircraft gunnery training programs to include helicopter door gunnery and UAS gunnery.
While deployed in theater, the master gunner manages helicopter gunnery training and sustainment and
advises the commander and staff in the selection of weapons and employment techniques during the
mission planning process. The aviation master gunner is assigned to the CAB as well as the AB/ACS. At
the CAB level, the aviation master gunner is a CW4 MTOE position.
BRIGADE AVIATION MAINTENANCE OFFICER
2-95. The brigade aviation maintenance officer (BAMO) is the commander’s primary advisor on
generating aviation combat power. This is a CW5 MTOE position. See chapter 4 for more information on
the BAMO.
FLIGHT SURGEON
2-96. The flight surgeon advises the commander on all aviation medicine matters to include flight status
qualification, support to aircrews, medical aspects of aircrew training, and monitoring the fit and use of
aviation life support equipment. This is a Major MTOE position.
MEDICAL OPERATIONS OFFICER
2-97. The medical operations officer advises the commander and staff on MEDEVAC operations. He or
she is responsible for planning MEDEVAC operations, maintaining liaison with the medical brigade and
division patient movement cells, operating a MEDEVAC control cell, and advising on aircraft and patient
movements. This is a Captain MTOE position.
SECTION IX – BRIGADE AVIATION ELEMENT
2-98. The brigade aviation element (BAE) is a planning and coordination cell organic to all BCTs whose
purpose is to incorporate aviation into the ground maneuver commander’s scheme of maneuver. The BAE
focuses on providing employment advice and initial planning for aviation missions, UAS, airspace planning
and coordination, and synchronization with the tactical air control party and fires cell. |
3-04 | 53 | Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
ORGANIZATION
2-99. The BAE is comprised of the following aviation personnel:
* Brigade aviation officer.
* Assistant brigade aviation officer.
* Aviation mission survivability officer.
* UAS officer.
* Operations sergeant.
* Assistant operations sergeant.
* Operations specialist.
CAPABILITIES
2-100. The BAE performs the following tasks:
* Integration and synchronization of aviation into the supported unit’s scheme of maneuver with
guidance from the CAB as necessary.
* Employment planning advice for the employment of all manned and unmanned Army Aviation
units designated to support the BCT.
* Tracking of the status of aviation assets in support of the BCT.
* Direct coordination with CAB and aviation task forces.
* Close integration and synchronization with LNOs and fire support officers.
* Airspace control planning and execution.
* Enabling C2 of current operations.
SECTION X – AVIATION LIAISONS
2-101. An LNO or liaison team represents the supporting CAB or ASTF/ABTF at the supported
maneuver headquarters to conduct detailed planning and unit-to-unit coordination for the duration of a
specific operation. LNOs facilitate coordination for operations with higher headquarters and/or supported
ground maneuver units. Although a BAE conducts many of the functions traditionally performed by an
LNO, the aviation LNO remains a critical part of the operations process and execution of AGO. ECAB and
TAB headquarters each contain an aviation LNO position, but CABs do not contain this position by
MTOE. Aviation battalions typically contain a two-person LNO element to represent their units as directed
to facilitate planning and execution of AGO.
DUTIES
2-102. LNOs participate in the supported unit’s operations process and ensure aviation is effectively
integrated into planning. LNOs ensure supportability of COAs and relay a clear task and purpose to the
parent aviation unit. Unit commanders empower LNOs to act on their behalf and ensure liaison teams are
fully resourced. LNOs maintain positive two-way communications with their parent aviation unit and do
not commit assets or approve changes to a plan without coordinating with the unit operations officer or
commander. LNOs perform the following tasks:
* Understand and incorporate capabilities, limitations, and tactical employment of aviation assets.
* Assist in the preparation of aviation estimates, plans, orders, and reports.
* Assist in planning aviation missions.
* Coordinate with airspace users and the higher airspace element for airspace management.
* Maintain the operational status of aviation assets and their impacts on the supported unit’s
mission.
* Inform appropriate aviation units of current and possible future operations.
* Maintain continuous communications with aviation units supporting the ground unit. |
3-04 | 54 | Chapter 2
2-103. In general, the CAB sends a battalion-level LNO team to a supported ground maneuver battalion,
since ground maneuver battalions do not possess a BAE expert at that level. The LNO team should have
commissioned or warrant officers with operational experience in the employment of aviation assets for all
seven aviation core competencies. Their employment is temporary and mission-specific since LNO team
members perform other functions within the ASTF/ABTF or CAB staffs.
CAPABILITIES
2-104. LNOs have access to current battalion status information to provide the most accurate common
operational picture of aviation capabilities. LNOs or liaison teams should be equipped and manned to
support 24-hour operations. Minimum equipment includes the following:
* Compatible automation equipment to provide connectivity between the supported unit and the
aviation battalion headquarters.
* Necessary vehicles and equipment required to operate on the move.
* Two single-channel ground and airborne radio systems and supporting antennas/equipment to
monitor command nets and communicate with aviation units.
* Map of the AO with supporting battle-tracking tools and equipment.
* Appropriate FMs, ATPs, TCs, SOPs, charts, and checklists to assist in aviation planning and
integration.
SECTION XI – AIRSPACE CONSIDERATIONS
2-105. Airspace control is an additional task of the C2 warfighting function. It is a continually refined
activity within the operations process. Each operational area has specific requirements for airspace control.
If or when assigned responsibility for a volume of airspace, maneuver commanders exercise airspace
control within their assigned AOs through the integration of positive and procedural airspace control.
Airspace elements provide airspace control expertise in planning efforts, with a focus on enabling the
commander flexibility while reducing risk. Commanders must ensure detailed planning and coordination
with next higher airspace element in order to integrate their aircraft (manned and unmanned) requirements
into the airspace control plan and airspace control order. See FM 3-52 for more information.
2-106. When maneuvering, Army Aviation RW assets normally operate below the coordination level
using airspace coordination areas or phase lines supporting an operation. Aviation units avoid using
restricted operation zones (ROZs) when possible in order to permit other nearby operations to continue
simultaneously. UAS assets normally operate above the coordination level using an air route, airspace
coordination area, ROZ, or kill box. A kill box is a three-dimensional, permissive fire support coordination
measure with an associated airspace coordinating measure (ACM) used to facilitate the integration of fires
(JP 3-09). When a division is assigned a volume of airspace, that division's JAGIC and subordinate
brigade's air defense airspace management (ADAM)/BAE integrate manned and unmanned Army aircraft
using enhanced procedural control—a combination of prescribed ACMs and voice and digital advisories
that ensure integration and simultaneity of effects. The JAGIC's enhanced procedural control compliments
the mission orders aviators and UAS operators receive from their respective maneuver command posts.
When manned or unmanned Army aircraft operate in division airspace without a subordinate brigade AO
assignment (such as ahead of a forward boundary) the JAGIC provides enhanced procedural control using
appropriate coordination measures and C2 systems.
2-107. Airspace elements continuously monitor all airspace users to support their operations and those
transiting through the airspace over their AOs. This continuous situational awareness ensures that
commanders can react to any situation requiring immediate use of airspace to include unplanned aircraft
launch, aerial delivery of fires, immediate ACMs, and indirect fire missions. When conducting the MUM-T
TTP, UAS-extended endurance and unique launch/recovery requirements may require AWTs to link up in
flight. Once linked up, the AWT air mission commander assumes responsibility for the maneuvering of the
UAS and directing the UAS crew’s tactical focus. The UAS aircraft commander is still responsible for
coordinating his or her movement with the appropriate airspace element. Coordination between UAS and
AWT aircrews to determine scheme of maneuver, engagement area development, frequency management, |
3-04 | 55 | Army Aviation Organizations and Command and Control
and crew coordination prior to mission execution is critical to successful MUM-T operations. When
conducting MUM-T and required to engage with an armed UAS, the air mission commander is responsible
for coordinating airspace (if not coordinated through pre-mission planning) that encompasses the UAS
location, missile flight route, and target location. When supporting a ground maneuver unit, the air mission
commander coordinates with the ground maneuver commander and BCT ADAM cell. When assigned an
AO, the air mission commander coordinates through the CAB ADAM cell. The CAB ADAM cell must
communicate regularly with the BCT ADAM cell to coordinate and relay ACMs required to maintain
situational awareness for the CAB commander.
2-108. ACMs must enable airspace users to operate effectively and safely, but must also provide the
commander flexibility to continue operations throughout the AO. A simple airspace control plan is more
easily understood and applied by all airspace users, and more-easily lends itself to immediate ACM
implementation. Airspace planners must consider all ground and air units involved in an operation and
ensure war gaming analyzes contingencies which involve airspace usage, to include operating with
degraded communications or C2 systems. Simple, well understood procedural controls which do not
require positive communications with a C2 node may provide the most redundant and effective method of
airspace coordination. Common ACMs and fire support coordination measures for Army Aviation shown
in figure 2-21 are as follows:
* The coordinating altitude is an ACM that uses altitude to separate users and as the transition
between airspace control elements (JP 3-52).
* The coordination level is a procedural method to separate FW and RW aircraft by determining
an altitude below which FW aircraft normally will not fly (JP 3-52).
* An airspace coordination area, a fire support coordination measure, is a three-dimensional block
of airspace in a target area in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly-surface
fires.
* A ROZ is airspace reserved for specific activities in which the operations of one or more
airspace users are restricted.
* Standard use Army aircraft flight routes are routes established below the coordination level to
facilitate the movement of Army Aviation assets; they are normally located in the Corp through
brigade rear AOs and do not require approval by the airspace control authority.
* All airspace users must coordinate with the appropriate airspace elements when flying or firing
through a coordinating altitude or coordination level.
Figure 2–21. Common Army airspace coordinating measures |
3-04 | 56 | Chapter 2
2-109. The airspace element in the CAB is the ADAM cell, located in the brigade main CP. The airspace
element in the BCT is the ADAM/BAE. The ADAM cell has established links within the theater air ground
system, through the next higher airspace element, and up to the airspace control authority normally located
at an established air operations center. The ADAM cell integrates information systems (air defense systems
integrator) with joint networks (Link-16) to provide a joint, integrated, three dimensional near-real-time air
common operational picture. With these systems, the ADAM cell coordinates immediate and pre-planned
ACMs as required to support operations. The ADAM cell receives airspace requirements from brigade
elements and coordinates these ACMs with the next headquarters airspace element. Pre-planned ACMs are
published on the airspace control order. Immediate ACMs are requested from subordinate brigade elements
via voice or digital communication and coordinated with the appropriate airspace element and depicted on
the common air picture when approved. The ADAM cell must continuously plan for and monitor the
operations of all airspace users that may affect CAB or BCT operations. |
3-04 | 57 | Chapter 3
Army Aviation Operations
SECTION I – CORE COMPETENCIES
3-1. Army Aviation conducts AGO as the aerial maneuver force of the combined arms team, or as an
independent maneuver force in support of ground forces conducting offensive, defensive, stability, and
DSCA operations. Regardless of the type of mission performed by the ground force, most aviation
operations are offensive in nature and designed to provide an asymmetric advantage. Aviation operations
are most effective when assets are task organized to correctly support the higher headquarters mission.
3-2. All aviation operations are planned and executed according to the operations process. The methods
for employing attack or reconnaissance units in section III are applicable to most Army Aviation
operations. When evaluating options for employing Army Aviation, commanders balance the need for
flexible and rapid response to a contingency against deliberate employment as a massed force. Mass
enables the combined arms team to gain and maintain situational understanding; control operational tempo;
achieve the element of surprise; seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; present the enemy with multiple
dilemmas; gain positions of relative advantage over an enemy force; and/or prevent an enemy force from
gaining a position of relative advantage. During the planning and preparation phases of a massed operation,
commanders should provide subordinate units time to recover from previous missions or prepare for
upcoming tasks; this may necessitate lapses or reductions in AGO depending on the amount of preparation
required.
3-3. The following are the seven core competencies of Army Aviation:
* Provide accurate and timely information collection on the enemy, terrain, local populations and
friendly forces.
* Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
* Destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay enemy forces.
* Air assault ground maneuver forces.
* Air movement personnel, equipment, and supplies.
* Evacuate wounded or recover isolated personnel.
* Enable C2 over extended ranges and complex terrain.
3-4. These core competencies are executed through the following tactical, enabling, and sustaining tasks:
movement to contact, attack, reconnaissance, security, air assault, C2 support, PR, air movement, and AE.
For more information on the conduct of aviation operations, see ATP 3-04. 1.
SECTION II – MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
3-5. A movement to contact is an offensive task designed to develop the situation and establish or regain
contact. It prevents the premature commitment of friendly combat power. Executing a movement to contact
enables freedom of action to develop the situation and creates favorable conditions to conduct subsequent
tactical or enabling tasks either by the force conducting the movement to contact or a follow-on main body
force. The speed, range, lethality, long-range communications, and persistent reconnaissance capabilities of
Army Aviation attack or reconnaissance units, using MUM-T, make them ideally suited to conduct
movement to contact. Army Aviation executes movement to contact at the platoon to battalion or squadron
level, either independently, or as a member of the combined arms team. In either case, the movement to
contact is organized with the smallest acceptable security force forward to initially gain and maintain
contact with the enemy and a separate force capable of developing the situation based on the size of the |
3-04 | 58 | Chapter 3
expected enemy force and commander’s intent. The following fundamentals of the aviation movement to
contact provide the framework for planning and execution:
* Focus all efforts on finding the enemy.
* Gain enemy contact early with the smallest reconnaissance force within the allotted time.
* Maintain contact and fix the enemy while retaining the freedom of maneuver to prevent
premature commitment of the protected force.
* Maintain adequate follow-on combat power to rapidly develop the situation after gaining enemy
contact.
* Destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay enemy forces within capability or conduct battle
handover or bypass in accordance with the commander’s intent.
3-6. Attack or reconnaissance units plan and execute a zone reconnaissance with an enemy force oriented
focus as their part of a larger unit movement to contact. To maintain continuous reconnaissance, the attack
or reconnaissance unit rotates aircraft as necessary. Continuous rotations of these teams in conjunction with
UAS increases the depth and breadth of this aviation reconnaissance effort. It also enhances the
survivability of aviation assets, enables persistent reconnaissance in zone with increased capability to gain
and maintain enemy contact, and provides more options to develop the situation with maneuver and fires.
3-7. Once the attack or reconnaissance unit gains contact with the enemy, its aircraft deploy into locations
where they may continue to maintain contact and report the situation. The unit commander evaluates and
develops the situation. The commander then chooses a follow-on COA based on the size and composition
of the enemy force and higher commander’s intent. The aviation unit executes the selected COA while
simultaneously recommending a COA to the higher commander. If the size or composition of the enemy
force meets bypass criteria, the enemy is reported and bypassed to continue the movement to contact.
Normally the unit keeps the bypassed force under observation. This observation can be maintained using
unmanned systems. If the size and composition of the enemy force meets engagement criteria, the aviation
unit commander may attack to disrupt, defeat, or destroy the enemy. The unit may transition to a screen if
the enemy force is too large, or conduct a battle handover to a ground maneuver force to further develop
the situation. Figure 3-1 provides an example of movement to contact.
Figure 3–1. Air cavalry squadron conducts movement to contact using MUM-T
3-8. The aviation unit’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) effort focuses on determining the
characteristics of the AO that influence friendly and enemy operations. This includes determining the likely
composition, capabilities, and most likely and most dangerous COA of the enemy force. When the
expected enemy contact is a mounted enemy force that is expected to be moving, IPB focuses on high
speed avenues of approach and cross-mobility corridors to gain greater understanding of the physical |
3-04 | 59 | Army Aviation Operations
environment to enable rapid execution. When the enemy force is dismounted and expected to be on the
move, IPB is focused on determining dismounted avenues of approach or infiltration routes. When
operating against a defending or stationary enemy force, IPB focuses on the best defensible terrain or areas
that the enemy may use as cover and concealment for the main body and security elements. IPB should also
focus on natural obstacles, known man-made obstacles and the terrain that is best suited for the
emplacement of enemy obstacles that may disrupt friendly ground maneuver. If a battle handover to ground
units is expected, IPB should also focus on the terrain that enables effective battle handover on terrain most
favorable for friendly ground maneuver forces to develop the situation.
3-9. When planning the scheme of maneuver, the aviation commander controls the operation by using
phase lines, objectives, contact points, checkpoints, and named areas of interest. Such control measures
allow for decentralized actions and small-unit initiative to the greatest extent possible. The aviation
commander controls the depth of the movement to contact by using a limit of advance (LOA) or a forward
boundary and may designate one or more objectives to orient the force or limit the extent of the movement
to contact.
3-10. The supported higher commander delineates bypass criteria, engagement criteria, and battle handover
criteria, as well as a desired end state to enable disciplined initiative in execution. This guidance is tied to
how the movement to contact enables the main body to accomplish subsequent tasks. Considerations for
determining these criteria include: available combat power, the anticipated size and capability of the enemy
force, proximity of friendly forces and their capabilities to further develop the situation, depth and breadth
of the AO, and availability of Army and joint fires. Based on the complexity of the OE and expected size of
the enemy force, the planning, prioritization, and use of joint fires may be required to successfully complete
the mission and prevent premature decisive engagement or commitment of the follow-on force.
3-11. The aviation unit commander determines the location and number of FARPs and UAS launch and
recovery locations based on the depth and breadth of the AO, time allocated, size of the aviation force and
the supported commander’s intent. The FARP and UAS launch and recovery locations support relief on
station to maintain continuous reconnaissance and develop the situation to transition to subsequent tasks.
3-12. The inherent risks with movement to contact are driven by the unknown enemy situation, complexity
of continuous reliefs on station, battle handover transitions, and the hasty nature of developing the situation
while in contact. To mitigate risk, aviation commanders should—
* Use the minimal security force required to gain contact while accomplishing the mission within
the allotted time.
* Maximize the use of UAS forward to provide reaction time and maneuver space.
* Provide subordinates with control measures for not only their own AOs but also adjacent AOs to
control and deconflict maneuver and fires.
* Develop and coordinate ACMs to enable freedom of action of manned and unmanned systems.
* Plan and employ joint fires throughout the depth of the zone.
* Employ communications relay packages, Army airborne C2 system aircraft or airborne battle
command console aircraft to maintain communications over extended distances.
* Position FARPs, UAS launch locations, and holding areas (HAs) forward to enable rapid turns
of combat power once enemy contact is gained.
* And most importantly, use speed and audacity to develop the situation upon gaining contact.
SECTION III – ATTACK.
3-13. Army Aviation attack or reconnaissance units, employing MUM-T, conduct attacks in support of
offensive, defensive and stability operations throughout the depth of the AO. This is done either as a
decisive or shaping operation in support of ground forces. Army Aviation conducts attacks at multiple
echelons. These can range from elements as small as attack or Scout weapons teams using MUM-T, or a
single armed UAS, up to battalion or squadron level.
3-14. Army Aviation attacks are executed against enemy forces in close friendly contact, or out of friendly
contact. Both can be executed as either hasty or deliberate operations, and they are typically supported with |
3-04 | 60 | Chapter 3
integrated joint fires. The methods of employment are solely driven by whether a friendly ground maneuver
force is in direct contact with the targeted enemy force or not; this factor determines who controls the
aviation maneuver and fires. Regardless of the methods employed, the tactical task assigned to the attack or
reconnaissance unit is attack to destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay. The higher commander’s choice of
operational framework is not used to describe the type of attack.
3-15. To ensure success, Army Aviation attacks with the necessary combat power, tempo and intensity to
overwhelm the enemy force. Audacity, speed, concentration of combat power at the right time and place,
violence of execution, simultaneity of joint fires with ground and air maneuver, and maximizing the
element of surprise are all essential components of successful Army Aviation attacks.
ATTACKS AGAINST ENEMY FORCES IN CLOSE FRIENDLY CONTACT
3-16. As a member of the combined arms team, Army Aviation conducts attacks against enemy forces in
close friendly contact to enable friendly ground maneuver forces to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative.
These attacks can be either hasty or deliberate, based on the amount of time available. The ground
maneuver commander controls the synchronization and integration of Army Aviation maneuver and the
distribution and de-confliction of Army Aviation fires.
3-17. Attacks against an enemy force in close friendly contact enable the higher commander to bring Army
Aviation combat power to bear simultaneously with other elements of the combined arms team. The
combined effects of aerial and ground fire and maneuver increase the combined lethality and protection of
the combined arms team, enabling the commander to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas while
dictating the tempo of operations to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage.
3-18. Hasty or deliberate attacks against enemy forces in close friendly contact are executed at each Army
Aviation maneuver echelon from an AWT/SWT or a single armed UAS up to elements as large as a
battalion or squadron. Ground commanders that plan for the possible employment of both hasty and
deliberate attacks throughout the depth of their close fight scheme of maneuver increase the likelihood of
success and reduce the risk of fratricide. Hasty attacks provide the combined arms team with the agility,
mobility and firepower to rapidly respond to unexpected enemy contact. However, hasty attacks should be
in extremis and not relied on to overcome a lack of planning for the employment and full integration of
Army Aviation attacks in the ground scheme of maneuver during the operations process. Deliberate attacks
are interdependent and fully integrated in the ground scheme of maneuver. This integration enables the
maneuver commander to maximize all available combat power at the chosen place and time.
3-19. The continuum of attacks against enemy forces in close friendly contact ranges from hasty attacks by
an AWT against an enemy force, to a deliberate attack with an AB/ACS as part of the combined arms
scheme of maneuver in the close fight. Some examples of this continuum include, but are not limited to—
* An AWT using MUM-T attacks to destroy an enemy platoon in close contact with a Stryker
Scout platoon conducting security operations as the lead element of a battalion movement to
contact. During the operations process, the Stryker battalion staff conducts detailed planning to
integrate Army Aviation attacks on known and templated enemy forces throughout the depth of
the battalion’s AO. To ensure agility, freedom of action, and disciplined initiative, the Stryker
battalion staff, in coordination with the supporting aviation staff or LNO team, plans detailed
control measures in zone, to include ACMs, attack by fire positions, attack routes, fire support
coordination measures, HAs, engagement criteria, and triggers and conditions for employment.
Once triggered, the AWT maneuvers along preplanned routes to an attack by fire position to
destroy the enemy platoon, enabling the Stryker battalion’s elements to maintain tempo and
freedom of action to continue to maneuver and gain contact with the enemy main body (figure 3-
2, page 3-5). |
3-04 | 61 | Army Aviation Operations
Figure 3–2. Deliberate attack by an attack weapons team in support of a Stryker battalion
conducting a movement to contact
* An AWT using MUM-T conducting area reconnaissance is dynamically re-tasked by the
supported higher headquarters to conduct a hasty attack in reaction to an unexpected enemy
attack on a friendly convoy. Upon re-tasking, the air mission commander directs the UAS
aircraft commander to continue the area reconnaissance mission and repositions the AWT to the
location of the contact. The friendly convoy commander uses the standard Army attack aviation
call for fire to enable the team to conduct the hasty attack. The AWT gains situational
understanding of the friendly and enemy forces and attacks to destroy the enemy force under the
control of the ground commander in contact. The destruction of the enemy force enables the
convoy to break contact and continue the mission (figure 3-3). Following the attack, the AWT
air mission commander provides BDA, reports to higher headquarters and repositions to
continue the area reconnaissance mission as directed. |
3-04 | 62 | Chapter 3
Figure 3–3. Hasty attack by an attack weapons team reacting to troops in contact
* An AC employing MUM-T attacks in support of an area defense to destroy the advance guard of
an attacking enemy force in a preplanned engagement area located in the BCT’s main battle
area. The purpose of the attack is to prevent the enemy from penetrating the defense and gaining
a position of relative advantage. The BCT staff, in coordination with the supporting AB staff or
aviation LNO team, plans the attack with pre-planned attack routes with timed passage of lines,
engagement areas with layered target reference points (TRPs), integrated joint fire, and multiple
attack by fire positions to effectively engage and destroy the advancing enemy force throughout
the depth of the engagement area. The movement of the enemy force in relation to UAS-
observed named areas of interest triggers the timing of the attack (figure 3-4). The detailed
planning and support from higher echelons of command enables the success of this
interdependent and fully integrated deliberate attack against an enemy force in close contact with
friendly forces. |
3-04 | 63 | Army Aviation Operations
Figure 3–4. Deliberate attack by an attack company in support of a BCT’s area defense
3-20. During the planning process, the ground maneuver commander integrates the employment of attack
or reconnaissance unit attacks into the scheme of maneuver to ensure their responsiveness, synergy, and
agility during actions on the objective or upon contact with the enemy. Pre-mission development of control
measures provides a foundation for the successful integration of Army Aviation into the unit’s operations.
Among these control measures are engagement criteria; the triggers and conditions for execution; and fire
coordination measures (such as TRPs, engagement areas, and ACMs [such as aerial ingress and egress
routes and ROZs]).
3-21. Shared understanding within the combined arms team, through known standardized procedures and
habitual training, increases the likelihood of successful employment of attack or reconnaissance units
against enemy forces in close contact with friendly forces. However, during in extremis situations, Army
Aviation attack or reconnaissance units may conduct hasty attacks in support of all friendly ground units
regardless of their training level or habitual relationship, but with greater risk. The use of the standardized
Army attack aviation call for fire ensures the minimum mission essential information is provided from the
ground commander in contact to the attack air mission commander.
3-22. To maintain shared understanding and prevent burdening the commander in contact during
execution, the attack or reconnaissance unit conducting hasty and deliberate attacks against enemy forces in
close friendly contact monitors the primary supported ground unit voice command net and uses C2
information systems (such as Blue Force Tracker) to gain and maintain situational understanding of
friendly forces. Use of these systems and effective pre-mission planning enables Army Aviation attack or
reconnaissance units to rapidly execute actions on contact and mitigates the risk of fratricide.
3-23. When conducting attacks against enemy forces in close friendly contact, targets may range from
hundreds of meters to several thousand meters from friendly forces. The attack or reconnaissance unit uses
terrain and the mutual protection of ground maneuver forces to vary attack headings to remain
unpredictable and limit exposure to enemy fires. Once the engagement is complete, the attack or
reconnaissance unit air mission commander provides the ground commander with BDA. The air mission
commander also provides a follow-on recommendation, such as re-attack, execution of a follow-on task, or
end-of-mission. |
3-04 | 64 | Chapter 3
ATTACKS AGAINST ENEMY FORCES OUT OF FRIENDLY
CONTACT
3-24. Army Aviation attack and reconnaissance units, maneuvering independently against an enemy force
not in close contact with friendly ground maneuver forces, conducts hasty or deliberate attacks to divert,
disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy capabilities before they can be brought to bear on friendly forces. The
Army Aviation air mission commander controls the maneuver and fires of Army Aviation within an AO
assigned by a higher headquarters, but the attack is still synchronized and/or integrated with the overall
higher ground scheme of maneuver. The higher headquarters assigning the attack mission coordinates the
required airspace with the appropriate airspace element.
3-25. These attacks are conducted at such a distance from friendly ground forces that detailed integration
with them during actions on the objective is typically not required. Based on the nature of the target and
complexity of the OE, Army Aviation attacks out of contact may be conducted as hasty attacks, but they
are most often deliberate attacks. Deliberate attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact require
detailed planning and the simultaneous or sequential employment of many enabling assets to mass effects
and achieve the commander’s intent.
3-26. Based on mission and operational variables, attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact
range from relatively low risk to extremely high-risk operations. They may be conducted by attack or
reconnaissance elements ranging in size from a single armed UAS up to one or more AB or ACS.
Increasing the distance from friendly forces increases the threat to the attack or reconnaissance unit.
Likewise, low target fidelity or increased mission complexity also increases mission risk, and more detailed
planning and integration is required by the assigning headquarters. Higher mission risk requires the
supported higher headquarters to prioritize required enabling capabilities to provide continuous
reconnaissance, continuous target development, and in depth integration of joint fires with detailed
rehearsals and conditions checks prior to execution. Consideration must also be given to how long attack
assets are committed to higher-risk attacks and weighed against the totality of the operational risk to other
ongoing or pending operations. The decision to execute attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact
must be based on the overall operational risk versus the reward of successful execution within the higher
headquarters scheme of maneuver.
3-27. These attacks are typically deliberate attacks, but they may be executed as hasty attacks against
emerging enemy targets of opportunity based on mission variables. If the enemy target is high payoff and
outweighs the risk of friendly losses or if the enemy threat to aviation is known to be acceptable for hasty
operations, hasty attacks against enemy forces out of contact can be effective in seizing emerging
opportunities to prevent the enemy from gaining a position of relative advantage.
3-28. Army Aviation units conduct attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact throughout the
depth and breadth of an AO. They may be conducted beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in
linear, contiguous AOs; in deep areas between non-linear and non-contiguous AOs; in close or rear areas
inside large non-linear and contiguous AOs where ground forces are not present or not in contact with the
targeted enemy force; or in joint or special operations AOs where friendly ground or surface forces are not
present or not in contact with the targeted enemy force.
3-29. Hasty and deliberate attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact are executed in support of
higher headquarters that can develop target fidelity, provide enablers to support the attack, and assign a
subordinate AO to the attack or reconnaissance unit. This is usually no smaller than a ground maneuver
battalion and is more typically a BCT, division, corps, or joint task force headquarters. Examples of hasty
and deliberate attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact, from generally the lowest risk with the
least required planning and synchronization efforts, to very high risk operations requiring detailed planning
and the full range of joint fires and intelligence capabilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
* An AWT using MUM-T conducts a hasty attack to destroy a dismounted enemy team located by
UAS while emplacing mines along a high speed avenue of approach in a deep area between non-
contiguous AOs. With the threat assessment estimated as low, the higher headquarters assigns an
AO for the AWT to conduct the attack and establishes ACMs. The air mission commander
maneuvers the AWT to the AO and determines the fire control and method of attack for the |
3-04 | 65 | Army Aviation Operations
team. Relaying information via the UAS, the AWT conducts the engagement and destroys
enemy force out of contact before their capabilities can be brought to bear effectively on friendly
forces (figure 3-5). Upon destruction of the enemy force, the air mission commander provides
BDA to the higher headquarters and proceeds as directed to a follow-on mission or mission
complete.
Figure 3–5. Hasty attack by an attack weapons team against an enemy force out of contact
* An attack platoon using MUM-T attacks to destroy a convoy of technical vehicles that are not in
friendly contact and are repositioning along a high speed avenue of approach in a deep area
between BCT AOs. Assessing the threat to aviation as low in the area and seizing upon this
emerging opportunity to prevent the enemy force from gaining a position of advantage between
BCT AOs in a non-contiguous AO, the division headquarters tasks an attack platoon to conduct
a hasty attack. The division staff coordinates airspace measures and assigns an engagement area
to the attack platoon to execute the attack. En route to the engagement area, the air mission
commander coordinates the platoon attack while gaining situational awareness and
understanding via the UAS observing the enemy convoy. As the convoy approaches the
engagement area, the air mission commander’s teams are set in their attack by fire positions,
have positive identification of the enemy convoy, and initiate the attack (figure 3-6, page 3-9). |
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Figure 3–6. Hasty attack by an attack platoon
* An AC using MUM-T attacks to defeat an enemy mechanized company, maneuvering to
counter-attack the flank of a friendly combined arms battalion. During the operations process,
the combined arms team conducts detailed planning to integrate attacks to defeat expected
counter-attacks along the friendly route of march. A second AC screens the flank of the friendly
ground maneuver force, as UAS conducts reconnaissance along key enemy avenues of approach.
A coordinated staff effort with the higher headquarters and the supporting aviation attack unit or
LNO team establishes an engagement area and attack by fire positions, and the combined arms
team conducts rehearsals prior to executing the operation. The proper timing of an aerial passage
of lines on the ground maneuver force’s left flank, synchronization of fire and maneuver, and
specific triggers enable the AC executing the attack to occupy their attack by fire positions as the
enemy begins to enter the engagement area. The air mission commander initiates the attack from
the attack by fire positions, and the enemy force is unable to make contact and bring its
capabilities to bear on the friendly main body. Detailed planning enables the combined arms
team to attack with speed and surprise, while maintaining tempo throughout the operation (figure
3-7). |
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Figure 3–7. Deliberate attack by an attack company to defeat an enemy counter-attack
* An AB attacks across the FLOT to disrupt an enemy mechanized regiment that is conducting an
approach march under the protection of organic air defense systems (figure 3-8). Enemy
capabilities, actions, and positions are identified through continuous information collection and
target development thus facilitating the deliberate planning of the attack. The supported higher
headquarters identifies the most dangerous and most likely enemy COAs and plans these attacks
based on information derived during the IPB. Further coordination must be made by the higher
headquarters to ensure a successful passage of lines and synchronization and timing of
preplanned joint fires and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) to achieve the desired
massing of effects, and enable AB movement to attack by fire positions, respectively.
Simultaneously, the AB plans maneuver, attack by fire positions, and methods of attack in
parallel to nest with the higher headquarters’ plan. The resultant attack disrupts enemy
capabilities before they can be brought to bear effectively on friendly forces, thereby providing
the friendly main body reaction time and maneuver space.
Figure 3–8. Deliberate attack by an AB to disrupt enemy mechanized regiment in deep area of
linear area operations |
3-04 | 68 | Chapter 3
3-30. Based on the depth of the attack against enemy forces out of friendly contact, time allocated, echelon
and size of the attack aviation force, and the supported commander’s intent, FARPs, UAS launch and
recovery locations, and forward C2 nodes are positioned forward to support relief on station to maintain
sustained attacks or attacks at extended ranges.
3-31. The inherent risks with hasty and deliberate attacks. against enemy forces out of friendly contact are
driven by the fidelity of the enemy situation en route to, from, and in the AO; the depth and duration of the
attack; the size and capabilities of the enemy force being attacked; the fidelity of the target location; the
proximity and capabilities of adjacent enemy forces; the time of day and weather conditions; and the
proximity and capabilities of friendly ground maneuver forces. To mitigate risk and when time is available,
the assigning higher headquarters and attack aviation staffs focus the operations process on the following:
* Target development, location, and refinement.
* Integration of joint fires and other enablers.
* Maximizing the use of UAS forward to confirm target location and disposition. During early
phases of shaping prior to an attack, armed UAS may provide critical intelligence and targeting
capabilities of enemy air defenses. During execution phases, tactical UAS flying ahead of attack
helicopters may locate surviving air defense systems prior to them targeting manned aircraft.
* Maximizing the use of terrain to mask maneuver along attack routes and in attack by fire
positions.
* Developing and coordinating ACMs to enable freedom of action for MUM-T and other ongoing
friendly operations.
* Planning the integration of joint fires and enablers to allow continuous target refinement, joint
SEAD and joint EW-all of which limit enemy freedom of action.
* Planning and developing triggers and conditions to initiate the attack.
* Employing radio retransmission sites, aerial communications relay packages, and/or forward
UAS ground control stations to maintain situational understanding over extended distances.
* Positioning multiple FARPs forward to maximize weapons loads and station time while
considering FARP survivability and capability.
* Maximizing the element of surprise by attacking from unexpected directions and unexpected
times with speed and audacity.
* Executing during hours of limited visibility.
* Conducting detailed rehearsals and employing appropriate decision support tools such as
conditions checks, go/no-go criteria, abort criteria, and decision support matrices.
EMPLOYMENT METHODS
3-32. Timing is critical to successful employment of attack or reconnaissance units. Employed too early,
the attack may culminate because of aircraft low on fuel. Aircraft arriving to their attack by fire positions
too late may miss all or part of the targeted unit and fail to achieve mission success.
3-33. The commander plans an attack after detailed coordination with subordinate units, support elements,
and higher headquarters to ensure shared understanding of higher intent and the capabilities of the attack
unit. The commander may employ subordinate units in the following methods, which are described below:
* Continuous attack.
* Phased attack.
* Maximum destruction attack.
3-34. It is important to note that these methods of employment are applicable to missions other than
attacks. While the examples below describe employment of ACs in an AB, the concepts may be scaled
down to platoon or AWT/SWT operations or up to battalion/squadron level. The factors described below
should be considered whenever Army Aviation units are employed in various combinations. |
3-04 | 69 | Army Aviation Operations
CONTINUOUS ATTACK
3-35. To exert constant pressure on the enemy force, the battalion commander employs companies using
the continuous attack method (figure 3-9, page 3-12). This method ensures at least one company is in the
battle at all times. While one company is engaged in the battle, the other two companies prepare to relieve
the engaged company by positioning at the HA or FARP, or maneuvering to the battle position or attack by
fire position. The continuous attack method provides the commander with the most flexibility as well as the
most efficient operation of the FARP. Depending on sustainment capabilities, operational tempo, and
numbers of aircraft committed to an operation, an AB may be able to sustain a continuous operation for
several days.
Figure 3–9. Continuous attack
PHASED ATTACK
3-36. To exert increased firepower on the enemy force, the battalion commander employs one company as
a shaping operation to begin attacking the enemy and then quickly phases in a second company from a
different battle position or attack by fire position (figure 3-10). The third company is phased into the fight
as a reserve element when either of the other companies is low on fuel or ammunition. The commander
may choose to modify this method of employment. For example, one company may be employed to shape
for the other companies to exploit as the main body. During the phased attack, it is important to minimize
aircraft turnaround time at the FARP. Generally, due to FARP limitations, the phased attack eventually
reverts to the continuous attack method. An AB typically conducts a phased attack for less than 24 hours
and requires up to 24 hours following the operation in order to resume operations. |
3-04 | 70 | Chapter 3
Figure 3–10. Phased attack
MAXIMUM DESTRUCTION ATTACK
3-37. To exert maximum combat power on the enemy force, the commander employs the maximum
destruction method (figure 3-11, page 3-13). To overwhelm the enemy force with massed fires, the
battalion attacks with all three companies simultaneously. While employing this method, it is important for
the supported commander to understand the entire battalion may be out of the fight for 45 to 90 minutes at
the completion of the initial attack. The time away from the fight is dependent on the distance to the FARP
and time required for refueling and rearming after the initial engagement. Employing a maximum
destruction attack may result in a large portion of the AB being unable to conduct further missions for at
least 24 hours following the completion of the mission.
Figure 3–11. Maximum destruction attack
STRIKE COORDINATION AND RECONNAISSANCE TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
3-38. Strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) is a mission flown for the purpose of detecting
targets and coordinating or performing attack or reconnaissance on those targets (JP 3-03). SCAR missions
are flown in a specific geographic area and are used to match weapons effects with targets per the
supported commander’s prioritized target list. A SCAR mission is designed to effectively and efficiently
destroy targets and conduct associated BDA. A SCAR aircrew coordinates the identification of targets and
subsequent attacks using multiple reconnaissance and strike assets. Army aircrews perform SCAR by
conducting attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact with friendly maneuver forces. If required |
3-04 | 71 | Army Aviation Operations
to serve as a SCAR aircrew, aircrews must be prepared to cycle multiple assets through the target area,
provide prioritized targeting guidance, and monitor enemy air defenses to maximize the effects of each
sortie.
ROTARY-WING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
3-39. As the aviation element of the ground maneuver plan, Army Aviation is not normally tasked by the
joint force air component commander to support the JFC’s CAS or air interdiction apportionment guidance.
However, attack or reconnaissance units must be familiar with and able to respond to and execute
according to terminal CAS procedures and TTP when they accept terminal control by a joint terminal air
controller or forward air controller (airborne) during mission execution in support of the joint force. The
CAS TTP requires the use of a joint terminal air controller or forward air controller (airborne) who is a
qualified (certified) service member and directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in CAS and other air
operations. See appendix A for CAS procedures.
UNIQUE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR ATTACKS
3-40. When determining what level of planning and preparation is required to execute the attack, the
commander must balance the time available versus the advantage of executing with tempo and surprise
with the minimum mission essential information required to understand the friendly forces, terrain,
weather, and enemy forces to achieve success. Taking too much time to develop perfect information can
paralyze the operations process, enable the enemy to continue to prepare or move, and may result in missed
opportunities to seize the initiative. It is normally better to err on the side of speed, audacity, and
momentum, with the minimum mission essential information, than on attempting to gain complete
situational understanding prior to conducting attacks. Bold decisions give the best promise of success, but
commanders must be able to distinguish between having the right level and fidelity of minimum mission
essential information required to accept prudent risk versus poor or incomplete information that results in
taking a gamble. Accepting prudent risk requires judgment, foresight, and adequate planning to determine
whether an operation is worth conducting. Maintaining current and running estimates while executing
continuous reconnaissance and target development mitigates risk and enables commanders to have greater
agility and shorter planning cycles to conduct both hasty and deliberate attacks against enemy forces that
are in or out of contact with friendly forces.
3-41. During the operations process for attack operations, IPB efforts are focused on determining the
location, composition, disposition, capabilities, and most likely and most dangerous COAs of the targeted
enemy force. IPB also focuses on detailed terrain analysis to inform planning for attack routes, attack by
fire positions, engagement areas, fire support targets, and HAs, as well as the effects on enemy movement
rates and formations.
3-42. IPB, when attacking against a moving enemy force, focuses on the most likely enemy high speed
avenues of approach and cross-mobility corridors within the AO to determine the best terrain on which to
attack the enemy. Engagement areas are designated on terrain that provides the best friendly fields of fire
while enabling the attack aviation force to maneuver throughout the depth of the enemy formation using
adjacent terrain for cover and concealment, while limiting the enemy’s freedom of maneuver. Attack by
fire positions are selected to enable attack or reconnaissance units to orient fires and maintain freedom of
action while maintaining maximum standoff during the engagement. Time-distance analysis determines
expected enemy rates of advance, which establishes where to place named areas of interest to confirm or
deny an enemy COA and to trigger the attack, as well as where to best place indirect fire targets to
simultaneously attack the enemy in depth. Target areas of interest, engagement areas, attack by fire
positions, attack routes, named areas of interest, and observation positions are planned in depth. This
provides the aviation force the maximum flexibility to maintain contact and exercise disciplined initiative
to continue the attack throughout the depth of the designated AO.
3-43. When conducting an attack against a defending or stationary enemy force, IPB focuses on the best
terrain to conduct the attack from while providing attack or reconnaissance units maximum standoff and
freedom to maneuver. Enemy reserve locations and counter-attack routes are analyzed to further identify |
3-04 | 72 | Chapter 3
aviation attack by fire positions and engagement areas to limit the enemy’s freedom of action and to attack
the enemy throughout the depth of his or her defense with either direct or indirect fires.
3-44. When planning attacks, the commander controls the operation by using attack. routes or axes of
attack, engagement areas, trigger lines, attack by fire positions, HAs, PLs, TRPs, ACMs, named areas of
interest, and target areas of interest. To limit the extent of the attack, the commander may also designate an
LOA and/or subordinate unit boundaries in the designated AO. These control measures allow for
decentralized actions and small-unit initiative to exploit successful attacks to the greatest extent possible.
3-45. Attacks are triggered based on enemy events, time, friendly actions or a combination. The nature of
the target and the commander’s end state determine which method to use. A decision support matrix is a
helpful tool to assist commanders with the timing and sequencing of the attack and integration of
supporting enablers.
3-46. During execution, the Army Aviation attack or reconnaissance units use maneuver and direct and/or
indirect joint fires to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage. To achieve superiority over the enemy,
the commander must take advantage of the range, precision, and lethality of all available fires. He or she
also must gain and maintain information superiority through in-depth reconnaissance and continuous
maneuver to positions of advantage using speed, maneuverability, maximum standoff, and the available
terrain.
SECTION IV – RECONNAISSANCE.
3-47. Reconnaissance is a mission to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information
about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance
operations allow the commander to understand the situation and visualize the battlefield by filling in critical
information gaps to mitigate risk, allocate resources, and prioritize tasks. Effective reconnaissance allows
the commander to identify where the enemy is weak or strong, the best place or opportunity to concentrate
combat power to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage, or where and when to best deny the
enemy a position of relative advantage. For more on reconnaissance, see FM 3-98. FM 6-99 contains
appropriate formats for bridge, route, and patrol reports.
3-48. Aerial reconnaissance serves as a link between sensors and mounted or dismounted units, and is used
to cue other reconnaissance methods to specific areas, thereby increasing overall tempo of the operation.
Aerial reconnaissance is appropriate when—
* Weather conditions are favorable.
* Time is limited or information is required quickly.
* Ground reconnaissance assets are unavailable, or the target is at an extended range.
* The enemy situation is vague but considered to be high risk, or is known and is high risk for
ground assets.
3-49. Army Aviation conducts reconnaissance as part of its parent organization’s focused information
collection efforts by either fighting for or collecting information by stealth and observation.
Reconnaissance is conducted before, during, and after operations to inform the IPB process and assist the
commander with the formulation, confirmation, or modification of a COA.
3-50. Army Aviation attack or reconnaissance units are specifically equipped, trained and organized to
conduct all forms of reconnaissance except special reconnaissance. Assault and GS aviation units can also
perform limited reconnaissance missions based on mission variables; however, regardless of whether
reconnaissance is assigned as a specified task or not, it is always an implied task for every aviation element
to gather and report information on enemy and friendly disposition, terrain, and civil activities observed
during the course of all operations.
3-51. Army Aviation conducts reconnaissance at all echelons, from elements as small as an AWT or SWT
using MUM-T, or a single UAS, up to elements as large as an AB or ACS, either independently as a pure
aviation maneuver force or as part of a deliberately planned scheme of maneuver as a member of the
combined arms team. The size of the aviation reconnaissance force is driven by the size of the AO, |
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complexity and number of reconnaissance objectives, fidelity of the information required by the
commander, the enemy situation, and the time available to answer the commander’s specified information
requirements.
3-52. The commander orients aviation reconnaissance operations on reconnaissance objectives within the
designated AO. Reconnaissance objectives can be a terrain feature, geographic area, or enemy force for
which the commander requires further information. The commander determines reconnaissance objectives
based on PIR. Based on the capabilities of the reconnaissance force and time available to conduct the
reconnaissance, the commander and staff further delineate the priority of tasks and information collection
efforts to ensure the most critical information is collected to enable timely decisions. The event template,
terrain analysis and enemy situational template create information requirements that in turn focus the
collection effort and reconnaissance objectives.
3-53. The commander controls the reconnaissance operation by using routes, subordinate unit boundaries,
PLs, contact points, checkpoints, named areas of interest, fire support coordination measures, ACMs, and
objectives. Such control measures allow for decentralized actions and small-unit initiative to the greatest
extent possible. The reconnaissance begins at the line of departure or start point; the depth of the
reconnaissance is controlled by using a LOA. Control measures are placed on recognizable terrain features
when possible.
3-54. To enable disciplined initiative in execution, the commander provides reconnaissance objectives,
refined critical reconnaissance tasks, bypass criteria, engagement criteria and/or reconnaissance handover
criteria, the latest time the required information is of value with date-time group, and an end state that
defines how the reconnaissance effort influences follow-on operations. This enables the aviation
reconnaissance force to develop and execute a reconnaissance plan that provides the required information
within the time necessary to inform the commander’s decisions.
3-55. Army Aviation conducts zone, route, and/or area reconnaissance, or reconnaissance in force when
task-organized with ground maneuver forces. These forms of reconnaissance allow the commander and
staff to understand and visualize the environment, develop the situation, create options, and identify
opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
3-56. Zone reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed
information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces in a zone defined by boundaries (ADP 3-90).
3-57. Commanders assign zone reconnaissance missions to gain detailed situational understanding when
the enemy situation is vague and/or the understanding of the terrain is limited. Zone reconnaissance
missions are generally large, deliberate efforts to gain a significant amount of information. The aviation
reconnaissance force commander must balance time and assets available against the urgency and number of
information requirements required by the higher commander to ensure the force executes with the right
tempo and level of detail. Aviation reconnaissance forces provide the combined arms team with increased
reconnaissance depth, and speed, as well as long-range communications and the ability to conduct
reconnaissance in complex or no-go terrain.
3-58. During offensive operations, a zone reconnaissance is typically oriented forward of ground maneuver
forces along an axis of attack or axis of advance. This enables friendly forces to maneuver within the zone
at reduced risk due to greater situational understanding of the terrain, movement routes, obstacles, and
enemy forces. During defensive operations, a zone reconnaissance may be conducted forward of a
defensive position to locate enemy reconnaissance or to provide the commander with terrain information on
where to best locate friendly obstacles, targets, engagement areas, and/or counter-attack routes. During the
defense, the zone reconnaissance typically transitions to a screen when the LOA is reached or when contact
is made with an enemy force that is superior in size or in a position of advantage to the aviation
reconnaissance force. However, not all zone reconnaissance missions are conducted forward of friendly
forces. A zone reconnaissance may also be conducted to the rear or flanks of a friendly ground maneuver
force to locate bypassed or infiltrating enemy forces or to provide the commander with greater situational
understanding of the AO. |
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3-59. The size of the zone, number of reconnaissance objectives, mission duration, the latest time the
information is of value, enemy situation, number of routes, number of built-up areas, and complexity of the
terrain drives the reconnaissance tempo and the size and task organization of the aviation force conducting
the zone reconnaissance. Although an attack or reconnaissance platoon using MUM-T is capable of
conducting zone reconnaissance in a small zone for a limited duration, zone reconnaissance missions
typically require commitment of an AC/ACT or larger force.
3-60. Unless the higher commander orders otherwise, the aviation reconnaissance force executes the below
listed critical tasks when assigned a zone reconnaissance mission. Figure 3-12, page 3-17, depicts an
aviation element conducting zone reconnaissance. If during the conduct of the mission, the aviation
reconnaissance force is unable to complete an assigned task, the unit reports and awaits further instructions.
The following are the critical zone reconnaissance tasks accomplished by the aviation reconnaissance force:
* Find and report all enemy forces in zone.
* Based on engagement criteria, destroy or defeat all enemy forces in zone within capability.
* Determine the trafficability of all terrain in zone.
* Conduct hasty visual inspection and classification of all bridges, overpasses, underpasses, and
culverts in zone.
* Locate and conduct hasty visual classification of all obstacles, minefields, built-up areas, and
barriers in zone.
* Locate and conduct hasty visual classification of all fords, crossing sites, and bypasses around
obstacles and built-up areas in zone.
* Report the above information, to include providing a sketch map, overlay, and/or full-motion
video feeds.
Figure 3–12. Attack element conducts a zone reconnaissance
AREA RECONNAISSANCE
3-61. Area reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that focuses on obtaining detailed information
about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (ADP 3-90). This area may include a town,
ridgeline, airhead, wood line, or any other critical operational feature or area such as a LZ/PZ or bridge.
The primary difference between an area and zone reconnaissance is that in an area reconnaissance the unit
conducting the reconnaissance first moves to the area, then conducts the reconnaissance. Area
reconnaissance is typically less complex and smaller than zone reconnaissance and generally takes less
time.
3-62. Army Aviation conducts area reconnaissance with elements as small as a AWT/SWT using MUM-T,
up to elements as large as an AC/ACT, either independently as a pure aviation maneuver force or as part of
a deliberately planned scheme of maneuver as a member of the combined arms team. |
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3-63. The size of the area, distance to the area, enemy situation in and en route to the area, and whether the
area will be occupied in the future drives the task organization and scheme of maneuver for the aviation
reconnaissance force. The control measures and critical reconnaissance tasks for an area reconnaissance are
the same as a zone reconnaissance. Figure 3-13 is an example of an air cavalry element conducting an area
reconnaissance of terrain and man-made areas of interest.
Figure 3–13. Air cavalry element conducts three simultaneous area reconnaissance missions
ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
3-64. Route reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all
terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (ADP 3-90). The route may be a
cross country mobility corridor, an air route, or a road, highway, or trail. The route reconnaissance provides
information on the condition of the route, and trafficability of the route, intersecting routes or mobility
corridors, key terrain that directly influences the route, obstacles along the route, and any friendly, enemy,
or civilian activity along the route.
3-65. Route reconnaissance is assigned either as a separate mission or as a specified task to a unit
conducting a zone or area reconnaissance. Army Aviation conducts route reconnaissance with elements as
small as an AWT/SWT using MUM-T, up to elements as large as an AC/ACT, either independently as a
pure aviation maneuver force or a member of the combined arms team.
3-66. The size of the aviation reconnaissance force is driven by the length of the route, complexity of the
terrain, fidelity of the information required by the commander, the enemy situation, and the time available
to answer the specified information requirements. If detailed information is required for route and bridge
classification or obstacle clearance, the aviation reconnaissance force must be task-organized as a
combined arms team.
3-67. The commander controls the route reconnaissance with lateral boundaries on each side of the route, a
start point at the beginning of the route, checkpoints at key intersections and turns along the route, and a
release point at the end of the route. A line of departure is established along the route, just short of where
enemy contact is expected and an LOA is established beyond the release point far enough out to encompass
any terrain the enemy can use to influence the route. Additional control measures can include PLs, TRPs,
and named areas of interest on adjacent key terrain or suspected enemy locations.
3-68. Unless the higher commander orders otherwise, the aviation reconnaissance force executes the
following tasks:
* Finds and reports all enemy forces that can influence movement along the route.
* Based on engagement criteria, clears all enemy forces that can influence movement along the
route, within capability.
* Determines route trafficability based on the size, capabilities, mission, and type of friendly force
to use the route. |
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* Reconnoiters all terrain the enemy can use to influence the route.
* Reconnoiters all built-up areas, contaminated areas, and lateral routes along the route.
* Evaluates and classifies all bridges, defiles, overpasses, underpasses, and culverts along the
route.
* Locates and conducts hasty visual classification of all obstacles, minefields, built-up areas, wire
obstacles, and barriers along the route.
* Locates and conducts hasty visual classification of all fords, crossing sites, and bypasses around
obstacles and built-up areas along the route.
* Reports the above information, to include providing a sketch map, route overlay, and/or full-
motion video feeds.
3-69. If during the conduct of the mission, the aviation reconnaissance force is unable to complete an
assigned task, the unit reports and awaits further instructions.
3-70. Figure 3-14, page 3-19, depicts an SWT conducting a route reconnaissance using MUM-T. While the
reconnaissance manned assets focus on the route, the UAS reconnoiters the adjacent terrain in which the
enemy may influence the reconnaissance objective during future operations.
Figure 3–14. Scout weapons team conducting route reconnaissance
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE
3-71. A reconnaissance in force is a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s
strength, disposition, and reactions or to obtain other information (ADP 3-90). Reconnaissance in force is
conducted as a combined arms operation at the battalion task force or higher level.
3-72. An ASTF or ABTF can conduct a limited reconnaissance in force when task-organized with adequate
ground maneuver forces, but typically Army Aviation is task-organized to the ground maneuver
headquarters tasked with reconnaissance in force. During a reconnaissance in force, subordinate aviation
elements may conduct the full range of tactical, enabling, and sustaining tasks, including attacks, air
assaults, reconnaissance, security, C2 support, and MEDEVAC.
3-73. A reconnaissance in force is an aggressive, enemy-oriented reconnaissance. The reconnaissance in
force is task-organized and maneuvers either by attacking or conducting a movement to contact to
overwhelm enemy reconnaissance and security forces to find the enemy main body and to determine enemy
weaknesses for exploitation. The reconnaissance is focused on enemy forces versus the terrain and typically
seeks some level of decisive engagement. The end state of the reconnaissance is either extraction of the
reconnaissance in force or exploitation by a follow-on force.
3-74. The enemy situation, size of the zone, and the commander’s follow-on concept of the operation
drives the task organization and scheme of maneuver. The less that is known about the enemy, the greater |
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the combat power required for the reconnaissance in force. The control measures associated with a
reconnaissance in force are similar to either a movement to contact or attack.
3-75. The following tasks are accomplished by Army Aviation when supporting a reconnaissance in force:
* Locate and determine the depth of the enemy security area.
* Destroy enemy reconnaissance and security forces within capability.
* Locate and report all obstacles and bypasses to enable the ground maneuver force to penetrate
the security area.
* Locate and determine the disposition of the enemy main body.
* Attack to destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay enemy main body forces within capability.
* Determine enemy weaknesses that can be exploited.
* Continuously report all information, including negative contact reports.
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
3-76. Special reconnaissance is characterized as reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a
special operation in hostile, denied, or politically-sensitive environments to collect or verify information of
strategic or operational significance (JP 3-05). Army Aviation units do not typically support special
reconnaissance missions.
FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE
3-77. When planning and executing reconnaissance operations, the application of the following seven
fundamentals inform the operations process and drive execution of successful reconnaissance missions.
3-78. Orient on reconnaissance objectives. Commanders direct reconnaissance operations by establishing
reconnaissance objectives with a specific task, purpose, and focus. Reconnaissance objectives enable the
commander to focus the efforts of the reconnaissance force to ensure his information requirements on the
enemy, terrain and civil populations are met within the required time. The enemy situation, time available,
complexity of the terrain and the number, depth, and types of reconnaissance objectives drive the task
organization and scheme of maneuver of the aviation reconnaissance force.
3-79. Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve. To provide continuous and focused reconnaissance
requires commanders to employ all available assets against reconnaissance objectives; however, this does
not necessarily mean to employ all assets simultaneously. Understanding the capabilities and limitations of
each asset, coupled with detailed planning, enables commanders to ensure each available reconnaissance
asset is employed to maximize its strengths to collect the required information while providing mutual
support and redundant coverage to the entire collection effort throughout the depth of the AO.
3-80. Ensure continuous reconnaissance. Due to the dynamic nature of the OE, commanders ensure that
reconnaissance is conducted continuously throughout the duration of the mission. The use of UAS to
provide persistent reconnaissance throughout the depth of the AO, coupled with AWTs/SWTs conducting
continuous relief on station, ensures the aviation reconnaissance force provides continuous coverage of the
designated reconnaissance objectives. Continuous reconnaissance using MUM-T enables greater change
detection in dynamic OEs, increased flexibility to maintain contact with acquired enemy forces,
redundancy to enable detailed information collection to achieve the reconnaissance objectives, and greater
flexibility to further develop the situation when required.
3-81. Retain freedom of maneuver. Mobility and maneuver are essential to successful aviation
reconnaissance operations. Commanders consider how the aviation reconnaissance force is task-organized,
the movement techniques used, and the planned scheme of maneuver, as well as bypass, reconnaissance
handover, and engagement criteria to ensure the aviation reconnaissance force retains the freedom to
maneuver to achieve the commander’s end state. Decisive engagement between the aviation reconnaissance
force and enemy forces may be necessary if fighting for information is required to fully develop the
situation. However, decisive engagement must be balanced against the time available to complete the
mission and the risk of the reconnaissance force becoming decisively engaged and possibly defeated by a |
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superior enemy force. Making contact with the smallest possible element, using redundant and different
reconnaissance capabilities, conducting effective counter-reconnaissance, maximizing stand-off, and
employing suppressive direct and indirect fires (when authorized) all contribute to reducing tactical risk
while enabling the aviation reconnaissance force to retain the freedom to maneuver.
3-82. Gain and maintain enemy contact. Using visual or technical means, the aviation reconnaissance
force locates and maintains enemy contact with the smallest force possible to prevent initial decisive
engagement while retaining freedom to maneuver and adequate combat power to develop the situation.
Based on the commander’s intent and contact criteria, maintaining contact with the enemy force provides
real-time information on the enemy’s disposition, composition, strength and actions to enable the
commander to make timely and informed decisions based on current intelligence. Once contact is gained
with an enemy force that does not meet bypass criteria, the aviation reconnaissance force does not
relinquish contact until directed to, reconnaissance handover is complete, or the enemy force is destroyed
based on engagement criteria.
3-83. Develop the situation rapidly. As timely collection of information requirements impact the
commander’s decisions, Army Aviation performs reconnaissance with the tempo required to meet the
requisite urgency to answer the necessary higher commander’s information requirements. If contact is
made with an enemy force, the aviation reconnaissance force reports immediately, conducts actions on
contact, and develops the situation to quickly determine the composition, disposition, strength, and activity
of the enemy prior to choosing a COA. Based on bypass criteria, engagement criteria, and reconnaissance
handover criteria, the aviation reconnaissance force may transition to a hasty attack to destroy an enemy
force, transition to a screen and employ direct and indirect fires. to harass and impede superior enemy
forces then conduct reconnaissance handover to a follow-on force, or report and bypass to continue the
reconnaissance effort if the enemy force meets bypass criteria.
3-84. Report all information rapidly and accurately. Quick and accurate positive and negative reporting
is essential to ensure the commander receives the necessary information to make timely decisions.
Reporting focuses on answering the commander’s PIR. However, seldom can a PIR be answered on its own
or in isolation. Therefore, PIR are broken down into different elements and assigned as collection tasks
within orders. (See ATP 2-01 for further information. )
3-85. At the ABTF/ASTF level and above, processing, exploitation, and dissemination is the execution of
the related functions that converts and refines reported data into usable information, distributes the
information for further analysis, and provides combat information to commanders and staffs. Processing,
exploitation, and dissemination is the link that ensures the efficient use and distribution of information
following collection and reporting. While performing these functions, some of the information meets the
criteria of combat information. In those cases, the combat information is disseminated to commanders and
staffs per standard operating procedure.
SECTION V – SECURITY
3-86. Security tasks are those tasks performed by the commander to provide early and accurate warning of
enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within which to
react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use their protected
force (ADP 3-90).
3-87. Security tasks protect the force from surprise and reduce unknowns. The protected force ranges from
friendly ground maneuver forces and facilities to the local population. Security tasks can be performed
forward, to the rear, to the flanks, or entirely around the protected force, whether stationary or moving.
3-88. The primary difference between reconnaissance and security missions is the focus of the effort.
Reconnaissance missions focus on the enemy and terrain, while security missions focus on the force being
protected. However, reconnaissance is inherent to all security operations. Security tasks serve as an
economy of force to prevent the premature commitment of other combat power.
3-89. Security tasks encompass five tasks—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. The
screen, guard and cover security tasks each require increasing levels of combat power and provide |
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increasing levels of security to the protected force. However, the more combat power in the security force,
the less combat power available for the main body. Area security preserves the commander’s freedom of
action to conduct sustaining operations, C2, and reposition reserves. Local security is an inherent
responsibility of all units and provides immediate and local protection of the force.
3-90. Army Aviation attack or reconnaissance units are specifically equipped, trained, and organized to
conduct security operations, but the only security task that aviation can perform autonomously is the screen
task. Army Aviation conducts screens at all echelons, from elements as small as an AWT/SWT using
MUM-T, up to elements as large as an AB/ACS, either independently as a pure aviation maneuver force or
as a member of the combined arms team.
3-91. The size of the aviation security force is determined by—
* Size and follow-on mission of the protected force.
* Location and orientation of the security area.
* Duration of the security mission.
* Enemy situation.
* Complexity of the terrain.
* Reaction time required by the protected force commander (most important).
3-92. When Army Aviation is designated as the combined arms team security force headquarters, only
screen or guard missions can be assigned to an ASTF/ABTF, or aviation brigade headquarters task-
organized with adequate ground maneuver forces. However, the security task assigned to subordinate
aviation elements is still screen. Due to the size, complexity, and C2 requirements, Army Aviation is not
assigned the covering force headquarters mission but may be task-organized to a BCT or higher ground
maneuver force assigned the covering force mission.
3-93. When task-organized to a ground maneuver force with an area, screen, guard, or covering force
security mission, Army Aviation conducts the full range of tactical, enabling, and sustaining tasks, to
include: screen, attack, reconnaissance, air assault, air movement, AE, and C2 support.
3-94. During security operations, Army Aviation can perform the following tasks:
* Screen the flanks or rear of a moving force or forward, to the flanks, or to the rear of a stationary
force.
* Conduct zone and route reconnaissance or provide a forward security element for a moving
ground force.
* Locate and destroy enemy reconnaissance and security forces in within the aviation unit’s AO or
attempting to penetrate the screen.
* Employ indirect and direct fires to fix or delay enemy main body forces.
* Conduct attacks to defeat or destroy enemy main body forces.
* Conduct force-oriented reconnaissance of all terrain and routes that influence the security area.
* Locate and reconnoiter obstacles and determine bypasses forward of a moving force.
* Air assault to seize an objective or to fix, block, or destroy an enemy force forward or to the
flanks of a moving or stationary force.
* Insert, extract, or resupply dismounted or mounted security units along a flank screen of a
moving force or forward of a stationary force.
* Conduct AE or aerial CASEVAC of the wounded and ill in the security area.
* Conduct air movement of friendly forces in the security area.
* Conduct C2 support to extend the range of communications networks to enable the protected
force increased situational understanding for early warning and reaction time.
3-95. Depending upon whether the aviation security force is protecting a moving or stationary force and
whether the security area is forward, to the rear, or to the flanks of the protected force, aviation security
force commanders use a variety of techniques when initially occupying positions within a security area or
along a screen line. When conducting a security mission for a stationary force, aviation security force
commanders consider how fast the security area must be occupied to meet mission requirements and what |
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level of security is required. If the enemy situation is unknown and time is limited, the aviation force
conducts a movement to contact through the security area to establish the screen at the LOA or prior to the
LOA if contact is gained with the enemy main body or a superior enemy force. If the enemy situation is
known and no substantial enemy forces are in the security area, the aviation security force can move
rapidly along planned routes to quickly establish the screen at the LOA. If time is available, the enemy
situation is vague, and/or the protected force commander requires detailed information in the security area,
the aviation security force conducts a zone reconnaissance to establish the screen line at the LOA or once
contact is gained with the enemy main body or a superior enemy force.
3-96. When conducting a security mission forward of a moving force, the aviation security force conducts
a zone reconnaissance or movement to contact forward of the ground security force; assists in maintaining
contact between the security force and the main body; assists in disengaging ground units, especially when
conducting battle handover and passage of lines with the main body; and conducts reconnaissance of terrain
that is hard to reach or would require too much time to cover with ground reconnaissance assets. The
technique used depends upon the requirements of the protected force. If the force is moving through
complex or unknown terrain, a zone reconnaissance is conducted far enough forward of the moving
protected ground force to locate enemy forces while providing the protected force with the required
information on trafficability of routes and movement corridors to enable freedom of maneuver. If the
terrain is known or easily trafficable and the enemy situation is unknown or vague, the aviation security
force conducts a movement to contact in zone with adequate distance to provide early warning of enemy
actions to allow the protected force time to react.
3-97. When conducting a flank security mission for a moving force, the aviation security force may use
three techniques to occupy the flank security area:
* Aviation security forces cross the line of departure separately from the main body and deploy to
perform the mission to the flanks. This is used when the enemy threat situation is known to be
low (figure 3-15).
Figure 3–15. Aviation assets conduct flank security in support of a BCT reconnaissance and
main body movement
* Aviation security forces cross the line of departure separately from the main body with lead
elements conducting a movement to contact while trail elements occupy the flank screen. This is
used when the enemy threat situation is unknown but knowledge or trafficability of the terrain is
known (figure 3-16, page 3-25). |
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Figure 3–16. Aviation assets conduct security in support of Stryker platoon movement
* Aviation security forces cross the line of departure with the main body and conduct zone
reconnaissance out to the LOA. This is used when the knowledge of the enemy and terrain are
vague and trafficability is of greater concern to the protected force commander than reaction
time to enemy contact (figure 3-17).
Figure 3–17. Aviation assets conduct zone reconnaissance in support of a BCT main body
movement
3-98. The aviation security force commander controls the security operation by using a variety of control
measures, to include: screen lines, subordinate unit boundaries, PLs, contact points, checkpoints, named
areas of interest, fire support coordination measures, ACMs, observation posts (OPs) and routes. Such
control measures allow for decentralized actions and small-unit initiative to the greatest extent possible.
The security operation begins at the line of departure and the depth and reaction time provided by the
security force is controlled by using an LOA. To the flank of a moving force or to the flanks or forward of a
stationary force, the LOA is depicted as a screen line or a lateral unit boundary. When possible, all control
measures are placed on recognizable terrain features. If a lateral unit boundary is the LOA and a friendly
ground maneuver unit is operating to the flank, contact points are established to ensure contact is
maintained with adjacent friendly units.
3-99. To enable disciplined initiative in execution, the protected force commander provides engagement,
battle handover and bypass criteria, the date-time group the security area must be established, the duration
of the security mission, and the reaction time required to enable the main body the required early warning |
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to react and prevent the enemy from achieving a position of relative advantage. This enables the aviation
security force commander to develop and execute a security plan that provides the required combat
information within the time necessary to inform the protected force commander’s decisions.
SCREEN
3-100. Screen is a security task that primarily provides early warning to the protected force (ADP 3-90).
While a screen provides minimal protection as compared to a guard or cover, Army Aviation’s lethality,
speed, and long-range precision fires significantly enhances the level of protection and reaction time
provided by a screen.
3-101. Figure 3-18, page 3-25, depicts two SWTs screening a security forward of a battalion area defense.
UAS focus on two primary avenues of approach into the security area while the SWTs screen secondary
routes in the security area.
Figure 3–18. Scout weapons team using MUM-T screens forward of a protected force
3-102. A screen is used to cover gaps between forces, exposed flanks of stationary forces, or to the rear or
flanks of a moving force. Screens are used when the expectation of enemy contact is low, the enemy force
is expected to be small or the protected force requires minimal reaction time. Screens are economy of force
missions to enable maximum combat power to remain uncommitted in the protected force. If significant
enemy contact is expected or more reaction time is required, other forms of security—guard or cover—are
more appropriate security tasks.
3-103. The screen force has the minimum combat power required to provide the desired early warning, as
well as destroy enemy reconnaissance forces with direct and indirect fires. ; however, to preserve main
body combat power, the screen force lacks adequate combat power to become decisively engaged with
enemy main body forces. Once contact is gained with the main body or a superior enemy force, the screen
force harasses and impedes the enemy force, then conducts battle handover to a follow-on force or the
protected force.
3-104. The enhanced endurance, mobility, lethality, sensors of Army Aviation attack or reconnaissance
units make them ideally suited to operate as an independent screening force or as a part of a combined arms
team conducting security operations. Attack or reconnaissance aircraft as well as UAS can acquire and
engage targets at extended ranges to provide maximum early warning and reaction time while not
becoming decisively engaged. Additionally, communication relay packages and non-LOS communications
enable effective reporting at greater distances to allow increased security area size and depth to maximize
early warning and reaction time.
3-105. Critical tasks for an aviation security force conducting screens, include the following: |
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* Allow no enemy to pass through the screen undetected and unreported.
* Maintain continuous surveillance of all avenues of approach larger than a designated size
(according to the protected force commander’s intent) into the security area.
* Destroy or repel all enemy reconnaissance prior to the enemy gaining observation on the
protected force.
* During defensive screens, locate the lead elements of the enemy and determine composition and
direction of movement.
* Maintain contact with enemy forces and report all activity with the security area.
* Maintain contact with the protected force main body and friendly security forces operating to its
flanks.
* Impede or harass enemy forces within capability while displacing to subsequent screens or
during battle handover.
3-106. Screens can be either stationary or moving. Stationary screens are conducted to the front, flanks, or
rear of a stationary protected force or to the flanks or rear of a moving protected force. Movement to
contact or zone reconnaissance is conducted to provide security forward of a moving protected force.
3-107. A stationary screen is established using a series of OP with overlapping fields of observation.
Using MUM-T with UAS focused on key named areas of interest that require persistent surveillance,
AWTs/SWTs conduct reconnaissance along the screen line focused on supporting named areas of interest,
routes, and mobility corridors that support enemy movement. Along the screen line, the aviation security
force typically remains dynamic and maneuvers between OPs, using terrain to mask movement to ensure
survivability and overlapping or redundant coverage of named areas of interest. The number of named
areas of interest and the frequency of coverage by the aviation screening force is driven by how many other
sensors and ground forces are committed to conducting the screen, the distance the screen is from the
protected force, and the expected enemy force that is attempting to penetrate the screen. Based on the
amount of space available for the security area, multiple screens are planned in depth to allow the screening
force to displace while maintaining contact and developing the situation with enemy forces.
3-108. A moving screen is tied to the movement rates and axis of advance or attack of the moving
protected force and is conducted either to the rear (seldom) or to the flanks (primary) of the moving force.
For a moving flank screen, the screen force screens from the lead combat element (does not include lead
security and reconnaissance. elements) of the main body of the moving protected force to the rear of the
protected force. To maintain protection of the moving force, the aviation security force executes a moving
flank or rear screen similar to a stationary screen with the exception of the movement techniques used to
occupy successive OPs along the screen line. The advantages and disadvantages of the various movement
techniques to occupy a moving screen are outlined in table 3-1 and figure 3-19 (page 3-27).
Table 3–1. Screen movement methods
Methods Characteristics Advantages Disadvantages
Alternate • Main body moves faster. • Very secure • Execution takes
bounds by • Conducted by platoon, method. time.
observation company, or troop. • Maintains maximum • Disrupts unit
posts • Contact is possible. surveillance over integrity.
the security area.
• Conducted from rear to
front.
Alternate • Main body moves faster. • Execution does not • May leave
bounds by unit • Conducted by platoon, take a great deal of temporary gaps in
company, or troop. time. coverage.
• Contact is possible. • Maintains good
surveillance over
• Conducted from rear to
the security area.
front.
• Maintains unit
integrity. |
3-04 | 84 | Chapter 3
Table 3–1. Screen movement methods, continued
Methods Characteristics Advantages Disadvantages
Successive • Main body is moving slowly. • Most secure • Execution takes the
bounds • Conducted by platoon, method. most time.
company, or troop. • Maintains • Unit is less secure
• Contact is possible. maximum when all elements
surveillance. are moving
• Conducted simultaneously or
in succession. • Maintains unit simultaneously.
integrity. • Simultaneous
• Unit should maintain an air
movement may
screen during ground
leave temporary
movement.
gaps.
Continuous • Main body is moving • Observation • Least secure
marching relatively quickly. posts displace method.
• Performed as a route quickly.
reconnaissance. • Maintains unit
• Enemy contact is not likely. integrity.
• Unit should maintain an air
screen on the flank.
Figure 3–19. Screen movement methods |
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GUARD
3-109. Guard is a security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and
reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body.
Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and functional
and multifunctional support assets of the main body (ADP 3-90). A guard differs in that it is a more robust
security force with increased combat power, is expected to engage the enemy force, and is expected to
avoid decisive engagement. Army Aviation can support the ground maneuver units conducting guard
operations, but they cannot conduct guard missions autonomously unless an ABTF or CAB is task-
organized with adequate ground maneuver forces. Army Aviation conducts the full range of tactical,
enabling, and sustaining. tasks when supporting or conducting a guard, including attack, reconnaissance,
movement to contact, screen, air assault, air movement, aerial C2, and AE or aerial CASEVAC.
COVER
3-110. Cover is a security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and
reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body
(ADP 3-90). Aviation forces can be task-organized to a BCT or larger element assigned a covering force
mission. Army Aviation conducts full-range aviation functions in support of the combined arms team
assigned to conduct cover, including attack, reconnaissance movement to contact, screen, air assault, air
movement, C2 support and AE or aerial CASEVAC.
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY
3-111. When planning and executing security operations, application of the following five fundamentals
informs the operations process and drives execution of successful security missions.
3-112. Provide early and accurate warning. Army Aviation provides depth to the security operation by
employing sensors and long-range observation techniques to detect enemy forces and provide early and
accurate warning. Early warning of threat activity should include a description of size, current disposition,
composition, location, direction of movement, and rate of advance to assist the staff in answering PIRs. The
distance the aviation security force operates from the main body is determined by mission variables; at a
minimum, it should operate far enough from the main body to prevent enemy forces from engaging or
observing the protected force. The earlier the aviation security force detects a threat, the greater the time the
protected force has to react. The use of UAS well forward of the screen line provides the security force
with additional early warning and reaction time to maneuver to further develop the situation. If the screen is
established at the LOA and the LOA is a forward unit boundary, coordination with the higher headquarters
is required if UAS are to operate forward to provide increased early warning and reaction time.
3-113. Provide reaction time and maneuver space. Based on the protected force commander’s desired
reaction time, Army Aviation operates at extended distances from the main body thus offering additional
time and space for the protected force commander to make an informed decision to employ forces. Based
on the commander’s intent, the aviation security force may transition to conduct offensive tasks to fix,
delay, or disrupt the enemy forces’ tempo and cohesion, providing reaction time and maneuver space to the
protected force.
3-114. Orient on the protected force, area, or facility. Whereas reconnaissance operations orient on the
reconnaissance objective, security operations orient on the protected force. The security force operates
between the enemy force and the protected force and is fully integrated in the protected force scheme of
maneuver. The movement and orientation of the security force is simultaneous and nested with the
protected force.
3-115. Perform continuous reconnaissance. The aviation security force provides continuous
reconnaissance through the persistent employment of UAS and continuous relief on station of
AWTs/SWTs. Reconnaissance is overlapping and redundant with ground security forces, when operating in
the security area, to ensure depth and mutual support. Based on the commander’s intent, aviation security
forces conducting reconnaissance transition to hasty attacks to defeat enemy reconnaissance and security |
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forces to prevent the enemy from gaining observation on the main body. Additional aviation attacks may be
conducted to harass, impede, or disrupt enemy main body forces. Aviation assault units may also infiltrate
and reposition ground maneuver security forces to provide redundant coverage of key named areas of
interest or to establish ambush locations to delay, block, or disrupt attacking enemy forces. Positioning of
FARPs, C2 nodes, UAS launch sites, and HAs as far forward as mission variables allow ensures the
aviation force can sustain the required tempo with the least amount of combat power to maintain
continuous reconnaissance while retaining the flexibility to rapidly develop the situation once contact is
gained.
3-116. Maintain enemy contact. Maintaining contact with the enemy develops the situation and allows
the commander to make well-informed decisions. Army Aviation’s inherent mobility and endurance allow
for aviation assets to rapidly gain and maintain enemy contact with the ability to develop the situation and
report the enemy’s actions as necessary. UAS provide persistent observation and allow manned aviation
systems to reposition to positions of advantage to maintain contact and further develop the situation.
Establishing subsequent screen lines and battle handover lines enable aviation security forces to maintain
contact in depth.
SECTION VI – AIR ASSAULT
3-117. An air assault is the movement of friendly assault forces by RW aircraft to engage and destroy
enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain (JP 3-18). Air assaults extend the tactical and operational
reach of the combined arms team by overcoming the effects of terrain, achieving surprise, and isolating,
dislocating, or destroying enemy forces by rapidly massing combat power at the maneuver commander’s
time and place of choice. (See FM 3-99 for detailed air assault information. )
3-118. Army Aviation conducts air assaults in support of offensive, defensive, and stability operations
throughout the depth and breadth of the AO. Air assaults are combined arms operations conducted to gain a
positional advantage, envelop, or turn enemy forces that may or may not be in a position to oppose the
operation. Assault units may be tasked with air assaulting a TCF in order to counter Level III enemy
penetrations of the main battle area. (For more information on the TCF, see FM 3-0 and JP 3-10. )
3-119. Task organization of the aviation task force supporting the AATF is based on mission variables but
at a minimum always includes an assault element and an attack or reconnaissance element as the
foundational aviation maneuver capability.
3-120. The assault element may be made up of assault helicopters, heavy lift helicopters, or a combination
of both. Aviation assault and heavy lift units transport ground maneuver forces and equipment from secure
or permissive PZs to either unsecure or secure LZs in the objective area. Based on mission variables and
the AATF commander’s intent, LZs may be directly on or very near the objective or offset from the
objective. The closer the LZ is to the objective, the greater the ability to rapidly mass combat power and
with greater likelihood of achieving surprise. Offset LZs are chosen when no suitable LZs are available, to
enhance survivability during the landing phase if the threat on the objective is high or when the AATF
commander desires to infiltrate into the objective. However, significant offset distances between the
objective and LZ location may reduce the element of surprise, may require a larger ground tactical force,
and may allow the enemy early warning and freedom to maneuver to gain a position of advantage.
Availability, size, and suitability of LZs; size, disposition, and capabilities of the enemy; size and
capabilities of the AATF; and the AATF commander’s intent drive the determination of LZ locations.
3-121. Army Aviation attack or reconnaissance. units, utilizing MUM-T, conduct a range of tactical and
enabling tasks in support of the air assault, to include air route reconnaissance, LZ/PZ reconnaissance,
attacks prior to and during the landing phase, attacks as shaping operations prior to the assault, and attacks,
screens, and reconnaissance operations in support of the ground tactical force after landing. Command and
control of the attack or reconnaissance element resides with the air mission commander until the ground
tactical force begins executing the ground tactical plan where the attack or reconnaissance units typically
become DS or OPCON to the ground tactical force commander.
3-122. Air assaults are typically deliberately planned operations. They can be conducted in deep areas
forward of a unit’s forward boundary in linear AOs; in the higher echelon’s deep areas between non-linear |
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and non-contiguous AOs; or in the echelon support area to defeat enemy threats that were either bypassed
during offensive operations or that have infiltrated or penetrated the main battle area or security area during
the conduct of defensive or stability operations. Air assaults into the close fight are generally in extremis
but may be used to exploit success by reinforcing friendly ground maneuver forces on an objective or to
prevent friendly forces from being overrun. Based on mission and operational variables, Army Aviation
executes air assaults with elements as small as a team of assault and a team of attack helicopters up to the
aviation brigade level, either as a subordinate member of the combined arms team or as the AATF
headquarters when task-organized with ground maneuver forces.
3-123. The amount of time required to plan and prepare an air assault is largely driven by the complexity
of the operation, the proficiency level of the ground and aviation forces forming the AATF, and the degree
to which habitual relationships allow the use of standardized procedures to reduce planning and preparation
times. Planning times can range from as short as 30 minutes for habitual quick reaction force missions up to
96 hours for larger company, battalion or brigade air assaults in high threat areas. Ultimately, however, air
assault planning should be as detailed as time permits and should include the production of written orders.
3-124. Examples of the continuum of air assault. operations, from generally the smallest force with the
least required planning and synchronization efforts, to very large, high risk air assault operations that
require detailed planning and rehearsals include, but are not limited to—
* A platoon (minus) air assaults to seize a small objective without a superior enemy security or
reaction force in close proximity and low air defense threats (figure 3-20).
Figure 3–20. Platoon (minus) air assault to seize a small objective
* An infantry company air assaults to seize a lightly defended bridge within a linear deep area just
beyond the FLOT to enable a BCT to maintain the offensive tempo without executing a
deliberate wet gap crossing operation during the attack (figure 3-21, page 3-32). |
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Figure 3–21. Infantry company air assault to seize key terrain in support of a BCT attack
* An infantry company air assaults to seize an objective in a small built-up area located between
non-contiguous AOs (figure 3-22).
Figure 3–22. Infantry company air assault to seize an objective
* An infantry battalion task force air assaults to seize a remote airfield in a non-contiguous deep
area and destroys local enemy security forces to establish a lodgment during a forced entry
operation (figure 3-23, page 3-33). |
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Figure 3–23. Infantry battalion air assault to seize a remote airfield and destroy local enemy
security forces
* An infantry brigade air assaults to seize key terrain and block enemy forces retrograding during
exploitation (figure 3-24).
Figure 3–24. Infantry BCT air assault to block enemy forces retrograding
3-125. The level of planning and preparation time required for an air assault is driven by the operational
and mission variables, as well as the training level and habitual relationship of the AATF. Although air
assault operations can be complex, maintaining continuous friendly and enemy running estimates, using
common SOPs, maintaining continuous liaison and habitual training relationships and continuous target
development through reconnaissance and IPB all increase the agility of the AATF to seize the initiative
through reduced time required to plan, prepare, and execute. (See FM 3-99 for detailed planning |
3-04 | 90 | Chapter 3
considerations.) Regardless of how long an organization takes to plan, brief, rehearse, and execute a
mission, all air assault operations use the following reverse planning sequence:
* Ground tactical plan.
* Landing plan.
* Air movement plan.
* Loading plan.
* Staging plan.
3-126. The steps of the reverse planning sequence are developed collaboratively between the ground force
and aviation force. The foundation of the operation is the ground tactical plan and is the plan from which
all others are developed.
3-127. The ground tactical plan is planned to accomplish the tactical mission, such as establish blocking
positions, destroy an enemy force or seize key terrain. The scheme of maneuver the ground tactical force
commander chooses to accomplish his or her mission drives the rest of the planning process to ensure the
ground force arrives at the right place with the right combat power to achieve surprise and overwhelm the
enemy force. The AATF is organized with sufficient combat power to seize initial objectives and protect
LZs. The required combat power should be delivered to the objective area consistent with aircraft and PZ
capacities to take advantage of surprise and shock effect.
3-128. When planning loads, squad integrity should be maintained by chalk and platoon integrity by serial
to reduce C2 and span of control challenges during the landing phase and initiation of the ground tactical
plan. To perform its mission, an AATF must arrive intact at the LZ. The force must be tailored to provide
en-route security and protection from the PZ, throughout the entire air route, and at the LZ.
3-129. The AATF is organized with adequate sustainment to accomplish the mission or until designated
follow-on or linkup forces arrive. Units that support the air assault operation normally are placed in DS to
the AATF to ensure close coordination and continuous, dedicated support throughout an operation.
3-130. Various elements perform specific tasks ensuring the successful execution of an air assault. Attack
or reconnaissance units using MUM-T conduct reconnaissance, security, and attacks during all phases of
the operation. Indirect and joint fires. provide fire support to set the conditions in the objective or to
suppress enemy air defense en route and on the objective before, during, and after the air assault and
continue to provide supporting fires once the ground tactical force is established on the ground. When
planning assaults, the AATF commander controls the operation by using air corridors, air routes, primary
and alternate LZs, engagement areas, attack by fire positions, screen lines, HAs, PLs, TRPs, ACMs, named
areas of interest, and target areas of interest. To define the AO, the commander may also designate
subordinate unit boundaries and objectives in the designated AO. These control measures allow for
decentralized actions and small-unit initiative to the greatest extent possible.
SECTION VII – AIR MOVEMENT
3-131. An air movement is the air transport of units, personnel, supplies, and equipment including
airdrops and air landings (JP 3-17) and is not synonymous with air assault. Air movement operations are a
viable means of transport and distribution in support of offensive, defensive, stability, and DSCA. Loads
can be configured internally or externally depending on mission variables, and type aircraft available to
conduct the air movement operation.
3-132. Air movement operations are conducted to reposition units, personnel, supplies, equipment, and
other critical combat elements in support of current and/or future operations. Air movement operations
allow the ground force commander to control the tempo of operations and meet the enemy force at the time
and place of choice as he or she sets conditions. Utility and cargo helicopters supplement ground
transportation to help sustain continuous offensive and defensive operations, and allow the supported
commander to overcome difficult terrain and time constraints on operations.
3-133. Assault and GS helicopter units perform air movement on a DS or GS basis. Though air assault
operations and air movement are separate missions, the planning sequence used for air assault operations |
3-04 | 91 | Army Aviation Operations
with modified phases are applied to an air movement. Army Aviation FW operations require a detailed
justification and validation for use and typically involve the air movement of limited critical personnel,
equipment, and supplies between intra-theater airfields when deployed.
INTERNAL LOAD OPERATIONS
3-134. Internal load operations are conducted by Army RW and FW aircraft. However, the primary
aircraft used for cargo is the CH-47, due to its size, airframe configuration, and lift capabilities, over utility-
type assault helicopters. Large-scale air movement operations require detailed planning and C2 similar to
air assaults. Most air movements are smaller and highly decentralized requiring as few as two RW or one
FW aircraft but can be executed with formations as large as an assault or GS battalion.
3-135. The CH-47 helicopter has an internal cargo handling system which allows for the transport of three
463L pallets or 10 standard warehouse pallets, permitting rapid load and offload of palletized cargo. At the
aft end of the aircraft, the rear ramp permits some internal drive-on and drive-off capabilities for light
vehicles and trailers. Internally, the CH-47 helicopter can seat 33 passengers with baggage; in an air
CASEVAC configuration, it can load litter patients directly to the floor.
3-136. The UH-60 is used mainly for tactical transport of troops, supplies, and equipment. Depending on
how the seats are installed, the cargo compartment of the UH-60 can seat up to 11 combat-equipped troops
and 2 crew chiefs/door gunners.
3-137. The C-12 and UC-35 are used as intra-theater transport assets to move mission-critical personnel
and light cargo. They are capable of self-deploying and transporting required personnel and equipment
(aircraft, crewmembers, and maintenance personnel with personal equipment, tools, and limited spare
parts) to conduct limited duration operations. These FW units support flights under the control of the
Operational Support Airlift Command.
EXTERNAL LOADS
3-138. Typical external loads include bulk supplies, fuel or water blivets, vehicles, trailers, material
handling equipment, towed artillery and other weapons systems, and bridging equipment. The supported
unit is responsible for preparing, weighing, and rigging external loads. They must avoid overloading
vehicles, trailers, pallets and other containers beyond maximum weights that have been coordinated with
the aviation unit. If the aircraft is unable to lift the load or transport it the required distance, the supported
unit must reduce the weight by removing items. The aviation unit is the final determination of the load’s
worthiness to fly and determines in advance what portion of the load to carry internally or externally.
Special consideration for the size and condition (dust, debris) of the PZ and security of the LZ must be
accounted for in the planning process.
3-139. The CH-47 is equipped with a triple cargo-hook system that enables the external transport of
vehicles and trailers, towed Howitzers in tandem, and to carry bulky, oversized, or heavier items. The CH-
47 is the only Army aircraft capable of transporting the 155-milllimeter towed Howitzer and the heavier
high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle variants. The triple cargo hooks help to stabilize external loads
in flight. Some lighter vehicles and other equipment can be lifted side-by-side. The UH-60 is equipped with
a single point cargo-hook system that enables the external transport of small vehicles and bulky, heavy
loads that do not easily fit in the cabin of the aircraft.
UNIQUE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIR MOVEMENT
3-140. Air movements are not as complex in planning and execution as an air assault operation, but
planning must be detailed to meet the commander’s end state and the safety of the crew and passengers. A
typical air movement may be vulnerable to enemy contact as a majority of missions support troop
movement and equipment to established secure areas such as forward operating bases or combat outposts.
Extended distances and limited low threat routes can induce limitations to mission planning and execution,
and may enable the enemy to identify predictable flight profiles or routes. |
3-04 | 92 | Chapter 3
3-141. Air movement requires pre-coordination between the operations cells of aviation units and the
units supported maximizing troop and equipment movements and the efficient use of air assets dedicated to
mission support. Air movements must be planned to maximize the capability and employment duration of
the aviation unit. These operations are especially effective in moving forces and equipment when—
* Ground routes are limited, congested, damaged, or nonexistent.
* Threat activities or obstacles restrict ground movement.
* The supported unit does not have adequate available vehicles.
* Time is critical.
* PZs/LZs are the appropriate size with the requisite security to safely execute the operation.
SECTION VIII – AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION
3-142. MEDEVAC is the timely, efficient movement, and en-route care by medical personnel of the
wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between MTFs. The provision of en-route care on a medically-equipped
vehicle greatly enhances the patient’s potential for survival and recovery, and may reduce long-term
disability by maintaining or improving the patient’s medical condition. The Army MEDEVAC system is
comprised of dedicated, standardized MEDEVAC ambulances (ground and air). These ambulances have
been designed, staffed, and equipped to provide en-route medical care and are used exclusively to support
medical missions.
3-143. Army air ambulance units provide DS and area support within the joint operations area and joint
security area to support the overall Army Health System and the Joint Service Support plan. At the tactical
level, DS or area support assets locate, acquire, treat, and evacuate patients to an appropriate MTF for
stabilization, prioritization, and preparation for evacuation to a higher level of medical care (if necessary).
3-144. Army air ambulances are dedicated assets which are marked according to international
agreements; all occupants are legally classified as noncombatants. This special protection provides a
reduced level of risk to the patient and crew as they conduct their missions. The focus of the MEDEVAC
mission, coupled with dedicated platforms, permits a rapid response to calls for support. The air ambulance
unit operates in a ready alert status to rapidly respond to evacuation missions and is not diverted to perform
any other tasks. Although air and ground vehicles are used to transport patients, AE is generally preferred
for seriously wounded, injured, and ill personnel because of the speed, range, and flexibility it provides.
3-145. Army AE spans tactical, operational, and strategic objectives in support of the combatant
commander’s mission. It is essential that all commanders in command of AE assets understand how
MEDEVAC systems integrate with each other throughout the AO and across the levels of war. Table 3-2
details Army AE support for each level of war is as follows:
* Tactical:
Brigade combat team.
Echelons above brigade (divisions and corps).
Emergency Class VIII resupply.
Emergency movement of medical personnel and equipment.
Enemy prisoner of war casualties.
Patient movement to and between medical facilities and contingency aeromedical staging
areas in the area of operation.
* Operational
Multinational.
Joint.
Class VIII resupply.
Department of Defense civilians/contractors.
Medical personnel/equipment.
Military working dogs. |
3-04 | 93 | Army Aviation Operations
Shore-to-ship.
Stability tasks.
* Strategic:
Host nation.
Defense support to civil authorities.
Nongovernmental organizations.
Department of Defense support to other government agencies.
Foreign humanitarian assistance.
3-146. Table 3-2 displays primary task and purpose of the AE function. For additional information on
MEDEVAC and medical regulations, refer to JP 4-02, AR 40-3, and ATP 4-02. 2.
Table 3-2. Primary task and purpose of AE functions
Primary task Purpose
Clear the battlefield of casualties to facilitate and
Acquire, locate, treat, enhance the tactical commander’s freedom of
stabilize, and evacuate movement. This task is performed by the aeromedical
evacuation crew.
Maintain the patient’s medical condition during transport
and provide emergency medical intervention when
required. This task is performed by the critical care flight
En-route medical care
paramedic. Additional en-route care is provided by en-
route critical care nurses and additional advance
providers on a case-by-case augmentation.
Provide evacuation for units without organic medical
evacuation assets. Provide for rapid medical evacuation
Area support response to units operating throughout the supported
area.
Emergency movement of Provide a rapid response for the emergency movement
medical personnel, supplies, of scarce medical resources throughout an operational
and equipment environment when required by the operational situation.
Transfer of patients between Provide a capability to cross-level patients within the
medical treatment facilities theater hospitals and to transport patients being
and en route patient staging evacuated out of the theater to staging facility prior to
system flight departure. Provide intra-theater aeromedical
evacuation.
Provide a reciprocal procedure to exchange like medical
Medical property transfer property when patients are evacuated with equipment
accompanying them.
Provide support to medical regulating activities to
ensure vital linkup between operational evacuation
Medical regulating support support and the scheduling of patients for evacuation
out of theater by strategic aeromedical evacuation
resources.
3-147. Air ambulance companies are equipped with 15 HH-60 aircraft, capable of supporting 24-hour
operations. These companies consist of a company headquarters, an area support MEDEVAC platoon
equipped with three HH-60s, and four forward support MEDEVAC platoons with three aircraft each. The
company can operate either from one location or up to five decentralized locations, depending on the
supported population, the size of the AO, the locations of MTFs, and the capabilities of supporting
elements. An aviation task force is typically task-organized with one forward support MEDEVAC platoon
of 3 HH-60s and 21 personnel. |
3-04 | 94 | Chapter 3
PROVISION OF EN-ROUTE CARE
3-148. The provision of en-route care on medically-equipped aircraft enhances a patient’s potential for
survival and recovery. Extended distances from a point of injury or ambulance exchange point (AXP) to the
MTF make en-route medical care even more critical. Army air ambulances are staffed with highly
specialized critical care flight paramedics with advanced critical care training. These flight paramedics are
essential for patient stabilization, sustainment, and survival during evacuation.
3-149. Patients may require additional medical professionals to ensure the appropriate level of care is
provided. En-route critical care nurses or other advanced medical providers may augment the AE crew on a
case-by-case basis. Figure 3-25 illustrates the en-route medical care capabilities between various platforms
and how each compare to United States emergency medical services standards of care. Commanders and
staffs should understand the varying medical capabilities for patient movement when planning and
conducting operations.
Figure 3–25. Medical skill-level comparison
RECEIPT OF THE EVACUATION PLAN FROM HIGHER
3-150. Theater evacuation policy refers to a command decision indicating the length, in days, of the
maximum period of non-effectiveness that patients may be held within the command for treatment. The
Secretary of Defense establishes this policy with advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
recommendations from the combatant commander.
3-151. The evacuation plan integrates AE to support a regionally-focused Army health service plan. The
Army health service plan supports the combatant commander and theater engagement plan. All joint, allied,
multi-national, and/or host-nation medical assets are assessed in the development of the Army health
service plan for a given operation. Depending on the requirement of the Army health service plan, Army
AE assets may be required to provide support to other services and/or provide area support throughout an |
3-04 | 95 | Army Aviation Operations
AO. To establish evacuation procedures, each level of command issues an evacuation plan through the
orders process. Figure 3-26 describes the evacuation orders process. On receipt of the higher headquarters
Army health service plan, the AE support plan must be synchronized with Army Aviation planners. The
evacuation order assigns—
* The area support mission responsibilities for patient movement, blood, and medical resupply.
For example, an air ambulance company in an ECAB supporting a division in the support area
may be assigned more patient movements between MTFs due to fewer expected casualties away
from the close area.
* Joint and multinational force support responsibilities. For example, an air ambulance company
could be tasked to provide AE to a Marine expeditionary force.
* Any DS or area support requirements that take an air ambulance asset away from their higher
headquarters. For example, a forward support MEDEVAC platoon could be tasked to support a
humanitarian mission in a specific region outside the boundaries of the higher command.
Figure 3–26. Medical evacuation orders process and medical planner locations
3-152. The evacuation plan for a given AO requires adjustment and change during different phases of an
operation. For example, transition from LSCO to consolidation of gains may dictate a significant change in
evacuation coverage priorities. AE operations often require plans which support continuous and often
decentralized operations. Such planning considerations include—
* Receipt and synchronization with the MEDEVAC plan from higher headquarters.
* DS and area support as required.
* Mission variables.
* Air ambulance company support for up to five locations during split-based operations.
* Battle rhythm and communications flow for a MEDEVAC mission request.
* Medical operations cell coordination with all medical units for collecting medical information to
develop and maintain situational awareness of the MTF and patient regulating requirements.
Note. In a multinational or coalition operation, a patient evacuation coordination cell may be
used in lieu of the medical operations cell.
* Fighter management plan to support 24-hour continuous operations at each AE location. |
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