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7-100.1 | 337 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
air parity, 8-67 air defense ambush. See air naval infantry, 13-86, 13-93–
defense. 13-97, 13-101–13-103,
local, 3-75, 8-72
13-105, 13-107–13-108
ambushing force(s), 2-150,
regional, 8-72
4-53, 4-117 naval SPF support, 13-86
airspace control net, 2-220, 9-38
reconnaissance, 6-11–6-12 naval transport, 13-86,
airspace deconfliction, 8-20–8-21.
13-94–13-96
sophisticated ambush. See
See also airspace management.
main entry. operational missions, 13-88–
airspace dominance, 8-62–8-67.
13-89, 13-104
amphibious landing, p. 13-1,
See also air parity; air
¶13-86–13-109 raids, 13-86, 13-92, 13-97–
superiority; air supremacy; local
13-98, 13-109
air superiority. airborne support, 13-95,
13-99–13-100, 13-108 reconnaissance, 13-92, 13-109
airspace management, 7-4, 8-56,
9-36–9-46 air defense support, 13-95 sabotage, 13-92
air defense control measures, air support, 13-88, 13-95, SPF conducting, 13-86,
9-45 13-98 13-88, 13-92, 13-95–
13-96, 13-108
staff responsibility, 9-37–9-38 ambush, 13-109
SPF support, 13-54, 13-64,
zones of responsibility, 9-39– amphibious landing force,
13-95
9-44 13-90–13-91, 13-95–13-96,
13-104 SSM support, 13-88
airspace operations subsection,
artillery support, 13-98 tactical missions, 13-90–13-91
ISC staff, 12-38
assault force, 13-101–13-102, amphibious operations. See
OSC staff, 2-54, 2-95, 2-99,
13-104–13-105 amphibious landing.
8-20–8-23, 8-26–8-27, 8-31
coastal defense, 13-89, 13-97 annihilation (target damage
air superiority, 6-26, 6-28, 8-43,
criteria), 7-9–7-10
8-65, 8-71–8-72, 9-8, 9-42– command and control, 13-93–
9-43, 9-84, 13-7, 13-14 13-96 antiaircraft guns. See air defense.
local, 8-57, 8-66, 8-71, 13-20, detachment, 13-109 antiarmor ambush, 3-77, 3-86, 3-116
13-98 envelopment, 13-107 antihelicopter mines. See mines.
regional, p. 8-1, ¶8-68–8-72 exploitation force, 13-101– antilanding defense, 4-62, 9-160–
air support, 2-54. See also 13-102, 13-104–13-105 9-161, 10-38
aviation. fixing force, 13-104 antilanding reserve, 4-53, 4-58, 4-64,
air supremacy, 8-64, 9-28. forcible entry, 13-105, 13-107 12-98, 13-13, 13-77, 13-83
air surveillance. See air defense. ground forces, 13-86, 13-88, antiradiation missiles, 7-42
air-to-surface missiles, 7-42 13-95–13-97, 13-101– antitank. See also antiarmor.
alliances. See coalitions. 13-103, 13-105 antitank capability, 1-52
allied forces. See coalitions; heliborne support, 13-98–13-99 antitank guided missiles, 9-61,
multinational forces and in adaptive operations, 9-93, 9-165
operations. 13-108–13-109 antitank reserve, 4-63, 10-17
all means available/necessary, in regional operations, area coverage. See air defense.
1-29, 1-32, 1-68, 1-94, 4-18, 13-104–13-106
area defense, 4-88, 4-112–4-131,
5-89, 11-97, 12-1 in support of airborne landing, 9-157
alternate command post, 2-194, 13-89
within maneuver defense, 4-91
2-216 in support of SPF, 13-88
area(s) of responsibility, 1-26,
ambiguity, 2-154 in transition operations, 13-107 2-68–2-80
ambush, 1-76, 2-146, 3-6, 4-25, landing force commander, defensive operations, 4-32, 4-34
4-105, 4-120, 4-123, 4-125, 9-8, 13-96
9-56, 9-62, 9-64, 9-194, 13-13, linear AOR, 2-68
linkup with ground maneuver
13-50, 13-61, 13-77, 13-79– nonlinear AOR, 2-68
force, 13-106, 13-109
13-80, 13-82, 13-85, 13-109
offensive operations, 3-28–3-30
naval fire support, 13-88, 13-98
area support. See logistics. |
7-100.1 | 338 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Armed Forces, 2-16. See also chemical munitions, 7-45, attack; integrated attack;
service component(s). For 11-8, 11-26 limited-objective attack.
individual services, see Air counterreconnaissance, 8-48 attack helicopters, 8-9, 8-33–8-34
Force; Army; Internal Security
in disruption force, 4-53, 4-103 as assault force, 8-51
Forces; Navy; Special-Purpose
Forces; Strategic Forces. in exploitation force, 3-87, 3-117 as counterattack force, 8-51
armies (operational-level in IFC, 2-47, 2-52–2-53, 7-16 as deception force, 8-51
command), 2-23, 2-37, 11-71 nuclear munitions, 7-46, 11-30 as disruption force, 8-51
armor(ed) forces, 3-6, 3-79, 3-88, precision munitions, 7-42 as exploitation force, 3-79,
3-109, 3-118, 6-43, 11-47 3-109, 3-118, 8-51
preparation of DZ/LZ, 13-17
Army (ground forces), as fixing force, 8-51
reconnaissance fire(s), 7-61
airborne forces, 2-26, 13-5 as reserve, 8-51, 8-61
remote minelaying, 10-40,
air defense, 9-79, 9-84, 10-42–10-43 (enemy) as targets, 9-74–
amphibious landing, 13-86, smoke delivery, 11-74, 11-77, 9-75, 9-94, 9-110, 9-122,
13-88, 13-95–13-97, 11-79, 11-90 9-196, 13-81
13-101–13-103, 13-105 escort transport helicopters,
support of airborne or
army aviation, p. 8-1, ¶8-1, helborne landing, 13-17– 13-18, 13-22
8-9–8-12 13-18, 13-34 in theater IFC, 8-10–8-11
Army service component support of amphibious attack to destroy, 3-18
headquarters, 2-26 landing, 13-98 attack to expel, 3-20
Army SPF. See Special- support of IW, 5-27, 5-35–5-36 attack to seize, 3-19, 3-40
Purpose Forces.
suppression of enemy air attack zone, 2-69, 2-79
army aviation, p. 8-1, ¶8-1, 8-9– defense, 8-58
defensive operations, 4-34,
8-12. See also aviation;
target acquisition, 2-52, 6-29, 4-42
helicopters.
6-38, 7-1, 7-26, 7-47
offensive operations, 3-29,
army aviation CP, 8-14
assassination, 13-50, 13-54, 3-43, 3-77
army aviation tactical groups, 13-58–13-59
automated fire control system,
8-11
assault force, 3-46, 3-53, 3-78, 2-47, 2-53, 2-188, 7-16
combat search and rescue, 8-53 3-87, 3-108, 3-117, 4-59, 8-51,
automation, 2-8, 2-159, 2-174,
direct air support, 8-10 9-147, 11-40, 13-3, 13-77,
6-13, 12-44
13-81, 13-83, 13-101–13-102,
heliborne landings, 8-10, 13-21
13-104–13-105 auxiliary command post, 2-195,
in IFC, 2-54, 7-16 2-216, 4-50
assembly area,
in OSC, 8-9, 8-12, 8-16 aviation, 2-47, 2-54, 7-1–7-2,
engineer preparation, 10-12,
in tactical groups, 8-12 10-15–10-16, 10-32–10-33 pp. 8-1–8-14. See also Air
Force; army aviation.
organization, 8-1, 8-9–8-12 for airborne landing, 13-27
aerial minelaying, 10-40,
task organization, 8-11–8-12, for heliborne landing, 13-30, 10-42, 10-46
8-16 13-33
aerial reconnaissance. See
support of defense, 8-51 for reserve, 9-158 main entry.
support of offense, 8-51 smoke camouflage, 11-82 aerial resupply, 12-91, 13-9,
theater-level, 8-8–8-11 assigned forces. See constituent 13-35.
army groups, 2-23, 2-37, 11-71 forces. air defense role, 9-2. See
artillery, 7-2, 7-38. See also fire asymmetric. See adaptive. counterair.
support. attached forces. See constituent air support requests, 8-24–
air defense role, 9-2, 9-56, forces. 8-25, 8-28–8-31
9-63, 9-74, 9-76, 9-93– attack, 3-69–3-88. See also attack allocation (sorties), 8-18–
9-94, 9-185, 9-196 to destroy; attack to expel; 8-19, 8-26–8-27, 8-49
biological munitions, 11-55 attack to seize; dispersed all-weather capability, 8-35–
8-36 |
7-100.1 | 339 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
aviation (continued) suppression of enemy air defensive operations, 4-34,
defense, 8-21 4-39–4-40, 4-56–4-57, 4-83,
aviation support plan, 8-25–
8-26 surge effort, 8-44 4-91, 4-106, 4-109, 4-129
civil aviation, 13-21 survivability, 8-44, 8-74–8-75 logistics, 12-50, 12-89, 12-96
combat service support, targeting, 8-25 main CP, 2-186
8-52–8-53 aviation tactical groups, 8-4 multiple battle zones, 3-41, 4-39
combat support, 8-52–8-53 axis, 2-74 noncontiguous, 2-77
command and control, 8-13– in defensive operations, 4-42 offensive operations, 3-29,
8-32 3-37–3-42, 9-145–9-147,
offensive operations, 3-28–
12-88
coordination with ground 3-29, 3-45
forces, 8-56 biological, 11-49–11-58. See also
NBC.
corridors, 8-26, 8-57, 9-45,
B
13-22, 13-35 agents, 11-51–11-52
ballistic missiles. See long-range
counterair, 8-37, 8-43–8-44, delivery, 11-53–11-55
missiles; surface-to-surface
9-2, 9-56, 9-73, 9-81, 9-189 munitions, 11-3, 11-54
missiles.
counterreconnaissance, 8-48 plausible deniability, 11-58
barriers, 4-126, 10-55–10-56,
decoy air raids, 8-60 12-93. See obstacles. release, 11-57–11-58
direct air support, 8-10, 8-25, basing area. See air defense. targets, 11-56
8-35–8-36, 8-49
battle damage assessment, 6-29, weapons, p. 12-1, ¶11-51–
ground attack. See main 10-28 11-52
entry.
battle drills, 3-26 bomb(s), air-delivered, 7-42,
immediate missions, 8-31 11-36, 11-74, 11-77
battlefield geometry, 2-63–2-67.
in adaptive operations, 8-73– See also linear; nonlinear. bombers (aircraft), 8-2–8-4, 8-6,
8-77 8-36, 10-46
battlefield organization. See
in IFC, 2-47, 2-54, 8-7–8-8 organization of battlefield booby traps, 10-75
in regional operations, 7-73, (command and control; offense; Border Guard Forces, 2-105
8-43, 8-68–8-70 defense).
branches and sequels,
interdiction, 8-50 battlefield surveillance radar(s),
to military strategic campaign
in transition operations, 8-68– 6-38 plan, 1-50
8-70 battle line, 2-71, 3-38
to national security strategy,
NBC delivery, 11-3, 11-8, 11- battle plan, 2-148 (Figure 2-16) 1-8, 1-12
26, 11-30, 11-55
battle position(s), 2-74, 4-44–4-47, to national strategic campaign
night capability, 8-33–8-36 4-104, 4-106, 4-108–4-109, plan, 1-8, 1-12
on-call missions, 8-30 4-114, 4-122–4-123, 4-129–4-131, to operation plan, 2-5, 2-98,
10-14–10-14, 10-16, 10-30,
precision munitions, 7-42 2-133–2-134
10-38, 10-55, 10-69, 13-28
preplanned missions, 8-29, 8-43 bridge. See engineer.
complex battle position(s),
readiness categories, 8-32 4-28, 4-46–4-47, 4-112– brigade(s), 2-23, 2-42–2-43, 7-28,
reconnaissance fire(s), 7-61 4-113, 4-129–4-130, 10-34 9-132, 10-6. See also brigade
tactical group(s).
reserve, 8-26 simple battle position(s), 4-45
brigade tactical group(s), 2-41,
smoke delivery, 11-74, 11-77, battle zone, 2-69–2-71, 2-76–2-77
7-28, 7-63, 8-9, 8-12, 9-32,
11-79 air defense of, 9-65, 9-70, 9-132, 9-157, 10-6, 13-74
support of airborne or 9-134, 9-145–9-147,
bunkers, 2-181, 12-12–12-13
helborne landing, 13-17– 9-156–9-158
13-18 close combat, 3-40
support of amphibious landing, engineer support, 10-56
13-88, 13-95, 13-98
FG or OSC, 2-77
support of IW, 5-27, 5-35–5-36 |
7-100.1 | 340 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
chemical, 11-7–11-28. See also chemical reconnaissance
C NBC. units, 6-39, 6-43, 11-61–
11-63, 11-65, 13-32,
C3D (camouflage, concealment, chemical agents. See main
13-34. See also NBC
entry.
cover, and deception). See also
reconnaissance.
the separate parts. 2-78, 2-233, chemical defense. See main
decontamination, 11-1, 11-7,
3-42, 4-25, 4-28, 4-41, 4-47, entry.
11-59, 11-62–11-63, 11-65,
4-68, 4-111, 5-39, 5-42–5-43, chemical munitions. See main
12-84
6-14–6-15, 8-60, 9-12, 9-102– entry.
9-104, 9-144, 9-148, 9-157– chemical munitions,
chemical weapons, 11-20–
9-159, 9-162, 10-15, 10-18, artillery-delivered, 7-46, 9-59,
11-22, 11-95, 11-97. See
10-20, 10-31, 10-62, 10-69, 11-3
also chemical munitions.
10-75, 11-60, 11-81, 12-87
fixing force, 3-77, 3-86, 3-116
chemical weapons plan, 11-21
caches, 3-60, 4-28, 4-47, 4-73,
handling of, 11-62
9-51, 10-34, 10-63, 12-14, defensive chemical warfare,
12-28–12-29, 12-94, 12-99 11-7, 11-28 SSMs, 9-193, 11-3
camouflage, 2-127, 2-203, 5-43, delivery means, 11-8, 11-26 chief of administration,
7-74, 9-30, 9-58, 9-102–9-104, offensive chemical warfare, ISC staff, 12-40
9-156, 9-172, 10-20, 10-24, 11-7, 11-23–11-27 OSC staff, 2-108, 12-33,
10-30, 11-81–11-86, 11-89,
release, 11-20–11-22, 11-38 12-36, 12-70
11-94, 12-12–12-14, 13-21.
See also C3D. targets, 11-26–11-28 chief of airspace operations,
chemical agents, 11-9–11-19 ISC staff, 12-38
canalizing the enemy, 4-116,
4-121, p. 10-1, ¶10-16, 10-60, blister, 11-9 OSC staff, 2-99, 2-220,
10-68, 11-28 blood, 11-9 2-224, 8-20, 8-23–8-25,
8-56, 9-38, 9-46
cannon artillery. See artillery. choking, 11-9
chief of communications, OSC
casualties, household chemicals, 11-13,
staff, 2-104, 2-208
casualty evacuation/handling. 11-19, 11-97
chief of current operations, OSC
See medical support. incapacitants, 11-9
staff, 2-97, 10-4
casualty evacuation routes irritants, 11-9
chief of force protection, OSC
and means (enemy), as
lethal, 11-9 staff, 2-112, 2-222, 5-71, 10-4,
targets, 3-35, 3-114, 4-127
nerve, 11-9 11-6, 11-67–11-69
causing politically unacceptable
nonpersistent, 11-10, 11-12, chief of future operations, OSC
(enemy) casualties, 1-33,
11-24, 11-26 staff, 2-98
1-67–1-68, 1-100, 3-10–
3-11, 3-16, 3-40, 3-82, nonlethal, 11-9 chief of information warfare,
3-93, 4-92, 4-113–4-114, persistent, 9-63, 11-10–11-11, General Staff, 5-55, 5-67
6-49, 8-44, p. 11-1, 11-11– 11-25–11-28 OSC staff, 2-103, 2-225,
11-12, 11-28, 13-67
toxic industrial chemicals, 5-66, 5-67, 5-69–5-71,
caves, 10-69, 12-14. See also 11-13–11-18 5-73, 5-78, 10-4
underground facilities.
chemical defense, 11-59, 11-61– chief of infrastructure management,
cellular telephones, p. viii, ¶5-14, 11-62, 11-65, 11-67, 11-71, OSC staff, 2-116, 10-4, 12-65
5-21 11-77. See also NBC defense; chief of integrated fires, OSC staff,
centralized planning, 2-2, 2-4, NBC protection. 2-111, 5-71, 7-15
2-22, 2-207, 2-229, 7-80, chemical defense reserve, chief of littoral warfare, OSC staff,
12-27–12-29, 12-55. See also 4-65, 11-61 2-117, 13-95
command and control,
chemical defense units, in chief of logistics,
centralized control.
OSC. 2-61, 2-112, 6-39,
ISC staff, 12-40
chaff, 11-73 11-6, 12-37
OSC staff, 2-107, 12-33,
change the nature of conflict, chemical protection
12-35, 12-53, 12-55
1-45, 1-73–1-76, 2-62, 4-8, equipment, 11-7, 11-61
4-10, 10-70 Ministry of Defense, 12-3, 12-66 |
7-100.1 | 341 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
chief of population management, coalition(s), automation, 2-8, 2-159, 2-174
OSC staff, 2-115, 5-71 involving the State, p. vii, aviation, 8-13–8-32
chief of reconnaissance, ¶1-21, 1-23 C2 helicopters, 8-11, 8-52.
OSC staff, 2-102, 2-190, involving the United States, See also airborne CP.
2-219, 2-224, 6-25, 6-44, p. vii C2 nodes (enemy), as targets,
11-6, 11-67, 13-58 vulnerability of, p. vii, ¶5-77, 1-100, 1-115, 1-118, 3-2,
theater staff, 13-58 5-85, 6-22, 13-10 3-18, 3-35, 3-52, 3-71, 3-73–
chief of special-purpose coastal defense, 13-89, 13-97 3-74, 3-83, 3-88, 3-91, 3-114,
operations, OSC staff, 2-113 COE. See contemporary 4-127, 5-24–5-26, 5-52,
5-56–5-58, 5-60, 5-82, 5-86,
chief of staff, OSC, 2-84, operational environment.
5-89, 6-16, 6-33, 6-46, 6-50,
2-87–2-88, 2-143, 2-161– collateral damage, avoidance of, 7-12–7-13, 7-40, 7-57, 7-66,
2-162, 2-177, 2-186–2-187, 1-63, 8-75 7-77, 8-65, 9-5–9-6, 9-56,
2-219, 2-221–2-222, 11-67–
combat forces, 1-114, 2-130, 3-2 9-125, 11-4, 11-26–11-27,
11-69
11-39, 11-46, 11-56, 11-96,
combat order, 2-171
Chief of the General Staff, 1-24, 1-85, 13-11, 13-48, 13-51, 13-54–
2-16–2-18, 2-20, 2-148, 5-55 combat power. See preservation. 13-55, 13-81, 13-85, 13-92
chief of weapons of mass combat search and rescue, 8-53, centralized control. See
destruction, OSC staff, 2-114, 12-81, 13-50 control; centralized
11-5 combat service support, 2-60–2-61, planning.
civil affairs, 2-115 8-52–8-53, 12-37, 12-40, 12-42. command group. See main
See also logistics.
civilians on the battlefield, p. xv, entry.
¶4-10. combat support forces, 1-114, command posts. See main
2-60–2-61, 2-130, 3-2, 8-52–
as shields, p. viii, ¶1-63, 1-75, entry.
8-53, 12-37, 12-40, 12-42
7-81, 8-75 commandos, 13-73–13-74
combat system, 1-89, 1-109,
as source of information, 1-99, concept, 2-1–2-2
1-112–1-115, 1-120, 2-75,
3-59, 6-1, 9-185, 13-17
2-130, 2-133, 2-152, 3-2, 3-9, decentralized control. See
as source of logistics, 12-31 3-18, 3-23, 3-74, 3-98, p. 4-1, control; decentralized
as targets, 1-29, 1-73, 7-76, ¶4-33, 4-35, 4-39, 4-54, 4-67, planning.
11-14, 11-24, 11-56, 11-92– 4-70, 4-86, 4-89, 4-92–4-93, decision making. See main
11-93, 11-98, 13-52–13-54, 4-103, 4-112–4-114, 4-121, entry.
13-59, 13-73, 13-76–13-77, 4-127–4-128, 5-57, 7-2, 7-5–
engineer, 10-3–10-9
13-81 7-6, 7-8, 7-57, 7-62, 7-75–7-76,
p. 10-1, ¶10-16, 10-60, 10-68. fire support, 7-14–7-25
contractors. See main entry.
See also disaggregation; heliborne forces, 13-6
humanitarian relief organi-
system; systems warfare.
zations. See main entry. logistics, 12-32–12-43
combined arms operations, 1-37,
internally displaced persons, organization of battlefield.
p. 2-1, ¶2-9, 2-36, 2-160, 3-13,
pp. viii, xv See main entry.
3-72, 3-81, 4-18, 4-82–4-83,
media. See main entry. 9-2–9-3, 9-9, 9-23, 9-37, 9-141, organization of forces. See
main entry.
refugees, pp. viii, xv, ¶11-24, 10-60–10-61, 13-60, 13-93,
13-62 13-98–13-103 planning. See main entry.
support of IW, 5-35, 5-72 command, 2-1, 2-3, 2-191. See preparation, 2-161–2-172
sympathizers (of OPFOR), also command and control. principles, 2-3–2-6
9-52, 9-64, 9-123, 11-8, command and control, pp. 2-1–2-50. process, 2-119–2-178
11-52, 11-55, 13-17 See also command; control.
SPF, 13-40–13-47
transnational corporations, adaptability, 2-141–2-142
staff. See main entry.
pp. ix, xv airborne forces, 13-5–13-6
structures, 2-7–2-118
close combat, 3-40 air defense, 9-22–9-47
survivability. See main entry.
close support fire, 7-59, 7-63 amphibious landing, 13-93–
systems, 2-204–2-223
cluster bombs, 7-42 13-96 |
7-100.1 | 342 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
command and support relation- command observation post, 7-54 complex battle position(s). See
ships, 2-10–2-14, 3-104, 7-69. command post(s), 2-179–2-203. battle position(s).
See also affiliated; constituent; See also airborne CP; alternate CP; complex terrain, pp. viii–ix, ¶1-52,
dedicated; supporting. auxiliary CP; deception CP; forward 1-63, 1-69, 1-75, 1-77, 2-75,
commander’s reconnaissance, 7-31 CP; IFC CP; sustainment CP 2-146, 2-194, 3-6, 3-51, 3-74,
3-82, 3-84, 3-97, 3-112–3-113,
command group, communications group, 2-180
4-9–4-10, 4-26, 4-28, 4-40,
IFC, 2-50 control group, 2-180
4-45–4-47, 4-70, 4-87, 4-117–
ISC, 12-38 engineer preparation, 2-202, 4-118, 4-129, 4-72, 4-114,
OSC, 2-81–2-88 10-12–10-13, 10-30– 4-117, 9-51, 9-58, 9-171, 13-72
10-31, 10-35, 10-69
command net, 2-215, 11-66, 11-68 computer warfare, 5-21–5-22,
location(s) of, 2-166, 2-200– 5-28–5-30, 5-65. See also
commando(s), 13-37, 13-40,
2-201 information warfare.
13-72–13-85
movement, 2-197–2-199 concealment, 5-43, 5-61, 5-63,
administrative force structure,
security, 2-202–2-203 9-104, 10-20, 10-23–10-24,
13-73
10-34, 11-89, 12-12, 12-14,
support group, 2-180
allocated to DTG/BGT, 13-74 12-86, 13-21. See also C3D.
communications, 2-207–2-227
allocated to OSC, 13-74, 13-83
constituent forces, 2-11, 2-47,
cellular telephones, p. viii,
ambushes, 13-77, 13-79– 2-52, 2-61, 2-103, 2-135, 6-35,
¶2-104, 2-209, 5-14, 5-21,
13-80, 13-82, 13-85 7-16, 7-20, 7-22, 7-24–7-25,
7-80
as antilanding reserve, 13-77, 7-35, 7-59, 8-8, 8-19, 9-38,
13-83 commercial, 2-209, 2-211 9-151, 10-2–10-4, 10-6, 10-9,
communications group, in 10-27, 10-48, 12-32, 12-37,
as assault force, 13-77,
CP, 2-180, 2-211 12-42, 13-5, 13-11, 13-43, 13-74
13-81, 13-83
communications plan, 2-101, contact force, 4-98–4-100, 4-108
as disruption force, 13-79
2-104, 2-170, 2-208 contemporary operational
as exploitation force, 13-82
communications security, environment, pp. vi–xi. See
as fixing force, 13-80
2-207, 5-41 also operational environment.
as security force, 13-83
communications subsection, adaptability, pp. xi, xviii
as stay-behind force, 13-85 OSC staff, 2-100, 2-104–2-105 combat development, p. xi
command and control, 13-73– courier, ¶2-104. 2-213, 7-80 complexity of, pp. viii, xi, xiv
13-74
digital, ¶2-104, 2-209, 2-214 constantly changing nature
commando detachments, 13-73
encryption, 2-209 of, p. xi
commando missions, 13-76–
Internet, 2-209 critical variables, pp. vii–xi
13-85
Intranet, 2-209 learning and adapting, p. xviii
commando teams, 13-73,
local area network, 2-209 overall (strategic), p. xi
13-77, 13-85
microwave, 2-209 real-world, p. x
in defense, 13-83–13-85
nets, 2-214–2-225, 7-25 training environments,
in disruption zone, 13-76–
pp. xi, xiii
13-77, 13-79, 13-83 non-electronic, 2-212
contemporary opposing force,
infantry-type missions/tactics, radio, ¶2-104, 2-209, 2-214,
pp. xiii–xix. See also opposing
13-72, 13-75, 13-84 9-47
force.
infiltration/insertion, 13-72– satellite, p. viii, ¶2-104, 2-209,
adaptability, pp. xi, xviii-xix,
13-73, 13-77–13-78, 13-82 2-214, 5-14, 5-16
¶1-47
in offense, 13-78–13-82 survivability. See main entry.
applicability, p. v
raids, 13-77, 13-79, 13-81, wide area network, 2-209
baseline, pp. xvi–xviii
13-85 wire, ¶2-104, 2-209, 2-211,
combat developments,
reconnaissance, 13-76– 2-214, 7-80, 9-47
pp. xii–xiii
13-79, 13-83–13-85 wireless, 5-14, 5-16
task organization, 13-74 vulnerability, 2-1, 7-80 |
7-100.1 | 343 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
contemporary opposing force conventional patterns of criminal organizations, p. xv
(continued) operation, pp. x, xviii–xix, ¶1-6, affiliated with State, 1-95, 1-99,
1-14, 1-34, 1-38, 1-40, 1-42–
composite example of threat 1-100, 1-105–1-106, 2-14,
1-44, 1-47, 1-61, 1-74, 1-87,
capabilities, pp. xi, xiii, xv, 4-53, 9-52, 9-64
p. 3-1, ¶3-5, 4-5–4-6, 5-19,
xviii critical variables of COE, pp. vii–xi
12-98, 13-61
doctrine evolving, p. xix cruise missiles,
convoys,
flexibility. See main entry. air defense against, 9-5, 9-83,
enemy, as targets, 11-56.
initiative. See main entry. 9-86, 9-101
See also lines of
learning and adapting, communication. air-launched, 7-42, 8-3
pp. xviii-xix OPFOR, 12-57, 12-59 NBC delivery, 7-44, 11-3
paramilitary, pp. xiii, xv, xvii, core states, p. xiv reconnaissance fire(s), 7-61
¶1-92, 1-93–1-106, 2-14
corner reflectors. See radar corner sea-launched, 7-23
thinking, p. xviii
reflectors. current operations subsection,
training tool, p. xvii corps, 2-23, 2-37, 11-71 2-95, 2-97
unpredictability, pp. xiii, xix corridors. See air defense; aviation. cyber attack. See information
contiguous AORs/force attack.
counterair missions. See aviation.
deployment/zones, 2-73
counterattack, 3-14–3-15, 3-103–
contingencies, 4-61, 4-111, 4-131, D
3-109, 4-17, 4-62, 4-71, 4-75,
7-47, 7-68, 9-35, 9-52–9-54,
4-92–4-93, 4-96, 4-111, 4-115, decentralized attack. See
9-158
4-121, 7-70, 9-8, 9-154, 9-157, dispersed attack.
contingency plans, 10-67, 11-48, 11-89
decentralized control. See control.
to military SCP, 1-25, 2-39, counterattack force, 3-9, 3-104,
decentralized defense, 4-16, 4-49,
9-50–9-52 3-106, 4-49, 4-61, 4-71, 8-51,
4-85–4-87, 4-90
to national SCP, 1-8, 1-16– 10-18
decentralized execution, 2-2, 2-5,
1-18, 1-88–1-90 counterattack plan, 2-170
2-229, 3-66, 4-81. 4-117, 10-64,
to operation order, 2-98, 2-139, counterbattery fire, 7-67, 7-72 12-27–12-29, 12-55
2-169, 2-176, 7-74, 9-64
counterfire, 7-66 deception, 1-77, 2-228, 3-34, 3-74,
contractors, as targets, 7-77, 9-64,
counterintelligence, 2-115 3-83, 3-97, 3-112–3-113, 4-68,
9-194, 11-96, 13-52
4-113, 4-119, 4-121, 5-12–5-13,
countermobility support, 4-69–
control, 2-1, 2-3, 2-186, 7-15, 10-3. 5-22, 5-24, 5-27, 5-31–5-34, 5-43,
4-71, 4-87, p. 10-1, ¶10-4,
See also command and control. 5-60, 5-71, 5-76, 5-79, 5-81, 6-15,
10-7–10-8, 10-10, 10-36–
centralized control, 7-14, 7-61, 10-58, 10-60, 10-66, 10-68 7-78, 8-40–8-41, 9-30, 9-100,
7-80, 8-9, 8-17–8-19, 8-49, 9-102–9-104, 9-168, 10-20–
countermortar/counterbattery
8-76, 9-20, 9-27, 9-34, 9-39, 10-24, 10-74, 11-81, 11-87, 11-89,
radar(s), 6-38
9-79, 12-4. See also 13-11, 13-13–13-14, 13-17–
centralized planning. counteroffensive operations, 3-14 13-18, 13-89, 13-91. See also
counterpenetration, 4-62, 4-71 C3D; information warfare.
decentralized control, 7-14,
8-19, 9-35, 9-153 counterreconnaissance, 2-112, deception CP, 2-196
control access into region. See 3-31, 3-55, 3-97, 3-101, 3-105, deception force, 3-46, 3-56,
access-control operations. 3-107, 3-113–3-114, 4-25, 4-62, 4-66, 8-51, 13-3
4-53, 4-55, 4-58, 4-119, 5-39,
control group, in CP, 2-180 deception jamming, 5-25,
6-51, 8-48, 9-156
8-40
control tempo. See tempo.
counterreconnaissance plan, 8-48
deception nets, 2-225
conventional forces, 1-38, 4-18
counterterrorism, 2-112
deception plan, 2-103, 4-55,
conventional munitions, 2-55–2-56,
course-corrected munitions, 7-59, 5-69, 10-24, 10-74, 12-87
3-13, 5-35, 7-40, 11-25
7-64
deception position(s), 4-71,
conventional operations. See cover, 10-24, 11-89. See also C3D. 5-43, 9-77, 9-103–9-104,
conventional patterns of
9-173, 10-16, 10-21–10-22,
operation. creative means. See adaptive
10-69, 10-74
approaches. |
7-100.1 | 344 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
decision making, 2-129–2-142 integrated defense, 4-83– detachments, 2-221, 3-27, 6-43,
4-84, 4-90, 9-153 8-11, 13-73, 13-46–13-47,
influenced by systems
13-90, 13-109
warfare, 1-116 in transition operations, 1-45,
4-6–4-12, 4-25, 4-28, 4-83, diplomatic-political means, p. xvii,
decisive operations, 2-76
4-90, 4-103, 4-113, 4-118 ¶5-46. See also national power,
decontamination. See chemical
instruments of.
linear, 4-34
defense; NBC protection.
direct action. See Special-
maneuver defense. See main
decoy, 1-77, 5-25, 5-32, 5-43, 7-74,
Purpose Forces.
entry.
9-102–9-104, 9-187, 10-16, 10-20–
direct air support, 8-10, 8-25, 8-35–
10-22, 10-74, 11-87, 11-94, 12-12. nonlinear, 4-34
8-36, 8-49
See also deception. organization of battlefield,
directed energy weapons, 5-37
dedicated forces, 1-97, 2-12, 2-47, 4-24, 4-30, 4-32–4-47,
2-52, 2-61, 2-135, 6-35, 7-16, 4-67, 9-154 disaggregation (of enemy combat
7-20, 7-22, 7-24–7-25, 7-35, 7-59, organization of forces, 4-24, system), 1-89, 1-109, 1-112,
8-8, 8-19, 9-38, 10-3–10-4, 10-9, 4-30, 4-48–4-67 2-75, 2-133, 4-39, 4-54, 4-67,
10-48, 12-32, 12-37, 12-42, 13-5, 4-92, 4-114, 4-121, 7-75,
planned defense, 4-26
13-11, 13-43–13-44, 13-74 p. 10-1, ¶10-16, 10-60, 10-68
planning, 4-24–4-66
defense information infrastructure, disaster management, 2-23, 12-81
5-4, 5-6–5-7, 5-11 preparing for, 4-67-4-75 disinformation, 5-44, 5-60, 13-51
defensive information warfare, purpose, 4-19–4-23 dispersed attack, 3-80–3-88
2-112, 5-61–5-63 situational defense, 4-27–4-31,
dispersal/dispersion, 1-63, 1-69,
defensive lines, 4-95–4-99, 4-101– 4-111, 10-40 1-75–1-77, p. 2-1, ¶2-78, 2-150,
4-102, 4-108, 4-110, 10-56 strategic defense, 1-87 2-181, 2-194, 2-204, 3-14, 3-27,
defensive maneuver, 4-98–4-102 transition to defense, 3-63, 4-28 3-52, 3-80, 3-83. 4-16, 7-65, 7-74,
7-78, 8-44, 8-74, 9-25, 9-30, 9-58,
defensive operations, pp. 4-1–4-28 defensive position(s). See battle
9-102, 9-104–9-107, 9-112,
air defense in, 9-34, 9-152– position(s).
9-144, 9-148, 9-159, 9-193,
9-161 deliberate defense. See planned
10-64, 11-60, 11-94, 12-13–12-
antilanding defense, 4-53, 4-58, defense. 14, 12-52, 12-86, 12-92, 13-67,
4-64, 9-160–9-161, 10-38, deliberate offense. See planned 13-73, 13-75. See also
12-98, 13-13, 13-77, 13-88 offense. dispersed attack.
area defense. See main demographics. See sociological displaced persons. See internally
entry. demographics. displaced persons.
commandos in, 13-83–13-85 demolition, disproportionate effects, 2-66,
consolidating gains, 3-63 engineer task, 10-36, 10-61 2-133, 9-168
decentralized defense, 4-16, target damage criteria (fire disproportionate interests, 1-68
4-49, 4-85–4-87, 4-90 support), 7-9, 7-11 disruption force,
defense to deny, 4-23 demonstration (operation), 2-146, defensive operations, 4-36,
defense to destroy, 4-21 3-41, 3-53, 3-56 4-39–4-40, 4-50–4-55,
defense to preserve, 4-22 depot(s), 12-10–12-14, 12-47, 12-64. 4-98, 4-103–4-106, 4-119–
See also logistics; storage. 4-128, 4-130
engineer support. See main
entry. ammunition, 12-11 disruption force commander,
3-49, 4-51
executing of, 4-76–4-81 area distribution, 12-11
offensive operations, 3-34–
fire support, p. 7-1, ¶7-70 maintenance, 12-11
3-35, 3-46, 3-48, 3-50,
in adaptive operations, 1-52, medical, 12-11, 12-80 3-76, 3-85, 3-106, 3-115,
4-13–4-18, 4-25, 4-28, deputy commander, 9-146
4-76, 4-113
of OSC, 2-51, 2-86, 2-188 use of attack helicopters, 8-51
in regional operations, 4-2–4-5,
of theater, 7-17 use of commandos, 13-79
4-83
destruction (target damage use of SPF, 3-32, 4-37, 4-52–
criteria), 7-9 4-53, 9-144, 13-63 |
7-100.1 | 345 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
disruption zone, 2-69–2-71, 2-75, drop zone, 12-99, 13-6, 13-14, engineer reserve, 4-65, 10-9,
3-32, 3-36, 4-37 13-16–13-17, 13-19–13-20, 10-64
air defense, 3-34, 4-53, 9-49, 13-22, 13-26–13-29 fortifications. See main entry.
9-57, 9-65–9-66, 9-69– drug organizations, p. xv in adaptive operations, 10-59,
9-70, 9-74, 9-144–9-146, affiliated with State, 1-95 10-64–10-75
9-155–9-156
in IFC, 10-3
commandos, 13-76–13-77,
E in ISC, 10-3
13-79, 13-83
early-entry forces, enemy (U.S.), in OSC, 10-3
defensive operations, 4-34–
4-38, 4-52, 4-71, 4-91– p. x, ¶3-10 in regional operations, 10-59–
4-92, 4-103–4-105, 4-108, early warning. See air defense. 10-61
4-114, 4-119–4-120, economics, pp. viii, xvii. See also in transition operations, 10-59,
4-122, 4-124–4-125, national power, instruments of. 10-61–10-63
4-130, 9-155–9-156
electronic counter-countermeasures, missions, 10-10–10-24
division and DTG disruption 8-33, 9-120 mobility support. See main
zones, 3-32
electronic countermeasures, 5-25, entry.
engineer support, 10-56 8-33 movement support detach-
FG disruption zone, 3-32, 4-37 electronic warfare, 5-22, 5-24– ment. See main entry.
heliborne units, 13-13 5-27, 5-80, 5-86, 9-7. See also obstacle(s). See main entry.
jammers/jamming; signals
offensive operations, 3-29, obstacle-clearing detach-
reconnaissance.
3-31–3-36, 9-144–9-146 ment. See main entry.
antilanding reserve, 4-64
OSC disruption zone, 3-32, obstacle detachment. See
4-37 EW aircraft, 8-3, 8-6, 8-38– main entry.
8-40, 8-52, 13-23
theater disruption zone, 3-32 plan, 2-170
fixing force, 3-77, 3-86, 3-116
diversionary measures, SPF, preparation of CPs. See
2-58, 13-49, 13-51 lethal EW, 5-25 command post(s).
division(s), 2-23, 2-31, 2-41, 7-22, nonlethal EW, 5-25, 5-71 preparation of positions,
7-28, 9-132. See also division end state, 2-138 9-104, 10-12–10-13, 10-23,
tactical group(s). 10-31, 10-34–10-35, 10-55,
enemy,
as operational-level 10-63, 10-69
of the State, p. xii. See also
command, 2-31 reconnaissance, 6-40, 6-43,
United States; threats to
as tactical-level command, the State. 10-9–10-10, 10-12–10-13,
2-43–2-46 10-18, 10-25–10-30, 10-66–
of the United States, p. xii
10-67, 10-72, 13-32
division headquarters, 2-46
engineer support, pp. 10-1–10-15
road construction, 10-1–10-2,
IFC, 7-8
and antitank reserve, 4-63 10-9, 10-12–10-13, 12-65
division tactical group(s), 2-31,
bridging/bridge construction, shared responsibility with
2-41, 2-45–2-46, 7-22, 7-28,
10-1, 10-9, 10-64, 12-65, other branches, 10-2, 10-32,
8-9, 8-12, 9-32, 9-132, 9-157
12-91. See also water 10-35, 10-65, 10-69
as operational-level obstacle-crossing.
special-category engineers,
command, 2-31, 2-46
civilian engineers, 10-2, 10-65, 10-1
as tactical-level command, 10-69, 12-65, 12-67
support of air defense, 9-2,
2-43–2-46
combat engineers, 10-1–10-2, 9-77
commando units, 13-74 12-65
support of defense, 4-45,
DTG headquarters, 2-46 command and control, 10-3– 4-47, 4-69–4-71, 4-125,
IFC, 7-8, 7-35 10-9 10-14–10-19, 10-23–
SPF units, 2-59, 13-40, 13-44– countermobility support. See 10-24, 10-30, 10-34–
13-45 main entry. 10-35, 10-54–10-56
drones, 6-29, 8-11. See also demolition(s), 10-36, 10-61
unmanned aerial vehicles. |
7-100.1 | 346 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
engineer support (continued) fighter aircraft, 8-2–8-4, 8-6, 8-36, naval fire support, 7-23–7-25,
9-40–9-43, 9-73, 9-134, 13-22. 13-88
support of IW, 5-27, 10-8,
10-10, 10-12, 10-16, See also interceptors. planning, 7-26–7-46, 7-80,
10-18, 10-20–10-24, fighting force structure (wartime), 11-94
10-66, 10-70, 10-74 2-23, 2-27–2-28, 2-35, 9-79, principles of, 7-4
12-20–12-21
support of offense, 3-87, reconnaissance fire(s). See
3-117, 10-11–10-13, 10-22, fire support, pp. 7-1–7-17. See main entry.
10-28–10-29, 10-32–10-33, also artillery; aviation; long-
support of defense, p. 7-1,
10-51–10-53 range fires; surface-to-surface
¶7-70
missiles.
survivability measures. See
support of offense, p. 7-1,
main entry. chief of integrated fires, 2-111,
¶7-69
5-71, 7-15
task organization, 10-1, 10-5–
target acquisition, 2-52, 6-29,
10-9, 10-25, 10-48–10-49, close support fire, 7-59, 7-63
6-38, 7-1, 7-26, 7-47
10-64 command and control, 7-14–
targeting, 7-47–7-56
water obstacle crossing. See 7-25
main entry. counterbattery fire, 7-67, 7-72 firing line(s), 4-109
water purification and supply. counterfire, 7-66 fixing, 3-33–3-34, 3-37, 3-40,
See main entries. 3-51–3-52, 3-74, 3-83, 10-61
fire and decoy TTP, 7-78, 7-81
engineer units, enemy (U.S), as fixing force, 3-46, 3-48, 3-51–3-52,
targets, 2-75 fire requests, 7-22 3-77, 3-86, 3-107, 3-116, 4-59,
fire superiority, 7-29, 7-46, 8-51, 9-147, 11-40, 13-3, 13-80,
envelopment, p. 3-1, ¶3-74, 13-1,
11-42 13-104
13-11, 13-107
fire support coordination fixing force commander, 3-48
equipment. See technology.
center, 2-51, 7-21, 7-25 flagship systems. See key
evacuation,
fire support coordination systems.
of casualties, 12-77, 12-81 measures, 7-38 flexibility, pp. xvii–xviii, ¶2-2, 2-5,
of equipment, 2-107, 12-35, fire support plan, 2-170, 4-40, 2-22, 2-26, 2-41, 2-54, 2-62, 2-71,
12-91 4-75, 5-71, p. 7-1, ¶7-21, 2-141, 2-174–2-176, 2-207, 3-30,
supply and evacuation routes, 7-26, 7-28, 7-34, 7-38, 7-45, 4-18, 6-6, 6-17, 7-4, 7-14, 7-35,
12-65, 12-96 7-62, 8-49, 10-18, 10-55, 7-68, 9-26–9-27, 9-34–9-35,
10-68, 11-21, 11-38 9-136, 10-6, 11-2, 12-21, 12-27,
exploitation, 3-70
12-44, 12-55, 12-59, 12-89, 13-5,
fire support of airborne or
exploitation force, 3-46, 3-48, 3-54,
13-38, 13-47, 13-77
heliborne landing, 13-17–
3-79, 3-88, 3-109, 3-118, 4-59,
13-18 flight area. See air defense.
7-69, 8-51, 9-147, 11-40, 11-43,
11-45–11-47, 11-82, 13-3, 13-82, fire support to a strike, 7-58– fluid battlefield, 2-7, 2-83, 2-193,
13-101–13-102, 13-104–13-105 7-59 2-212, 3-24, 4-27, 6-7, 6-13, 9-18,
9-26, 9-35, 9-136, 10-40, 11-43,
external organizations, p. ix IFC. See integrated fires
12-52, 12-59, 12-89, 13-1
command main entry.
extraregional power. See United
foraging, 12-31
States. in adaptive operations, 7-72,
7-79–7-81 force commander, 3-48–3-49,
4-49, 4-51, 4-58
F in regional operations, 7-73–
7-74 force projection,
failed or failing state(s), p. xiv
integrated, p. 7-1. See also global, 1-78, 13-52–13-53,
feint, 2-146, 3-56, 13-89
integrated fires command. 13-66, 13-69–13-70
field groups, 2-30, 2-2-332-35
interdiction fire, 7-59, 7-74–7-65 out-of-theater operations
FG commander, 1-85, 2-148, (beyond the region), 1-56,
in transition operations, 7-75–
3-32 1-59, 1-106, 3-13, 5-30,
7-78
FG headquarters, 2-34–2-35, 11-55, 13-39, 13-66, 13-68
IW element, 7-3, 7-47
2-224
methods of fire, 7-57–7-67 |
7-100.1 | 347 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
force projection (continued) Chief of the General Staff, as security force, 13-13
regional, p. 13-1, ¶13-2, 13-8, 1-24, 1-85, 2-16–2-18, command and control, 13-6
13-39, 13-47, 13-52, 13-66, 2-20, 2-148, 5-55 envelopment, 13-1, 13-11
13-68–13-69 control of airborne forces,
heliborne landing. See main
vulnerability of U.S. force p. 13-1, ¶13-5, 13-8, 13-11 entry.
projection. See United control of SPF, p. 13-1, ¶13-5,
in adaptive operations, 13-3
States. 13-41, 13-43–13-45, 13-47–
force protection, 2-112, 2-170, 3-55, 13-48, 13-55, 13-60 in transition operations, 13-3
4-58, 4-70, 4-119, 5-39, 11-66. executive agent for NCA, 2-16 raids, 13-13
See also chief of force protection. functional directorates, 2-16– reconnaissance, 13-13
forces analysis, 2-152, 2-166, 13-20 2-18 sabotage, 13-13
force structure. See administrative Intelligence Directorate, support of amphibious
force structure; fighting force 2-18, 5-55, 6-23, 6-29, landing, 13-98–13-99
structure (wartime); task 13-41, 13-49, 13-55
tactical airborne missions, 13-12
organization. Operations Directorate, 1-22,
heliborne jamming, 8-4, 8-11,
forcible entry, 13-105, 13-107 1-25, 2-17–2-18, 2-148, 5-55
8-33, 8-39–8-40, 8-52. See also
fortifications, 1-63, 2-186, 4-47, Organization and Mobilization electronic warfare.
10-10, 10-15–10-16, 10-18, Directorate, 2-18, 12-8
heliborne landing, 8-52–8-53,
10-31–10-35, 10-63 global information infrastructure, 11-29, 13-1–13-36
forward arming and refueling points, 5-4, 5-7, 5-11
air defense for, 9-5
enemy, as targets, 4-127, 6-20, global positioning system, 5-14
air movement, 13-18, 13-21–
9-49, 9-57, 9-125 GPS jammers, 5-25, 5-89, 6-25, 13-23
OPFOR, 8-53 9-7, 9-83, 9-96, 9-101
assembly area, 13-30, 13-33
forward command post, 2-87, ground forces. See Army.
aviation commander, 13-6,
2-183, 2-189–2-191, 2-215, ground-attack aircraft/aviation, 2-54, 13-25
3-48, 4-50, 8-22, 9-46 4-40, 8-4, 8-58, 8-69, 10-46
combat search and rescue,
frontal attack, p. 3-1 ground reconnaissance. See 12-81
fuel-air explosives, p. 11-1 reconnaissance.
departure area, 13-22
functional forces, 3-46, 4-49 guerrillas, p. xv
embarking troops, 13-14–
defensive operations, 4-48–4-51 13-15, 13-17
functional force commander, H fire support, 13-17–13-18
3-48–3-49, 4-49, 4-51, 4-58
hackers/hacking, 5-10, 5-17, 5-28, heliborne landing force,
offensive operations, 3-46–3-49 5-48 2-221, 3-6, 12-98, 13-6,
future operations subsection, harassment (target damage 13-30–13-31
ISC staff, 12-38 criteria), 7-9, 7-13 landing force commander,
OSC staff, 2-95, 2-98 hasty defense. See situational 13-6, 13-19, 13-25, 13-31
defense. landing zone. See main entry.
G hasty offense. See situational linkup with ground maneuver
offense. force, 13-6, 13-35–13-36
gap crossing, 10-10–10-11, 10-13.
heliborne assault. See heliborne movement to objective,
See also water obstacle
landing. 13-31–13-32
crossing.
heliborne forces, 13-1–13-36 objective area, 13-27, 13-30,
General Staff, 1-22, 1-24–1-25,
ambushes, 13-13 13-34–13-36
2-16–2-20, 2-22, 2-25, 2-34,
2-36, 2-122, 2-141, 2-147–2-148, as antilanding reserve, 13-13 planning, 13-14–13-19
2-174, 2-224, 5-54–5-55, 6-23, as assault force, 13-3 reconnaissance of objective,
6-35, 9-50, 12-4, 12-7, 12-32 13-33
as deception force, 13-3, 13-13
Chief of Information Warfare, heliborne operations. See
as exploitation force, 13-3
5-55, 5-67 heliborne landing.
as fixing force, 13-3 |
7-100.1 | 348 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
helicopters, 6-28, 6-37, p. 8-1, ¶8-2, 13-50, 13-92. See also key information infrastructure, 5-3–5-7
8-4, 8-6, 8-9–8-11, 8-19, 8-25, systems. defense information infra-
8-33–8-34, 8-36, 8-48–8-49, 8-51– high-visibility systems. See key structure, 5-4, 5-6–5-7, 5-11
8-55, 8-61, 8-70, 8-74–8-75 systems.
enemy, as target of IW, 5-20,
air ambulance, 8-4, 12-81 homeland. See United States. 5-24, 5-28, 5-35, 5-50,
armed helicopters, 8-33– hostage rescue, 13-50 5-52, 7-79
8-34, 8-52 hostage-taking, 13-50 global information infra-
attack helicopters. See main structure, 5-4, 5-7, 5-11
human intelligence, p. viii, ¶6-7,
entry. 6-24, 9-123, 13-48–13-49 national information infra-
aviation component, IFC, 2-54 structure, 5-4–5-5, 5-7, 5-11
humanitarian relief organization(s),
C2 helicopters, 8-11, 8-52 pp. ix, xv. See also of the State, 5-38, 5-61, 5-71
gunships. See helicopters, nongovernmental/private information requirements,
armed. volunteer organizations. operational, 2-123
heavy-lift, 8-6, 8-11, 8-53. hybridization, p. ix strategic, 2-112
See also helicopters, lift;
tactical, 2-124–2-128
transport helicopters.
I
information section, OSC staff,
heliborne jamming. See main
identification, friend or foe, 9-45 2-96
entry.
imagery. See reconnaissance. information security, 2-233, 5-39–
heliborne landing. See main
5-41, 5-69
entry. infantry, 3-6, 3-55, 3-78, 3-87, 3-117,
4-58, 8-48, 8-61, 9-2, 9-62, 9-144, information superiority. See
lift helicopters, 8-52, 8-55,
11-77, 13-12, 13-15, 13-97, United States, information
8-61. See also helicopters,
13-102–13-103, 13-105. See dominance.
heavy-lift; medium-lift;
transport helicopters. also mechanized infantry; naval information technology, 2-153,
infantry. p. 5-1, ¶5-2, 5-14–5-15
medium-lift, 8-6, 8-11, 8-53.
See also helicopters, lift; infiltration, p. 3-1, ¶3-6, 3-22, 3-78, information warfare, pp. 5-1–5-18
3-87, 3-117, 4-25, 6-12, 6-35,
transport helicopters. as element of fire support, 7-3
9-52, 9-58, 9-62, 9-67, 10-27,
minelaying, 8-52, 10-40, 10-47 10-70, 10-72–10-73, 13-72– chief of IW. See main entry.
night capability, 8-34, 8-70 13-73, 13-77–13-78, 13-82 computer warfare. See main
reconnaissance helicopters, information, pp. viii, xvii, ¶5-1–5-21. entry.
8-10–8-11, 11-65 See also information attack; deception. See main entry.
smoke delivery, 11-77, 11-79 information campaign(s); deception plan. See deception.
information environment;
tactical airborne landings, defensive IW, 2-112, 5-61–
information infrastructure;
13-12 5-63
information warfare; media;
transport helicopters, 6-28, Ministry of Public Information denial-of-service attacks,
8-4, 8-6, 8-9, 8-11, 8-52– 5-50–5-51
informational means. See national
8-53, 13-21–13-22. See
power, instruments of. electronic warfare. See main
also helicopters, heavy-lift;
entry.
lift; medium-lift. information attack, 1-58, 1-71, 5-22,
5-48–5-50, 5-80, 5-86, 5-90 elements of IW, 5-22–5-50
hide position(s), 9-58–9-60, 9-174,
9-177, 9-193 information campaign(s), 1-58, engineer support. See main
5-80, 5-84, 5-86 entry.
high-payoff targets, 7-21, 7-49–
7-50, 7-61, p. 8-1, ¶9-6, 13-68. information dominance. See in adaptive operations, 5-86–
See also key systems. United States. 5-90
high-priority targets, 6-12, 6-29, information environment, p. 5-1, information attack. See main
7-55, 9-39, 11-60, 13-81. See ¶5-1–5-4, 5-7, 5-14, 5-18, 5-62 entry.
also key systems. information campaign(s),
1-58, 5-80, 5-84, 5-86
high-value targets, 5-37, 6-12,
6-16, 7-43, 7-48–7-49, 7-60, in regional operations, 5-79–
5-80 |
7-100.1 | 349 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
information warfare (continued) theater IW campaign, 2-137, integrated fires command, 2-40,
5-55 2-47–2-60, 7-8, 7-14, 7-16–7-20,
in strategic operations, 1-29,
10-3, 12-37, 12-40–12-43
5-75–5-78 theater-level IW assets,
2-101, 2-103, 5-68–5-69 artillery component, 2-47,
in transition operations, 5-81–
2-52–2-53
5-85, 10-62 tools, 5-51, 5-21
as alternate command
IW plan, p. 2-1, ¶2-101, 2-102, infrastructure,
structure for OSC, 7-18
2-103, 2-170, 2-225, 3-56, information infrastructure,
3-94, 4-66, 4-71, 5-22, 5-36, See main entry. aviation component, 2-47,
5-55, 5-64, 5-66, 5-68–5-70, 2-54, 8-7–8-8
infrastructure (enemy), as
5-72, 7-77, 7-81, 10-68, fire support coordination
target, 3-79, 3-109, 5-20,
10-71, 11-96, 11-98 center, 2-51, 7-21, 7-25
5-24, 5-28, 5-35, 5-50,
IW planning, 5-64–5-66, 5-72 5-52, 7-76, 7-79, 8-71 IFC commander, 2-50–2-51,
IW subsection, OSC staff, initiative, 2-86, 2-217, 7-28, 7-31–
2-100, 2-103, 5-69 7-33, 7-50, 7-53, 7-61–
of commanders, p. xix, ¶2-2,
7-62, 8-13–8-16, 11-38
IW units, 2-61, 12-37 2-5, 2-83, 2-159, 3-66, 4-81,
IFC CP, 2-47, 2-188, 2-194,
military IW plan, 5-54–5-55, 4-86, 6-11, 9-18, 9-26, 9-35
2-215, 3-48, 4-51, 7-16,
5-67 seized, regained, or retained
8-13–8-14, 8-22
national-level IW assets, against enemy, 1-45, 1-51,
IFC headquarters, 2-50–2-51,
2-101, 2-103, 5-68–5-69 4-59, 4-113, 11-42, p. 12-1
7-80
NCA responsibility for, 5-54 instruments of national power.
in division/DTG, 7-8, 7-35
See national power.
nonmilitary, 5-72
in OSC, 2-40, 2-47–2-60, 7-8,
insurgent forces, p. xv, ¶1-95,
objectives, 5-3
7-16–7-20
1-101–1-104
offensive IW, 1-71, 5-58–5-60
integrated support group. See
affiliated with State, 1-99,
operational-level IW, 5-56– main entry.
1-101–1-104, 2-14, 4-53,
5-63, 5-66
9-52, 9-56, 9-61, 9-64, maneuver forces, 2-47
operational shielding, 1-63 9-194, 11-8, 11-55 missile component, 2-47,
perception management. See as source of information/ 2-55–2-56, 7-16
main entry. intelligence, 1-102–1-103 planning, 7-33–7-37
physical destruction, 5-22, 5-25, as threat to State, 1-17, 3-55, reconnaissance fire, 7-60
5-27, 5-35–5-37, 5-60, 5-76, 4-58
SPF component, 2-57–2-59,
5-86, 5-90
SPF support of. See Special- 13-44, 13-63, 13-71
protection and security Purpose Forces.
support to a strike, 7-59
measures, 5-22, 5-27, 5-38–
State-supported, 1-29, 1-100
5-43, 5-65, 5-69, 5-71, 5-76, task organization, 2-47, 2-49,
5-80–5-81, 5-83. See also support of IW, 5-35 2-52, 2-54–2-55, 7-16, 7-19
information security; integrated air defense system, theater IFC, 7-17, 7-24, 7-28,
operations security. 9-10, 9-19, 9-22–9-26, 9-28, 8-7, 8-10–8-11, 8-13–8-14
9-32–9-33, 9-72, 9-115, 9-152–
RISTA and IW section, IFC integrated fires net, 2-217
9-153, 9-182
staff, 2-51, 5-71
integrated fires subsection, OSC
national-level, 9-27, 9-72
staff responsibilities, 2-51, staff, 7-22
2-101, 5-67–5-71, 12-38 operational-level, 9-32, 9-72
integrated support group, IFC,
strategic IW, 2-101, 2-137, sector-level, 9-28–9-31, 9-195 2-60–2-61, 12-37, 12-41–12-43
5-53–5-55, 5-67, 5-78 tactical-level, 9-33 integrated support command,
support of defense, 4-24, integrated attack, 3-72–3-79 2-40, 2-61, 10-3, 12-37–12-41
4-87, 4-113
integrated defense, 4-83–4-84, ISC commander, 12-38–12-40
support of offense, 3-20–3-21, 4-90, 9-153 ISC headquarters, 12-38–12-39
3-54, 3-67, 3-74, 3-80, 3-83,
3-94, 3-96, 3-112 support operations coordination
center, ISC staff, 12-38
targets, 5-20, 5-52 |
7-100.1 | 350 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
intelligence. See also special police, 2-105, 4-53 9-127, 10-57, 11-96, 12-28,
reconnaissance. Special-Purpose Forces. See 13-51, 13-53, 13-59, 13-63–13-
human intelligence. See main main entry. 64, 13-67, 13-77, 13-86, 13-99.
entry. Internet, 2-209, 5-14, 5-17, 5-21, See also combat system; high-
priority targets; high-value
sources of information, 1-99, 5-28, 5-30, 5-48, 5-51
targets; systems warfare.
1-102–1-103, 3-59, 6-1, Intranet, 2-209
9-185, 13-17, 13-55 kidnapping. See abduction.
invaded territory. See occupied
intelligence and information territory. kill zone, 2-69, 2-71, 2-80
section, OSC staff, 2-100– defensive operations, 4-34,
irregular forces, 1-93–1-106, p. 3-1,
2-105, 5-68 4-36, 4-40, 4-43, 4-64,
¶3-6. See also paramilitary forces.
Intelligence Directorate. See 7-70, 11-28
as source of information, 3-59
General Staff. offensive operations, 3-29,
intelligence net, 2-219 SPF support of. See Special- 3-31, 3-44, 3-116, 4-119
Purpose Forces.
intelligence officer, reconnaissance fire, 7-61
General Staff, 2-18, 5-55
J
L
OSC, 2-84, 2-100–2-101, 2-208,
jammers/jamming,
5-67–5-69, 5-73, 5-78 landing force commander, 13-6,
interagency operations, 1-37, p. 2-1, airborne, 8-4, 8-52 13-19, 13-25, 13-31, 13-96
¶2-9–2-10, 2-29, 2-33, 2-36, air defense, 8-39–8-40, 9-7, landing zone, 12-99, 13-6, 13-14,
2-38, 2-40, 2-105, 2-160, 4-18, 9-96–9-99, 9-173 13-16–13-20, 13-22, 13-25–
10-60–10-61 deception, 5-25, 8-40 13-27, 13-30
intercept and direction finding. electronic (EW), 5-25, 5-36, lasers, high-power, 5-37
See radar intercept and 9-97, 9-186 law enforcement units, 2-61, 12-37,
direction finding; radio intercept escort jammers, 13-23 12-57. See also police.
and direction finding; signals
GPS, 5-25, 5-89, 6-25, 9-7, liaison teams,
reconnaissance.
9-83, 9-96, 9-101 in IFC HQ, 2-51, 2-188, 7-25
interceptors (aircraft), 8-3, 8-6,
8-37, 8-43, 9-68, 9-73, 9-81, heliborne, 8-4, 8-11, 8-33, in ISC HQ, 12-38
8-39–8-40, 8-52
9-134. See also fighter aircraft. in main CP, 2-187, 9-46
radar jamming. See air
interdiction fire, 3-16, 7-59, 7-64– in OSC HQ, 2-83, 2-110, 2-112,
defense jamming.
7-65 2-114–2-115, 2-117–2-118,
interdiction missions (aviation), 8-50 joint operations, 1-37, p. 2-1, ¶2-9, 2-213, 2-220, 8-20, 8-26,
2-29, 2-33, 2-36, 2-40, 2-105, 8-56, 9-38, 9-46, 10-4,
internally displaced persons,
2-160, 3-13–3-14, 3-72, 3-81, 11-5–11-6
pp. viii, xv
4-18, 4-82–4-83, 8-8, 9-2, 9-37–
limited-objective attack, 3-10, 3-15,
Internal Security Forces, 1-94, 2-26, 9-38, 10-60–10-61, 13-45, 13-93,
3-89–3-109, 4-17, 4-40, 4-80,
2-105 13-95, 13-98–13-103
4-113, 4-126, 9-8, 13-83, 13-85.
allocated to OSC, 1-97, 1-100, joint SPF operations, 6-23, 13-45, See also counterattack; sophis-
2-112, 2-115 13-68 ticated ambush; spoiling attack.
as security force, 3-55, 4-58 limit of responsibility, 2-68, 2-72,
as source of information, 1-99 K 2-143, 3-36, 4-107
Border Guard Forces, 2-105 key systems (enemy), as targets, linear,
in adaptive operations, 1-100 1-33, 1-72, 1-76, 2-80, 3-11–3-12, battlefield, 2-63, 9-116
3-16, 3-18, 3-20, 3-24, 3-33–
in regional operations, 1-98, 4-4 operations, 2-62–2-64, 2-66–
3-34, 3-44, 3-81–3-83, 3-89–
in transition operations, 1-99 2-67, 2-73, 3-31, 3-36, 4-34
3-90, 3-93, 3-96, 3-98, 3-110,
movement control, 12-57–12-59 3-112, 3-114, 4-25, 4-43, 4-89, zones, 2-69, 3-29, 3-31, 4-34
paramilitary, 1-92, 1-95 4-113, 4-115, 4-121, p. 5-1, ¶5-71, lines of communications,
resubordinated to SHC, 1-94, 5-82, 6-8, 6-20, 6-49, p. 7-1, defense of, 9-99, 9-128,
1-97 ¶7-2, 7-6, 7-8, 7-35, 7-60, 7-77, p. 12-1, 12-57, 13-77
8-3, 9-6. 9-529-53, 9-90–9-91, |
7-100.1 | 351 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
lines of communications logistics forces, 1-114, 2-130, transportation. See main
(continued) 9-128, 12-18–12-21 entry.
enemy, as targets, 1-60, logistics forces or sites long-range fires, 1-29, 1-77, 2-102,
1-104, 1-118, 3-13, 3-35, (enemy), as targets, 3-31, 3-34, 3-118, 4-36, 4-40,
4-127, 5-56, 7-76, 9-51, 9-62, 1-100, 1-115, 1-118, 3-2, 4-64, 4-105, 4-119, 4-123, 7-14,
9-125, 11-23, 12-29, 13-11, 3-13, 3-18, 3-35, 3-52, 3-71, 7-23, 7-64–7-65, 9-63, 13-98
13-48, 13-51–13-52, 13-54– 3-73–3-74, 3-79, 3-82, 3-88, long-range missiles, 1-59, 2-55–
13-55, 13-65, 13-85, 13-89 3-91, 3-114, 4-127, 5-56, 2-56, 3-13, 3-82, 7-44, 7-73, 9-63,
regulation of, 12-56 5-89, 6-46, 7-13, 7-66, 7-77, 9-81, 11-8, 11-26. See also
11-4, 11-27, 11-56, 11-56, surface-to-surface missiles.
local air superiority, 8-57, 8-66,
11-96, 13-11, 13-48, 13-52,
8-71, 13-20, 13-98 long-range rockets, 2-55–2-56,
13-54–13-55, 13-66, 13-77,
7-44, 7-73, 9-63, 9-81, 11-8,
local area network, 2-209 13-81, 13-85, 13-92
11-55
logistics, pp. 12-1–12-22. See also logistics plan, 2-166, 2-170,
combat service support; 12-27, 12-90–12-91
integrated support command; M
logistics subsection, ISC staff,
integrated support group. 12-38, 12-40 main command post, 2-87, 2-96,
administrative force structure, 2-183, 2-186–2-187, 2-215,
maintenance. See main entry.
2-26, 12-8, 12-20–12-21, 2-222–2-224, 6-41, 8-13–8-14,
materiel support. See main
12-36–12-37, 12-41 9-46, 9-154
entry.
area support, 2-27, 12-20, main defense force, 3-106, 4-39–
medical support. See main
12-24, 12-41, 12-47 4-40, 4-49, 4-56, 4-98, 4-106–
entry.
automation of, 12-44 4-110, 4-129–4-130, 9-157, 10-24
mission support sites, 12-99
caches. See main entry. main defense force commander,
personnel. See main entry. 4-49
centralized planning, 12-27–
12-29, 12-55 post-combat support, maintenance, 2-107, 12-10–12-11,
12-100–12-105 12-20, 12-35, 12-37, 12-50–12-51
chief of administration. See
main entry. primary support, 12-23, 12-41 maintenance collection
procurement, 12-3 points, 12-91
chief of logistics. See main
entry. resources officer, OSC staff. maintenance depots, 12-11
civilian resources, 12-1, 12-4, See main entry. maintenance units, 12-23–
12-10, 12-17, 12-53–12-54 services. See main entry. 12-24, 12-91, 12-96
command and control, 12-32– stockpiles. See main entry. medical equipment, 12-80
12-43 strategic-level, p. 12-1, ¶12-1– repair, 2-107, 12-35, 12-50–
decentralized execution, 12-21, 12-25, 12-32 12-51
4-117, 12-27–12-29, 12-55 support areas, 12-11, 12-30 replacement of equipment,
depot(s). See main entry. support forward, 12-30 2-107, 12-35, 12-101–12-102
depot support, 2-27, 12-20, support of defense, 4-73, signal equipment, 2-104
12-25 12-92–12-95 maneuver defense, 4-59, 4-88–
fighting force structure, 12-21 support of offense, 3-60, 4-111, 9-157, 12-96
foraging, 12-31 12-88–12-91 within area defense, 4-118,
4-124, 4-126
heliborne resupply, 8-52 supply. See materiel support;
supply. maneuver reserve, 3-99, 3-106,
in adaptive operations, 12-14
4-58, 4-61–4-62, 4-75, 4-111,
support zone security. See
in OSC, 12-4, 12-18–12-19, 4-131, 4-131, 8-51, 8-61
main entry.
12-21, 12-32–12-43
Manpower and Readiness
sustainment from other
integrated support command. Department, Logistics
sources, 12-31
See main entry. Directorate, MOD, 12-66
tactical-level, p. 12-1
integrated support group. See maritime forces, 2-40. See also
main entry. task organization, 12-18– Navy, naval infantry.
12-21, 12-40–12-41, 12-43 |
7-100.1 | 352 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
marshalling areas (enemy), as mercenaries, p. xv, ¶2-14 antitank, 10-38, 10-45–10-46
targets, 9-49, 9-160 meteorological. See weather. controlled, 10-40
massing, method (concept of operations), decoy, 10-38
of fires, 1-69, 1-76, 3-22, 2-137 mixed, 10-38
3-110, 7-18, 7-41, 7-68, military art, 1-79–1-92 nuisance, 10-68
9-8, 9-112, 11-35, 11-39
military capabilities, pp. x, xvii. protective, 10-40
of forces, 1-69, 1-76, 3-22, See also national power,
3-83, 12-52 instruments of; State, military minelaying, 4-71, 10-6, 10-9,
10-39–10-40, 10-49, 10-56,
materiel support, 12-37, 12-44– capabilities.
10-61, 13-13. See also
12-49. See also depots; military districts, 2-23, 2-37, 12-8 countermobility support;
logistics; services; stockpiles;
military information warfare plan, mine(s); obstacle detachment.
storage; supply.
5-54–5-55, 5-67 aircraft-delivered, 10-40,
distribution, 12-15–12-17,
military power. See military 10-42, 10-46
12-47–12-49
capabilities. artillery-delivered, 10-40,
forward distribution, 12-47
military regions, 2-23, 2-37, 12-8 10-42–10-43
planning factors, 2-151, 12-9
military strategic campaign plan, ground vehicles, 10-42, 10-44
pull system, 12-47, 12-80 1-22–1-26, 2-17–2-18, 2-144, helicopters, 8-52, 10-40, 10-47
push system, 12-47 2-147–2-148, 2-165, 3-89, 5-55
manual, 10-40, 10-42
mechanized infantry, 3-6, 6-12, branches and sequels, 1-50, 2-5
man-portable remote mine
6-43, 11-47, 13-97, 13-102– contingency plans, 1-25, 2-39, dispensers, 10-42, 10-45
13-103, 13-105 9-50–9-52
mechanical, 10-40, 10-50,
media, pp. viii–ix, ¶4-10, 5-44, designates operational-level 10-64
5-46, 5-51, 5-60, 5-76–5-77, AORs, 2-17, 2-32
5-88, 7-77, 7-81, 11-96, 11-98. remotely-delivered, 10-37,
military strategy, 1-79, 1-81–1-83 10-40–10-47, 10-57. See
medical support, 12-37, 12-77–12-85
military transportation center, 12-53 also mine(s), scatterable.
ambulance, air, 8-4, 12-81
militia forces (reserve component), Minister of National Security, 1-3
ambulance, ground, 12-80 2-24, 4-11, 4-18, 12-8, 12-44, Ministry of Defense, 1-2, 1-19,
blood management, 12-85 12-53, 12-66 1-22, 1-25, 2-16, 2-44, 5-54,
casualty collection points, mine(s), 10-37–10-47. See also 12-3, 12-11, 12-66, 12-68
12-79 minefields; minelaying. Ministry of Health, 12-85
casualty evacuation/handling, antihelicopter, 9-74–9-75, Ministry of Public Information, 1-2,
12-77, 12-81 9-94, 9-169, 9-196 2-115, 5-47, 5-71, 5-78
hospitals, 12-1, 12-4, 12-82– antipersonnel, 10-38, 10-43, Ministry of the Interior, 2-44, 2-115
12-84 10-45–10-46, 10-75
civil engineering, 12-65
civilian medical personnel antitank, 10-38, 10-40, 10-43,
internal security forces. See
(mobilized), 12-4, 12-67 10-45–10-46
main entry.
medical depot, 12-11, 12-80 chemical, 11-8
misinformation. See
medical equipment scatterable, 9-59, 10-40, 10-42. disinformation.
maintenance, 12-80 See also minelaying,
missile defense, 2-112, 6-32,
remotely-delivered.
medical supplies, 12-80 9-41, 9-83, 9-86, 9-101
mineclearing, 10-6, 10-9, 10-11,
mutual aid, 12-79 missiles. See antitank guided
10-73, 13-13
NBC casualty treatment, missiles; integrated fires
11-63, 12-84 minefields, 10-9, 10-38–10-47, command, long-range missiles;
10-56, 10-68–10-69. See also surface-to-air missiles; surface-
self-help, 12-79
mine(s); minelaying. to-surface missiles; tactical
treatment categories, 12-78
antilanding, 10-38 ballistic missiles.
underground medical facilities,
antipersonnel, 10-38, 10-45– mission support sites. See
12-13–12-14, 12-85
10-46 logistics.
unit aid stations, 12-79 |
7-100.1 | 353 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
mission-type orders, 2-141, 2-163, N nature and stability of the state,
2-174 p. vii
National Command Authority,
mobility support, 4-125, p. 10-1, 1-2–1-4, 1-15–1-17, 1-24, 1-27, Navy, 2-26
¶10-4, 10-7–10-8, 10-10, 10-60– 1-33, 1-56, 1-59 amphibious capability, 13-86
10-61, 10-66, 10-70–10-73.
General Staff as executive in OSC, 2-40
See also mineclearing; obstacle
agent, 2-16
clearing; route(s); water in transition operations, 3-13
NBC release authority, 7-44,
obstacle crossing local naval superiority, 13-98
11-21, 11-37–11-39, 11-57
mobility and countermobility naval infantry, 2-40, 13-86,
responsible for long-range
assets (enemy), as targets, 13-93–13-97, 13-101–13-103,
rockets and missiles, 2-56
3-35, 4-35, 4-127, 10-57–10-58 13-105, 13-107–13-108
responsible for national SCP,
mobilization, naval fire support, 7-23–7-25,
2-15, 2-38, 2-148
of civilian resources, 12-1, 13-88, 13-98
staff responsibility for
12-4, 12-8, 12-53–12-54, naval fire support net, 7-25
strategic IW, 5-54
12-66–12-67
Naval SPF. See Special-
national information infrastructure,
of reserves, 2-27–2-28, 4-11, Purpose Forces.
5-4–5-5, 5-7, 5-11
4-18, 4-22, 12-8, 12-53,
naval transport, 13-86,
12-66, 12-105 national power, instruments of,
13-94–13-96
p. xvii, ¶1-1–1-3, 1-6, 1-10, 1-15–
mockup. See deception and
submarines, 13-39, 13-68,
1-16, 1-18, 1-20, 1-27, 1-30–1-32,
decoy.
13-86
1-40, 1-45, 1-49, 1-54, 1-57, 1-87,
modernization, pp. vi, xvii, ¶8-33–
1-89, 1-107, 1-110–1-111, 4-7, NBC, pp. 11-1–11-13. See
8-34, 9-80, 9-94
4-13, p. 5-1, ¶5-8, 5-77, 5-83 nuclear; biological; chemical;
mortars, 7-38, 7-42, 9-2, 9-58, weapons of mass destruction.
diplomatic-political, p. xvii,
9-60, 11-74, 11-79, 11-90
¶1-1, 1-30, 1-32, 1-54, 1-87, in adaptive operations,
mountains, air defense in, 9-166 p. 5-1 11-97–11-98
movement. See also transportation. economic, p. xvii, ¶1-1, 1-30, in regional operations, 11-33,
movement control, 12-55– 1-32, 1-54, 1-87, p. 5-1 11-92–11-93, 11-95
12-59. See also traffic informational, p. xvii, ¶1-1, 1-30, in transition operations, 11-96
control/management. 1-32, 1-54, 1-87, p. 5-1 NBC attack, 7-45
movement program, 12-58 military, p. xvii, ¶1-1, 1-54, NBC defense, 2-112, 6-39,
movement route(s), 2-167, p. 5-1 11-6. See also NBC
10-10, 10-12–10-13, 10-25– national security strategy, p. xvi, protection/reconnaissance.
10-28, 10-34. See also ¶1-1–1-14, 1-79, 1-86–1-92, NBC environment, 2-127,
route(s). 12-2, 12-5 6-39, 10-10, 10-13, 10-19,
tactical movement, 9-149– national strategic campaign, 1-15, 11-1
9-151 2-18. See also strategic campaign. NBC medical treatment, 12-84
movement support detachment, national strategic campaign plan, NBC munitions, 2-55, 2-127,
10-9 1-18–1-21, 1-86, 2-15, 2-17, 11-3. See also biological/
multinational forces and operations, 2-38, 2-148, 5-55, 5-65, p. 11-1 chemical/nuclear munitions.
1-21, 1-23, 1-37, p. 2-1, ¶2-9, 2-10, branches and sequels, 1-8, 1-12 NBC observers, 11-67
2-33, 2-36, 2-38, 2-40, 2-105,
contingencies, 1-8, 1-16–1-18, NBC protection. See main
2-160, 4-18, 10-60–10-61
1-88–1-90 entry.
multiple rocket launcher, 5-35, 7-38,
national will, pp. ix–x NBC reconnaissance. See
9-58–9-59, 9-185, 10-42–10-43,
of extraregional enemy. See main entry.
11-8, 11-26, 11-74, 11-79
United States, national will. NBC weapons (OPFOR),
multiservice operations. See joint
of regional enemy, 1-35, 3-2, 7-44–7-46, p. 11-1, ¶11-2–
operations.
3-20, 6-46 11-3, 11-5, 11-95. See also
biological/chemical/nuclear
of State. See State, national will.
weapons.
nation-state(s), p. xiv |
7-100.1 | 354 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
NBC (continued) nonlethal means, 5-25, 5-71, 7-1, delivery means (OPFOR),
7-3–7-4, 9-96–9-108, 11-9 11-3, 11-30
NBC weapons (enemy),
2-127, 6-20, 6-22, 10-10, nonlinear, in regional operations, 11-33
10-16, 10-19, 11-1, 11-4, battlefield, 1-78, 2-63, 9-61, munitions, 7-46, 11-3, 11-30,
11-26–11-27, 11-29, 11-39, 9-116, 13-53 11-36
11-42, 11-46, 11-48, 11-56,
operations, 2-62–2-63, 2-65– nuclear attack, 11-34–11-41,
11-60, 13-11, 13-48, 13-54,
2-66, 2-73, 2-192, 2-206, 11-45
13-77
3-41, 4-34, 6-24, 12-52, offensive use, 11-39–11-47
retaliation in kind, 11-32– 13-48
11-33, 11-93 preemptive use (first use),
zones, 2-69, 3-29, 4-34 11-31–1-32, 11-42, 11-48
targets, 11-4, 11-26, 11-39–
11-41, 11-56 nonmilitary means, 1-10–1-11, release, 11-22, 11-37–11-39,
1-18, 1-21, 2-30 11-45
NBC protection, 11-59–11-69.
See also chemical defense; nonmilitary organizations, p. xvii response in kind, 11-32–
NBC defense. as affiliated forces, 2-14 11-33, 11-93
air defense and NBC warning non-state actor(s), pp. vi, xv. weapons, p. 11-1, ¶11-3,
communications net, 2-222, affiliated with State, 2-14. See 11-31–11-32, 11-38, 11-48
9-47, 9-120, 11-66, 11-68 affiliated forces.
decontamination, 11-1, 11-7, civilians on the battlefield. O
11-59, 11-62–11-63, 11-65, See main entry.
objective(s),
12-84
criminal organizations. See
in offensive operations, 2-74,
detection and warning main entry.
3-28–3-29, 3-45
devices, 11-1, 11-64–11-69
drug organizations. See main
subordinate unit missions,
NBC detection report, 11-67– entry.
2-135
11-68
guerrillas, p. xv
obscurants, 10-20, 11-73. See
NBC reconnaissance. See
humanitarian relief also smoke.
main entry.
organizations, p. ix
obstacle(s), 3-51, 4-40, 4-47,
NBC warning reports, 2-222,
insurgent forces. See main 4-71, 4-125–4-126, 7-70,
11-62, 11-68–11-69
entry. 10-60, 10-68–10-69
protection equipment, 11-1,
internally displaced persons, clearing, 10-9, 10-10–10-11,
11-59, 11-64
pp. viii, xv 10-19, 12-92, 13-77, 13-79,
NBC reconnaissance, 6-39, 6-43, media. See main entry. 13-101. See also obstacle-
8-10, 11-61–11-69. See also clearing detachment.
mercenaries, p. xv, ¶2-14
chemical reconnaissance units.
creating, 10-90–10-11, 10-15–
refugees, p. viii, ¶13-62
neutralization (target damage 10-16, 10-18, 10-21, 10-28,
criteria), 7-9, 7-12 rogue actors, p. xv 10-36, 10-49, 10-55–10-56,
night capability, 8-33–8-36, 8-70, subnational political 13-77, 13-79–13-80. See
9-194, 10-72, 13-18, 13-23, movements, p. xv also obstacle detachment.
13-27, 13-72 terrorists. See main entry. explosive obstacles. See
nonaligned states, p. vii third-party actors. See main mines.
noncombatants. See also civilians entry. natural (terrain), 10-38, 13-16
on the battlefield. transnational corporations, situational obstacles, 3-77,
noncontiguous, pp. ix, xv 3-86, 3-116
battle zones, 2-77 transnational political obstacle-clearing detachment, 10-9
defensive fronts, 4-17 movements, p. xv obstacle detachment, 4-63, 4-71,
nuclear, 11-29–11-48. See also NBC. 4-105, 4-123, 10-9, 10-17, 10-41,
operations, 2-73, 13-48
10-48–10-56
defensive use, 11-48
support zones, 2-78
multiple ODs, 10-48
delivery means (enemy),
nongovernmental organizations,
6-43, 9-107, 11-4 with ATR, 4-64, 10-48, 10-50–
4-10, 5-46
10-51, 10-53–10-54 |
7-100.1 | 355 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
obstacle plan, 4-71, 10-36, 10-54, operational environment, p. vi. Operations Directorate,
10-60, 10-68 See also contemporary General Staff, 1-22, 1-25,
occupied territory, 1-98–1-99, 4-4, operational environment; 2-17–2-18, 2-148, 5-55
information environment.
5-87, 12-53, 13-68 theater HQ, 2-148
overall (strategic), p. xi
offensive countermobility, 10-57– operations net, 2-216
10-58 specific, pp. vii, xi
operations officer, OSC staff,
offensive information warfare, total, pp. xi, xvii 2-96–2-96, 2-190, 2-216, 8-20,
5-58–5-60. See also operational exclusion, 1-59–1-60 9-38, 10-4–10-5, 10-8
information warfare.
operational shielding, 1-63, 8-75 operations section,
offensive operations, pp. 3-1–3-28.
operational-strategic command(s), FG staff, 2-148
See also attack; limited-objective
attack; strike. 2-30, 2-36–2-42 IFC staff, 2-51, 7-25
air defense in, 9-141–9-151 chief of staff. See main entry. ISC staff, 12-38
commandos in, 13-78–13-82 commander, 1-85, 2-83–2-85, OSC staff, 2-95–2-99, 2-148,
2-148, 2-189, 7-22, 7-31, 2-197, 5-69
engineer support. See main 7-50, 7-53, 7-62, 7-68, 8-15–
entry. 8-16, 8-25, 8-27, 8-76–8-77, operations security, 2-233, 5-39–
5-41
executing of, 3-63–3-67 9-46, 9-156, 9-158, 10-3,
10-5, 11-21, 11-38, 12-39, OPFOR. See contemporary
fire support, p. 7-1, ¶7-69
13-5–13-6, 13-44–13-45, opposing force; opposing force.
in adaptive operations, 3-14–
13-95–13-96 opportunity, window of, p. xix, ¶1-75,
3-16, 3-18–3-20, 3-22, 3-89,
command group 2-81–2-88 1-117, p. 2-1, ¶2-75, 2-100, 2-131,
3-95, 4-17, 4-69, 4-113
2-136, 2-145–2-146, 2-150,
commando units, 13-74, 13-83
in regional operations, 1-34, p. 3-1, ¶3-12, 3-15–3-16, 3-18,
1-87, 3-2–3-7, 3-18–3-19 deputy commander, 2-51, 3-23–3-24, 3-47, 3-53–3-54,
in transition operations, 1-45, 2-86, 2-188 3-57, 3-63, 3-66, 3-72, 3-78,
3-8–3-13, 3-18–3-20, 3-22 headquarters, 2-35, 2-36, 3-81–3-82, 3-84, 3-87, 3-90,
2-81, 7-22, 7-28, 9-38 3-93, 3-96–3-97, 3-100, 3-103–
linear, 3-31, 3-36
3-104, 3-113, 3-117, 4-14, 4-17,
integrated fires command.
nonlinear, 3-41
4-26–4-27, 4-33, 4-35, 4-59, 4-61,
See main entry.
organization of battlefield, 4-67, 4-70, 4-81, 4-84, 4-93,
integrated support command.
3-21, 3-27–3-45, 3-58 4-111–4-113, 4-115–4-116, 5-2,
See main entry.
organization of forces, 3-21, 5-74, 6-13, 6-50, 7-51, 7-57,
3-27, 3-46–3-58, 3-76– Internal Security Forces 7-79, 8-73, 8-76, 9-8, 9-147,
3-79, 3-85–3-88, 3-102, subordinate to, 1-97, 1-100 9-157, 10-67, 11-48, 13-59,
3-106–3-109, 3-115– joint command, 2-36, 2-40, 13-105
3-118, 9-142 8-8, 9-37 opposing force, pp. xii–xiv, xv–xix.
planned offense, 3-21, 3-23 staff. See main entry. See also contemporary
opposing force.
planning for, 3-21–3-57 task organization, 2-37, 2-39,
2-148, 4-103, 13-11 Cold War, pp. xii–xiii
preparing for, 3-58–3-62
operation plan, 2-30, 2-33, 2-72, contemporary, pp. xiii–xix
purpose, 3-17–3-20
2-74, 2-95, 2-143, 2-147–2-148, threat-based, p. xiii
situational offense, 3-21,
2-165–2-167, 3-68, 4-52, 5-70,
3-24–3-27, 3-99 organic forces. See constituent
7-15, 7-33–7-34, 7-62, 9-37,
forces.
transition to defense, 3-63 10-11, 10-71, p. 11-1, ¶12-87
organization. See also task
within defensive context, p. 3-1 annexes, 2-167
organization.
operational art, 1-84–1-86 modification, 3-61, 3-65, 4-74,
operational-level, 2-30–2-42
operational directive, 2-95, 2-169– 4-76, 4-80
strategic-level, 2-15–2-29
2-170, 3-26, 3-66, 4-29, 4-81, organization of battlefield,
5-70 2-74, 2-148, 3-28, 4-32 tactical-level, 2-43–2-46
annexes to, 2-170, 2-208 organization of forces, 3-47,
4-48, 4-66 |
7-100.1 | 356 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
organization of battlefield, 2-62– also information warfare; political (means/power). See
2-80, 2-134, 2-137, 2-148, media; psychological warfare. diplomatic-political means;
2-152, 2-166. See also personnel, 12-37, 12-66–12-76 national power, instruments of.
offensive operations; defensive political goals, for use of
personnel operations center,
operations.
12-70 long-range missiles and
organization of forces, 2-134, rockets, 2-56, 7-44
personnel support, 2-108,
2-152, 2-166, 7-26, 7-32. See
12-36–12-37, 12-66, SPF, 2-58
also offensive operations;
defensive operations. 12-68–12-70 politically unacceptable casualties.
replacement, 2-108, 12-36, See casualties.
out-of-theater operations. See
force projection. 12-69, 12-71–12-76, 12-100 ports (as targets), 11-4, 13-3, 13-10,
physical environment, p. viii. See 13-11, 13-48, 13-52, 13-65, 13-77,
also complex terrain; terrain; 13-89, 13-90, 13-99. See also
P
urban environments; weather. aerial ports of debarkation;
paramilitary forces, pp. xiii, xv, xvii, planned defense, 4-26 aerial ports of embarkation; sea
¶1-92, 1-93–1-106, 2-14. See ports of debarkation; sea ports
planned offense, 3-21, 3-23
also criminal organizations; drug of embarkation.
organizations; guerrillas; insurgent planning, 2-143–2-160 potential adversary. See threat.
forces; internal security forces; airborne landing, 13-14–13-19
power projection. See force
irregular forces; mercenaries;
air defense, 9-50–9-55, 9-66, projection.
private security organizations;
9-72
terrorists. precision munitions and fires
centralized planning. See (OPFOR), 1-29, 3-12–3-14, 3-31,
as affiliated forces, 2-14, p. 3-1,
main entry. 3-77, 3-86, 3-110, 3-116, 4-47,
¶4-18
defensive operations, 4-24– 4-119–4-120, 5-25, 5-37, 5-52,
as source of information, 6-1 4-66 7-15, 7-40, 7-42–7-43, 7-46, 7-59,
in adaptive operations, 1-100, 7-61, 7-72, 7-64, 8-44. See also
executive planning, 2-175
1-104, 4-18 precision weapons.
fire support, 7-26–7-46, 7-80,
in disruption force, 4-119 precision weapons,
11-94
in regional operations, 1-98, enemy (U.S.), 2-125, 3-35,
heliborne landing, 13-14–13-19
1-103, 4-4 4-127, 5-25, 6-16, 6-20,
IFC, 7-33–7-37
6-43, 6-47, 7-66, 9-101,
in transition operations, 1-99,
IW, 5-64–5-66, 5-72 9-107, 10-10, 10-16, 10-19,
1-104, 3-13
influenced by systems 11-4, 11-39, 11-48, 11-70,
non-state, 1-94
warfare, 1-122 13-11, 13-48, 13-54
of the State, p. xvii, ¶1-94–1-100
logistics, 2-166, 12-27–12-29, OPFOR, 3-118, 4-104, 5-35,
partisan forces, 9-56, 13-61 12-55 5-37, 7-9, 7-40–7-43,
patterned operations. See also p. 11-1, ¶11-2, 11-25, 13-54
offensive operations, 3-21–
conventional patterns of 3-57 preliminary instructions, 2-144,
operation. 2-159, 2-164
parallel planning, 2-157,
patternless operations, 1-69, 2-140 2-159, 2-175 preservation,
peer competitor (of United States), planning factors, 2-149– of combat power (military
pp. vi, xvi 2-151, 12-9 capability, military forces),
penetration, p. 3-1, ¶3-40, 3-78– 1-51, 1-63–1-64, 1-73, 3-89,
sequential planning, 2-175
3-79, 3-87, 6-10–6-11, 11-29, 4-11, 4-13–4-15, 4-17, 4-19,
11-47 SPF planning, 13-60 4-21–4-22, 4-57, 4-77–4-78,
top-down, 7-28 4-85–4-86, 4-89, 4-92,
perception management, p. viii,
4-112, 4-114, 7-74, 7-79–
¶2-103, 2-115, 3-22, 4-25, 4-113, plausible deniability, 11-58, 13-59
7-80, 8-73, 9-8, 9-157,
5-12–5-13, 5-22, 5-44–5-47, 5-60, point protection. See air defense.
9-189, 10-31, 10-64, 11-94.
5-65, 5-69, 5-71, 5-76, 5-79–5-81,
police, See also survivability
5-85, 5-87–5-88, 7-71, 7-76–
as source of information, 3-59 measures.
7-77, 11-92, 11-96, 11-98. See
special police, 2-105, 4-53 of infrastructure, p. 12-1 |
7-100.1 | 357 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
preservation (continued) radar intercept and direction in adaptive operations, 6-50–
finding, 6-25, 6-27, 6-36, 8-38, 6-51
of information infrastructure,
5-38, 5-61, 5-71 9-97 in amphibious landing, 13-92,
radar jamming. See air defense 13-109
of instruments of power, 1-6,
1-45, 1-49, 1-111, 4-7, jamming. in disruption force, 4-119
4-13, 5-83 radio(s). See communications. information requirements.
of regime, 1-48–1-49, 1-51, radio frequency weapons, 5-37 See main entry.
4-57, 4-77, 11-32 radio intercept and direction in IFC, 2-47, 2-49-2-50, 7-15–
principle(s), finding, 6-25, 6-36, 8-38, 9-97, 7-16, 7-19–7-20, 7-60
of air defense, 9-11–9-21 9-126 in regional operations, 6-46–
of C2, 2-3–2-6 radio silence, 2-226–2-227, 8-60, 6-47
9-59, 9-120, 9-164, 13-23 in transition operations, 6-48–
of fire support, 7-4
raid(s), 1-76, 3-13, 4-96, 6-11–6-12, 6-49
of movement (transportation),
9-8, 9-56, 9-62, 9-64, 9-194, mechanized infantry, 6-12,
12-54–12-61
13-13, 13-46, 13-50, 13-61, 6-43
of operation versus an extra- 13-64, 13-66, 13-68, 13-77,
mission, 6-1
regional power, p. xviii, 13-79, 13-81, 13-85–13-86,
¶1-54–1-78, 1-89, 10-59 13-92, 13-97–13-98, 13-109 NBC reconnaissance. See
main entry.
of reconnaissance, 6-4–6-16 raiding forces, 4-117
operational reconnaissance,
of systems warfare, 1-109 rear area security. See support
6-2, 6-21, 6-34–6-44, 8-45,
prisoners of war, 6-12 zone security.
13-48, 13-59
private volunteer organizations, reconnaissance, pp. 6-1–6-10.
principles, 6-4–6-16
4-10, 5-46 See also RISTA.
priorities, 6-17–6-21, 7-53
protected force, 4-57, 4-77 aerial reconnaissance. See
main entry. reconnaissance aircraft,
protection and security measures.
6-26–6-28, 6-37, 8-4, 8-46
See information warfare. affiliated forces, 4-25
reconnaissance ambush,
psychological effects, 9-6, 9-12, aggressiveness, 6-10–6-12
6-11–6-12
p. 11-1, ¶11-93, 13-53, 13-71 airborne forces, 6-41
reconnaissance attacks,
psychological warfare, 2-115, air defense, 9-109–9-126. 6-10–6-11, 6-43
5-12, 5-44–5-45, 5-71, 10-75. See also air surveillance.
reconnaissance detachment,
See also information warfare;
chemical reconnaissance. 2-221, 6-43
perception management.
See chemical defense;
reconnaissance plan, 1-102,
pursuit, 3-71 NBC reconnaissance.
2-170, 3-23, 4-26, 6-5–6-6,
chief of reconnaissance, OSC 6-10, 6-14, 6-44, 7-54, 8-45
R staff. See main entry.
reconnaissance reserve,
radar(s), combined arms effort, 6-1, 6-43 6-17, 6-35
air defense, 9-83, 9-88, 9-108, commander’s reconnaissance, reconnaissance subsection,
9-113–9-121, 9-156, 9-183 7-31 OSC staff, 2-100, 2-102
battlefield surveillance, 6-38 commando units, 13-76– reconnaissance units, 6-1
13-79, 13-83–13-85
countermortar/counterbattery, reconstitution of, 3-64, 4-79,
6-38 engineer reconnaissance. 6-9
See engineer support.
limiting or eliminating radar reporting procedures, 6-44,
emissions, 8-60, 9-108, ground reconnaissance, 3-59, 7-54, 11-66
9-120, 9-174–9-175 3-96, 6-5, 6-43–6-44, 13-17
route reconnaissance. See
side-looking airborne radar, heliborne reconnaissance, main entry.
6-27, 8-38 6-37, 8-10–8-11, 13-13
satellite reconnaissance,
synthetic aperture radar, 8-38 imagery, p. viii, ¶6-30–6-31, p. viii, ¶3-96, 6-7, 6-30–
radar corner reflectors, 5-25, 9-96, 8-38, 9-185, 10-29. See also 6-33, 9-185
satellite reconnaissance.
9-100, 9-104, 10-23 |
7-100.1 | 358 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
reconnaissance (continued) NBC use, 11-33, 11-92– resources section,
signals reconnaissance. See 11-93, 11-95 in IFC staff, 2-51
main entry. paramilitary forces, 1-98, in ISC staff, 12-38
1-103, 4-4
Special-Purpose Forces. See in OSC staff, 2-106–2-108,
main entry; see also primarily offensive, 1-34, 12-33
special reconnaissance. 1-87, 3-3
resupply. See logistics; supply.
special reconnaissance, reconnaissance, 6-46–6-47
RISTA (reconnaissance,
13-48–13-49 regional air superiority, p. 8-1, intelligence, surveillance, and
strategic reconnaissance, ¶8-68–8-72 target acquisition). See also the
6-2, 6-19, 6-22–6-33, 8-45, SPF, 2-57, 13-38, 13-64 separate parts.
13-37, 13-48, 13-55, 13-59,
regular forces (active component), component of combat system,
13-65, 13-69
2-24, 12-66 1-114–1-115, 1-118
support of IW, 5-27, 5-39
rehearsal(s), 2-171, 3-62, 4-62, enemy, as targets, 1-115,
tactical reconnaissance, 6-2, 4-64, 4-75, 8-51 1-118, 3-2, 3-35, 4-55, 4-68,
6-21, 6-43–6-44, 8-45, 13-48 4-127, 5-25, 5-56, 5-82,
reinforcements, 12-101, 12-105
tank units, 6-43 5-86, 5-89, 6-47, 6-50, 7-40,
relationship(s),regional and global,
7-57, 7-66, 7-77, 9-5–9-6,
terrain reconnaissance, p. vii
11-4, 11-96, 13-48, 13-54
9-109–9-110, 9-178
religion, p. viii
in IFC, 2-47, 2-49, 2-51, 7-16,
reconnaissance fire(s), 3-112,
remotely-piloted vehicles, 6-29. 7-19–7-20, 7-58
3-114, 4-52, 4-87, 4-96, 4-121,
See also unmanned aerial
4-130, 7-41, 7-59–7-62, 7-80, RISTA and IW section, ISC
vehicles.
9-8, 9-157, 12-28 staff, 2-51, 5-71
repair. See maintenance.
reconstitution, 3-64, 4-79, 6-9, sophisticated ambush, 3-93
12-69, 12-74, 12-100, 12-102– replacement, road construction. See engineer
12-104 of equipment, 2-107, 12-35, support; route(s).
recovery. See evacuation. 12-101–12-102 rocket artillery, 10-40. See
refugees, pp. viii, xv, ¶11-24, 13-62 of personnel, 2-108, 12-36, multiple rocket launchers.
12-69, 12-71–12-76, 12-100
regional and global relationships, rogue actors, non-state, p. xv
p. vii reserve forces, rogue state(s), p. xiv
regional operations, 1-6, 1-34– in organization of battlefield, rotary-wing aircraft. See helicopters.
1-38, 1-87 3-46. 3-57, 4-47, 4-60–4-65,
route(s). See also movement route(s).
4-71, 4-94, 4-104, 4-106,
air defense, 9-27, 9-81–9-82,
8-51, 8-61, 9-131, 9-158, route clearing, 10-11, 10-64
9-189–9-190
9-170, 9-193, 10-12–10-13, route preparation and
amphibious landings, 13-86, 10-54, 13-35. See also maintenance, 10-9–10-13,
13-104–13-106 antilanding reserve; 10-16–10-18, 10-34, 12-65
attacks to destroy, 3-18 antitank reserve; chemical
route reconnaissance, 8-10,
defense reserve; engineer
attacks to seize, 3-19 10-9, 10-25–10-27, 10-67
reserve; maneuver
aviation, 7-73, 8-43, 8-68– reserve; reconnaissance roving air defense units, 9-161,
8-70 reserve; special reserves. 9-178
defensive operations, 4-2– reserve component of Armed rules of engagement, enemy. See
4-5, 4-83 Forces, 2-24, 4-11, 12-44, United States.
engineer support, 10-59– 12-66, 12-75, 12-105. See ruses, 2-146
10-61 also militia; mobilization of
fire support, 7-73–7-74 reserves.
S
heliborne forces, 13-2 resources officer, OSC staff,
sabotage, 6-11, 9-64, 9-194
2-106, 2-192, 2-218–2-219,
IW support of, 5-79–5-80
12-27, 12-33–12-34, 12-39– by amphibious landing force,
offensive operations, 1-34,
12-40, 12-55, 12-65 13-92
1-87, 3-2–3-7, 3-18–3-19
by heliborne forces, 13-13 |
7-100.1 | 359 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
sabotage (continued) service component headquarters, smoke barrels, 11-74, 11-83
by information attack, 5-49 2-24, 2-26, 2-37, 13-40–13-41, smoke bombs, 11-74, 11-77
13-45
by SPF teams/agents, 13-50, smoke drums, 11-74
services, 12-23–12-24, 12-37, 12-44,
13-55–13-59 smoke-generating trucks,
12-46–12-47. See logistics.
sanctuary, 1-75, 1-77–1-78, 2-186, 11-71, 11-74, 11-77,
4-17 shielding force, 4-98–4-100, 4-108 11-83–11-85
air defense of, 9-21, 9-154, side-looking airborne radar, 6-27, smoke grenades, 11-74–
9-156, 9-162–9-165 8-38 11-75, 11-83
denied to enemy, 1-29, 1-78, signal(s). See communications. smoke pots, 11-74, 11-77,
7-7, 9-61, 10-70, 11-93, signals reconnaissance, 3-55, 4-58, 11-83
11-97, 13-53 5-25, 6-25–6-27, 6-30, 6-33– smokescreens. See main
engineer preparation, 10-34 6-34, 6-36, 8-38, 8-46, 13-17. entry.
See also electronic warfare;
moral sanctuary, 1-75, 4-17, smoke units, 11-71
jamming; radar intercept and
7-81 direction finding; radio intercept spray tanks, 11-74, 11-77
physical sanctuary, 1-75, 4-17 and direction finding. toxic smokes, 11-70, 11-72
sanctuary-based operations, signature reduction, 5-42, 5-63, vehicle engine exhaust
1-75, 3-10, 3-16, 4-11, 4-17, 9-30, 10-21, 12-12, 12-14 smoke systems, 11-74,
4-90, 6-50, 8-74, 10-62 simultaneous battlefield/ 11-76, 11-83
support zone, 2-78 operations, 1-78, 9-61, 12-52, smokescreens, 9-103, 11-78
satellite. See communications; 13-52–13-53 blinding, 11-79–11-80
reconnaissance; space. single-round rocket launchers,
camouflage, 11-81–11-86
scatterable mines. See mines. 9-58, 9-60
decoy, 11-87
sea ports of debarkation (enemy), situational awareness,
protective, 11-86
as targets, 1-61, 1-104, 6-48, enemy. See United States.
sociological demographics, p. viii,
7-77, 8-71, 10-58, 11-96. OPFOR, p. viii, ¶2-130, 3-23
¶2-128
See also ports.
situational defense, 4-27–4-31,
sophisticated ambush, 3-11, 3-31,
sea ports of embarkation (enemy), 4-111, 10-40
3-92–3-97, 4-119, 6-49
as targets, 1-60, 8-71. See situational obstacles, 3-77, 3-86,
sound ranging, 6-38, 9-184.
also ports. 3-116
space,
search and rescue. See combat situational offense, 3-21, 3-24–
search and rescue. 3-27, 3-99 space-based assets (enemy),
5-1
sectors. See air defense. situational understanding. See
space-based assets
security force(s), 2-78, 11-67, situational awareness.
(OPFOR), 5-16
13-13, 13-83 smoke, 11-70–11-98
space defense, 2-112
defensive operations, 4-25, air-delivered, 11-74, 11-77,
4-41, 4-58, 12-98 11-79 special mission net, 2-221
offensive operations, 3-42, artillery-delivered, 11-74, special police, 2-105, 4-53
3-46, 3-55 11-77, 11-79, 11-90 Special-Purpose Forces, 1-59, 3-32,
security force commander, 4-58 camouflage smoke, 5-43 11-29, p. 13-1, ¶13-7–13-85
semiactive laser-guided delivery systems, 11-74–11-77 abduction, 13-50
projectiles, 7-42 administrative force structure,
in air defense ambush, 9-173
sensor-fuzed submunitions, 7-42 13-41–13-42
in antilanding reserve, 4-64
sequels, 2-5. See also branches air defense role, 9-2, 9-56,
in defense, 11-89–11-90
and sequels. 9-61–9-62, 9-67, 9-76,
in offense, 3-87, 3-117, 11-88 9-81, 9-123, 9-144, 9-185,
service component(s), Armed
neutral smoke, 11-70, 11-72 9-189, 9-194
Forces, 2-16
protective smoke, 11-86
signaling smoke, 11-91 |
7-100.1 | 360 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Special-Purpose Forces in strategic operations, 13-68 support of insurgent/irregular
(continued) in transition operations, 2-57, forces, 1-102, 1-104, 2-58,
9-194, 13-37, 13-54, 13-59,
Air Force SPF, 2-57, 6-23, 13-38, 13-65–13-66
13-61, 13-64–13-65, 13-69
13-38–13-42, 13-45, insertion by air, 13-39, 13-66
13-52, 13-64, 13-66 support of IW, 5-35, 13-51
insertion by Navy, 13-39,
allocated to DTG or BTG, 13-66, 13-68 support of terrorism, 2-58,
2-59, 13-40, 13-44–13-45 13-37, 13-64–13-65
Internal Security Forces SPF,
allocated to OSC, p. 13-1, 6-23, 13-38, 13-40, 13-45 task organization, 13-40,
¶16-23, 13-38, 13-40– 13-42–13-47
joint SPF operations, 6-23,
3-41, 13-43–13-45, 13-47, terminal guidance for
13-45, 13-68
13-52, 13-60–13-61, 13-63, weapons, 13-54
13-71 logistics, 12-29
terror tactics, 13-59, 13-65
allocation to theater HQ, missions, 13-52–13-70
train affiliated forces, 13-49
13-43–13-45, 13-47 Naval SPF, 2-57, 6-23, 13-38–
train and control agents,
ambushes, 13-50, 13-61 13-42, 13-45, 13-52, 13-64,
13-49, 13-55
13-66, 13-86
amphibious landings, 13-86,
Special-Purpose Forces Command,
13-88, 13-92, 13-95– NBC delivery, 11-3, 11-8,
6-23, 13-37–13-38, 13-40-13-42,
13-96, 13-108 11-30, 11-52, 11-55, 13-70
13-52
antilanding reserve, 4-64 planning, 13-60
air defense role, 9-2, 9-81
Army SPF, 2-26, 2-57, 6-23, raids, 3-13, 9-194, 13-46,
commando units, 13-37,
13-38, 13-40–13-42, 13-45, 13-50, 13-61, 13-64,
13-72–13-74. See also
13-52, 13-64, 13-66 13-66, 13-68, 13-86
main entry.
assassination, 13-50, 13-54, reconnaissance, 2-58, 6-12,
control of joint SPF operations,
13-58–13-59 6-23–6-24, 6-34–6-35, 13-17,
6-23, 13-45, 13-68
13-37–13-39, 13-48–13-49,
combat search and rescue,
13-54–13-55, 13-59, 13-61, direct action, 13-37
13-50
13-64–13-65, 13-69, 13-76– forces allocated to IFC, 2-27
command and control, 13-40– 13-79, 13-83–13-86. See
13-47 also special reconnaissance. forces allocated to theater, 2-25
commandos. See main entry. sabotage, 13-50, 13-55–13-59 forces centrally controlled at
national level, 2-26, 6-23,
direct action, 2-58, 4-52, 4-64, security force, 3-55, 4-58 13-41
9-81, 9-185, 13-37–13-39,
13-48, 13-50–13-51, 13-59, special reconnaissance, in adaptive operations, 13-38,
13-61, 13-64–13-65, 13-68– 13-48–13-49 13-68–13-69
13-69 SPF annex, operation plan, in regional operations, 13-38,
disruption force, 3-32, 4-37, 2-167 13-64
4-52–4-53, 9-144, 13-63 SPF Command. See main in strategic operations, 13-68
entry.
diversionary measures, 2-58, in transition operations, 13-38,
13-49, 13-51 SPF component of IFC, 2-57– 13-65
2-59, 13-44, 13-63, 13-71
exploitation force, 3-88 strategic reconnaissance,
force projection, p. 13-1, SPF detachment, 13-46–13-47 13-37, 13-55, 13-59
¶13-39, 13-47, 13-52, SPF teams, 2-59, 13-42, support of irregular forces,
13-66, 13-70 13-46–13-47, 13-55, 13-70
13-58–13-59, 13-65, 13-92
hostage rescue, 13-50 tactical transport, 13-37
strategic objectives, 2-58,
hostage-taking, 13-50 trains and controls agents,
p. 13-1, ¶13-41, 13-44–
in adaptive operations, 2-57, 13-45, 13-52, 13-71 13-55
9-194, 13-38, 13-67–13-70 special reconnaissance, 13-48–
strategic operations, 1-29
infiltration, 9-62, 9-67 13-49
support of amphibious
in regional operations, 2-57, landing, 13-54, 13-64, 13-95 special reserves, 4-65
13-38, 13-64 |
7-100.1 | 361 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
spin management. See perception threats to the State. See main Strategic Integration Department,
management. entry 1-3, 1-19
spoiling attack, 3-25, 3-98–3-102, views of the United States, organizes civil engineering
4-25, 4-115, 9-8 p. x support, 12-65
staff (OSC), 2-81, 2-89–2-118, 7-33 stay-behind forces, 3-32, 4-38, responsible for national SCP,
4-52, 9-58, 9-62, 12-94, 13-61, 1-19, 2-148
functional staff, 2-109–2-117,
2-188, 5-71, 10-4, 10-8, 13-85 responsible for strategic IW
11-5–11-6, 13-95 stockpiles (war stocks), 12-2, plan, 5-54–5-55
primary staff, 2-93–2-108 12-5–12-10, 12-14, 12-25. See strategic-level courses of action,
also storage. 1-6–1-14, 1-86. See also
secondary staff, 2-93–2-108
mobile reserves, 12-9, 12-93 adaptive operations, regional
staging areas/bases,
operations, strategic
mobilization reserves, 12-8
enemy, as targets, 6-48, operations, and transition
national-level reserves, 12-6,
9-49, 13-52 operations.
12-10, 12-64
for OPFOR airborne or strategic offense, 1-89
strategic reserves, 12-6–12-7,
heliborne landings, 13-21
strategic operations, 1-6–1-7,
12-10, 12-64
stalemate, 1-49, 4-78 1-12, 1-14, 1-23, 1-27–1-33
storage. See also depot(s);
State, p. xvi defensive actions, 1-30
stockpiles.
disproportionate interests, 1-68 during adaptive operations,
aboveground facilities, 12-10,
doctrine, pp. xvi, xix, ¶1-47 12-12 1-14, 1-31, 4-15, 4-78,
4-85, 4-112
goals. See strategic goals. bunkers, 12-12–12-13
during regional operations,
information infrastructure, short-duration facilities,
1-30, 1-36
5-38, 5-61, 5-71 10-34, 12-14, 12-28
during transition operations,
information technology, 5-15– underground structures,
1-14, 1-31
5-16 12-10, 12-13, 12-85
IW support of, 1-29, 5-75–5-78
logistics system, 12-1–12-4. strategic campaign, 1-15–1-26,
See also logistics. 1-85, 3-1, 3-17, 4-3, 4-19, 5-8, means, 1-27, 1-30–1-32
military capabilities, p. xvi, 5-56, 7-17, 8-1, 8-3, 8-11, 8-68– target enemy strategic
¶1-6, 1-42, 1-47, 3-4, 3-6, 8-69, 9-50, p. 10-1, ¶11-22, 13-8. centers of gravity, 1-6,
4-2–4-3, 4-6, 4-12 strategic campaign plan. See 1-28, 1-32–1-33, 4-78
National Command Authority. military SCP; national SCP. timeframe, 1-7
See main entry. strategic centers of gravity, enemy strategic preclusion. See access-
national industrial base, 12-1 (U.S.), 1-6, 1-28, 1-32–1-33, control operations
national power, instruments 4-78, 5-12, 5-45, 5-77, 13-53 strategic reconnaissance. See
of, p. xvii. See main entry strategic environment, p. xi reconnaissance.
on national power. strategic defense, 1-87 strategy. See military strategy;
national security strategy. Strategic Forces, 2-26 national security strategy.
See main entry. strike, 3-110–3-118, 4-36, 4-113,
NBC delivery, 11-35
national will, pp. ix–x, ¶1-68, 4-121, 10-67
SSM units for IFC, 2-56
5-77, 5-80, 5-84 fire support to, 7-58–7-59,
support of air defense, 9-81
not a peer competitor of 7-69–7-70
strategic framework, pp. 1-1–1-26
United States, p. xvi in offense or defense, 3-110
strategic goal(s), 1-4–1-5, 1-9, 1-15–
regional power, p. xvi IFC CP control, 2-47
1-17, 1-48, 2-32, 2-58, 2-112,
strategic goal(s). See main logistics, 12-28
3-8, 3-17, 4-9, 4-19, 5-53–5-54,
entry.
5-65, 5-72, 5-75, 7-17, 8-62, 8-77 reconnaissance fire, 7-60, 7-62
strategy. See national
strategic information warfare. See submarines. See Navy.
security strategy.
information warfare. subnational political movements,
technology. See main entry.
p. xv |
7-100.1 | 362 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
subordinate forces. See medium-range, 9-43, 9-68, sympathizers (civilian, of OPFOR),
constituent forces; dedicated 9-73, 9-83, 9-86, 9-90, 9-52, 9-64, 9-123, 11-8, 11-52,
forces. 9-130–9-131, 9-133–9-134 11-55, 13-17
supply, 2-107, 12-20, 12-23–12-24, short-range, 9-73, 9-90, synthetic aperture radar, 8-38
12-35, 12-37, 12-44–12-45, 9-133–9-134 system, 1-107
12-47–12-49, 12-93. See also shoulder-fired, 9-61, 9-67, system of systems, 1-107, 1-114,
logistics; materiel support. 9-84, 9-86, 9-88, 9-90– 4-67, 7-5
supply (and evacuation) 9-92, 9-133, 9-144, 9-164,
systems warfare, 1-89, 1-107–
routes, 10-16, 12-65, 9-171, 9-194
1-122, 4-67
12-96, 12-99. surface-to-surface missiles, 1-59,
operational level, 1-113–1-119,
supply point(s), 12-1, 12-47– 5-35, 7-2, 7-38. See also
2-133, 3-91, 5-57, 7-2, 7-5–
12-48, 12-96 tactical ballistic missiles.
7-6, 7-57, 7-75, 10-57
support group, in CP, 2-180 air defense role, 9-2, 9-56
principle, 1-109
supporting relationship, 2-13, 2-83, as dedicated units, 2-12
strategic level, 1-110–1-112
2-135, 4-104, 7-18, 7-20, 7-24– conventional munitions, 2-55–
7-25, 7-35, 8-19, 9-38, 10-3– 2-56 tactical level, 1-120
10-4, 10-48, 11-5–11-6, 12-32,
in adaptive operations, 2-56
13-5, 13-11, 13-44, 13-74 T
in IFC, 2-47, 2-55–2-56, 7-16
support line, 2-71
tactical ballistic missiles, 9-131,
in regional operations, 2-56,
support net, 2-218 9-189, 9-193–9-194. See also
7-73
support operations coordination surface-to-surface missiles.
in transition operations, 2-56
center, ISC staff, 12-38 tactical group, 2-43–2-46, 6-21,
NBC munitions, 2-55, 7-44,
support zone, 2-69–2-71, 2-79 6-34, 6-43, 8-4, 8-11, 8-20. See
11-3, 11-30, 11-26, 12-1
also brigade tactical group;
air defense, 9-70, 9-85,
precision munitions, 7-42 division tactical group.
9-134, 9-148, 9-159
reconnaissance fire(s), 7-61 tanker (aircraft), 8-3
commando units, 13-83
support of airborne or target acquisition. See air
defensive operations, 4-34,
heliborne landing, 13-18 defense; artillery.
4-41, 4-57–4-58, 4-83,
12-92, 12-96 support of amphibious target area. See air defense.
landing, 13-88
engineer support, 10-2, 10-47 target damage criteria, 7-9–7-13,
surprise, 3-11, 7-4, 8-60, 9-11– 7-27, 7-47, 7-50, 7-57, 7-62, 7-68
offensive operations, 3-29,
9-14, 9-168, 9-174, 11-23, 11-39,
3-42, 3-55, 9-148, 12-88 target value analysis, 7-21, 7-47,
11-44, 12-87, 13-14, 13-18,
8-76
noncontiguous, 2-78 13-33, 13-50, 13-54, 13-77,
task organization, 2-37, 2-39, 2-41,
support-zone security, 1-97–1-98, 13-81, 13-109
2-47, 2-49, 2-52, 2-54–2-55,
1-100, 12-2, 12-97–12-98, 13-83 survivability measures,
2-148, 2-210, 4-18, 4-59, 4-103,
suppression of enemy air defenses, command and control, 2-7, 5-68, 7-16, 7-19, 8-2, 8-4, 8-7,
8-21, 8-58, 11-4, 13-18, 13-22– 2-181-2-182, 2-188, 2-203, 8-9, 8-11–8-12, 8-15–8-16, 10-1,
13-23, 13-48, 13-54, 13-61 2-205, 2-228–2-233, 5-61 10-5–10-9, 10-25, 10-48–10-49,
Supreme High Command, 1-25, communications, 2-207, 10-64, 12-18–12-21, 12-40–
1-94, 1-97, 2-16, 2-20–2-22, 2-228–2-232 12-41, 12-43, 13-11, 13-40,
2-25, 2-31. 2-43–2-44, 2-56, 13-42–13-47, 13-74
engineer, 4-69-4-71, 4-87,
2-141, 2-174, 2-224, 8-3, 13-5,
p. 10-1, ¶10-7–10-8, technological overmatch,
13-8, 13-11, 13-41, 13-93
10-10, 10-31–10-35, by extraregional enemy (U.S.),
surface-to-air missiles, 9-34, 9-96, 10-61, 10-66, 10-69 pp. vi, ixx, xvi, 1-12, 4-6,
9-98, 9-108, 9-119, 9-137, 9-143,
sustainment. See logistics. 4-9, 4-14–4-15, 4-85, 4-90,
9-154, 9-161, 9-169
5-74, 5-85, 7-1, p. 8-1,
sustainment command post,
long-range, 9-68, 9-83, 9-86, ¶8-37, 8-71, 9-188, 11-50,
2-183, 2-192, 2-223, 12-34, 12-39
9-134 11-94
resources officer in charge,
2-106, 12-34 |
7-100.1 | 363 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
technological overmatch 2-14, 4-53, 9-52, 9-61, 9-64, threat(s) to the State,
(continued) 9-194, 9-194, 11-8, 11-55 extraregional, p. xvi, ¶3-3, 4-6.
by the State, pp. ix, xvi, ¶3-4, SPF support of, 2-58, 13-37, See also United States.
3-75, 4-2–4-3, 7-1, 7-73, 13-64–13-65 insurgent, 1-17, 3-55, 4-58
p. 8-1, ¶8-68, 11-59 state-sponsored, p. xiv internal, 1-6, 3-3, 4-4
neutralization of, pp. vi, viii, support of IW, 5-35 regional, p. xvi, ¶1-6, 1-9,
¶1-69–1-72, 5-18–5-19
threat to State, 3-55, 4-58 1-11, 1-37
technology, p. ix
terror tactics, 1-73, 7-76, 9-61, threat(s), to the United States,
commercial off-the-shelf, 9-64, 13-59, 13-65 pp. xii–xiii
p. viii, ¶5-15, 5-17
theater(s), 1-24, 2-19–2-22, 2-33– throughput, 12-49, 12-91. See
global market, pp. vi, xviii 2-35, 6-5, 7-24, 8-1–8-2, 8-9– materiel support.
hybridization, p. ix 8-11, 8-20, 8-50, 13-10, 13-43, time, p. x, ¶1-48, 1-64–1-66, 1-69,
information technology, 2-153, 13-93 2-154, 2-157–2-158, 2-162, 3-5,
p. 5-1, ¶5-2, 5-14–5-15 establishing a new theater, 3-14, 3-23, 3-26, 4-5, 4-10–4-11,
13-10 4-15, 4-69, 4-78, 4-85, 4-90, 4-92,
modernization, pp. vi, xvii,
4-116, 4-131, 6-13, 7-17, 7-61,
¶8-33–8-34 out-of-theater operations. See
7-51, 7-68, 10-63, 10-73. See
force projection.
niche, p. ix, ¶3-11, 9-80,
also tempo.
9-195 theater air armies, 2-25, 8-1,
total war, 1-68, 12-1
8-5–8-7, 8-13, 8-23–8-24,
technological overmatch. See
11-30 toxic industrial chemicals, 11-13–
main entry.
11-18
theater campaign, 1-85, 7-17,
technological surprise, 3-11
8-5, 8-10, 13-60–13-61 traffic control, 1-98–1-99, 2-96,
upgrades, p. ix, ¶12-50
12-57
theater campaign plan, 2-21,
vulnerability, 5-17
2-148 traffic management, 12-53, 12-56–
tempo, 12-57. See also movement
theater commander, 1-85,
control of, p. x, ¶1-45, 1-65– 2-33, 2-35, 2-56, 2-148, control; traffic control.
1-66, 1-69, 2-5, 3-4–3-5, 3-7– 2-184, 3-32, 6-37, 7-17, transition operations, 1-6–1-7,
3-9, 3-67, 3-90, 3-98, 3-103, 8-13–8-14, 8-23–8-24, 8-76– 1-13, 1-39–1-46, 1-88
4-8, 5-59, 5-89, 7-45, 7-77, 8-77, 9-49, 13-5–13-6, airborne/heliborne forces, 13-3
7-80, 8-71, 9-142, 10-16, 13-43–13-44, 13-95–13-96
air defense, 3-13, 9-153,
10-37, 10-68, 10-70, 11-47,
theater CPs, 2-184, 2-195 9-191–9-192
12-59, 12-91, 13-1, 13-91
theater disruption zone, 3-32 amphibious landings, 13-86,
prolong the conflict, p. x,
theater headquarters, 2-19– 13-107
¶1-66, 4-72
2-22, 2-25, 2-37, 2-43–2-44, attacks to destroy, 3-18
terminally homing projectiles, 7-42
2-92, 2-141, 2-148, 2-174,
attack to expel, 3-20
terrain, p. viii, ¶2-127, 2-131, p. 6-1, 2-184, 2-224, 5-55, 6-23,
¶6-3, 6-8, 6-40, 9-13, 9-74, 9-103– 8-5, 8-10–8-11, 8-14, 8-23– attacks to seize, 3-19
9-104, 9-142, 9-166, 10-10, 10-13, 8-25, 9-29, 13-5, 13-43, aviation, 8-68–8-70
10-15, 10-18, 10-23, 10-26–10-28, 13-45, 13-47
consolidate gains, 3-8–3-9
10-30–10-31, 10-34, 10-39,
theater IFC, 7-17, 7-24, 7-28,
10-68–10-69, 11-23, 11-82, 11-85, defensive operations, 1-45,
8-7, 8-10–8-11, 8-13–8-14.
11-87, 12-19, 13-16, 13-35, 13-77, 3-9, 4-6–4-12, 4-25, 4-28,
See integrated fires
13-80–13-81. See also complex 4-83, 4-90, 4-103, 4-113,
command.
terrain; physical environment; 4-118
third-party actor(s), p. xv
urban environments. engineer support, 10-59,
terrain reconnaissance, 9-109– as shields, p. viii 10-61–10-63
9-111, 9-178 affiliated with State, 2-14 fire support, 7-75–7-78
terrorists, p. xv conducting IW, 5-9, 5-28, IW support of, 5-81–5-85,
affiliated with State, 1-95–1-96, 5-35, 5-46, 5-51 10-62
1-99, 1-100, 1-105–1-106, NBC use, 11-96 |
7-100.1 | 364 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
transition operations (continued) United States (as extraregional strategic centers of gravity,
power), 1-6, 1-28, 1-32–1-33, 4-78,
offensive operations, 1-45,
3-8–3-13, 3-18–3-20, 3-22, aversion to heavy losses, 5-12, 5-45, 5-77, 13-53
4-7–4-8 1-67–1-68. See also sensitivity to domestic and
casualties. world opinion, 1-67
paramilitary forces, 1-99,
1-104, 3-13 coalitions, vulnerability of, technology and warfighting
p. vii, ¶5-77, 5-85, 6-22, capability, p. ix. See also
reconnaissance, 6-48–6-49
13-10 technological overmatch.
SPF, 2-57, 13-38, 13-65–13-66
commitment, lack of, 1-66–1-67 threat(s) to, pp. xii–xiii
transition states, p. xiv
critical infrastructure, as views of, p. x
transmission security, 5-41
target, 5-5, 5-20, 5-35, unmanned aerial vehicles,
transnational corporations, pp. ix, 5-49, 5-53, 13-52
air defense against, 9-5, 9-41,
xv
early-entry forces, p. x, ¶1-74, 9-125, 9-179–9-187
transnational political movements, 3-10, 4-12, 6-49, 8-44, 13-65,
attack roles, 8-41
p. xv 13-107
deception roles, 8-41
transport aircraft, 8-3, 8-11, force projection, vulnerability
13-21–13-22, 13-37, 13-39 of, p. x, ¶1-55, 1-73, 4-5, logistics roles, 8-41
transport helicopters. See 4-10, 13-59, 13-65 reconnaissance, 3-96, 6-7,
helicopters. homeland, as target, 1-60, 6-26, 6-29, 6-37, 6-42, 8-41,
transportation, 12-37, 12-52–12-65. 9-191, 11-55, 13-52–13-53 9-180. See also drones;
remotely-piloted vehicles.
See also movement; traffic home stations, as targets,
control; traffic management. 1-60, 13-52 urban environments, pp. viii–ix,
¶1-49, 1-75, 1-77, 4-72, 7-81,
air, 12-60, 12-62–12-63, information dominance, 1-71,
9-171, 11-14–11-15, 11-24,
12-76, 12-80, 12-91 p. 5-1, ¶5-18–5-19, 5-58,
11-56, 12-86. See also complex
civilian assets, 12-53–12-54 5-60, 5-82, 5-89–5-90,
terrain; physical environment;
7-79–7-80
coastal waterway, 12-60, 12-62 terrain.
intervention by, pp. vi, xvi,
convoys, 12-57, 12-59
xviii, ¶1-6, 1-47
inland waterway, 12-60, V
key systems (U.S.), as
12-62, 12-76, 12-80
targets. See main entry. variables, of COE. See critical
military transportation center, variables.
national will (U.S.), pp. ix–x,
12-53
¶1-28, 1-33, 1-51, 1-58, victory, p. x, ¶1-49, p. 2-1, p. 3-1
principles, of movement,
1-67, 1-78, 1-119, 3-27, views of the United States, p. x
12-54–12-61
3-69, 3-72–3-73, 3-81,
rail, 12-60, 12-62, 12-64, 12-76 3-96, 3-111, 4-15, 4-117,
W
road (motor vehicle), 12-60, 5-3, 5-19, 5-76–5-77, 5-89,
12-61–12-64, 12-76, 12-80 7-8, 9-61, 13-51, 13-53– warning order. See preliminary
13-54, 13-59, 13-62, 13-66 instructions.
units, 12-23–12-24
OPFOR principles of water obstacle crossing,
tunnels, 10-69, 12-13
operation versus an air defense of, 9-167, 9-170
turning movement, p. 3-1
extraregional power (U.S.),
engineer support, 10-5, 10-13,
p. xviii, ¶1-54–1-78, 1-89,
10-25–10-26, 10-28, 10-61,
U 10-59
10-71–10-72. See also gap
unconventional forces, 1-38, 4-18 rules of engagement (U.S), crossing.
1-61, 1-73
underground facilities, NBC use, 11-41
situational awareness (U.S),
medical, 12-13–12-14, 12-85 smoke use, 11-87
p. viii, ¶1-71, 3-23, 3-74,
shelters for aircraft, 8-44 3-83–3-84, 3-97, 3-113, water purification, 10-10, 11-63
storage, 12-10, 12-13, 12-85 4-26, 4-68, 5-31, 5-82, water supply, 10-10, 10-18, 10-25,
5-90, 6-51, 7-79 10-30, 10-63
unit distribution, 12-49. See
materiel support. |
7-100.1 | 365 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
weapons of mass destruction,
1-59, p. 11-1
chief of WMD, OSC staff,
2-114, 11-5
in strategic operations, 1-29
offensive use, 2-114, 3-12,
3-13, 3-51, 6-19, 9-63,
11-5, 11-14
WMD conditions, 2-204, 3-55,
4-58, 4-65, 11-33, 11-59
WMD-like events, 11-98
weather, p. viii, ¶1-70, 2-127, p. 6-1,
¶6-3, 6-8, 6-38, 8-35–8-36, 9-17,
9-106, 9-172–9-173, 10-72,
11-12, 11-82, 11-85, 11-87.
See also physical environment.
wide area network, 2-209
window of opportunity. See
opportunity.
Z
zones. See attack zone; battle
zone; disruption zone; kill zone;
support zone; (air defense)
zones of responsibility. |
7-100.1 | 367 | FM 7-100.1
27 DECEMBER 2004
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
SANDRA R. RILEY
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0432104
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in |
3-07 | 1 | FM 3-07
STABILITY
JUNE 2014
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. |
3-07 | 2 | This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online
(https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html).
To receive publishing updates, please subscribe at |
3-07 | 3 | *FM 3-07
Field Manual Headquarters
Department of the Army
No. 3-07
Washington, DC, 2 June 2014
Stability
Contents
Page
PREFACE.............................................................................................................. iii
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... iv
Chapter 1 STABILITY TASKS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS ............................................ 1-1
Primary Stability Tasks ....................................................................................... 1-1
Identification and Accomplishment of Stability Tasks ........................................ 1-5
Related Activities and Missions .......................................................................... 1-6
Chapter 2 STABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRANSITIONS ..................................... 2-1
Stability Transition Levels ................................................................................... 2-1
Transition of Stability Tasks ................................................................................ 2-4
Transitional Military Authority ............................................................................. 2-7
Interim Civil Authority ........................................................................................ 2-16
Chapter 3 CONSIDERATIONS TO ACHIEVE UNITY OF EFFORT .................................. 3-1
Whole-of-Government Approach ........................................................................ 3-1
Comprehensive Approach ................................................................................ 3-19
Chapter 4 STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS ................................................... 4-1
Importance of Assessing Stability Tasks ............................................................ 4-1
District Stability Framework ................................................................................ 4-1
Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework .................................................... 4-3
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1
INDEX .......................................................................................................... Index-1
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-07, Stability Operations, 6 October 2008. |
3-07 | 4 | Contents
Figures
Introductory figure 1. Stability underlying logic .......................................................................... v
Figure 1-1. Five guidelines for protection of civilians ............................................................. 1-9
Figure 3-1. Levels of interaction ........................................................................................... 3-21
Figure 4-1. District Stability Framework process ................................................................... 4-2
Figure 4-2. Conflict diagnosis process of the interagency conflict assessment
framework ........................................................................................................... 4-5
Tables
Introductory table 1. Terms modified by ADRP 3-07 ................................................................ vi
Table 1-1. Practical guidelines for supporting foreign humanitarian assistance.................. 1-25
Table 2-1. Phases of the stability framework and stability transition phases ........................ 2-4
Table 2-2. Sample indicators for partners to transfer stability tasks ...................................... 2-6
Table 3-1. The ACTion approach to social perspective taking .............................................. 3-7
Table 3-2. Global clusters and lead agencies ...................................................................... 3-20
Table 3-3. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
Nongovernmental Organization Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief ............... 3-28
Table 3-4. Interagency Standing Committee principles for civil-military relationships in
complex emergencies ....................................................................................... 3-29
Table 4-1. Interagency conflict assessment framework transition into planning ................... 4-8 |
3-07 | 5 | Preface
FM 3-07 contributes to the Army and joint community by providing tactical guidance on the conduct of
operations focused on stability. FM 3-07 addresses employment of forces in the conduct of operations focused
on stability. FM 3-07 expounds on the doctrinal fundamentals and concepts established in ADRP 3-0 and
ADRP 3-07. Readers should be familiar with ADRP 3-07, which establishes the doctrinal fundamentals for the
conduct of operations focused on stability.
The principal audience for FM 3-07 is leaders and planners at the battalion level and above. Commanders and
staffs of Army headquarters serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to
applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational
forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.
FM 3-07 is a common reference for all Army professionals, in the field and in the Army school system. The
stability considerations in this publication apply to units at all levels. Army techniques publications discuss
techniques for applying this doctrine. This publication will serve as a resource for the other government
agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and
private sector entities who seek to understand the role of the military in broader stability efforts.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their
Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)
FM 3-07 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary
and the text. The definition for which FM 3-07 is the proponent publication (the authority) is marked with an
asterisk (*) in the glossary and boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is
italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
FM 3-07 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/the Army National Guard of the United States,
and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of ADRP 3-07 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the
United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, United States Army War College. Send
written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and
Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD
(FM 3-07), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to
[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. |
3-07 | 6 | Introduction
Doctrine by definition is broad in scope and involves principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures
applicable to Army operations worldwide. Thus, this publication does not focus on any region or country.
Nor is it intended to be a standalone reference. Users should assess information from other sources to help
them decide how to apply the doctrine in this publication to the specific circumstances facing them.
Throughout U.S. history, the Army has learned that military force alone cannot secure sustainable peace. A
comprehensive approach is required, as well as in-depth understanding of an operational environment.
Stability ultimately aims to establish conditions the local populace regards as legitimate, acceptable, and
predictable. Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of
instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. Therefore, stability tasks focus on identifying
and targeting the root causes of instability and building the capacity of local institutions. Army forces
accomplish stability missions and perform tasks across the range of military operations and in coordination
with other instruments of national power. Stability missions and tasks are part of broader efforts to establish
and maintain the conditions for stability in an unstable area before or during hostilities, or to reestablish
enduring peace and stability after open hostilities cease. Army stability doctrine is based on lessons learned
from previous and contemporary operations.
FM 3-07 expands upon stability tasks, their role in unified land operations, and considerations specific to
stability. It contains four chapters.
Chapter 1 expands the discussion of stability tasks introduced in ADP 3-07 and ADRP 3-07. It introduces
the reader to the stability tasks and places them in the context of Army operations.
Chapter 2 discusses transitions, including how to perform the tasks of changing the focus of the operation.
Transitions are an essential part of stability.
Chapter 3 addresses the whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches to unity of effort. This
chapter elaborates considerations that will assist commanders and staffs in focusing collaboration and
cooperation with partners toward a common goal.
Chapter 4 looks at assessment. Identifying and prioritizing the local sources of instability is an essential
first step toward understanding on how to apply military resources and how to determine what is working.
This publication completes the transition of Army stability doctrine to the Doctrine 2015 structure.
ADP 3-07 and ADRP 3-07 introduced the basic concept behind stability including the stability principles:
conflict transformation, unity of effort, legitimacy and host-nation ownership, and building partner
capacity. ADP 3-07 and ADRP 3-07 also identified and described the primary stability tasks, how to
consider stability in planning for operations, the place of stability in unified land operations, and unique
considerations for stability across the range of military operations. Introductory figure 1 lays out the
underlying logic for stability tasks in operations and lists stability tasks in both decisive action and the
Army’s concept of unified land operations. |
3-07 | 7 | Introduction
Introductory figure 1. Stability underlying logic |
3-07 | 8 | Introduction
The information from the following chapters from the legacy FM 3-07 (2008, now obsolete) was updated
and moved into ADP 3-07 and ADRP 3-07:
* Chapter 1: The Strategic Context.
* Chapter 2: Stability in Full Spectrum Operations.
* Chapter 4: Planning for Stability Operations.
To avoid confusion, rule of law was removed as a principle and the information consolidated into the
discussion of end state conditions in chapter 1 of ADRP 3-07. Additionally, information retained from the
appendixes of the obsolete field manual—regarding assessment—was updated, condensed to a discussion
of principles, and moved into chapter 4 of this field manual. ATP 3-07.5 explains more fully the techniques
for performing stability tasks, including measuring success.
Certain terms for which the legacy FM 3-07 (2008, now obsolete) had been proponent were modified by
change 1 to ADRP 3-07 (2013). For the reader’s convenience, those terms are included in introductory
table-1. FM 3-07 remains the proponent for one Army term: transitional authority.
Introductory table 1. Terms modified by ADRP 3-07
Term Remarks
capacity building Modified usage as building partner capacity in common English usage. No
longer formally defined.
comprehensive approach Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
conflict transformation Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
crisis state Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
disarmament Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
fragile state Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
governance Adopts the joint definition.
reconstruction Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
reintegration Proponency moved to ADRP 3-07.
rule of law Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
security force assistance Adopts the joint definition.
security sector reform Adopts the joint definition.
stabilization Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
vulnerable state Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.
whole-of-government approach Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined. |
3-07 | 9 | Chapter 1
Stability Tasks in Military Operations
This chapter begins with a discussion of the five primary stability tasks. Then it
provides guidance to help Army leaders identify and execute them effectively.
Finally, it presents considerations for related activities and missions that apply to all
aspects of stability tasks.
PRIMARY STABILITY TASKS
1-1. Stability tasks are part of every operation. However, the proportion of stability tasks, in relation to
offensive and defensive tasks, may change. Whether an operation is a peace operation preventing conflict
or a large-scale combat operation, forces will always integrate offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. For
example, in a peace operation, forces may still perform offensive tasks such as raids to capture war
criminals. Conversely, in large-scale combat operations, forces perform stability tasks to control captured
areas or provide emergency essential services.
1-2. The primary stability tasks reflect myriad interrelated activities conducted across the five stability
sectors. Tasks performed in one sector inevitably create related effects in another sector; planned and
performed appropriately, carefully sequenced activities complement and reinforce these effects. Achieving
a specific objective or setting certain conditions often requires performing a number of related tasks among
different stability sectors. An example of this is the effort required to provide a safe, secure environment for
the local populace. Rather than the outcome of a single task focused solely on the local populace, safety
and security are broad effects. Military forces achieve them by ending hostilities, isolating belligerents and
criminal elements, demobilizing armed groups, eliminating explosives and other hazards, and providing
public order and safety. In other words, to ensure security will be sustained over time, forces perform
numerous tasks across all the stability sectors.
1-3. Operations focused on stability aim to stabilize the environment enough so the host nation can begin
to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure. These operations establish a safe, secure environment
that facilitates reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Operations focused on stability aim to
establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate host-nation governance, a functioning civil
society, and a viable market economy.
1-4. The size of the force and combination of tasks necessary to stabilize conditions depend on the
situation in the operational area. When a functional, effective host-nation government exists, military forces
work through and with local civil authorities. Together they restore stability and order and sometimes to
reform the security institutions that foster long-term development. In this situation, the size of the force and
the scope of the mission are more limited. However, in a worst-case scenario, the security environment
would be in chaos and the state would be in crisis or failed altogether. In this situation, international law
requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and to
address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. This requires a force capable of securing
borders, protecting the population, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, regulating the
behavior of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablishing essential civil services, and setting
conditions in the operational area that enable the success of other partners.
1-5. Military forces provide support to facilitate the completion of tasks for which the host nation is
normally responsible. Typically, these tasks have a security component ideally performed by military
forces. However, military forces sometimes provide logistics, medical, or administrative support to enable
the success of civilian agencies and organizations. These tasks generally fall into one of three categories,
representing the collective effort associated with an operation focused on stability: |
3-07 | 10 | Chapter 1
* Tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility.
* Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations likely retain responsibility, but military forces
are prepared to execute until transition can safely occur with those organizations.
* Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.
1-6. The primary stability tasks are—
* Establish civil security.
* Establish civil control.
* Restore essential services.
* Support to governance.
* Support to economic and infrastructure development.
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY (INCLUDING SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE)
1-7. Civil security is the provision of security for state entities and the population, including protection
from internal and external threats. Establishing a safe, secure, and stable environment is key to obtaining
local support for military operations. The primary task of establishing civil security may include security
force assistance tasks depending on the missions assigned. As soon a host nation’s security forces can
perform this task, Army forces transition civil security responsibilities to them. Within the security sector,
transformation tasks focus on developing legitimate, sustainable, and stable security institutions. Civil
security sets the conditions for enduring stability and peace.
1-8. Military forces set these conditions by performing subordinate tasks during all three phases of the
stability framework—initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. During the initial
response phase of the stability framework, Army units often perform the tasks on their own because the
host nation lacks capability.
1-9. In the transformation phase of the stability framework, host-nation personnel and, potentially,
interorganizational entities begin to contribute. Army units then focus more on security force assistance,
particularly the systems required to professionalize a host nation’s security forces.
1-10. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, Army units transition to a steady-state
posture focused on advisory duties and security cooperation. The host nation assumes responsibility for its
civil security. Some societies have strong cultural resistance against foreign or domestic military
involvement in civil security. On these occasions, United States (U.S.) forces explore other options or
mitigate concerns about such involvement by synchronizing information-related capabilities and
engagement.
1-11. Depending on the situation, establishing civil security can include seven subtasks:
* Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
* Determine disposition and composition of host-nation armed and intelligence services.
* Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
* Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
* Support identification programs.
* Protect key personnel and facilities.
* Clear explosives and other hazards.
(For a more detailed discussion of establish civil security subtasks, see chapter 2 of ATP 3-07.5.)
ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL
1-12. Civil control fosters the rule of law. The rule of law means that all persons, institutions, and
entities—public and private, including the state itself—are accountable to laws that are publicly
promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights
principles. To strengthen civil control and the rule of law, Army units seek to improve the capability,
capacity, and legitimacy of host-nation judicial and corrections systems by providing training and support |
3-07 | 11 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
to law enforcement and judicial personnel. Army units focus on implementing temporary or interim
capabilities to lay the foundation for host-nation or interorganizational development of this sector.
1-13. Civil control is based on a society ensuring individuals and groups adhere to the rule of law. A
society that embraces the rule of law provides equal access to a legal system consistent with international
human rights principles. Developing such a society is a long-term process guided by civilian entities.
1-14. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate civil control during all three phases of the
stability framework. Initial response tasks focus on establishing civil control and fostering the rule of law.
During the initial response phase of the stability framework, Army units may have to complete tasks on
their own because the host nation has little or no capability or legitimacy. In other phases, host-nation
security forces can maintain public order and require little Army unit involvement.
1-15. Transformation tasks develop justice, corrections systems, and other legal fields that meet
international human rights standards and support viable processes for redress and reconciliation. In the
transformation phase of the stability framework, host-nation police forces and interorganizational entities
take the lead with Army units focusing on security force assistance, particularly the professionalization of
host-nation security forces.
1-16. Fostering sustainability tasks emphasizes the transfer of the judicial and corrections systems to host-
nation personnel. Army units facilitate this transfer, continue to monitor and report, and transition to a
steady state posture focused on advisory duties and security cooperation.
1-17. Depending on the situation, nine subtasks may be performed:
* Establish public order and safety.
* Establish an interim criminal justice system.
* Support law enforcement and police reform.
* Support judicial reform.
* Support a civil property dispute resolution process.
* Support criminal justice system reform.
* Support corrections reform.
* Support war crimes courts and tribunals.
* Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.
(For a more detailed discussion of establish civil control subtasks, see chapter 3 of ATP 3-07.5.)
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES
1-18. Restoring services essential to local expectations of normalcy allows people to return their daily
activities and prevents further destabilization. Ideally, the host nation’s government and civilian relief
agencies should restore and develop essential services. In most cases, local, international, and U.S. agencies
have arrived in country long before U.S. forces. However, when partner organizations are not well
established or lack capacity, Army units accomplish these tasks until the other organizations can.
1-19. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate restoring essential services during all three
phases of the stability framework. During the initial response phase of the stability framework, Army units
take the lead in providing for the population’s immediate critical needs, supporting and enabling other
actors as they become operational. Army units provide minimal assistance if the other actors are already
well-established. In any case, Army units assess essential services based on local norms. They determine
the levels of functionality necessary to mitigate instability.
1-20. The transformation phase of the stability framework occurs once the immediate crisis is past and
sufficient capacity begins to grow. This phase establishes the foundation for long-term development and
resolves root causes of conflict that lead to famine, dislocated civilians, refugee flows, and human
trafficking.
1-21. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, the host nation makes the efforts
permanent by institutionalizing positive change in society and ensuring it has the means to sustain progress.
If the situation in the host nation regresses, the host nation may resume stability tasks from earlier phases. |
3-07 | 12 | Chapter 1
1-22. Restore essential services can include eight subtasks:
* Provide essential civil services.
* Perform tasks related to civilian dislocation.
* Support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.
* Support nonfood relief programs.
* Support humanitarian demining.
* Support human rights initiatives.
* Support public health programs.
* Support education programs.
(For a more detailed discussion of restore essential services subtasks, see chapter 4 of ATP 3-07.5.)
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE
1-23. Governance is the set of activities conducted by a government or community organization to
maintain societal order, define and enforce rights and obligations, and fairly allocate goods and services.
Effective, legitimate governance ensures these activities are transparent, accountable, and involve public
participation. Elections, while often an end state condition in planning, does not ensure these outcomes. In
societies divided along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, elections may further polarize factions. Generally,
representative institutions based on universal suffrage offer the best means of fostering governance
acceptable to most citizens. If a host nation’s government or community organizations cannot provide
governance, some degree of military support may be necessary. In extreme cases where civil government or
community organizations are dysfunctional or absent, international law requires military forces to provide
basic civil administration.
1-24. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate support to governance during all three phases
of the stability framework. During the initial response phase of the stability framework, the U.S. military
may be directed to act as the transitional military authority to establish governance. In other cases, Army
commanders can influence host-nation officials who have formal authority but little capacity. In either case,
Army units develop host-nation partnerships and foster governance in their areas of operations. Even if
U.S. forces have formal authority as a transitional military authority, they work closely with host-nation
and interorganizational entities in order to prepare host-nation government and community organizations to
assume responsibility for governance.
1-25. In the transformation phase of the stability framework, responsibility for governance is transferred to
civilian authorities. This may be provisional under the control of an ambassador, a United Nations (UN)
mission, or some other temporary entity. In some cases, authority will be transferred to host-nation
representatives that may be from the same host-nation government prior to the operation. As Army units
develop host-nation institutional capability and capacity, they continue to foster good governance by
advising, assisting, supporting, and monitoring other actors.
1-26. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, host-nation authorities assume
complete responsibility for governance. Army units and host-nation security partners focus on maintaining
security, building capability and capacity, and facilitating appropriate security forces involvement in
governance. Army units continue to monitor developments regarding governance and identify concerns to
host-nation authorities and the U.S. Government.
1-27. Depending on the situation, support to governance has four primary subtasks:
* Support transitional administrations.
* Support development of local governance.
* Support anticorruption initiatives.
* Support elections.
(For a more detailed discussion of support to governance subtasks, see chapter 5 of ATP 3-07.5.) |
3-07 | 13 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
1-28. Long-term peace and stability require sustainable host-nation economic and infrastructure
development. The end state is the creation of a sustainable economy. In post-conflict and fragile states,
host-nation actors, interagency partners, and interorganizational partners often have the most useful
knowledge and skills regarding the restoration and facilitation of economic and infrastructure development.
However, if security considerations or other factors restrict their ability to intervene, Army units should
assist host-nation entities to foster sustainable economic and infrastructure development.
1-29. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate support to economic and infrastructure
development during all three phases of the stability framework. In the initial response phase of the stability
framework, Army units take the lead in assessing local economic conditions and prioritizing the obstacles
to economic development. If other partners are unable to mitigate them, Army units work with host-nation
and interorganizational partners to implement activities. Depending on the situation, Army units may
provide security to foster commerce, create short-term livelihood opportunities, facilitate market access,
secure key infrastructure or natural resources, or perform other tasks. It is crucial for Army commanders to
implement only activities that support long-term sustainable development. For example, a project focused
on creating jobs in the short term must ensure appropriate wages for local economic conditions. Inadequate
wages for teachers or other professionals could eventually lead to their resignations. Such situations could
disrupt progress and distort expectations of the host nation’s economy and government.
1-30. During the transformation phase of the stability framework, Army units establish the foundation for
sustainable economic development and transition control of economic development to host-nation officials
or interorganizational entities. Army units focus on establishing host-nation institutions that can provide
sustainable economic growth. Once a civilian administration assumes control, Army units primarily advise
and assist those officials. During this phase, Army forces continuously update the economic and
infrastructure assessments. They transfer responsibility for maintaining the economy and infrastructure to
host-nation officials or interorganizational entities. In general, the transformation phase builds on and
reinforces successes of the initial response phase.
1-31. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, Army units facilitate the
institutionalization of a long-term, sustainable economic infrastructure development program and transition
economic control to host-nation officials and the civil society. The primarily task of Army units is to advise
and assist host-nation civilian economic officials.
1-32. Depending on the situation, economic and infrastructure development has ten primary subtasks:
* Support economic generation and enterprise creation.
* Support monetary institutions and programs.
* Support national treasury operations.
* Support public sector investment programs.
* Support private sector development.
* Protect natural resources and environment.
* Support agricultural development programs.
* Restore transportation infrastructure.
* Restore telecommunications infrastructure.
* Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs.
1-33. Before implementing any activities, Army units must first assess the economic and infrastructure
situation. This assessment should be based on local norms. It should identify and prioritize the sources of
instability that threaten effective economic and infrastructure development. (For a more detailed discussion
of support to economic and infrastructure development subtasks, see chapter 6 of ATP 3-07.5.)
IDENTIFICATION AND ACCOMPLISHMENT OF STABILITY TASKS
1-34. Ensuring a state’s long-term stability depends on applying combat power to those tasks that are, in
fact, essential. For the commander and staff, operations focused on stability require a unique combination
of knowledge and understanding, the ability to achieve unity of effort, and a thorough depth of cultural |
3-07 | 14 | Chapter 1
astuteness. A finite amount of combat power is available to apply against the essential tasks associated with
a given stability mission. Essential stability tasks lay the foundation for success. This foundation must
sustain the burdens of governance, rule of law, and economic development that represent the future
viability of a state. Establishing this foundation depends on applying combat power to the essential stability
tasks identified during the initial assessment of the situation and the framing of the basic problem.
Decisions about using combat power are more than a factor of the size of the force deployed, its relative
composition, and the anticipated nature and duration of the mission.
IDENTIFICATION OF TASKS
1-35. Success in operations focused on stability often depends on the commander’s ability to identify the
tasks essential to mission success. Success also depends on the commander’s ability to prioritize and
sequence the accomplishment of those tasks with available combat power, the diverse array of actors
participating, and the ability of the host nation to accept change. Even more so than in the offense and
defense, operations focused on stability require commanders to demonstrate cultural understanding and a
clear appreciation of the myriad stability tasks to determine which are fundamentally essential to mission
success.
1-36. The commander and staff identify essential stability tasks after considering the relevant mission
variables. Essential stability tasks are those that the force must successfully complete to accomplish the
specific mission. These essential tasks may include specified and implied tasks required to establish end
state conditions that define success. They include the primary stability tasks, informing and influencing of
audiences, and protection of civilians. In addition, they include any essential offensive and defensive tasks
associated with the defeat of an enemy force. Typically, military forces retain primary responsibility for
these initial response tasks. Other tasks may be included that are not the primary responsibility of military
forces. Some tasks are performed simultaneously and some sequentially.
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ALL ESSENTIAL TASKS
1-37. In a complex operational environment—with unstable security conditions and a failed or
nonfunctioning government—a military force may be the only substantial stabilizing presence. In these
conditions, the force must be prepared to perform all the tasks essential to establishing and maintaining
security and order while providing for the essential needs of the populace. In most situations, local and
international aid organizations will be present in the operational area but may have limited access to the
population. Military forces can significantly contribute to increasing the access of these aid organizations,
allowing them to provide essential humanitarian assistance and conduct development activities for the
civilian population. In turn, this reduces a substantial logistics burden on military forces, allowing them to
focus on providing a safe, secure environment.
RELATED ACTIVITIES AND MISSIONS
1-38. Operations characterized by stability tasks often combine with certain activities and missions
common to Army operations. These activities and missions cut across all stability missions regardless of
the focus and require increased emphasis and attention by commander. Some activities—such as security
sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration—cut across the primary stability tasks
and may be the centerpiece of an operation. Some operations feature a large component of stability tasks
relative to offensive and defensive tasks. However, these operations, as with most decisive action, have
elements of offense and defense as well. Some types of operations have a greater focus on stability tasks
than others. Related activities and missions include—
* Information-related capabilities.
* Protection of civilians.
* Mass atrocity response operations.
* Security sector reform.
* Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
* Destruction, monitoring, and redirection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and mitigation
of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards. |
3-07 | 15 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
* Army support to security cooperation.
* Peace operations.
* Foreign humanitarian assistance.
* Counterinsurgency.
* Foreign internal defense.
INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES
1-39. Stability operations depend heavily on keeping audiences informed to minimize noncombatant
interference, countering adversary and enemy information, and shaping their support of local transitional
civil or military authorities. Information-related capabilities are integrated to directly influence the
perceptions and increase support among key populations. An information-related capability is a tool,
technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to
create effects and operationally desirable conditions (JP 3-13). Synchronizing information-related
capabilities—such as Soldier and leader engagement and military information support operations—can
amplify positive actions, counter enemy information activities, and increase support. Commanders use
received information and actions to shape analyzed information and operational environments to multiply
the effects of friendly successes.
1-40. During operations, commanders and staffs synchronize information-related capabilities and tasks to
produce complementary and reinforcing actions, themes, and messages. Army forces make every effort to
reduce the potential for conflicting information that could interfere with achieving objectives. Commanders
inform and influence audiences inside and outside their organizations. Commanders—
* Provide their commander’s intent, the mission narrative, and their vision of the desired end state.
* Establish and synchronize themes and messages to inform and influence audiences inside and
outside their organization.
* Incorporate cultural awareness, relevant social and political factors, and informational
considerations into the operations process.
* Guide the integration of information-related capabilities during the operations process.
* Assess how the staff and subordinate units use information-related capabilities to support
operations.
* Understand their audiences, ranging from the audiences in the United States to indigenous
civilians in the area of operations.
1-41. A critical information-related capability is Soldier and leader engaging with key leaders and the
population. Soldier and leader engagement is interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with
audiences in an area of operations (FM 3-13). Soldiers and leaders conduct engagement to provide
information or to influence attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. Engagement is critical to understanding
host-nation population concerns, explaining how Army units are pursuing stability along with other
objectives, and gaining the cooperation with other actors. Engagements with adversaries may at times be
appropriate to improve stability efforts. Soldier and leader engagement provides a venue for building
relationships, solving conflicts, conveying information, calming fears, and refuting rumors, lies, or
incorrect information.
1-42. Army leaders account for effective engagement that includes females in the population. Leaders
consider how gender norms differ by culture. They plan and prepare to include female teams and
interpreters, which are critical to effectiveness. In some situations, a trained female team can interact with
the population, develop an understanding of gender and family issues, provide care to victims, and
influence a significant but often inaccessible part of the population. Female teams require special training
as these functions will likely differ from their normal responsibilities. Female teams have been known to
experience difficulties with integration into military units; therefore, commanders emphasize their
importance and integration to avoid problems.
1-43. Army units will have to engage actors who are in competition with each other. Soldiers must be
careful to maintain their impartiality and avoid manipulation by actors with ulterior motives. Additionally,
some actors may be perpetrators or otherwise have questionable legitimacy. Some actors will use |
3-07 | 16 | Chapter 1
negotiation as an expedient tactic that is part of a larger campaign in opposition to the Army unit’s
objectives. Units should be careful not to overlook or marginalize important groups such as women or
minorities. Effective Soldiers strive to understand and address the concerns of each group. If possible, units
coordinate engagements with activities of other partners to avoid contradictory messages. Finally, units
take care that engagements do not generate unrealistic expectations. (See FM 3-13 for a more detailed
discussion of Soldier and leader engagement and other information-related capabilities.)
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
1-44. Protection of civilians applies across the range of military operations. Regardless of the primary
objective, protection of civilians is an important moral, political, legal, and military consideration. The
protection of civilians refers, in general, to efforts that protect civilians from physical violence, secure their
access to essential services and resources, and protect human rights. Military and nonmilitary stability
partners perform tasks that support protection of civilians in the short term and long term. In addition to
physical protection from imminent violence and provision of necessities, elements include setting broader
enabling conditions.
1-45. A civilian is a person who is not a member of his or her country’s armed forces or other militia. The
credibility and legitimacy of an Army operation, the success of the overarching mission, and the
achievement of U.S. strategic goals depend on Army units being able and willing to protect civilians. Army
units must ensure that civilians are not the object of attacks. They must ensure that civilians are spared and
protected during conflict. The law of war (also known as international humanitarian law) requires
belligerents to protect civilians from the effects of war and military occupation. Moreover, in many
operations, the population’s support may be the center of gravity or indispensable for mission
accomplishment. Political objectives often include security, stability, a sustainable peace, and other
favorable conditions. Civilians living in a highly insecure environment, and observers around the world,
expect that Soldiers will protect civilians.
1-46. Army units frequently work with, support, and enable other actors to establish an environment in
which civilians are protected in the short term and long term. Army units will likely comprise one part of a
larger multidimensional effort that includes other actors whose activities are, in fact, the most significant
for ensuring protection of civilians in the long term. These actors include host-nation and international
civilian, police, and military organizations that address security, governance, rule of law, humanitarian, and
developmental needs. The various actors may have dissimilar objectives and use different methods, but
they agree about the general desirability of protecting civilians.
1-47. Protection of civilians may be the primary purpose of a mission or a supporting task. Effective
protection of civilians depends on adaptive units, a command climate that emphasizes its importance, and
leaders who can make timely and appropriate decisions based on critical situations on the ground.
Regardless of the operation, leaders will likely have to address protection of civilians.
1-48. Army units support protection of civilians by doing no harm and performing deliberate actions to
protect civilians. First, Army units do no harm. These units act in accordance with the law of war and other
relevant bodies of law in order to minimize civilian harm. Additionally, Army units avoid actions that
undermine efforts by other actors that improve human security. Second, Army units perform deliberate
actions to protect civilians. These units perform offensive, defensive, and stability tasks expressly intended
to mitigate harm to civilians, including operations intended to create an environment conducive to
protection of civilians.
Risks to Civilians
1-49. Civilians are potentially at risk from armed conflict and many other situations. Examples include
widespread or systematic targeted violence including genocide and other mass atrocities, sexual violence,
human trafficking, displacement, and impeded access to humanitarian assistance and essential services. To
mitigate these risks, Army units must understand the relevant civilian vulnerabilities and the threats to
civilians’ well-being. |
3-07 | 17 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
Civilian Vulnerabilities
1-50. Civilian vulnerabilities come from many sources, including individual and community factors,
environmental factors, and unavailability of services such as healthcare and emergency food distribution.
For example, ethnic or sectarian violence may target certain groups within a population, rendering those
more vulnerable than others. Civilians near military targets may be more vulnerable to collateral damage,
and dislocated civilians who flee their homes may be more vulnerable to disease, starvation, and crime.
Some groups may be vulnerable in certain contexts, including women, children, or the elderly, infirm, and
disabled. Stability partners can mitigate vulnerabilities in many ways, including assistance and security.
Threats to Civilians
1-51. Threats consist of individuals or groups with the capability, intent, and opportunity to harm civilians.
Specific threats vary in terms of their dimensions, type, and perpetrators’ objectives. The most important
aspect of the threat is the perpetrators’ motivation or strategic logic behind the violence. If the violence is
intrinsic to the goals or ideology of the perpetrator (such as cases of sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing, or
genocide), the perpetrator may view the civilian population as a threat, and may prove difficult to deter.
Similarly, when violence against civilians is intrinsic to a group’s existence, such as a group that survives
from forced recruitment and pillage, it can be difficult to deter the perpetrators. When violence is
instrumental to a group’s goals, such as some cases of terrorism or a brutal counterinsurgency campaign,
perpetrators may attack civilians as a means to achieve some other objective. In such cases, perpetrators
may be deterred or persuaded to use other methods. Their motivations may change over time and may
overlap.
Five Guidelines for Protection of Civilians
1-52. Five overarching guidelines assist Army units with protection of civilians during operations. (See
figure 1-1.) Leaders ensure Army forces do not neglect any of the guidelines as doing so increases the
possibility that civilians will suffer unnecessary harm. These guidelines are not prioritized. However, their
sequence suggests that Army units should understand the circumstances in which they will operate,
establish their goals, conduct operations to achieve their goals, develop synergy with other actors, and
shape the surrounding environment to enable success.
Figure 1-1. Five guidelines for protection of civilians |
3-07 | 18 | Chapter 1
Continually Understand the Situation
1-53. Army leaders must constantly have situational understanding of an operational environment, relevant
actors, and dynamics. The staff’s analysis of the operational variables (political, military, economic, social,
information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time, known collectively as PMESII-PT) contribute
to understanding threats to civilians and ways to protect them.
1-54. Units have to influence (and, in many cases, should be influenced by) a wide range of other actors.
These actors may be loosely categorized as adversaries, vulnerable civilians, bystanders, negative actors,
and positive actors. These categories may overlap and could change over time. For example, a particular
ethnic group could be both a perpetrator and victim of violence against civilians. In many situations, the
military operates in support of other actors whose efforts are more important for achieving protection of
civilians.
1-55. Additionally, effective Army leaders comprehend dynamics. These dynamics include evolving
strategic guidance and mandates, the strategic logic of perpetrators, the impact of operations, changing
vulnerabilities and threats that relate to protection of civilians, emerging opportunities to enhance
protection of civilians, and changes in an operational environment or among the actors.
1-56. A situation often features a complex and evolving relationship among the operational variables and
other dynamics, requiring good intelligence, efficient information management based on the commander’s
critical information requirements, and effective current assessments. Different actors concerned with
protecting civilians may be reluctant to exchange information—when this exchange could compromise
their neutrality, confidentiality, or operations security. However, it may be possible to develop formal and
informal information-sharing mechanisms that improve Army and partner efforts to protect civilians.
Pursue the Desired Outcomes
1-57. Effective protection of civilians ultimately depends on achieving five outcomes (or end states)
essential to human security:
* Safe and secure environment.
* Good governance.
* Rule of law.
* Social well-being.
* Sustainable economy.
1-58. These outcomes are directly related to the Army’s primary stability tasks. They are often related to
peace building and development and usually must be pursued as parallel, mutually supporting efforts.
Failure to achieve these end states can result in civilian harm or inflame grievances that result in conflict
and place civilians at increased risk. Tensions and tradeoffs often exist between short-term goals and long-
term outcomes, as well as a potential tension between protection of civilians and other objectives. Army
units are primarily involved with establishing a safe and secure environment. In addition to improving
protection of civilians, security is necessary to enable a political settlement, permit a normal life for
civilians, and support the end states for which other partners are responsible. However, to maintain
security, units must be flexible. In varying degrees, units may need to enable, monitor, or support the
objectives of other partners. In extreme cases of last resort, Army units may have to assume temporary
responsibility for other tasks. Army units, at a minimum, will have to be aware of the status of other
partners’ efforts, even if these partners do not have primary responsibility and authority for those tasks.
This awareness enables units to comprehend the big picture, do no harm, and avoid undermining
nonmilitary tasks that may be critical to mission accomplishment.
Design and Conduct Operations That Quickly Reduce Risks to Civilians
1-59. During operations, Army units may be required to protect civilians, neutralize threats to civilians,
and mitigate civilian casualties or other forms of civilian harm. While conducting operations, units must
routinely and proactively incorporate protection of civilians’ considerations, as failure to do so can convey
the message that violence against civilians is acceptable. Some operations, such as patrols, checkpoints,
support for humanitarian assistance, or evacuation of noncombatants, may be conducted to enhance |
3-07 | 19 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
protection of civilians directly. In other cases, operations have a secondary effect of protecting civilians.
Routine Army warfighting functions such as intelligence, mission command, sustainment, and protection
may require some modification to account for protection of civilians.
Comprehensively Engage the Full Range of Actors
1-60. Protection of civilians usually requires contributions from a wide variety of military and nonmilitary
actors (both local and international) who are not subordinate to a common authority and do not necessarily
share the same objectives. A comprehensive approach to protecting civilians is, generally, the most
effective. In a comprehensive approach, military and nonmilitary actors integrate military and nonmilitary
means to achieve shared objectives while understanding that many of the nonmilitary considerations are
most important in the long term. It is particularly important to understand protection of civilians from the
local population’s perspective. Army units should integrate plans and operations with those of other
partners. Examples of comprehensive engagement includes engaging with key leaders and the population,
conducting multinational operations with international and host-nation police and military partners,
building the capacity of (or enabling) other partners, developing effective civil-military operations centers,
and enabling humanitarian assistance.
Shape the Protective Environment
1-61. In addition to understanding and operating within an operational environment, Army leaders must
determine how to shape that environment in ways that enhance protection of civilians. These shaping
efforts are achieved through effective risk mitigation, information-related capabilities, and programs
including security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and transitional justice.
Additionally, Army leaders focus on eliminating conflict-related sexual violence and protecting children
from threats—including recruitment as child soldiers. These problems are often overlooked but are critical
to address. It is impossible to have a secure environment and adequate protection of civilians when
atrocities of these types regularly occur. Local, community efforts are also critical for protection of
civilians. Other partners (including domestic and international political, police, humanitarian, and
developmental organizations) have primary responsibility, authority, and capability for many functions.
Often, Army units are limited to a supporting and enabling role.
Challenges to Protection of Civilians
1-62. While conducting operations to achieve protection of civilians, military forces will confront
tradeoffs, gaps, and challenges that require difficult choices by unit leaders. Most problems will be
situational in nature and defy a blanket solution. Tradeoffs occur when conflicting considerations exist and
leaders must attempt to strike a balance between them. For example, peace and stability are important
objectives, but so is a just environment in which basic human rights are protected and violators are held
accountable. Other tradeoffs include the role of host-nation and external actors, the pursuit of short-term
and long-term goals, and the balanced protection of civilians with other objectives. Requirements for
effective protection of civilians will likely exceed capacity. In addition, host-nation corruption, constraints
with respect to civilian authorities and responsibilities, and difficulties in achieving unity of effort among
the diverse actors will likely challenge Army units. (For additional resources, see the Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute [PKSOI] Web site.)
MASS ATROCITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS
1-63. Commanders should be prepared within their capabilities to monitor, prevent, and if necessary,
respond to mass atrocity situations in all operations, not just in peace operations. Evidence of previously
committed mass atrocities can also become known during the course of peace operations, potentially
raising diplomatic, political, and social turmoil, the consequences of which can directly affect ongoing
operations. Addressing the sources of instability may contribute to preventing mass atrocities. Military
support and supporting efforts of other agencies and organizations in response to mass atrocities may be
key to the success of stability missions. (JP 3-07.3 provides joint doctrine for mass atrocity response
operations. For additional resources, see the PKSOI Web site.) |
3-07 | 20 | Chapter 1
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
1-64. Security sector reform is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the
way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07). Security sector reform aims to provide an
effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civil authority, and responsive to
the needs of the public. It may include integrated activities to support defense and armed forces reform;
civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security
planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and
concurrent reduction of armed violence.
1-65. Security sector reform involves reestablishing or reforming institutions and key ministerial positions
that maintain and oversee the safety and security of a nation. Through the whole-of-government approach,
ministerial officials and institutions can assume an effective, legitimate, and accountable role; they are
responsible for security and should be subordinated under civil authorities. Effective security sector reform
enables a nation to build its capacity to provide security and justice. Security sector reform promotes
stability, fosters reform processes, and creates an environment for economic development. Security sector
reform should result in effective and legitimate security sector firmly rooted within the rule of law.
Roles and Responsibilities of United States Government Partners
1-66. The departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, including the Department of Defense (DOD),
pursue integrated security sector reform based on a whole-of-government approach. With the support of the
host nation, military officials collaborate with interagency and interorganizational partners to design and
implement security sector reform strategies and plans. The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency
for security sector reform, providing oversight for these efforts through its bureaus, offices, and overseas
missions. DOD provides capabilities to support the establishment, reform, and restructuring of a host
nation’s armed forces and defense sector. DOD also helps other U.S. agencies involved in security sector
reform. Army forces participate in and support security sector reform as directed by the joint force
commander. (Roles and responsibilities of interagency partners in security sector reform are discussed in
the combined United States Agency for International Development [USAID], DOD, and DOS publication
Security Sector Reform.)
1-67. The Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP) can often serve as the primary effort for justice system reforms within a host nation. Effective
commanders request assistance with identifying the critical tasks prior to deployment. If ICITAP personnel
deploy, commanders involve ICITAP with all planning efforts. ICITAP can assist not only on police
systems, but on both detention centers and prisons as well. ICITAP lends expertise in the following areas:
* Organizational development within the justice systems.
* Terrorism and transnational crime.
* Public integrity and anticorruption.
* Specialized and tactical skills.
* Marine and border security.
* Academy and instructor development (basic through advanced courses to include leadership and
executive development).
* Criminal justice coordination (such as training and development for police, prosecutors, and
judges).
* Criminal investigations.
* Forensics (basic to international standards).
* Basic police services.
* Community policing.
* Corrections.
* Information systems within the justice systems.
* Intelligence-led policing. |
3-07 | 21 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
1-68. While the military may initially shape an operational environment, organizations and agencies such
as ICITAP can provide long-term assistance from the tactical to the sustained institutional levels of
development.
The Military Role in Security Sector Reform
1-69. Security sector reform can occur at any point across the range of military operations, in conditions
ranging from peace to the aftermath of major combat operations. No matter the conditions, security sector
reform focus on mitigating conditions that might foster crisis and conflict. Within unified land operations,
security sector reform is often an aspect of operations focused on stability. Security sector reform includes
tasks, functions, and activities from each of the primary task areas. It concentrates on generating the
capacity of the state and societal institutions to support responsible governance and the rule of law. (The
roles and responsibilities of the military in security sector reform are discussed further in ADRP 3-07 and
JP 3-07.)
The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in Security Sector Reform
1-70. Since the end of the Cold War, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have emerged as prominent
partners in security sector reform efforts worldwide. The most prominently recognized among these actors
is the UN. The UN brings high levels of legitimacy, special capabilities provided by a broad mix of
member states, and a capacity for sustaining large missions over long periods. The UN deploys many
agencies capable of supporting security sector reform across the security sector. Integrated missions
mandated by a UN Security Council resolution and directed by a special representative to the UN Secretary
General encourage cooperation in security sector reform by multiple partners from UN agencies.
Security Sector Reform and Host-Nation Autonomy
1-71. Operations focused on stability seek to enhance the legitimacy of host-nation governance while
leveraging efforts to reform the security sector. A host nation’s constitution, institutions, laws, and
processes, however developmental, should play a central role in security sector reform. External influences
frequently shape security sector reform policy, especially when a host nation’s government functions
poorly. Nonetheless, security sector reform planners carefully uphold the host nation’s sovereignty by
integrating its government into reform planning and execution.
1-72. After hostilities cease, a comprehensive peace agreement must exist before security sector reform can
begin. Once a peace agreement is established, partners can focus on helping the host nation create a
national constitution. To create a suitable constitution, the partners ensure constitutional scholars work with
host-nation officials to promote understanding of the political structure. National security strategies or
policies and subordinate strategic documents, national defense acts, and national justice codes illustrate
host-nation guidelines that can help to add structure to the security sector reform effort. Also important to
the security sector reform effort are host-nation groups in charge of specific responsibilities, such as
government reform agencies and national reconciliation commissions.
1-73. Each partner in security sector reform helps develop the programs using its own policy guidance and
implementation mechanisms. For example, UN Security Council resolutions define the mandates of UN
peacekeepers and missions led by the UN. Host-nation national policy guidance, national justice systems,
and relevant national legislation, treaties, and agreements—bilateral and multilateral—provide a framework
for the host nation and its military forces. U.S. security assistance must proceed within the framework of
legislated provisions governing the delivery of foreign assistance by U.S. agencies. While security sector
reform should integrate these activities, the reform programs should primarily reflect the host nation’s
institutions, laws, and processes. (The roles and responsibilities of the U.S. Government and other partners
in security sector reform are discussed in JP 3-07 and JP 3-08.)
Security Sector Reform Planning
1-74. Sustainable security sector reform depends on thorough planning, assessment, patience, and
perseverance. Working within a collaborative environment, the various partners consider the unique
capabilities and contributions of each participant. The ensuing plan aims for a practical pace of reform and |
3-07 | 22 | Chapter 1
accounts for the political and cultural context of the environment. The plan accounts for available resources
and capabilities while balancing the human capacity to deliver change against a realistic timeline. The
security sector reform plan reflects the host nation’s cultures, sensitivities, and historical conceptions of
security. It does not seek to implement a Western paradigm for the security sector, understanding that a
Western model may not be appropriate. Yet, security sector reform planners cannot adopt a lax attitude
toward security practices that contribute to conflict or instability. As with the broader campaign plan, the
security sector reform plan seeks to resolve the underlying sources of conflict while preventing new
security crises.
1-75. The level of host-nation development—especially as it pertains to poverty and economic
opportunity—is an important consideration in security sector reform planning. High levels of poverty and
extensive corruption significantly challenge security sector reform efforts. Poverty and corruption at the
individual and institutional levels typically lead to poor economic growth, inadequate or excessive
government revenues, and a chronically under-resourced public sector. Security sector reform should
address these challenges. Programs should confront flagrant corruption in the public sector and
accommodate limited host-nation public administration and public management capacities. External
resourcing and external fiscal management for the host nation’s security sector, including its military
institutions, may be necessary until the host nation can sustain security sector reform.
1-76. Ideally, the host nation’s security strategy and defense policy guide the security sector reform plan.
However, in states without established, legitimate government institutions able to develop mature strategy
and policy, interagency and interorganizational security sector reform planners must review international
security strategy and defense policy before developing a plan. Any such review must account for the
characteristics of the host nation’s cultures. It must help ensure the security sector reform plan reflects the
genuine needs of the nation, not just the demands of its officials. It must ensure the final plan leads to a
sustainable security apparatus appropriate for the needs of the host nation and its people.
Principles of Security Sector Reform
1-77. Effective security sector reform requires unity of effort and a shared vision among the agencies,
organizations, institutions, and forces contributing to the reform process, both within and outside of the
U.S. Government. This unity of effort and shared vision reflects a comprehensive approach. Security sector
reform is a cooperative activity, conducted with the other agencies of the U.S. Government, IGOs,
nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and the host nation. Integrated programs that
consider relationships among organizations, sectors, and actors increase the likelihood of success, minimize
unforeseen developments, and ensure the most effective use of resources. Six principles guide security
sector reform:
* Support host-nation ownership.
* Incorporate principles of good governance and respect for human rights.
* Balance operational support with institutional reform.
* Link security and justice.
* Foster transparency.
* Do no harm.
(The principles for security sector reform are discussed in ADRP 3-07 and JP 3-07.)
Foundations of Security Sector Reform
1-78. During security sector reform, participating military forces understand that the ultimate responsibility
for reform rests with the host nation. Security sector reform planning is based on the recognition that
successful efforts require an extended commitment of time and resources. The military judiciously selects
and uses forces to create a secure environment so security sector reform proceeds smoothly. The military
may provide temporary capability and expertise, but long-term success in reform depends on how quickly
and effectively it transitions to appropriate civilian agencies and the host nation.
1-79. The foundations of security sector reform are— |
3-07 | 23 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
* A concept of security developed by the host nation and ingrained in its culture.
* A framework that encompasses all security sector participants and challenges.
* Cooperation with and among civil authorities.
* Human rights.
* Clear policies, accountability, and professionalism.
A Concept of Security Developed by the Host Nation
1-80. The host nation develops a concept of security; its culture then ingrains this concept. The core values
of security sector reform should reflect the security needs of the people. Security sector reform should
instill the principle of ownership.
A Framework That Encompasses All Security Sector Participants
1-81. Security sector reform should encompass all security sector participants and challenges. It provides a
framework to structure thinking concerning the diverse security challenges facing host nations and their
populations. An inclusive framework is essential to integrate security sector reform policies and to achieve
civilian involvement and oversight. An inclusive framework is founded on understanding the security
sector from the host nation’s perspective.
Cooperation With and Among Civil Authorities
1-82. Military forces develop security sector reform approaches in cooperation with civil authorities.
Security sector reform approaches should be based on a broad assessment of the security and justice needs
of the people and the state. Effective strategies reflect a comprehensive plan that encompasses all the
numerous functions in the security sector.
Human Rights
1-83. Security sector reform must be based on democratic norms and supported by principles of
international human rights. Effective security sector reform creates freedom from fear by measurably
reducing armed violence and violent crime. Security sector reform should enhance the institutional and
human capacity for security policy to function effectively and for justice to be delivered impartially.
Clear Policies, Accountability, and Professionalism
1-84. Security sector reform should include well-defined policies that strengthen the governance of
security institutions. It should build professional host-nation security forces that are accountable to civil
authorities and capable of executing their responsibilities. The security sector and supporting activities
must adhere to basic principles of governance and broader public sector reform programs, including
transparency and accountability. (Other considerations in security sector reform planning are discussed in
ADRP 3-07 and JP 3-07.)
Comprehensive Security Sector Reform
1-85. Through unity of effort, execution of security sector reform unites all elements of the security sector.
The activities of military forces may focus on reforming a host nation’s military forces, but those actions
are only part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reform the entire security sector. Military forces may
directly support related reform efforts or indirectly support the efforts as related, integrated activities.
1-86. Once the security sector is stabilized, other partners can safely begin operations in the operational
area. Over time, military forces transfer appropriate responsibilities to other partners in the stability effort,
whether from one military force to another or to a civilian group. Military forces complete the transfers of
responsibilities and then focus their efforts on other stability tasks. |
3-07 | 24 | Chapter 1
Civilian Oversight and Control
1-87. Establishing civilian oversight and control of the defense sector is critical to the success of any
security sector reform. Oversight and control mechanisms as well as processes ensure civilian control of the
military, a fundamental tenet of democratic governance. These processes and mechanisms also ensure that
the various components of the defense sector are accountable to elected and appointed civilian leadership,
in both the executive and legislative branches. That accountability is essential to establishing a sound
foundation for defense budget planning and program implementation.
1-88. The ministry of defense acts as the primary agent of civilian oversight and control within the defense
sector of many foreign nations. A key indicator of civilian oversight and control is the number of civilian
positions in the ministry of defense. The ministry of defense operates within some form of interagency or
cabinet framework that establishes political links and accountability between the ministry and the executive
and legislative branches. Other agencies involved in the defense sector may share oversight and control
responsibilities, such as the cabinet-level leadership of intelligence agencies, executive protection forces,
and border forces. In transitioning or post-conflict states, these institutions are frequently weak,
dysfunctional, or altogether absent. Security sector reform encompasses restructuring, rebuilding, and, in
some cases, creating entirely new institutions. These programs coordinate with the host nation to provide
oversight and control mechanisms for the defense sector.
1-89. The legislative branch plays an important role in oversight and control. The legislature typically
determines the funding level of government activities while providing the statutory framework for planning
and implementation. Constitutional frameworks may give the legislature a share in the appointment of
senior government officials, or in the structuring, commissioning, and promoting of Soldiers. In this
context, building an effective partnership between the executive and legislative branches becomes an
important enabler of effective security sector reform.
1-90. Most transitioning and post-conflict host nations clearly define and delineate the roles and
responsibilities of military forces and law enforcement agencies as they provide internal security. If the
security apparatus of a host nation begins to fracture, the necessary distinctions between military and law
enforcement roles and missions erode or disappear entirely. This situation frequently leads to inappropriate
military involvement in political affairs. As a result, military forces may subsume justice and law
enforcement functions although they lack professional training and appropriate equipment. Security sector
reform must restore the distinction between military and law enforcement functions as well as provide
robust mechanisms to sustain that distinction. This is particularly important with host nations embroiled in
an insurgency, where the military seeks to assume the primary role while marginalizing the police.
1-91. The primary agent of civilian oversight and control over law enforcement agencies is likely a
separate ministry, such as the ministry of interior or of justice. As host-nation capacity for law enforcement
increases, inherent power struggles may develop as police leaders strive to control the management of
social order. For this reason, security sector reform focuses on improving communication and coordination
between disparate ministries that have overlapping responsibilities for maintaining civil security. Often, the
threshold for transitioning law enforcement from military to police oversight depends on the level of
violence. This threshold serves as a quantifiable measure of effectiveness for military or civilian security
sector efforts. The goal is to reduce violence to levels that host-nation police can manage, not to eradicate
violence completely.
Developing Security Forces
1-92. Security force assistance is the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by
the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces
and their supporting institutions (JP 3-22). The development of capability and capacity is integral to
successful stability missions and extends to all security forces: military forces, police forces, border forces,
and other paramilitary organizations. Development applies to all levels of government within the host
nation as well as to other local and regional forces. DOD and other partners help the host nation develop
forces that will be able to operate across the range of military operations. Such forces can combat internal
threats such as insurgency, subversion, and lawlessness; defend against external threats; or serve as
coalition partners in other geographic locations. Partners conducting security force assistance develop |
3-07 | 25 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
programs that will facilitate the host nation to perform stability tasks and eventually sustain its own
security. The host nation needs to sufficiently size, resource, organize, train, and equip its forces to meet its
own standards (or internationally accepted standards) of security for its people. Successful security force
assistance depends on thorough and continuous assessment. It includes the organizing, training, equipping,
rebuilding, and advising of the forces involved. (Security force assistance is further discussed in FM 3-22
and JP 3-22.)
Military Forces
1-93. Military forces conducting security force assistance develop host-nation military forces for the
primary purpose of countering external threats. The design of host-nation military forces develops from
analyzing external threats to the host nation and determining the capabilities required to counter such
threats. Other key military missions include providing humanitarian assistance, and in special cases,
countering certain types of internal military threats. External organizations executing security sector reform
and the individuals assigned to them are selected for their specific abilities to train and advise the
developing force. For example, military police should help develop military police forces. This provides for
appropriate development of expertise while facilitating the advising process.
Justice and Law Enforcement Forces
1-94. An effective and accountable justice system and supporting law enforcement (especially police)
forces are central to a legitimate security framework. Although the military may be involved initially in
developing the justice and law enforcement forces, other agencies should assume this task as soon as
possible. Qualified, professional justice sector and police trainers support an improved advising process and
ensure sustainable development with appropriate civilian oversight. Their expertise ensures an appropriate
delineation of roles and responsibilities between military forces and law enforcement sectors. In policing,
development of organizational substructure—supervision, process, policy, internal governance, planning,
and budgeting—is vital to the long-term sustainability of reform efforts. (Further discussion on justice and
law enforcement forces reform is found in JP 3-07.)
Law Enforcement
1-95. The Foreign Assistance Act specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police forces by DOD unless
a Presidential directive provides specific exceptions. When providing assistance to training, the DOS’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs takes the lead in police assistance. The
President, however, may delegate this role to other agencies. For example, in 2004, President George W.
Bush signed a decision directive granting the Commander, United States Central Command authority to
train and equip the Iraqi police.
1-96. When given the appropriate authority, Army military police support the criminal justice system
reform through their law enforcement capabilities. Throughout the joint operational phases—shape, deter,
seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority—professional military police units can
support host-nation police organizations through partnership and mentorship programs. When criminal
justice system reform, specifically the law enforcement activity, has broken down within a society, the
military police may initially support efforts to assist in recruiting, training, and equipping host-nation police
organizations to build force capability and capacity.
1-97. Following an intervention in a failed or fragile state, an effective police force may not exist. With the
local security environment in disarray, international police trainers and advisors often cannot safely deploy
into the area. Military forces may be required to take the lead in restoring and maintaining order—through
clearing and holding operations—until enough civilian police partners arrive to initiate that component of
security sector reform. When few military forces exist, counterinsurgency strategies require systematically
creating secured zones before establishing local police in insurgent enclaves. While conventional military
forces may be capable of providing immediate security from armed threats, they are not effective trainers of
policing skills. Nor are they appropriate providers of police services to local communities unless they act as
an occupying force under the provisions of the law of land warfare. Formed police units trained in stability
policing skills are appropriate to perform these functions. Initial planning for failed state interventions
should plan to incorporate such forces at the earliest opportunity. Typically, military police assist in |
3-07 | 26 | Chapter 1
training and advising local police and establishing police stationing operations for local law enforcement
forces. Military police forces may also assist in training and advising corrections officers as part of
capacity-building activities. As the police program matures, formal police training centers and academies
foster professional police forces.
1-98. Commanders and staffs at all levels during preplanning efforts must carefully analyze and assess the
situation from a rule of law perspective. Either as the result of increased looting or an escalation of
incidents caused by a simple disregard for the law, the military police may serve as the initial force to assist
in stabilizing a situation. In the meantime, planning and coordination efforts must develop with the DOS to
deploy civilian experts to the operational area. Specific law enforcement operations and activities that
support stability tasks may include:
* Conducting police station operations.
* Conducting criminal investigations.
* Conducting traffic enforcement operations.
* Employing forensic capabilities.
* Conducting police engagement.
* Conducting temporary detention of personnel.
* Providing protective services for selected individuals and high-risk personnel security.
* Providing investigative support.
* Employing biometric capabilities.
* Conducting critical site security.
* Providing customs support.
* Restoring and maintaining order.
* Conducting border control, security, and freedom of movement operations.
* Restoring public safety, order, and confidence.
* Performing host-nation police training and support operations.
* Providing support to civil law enforcement.
Legal System
1-99. When criminal justice system reform, specifically the legal system, has broken down within a
society, staff judge advocates and others may initially support efforts to assist in recruiting, training, and
equipping the host nation’s legal system. Prior to deployment should coordinate and formulate basic,
flexible rule of law plans that participants can tailor to the particular circumstances of the deployment.
These participants can include judge advocates, civil affairs personnel, military police, and others who
anticipate a rule of law activity that contemplates criminal justice system reform activities. Once deployed,
information and time will likely be in short supply. Criminal justice system reform practices involving the
practice of law include, but are not limited to—
* Evaluating and assisting in developing transitional decrees, codes, ordinances, courts, and other
measures intended to bring immediate order to areas in which the host nation’s legal system is
impaired or nonfunctioning.
* Evaluating host-nation law, legal traditions, and administrative procedures in light of
international legal obligations and human rights standards and, when necessary, providing
appropriate assistance to their reform.
* Evaluating the training given to host-nation judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, legal advisors,
court administrators, and police and corrections officials in light of international legal
obligations and human rights standards.
* Advising commanders and others on the application of international, U.S., and host-nation law
considered in restoring and enhancing rule of law in the host nation.
* Advising commanders and U.S., international, and host-nation authorities on the legality,
legitimacy, and effectiveness of the host nation’s legal system—including its government’s
compliance with international legal obligations and host-nation law. |
3-07 | 27 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
* When necessary, serving as legal advisors for transitional courts.
* Supporting the training of U.S. personnel in the host nation’s legal system and traditions.
1-100. Criminal justice system reform activities require continuity. Judge advocates deploying to replace
judge advocates already in the operational area rely on their predecessors for information regarding an
operational environment. This information can detail the host nation, its legal system, existing rule of law
and criminal justice system reform activities, lessons learned, and opportunities identified for future
activities.
Corrections
1-101. Commanders may have to conduct corrections operations should inadequacies exist within the host
nation. Internment and resettlement planners can incorporate the number of companies required based on
estimates of capture rates and dislocated civilians. A military police commander may serve as the
commander of detainee operations, or a military police brigade commander may perform those functions in
a smaller area of operations. Working through host nation’s corrections personnel and through authorized
advisory efforts, U.S. corrections specialists can, through any phase of the stability framework, begin initial
steps towards improving this crucial aspect of the criminal justice system. Of note, however, the military
police houses detainees off the battlefield whereas prisons house inmates awaiting trial or convicted by the
courts in the criminal justice system.
Other Security Forces
1-102. Requirements may arise for developing other forces within the security sector. These requirements
may include specialized security forces; presidential guards; coast guard, border control, and customs
services; or intelligence services. The host nation determines the specific requirements on which to develop
these forces. Until such forces are developed and trained, other security forces assume responsibilities
outside their intended domain. In such cases, commanders ensure forces conduct operations in compliance
with relevant host-nation constitutional and statutory provisions and consistent with international law and
humanitarian guidelines. Commanders consider civilians’ perceptions of operations and the legitimacy of
the forces supporting operations. Units conducting security sector reform continuously assess operations.
Commanders use those assessments to monitor the effect of operations on the local populace and broader
security sector reform.
1-103. In general, capabilities of security forces reflect the roles for which they were designed and
trained. There may be overlap, particularly in times of emergency or until all planned forces are developed
and trained. Cooperation between military and police forces is emphasized from the outset, permitting both
to maintain their appropriate and distinct constitutional roles in the security sector. Security sector reform
educates host-nation forces, civilian oversight agencies, and political leadership on the appropriate roles for
each part of the security forces. Security sector reform restricts military forces to their role as a force of last
resort in the face of military threats. Using such forces may require several approaches within the
constitutional rule of law when military support to civil authority is required.
1-104. Ultimately, force development clearly defines and institutionalizes the separation of roles and
responsibilities between military forces and law enforcement agencies. Usually, their organization, training,
and equipment reflect this distinction; their design clearly limits the amount and degree of force that law
enforcement agencies can generate. For example, civilian police entities may adopt military command
structures and systems but not their mobile organizational structure. Another separation of roles and
responsibilities exists in that police forces provide services to a particular local area, neighborhood, or
community. Since police lack organization for a large-scale maneuver, they seldom form like military
forces. (Reform of these other security forces is discussed in JP 3-07.)
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS
1-105. The immediate goal of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs is to assess the
security requirements of the host nation and bring the military and police forces into alignment with those
requirements. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts are a critical component of
stabilization activities and should be accounted for in initial planning. Often, the terms of these programs |
3-07 | 28 | Chapter 1
are negotiated in ceasefire or peace accords. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs are
designed to remediate sources of instability. These programs facilitate achieving long-term peace, security,
and development. Efforts focus on immediately managing people previously associated with armed forces
and belligerent groups.
1-106. Conceptually, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs transition from
disarmament and demobilization to reintegration, but sequential progress is rare among all former warring
factions. Disarmament is the voluntary collection and positive control of weapons, while demobilization is
the formal disbanding of armed units and their support apparatus. Reintegration helps former combatants
become productive members of society. Because of their significance to security sector reform,
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts require a carefully crafted strategy that aligns
funding, resources, organizations, and time available. This helps avoid stalled or haphazard programs that
could lead former combatants to withdraw in frustration and distrust future efforts. Commanders implement
programs as efficiently and effectively as possible. The success of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration depends on integrating strategies and planning across all the sectors. These programs can set
the foundation for safeguarding and sustaining communities in which former combatants live as
contributing, law-abiding citizens. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration will not be effective
until all major actors to the conflict participate in the peace agreement. However, minor, irreconcilable
factions should not factor into the decision to proceed with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
1-107. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration officials must seek ways to defray costs and
extend their programs as long as possible with the resources given. Leaders aim to conduct efficient
operations that provide the maximum benefit to the host nation, keeping in mind that most programs end
when funding stops.
1-108. Successful programs are rewarding for participants. Such programs provide certificates of
completion along with certificates for education and vocational training. Many participants cherish this
recognition. Additionally, forces host a graduation ceremony for successful completion of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration. (For doctrine on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, see
ADRP 3-07 and JP 3-07. See the DOS’s Lessons-Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR) in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations—A Guide for United States
Government Planners for interagency perspectives.)
Disarmament
1-109. In the context of stability, disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of
small arms, ammunition, explosives, unexploded ordnance, and light and heavy weapons of former
combatants. Disarmament does not extend to the citizenry, which possesses the inalienable right of self-
defense. Because disarmament is a voluntary process, coercive techniques are counterproductive to the
desired objectives of the disarmament programs. Accordingly, a comprehensive information campaign
detailing collection points, dates for turning in weapons, ceremonies, and other pertinent information is
essential. The host nation’s government must exploit every medium available to ensure the word spreads.
However, it is counterproductive to offer money for weapons, since this can motivate individuals to turn in
unserviceable and antiquated weapons. The military often provides security at collection points, but it
should not participate directly in collection. For the irreconcilable factions, the host nation’s government
should assume responsibility.
Demobilization
1-110. Demobilization is the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and
defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and
economic vitality (JP 4-05). Because demobilization is complex, organization of infrastructure,
administrative and medical personnel, and the structured program for processing is paramount. While the
government security forces can use existing camps, rebel forces cannot. Consequently, these disparate
groups need separate temporary camps for effective demobilization. The demobilization process typically
takes several days to complete properly. Numerous challenges confront this process: a weapons turn-in and
storage point; the ability to in-process and verify statuses of the combatants; medical screening; segregated
barracks and latrines for males, females, child soldiers, and families; accommodations for disabled |
3-07 | 29 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
individuals; and food and water. Fighters are not the only former combatants that process through
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Service support providers, most often women, must also be
demobilized. For example, during in-processing, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration personnel
must identify women who are victims of sex slavery and forced marriage and place them in secure
barracks. (For additional resources on constructing and operating disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration cantonments, see the PKSOI Web site.)
Reintegration
1-111. Reintegration is the process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians
receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of
the local populace (ADRP 3-07). It encompasses the reinsertion of individual former combatants and
dislocated civilians into host-nation communities, villages, and social groups. Reintegration is a social and
economic recovery process focused on the local community; it complements other community-based
programs that spur job training, employment services, and economic recovery.
1-112. Reintegration includes programs to impart marketable skills to demobilized armed forces and
groups, belligerents, and dislocated civilians; relocation assistance to support their resettlement in civilian
communities; basic and vocational education; and assistance in finding employment in local economies. It
accounts for the specific needs of women and children associated with armed forces and groups, as well as
those of civilians forced to flee their homes after violent conflict or disaster. Consequently, temporary
camps need facilities for education and vocational skills training. Recruiting local teachers and vocational
instructors facilitates members of a society assisting in the reintegration process. Specialized assistance,
such as psychiatric counseling for traumatized combatants and devices for disabled combatants, ensures
victims of conflict receive necessary assistance.
1-113. Reintegration also addresses the willingness of civilian communities to accept former fighters into
their midst. If reconciliation fails, programs include finding new communities for those who cannot be
reintegrated. Amnesty and reconciliation are key components to successful reintegration. In this context,
reintegration cannot be divorced from justice and reconciliation programs that are part of the broader
transition process. Officials cannot promise or grant amnesty and must defer to the UN for such matters. If
the host nation assumes this responsibility, it prosecutes alleged war criminals and conducts truth and
reconciliation committees for lesser war crimes. In such cases, a temporary camp requires a facility for
hearings. Successful reintegration programs tend to be long term and costly, requiring the participation of
numerous external and host-nation security sector reform actors.
1-114. Reintegration inherently includes reinsertion, repatriation, and resettlement:
* Reinsertion is the assistance offered to former combatants, belligerents, and dislocated civilians
prior to the long-term process of reintegration.
* Repatriation, in this context, is the return of individuals to their country of citizenship.
* Resettlement is the relocation of refugees to a third country that is not the country of citizenship
nor the country into which the refugee has fled.
1-115. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance intended to provide for the basic needs of
reintegrating individuals and their families. This assistance includes transitional safety allowances, food,
clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment, and tools. While
reintegration represents enduring social and economic development, reinsertion comprises short-term
material and financial assistance programs intended to meet immediate needs. Resettlement to a third
country is granted by accord of the country of resettlement. It is based on criteria that include legal and
physical protection needs, lack of local integration opportunities, medical needs, family reunification needs,
and threat of violence or torture.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND CBRN
1-116. A related mission may include the destruction, monitoring, and redirection of WMD as well as
mitigating CBRN hazards. CBRN threats include WMD. CBRN hazards may result from deliberate attack
or accidental release. During the performance of stability tasks, the presence of these CBRN hazards can be
a major destabilizing force. Destruction activities include the dismantling, removal, transfer, disposal, and |
3-07 | 30 | Chapter 1
consolidation of an adversary’s materials, equipment, personnel (intellectual capital), and infrastructure of
WMD. Monitoring and redirection activities follow destruction activities. Monitoring and redirection aims
to convert WMD programs, personnel, sites, and facilities to prevent the transfer, reconstitution, and misuse
of residual dual-use capabilities. During monitoring and redirecting efforts, leaders need to understand the
political and legal ramifications of U.S. military personnel handling WMD—all treaties, conventions,
agreements, resolutions, and protocols should be considered.
1-117. The range of CBRN threats and hazards (beyond just WMD) can continue to pose a problem for
both military forces and other partners supporting the stabilization efforts. Removing, decontaminating, or
otherwise neutralizing these hazards ensures the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace and
freedom of movement to U.S. forces.
1-118. The list of tasks related to CBRN activities may include an initial response in which military
forces—
* Remediate hazards remaining in the area.
* Provide decontamination support.
(For a discussion of destruction, monitoring, and redirection of WMD, see JP 3-40, and for mitigation of
CBRN hazards, see JP 3-41.)
ARMY SUPPORT TO SECURITY COOPERATION
1-119. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments
to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly
military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with
peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22). Security cooperation includes all security
assistance programs administered by DOD that build defense and security relationships that promote
specific U.S. security interests. Security assistance programs include all international armaments
cooperation activities and other security assistance activities. Security assistance and security force
assistance may prove important to the primary stability task of establishing civil security either as part of
peacetime activities or as assigned missions along the stability framework after conflict. (For a more
detailed discussion of Army support to security cooperation, see FM 3-22.)
PEACE OPERATIONS
1-120. In joint doctrine, peace operations include crisis response and limited contingency operations.
Peace operations normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the
peace, and shape the environment for reconciling, rebuilding, and transitioning to legitimate governance.
Peace operations usually have a high proportion of stability tasks compared to offensive and defensive
tasks. Peace operations include—
* Peacekeeping operations.
* Peace building, which are post-conflict actions.
* Peacemaking.
* Conflict prevention efforts.
* Peace enforcement operations.
1-121. Peace operations may be conducted under the mandate of the UN, another IGO, within a coalition
of agreeing nations, or unilaterally. As with other types of military operations, peace operations depend on
the situation, reflecting the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
characteristics of the environment. (Each type of peace operation is presented in more detail in JP 3-07.3.)
1-122. Peace operations overlap significantly with stability tasks and often contain a sizeable stabilization
component. The military force focus initially on tasks relating to the establishment of civil security. A safe
and secure environment is essential toward enabling the other nonmilitary aspects of the mission that
promote the peace process and strive for resolution of the conflict. Protection of civilians has been key to
most peace operations. As the situation stabilizes, the requirements for peace building increase and the
military force need to prepare to support tasks dealing with establishment of civil control and governance. |
3-07 | 31 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
1-123. The political objectives of a peace operation shape the development of key documents that provide
legal authority and define its boundaries. These key documents assist commanders and their staffs in
planning and accomplishing their missions in peace operations. Some key documents used in peace
operations include—
* A mandate.
* A status-of-forces agreement or status-of-mission agreement.
* A term of reference.
* A memorandum of understanding.
* Rules of engagement.
1-124. Both the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (known as NATO) have published
doctrine on the conduct of peace operations. (See the UN Web site for UN publications. See the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Web site for North Atlantic Treaty Organization publications.)
FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
1-125. Foreign humanitarian assistance consists of DOD activities, during military operations or
peacetime, to alleviate human suffering. (See JP 3-29 for joint doctrine on foreign humanitarian assistance.)
Foreign disaster relief, one type of foreign humanitarian assistance, refers to prompt aid to alleviate the
suffering of foreign disaster victims. Army units and other security partners may be required to establish
conditions conducive to humanitarian action. The administrator of USAID, the President’s Special
Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, promotes maximum effectiveness and coordination in
responses by the U.S. Government to foreign disasters. Delivery of humanitarian assistance during the
initial response phase of the stability framework may prove an important element of restoring essential
services. (The minimum-essential stability tasks—provision of minimum levels of civil security, food,
water, shelter, and medical treatment to the civilian populace—are further discussed in ADRP 3-07.
Chapter 4 of ATP 3-07.5 discusses tasks of foreign humanitarian assistance.)
1-126. Threats to civilians are often accompanied by acute needs for essential goods and services.
Civilians may flee a threat, thus losing their access to livelihoods, services, and support networks.
Perpetrators may destroy sources of food, water, and shelter or otherwise purposely restrict access to
essential services. The situation may be a complex emergency, characterized by both conflict and natural
disasters such as droughts or flooding. Lack of access to clean water, medical services, and other essentials
can harm more civilians than physical violence. Moreover, lack of access to basic goods and services may
undermine an individual or communities’ ability to protect or rebound from physical violence.
Additionally, competition over scarce essential goods and services can be a root cause of or contribute to
conflict and violence against civilians. It is therefore vital to foster an environment conducive to
humanitarian assistance to protect civilians. This requirement could accompany other military operations
and may at times be the military’s most important task to prevent widespread human suffering.
Army Role in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
1-127. With the exception of immediate response to prevent loss of life, U.S. forces normally conduct
foreign humanitarian assistance only upon the request of DOS and in coordination with the chief of mission
and USAID. The U.S. military’s unmatched capabilities in logistics, mission command, communications,
and mobility can provide rapid and robust response to dynamic and evolving situations among vastly
different military, civilian, and government entities. Usually the military’s primary task in a humanitarian
crisis is to ensure a secure environment in which humanitarian workers can operate.
1-128. Army forces, often as part of a joint task force, normally play a supporting role in foreign
humanitarian assistance. Sometimes, the primary role for Army units is to help provide secure space so that
humanitarian partners can focus on objective and apolitical human needs. Typical supporting roles
include—
* Providing prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims.
* Making available, preparing, and transporting nonlethal excess property to foreign countries.
* Transferring on-hand DOD stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies. |
3-07 | 32 | Chapter 1
* Providing funded and space available transportation of humanitarian and relief supplies.
* Conducting some DOD humanitarian demining assistance activities.
* Conducting foreign consequence management.
1-129. Army units sometimes provide direct support to humanitarian operations. For example, in extreme
situations and as a last resort, humanitarian actors may request direct assistance such as escorts from Army
units for humanitarian teams delivering aid. In such cases, humanitarian use of military assets should seek
to comply with international guidance designed to safeguard humanitarian actors and the people they seek
to assist. Where humanitarian actors are not present or able to help people in need, Army units may be
temporarily involved in the actual delivery of essential goods and services until other actors are able to
assume the role. While Army units may become directly involved in humanitarian assistance as a last resort
under extreme circumstances, normally these units contribute to an environment conducive to humanitarian
action by—
* Establishing and maintaining general security, thus providing space in which humanitarian
actors can operate.
* Providing situational awareness regarding such issues as the location, number, and condition of
civilians in need.
* Providing information on potential threats.
* Providing communications support.
* Supporting planning efforts.
* Providing security at storage sites and during transload operations, transportation, and
distribution.
* Improving or building infrastructure capability for transportation and delivery of humanitarian
assistance.
* Providing transportation support (including helicopter transport and airfield operations).
* Providing equipment (such as materials handling equipment) and operators.
* Synchronizing information-related capabilities.
* Providing required technical expertise with selected Soldiers or units (such as medical,
construction, water purification, graves registration, and interpreter expertise).
Types of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Activities
1-130. Foreign humanitarian assistance activities conducted by U.S. forces span the range of military
operations but are most often crisis response and limited contingency operations. A single foreign
humanitarian assistance activity may well contain more than one of the following missions:
* Foreign disaster relief.
* Dislocated civilian support.
* Security missions.
* Technical assistance support functions.
* Foreign consequence management.
1-131. Foreign disaster relief missions include prompt aid that alleviates the suffering of disaster victims.
Dislocated civilian support missions support assistance and protection for dislocated civilians. Dislocated
civilian is a broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an
evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person (JP 3-29). Security
missions may include establishing and maintaining conditions to support humanitarian efforts by
organizations of the world relief community. Technical assistance and support functions may include short-
term support tasks such as communications restoration, relief supply distribution management and delivery,
port operations, base operating support, emergency medical care, search and rescue, and humanitarian
demining assistance. (For further information regarding humanitarian demining assistance, see appendix B
of JP 3-29.) Foreign consequence management is U.S. Government activity to help friends and allies
mitigate the effects of a CBRN incident. (For further information regarding foreign consequence
management, see JP 3-41.) Army leaders apply the practical guidelines summarized in table 1-1 for Army
support to foreign humanitarian assistance. |
3-07 | 33 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
Table 1-1. Practical guidelines for supporting foreign humanitarian assistance
Army units supporting • Consult with international humanitarian organizations for guidance.
foreign humanitarian • Develop a plan of action for the distribution.
assistance— • Adequately staff the distribution site, including translators to assist
with communications.
• Provide water, sanitation, and shelter at the distribution site.
• Identify leaders from the population to assist with the operation.
• Attempt to calm the population and create a sense of order prior to
handing out supplies.
• Use members of the community to assist with the distribution by
informing people of what is being given to whom, including how and
where the distribution will happen.
• Divide large stockpiles of supplies into smaller parts to distribute to
different locations or zones at the same time to minimize long lines
and crowds.
• Consider the special needs of women, children, the elderly, infirm,
and handicapped who may have a difficult time accessing supplies.
• Stop the distribution if disorder or violence occurs as a result.
Army units supporting • Distributing commodities without a site plan.
foreign humanitarian • Sending a small team to execute a distribution.
assistance avoid— • Setting conditions that would lead to dehydration or an unsanitary
environment.
• Ignoring, marginalizing, or alienating local leaders during the
distribution.
• Using one major distribution point that will attract a large crowd.
• Throwing commodities from vehicles or other modes of transport,
creating a fight for the fittest to obtain the supplies.
• Ignoring questions and concerns of the population.
• Allowing long lines or waiting periods that can agitate populations and
be harmful for vulnerable persons.
• Distributing supplies to only one race, gender, religious group, or
ethnic group that can aggravate social tensions resulting in violence.
• Delivering commodities under unsafe conditions that put civilians at
risk.
• Assuming that distribution is an easy task; commodities are valuable
items that can be monetized, which is why some people try to cheat
the system to get as much as possible.
COUNTERINSURGENCY
1-132. Counterinsurgency operations often focus on stability tasks. The combination of stability tasks
with offensive and defensive tasks sets the tone for the operation. Although all tasks performed to establish
conditions to achieve a desired end state are significant, an emphasis related to stability tasks is often
critical in counterinsurgency operations. Changes in an operational environment occur rapidly and
frequently, requiring adaptability when performing a combination of tasks. Army forces continuously
assess the mix of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks so they can adjust operations to achieve the
desired objectives. The tasks of establishing civil security and governance focus on legitimacy of the
government when facing an insurgent threat. Complementary action to address insurgency is building up
the capability of the host nation to resist the insurgency over time and to address the drivers of the conflict.
The tasks of establishing civil control and support to economic and infrastructure development support this
complementary action. (For more detail, see ATP 3-07.5.)
1-133. Countering an insurgency incorporates previous or continuing security cooperation efforts, U.S.
and host-nation objectives, a whole-of-government effort, and a comprehensive approach to address root |
3-07 | 34 | Chapter 1
causes of the conflict. Insurgency is a struggle for legitimacy and influence, generally from a position of
relative weakness. Insurgencies can exist apart from or before, during or after conventional conflicts.
Throughout history, elements of a population have grown dissatisfied with the status quo. When they are
willing to fight to change the conditions to their favor, using both violent and nonviolent means to affect a
change in the prevailing authority, they have often initiated an insurgency.
1-134. Ideally, the host nation is the primary partner in responding to, isolating, and defeating an
insurgency. Often, the host nation cannot effectively address sources of instability that provide an insurgent
organization freedom of movement. A critical goal of a counterinsurgency is to address those sources of
instability, erode the vulnerabilities of a population, and thus reduce active and passive support to an
insurgent movement. Although U.S. forces may be directed to support to another nation in countering an
insurgency, eventually the host nation will need to build its own capacity and capability to resolve its issues
related to instability.
1-135. U.S forces must understand the strategic context within which counterinsurgencies are conducted
so they can plan, prepare for, and execute counterinsurgency operations to achieve national objectives.
Counterinsurgency efforts support U.S. policy. The U.S. approach to countering an insurgency incorporates
agencies of the U.S. Government, and when possible, international agencies and partners, in supporting a
host nation. (FM 3-24 provides doctrine on counterinsurgency and the importance of stability efforts in
counterinsurgency.)
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
1-136. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any
of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22).
Foreign internal defense involves all instruments of national power. Primarily a series of programs, it
supports friendly nations operating against or threatened by hostile elements. Foreign internal defense
promotes regional stability by helping a host nation respond to its population’s needs while maintaining
security.
1-137. Foreign internal defense requires an evolving combination of offensive, defensive, and stability
tasks. The military role in foreign internal defense often includes indirect support, direct support (not
involving U.S. combat operations), and combat operations. Foreign internal defense is often conducted as
military engagement in peacetime.
1-138. Army support to foreign internal defense often takes the form of security force assistance. Security
force assistance activities support foreign internal defense activities where U.S. forces organize, train,
equip, rebuild, build, and advise a host nation’s security forces. Participating Army forces normally advise
and assist host-nation forces while refraining from combat operations. However, conduct of U.S. combat
operations is possible. Security force assistance by all types of Army forces, both conventional forces and
special operations forces, can support a foreign internal defense mission. (See JP 3-22 for more
information.)
1-139. U.S. foreign internal defense supports the host-nation’s internal defense and development. The
strategic aim of internal defense and development is to prevent subversion, lawlessness, insurgency,
terrorism, and other threats to a host nation’s security, stability, and legitimacy. It focuses on building
viable institutions—political, economic, military, and social—that respond to the needs of the society.
Internal defense and development is not only a single master plan, it is a compilation of all internal defense
and development plans at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that a nation possesses. Tactical units
may only see the local government strategy, economic development plan, or the long-range military plan of
the host-nation security force unit, all of which inform internal defense and development strategy. Internal
defense and development has multiple supporting objectives to include—
* Providing training and opportunities for host-nation security forces to improve and take the lead.
* Providing opportunity for the host-nation police and other governmental institutions to enforce
and maintain the rule of law.
* Providing essential services and addressing the causes of instability to mitigate insurgent goals
and access. |
3-07 | 35 | Stability Tasks in Military Operations
* Training and employing local workers, providing materials to rebuild, and providing a
sustainable economic and social system.
* Providing the conditions for political reforms.
1-140. Internal defense and development has four functional lines of effort:
* Balanced development.
* Mobilization.
* Neutralization.
* Security.
Balanced development consists of a variety of political, social, and economic reforms conducted in a
balanced way. Balanced development avoids benefitting one group at the expense of others and builds
viable political, economic, and social institutions that respond to the needs of the society. Mobilization is
the widespread involvement of the local workforce and use of local material and resources. It organizes the
population to participate in internal defense and development efforts and prevent the proliferation of
insurgency. Neutralization renders the insurgents’ effort ineffective by preempting valid parts of their
program, physically or psychologically separating insurgents from the people. Physically it focuses on
disrupting their organization or capturing or killing their members. It uses information operations, media,
and military information support operations to negate the effects of the insurgency and bolster the
legitimacy of the host nation. Security protects the people from insurgent violence, separates them from
insurgent control, and establishes conditions in which development can occur. Security addresses the
prerequisites related to the safety of the people and the protection of critical infrastructure. (For more
information regarding internal defense and development, see FM 3-22, FM 3-24, JP 3-05, JP 3-22, and
JP 3-24.) |
3-07 | 37 | Chapter 2
Stability Considerations for Transitions
This chapter starts by discussing levels of stability transitions that must be integrated.
Then, it discusses the transition of stability tasks from U.S. forces to the host nation.
Next, it explains transitional military authority. Finally, it discusses interim civil
authority.
STABILITY TRANSITION LEVELS
2-1. Army leaders performing stability tasks at any level must be aware that their actions support goals at
other levels. Stability transitions at the tactical level can influence operational or strategic stability goals
and transitions. An operation may contain several types of transitions that may or may not occur
simultaneously. Commanders and staffs consider how to facilitate smooth and coordinated transitions
across all levels. Completing transitions successfully, safely, and seamlessly is vitally important to the
success of stability efforts. The most critical and dangerous actions occur when forces shift from one type
of operation to another. For example, shifting a unit from the offense to the defense or moving a support
area from one locale to another is when loss of focus or missteps often occurs.
2-2. Understanding the levels of transitions, types of transitions, and their horizontally and vertically
impacts helps planners achieve the desired end state. Coordination helps ensure military actions conducted
across stability tasks are clear to all governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
responsible for the smooth transitions to a stable host nation. Transitions at the strategic level involve
coordinated efforts across the civil-military domain. In addition, transition challenges differ at national,
regional, and local levels. For example, national-level transitions involve sovereignty, legitimacy, and
social and ministerial reform. Local-level transitions may consist of supporting the village leaders in
reestablishment of their local customs. Each transition level and phase requires careful planning.
2-3. Returning to normalcy as quickly as possible is critical to success. All partners, including those from
other nations, must understand what normalcy looks like so they can plan appropriately. The study of the
host nation—as time permits—helps unified action partners understand how the host nation can transition.
They should understand the host nation’s history, traditions, customs, and cultures. To facilitate
understanding, planners identify host-nation personnel and NGOs already in place who can assist in quickly
redeveloping structures and procedures. These people can provide a clear picture of normalcy to planners
and practitioners.
IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATION
2-4. Army leaders ensure the actions of Army forces are integrated within the joint force. Integration is
the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a
whole (JP 1). In the context of stability, the actions of United States (U.S.) forces support the integrated
efforts of all unified action partners and the host nation. This supports the stability principle of unity of
effort and purpose as described in ADRP 3-07—to achieve unity of effort and unity of purpose among all
actors. To ensure the integration of transitions, planning must be collaborative and interactive between all
partners. For the success of the host nation, all actions by all parties need to be nested and reinforcing.
Actions performed at the local level must fit into national efforts while national efforts appropriately
support local actions. Each action must be weighted appropriately to create equilibrium. Too much
attention to actions at one level or too little to another level can lead to failure. Trying to correct the
imbalance will become the focus and distract from the overall strategy. Partners must develop a robust
cadre of civilians with the knowledge and training to collaborate effectively with locals and help them build
host nation institutional capacity. To ensure long-term success, planners develop transition strategies as |
3-07 | 38 | Chapter 2
early as possible. Military planners establish trust, shared objectives, and collaborative approaches to
overcome difficulties that could impede successful unified action among partners.
2-5. Numerous partnerships are needed to ensure smooth transitions. Some are partnerships between the
host nation and other nations, but partnerships among actors within the host nation are just as important. A
coordinated, comprehensive approach depends on the combined support of external actors’ resources and
internal actors’ commitment. Army leaders engage and establish links to all partners to facilitate successful
transitions. Agencies and organizations operating within the region often understand the relationships
between the new regime and the opposition. These agencies and organizations include U.S. agencies and
those of other governments, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other international
organizations. The people within these agencies and organizations are not only familiar with the local
culture and customs, they may have already developed a relationship of trust among the actors of both
sides. This trust will help nurture these critical partnerships.
OVERALL TRANSITION PRINCIPLES
2-6. Army leaders at all levels keep in mind how their actions fit into a comprehensive approach. Leaders
must avoid considering their missions in isolation from overall stability goals and principles. Principles of
effective transition, within this comprehensive approach, include reconciliation, transparency, and patience.
Applying these principles can support the development of trust among the various actors and, over time,
provide an environment conducive to building partner capacity.
Reconciliation
2-7. The principle of reconciliation is to establish the end of conflict and renew a friendly relationship
between disputing people or groups so the post-conflict government can represent them all. The transition
principle of reconciliation builds on the stability principle of conflict transformation. Reconciliation must
include more than an end to armed conflict. It also must involve renewing a friendly relationship between
disputing people or groups. The disparate parties within the host nation must sufficiently resolve their
differences and accept one another to allow for proper representation of each party in the host nation’s
government. Reconciliation can be an end, a means, an outcome, or a process. For the purposes of this
doctrine, reconciliation is a prerequisite to restoring governance. It must be achieved for the nation under
new governance to move forward toward adequately serving its people. Including all groups and ensuring
they all have representation from the beginning facilitate transparency, a key enabler for reconciliation.
2-8. Army units assist the host nation and other contributors in developing a means to facilitate
reconciliation. Most likely, developing reconciliation will take time to build trust among the groups within
the host nation. Initially units may carry messages among the groups. Eventually the host nation and other
contributors discuss key issues that focus on their relationships. Discussing the collective fears and desires
of the future will help drive the dialogue.
2-9. Effective stability efforts address underlying issues such as distrust and hatred passed from
generation to generation. Planners develop a strategy to address and counter the underlying causes.
Reconciliation needs to occur at personal and public levels.
2-10. Transitional justice refers to a society’s efforts to bring accountability, justice, and reconciliation to
bear in addressing a legacy of major abuse of human rights and is a key component of reconciliation.
Transitional justice mechanisms may include truth and reconciliation commissions, lustrations (banning
members of the previous regime from holding public office), reparations, and judicial processes. The
country team coordinates U.S. support to specific forms of transitional justice. Ongoing dialogue among
host-nation groups includes the root causes of conflict. Root causes may be tribal, cultural, based in
religion, or based on the disagreement of land ownership and land rights. Disputing people or groups can
resolve less severe grievances through workshops, public apologies, or policy reform.
2-11. To facilitate reconciliation among individuals, transition planners should help the host nation develop
a means for individuals to express their feelings through acceptable and peaceful cultural expression. Army
units should take advantage of the expertise and contacts those IGOs and NGOs provide. Such
organizations not only have direct contact with the many groups involved, but they most likely have tools
and resources that can facilitate mutual respect among the host-nation groups. Despite apparent progress |
3-07 | 39 | Stability Considerations for Transitions
toward reconciliation at the national level, Army leaders should remain aware that reconciliation requires
the belief of the individuals. All past wrongs are not necessarily swept away with the end of conflict.
Individuals who feel wronged and unfairly compensated often harbor resentment.
Transparency
2-12. The principle of transparency is to establish openness, integrity, and accountability in the post-
conflict government so it will conduct itself responsibly. This transition principle of transparency builds on
the stability principle of legitimacy and host-nation ownership. With reconciliation established, external
contributors need to assist in ensuring the new government of the host nation is inclusive so that all host-
nation actors can develop trust. A lack of transparency can easily become an issue among all groups if
resources and programs prove inequitable. A society is likely to perceive, for example, that the political
elite or military controls distribution to improve its own position. In some cases, a government can easily
control contracting funds, food, and other humanitarian aid. Even with the best of intentions, it can lose
credibility within the society if its activities are not transparent. Without proper processes, programs, and
supervision to provide accountability, failure will occur. The magnitude of external support can easily
overwhelm a fledgling nation that lacks structures and control procedures necessary to arrive in the proper
quantity to the right people. Lax structures and control procedures can lead to corruption, particularly when
for a culture accepts leaders at any level taking a portion of the payments for themselves.
2-13. Partners supporting a host nation must neither replace the government nor give the government carte
blanche in operations until the host nation shows it can operate with transparency. External contributors
should understand the difference between supporting the members of a society directly and giving the
government resources it can use to provide for its people. Whether supporting the government or
supporting the people directly, organizations help a fledgling government to operate effectively.
Patience
2-14. The principle of patience is to establish unity of effort with long-term interagency and
interorganizational activities so the post-conflict government becomes successful. This principle of
patience builds on the stability principle of unity of effort and purpose. All contributors must achieve unity
of effort to build success over the long term. As in defense support of civil authorities, military forces will
accomplish their missions, hand off tasks, and redeploy when other partners can continue remaining
stability efforts without military support. Army leaders focus on the following to ensure successful
transition:
* Knowledge: develop in-depth knowledge and situational understanding of host-nation actors and
dynamics.
* Essential functions: focus assistance on essential functions, not all the problems in a particular
organization.
* Realistic demands and expectations: set realistic demands and expectations for fragile states.
* Preeminence of civilian leadership: Civilian agencies should lead assistance to help build
government effectiveness in the political, economic, and social spheres.
2-15. Military planners incorporate long-term planning with the U.S. Government, IGOs, and NGOs that
remain in the country to assist in further development. Incorporating the United States Agency for
International Development (known as USAID) is essential, as it assists in long-term development. Many
times when the military is involved in reconstruction, the military looks to make as much impact as
possible during its current tour of duty. Commanders ensure that military projects and programs do not
interfere with long-range vision of the United States Agency for International Development. History shows
that the length of involvement needed to support the transition of organizations exceeds the political will of
most external actors. This may be due to financial strains or erroneous expectations about the time needed.
In fact, effective transitions may take decades to complete. In most cases, a post-conflict transition
continues long after military involvement. (See ADRP 3-07, chapter 4, for guidance on planning operations
focused on stability using lines of effort and the desired end state. The discussion in ADRP 3-07 includes
force tailoring and task-organizing the force. Refer also to Senior Leader’s Guide to Transition Planning
for information on transitions between joint operational phases.) |
3-07 | 40 | Chapter 2
TRANSITION OF STABILITY TASKS
2-16. In the context of stability tasks, transitions occur across each of the five primary stability tasks to
achieve the end state. Comprehensive transition planning incorporates the transfer of responsibility,
authority, power, and accountability incrementally, on several levels, and by numerous partners. The
measures of performance (MOPs) or measures of effectiveness (MOEs) indicating the appropriate time to
complete tactical transitions tend to be clear and specific. Strategic transitions are exponentially more
complex due to the magnitude of systems affected. A rush to complete transitions may only result in a rush
to failure if the host nation and supporting actors are not prepared. A well-structured transition plan helps
minimize corruption and dependency of the provisional or interim government.
2-17. Army planners consider managing complex transitions in transition phases. Transition phases are
consistent with the Army definition that describes a phase as a planning and execution tool used to divide
an operation in duration or activity (ADRP 3-0). Transitions include transferring authority and control to
other military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and the host nation. Forces should execute
transitions phases gradually rather than abruptly. While gradual transitions are optimal, an unexpected
change in conditions may require commanders to direct an abrupt transition. In such cases, the overall
composition of the force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task organization, and
rules of engagement.
2-18. U.S. government leaders have the lead for managing overall stability transitions. Civil organizations
with more expertise in national development take the lead in stability transition. The host nation must have
the political will and the resiliency to assume responsibility. The complexity of external actors and
contributing nations’ international politics and policies may complicate the process. All short-term actions
must nest and reinforce long-term end states. Numerous lines of effort crossing different transition phases
potentially add complexity to all partner organizations. The numerous layers of tasks and actors compound
the challenges with the finite number of people able to accomplish missions.
2-19. Unified action partners clearly plan and express the steps for their withdrawal so local actors have
time to adapt to their responsibilities and structures. Extending a transition phase can provide an
opportunity to test local readiness for sovereignty. Conversely, delaying completion of a transition phase
might encourage others to create artificial disturbances to extend the delay.
2-20. In an operation, stability tasks transition within the stability framework (see ADRP 3-07). Military
tasks are described in the stability framework as the initial response phase, transformation phase, or
fostering sustainability phase. Forces accomplish stability tasks over time, carefully planning all levels of
transitions throughout operations. Army leaders consider planning stability tasks in three transition phases:
* Phase 1—Repair and (re)establish systems.
* Phase 2—Normalize systems.
* Phase 3—Transfer and exit.
2-21. Initial response tasks generally occur in transition phase 1, transformation tasks in transition phase 2,
and fostering sustainability tasks in transition phase 3. (See table 2-1.) However, there is overlap. In the
fostering sustainability phase, military planners should keep in mind that the efforts of partners outside the
Department of Defense are likely to continue after military forces depart. However, military tasks may
continue with the emphasis on security cooperation activities, including security force assistance.
Table 2-1. Phases of the stability framework and stability transition phases
Phases of
the Initial
Transformation Fostering sustainability
stability response
framework:
Stability 1—Repair and
transition (re)establish 2—Normalize systems 3—Transfer and exit
phases: systems
Time: |
3-07 | 41 | Stability Considerations for Transitions
2-22. The emphasis for commanders is on the transition of military tasks from U.S. forces to host-nation
forces. Specific transitions will occur both as a change in focus of the tasks as described in the stability
framework and as transfers of authorities to other partners or to the host nation. These transitions often do
not occur all at once, but over time. At any given point, the lines of effort associated with the primary
stability tasks may span different phases of the transition. For example, a line of effort associated with the
primary stability task of establishing civil security is in transition phase 2, while another line of effort
associated restore essential services is in transition phase 1. Additionally, transfers of authority may switch
to other organizations or the host nation at a different pace. Finally, in the fostering sustainability phase of
the stability framework, military planners consider that the efforts of partners outside the Department of
Defense often continue after military forces depart. However, military tasks may continue with the
emphasis moving to long-term security cooperation activities, including security force assistance.
2-23. Early integration of all supporting actors into a comprehensive approach toward a common end state
is key to success. In addition, integrating host-nation personnel into the transition from the beginning is
vital. Retaining and incorporating knowledge of past institutional procedures also streamlines the transition.
TRANSITION PHASE 1—REPAIR AND (RE)ESTABLISH SYSTEMS
2-24. Partners begin to repair or replace the systems that were once active or in control of the host nation.
Typically, partners selectively support local actors based on the security situation. This means foreign
actors often drive stabilization and reconstruction: they develop the strategies, priorities, and projects and
manage implementation. Partners operate in those sectors in which they are proficient or chartered by their
sponsors.
2-25. In transition phase 1, Army leaders begin a comprehensive approach toward mentoring and advising
host-nation military leaders to ensure the host nation becomes willing to and capable of assuming its
legitimate responsibilities. From the beginning, Army leaders organize a civil-military team for planning
and executing subsequent transition phases. They coordinate horizontally and vertically to ensure that
military efforts support host-nation agencies and organizations. The military must cooperate and coordinate
with all partner agencies and organizations in a comprehensive approach. Military leaders recognize that
military efforts are just one part of successfully building host-nation autonomy.
2-26. In some situations, a partner nation’s military must serve as the initial lead in repairing or
reestablishing certain aspects of normalcy. This happens due to inadequate security within the host nation.
TRANSITION PHASE 2—NORMALIZE SYSTEMS
2-27. In this context, systems refers broadly to host-nation political, economic, social, and military
structures that ensure—
* A safe and secure environment.
* The rule of law.
* Social well-being.
* Stable governance.
* A sustainable economy.
2-28. Transition phase 2 begins as the host-nation government becomes operational, and its management
of civil security, civil control, essential services, governance, economic development, and infrastructure
tasks becomes routine practice. This transition phase takes time. Host-nation personnel take the lead, while
partners continue to mentor and coach. The host nation owns and operates the systems and processes.
Mentors seek to understand the culture, norms, and customs of the host nation to help determine when to
terminate education, training, mentoring, and coaching support.
2-29. Army leaders use MOEs and MOPs appropriate to the situation for measuring success. (See
ADRP 3-07 for guidance on incorporating MOEs and MOPs in planning stability.) Determining criteria for
normalized political, economic, social, and military systems is a challenge. Planners determine when to
consider the actions in this transition phase complete based on achieving the end state conditions.
Achieving the end state means that transition phase 2 should end and transition phase 3 should begin. |
3-07 | 42 | Chapter 2
(Table 2-2 gives sample indicators that partners should transition stability tasks entirely to the host
nation.)
Table 2-2. Sample indicators for partners to transfer stability tasks
Stability task End state conditions Sample transfer indicators
Establish civil security Safe and secure environment Host-nation security forces able to provide
security.
Society has trust and confidence in host-
nation forces to provide security.
Establish civil control Establish rule of law Host-nation has fair laws, courts, police,
and detention.
Society accepts and trusts the established
laws and procedures of the nation.
Restore essential services Social well-being Essential food, water, shelter, and medical
support sustain the needs of the
population.
Support to governance Stable governance Legitimate host-nation political and
administrative institutions serve citizens
through participative fair practice of rules,
processes, and behavior.
Support to economic and Sustainable economy Host-nation institutions and processes
infrastructure development ensure the sustained viability of the state.
2-30. As transition phase 2 moves forward, stability planners ensure the host nation does not develop an
over-dependence on partners. These partners provide the host nation the opportunity to become
independent, even at the cost of mistakes. Learning from mistakes proves valuable in reinforcing planning
and execution processes while correcting deficiencies and developing the opportunity to work in crisis
management processes.
2-31. Army stability planners develop details of the transfer plan during transition phase 2. All actors must
understand what roles and responsibilities require a formal transfer plan. Planners develop a clear
delineation of which party takes the operational role and which party takes the monitoring role. Planners
identify the timeline for the formal transfer. Ideally, transition timelines align with times that actors expect
tasks to be completed.
2-32. At the tactical level during transition phase 2 of stability transitions, deploying and redeploying units
may overlap so the new unit can learn the area of operations from the previous unit. This method of
transition establishes clear roles and responsibilities for those releasing responsibility as well as those
assuming responsibility. At the operational and strategic levels, relationships made during the coaching and
mentoring of host-nation representatives may provide less structured lines for the time or conditions for
transfer.
TRANSITION PHASE 3—TRANSFER AND EXIT
2-33. As the systems normalize with the host nation, military and international partners begin to remove
themselves from the national bureaucracy. With clear transfer plans developed in transition phase 2, the
process of transferring responsibilities may begin to occur. Forces expect to transfer different aspects of an
operation at different times based on setting conditions. Additionally, they consider that delays in one
sector may delay the transfer in another. Plans should anticipate and account for potential delays.
2-34. The number of partners can easily overwhelm the very nation they are attempting to help. As a result,
the pace of transition must be driven by the host nation’s priorities and its ability to incorporate the
assistance provided. The speed to which transition occurs depends on the level at which the transition
occurs. Local transitions normally occur quickly. A coordinated national transition should facilitate local
transitions. Military forces should be the first partners to exit, as the long-term tasks of building institutions,
strengthening the economy, and providing social services are inherently civilian. |
3-07 | 43 | Stability Considerations for Transitions
MEASURING SUCCESS
2-35. MOPs and MOEs are the standard measures used to analyze progress when moving from one
transition phase to another. As in any operation, leaders report on what is being done to achieve success
and whether or not what is being done is successful in each transition phase. Army leaders use the
assessment process described in ADRP 5-0: monitoring, evaluating, and recommending. Army leaders
conducting operations focused on stability integrate assessments with partners. Designing the criteria for
MOPs and MOEs is difficult. Equally challenging is determining what standard is being used by partners to
reflect the host-nation norms.
2-36. Interagency and interorganizational stability practitioners use various tools to assist in measuring
success. However, no single tool adequately provides all the information necessary to show success in all
situations. Military planners developing MOEs and MOPs should work with partners in determining what
standards to use, particularly with host-nation representatives. Coordinating the MOEs and MOPs helps
ensure all partners work to the same purpose and the same goal. Available tools include the Interagency
Conflict Assessment Framework and the District Stability Framework (discussed in chapter 4). Additional
interagency and interorganizational tools commonly used by stability partners for measuring success (see
the references to access these tools) include—
* The U.S. Institute of Peace framework, Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments.
* The United Nations (UN) framework, Managing Performance in Peacebuilding: Framework for
Conflict-Sensitive Monitoring and Evaluation.
* The Department of State task matrix, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks.
* The Sphere Handbook.
* UN transition strategies at the UN Web site.
2-37. Army leaders use assessment tools to determine what and how to measure in regards to individuals,
relationships among the actors, and institutional and cultural actions and norms. Every operational
environment will differ from the last. Understanding the current environment and the history helps inform
leaders of the direction the transition should go and the look and feel of success.
2-38. Transition involves a complex set of processes further complicated by the diversity of partner
cultures. Developing a plan and ensuring integration of the host-nation populace from the beginning is
critical to success. Reconciliation, transparency, and patience are crucial in successful transition. Though
much of the support and resources come from external partners, the driver of transition must remain the
host nation. Without its acceptance and participation, failure is imminent. Partners develop a collective
approach along with the host nation to ensure unity of purpose and achievable goals. When individual
partners provide their selective resources to meet organizational goals that do not synchronize with stated
interorganizational goals and objectives, then wasted resources—time, money, and energy—may result in
failed objectives. Finally, forces ensure the MOEs and MOPs are clear and achievable to provide a true
picture of progress.
TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY
2-39. A transitional military authority is a temporary military government exercising the functions of
civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. Under extreme circumstances, in
which the host-nation government has failed completely or an enemy regime has been deposed, the
intervening authority has a legal and moral responsibility to install a transitional authority on the behalf of
the population. When military forces have invaded and are occupying enemy territory, a transitional
military authority may be established. Under these circumstances, the military will take the lead in the
stability sectors. However, a transitional military authority may draw assistance from experienced civilian
agencies and organizations. These agencies and organizations have the expertise to establish a system of
government that fosters the gradual transition to a legitimate host-nation authority. Sometimes, however,
sufficient civilian expertise is not present or conditions of an operational environment do not support
introducing such civilian expertise. Military forces may then be required to lead until they stabilize the
security situation and can safely transition responsibility for the stability sectors to civil authority and civil
control. |
3-07 | 44 | Chapter 2
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY
2-40. An occupying force establishes transitional military authority pursuant to international law, including
The Hague and Geneva Conventions. Such authority is limited in scope by international law. In other
circumstances, military forces establish a transitional military authority pursuant to a UN Security Council
resolution or a similar international legal authority, which will also describe the limits of that authority.
Furthermore, when occupying enemy territory, authority additional to that provided by traditional sources
of international law, such as The Hague and Geneva Conventions, may be provided by UN Security
Council resolutions or similar authority. Commanders should only take action with regard to transitional
military authority after close and careful consultation with the legal advisor.
2-41. A transitional military authority acts on the behalf of the population and, in the case of occupation of
enemy territory, to secure the occupying force. The UN Security Council resolution or similar authority
may prescribe specific or additional roles of the transitional military authority. In cases other than the
occupation of enemy territory, the international community generally will lead this effort through an IGO
such as the UN. The occupation of enemy territory may result in one nation or a coalition of nations
providing the transitional military authority.
2-42. Effective transitional military authority enhances security and facilitates ongoing operations while
fulfilling the legal obligations of occupying forces under international law. This authority enhances stability
by promoting the safety and security of both military forces and the local populace, reducing active or
passive sabotage, and maintaining public order. It helps ongoing operations by building host-nation
capability and capacity to perform government functions and relieving maneuver forces of the
responsibility of civil administration. Until the military authority can safely transition to civil authority and
control, activities of the transitional military authority are performed with civilian personnel assistance and
participation. These civilians may come from the host nation, the U.S. Government, or other agencies or
organizations. This cooperation facilitates the transition while ensuring that all activities complement and
reinforce efforts to set conditions necessary to achieve success.
2-43. A transitional military authority exercises functions of civil administration. These functions include
providing for the safety, security, and well-being of the populace; reestablishing and maintaining public
order; and restoring essential services. Such functions—and the tasks that support them—evolve from the
essential tasks described in the essential stability task matrix and are reflected in the five primary stability
tasks. Establishing transitional military authority may require military forces to complete tasks typically
performed by the host-nation government. These tasks may be provided for under international law—
including applicable treaties such as The Hague and Geneva Conventions—and UN Security Council
resolutions.
Command Responsibility for Transitional Military Authority
2-44. The exercise of transitional military authority is a command responsibility, exercised in accordance
with international law. To ensure that situational understanding and cultural awareness inform planning and
the conduct of transitional military authority, commanders at all levels maintain open, continuous dialogue.
They also collaborate among the echelons of command and various agencies, organizations, and institutions
that share in efforts to restore legitimate governance to the host nation.
2-45. The authority to implement transitional military authority resides with the President, exercised
through the Secretary of Defense and the joint force commander. Broad policy formulation and initial
planning for transitional military authority is conducted under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
However, the joint force commander, key staff, subordinate Service components, and allied commanders
also participate to a lesser degree.
Establishment of Transitional Military Authority
2-46. A transitional military authority restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security
of the local populace, and provides essential civil services. Transitional military authority is not limited to
the occupation of enemy territory. During operations outside the United States and its territories, necessity
may also require establishing transitional military authority in various situations, including— |
3-07 | 45 | Stability Considerations for Transitions
* An allied or neutral territory liberated from enemy forces.
* A neutral or allied territory proven to be hostile.
* An ungoverned area.
2-47. The time during which a transitional military authority exercises authority varies based on the
requirements of both the military operation and international law. To establish transitional military
authority, commanders may require from the host-nation population a level of obedience commensurate
with military necessity. Such obedience provides security of military forces, maintenance of law and order,
and proper administration of the operational area. Commanders can reward civil obedience by reducing
infringement on the individual liberties of the local populace.
2-48. The degree of control exercised by a transitional military authority varies greatly due to several
factors, including—
* The legal authorities of the military commander under international law.
* The relationship that previously existed between the U.S. Government and the host-nation
government.
* Existing attitudes and the level of cooperation among the host nation’s national, regional, and
local leaders and the local populace.
* Ongoing and projected military operations.
* The presence of hostile or enemy forces.
* The level of civil obedience.
As conditions in the territory subject to transitional military authority stabilize, the degree of control
exercised by a military authority can decrease. Authority and control can transfer either to the legitimate
sovereign or to another civil authority.
ORGANIZATION OF TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY
2-49. The joint force commander is responsible for the detailed planning and operations of the transitional
military authority under the general guidelines received from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The structure and organization of the transitional military authority depend on—
* International law, including any applicable UN Security Council resolutions or similar
authorities.
* The mission of the military force.
* The organization, capabilities, and capacities of deployed forces.
* The military and political conditions of the operational area.
* The nature, structure, and organization of the existing or former host-nation government.
* The physical, political, economic, and cultural geography of the host nation.
Existing Laws, Customs, and Boundaries
2-50. In general, the laws of the host nation subject to transitional military authority should not be changed,
except to the extent permitted by The Hague and Geneva Conventions. Commanders must consult closely
and carefully with their legal advisors before attempting to change any local laws.
2-51. In general, the military authority should not impose the customs of another nation on an occupied
nation. Implementing changes or reforms inconsistent with local customs may foster active or passive
resistance, adding friction to an already complex effort. Commanders and their legal advisors must
recognize that laws and customs often vary between political divisions of a country, such as between
provinces or municipalities. Commanders identify issues related to ethnic and minority groups so policies
of the transitional military authority do not inadvertently oppress such groups.
2-52. Commanders avoid redrawing local boundaries and political divisions except to the extent permitted
by international law. Unit boundaries should normally reflect these boundaries as closely as possible.
Periodically, however, unit boundaries shift to avoid inadvertently creating sanctuaries for adversaries.
Commanders examine existing police jurisdictional boundaries and lines to determine if their locations |
3-07 | 46 | Chapter 2
contribute to setting the conditions for successful operations. Established precincts, zones, districts, regions,
counties, parishes, or other mechanisms that delineate police authority facilitate commanders using
decision making and employing military forces. Police jurisdictional boundaries may reflect dominant or
sensitive cultural realities or fault lines that exist in a community. Some police boundaries may also exist to
ensure that police capability is commensurate or appropriate to the criminal conditions of an area.
Forms of Transitional Military Authority
2-53. In general, transitional military authorities are either operational or territorial. An operational form of
transitional military authority expands in authority as operations continue. In the territorial form of
transitional military authority, the joint force commander establishes a separate organization under the
direct command of the joint force commander or an authorized subordinate.
Operational Form of Transitional Military Authority
2-54. The responsibilities and geographic area over which a transitional military authority exercises civil
administration may expand as operations continue. Commanders oversee civil functions of government in
their respective operational areas. This includes ensuring the safety, security, and well-being of the local
populace as well as providing humanitarian assistance. Under the operational form of transitional military
authority, the chain of command retains the responsibility for authority and is supported by its staff
structure.
2-55. Concentrating authority and responsibility in the commander helps ensure that activities related to
civil administration are integrated consistently with ongoing operations. These activities include
relationships between the military force and civilians. By ensuring the integrity of unity of command in an
operational area, commanders mitigate much of the friction associated with operations in and among the
local populace. As the situation permits, the responsibility for civil administration transfers to the host
nation or other civil authority to help the host nation return to full self-governance. Using host-nation
civilian advisory groups helps accelerate this transfer of authority.
2-56. The advantages of operational form of transitional military authority, however, are tempered by the
rate of military activities. Generally, the higher the tempo within the operational area, the less the
commander can address the requirements of transitional military authority. In areas where the tempo of
operations and civil situation are consistently dynamic, civil administration policies may change frequently.
Finally, operational headquarters are not always assigned operational areas corresponding to known
political subdivisions. Even after hostilities, conformance of these areas to political boundaries may prove
impossible, however desirable.
Territorial Form of Transitional Military Authority
2-57. In the territorial form of transitional military authority, commanders establish a separate organization
to exercise the functions of civil administration. It may be under the direct command of the joint force
commander or an authorized subordinate, or it may report directly to the Secretary of Defense or the
President. The military governor may command subordinate military governors assigned to political
subdivisions throughout the host nation. Generally, the territorial form of the transitional military authority
follows a separate chain of command from operational forces.
2-58. A territorial form of transitional military authority typically uses military manpower and expertise
more effectively and economically than an operational form of transitional military authority. Established
after the operational area is stabilized, a territorial form of transitional military authority may ensure
improved continuity of policy and administration. It should facilitate selecting and assigning specially
trained military personnel. A territorial form of transitional military authority operates under the stability
principle of unity of effort and purpose, to achieve unified action.
2-59. However, the existence of a separate chain of command within an operational area or a political
subdivision presents unique challenges to the territorial form of transitional military authority. Activities of
the territorial military authority must be carefully coordinated with those of operational military forces.
These activities must not interfere with ongoing operations or expose the operational force to undue risk. |
3-07 | 47 | Stability Considerations for Transitions
To ensure unity of effort, the territorial form of transitional military authority and the operational forces
must maintain close communications, cooperation, and coordination.
2-60. In practice, the exact form of authority should be adapted to suit the political and military situation in
the operational area. A territorial form of transitional military authority may draw certain features from an
operational form, or vice versa. As operations progress, the character of the military authority may evolve
according to the situation, mirroring the effort to build host-nation capacity. In certain cases, one type of
military authority may dominate in one region of the host nation, while another type is better suited for
another region.
Local Government Officials and Departments
2-61. Successfully implementing transitional military authority often depends on how the host-nation
government and its civilians participate and contribute. The transitional military authority thoroughly
assesses the capability of the remaining host-nation government officials. This assessment determines if
those officials can support and contribute to transitional military authority. The long-term success of the
operation may depend on this assessment. If permitted by international law, offices that are unnecessary or
detrimental to the transitional military authority may close temporarily, and officials who refuse to serve
the best interests of the transitional military authority may be suspended. However, such officials may be
retained in an advisory capacity at the discretion of the military commander. In such cases, they should
continue to receive compensation for their services.
2-62. Generally, if a transitional military authority needs to be established, high-ranking political officials
of the former government will not continue to hold office. Such officials may include heads of the host-
nation government, cabinet ministers, and other political elites. To the extent permitted by international
law, the transitional military authority may be required to perform certain duties that would otherwise fall
to individuals in these positions.
2-63. Typically, mere membership in unfriendly organizations or political groups is not by itself
considered sufficient grounds for removal from office. However, officials who have served as active
leaders of such organizations or political groups may need to leave office. Similarly, officials who prove
unreliable or corrupt must leave office through legal action or through an open, transparent administrative
process. The willful failure of retained officials to perform their duties satisfactorily is a serious offense
against the transitional military authority.
2-64. The commander’s decisions about whether or not to retain leaders of the local government will likely
vary. In some areas, full local participation may be the norm, while in other areas entire departments and
bureaus of the local government may need to close. Where practical, the transitional military authority
should retain subordinate officials and employees of the local government. These officials can continue to
discharge their duties under the direction and supervision of appropriately trained military personnel. Under
certain circumstances, military forces may protect officials who continue to serve in, or are appointed to,
local public service. Hostile elements may pose a threat to these individuals.
2-65. In some areas, the local populace may have had very limited participation in government due to
centralized power in an authoritarian regime or a dominating foreign power. Elitist groups may also have
focused regional, provincial, or municipal power under their control, negating the participation of the local
populace. In such cases, civilian officials of the former government may flee. Even if they remain, it may
be impractical or unsafe for them to continue in office. For this reason, building new partner capability—
training local nationals to assume certain government positions—must often precede long-term efforts in
building partner capacity.
2-66. When military authority removes a local official or that official is unavailable, the transitional
military authority seeks a fully qualified, trained, and experienced replacement. When selecting officials,
the military authority considers their reliability, willingness to cooperate with the transitional military
authority, and status in the community. The transitional military authority does not make permanent
appointments, however. If a suitable candidate is not available, a representative of the transitional military
authority performs the duties of the position until an appropriate replacement can assume the duties. |
3-07 | 48 | Chapter 2
2-67. Commanders at all echelons must avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, local political
elements without the approval of higher authority. Military personnel should refrain from developing or
maintaining unofficial relationships with local officials and host-nation personnel. Soldiers must refuse
personal favors or gifts offered by government officials or the local populace unless authorized by higher
authority.
GUIDELINES FOR TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY
2-68. For military forces, the successful accomplishment of the mission is paramount. As long as
operations continue, the commander must exercise the necessary control. This may involve actions related
to host-nation personnel and the local populace. The policies and practices adopted for transitional military
authority should reduce the possibility that civilians interfere with ongoing operations.
2-69. To ensure operations continue unimpeded by civilians, transitional military authority focuses on
ensuring the safety and security of civilians, restoring and maintaining law and order, building host-nation
capability and capacity in key areas of government, and reestablishing living conditions to a normal,
customary state. Thoroughly integrating civil affairs capabilities into the operations process helps facilitate
unimpeded operations. Civil affairs integration supports maintaining positive interaction between military
forces and the local people.
2-70. Commanders develop codes of behavior that avoid violation of, or insult to, local customs and
practices. Foreign area officers, civil affairs and intelligence staff, and chaplains provide relevant
information on the local populace, specific aspects of culture, and general customs and behaviors. Civil
affairs personnel and chaplains provide host-nation religious information that may restrict military use or
targeting of religiously consecrated buildings or locations. Commanders may direct trained personnel, in
coordination with chaplain support, to act as negotiators or mediators between opposing groups within the
local populace. (See FM 27-10 for doctrine on customary and treaty law during land operations.)
Treatment of the Population
2-71. Fair treatment of the local populace can help reduce the chance that the local populace will be hostile
to U.S. forces and increase the chance for obtaining its cooperation. The proper and just treatment of
civilians helps military forces establish and maintain security; prevent lawlessness; promote order; and
secure local labor, services, and supplies. Such treatment promotes a positive impression of the military
force; the United States; and other government agencies, organizations, and institutions engaged in unified
action. Fair treatment strengthens the legitimacy of the operation and the transitional military authority in
the eyes of the populace, bordering nations, and other members of the international community.
2-72. Nonetheless, a policy of proper and just treatment does not prevent the imposition of restrictive or
punitive measures necessary to achieve objectives of the transitional military authority. Commanders
consider imposing restrictive measures on the initial occupation or liberation of a host nation to establish
control of the populace. Populace control measures addressing curfews, assembly, looting, reprisals, and so
on require planning, and upon implementation, information dissemination to the populace. Furthermore,
mission-specific rules of engagement addressing population control measures should be succinct and
unambiguous. In particular, areas with active and aggressively hostile actors often need restrictive or
punitive measures.
2-73. The military’s policies for treating any population vary depending on several factors. These factors
first include characteristics of the population, such as their attitude toward the governing forces, the degree
of technical-industrial development, socioeconomic conditions, the political system, and local history and
culture. Another determining factor is the policies of the United States with respect to the host-nation
government. The commander must become familiar with host-nation customs, institutions, and attitudes
and implement transitional military authority accordingly. |
3-07 | 49 | Stability Considerations for Transitions
2-74. When determining policies for treating the local populace, commanders consider other factors:
* Generally, measures that are less restrictive are appropriate for civilians of friendly or nonhostile
states. Measures that are more restrictive may be needed with civilians of hostile states.
* Depending on the culture, the local populace may perceive certain actions as characteristic of an
illegitimate or weak military government. On the other hand, certain actions, though permissible
under international law, may aggravate an already complex civil situation or reduce the
effectiveness of the force in imposing civil control.
* Force may be used to subdue those who resist the transitional military authority or to prevent the
escape of prisoners or detainees suspected of crimes. Commanders limit force to what is
necessary and is consistent with international law. Leaders consult legal advisors when forming
standing rules for the use of force and the treatment of prisoners, detainees, and other persons.
2-75. Military commanders are inherently empowered to take all prudent and proportional measures
necessary to protect their forces. However, during operations focused on stability, the nature of the threat
can often inhibit the ability of friendly forces to differentiate between hostile acts, hostile intent, and
normal daily activity among civilians. For this reason, military forces must retain the authority to detain
civilians, using an acceptable framework under which to confine, intern, and eventually release them. This
authority has the most legitimacy when sanctioned by international mandate or when bestowed or conveyed
from the local or regional government power. The initial or baseline authority granted to military forces to
use force to detain civilians will determine the status of the persons they detain. Based on that authority and
the status of detained persons, forces will determine how to manage detainees, what due process is
required, and whether to treat offenses as military or criminal offenses.
Economic Stabilization and Recovery
2-76. Transitional military authority generally focuses on security, the restoration and maintenance of law
and order, and the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. In certain circumstances, military
forces may need to act with regard to economic conditions that promote security and law and order.
However, international law generally limits a transitional military authority in this area. Specific sources of
international law directed at activities of the transitional military authority, such as UN Security Council
resolutions, may provide additional authority. Commanders must routinely consult legal advisors in this
complex area.
2-77. When international law and the governing mandate permits a transitional military authority to engage
in economic stabilization and recovery activities, two immediate goals exist for the economic sector. The
first goal is to use all available goods and services as efficiently as possible to meet the essential needs of
the local populace. The second is to revive the economy at the local level to reduce dependence on external
support. Achieving these goals depends on stimulating production capability and workforce capacity. The
transitional military authority should quickly identify local sources of supply and services to support
military operations. This infuses critical monetary resources into the local economy to stimulate growth,
investment, and development.
2-78. Actions taken to stimulate economic recovery at the local level must closely work with efforts to
stabilize the national economy. Therefore, the transitional military authority must immediately draw on the
expertise and advice of civilian agencies (such as the Department of the Treasury) and organizations (such
as the International Monetary Fund) to contend with macroeconomic challenges. Issues such as stabilizing
monetary policy, controlling inflation, and reestablishing a national currency generally exceed expertise
resident in the transitional military authority. This lack of expertise underscores the necessity of introducing
appropriate civilian expertise as soon as practical or puts the success of broader economic recovery
programs at risk from the outset of operations.
2-79. Stimulating the economy at the microeconomic level facilitates economic recovery, especially in
areas suffering from market failure or collapse. The transitional military authority may apply
microeconomics principles to influence local prices, supply and demand, or the availability of labor. For
example, the transitional military authority can offer small-scale grants and low- or fixed-interest loans to
encourage entrepreneurial investment and host-nation enterprise creation. These practices enable
impoverished people to invest in projects that generate income, begin to build wealth, and eventually get |
3-07 | 50 | Chapter 2
out of poverty. At the local level, this stimulation is essential to economic recovery; it sets the cornerstone
for recovery and development on a national scale.
2-80. Economic assessments are critical to the success of recovery programs. The transitional military
authority must understand economic conditions in the operational area, factors that affect stabilization and
growth, and cultural nuances that influence market sector performance. Developing a shared situational
understanding of the economic situation spurs market integration, helps to identify key needs and
opportunities, increases private sector participation, and improves social and economic cohesion throughout
the host nation.
2-81. An equitable distribution of necessities—such as food, water, shelter, and medicine—supports
economic stability. To this end, commanders may need to establish and enforce temporary controls over
certain aspects of the local economy. They may design these controls to affect the prices of goods and
services, wage rates and labor practices, black market activity, hoarding of goods, banking practices,
imports or exports, and production rates within industry. However, these controls may also have adverse
effects that can lead to renewed violence. These adverse effects may consist of causing potential shortages
of goods and services, impeding economic progress, and causing corruption, conflict over limited
resources, and social tension. Commanders must weigh the decision to implement economic controls very
carefully. In doing so, they should seek guidance from higher echelons and from personnel and
organizations with appropriate expertise. They may discover alternatives available that achieve the same
results with fewer negative consequences. They determine how well the private sector can identify
profitable lines of investment and enterprise creation quickly, stimulate market-led economic recovery, and
provide reasonably priced consumable goods and services to the population. (See FM 3-57 and
ATP 3-57.10 for doctrine on populace and resources control.)
2-82. When permitted by international law, the transitional military authority may stimulate the economy
to help the local industry develop, but it must do so with the end state of sustainable, private-sector
activities. These may include agriculture, manufacturing, mining, forestry, and any number of service
trades. The transitional military authority may support an activity in a specific operational area. Industries
may require some form of initial subsidization to spur productivity as well as assistance with management.
In potentially hostile areas, the transitional military authority may provide or train personnel for skilled
positions (to replace people who have fled or are not cooperative or dependable). Detailed infrastructure
assessments help to locate useable production facilities and identify damaged or inoperable facilities for
reconstruction planning.
Public Health
2-83. The transitional military authority establishes a public health policy for security, public safety, and
humanitarian reasons. This policy applies to the health of the military forces as well as the local populace.
Sustained operations cannot exist without healthy military forces. Without a healthy, viable force, the
military cannot provide for the health and well-being of the people adequately. To protect the health of the
force, the transitional military authority sometimes takes measures to safeguard, and if necessary, improve,
the health of the local populace. Generally, the force lacks the health service support and force health
protection capacity to provide sustained medical care for civilians. However, with appropriate resources
and security, the transitional military authority may open and secure humanitarian access to the local
populace. It may also establish temporary clinics, train local health professionals, and augment existing
medical facilities.
2-84. The transitional military authority reinforces the public health policy by securing the public health
infrastructure. The transitional military authority may enable functioning hospitals and clinics to remain
open so local medical personnel can continue to serve civilians. This authority may repair critical
transportation infrastructure to ensure continued delivery of medical supplies and accessibility for
emergency patient transport. Securing the public health infrastructure may involve ensuring the continued
functioning of essential services infrastructure so that adequate power, water, and sanitation are available to
support health care facilities. Public health policy focuses on disposing of sewage, garbage, and refuse
properly; purifying local water supplies; inspecting food supplies; and controlling insects and disease.
Additionally, the public health infrastructure addresses burying and cremating remains from a public health |
3-07 | 51 | Stability Considerations for Transitions
perspective. However, handling remains is not a medical function. Preventive medicine specialists, working
with civil affairs personnel, provide the capability to exercise public health policy.
Other Considerations
2-85. During operations focused on stability, Army leaders and Soldiers become governors in a much
broader sense, influencing events and circumstances normally outside the bounds of the military. They
become the executors of international and national policy. They are often required to reconcile long-
standing disputes between opposing parties. These are responsibilities more suited to civilian expertise.
Army forces are frequently called up to restore host-nation civil authority and institutions so national and
international order can be restored. The burdens of governance on a transitional military authority require
culturally astute leaders and Soldiers.
Respect for Religious Customs and Organizations
2-86. Religious and political factors often interact within a society, reflecting the motivations and
perceptions of the local populace. The religious conventions and beliefs of a society may significantly
influence the political dimension of conflict. The methods leaders use to manage religious factors can
determine whether conflict and instability give way to peaceful outcomes. International law mandates that
military forces respect the religious convictions and practices of members of the local populace. The
military force should, consistent with security requirements, respect the religious celebrations and the
legitimate activities of religious leaders. Places of religious worship should remain open unless they pose a
specific security or health risk to the military force or the local populace.
Archives and Records
2-87. Military forces secure and preserve archives and records, current and historical, of all branches of the
former government. These documents are of immediate and continuing use to the military force as a source
of valuable intelligence and other information. They are even more important to the transitional military
authority by providing invaluable information in running the government. Therefore, the military force
must seize, secure, and protect archives and records.
Shrines and Art
2-88. Military forces protect shrines and art. Except in cases where military operations or military
necessity prevents it, the force protects and preserves all historical and cultural monuments and works,
religious shrines and objects of art, and any other national collections of artifacts or art.
Atrocities
2-89. Under certain circumstances, the transitional military authority may be required to contend with the
aftermath of atrocities, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. To the greatest extent
possible, the transitional military authority should assist in establishing commissions and with identifying,
processing, and memorializing remains of victims. These are especially sensitive matters. The transitional
military authority performs these tasks with appropriate sensitivity and respect for local culture and
customs.
Corruption
2-90. Often, the transitional military authority contends with corruption in certain sectors of the host
nation. Transparent, legitimate processes are fundamental to effective anticorruption programs. Therefore,
the transitional military authority needs appropriate anticorruption measures to counter the influence of
corrupt officials in host-nation institutions. However, the military authority should not dismiss corrupt
officials before considering the effect of their prestige and influence. |
3-07 | 52 | Chapter 2
Vetting
2-91. Successful building partner capacity relies on dependable vetting processes (such as biometric data
collection devices for verifying identities) to screen potential civil servants from the host nation. These
processes help commanders to select qualified, competent officials while reducing security risks. Vetting
processes should include the participation of local inhabitants to ensure transparency, cultural sensitivity,
and legitimacy. Commanders monitor these processes closely to prevent the exclusion of specific religious,
ethnic, or tribal groups. (For additional information on security screening, see FM 2-22.2.)
COURTS AND CLAIMS
2-92. The ordinary courts in areas under control of the transitional military authority generally continue to
function during a military occupation. The transitional military authority may suspend ordinary courts if
judges do not fulfill their duties, the courts are corrupt or unfairly constituted, or the administration of the
local jurisdiction has collapsed. In such cases, the transitional military authority may establish its own
courts.
2-93. The penal laws of the occupied territory remain in force during the occupation. However, the
transitional military authority may suspend these laws during an occupation if they constitute a threat to
security or an obstacle to the application of the Geneva Conventions.
2-94. During an occupation, the transitional military authority may enact special decrees and penal
provisions essential for it to—
* Fulfill its obligations under The Hague and Geneva Conventions.
* Maintain orderly administration of the occupied territory.
* Ensure the security of the occupying forces.
2-95. Penal provisions enacted by the transitional military authority during an occupation may not be
enforced until they are made public to the population of the occupied territory in the national language of
that host nation. Such penal provisions may not be retroactive and the penalty must be proportionate to the
offense. Courts may only apply those provisions of law that applied prior to the alleged offense and are in
accordance with the general principles of law.
2-96. The transitional military authority may establish courts to hear cases on alleged violations of the
special decrees and penal provisions enacted by the transitional military authority. It may also establish
courts and administrative boards for other certain purposes. These purposes might include considering the
cases of detainees and reconsidering the refusals of requests by aliens to leave the occupied host nation.
(For further information on courts, commissions, and military tribunals, see the Manual for Military
Commissions.)
2-97. During an occupation, the transitional military authority has certain requirements. It may not declare
that the rights and actions of enemy nationals are extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a court of
law. During an occupation, U.S. forces and the transitional military authority are not subject to local laws.
Nor are they subject to the jurisdiction of the local civil or criminal courts of the occupied territory unless
expressly agreed to by the transitional military authority or by the occupying power. Only U.S. military
courts should try U.S. personnel subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (known as UCMJ).
Promptly investigating, arbitrating, and settling local damage claims—to the extent permitted by U.S. law,
regulation, and policy—can help to strengthen the credibility of the transitional military authority. (See
AR 27-20 for regulatory guidance on claims.)
INTERIM CIVIL AUTHORITY
2-98. An interim civil authority is set up when the collapse of a government created a political void. An
interim civil authority is also called a provisional or interim government. It can be formed by an outside
nation or coalition of nations, local inhabitants or by an IGO, such as the United Nations.
2-99. Sometimes local unelected individuals organize to govern their town or region after a war, or
sometimes a government may reform itself with provisional status under a coalition following a crisis. In |
3-07 | 53 | Stability Considerations for Transitions
these cases, U.S. forces most often support the American ambassador through collaboration with the U.S.
country team.
2-100. Occasionally the established government has ceased to carry its basic functions because of foreign
or domestic conflict, and the situation poses a threat to international peace and stability. In such cases, the
international community may decide to establish an interim civil authority instead of an interim military
authority. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the Office of the High Representative in
Bosnia, the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (known as UNMIK), the UN Transitional
Administration in East Timor, and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq are examples.
Although under the Department of Defense, the CPA was led by an ambassador and staffed primarily by
civil administrators.
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERIM CIVIL AUTHORITY
2-101. The interim civil authority exercises the functions of civil administration in the absence of a
legitimate civil authority. It restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security of the local
populace, and provides essential civil services. Because the interim civil authority is an external imposition
on domestic affairs and affects the sovereignty of the state and the rights of the people, it can transition
quickly to local governance. Therefore, the interim civil authority seeks an approach openly cooperative
with the host nation and its population to facilitate transition to the host nation or international authority.
2-102. The timing of this transition varies across the sectors. Success depends on a viable political process
that can establish local legitimate governance. The political process can include a range of activities such
as—
* The negotiations towards an enduring, comprehensive peace agreement between the parties to a
conflict.
* The holding of what is hoped to be peaceful and credible elections and the strengthening of
democratic processes.
* The assistance to whatever local institutions exist in the extension of state authority.
* National reconciliation.
* Continual attention to the avoidance of a breakdown in the peace or political process.
* Supporting and facilitating an all-inclusive political process that can successfully move the
country from a post-conflict state towards a sustainable peace.
2-103. The interim civil administration may organize itself in many ways that might include pillars and
interim administrative structures, with combined international and local participation. In Kosovo, UN
Interim Administration in Kosovo was divided into four sections:
* Pillar I: Police and justice (led by the UN).
* Pillar II: Civil administration (led by the UN).
* Pillar III: Democratization and institution building (led by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe).
* Pillar IV: Reconstruction and economic development (led by the European Union).
Additionally, a joint interim administrative structure was established with UN Interim Administration in
Kosovo and North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation, along with local partners. This consisted of a
Kosovo Transition Council and an Interim Administrative Council to smooth the way for a permanent
legitimate structure. The interim civil administration put similar arrangements in place to establish the
capacity and legitimacy of local partners. (See the cases listed in paragraph 2-100.)
MILITARY ROLE IN INTERIM CIVIL AUTHORITY
2-104. Military forces provide support to the interim civil authority. Stability tasks support the efforts of
an interim civil authority when no legitimate government exists. Stability tasks leverage the coercive and
constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate
reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; support the establishment of political, legal, social, and
economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority. |
3-07 | 54 | Chapter 2
2-105. In a whole-of-government approach, commanders identify and prioritize critical objectives that
need immediate attention. When other agencies, organizations, and the host nation lack a capability,
commanders collaborate with them to provide military expertise. With an interim civil authority, that may
mean that the military provides direct support to some of the offices and agencies of that authority while
the overall direction remains with that authority. An example of this is the combined governance effort of
the CPA in Iraq.
2-106. In the CPA, military participation consisted of a joint team (which included civil affairs, military
information support operations [known as MISO], and public affairs) that provided initial security,
communications, and transportation. Military information support operations and other information-related
capabilities enabled integrated and tailored communications among the populace and key leaders,
consistent with approved overarching themes, messages, and national objectives.
2-107. In the CPA, civilian representatives provided political and policy guidance on behalf of the
administrator as well as identified needs and concerns in the political districts and offices. Civilian
representation synchronized local programs and policies with regional and national structures. Local
leaders emerged. These leaders linked interim administration initiatives with needs and requirements
determined by local town and city councils and assisted in quicker transition to Iraqi control. Expatriates
bridged cultural, linguistic, and tribal gaps. Contractors provided professional training and mentoring to
interim local teams of public servants and administrators.
2-108. The military establishes physical liaison, communication, and data sharing between the interim
civil authority and any task force headquarters. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the basic
needs of the people rests with the host-nation government, designated civil authorities, or other
organizations. When needed, military forces provide minimum levels of civil security and restore essential
services until a civil authority or the host nation is able. These essential services provide for minimal levels
of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Commanders at all levels assess resources available
against the mission to determine how to complete these minimum-essential stability tasks and what risks
they can accept.
2-109. Army forces coordinate the performance of their stability tasks with other partners. They perform
tactical tasks subordinate to the primary stability tasks. The five primary Army stability tasks correspond to
the five stability sectors used by the Department of State. Army stability tasks directly support broader
efforts within the stability sectors. All partners complete tasks as part of unified action. Together, the
primary Army stability tasks and the Department of State stability sectors can form a framework to help
Army leaders understand the organization developed by interim civil authorities. Army leaders can use this
framework to coordinate discreet tactical tasks with civil authorities.
2-110. Military forces perform none of the primary stability tasks in isolation. When integrated within
their complementary stability sectors, the tasks represent a comprehensive effort to reestablish the
institutions that provide for the civil participation, livelihood, and well-being of the citizens and state. At
the operational level, the primary stability tasks serve as lines of effort or simply as a guide to action,
ensuring broader unity of effort across the stability sectors. |
3-07 | 55 | Chapter 3
Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort
This chapter discusses achieving unity of effort with two major groups of stability
partners. It begins by discussing considerations for a whole-of-government approach
among interagency partners. It concludes by discussing a comprehensive approach
for unity of effort with interorganizational partners based outside the United States.
WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH
3-1. Army doctrine describes operations focused on stability using both a whole-of-government approach
and a comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort, depending of the nature of the partnerships. A
whole-of-government approach encompasses coordination among all interagency partners. Such
coordination is known as interagency coordination. Interagency coordination is defined as within the
context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of
Department of Defense, and engaged United States Government agencies and departments for the purpose
of achieving an objective (JP 3-0). In the context of Army stability, partners can refer to organizations or
their individual representatives who collaborate through structured teams or informal cooperation. Army
forces perform stability tasks as partners in support of U.S. policy goals. In addition, this doctrine
sometimes refers to U.S. and other partners as stability partners.
3-2. Coordination among United States (U.S.) and other partners is known as interorganizational
coordination. Interorganizational coordination is defined as the interaction that occurs among elements of
the Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal
agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations;
nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). For the purposes of Army stability
doctrine, the discussion of a comprehensive approach emphasizes coordination with civilian and military
partners based outside the U.S. Government and any not considered of the United States. Many principles
that apply to interagency coordination also apply to interorganizational coordination. (See JP 3-08 for joint
doctrine on interorganizational coordination during joint operations.)
3-3. Security solutions are not likely to be determined by the military alone. U.S. military security efforts
nest within a larger national security strategy that works with all the elements of good U.S. governance. As
in the work of provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, engagements often include military
forces working alongside governmental agencies in a whole-of-government approach. Working as stability
partners, military forces can help build or restore the political, economic, and security institutions of
weakened or failing states. Future engagements often include the coordinated action of civilian and military
partners following natural disasters.
3-4. In stability, unity of effort results from successful synchronization, coordination, and integration of
activities by governmental and nongovernmental entities. While military operations typically demand unity
of command (a single commander directs the actions of all forces toward a common objective), operations
focused on stability require coordination and cooperation toward common objectives by participants who
belong to different commands or organizations. Moreover, achieving unity of effort can be challenging in
an ambiguous operational context that is neither war nor peace. During operations focused on stability,
extensive overlap among defense, diplomacy, and development activities is necessary to achieve mission
objectives. Different stability partners simultaneously perform various tasks to create a secure environment,
establish government control, and gain support from the populace. |
3-07 | 56 | Chapter 3
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
3-5. To foster effective interagency coordination, Army leaders need to understand and use the common
characteristics of interagency groups. Army leaders should take advantage of the benefits of interagency
partnerships, which have been proven by civil-military groups such as provincial reconstruction teams.
Leaders and Soldiers should develop essential competencies such as cultural agility. The need for cultural
agility applies to coordination among the different cultures of civil and military organizations as well as
those of other nations. Army leaders should understand the capabilities of stability partners, including how
partner organizations differ from the Army. They should consider relevant financial and legal factors.
Above all, Army leaders should know how to improve communication and build relationships. No
overarching interagency doctrine delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all
agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations.
Characteristics of Interagency Coordination
3-6. Interagency partnerships take many forms, such as formally structured teams with assigned tasks and
members or informal collaboration among dissimilar groups with overlapping but independent goals.
Stability involves networks of groups and organizations—including military groups—who work together
toward at least one shared goal. This means Army leaders need to coordinate efforts within their own
organization, between their organization and others when forming teams for specific tasks, and across
numerous groups (including military units) whose individual efforts work more efficiently through
partnerships.
3-7. Power, information, and expertise are widely distributed across civil and military stability partners.
Because all the knowledge, skills, or abilities needed to achieve U.S. stability objectives does not reside in
any one partner, stability partners establish teams with specialized skills sets. Each team or ad hoc
partnership relies on others to provide capabilities it lacks, making all partners interdependent. This
reliance results from the dangerous security situation that often characterizes operational environments. It
also results from the complexity associated with operations focused on stability.
3-8. The temporary nature of interagency partnerships poses challenges to effective collaboration.
Partners who collaborate in operations focused on stability often share a collective identity for a finite
period. Interagency teams frequently are ad hoc; often members have little to no interaction before arriving
in country. Short-term deployments for team members also make developing and maintaining relationships
(and group identity) difficult. In circumstances such as these, leadership and personality factors influence
success. Planners may need to factor in additional time to build trust and motivation to collaborate.
Benefits of Interagency Coordination
3-9. The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to mission success. For example, nation-
building functions—such as implementing rule of law, developing human capital, providing social welfare,
providing security, managing the use of the force, and establishing commercial markets—require
coordinated and integrated actions from different U.S. agencies. By collaborating with other U.S. agencies,
Soldiers gain access to individuals with extensive and specialized knowledge and skills. Collaboration with
such individuals often leads to holistic solutions that consider factors normally outside the purview of
military personnel.
3-10. Through successful interagency coordination, the U.S. Government conducts operations that achieve
shared goals, build international support, achieve sustainability, and conserve resources. Interagency
partners collaborate to determine when it is more efficient for partners outside the U.S. Government to
perform certain tasks. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), for example, serve large numbers of people
and have the capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises—these capabilities can effectively
reduce the resources an Army commander would otherwise devote to an operation. Enabling partners to
respond to security challenges may also reduce risk to U.S. forces and extend security to areas Army forces
cannot reach alone.
3-11. Provincial reconstruction teams illustrate the effectiveness and challenges of interagency
partnerships. These teams are interagency groups formed to improve stability in a region by integrating all
instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. While provincial |
3-07 | 57 | Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort
reconstruction teams have experienced success in Iraq and Afghanistan, their implementation also has
highlighted significant challenges to interagency coordination. Overall, their levels of effectiveness,
cohesion, and coherence have varied. Observers have suggested that provincial reconstruction team
performance hinges almost solely on the ability of the military commander to work around obstacles to
coordination.
COMPETENCIES FOR INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
3-12. At the national level, the Department of State has led efforts to build frameworks that enhance
interagency coordination for stability efforts. However, leaders on the ground may only have general
guidance and concepts and few formal arrangements. To improve collaboration in the field, commanders
consider types of knowledge and skills along with best practices for working with interagency partners.
Development of Cultural Agility
3-13. Soldiers develop cultural agility—their ability to understand new cultures and adjust behavior to
function effectively in them. In the context of stability, the idea of cultural differences normally refers to
the cultures of a host nation. However, Army leaders also need to understand the organizational cultures of
U.S. stability partners. Soldiers improve their sociocultural understanding of other groups by developing a
greater awareness of norms, beliefs, practices, and perceptions. They try to understand how cultural factors
will influence others’ behaviors, perceptions, and motivations. Sociocultural understanding helps
commanders and staffs determine the effects of cultural norms and perceptions on mission objectives.
Soldiers assess cultural factors so they can understand how individuals from other groups (societies or
partner organizations) may view their behavior. They try to mitigate or avoid misunderstandings. Soldiers
improve their ability to establish rapport and build relationships with individuals from different societal and
organizational cultures.
Understanding of the Context of Interagency Coordination
3-14. The context of interagency coordination includes the interagency partners and an operational
environment. A holistic understanding of an operational environment includes an awareness of civil
considerations and sociocultural factors, such as beliefs and values, sources of power and authority, and
social structures. These form a context for Army and interagency stability efforts. Whatever the mission
objective, Army leaders study the environment’s historical, regional, and cultural context. To support
situational understanding, Army leaders need to understand how a population perceives Army operations
and interagency activities in which Army units participate.
3-15. Army leaders maintain a focused and persistent effort to understanding the culture, geography,
politics, infrastructure, and economics of the country or region where forces are employed. This is
challenging because such factors are dynamic and constantly evolving. Individuals working on interagency
teams must find out where to obtain relevant information about the cultural context. Members must also be
able to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of such information. (For more information on civil
considerations and sociocultural factors, see FM 3-24.)
Understanding of Capabilities of Interagency Partners and Systems for Coordination
3-16. Understanding an operational environment includes understanding all interagency stability partners.
Effective collaboration required understanding the policies, processes, and norms of interagency partners.
Success in operations focused on stability also requires an awareness of trends that influence views of the
actors and an understanding of factors that shape or constrain options and capabilities for partner
organizations.
3-17. Army leaders develop the information needed to understand partner organizations, their component
teams, and their place in overall U.S. stability activities and goals. This understanding forms the backdrop
for assessing the effect of Army actions, plans, and decisions on partner organizations. A poor
understanding of the partners must be avoided because it can hamper trust and impair integration of Army
team members in interagency decisionmaking. |
3-07 | 58 | Chapter 3
ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES
3-18. Military and civilian organizational cultures differ in significant ways. Organizational cultures
comprise factors such as shared values, norms, expectations, and practices. An organizational culture
influences how individuals approach work and what they regard as mission accomplishment. When team
members with different organizational cultures interact with one another, differences become evident and
can create tension in the group. Soldiers can minimize difficulties by improving their understanding of and
attitudes toward partners.
3-19. Organizational differences—in mission objectives, size, and resource capabilities, and neutrality
among others—and challenges in information sharing can create friction between military and civilian
partners. Military personnel can improve interagency coordination by educating themselves on these
differences. They should demonstrate a knowledge and appreciation of their partners’ capabilities and
viewpoints.
3-20. Military personnel conducting interagency coordination consider organizational differences related
to—
* Leadership.
* Mission objectives.
* Resources available.
* The nature of teamwork.
* The nature of humanitarian efforts.
* Time orientation.
* Measurement.
Leadership
3-21. Army leaders lack authority over the interagency partnerships in which they participate. Therefore,
they need to develop other means of influence, as interagency decisionmaking processes tend to require
building consensus. Soldiers also need to develop influence techniques that gain cooperation and preclude
resistance to military objectives. Such techniques are uncommon within a traditional military setting.
Mission Objectives
3-22. Army leaders ensure various organizational priorities and mandates do not reduce the unity of effort
for interagency teams or partnerships. They develop an understanding of the interrelatedness of
objectives—how the objectives of Army forces and other partners align within U.S. security policy. With
this perspective in mind, Army leaders strive to enhance unity of effort. The objectives of all partners are
important and should be integrated into the whole rather than regarded as competing.
Resources Available
3-23. Army forces sometimes have more resources than their interagency stability partners have. While
uncertain or hostile environments need resource overmatch, this imbalance may hinder success when
conducting interagency coordination. Army leaders regularly monitor their attitudes and those of others in
relation to volume of resources. They should avoid inadvertently creating a perception that they consider
their mission more important simply because they have more resources. Army leaders should avoid
inadvertently stifling contributions of smaller agencies or considering partner objectives unimportant in
comparison with Army objectives. Such negative attitudes potentially impair collaborative decisionmaking
and effective partnerships.
Nature of Teamwork
3-24. The take-charge, can-do attitude of Soldiers can come across as overbearing to interagency partners.
In areas related to host-nation development, the Army may be seen as attempting to take over and manage
all activities. Many partners join stability efforts intending to share the work, discuss the needs, and build
consensus with an attitude of collaboration. Certain preferences of Army organizational culture, such as |
3-07 | 59 | Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort
getting right to the point in discussions and taking charge of meetings or missions, often fail to facilitate
cooperation. Moreover, Army leaders must remember that the relatively strict hierarchical structure
common to Army operations is less common among many partner organizations and possibly unwelcome
on interagency teams.
Nature of Humanitarian Efforts
3-25. Some U.S. agencies are reluctant to be seen as having direct connections to U.S. forces. Reasons may
be philosophical as well as practical. Members of many U.S. agencies providing aid intend to serve
altruistic humanitarian purposes. They do not wish to be regarded as serving political objectives or
advancing U.S. influence. They prefer their identity to be as civilian as possible in stabilization efforts.
Moreover, the host-nation populace may not welcome humanitarian aid when U.S. forces are known or
believed to be connected to humanitarian operations. Therefore, members of civilian agencies may feel that
increased military involvement in stability efforts impairs their mission or image and compromises
humanitarian values. Army leaders should expect such viewpoints. They can avoid friction by
understanding that these attitudes may reflect the situation on the ground and most likely do not indicate
that partners are criticizing Army operations. Army leaders and partners should determine collaboratively
the most effective way Army forces can contribute to the whole-of-government approach.
Time Orientation
3-26. Army leaders need to consider how the tendency of Army operations to focus on relatively short-
term objectives affects long-term goals of partners and U.S. policy. Some partners tend to emphasize
future, long-term goals and the actions necessary to achieve them. For example, in Afghanistan, the
Army’s’ short-term orientation has typically led to a focus on projects that achieves quick results. Some
partners have considered projects such as building schools or clinics without adequate infrastructure or
resources for their sustainment detrimental to Afghanistan’s long-term development. Overall stability
efforts must achieve a balance of short- and long-term objectives; interagency coordination that includes
military forces can be ideal for this purpose.
Measurement
3-27. Military and interagency partners also differ in how they measure success and when they consider
the work of stability complete. Due in part to the military’s orientation on relatively short times and quick
results, the military often measures tangible items such as the number of units trained or neighborhoods
cleared. Conversely, civilian agencies often assess more intangible goals, such as the progress toward
reconciliation. Not only are these intangible goals harder to measure, but they also require more time.
Friction can result when Army leaders consider their mission accomplished while civilian leaders believe
much work remains toward long-term, intangible goals not easily quantified. Army leaders can avoid
discord by considering Army efforts within the context of long-term U.S. goals. They can collaborate with
interagency partners to apply measurements that show the success of the whole-of-government approach.
Army leaders participating in interagency groups—
* Learn about partners’ timelines and develop metrics supportive of all U.S. stability objectives.
* Establish metrics that measure outcomes (end results), not just activities (such as dollars spent,
number of units trained).
* Clarify exactly how proposed actions support stability or developmental goals.
* Place immediate needs in the context of long-term strategic goals.
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING COMMUNICATION
3-28. Effective Soldiers learn how to facilitate communication and information sharing across partner
agencies. Differences in organizational objectives and cultures present variations in informational needs,
communication style, information-sharing processes, and priorities. Differences may include willingness or
urgency to share information. Further, as teams are likely to be ad hoc, so are information arrangements.
Therefore, every effort to enhance communication will support an effective whole-of-government
approach. |
3-07 | 60 | Chapter 3
3-29. Soldiers should ensure information is accessible to all interagency members. This requires an
understanding of the available communication processes, technologies, and potential barriers that could
impede communication (such as security concerns, system and program compatibility, and connectivity
issues). Military organizations should avoid unnecessarily classifying information that could be helpful to
partners, especially when the information originally belonged to other agencies.
3-30. Key strategies for improving communication include—
* Using a common lexicon of terms among interagency partners, since many terms can be
misinterpreted or have slightly different meanings (such as assessment and targeting) across the
different agencies.
* Avoiding the use of acronyms or terms that may not be familiar to all interagency members,
since this may cause confusion or feelings of exclusion.
* Practicing suitable ways to share information based on the context and the intended audience.
For example, it may be better to discuss certain subjects informally with a limited audience
(outside a group meeting) or to bring up other subjects in front of all members of the group.
* Engaging in active listening.
Active Listening
3-31. No communications skill is more important than listening. Active listeners keep judgments in check
while the other person is speaking. They listen to understand before they respond. Interagency group
members take notes or write down points for clarification while another person is talking to ensure they
capture important details of the message and are not distracted by counterarguments.
3-32. Active listeners restate and paraphrase the message they heard to help confirm they perceive it
correctly. When working with interagency partners Soldiers ask open-ended questions to gain more
information about the topic. This active listening gives the listener more insight into the speaker’s
perspective and viewpoint on the discussion.
3-33. Active listeners pay attention to the verbal and nonverbal aspects of the message and the culture from
which the speaker comes. For example, the manner and urgency in which a message is presented provides
useful information. If the speaker leans forward and looks the listener in the eye, then the speaker probably
tells the truth.
Understanding the Perspectives of Others
3-34. A key strategy to increase understanding of others is known as social perspective taking. In the
discipline of social psychology, social perspective taking refers to methodically trying to understand what
others are thinking and feeling and how their points of view differ from one’s own. Social perspective
taking includes approaches individuals can use to improve understanding of others, including the
motivations for their behaviors. Soldiers who successfully engage in social perspective taking (also called
perspective taking) can see situations from another’s point of view and recognize the issues, challenges,
and situations relevant to the actors involved. This understanding increases Army leaders’ ability to
interpret, predict, and coordinate interagency behavior.
3-35. Perspective taking has several benefits for Soldiers working with interagency partners. Perspective
taking can help Army leaders become aware of how their own organization and its cultural norms are
perceived by individuals from partner agencies. Since many interpersonal friction points within an
interagency stem from organizational and communication differences, being aware of one’s own cultural
norms and potential biases, and how others perceive them, may help Soldiers anticipate and avoid
unnecessary issues.
3-36. Soldiers who recognize that others may view a situation differently become more aware of and open-
minded to differing or competing ideas. Perspective taking has also been shown to improve communication
and facilitate negotiations and conflict resolution. Skilled perspective takers resort to stereotyping less
often.
3-37. People are social beings. They naturally try to determine the reasons for others’ behavior. Often,
people tend to use their experiences, beliefs, assumptions, and value systems as a frame of reference. This |
3-07 | 61 | Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort
can reduce the accuracy of their understanding of others. Perspective taking efforts may be challenging
when Soldiers interact with someone from a different organizational culture. Soldiers may be unaware of
the effects their own organizational culture has on their perspective. To increase perspective taking
accuracy, Soldiers need to be self-critical when trying to understand the perspective of someone else.
Perspective taking is an aptitude that can be increased with training and practice.
3-38. One method to increase social perspective taking is known as the ACTion approach to perspective
taking (summarized in table 3-1). This approach illustrates a process Soldiers can use to improve
perspective taking and to respond effectively to others. The ACTion approach involves three main steps:
* Assess yourself, others, and the situation while managing your emotions.
* Create guesses—based on information gathered—about the reasons for others’ behavior, and
then test, refine, and prioritize the guesses.
* Take a course of action selected after testing, refining, and ranking guesses about others’
behavior and predicting the results.
Table 3-1. The ACTion approach to social perspective taking
Assess yourself, others, and the situation while managing your emotions.
• Self: assess your biases and manage your emotions.
• Others: assess a baseline and observe personal space, facial expressions, and signs of stress.
• Situation: assess all relevant cultural and contextual information.
Create guesses about the reasons for others’ behavior.
• Testing: check your hypotheses against facts and an ongoing assessment of self, others, and
the situation.
• Refining: improve your understanding of others’ perspectives; adjust your hypotheses.
• Prioritizing: rank your hypotheses according to probable correctness in terms of explaining the
perspectives of others.
Take the course of action most likely to yield desired results.
• Selecting: determine the course of action most likely to be effective—based on your
understanding of others’ perspectives and your estimate of consequences or costs.
• Accomplishing: carry out your course of action.
• Reassessing: continue gathering information.
3-39. The ability to understand accurately another person’s words and behavior, and their reasons for them,
depends on biases. Biases, or distortions in thought and perception, are the main reasons one can be
incorrect when trying to understand the behavior and motivation of others. Common biases include—
* The fundamental attribution error.
* Naive realism.
* Confirmation bias.
* The in-group/out-group bias.
3-40. The fundamental attribution error is the tendency to attribute a person’s behavior to personality rather
than the situation. As a result, individuals tend to undervalue the importance of context to another person’s
actions.
3-41. Naive realism refers to an assumption that the world is seen as it truly is and that others have this
same perception of the world. However, if others do not share the same view, one may incorrectly assume
it is because they have not been given the proper information or are illogical in their interpretation.
3-42. Confirmation bias refers to the tendency individuals have to gather evidence that supports their
theories or ideas and to ignore information that may contradict their theories.
3-43. In-group/out-group bias refers to the preferential treatment people will give to individuals they
perceive as members of their own group. Further, people often perceive more diversity within the
characteristics of their in-group members and engage in discriminatory behaviors against out-group
members. |
3-07 | 62 | Chapter 3
3-44. Trying to manage complex situations with a diverse team of individuals with ambiguously defined
roles and responsibilities—from different organizations with varying organizational goals and priorities—
can be challenging and frustrating. Under these circumstances, regulating one’s emotions plays an
important role in effective interagency interactions. This is because unchecked emotions may interfere with
the formation of accurate impressions and hinder effective communication.
3-45. Key strategies for managing one’s emotions include—
* Reframing.
* Acting as if.
* Physiological regulation.
3-46. Reframing is the ability to deliberately change one’s understanding of the situation by stepping back
and looking at it from another angle. A person can imagine watching a situation as a spectator, for example,
and gain new insights.
3-47. Acting as if refers to determining what emotional response a situation calls for, considering the social
norms, and regulating one’s emotions appropriately as if playing a role. For example, a person can imagine
someone known to remain calm and cool under pressure, and behave as that person.
3-48. Physiological regulation involves deliberate physical actions that interrupt natural and immediate
reactions to emotions. The brain produces predictable changes in the body (physiological changes) in
reaction to certain stresses. Individuals may be able to regulate such changes by taking slow deep breaths,
taking a drink of water, or taking one’s glasses off and putting them back on.
3-49. In addition to assessing themselves, Soldiers should also assess others by gathering information
regarding the person with whom they are interacting. As part of assessing others, Soldiers establish the
person’s normal baseline behavior in different situations. The Soldier then watches for fluctuations in that
baseline behavior. Often the presence of change may indicate something important is triggering the
behavior shift. For example, a Soldier would need to analyze a situation in which a normally reserved
notional interagency partner suddenly becomes very vocal during discussions of security measures for an
upcoming district election. Such a change in the partner’s behavior should trigger Soldiers to gather more
information on the situation and to understand the motivations for the partner’s change in behavior.
3-50. When assessing others’ behavior, Soldiers should also examine the physical space between
individuals. Culture, behaviors, and society affect the amount of space individuals permit. Two common
uses of space include the use of closeness and space consumption. Generally, when people are physically
closer to each other, it means that they like each other or feel positive about how the interaction is going.
Further, when an individual takes up more space, this often signals comfort, dominance, or both. Therefore,
the use of space is a simple clue to a person’s general feelings towards others, even if the verbal message
seems unclear or even questionable.
3-51. Soldiers should also watch for other nonverbal behaviors, such as showing stress. Since stress often
produces a physical reaction, many people try to block the stress they feel (perhaps by squinting their eyes
or crossing their arms in front of their body). Other individuals manage feelings of stress by engaging in
pacifying behavior (such as rubbing one’s neck, cracking knuckles, or playing with jewelry or ties). Lastly,
Soldiers should try to observe people’s facial expressions (such as raised or furrowed eyebrows).
3-52. After Soldiers assess themselves and others, they need to assess the situation. Specifically, Soldiers
determine what cultural and contextual information likely is influencing the person’s actions and motives.
Soldiers use the information gained from assessing the speaker and the situation to create guesses about
reasons for the person’s behavior. They develop and take a course of action based on the hypotheses
generated.
3-53. Because accurate perspective taking is a continuous learning process, Soldiers continually gather
more information to help refine and prioritize their hypotheses. By taking steps to increase perspective
taking accuracy, Soldiers lay the foundation for successful interagency relationships. |
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STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS
3-54. Because successful partnerships depend on civil-military relationships, effective Soldiers take time to
build relationships before engaging in shared planning for operations. Military personnel can facilitate
effective interactions with partner agencies by understanding roles and responsibilities, developing
alliances, fostering positive relationships, managing conflict, and building common ground and shared
purpose. By engaging successfully with other partners, military leaders set the conditions for mission
accomplishment.
Understanding Roles and Responsibilities
3-55. Army leaders allow time to understand roles and responsibilities, build relationships, and align
missions with interagency goals. This time helps avoid unnecessary obstacles to collaboration, productivity,
and cohesion. In situations where leaders have not received guidance on roles and responsibilities, they can
minimize confusion and enhance effectiveness by building their understanding of roles and responsibilities.
3-56. During the conduct of operations focused on stability, Army leaders work collaboratively with other
organizations to define the most appropriate and essential roles for civilian and military agencies.
Collaboration begins during planning and continues through preparation, execution, and assessment. Where
security issues do not prevent nonmilitary organizations from helping the local populace, Soldiers prepare
to play a supporting role in operations focused on stability. Military participants also prepare to work in
informal or formal, integrated civil-military groups led by representatives from other agencies. Civilian
partners often serve as decisionmakers rather than advisors to military partners, and Soldiers may not have
the authority to direct civilian partners toward a particular action.
3-57. Military members of interagency groups must remember that a military force alone cannot build
long-term security and development. Within operations focused on stability, military leaders must act
cooperatively rather than competitively, building strategic relationships to achieve coordinated goals.
Organizations can increase collaboration by providing their representatives with a clear understanding of
their organization’s functions and authority within the larger civil-military partnership. Regular interaction
with interagency partners also contributes to an increased understanding of roles and mission requirements.
3-58. Key strategies for understanding roles and responsibilities include—
* Engaging civilian counterparts early to gain an understanding of their roles and mission
requirements.
* Defining clear-cut responsibilities for civilian and military partners to ensure mission success.
* If possible, collaboratively determining roles and responsibilities for a particular task at the onset
of consensus building. Each stakeholder participates in shaping his or her involvement.
* When possible, avoiding the provision of aid as a military responsibility. Attempts to define
roles and responsibilities should seek creative ways for Army forces to enable provision of aid,
rather than delivering aid directly.
* Considering military partners as enablers; working to help, inform, support, plan, and build
capacity for others.
* For new members to interagency partnerships, identifying roles through research and
communication with contacts experienced in civil-military partnerships.
* Conducting Army interactions with partners from other organizations collaboratively. This
means Army commanders ensure they and their subordinates adopt a collaborative, whole-of-
government approach.
Developing Alliances
3-59. To facilitate effective interagency collaboration, Soldiers develop networks and establish alliances
with appropriate agencies. Sharing knowledge, skills, and learning opportunities is an effective strategy for
building and maintaining alliances. Military team members can also facilitate effective partnerships by
placing common goals above individual needs. As an example, military leaders demonstrate humility and a
desire to work together by prioritizing mission goals over personal credit or professional achievement. |
3-07 | 64 | Chapter 3
3-60. Early and frequent contact by key team members, or team leaders, helps reduce uncertainties and
delays that characterize interagency collaboration and facilitates developing effective partnerships. If
possible, senior military leaders and their staff locate near other partner agencies. Proximity has a beneficial
effect on personal interaction and coordination. Specifically, being in the same space allows more agility
and speed in managing rapidly developing crises. Co-location allows greater information sharing and
regular participation by all partners in making critical decisions. Finally, regular informal interaction
contributes to developing trust and, if needed, facilitates conflict resolution.
3-61. When organizations rely on one another to achieve shared objectives and create strong and
potentially lasting bonds. To facilitate interagency alliances, leaders and Soldiers first develop an
understanding of the mutual needs of all partner agencies. Once mutual needs have been determined,
leaders and Soldiers should plan how best to support their interagency partners.
3-62. Leaders also should ensure that all organizations share the responsibility and the recognition for
mission accomplishment. As much as possible, Army leaders ensure partners receive credit for the
successes of their respective organizations and the successes of the interagency groups in which they
participate. Praising and drawing attention to the success of others increases interagency support and
strengthens bonds.
3-63. Key strategies for developing alliances are—
* Meeting with the partner on a regular basis and engaging in a variety of conversations.
* Taking the time to build a relationship with the partner and find out how to support him or her.
* Attending meetings of the partner’s agency and noting information shared.
* Taking advantage of opportunities to praise others and drawing attention to their successes.
* Introducing the partner to other key actors.
* When possible, co-locating Army partners close to agency or military partners.
* Valuing humility by focusing on shared outcomes rather than on getting credit.
Fostering Positive Relationships With Others
3-64. Building relationships with appropriate organizations requires frequent positive interactions among
group members. Military personnel should strive to interact with partners in a way that will result in
successful shared experiences. Informal interaction is important to forming positive relationships and
developing trust. When possible, Soldiers should also try to engage interagency partners prior to, and
outside of the context of, operational planning.
3-65. Soldiers demonstrate a willingness to cultivate relationships with people from differing backgrounds
and organizational cultures. They show respect and appreciation for these differences—and for partners’
roles and responsibilities—to develop positive relationships. Military group members demonstrate respect
for others by acknowledging partners’ strengths and abilities and by welcoming input from all partners
during the planning process.
3-66. Key strategies for fostering positive relationships are to—
* Welcome partners into existing civilian, military, or interagency planning functions.
* Form good relationships before taking major actions.
* Communicate respect to others through behavior.
* Highlight each partner’s strengths and abilities.
* Actively listen to input from interagency partners.
* Coordinate off the record during informal interactions (such as coffee breaks, meals, and
convoys).
Identifying and Leveraging Key Relationships
3-67. Successful cooperation depends on the belief that engagement in a collaborative process will produce
a better result than working independently. For effective interaction, Soldiers must acknowledge that other
agencies have resources, capabilities, and expertise essential for success in operations focused on stability. |
3-07 | 65 | Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort
3-68. Because coordinating with others is often a choice, military leaders should evaluate when and how
collaboration makes sense. Before engaging with other agencies, Soldiers should reflect on their readiness
to collaborate. This includes reflection on—
* How well one understands the issues at hand.
* What one believes can be achieved by working with others.
* What assumptions and expectations one has for interagency interactions.
* How open one is to alternative paths to mission accomplishment.
3-69. Identifying and fostering relationships with potential stakeholders is a critical first step in
collaborative work. Stakeholders include individuals who participate in planning and implementing
collaborative solutions, those who may be affected by them, and those who could block implementation.
Military partners must be careful to establish relationships with stakeholders who are credible to the other
collaborators, as well as to the group or organization that sent them. Representatives without credibility will
lack the authority to commit their group or organization to a collaborative solution.
3-70. Soldiers must understand civilian partners’ operational strengths and limitations so they can ensure
interagency relationships support mission objectives. By understanding and then building on identified core
competencies and successful experiences of interagency partners, Soldiers can better use available
resources, create lasting partnerships, and ensure mission success. When possible, Army leaders defer to
the agency most competent by training, experience, and mandate to be the designated lead for interagency
partnerships.
3-71. Key strategies for identifying and benefitting from key relationships are to—
* Approach assignments with an open mind and without assuming one knows all the answers.
* Show appreciation for different paths to success.
* Identify number, type (such as local, United States only, or international), and purpose of each
group working in the theater of operations.
* Identify the key decisionmakers.
* Recognize that several entities within the same organization could be important for coordination.
* Identify agencies not yet represented and invite them to participate in collaboration.
* Build relationships with civilian partners to employ their capabilities when military forces are
not allowed to work in an area.
Managing Conflict
3-72. Soldiers should understand the potential for conflicts among individuals with differing cultural
backgrounds. For example, interagency conflict may arise because of perceived differences in
organizational goals or attitudes about the appropriateness of military involvement. Anticipating
counterproductive confrontations and taking steps to resolve individual and organizational conflicts
constructively is paramount to successful collaboration.
3-73. To preserve working relationships, Soldiers should understand and apply compromise and mediation
techniques where possible. Soldiers practice mediation by meeting one person to work out a solution or by
grouping individuals who are in disagreement and allowing them to work out solutions separately.
Mediation should occur quickly before positions become polarized and opinions are intractable. Mediation
need not be a formal process; informal approaches conducted early are preferable.
3-74. Soldiers recognize the value of interagency coordination and demonstrate a commitment to
preserving relationships with interagency partners. To prevent and manage conflict, Soldiers engage in
regular interaction and ongoing, open communication with partners. These practices can prevent
misunderstandings or rebuild lost confidence when disagreements result in bad feelings. Additional
preemptive strategies for managing conflict include ensuring all stakeholders are identified and included in
making decisions. Army leaders ensure that ground rules for interagency interaction are collaboratively set
and that key players support the partnerships and proposed strategies for interagency mission
accomplishment.
3-75. Key strategies for managing conflict are— |
3-07 | 66 | Chapter 3
* Define and develop roles and responsibilities early.
* Bring hidden agendas (one’s own and those of others) and conflicts out into the open; address
them with a win-win attitude.
* If a person seems difficult to work with, try a cooling-off time, a side conversation, a new person
to speak with them, and empathy. If all else fails, work around that person altogether.
Building Common Ground and Shared Purpose
3-76. As part of fostering successful collaboration, Soldiers work with others. Together they develop ideas,
obtain resources, gain commitment, and accomplish mutually important goals. This collaboration builds a
common ground and shared purpose with interagency partners.
3-77. A common approach to interagency decisionmaking is consensus building. In consensus building,
the decision-making authority resides with the collective group rather than a single individual. This process
may feel alien to Soldiers accustomed to delegated orders from a chain of command. The consensus-
building process may seem slow to Army leaders. Army leaders must understand the importance of
ensuring that interagency partners explore various alternatives and all partners participate. Army leaders
can adopt consensus-building leadership behaviors. Consensus-building behaviors include open discourse,
friendly debate, and discussion with opinion sharing with and feedback from participants.
3-78. Key strategies for building common ground are to—
* Encourage joint civilian and military coordination at the planning stage.
* Clarify how proposed actions are in support of stability or developmental goals.
* Define clear-cut responsibilities for civilians and military forces to ensure mission success.
* Seek support of local community decision-making groups—it will be hard for others to disregard
the voice of a locally organized entity.
* Use tact and work towards compromise.
* Engage in active listening.
3-79. During stability tasks, Soldiers will find themselves needing to rely on external organizations to
maximize resources, reach difficult segments of the populations, and create sustainable solutions to
problems. Therefore, success in stability tasks requires the coordination and cooperation of numerous
civilian and military agencies. Understanding the context for partnerships, the capabilities and resources of
different agencies, and the need to form positive, long-lasting relationships with interagency partners are
fundamental to effective collaboration.
TYPES OF FUNDING
3-80. Commanders normally have access to a variety of monetary instruments during operations focused
on stability, so they can spend money how they determine it needs to be spent. For instance, they normally
can spend appropriated funds for stipulated purposes that directly contribute to reconstruction and
development. This means Army commanders should expect no caveats to funding that would restrict their
ability to respond to the situation. This fiscal freedom does not mean that commanders can dispense funds
without constraint. As for every other appropriation it makes, Congress sets criteria that specifically
address how commanders can and cannot spend funds in operations focused on stability. Furthermore,
funding strictly tied to the in-theater ground portion of operations focused on stability should flow through
leaders to the suborganizations or units responsible for executing reconstruction and development, as this
establishes fiscal accountability. Additionally Army commanders spend any stability funds in the context of
a whole-of-government and comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort toward an agreed goal.
Funding Guidance and Authorities
3-81. Resources are often limited and cannot be restricted to use by a single agency, Service, or entity.
Army commanders and staff understand no other interagency stakeholders apply resources to achieve
effects in the operational area. This list includes not only U.S. government agencies, but also
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, multinational partners, and private sector entities. The
commander, together with key stability partners, completes detailed analyses of situations and operational |
3-07 | 67 | Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort
environments. These analyses include understanding the sources of funding and resources and the methods
of application. Each analysis helps ensure the various capabilities and activities focus on achieving stability
objectives shared by all partners.
3-82. Funding for activities within any area of operations often comes from several sources with funding
differing for each country and region. Funding examples include economic support funds (Department of
State [DOS] or United States Agency for International Development [USAID]); overseas humanitarian,
disaster, and civic aid (Department of Defense [DOD]); Quick Impact Funding—called the Commander’s
Emergency Response Program funding in Afghanistan and Iraq (DOD); and International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement funding (DOS).
3-83. In many cases, such as economic support funds and International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement funds, the military may play an oversight or supporting role as it did in the provincial
reconstruction teams. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program provided
military commanders with funds they could directly program and disburse. Even though the concept of
quick-impact funds is firmly established, this practice may not continue in future reconstruction and
stabilization missions.
3-84. Legal restrictions on the use of certain funds and the existing sanctions on the country in question
require the separate management of these funds by the organization responsible for their expenditure. The
separation of funding from different authorities is not always obvious and there is no blanket exception for
deployment to the fiscal law framework. Commanders should use their resource and legal advisors to
ensure the laws are not violated. In addition, constraints, including prohibitions on certain uses of the funds,
must be taken into account in planning. Balancing so many considerations is an essential task for U.S.
military and civilian leaders that ensures an effective, efficient, and sustainable work plan.
3-85. Commanders in a rapidly evolving stability environment sometimes react more effectively if they
can access funds for a given response quickly and efficiently. In addition to civil affairs support to stability
tasks, commanders and planners engage frequently with members of financial management, contracting,
and staff judge advocate to ensure timely funding. (See FM 1-06 for more information about financial
management.)
3-86. Two major areas of funding that the military commanders manage in operations focused on stability
are quick impact funds and security cooperation activities.
Quick Impact Funds
3-87. A quick impact fund enables Army commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and
reconstruction requirements in their areas of operations by carrying out programs that immediately assist
the population. The fund serves small tasks that benefit the local population directly. Commanders can use
the money to fix problems in infrastructures quickly and increase the quality of life. Ideally, the immediacy
of these actions prevents crises from developing. Commanders need not wait for the longer approval
processes for other aid, which can allow the situation to deteriorate. This fund hastens a return to normalcy.
Projects can bring some order and prevent deterioration of a situation that insurgents or other spoilers could
exploit.
3-88. Army commanders have some considerations when using these funds. While these projects can
reduce local unrest, some have had the opposite effect. They can lead to increased violence if targeted by
insurgents. For example, insurgents frequently have targeted medical facilities and police stations funded
by the United States. Their high visibility and connection with the United States makes striking at them
generate a strong ideological message and frustrate the overall mission. Attacks are less likely if locals staff
them and local contractors manage them, but the threat remains.
3-89. Another consideration is that quick impact funds, if not informed as part of a comprehensive
approach, can adversely affect the building of host-nation capability and capacity and retard host-nation
ownership. When U.S. partners complete essential tasks that should be under control of the host nation, the
government has less motivation to take fiscal responsibility.
3-90. To avoid errors, commanders and staffs must be vigilant and seek advice from USAID and other
interagency partners. Quick impact funding projects do not always succeed at building local capacity. |
3-07 | 68 | Chapter 3
These funds sometimes have supported corrupt activities by local nationals. This happened because
commanders received faulty recommendations and inadequate information. For example, Army forces
might unknowingly build public structures on private land because a corrupt person influenced the project
for personal gain.
3-91. The greatest danger occurs when commanders undertook projects with very broad scopes. When the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction inspected development in the Baghdad Economic Zone,
some of the larger projects were deemed unsuccessful. They failed because the project managers followed
the same management and oversight procedures for small development. Smaller projects, too, are not
without dangers. Quick impact funding, if not well coordinated, promotes a patchwork solution to
problems. Commanders in different areas may not know what others are doing. This lack of knowledge
leads to duplication of projects or the creation of many little projects that impede large-scale reconstruction
and development by other agencies.
3-92. Quick impact funding projects are most effective when used with longer-term reconstruction and
development in a comprehensive approach. There is a window of opportunity at the beginning where these
funds are particularly effective. Later, short-term solutions can be counterproductive. Instead of promoting
growth, these projects might encourage locals to expect more, similar short-term projects. At this point,
U.S. forces are beyond simply handing out money, and civilian agencies should move towards establishing
sustainable long-term programs.
Security Cooperation Activities
3-93. Security cooperation activities are supported by a diverse range of resources. Many require the
commitment of military units, some with special capabilities. Others require participation by individuals or
small teams of Soldiers, and some use DOD facilities. Some resources are used to directly reimburse the
participation of foreign personnel. Dozens of special sources are involved, including service operations and
maintenance accounts and special funding sources outside DOD, most notably DOS. (For additional
information, see The Management of Security Cooperation also known as The Green Book.)
Funding Sources in Public Law
3-94. Some funding sources are directly authorized by public law, with particular restrictions on use and
individual reporting requirements. In several cases, applicability of a resource category to an activity does
not mean the resource may be freely applied. Other restrictions, peculiar to the resource, may limit the
applicability of the resource to particular expense categories (such as travel by U.S. personnel only) or may
limit the countries whose expenses may be reimbursed through the funding source.
Title 10
3-95. Programs funded under Title 10 that build partner capacity include but are not limited to—
* Combatant Commander Initiative Fund: a means of handling unforeseen requirements not
addressed in the normal budget process.
* Counterdrug support: support for training and equipping partners and host nations to combat
illegal drugs and narcoterrorism in their territories.
* Defense Environmental International Cooperation: a program to support access to resources—
including air, land, and sea—for training and readiness; minimizing encroachment; contributing
to interoperability; and fostering a global military environmental ethic.
* Defense Threat Reduction Agency: various programs to reduce biological, chemical, and nuclear
threats (programs include funding for counterproliferation).
* Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid: appropriation funds of DOD activities in
humanitarian assistance (such as nonlethal excess property, medical visits, minor construction,
and disaster preparedness), foreign disaster relief and emergency response (such as logistics,
airlift, search and rescue, humanitarian daily rations, plastic sheeting, tents), and humanitarian
mine action, formerly referred to as humanitarian demining operations.
3-96. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid includes explosive remnants of war and other issues
involved in landmines and areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war, such as assistance to mine |
3-07 | 69 | Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort
victims, mine risk education, and program management in humanitarian mine action. Conventional forces
conduct humanitarian mine action training with partner nations. Explosive ordnance disposal forces
[designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the priority force], combat engineers, and
infantry conduct train-the-trainer humanitarian mine action operations.
Title 22
3-97. Programs funded under Title 22 that build partner capacity include but are not limited to—
* Foreign military financing, foreign military sales, draw downs, excess defense articles, foreign
military financing grants, and international military education and training.
* Economic Support Fund, which advances U.S. interests by helping countries meet short- and
long-term political, economic, and security needs.
* Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related programs, which strengthen bio-security
and help combat nuclear smuggling.
* Export Control and Related Border Security programs, which strengthen border security and
help, states implement United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540, related to
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
* Anti-Terrorism Assistance program and Counterterrorism Finance program that build law
enforcement capacity to fight terrorism.
* Global Peace Operations Initiative designed to meet the world’s growing need for well-trained
peace operations forces.
* International military education and training grants given to foreign governments to pay for the
training or education of foreign military and a limited number of civilian personnel.
* International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding, which helps other countries with
their law enforcement systems.
Other Authorities
3-98. Congress provides other funding sources and authorities found outside Title 10 and Title 22 that may
be available for stability purposes. One example is the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS [human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome],
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-293). This law authorizes
activities to reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS among foreign nation uniformed personnel. Often these
funding authorities have restrictions, such as carrying particular reporting requirements, requiring oversight
or control by another executive agency, or limiting their applicability to certain locations or expense
categories.
THE RULE OF LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM
3-99. The whole-of-government approach includes reform activities related to the rule of law and the
criminal justice system of the host nation.
Rule of Law Reform
3-100. The execution of rule of law activities resides primarily within the interagency and possibly
multinational organizations. Rule of law activities involve subordinate tasks that support the five primary
Army stability tasks. These activities often entail a wide variety of issues inherently legal or framed by the
practice of law. The rule of law dictates government conduct according to publicly recognized regulations
while protecting the rights of all members of society. The rule of law also provides a way to resolve
disputes nonviolently and an integral method to establish enduring peace and stability. Generally, rule of
law exists when—
* The state monopolizes the use of force in resolving disputes.
* Individuals are secure in their persons and property.
* The state is bound by law and does not act arbitrarily.
* The law can be readily determined and is stable enough to allow individuals to plan their affairs. |
3-07 | 70 | Chapter 3
* Individuals have meaningful and timely access to an effective and impartial legal system.
* The state protects human rights and fundamental freedoms.
* Individuals rely on existing legal institutions and the law during their daily lives.
3-101. The rule of law means that all persons, institutions, and entities, including the state itself, are
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and
consistent with international human rights principles. The rule of law is more than a safe and secure
environment. It requires the security of individuals and institutions and accountability for crimes.
3-102. Commanders executing stability tasks must decide how to address host-nation corruption they
encounter. Corruption undermines the rule of law, tending to turn public service into a means to private,
illegitimate gain. This weakens the value of merit within the government. Even so, many societies have
developed forms of corruption that are entrenched and culturally acceptable. For example, public officials
may be expected to supplement the incomes of low-wage workers illegitimately. Though not ideal, the rule
of law can still develop in the presence of some level of corruption. Anticorruption efforts should address
significant impediments to the rule of law while aiming for achievable results within the societal context.
3-103. An integrated effort across many partners (such as DOS, Department of Justice, DOD, and
USAID) focusing on rule of law capabilities remains critical. Rule of law activities within the DOD and
Army should be synchronized at all echelons of command. Uncoordinated rule of law activities may risk
lives, often incur excessive costs due to waste and poor management, and may not actually promote the rule
of law. Just as units need unity of command, the rule of law effort needs a clear mission, a designated
leader, and a clear structure.
3-104. Building public confidence requires planning, preparing, and executing the transfer of
responsibility for rule of law programs from the military to national or international civilian organizations
or to the host-nation government. This transfer often proves to be a difficult and complex transition. Failure
to ensure continuity of the rule of law effort throughout all transition phases threatens the safety and
security of the local populace, erodes the legitimacy of the host nation, and impedes long-term development
potential. Such failure renders achieving the desired end state highly improbable. Accordingly, a daunting
obstacle is the extensive influence of illicit power structures in many ethnic or factional communities. Thus,
establishing a secure environment with respect to the rule of law should proceed in tandem with other
institution-building activities. Once progress is made in these areas, essential civilian-led measures to shape
societal values and attitudes toward the rule of law and to build in safeguards against abuse have a much
better chance to succeed in the long term.
3-105. In both permissive and nonpermissive environments, judge advocates prepare to take primary
responsibility within the staff to coordinate with host-nation legal, ministry of defense, and security force
personnel. In nonpermissive environments, judge advocates also prepare to take primary responsibility for
supporting host-nation criminal and civil judicial systems and processes.
3-106. Rule of law activities are broad categories of actions designed to support host-nation institutional
capacity, human capacity, functional effectiveness, and popular acceptance of a legal system and related
government areas. This includes both civil and criminal law activities. Broad categories of rule of law
activities include—
* The criminal justice system.
* Law enforcement.
* Judicial systems and processes.
* Corrections.
* The civil judicial system.
* Anticorruption.
* Elections.
* Detention.
* Transitional military authority and military governance.
* Transitional justice.
* Coordination with host-nation leaders. |
3-07 | 71 | Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort
* Coordination with host-nation police forces.
* Coordination with host-nation legal personnel.
* Coordination with host-nation ministry of defense and security force legal personnel.
Criminal Justice System Reform
3-107. While the categories of activities supporting rule of law are broad, commanders should pay
particular attention towards those activities involving criminal justice system reform. The three primary
components of the criminal justice system include law enforcement (police), judicial systems and processes
(laws and courts), and corrections (jails and prisons). Throughout all joint operational phases of a campaign
or operation, interagency partners must empower the criminal justice system components through advising
and equipping for a broader culture of rule of law to take hold in a society, either before or after a conflict.
3-108. Criminal justice system reform is crucial to establishment of the rule of law. As with other rule of
law activities, the execution of criminal justice system reform tasks resides primarily with the lead
interagency partner. Though the military may initially execute rule of law activities based on an operational
environment and availability of civilian experts, the DOS is the lead for U.S. rule of law efforts. The
primary interagency partners with the DOS for these efforts are the USAID and the Department of Justice.
Whether military or civilian, partners coordinate any rule of law activities executed at the tactical or local
level with the country team, if there is one. In a permissive environment, rule of law activities should be
coordinated with DOS. The military contribution to criminal justice system reform may be limited to
engagement with host-nation counterparts. However, in a nonpermissive environment, where the security
situation does not permit easy access by interagency personnel, military forces may be required to
coordinate criminal justice system reform activities on its own. Nonetheless, the military is neither tasked
nor resourced to conduct long-term institutional reform on its own. When interagency partners are not
participating in the field, the military contribution to criminal justice system reform may include operations
at the tactical level, other support to the lead agency, and coordination with all criminal justice system
reform partners—including host-nation and nongovernmental partners.
3-109. Establishing effective rule of law through criminal justice system reform typically requires an
international review of the host-nation legal framework, a justice reform agenda, police and corrections
institutional reviews, and general justice reform programs. Many societies emerging from conflict also
require a new constitution or significant modification of an existing or previously instituted constitution.
All efforts to establish and support the rule of law must account for the customs, culture, and ethnicity of
the local populace.
3-110. Identifying the correct objectives for criminal justice system reform remains paramount during the
planning stages. Divorcing planning efforts from critical interagency enablers who have a vital role in this
reform effort is a dangerous proposition. Though not all inclusive, commanders consider the following key
criminal justice system reform actions:
* Enforce law and order.
* Establish public security.
* Build effective police, customs, borders, and immigration organizations.
* Protect civilians and human rights.
* Establish an ethical legal framework.
* Promote accountability to the law.
* Establish effective courts and penal systems.
* Ensure access to judicial processes.
* Ensure access to justice systems.
* Promote civilian participation (public awareness).
* Promote a culture of lawfulness.
3-111. Commanders and planners analyzing the effect of rule of law on operations, as well as those
leading the rule of law line of effort, should include experts within the specific fields of law enforcement,
judicial, and corrections. Those experts should not necessarily be called to lead the rule of law line of
effort, but they should be relied upon for their special area of expertise. For instance, military and civilian |
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