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3-24 | 69 | Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals
networked organization embedded in a sympathetic population. Differentiating between insurgents,
insurgent supporters, neutrals, and the host-nation government supporters is difficult.
4-92. Insurgencies can be viewed from an overall organizational perspective to the perspective of an
individual. Networked insurgencies often have a great degree of internal complexity and this makes
understanding networked insurgencies difficult. The relationship between two individuals or two groups in
an insurgency may be hierarchal, based on a mutual peer to peer understanding, or a cultural understanding
based upon social norms. Understanding the relationship between groups and individuals within groups is
essential to understanding how an insurgency works and is a part of the overall intelligence preparation of
the area of operations and understanding mission variables. This understanding starts with an individual
level analysis.
4-93. Individual-level analysis characterizes members within an organization, identifies its key members,
describes the types of connections between members, and makes assumptions about unknown members.
Commanders and staffs can describe individuals based on their network position in relation to the network
position of other individuals in the network. A networked insurgency consists of individuals and
connections between them. Commanders and staffs can think of the individuals in an insurgency as actors
or nodes. The connections between nodes are called links. This connection between two people is called a
dyad. Understanding the various types of dyads is essential in understanding the nature of an insurgency.
Person A could be connected to Person B through a number a various types of connections and each type of
relationship represents an important type of dyad. (See figure 4-4 for examples of some of types of dyads.)
Figure 4-4. Examples of dyads
4-94. Individual connections and new connections matter to an insurgency. For example, a marriage
between a combatant and a member of the auxiliary opens new paths in a networked insurgency. Moreover,
the success or lack of success of the couple will now be important. In other words, in this example, both
individuals will be vested in one another, and other insurgents’ perceptions of them will be tied together.
The nature of the bonds between individuals and decisions on who to create new relationships with have a
future impact on both the insurgency and the individuals in the dyad.
4-95. Commanders and staffs must understand the role individuals play in a networked insurgency. One
node or a very few central nodes dominate a very centralized network. If these nodes are removed or
damaged, the network may quickly fragment into unconnected subnetworks. Hubs are nodes with high |
3-24 | 70 | Chapter 4
degrees of centrality. A network centralized around a well-connected hub can fail abruptly if that hub is
disabled or removed. A less centralized network has no single points of failure, and it has multiple
connections between all members. It is resilient even if some nodes are removed. Many nodes or links can
fail while still allowing the remaining nodes to reach each other over other network paths.
4-96. Commanders and staffs can also understand how an individual fits into a network by looking at that
individual’s degree centrality and betweenness centrality. Degree centrality describes how active an
individual is in the network. Network activity for a node is measured using the concept of degrees—the
number of direct connections a node has. Nodes with the most direct connections are the most active in
their networks. Commanders and staffs determine where those connections lead and how they connect the
otherwise unconnected. If a node has many ties, it is either prominent or influential. Betweenness centrality
indicates the extent to which an individual lies between other individuals in the network, serving as an
intermediary, liaison, or bridge. A node with high betweenness centrality has great influence over what
flows in the network. Depending on position, a person with high betweenness plays a broker role in the
network.
4-97. Nodes on the periphery often receive very low centrality scores. However, peripheral nodes are often
connected to networks that are not currently mapped. The outer nodes may be resource gatherers or
individuals with their own network outside their insurgent group. These characteristics make them very
important resources for fresh information that is not available inside their insurgent group.
4-98. However, understanding a networked insurgency requires more than simply understanding
relationships between individuals. Commanders and staffs must understand an insurgency at the
organizational level. Organizational-level analysis provides insight about the insurgent organization’s form,
efficiency, and cohesion. Commanders and staffs must understand a networked insurgency’s overall
organization to understand the nature of the threat. An insurgency may consist of large numbers of
subinsurgencies. As a result, each group will have a range of capacities as compared to the other groups.
Commanders and staffs can describe organizational capacities using the concept of network density.
4-99. Network density is a general indicator of how connected people are in a network. Network density is
the proportion of links in a network relative to the total number of links possible. Network density within
an insurgency indicates which groups are most capable of conducting a coordinated attack or other type of
coordination. (See figure 4-5.) |
3-24 | 71 | Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals
Figure 4-5. Examples of dyad networks
4-100. Changes in network density can also show changes in an insurgency’s capabilities over time. A
decrease in network density means the group is reduced and becoming fragmented. This can be in response
to actions taken by counterinsurgents.
4-101. Most network measures, including network density, can be mapped out to evaluate performance
over time. Based on changes in network density over time, a commander can—
* Monitor enemy capabilities.
* Monitor the effects of recent operations.
* Develop tactics to further fragment the insurgency.
4-102. Changes in network density can also show changes in the capabilities of an insurgency over time.
An increase in network density indicates an increased likelihood that the insurgent group can conduct
coordinated attacks. A decrease in network density means the group is reduced and becoming fragmented.
This can be in response to actions taken by counterinsurgents. An effective counterinsurgency may
eventually face only low-network-density subgroups. This is because high network-density subgroups
require only the capture of one or a few highly connected insurgents to degrade the network. So while
high-network-density groups are the most dangerous, they are also the easiest to disrupt. (See figure 4-6 on
page 4-22 for an example of the possible evolution of a networked insurgency.) |
3-24 | 72 | Chapter 4
Figure 4-6. Example of changes to tactics based on density shift
4-103. Individuals within a network can also shape an insurgency. If one individual or a small group of
individuals have relationships essential to maintaining an insurgency, counterinsurgents must understand
those relationships. One node or a very few central nodes could dominate a highly centralized network.
These nodes are called hubs and can be essential for an insurgency. A less centralized network may have no
single point of failure.
OTHER ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS
4-104. The district stability framework assists planners in identifying and mitigating sources of instability.
Because of the uniqueness of the stability environment in each district within an area of operations, the
district stability framework was designed to identify and mitigate sources of instability. This framework
works as a planning assessment tool and nests into the military decisionmaking process. There are three
steps to the district stability framework: analysis, design, and monitoring and assessment. (See ADRP 3-07
for more details on the district stability framework.)
4-105. The interagency conflict assessment framework is another framework used to understand conflict.
The purpose of the interagency conflict assessment framework is to develop a commonly held
understanding, across relevant U.S. government departments and agencies, of the dynamics driving and
mitigating violent conflict within a country. This common understanding informs U.S. policy and planning
decisions. It may also include steps to establish a strategic baseline against which U.S. government
engagement can be evaluated. It is a both a process and a tool available for use by any U.S. government
agency to supplement interagency planning. (For more information on interagency conflict assessment
framework, see the U.S. government publication Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework.) |
3-24 | 73 | Chapter 5
Insurgency Threat Characteristics
5-1. Threat characteristics involve the composition, disposition, activities, and tactics of an insurgency.
The composition of an insurgency is covered under the eighth dynamic, organizational and operational
patterns. Tactics for an insurgency include political activities, criminal actions, and military tactics.
Counterinsurgents consider how these threat characteristics create strengths and weaknesses for an
insurgency.
DISPOSITION AND ACTIVITIES
5-2. The disposition is the geographic location of insurgent elements and the way they are deployed,
employed, or located. The dispositions of an insurgency are partially determined by an operational
environment and the operational variables. For example, if an insurgency has connections to a black
market, some of its dispositions will normally be to protect that market. Terrain will also affect the
dispositions of an insurgency. Commanders and staffs must understand an operational environment to
understand an insurgency’s dispositions. (See chapter 2 for more information on an operational
environment.)
5-3. Insurgents who rely solely on violence to achieve their political goals are probably ineffective.
Instead, effective insurgents conduct a wide range of activities to achieve their goals. Many of these
activities are not enemy or terrain oriented, but political. Insurgents use a range of activities supporting
both military and political actions. Insurgent actions can include:
* Political activities.
* Population control.
* Military tactics (including terrorist actions and conventional tactics).
* Support activities.
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
5-4. Insurgents may use political activities to achieve their goals and enhance their cause’s legitimacy. An
insurgency’s actions can come from inside the government’s political system or can be used to
communicate a message to the population. Political actions that happen within a government normally
happen in a democracy or a semidemocracy. In these systems, an insurgency and related political parties
can have some political power through elections. This gives groups the ability to launch official
investigations and a platform to question government actions. This was a technique used by the Irish
Republican Army and Sinn Fein.
5-5. Insurgent political actions within the government are limited to an autocratic regime, unless those
actions are secretive. An authoritarian regime can have members that are either sympathetic to or actual
members of an insurgency. However, those individuals must remain clandestine if they are to remain inside
the government. In these cases, insurgencies can use these individuals for intelligence and to influence
some governmental decisions.
5-6. The use of political activities to influence a society is another political activity of an insurgency.
Demonstrations, propaganda, strikes, and civil disobedience can be effective means to undermine the
legitimacy of a government and to disrupt a host nation. These actions show the level of support for the
insurgency and transmit the insurgents’ message to the rest of society.
5-7. Propaganda is one of the most important political tools an insurgency has. Propaganda provides the
means for the insurgency to communicate a message, often political, to the population. It allows the |
3-24 | 74 | Chapter 5
insurgency to create a narrative of why the government’s actions are not legitimate, and how the insurgency
can eliminate the root causes of the conflict.
5-8. In areas of a country where an insurgency is in control, the insurgency can perform governmental
functions. These functions replace the functions of the host-nation government. When an insurgency
provides effective governance of a region or community, it can build local legitimacy.
5-9. At the national level, an insurgency can promote a shadow government. A shadow government offers
a known, tangible alternative to the present government to the population. This can be effective as a
propaganda technique, and a shadow government can be useful in creating a successful transition for an
insurgency. As propaganda, a shadow government allows an insurgency to identify and inform a population
of a known alternative to the current government. In practice, a shadow government allows a governmental
structure to quickly form in insurgent controlled areas. If an insurgency is successful, this allows for a
transition to a coherent national government.
POPULATION CONTROL
5-10. One of the primary goals of a local insurgency is population control. Once the government is
displaced from an area, an insurgency can act as the functioning government. With the use of force to
enforce local rules and norms, an insurgency can become a functioning instrument to control the
population. In such cases, it has displaced the government, at least locally. This control can be used to gain
legitimacy among the population. When an insurgency both controls a local population and is seen as
legitimate by the local population, it becomes more difficult to displace. The host nation must not only
regain control of the area, but maintain control when the population may not view the host nation as a
legitimate authority.
MILITARY TACTICS
5-11. Insurgents use violence to create a wide range of effects. For example, in the early phases of an
insurgency, insurgents plan attacks to achieve the greatest political and informational impact while not
becoming decisively engaged. During the war of movement, insurgents may try to destroy a host nation’s
security forces or its communication channels. Commanders need to understand the wide variety of
insurgent tactics. Insurgents may use both terrorist acts and conventional military tactics.
Terrorist Acts
5-12. Terrorist acts are meant to undermine the legitimacy of the government by demonstrating both the
inability of the government to protect the population and the strength of the insurgency. The perpetrator of
a terrorist act seeks to use the terror that the act produces among the population and the government to gain
some political objective. Insurgents generally select targets based on their strategic, operational, and
tactical importance and propaganda value. A terrorist attack will generally employ some deception and use
techniques outside of accepted norms.
5-13. The possibility of an insurgent group gaining access to weapons of mass destruction changes the
strategic effect of terrorist actions. If an insurgency gains a nuclear capability, which is an increased
possibility in an interconnected world, the threat of using a nuclear weapon would provide that insurgency
leverage for political negotiations. The actual use of a nuclear weapon would have regional and global
effects. The use of biological and chemical weapons would also have a strategic effect, but to a lesser
degree than nuclear weapons. An insurgent’s use of weapons of mass destruction would transform the
nature of a conflict.
Conventional Tactics
5-14. Insurgents use a wide range of tactics to attack counterinsurgents. The tactics insurgents use will be
based on their capabilities. During a war of movement, insurgents may try to destroy host-nation
government forces. However, this may expose insurgents if an attempt to destroy a host nation’s security
force is taken too early. Insurgents must correctly judge their capabilities versus the host nation’s |
3-24 | 75 | Insurgency Threat Characteristics
capabilities. When the host nation has an advantage in capability, insurgents will probably use small-unit
tactics in order to not become decisively engaged.
5-15. Insurgents may use a wide range of conventional tactics. Insurgents often employ ambushes for
harassment and disruption. Snipers or sharpshooters may be an effective means of engaging government
forces without becoming decisively engaged. Insurgents may use indirect fire, such as mortar and rocket
attacks, to harass counterinsurgents or cause them to commit forces that can then be attacked by other
means. Weapons and munitions are frequently modified to best suit insurgent needs for a specific target or
mission. For example, insurgents may use direct fire rockets or missiles in an indirect manner to avoid
detection. Moreover, insurgents may have to improvise because they lack weapons.
5-16. Improvised explosive devices are effective tools that can be integrated into many different types of
attacks. Improvised explosive devices can be inexpensive to produce and, because of the various detonation
techniques available, may avoid risks to the perpetrator. Also, insurgents may use suicide bombing as an
employment method, and it can be very effective.
5-17. Insurgents may use cyber electromagnetic attacks. Cyber electromagnetic capabilities can give an
insurgency the ability to affect systems both within and outside the host nation. For example, a cyber
electromagnetic attack could undermine the financial system within a state. This may be an effective way to
undermine the legitimacy of a host nation. However, a cyber electromagnetic attack could also affect any
state or region. For example, cyber electromagnetic capabilities provide an insurgent the ability to attack a
country that supports the host nation. If an insurgency attains cyber electromagnetic capabilities, the nature
of the conflict changes.
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES
5-18. Although noticeable, violence may be only a small part of overall insurgent activity. Insurgent
support activities include training, logistics, and communications. These support activities sustain
insurgencies and allow for both military and political actions. They are enabled by an insurgency’s ability
to generate popular support. Insurgent support networks may be large, even when violence levels are low.
These networks can include support from other nations or from population groups outside the country. The
effectiveness of insurgent operations depends heavily on logistics.
5-19. In some parts of the world, a lack of access to weapons may forestall insurgencies. However, there is
widespread availability of weapons in many areas, with especially large surpluses in the most violent
regions of the world. Explosive hazards, such as mines and improvised explosive devices, are likely to be
common weapons in insurgencies. Insurgents can obtain weapons through legal or illegal purchases or from
foreign sources. A common tactic is to capture them from government forces. Counterinsurgency forces
should seek to cut off the flow of arms into an area of operations and eliminate their sources.
5-20. Income is essential, not only for insurgents to purchase weapons, but to pay recruits and bribe
officials. Money and supplies can be obtained through many sources. Foreign support is one possible
source of income. Local supporters or international front organizations may provide financial support.
Sometimes legitimate businesses are established to furnish funding. In areas controlled by insurgents,
confiscation or taxation may be used. Another common source of funding is criminal activity.
5-21. Funding greatly influences an insurgency’s character and vulnerabilities. The insurgents’ approach
determines the movement’s requirements. Protracted popular war strategies that emphasize mobilization of
the masses require considerable resources to build and maintain a counter state. In comparison, the
military-focused approach—which emphasizes armed action—needs only the resources to sustain a
military campaign. Counter threat finance is an important means to interdict an insurgency’s funding. (See
ATP 3-07.20/MCRP 3-33 for more information.)
TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION
5-22. The quality and quantity of training depends on how advanced the insurgency is and what its specific
strategy is. Indoctrination is a part of training which seeks to maintain allegiance and to focus cells to
conduct continuous operations without frequent communications and direction from insurgent leadership.
The level of indoctrination can help analysts identify the strategy and sophistication of the insurgency and |
3-24 | 76 | Chapter 5
includes more than just the overall objective of the insurgency. Subordinate leaders within an insurgency
are indoctrinated because they must execute the senior leadership’s intent and vision as well as guide
operations until redirected. With better indoctrination of intent and vision, insurgents may be more
effective in decentralized operations and being self sufficient.
5-23. Training also includes individual and collective training, depending on the role of the insurgent and
the specific skills of the insurgent (such as sniper, information operations, human intelligence, raid or
ambush, communications, logistics and caches, or bomb maker). More advanced training may include how
insurgents conduct themselves if captured, including resistance to interrogation and operations within
detention facilities (recruiting, clandestine communications, and maintaining control of other insurgents).
Other states may play an essential role in training an insurgency. Training can occur at sites in the
supporting country or covertly within the host nation. Many states maintain the ability to conduct
unconventional warfare. (See FM 3-05 for more information on unconventional warfare.)
COMMUNICATIONS
5-24. Communications in an insurgency cannot depend on open and traditional means. Ensuring an
effective network of communications is an essential support activity of an insurgency. Insurgents can
compensate for the lack of regular and reliable communications in numerous ways, including masking their
communications in radio, television, or Internet messages. They may also pass information in cameras,
high frequency, short-wave, and amateur (ham radio) sets, cellular phones, the mail, computers, or memory
storage devices transported by couriers. They may also avoid detection by use of couriers and face-to-face
meetings.
INSURGENT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
5-25. Insurgents usually have several strengths. They usually have a significant knowledge of an area of
operations. Usually they are operating in their own country and own ethnic group, making it extremely
difficult for friendly forces to identify insurgents in the community or to identify people connected with the
insurgency. Insurgents have intimate knowledge of the area of operations including things like the
characteristics of the local people and their culture, daily schedules, accents, and local slangs that enable
them to blend in with the local population, enhancing their ability to operate with secrecy. They will
probably wear similar clothing, have like postures, mannerisms and hand gestures, body movements,
walking speed, greetings, body motions, and maintain eye contact (or lack of) as the population of the area
of operations. They will also probably observe local social norms of food, drink, and sleeping schedules.
5-26. An insurgent is not usually responsible for maintaining normal governmental obligations to the local
population. While insurgents may conduct some governmental functions and set up a shadow government,
an insurgency does not normally have the same expectations from the population to provide governmental
services. This normally means that insurgencies spend few resources on governmental functions, which
frees more resources to conduct the insurgency.
5-27. Most insurgencies have limited personnel and resources. Long periods without resupply and loss of
key personnel can affect an insurgency’s ability to sustain a conflict. Counterinsurgents can apply pressure
on an insurgency by conducting raids on cell members; recovering enemy caches; interdicting supply
routes; searching or seizing resources from cars, homes, and personnel entering the area of operations;
isolating the insurgents from access to markets, smugglers, and black-market goods; and by conducting
offensive operations that diminish guerrilla numbers. Insurgencies usually fail when their ability to
replenish, either through counterinsurgent action, mismanagement on their own part, or withdrawal of the
support of an external actor, is undermined.
5-28. Insurgent movements are vulnerable to friendly force information operations that show their danger,
futility, privation, and numerical inferiority compared to government forces. In some cases, the fear of
being treated as a criminal if captured, and the fear of violence to an insurgent and the insurgent’s family,
can cause desertions and defections. In some societies, good treatment, pardons, protection, food, shelter,
and participation in the government may be stronger incentives than the fear of criminal punishment to
induce desertions. Other insurgent stress factors include sustained combat and a hostile environment that
weakens insurgent resolve. |
3-24 | 77 | Insurgency Threat Characteristics
5-29. The decentralized nature of networked insurgencies that provides operations security can also be a
weakness as it is resource intensive, slows responsiveness, and causes information to move slowly. The
difficulty of insurgents receiving encouragement from superiors and members of the political wing, a lack
of direction in the face of counterinsurgent pressures, and an inability to openly call for reinforcements and
logistics due to their operations security plan can make insurgents feel isolated, alone, confused, and
unsupported. Analysts need to identify these points and recommend operations to demoralize and promote
defections among insurgents.
ASSOCIATED THREATS
5-30. Other threats can play interconnected roles in an insurgency. Insurgencies create change in a society
and this can create an opportunity for some organizations. Opportunists are important actors in this type of
operational environment. Two other groups are particularly important, criminal organizations and
nongovernmental militias. These groups can be supportive, neutral, or opposed to an insurgency. Moreover,
these groups can have important connections to an insurgency.
OPPORTUNISTS
5-31. An opportunist is one who takes advantage of any opportunity to achieve an end, often with no
regard for principles or consequences. In the context of counterinsurgency, opportunists often take
advantage of the conditions of instability in the pursuit of their own goals, such as smuggling contraband,
while security forces are distracted from protecting the border due to combating an insurgency.
Commanders and staffs identify opportunists, assess their impact on the mission and force protection,
consider them in planning, and mitigate their impact as needed.
5-32. There are several types of opportunists who, by nature, impede the regular and effective functions of
government and may act contrary to the well-being of the people. Opportunists may be existing local
people or external actors, including civilians, members of the government, or security forces. Opportunists
can be in direct support of the insurgency or outside actors. They can be state sponsored, sponsored by a
non-state actor, or unsponsored, all while taking advantage of unstable conditions. Opportunists understand
and exploit the conditions of instability inherent in counterinsurgency where lawlessness, subversion, and
insurgency are the norm. The extreme conditions of an insurgency may allow activities that are normally
countered with effective law enforcement and governance to proceed with impunity. These conditions
allow opportunists to pursue their political and economic interests.
5-33. Opportunists may tend to exploit populations by conducting kidnapping for ransom; revenge killings;
murder for hire; hijacking; extortion; black marketing; smuggling; and trafficking of drugs, humans, and
weapons. Opportunists use the conditions of instability to conduct activities that are often illegal to further
their interests. They may also work within the political system to further their interests. Insurgencies often
occur in a chaotic political environment. As such, opportunists can take advantage of the chaos to gain
political power.
5-34. Foreign opportunists, such as mercenaries, international criminal groups, and terrorists, may be
sponsored by an external state or non-state actor or act independently. These groups may also work in the
environment of an insurgency. They can act in a similar manner as internal opportunists, but they pursue
the interests of an external actor.
5-35. Opportunists can work for an insurgency, against an insurgency, or both. How they work and who
they work for is determined by an opportunist’s own interests. Opportunists can work both sides of a
conflict to maximize influence and profits while avoiding retribution. An opportunist can provide safe
passage for insurgents, while also providing intelligence to counterinsurgents. An opportunist is not bound
by the objectives of either the counterinsurgent or insurgent.
5-36. Reintegration initiatives, although favorable to resolve many insurgencies, can be exploited by
opportunists due to the inclusive and reconciliatory nature of these programs. Opportunists can infiltrate
local civilian security forces to avoid retribution, influence less secure communities, and provide
opportunities for vigilantism. Reintegration can also offer incentives for opportunists looking for
employment, benefits, or even amnesty from a seditious criminal, social activist, or political past. |
3-24 | 78 | Chapter 5
5-37. Opportunists can be malign by design or by circumstance. Malign by design refers to the
opportunists whose purpose by character is criminal and counterproductive to effective government and a
population’s well-being. Malign by circumstance refers to opportunists whose purpose is not criminal by
design but which shifts to wholly or partial illicit activities to further their interests based on obstacles to
their original path. Groups like corporations, nongovernmental organizations, or security contractors may
be advocates for a functioning government, but due to conditions which present opportunities for them,
these groups or individuals may act counterproductively to counterinsurgent efforts. These opportunists are
very difficult to identify due to their favorable position and the potentially clandestine activities employed
to sustain their position.
5-38. In the planning process, counterinsurgents analyze the activities of opportunists, even though their
presence may not be apparent. The same conditions that may allow an insurgency to form and enjoy
freedom of movement also allow opportunists to act. Opportunists will probably take advantage of the
vulnerability of the population and exploit the lack of governmental control in pursuit of their goals.
5-39. The presence, actions, and impact of opportunists can affect the success of the mission to defeat the
insurgency and address the root causes of the conflict. This is especially true as opportunists may rely on
the presence of the insurgency and unstable conditions to achieve their ends. Commanders and staffs need
to include opportunists and their activities in understanding an area of operations and address them during
mission planning and in attack the network operations. In the intelligence preparation of the
battlefield/battlespace process, commanders and staffs may address opportunists within civil
considerations, or within the threat, depending on where they are appropriate. The mission analysis must
address identifying opportunists, understanding their impacts, and addressing or mitigating their impacts.
5-40. The commander’s intent may need to include dealing with opportunists, depending on the level of
interference or political nature of opportunists. Opportunists can impact the mission or force protection
operations. This is especially true if the opportunists are from a state sponsor or a border region where an
internal conflict can spread to another country. Overall, counterinsurgents need to understand how
opportunists can aid an insurgency, either directly or indirectly, and how they can undermine the efforts of
a host-nation government or a multinational effort to address the causes of instability.
5-41. Commanders and staffs need to analyze how their units’ actions can provide opportunities for
opportunists. Decisions concerning contracting, for example, can have various effects on giving
opportunities to opportunists. Commanders and staffs must analyze their units’ effects on the battlefield.
Some decisions that might seem to only effect a unit internally may also effect opportunists. Commanders
and staffs must think holistically about how their units interact with the environment in order to minimize
the effects of opportunist.
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
5-42. Insurgents commonly use criminal organizations to accomplish objectives. Common activities
designed to gain revenue or materials include theft, drug or human trafficking, smuggling of illicit
materials, prostitution, extortion, kidnapping, blackmail, counterfeiting, taxing of civilians, bank robbery,
and bribery. Criminal organizations can appear as street gangs, mafias, or cartels. Criminal organizations
may also assist insurgent groups in achieving objectives other than accumulating resources. Other
objectives may include intimidating government employees or candidates, conducting assassinations,
kidnapping key personnel, initiating sectarian violence, strikes, demonstrations, riots, and smuggling
high-value leaders, advisors, or weapons. Criminal organizations may also conduct operations deemed
unpopular with a civilian population at a distance from an insurgent movement to create deniability.
5-43. Many insurgencies degenerate into criminality. This occurs as the primary movements disintegrate
and the remaining elements become isolated, or the root cause is addressed. Insurgent disintegration is
desirable; it replaces a dangerous, often ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals with a less
dangerous but more diverse body, normally of uneven character. The first is a security threat; the second is
a law-and-order concern. This should not be interpreted as denigrating the armed capacity of a
law-and-order threat. Successful counterinsurgents are prepared to address this disintegration. They
recognize that the ideal approach eliminates both the insurgency and any criminal threats the insurgency’s
elimination produces. |
3-24 | 79 | Insurgency Threat Characteristics
5-44. However, criminal groups can develop into insurgencies. In the case of localities that depend on
black markets for their general welfare, the local population may depend on criminal activities. This creates
a closely interlocked relationship between the criminal element (running the black market) and the
insurgents (linked to the black market). In some cases, this relationship feeds into the causes of an
insurgency. For example, a local population may support the insurgents because they want to stop
interference with their economic livelihood. An insurgency based on a black market generally has ties to
other black markets and resources through globalization. At its core, a black market requires trade and
contact with others. This can create a well-funded, trained, and equipped commercial insurgency.
5-45. An insurgency can begin with a political aim and then develop into a commercial insurgency because
of connections to a market. For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia started as a
communist insurgent group in 1964. However, through its involvement in the drug trade, it has become the
richest self-sustaining insurgent group in history. In the parts of Columbia that it controls, it is closely
linked to the population because the population depends on the drug trade for its economic well-being.
NONGOVERNMENT MILITIAS
5-46. As the host-nation government weakens and violence increases, people look for ways to protect
themselves. If the government cannot provide protection, people may organize into armed militias to
protect themselves. Moreover, some social structures, such as tribes, may have a militia structure.
Examples of militias include the following:
* Loyalist militias formed in Northern Ireland.
* Right-wing paramilitary organizations formed in Colombia to counter the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia.
* Militias of various ethnic and political groups formed in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
5-47. If militias are outside the host-nation government’s control, they can often be obstacles to ending an
insurgency. Militias may become more powerful than the host-nation government, particularly at the local
level. They may also fuel the insurgency and precipitate a downward spiral into a full-scale civil war.
However, they can also play a constructive role and provide local security. While this can undermine the
host nation’s government, it can also be a building block to help build legitimacy at the local level.
5-48. A militia can also shift into becoming an active insurgency and an insurgency can sometimes shift
into becoming a militia. A militia may not actively oppose the government and may be working within the
system. However, it represents a capability to challenge the host nation. Militias may become insurgencies.
An insurgency may also be integrated by a government and become a militia. |
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Counterinsurgencies
Part three provides doctrine for how to counter an insurgency. How commanders and
staffs counter an insurgency is dependent on the strategic and operational context
(part one) and the type of insurgency (part two). Chapter 6 discusses command and
control and mission command. Chapter 7 discusses planning and operational
considerations. Planning is essential in framing the problem and the possible
solutions. Chapter 8 covers intelligence. Intelligence is fundamental in gaining
situational understanding. Chapter 9 discusses direct methods and chapter 10
discusses indirect methods to counter insurgency. These chapters provide a
framework to help commanders and staffs develop an overall operational approach
to counter an insurgency. Chapter 11 discusses working with host-nation forces.
Chapter 12 discusses assessments, which provide information on effectively using
measures of performance and measures of effectiveness in counterinsurgency.
Finally, part three discusses legal considerations in chapter 13.
Chapter 6
Mission Command and Command and Control
6-1. The operations process is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and
uses the mission command or command and control process to ensure appropriate actions are taken.
Sometimes this recognition takes the form of a conscious command decision, as in deciding on a concept of
operations. Sometimes it takes the form of a rules-based procedure, as in the guiding of an aircraft on final
approach. Other forms may require a degree of judgment and intuition so that they can only be performed
by skilled, experienced people, as in devising tactics, operations, and strategies. (See ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0,
and MCDP 6 for more information on mission command and command and control.)
COMMAND IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
6-2. Command in counterinsurgency often involves a large geographic area and control over multiple
units performing different types of operations. In Western Iraq, Brigadier General W. Blake Crowe
commanded a large area that began along the Syrian border and extended to the Jordanian border. He
executed command over multiple units, performing multiple tasks in different areas. The vignette
“Command in Counterinsurgency” provides an insight into Brigadier General Crowe’s command during
the Iraqi War in 2006. |
3-24 | 82 | Chapter 6
Command in Counterinsurgency
Our area of operations began along the Syrian border and extended down
to the Jordanian border. We were also responsible for the Marine expeditionary force
security area, which extended to Saudi Arabia. This was a large area, and it was not
possible to be everywhere. This situation forced us to work with the locals and to
work and play well with other units operating in the region, such as the special
operations forces (SOF). But there in 2006, we were the surrogate government. We
did not have mayors at the time. The provincial governor was in Ramadi, and he
stayed there. Twice we were able to get him out to western al-Anbar in the year I was
there, and it took a regimental-sized operation to get him out to cities such as
Baghdadi, Haditha, and al-Qa’im. We spent nearly thirty days’ worth of planning to
get him out there because for us he was more important than the President of the
United States. I think Marines here would understand that.
Our first mayor came in six months into my deployment in al-Qa’im.
Lieutenant Colonel Dale Alford, commander of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, was
involved in setting the conditions for that success. We didn’t have a mayor in Haditha
because we had to arrest him. He was an insurgent. We didn’t have a mayor in Hit
because the previous ones had been killed. So until December 2006, we were the
surrogate local government. We learned very quickly that if we allowed the Iraqis to
fail to build and provision their security forces, then we would have failed as well. So,
we had to step in and fill that surrogate role.
There is a debate concerning these operations and whether or not they are
counterinsurgencies, hybrid operations, or distributed operations. We did them all. In
al-Qa’im, we conducted what I would call a pure counterinsurgency (COIN) operation
because the conditions had been set by the previous regiment. We were still having
major manned gun, tank rounds, and combined arms in downtown Hit with more than
one hundred insurgents surging on twelve- to fifteen-man positions. Phasing,
synchronizing, supporting, and enabling formed what I thought was my primary role
there.
Every battalion commander wants to be the main effort. Every regimental or
brigade commander wants to be the main effort. We weren’t the main effort in Iraq.
And every battalion could not be the main effort, and that’s the hard thing for people
to reconcile. How come I’m not getting all these assets?
When I was in Afghanistan, I received everything. We were one Marine
battalion attached to the Army and we were given everything. In Iraq, I had five
battalions in my command and one reduced force reconnaissance company
commanded by six lieutenant colonels. At least one unit is not going to get what they
want in a timely fashion. The battalions, companies, and platoons had autonomy, but
autonomy doesn’t mean that they operated independently. That’s where
synchronizing comes in. It means going out and working very closely to the battalions
and blurring the borders between zones of responsibility and forcing commanders to
get together and have a cup of coffee. Just as we needed to have tea with the local
nationals, we also needed to do that among ourselves. We did that very well with the
SOF through liaisons. We established an ad-hoc tactical fusion center at the
regimental level.
[W]e raised close to 4,000 police officers. I waited a year and was told the
police stations are coming. They never did. So we created expeditionary forward
operating bases, because that way I could use Marine Corps money. I could put
police in them, although they could not be designated official Iraqi Police stations. If it
was designated as such, you would get reported because it would not be official. So,
there are things that you have to do. It’s not selective disobedience of orders, but
rather a creative way of getting the mission accomplished.
We had two force protection measures: the American standard and what
was acceptable to the Iraqis. Casualties were unacceptable to me as a commander. |
3-24 | 83 | Mission Command and Command and Control
The first time you go to a scene where you’ve lost a soldier, it does not matter what
uniform he’s wearing. He is one of ours. He was brought in to serve with us, and I
don’t care what nationality he is. We needed to build it to one standard: checkpoints,
force protection, food, weapons, ammunition, all the way down. They fight with us
and we’re going to treat them to our standard. That’s just nonnegotiable.
Note: For Army users, JP 1 defines command as the authority that a commander in the armed
forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes
the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the
employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the
accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale,
and discipline of assigned personnel. ADP 6-0 defines control as the regulation of forces and
warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent.
6-3. Many actions contribute to successful mission command, including planning, training, and education.
Moreover, a well understood commander’s intent is essential for mission command. In a
counterinsurgency, the operational environment is changing and real-time guidance or direction will need
to change. Planning, whether hasty or deliberate, provides a foundation of shared understanding. Effective
training and education, which make it more likely that subordinates will take the proper actions in combat,
help ensure the success of mission command. A commander's intent, expressed clearly before an operation
begins, is an essential element of mission command. Likewise, analysis after the operation, which
ascertains the results and lessons of the action and so informs future actions, contributes to mission
command.
Note: For Marine Corps users, mission command does not replace command and control as a
warfighting function. Mission command is a type of command and control that promotes
innovation and requires the strong relationships of trust and mutual understanding necessary for
decentralized decisionmaking necessary to seize the initiative, degrade enemy cohesion, and
strengthen friendly cohesive relationships that are critical elements to any counterinsurgency.
Based on leader character and subordinate initiative, mission command offers no checklist for
success, but instead challenges the services to cultivate a bias for taking appropriate action and
accentuate the senior leadership virtues of trust, moral courage, and restraint. The mission
command philosophy asserts that people are the basis of all military organizations, and military
operations occur as human interactions. Commanders use the philosophy of mission command to
exploit and enhance uniquely human skills. Commanders implement mission command though
leadership, providing direction and guidance as part of command and understanding that
subordinates contribute to control. The other types of command and control are command by
direction and command by planning. For the Army, the philosophy of mission command is the
exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined
initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of
unified land operations. (For more information, see MCDP 6 and ADP 6-0).
6-4. Due to the nature of counterinsurgency operations, the inculcation of the mission command
philosophy is beneficial in dealing with the local environment. Soldiers and Marines interact with a society
at the platoon, squad, and individual level. Tactical leaders must have the ability, within the commander’s
intent, to have freedom of action to work with a local society. As such, tactical leaders should act with a
conceptual understanding of an operational environment and how their action’s fit into that operational
environment.
6-5. A counterinsurgency involves simultaneous activities at every echelon. Platoons within a company
could be doing different tasks, and companies within a battalion could be doing different tasks, all in
support of a battalion’s method of counterinsurgency. Every task involves potential decisions that can have
an immediate impact on success or failure. Moreover, these tasks are interrelated. This means that junior
leaders will make decisions at the point of effort, relying on mission type orders. This applies to any
operational approach taken to defeat an insurgency. For example, if the commander integrates a direct |
3-24 | 84 | Chapter 6
action force into a host nation’s counterinsurgency effort, that force will have to understand the operational
environment and the commander’s intent. Any mission can have unintended consequences, and this
includes missions with clear objectives. For example, a direct action mission taken with faulty intelligence
could result in the deaths of civilians. All commanders have to be empowered to make decisions that
positively impact mission accomplishment. Whatever operational approach the commander takes and
however the host nation is supported, mission command is essential.
6-6. When squads, platoons and companies are distributed over wide areas, they must frequently make
decisions, and their understanding of the environment is generally better than that of their higher
headquarters. In an effective counterinsurgency, there is a need for decentralization that puts a premium on
the higher headquarters establishing a clear commander's intent and providing subordinates with vision and
guidance particular to an insurgency and a host nation. In a counterinsurgency, commanders must
effectively execute the art of command, which is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through
timely decisionmaking and leadership. These decisions often have to be made in a time constrained
environment. As such, decentralized decisionmaking is essential, and it provides control over the
operations and activities inherent in a counterinsurgency.
HEADQUARTERS USE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
6-7. While mission command allows for multiple actions to simultaneously occur at every echelon, every
echelon has an important role in ensuring that the various actions meet the desired end state. Control
requires a shared understanding of an operational environment and operational approach in a
counterinsurgency. A lack of effective control over these activities can create gaps that insurgents can
exploit. For example, if different brigades or different divisions set different prices for weapons buyback
programs or have different policies on wages, this sometimes creates situations that hamper the overall
policy. A lack of understanding of the economic variables within a country can produce policies that
undermine a weapons buyback program or distort the labor market. On the other hand, there might be cases
in counterinsurgents want to allow a local commander more flexibility in setting such policies. The balance
between local control and coordination of overall policy is one of the primary challenges facing the
commanders and staffs of brigades, battalions, and regiments.
6-8. A commander bases the level of flexibility and coordination of activities and policies on an
operational environment and a superior commander’s intent. Moreover, the type and experience level of a
unit may play a role in determining the level of flexibility and coordination. Conditions vary within a
country or region and the cities and towns within it. For example, while different policies on wages could
produce a disjointed overall policy, it is also possible that different wages are justified by the economic
environment in different areas in the country. One city could have low unemployment, while another city
could have high unemployment. The different conditions in the labor market is something commanders
should take into account when designing a policy on economic development and hiring local workers. Also,
an inexperienced unit or a unit that is not performing its traditional mission might have less flexibility than
an experienced unit performing its traditional mission.
6-9. In a counterinsurgency, operations are interrelated, and they must support the overall commander’s
intent. The various activities that different units perform must also work within the operational approach of
the joint commander. The joint commander is responsible for designing the overall operational approach of
the counterinsurgency campaign. The joint commander has to ensure that that various activities being
performed will meet stated United States (U.S.) policy goals. Subordinate commanders ensure that their
operational approaches and activities fit within the overall operational approach. The combination of
tactical actions must produce a strategic result, and every echelon of command shares a responsibility for
ensuring that this occurs. Commanders must understand the end state and the ramifications of their actions
in meeting that end state. The commander drives the operations process. The commander’s staff must
ensure that the commander understands the operational environment and can visualize the
battlefield/battlespace. This is accomplished through staff action during mission analysis. However,
because a counterinsurgency environment is complex, situational understanding is continually developing.
Understanding what counterinsurgents should do is more important than doing tasks that may be
counterproductive. Also, constant engagement of key leaders with the population is essential to enhancing |
3-24 | 85 | Mission Command and Command and Control
understanding of the population and understanding of the counterinsurgency. Understanding the problem
and having key leaders engage the population may be more important than having a large number of troops.
6-10. Headquarters elements may be essential in coordination with the host nation, other government
agencies, or other unified action partners. Counterinsurgents tailor headquarters units to the requirements to
coordinate and enable subordinate units to be effective. A larger number of headquarters or a more robust
headquarters may provide a further ability to work with interagency and host-nation organizations.
Interagency organizations can integrate their capabilities more effectively if there is a robust headquarters
element to work with. The analysis and intelligence capabilities of a division or corps headquarters may be
essential in integrating interagency organizations’ capabilities. These division and corps capabilities
provide brigades the needed span of control to operate and integrate interagency organizations and their
capabilities. Using multiple headquarters provides a robust capability for working with host-nation
organizations, both military and civilian. Many programs meant to build capacity within a host nation are
national level programs. A robust headquarters element will help to ensure that these programs are
integrated and resourced to maximize the benefit to the counterinsurgency effort. This is needed to ensure
that these programs are effective at the local level.
6-11. A headquarters can also serve as a coordination center. A coordination center can provide a means to
unify multiple governmental, military, police, and civilian partners to gather and share information, provide
support to priority projects, conduct meetings with local leaders, promote a whole of government and
unified effort approach, and lend added credibility to the government. Coordination centers provide needed
flexibility to control and coordinate host nation and multinational actions. Coordination centers can also act
as joint tactical command posts and integrate various joint capabilities, such as air support.
6-12. An operational environment does not normally dramatically change at a unit boundary. It is essential
in a counterinsurgency to understand the actual economic, political, and social boundaries of an operational
environment and not use unit boundaries as the only planning consideration for operations. The
relationships between units that are adjacent is essential. While the conditions in their operational
environment may be different, commanders should understand their adjacent unit’s problem frame and
operational approach. They should also understand how their actions may affect the operational
environment of other units. This is of particular importance when integrating information-related
capabilities. Commanders at every echelon ensure adjacent units have relationships that allow for the
completion of the overall mission.
6-13. The same is true of forces operating in another unit’s area of operations, such as special operations
forces (SOF). While missions to capture an insurgent leader may be essential to the overall mission,
commanders must coordinate with other commanders and units to mitigate negative consequences of these
types of actions with effective information operations. Commanders and staffs at all levels must ensure that
the units under their command have productive relationships with other units. Establishing command and
support relationships helps create channels that streamline information dissemination by ensuring the right
information passes promptly to the right people. The three common channels for information dissemination
are known as command, staff, and technical channels. (See ADRP 6-0 for more information on command
channels.)
6-14. The effective link between planning and assessing the effects of operations in a counterinsurgency is
the foundation for establishing effective mission command. Success in a counterinsurgency is largely
dependent on making lasting changes to an operational environment. This requires that commanders and
staff continue to evolve in their situational understanding. A continuous assessment process is essential for
planning in counterinsurgency operations. (See chapter 12 for more information on assessments.)
CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
SYNCHRONIZATION
6-15. Counterinsurgency requires the integration of all capabilities of the U.S. and often requires this
integration for long periods of time. However, the integration of SOF capabilities into the effort to counter
an insurgency is of particular importance to both Army and Marine commanders. FM 6-05/MCWP 3-36.1
provides a doctrinal foundation for conventional force and special operating force integration. Also, |
3-24 | 86 | Chapter 6
JP 3-05 provides an overview of special operations. The synchronization of conventional forces and SOF
have special considerations in counterinsurgency.
6-16. Conventional forces and SOF depend on each other. SOF lack long term sustainability without
conventional support. More importantly, if SOF are conducting direct action missions, it becomes vital that
conventional forces and SOF coordinate so that they do not produce negative effects on the operational
environment. However, SOF can provide conventional forces with important cultural and advising
capabilities. They also provide important offensive capabilities. SOF capable of conducting direct action
might be able to conduct raids and gain intelligence that conventional forces cannot.
6-17. Typically, SOF control a joint special operations area either long term or temporarily. A joint special
operations area is simply an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to conduct
special operations. This is a means to manage SOF, which tend to operate in small teams, separately from
conventional forces, which are larger in size and capabilities. Creating a joint special operations area is a
means to synchronize actions towards a common goal, prevent conventional forces and SOF from
interfering with one another, and prevent fratricide.
6-18. In some counterinsurgency operations involving a large direct approach and conventional forces that
are likely, at least for a time, to be the primary counterinsurgents, the land forces area of operations will
typically encompass any area where SOF may operate. Unlike other operations, where the joint commander
can separate forces by time and space, a counterinsurgency can involve large scale and long term
involvement by land forces. Joint commanders typically set up joint special operations areas, but joint
special operations areas are normally temporary, and these areas return to the control of the ground
commander once the special operations mission is completed.
6-19. In a long term and large scale counterinsurgency effort, SOF operations, if not coordinated, could
create problems. SOF actions, such as direct action missions, could be highly disruptive to a conventional
unit’s ongoing efforts to build the legitimacy of the host-nation government if not coordinated. For
example, a direct action mission that is not coordinated with information operations can alienate a local
population. In some cases, a direct action mission can undermine a unit’s progress in an area, even if
counterinsurgents attempt to mitigate the negative effects to the conventional unit’s missions. Commanders
and staffs must ensure synchronization of both conventional forces and SOF can to ensure neither force
undermines the overall effort. This synchronization can include decisions on how to perform missions and
decisions on whether or not to perform missions. Both conventional forces and SOF should support the
joint commander’s intent.
6-20. SOF and conventional forces complement each other’s capabilities. When SOF are operating on
short duration missions, if not coordinated, they might not be aware of some of the local knowledge of the
area. Commanders and staffs must share information to ensure progress. Combined operations can enhance
the effectiveness of both SOF and conventional forces. The ground commander will have the daily
experiences in an area and will understand the local population. On the other hand, a successful mission by
the SOF commander could have strategic effects throughout the country. Coordination with SOF by the
ground commander benefits both the SOF and conventional forces, who have to continue the longer term
mission in an area of operation.
6-21. Both the SOF and conventional commanders share responsibility for ensuring an effective
relationship. However, the joint force commander has overall responsibility for effective integration.
FM 6-05/MCWP 3-36.1 offers some important tools, such as the use of liaison officers, to ensure an
effective relationship. Ultimately, the joint force commander has overall responsibility for synchronization.
Both SOF and conventional forces’ commanders and staffs ensure their actions meet the joint forces
commander’s intent. The joint force commander ensures that the mechanisms for effective synchronization
are in place. |
3-24 | 87 | Chapter 7
Planning and Operational Considerations
7-1. Planning is important for gaining understanding. Military planning processes provide a way to
understand an operational environment and understand the commanders’ intent within that operational
environment. Planning is often conducted simultaneously with other activities, such as execution and
assessment, and both informs, and is informed by, those activities. Planning as understanding, continually
refined and questioned through assessments, helps commanders maintain situational understanding in the
ever changing environment of counterinsurgency. This continued conceptualization of the operational
environment and problem is essential for the use of mission command. However, before commanders and
staffs can conceptualize the problem, they need to understand certain paradoxes of counterinsurgency.
COUNTERINSURGENCY PARADOXES
7-2. A commander planning a counterinsurgency requires a specific mindset before that commander can
plan or execute operations, and that mindset is the foundation for understanding how to counter an
insurgency. When the United States (U.S.) acts, even temporarily, as the primary counterinsurgent,
commanders operate carefully between fighting for a population and being seen as fighting against a
population. When acting indirectly to enable a host nation, these paradoxes provide a framework for
understanding and enabling the host nation. Throughout conceptual and detailed planning, the
counterinsurgency paradoxes described in paragraphs 7-4 through 7-12 provide a set of apparent
contradictions that aid commanders and staffs in developing a counterinsurgency mindset that helps
commanders and staffs operate effectively. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit
it. The applicability of the these paradoxes depends on the local situation and, in particular, the state of the
insurgency. For example, the statement that “sometimes, the more force used, the less effective it is”, does
not apply when the enemy is breaching the perimeter; however, that thought is applicable when effective
security has already been achieved in an area. In short, commanders and staffs should not reduce these
paradoxes to a checklist; they should be used with considerable thought.
7-3. The commander must be conscious of the problem of the observer effect, where the act of engaging
the population, itself, makes changes in the operational environment. Any action on the environment
generates a reaction, thereby altering the environment. This means the environment changes with every
interaction with a society. In other words, the very act of interactions with a society changes the operational
environment. Commanders must understand this reality and constantly consider its effects on their
assessment and planning processes. Moreover, this fact is at the heart of many of the paradoxes that follow.
Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be
7-4. Ultimate success in counterinsurgency operations is normally gained by protecting the population,
not the counterinsurgency force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the
people, appear to be running scared, and give the initiative to the insurgents. A possible path to success
could include an increase in outreach programs that focus on protecting the population. Commanders weigh
the effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and operational support bases against the security of using
larger unit bases. Establishing patrol bases ensures access to the intelligence needed to facilitate operations.
Sharing risks with the population reinforces the connections with them that help establish legitimacy.
Sometimes, the More Force is Used, the Less Effective It Is
7-5. Any use of force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. Using substantial force
also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In
contrast, using force precisely and discriminately could strengthen the rule of law that needs to be
established. The key to successful counterinsurgency operations is knowing when more force is needed, |
3-24 | 88 | Chapter 7
and when it might be counterproductive. This judgment involves constant assessment of the security
situation and a sense of timing regarding insurgents’ actions.
The More Successful the Counterinsurgency is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk
Must Be Accepted
7-6. This paradox is really a corollary to the paradox described in paragraph 7-5. As the level of insurgent
violence drops, expectations of the population may lead to a reduction in direct military actions by
counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and
troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to
maintain involvement with the people.
Doing Nothing is Sometimes the Best Action
7-7. Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing
counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit. For example,
counterinsurgents opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation may create more enemies than
it removes from the streets. If an assessment of the effects of a course of action determines that more
negative than positive effects may result, an alternative should be considered, potentially including not
acting.
Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot
7-8. Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and
legitimacy for the host-nation government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents (although
killing clearly will often be necessary). Arguably, the decisive effort is to isolate the insurgents by denying
the local population as a base of support. This establishes the need for synchronizing information
operations across the various lines of effort in order to generate operational advantages for the commander
conducting counterinsurgency operations. Every action, including the use of force, must be supported by
adequate information. While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory
may come from a vibrant economy and political participation that restore hope. Particularly after security
has been achieved, dollars and ballots may have more important effects than bombs and bullets. This is
dependent on the context of a particular insurgency and the strategy to counter that insurgency. As with the
other paradoxes, counterinsurgents cannot treat this as a uniform rule. However, a thriving economy may
be more important than ammunition. Depending on the state of the insurgency, therefore, Soldiers and
Marines should prepare to accomplish many nonmilitary missions to support counterinsurgency efforts. All
unified action partners have a role in supporting efforts to enable governance to counter an insurgency, not
just Department of State and civil affairs personnel.
The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably is Normally Better Than Us Doing it Well
7-9. It is just as important for counterinsurgents to consider who performs an operation as to assess how
well it is done. Where the U.S. is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires supporting viable
host-nation leaders and institutions that are legitimate and capable. The longer that process takes, the more
U.S. public support will wane and the more the local population will question the legitimacy of their own
forces and government. However, if the host nation cannot perform tolerably, the counterinsurgents
supporting it may have to act. Experience, knowledge of the area of operations, and cultural sensitivity are
essential in deciding when such action is necessary.
If a Tactic Works This Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works In This Province, It
Might Not Work In The Next
7-10. Competent insurgents are adaptive. They are often part of a widespread network that communicates
constantly and instantly. Insurgents quickly adjust to successful counterinsurgency practices and rapidly
disseminate information throughout an insurgency. Indeed, the more effective a counterinsurgency tactic is,
the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it. Effective leaders |
3-24 | 89 | Planning and Operational Considerations
at all levels avoid complacency and are at least as adaptive as their enemies. There is no single prescribed
set of counterinsurgency procedures. Commanders and staffs must constantly develop new practices.
7-11. The environment of an insurgency is not static and different factors may influence various areas. An
operation or a tactic that works well in one area may not work well in another because of different factors
in the environment. Village stability operations in Afghanistan demonstrate this. Soldiers had success in
one area but did not have success in another. The reason was that the operational environments and the
population’s responses to these environments were vastly different. Commanders and staffs must
understand the local area and not assume that the same methods will work in other areas, even in an
adjacent town.
If a Tactic Works in This Province, it Might Not Work in The Next:
The Case of the Dan Aw Patan District, Afghanistan, 2010
In the fall of 2010, U.S. Army units comprised of special forces teams and
infantry squads from the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment introduced village
stability operations in the Dan Aw Patan district of Paktia Province in southeastern
Afghanistan and along the Pakistan border. Village stability operations were an effort
to empower Afghan villagers to defend themselves from insurgents. The primary U.S.
Army mission was to recruit Afghan men in each village to serve in the local police
that would provide physical security for their community and thereby decrease the
power of the Taliban. In the course of the next year Soldiers regularly visited the
villages of the district, meeting with local leaders and equipping and training
members of the local police.
Village stability operations in Dan Aw Patan enjoyed only partial success. In
the north and central areas of the district, U.S. units were able to form and train
squads of local police. The villagers generally supported these efforts, participated in
sustainment training, and provided useful intelligence. More importantly, the Soldiers
never felt they might be in imminent danger while working with the local Afghans. In
the southern part of the district, however, village stability operations failed. U.S.
Soldiers in this region never enjoyed the security their counterparts enjoyed further
north. Moreover, the police units that were established in these villages were far less
interested in conducting patrols than in receiving pay. Despite lengthy negotiations
with village leaders in which the Soldiers offered incentives such as medical
assistance and funds for new schools, bridges, and other infrastructure, these local
police squads never became the means of countering insurgent influence in the
district.
Why did village stability operations work in the northern and central villages
but not in those to the south? The answer was not obvious. The distances between
the central and southern villages were minimal, less than 10 miles in most cases. The
demographics in each region were essentially identical in terms of size, economics,
Pashtun ethnicity, religion, and culture. The U.S. approach was consistent in its
methods and leadership. In fact, the same Soldiers who led the successful efforts in
the north and central regions also worked with the southern villages.
The lack of full success in the southern villages resulted from less visible
factors. The southern area saw much more fighting during the Soviet occupation, and
the local people viewed any foreign troops as “Soviets.” More important was the
existence of insurgent “rat lines” in this part of the district. From the Teri Mangel arms
bazaar, located just across the border in Pakistan, historic smuggling routes crossed
the Afghan border into Paktia Province toward the provincial capital of Gardez.
Because of the routes’ importance to the insurgent campaign, the Taliban exerted
pressure on the southern villages to resist American efforts to deny freedom of
movement to the insurgents and keep the routes open. Village stability operations
were designed to counter exactly this type of influence. Yet because of Taliban
pressure that succeeded despite the U.S. presence, the southern villages never
accepted the program fully. U.S. units were not resourced to collect sufficient
intelligence to discover the extent of Taliban influence, and the newly-hired local |
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police proved unreliable but in a passive-aggressive manner, demonstrating little
initiative except in the collection of their salaries.
The case of Dan Aw Patan displays the importance of local conditions in the
counterinsurgent’s choice of tactics. In general, village stability operations
represented an innovative approach to the challenge of securing the Afghan
population at the village level. In this case, however, the counterinsurgent learned
that what worked in one village did not work in a neighboring village only a few miles
distant.
Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals
7-12. Successful counterinsurgency operations require competence and judgment by Soldiers and Marines
at all levels. Indeed, young leaders often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic
consequences. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear
guidance; they then trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation for tactical-level leaders
requires more than just mastering Service doctrine; they must also be trained and educated to adapt to their
local situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and
sound judgment in accordance with their senior commander’s intent.
CONCEPTUAL PLANNING
7-13. The complexity of insurgencies presents problems that have incomplete, contradictory, and changing
requirements. The solutions to these challenging problems are often difficult to recognize because of
interdependencies of the relationships of an operational environment. While attempting to solve these
problems, the solution to one problem may reveal or create another, even more complex, problem.
Operational design employs various elements to develop and refine the commander’s operational approach.
Operational design involves conceptual planning. Conceptual planning establishes aims, objectives, and
intentions, and it also involves developing broad concepts for action. It generally corresponds to the art of
war. The commander’s activities of understanding and visualization are key aspects of conceptual planning.
(See MCDP 5 for more information on the art of war and ADRP 5-0 for more information on
understanding and visualization).
7-14. Design is the conception and articulation of a framework for solving a problem, and it is critical to
conceptual planning. The purpose of design is to achieve a greater understanding of the environment and
the nature of the problem in order to identify an appropriate conceptual solution. While not prescriptive,
design is based on critical thinking, conceptual planning, visualization, emergence of a hypothesis, and
continuous activity. Design is the primary way to develop an operational approach. First, design helps
commanders and staffs create a shared understanding of the current operational environment and visualize
what the environment should look like. Understanding an operational environment is an essential
foundation of counterinsurgency. Second, design enables the collaborative, conceptual planning necessary
to understand a problem and develop broad approaches to solving it. From there, commanders can visualize
their operational approach and describe to staffs and subordinate commanders how to move the
environment from the current state to the desired end state. From an operational approach, the commander
conducts detailed planning. (See figure 7-1.) (See JP 5-0 for more information on design. See ADP 5-0 for
more information on Army design methodology and MCWP 5-1 for more information on Marine Corps
design. See chapter 2 for an understanding of an operational environment.) |
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Figure 7-1. Design concept
7-15. By definition, design is iterative, and reframing the problem as necessary is essential. Reframing the
problem involves revisiting earlier hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current
operational approach. Reframing can lead to a new problem statement and operational approach, resulting
in an entirely new plan. By their nature, counterinsurgency efforts require repeated assessments from
different perspectives to see the various factors and relationships required for adequate understanding.
Assessment and learning enable incremental improvements to the operational approach. The goal is to
understand the problem, to construct a reasonable explanation of observed events, and to subsequently
construct a framework within which to solve the problem. The essence of this is determining the
mechanism or combination of mechanisms necessary to achieve success. These mechanisms may not be
military activities, or they may involve military actions in support of nonmilitary activities. Once
commanders understand the problem and what needs to be accomplished to succeed, they identify the
means to assess effectiveness and the related information requirements that support assessment. This
feedback becomes the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent reframing. (See ADRP 5-0 and
MCWP 5-1 for more information on design and reframing.)
7-16. In an ideal world, a commander engaged in counterinsurgency operations would enjoy clear and
well-defined goals for the campaign from the beginning. However, the reality is that many goals emerge
only as the mission develops and goals can change as a result of interacting with an environment. For these
reasons, counterinsurgents usually seek to achieve a combination of defined and emerging goals. Likewise,
the complex problems encountered during counterinsurgency operations can be so difficult to understand
that a clear operational approach cannot initially be developed and some assumptions must be made during
problem framing. Often, the best choice is to create iterative solutions (also known as discovery learning)
to better understand the problem. The use of design and the planning process allow commanders and staffs
to learn and achieve greater understanding as they interact with the environment. As this interaction with |
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the population and insurgents occurs, it will reveal the validity of planning assumptions, test the strengths
and weaknesses of designs, inform the operational approach, and provide guidance to further planning and
engagement. Other considerations include:
* Systems thinking.
* Continuous assessment.
* Structured learning.
7-17. Systems thinking involves understanding a problem in terms of systems and how they relate to, and
influence, each other. For counterinsurgents this includes not only how the various systems in an
insurgency interact, but how they interact and affect the various systems in the operational environment.
Additionally, systems thinking should drive commanders and staffs to develop an understanding of how
their lines of operations and lines of effort relate and influence each other. (See paragraphs 4-88 through
4-103 for more information on networked insurgencies.)
7-18. Continuous assessment is essential to learning and adapting within the inherent complexity of
counterinsurgency operations. No design or model completely matches reality, and reasonable and feasible
solutions at one moment can become ineffective at the next moment due to changes in the situation. The
object of continuous assessment is to identify where and how the actions and activities of the
counterinsurgent are working or failing and to consider adjustments to design and the operational approach.
(See chapter 12 for more information on assessments.)
7-19. The objective of structured learning is to develop a reasonable initial design and then learn, adapt,
and iteratively and continuously improve the initial plan as more about the dynamics of the
counterinsurgency problem become evident. The operational approach and framing of the problem can be
thought of as models. In counterinsurgency, these models must always be tested to determine how well
they match reality. In other words, counterinsurgents may believe they have an understanding and general
idea of how to solve a problem, but they review that belief to ensure it is still valid at any given time.
Counterinsurgents must understand the actual problem to ensure that tactical actions have an effect on the
environment.
CENTER OF GRAVITY
7-20. An important element of conceptual planning is center of gravity analysis. The center of gravity is
important in understanding both the environment and the enemy. A center of gravity is the source of power
that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). A center of gravity
construct is useful as an analytical tool to help counterinsurgency forces analyze the insurgency’s sources
of strength as well as its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Centers of gravity may change over time, they
may be different at the operational and strategic level, and they could be different from location to location.
(See JP 2-01.3 for more information on centers of gravity.)
7-21. In an insurgency, the population is not necessarily the center of gravity for an insurgent. A center of
gravity could be external support from another country, it could be a group of core leadership or believers,
or it could be a host of other factors or vital functions. Center of gravity analysis begins with the
understanding that every environment is unique, and a center of gravity analysis must not begin with a
preconceived center of gravity.
7-22. Counterinsurgents must understand their own center of gravity and that of the host nation. In many
cases, political support is the strategic center of gravity for the U.S. Some tactical actions, such as war
crimes, can undermine political support for the counterinsurgency. Host nations may also have a wide
range of centers of gravity. Operational and tactical leaders must plan and execute operations that do not
undermine the host nation’s center of gravity.
LINES OF OPERATION AND EFFORT
7-23. Lines of operation and effort are important planning tools to move conceptual planning into detailed
planning. These planning tools help describe how a military force will turn a commander’s understanding
of the current situation into a desired end state. An end state is the set of required conditions that defines
achievement of the commander’s objectives (JP 3-0). The primary source for any commander’s end state is |
3-24 | 93 | Planning and Operational Considerations
the mission the commander received. The use of conceptual planning helps commanders visualize how to
generate the conditions that achieve that end state. Conceptual planning also allows commanders to
determine if the dictated end state is achievable, if additional resources are necessary, what level of risk
must be accepted, and if modification of the mission and expectations is required. The end state may
change as the situation changes. Lines of operations and effort help provide the detail necessary to turn the
commander’s visualization and the operational approach (how to move from the current situation to the
desired end state) into a detailed plan.
7-24. A line of operation is a line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to
the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an
objective(s) (JP 5-0). Lines of operation are normally associated with the spatial aspects of a tactical
problem. Lines of operation are useful, especially when addressing the physical aspects of
counterinsurgency, such as infrastructure protection, control of movement, and locating and engaging
insurgent forces. Lines of operation and lines of effort can be used separately or in combination.
In Service-level doctrine, United States Marine Corps doctrine does not make a distinction
between lines of effort and lines of operation. MCDP 1-0 states that, “A line of operations helps
define the orientation of the force. In conventional operations, lines of operations connect
actions related in time and space to an objective. During counterinsurgency or other irregular
warfare operations, lines of operations, for example, could focus on major stability-related
objectives, such as security, restoration of essential services, and training host-nation military
and police forces. In either case, lines of operations reinforce the idea of the single battle, since
success or failure in any line of operations will have an impact on the other lines of operations.”
7-25. A line of effort is, in the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to
focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions
(JP 5-0). Because counterinsurgencies are often more oriented towards an intended outcome or purpose
than an enemy force, counterinsurgency operations generally use lines of effort. If a line of operation is
spatially oriented, then that line of effort is purpose oriented and is appropriate when positional references
to an enemy or adversary are not the determining factor in friendly action. Because counterinsurgency
operations involve many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may form a way to link tasks, effects,
conditions, and the desired end state. Lines of effort help commanders visualize how to integrate their
military capabilities into the efforts of the rest of the unified action community. (See JP 5-0 for more
information on lines of effort.)
7-26. +Lines of effort are important tools to link conceptual planning to detailed planning. They are an
essential means that commanders can use to arrange tactical events in time, space, and purpose. The
benefits of using this type of framework include—
* Aiding the commander in visualizing, describing, and directing operations toward a definitive
end state.
* Unifying the efforts of joint, interagency, multinational, host-nation government, and host-nation
security forces toward a common purpose.
* Allowing commanders and staffs to synchronize activities along all lines of operation and effort
to gain unity of effort.
* Ensuring all efforts converge on a well-defined, commonly understood end state.
* Combining the effects of long-term operations with short-, mid-, and long-term goals.
* Helping commanders identify missions, assign tasks, allocate resources, and assess operations.
* Enhancing mutual support between echelons and adjacent organizations.
7-27. Lines of effort depict how the actions of a counterinsurgent, over time, achieve the end state
visualized by the commander. In a counterinsurgency, lines of effort must also be nested into the actions
and activities of the host nation. From the tactical level to the strategic level, the goal of the
counterinsurgent may be to support the host nation, depending on the operational design of the
counterinsurgency. While that may require some tactical actions that do not involve host-nation forces, the
overall effort must be to support the host nation’s efforts at all levels. The counterinsurgent forces support
and integrate their efforts with the efforts of the host nation’s strategic and operational approaches. |
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7-28. Commanders and staffs must consistently question and evaluate lines of effort as part of the
operations process. As assessment indicates changes to the situation (sudden opportunities to exploit,
failure of certain activities, new actors, and an actual change to the end state) the tasks and objectives of
various lines of operation and effort may no longer be relevant or appropriate. Worse, they can trap the
commander into a preconceived notion that accomplishment of various tasks will result in a successful
completion. Lines of operation and effort are useful means to help plan activities, but they are not measures
of mission success. All leaders must guard against the assumption that their actions are relevant because
they support any particular line of operation or effort. The underlying assumptions behind the tasks and
objectives of any detailed plan must be constantly questioned and evaluated. Just because counterinsurgents
take an action, that does not make that action relevant.
7-29. The effects of actions in one line of effort are not contained to only that line. For example, the
commander could have a line of effort to support the rule of law and a line of effort to support economic
development. However, a working legal system has a direct effect on the economic system. A system in
which contract law is enforced, for example, will have a much wider range of economic activity than a
system where contract law is not enforced. In this example, progress in the support economic development
line of effort may be hindered by struggles within the support rule of law line of effort. The use of systems
thinking allows commanders and staffs to use lines of operation and effort not only for planning and
conceptualization, but also for visualization of how they relate and influence each other.
7-30. Figure 7-2 illustrates one example of lines of effort in a counterinsurgency. However, while this is an
example that may apply well to a counterinsurgency after large-scale combat operations, it may not apply
well to other counterinsurgency operations. The U.S. could be providing only enablers for a
counterinsurgency effort. For example, U.S. forces might be combining capabilities such as counter threat
finance, signals intelligence, and a direct action force to enable the host nation by stopping the insurgency
from attaining the means to fight, providing intelligence on an insurgency’s communications, and providing
a means to neutralize insurgent leadership. The host nation may have the capability to handle basic
functions such as governance. When designing lines of effort for a counterinsurgency, the context the
counterinsurgent is operating in is not important. If commanders and staffs reduce lines of effort to some
standard solution set, they are no longer using the tool, but they are being used by the tool. This illustrates
that complex problems in counterinsurgency require critical thinking and defy solution by checklist and
battle drill methodologies. When commanders and staffs use them properly, and when they are tied to
operational and strategic purposes, lines of operation and effort are means to help commanders and staffs
perform successful counterinsurgency operations. Figure 7-2 provides examples of possible tasks on each
line of effort. However, commanders and staffs must remember that these are sample lines of effort and
sample tasks on the lines of effort. Just as the individual lines of effort must meet the situation commanders
and staffs find themselves in, tasks on a lines of effort must fit an operational environment and its desired
end states. (See figure 7-2.) |
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Figure 7-2. Sample of individual lines of effort |
3-24 | 96 | Chapter 7
DEVELOP SIMPLE, FLEXIBLE PLANS THROUGH MISSION ORDERS
7-31. Effective plans and orders are simple and direct. During insurgency and counterinsurgency
operations, not all participates will understand military language and terms. Staffs must be careful to
prepare clear, concise orders that communicate to all organizations involved a clear understanding of the
operation using operational terms and symbols that are understood by all or enabling understanding through
liaisons or other coordination means.
7-32. Flexible plans help participates adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Commanders and planners
build opportunities for initiative into plans by anticipating events. This allows them to operate inside of the
enemy’s decision cycle or to react promptly to deteriorating situations. Identifying decision points and
designing branches ahead of time—combined with a clear commander’s intent—help create flexible plans.
7-33. Commanders stress the importance of using mission orders as a way of building simple, flexible
plans. Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they
are to achieve them (ADP 6-0). Mission orders clearly convey the unit’s mission and the commander’s
intent. Mission orders provide subordinates information on what to do and the purpose of doing it, without
prescribing exactly how to do it.
7-34. +Commanders must also give guidance concerning risk when they issue mission orders. It is the
responsibility of commanders and staff to assess tactical and operational risk. Moreover, they should ensure
their forces are using techniques that take safety into account. That said, tactical initiative that supports
mission accomplishment should never be sacrificed because of safety. An over focus on safety undermines
the needed aggressive behavior to attack the enemy and take the needed risk to maintain contact with the
population. However, informing decisionmakers of hazards, recommended controls (resources), and
residual risk allows responsible individuals to weigh benefit against risk, direct resources to best mitigate
the risk, and employ forces in the most efficient manner. (See ATP 5-19 for details on the risk management
process and processes for integrating the process in both deliberate planning and under real-time
constraints.)
TRANSITIONS
7-35. Transitions are fundamental to the planning and execution of any line of operation or effort.
Transitions may occur as a result of both success and failure in terms of friendly actions, host-nation
actions, and adversary actions. There are four types of transitions in counterinsurgency operations:
* Transitions between changes in the environment.
* Transitions between phases.
* Transitions between units in an area of operations.
* Transitions of responsibilities to host nation or other agencies.
7-36. Transitions are critical events. They are critical because they represent significant changes to the
situation and because a failure to properly execute them can stall or even negate progress. Whatever their
nature, transitions are milestones that require reassessment. Even if a transition is a result of success, such
as moving forward in phases, it is a cause to assess whether the basic assumptions and plans associated
with the next phase are still appropriate and relevant. In counterinsurgency, in addition to possible
transitions due to enemy actions, the commander and staff base transitions on changes in the population’s
perception of legitimacy.
Because transitions are based on the conditions of an operational environment, they must be a part of both
the planning process and based on assessments of an operational environment. Transitions in
counterinsurgency are essential because they generally measure progress towards the desired end state.
However, the commander must link transitions to an assessment process that allows that commander to
attain situational understanding. A transition to another phase or a transition to the host nation not linked to
the assessment process can undermine the achievement of the end state. For example, a transition to a
host-nation agency before that host-nation agency is ready to assume responsibility may ultimately have the
effect of undermining the legitimacy of the host nation as the host nation fails to meet the basic
expectations of the population. |
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7-38. Transitions and assessments should be planned and executed from the beginning of any
counterinsurgency. Commanders can build legitimacy by ensuring that the host nation takes responsibility
for basic functions when it can. Therefore, building towards and executing that transition to the host nation
is fundamental to the commander’s planning and operations. Transitions to other units or other agencies
maintain a coherent and logical progression towards an ultimate transition to the host nation. The
commander avoids allowing any U.S. element to transition with another U.S. or multinational element in a
way that sets back the mission. This is also true for transitions between phases. A transition to another
phase before the operational environment allows can have disastrous consequences.
7-39. Effective counterinsurgency is about effectively linking tasks to a purpose and achieving that
purpose. This is what makes lines of effort effective planning tools for a counterinsurgency. Whether
commanders and staffs are using direct or indirect methods, they must link those methods to an end state.
However, linking both assessments and transitions into each line of effort is just as essential. The end state
of every line of effort is the creation of the conditions that satisfy the requirements of mission
accomplishment. (See figure 7-2 on page 7-9.) In counterinsurgency, ultimate success comes when a
society maintains its own legitimate government and defeats its insurgency using its own resources, not
through outside enablers. Transitioning to that point requires a well planned effort that evaluates progress
and executes all transitions in a way that does not undermine the objective of the line of effort. (See chapter
12 for a further discussion on assessments.)
7-40. A transition is a sequence of actions required to reorient on a changed situation, change to the next
phase of action, or shift responsibility from one organization to another, not a specific point in time.
Transitions require adequate time to allow for all transitional tasks to be completed. Thinking of a transition
as a general series of actions rather than a point in time better aids commanders and staffs in recognizing
transitions, planning for them, and executing them seamlessly.
7-41. When transitions occur between organizations, whether between military units or from a military unit
to a civilian agency, all involved organizations must clearly understand the tasks and responsibilities being
transferred and the time expected for completion. Commanders and staffs enable coordination between
units, agencies, and organizations to reduce the friction normally associated with a transition. Commanders
identify a collaborative transition planning team early in the process.
7-42. Commanders and staffs identify the criteria and conditions that must be met prior to executing a
transition. For example, transitioning a strongpoint to host-nation control may require the host nation to
allocate specialized personnel to replace the specialized personnel previously provided by other forces.
Additionally, host-nation manning may need to be increased to offset the departure of transitioning forces.
Commanders identify criteria for all parties involved or gaps will develop in execution. One criteria is the
minimum sustainable effort of the host nation prior to transition. Getting the host nation’s minimum
sustainable effort right with the proper balance for sustained effectiveness and long-term maintenance may
reflect a less than optimal solution from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, but any higher level of
effort by the host nation may actually jeopardize the legitimacy of the host nation in the long term by being
too heavy-handed or too costly.
7-43. Counterinsurgents must understand that transitions occur at varying times and locations based on the
situation in a given area. A transition may be linear at the local level, but transitions may occur at multiple
levels in the aggregate. For example, one battalion or brigade may have three village clusters in a build
phase, one that has transitioned, and two that are in a clear phase without any geographic context. One
host-nation security unit may be more advanced in training and equipping than another. As a result,
counterinsurgent forces may have to tailor their approach on a daily basis depending on the area, village, or
unit where they are operating. Success in counterinsurgency operations requires small-unit leaders agile
enough to transition among many types of missions and able to adapt to change. (See chapter 9 for more
information on the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework.)
7-44. Maintaining unity of effort is particularly important during transitions, especially between
organizations of different capabilities and capacities. Relationships tend to break down during transitions.
A poorly executed transition affects the success of the mission and places the new unit at risk. Ego and
unhealthy competition are often the greatest impediments to achieving an effective transition, and they
increase unnecessary risks to Soldiers, Marines, and the mission. Commanders must set the tone for their
forces to accomplish effective physical and contextual transitions. |
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7-45. A successful transition is achieved when it is executed properly and in synchronization with all the
relevant organizations, entities, and agencies. Planning for transitions is more than the identification of the
events that govern phases and branches for planning. It requires a holistic framing to develop the full
appreciation of the tasks, time, and resources required to execute effectively and efficiently in a
counterinsurgency environment. Well-planned transitions require proactive analysis and continuous
assessment during execution. Assessment of qualitative and quantitative criteria, supported by expert
opinion, should inform the decision to transition.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
7-46. There are certain operational considerations that have important consequences for planning and
executing counterinsurgency operations. Currently, insurgencies are likely to be networked. This makes
attack the network an essential operational consideration in understanding an insurgency and planning and
executing a counterinsurgency. Other considerations include remote area considerations, border
considerations, and basing. Counterinsurgency operations normally integrate information related
capabilities with other capabilities, and information operations are essential to most operational approaches.
This makes information operations uniquely important to counterinsurgents. (See paragraphs 4-88 through
4-103 for more information on networked insurgencies.)
ATTACK THE NETWORK
7-47. Attack the network operations can be essential in planning and an essential consideration for every
step in the operations process. When an insurgency is deeply networked into a society, it is important that
attack the network operations are integrated into planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations.
Networked insurgencies must be understood and attacked.
7-48. Attack the network operations provide the primary means to attack an insurgent network or enable a
host-nation force to defeat a networked insurgency. As such, they must be integrated and used when
counterinsurgents are facing a networked insurgency. (See paragraphs 4-88 through 4-103 for more
information on networked insurgencies.)
7-49. Attack the network operations consist of activities that employ lethal and nonlethal means to support
friendly networks, influence neutral networks, and neutralize threat networks. Attack the network
operations are conducted continuously and simultaneously at multiple levels (tactical, operational, and
strategic) throughout the whole of government. Attack the network operations are constructed around six
fundamentals:
* Understand the mission.
* Understand the operational environment.
* Understand the networks. (See paragraphs 4-88 through 4-103 for more information on networked
insurgencies.)
* Organize for the fight.
* Engage the network.
* Assess.
7-50. While listed sequentially, these actions occur continuously and simultaneously and are designed as
an enhancement to planning processes and intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace. Effective
attack the network operations occur when operations and intelligence efforts are synchronized. Failure to
synchronize efforts may hamper a unit’s ability to plan and operate in an efficient manner.
7-51. Attack the network operations predominantly support problem framing and mission analysis within
planning. During the initial stages of planning, intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace must
include an analysis and graphical (geospatial) representation of an operational environment as a series of
interconnected networks (friendly, neutral, and threat) in addition to weather, terrain, and civil
considerations. Threats to mission accomplishment can be presented by any network, not solely threat
networks. |
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7-52. Attack the network operations enable greater understanding of the human networks and those
variables critical to insurgent and threat networks. Network mapping, charting, and social network analysis
are intelligence products that can aid in refined analysis and course of action developments, bridge
conceptual planning and detailed planning by visually depicting time sensitive intelligence and mission
requirements, and provide a shared understanding of the operational environment and design. Additionally,
these network analysis products assist commanders and staffs in recognizing dynamic and static network
relationships for targeting to support mission accomplishment. The evaluation and measurement of
targeting effects continually aid in refined understanding and provide potential follow-on targets to degrade
threat and insurgent networks.
7-53. Attack the network operations require that commanders and staffs understand social networks. A
social network analysis is a tool for understanding the organizational dynamics of an insurgency and how
best to attack or exploit them. A social network analysis allows analysts to identify and portray the details
of a network structure. It shows how an insurgency’s networked organization behaves and how that
connectivity affects its behavior. A social network analysis allows analysts to assess the network’s design,
how its members may or may not act autonomously, where the leadership resides, how leadership is
distributed among members, and how hierarchical dynamics may mix or not mix with network dynamics.
7-54. Attack the network operations provide a construct to identify, define, and engage any network,
regardless of its design. The framework for attack the network operations can be applied against any type
or combination of adaptive networks. It allows leaders to effectively engage neutral and threat networks
with the appropriate lethal or nonlethal targeting, once a network has been defined through information
collection and analysis. It also provides a means to protect friendly networks. Assessments of targeting and
the measurement of the effects on networks (friendly, neutral, and threat) in an operational environment
assist the staff in providing further targeting recommendations in sustainment of lethal or nonlethal
activities.
7-55. Attack the network operations are tactical, operational, and strategic operations that capitalize on or
create vulnerabilities to neutralize the threat network’s ability to function and enable success of the
operation. Adaptive networked threats present an enduring challenge to all military operations. Neutralizing
them may require an attack the network approach that includes the following activities:
* Support friendly networks.
* Influence neutral networks.
* Neutralize threat networks.
Support Friendly Networks
7-56. Friendly network actions are intended to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for
friendly networks to function effectively and increase capability. These operations also have indirect effects
on threat networks, driving down their capabilities and altering the environmental conditions those
networks require to survive and operate. Actions supporting friendly networks are intended to establish,
reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the host nation or civil authorities to function effectively, add
capability, and increase capacity.
7-57. Commanders and staffs use all resources available, both Department of Defense (DOD) and
non-DOD, in an area of operations to ensure a comprehensive approach to supporting and enabling friendly
networks. Host-nation networks such as government agencies, local business or religious organizations,
tribal or cultural communities, and educational institutions all have an impact on a population and can alter
its perceptions. Commanders can affect these organizations positively, thus altering public perceptions in
favor of supporting those organizations. This results in increased cooperation, support, and even active
rebuttal of threat networks. (See paragraphs 1-47 and 1-48 for more information on comprehensive effort.)
Influence Neutral Networks
7-58. Influence neutral networks activities include operations intended to alter the opinions and attitudes of
a population segment through information, influence, presence, and conduct. These activities reflect the
ability of friendly forces to operate within the cultural and societal norms of the local population while |
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accomplishing the mission. They require legitimacy. Developing legitimacy requires time, patience, and
coordinated, cooperative efforts across the operational area. Influencing neutral networks to be more
favorably disposed to U.S. and host-nation objectives has indirect effects on threat networks by making the
operational environment in which threat networks operate less hospitable to their formation, growth, and
sustainment.
Neutralize Threat Networks
7-59. Threat networks are typically the immediate concern for any unit arriving in an area of operations.
These networks must be neutralized in order to protect friendly forces and populations while creating time
and space for other attack the network operations. While local friendly networks are being bolstered, there
is a period when host-nation capabilities are insufficient to address the threat. U.S. forces and multinational
partners must take direct actions against threats, reducing their functionality and impact, in order to set
conditions for supporting friendly networks and influencing neutral networks. The goal is to change the
perceptions and behaviors of neutral audiences to support the achievement of U.S., multinational, and
host-nation objectives.
7-60. A solid understanding of threat networks helps commanders engage those networks to achieve their
desired end state. Knowledge of numerous characteristics of networks can assist in the engagement process.
Conditions for network formation can help commanders and staffs understand the cognitive domain of
networks. Knowing the strengths and types of links can help commanders determine whether or not they
want to target or engage key nodes within networks or all known and potential nodes and actors of a
network.
7-61. Attack the network operations require that commanders understand and integrate specific staffing
requirements. Commanders and staffs integrate organic capabilities with enablers including, but not limited
to, other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations,
law enforcement professionals, and theater-specific joint task force explosive ordnance disposal elements to
conduct attack the network operations.
OTHER OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
7-62. Operations that occur in three additional types of environments have important considerations for
counterinsurgency. They include—
* Remote area considerations.
* Border considerations.
* Basing.
Remote Area Considerations
7-63. Operations in remote areas may be conducted in rural areas where a decentralized array of forces can
be most effective. Operations in remote areas are generally conducted in insurgent-controlled or contested
areas to establish pockets of popular support for the host-nation government and deny support to
insurgents. These operations may be conducted to establish bases in unpopulated areas where insurgent
forces have established staging areas, training areas, rest areas, logistic facilities, or command posts. Units
operate in remote areas to interdict insurgent activity, destroy insurgent base areas, and demonstrate that the
host-nation government has not ceded control to the insurgents.
7-64. Operations in remote areas are usually conducted in areas that are either under insurgent control or
are contested. In these areas, ground or water modes of entry are often used, but air assault or parachute
operations can be employed. These operations may use offensive tactics such as raids, reconnaissance in
force, cordon and searches, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuit (or combinations of these tactics). Their
purpose may be to—
* Harass insurgents to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistic resources.
* Isolate insurgents from their support.
* Demonstrate support for the government and for the populace in the local area. |
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* Expand controlled areas.
* Destroy the insurgent force and its base complexes.
7-65. To the extent possible, the counterinsurgency force should include personnel indigenous to the
operational area. The type of force employed, along with its host-nation counterpart (regular forces or
paramilitary) depends on the objectives, characteristics of the area, attitude of the local population, political
considerations, and the equipment and logistic support available. The size and composition of the
host-nation unit is, in part, determined by the insurgent’s influence over the population and the
government’s ability to recruit and develop an adequate local force. When the unit is recruited from local
inhabitants, local leaders should be used even though their military ability may be limited. By using local
leaders, assisted by advisors, better control and motivation are possible. Training, indoctrinating, and
incorporating the local force into the governmental structure is facilitated by using local leaders.
7-66. Understanding the host nation’s population’s issues from their perspectives enables
counterinsurgents to address the prerequisites of the insurgency and obtain local support for remote area
operations. Success is more likely if—
* A significant segment of the local population supports the program.
* The host nation recruits local personnel for its remote area paramilitary or irregular force.
* Host-nation forces conduct remote area operations to interdict infiltration routes in areas nearly
devoid of people. In this case, U.S. and multinational elements and host-nation forces operate in
a manner similar to that of the insurgents, but with access to superior sustainment resources.
7-67. In a rural environment, insurgents rely on friendly elements within the population to provide supplies
and intelligence. Rural insurgents prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment,
such as heavily forested and mountainous areas that hinder a counterinsurgency force from gaining access
to them. Often operating from their own home or village, rural insurgents often move to camps if security
does not permit them to remain at home. Insurgent camps are chosen with a view toward easy access to the
target population, access to a friendly or neutral border, prepared escape routes, and good observation of a
counterinsurgency force’s approach routes. When counterinsurgency operations force the insurgents from
their preferred base camps, insurgents tend to establish camps in rugged inhospitable areas that are not
easily penetrated. Like counterinsurgency in urban areas, remote counterinsurgency operations must focus
on both locating and eliminating insurgents and on severing the supportive element of the population from
providing supplies and intelligence to them.
7-68. Operations in remote areas typically call for use of combat outposts that are linked to the local
population. Commanders and staffs consider three perspectives (the population, insurgents, and
counterinsurgents) when choosing combat outpost locations. Establishing an outpost close to the local
population does not serve to advance the counterinsurgency’s goals without certain factors. These
include—
* Gaining acceptance of the local civilian leadership.
* Maintaining a constant presence in the community.
* Maintaining constant communications with the local community to provide immediate
emergency assistance.
* Maintaining situational understanding and an awareness of any changes in the population’s
patterns of life. This includes movement of outsiders (such as visitors, merchants, nomads, or
seasonal labor).
7-69. Operations in remote areas may include civil affairs, defense support of civil authorities, intelligence,
population and resources control, and advisory assistance operations. Most remote operations are long term
and continuous. They are initially directed at disrupting the insurgent’s operations and then destroying the
insurgent armed forces. Counterinsurgents destroy the insurgent infrastructure as quickly as possible.
7-70. Initially, strong combat and sustainment forces establish secure operational bases. Counterinsurgents
may conduct remote area operations in areas with little or no population to interdict infiltration routes.
Counterinsurgents make maximum use of special equipment to provide continuous coverage of suspected
areas and routes. Firepower and combat forces, with air assault capabilities, should be prepared to quickly
attack identified targets. Because remote area operations can stress the capability of land forces to make |
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rapid responses, commanders can mitigate risk by coordinating with joint enablers for close air support,
tactical airdrops, information collection, communications relays, and personnel recovery forces.
Border Considerations
7-71. In a counterinsurgency environment, armed forces may be responsible for border security, and they
may have to help other security forces with immigration, customs, and internal security operations. The
specific threat level, however, may require combat-type border operations, particularly in remote areas. The
threat level may require units or advisor teams to advise and assist host-nation forces assigned to prevent or
interdict the infiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. This method is
a terrain-centric approach to combating an insurgency. The commander’s intent is to isolate insurgent
forces from their external support and sanctuaries. Secondary purposes include locating and interdicting
insurgent land infiltration routes, destroying insurgent forces and bases in areas adjacent to the border, and
collecting and reporting information on insurgent capabilities and intentions. Border operations normally
require restrictive control measures for populations and resources that are particularly annoying to tribal
and ethnic border groups who do not recognize the international boundary. The host-nation government
must make a continuing effort to physically and psychologically gain and maintain the loyalty of the
affected population.
7-72. Designated border forces may be composed of border police and guards and may include
paramilitary forces and regular armed forces with supporting or direct responsibility for portions of the
national border or key internal routes to access other regions. Border operations are planned, conducted,
and supervised from the national level, to the regional level, and finally through commanders at the local
level. Border task forces are tailored units designed to meet requirements in their assigned areas. They
should contain sufficient sustainment warfighting function and sustainment elements to support civil
authorities’ operations for extended periods.
7-73. Tasks that may be performed in controlling the border include the following:
* Security of populated areas.
* Intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
* Operation of authorized points of entry.
* Refugee and internally displaced person control.
* Enforcement of movement and travel restrictions.
* Military information support operations.
* Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
* Attacks against insurgent forces.
* Destruction of insurgent base areas.
* Barrier and denial operations.
7-74. In a phase I insurgency, operations in border areas are normally a function of police, customs, and
other government organizations. Armed and paramilitary forces may assist these organizations, particularly
in remote areas. In phases II and III, denial of external support for the insurgency may require combat
operations in border areas. These operations require close coordination and cooperation between the armed
forces, paramilitary forces, and all government agencies involved. Attempts by insurgents to infiltrate can
be mitigated through the use of biometrics to identify subversive activities and limit or disrupt insurgent
mobility. (See paragraphs 4-70 through 4-75 for a discussion on the insurgency phases.)
7-75. Physically sealing a border may not be possible, since it could require the commitment of more
government forces and materiel than overall resources permit. Intelligence must be gathered by all means
available to determine the locations and extent of insurgent activities in border areas.
7-76. Commanders determine infiltration and exfiltration routes, support sites, frequency and volume of
traffic, type of transportation, number and type of personnel, amount and type of materiel, terrain and
traffic conditions, and the probable location of base areas and sanctuaries. Units conduct continuous and
detailed surveillance of these areas. Since placing forces and barriers at all possible crossings or entry sites
may be impossible, commanders establish priorities. Counterinsurgents use natural barriers wherever
possible. Using patrols, sensors, and obstacles in selected areas increase the effectiveness of natural |
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barriers. Herbicides, if approved for the area of operations, may be used to enhance visibility in vegetated
areas.
7-77. A restricted zone is a carefully selected area, of varied width, that is contiguous to the border.
Counterinsurgents give public notice that all unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the
restricted zone will be dealt with as infiltrators or insurgents. A friendly population buffer zone is an area in
which civilians living within the area of operations are limited to those believed to be loyal to the
government. Persons whose loyalty cannot be established are monitored. This concept offers a good
potential for establishing information nets and using loyal citizens in self-defense border units. It denies
insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for border-crossing activities. Commanders and staffs
direct a continuing military information support operation effort toward maintaining the morale and loyalty
of the population.
7-78. Counterinsurgents may employ aerial reconnaissance, unattended ground sensors, and ground
reconnaissance patrols to ensure adequate reconnaissance and surveillance of remote areas. Surveillance
and control of extensive coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated ground patrols on the
shoreline, coordinated offshore patrols, aerial surveillance, strategically located observation posts, and an
effective system of licensing and identifying friendly, military, and civilian watercraft.
7-79. Commanders and staffs must consider the population of the host nation’s neighbor country.
Counterinsurgent actions will be viewed and interpreted by local populations in neighboring countries.
Counterinsurgents must consider the impact their actions have on these populations. If the neighboring
local populations sympathize with host-nation insurgents or believe that counterinsurgent programs are
counterproductive to their individual goals, then negative perceptions can lead to increased foreign fighters,
weapons, and resource trafficking to support an insurgency. Counterinsurgents lack the physical means to
influence this population, but they can mitigate risk by performing effective information operations that
explain counterinsurgent programs and their benefits.
Basing
7-80. Counterinsurgency forces operate within a host country and must have a base from which to operate.
A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). All bases must be securable
and defendable. Bases vary according to the size and missions of the units occupying a base. All types of
bases require clear command relationships. In counterinsurgency operations, forward operating bases and
combat outposts are important.
7-81. Normally, when U.S. forces are the primary counterinsurgents, at least one forward operating base
exists in an area of operations. The size of the area, its physical characteristics, and the number and size of
the units operating within the area often require additional operating bases. The forward operating bases
established by a brigade or battalion are often semipermanent and provide deployed units with command,
control, and communications facilities; sustainment; personnel systems support; staging areas; and
intelligence activities. They provide units with relatively secure locations from which to plan and prepare
for operations. During counterinsurgency operations, they aid in limiting insurgent mobility nearby and in
providing some security and contact to the local population.
7-82. There are a few differences between brigade and battalion forward operating bases. Brigade forward
operating bases are larger than battalion forward operating bases and provide a secure location for
nondeployed elements of the deployed battalions, such as battalion forward support companies. A battalion
forward operating base is normally staffed with the minimum personnel needed to operate and provide
security. Other assets are normally positioned in a brigade operational base. A battalion forward operating
base should maintain two methods for sustainment: by road and either air or water.
7-83. A combat outpost is a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations
(FM 3-90-2). In counterinsurgency operations, combat outposts are often company and platoon-sized bases
inside of insurgent influenced territory. When U.S. forces are acting as the primary counterinsurgents,
combat outposts represent a cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations. Located in strategically
important areas, a combat outpost provides security in its immediate area and direct contact with the local
population not possible from remote bases. Although this method carries with it potential downsides in |
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terms of increased proportion of forces used for force protection, thus limiting combat power available,
combat outposts provide an increase in security for the population.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
7-84. Information operations is the integrated employment, during military operations, of
information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or
usurp the decisionmaking of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13). For
the Army, information operations integrates information related capabilities into the overall operational
approach. The joint and multinational communities continue to use the term information operations. The
joint construct for conducting information operations is the information-influence relational framework.
The framework describes the application, integration, and synchronization of information-related
capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decisionmaking of target audiences to create a
desired effect to support achievement of an objective. An information-related capability is a tool,
technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to
create effects and operationally desirable conditions (JP 3-13). (See Army doctrine for more information on
integrating information-related capabilities.)
7-85. A target audience is an individual or group selected for influence (JP 3-13). Information operations
seek to generate effects against the decisionmaking of individuals, a group, or perhaps elements of a
population. In general, the integration of information-related capabilities is most effective when employed
against precisely selected targets to achieve clearly defined objectives.
7-86. Information-related capabilities generate effects that support achievement of the commander’s
objectives. There are many military capabilities that contribute to operations, and commanders and staffs
should consider them during the planning process. Some of these capabilities are:
* Soldier and key leader engagement.
* Civil-military operations.
* Cyberspace operations.
* Military deception.
* Electronic warfare.
* Operations security.
* Military information.
* Physical attack.
* Physical security.
* Counterintelligence.
* Public affairs.
* Combat camera.
* Defense support to public diplomacy.
* Space operations.
* Special technical operations.
* Intelligence.
* Joint electromagnetic spectrum operations.
* Information assurance.
7-87. A commander can use many other capabilities to enhance and reinforce the shaping of the area of
operations and the accomplishment of mission objectives in the information environment. (See JP 3-13 for
additional information on the use of information-related capabilities.)
7-88. Information-related capabilities, whether applied in shaping the operational environment to deter
conflict or in enabling decisive maneuver, must be recognized as an essential enabling activity that
facilitates development of an operational advantage for the commander. In current and future operational
environments, the integrated employment of information-related capabilities into operations is critical to
mission success. (See the Marine Corps operating concept for information operations for more information
on information-related capabilities.) |
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7-89. The actions of Soldiers and Marines in an area of operations are the most powerful influence on
credibility of their commanders’ message. All audiences (including local, regional, and threat) compare the
friendly force’s message with its actions. Consistency contributes to the success of friendly operations by
building trust and credibility. Conversely, if actions and messages are inconsistent, friendly forces lose
credibility. Loss of credibility makes land forces vulnerable to threat counter propaganda and information
warfare and places Army and Marine forces at a disadvantage. (See FM 3-13 for more information on
messaging.)
7-90. Commanders, staffs, and unified action partners construct a narrative to help understand and explain
an operational environment, its problem, and solutions. Narratives are tied to actions in an operational
environment. A narrative is a brief description of a commander’s story used to visualize the effects the
commander wants to achieve in an information environment to support and shape an operational
environment.
7-91. The key to successful information operations during an insurgency is the commander’s intent. The
commander’s intent provides a focus for the coordination and synchronization of information-related
capabilities. Staffs and information operations planners must balance the use of different
information-related capabilities, such as civil affairs operations, physical attack, and cyberspace operations,
in order to communicate the intended message to the target audience with an understanding of possible
second and third order effects on the rest of the global population.
7-92. When commanders and staffs use the various types of information capabilities, there is a tension
between a broad message and engaging the population to achieve a two way understanding. The U.S. is
generally involved in counterinsurgencies to aid host nations. As such, commanders and staffs integrate
information capabilities with the host nation’s message to tell the population the reason for U.S.
involvement. Commanders and staffs have to establish relationships, seek two-way understanding, and
listen to what others think. Effective counterinsurgency normally requires an effective broad message and
engaging the population in a dialogue. Commanders and staffs must find the right balance between using
information capabilities to give a broad message versus creating a dialogue.
7-93. Commanders and staffs balance between controlling the message and allowing for complete freedom
of messaging. Having a perfectly controlled message does not allow for real, timely communication with a
population. Leaders must have some ability to actually engage a population and create a shared
understanding. However, if representatives of a command have total freedom of message, the population is
bombarded with contradictions and inconsistencies. Commanders and staffs must find the right balance to
allow real communication, but also to ensure that the command has a coherent message.
7-94. Public affairs and information operations are separate but related functions. Public affairs are those
public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward both the
external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense (JP 3-61). External publics include
allies, neutrals, and threats. When addressing external publics, opportunities for information overlap exist
between public affairs and information operations.
7-95. Information operations and public affairs personnel must maintain a common awareness of each
other’s support to operations to preclude the potential for information conflict. The information operations
cell provides an excellent place to coordinate and deconflict information operations and public affairs
activities that could result in information fratricide. Information fratricide is the result of employing
information-related capabilities in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the
conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces (FM 3-13). Final coordination of public
affairs and information operations must occur within the operations process.
7-96. In a counterinsurgency, the insurgent often targets the U.S. population with themes and messages
concerning the insurgency. There are legal and professional reasons why the armed forces cannot attempt
to influence American public opinion; to do so would undermine civil control over the military. However,
the military has a responsibly to provide information to the U.S. public. Transparency and truthful
information allows policy decisions to be debated between decisionmakers and the public. Although
providing that information during an insurgency is a responsibility of the military, trying to influence the
actual debate is unethical and damages the military’s relationship with the society. |
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Intelligence
8-1. Intelligence must drive operations in a counterinsurgency. Commanders and staffs must understand
the area of operations in a counterinsurgency. The insurgency in Peru demonstrates that intelligence
capabilities can be integrated with information operations and integrated monetary shaping operations to
successfully undermine an insurgency. The Peruvian government was eventually successful in using
economic development and an information campaign to weaken the Shining Path insurgency. With the
gradual development of an effective military, Peru was able to continue its success. Intelligence, resulting
in the capture of the Shining Path’s leader, changed the nature of the insurgency and significantly reduced
the threat of the Shining Path to Peru.
Intelligence and the Shining Path
Peru suffered an unprecedented economic downturn in the 1970s and
1980s. The Peruvian government, though democratic, was characteristically
ineffective and unable to stem the worsening crisis. This opened the door for an
insurgent organization, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and its establishment
of alternative governance structures in the economically devastated Peruvian
highlands. Sendero Luminoso leaders purged local officials and established their own
authority in the villages, beating back control efforts by the Peruvian police.
In the first few years of the insurgency, the government did not take the
threat seriously. Opposition to the insurgents (such as it was) was organized by local
police, and the government made no effort to improve the desperate socioeconomic
conditions in the highlands or to define a clear mission for regional security forces.
With its superior organization and a lack of effective response by the government,
Sendero Luminoso made significant progress. Its operations and propaganda were
coordinated to create the perception that the group was a “winner” and was meeting
its Maoist strategic goals, in sharp contrast to the largely ineffective government.
Still plagued by a lack of internal unity both in the government and in the
military, the state moved forward with two competing counterinsurgency strategies:
one focused on development and the other focused on ideology and military force.
First proposed in 1984, the developmental approach finally got its turn in 1985. The
state recognized that the highlands were particularly hard hit by the economic crisis
and were the heartland of the insurgency, so its goal was to increase development
and job opportunities in these regions. Public investment in Ayacucho (a region in the
southern highlands) quadrupled between 1985 and 1986. Unfortunately, the
insurgents actively resisted this development, or co-opted it, forcing government
teachers to include Sendero Luminoso materials in their curricula. The government
did not provide the security necessary for development to have any effect.
Subsequent to 1986, development funding fell off, and embezzlement became
common. As a result, this initial push of development and investment fell far short of
meeting the needs of the economically disadvantaged population in the highlands.
The election of Alberto Fujimori in June 1990 raised new hopes of resolving
the conflicts within the government and making greater headway against the
insurgents. Fujimori promised a better human rights record and a new commitment to
development. In addition to renewed government legitimacy, the Fujimori
administration also brought two significant improvements to Peru’s approach to
counterinsurgency: first, the use of the police and the national intelligence service to
track the movements of Sendero Luminoso sympathizers and attempt to infiltrate the
group and, second, the arming of rondas, peasant civil-defense militias. These |
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rondas were possible only because the insurgents’ treatment of villagers in its areas
of operation had become so harsh that the locals were finally pushed to stand up for
themselves. Improved intelligence and an end to internal divisions within the military
allowed effective engagement of insurgent forces and effective (and rapid) support to
threatened rondas. For the first time in the conflict, the government, police, and
military made effective use of what would now be called strategic communication,
with a greater emphasis on government credibility, consistency between actions and
messages, and significant efforts to woo the population in the highlands away from
the insurgents (efforts of which the rondas were an integral part).
In 1992 good intelligence led to Abimael Guzmán’s (the leader of Sendro
Luminoso) capture. The capture of Guzman changed the ongoing insurgency and
significantly undermined insurgent efforts. At the time of his capture, the police seized
Guzmán's computer, in which they found a very detailed roster of his armed forces
and the weapons each formation had in each region of the country. His authoritarian
management of Sendero Luminoso had proven very effective when he was at large,
but when he was captured, it provided a wealth of information. This information was
used for further operations.
INTELLIGENCE FUNDAMENTALS
8-2. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis,
and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces
or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations (JP 2-0). Intelligence can be broken down into seven
disciplines, and it is an enabler of any counterinsurgency effort. Each discipline provides a means for the
counterinsurgent to gain a higher level of situational understanding. These disciplines include
counterintelligence, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence,
open-source intelligence, signals intelligence, and technical intelligence. The intelligence disciplines are
integrated to ensure a multi-disciplined approach to intelligence analysis. Ultimately all-source intelligence
facilitates situational understanding and supports decisionmaking. All intelligence disciplines are important
in counterinsurgency. However, this chapter will focus on elements of intelligence that have unique
considerations in counterinsurgency. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on intelligence.)
8-3. An essential part of understanding the operational environment is the process of intelligence
preparation of the battlefield/battlespace. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace is a
systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of threat/adversary,
terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By
applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace, commanders gain the information necessary
to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space
(FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A). (See FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A for more information on intelligence preparation
of the battlefield/battlespace.) In a counterinsurgency environment, intelligence preparation of the
battlefield/battlespace must take into account operational environment considerations. (See chapter 2 for
considerations about the operational environment and chapter 4 for considerations on analyzing an
insurgency.)
8-4. Culture is an element of the operational environment and, like the physical terrain, creates both
opportunities and challenges for Soldiers and Marines. A nation’s culture is a set of complex,
ever-changing, and interconnected social, historical, political, and environmental factors that shape the
perceptions, motives, and behaviors of its population. Cultural intelligence is the analysis and
understanding of groups of people and the reasons they do certain things. Cultural intelligence includes
gaining an understanding of the mindset of a local population to support the commander’s decisionmaking
and help drive operations. (See chapter 3 for more information on culture.)
8-5. The counterinsurgency force must understand the cultural foundations of the operational
environment in order to transform seemingly random and irrational activity into describable and
semipredictable acts. Commanders and staffs must devote as much effort to understand the local population
being supported as they do to understand the insurgents. Cultural intelligence requires historical perspective
as well as collection and analysis of current information, because cultures and cultural factors are |
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consistently shifting. Periods of warfare, instability, and natural disasters increase the rate of cultural
change within a society.
8-6. Also, cyberspace is an essential domain for the gathering of intelligence in a counterinsurgency.
Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent
network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 1-02). The
commander and senior intelligence officer must be highly aware of the intelligence oversight implications
of collecting against United States (U.S.) persons, as the distinction of citizenship is difficult to assess in
cyberspace. The distinction is required because intelligence collection is enabled by and must comply with
all applicable U.S. laws and policy. However, cyberspace is used by insurgents and cannot be ignored by
counterinsurgents. Cyberspace and the technologies that enable it allow people of every nationality, race,
faith, and point of view to communicate, cooperate, and prosper like never before. Some adversaries clearly
understand the power of cyberspace. Terrorists employ the Internet for recruiting, training, motivating, and
synchronizing their followers. Adversaries frequently operate in cyberspace unrestrained, and they exploit
its potential. To be effective in defeating an insurgency, commanders and staffs must gather intelligence on
how an insurgency is using cyberspace.
ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
8-7. The Army defines all-source intelligence as the integration of intelligence and information from all
relevant sources to analyze situations or conditions that impact operations. (See ADRP 2-0.) The joint force
defines all-source intelligence as intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate
all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence (JP 2-0). All-source intelligence is used
to develop the intelligence products necessary to aid situational understanding, support the development of
plans and orders, and answer information requirements. Although all-source intelligence normally takes
longer to produce, it is more reliable and less susceptible to deception than single-source intelligence.
Intelligence organizations fuse data and information into all-source intelligence products to support
counterinsurgency operations. Analysis for counterinsurgency operations is challenging, due in part to
the—
* Need to understand perceptions and culture.
* Need to track hundreds or thousands of personalities.
* Local nature of insurgencies.
* Tendency of insurgencies to change over relatively short periods of time.
8-8. Commanders and staffs need data to analyze and synthesize insurgent activities and personalities.
Intelligence staffs should create a common searchable combatant command database of insurgent actions
and personnel, and another database(s) that provides discoverable, accessible, and retrievable data on
insurgent actions and personnel, and provide similar access to all intelligence reporting. This data should be
accessible by analysts both in and out of the theater as well as conventional, special operations forces, and
multinational units.
8-9. Because all echelons collect and use intelligence, all staffs are heavily involved in analysis. Units are
simultaneously intelligence producers and consumers. Intelligence capabilities are normally greater at
higher echelons of command. For example, battalion staffs have fewer personnel than brigade staffs to
collect patrol debriefs, analyze incoming information from multiple sources, produce finished intelligence
products, and disseminate products to appropriate consumers. In many cases, brigade intelligence sections
may be inadequately staffed to handle the vast amounts of information necessary to conduct operations in a
counterinsurgency environment.
8-10. Counterinsurgency requirements may require pushing analysts to battalion and brigade staffs to give
those echelons the required analytical support. Often analysts can be beneficial at the company level. In
these cases, developing company intelligence support teams may be useful. Many maneuver company
commanders organize small intelligence support teams from within their units to provide tailored
intelligence products to the company leadership. They may receive augmentation from the brigade military
intelligence company or other intelligence Soldiers and Marines to form the nucleus of a company
intelligence support team. The company intelligence support team combines information gained from |
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company operations with intelligence received from adjacent and higher units. The team analyzes and
reports information collected by the company while receiving, parsing, and reporting intelligence collected
by other organizations. The battalion intelligence cell is responsible for integrating the various company
reports into intelligence products. This is particularly useful when a maneuver company must collect large
amounts of information on the local population and insurgents. A company intelligence support team can
help focus collection, process information collected, and develop a common operational picture of an area
of operations. Pushing analysts to brigades and lower echelons places analysts closer to collectors,
improves the common operational picture, and helps higher echelon staffs receive answers to the
commander’s priority intelligence requirements. Commanders may need to be creative in developing
analytical capabilities within their units. Though it is not ideal, commanders can assign non-intelligence
personnel to work in the intelligence section. (See TC 2-19.63 for more information on company
intelligence support teams).
8-11. In a counterinsurgency, a bottom-up flow of intelligence is important. Battalions and brigades
develop intelligence for their area of operations. Higher echelons fuse it into intelligence of the insurgency
throughout the combatant command. Higher echelons can also integrate the human intelligence that
battalions and brigades receive with the other intelligence disciplines. Comprehensive insurgency analysis
focuses on the people in the area of operations. It develops information about relationships among them and
the ideas and beliefs driving their actions. Comprehensive insurgency analysis brings together all other
forms of analysis.
FUSION CENTERS
8-12. A fusion center is an ad hoc collaborative effort between several units, organizations, or agencies that
provides resources, expertise, information, and intelligence to a center with the goal of supporting the rapid
execution of operations by contributing members. Fusion centers are primarily designed to focus collection
and promote information sharing across multiple participants within a specific geographic area or mission
type. These centers are not operations centers. Commanders at various echelons create fusion centers to
manage the flow of information and intelligence, focus information collection to satisfy information
requirements, and to process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the resulting collection. Fusion centers are
most effective if they have participation from all the key elements in an area of operations and
representatives from all the warfighting functions. When possible, fusion centers include unified action
partners. The intelligence portion of a fusion center typically comprises intelligence representatives from
different tactical echelons, interagency partners, multinational organizations, host-nation organizations, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the area of operations. (See ADRP 2-0 for more
information on fusion centers.)
8-13. In a counterinsurgency, commanders and staffs must create shared situational understanding. Fusion
cells are important in creating this understanding. The mixture of personnel and expertise allows for the
integration of information and analysis. This is an effective means of understanding the operational
environment from multiple perspectives. Fusion cells aid in understanding intelligence and informing
operations to avoid unintended consequences.
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
8-14. Human intelligence is the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information
from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics,
equipment, and capabilities (FM 2-22.3). For the joint force, human intelligence is defined as a category of
intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources (JP 2-0). Because
insurgency and counterinsurgency are struggles for legitimacy, human intelligence plays a vital role in
determining legitimacy. Human intelligence uses human sources for information collection and uses a
variety of collection methods, both passive and active, to collect information to meet intelligence
requirements and inform other intelligence disciplines. Interrogation is one of the human intelligence tasks,
along with screening, debriefing, liaison, and conducting controlled source operations in support of Army
operations. During counterinsurgency operations, a great deal of intelligence is based on information
gathered from people. However, military source intelligence operations are only conducted by human
intelligence collectors. A human intelligence collector is a person who is trained to collect information |
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from individuals for the purpose of answering requirements. (See FM 2-22.3 for more information on
human intelligence.)
8-15. Operational reporting may have information of intelligence value that originates from a local
population. People may approach Soldiers and Marines during the course of their day-to-day operations and
offer information. Soldiers and Marines record information and report it to the intelligence section. This
allows for verification of information and establishes a means for human intelligence collectors to contact
individuals offering information of value.
8-16. People offering information on insurgents are often in danger as insurgents continuously try to defeat
collection operations. Commanders ensure that the appropriate personnel are trained in handling human
sources in accordance with Army, Marine Corps, and Department of Defense (DOD) standards and
policies. Human intelligence collectors are trained in procedures that limit risks to sources and handlers.
Counterinsurgents should not expect people to willingly provide information if insurgents have the ability
to violently intimidate sources. Human intelligence reporting increases if counterinsurgents protect the
population from insurgents and people begin to believe the insurgency is defeated.
8-17. People often provide inaccurate and conflicting information to counterinsurgents. They may spread
rumors or provide inaccurate information for their own reasons. For example, people may give inaccurate
information to settle tribal, ethnic, or business disputes. The accuracy of information obtained by Soldiers
and Marines is verified before using it to support operations. This means that information reported to
patrols should be verified with all-source intelligence. Improved accuracy will come from collecting
intelligence from the whole population. Information must be seen as part of a whole picture and parts or
segments of information cannot override the whole picture. An important part of gaining access from the
whole population is gaining access to restricted populations. These populations often include women, but
they can include any element that the counterinsurgent cannot access because of cultural considerations.
Restricted access teams may be helpful in ensuring that information is attained from the whole population,
including women.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
8-18. Counterintelligence also uses human sources to assist in collection of information on foreign
intelligence, international terrorist, or insider threat activities that may threaten the counterinsurgency.
Counterintelligence efforts may be directed toward assisting commanders in detecting and neutralizing the
insider threat by ensuring that counterinsurgency operations are not compromised by adversaries operating
inside a base. Counterintelligence operations, including the use of humans as sources, must be
accomplished by trained counterintelligence special agents.
INFORMATION COLLECTION AND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
8-19. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of
sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of
current and future operations. The deputy chief of staff, (G-2 [S-2]) and assistant chief of staff, operations
(G-3 [S-3]) staffs collaborate to collect, process, and analyze information the commander requires
concerning threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that affect operations. The information
collection tasks are—
* Plan requirements and assess collection.
* Task and direct collection.
* Execute collection.
(See FM 3-55 for more information on information collection and planning requirements and assessing
collection.)
8-20. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance provides commanders with detailed and timely
intelligence. This intelligence helps commanders gain situational understanding of a threat and an
operational environment. This is accomplished by answering requirements focused in time and space and
identifying any threats to mission accomplishment. The intelligence staff provides commanders with
predictive assessments of threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. These assessments also |
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provide commanders with a running estimate regarding the degree of confidence the staff places in each
analytic assessment. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to
determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future
operations are supportable (ADP 5-0).
INTELLIGENCE-RELATED CAPABILITIES
8-21. Commanders and staffs consider several capabilities for intelligence in a counterinsurgency. They
include—
* Biometrics and biometric-enabled intelligence.
* Forensics and forensic-enabled intelligence.
* Site exploitation.
Biometric-Enabled Intelligence
8-22. Understanding biometrics-enabled intelligence requires knowledge of biometrics and its contribution
to Army and Marine Corps missions. The term biometric describes both a characteristic (biometric) and a
process (biometrics):
* A biometric is a measurable physical characteristic or personal behavior trait used to recognize
the identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual.
* Biometrics is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical,
physiological, and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0).
8-23. The Army and Marine Corps employ automated biometric systems to deny threat forces any freedom
of movement within the population and to positively identify known threats, threat forces, friendly
populations, local nationals, and third-country nationals throughout their areas of operation to separate
insurgents and foreign fighters from the general population. Biometric systems collect biometric data, such
as iris images, fingerprints, and facial images, and combine them with contextual and biographic data to
produce an electronic dossier on an individual. Automated biometric systems may support the following
tasks:
* Positively identify high-value targets.
* Screen and badge personnel.
* Manage the population.
* Perform force protection (local access).
* Conduct detention operations.
8-24. Biometrics are important assets in any counterinsurgency operation. These tools allow the
counterinsurgent to gain both civil security and control. Through positive identification, biometrics allow
the counterinsurgent to effectively execute offensive operations against the insurgency while at the same
time protecting the civilian population by not detaining innocent civilians. If used correctly, biometrics
allow the counterinsurgent to effectively execute offensive operations against the insurgency and protect
the population. Moreover, the host nation can be enabled with these capabilities. Biometric abilities can be
essential in building legitimacy among the population. (For more information on biometrics, see
FM 2-22.3, ATTP 2-91.6, TC 2-33.4, and TC 2-22.82.)
Forensic-Enabled Intelligence
8-25. Although not an intelligence discipline, police intelligence operations can support the overall
intelligence effort through the analysis, production, and dissemination of information collected from police
activities. Information gathered from military police operations may contribute to a commander’s critical
information requirement and focusing police forces on maintaining order. Criminal acts such as robberies,
kidnappings, terrorism, and extortion may be linked to insurgent psychological or money-gathering
activities. Police information, police intelligence, and criminal intelligence are subtasks of police
intelligence operations. (See ATTP 3-39.20 for additional information on law enforcement.) |
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8-26. Forensics involves methodically gathering and analyzing evidence to establish facts that can be
presented in a legal proceeding. It applies multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts. Forensics
operations, to include site and document exploitation, further aid the positive identification efforts of a
counterinsurgent and help to separate insurgents from the general population, thus contributing to overall
situational understanding. Commanders and staffs should make every effort to operate within status of
forces agreements and combatant command requirements. (See ATTP 2-91.6 for more information on
forensics.)
8-27. For example, latent fingerprints discovered on pieces of improvised explosive devices provide
critical information that analysts need to link individuals, insurgent organizations, their capabilities, and
their activities. Forensics that includes site exploitation and forensic documents is of great benefit to
substantiating information if detainees are insurgents. The methods of forensics allow the counterinsurgent
to work towards situational understanding.
Site Exploitation
8-28. Site exploitation is a series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze
information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of operations (JP 3-31). When countering
an insurgency, site exploitation of an insurgent location is essential. Computers, cell phones, and other
means of communication and storing information are vital to understanding the insurgent structure.
8-29. Site exploitation uses the full range of resources at the commander’s disposal, starting with the
Soldier’s basic cognitive skills to sophisticated analytical processes conducted by joint, interagency, and
intergovernmental organizations. Exploitation operations provide answers to the commander’s information
requirements regardless of whether the information was gained by a squad on patrol or through external
sensor platform outputs.
8-30. Site exploitation may require additional technical expertise not resident within the theater to process
the collected information, material, and personnel to maintain their unique physical or forensic attributes.
Detailed technical exploitation of collected items can divulge actionable information or intelligence that
can be used to positively identify any unique threat characteristics or threat networks for follow-on actions.
8-31. Knowledge management enables the effective dissemination of actionable information and
intelligence to units for their integration into the intelligence, targeting, and operations processes. This
facilitates follow-on operations and enhances commanders’ and staffs’understanding. |
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Direct Methods for Countering Insurgencies
9-1. The direct method of using United States (U.S.) land, maritime, and air forces in a decisive action
role is resource intensive when done on a large scale, but it is often necessary to fully support a
counterinsurgency effort. A direct method may be used, for example, when the success of a host nation’s
counterinsurgency efforts is critical to U.S. interests. The U.S. can use a direct method after or during a
major conflict or when U.S. interests necessitate stability in a failed or failing state. Leaders can also
integrate land forces into a host nation’s ongoing effort. Unfortunately, unintended consequences, such as
increased tensions among segments of society or resistance to U.S. involvement, often accompany a direct
approach. Leaders must carefully plan and execute operations before and during a direct response to avoid
negative consequences. However, using direct capabilities remains a valid option and an important
capability that the Army and Marine Corps provide the joint force.
9-2. The level of direct U.S. involvement can vary. In many cases, a host nation will be fully capable of
providing security for its population. However, integration of fires or a direct action force could enable a
host nation’s counterinsurgency efforts. The Army and Marine Corps bring many capabilities that can be
integrated into a counterinsurgency effort. When counterinsurgents consider direct involvement, they
should consider a wide spectrum of activities that range from a modest force conducting limited missions to
a large force that could be, at least for a time, the primary counterinsurgency force.
9-3. The U.S. has a wide range of capabilities that it can use to create many different operational
approaches to counter an insurgency. Direct involvement by U.S. forces can take place along a spectrum,
from little direct U.S. involvement to U.S. forces acting as the primary counterinsurgents. If U.S. forces are
acting temporarily as the primary counterinsurgents, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework forms
a tactical and operational background for battalion and brigade operations. While the shape-clear-hold-
build-transition framework must be enabled with other capabilities, such as security force assistance, the
shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework provides a framework for how Army and Marine forces will
defeat an insurgency at the tactical level. Moreover, this tactical background also creates a frame of
reference for understanding actions by the host nation to defeat an insurgency. This understanding is
essential in integrating U.S. capabilities into a host-nation effort.
9-4. Counterinsurgents should not think that all counterinsurgencies end the same way. The shape-clear-
hold-build-transition framework provides a good framework for a protracted struggle. Counterinsurgencies
are conducted using a wide range of different approaches. For example, the insurgency in Sri Lanka was
fought using conventional tactics and ended in a traditional offensive operation. It ended in something that
looked much more like a conventional offensive operation then an application of the shape-clear-hold-
build-transition framework. In some cases, the government or insurgents can impose their impose their will
and control the population. While counterinsurgents should remember that specific insurgencies are unique,
for many insurgencies, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is a starting point for understanding
host-nation actions and then enabling those actions.
SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION FRAMEWORK
9-5. For a tactical and operational ground commander acting as the primary counterinsurgent commander,
the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework provides a foundation for detailed planning. Moreover, the
shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is well-suited to those commanders and staffs engaged in
training, advising, or integrating capabilities into a host-nation effort. If a host nation is performing
operations, whatever the U.S. role in the counterinsurgency, Soldiers and Marines must have a framework
for understanding that host nation’s actions. Commanders and staffs cannot evaluate, advise, or train
another force unless they have a base of knowledge on the operations being conducted. In many
counterinsurgency efforts, a state will try to defeat insurgencies by performing a general operational |
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approach that is similar to the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework at the tactical level. While this
is certainly not a uniform rule, having some framework in understanding another counterinsurgent’s actions
provides a point of reference for understanding. Commanders and staffs must have an understanding of
how to solve a particular problem before they advise or assist another commander solve that problem.
Understanding the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is a fundamental framework for
understanding what units are trying to accomplish in a counterinsurgency. This framework applies to all
units involved in the counterinsurgency, including, for example, an infantry battalion directly performing
actions, a member of a special forces team advising a host nation, or a member of a combatant command
integrating and evaluating various security cooperation capabilities.
9-6. Whether U.S. forces are executing the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework or another state
is executing it, it can be very effective in defeating an insurgency. For example, in the Philippines, the
government was successful in using the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, even if it was not
called shape-clear-hold-build-transition by the counterinsurgents at the time. Commanders and staffs must
understand the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework to understand what a host nation is trying to
achieve in its counterinsurgency efforts. This framework is used by U.S. and foreign forces.
Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition: The Huks
The Hukbalahap, or “Huks,” were one of several guerilla organizations that
appeared in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation of World War II. By the
time of the country’s liberation from the Japanese occupation, the Huks were
well-armed with weapons taken from the Japanese or shipped to them from the U.S.
The Philippines gained independence from the U.S. on July 4, 1946, and
held its first national election in November 1946. The Huks participated in the
elections, and the head of the wartime Huk movement, Luis Taruc, won a seat in the
Philippine Congress. However, the newly elected President, Manuel Roxas, refused
to seat Mr. Taruc or his allies in Congress, leading many Filipino peasants to join the
Huk movement.
By late 1946, there was open fighting between the Huks and the forces of
the newly independent Republic of the Philippines. The insurgency was motivated by
vast economic inequality during the country’s transition to an export-led capitalist
economy, with abject poverty affecting 90 percent of the population.
The Huks’ primary tactics in the beginning of the conflict included bank,
payroll office, and train robberies, as well as small hit-and-run raids and ambushes
that allowed them to avoid contact with large government formations. During these
first few years, the Huks numbered 5,000 active insurgents, 10,000 lightly armed
reserves, and 35,000 other supporters. The Huks also enjoyed incredible levels of
internal support, with an estimated 250,000 peasants actively supporting them during
the early years of the insurgency.
The counterinsurgency force was unable to control the insurgency in the
early years. Shortly after the country was granted independence, the Philippine Army
was reduced from 132,000 to 37,000 men. Approximately 24,000 of these men were
in the Military Police Command, which was tasked with combating the insurgency.
However, the Military Police Command was poorly led and poorly equipped, and
pursued tactics that accomplished little beyond alienating the population between
1946 and 1948. In 1948, President Roxas reorganized the Military Police Command
into the Philippine Constabulary, which remained neither well-trained nor
well-equipped. It mainly practiced encirclement and sweeps, both of which were
easily evaded by the Huks, and systematically committed abuses against civilians:
raiding villages, stealing possessions, and treating the population worse than the
Huks did.
The Huks then began making strategic and operational errors, failing to
reach out to other disaffected groups to form a broad front, and employing many
common criminals in their ranks, causing peasants to fear the group. Probably most
catastrophic to the group’s public image was the assassination of Mrs. Aurora
Quezon, the well-liked and popular wife of the late former President, Manuel Quezon. |
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As a result of Mrs. Quezon’s murder, President Quirino appointed then-Congressman
Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense in 1950.
After this, the Huk Rebellion became a good example of successful
shape-clear-hold operations, with Magsaysay immediately instituting a
shape-clear-hold approach. Shaping operations focused on efforts to win popular
support for the counterinsurgency effort in preparation for future operations to clear
insurgent areas. These operations included putting a stop to the abuses of civilians
by the Constabulary and Army, firing many high-level military officers, placing the
Constabulary under Magsaysay’s personal control, suppressing troop brutality
towards the population, and increasing pay for enlisted troops to remove their
incentives for looting. They also involved the establishment of a civil affairs office
through which troops became involved in civic action projects (including digging wells
and building bridges) and the Army’s provision of medical assistance to villagers.
Additionally, Magsaysay pursued a population engagement strategy, even going so
far as to set up a telegraph system that provided a direct line to the Defense Ministry
for any villager on Luzon to use.
9-7. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework describes an operational approach that moves
through each of its phases to destroy insurgent capacity and empower host-nation capacity. The phases of
this method are not mutually exclusive, but the phases represent a general progression of operations. The
shape phase refers to making changes to the environment, through information operations or other methods,
that create the conditions for success of the other phases. The population needs to understand that there will
be an increase in security and initially local leaders should be contacted. The clear phase is an effort to
remove the open insurgent presence in an area. The hold phase is defined by providing security for the
population in an area so an open insurgent presence cannot return. The build phase entails efforts to
increase security and governmental capacity so that government and local forces can control the area and
prevent the return of insurgents. The transition phase is the transition of security to local and government
forces.
9-8. The commitment of resources, to include time, troops, money, development programs, and other
enablers depends entirely on the capacity of the insurgency, the capacity of the host nation’s institutions,
the capacity of the host nation’s security forces, and the capacity of the host nation’s population. The
capacity requirement for the external counterinsurgent is that capacity which overcomes the capacity
differential between the insurgents and the host nation’s systems. As the framework is predicated on the
conditions on the ground, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is based on understanding areas
of operation and understanding the comprehensive threat. To transition between the clear, the hold, and the
build, a unit must be able to measure the conditions on the ground and how those conditions are achieving
the commander’s end state. This ties the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework to assessments.
9-9. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework can be used as a method for constructing specific
tactical operations, planning short-range operations for a specific area, or developing a mid- to long-range
operational framework for a unit’s plan for countering an insurgency. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition
framework can be used as a campaign framework, guiding planning from the introduction of foreign forces
to conflict resolution. It can be used as campaign design to be executed by multiple units on a rotational
basis. The imperatives, structure, considerations, and conditions listed here apply no matter how the
shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is applied.
9-10. Counterinsurgents must be aware that the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is not a phase
by phase linear process. The phase that a unit performs is determined by the environment in an area of
operations and each area must be assessed. Different villages, cities, or regions can be in varying degrees of
insurgent control to host-nation control. Moreover, different areas in one city or different towns in one
region might be along a spectrum of insurgent to host-nation control. Areas can reverse progress during a
counterinsurgency. While the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework can be a phased operation in
each area, the environment must dictate its progress. The counterinsurgent uses the framework as the way
to synchronize subordinate unit actions, prioritize efforts, allocate resources, and direct specific effects to
achieve end state criteria in an ever-changing environment. The overall objective of using the shape-clear-
hold-build-transition framework is to transition responsibility for countering the insurgency to the host |
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nation’s institutions. The commander must understand that conditions associated with the clear, the hold,
and the build phases may be present at any time in different areas. U.S. ground forces can expect to carry
out a range of tasks simultaneously in varying combinations and varying intensity throughout the entirety
of shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework.
9-11. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition method has imperatives that help counterinsurgents turn the
method from theory into practical application. The imperatives are—
* The conditions are assessed across several variables and cannot be taken in isolation.
* The phase that the environment is in dictates the decisive operation, priorities, and resourcing.
* In the clear, hold, and build phases, counterinsurgents must simultaneously conduct offensive,
defensive, and stability tasks.
* Each area requires its own assessment and assessments change over time.
* The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is not a straightforward path, as the operational
environment can change and cause the counterinsurgent to lose progress. However, the
methodology is meant to be progressive. Improving conditions in the environment allows for
progression from one phase to the next. In essence, the operational framework is determined by
the operational environment. Changes in the capacity of any element in the environment can
change the conditions on the ground and, therefore, change the priorities and actions of the
counterinsurgent, including the host-nation forces.
* The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is only reactive if the unit on the ground
responds to conditions. The framework can be proactive if the counterinsurgents dictate the
conditions they want to establish and provide the resources and emphasis necessary to achieve
them.
* Although an area is in a certain phase, this does not preclude operations associated with other
phases. For example, although a unit is in the build phase, that does not preclude that unit from
performing offensive operations against underground cells.
9-12. Executing operations in the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework requires counterinsurgents
to continually address the root causes of the insurgency. Actions taken in the clear, hold, and build phases
are not executed in isolation. Instead, elements of each phase must be conducted simultaneously. The
shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework does not require phasing or stages of operations, but a
commander may create phases or stages of operations corresponding generally to shape-clear-hold-build-
transition phases in order to synchronize actions and priorities effectively.
9-13. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is driven by the conditions in an area of operations.
To facilitate discussion of these conditions, figure 9-1 depicts the generic spectrum of counterinsurgency
conflict. The graph portrays the relationship of capacity between insurgents, the host-nation government,
the host-nation security forces, the host-nation population, and external counterinsurgents. Capacity
represents the ability to change the conditions in the environment towards insurgents or counterinsurgents.
As counterinsurgents are able to impact these conditions, the capability spectrum changes. The left hand
side of the graph depicts the worst-case scenario in which insurgents possess increased capacity compared
to the host nation. The right hand side of the graph depicts the best-case scenario in which the host-nation
capacity is sufficient to counter the insurgent capability without assistance from external counterinsurgents.
The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework describes the process counterinsurgents take to progress
from the left of the graph to the right. (See figure 9-1.) |
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Figure 9-1. The capability spectrum of counterinsurgency conflict
9-14. As part of developing understanding, counterinsurgents must identify the conditions that exist in
particular regions that lead to instability or allow the insurgency to impact the environment. Commanders
must decide where to focus actions and priorities to impact the conditions in a designated area for tactical
or operational reasons. In many instances, commanders specify a preparation phase or shape phase of the
shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework which clarifies the period of time, series of tasks, and effects
to be achieved before counterinsurgents begin taking deliberate action against insurgents. Whether phasing
is used or not, preparation of the environment is an absolute requirement to achieve conditions to progress
along the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework.
SHAPE
9-15. Shaping operations involve identifying which areas in an operational environment exhibit conditions
that counterinsurgents can impact to change the capability differential between insurgents and
counterinsurgents. Commanders choose where to execute operations in the shape-clear-hold-build-
transition framework based on a host nation’s ability (and unified action partners’ abilities if the host
nation’s capabilities are still being built) to impact the root causes of the insurgency, alter or eliminate the
conditions which allow the insurgency to exist in that area, or isolate the insurgents from the population.
During preparation, commanders and staffs execute include information collection on the components of an
insurgency. An initial census in towns or cities using biometrics data collection devices is the most
effective tool to establish initial accountability for everyone. Additional information collection includes the
specific root cause or causes in the particular area, the expectations of the host-nation population, and the
capability of host-nation institutions such as government, security, and rule of law. Commanders and staffs
conduct disruption operations to impact an insurgency’s ability to influence an operational environment.
Counterinsurgents may conduct deception operations while preparing for shape-clear-hold-build-transition
framework operations to force the insurgency to alter its course of action. While preparing to execute the
shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, counterinsurgents (and whenever possible the unified action
and host-nation partners) conduct information operations. Counterinsurgents conduct information
operations aimed at the insurgency, the insurgency’s support mechanisms (both internal and external to the
country), the host-nation population, and host-nation institutions such as governance and security functions.
9-16. U.S. ground forces do not prepare for the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework in isolation.
Elements of the unified action partners are essential in shaping the area, the population, and the insurgency
for future operations. In some instances, the area indicated for shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework
operations may not be suitable for some partners to directly operate in, but other unified action partners |
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may have the capability to shape the environment in areas of limited access. U.S. special operations forces
(SOF) can conduct reconnaissance, information collection, and precision targeting. The United States
Agency for International Development has the capability to introduce implementing partners who have
access to initiate governance or development programs. The Department of State has the ability to
influence the diplomatic process to generate initial governmental structures prior to the introduction of U.S.
ground forces. Soldiers and Marines must recognize the potential that unified action partners have in
shaping an operational environment prior to shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework operations.
CLEAR
9-17. Once counterinsurgents have effectively shaped the environment, including host-nation partners and
enablers, and prepared all elements of the unified action partners appropriately, decided on where to focus
the counterinsurgent effort, and has developed the plan to progress through to transition to host-nation
responsibility, the force begins executing tasks associated with clear. Clear is as a tactical mission task that
requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned
area (FM 3-90-1). When used in this context, the term clear is considered the desired effect by U.S. ground
forces: to eliminate the insurgency’s combatants to enable the host nation to develop the capability to
address the insurgency’s root cause and eliminate the conditions that allow it to exist. While attempting to
achieve the clear, the insurgency’s underground and auxiliary elements probably remain in the area of
operations. While the counterinsurgent can target them along with the insurgency’s combatants, it is
unlikely that the counterinsurgent will be successful in removing all of the underground or auxiliary
elements.
9-18. During the clear phase, counterinsurgents should be actively securing the population.
Counterinsurgents must displace insurgents and enable basic governmental functions in their area.
Moreover, the population must have the confidence that counterinsurgents will remain and insurgents will
not control the area. During this period, the population may face intimidation, threats, and assassinations
from insurgent forces. To gain legitimacy during this period, counterinsurgents must focus on securing the
population.
9-19. Operations and tasks associated with achieving the clear begin by controlling access to an area and
then by controlling key points within that area. Security and influence can then spread out from this area.
Commanders and staffs should consider the following points for operations in the clear:
* Create a secure physical and psychological environment.
* Provide continuous security for the local populace.
* Eliminate the insurgent combatants.
* Reinforce culturally appropriate political primacy within the context of host-nation systems.
* Enforce the rule of law.
9-20. Security tasks associated with the clear include—
* Implement the provisions of a cease fire and control, capture, and disarm belligerents.
* Provide territorial security until the host-nation national army can defend itself.
* Protect the population—provide immediate law and order and humanitarian assistance.
* Protect key individuals and sites—civilian government agencies, infrastructure, and institutions.
9-21. During the clear, counterinsurgents must execute offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Offensive
operations are the priority for counterinsurgents. In most cases, the measure of effectiveness (MOE)
associated directly with impacting the insurgency’s combatants (for example, isolate insurgents from the
population) is the decisive operation. Offensive operations conducted during the clear include raid,
deliberate attack, cordon and search, seize key terrain, and movement to contact. Counterinsurgents execute
defensive operations as well, to include block access routes, establish and secure combat outposts, conduct
sniper operations, and secure the population. To set the conditions to progress through the framework,
counterinsurgents must execute stability tasks and operations at this point. Stability tasks include
identifying potential government or security leaders, identifying civic capacity requirements from the
population, establishing a local security force (in the context of host-nation systems) and beginning a
training program (if necessary), and identifying the root causes for that area. Throughout these operations, |
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the commander must consider securing the population and building host-nation capability. Actions taken
while achieving the effects necessary for clear should not alienate the population. The messages of
information operations are important while performing clear. Responsible use of force is essential.
9-22. Counterinsurgents conduct information operations to achieve the effects of the clear component. The
focus for information operations during the clear is the insurgency’s combatants, the underground and
auxiliary elements, and the host-nation population. Counterinsurgents’ information operations should
facilitate operations which eliminate the combatants from an area, facilitate effective information collection
on the combatants, and build a sense of security among the population.
HOLD
9-23. Counterinsurgents do not execute tasks associated with the clear component unless they have
developed the capability to execute tasks in the hold. Beginning shape-clear-hold-build-transition
framework operations requires resources in the form of manpower, time, money, and development
programs (but this framework is based on capacity, not resources). For this reason, these type of operations
cannot be conducted everywhere and must be prioritized. To meet the imperatives listed above, the
counterinsurgent must progress along the framework to continue to improve conditions in the environment.
Therefore, units should not clear an area that they cannot hold. Until those conditions exist, the
counterinsurgent may choose to continue to prepare or shape the environment for future
shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework operations.
9-24. As the capability of the insurgency decreases in an area based on counterinsurgency operations, the
capacity of the host-nation government and security force must increase. As the conditions improve to the
point that offensive operations aimed at eliminating the insurgency’s combatants are no longer the priority
and the host-nation population has freedom of movement, counterinsurgents can begin to execute tasks and
operations associated with hold. The hold involves disrupting insurgent activities in an area and providing a
good security environment for the population. The objective of the hold is to set the conditions for the
host-nation security apparatus to provide security for the population. For this reason, the hold lasts as long
as it takes to—
* Develop the capability of the host-nation security forces.
* Reduce the enemy strength in the area to the point that the host-nation security forces can take
lead responsibility for security.
9-25. Lead responsibility means that the host-nation security forces are the decision authority for allocation
of resources, priority of tasks and operations, and tactical decisions during operations. Counterinsurgents
continue to eliminate the insurgency’s leadership and infrastructure. However, perhaps more importantly,
counterinsurgents should focus on securing the population. During this period, proper basing of
counterinsurgent forces is essential. If an area is supportive of an insurgency, then a base of
counterinsurgent forces may sever the relationship between insurgents and the population. If the area is
neutral or has pockets of support for the government, then the base should be established where it can best
help in developing the area.
9-26. Contact with the population should be continuous, predominantly with host-nation entities (security
forces, law and order officials, and government representatives) leading and U.S. counterinsurgents in
support. Information operation activities provide opportunities for contact with the population. From the
start of operations, Soldier and Marine actions in these areas, if culturally astute, can build bonds with the
local population and in many cases change the attitudes of the people. Ultimately, the goal of this contact is
twofold: to gain a better picture of the actual situation and to turn the population’s support toward the
government.
9-27. Counterinsurgents must also secure key physical infrastructure. Because resources are always
limited, parts of the infrastructure vital for stability and vulnerable to attack must receive the priority of
protection, specifically the protection of capable host-nation security forces (if possible). This can be
accomplished by analyzing the risk and likelihood of attack on various sites in the area of operations.
9-28. Much like the clear, achieving the hold requires counterinsurgents execute offense, defense, and
stability tasks. While achieving the hold, defensive tasks and operations are the priority. However, to meet
the objectives of the hold, the line of effort associated with development of the host-nation security forces |
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is the decisive operation. Examples of stability tasks include manning, equipping, and training the
host-nation security forces, establishing local governance functions, and establishing culturally appropriate
rule of law systems within the host nation’s plan. Examples of some defensive tasks during the hold include
counter cache operations, area denial, combined security at fixed sites, block infiltration routes,
countermobility, and securing the population. Counterinsurgents must execute offensive tasks to attack the
insurgency’s underground and auxiliaries. Examples of offensive operations in the hold include raids
against insurgent leaders, ambushes, and disruption operations to impact support structures and local
sanctuaries. The amount and scope of stability tasks and operations increase during the hold.
9-29. Security operations to achieve the hold are dominated by developing the host-nation security forces
and then transitioning security responsibilities to them. Examples of security focus during the hold
include—
* Reform of local security institutions—reestablish military and police forces which may include
the entire rebuilding of the enduring institution including recruiting, educating, training,
manning, equipping, sustaining and leader development for the Army, police, rule of law,
detention capacity, and court systems.
* Develop the host-nation military to provide security and external defense of the nation; develop
the capacity to become self-sufficient in the development and conduct of their own enduring
training programs at individual and collective levels.
9-30. Counterinsurgents conduct information operations to achieve the hold as well, but the focus and
message changes as conditions improve. The focus for information operations during the hold is on the
remaining underground and auxiliary, the host-nation population, the host-nation security forces, and
host-nation governance institutions. Counterinsurgent information operations should facilitate operations
that improve the perception of security among the population, legitimize the host-nation security forces,
dissuade the underground and auxiliaries from continuing insurgent activities, and promote effective
host-nation governance solutions. During the hold, it is critical that the host nation becomes an integral part
of information operations.
BUILD
9-31. When the conditions in an operational environment allow the host-nation security forces to take lead
responsibility for security, counterinsurgents transition to the build. The build comprises carrying out
programs designed to remove the conditions that allow the insurgency to exist, specifically addressing the
root causes, tying inhabitants to host-nation security institutions, governing and rule of law, and
strengthening the host nation’s ability to provide legitimate and effective governance. Stability tasks
predominately build, with many important activities being conducted by nonmilitary agencies. Progress in
building support for the host-nation government requires protecting the local population. People who do not
believe they are secure from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals do not risk overtly supporting
host-nation efforts.
9-32. Counterinsurgents execute offense, defense, and stability tasks in the build as well. The priority for
tasks and operations during the build is on the stability tasks. The line of effort that addresses increasing the
host-nation government capacity becomes the decisive operation during the build. Examples of stability
tasks in the build include advising and assisting the host-nation security forces, developing professional
development programs (including professional education) for host-nation security and governance
individuals, facilitating host-nation governance activities, support to local and national demilitarization,
demobilization, and reintegration programs, and development of host-nation rule of law and conflict
resolution mechanisms. However, U.S. forces execute offensive operations during the build. Examples of
offensive operations in the build include providing a quick reaction force for the host-nation security
forces, conducting tactical overwatch for specific host-nation security forces operations, conducting follow
and assume or follow and support for host-nation security forces operations, or conducting precision strike
operations in support of host-nation or U.S. objectives. Counterinsurgents execute defensive operations and
tasks as well, to include protecting the population, combined action with the host-nation security forces to
secure combined positions, and sanctuary denial and disruption operations.
9-33. U.S. counterinsurgents conduct information operations as part of the build in support of host-nation
programs. The focus of information operations during the build is on the host-nation population, the |
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host-nation security forces, and host-nation governance institutions. U.S. counterinsurgents conduct
information operations during build operations to facilitate host-nation leaders’ messaging and to
emphasize success in generating the conditions that further the connection between the population and the
host-nation institutions. U.S. ground force information operations reinforce the host nation’s ability to
counter an insurgency without the direct involvement of U.S. ground forces. Host-nation information
operations should focus on increasing the perception of security, increasing the legitimacy of the
host-nation government and security forces, and promoting the host nation’s ability to address root causes.
TRANSITION
9-34. Transition allows the counterinsurgent to delineate tasks associated with development of host-nation
institutions (governance, rule of law, security, and economic) with those tasks associated with transitioning
to host-nation lead of operations. To make transition effective, U.S. commanders incorporate planning and
execution of transition as part of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework.
9-35. This transition is not a onetime event. Counterinsurgents transition responsibility to host-nation
agencies when they are capable of taking over a function. This may mean multiple transitions to multiple
host-nation agencies at different times during a counterinsurgency. Transition is a continued process in
which the host nation assumes any responsibility that an external counterinsurgency may temporarily have.
9-36. Security tasks associated with transition represent the U.S. forces’ transition to security cooperation
tasks. During this phase, the U.S. ground force, under the combatant command and in conjunction with the
American embassy, helps generate and then implement theater engagement plans and programs.
9-37. The end goal of shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is to create the conditions necessary for
the host nation to counter an insurgency independently. However, creating these conditions may not
eliminate the presence of external counterinsurgents. U.S. counterinsurgents may remain in an area during
and beyond transition to help train host-nation security forces or institutions, provide enablers, or begin
security cooperation tasks at the request of the host-nation government. (See FM 3-22 for more information
on security cooperation tasks.)
9-38. To better facilitate the integration of all components of the unified action environment into the
shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, counterinsurgents may establish an area coordination center.
An area coordination center controls, manages, and coordinates shape-clear-hold-build-transition
framework operations. Commanders and staffs can establish area coordination centers and subordinate area
coordination center civil-military task forces from the tactical to the strategic level. An area coordination
center’s membership includes representatives of all multinational forces and host-nation agencies (military,
police, intelligence, political, and civil administration) operating at the regional and local level. To be truly
effective, Department of State representatives (including United States Agency for International
Development personnel) should lead an area coordination center. As an area coordination center
coordinates all efforts that affect the ability to transition to host-nation control, the area coordination center
is responsible for generating host-nation capability beyond just the security realm. For that reason,
diplomatic and governmental leaders should run an area coordination center with the goal of turning over
decisionmaking and coordination authority to the host nation at the earliest opportunity. In the absence of
Department of State personnel, the military force assigned an area of operations should initiate and manage
an area coordination center until a government representative can take control. An area coordination center
coordinates the allocation of material and personnel resources, methods of policy implementation, and
evaluation of intelligence in the area within which it is organized.
9-39. The area coordination center consists of civilian and military elements necessary to plan the political,
economic, social, psychological, security, intelligence, and tactical operations within that area.
Commanders and staffs base operation plans on an integrated civil-military approach, and unity of effort is
essential. The leadership must have authority to control the allotted resources of all agencies and activities
operating within its respective area of responsibility. In those instances where U.S. or multinational forces
are operating in support of host-nation forces, an exceptionally high degree of cooperation must exist and
advisory efforts are critically important for success. All armed civilian defense forces and civilian
organizations normally remain under operational command of their respective area coordination center task
force chiefs: however, in cases where civilian administration is ineffective, military forces may provide |
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civil administration until civilian programs have taken effect. A composite view of the shape-clear-hold-
build-transition framework is provided in figure 9-2.
9-40. Transitions can also occur within the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. Soldiers and
Marines will have different tasks when an operational environment changes. For example, a unit must
understand when it transitions from eliminating the combatants in an area to creating an environment for
host-nation control. Units will change their mix of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. More
importantly, they will have to change their mindsets. Figure 9-2 provides the changes of capacity over time,
the changes in the mix of tasks units could perform, and finally when a transition may occur. This graph
provides a snapshot of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. In it, counterinsurgents are moving
from clearing, to holding, and then to building. During this movement, the local population is becoming
more supportive of the counterinsurgency, and the insurgency is losing capabilities and moving from being
in a possible war of movement back to being in phrase I. As insurgent capacity decreases and
counterinsurgent capabilities increase, several transitions take place that involve a different mindset and
performing different tactical tasks. This is in addition to the final transition to the host-nation lead, which is
the end point for the U.S. when it acts as the primary counterinsurgent. (See figure 9-2.) (See chapter 4 for
more information on the phases of an insurgency and chapter 7 for more information on transitions.) |
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Figure 9-2. Example of a possible transition framework
OTHER DIRECT ENABLERS
9-41. The Army and Marine Corps can also integrate other direct enablers into a counterinsurgency
operation. For example, indirect fires can be integrated into an ongoing counterinsurgency effort. Special
forces have the capability to perform direct actions. These are short-duration strikes. Special forces can also
conduct other small-scale offensive actions conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive
environments that employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or
damage designated targets. As with indirect enablers, the Army and Marine Corps have a wide range of
direct capabilities that can be integrated into an ongoing counterinsurgency effort. Tactical units that can be
successfully integrated into a host nation’s efforts to perform cordon and searches or raids could be an
effective capability for any counterinsurgency operation. |
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9-42. As part of the joint force, the air component provides Army and Marine Corps units a number of
critical direct enablers. Airpower provides supported ground forces a significant asymmetric advantage
over insurgents as a result of their flexibility, situational understanding, freedom of maneuver, and access
to immediate joint fires. Direct air and space enablers include, but are not limited to, air mobility, casualty
evacuation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, cyber, global positioning
system, personnel recovery, precision engagement (close air support and air interdiction), and electronic
warfare.
9-43. Two other important enablers are targeted threat infrastructure and strikes. Targeted threat
infrastructure provides a means for a counterinsurgent to attack the resources that an insurgency uses to
continue its effort. However, targeted threat infrastructure must always be conducted in support of other
efforts. Counterinsurgents must weigh the effect of the operations on the legitimacy of the host nation
among the local population. Strikes are conducted to disrupt an insurgency, and they can allow other efforts
to succeed. Targeted threat infrastructure and strikes are not to be conducted in isolation, and
simultaneously some force should be actively securing the population and building legitimacy.
TARGETED THREAT INFRASTRUCTURE
9-44. Targeted threat infrastructure is a method that seeks to destroy an insurgent force’s physical
infrastructure. This is a method that will normally only work if another force is securing the population and
building legitimacy. In other words, it is a method to enable another force. This method seeks to destroy the
necessary requirements of an insurgency to conduct combat operations. Targeted threat infrastructure
proactively targets the physical and societal mechanisms that support and fuel the insurgency. It involves
an aggressive spirit of the offense. When using this method, commanders and staffs must consider the law
of war principle of proportionality. The anticipated injury or damage caused to civilians or civilian property
must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an attack on a
military objective. Commanders and staffs using targeted threat infrastructure must also ensure it is not
contributing to the recruitment of insurgent fighters by using too heavy a hand against elements of society
that are not fully or willingly supporting the insurgency.
9-45. Targeted threat infrastructure must be integrated into an effective host-nation effort that is securing
the population. Targeted threat infrastructure can be an effective tool, if it is well planned and executed to
avoid possible negative consequences of alienating the population and decreasing the legitimacy of the host
nation. If the effect of targeted threat infrastructure is the physical elimination of the basic physical
infrastructure needed by an insurgency, and it avoids the negative effects of alienating the population, it can
be essential in a host nation’s counterinsurgency effort. However, it is a means to enable a host nation, not
a method that should be used without an additional effort to secure the population.
9-46. For targeted threat infrastructure to be effective, commanders and staffs must understand where an
insurgency is attaining its strength and attack those areas and facilities. These efforts must further the
desired overall end state and not undermine a host-nation government’s legitimacy. Commanders and staffs
plan for and limit second and third order effects of attacks. Moreover, attacks are only targeted against the
infrastructure the insurgency relies on. For example, crop eradication aimed at reducing cash flow is
unlikely to effect an insurgency with a large amount of financial resources. It may, however, hurt the
legitimacy of the host nation.
9-47. Illicit crops such as marijuana, coca, or poppy used to fuel and fund an insurgency can be the targets
threatened under the targeted threat infrastructure method. The cash from these crops may help arm, train,
and pay insurgent fighters or pay condolence payments to the families of terrorists who kill themselves in
suicide acts. Attacking such crops may hurt individual farmers. In some cases, farmers may be coerced by
insurgents and have no real choice in the crops they produce. In others, farmers may support the
insurgency. However, the illicit nature of these crops make them valid targets. To avoid creating new
insurgents through crop destruction, counterinsurgents can work with interagency partners and the United
States Agency for International Development to establish crop substitution programs that can help ease
hardships farmers may experience.
9-48. Another key target for the targeted threat infrastructure method is any material or physical item used
to fuel the insurgency. For example, a road network that is the primary means of movement for insurgents |
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needs to be interdicted by checkpoints or destroyed. This may inconvenience the local population, but if
consistent with the principle of proportionality this can be a valid course of action. Power systems and
water systems deep in insurgent controlled areas are prime targets for targeted threat infrastructure, but
targeting them requires careful proportionality analysis. As critical components of a society, power and
water are staples that the insurgents need to survive in their own region. By impairing these resources,
counterinsurgents may undermine the insurgency’s resources and its ability to continue the insurgency.
However, any effort to attack these resources must be balanced with the host nation’s legitimacy among the
local population that is affected. Aggressive strikes and raids are central to the targeted threat infrastructure
method to destroy the physical infrastructure that supports an insurgency. This tactic is not a slash-and-burn
technique, but consists of well-planned, pinpointed attacks on those critical enablers that the insurgency
needs to operate.
9-49. Another key target is the illicit funds used to fuel an insurgency. By establishing counter threat
finance fusion centers, commanders and staffs can work with the power of interagency law enforcement
and international legal partners to find, interdict, and seize huge sums of money that the illicit regime must
launder before it can be used again for legal currency. By using unit counter threat finance specialists in
targeted threat infrastructure operations, funds determined to have been gained through illicit means can be
targeted for seizure at the local level. For example, if a man is a small farm owner and lives in a palatial
home with three cars, he should be investigated, and his funds can be targeted if it is determined that his
wealth is from illicit means and those means are being used to fuel an insurgency.
STRIKE
9-50. A strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability (JP 3-0). A strike may be
useful in disrupting an insurgency, especially in insurgent controlled areas. Strikes can be made on guerrilla
bases, large, enclosed or isolated compounds, and training camps. Normally these operations are meant to
disrupt an insurgency and allow for the success of other operations. Strike operations can be integrated into
a host nation’s operations to secure a population. The U.S. may contribute a force to perform strikes.
9-51. The purpose of a strike is to destroy insurgent forces and base areas, isolate insurgent forces from
their support, and interdict insurgent infiltration routes and lines of communications. Strikes are primarily
offensive operations. They are characterized by reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and careful
planning, followed by vigorously executed, coordinated attacks or raids by small, highly mobile combat
forces operating in dispersed formations to locate and fix an insurgent force. Upon locating an insurgent
force, strike force commanders attack, pursue, and destroy that insurgent force. If contact is lost, the strike
forces resume aggressive patrolling to reestablish contact and destroy the insurgent force before it can rest,
reorganize, and resume combat operations.
9-52. Strikes can be conducted in support of shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework operations after
guerrilla forces are initially driven out of an area during the clear phase. Strikes are often employed to
assault objectives outside cleared areas to fix and destroy guerilla forces and prevent counterattacks against
government and reconstruction personnel. Counterinsurgents conduct assaults in areas where guerrillas
attempt to consolidate during the hold and build phases. Precision airpower weapons can be used to support
other units conducting strike operations or to conduct strike operations on their own.
9-53. Reconnaissance to locate and test insurgent dispositions and strengths or to develop additional
intelligence can be followed immediately by a hasty attack or raid. Reconnaissance should emphasize
thorough coverage of an area, and it is characterized by continuous, decentralized, small-unit operations.
Since strike campaigns are conducted in insecure areas, plans must provide for force withdrawal after
mission accomplishment.
9-54. Strike forces are generally task forces composed of military units and may contain intelligence,
police, and paramilitary elements. Civilian elements may be represented. Forces designated to conduct
strikes should be relieved of routine area defense responsibilities well in advance of an operation. Strike
forces can be controlled at the national, regional, or local levels. Strike forces are organized as
self-sufficient task forces capable of operating for extended periods in areas remote from home bases.
9-55. Once insurgent bases have been located, strike forces maneuver to destroy them. An insurgency’s
ability to hide weapons and to assume noncombatant guises in attempting to avoid capture may require a |
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thorough reconnaissance and search of the area. Suspects must be managed firmly but treated fairly to
avoid turning innocent suspects into insurgency sympathizers. When small units conducting reconnaissance
locate relatively large insurgent operating forces, surveillance should be maintained and reaction forces
quickly deployed to destroy them. In areas suspected of harboring insurgent forces or installations,
reconnaissance and surveillance should be conducted and followed with an immediate raid by reaction
forces when sufficient information has been developed on a target. Good communications and mobility are
essential for success in these combat operations.
9-56. Speed and surprise are important in strikes. The sudden and unexpected delivery of combat forces
into an insurgent held or contested area provides significant advantages to the forces conducting strike
operations. If caught by surprise, guerrillas may be unable to react effectively. Speed and surprise can be
achieved by using air assault tactics to insert the first forces into the area of operations. Subsequent forces
can be delivered on later airlifts or by other modes of transportation. Fires can be used to restrict escape
routes or areas that are not secured by land forces.
9-57. However, strikes do not address the root causes for beginning or sustaining an insurgency, nor do
they necessarily increase the legitimacy of the host-nation government. Strikes are integrated with other
approaches to counterinsurgency as part of the overall operational design. In some cases, the U.S. can
integrate this ability into an ongoing host-nation effort. |
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Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies
10-1. An indirect approach seeks to support existing governments, security forces, and groups through
increasing capacity to counter an insurgency and enabling existing capabilities. This approach indirectly
counters an insurgency by working through host-nation institutions or with groups in the society. The
United States (U.S.) can use nation assistance and security cooperation to aid a host nation in building its
institutions.
10-2. Beyond nation assistance and security cooperation, there are several methods that are indirect
methods for countering an insurgency. Among these are generational engagement, negotiation and
diplomacy, and identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate. Beyond these methods, there are
several indirect enablers that are important in any counterinsurgency. This includes integrated monetary
shaping operations.
NATION ASSISTANCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION
10-3. Nation assistance is assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory
based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 3-0). This civil or military assistance (other
than foreign humanitarian assistance) is rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory
during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the U.S.
and that nation. Nation assistance operations support the host nation by promoting sustainable development
and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.
10-4. Nation assistance involves other government agencies that provide expertise in building civil
institutions. This is an essential element in counterinsurgency because the military lacks the expertise to
build civil control over the population, perform economic reforms, or aid in other basic functions that a host
nation may need to prevent or prevail against an insurgency. Using a whole-of-government approach is
essential in conducting nation assistance to prevent insurgencies from developing freedom of movement by
exploiting the root causes of conflict within an operational environment.
10-5. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to
build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and
contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22). This includes-
* Military to military exchanges (for example, seminars and symposia).
* Combined exercises.
* Humanitarian assistance.
* Security assistance.
When these activities are used to defeat an insurgency, they are part of a counterinsurgency operation.
While not all security cooperation activities are in support of counterinsurgency, security cooperation can
be an effective counterinsurgency tool. These activities help the U.S. and the host nation gain credibility
and help the host nation build legitimacy. These efforts can help prevent insurgencies or shape the host
nation’s ability to defeat or contain insurgencies.
10-6. When directed, the Army and Marine Corps provide forces to support security cooperation missions.
This requirement can include assistance in training, equipping, and advising the military forces of foreign
nations. Security cooperation includes security assistance, foreign internal defense, and security force
assistance. (See FM 3-22 and chapter 10 for more information on security cooperation activities. See
chapter 10 for more information on working with other forces by using security cooperation.) |
3-24 | 130 | Chapter 10
GENERATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
10-7. Generational engagement is a method that can be conducted in conjunction with other approaches
that seeks to get the host nation to educate and empower the population to participate in legal methods of
political discourse and dissent. This can be done in both high threat situations and situations where an
insurgency is at its infancy and combat is less intense. It is best that the host nation undertake this method
as soon as possible to affect the next generation. Generational engagement focuses on the population.
Generational engagement focuses on building new constituents in the host-nation population to counter
insurgent actions. Generational engagement is a method of political mobilization of the people. The
purpose of the method is to get population groups to side with the host nation.
10-8. Figure 10-1 provides a general framework for generational engagement. First, counterinsurgents
identify the population that they wish to engage. This relevant population may politically engage and this
will encourage the host nation to redress any grievances. This may lead to a reduction of violence. This is
all built on a foundation of education, empowerment, and participation. (See figure 10-1.)
Figure 10-1. Generational engagement
10-9. Five principles are fundamental to generational engagement:
* Groups with whom counterinsurgents partner (such as nongovernmental organizations [NGOs])
must be seen as indigenous, not as foreign constructs.
* Independence of funding and resources are important. Support groups can lose credibility the
more they are perceived as solely reliant on foreign funding, possibly due to a shift in priorities
by a sole and influential benefactor. Organizations and their partners should identify alternative
sources of support, including local sponsors, funding from the relevant ministries, or collecting
dues from members.
* In selecting partners, counterinsurgents should not limit themselves to the vocal intellectual elite.
If the insurgency is based on the root causes of a rural population, intellectual elites might not
have legitimacy among the rural poor. Therefore, counterinsurgents should balance support
between the central leadership and local branches in the provinces or townships (where youth
engagement is usually most important). |
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* Expansion and membership numbers should not be used as a key indicator of success. It can be
difficult to accurately track and confirm these numbers with national organizations. A more
accurate measure is the staff, number of offices, actual activity levels, and efficacy. Activity
reports and photos can verify progress.
* A main role for organizations is to make the connections between the local administrations and
the provincial or national level government, as well as other stakeholders and peer organizations.
At some point the NGOs will not be present to facilitate government access, and will be most
effective when they facilitate cooperative and enduring relationships between the population and
the government.
10-10. Generational engagement works with factions from a population to get them to see the benefit of
participating in peaceful means to address their core grievances. Getting youths to understand the legal
means they have to address root causes of conflict is a critical tool for reducing violence. If commanders
and staffs believe that insurgencies may occur over extended periods, then some efforts must be made to
engage this next generation of leaders who can establish a lasting peace. Engagement also has to be made
with the intellectual elites of the country. They may still be residing in the country of conflict or in another
country that has significant influence over the insurgent cause.
10-11. Soldiers and Marines planning to use generational engagement must identify relevant portions of
the population through their planning. Plans and methods for engagements can vary, depending on the
operational environment and the culture. This method is used in conjunction with direct methods as part of
a comprehensive approach to combating insurgent forces. Counterinsurgents can make progress in
defeating insurgent forces, but if they neglect the younger generation of the population they may lose the
war. Continued and prolonged efforts must be made to ensure that counterinsurgents and the host-nation
government are seen as positive influences. The population must identify with and trust their government.
Counterinsurgent efforts are coordinated and tracked through continued assessments to ensure success.
10-12. Counterinsurgents engage with young factions of the population by implementing youth programs.
Counterinsurgents also participate in local council meetings that include representatives from different
generations of the population.
10-13. The idea behind these engagements is that they are initiated by the counterinsurgent forces and
eventually taken over or continued by the host nation. It is not enough for the host nation to just continue to
implement these engagements, rather the host nation must make every effort to ensure that these elements
of the population identify more with the government than with the insurgents. Local leaders who identify
with the government must be protected and supported.
10-14. Some examples of generational engagement can be as simple as ensuring that schools are open and
available to students and ensuring adequate access to medical attention as part of the effort to ensure
essential services. This can address younger portions of the population who, over the long term, will have a
positive view of counterinsurgents and the efforts of their own government to ensure for their care and
protection.
10-15. Some examples of generational engagement along the governance line of effort can include
recruitment of younger influential leaders and including others in the electoral process. This may be
difficult based on the culture in which counterinsurgents are operating because some cultures only allow for
leadership positions for older members of the population. If members of the younger generation cannot
assume roles in the government, they can still be encouraged to participate in the governance process and
feel that they have a place where they can make their views heard by their local government.
10-16. Local participation that builds civil society has proven important in countering an insurgency. This
can be essential in building legitimacy for a host government. For example, in Vietnam, the U.S. military
and Department of State, along with the government of South Vietnam, established several youth groups
that were very successful. One example, the 4-T Youth Club, was modeled after the American 4-H
organization. Over 2000 4-T clubs served as a model of success for organizing youths at the grassroots
level. A host government is essential in building local participation and a civil society. The Republican
Youth Movement, National Revolutionary Movements, and Personnel Labor Revolutionary Parties were all
models of successful youth engagement. These efforts increased the legitimacy of the host nation while
decreasing the ability of the insurgency to recruit. These programs were generators of self-esteem for the |
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participants and worked out pent-up student energy by deploying them to the provinces. In Vietnam, youth
programs proved beneficial.
10-17. Outside groups can be very effective at generational engagement. For example, the Afghanistan
Youth National and Social Organization is a non-profit, non-governmental organization that enrolls young
Afghani males. It has district chapters, made up of around 45,000 dues-paying members, it enjoys a great
deal of autonomy, and it organizes according to the needs of its local members. Its civic education program
educated Afghans about their political rights and obligations, and it strengthened dialogue between local
leaders and government officials. The importance of engaging local youth in Afghanistan was indicated in
after action reviews and outside groups play an important part in building civic society. In sum, a non-
governmental organization was effective at engaging the population and encouraging dialogue.
10-18. The first step that counterinsurgents can take to ensure that this happens is by leveraging key
leadership at the local and district levels to meet with and discuss significant issues with the population.
Just meeting with the younger elements of the population will not constitute completion of generational
engagement. There must be efforts to follow through on major discussion topics and resolve issues that are
significant to them. Where counterinsurgent forces are able to, they must continue to push local leaders to
not just meet with them but also to address and resolve issues. This can be done initially by
counterinsurgents and eventually by the host-nation government in concert with host-nation security forces.
10-19. Lastly, host-nation security forces must ensure that these actions are taken and that they are
perceived as supportive of all elements of the population. This may done initially with counterinsurgent
forces as the lead elements and later as host-nation forces develop their ability to take the lead on providing
security as a supporting element of government representatives.
NEGOTIATION AND DIPLOMACY
10-20. Negotiation and diplomacy are ways to resolve or defeat an insurgency. Counterinsurgents must
influence the host-nation government and its subordinate elements (for example, the office of land reform)
to remove the root causes that have led to acts of subversion and violence in order to seize, nullify, or
challenge political control of a region. (See figure 10-2 which shows the process of negotiation and
diplomacy.) |
3-24 | 133 | Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies
Figure 10-2. Negotiation and diplomacy
10-21. The goal of negotiation and diplomacy is to address the insurgent root cause and therefore reduce
the causes for armed conflict. If a host nation can be influenced by U.S. government or military personnel
to peacefully address root causes, then the expected outcome is a reduction in violence and bringing the
insurgents into the political process to have their issues resolved peacefully. If the host-nation government
can do this successfully, the insurgency may not totally go away, but it may only use force of arms in a
limited context that would manifest as limited insurrections compared to a full blown armed insurgency.
10-22. The U.S. has many tools at its disposal to influence a host nation in addressing the root causes of
an insurgency. For example, economic and military aid can be tied to certain actions or standards of
behavior by a host nation. Counterinsurgents must also evaluate how their actions help shape the
environment. Contracting, for example, has direct links to the economy and the society. Using contracts to
encourage a host nation to address root causes is another possible tool. In sum, commanders should make
an assessment of how they are interfacing with a host nation and determine what tools are available to
enable and encourage the host nation to take the needed actions to defeat an insurgency.
10-23. In an armed conflict environment where U.S. forces have been sent in to assist a host nation to
fight its insurgency, U.S. military personnel can work with the host-nation armed forces to reduce causes
for conflict, and U.S. military personnel can also interact with U.S. and host-nation government personnel
to take steps to peacefully address core grievances and root causes of conflict.
10-24. In a peacetime environment where U.S. forces are not committed to help a host nation combat its
insurgency, U.S. military personnel can lessen the causes of a potential crisis or insurgency in the conduct
of security cooperation activities and bi-lateral military exercises. If one of the insurgents’ root causes is
against the host-nation military for human rights abuses or using heavy handed tactics with the local
population, U.S. military personnel can work with the military wing of the government to find alternative
ways of dealing with the population. |
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IDENTIFY, SEPARATE, ISOLATE, INFLUENCE, AND
REINTEGRATE
10-25. Identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate is a method that combines several activities
that affect relevant population groups. This can be done in both high threat situations and situations where
the insurgency is at its infancy and combat is less intense. This method works by, with, and through the
host nation; however, it may have some elements which Soldiers and Marines are directly interacting with a
local population.
10-26. Identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate is a proactive method of addressing root
causes before a full blown armed insurgency can develop. Its purpose is to identify and separate the
insurgents from the population. This is a primary requirement for forces conducting counterinsurgency. By
identifying who is an insurgent and who is not, and then applying resources to separate insurgents from the
population, commanders and planners can more effectively focus their efforts on making the insurgency
feel isolated. Insurgents may then believe that their causes for conflict are not supported by the population.
Once the insurgent leaders and members feel isolated from the population, peaceful efforts can be made to
influence insurgents to surrender, return, and be reintegrated into society.
10-27. Commanders conduct a detailed assessment of the insurgent and population networks before
executing the identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate method. This assessment guides the
application of individual means to disassemble the insurgent network. Joint forces and other actors may
enter the process at many different stages; therefore, assessment is a continuous process used to guide
decisionmaking throughout operations.
IDENTIFY
10-28. The identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate method is used to divide and conquer the
insurgency, including all elements of the insurgency listed in chapter 4. The U.S. Marine Corps refers to
these as identity operations (See Marine Corps order [MCO] 5530.17), while the Army uses identity
activities. The elements of an insurgency are the leadership (including the political cadre), guerilla units,
auxiliary forces, and the underground elements. Although all elements of the insurgent network should be
identified, the main target of the identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate effort is to identify the
guerillas and eventually neutralize them, since they are the main source of the violence. Military operations
should support the host nation in any thorough population screening to identify and eliminate insurgents
and to identify any lingering insurgent support structures.
10-29. Operations that support identity activities include—
* Raids and cordon operations.
* Base access, checkpoints, and protection of critical sites.
* Area security operations.
* Border control and ports of entry.
* Site exploitation.
* Population census using biometric data collection devices and mapping the human environment
and patterns of life
* Medical capacity and tracking medical records.
10-30. Tools to support identity activities include—
* Biometrics and biometrically enabled intelligence collection.
* Tip lines.
* Civil records (land documents and registration databases).
* Reward programs (paying civilians to identify insurgents and their networks).
* Forensics and forensics-enabled intelligence collection.
* Document and media exploitation. |
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SEPARATE
10-31. While killing or capturing insurgents in counterinsurgency operations may be necessary, an
alternate and still effective method in the long run is to separate an insurgency from the population, the
second phase of the identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate method. Counterinsurgents need to
isolate their adversaries from the relevant population, both physically and psychologically. At the same
time, counterinsurgents should also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise
influence over that same population.
10-32. Establishing security forces in bases among the population furthers the continued separation of the
local insurgents and the population. The success or failure of the effort depends on effectively and
continuously securing the population. In some cases, it may be useful to physically secure an area using
barriers or other means.
10-33. Combined action programs, such as community stability operations, are local level stability
operations designed to augment wider counterinsurgency operations. Village or community stability
operations can work in areas with limited insurgent activity and attempt to establish security and stability
“bubbles” around rural communities. These cordons are created and ideally expanded to make the area
inhospitable to insurgents and enable legitimate local governance, which further separates the insurgents
from the local population. (See JP 3-24, chapter 5, for more information on stability operations.)
Appropriate tasks for units include, but are not limited to, the following:
* Helping host-nation security forces maintain entry control points.
* Providing reaction force capabilities through the parent unit.
* Conducting multinational, coordinated day and night patrols to secure the town and area.
* Facilitating local contacts to gather information in conjunction with local host-nation security
force representatives.
* Training host-nation security forces in leadership and general military subjects, so they can
secure the town or area on their own.
* Conducting operations with other multinational forces and host-nation units, if required.
* Operating as a team with host-nation security forces to instill pride, leadership, and patriotism.
* Assisting host-nation government representatives with civic action programs to establish an
environment where the people have a stake in the future of their town and nation.
* Protecting host-nation judicial and government representatives and helping them establish the
rule of law.
10-34. The lines of operations that support the separation process include—
* Sweeps and cordon and searches.
* Combat outposts.
* Village and community stability operations.
* Border operations and port of entry operations.
* Strikes, raids, and ambushes.
* Interdiction operations.
* Military deception and military information support operations.
* Electronic warfare.
* Information collection.
ISOLATE
10-35. The isolation phase objective is to break the psychological and physical links between insurgents
and the remainder of the insurgent organization and its support base. The first step in this segregation is to
identify vulnerabilities of the insurgents. This requires a deep understanding of the operational environment
and, more specifically, an understanding of all the adversaries (for example, the insurgent network,
transnational terrorists, and external supporters). |
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10-36. Counterinsurgents ensure efforts strive to physically isolate the insurgency in all domains (air,
land, maritime, and cyberspace) from other nodes of the insurgent network. Ultimately this means
controlling the physical and cognitive domains. However, completely controlling the domains at all times is
not realistic.
10-37. Patrolling and cordon and search operations can physically isolate insurgents through capture or
deterrence. Following these operations, counterinsurgents’ treatment of captured insurgents has immense
potential impact on insurgent morale, retention, and recruitment. Humane and just treatment may afford
counterinsurgents many short-term opportunities as well as potentially damaging insurgent recruitment.
Abuse may foster resentment and hatred, offering the enemy an opportunity for propaganda and assist
potential insurgent recruitment and support. It is important that unless they are entitled to another standard
based on status, all detainees or other persons captured in any conflict, regardless of how it is characterized,
shall be treated, at a minimum, in accordance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
10-38. Isolation must include operations to counter the insurgency lines of communication to recruit,
obtain funding, weapons, equipment, direct operations, or gain intelligence. Operations such as information
operations, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations are examples of efforts designed to detect and
respond to enemy insurgent networks. These operations are vital as force multipliers to identify insurgent
activities and create conditions to deny or defeat their operations.
10-39. In addition to physical and psychological isolation, efforts to isolate the insurgency economically
are necessary, but must be narrowly focused on the activities of insurgents. These efforts seek to isolate the
insurgency as much as possible, as complete isolation of the insurgency is not realistic. If implemented too
broadly, efforts to isolate may have a negative effect on the population and strengthen the insurgency. (For
example, eradicating the poppy harvest in Afghanistan may have cut funding to the Taliban, but it also
alienated the farmers who subsisted on the illicit crop.) Economic efforts to isolate an insurgent require
both physical and informational interruption of financial, business, and criminal enterprises. Attempts to
isolate insurgents from the population economically must be narrowly focused on the insurgents and
minimize the effect on the population by offering viable replacement sources of employment and revenue.
A primary means of the financial isolation is through counter threat finance operations.
10-40. The lines of operations that support the isolation process include—
* Border operations and port of entry operations.
* Strikes, raids, and interdiction operations.
* Counter threat finance.
* Military deception and military information support operations.
* Cyber electromagnetic activities.
* Electronic warfare.
* Intelligence operations.
* Information collection.
INFLUENCE
10-41. The intent to influence the insurgent network is for the population to abandon support to the
insurgency’s efforts. Planned influence operations should convey selected information and indicators to
insurgent networks to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of
insurgent network itself. While it is unlikely counterinsurgents will change insurgents’ beliefs, it is possible
to change their behavior. The counterinsurgency lines of effort (shown in figure 7-2 on page 7-9) support
this behavior modification, but to further mitigate the insurgent threat to the host nation, additional
programs should be offered as enticement solutions. In other words, counterinsurgents must leave a way
out for insurgents who have lost the desire to continue the struggle.
10-42. Effective amnesty and reintegration programs provide insurgents this avenue; amnesty provides
the means to quit the insurgency and reintegration allows former insurgents to become part of greater
society. Rifts between insurgent leaders, if identified, can be exploited in this fashion. Offering amnesty or
a seemingly generous compromise can also cause divisions within an insurgency and present opportunities
to split or weaken it. Counterinsurgents can also act to magnify existing rifts. If insurgent forces are |
3-24 | 137 | Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies
expelled or have broken into smaller groups, they must be prevented from reentering the area or
reestablishing an organizational structure inside the area.
10-43. Amnesty programs provide a means for members of an insurgency to stop fighting. The essential
part of an amnesty program is that insurgents believe they will be treated well and protected from their
former comrades’ potential reprisal. Thus, counterinsurgents must have detailed information operation
plans to inform the insurgents about the program, to turn themselves in, and to support subsequent amnesty
efforts. Pragmatism must be the first consideration of amnesty programs, not ideology or vendetta.
Counterinsurgents also must have methods to protect the former insurgents. Incentives for disaffected
insurgents or their supporters are important, especially modest monetary rewards.
10-44. Turning former insurgents against their previous comrades can prove invaluable to
counterinsurgency efforts. Former insurgents can provide vital information and even become valuable allies
and combatants. However, information provided by a former insurgent must be evaluated and validated to
prevent misinformation and deception. Incentives and a sense of fair treatment by counterinsurgents are
vital to effective defector programs, which are also dependent on effective information operations so
insurgents are aware of their options. Insurgents may be prone to defect when conflict has been prolonged,
the broad population is weary of conflict, or if the insurgents have an uneven sense of purpose or drive.
Defector knowledge of how the insurgents are led, organized, and operate can prove invaluable. This can
include personality profiles of insurgent leaders, current communication procedures, plans, and tactics,
techniques, and procedures. This detailed intelligence is difficult to gain without defector operations.
10-45. The influence lines of operations include—
* Information operations.
* Military information support operations.
* Military deception.
* Cyber electromagnetic activities.
* Engagement.
* Stability operations.
* Defense support to public diplomacy.
* Negotiation and diplomacy.
* Targeted strikes and raids.
* Support to amnesty programs.
REINTEGRATE
10-46. The objective of reintegrating an insurgent is for the former insurgent to become a productive
member of the society. Military forces, governmental organizations, NGOs from the international
community, and the host nation must cooperate to plan and execute reintegration programs. Former
insurgents must develop confidence in reintegration and the organizations charged with implementing it.
To build this confidence, reintegration programs must be holistic and encompass efforts to restore the
society, the government, and the economy at all levels.
10-47. Reintegration programs should help protect and empower moderate insurgents from extremist
influence and encourage them to not rejoin the insurgency. Programs must be tailored for each area and
insurgency. They can include vocational, educational (especially reading and writing), and religious
programs. The employment opportunities extended to former insurgents depend on an effectively governed,
viable economy with an active market sector. If the reintegration process does not provide alternative
economic opportunities to the former combatants, the likelihood of their return to violence substantially
increases.
10-48. Demobilization of insurgents normally involves the controlled discharge of active combatants from
paramilitary groups, militias, and insurgent forces that have stopped fighting. Demobilization under these
circumstances may include identifying and gathering ex-combatants for demobilization efforts.
Demobilization involves deliberately dismantling insurgent organizations and belligerent group loyalties,
replacing those with more appropriate group affiliations, and restoring the identity of former fighters as part |
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of the national population. The demobilization of insurgents enables the eventual development of value
systems, attitudes, and social practices that help them reintegrate into civil society.
10-49. Reintegration is the process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians
receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of
the local population. It encompasses the reinsertion of individual former insurgents into host-nation
communities, villages, and social groups. Reintegration is a social and economic recovery process focused
on the local community. It complements other community-based programs that spur economic recovery,
training, and employment services. It includes programs to support resettlement in civilian communities,
basic and vocational education, and assistance in finding employment in local economies. It accounts for
the specific needs of women and children associated with insurgent and other armed groups.
10-50. Insurgents, when properly protected, reintegrated, and well treated, can become positive members
of their community. Conversely, unprotected, poorly prepared, or poorly treated former insurgents will
become powerful propaganda opportunities for the insurgents. Reintegration processes and programs, such
as host nation-led moderate ideological or religious education and job training, should be started early in
the reintegration process.
10-51. Counterinsurgency operations ultimately support reintegration through the integration of the
stability functions in planning and execution. The stability functions are security, governance and
participation, humanitarian assistance, rule of law, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. Specific
consideration within stability operations to support the reintegration process include—
* Civil-military operations and commander’s emergency response program funds for special
projects.
* Support to civic education projects.
* Support to employment programs.
* Support to relocation to prevent reprisals.
* Support to integration into the political process.
* Support to transitional justice.
10-52. The importance of influencing members of an insurgency to surrender cannot be overstated. The
importance of how a former insurgent is reintegrated into a peaceful society is also critical because the way
a war is won will decide how long the peace will last.
10-53. Counterinsurgents should offer surrendered insurgents generous terms, and counterinsurgents
should follow those terms. By separating an insurgent from the population, commanders and staffs make
that insurgent feel vulnerable and also take from the insurgency a means for recruitment and logistic
support. Planners and commanders should work toward creating liberal and generous surrender terms.
Counterinsurgents must protect surrendered insurgents from reprisals from their former insurgent
colleagues.
OTHER INDIRECT ENABLERS
10-54. The U.S. can integrate enablers into a host nation’s counterinsurgency efforts. These enablers can
provide intelligence or prevent the flow of resources to a counterinsurgency. Various intelligence
capabilities, such as signals intelligence, human intelligence, and geospatial intelligence, may be essential
to a host nation’s counterinsurgency. Sharing of information from these sources may enable a host nation to
defeat an insurgency. Also, other enablers, such as airlift capabilities, might be important for
counterinsurgency. Another capability that can be integrated into a counterinsurgency effort is counter
threat finance. Counter threat finance works to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter, or dismantle the
transitional financing of state and non-state enemies threatening the U.S. Counter threat finance can deny
an insurgent access to vital funding streams by identifying the sources and conduits of funding. In
counterinsurgency, this can play an important role because of the connection between insurgencies and
black markets. It provides one means to prevent an insurgency from obtaining resources. (For more
information on counter threat finance, see ATTP 3-07.20/MCRP 3-33 and DODD 5205.14.) |
3-24 | 139 | Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies
10-55. The effective integration and synchronization of many capabilities, organizations, and functions
that support the collection, analysis, exploitation and sharing of identity information leads to the
identification of threat personnel, groups, and networks. These capabilities include biometric data, forensic
data, document and media exploitation, intelligence, and other information exchanges. Identification of
personnel allows multinational partners to prevent or mitigate insurgents or counterinsurgents from
conducting operations among the innocent population. U.S. forces must comply with U.S. Army Forces
Command predeployment training requirements. These requirements (such as training in personnel
recovery, mitigation of insider threats, biometrics, languages, and cultural awareness) will further enable
U.S. forces in a counterinsurgency environment.
INTEGRATED MONETARY SHAPING OPERATIONS
10-56. Integrated monetary shaping operations are the use of monetary resources, provided with various
types of aid (for example, economic, financial, humanitarian, or developmental), involving the voluntary
transfer of resources (for example, money, equipment, knowledge, or training other than military) from
U.S. or unified action partners to a host nation, directly or indirectly, for mutual benefit. (See
ATP 3-07.20/MCRP 3-33.1G for more information on integrated monetary shaping operations.) Integrated
monetary shaping operations are the coordinated use of money, goods, or services to support the
commander’s objectives. They are a means to an end. Integrated monetary shaping operations are used to
attack sources of instability, build partnerships, and provide for economic stabilization and security.
Integrated monetary shaping operations have two major components:
* Supporting operations by funding developmental assistance, infrastructure, and governance
support projects to win the support of an indigenous populace and erode support for the
adversary.
* Denying adversaries sanctuary and operational flexibility by hindering their ability to reliably
fund operations.
10-57. Integrated monetary shaping operations can be an effective tool to stabilize the security
environment. However, they can also undermine both the local and national economies. One essential
consideration of counterinsurgencies is to understand that long-term counterinsurgency efforts have an
economic impact on the host nation. Additionally, the implementation of funding and projects can have
negative secondary and tertiary effects. Commanders should recognize decisions over which contractors,
communities, and individuals are chosen to receive funding could create winners and losers in their area.
These effects can exacerbate tensions in the area. Finally, a counterinsurgency can last many years, and this
effort can distort the pricing of goods and services within the local and national economy.
Counterinsurgents must understand that they can undermine their own efforts by demanding goods in such
quantities that they fundamentally alters market forces, which results in economic dependence on the
counterinsurgency. This can result in economic problems that can undermine the host nation’s stability
when the external counterinsurgent departs.
10-58. Integrated monetary shaping operations can be effective, but they should be linked into an overall
development plan. Without that link, the haphazard use of money can be highly destructive to an economy
because it creates an unsustainable economy once the counterinsurgent leaves. The basic point of integrated
monetary shaping operations is primarily to be a catalyst for long-term and natural development and only
secondarily to meet short-term needs or security concerns. Counterinsurgents must understand that
interactions with the local culture do have far-reaching effects. The host-nation economy is one area where
counterinsurgents can have both positive and negative effects.
10-59. Integrated monetary shaping operations can also inform a commander’s situational understanding.
Property ownership records include census records, deeds, and other means of determining ownership of
land and buildings. They help counterinsurgents to determine who should or should not be living in a
specific area and help them secure the population. In some cases, it may be necessary for Soldiers and
Marines to go door to door and collect census data themselves.
10-60. Financial records can provide information on sources of insurgent funding. Collection of financial
records often requires help from agencies like the Department of the Treasury and financial institutions. It
may require analyzing criminal activities or traditional means of currency transfer. |
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10-61. Property ownership and financial records can reveal information about the structure of a society.
Who owns and controls land and who controls debt provide some information on who may be a power
broker in a particular society. Finding these individuals or institutions provides greater situational
understanding for counterinsurgents.
10-62. Integrated monetary shaping operations can be used to aid stability efforts. Applicable funding
authorities guide what types of uses of money are authorized. If authorized for the area of operations, some
possible uses of money include—
* Repairing damage resulting from operations.
* Providing condolence payments to civilians for death or injury resulting from operations. This
type of payment must be in accordance with prevailing standards for payments of solatia, a
victim’s bereavement fund, or compensatory statutes provided by donor agencies and the United
Nations. (Counterinsurgents must be aware of the going rates and, as far as possible, ensure that
the right messaging is provided to the village or other district leadership where death or injury
has occurred resulting from operations.) Further, counterinsurgents must guard against payment
for injury or accident becoming a means of extortion or harassment.
* Funding civic clean-up projects and other sanitation projects and equipment to provide those
services.
* Funding small-scale infrastructure improvements to improve the quality of life of citizens.
* Funding agricultural projects to improve farming practices, improve livestock health, or
implement cooperative farming programs. This type of activity should be conducted in
consultation with donor agricultural agencies or the host-nation departments of agriculture to
ensure that land rights and water rights of communities are not infringed and crop management
is according to agriculturally sustainable principles.
* Repairing civic and cultural sites and facilities. Preservation of cultural heritage is a sensitive
issue and due respect to the site or culture and its practices must be adhered to.
Counterinsurgents might be better to maintain a low profile and let the cultural leaders take a
leading role in this initiative.
* Repairing institutions and infrastructure critical to governance and rule of law (such as prisons,
courthouses, and police stations).
* Purchasing education supplies or repairing infrastructure critical to providing education to the
local population.
* Paying rewards, often discreetly, to citizens who provide information on enemy activities and
locations.
* Supporting the creation, training, and operation of host-nation security forces.
* Funding events and activities designed to build relationships with host-nation officials and
citizens.
Money Usage Principles in Counterinsurgency
10-63. Seven principles can help guide the commander and staff in integrated monetary shaping
operations in a counter insurgency. They are—
* Host-nation ownership.
* Capacity building.
* Sustainability.
* Selectivity.
* Partnership.
* Flexibility.
* Accountability.
Host- Nation Ownership
10-64. Units must ensure that there is counterinsurgent and host-nation ownership of any project. The
local population and local government officials should view any project as their own and not one that has |
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been imposed on them by outside agencies. A project that has been conceptualized, funded, and constructed
at the local level legitimizes the local government in the eyes of the population and further contributes to
stability. However, host-nation officials might lack the capacity to implement and manage the project.
Counterinsurgents often consult development agencies to promote adequate ownership and accountability
for projects.
Capacity Building
10-65. Capacity building involves the transfer of knowledge, techniques, and skills to the local people,
institutions, and government. This transfer enables those people to develop the capabilities to deliver
essential services to the population. Ultimately, the local officials and institutions that gain capacity are
better prepared to lead their regions through political, economic, and security-related issues.
Sustainability
10-66. The principle of sustainability states that commanders should design and select projects and
services that have a lasting effect on the local population. In other words, the impact of the projects under
consideration must endure after forces hand over the facility or service to local authorities and the unit (or
contractors) departure from the site. Sustainability implies that the local government has the necessary
resources to staff and maintain the project. There are examples where commanders have failed to conduct
adequate analysis and built new schools or medical clinics only to discover that too few teachers or doctors
were available to staff these facilities. Similarly, some commanders have purchased large generator systems
to address electricity shortfalls for neighborhoods within their areas of operation. However, without
addressing the fuel, maintenance, and service requirements of these systems, the machines eventually failed
and were unable to serve as a sustainable solution for the local electrical deficit.
Selectivity
10-67. The development community defines the principle of selectivity as the allocation of resources
based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests. These characteristics, while strategic, are
equally important at the tactical level. Commanders seldom receive all of the financial resources they
would like to have when implementing their essential service, economic, and governance lines of effort.
Therefore, commanders and staffs allocate the available resources into select areas where there is a strong
local commitment to the reconstruction program, where the project can positively impact the most people,
and where the project under consideration can simultaneously best achieve the commander’s intent.
10-68. Commanders and staffs carefully research nominations, adopt best practices, and design for local
conditions in their proposed projects. Commanders assess local conditions before investing financial
resources into any potential relief or reconstruction program. Commanders and staffs do not invest money
in an intelligence vacuum. They consider all available information about local conditions (such as the
population’s requirements, animosities, traditions, capabilities, and economics). A detailed assessment of
local conditions will best inform the commander on the project’s potential to deliver its desired effects.
Each project should have a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Commanders and staffs must
assess potential unintended results from their integrated monetary shaping operations. Many second or third
order negative effects from a project may potentially outweigh the benefits from the original commander’s
intent.
Partnership
10-69. The principle of partnership involves close collaboration with local governments, communities,
donors, nonprofit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities. Partnership
plays a central role in any relief, reconstruction, or development program, as it supports each of the other
principles of reconstruction and development. In the context of money in integrated monetary shaping
operations, effective partnership ensures the unit’s financial resources are well invested and synchronized
to support the host nation’s internal defense and development programs and support other U.S. government
strategic objectives for the country. |
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Flexibility
10-70. The principle of flexibility mandates that units adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of
opportunities, and maximize effectiveness as part of their reconstruction and development program. Just as
the conditions for offensive and defensive operations are often changing and uncertain, so are the relief and
reconstruction tasks associated with stability operations. These conditions often require commanders to
change tactics to achieve desired objectives.
Accountability
10-71. Enforcing accountability, building transparency into systems, and emplacing effective checks and
balances to guard against corruption are important components to any relief, reconstruction, or
development program. Accountability in all actions, to include the unit’s integrated monetary shaping
operations, reinforces the legitimacy of the commander and operations, as well as the legitimacy of the
local government, in the eyes of the population. (See ATP 3-07.20/MCRP3-33.1G for more information on
integrated monetary shaping operations.) |
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Working With Host-Nation Forces
11-1. The use of security cooperation tools to build governmental capability, including building a host
nation’s forces, may be essential. In the eyes of a local population, the credibility of the host-nation
government is vital in counterinsurgency efforts to address the threat and conditions of instability. The host
nation’s military, police, and paramilitary forces are often the most visible elements of a host-nation
government’s power and authority. Therefore, building the capacity of a host nation’s security forces
should work toward improving the security force’s competence, capability, commitment, and confidence.
(See table 11-1.)
Table 11-1. Developing a host-nation security force
Developmental Area Developmental Indicators
Competence Host-nation security forces must possess and demonstrate
individual and collective skills in their respective warfighting or
law enforcement tasks. They must also support institutional
functions.
Capability Host-nation security force organizations must be appropriately
sized to accomplish their respective missions. A host-nation
security force must be adequately manned and equipped at a
level that is sustainable, given that host nation’s own resources.
A host-nation security forces’ supporting institutions, such as
their national level force generation and logistic agencies, must
be organized and directed in a manner that adds value to the
lower-level, host-nation security forces’ mission requirements.
Commitment A host-nation security force must be committed to the peaceful
transition of political power. It must also be committed to the
security and survival of the state, the rule of law, the
preservation of human rights, civil liberties for the population,
and to fighting hard (when necessary) to defeat the active
insurgency.
Confidence A host-nation’s population must believe that its host-nation
security forces’ actions are always in the best interests of the
people. A host-nation government must believe that its
host-nation security force supports that government’s legal
authority. Also, the international community must see a host
nation’s security force as a force for good that respects human
rights and the international law of war.
11-2. To enable a host-nation security force to conduct counterinsurgency operations, United States (U.S.)
or multinational forces conduct various security cooperation activities. Commanders often view host-nation
security force development as an essential task and one of their primary lines of effort. The resulting
increase in a host nation’s ability to secure its own population yields significant benefits because
host-nation troops are normally more effective in conducting operations among the local population than
U.S. or multinational forces. Transitioning responsibility for operations to the host-nation security force
reduces the visible presence of U.S. or multinational troops, further enhancing the legitimacy of the
host-nation government.
11-3. Security cooperation can be an effective means to shape and aid a host nation’s counterinsurgency
efforts. In the case of El Salvador, the U.S. had limits on its level of direct involvement. The U.S. mainly |
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provided the government of El Salvador with security assistance. By following an effective strategy that
linked this aid to governmental and military reform, the U.S. was able to shape the ongoing
counterinsurgency and aid the government of El Salvador in defeating its insurgency.
Security Cooperation in El Salvador
In 1979, a group of disparate insurgent groups formed a coalition that would
become a significant threat to the Salvadoran government. They were opposed by
the Salvadoran armed forces, at that time a barracks-bound, defensively minded
organization with severe deficiencies in command and control, tactical intelligence,
tactical mobility, and logistics. The Salvadoran army did poorly in combat, and its only
significant successes early in the conflict were in intimidating and massacring the
civilian population.
The mid-1980s saw a massive U.S. aid effort, and considerable civilian and
military reform. Congressionally constrained to an initial limit of no more than 55
military advisors and no combat troops, U.S. aid consisted of arms, military trainers,
and reform and civic action programs. Several of these programs made slow
progress because many in the Salvadoran military resented their imposition by an
outside power.
Though resentful of the imposition, many in the Salvadoran military
recognized the incentive structure, where much U.S. aid was contingent on improving
El Salvador’s human rights record. Salvadoran Defense Minister Vides Casanova
said, “We know that improving our image is worth millions of dollars of aid for the
country.” Even if many Salvadoran counterinsurgents were principally motivated by
the flow of foreign aid, they did learn, they did increase their competence, and they
did improve their human rights behavior. The idea of focusing on all aspects of the
struggle, political, social, economic, as well as military, had taken root and continued
to the end of the war.
11-4. One issue with developing security forces in counterinsurgency is the issue of the quality versus the
quantity of host-nation counterinsurgency forces. In the case of counterinsurgency, quality tends to be more
important than quantity. While quantity and quality must be balanced to some degree and “quantity has a
quality all its own” to the extent that too small a force will not be able to accomplish its mission, quantity is
not a substitute for quality.
11-5. U.S. or multinational efforts to develop the capability and capacity of a host-nation security force
must focus on operational and developmental needs of host-nation counterparts. Developing a sound plan
to develop a host nation’s capability to address the root causes of the insurgency requires a deliberate,
comprehensive assessment of that host nation’s security force. The set of metrics that the U.S. or
multinational forces selects to assess a host-nation security force must be appropriate for the type of
security force being assessed. For example, assessment of a host-nation army may require a completely
different set of criteria from those used to assess a host-nation police force. Likewise, a host nation’s border
or customs police, local (city or county) police, and provincial, state, or national police must all be assessed
according to their specific mission requirements, while taking into consideration that host nation’s federal
or local laws, political considerations, culture, and tribal affiliations.
ASSESSING AND DEVELOPING A HOST-NATION FORCE
11-6. Assessment of host-nation army or land forces typically comes more naturally to U.S. or
multinational forces than assessing host-nation police forces. It is easier for a Soldier or Marine to assess
another Army or Marine Corps unit than it is for a Soldier or Marine to accurately assess a police precinct,
fire department, or sanitation department. Developing measures of performance and measures of
effectiveness based on their standards and how effective those standards are is important. (See chapter 12
for more information on assessments.)
11-7. One method to create an assessment framework is to form a working group of subject matter experts.
This working group will review any lines of effort and tasks identified by the host nation and recommend |
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additions and subtractions based on their expert opinion. They will then identify relevant objective and
subjective metrics that accurately measure the capability and capacity of the security force based on its
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, policies, and operations.
11-8. U.S. or multinational forces working to develop the capability and capacity of host-nation security
forces during the course of counterinsurgency operations must understand the difference between the
assessment of host-nation security forces and the fulfillment of higher headquarters’ reporting
requirements. Assessment requires a steady, persistent cycle of observation. Those observations help
inform plans for subsequent security cooperation activities. They are also generally included in reports that
help higher echelons make assessments of the overall effort. However, the data required for a report may
not be enough to assess a host-nation security force. Historical examples of these kinds of reports include
the operational readiness assessment submitted by advisor teams during operation Iraqi Freedom, and the
commander’s unit assessment tool prepared by advisors or partner units during operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan. Higher headquarters reports rarely constitute a complete assessment of the
host-nation security force at the tactical level.
11-9. Learning from how a host nation fights could benefit U.S. and multinational efforts in countering an
insurgency. When the U.S. decides to become involved in an insurgency, U.S. forces need to learn how the
host nation fights. If possible, the U.S. should send officers and noncommissioned officers to the host
nation’s professional military schools. If the host nation does not have a developed institutional military,
the U.S needs to find ways for leaders to observe how the host nation operates. To the extent possible,
host-nation forces are built following host-nation doctrine or otherwise following the host nation’s
traditional organization and approach.
11-10. Security cooperation is a multi-echelon endeavor that builds the capability and capacity of a
host-nation security force at the executive direction, generating force, and operating force functions. During
counterinsurgency operations, U.S. or multinational forces may take a bottom-up approach to building a
host nation’s capacity to defeat the insurgency and defend its sovereignty by first developing host-nation
security forces at the small-unit level. This approach buys time and space for a host nation to develop
capacity at higher echelons. In time, a host-nation security force establishes the capacity to generate its own
forces through recruiting, vetting, and induction of enlistees as well as officer candidates; initial entry
training for all personnel, to include basic warrior or police skills and advanced technical, tactical, and
leadership training; and processes for promotion, noncommissioned officer training, and senior leader
training. A host-nation security force must also develop processes for acquisition and life-cycle
management of major end items, as well as processes for procurement of all classes of supply, and
contracting of other services or capabilities. At the executive direction levels, a host-nation security force
must establish policies and a system of orders and directives that supports that host nation’s statutory
framework and drives standardization of policies and procedures through a top-down flow of information
and a robust command inspection program. U.S. or multinational personnel charged with conducting
security cooperation activities in a counterinsurgency environment must look beyond the immediate tactical
conditions on the ground and collaborate with multiple agencies to develop the supporting infrastructure
required for a host-nation security force to sustain and regenerate itself over the long term.
11-11. A bottom up approach does not negate the importance of strategic and operational planning in
security cooperation. In fact, decisions made at the strategic level may have strategic value and yet make
little tactical or operational sense to local commanders and staffs. The is especially true with foreign
military sales. For example, the U.S. may sell a major weapon system to a host nation that has inadequate
means to maintain and support that weapon system. However, the sale may accomplish an essential
political goal, or it may ensure a continued relationship between the host nation and the U.S. If a host
nation is dependent on the U.S. for maintaining a major weapon system, this gives the U.S. influence over
that host nation’s decisionmaking process. Tactical leaders must understand how their actions fit into the
overall operational approach.
11-12. Counterinsurgency usually requires an adaptable campaign plan that includes specific objectives
for all lines of effort, to include host-nation security force development. Comprehensive assessments of
host-nation security force units conducted at regular intervals (possibly aligned with reporting
requirements) provide critical information that can shape and inform U.S. or multinational units’ goals and
objectives for host-nation security force development. One proven technique for creating an adaptable |
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campaign plan is to prepare a draft plan prior to deployment, and then complete the plan once the initial
assessment is complete. Following every subsequent assessment, the U.S. or multinational commander
develops new goals and objectives based upon the developmental needs of the host-nation security force,
and then the commander issues a fragmentary order with specific tasks for the advisor teams or partner
units that support the new goals.
11-13. Host-nation security force developmental goals must include harmonized coordination among the
various branches of the host-nation security force, particularly between the land forces and the police. All
components of a host-nation security force must understand their own constitutional mandates and
limitations. For example, a host-nation army must know if or when it has the authority to detain individuals
suspected of a crime. Host-nation police forces must understand and support the rule of law, and ensure that
their actions harmonize with the nation’s criminal courts, as well as with the prison system. Finally, when
U.S. and multinational forces advise host-nation security force personnel, they must conduct the proper
troop-to-task analysis to ensure that land forces orient their operations according to host-nation army
doctrine, while police forces should be employed in a way that meets the expectations of a host-nation
government and the people they protect.
11-14. Monitoring of host-nation security forces serves multiple functions, including intelligence and
operations security. U.S. or multinational forces must always be aware of a host-nation security forces
leadership’s loyalty to its host nation and be sensitive to any perceived intentions on the part of a
host-nation security force that may run counter to legitimization of its nation’s government.
11-15. Unified action partners advise host-nation security forces to affect changes in the way they operate.
If host-nation security forces are efficient across all functions, no advising is necessary. However, the only
way a host-nation security force will undergo enduring growth and improvement is if the motivation comes
from within. Therefore, advisors must shape host-nation security force actions so that they make their own
processes and their systems work as intended. Prior to and during deployment, advisors must apply a
motivated approach to learning and understanding a host-nation security force’s organizational design. To
build effective working relationships, advisors need to possess a basic understanding of the host nation’s
culture, social mores, and taboos. Language capability (focused on rapport-building words and phrases
instead of just operational jargon) further enhances an advisor’s credibility and status. The ability to
negotiate and communicate diplomatically is essential for effective advising.
11-16. Once the U.S. or multinational forces gain an understanding of their counterparts’ culture and
organizational design and have completed an initial assessment of the host-nation security force unit’s
capabilities and capacity, advising activities can commence. Advisors consider culture, resources available,
and the base line assessment when choosing which advising task to employ when advising the host-nation
security force. There are three tasks that impart knowledge to the host-nation security force: teach, coach
and advise.
* Teaching involves a number of activities designed to impart knowledge or skills to host-nation
security force counterparts, but the advisor or partner unit drives the process.
* Coaching also involves the transfer of knowledge, skills, and abilities, but host-nation security
force units or individuals assume responsibility for applying what they have learned when
executing counterinsurgency tasks.
* Advising simply involves providing advice to commanders and staffs on their actions. There is
no longer a need to actively transfer knowledge. Advising is passive and allows a host nation to
be the primary actor.
In many counterinsurgencies, the U.S. will only provide equipment, training, and advice. The host nation
has a better understanding of the operational environment and is able to better maintain its legitimacy if it
does not employ foreign forces directly. Advisors must keep in mind that they are also students and they
probably have a great deal to learn from their host-nation counterparts. (See figure 11-1.) |
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Figure 11-1. Host-nation security force meter
11-17. Regardless of the tasks taken to develop the capabilities of a host-nation security force, a key
interest of security cooperation in counterinsurgency is to legitimize a host-nation security force in the eyes
of its population. This is best accomplished by setting the conditions for a host-nation security force to
conduct security and law enforcement operations independently and professionally.
11-18. Assisting a host-nation security force in counterinsurgency means providing or augmenting a host
nation’s security forces with U.S. or multinational capabilities or resources that they cannot generate on
their own. Forms of assistance may include enablers such information collection assets and capabilities in
support of a host-nation security force’s intelligence collection efforts. U.S. or multinational forces may
provide assistance in the form of certain battlefield effects such as close air support, electronic warfare,
secure long-range communications, or information operations. Assistance to host-nation security forces
often complements their nascent logistics capabilities, such as transportation or mobility, medical
capabilities, or corrective maintenance support. Assistance may also come in the form of materiel support
across one or more classes of supply. For example, the U.S. may provide a host nation with fuel under a
bilateral agreement, even if that host nation could acquire its own fuel for operational efficiency.
Historically, host-nation security force personnel have shown few reservations about asking U.S. forces for
materiel or other forms of assistance. Before providing any of these types of assistance, U.S. forces must
ensure legal authorities permit the assistance. When pressed for assistance of any kind, U.S. or
multinational personnel should ask themselves three questions:
* Do my counterparts really need this materiel or capability to accomplish their mission?
* Is there any way host-nation security forces could procure or acquire this resource or capability
using their own systems, processes, or methods?
* Can host-nation security forces sustain this system or capability over the long term?
11-19. Commanders and staffs should consider the following example. Host-nation security force
counterparts suspect that insurgent forces have established camps on the far side of a ridgeline where they
assemble and conduct final preparations prior to conducting attacks into major towns in the area. These
counterparts ask if the U.S. commander can arrange for unmanned aircraft systems to maintain persistent
surveillance over these suspected campsites to provide early warning of pending attacks. By posing the
three fundamental questions listed in paragraph 11-18, it may be possible to determine other courses of
action whereby a host-nation security force can produce and sustain the same effects. For example, the
commander might offer a host-nation security force instruction on how to build an information collection
plan and techniques for determining named areas of interest. Next, the advisors could coach their |
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counterparts on determining what capabilities they have at hand to observe those named areas of interest.
Can they establish permanent outposts or temporary observation posts that overlook these named areas of
interest? Can they establish or improve relations with local police forces or tribal networks to establish
hotlines linking the local population and the host-nation security force? Host-nation security force
personnel may often imagine U.S. or multinational technological or logistic capabilities as more powerful
than they truly are, and they may also fail to consider or neglect their own capabilities that can ultimately
create the same effect.
RELATIONSHIPS
11-20. Counterinsurgency operations require well-defined and understood relationships between U.S. and
multinational forces and a host-nation security force. Insurgent forces will quickly identify and exploit gaps
in counterinsurgents’ leadership and cohesion. Clearly defined relationships that evolve as a host-nation
security force’s operational capabilities grow are essential for effective mission command and facilitate a
smooth transition to a host-nation security force lead for security. Broadly stated, five possible command
relationship types are worth considering for each specific counterinsurgency operation. These relationships
are parallel, lead nation, partnered, integrated, and advisory. Each of these relationships requires U.S. or
multinational forces to modify or adapt their organizations for combat to complement combined U.S. or
multinational and host-nation security force counterinsurgency goals. (See figure 11-2.)
Figure 11-2. Counterinsurgency command relationships
11-21. These relationships are useful for tactical and operational forces to understand. However, they are
also somewhat different than the relationships found in JP 3-16. While JP 3-16 outlines a command
structure in which the joint force can integrate multinational partners, paragraphs 11-22 through 11-26
provide information for understanding how to integrate forces at the tactical and operational level. |
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PARALLEL
11-22. A parallel command is when U.S. or multinational forces maintain their own command structure
with no integration or partnership with a host nation. Under a parallel command structure, no single force
commander is designated. This arrangement is suitable when a host-nation security force has well
established, mature operational and institutional capabilities, and U.S. or multinational forces deploy to
provide additional capabilities. The relationship may be based on U.S. forces being given a specific task.
For example, U.S. forces may only conduct raids or only gather intelligence for the national command
authority. It can also be based on the U.S. forces being given their own area of operations within a host
nation. This can be done for various reasons, including that the area is sensitive to host-nation forces and an
external counterinsurgent may provide a temporary stabilization of the area. This arrangement supports unit
cohesion, and it also supports unity of command.
LEAD NATION
11-23. A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one
nation. This relationship works with one nation’s forces in the lead, and the supporting nation provides a
unit or units that are attached to and under operational or tactical control of the lead nation. This
arrangement provides flexibility in that the U.S. or multinational force may initially serve as the lead
nation, and as the operational capacity of the host-nation security force grows, the host nation can
eventually assume the role of lead nation. In also provides a possible means for the U.S. to aid a host nation
in an ongoing insurgency. For example, the U.S. could provide a brigade to a host nation in an ongoing
insurgency. Like parallel command, this arrangement supports unit cohesion, and it also supports unity of
command.
PARTNERED
11-24. This arrangement differs from parallel command in that U.S. or multinational forces and
host-nation security forces are paired down to the small-unit level. Commanders and staffs must consider
how to manage unity of command, logistics challenges, and language and cultural barriers. Partnering has
the advantage of maintaining a degree of unit cohesion (individual units are still homogenous), and the
specific capabilities of each nation’s force can be leveraged down to the small-unit levels.
INTEGRATED
11-25. Integrate means to assemble forces from both the U.S. or multinational and a host-nation security
force, and meld them into a single, inseparable unit. Integration, also referred to as augmenting, poses many
challenges, but it has been used successfully in the past. For example, the Korean augmentation to the U.S.
Army was a very successful program that integrated individual South Korean soldiers into Army units. This
yielded units with enhanced manpower, and cultural and linguistic fluency, down to the squad level. The
drawback is that integration requires significant time to institutionalize and does little to enable a
host-nation security force as a whole to assume lead responsibility for operations. Integration requires a
single shared language for all personnel, so either the U.S. or multinational forces will have to learn the
host nation’s language or host-nation security force personnel will have to learn English. Furthermore,
integration of U.S. and host-nation security forces into a single coherent force requires significant
combined training in individual and collective tasks, which will result in a period at the beginning of the
deployment when the integrated force is not fully combat capable. This could result in extended
deployment periods to compensate for this operational integration and training period. Finally, integration
does little to build the capability and capacity of the host nation’s ministerial-level leadership or the
security forces’ supporting institutions.
ADVISING
11-26. When host-nation security force units achieve a certain degree of organizational maturity at a
specific echelon, U.S. or multinational forces may assign individuals or teams of advisors to perform any
number of advisory tasks. One advantage of this approach is that is imposes the smallest possible U.S. or
multinational force requirement. It also puts the host-nation security force in the most visible role of |
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providing security to local population. Finally, since the basing and force requirements are relatively small
for U.S. or multinational forces, it is the most flexible and adaptable relationship. Advisor teams can be
quickly reassigned to different host-nation security force units based upon capability gaps across the
host-nation security force. (See FM 3-22 for more information on advisors.)
SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING
11-27. Security cooperation activities occur across the range of military operations. Two important
activities relevant to counterinsurgency are foreign internal defense and security force assistance. Foreign
internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action
programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). Security force
assistance consists of the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US
Government to support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their
supporting institutions (JP 3-22). Moreover, security assistance, which includes activities in which the U.S.
provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan or credit, could
be important in equipping and resourcing a counterinsurgency force. Both foreign internal defense and
security force assistance represent important defense activities to build the capacity of a host nation to
defeat an insurgency. (For a further discussion on foreign internal defense, security force assistance, and
security assistance, see FM 3-22).
11-28. Security cooperation activities are part of both strategy and policy. In planning security
cooperation activities, combatant commanders start with the National Security Strategy issued by the White
House and expanded upon in overarching Department of Defense (DOD) guidance documents. The
National Defense Strategy influences the Guidance for Employment of the Force, which provides the
parameters for combatant commands to develop their theater and functional campaign plans, which are the
mechanisms to support the synchronization of the comprehensive civilian and military efforts specifically
designed to end insurgent violence and facilitate a return to peaceful political processes. The combatant
commander’s plans are comprehensive, as they consider design, organization, integration, conditions and
objectives for a region during steady state, crisis, and contingency (including counterinsurgency). DOD
develops its plans, taking into consideration all relevant stakeholders (including other partner nations and
international organizations.) These plans should incorporate the full range of capabilities that are required
to meet the desired end state. These plans set conditions for actions that take place throughout all phases of
joint operations. (See figure 11-3 for a graphic representation of this relationship.) (See FM 3-22 for a
detailed explanation on security cooperation activities and planning.) |
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Figure 11-3. Country planning
JOINT PHASING MODE
11-29. Security cooperation takes place during all phases of the joint phasing model. Counterinsurgents
may use security cooperation to prevent an insurgency before a major combat operation, during a combat
operation, and after a major operation. This can also apply to an active insurgency. While the joint phasing
model does not provide a universally prescriptive template for all conceivable joint operations, it does
provide a flexible model to arrange operations. The operation plan consists of six phases:
* Phase 0, shape.
* Phase I, deter.
* Phase II, seize the initiative.
* Phase III, dominate.
* Phase IV, stabilize.
* Phase V, enable civil authority.
11-30. Shape, or phase 0, operations of the joint phasing model are joint and multinational operations that
include normal and routine military activities. During phase 0, both the Army and Marine Corps perform
security cooperation activities as directed in higher plans and orders to indirectly support a host nation in
countering an insurgency. Since security cooperation operations can continue through all phases of the
operation, many of the activities, such as foreign internal defense direct support and foreign internal
defense combat operations, must have the unified application of U.S. forces to achieve the desired effects in
countering insurgent operations. This is critically important as these efforts are important elements in
phases II and III. Foreign internal defense, security force assistance, and other security cooperation |
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activities are essential throughout the phases of any operation. (See JP 5-0 for more information on the joint
phasing model.)
11-31. If the U.S. commits forces to a counterinsurgency conflict, it will normally deploy a joint task
force or multinational joint task force headquarters to provide planning and command and control. The
multinational joint task force’s desired end state is to terminate the operation plan at the conclusion of
Phase V, stand-down or redeploy the multinational joint task force headquarters, and revert to Phase 0
operations. The geographic combatant command and respective Service component commands, in
coordination with the country team, resume security cooperation activities directed by the country plan.
Counterinsurgency operations typically extend across all phases (0 through V). Therefore, U.S. or
multinational security force assistance and foreign internal defense activities in support of the host-nation
security force’s counterinsurgency conflict may occur under the auspices of the American ambassador to
the host nation and the geographic combatant commander, or under the authority of the multinational joint
task force commander.
DEVELOPING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES
11-32. Both foreign internal defense and security force assistance can be used as part of a long term plan
to develop and deploy a host-nation force to defeat an insurgency. While the U.S. may intervene in a
country that only needs enablers to enhance an already effective military force, a host nation may lack an
effective military. If the host nation lacks an effective military, aid in the development of that host-nation
military could follow five phases: planning and resourcing host-nation security force, generation of
host-nation security force, employment of host-nation security force, transition of responsibility for security
to host-nation security force, and sustainment of host-nation security force. These phases are distinct and
independent of those in the joint phasing model. U.S. or multinational forces conduct parallel planning with
their host-nation security force counterparts to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in
support of the overall counterinsurgency campaign, while at the same time working toward milestones that
lead to a successful transition from U.S. or multinational lead to host-nation security force lead for security.
11-33. Typically, the first phase of building a host-nation security force, planning and resourcing, falls to
the responsibility of geographic combatant command-level planners in coordination with the country team.
Coordination of legal authorities and funding for security force assistance and foreign internal defense
activities is an interagency process because it typically involves resources provided under a number of
different sections of the United States Code (USC). Moreover, other security cooperation programs, such as
foreign military sales, may be essential in equipping another military to perform foreign internal defense
operations.
11-34. Generating the host-nation security force is the second phase in building a host-nation security
force. If the U.S. is deploying conventional forces, this will probably be the initial phase in which
regiments or brigade combat teams will actually have an active role. These forces can partner with
host-nation security forces of varying developmental levels in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.
For example, while supporting recent counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and the Philippines,
host-nation security force counterparts had already fielded relatively sophisticated, well-developed
operational units supported by robust supporting institutions and well established executive-level or
ministerial leadership. In other U.S. historical counterinsurgency operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq,
the host-nation security force operational units, their supporting institutions, and the most senior-level
executive leadership functions were undeveloped or completely non-existent. In situations such as these,
U.S. and multinational forces must organize, train, and equip host-nation security force units while
assisting in the building or rebuilding of their supporting infrastructure. The organize, train, and equip
security force assistance tasks may be assigned to U.S. or multinational regiment- or brigade-sized units
while they are simultaneously battling the insurgents. At the same time, unified action must be taken to
establish a host-nation security force’s own sustainable force generation capabilities and capacity. U.S. or
multinational personnel, working with their host-nation security force counterparts, are placed in a difficult
predicament in that they must carefully select key host-nation security force leaders to be pulled away from
the immediate counterinsurgency fight to assume critical command and staff positions within the
host-nation security force’s organizations. Counterinsurgents must exercise restraint by not assigning all of
the best host-nation security force leaders to operating force units while neglecting to invest in their own
force generation capacity. (See figure 11-4.) |
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Figure 11-4. Phases of building a host-nation security force
11-35. The third phase of building a host-nation security force is the employment of a host-nation security
force to protect the population and defeat the insurgents. During this phase, the primary focus shifts from
organizing, training, equipping, and rebuilding host-nation security forces to employing host-nation
security forces to perform the security tasks for which they were designed. As one host-nation security
force unit enters the employment phase, other units may have just begun the force generation process.
Meanwhile, there may be more seasoned host-nation security force units that are ready to transition to the
lead for security operations in their assigned area of operations. Additionally, it may be possible to generate
host-nation police forces more quickly than army units, since they can be employed individually or in small
station-level units, they do not need to conduct large-scale collective training exercises, and they typically
have fewer materiel requirements. However, it may take considerably longer for police forces to show their
effectiveness during the employment phase due to the length of time it takes for police forces to gain the
trust of the local population and build productive, enduring relationships with local or tribal leaders.
11-36. The fourth phase of building a host-nation security force in a counterinsurgency is the transition of
responsibility for security operations from the U.S. or multinational forces to a host-nation security force.
In some instances, such as in Colombia or the Philippines, a host-nation security force may already be
mature and highly capable in most or all operational realms (land, air, and maritime). Security force
assistance activities and the resulting transition to a host-nation security force lead may refer only to
specific functions such as intelligence or an even more discreet set of tactical tasks, such as employment of
remote sensors, that supports the host nation’s strategic or operational counterinsurgency goals. In these
instances, the U.S. may provide operational capabilities to meet the immediate threat, while conducting
security force assistance in the form of equipment or training to close the capabilities gap. Once the
capability gap is filled, a host nation’s security force assumes responsibility for that function, and U.S.
forces redeploy, with the country team providing the host nation access to long-term security assistance
programs as appropriate.
11-37. The defense attaché office and foreign area officers play an important role in long-term security
assistance programs. In other cases such as Iraq, U.S. or multinational forces may initially have to assume
responsibility for all security tasks in all operational realms, and across all security force functions (land
forces, police, and border security). In the latter case, transition is a lengthy process with no clearly defined
beginning or end date.
11-38. Transition will likely be conducted in steps or subphases, and the steps or subphases may be
geographic, functional, or a combination of both. For example, the transition to host-nation security force
lead for land force security operations may transpire one province at a time until the entire country has
transitioned. A second example might be for transition to occur for land forces across the entire country by |
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January 20XX, all police forces by June 20XX, and air and maritime forces by December 20XX. A
transition to a host-nation security force lead should be conditions or assessments-based, although the U.S.
or multinational forces may elect to use a set transition date as a forcing function to compel the host-nation
security forces to assume greater responsibility for securing their own country and their own people.
Transitions will rarely be simple. In cases where U.S. or multinational general-purpose brigade combat
teams deploy for extended tours such as 12-month rotations, units may find that they are supporting the
host-nation security force transition to lead for security when they arrive in-country and still supporting the
same transition when they redeploy one year later.
11-39. The fifth phase of building a host-nation security force in counterinsurgency is sustainment. In this
context, the term sustainment does not refer exclusively to logistic sustainment or sustainment functions.
Rather, sustainment is an ongoing set of security assistance activities (Title 22) and security cooperation
activities (Title 10) designed to enhance the capabilities and capacity of a host nation to provide for its own
security and to participate in regional or global multinational operations. These programs also seek to
develop enduring relationships with key leaders within the host-nation security force and to facilitate
peacetime or contingency access to host-nation facilities such as ports, airfields, and training venues. As the
transition to the host-nation security force lead for security draws to a close, there may be a number of
security force assistance tasks that require an extended period to be completed properly. Examples include
foreign military sales of new equipment such as tanks, artillery, helicopters, or watercraft and subsequent
deployment of mobile training teams to train the host-nation security force on the employment of these new
weapons systems. Enduring geographic combatant command-level security cooperation activities, such as
rotational deployment of U.S. forces to conduct combined exercises with the host-nation security force,
sustain and extend the development of the capability and capacity of a host-nation security force to deal
with residual insurgent threats and potential future external threats to that host nation’s sovereignty.
11-40. In a counterinsurgency, the host-nation security force’s executive and ministerial leadership, its
force generation capacity, and its operating forces’ capabilities must develop and mature quickly, while
U.S. or multinational forces initially provide time in the form of security to allow this process to succeed.
U.S. or multinational forces gradually reduce and eventually relinquish control of the counterinsurgency to
a host-nation security force. Parallel planning with a host-nation security force provides the blueprint for
what must occur from the U.S. or multinational side and a host-nation security force side of an operation.
Both entities plan for transition to host-nation security force lead, but they approach the transition from
different perspectives. Initially, teaching, coaching, and advising host-nation security forces in their
planning efforts is part of the overall process, but it ultimately should result in a host-nation security force
having the capability and capacity to defeat an insurgency on its own.
PARALLEL PLANNING
11-41. When enabling a host nation to develop a security force, parallel planning is essential. Parallel
planning is a time-saving technique that enables leaders at all levels from fire team to division to initiate the
operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) prior to the receipt of a complete operation order.
Parallel planning allows units to generate tempo by conducting a multi-tiered planning process. This
reduces haste and provides all echelons more available time to prepare for future actions. Likewise, parallel
planning with host-nation security forces enables greater efficiency and the ability to conduct simultaneous
actions. It also serves as an essential step in the host-nation security force transition to the lead for security
in a counterinsurgency.
11-42. Parallel planning with the host-nation security force assumes adequate planning capabilities on the
part of at least some of the host-nation security force commanders and staffs. When making this
assumption, U.S. or multinational forces assume operational risks relating to the ability of the host-nation
security force staffs to deliver on their planning requirements. Considerations when conducting parallel
planning with the host-nation security force commanders and staffs may include, but are not limited to,
varying or competing agendas, lower literacy rates, access to computer technology, and use of graphics or
visuals. U.S. commanders and staffs conducting parallel planning consider these points: |
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* U.S. or multinational forces have their own national security objectives, while host-nation
counterparts may have conflicting objectives from the national to the local level.
* Literacy rates in many of the countries that the U.S. or multinational forces may partner with are
often far below that of the U.S. or other western countries. Lack of formal education, however,
does not preclude the host nation from being capable of understanding the western style of
military planning.
* Access to computer technology in various host nations often does not match that of the U.S. or
western countries. Commanders and staffs may have to use manual methods of data collection,
storage, and dissemination.
* Instructional programs, whether computer based or done on a terrain model, are based on
western preference for the presentation of information through visual modalities. Successful
counterinsurgency operations require U.S. or multinational advisors to imbue their host-nation
security force counterparts with the capability to process raw data into information that provides
knowledge and leads to an understanding of an operational environment.
* Security classification of host-nation counterparts.
* Foreign disclosure restrictions.
11-43. Regardless of the difficulties of parallel planning, U.S. and multinational forces make every effort
to understand host-nation planning capabilities prior to conducting operations. Despite the many challenges
presented by conducting parallel planning with host-nation security forces, U.S. and multinational forces
should be completely integrated into the planning process as early as possible because the host nation can
potentially bring to the counterinsurgency specific and essential abilities. (See table 11-2 for examples of
host-nation contributions.)
Table 11-2. Host-nation contributions
Task Reason for contribution
Understand an operational An area of operations is a host nation’s home and its
environment culture; a host-nation force knows the language, the
different groups, the political situation, educational levels,
economic considerations, historical bad actors, and
unofficial community leaders.
Provide human intelligence Host-nation security forces may be able to better gather
information that leads to human intelligence for many
reasons, including speaking the same language and
understanding the important players in the area.
Put the pieces together Host-nation forces can often better integrate the different
fragments of intelligence into the context of an operational
environment.
Determine credibility of Host-nation forces possess a vastly superior sense of
intelligence assets (sources, cultural intelligence and may be able to assist in assigning
walk-ins, call-ins) credibility to sources.
Validate and check Host-nation forces can assist in confirming the locally hired
interpreters interpreters’ abilities to interpret.
Identify and root out Host-nation forces can pick out minute differences between
infiltrators normal and abnormal behaviors.
Gain information superiority Host-nation forces can help write messages that may
resonate with the local population.
Vet locally hired personnel for Host-nation forces have access to resources not
counterintelligence and necessarily available to U.S. personnel.
security purposes
11-44. Tactical-level planners in the U.S. military employ either the military decisionmaking process or
the Marine Corps planning process to gain an understanding of an operational environment, identify the |
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tactical problem, develop possible courses of action, and evaluate and select the best course of action to
most effectively address the tactical problem. Commanders and staffs first properly frame the problem.
When given a set of inputs, such as an order from higher headquarters or some other initiating directive,
certain intelligence products, and an initial commander’s visualization, commanders and staffs complete
the steps to work toward a specified output, such as a finished operation order. In cases where host-nation
security force leaders have been directly involved in combat operations over many years, those leaders who
survive often owe their lives to their own ability to improvise. As a result, many host-nation security force
leaders apply an intuitive, instead of a process-oriented, method of making decisions. They can
immediately size up a tactical situation, almost instantaneously recognize dangers and opportunities, and
decide upon a course of action. While this capability can serve in critical situations, it cannot be taught to
others, and it is of no use in situations unrelated to the leader’s own experiential learning. Therefore, U.S.
or multinational advisors may have to work patiently with their host-nation security force counterparts for
them to develop a planning and decision support process instead of allowing them to rely solely on the
intuitive approach.
11-45. U.S. and multinational planners ensure that they have conducted basic mission analysis prior to
parallel planning with host-nation partners. This allows advisors to develop and assess assumptions,
identify implied and specified tasks, determine what assets and capabilities are available, and formulate a
tentative timeline to coordinate advisory efforts throughout the planning process. |
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Assessments
12-1. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force
capabilities during military operations. It is also a determination of the progress toward accomplishing a
task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). The assessment process monitors the effects
of actions on mission accomplishment. Operational assessments have three enduring purposes. First, they
monitor the nature, scope, and severity of a situation. Second, they track a military force’s implementation
of a plan in combination with collaborating agencies. Finally, operational assessments evaluate progress
towards achieving goals or objectives. Commanders and staffs must integrate assessments into the Army
design methodology and conceptual planning. Assessments are crucial for successful adaptation and
innovation by commanders within their respective areas of operation. Assessments are also essential in any
type of transition. They are a key ingredient in adapting and learning. Assessments must be part of initial
design. Commanders and staffs must conceptualize what is actually important and determine how to
question those assumptions from the beginning of understanding a problem. (See ADRP 5-0 and ADRP 6-0
for doctrine on assessments.) Assessment precedes and is integrated into every operations activity and
entails two broad, enduring tasks:
* Continuously monitoring the current situation (including the environment as it affects friendly
forces, enemy forces, and the population) and the progress of the operation.
* Evaluating the operation against established criteria, expected outcomes, and the desired end
state.
12-2. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, continuously evaluate an operation’s progress against the
established commander’s intent, mission, and concept of the operation. Based on their assessments,
commanders may adjust the operation and associated activities to better achieve the end state and adjust
assessment criteria to address the most credible and relevant activities.
12-3. The critical role of assessment necessitates establishing measures of effectiveness and performance
during planning. Commanders choose these measures carefully so that they align with the overall
operational design and the superior commander’s intent. These measures reflect the interrelationship among
the lines of effort. Commanders and staffs revise their assessment and measures of effectiveness and
performance as an operation progresses to most effectively focus limited collection and analytical
resources.
12-4. Sound assessment blends qualitative and quantitative analysis with the judgment and intuition of all
leaders. Commanders must apply assessments carefully, as counterinsurgency operations most often
involve complex societal issues that may not lend themselves to quantifiable measures of effectiveness.
Moreover, bad assumptions and false data can undermine the validity of both assessments and conclusions
drawn from them. Data and metrics can inform a commander’s assessment. However, they must not be
allowed to dominate it in uncertain situations. Subjective and intuitive assessment must not be replaced by
an exclusive focus on data or metrics. Commanders must exercise their professional judgment in
determining the proper balance.
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS
12-5. Several assessment frameworks have been developed over the past decade. Depending on their
specific purpose, they can be used as tools to develop an interagency initial assessment, assess conflicts, or
measure progress. For example, the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework is a recognized and very
useful initial assessment framework (See United States [U.S.] Government publication Interagency Conflict
Assessment Framework). Alternatively, units may use some form of systems analysis based on the
operational variables. |
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ASSESSMENT METHODS
12-6. Selecting the appropriate approach to assessment is the commander’s most important assessment
decision. Assessment methodologies may be centralized, decentralized, or both. A centralized methodology
requires units to collect and report information requirements to their higher headquarters for analysis and
situational understanding. This is a common methodology and is often described as pattern and trend
analysis. Pattern and trend analysis uses centralized quantitative analysis to produce a snapshot of the
operation’s momentum over time. Pattern and trend analysts tend to accept that counterinsurgency data will
be inaccurate and incomplete, but when viewed in aggregate this data will be sufficient to produce relevant,
centralized, and quantifiable analysis. Pattern and trend analysis measures progress, but it is not truly an
assessment. The problem with the centralized approach to assessment is that the decentralized nature of
counterinsurgency prevents the development of any centralized model to understand the important nuances
of local context. Decentralized assessments enable subordinate units to develop and measure progress
locally. The interaction between levels of command is critical to informing the higher commander.
Although decentralized assessments are preferred by the lower tactical levels, actual measurement of
progress is limited by the lack of a common starting point. This often gives the best picture of a local
situation, but it lacks the context of how it compares to other locations. Senior commanders must weigh the
results by comparing assessments with dissimilar measurements. This makes the development of an
aggregate analysis very difficult.
12-7. Military forces in counterinsurgencies usually use a combination of these two assessment methods,
choosing common reporting requirements for all subordinates but also requiring a subjective analysis from
each of the subordinate commanders to aid in informing the senior commanders’ situational understanding.
Units report qualitative statistics to enable pattern analysis, and commanders provide quantitative analysis
to fully depict what the statistics mean at the local level. The combined assessment involves a top down
planning, bottom-up refinement approach in which analysis is conducted at the level the data is collected
and reports to higher headquarters include narratives from local commanders. This type of assessment
eschews the establishment of core level metrics at the highest levels and allows commanders to establish
additional metrics in accordance with their situation and their resources. Combined assessment generally
results in more accurate reporting and efficient use of collection and analysis resources.
12-8. In geographically distributed, decentralized counterinsurgency campaigns, only a few activities
produce similar outcomes or are consistently implemented across the theater of operations. What is
important in one area may not be important in another. Similarly, what works in one area may not work in
another area.
ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS
12-9. Assessment begins as soon as a military force receives an alert or warning and does not end until
after that force has ceased operations and left the area of operations. Assessment begins with an initial
assessment that serves as the basis for planning. Planning develops this into an operational assessment that
evaluates plan effectiveness and focus. The assessment is continually reassessed. Often plans are updated
because of the reassessment process.
12-10. The assessment should reflect the achievements of collaborating partners. Military forces cannot
defeat an insurgency alone. Assessors must realize that information about the underlying root causes for
social, cultural, political, and economic turbulence will probably be incomplete. Obtaining reliable
information can be costly and time-consuming. Assessors should be extremely wary of methods that claim
to provide this information quickly. An assessment based on faulty information can result in military force
actions that are counterproductive. It is better for assessors to monitor the situation, track what every
organization is doing, and be clear about what they do not know. The next step is to postulate, hypothesize,
and clearly state what assumptions the evaluation process is making. Assessors seek information to test
assumptions and revise estimates as operations continue.
12-11. At its core, a counterinsurgency environment is a political problem. Understanding and solving the
political problem is the essence of counterinsurgency operations. A counterinsurgency environment is
complex, with many lines of effort covering a variety of political, military, economic, social,
infrastructural, and informational activities. As such, developing a comprehensive assessment is a |
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time-consuming process that is difficult to perform properly and effectively. Counterinsurgents must assess
not only their own actions or inactions, but also those of insurgents and the population. In understanding
these actions and inactions, counterinsurgents must have a thorough knowledge of the history and culture
of their areas of operations. These assessments must include, among many other factors, the context for any
given situation, the perceptions of those involved, and the possible outcomes of actions or inactions.
12-12. Commanders are responsible for assessments. The commander’s direct and personal involvement
in the assessment process is critical. Moreover, assessments must contain both subjective and objective
elements. Assessments combine elements of science and art. They are not simply a collection of numbers
or indicators. Commanders and staffs must understand assessments in the context of the overall campaign,
not just from a military perspective.
12-13. Countering an insurgency most often involves an extended campaign. Counterinsurgents must
assess actions or inactions broadly, to include how they are viewed locally, within the multinational force
(if one exists), host nation, and the region. Counterinsurgents also assesses actions against host-nation
strategic goals. Without the backing of each of these levels, counterinsurgents risk loss of legitimacy and
potential failure.
12-14. Eliminating the root causes of an insurgency is the goal of a counterinsurgency. Assessment must
focus on those activities and actions that are most important in addressing these root causes. Assessment
must be focused on gathering the right information needed to understand what to do. The commander must
determine if counterinsurgents are doing things right, if counterinsurgents are doing the right things, and if
change is necessary.
12-15. Balanced assessments include information from all relevant and objective sources, including both
quantitative and qualitative data. This data includes the proper combination of centralized and decentralized
reporting. A balanced assessment includes countering opinions and data that contradict overall findings. A
combination of quantitative and qualitative types of indicators reduces the chance of misconstruing trends.
12-16. No assessment will ever show all the aspects of a counterinsurgency campaign. Efforts to show all
aspects of a counterinsurgency waste resources and place unrealistic demands on subordinate units that
often result in falsified reporting. Assessment should rely principally on information gathered through
ongoing intelligence and operational reporting. Demands for additional reporting should be minimized.
12-17. There is no substitute for seeing a battlefield as a means for understanding a situation. Battlefield
circulation is critical to establishing relationships between commanders at all levels. The view of a
commander who daily walks and lives in a particular area of operations provides a level of insight that no
statistic or report can replace. These first-hand encounters provide commanders a lens with which to review
and compare centralized reports and trend analysis with the intuition and local understanding of
subordinate commands.
12-18. Collecting, assembling, and analyzing information is a time and labor-intensive process.
Commanders balance time and resources for assessment just as they do across the planning, decision, and
execution continuum. To help achieve this balance, commanders and staffs ask the following questions:
* What must be understood to begin planning?
* What will be assessed and to what detail?
* How will a particular task, objective, end state condition, or assumption be assessed?
* What measures of effectiveness and measures of performance will be used?
* What information requirements (indicators) are needed to support a particular assessment?
* Who on the staff has primary responsibility for assessing a particular area?
* What is the collection plan?
* How can the host nation help?
* How can the other agencies of the U.S. government assist?
DEVELOPING MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
12-19. Assessment requires determining why and when progress is being achieved along each line of
effort. Traditionally, commanders use discrete quantitative and qualitative measurements to evaluate |
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progress. However, the complex nature of counterinsurgency operations makes progress difficult to
measure. Subjective assessment at all levels is essential to understand the diverse and complex nature of
counterinsurgency problems. It is also needed to measure local success or failure against the overall
operation’s end state. Additionally, commanders need to know how actions along different lines of effort
complement each other; therefore, planners evaluate not only progress along each line of effort but also
interactions among lines of efforts.
12-20. The most common types of assessment measures are measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and
measures of performance (MOPs). A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in
system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end
state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs focus on the results or
consequences of actions. MOEs answer the question, “Are we achieving results that move
counterinsurgents towards the desired end state, or are additional or alternative actions required?” A
measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task
accomplishment (JP 3-0). MOPs answer the question, “Was the task or action performed as the commander
intended?”
12-21. MOEs and MOPs for assessing counterinsurgency operations are designed with the same
characteristics. MOEs and MOPs are measurable, observable, distinctive, relevant, and responsive:
* MOEs and MOPs have quantitative or qualitative standards against which they can be measured.
The most effective measurement is a combination of quantitative and qualitative measures to
guard against an inaccurate view of results.
* Each MOE and MOP measures a separate, distinct aspect of the task, purpose, or condition.
* MOEs and MOPs are relevant to the measured task, outcome, and condition. Host-nation local,
regional, and national leaders, and NGO personnel, may provide practical ideas, professional
ideas, and feedback to craft relevant MOPs and MOEs.
* Assessment tools detect environmental and situational changes.
DESIGNING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE
12-22. An MOE provides some information about how an operational environment is changing. An MOE
of a number of attacks on counterinsurgents can indicate a successful counterinsurgency, or it can indicate
insurgent control of an area and an unwillingness of counterinsurgents to contest that control. In this
example, commanders and staffs need to understand why the number of attacks are down. What is essential
to any MOE is the development of an effective measure that tells the commander critical information about
how an operational environment is changing.
12-23. Moreover, in developing MOPs, commanders and staffs measure a unit’s performance based on
the conditions of its area of operations. In other words, MOPs should be developed as a means to measure
if a unit is effectively doing the things that the commander and staff view as essential to defeating an
insurgency. MOPs are developed based on a counterinsurgency mission and an area of operations.
12-24. When designing MOEs and MOPs, commanders and staffs consider several points:
* Raw counts of something is usually not as important as how many out of a possible total and
how important each one is.
* Knowledge of the state of insurgent training may provide information about the overall
capability of the insurgency. If an insurgency can produce trained units, it may have a higher
military and sustainment capacity.
* Training in other states could indicate support from another state.
* A high number of un-coerced informant reports could be an important indicator of a breakdown
in insurgent security. Also, the position of the informer in the society might be an important
indicator.
* The number of insurgent attacks is not always as important as the scale of an insurgent attack.
Large-scale attacks require a level of operational sophistication that may imply an increased
insurgent capability. |
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* How many insurgents are caught and jailed may be an important MOE. However, the number
convicted and sentenced by government judicial authorities and remaining in jail over time is
also an important MOE of governmental capability and corruption.
* The number of recruits available for an insurgency can be an important indicator of the
government’s and the insurgency’s legitimacy.
* An MOP based on the number of patrols in a given area over a period may not be as effective as
the persistence of patrols in a given area over the same period of time.
* An MOE based on the amount of money seized may not be as important as an MOE based on
denying funding sources. It may simply show an increased flow of funds into an area.
12-25. When developing MOPs and MOEs, commanders and staffs avoid developing MOPs or MOEs
that highlight what a commander and staff are actively doing to defeat an insurgency. For example,
building a number of schools can be used as an MOP, and the number of students in the school can be used
as an MOE. However, these activities may have no effect on an insurgency at all. Commanders and staffs
connect MOEs and MOPs to their operational environment and insurgency. Accepting the assumption that
what one is doing is actually relevant to defeating an insurgency is an easy means to undermine the
effectiveness of MOPs and MOEs. Commanders and staffs avoid the trap of thinking that because they do
something and measure it, it is important.
12-26. Commanders and staffs generally avoid measures that lack context. For example, the number of
enemy killed, without any context, is normally a dangerous MOP. The number of enemy killed can indicate
that the insurgency is increasing its recruitment and capabilities, thus more insurgents are being killed in
more attacks. Commanders and staffs establish some context in any measure that they use.
12-27. Vietnam highlights the importance of creating an assessment framework that is contextual to the
insurgency and is relevant to actually measuring success. In Vietnam, U.S. leadership made assumptions
about what were important measures of success without connecting those measurements to situational
understanding. Many U.S. leaders did not actively question their assumptions. Even worse, their ineffective
assessment framework had an influence on operations.
Measuring Effectiveness and Performance in Vietnam
Historical accounts of the conflict in Vietnam vary widely in the points
emphasized and the explanations offered. Disputes are facilitated by the different
personal experiences of many different direct observers who saw or participated in
sometimes very different slices of the conflict at different times, at different
operational levels, and in different parts of the country. What, if anything, could have
been done to change the outcome of the war and who to blame for that outcome
remains fairly hotly contested. What the outcome was, however, is not contested:
U.S. forces withdrew in 1973, and the Saigon government fell to the combined
pressure of the insurgency and North Vietnamese regular forces in April of 1975,
unequivocally a counterinsurgent loss.
The literature on the U.S. military’s Vietnam-era assessment process is
highly negative; even the most strident defenders of the assessment reports
produced during that period expressed some dissatisfaction with the process.
Assessments of the Vietnam War varied in type, purpose, and intended consumer.
The entire process changed and grew between the early 1960s and the early 1970s;
there was no single “Vietnam War assessment.” There were many assessment
processes, and many were burdened with murky objectives, measures that were
poorly connected to those objectives, and poor data collection. Quantitative data of
questionable veracity were used to make optimistic prognostications, such as the
illusion of a trend toward “a light at the end of the tunnel.” Distrust of Vietnam-era
military briefings became so endemic that members of the press corps referred to the
daily military press briefings as the “five o’clock follies.”
The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, or MACV, was the theater-
level military command in Saigon, South Vietnam. MACV was the neck of the funnel
for nearly all field reports on operations, intelligence, pacification, and other data |
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categories. Some of the MACV reports and nearly all of the Secretary of Defense’s
reports relied heavily on aggregated quantitative data and pattern and trend analysis.
In some cases, data collection requirements were developed to meet perceived
operational or strategic needs; in other cases, they were specifically designed to
provide data that would show some kind of progress without context. For example, in
1968, MACV reported the number of cakes of soap it had issued to Vietnamese
villagers in 1967 (572,121), an irrelevant input metric. More famous (or infamous) is
the use of “body counts” as a primary progress metric. Not only were body counts a
poor proxy for progress driven by an untenable assumption about adversary attrition,
but data collected were wildly inaccurate because of the adversary emphasis on
reclaiming bodies, difficult terrain, duplicate reporting, and the temptation to
exaggerate, among other reasons.
Assessment of the Vietnam War was haphazard before MACV became a
theater combat command in the early 1960s. Between the mid-1960s and the early
1970s, MACV and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (with Central Intelligence
Agency assistance) created the single largest and most comprehensive military
counterinsurgency assessment apparatus in the history of warfare. It involved the
efforts of hundreds of thousands of military personnel, civilians, Vietnamese
nationals, intelligence experts, and analysts over the course of several years. These
contributors produced hundreds of millions of data items (in Department of Defense
[DOD] parlance), tens of thousands of tactical and operational analytic reports, and
hundreds of comprehensive assessments that addressed nearly every aspect of the
war. Data flowed up from the hundreds of thousands of troops on the ground,
province advisors, military advisors to Republic of Vietnam units, U.S. civilian
officials, and U.S. intelligence officers, as well as Republic of Vietnam military units,
government agencies, and civilian development teams. These data points were then
fed into catalogs and computer databases, including the Hamlet Evaluation System,
the Terrorist Incident Reporting System, the Territorial Forces Effectiveness System,
the Pacification Attitude Analysis System, the Situation Reports Army File, and many
others. “Data” could mean anything from a simple number (for example, rounds fired
in a single artillery attack) to a more complex set of ostensibly correlated survey data
(for example, hamlet evaluation data).
Assessment in Vietnam was non-trivial: A July 26, 1970, U.S. military
intelligence briefing listed 44 provinces, 257 districts, 2,464 villages, 11,729 hamlets,
and 1,500 miles of coastline from the demilitarized zone with North Vietnam to the
border with Cambodia in the Gulf of Siam. The challenges of assessment in Vietnam
are the same challenges faced in any counterinsurgency: How should policymakers
determine progress and decide strategy if all they have to choose from is inaccurate,
decontextualized, and aggregated numbers or thousands of pages of lengthy
narrative?
While it is not possible to state that poor assessment led to the loss of the
Vietnam War, the war was distinguished by internal confusion, poor decisionmaking,
and, ultimately, strategic defeat. It is apparent from analyzing the way in which
assessments were presented and used that they contributed to many of the poor
decisions that led to this defeat.
BROAD INDICATORS OF PROGRESS
12-28. Numerical and statistical indicators have limits when measuring social environments. For example,
in South Vietnam U.S. forces used the body count to evaluate success or failure of combat operations. Yet,
the body count only communicated a small part of the information commanders needed to assess their
operations. It was therefore misleading. Body counts can be a partial, effective indicator only when
adversaries and their identities can be verified. (Normally, this identification is determined through a
uniform or possession of an insurgent identification card.) Additionally, an accurate appreciation of what
insurgent casualty numbers might indicate regarding enemy strength or capability requires knowing the
exact number of insurgent armed fighters initially present. In addition, this indicator does not measure |
3-24 | 163 | Assessments
several important factors. For example, it does not measure which side the local population blames for
collateral damage, whether this fighting and resultant casualties damaged the insurgent infrastructure and
affected the insurgency strategy in that area, and where families of dead insurgents reside and how they
might react. Within the essential services lines of effort, the number of schools built or renovated does not
equate to the effective operation of an educational system, nor is it as important as the number of children
in school. Moreover, counterinsurgents should question whether the number of children taught is an
important measure at all.
12-29. Planners start with broad measures of social and economic health or weakness when assessing
environmental conditions. Examples of possible counterinsurgency indicators include—
* Acts of violence (numbers of attacks and friendly or host-nation casualties).
* Dislocated civilians. The number, population, and demographics of dislocated camps or the lack
of lack of camps are indicators of overall security and stability. A drop in the number of people
in camps often indicates a return to normalcy. The numbers of people and families exiled from
or fleeing their homes and property and people returning to them are measurable and revealing.
Human movement and religious attendance. Religious activity can be used as a measure of
religious freedom and of how much confidence the population has in their government’s
security. Possible indicators include the ability or lack of ability of religious pilgrims to move
about the country.
Development and active use of places of worship.
Number of religious structures (for example, temples, churches, mosques, religious schools)
closed by a government.
* Presence and activity of small- and medium-sized businesses. When danger or insecure
conditions exist, these businesses close. Patrols can report on the number of businesses that are
open and how many customers they have. Tax collections may indicate the overall amount of
sales activity.
* Level of agricultural activity:
Is a province, region, or nation self-sustaining, or must life-support type foodstuffs be
imported?
How many acres are under cultivation? Are the fields well maintained and watered?
Are agricultural goods getting to market? Has the annual need increased or decreased?
* Presence or absence of associations. The formation and presence of multiple political parties
indicates more involvement of the people in government. Meetings of independent professional
associations demonstrate the viability of the middle class and professions. Trade union activity
indicates worker involvement in the economy and politics.
* Government services available. Examples include—
Police stations operational and police officers present throughout the area.
Clinics and hospitals in full operation, and whether or not new facilities sponsored by the
private sector are open and operational.
Schools and universities open, functioning, with increasing attendance over time.
* Freedom of movement of people, goods, and communications. This is a classic measure to
determine if an insurgency has denied areas in the physical, electronic, or print domains.
* Tax revenue. If people are paying taxes, this can be an indicator of host-nation government
influence and subsequent civil stability.
* Industry exports.
* Employment or unemployment rate over time. An increasing employment rate over time is
generally a sign of stability.
* Amount of electricity produced. Increasing production of electricity is associated with provisions
for essential services. However, increased stability often results in greater demand so care must
be taken in the use of this indicator.
* Specific attacks on infrastructure. |
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ASSESSMENT CELL
12-30. An assessment cell normally shadows the planning effort, looking for areas of the plan that may
require assistance in measuring progress toward planned goals and the purpose of the operation. Assessing
progress is the responsibility of all staff sections and not the sole responsibility of any one staff section or
command post cell. Each staff section assesses the operation from its specific area of expertise. However,
staff sections must coordinate and integrate their individual assessments and associated recommendations
across the warfighting functions to produce comprehensive assessments for the commander, particularly in
counterinsurgency operations.
12-31. The function and purpose of an assessment cell or working group must include not only the
assessment of the plan and progress of operations, but also the effects of those operations on operational
environments. To understand the effect, it is important to assess not only what happened or how, but why a
particular result was achieved. This level of understanding aids in informing future decisions and plans.
12-32. In counterinsurgency operations, especially in widely decentralized operations, assessment cells
with analysts are organized down to and including the battalion level. This capability greatly assists in the
development of bottom-up assessment metrics that provide context and balance for other types of
assessment.
DIRECTED TELESCOPE TECHNIQUE
12-33. The directed telescope technique aids commanders with assessments by providing eyes on the
ground. Military commanders often find value in a separate and objective source of information regarding
actions and events “on the ground.”
12-34. When using the directed telescope technique, commanders send trusted subordinates and teams to
the battlefield to swiftly assess and report. This helps commanders get a sense for what is transpiring in the
field. This technique does not take the place of regular after action reviews or reporting, but instead it helps
commanders confirm or deny the visual image they have of how operations are going and the impact their
troops efforts’ are having.
12-35. The duties of a team assigned to a directed telescope mission include a variety of skills and
qualities to be successful. They include—
* Good judgment.
* Unfailing tact.
* Initiative.
* Sympathy, which implies a desire to help rather than to criticize.
* Acute perception, coupled with exactness and accuracy in determining facts.
* Ability to express themselves and deliver impartial reports in the clearest and most concise
terms.
* Good tactical knowledge.
12-36. Instead of spying or informing the commander on personnel or single events, the focus is to
provide advice to units based on their findings, report trends to the commander, and most importantly
provide recommendations that are feasible, acceptable, and suitable.
12-37. The directed telescope technique can work at various echelons and can be included when battalion
and brigade staff and personnel are supporting subordinate units in information analysis, operations,
planning, and training. |
3-24 | 165 | Chapter 13
Legal Considerations
13-1. Counterinsurgency operations are complex and raise challenging legal issues for Soldiers, Marines,
and their commanders. Counterinsurgency commanders, staffs, and planners should consult their servicing
legal advisors often in their initial planning and as they encounter changing conditions that may change the
application of relevant legal authorities. This chapter is not intended as a complete legal guide or a
substitute for legal advice, but rather serves to alert counterinsurgency leaders of some of the more
common legal issues that may affect United States (U.S.) counterinsurgency operations. This summary
cannot replace a consultation with the unit’s supporting legal advisor.
13-2. All U.S. military operations, including counterinsurgency operations, are governed by U.S. domestic
law, the international law binding on the U.S. (to include the law of war), and U.S. policy and regulations.
A number of areas of the law are critical for counterinsurgency operations, including the authority to
deploy forces and conduct counterinsurgency operations in the first instance, the laws governing the
conduct of operations, and the laws that fund counterinsurgency operations. The law of war, including the
treatment of civilians and detainees, and the application of rules of engagement, in particular, are critical
issues that have a significant impact on the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.
AUTHORITY TO ASSIST A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
13-3. In addition to the authorities to use military force, through a variety of statutes contained in Title 10,
United States Code (USC) and Title 22, USC, Congress has authorized and directed the Department of
Defense (DOD) and Department of State, respectively, to provide assistance to foreign governments
relevant to counterinsurgency. For example, U.S. forces may be called upon to provide foreign internal
defense or training to foreign security forces (such as military forces and police).
AUTHORITY FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
13-4. The President or Secretary of Defense may issue a deployment or execution order, which may
authorize U.S. forces to make limited contributions during operations that involve foreign internal defense.
If the Secretary of State requests and the Secretary of Defense approves, U.S. forces can participate in
foreign internal defense. The request and approval may go through the standing statutory authorities in
Title 22, USC. Among other foreign relations programs, Title 22 contains the Foreign Assistance Act and
the Arms Export Control Act. Programs under Title 22 authorize security assistance, developmental
assistance, and other forms of aid. The request and approval might also occur under various provisions of
Title 10, as well. Title 10 authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and
limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the U.S. ambassador for the host
nation. In such situations, U.S. military personnel ordinarily work as administrative and technical personnel
of the embassy. They are part of the U.S. diplomatic mission, pursuant to a status of forces agreement, or
pursuant to an exchange of notes. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training,
equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations.
GENERAL PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO POLICE
13-5. The Foreign Assistance Act specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police forces except within
carefully circumscribed exceptions. The lead role in providing police assistance within those exceptions
normally has been delegated to the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs. U.S. commanders are not able to train foreign law enforcement personnel unless
given specific legal authority. That said, Congress granted DOD the authority to train the police forces of
Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, Congress has provided limited authority for U.S. forces to train foreign
law enforcement personnel in counternarcotics and counter narco-terrorism operations |
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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
13-6. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). Often these directives are specific to an operation.
Absent operation-specific rules of engagement, U.S. forces apply the standing rules of engagement. When
working with a multinational force, commanders must thoroughly coordinate the rules of engagement.
MISSION-SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
13-7. The standing rules of engagement provide a mechanism for combatant commanders to develop
mission-specific rules of engagement by implementing supplemental measures within their discretion, or by
submitting a request for supplemental measures to the Secretary of Defense for approval. These
mission-specific rules of engagement are then passed down the chain of command in the form of a rules of
engagement execute order, fragmentary order, or other formal operational tasking. The combatant
commander and subordinate commanders must follow these mission-specific rules of engagement.
Combatant commanders may augment the rules of engagement as necessary by implementing supplemental
measures within their authority to approve. Both combatant commanders and subordinate commanders are
required to notify the Secretary of Defense of any restrictions placed on the Secretary of Defense-approved
mission-specific rules of engagement. Commanders at all levels are required to evaluate the rules of
engagement and request changes if they determine the rules of engagement are inadequate for the mission.
13-8. Taken as a whole, the rules of engagement regulate the conduct of U.S. forces for the application of
force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of self-defense. For instance, for mission
accomplishment, U.S. forces may be authorized to engage enemy forces declared hostile anywhere in the
area of operations at anytime without the need to observe a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. With
respect to self-defense, unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit
self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. U.S. forces may exercise individual
self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent; however, unit commanders may
limit individual self-defense by members of their unit. The rules of engagement in counterinsurgency
operations change from time to time. To meet the ever-changing operational environment, supplemental
measures and the level of force commanders employ from day to day may change often. Commanders must
regularly review the rules of engagement for their effectiveness in a complex counterinsurgency
environment. Counterinsurgency leaders should frequently train their Soldiers and Marines in the
application of the rules of engagement to the situations they may encounter in the area of operations so
their actions become instinctive, effective, and legally sound.
MULTINATIONAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
13-9. U.S. forces assigned to the operational or tactical control of a multinational force follow the rules of
engagement of the multinational force for mission accomplishment, if authorized by the Secretary of
Defense. U.S. forces retain the right of self-defense. Apparent inconsistencies between the right of
self-defense contained in U.S. rules of engagement and the rules of engagement of the multinational force
will be submitted through the U.S. chain of command for resolution. While final resolution is pending, U.S.
forces will continue to operate under the U.S. rules of engagement. When U.S. forces, under U.S.
operational or tactical control, operate with a multinational force, reasonable efforts are made to develop
combined or common rules of engagement. If common rules of engagement cannot be developed, U.S.
forces operate under U.S. rules of engagement. The multinational forces will be informed prior to U.S.
participation in the operation that U.S. forces intend to operate under U.S. rules of engagement. U.S. forces
remain bound by international agreements to which the U.S. is a party even though other multinational
force members may not be bound by them. The U.S. does not interpret any international agreements, such
as status-of-forces agreements, to limit U.S. forces’ right of self-defense.
LAW OF WAR
13-10. Counterinsurgency operations may occur in both an international armed conflict (state versus state)
and a non-international armed conflict (state versus armed nonstate actor). Situations can occur, such as |
3-24 | 167 | Legal Considerations
during occupation, where armed forces are engaged in combat with armed nonstate actors, or other persons
who are not part of a state’s armed forces. Any hostilities between state and non-state actors may rise to the
level of a non-international armed conflict. A non-international armed conflict may exist in the same area
of operations as an ongoing international armed conflict. An armed conflict exists whenever there is a
resort to armed force between states (in an international armed conflict) or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state (in a
non-international armed conflict). Regardless of the context, U.S. forces obey the law of war. The U.S. is
bound by the law of war treaties to which it is a party, as well as binding norms of customary international
law.
13-11. The law of war is the branch of international law applicable to the conduct of armed conflict and
concerns the rights and relationships among the participants and victims of armed conflicts. It is often
called the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law. The law of war generally regulates the
use of force to the amount necessary to achieve the aim of the conflict and spares those who do not or no
longer directly participate in hostilities. The purposes of adhering to the law of war include—
* Ensuring good order and discipline.
* Fighting in a disciplined manner consistent with U.S. national values.
* Maintaining domestic, international, and local support.
* Protecting combatants, noncombatants, and civilians from unnecessary suffering.
* Safeguarding persons who fall into the hands of an enemy.
* Facilitating the restoration of peace.
13-12. The primary sources of the law of war include the various Hague Conventions, the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, the 1980 UN Conventional Weapons Convention and its five protocols, and
customary international law. Many nations that have been recent coalition partners with the U.S. are also
parties to two additional 1977 protocols to the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I and Additional
Protocol II. However, the U.S. is not a party to these two protocols. Without recognizing the authority of
these two protocols, the U.S. recognizes that many of their provisions, some of which are discussed in this
manual, are either an accurate statement of the law or consistent with U.S. practice.
13-13. The law of war is based on the following fundamental principles:
* First, military necessity, that is, that a belligerent is justified in applying those measures not
forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of
the enemy as soon as possible.
* Second, humanity, which requires military forces to avoid inflicting gratuitous violence on the
enemy.
* Third, discrimination, which posits that military attacks should be directed at combatants and
other military targets, not civilians or civilian property.
* Fourth, proportionality, expressed in the concept that the expected incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects must not be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
MILITARY NECESSITY
13-14. The principle of military necessity is expressed in Article 23(g), of Hague IV Annex., which
forbids a belligerent to destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. While no law of war treaty defines military necessity, its
role is recognized in many treaties to which the U.S. is a state party. Moreover, the U.S. has defined
military necessity in its law of war manuals. Military necessity is that principle which justifies those
measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission
of the enemy as soon as possible. (See FM 27-10 for more information on military necessity.)
13-15. Military necessity does not authorize all military action and destruction. Under no circumstances
may military necessity authorize actions specifically prohibited by the law of war, such as the murder of
prisoners of war, ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees, the taking of hostages, or the execution of a
reprisal against a person or object specifically protected from reprisal. Civilian objects are generally |
3-24 | 168 | Chapter 13
protected from intentional attack or destruction. However, civilian objects may lose their protections if they
are being used for military purposes, or there is a military necessity for their destruction or seizure. Civilian
objects may, in such circumstances, become military objectives, and if so, the law of war permits their
destruction. In treaties such as Hague IV and its annex and the Geneva Conventions, where an express
prohibition has been stated, neither military necessity nor any other rationale of necessity may override that
prohibition. In short, the principle of military necessity authorizes that use of force that is required to
accomplish the mission, but it does not authorize acts otherwise prohibited by the law of war. This principle
must be applied in conjunction with other law of war principles as well as other, more specific legal
constraints set forth in law of war treaties to which the U.S. is a party.
HUMANITY, UNNECESSARY SUFFERING, OR SUPERFLUOUS INJURY
13-16. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited, as Hague IV
Annex, Article 22, states. Article 23(e) then captures the essence of the Law of War principle of humanity
as it prohibits the employment of arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.
The principle of humanity is also called the principle of unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. The
terms unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury are regarded as synonymous. Although neither of the
terms is defined, they are understood to refer to injury to persons, rather than damage to objects. The
prohibition of unnecessary suffering constitutes acknowledgement that the suffering of combatants is
lawful and expected, and may include severe injury or loss of life. As a general proposition, the suffering
inflicted by weapons or munitions would be deemed unnecessary only if—
* Its use was calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.
* The inevitable result of the normal use causes an injury the nature of which is considered by
governments as manifestly disproportionate in relation to the military advantage anticipated
from employment of the weapons or munitions.
13-17. Weapons’ or munitions’ effects must be weighed in light of comparable lawful weapons and
munitions in use on the modern battlefield. A weapon cannot be declared unlawful merely because it may
cause severe suffering or injury. The appropriate determination is whether a weapon’s or munitions’
employment for its normal or expected use would be prohibited under some or all circumstances. The
correct criterion is whether the employment of a weapon for its normal or expected use inevitably would
cause injury or suffering manifestly disproportionate to its military effectiveness. A state is not required to
foresee or anticipate all possible uses or misuses of a weapon or munitions, since almost any weapon or
munition can be misused in ways that might be prohibited.
13-18. Under the law of war, combatants may kill or wound enemy combatants and civilians taking a
direct part in hostilities; such acts are legitimate if accomplished with lawful means and methods. For
example, the prohibition of unnecessary suffering does not limit the bringing of overwhelming firepower
on an opposing military force in order to subdue or destroy it. What the law of war does prohibit is the
design, modification, or employment of a weapon or munitions for the purpose of increasing or causing
suffering beyond that required by military necessity.
DISCRIMINATION
13-19. The principle of discrimination, sometimes referred to as the principle of distinction, is the
international law obligation of parties to a conflict to distinguish between the civilian population (or
individual civilians not taking a direct part in the hostilities) and combatant forces when engaged in
military operations, directing the application of force solely against personnel belonging to the latter.
Similarly, military force may be directed only against military objects or objectives, and not against civilian
objects. A military objective is not limited to military bases, forces, or equipment, but includes other
objects that contribute to an opposing state’s ability to wage war. Additionally, a civilian object is immune
from intentional attack unless and until it loses its protected status through enemy abuse of that status. The
principle of discrimination also provides civilians immunity from direct attack for as long as they take no
part in hostile acts against military forces.
13-20. The principle of discrimination applies to military forces engaged in offensive or defensive
operations, and to governments providing protection for their civilian population and civilian objects. Each |
3-24 | 169 | Legal Considerations
government and its military forces, as well as armed nonstate parties to a conflict, are obligated to separate
their military or other fighting forces and military objects from the civilian population and civilian objects,
to take steps to protect the civilian population (or civilians within its control) through affirmative steps such
as evacuation from the vicinity of military operations or air raid precautions, and to minimize or avoid
actions that might otherwise place the civilian population at risk from lawful military operations by the
opposing force. The employment of voluntary or involuntary human shields to protect military objectives,
individual military units, or military personnel is a violation of the law of war principle of discrimination.
13-21. Physical damage or destruction of property is an inevitable and lawful aspect of combat. Military
equipment (other than military medical equipment and transportation) is subject to lawful attack and
destruction at all times. Civilian objects, including cultural property, are protected from seizure or
intentional attack unless there is military necessity for their seizure or destruction, that is, they become
military objectives. Destruction of civilian objects that is expressly prohibited, or that is not justified by
military necessity, or that is wanton or excessive, is unnecessary destruction for which a commander may
be culpable.
13-22. The civilian population and individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities are protected
from intentional attack. Where civilians are present on the battlefield or in proximity to legitimate military
objectives, or they are being used to shield legitimate targets from an attack that otherwise would be lawful,
they are at risk of injury incidental to the lawful conduct of military operations. A law of war violation
occurs when—
* The civilian population is attacked intentionally.
* Civilian casualties incidental to an otherwise lawful attack become excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage to be gained and are attributed to the wanton conduct of
an attacking force, for which the defending force or individual civilians or groups of civilians
(such as voluntary human shields) bear no responsibility.
* A defender or attacker employs civilians as voluntary or involuntary human shields. Each of
these acts constitutes a violation of the principle of discrimination.
13-23. The law of war does not expressly prohibit civilians from taking a direct part in hostilities. If they
do, however, they may be targeted for so long as they take a direct part. Civilians do not enjoy the
combatant’s privilege—that is, they do not have combatant immunity—and if captured, they may be
prosecuted for their belligerent acts under the domestic law of the captor. Civilians engaging in belligerent
acts not only forfeit their immunity from direct attack; they also make it more difficult for military
personnel to apply the principle of discrimination and, thereby, put all civilians at risk. There is no
definition of direct part in hostilities in treaty law or customary international law. At a minimum, it
encompasses actions that are belligerent per se, that is, by their very nature and purpose can be expected to
cause actual harm to an enemy. In general, the qualification of an act as direct participation in hostilities is
a fact-dependent analysis that must be made after analyzing all relevant available facts, in the
circumstances prevailing at the time.
13-24. Within an international armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict, the armed forces of a
state may engage in hostilities with armed nonstate actors. This is the classic counterinsurgency
environment. While most international armed conflict involves warfare between the armed forces of two or
more states, situations can occur, such as during occupation, where such armed forces and other armed
security forces of the state (including police forces) are engaged in combat with armed nonstate actors, or
other persons who are not part of a state armed force. These groups can take a variety of forms, including
an organized resistance movement that belongs to a state party but fails to meet the requirements for
prisoner of war status under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Article
4A (2), or a terrorist organization such as al Qaeda that, without regard to compliance with any of the other
requirements of Article 4A(2) (such as being under responsible command, wears fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance, carries arms openly, and conducts operations in compliance with the law of
war), operates without any authorization or affiliation with a state and thereby falls outside of the Geneva
Convention’s protections. An individual who is formally or functionally part of an organized armed group
that is engaged in hostilities may be targeted at any time. In essence, membership in armed forces or armed
groups (such as the status of belonging to such a group) and direct participation in hostilities (such as a
conduct-based standard) are separate bases for targeting under the law of war. |
3-24 | 170 | Chapter 13
13-25. U.S. practice is that the designation of an armed nonstate group as hostile (as such targetable at all
times) and its members as direct participants in hostilities, should only be made by an official authorized to
do so. Without such a designation, the determination of whether a civilian may be targeted depends on
whether that civilian is committing specific acts that amount to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile
intent, in accordance with the standing rules of engagement. In addition, individual conflicts may involve
specific rules of engagement that incorporate direct participation in hostilities analysis.
PROPORTIONALITY
13-26. Proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to
attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be
gained. Proportionality is process-oriented rather than result-oriented. Decisionmakers are expected to take
all feasible precautions in planning military operations, but they remain dependent on the (often imperfect
and incomplete) information available at the time to weigh the risk these operations may pose to the
civilian population. In this context, proportionality may be viewed as a fulcrum upon which military forces
and commanders must weigh the legitimate destructive effect of an attack (the law of war principle of
military necessity) against the undesirable incidental effects of an attack (such as the risk of death or injury
to civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities). Proportionality may be applied by decisionmakers at the
national, strategic, operational, or tactical level.
13-27. Proportionality does not prohibit destruction for which there is military necessity, or limit the
degree of engagement of enemy military forces in the absence of civilians or civilian objects. In particular,
it does not prohibit bringing overwhelming firepower to bear on an opposing military force to subdue or
destroy it. Nor does it prohibit injury to civilians that is incidental to lawful military operations. As used in
this context, proportionality constitutes an acknowledgment of the unfortunate inevitability—but
lawfulness—of incidental injury to civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities, or of the incidental
damage or destruction of civilian objects, despite precautions, in the execution of legitimate military
operations, particularly when these persons or objects have been intermingled with military forces or
objectives.
13-28. Proportionality is weighed by a commander in determining whether, in engaging in offensive or
defensive operations, that commander’s actions may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by those actions. The military advantage
anticipated is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from those actions considered as a whole, and
not only from isolated or particular parts thereof. Generally, military advantage is not restricted to tactical
gains, but is linked to the full context of a war strategy.
HONOR
13-29. Honor has long been a basis of warrior ethos and of the law of war. Honor demands a certain
mutual respect and trust between opposing forces. It denounces and forbids resort to dishonorable means,
expedients, or conduct that would constitute a breach of trust. An example of this form of honor is the use
of a white flag, which in land warfare represents a flag of truce. Its display is predicated upon good faith.
Its misuse is prohibited and constitutes a war crime. Another example of how honor applies comes from
law of war requirements regarding the treatment of persons hors de combat—that is, military personnel
who are no longer able to fight due to sickness, injury, or wounds, or because they are shipwrecked. The
principle of honor (and other humanitarian considerations) requires that an individual who is hors de
combat be treated and protected in the same manner as one would wish to be treated and protected by the
enemy if the roles were reversed. However, this principle is not dependent upon reciprocity.
THE SOLDIER’S AND MARINE’S BASIC RULES
13-30. It is DOD policy that members of DOD components comply with the law of war during all armed
conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized (such as international armed conflict or
non-international armed conflict), and in all other military operations. The law of war principles discussed
in paragraphs 13-13 through 13-29 can be safely applied by Soldiers and Marines by adhering to the
following ten basic rules: |
3-24 | 171 | Legal Considerations
* Soldiers and Marines fight only enemy combatants.
* Soldiers and Marines do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them over
to their superiors.
* Soldiers and Marines do not kill or torture enemy prisoners of war or detainees.
* Soldiers and Marines collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
* Soldiers and Marines do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.
* Soldiers and Marines destroy no more than the mission requires.
* Soldiers and Marines treat all civilians humanely.
* Soldiers and Marines do not steal. They respect private property and possessions.
* Soldiers and Marines do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.
* Soldiers and Marines report all violations of the law of war to their superior.
13-31. When working with host-nation or local friendly forces in a counterinsurgency, it is critical to both
teach and enforce these rules among allies and friendly forces. Following the law of war is a critical
component of counterinsurgency operations that directly supports the accomplishment of the strategic
mission to defeat the insurgency and establish local rule by gaining the trust of the local civilian population,
or at a minimum, enabling a local population to cease active support of an insurgency. Violations of the law
of war have a direct and significant negative impact on the ability to conduct successful counterinsurgency
operations.
13-32. The law of war includes rules governing situations in which the military forces of one state occupy
the territory of another. Occupation is not a transfer of sovereignty. It does, however, grant the occupying
power the authority and responsibility to restore and maintain public order and safety. The occupying
power must enforce, as much as possible, the laws in force in the host nation. One of the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949—the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War—becomes a prominent source of law during occupation, as well as the Hague Convention IV
Regulations of 1907.
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
13-33. The full body of the law of war only applies during international armed conflict. It does not apply
during a non-international armed conflict. This does not mean no rules apply during a non-international
armed conflict. For instance, the law of war principle of distinction still applies. It requires force to be
directed at combatants and not innocent civilians, and a proportionality analysis is required when targeting
combatants and military objectives if civilians or civilian objects may be impacted. Counterinsurgency
operations are almost certain to be a feature of non-international armed conflict, the most common form of
armed conflict today. During counterinsurgency operations, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
applies. Commanders must be aware of Common Article 3, and the basic protections that must be afforded
to insurgents or others captured by U.S. forces, as well as the status of insurgents under the laws of the host
nation.
GENEVA CONVENTION, COMMON ARTICLE 3
13-34. Although insurgencies can occur within the context of an international armed conflict, they are
classically conflicts between states and non-state actors that are considered to be non-international armed
conflicts.
13-35. It bears emphasis, however, that one article contained in all four of the Geneva Conventions—
Common Article 3—is specifically intended to apply to non-international armed conflicts. Common Article
3 affords significantly fewer protections to combatants fighting in a non-international armed conflict than
does the full body of the law of war in an applicable international armed conflict. However, it does set a
simple baseline of humane protection, along with fundamental rules that reflect the principles captured in
the broader law of war.
13-36. Common Article 3 requires that in the case of armed conflict not of an international character (a
non-international armed conflict) occurring in the territory of one of the high contracting parties to the |
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