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7-100.1 | 135 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
of subordinate division and brigade tactical groups (DTGs and BTGs), al-
though assets directly controlled by the OSC could also operate throughout
an OSC disruption zone. In such cases, each subordinate would be responsi-
ble for a portion of the operational-level disruption zone, and that portion
would constitute the subordinate’s disruption zone within its own AOR. In
other cases, an operational-level disruption zone may extend beyond those of
the FG’s or OSC’s subordinates, to include an area occupied by forces sent out
under direct control of the FG or OSC commander.
4-38. Operational-level forces in the disruption zone could include special-
purpose forces (SPF) and affiliated forces, which could be operating in enemy-
held territory even before the beginning of hostilities. There could also be
stay-behind forces in areas seized by the enemy.
Battle Zone
4-39. The battle zone is that battlespace in which the main defense force uses
fires and maneuver to exploit the conditions created by successful disruption
zone operations. In the battle zone, the main defense force completes the dis-
aggregation of the enemy’s combat system by destroying the components ex-
posed by the disruption force. By inflicting significant damage or denying the
enemy his objectives, the main defense force causes the enemy to culminate
and, in the best case, to quit the field entirely. An operational-level battle
zone is often the aggregate of the battle zones of subordinate units.
4-40. The battle zone ties all available obstacles into an integrated fire sup-
port plan of all available weapons. It denies complex terrain to the enemy. It
allows the enemy to enter easily, but to exit only at great cost or ideally not
at all. The operational-level commander may establish kill zones within the
battle zone for the purpose of integrating long-range fire, ground attack avia-
tion, and main defense forces. Long-range fires from the battle zone may also
reach kill zones in the disruption zone, where these fires can be integrated
with the actions of disruption forces.
Support Zone
4-41. The support zone is that area of the battlespace designed to be free of
significant enemy action and to permit the effective logistics and administra-
tive support of forces. Security forces (see Organizing Forces for the Defense
below) operate in the support zone in a combat role to defeat enemy special
operations forces and other threats. Camouflage, concealment, cover, and de-
ception (C3D) measures occur throughout the support zone to protect the force
from standoff RISTA and precision attack.
Attack Zone
4-42. During an overall defensive operation, an attack zone may be employed
to conduct an offensive action inside a larger defensive action. It will have the
characteristics described in Chapter 3. An axis is a control measure showing
the location through which a counterattack force, for example, will move as it
proceeds from its assembly area to its attack zone. At the operational level,
multi-division OSCs may conduct offensive actions as a part of a larger de-
fensive scheme. |
7-100.1 | 136 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Kill Zone
4-43. A kill zone is a designated area on the battlefield where the OPFOR
plans to destroy a key enemy target, usually by fire. Kill zones may be within
any of the zones described above.
Battle Position
4-44. Within the AOR of an operational command, tactical-level subordinates
may occupy battle positions. A battle position is a defensive location designed
to maximize the occupying unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. A battle
position is selected such that the terrain in and around it is complementary
to the occupying unit’s capabilities and its tactical task. There are two kinds
of battle positions: simple and complex. See Figure 4-3.
Enemy
Enemy
Enemy
X
Enemy Enemy
Complex Battle Position
Simple Battle Positions
Figure 4-3. Battle Positions
4-45. A simple battle position is a defensive location oriented on the most
likely enemy avenue of approach. Simple battle positions are not necessarily
tied to complex terrain but often employ as much engineer effort as time allows.
4-46. Complex battle positions are defensive locations designed to protect the
units within them from detection and attack while denying their seizure and
occupation by the enemy. They typically employ a combination of complex
terrain, C3D measures, and engineer effort to protect combat forces from en-
gagement by precision standoff attack. |
7-100.1 | 137 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
4-47. A typical complex battle position contains
• Complex terrain.
• A substantial logistics cache.
• Extensive engineer fortification and obstacle work.
• C3D effort to confuse the enemy picture of strength and disposition.
• Precision fire capability.
• Mobile reserves.
• Air defense systems.
• Redundant C2 systems.
ORGANIZING FORCES FOR THE DEFENSE
4-48. In his operation plan, the operational-level commander also specifies
the organization of the forces within his level of command. Thus, subordinate
forces understand their roles within the overall operation. However, the or-
ganization of forces can shift dramatically during the course of an operation.
For example, a unit that initially was part of a disruption force may eventu-
ally occupy a battle position within the battle zone and become part of the
main defense force or act as a reserve.
4-49. Each of the separate functional forces has an identified commander.
This is often the senior commander of the largest subordinate unit assigned
to that force. For example, if two DTGs and a separate BTG are acting as the
OSC’s main defense force, the senior of the two DTG commanders is the main
defense force commander. During decentralized operations, even when the force
consists of like units of the same command level, control can be delegated to the
senior commander of that force’s like units. Since, in this option, each force
commander is also a subordinate unit commander, he controls the force from
his unit’s command post (CP).
4-50. Another option is to have one of the OSC’s or FG’s CPs be in charge
of a functional force. Particularly during dispersed defensive operations,
functional forces that contain units of the same command level might be
controlled from the forward, auxiliary, or airborne CP of the OSC or FG.
For example, the forward CP could control a disruption force. Another
possibility would be for the IFC CP to command the disruption force or
any other force whose actions must be closely coordinated with fires deliv-
ered by the integrated fires command (IFC).
4-51. In any case, the force commander is responsible to the OSC or FG
commander to ensure that combat preparations are made properly and to
take charge of the force during the operation. This frees the operational-level
commander from decisions specific to the force’s mission. Even when tactical-
level subordinates of an OSC or FG have responsibility for parts of the OSC
or FG disruption zone, there is still an overall OSC or FG disruption force
commander. |
7-100.1 | 138 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Disruption Force
4-52. The size and composition of forces in the disruption zone depends on
the level of command involved, the commander’s concept of operations, and
the circumstances in which the unit adopts the defense. An operational-level
disruption force has no set organization but may be as large as a multi-division
OSC or consist only of SPF teams to direct reconnaissance fires and conduct
direct action. The operational-level commander will always make maximum use
of stay-behind forces and affiliated forces existing within his AOR. Subordinate
commanders can employ forces in a disruption zone role independent of the
operation plan only with approval of the operational-level commander.
4-53. A disruption force has no set order of battle, but may contain
• Ambush teams (ground and air defense).
• SPF teams.
• RISTA assets and forces.
• Counterreconnaissance forces.
• Artillery systems.
• Target designation teams.
• Affiliated forces (such as terrorists, insurgents, criminals, or special police).
• Antilanding reserves.
4-54. The purpose of the disruption force is to prevent the enemy from
conducting an effective attack. The disruption force does this by initiating
the attack on components of the enemy’s combat system. Successful attack of
designated components or subsystems begins the disaggregation of the
enemy’s combat system and creates vulnerabilities for exploitation in the
battle zone. Skillfully conducted disruption operations will effectively deny
the enemy the synergy of effects of his combat system.
4-55. The disruption force may also have a counterreconnaissance mission.
It may selectively destroy or render irrelevant the enemy’s RISTA forces.
There will be times, however, when the OPFOR wants enemy reconnaissance
to detect something that is part of the deception plan. In those cases, the dis-
ruption force will not seek to destroy all of the enemy’s RISTA assets.
Main Defense Force
4-56. The main defense force is the component of the operational-level command
that is charged with execution of the defensive mission. It operates in the battle
zone to accomplish the purpose of the operation (destroy, preserve, or deny).
Protected Force
4-57. In a defense to preserve, the protected force is the force being kept from
detection or destruction by the enemy. Protection can be afforded by C3D
and/or the actions of other OPFOR units. There is generally some force that
the OPFOR is trying to protect from enemy observation and fire, to ensure
that it will still have that force after the current operation is over. At the
operational level, this force is critical to future operations and the preser-
vation of the regime. It may be in the battle zone or the support zone. |
7-100.1 | 139 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
Security Force
4-58. The security force conducts activities to prevent or mitigate the effects
of hostile actions against the overall operational-level command and/or its
key components. If the commander chooses, he may charge this security force
with providing force protection for the entire AOR, including the rest of the
functional forces; logistics and administrative elements in the support zone;
and other key installations, facilities, and resources. The security force may
include various types of unitssuch as infantry, SPF, counterreconnaissance,
and signals reconnaissance assetsto focus on enemy special operations and
long-range reconnaissance forces operating throughout the AOR. It can also
include internal security forces units allocated to the operational-level com-
mand, with the mission of protecting the overall command from attack by
hostile insurgents, terrorists, and special operations forces. The security
force may also be charged with mitigating the effects of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). The security force commander can be given control over
one or more reserve formations, such as the antilanding reserve.
Counterattack Forces
4-59. In a defensive operation with a planned counterattack scheme (typically in
a maneuver defense), the operational-level commander designates one or
more counterattack forces. He also shifts his task organization to create a
counterattack force when a window of opportunity opens that leaves the enemy
vulnerable to such an action. At the operational level, the counterattack force
may be a multi-division force with the mission to destroy a major enemy for-
mation that is exposed. The operational-level commander uses counterattack
forces to complete the defensive mission assigned and regain the initiative
for the offense. The counterattack force can have within it fixing, assault,
and exploitation forces (as outlined in Chapter 3).
Types of Reserves
4-60. At the commander’s discretion, forces may be held out of initial action
so that he may influence unforeseen events or take advantage of developing
opportunities. He may employ a number of different types of reserve forces of
varying strengths, depending on the situation.
4-61. Maneuver Reserve. The size and composition of a reserve force is
entirely situation-dependent. However, the reserve is normally a force
strong enough to respond to unforeseen opportunities and contingencies at
the operational level. A reserve may assume the role of counterattack
force to deliver the final blow that ensures the enemy can no longer conduct his
preferred operation.
4-62. A reserve force is given a list of possible missions for rehearsal and
planning purposes. The staff assigns to each of these missions a priority,
based on likelihood that the reserve might be called upon to execute that
mission. Some missions given to the reserve may include
• Conducting a counterattack. (The counterattack goal is not limited to
destroying enemy forces, but may also include recovering lost positions
or capturing positions operationally advantageous for subsequent
combat actions.) |
7-100.1 | 140 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
• Conducting counterpenatration (blocking or destroying enemy pene-
trations).
• Conducting antilanding operations (eliminating vertical envelopments).
• Assisting forces heavily engaged on a defended line to break contact
and withdraw.
• Act as a deception force.
4-63. Antitank Reserve. OPFOR commanders faced with significant ar-
mored threats may keep an antitank reserve (ATR). It is generally an anti-
tank unit and often operates in conjunction with an obstacle detachment (OD).
Based on the availability of antitank and engineer assets, an operational-level
command may form more than one ATR.
4-64. Antilanding Reserve. Because of the potential threat from enemy
airborne or airmobile troops, an operational-level commander may designate
an antilanding reserve (ALR). Operational-level ALRs would be resourced for
rapid movement to potential drop zones (DZs) and landing zones (LZs). The
ALR commander would have immediate access to the operational intelligence
system for early warning of potential enemy landing operations. ALRs typically
include maneuver forces, air defense assets, and engineer units, but may be
allocated any unit capable of disrupting or defeating an airborne or heliborne
landing, such as smoke or electronic warfare (EW). While other reserves can
perform this mission, the commander may create a dedicated ALR to prevent
destabilization of the defense by vertical envelopment of OPFOR units or seizure
of key terrain. ALRs assume positions prepared to engage the enemy primary DZ
or LZ as a kill zone. They rehearse and plan for rapid redeployment to other sus-
pected DZs or LZs. Operational-level commanders may direct long-range fires or
SPF direct action to prevent enemy forces from mounting air insertions. The de-
struction of airframes or fuel sources, or the positioning of air defense assets may
serve to take this option away from enemy forces.
4-65. Special Reserves. An operational-level command may form an
engineer reserve of earthmoving and obstacle-creating equipment. A com-
mander can deploy this reserve to strengthen defenses on a particularly
threatened axis during the course of the operation. An operational-level
command threatened by enemy use of WMD may also form a chemical
defense reserve.
Deception Force
4-66. When the IW plan requires the creation of nonexistent or partially ex-
isting formations, these forces are designated deception forces in close-hold
executive summaries of the operation plan. Wide-distribution copies of the
plan make reference to these forces according to the designation given them in
the deception story. The deception force in the defense is typically given its own
command structure to both replicate the organization(s) necessary to the decep-
tion story and to execute the multidiscipline deception required to replicate an
actual military organization. For example, FG commanders can use deception
OSC command structures to deny enemy forces information on operation plans
for the defense. |
7-100.1 | 141 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
PREPARING FOR THE DEFENSE
4-67. In the preparation phase, the OPFOR focuses on ways of applying all
available resources and the full range of actions to conduct defensive operations.
Commanders organize their forces and the battlefield with an eye toward
capitalizing on conditions created by successful defensive actions, and seizing
opportunities for offensive actions wherever possible. The defensive dispositions
are based on the application of the systems warfare approach to combat, as
described in Chapter 1. OPFOR defensive operations focus on attacking
components or subsystems to of the enemy’s combat system to disaggregate
the “system of systems.” By denying the enemy the synergy created by an
integrated, aggregated system, vulnerabilities are created that defensive
forces can exploit.
DENY ENEMY INFORMATION
4-68. Operational-level commanders realize that enemy operations hinge on
an appreciation of the situation. So, defensive preparations focus on de-
struction and deception of enemy national and theater sensors. Lethal and
nonlethal attack of enemy intelligence satellites and reconnaissance aircraft
can limit the ability of enemy forces to understand the OPFOR defensive
plan. The OPFOR recognizes that, when conducting operations against an
extraregional power, it will often be impossible to destroy the ability of the
enemy’s standoff RISTA means to observe its defensive preparations.
However, the OPFOR also recognizes the reluctance of enemy military
commanders to operate without human confirmation of intelligence, as well
as the relative ease with which imagery and signals sensors may be deceived.
The OPFOR operational-level commander considers ground reconnaissance
by enemy special operations Forces as a significant threat in the enemy
RISTA suite and focuses significant effort to ensure its removal. While the
OPFOR will execute missions to destroy standoff RISTA means, C3D would
be the method of choice for degrading the capability of such systems.
MAKE THOROUGH COUNTERMOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY PREPARATIONS
4-69. The more time available, the greater the preparation of an AOR for
the defense. This is a reflection of engineer effort and time to devote to
that effort. The OPFOR employs every method to maximize the time
available to prepare for the defense. This includes preparation of the State
during peacetime and highly detailed plans for transition from regional to
adaptive operations to take full advantage of any operational lull as the
enemy builds combat power. This might involve an offensive operation
with limited objectives that transitions to the defense by design.
4-70. Operational-level commanders realize that engineer works are vital to
the stability of the defense. Engineer assets will be used to improve the ad-
vantages of complex terrain in protecting friendly forces and exposing enemy
forces to engagement. Engineer efforts can contribute to creating windows of
opportunity by degrading the ability of the enemy’s combat system to inte-
grate the effects of its subsystems. |
7-100.1 | 142 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
4-71. Engineer units specializing in rapid obstacle construction and minelaying
form mission-specific units known as ODs. These ODs normally deploy in
conjunction with reserves to block enemy penetrations or to protect the flanks
of counterattack forces. In the initial stages of the defense, engineer assets
concentrate on creating obstacles in the disruption zone, in gaps in the combat
formation, and to the flanks, and preparing lines for counterpenetration and
counterattack and routes to such lines. The obstacle plan ensures that the
effort is coordinated with fires and maneuver to produce the desired effects.
In conjunction with other tasks, engineers support the IW plan through
activities such as constructing false defensive positions and preparing false
routes. More information on countermobility and survivability planning at the
operational level can be found in Chapter 10.
MAKE USE OF COMPLEX TERRAIN
4-72. The OPFOR tries to make maximum use of complex terrain in all
defensive operations. Complex terrain provides cover from fires, concealment
from standoff RISTA assets, and intelligence and logistics support from the
population of urban areas. It plays into the strength of OPFOR resolve to win
through any means and through protracted conflict if necessary.
MAKE THOROUGH LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS
4-73. The overwhelming ability of extraregional intervention forces to attack
exposed logistics elements makes it difficult to resupply forces. The OPFOR
understands that there is as much chance of a defensive operation being
brought to culmination by a lack of sufficient logistics support as there is by
enemy action. Careful consideration is given to carried days of supply and
pre-established caches to obviate the need for easily disrupted lines of
communication (LOCs).
MODIFY THE PLAN WHEN NECESSARY
4-74. The OPFOR takes into account that, while it might consider itself to be
in the preparation phase for one operation, it is continuously in the execution
phase. Plans are never considered final. Plans are checked throughout the
course of their development to ensure they are still valid in light of battlefield
events.
REHEARSE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE, IN PRIORITY
4-75. At the operational level, rehearsals are usually confined to map or
sand table exercises to ensure understanding by subordinate commanders.
The commander establishes the priority for critical parts of the operation,
and rehearses those operations with his subordinates. Typical actions to
be rehearsed in a defensive operation include
• Commitment of a reserve.
• Initiation of a counterattack.
• Execution of the fire support plan. |
7-100.1 | 143 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
EXECUTING THE DEFENSE
4-76. Successful execution depends on forces that understand their roles in
the operation and can swiftly follow preparatory actions with implementation
of the operation plan or rapid modifications to the plan, as the situation
requires. A successful execution phase results in the culmination of the
enemy’s offensive action. It ideally ends with transition to the offense in
order to keep the enemy under pressure and destroy him completely. During
adaptive operations against superior enemy force, however, a successful
defense may end in a stalemate.
4-77. A successful operational-level defense sets the military conditions for a
return to the offense or a favorable political resolution of the conflict. The
OPFOR may have to surrender territory to preserve forces. Territory can al-
ways be recaptured, but the destruction of OPFOR operational formations
threatens the survival of the State. Destruction of the protected force is
unacceptable.
4-78. Success criteria for an operational-level commander conducting an area
or maneuver defense may include
• Major combat formations remain intact.
• The enemy is forced to withdraw or, at a minimum, forego offensive
operations due to losses.
• A stalemate allows theater- and national-level assets time to conduct
attacks against enemy strategic centers of gravity.
MAINTAIN CONTACT
4-79. OPFOR operational-level commanders go to great lengths to maintain
contact with enemy formations and headquarters that may influence theater
operations. This includes rapid reconstitution of reconnaissance assets and
forces.
MODIFY THE PLAN WHEN NECESSARY
4-80. The OPFOR is sensitive to the effects of mission dynamics and realizes
that the enemy’s actions may well make the original mission of an OPFOR
unit achievable, but completely irrelevant. As an example, an OSC assigned a
mission to secure a critical area or facility may find that mission is not viable
if the enemy conducts a major air insertion that threatens the overall defen-
sive plan. Parts of that OSC may be called upon to initiate limited offensive
action while the air insertion is still vulnerable.
SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES
4-81. The OPFOR places maximum emphasis on decentralized execution, ini-
tiative, and adaptation. Subordinate units are expected to take advantage of
fleeting opportunities so long as their actions are in concert with the purpose
of the operational directive. |
7-100.1 | 144 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
INTEGRATED AND DECENTRALIZED DEFENSES
4-82. The OPFOR recognizes two general forms of defense: integrated and
decentralized. The distinction between the two rests on the ability of the
OPFOR to operate freely in the battlespace with full joint and combined arms
synchronization and adequate C2 and logistics support.
INTEGRATED DEFENSE
4-83. A defensive operation is integrated if the OPFOR has the ability to
achieve full joint and/or combined arms synchronization through all levels of
command and throughout the battlespace. This requires a modernized C2
system, a robust logistics capability, and the ability to operate relatively
free of enemy influence in the support zone and battle zones prior to the
commencement of full-fledged enemy offensive action. The OPFOR force
structure possesses the first two of these characteristics, at least in relation
to regional opponents. Thus, during regional operations and perhaps
transition operations, it would often be operating in an integrated fashion
unless the enemy is able to achieve a sufficient level of overmatch in RISTA
and standoff attack capability to deny the OPFOR freedom of action.
4-84. Integrated defenses are able to
• Operate, at least partially, without the requirement for windows of
opportunity.
• Maximize the effects of destructive fire and maneuver.
• Achieve operational decision through primarily military means.
DECENTRALIZED DEFENSE
4-85. A defensive operation is decentralized if the OPFOR’s C2 and/or logis-
tics capability has been significantly degraded or it does not have the ability
to operate freely in the battlespace. This typically occurs when the enemy en-
joys significant technological overmatch, particularly in technical RISTA
means and standoff precision attack. Decentralized defenses do not achieve
decision in and of themselves. Rather, they focus on preserving combat power
while buying time for the execution of strategic operations (see Chapter 1).
4-86. In some cases, an operational-level commander may chose to adopt a
decentralized defense to preserve his C2 and logistics, understanding that
his ability to synchronize operations will be degraded. Operational-level
commanders are constantly estimating the situation to determine risk versus
reward for active measures. A decentralized defense relies on initiative of
subordinate commanders and the discrete targeting of elements of the
enemy’s combat system to reduce combat capability and expose enemy forces
to destruction.
4-87. To be successful, decentralized defenses must
• Operate primarily in complex terrain.
• Maximize the effects of countermobility and survivability measures.
• Rely heavily on IW.
• Make the best possible use of reconnaissance fires (see Chapter 7). |
7-100.1 | 145 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTION
4-88. The types of defensive action in OPFOR doctrine are both tactical
methods and guides to the design of operational courses of action. The two
basic types are maneuver and area defense. An operational-level defensive
plan may include subordinate units that are executing various combinations
of maneuver and area defenses, along with some offensive courses of action,
within the overall defensive mission framework.
MANEUVER DEFENSE
4-89. In situations where the OPFOR is not completely overmatched, it
may conduct an operational maneuver defense. This type of defense is
designed to achieve operational decision by skillfully using fires and
maneuver to destroy key components of the enemy’s combat system and
deny enemy forces their objective, while preserving the friendly force.
Maneuver defenses cause the enemy to continually lose effectiveness until
he can no longer achieve his objectives. They can also economize force in
less important areas while the OPFOR moves additional forces onto the
most threatened axes.
4-90. Maneuver defenses are almost always integrated defenses. Decentralized
maneuver defenses typically occur as part of transition operations. As an
extraregional enemy builds combat power to overmatch levels, but before
the OPFOR is completely overmatched, maneuver defense can buy time
for other forces to move into sanctuary areas and prepare for adaptive
operations.
4-91. Even within a maneuver defense, the OPFOR may use area defense on
some enemy attack axes, especially on those where it can least afford to lose
ground. (See Figure 4-1.) An operational-level commander may use both
forms of defense simultaneously across the theater. A command may employ
maneuver defense techniques to conduct operations in the disruption zone if
it enhances the attack on the enemy’s combat system and an area defense in
the battle zone.
Method
4-92. Maneuver defense inflicts losses on the enemy, gains time, and protects
friendly forces. It allows the operational defender to choose the place and
time for engagements. Each portion of a maneuver defense allows a
continuing attack on the enemy’s combat system. As the system begins to
disaggregate, more elements are vulnerable to destruction. The maneuver
defense accomplishes this through a succession of defensive battles in
conjunction with short, violent counterattacks and fires. It allows
abandoning some areas of terrain when responding to an unexpected enemy
attack or when conducting the battle in the disruption zone. In the course
of a maneuver defense, the operational-level commander tries to force the
enemy into a situation that exposes enemy formations to destruction. See
Figures 4-4 and 4-5 for examples of maneuver defense. |
7-100.1 | 146 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
OSC
Support Zone Battle Zone Disruption Zone I I
X X X X X X I
I
I I
X
KILL
ZONE
X X XX XX XX
I I
X I
Counterattack
I
LEGEND
Ambush
XX
XX
Disrupt
XX
Fix
I I I
Contain
Counterattack
OSC
Figure 4-4. Maneuver Defense (Example 1)
4-93. A maneuver defense trades terrain for the opportunity to destroy
portions of the enemy formation and render the enemy’s combat system
ineffective. The OPFOR might use a maneuver defense when
• It can afford to surrender territory.
• It possesses a mobility advantage over enemy forces.
• Conditions are suitable for canalizing the enemy into areas where the
OPFOR can destroy him by fire or deliver decisive counterattacks.
4-94. Compared to area defense, the maneuver defense involves a higher de-
gree of risk for the OPFOR, because it does not rely heavily on the inherent
advantages of prepared defensive positions. Units conducting a maneuver de-
fense typically place smaller forces forward in defensive positions and retain
much larger reserves than in an area defense.
Defensive Lines
4-95. The basis of maneuver defense is for units to conduct maneuver from
position to position on a succession of defensive lines. In this case, the “line”
defended on is not a continuous line of defenses, but rather a notional line on
which one or more units have orders to defend for a certain time at a certain
depth within a unit’s AOR. The OPFOR accepts large intervals between de-
fensive positions on such a line. Part of the line may consist of natural or
manmade obstacles or of deception defensive positions.
4-96. These “lines” are not necessarily linear, in the sense of forming a
straight line. Nor are they necessarily at regular intervals from one another. |
7-100.1 | 147 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
A particular unit’s position on a subsequent line may not be directly behind
its previous position. In the spaces between the lines, the defenders can or-
ganize reconnaissance fire, raids, and counterattacks. Thus, it is difficult for
the enemy to predict where he will encounter resistance.
4-97. The number of lines and duration of defense on each line depend on the
nature of the enemy’s actions, the terrain, and the condition of the defending
units. Lines are selected based on the availability of natural obstacles and
shielding terrain, with consideration of being able to leave the lines without
being observed.
OSC
Support Zone Shielding Force Battle Zone Contact Force Disruption Zone
City X
X
XX
KILL
X Marsh ZONE
KILL
Attack Zone ZONE
XX
KILL
X ZONE
C
X X
X
KILL
ZONE C
X
City
Attack Zone
X XX
KILL
X ZONE
Mountains
LEGEND
C Cover Shielding Contact
Force Force
OSC
Figure 4-5. Maneuver Defense (Example 2)
Defensive Maneuver
4-98. Defensive maneuver consists of movement by bounds and the mainte-
nance of continuous fires on enemy forces. A disruption force and/or a main
defense force (or part of it) can perform defensive maneuver. In either case,
the force must divide its combat power into two smaller components: a con-
tact force and a shielding force. The contact force is the component occupying
the forward-most defensive line at any point in time. The shielding force is
the component occupying the next line immediately to the rear. |
7-100.1 | 148 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
4-99. At each line, the contact force ideally forces the enemy to deploy his
maneuver units and perhaps begin his artillery preparation for the attack.
Then, before the contact force becomes decisively engaged, it maneuvers to its
next preplanned line, behind the line occupied by the shielding force. While
the original contact force is moving, the shielding force is able to keep the en-
emy under continuous fires. When the original contact force passes to the
rear of the original shielding force, the latter force becomes the new contact
force. When the original contact force occupies its next line, it becomes the
shielding force for the new contact force. In this manner, units continue to
move by bounds to successive lines, preserving their own forces while delay-
ing and destroying the enemy.
4-100. Figures 4-1, 4-4, and 4-5, due to the operational scope of the overall
maneuver defense shown, depict only the general location of a BTG or DTG
as it moves to subsequent positions. These figures do not reflect the reality
that the contact and shielding forces moving by bounds are likely to be de-
tachments within a BTG or DTG. See FM 7-100.2 for examples of how this
process works at the tactical level.
4-101. Subsequent lines are far enough apart to permit defensive maneuver
by friendly units. The distance should also preclude the enemy from engaging
one line and then the other without displacing his indirect fire weapons. This
means that the enemy, having seized one line, must change the majority of
his firing positions and organized his attack all over again in order to get to
the next line. However, the lines are close enough to allow the defending
units to maintain coordinated, continuous fires on the enemy while moving
from one to the other.
4-102. OPFOR commanders may require a unit holding a line to continue
defending, even if this means it becomes decisively engaged or enveloped.
This may be necessary in order to allow the construction of defenses to the
rear of the line this unit is defending.
Disruption Force
4-103. An operational-level defense may have an OSC occupying an opera-
tional disruption zone if it is important to delay enemy forces to allow theater
transition to adaptive operations. The task organization of such an OSC
would have sufficient mobility to conduct a maneuver defense and a signifi-
cant allocation of artillery and rocket units. The disruption force initiates the
attack on the enemy’s combat system by targeting and destroying subsystems
that are critical to the enemy. If successful, the disruption force can cause
culmination of the enemy attack before the enemy enters the battle zone. In
the worst case, the enemy would enter the battle zone unable to benefit from
an integrated combat system and vulnerable to defeat by the main defense
force.
4-104. Forces committed to the disruption zone battle for an OSC usually
would be a BTG or DTG, along with supporting and affiliated assets from the
OSC. The OSC conducts the defense throughout the depth of the disruption
zone. Maneuver units conduct the defense from successive battle positions.
Intervals between these positions provide space for deployment of mobile
attack forces, precision fire systems, and reserves. |
7-100.1 | 149 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
4-105. The distance between successive positions in the disruption zone is
such that the enemy is forced to displace the majority of his supporting weap-
ons to continue the attack on the subsequent positions. This aids the force in
breaking contact and permits time to occupy subsequent positions. Long-
range fires, ODs, and ambushes to delay pursuing enemy units can assist
units in breaking contact and withdrawing.
4-106. If the disruption force has not succeeded in destroying or halting
the attacking enemy, but is not under too great a pressure from a pursuing
enemy, it may occupy prepared battle positions in the battle zone and assist
in the remainder of the defensive mission as part of the main defense
force. A disruption force may have taken losses and might not be at full
capability; a heavily damaged disruption force may pass into hide positions.
In that case, main defense or reserve forces occupy positions to cover the dis-
ruption force’s disengagement.
Main Defense Force
4-107. The mission of the main defense force is complete the defeat of the enemy
by attack of those portions of the force exposed by disruption zone operations.
In a multi-OSC operation, this may involve resubordination of units and in some
cases attacks by fire or maneuver forces across OSC limits of responsibility.
4-108. The main defense force in a maneuver defense divides its combat
power into contact and shielding forces. These forces move in bounds to
successive defensive lines. If maneuver defense in the disruption zone has
provided sufficient time, the defensive positions on these lines may take on
more of the characteristics of prepared battle positions.
4-109. The basic elements of the battle zone are battle positions, firing lines,
and repositioning routes. Battle positions use the terrain to protect forces
while providing advantage in engagements.
4-110. The commander may order a particular unit to stand and fight on a
line long enough to repel an attack. He may order this if circumstances are
favorable for defeating the enemy at that line. The unit also might have to
remain on that line because the next line is still being prepared or a vertical
envelopment threatens the next line or the route to it.
Reserves
4-111. An operational-level command in the maneuver defense can employ a
number of reserve forces of varying strengths. The maneuver reserve is a
force strong enough to respond to unforeseen opportunities and contingencies
at the operational level. It is normally strong enough to defeat the enemy’s
exploitation force. The commander positions this reserve in an assembly area
using C3D to protect it from observation and attack. From this position, it
can transition to a situational defense or conduct a counterattack. The re-
serve must have sufficient air defense coverage to allow maneuver. If the
commander does not commit the reserve from its original assembly area, it
maneuvers to another assembly area, possibly on a different axis, where it
prepares for other contingencies. (See the Reserves section above for discussion
of other types of reserves.) |
7-100.1 | 150 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
AREA DEFENSE
4-112. In situations where the OPFOR must deny geographic areas (or the
access to them) or where it is overmatched, it may conduct an operational
area defense. An area defense uses complex battle positions to protect key
components of the OPFOR’s combat power while creating opportunities, if
possible, to attack the enemy’s combat system. Not every component of
OPFOR combat power needs to or will be able to operate from complex battle
positions. However, those components most central for the OPFOR com-
mander’s plan will be the priority for preservation. Area defense is designed to
achieve a decision in one of two ways:
• By forcing the enemy’s offensive operations to culminate before he can
achieve his objectives.
• By denying the enemy his objectives while preserving combat power until
decision can be achieved through strategic operations (see Chapter 1).
See Figures 4-6 and 4-7 for examples of area defense.
OSC
Enemy
Kill
Zone
X X X
Marsh
DTG
Battle X X X
Zone I I Forest
DTG
Battle
Zone
Disruption
Zone Kill
Kill Zone
X
Zone
X DTG
Enemy
Disruption
Enemy B Za ot ntl ee
Zone
X
X
X
LEGEND
O
S
C Complex
Battle
Position
Figure 4-6. Area Defense (Example 1) |
7-100.1 | 151 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
O S C OSC
Disruption
Zone
I I
C C I C I I
C
OSC Battle
XX
Zone
I City X
XX
X
OSC
I
Reserve
XX
C
OSC I I I
Disruption I I
C
Zone
C
C
I
I
I I OSC
Disruption
C
C Zone
O
S
C
Figure 4-7. Area Defense (Example 2)
4-113. The area defense does not surrender the initiative to the attacking
forces, but takes action to create windows of opportunity that permit forces to
conduct small-scale offensive actions to attack key components of the enemy
combat system and cause unacceptable casualties. Area defense can set the
conditions for destroying a key enemy force in a strike. Extended windows of
opportunity permit the action of maneuver forces and facilitate transition to a
larger offensive action. IW is particularly important to the execution of the
area defense in adaptive and transition operations. Deception is critical to the
creation of complex battle positions, and effective perception management is
vital to the creation of the windows of opportunity needed to execute ma-
neuver and fires. |
7-100.1 | 152 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Method
4-114. Area defense inflicts losses on the enemy, retains ground, and protects
friendly forces. It does so by occupying battle positions in complex terrain and
dominating the surrounding battlespace with reconnaissance fire (see
Chapter 7). These fires attack designated elements of the enemy’s combat
system to destroy components and subsystems that create an advantage for the
enemy. The operational design of an area defense is to begin disaggregating
the enemy’s combat system in the disruption zone. When enemy forces enter
the battle zone, they should be incapable of synchronizing combat operations.
4-115. Area defense creates windows of opportunity in which to conduct
spoiling attacks or counterattacks and destroy key enemy systems. In the
course of an area defense, the operational-level commander uses terrain that
exposes the enemy to continuing attack.
4-116. An area defense trades time for the opportunity to attack enemy forces
when and where they are vulnerable. The OPFOR might use an area defense
when
• It is conducting access-control operations.
• Enemy forces enjoy a significant RISTA and precision standoff advantage.
• Conditions are suitable for canalizing the enemy into areas where the
OPFOR can destroy him by fire and/or maneuver.
4-117. A skillfully conducted area defense can allow a significantly weaker force
to defeat a stronger enemy force. However, the area defense relies to a significant
degree on the availability of complex terrain and decentralized logistics. Units
conducting an area defense typically place small ambushing and raiding
forces in complex terrain throughout the AOR to force the enemy into
continuous operations and steadily drain his combat power and resolve.
4-118. Within an overall operational area defense, the OPFOR might use
maneuver defense on some portions of the AOR, especially on those where it
can afford to lose ground. This occurs most often during transition operations
as forces initially occupy the complex terrain positions necessary for the
execution of the area defense.
Disruption Force
4-119. In an area defense, the disruption zone is that battlespace surrounding
its battle zone(s) where the OPFOR may cause continuing harm to the enemy
without significantly exposing itself. For example, counterreconnaissance ac-
tivity may draw the attention of enemy forces and cause them to enter the
kill zone of a sophisticated ambush using long-range precision fires. RISTA
assets and counterreconnaissance forces occupy the disruption zone, along
with affiliated forces. Paramilitary forces may assist other disruption force
units by providing force protection, controlling the civilian population, and
executing deception operations as directed.
4-120. The disruption zone of an area defense is designed to be an area of un-
interrupted battle. OPFOR RISTA maintains contact with enemy forces, and
other parts of the disruption force attack them incessantly with ambush and
precision fires. |
7-100.1 | 153 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
4-121. The disruption force has many missions. The most important mission
at the operational level is the destruction of appropriate elements of the en-
emy’s combat system, to begin disaggregating it. The following list provides
examples of other tasks that the disruption force may perform:
• Detect the enemy’s main groupings.
• Force the enemy to reveal his intentions.
• Deceive the enemy as to the location and configuration of battle
positions.
• Delay the enemy, allowing time for preparation of defenses and
counterattacks.
• Force the enemy into premature deployment.
• Attack lucrative targets (key systems, vulnerable troops).
• Canalize the enemy into situations unfavorable to him.
The disruption force mission also includes maintaining contact with the
enemy and setting the conditions for successful reconnaissance fire and
strikes.
4-122. In an area defense, the disruption force often occupies and operates
out of battle positions in the disruption zone and seeks to inflict maximum
harm on selected enemy units and destroy enemy systems operating through-
out the AOR. An area defense disruption force permits the enemy no safe
haven and continues to inflict damage at all hours and in all weather
conditions.
4-123. Disruption force units break contact after conducting ambushes and
return to battle positions for refit and resupply. Long-range fires, ODs, and
ambushes to delay pursuing enemy units can assist units in breaking contact
and withdrawing.
4-124. Even within the overall context of an operational area defense, the
disruption force might employ a maneuver defense. In this case, the distance
between positions in the disruption zone is such that the enemy is forced to
displace the majority of his supporting weapons to continue the attack on the
subsequent positions. This aids the force in breaking contact and permits
time to occupy subsequent positions.
4-125. The disruption zone often includes a significant obstacle effort.
Engineer effort in the disruption zone also provides mobility support to
disruption force units requiring maneuver to conduct their attacks or
ambushes.
4-126. Within the overall structure of the area defense, disruption force units
seek to conduct highly damaging local attacks. They deploy on likely enemy
avenues of approach. They choose the best terrain to inflict maximum dam-
age on the attacking enemy and use obstacles and barriers extensively. They
defend aggressively by fire and maneuver. When enemy pressure grows too
strong, these forces can conduct a maneuver defense, withdrawing from one
position to another in order to avoid envelopment or decisive engagement. |
7-100.1 | 154 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
4-127. Since a part of the disruption force mission to attack the enemy’s
combat system, the following are typical targets for attack:
• C2 systems.
• RISTA assets.
• Precision fire systems.
• Aviation assets in the air and on the groundat attack helicopter
forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) and airfields.
• Logistics support areas.
• LOCs.
• Mobility and countermobility assets.
• Casualty evacuation routes and means.
4-128. In some cases, the disruption force can have a single mission of detect-
ing and destroying a particular set of enemy capabilities. This does not mean
that no other targets will be engaged; it means that, given a choice between
targets, the disruption force will engage the targets that are the most damag-
ing to the enemy combat system.
Main Defense Force
4-129. The units of the main defense force conducting an area defense occupy
battle positions in complex terrain within the battle zone. That terrain is re-
inforced by engineer effort and C3D measures. These complex battle positions
are designed to prevent enemy forces from being able to employ precision
standoff attack means and force the enemy to choose costly methods in order
to affect forces in those positions. They are also arranged in such a manner as
to deny the enemy the ability to operate in covered and concealed areas himself.
4-130. The main defense force in an area defense conducts attacks and
employs reconnaissance fire against enemy forces in the disruption zone.
Disruption forces may also use the complex battle positions occupied by the
main defense force as refit and rearm points.
Reserves
4-131. An operational-level command in the area defense can employ a num-
ber of reserve forces of varying strengths. In addition to its other functions,
the maneuver reserve in an area defense may have the mission of winning
time for the preparation of positions. This reserve is a unit strong enough to
respond to unforeseen opportunities and contingencies at the operational
level. It is normally strong enough to defeat the enemy’s exploitation force.
The commander positions his reserve in an assembly area within one or more
of the battle positions, based on the commander’s concept of the operation.
(See the Reserves section above for discussion of other types of reserves.) |
7-100.1 | 155 | Chapter 5
Information Warfare
Modern information technologies (ITs) have created conditions for the con-
frontation of states, combatants, and non-state actors in a fundamentally
new arenathe information sphere. Information, information processing,
and communications networks are at the core of every military activity.
The concepts of time, space, force, navigation, speed, precision, and lethality
have changed because of the capabilities of information-age technology
and the availability of information. These changes have a tremendous
effect on how military forces conduct activities. The OPFOR addresses this
issue through continued refinement of its information warfare (IW) doctrine.
The OPFOR defines information warfare as the specifically planned and
integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical
points and times. The ultimate goal of IW is to influence decision makers.
The OPFOR conducts IW at all levels of warfarestrategic, operational,
and tacticalbut without regard to strict definitional boundaries among
these levels. Opponents of the State are subject to IW regardless of the
level and degree of engagement in other types of operations. The State’s
leadership integrates all instruments of powerdiplomatic-political,
economic, military, and informationalto implement an information
strategy. One element of power may have primacy over the others at a
given time, but all work together.
In the OPFOR’s view, skillful application of IW can facilitate the defeat of
a technologically superior enemy. It can challenge or counter an enemy’s
goal of information dominance. The OPFOR can target key components
(such as technology providing situational awareness, and advanced com-
puting and communications technologies) that provide such dominance,
thus shaking the opponent’s confidence.
NEW CONCEPTS OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE
5-1. The State envisions an operational environment (OE) in which the bat-
tlespace stretches from the depths of an opponent’s territory to the center of
the State’s political, economic, and military organizations. This OE is con-
ducive to the practice of IW. Combat cannot be confined to a single battle-
space, but instead will often expand globally to encompass attacks on an
adversary’s information and space systems or his entire information envi-
ronment.
5-2. Information is a powerful strategic, operational, and tactical multiplier.
It enhances leadership and magnifies the effects of maneuver, firepower, and
protection at decisive points. The OPFOR can use information as a component
of combat power to shape the OE and create the conditions for employing the |
7-100.1 | 156 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
other components of its combat power. Information has become a vital strate-
gic and operational resource. The OPFOR clearly understands the power of
information and the revolution in IT and is actively developing doctrine and
tactics to supplement more traditional types of warfighting. The OPFOR can
use IW activities to create and/or exploit windows of opportunity for itself.
5-3. The importance of information, and its flow and control, to the conduct of
military operations is not a new concept. The OPFOR has for years employed an
integrated approach to attacking, disrupting, or manipulating information inside
the enemy’s decision-making cycle. Objectives have included not only the sys-
tems and information its enemies collect, process, and analyze, but also the leaders
and the decisions they make. What is new, however, is the speed and volume of
information available; networking, routing, and switching technologies; and the
global connectivity of information systems and infrastructures. This information
explosion, coupled with an integrated IW doctrine, provides the OPFOR a
greater opportunity to inflict damage, trigger chaos, weaken national will, or
permanently cripple an opponent. In effect, IW challenges traditional approaches
to warfare. The following are ways in which IW redefines operations.
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
5-4. Most of today’s information environment is outside of military control,
making it harder to regulate, dominate, or protect. While neither the State
nor its opponents can control the global information environment or global
information infrastructure (GII), they must prepare to operate within it. The
GII is defined as the worldwide interconnection of communications networks,
computers, databases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of
information available to users. Within the GII, various countries have their
own national information infrastructures (NIIs) and defense information
infrastructures (DIIs).
5-5. The NII is the physical and virtual backbone of a nation. It is composed
of multiple critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures are those in-
formation and communication assets, systems, and functions so vital to a
nation that their disruption or destruction would have a debilitating effect
on national security, economy, governance, public health and safety, and morale.
5-6. The DII is defined as the shared or interconnected system of computers,
communications, data applications, security, people, training, and other sup-
port structures serving an actor’s defense needs. The DII connects computers
used for mission support, command and control (C2), and intelligence through
voice, telecommunications, imagery, video, and multimedia services.
5-7. The interaction of the GII, NIIs, and DIIs introduces multiple actors into
the information environment. This increases vulnerabilities and dependen-
cies, and creates many legal issues.
BLURRED BOUNDARIES
5-8. The OPFOR understands that there is no clear-cut line of demarcation
between the military, economic, and diplomatic-political aspects of an opera-
tion or strategic campaign and that the informational element cuts across the
other three. Therefore, it uses all types of IW across all these dimensions. |
7-100.1 | 157 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
5-9. In an information-based world, the boundaries between nations, individu-
als, and private-sector organizations can be undefined and nebulous. The tradi-
tional distinction between enemy and friendly forces becomes harder to observe,
define, and ultimately defend against. The OPFOR is keenly aware of this devel-
opment and can use it to its advantage when conducting IW actions. For exam-
ple, the OPFOR could employ third-party individuals or organizations (either
domestic or international) to conduct IW activities, making traceability difficult.
5-10. There may also be an inherent difficulty in isolating a specific OPFOR
IW activity. For example, the distinction between OPFOR-sponsored IW at-
tacks and other types of activities and events (such as espionage, accidents,
system failures, disgruntled employee actions, and hacker pranks) are hard
to distinguish. This period of confusion, and time spent trying to identify the
attacker, can benefit and be manipulated by the OPFOR.
5-11. The interaction of the GII, NIIs, and DIIs compresses and blurs the dis-
tinction among tactics, operations, and strategy. For example, images of
tactical military actions, disseminated by the media, are likely to influence
strategic decision makers or the populace.
EXPANDED ROLE FOR PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT
5-12. Thus, perception management is a critical piece of IW. The OPFOR
constantly attempts to “spin” any conflict or situation to its advantage. IW
planning and implementation emphasizes increased use of psychological
warfare (PSYWAR) and deception designed to manipulate public opinion,
coupled with attacks against an opponent’s centers of gravity.
5-13. New information-based techniques and tools can dramatically increase
the ability to conduct perception management and supporting deception op-
erations. Modern technologies allow the OPFOR to target a global audience
for support and sympathy. The OPFOR stresses the importance of perception
management from the strategic to the tactical level. (See the Perception
Management section of this chapter for further detail.)
ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
5-14. Rapid advances in technology have produced an incredibly complex
global information environment. Information and communications technolo-
gies have grown exponentially in recent years. Satellite and cellular commu-
nications, direct-broadcast television (expanding the awareness of events, is-
sues, and military activities), personal computers, global positioning system
(GPS) technologies, wireless communication capabilities, and the Internet are
a few examples of the capabilities widely available to nations, as well as in-
dependent organizations and individuals. Given such advances, the capabili-
ties of both the OPFOR and its potential adversaries are increasing in both
sophistication and lethality. The OPFOR tries to exploit such technologies to
gain the operational advantage.
INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY
5-15. The State is committed to creating an IT research and development
base. However, until such a capability is developed, the State actively seeks |
7-100.1 | 158 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
international sources (overt and covert) and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
products to satisfy its civilian and military requirements.
5-16. The OPFOR focuses its investment strategy on the following areas:
• Computers (including increasingly complex distributed information
systems).
• Telecommunications (traditional and wireless communications).
• Electronics (to included microelectronics).
• Computer integrated manufacturing.
• Nanotechnology.
• Robotics.
• Biotechnology.
• Space-based communications.
• Sophisticated sensing capabilities.
VULNERABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY
5-17. The OPFOR can manipulate an enemy’s unresolved problems of inter-
operability and dependence on COTS systems to its advantage. COTS mate-
rials are usually not hardened against electronic spikes, remote collection ca-
pabilities, or extreme weather conditions. The OPFOR understands that se-
curity cannot be constructed or guaranteed when depending on COTS. For
example, if hackers (working independently or for a government or criminal
organization) disrupted Internet communications or links while a military
operation was in progress, information exchange between combat units could
be severely disrupted.
NEUTRALIZING TECHNOLOGICAL AND INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
5-18. The OPFOR recognizes the increasing dependence of modern extrare-
gional forces on information systems and their desire to obtain information
superiority. However, the OPFOR also understands that information superi-
ority does not equate to perfect information, nor does it eliminate the “fog of
war.” Information systems, processors, and links add their own source of fric-
tion and vulnerability to the operational environment. Systems and sensors
can be tricked, destroyed, or overwhelmed with data, thus causing an enemy
to question the value and validity of his gathered intelligence. The OPFOR
seeks to exploit this uncertainty and friction at all times.
5-19. The OPFOR recognizes that it cannot stand toe-to-toe with most ex-
traregional enemies in a conventional war, and therefore seeks to target en-
emy weaknesses. IW will be the tool of choice to counter a technologically su-
perior opponent and to challenge his relative information dominance. In addi-
tion, IW actions designed to break the will of a conventionally more powerful
adversary will be common.
NEW TARGETS
5-20. Societies rely increasingly on a high-performance, networked informa-
tion infrastructure for everything from air travel to electric-power generation
and telecommunications to financial transactions. This means that a new set |
7-100.1 | 159 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
of lucrative strategic and operational targets is now open to attack. The
OPFOR will focus all elements of its power, as well as the State’s, on the de-
struction of the adversary’s critical information infrastructures.
EASY OF OPERATION AND LOW COST
5-21. In contrast to other forms of warfare, IW actions might occur without
access to large financial resources or backing or without state sponsorship.
Information weapons could be software logic bombs or computer worms and
viruses. IW could be conducted with such easily accessible means such as cel-
lular telephones and the Internet.
ELEMENTS OF IW
5-22. OPFOR IW occurs through the combinations of seven elements:
• Electronic warfare (EW).
• Computer warfare.
• Deception.
• Physical destruction.
• Protection and security measures.
• Perception management.
• Information attack (IA).
The seven elements of IW do not exist in isolation from one another and are
not mutually exclusive. Often they are mutually supporting. The overlapping
of functions, means, and targets makes it necessary that they all be inte-
grated into a single, integrated IW plan. However, effective execution of IW
does not necessary involve the use of all elements concurrently. Although one
element might be all that is required to successfully execute a tactical IW ac-
tion, that would seldom be the case at the operational level. Likewise, using
one element or subelement, such as camouflage, does not by itself necessarily
constitute an operational application of IW.
5-23. The use of each element or a combination of elements is determined by
the operational situation and support to the overall strategic objective. The
size and sophistication of an enemy force also determines the extent to which
the OPFOR employs the various elements of IW. The commander has the
freedom to mix and match elements to best suit his operational needs, within
the bounds of guidance from higher headquarters.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
5-24. EW consists of measures conducted to control or deny the enemy’s use
of the electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the State and the
OPFOR. EW capabilities allow the OPFOR to exploit, deceive, degrade,
disrupt, damage, or destroy sensors, processors, and C2 nodes. Spectrum
supremacy and delay, denial, or distortions of information in the adversary’s
information infrastructure are the objectives. At a minimum, the goal of
OPFOR EW is to control the use of the electromagnetic spectrum at critical
locations and times in the battlespace or to attack the enemy. |
7-100.1 | 160 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
5-25. To accomplish these EW goals and objectives, the OPFOR employs both
lethal and nonlethal measures. Lethal EW activities include the physical de-
struction of high-priority targets supporting the enemy’s decision-making
processsuch as reconnaissance sensors, command posts, and communica-
tions systems. They also include activities such as lethal air defense suppres-
sion measures. If available, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate
high-technology C2 assets and associated links. Nonlethal means range from
signals reconnaissance and electronic jamming to the deployment of corner
reflectors, protective countermeasures, and deception jammers. Sophisticated
camouflage, deception, decoy, or mockup systems can degrade the effects of
enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RISTA) systems. Also, the OPFOR can employ low-cost GPS jammers to
disrupt enemy precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and
navigation.
5-26. EW activities especially focus on the enemy’s advanced C2 systems de-
veloped to provide real-time force synchronization and shared situational
awareness. The enemy relies on the availability of friendly and enemy force
composition and locations, digital mapping displays, and automated targeting
data. By targeting vulnerable communications links, the OPFOR can disrupt
the enemy’s ability to digitally transfer and share such information. The
OPFOR enhances its own survivability through disrupting the enemy’s abil-
ity to mass fires with dispersed forces, while increasing enemy crew and staff
workloads and disrupting his fratricide-prevention measures.
5-27. EW is a perfect example of the integrated nature of OPFOR IW
elements. It overlaps significantly with protection and security measures,
deception, and physical destruction. Reconnaissance, aviation, air defense,
artillery, and engineer support may all contribute to successful EW for IW
purposes.
COMPUTER WARFARE
5-28. Computer warfare consists of attacks that focus specifically on the
computer systems, networks, and/or nodes. This includes a wide variety of ac-
tivities, ranging from unauthorized access (hacking) of information systems
for intelligence-collection purposes, to the insertion of malicious software (vi-
ruses, worms, logic bombs, or Trojan horses) and deceptive information entry
into enemy computer systems. Such attacks concentrate on the denial, dis-
ruption, or manipulation of the infrastructure’s integrity. The OPFOR may
attempt to accomplish these activities through the use of agents or third-
party individuals with direct access to enemy information systems. It can also
continually access and attack systems at great distances via communications
links such as the Internet.
5-29. OPFOR computer warfare activities may be conducted prior to or
during a military action. For example, by accessing databases related to an
enemy’s projected force deployments and troop movements, the OPFOR can
effectively disrupt planning and misdirect movement, producing substantial
confusion and delays. As modern armies increasingly rely on “just-in-time”
logistics support, targeting logistics-related computers and databases can
produce delays in the arrival of critical materiel such as ammunition, fuel,
and spare parts during critical phases of a conflict. |
7-100.1 | 161 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
5-30. The OPFOR can successfully conduct invasive computer warfare activities
from the safety of its own territory, given the distributed ability to reach targeted
computers anywhere in the world (as long as they are connected to the Internet).
The OPFOR can continuously exploit the highly integrated information
systems of an adversary.
DECEPTION
5-31. OPFOR deception activities include measures designed to mislead ad-
versaries by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information. The aim
of deception is to influence opponents’ situational understanding and lead
them to act in a manner that favors the OPFOR or is prejudicial to their own
interests. Deception measures are a part of every military operation, and are
also used to achieve political and economic goals. The international media
may be a target for deceptive information at the operational level, being fed
false stories and video that portray tactical-level actions with the goal of in-
fluencing operational or even strategic decisions.
5-32. The OPFOR applies all forms of deception in support of IW. These
range from physical decoys and electronic devices to operational activities.
The OPFOR can even use its own information systems to pass misleading
or false information in support of deception activities. Such information
may cause the adversary to analyze incorrectly OPFOR capabilities and
intentions.
5-33. Because of the number and sophistication of sensors available to an ex-
traregional adversary, the OPFOR recognizes that a multispectral effort is
required to deceive him. This includes providing false or misleading thermal,
visual, and electronic signatures.
5-34. Successful deception activities depend on the identification and ex-
ploitation of enemy information systems and networks, as well as other
“conduits” for introducing deceptive information. Knowing how the conduits
receive, process, analyze, and distribute information are priority intelligence
requirements for the OPFOR.
PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION
5-35. Physical destruction, as an element of IW, involves measures to destroy
critical components of the enemy’s information infrastructure. The OPFOR
integrates all types of conventional and precision weapon systems to conduct
the destructive fires, to include fixed- and rotary-wing aviation, cannon
artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and surface-to-surface missiles. It can
also utilize other means of destruction, such explosives delivered by special-
purpose forces (SPF), insurgents, terrorists, or even co-opted civilians.
5-36. The OPFOR may integrate all forms of destructive fires, especially ar-
tillery and aviation, with other IW activities. Physical destruction activities
are integrated with jamming to maximize their effects. Specific missions are
carefully timed and coordinated with the IW plan and the actions of the sup-
ported units. |
7-100.1 | 162 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
5-37. Due to the mobility and fleeting nature of many IW targets, precision
weapons deliver the munitions of choice against many high-value targets.
The increased accuracy provided by such weapons allows the OPFOR to
attack specific IW-related targets rapidly and accurately. The OPFOR
continues to research and develop directed energy weapons, to include ra-
dio frequency weapons and high-power lasers.
PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES
5-38. The purpose of protection and security measures in IW is to protect
the OPFOR’s information infrastructure, maintain OPFOR capabilities for
effective C2, and deny protected information to other actors. The OPFOR con-
tinues to develop capabilities to effectively preserve OPFOR C2 at all levels of
command.
5-39. Protection and security measures conducted as part of IW include
• Information collection, processing, and utilization.
• Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance.
• Information and operations security.
• Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D).
• Force protection.
• Secure use of information-collection and -processing systems.
Information and Operations Security
5-40. Information and operations security is used to protect the physical and
intellectual assets used to facilitate command and control. It must function
continuously to be effective. It must conceal not only operational intentions,
current locations and configurations, and actions but also the tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures of information systems employment and operation.
5-41. The OPFOR clearly understands the importance of information security.
Commanders understand their vulnerabilities to being attacked through
their own information systems and develop means to protect these systems.
In addition, the OPFOR must be capable of isolating attacks on its informa-
tion systems while maintaining the ability to execute. In order to reduce the
vulnerability, the OPFOR emphasizes strong communications, computer, and
transmission security. It uses all State assets to support this process and sup-
ply the necessary resources and intelligence.
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception
5-42. The OPFOR gives particular attention to protective measures aimed
at reducing the enemy’s ability to target and engage OPFOR systems with
precision munitions. Knowing that the enemy cannot attack what his
RISTA systems do not find, the OPFOR employs a variety of C3D tech-
niques. These range from the most simple and inexpensive methods to
hide from observation to the most modern multispectral signature-
reducing technology.
5-43. All OPFOR units can use one or more forms of technical camouflage.
The purpose of these techniques is to alter the appearance of personnel and |
7-100.1 | 163 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
equipment and to blend them with the surrounding terrain. Capabilities
available include—
• Natural concealment.
• Camouflage paint.
• Artificial camouflage (nets and screens).
• Antiradar camouflage (radar-absorbing nets and paints).
• Decoy equipment (mockups) and deception positions.
• Light and thermal camouflage.
• Smoke camouflage.
PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT
5-44. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a percep-
tion of truth that furthers the OPFOR’s objectives. It integrates several
widely differing activities that use a combination of true, false, misleading, or
manipulated information. Enemy or foreign audiences, as well as the State’s
own public, may be targets. Perception management can include misinforma-
tion, media manipulation, and PSYWAR. Perception management is critically
important to all types of OPFOR operations.
5-45. PSYWAR is the capability and activities designed to influence selected
friendly, neutral, and/or hostile target audiences’ attitudes and behaviors in
support of the OPFOR. PSYWAR can target either specific decision-making
systems or the entire information system of the target audience, while influ-
encing key communicators and decision makers. The OPFOR attacks an en-
emy’s perceived centers of gravity. For example, prolonging an operation and
using all forms of media to show the devastation of conflict can sway public
opinion against the effort.
5-46. Statecraft (the art of conducting state affairs) and diplomacy (the art
and practice of conducting negotiations with other states) are aspects of
perception management conducted with foreign governments, and include
those countries’ populations as a target. The OPFOR skillfully employs
media and other neutral players, such as nongovernmental and private
volunteer organizations, to influence further public and private perceptions. It
exploits the international media’s willingness to report information without in-
dependent and timely confirmation. Individuals such as agents of influence,
sympathizers, and antiwar protesters are also employed advantageously by the
State or OPFOR to influence the enemy’s media, politicians, and citizenry.
5-47. The State’s Ministry of Public Information controls its own population’s
access to information and perceptions of reality. Successful preparation of the
population significantly enhances public support for the OPFOR’s military actions.
INFORMATION ATTACK
5-48. An information attack (sometimes called cyber attack) focuses on the in-
tentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that supports a
comprehensive IW campaign. Unlike, computer warfare attacks that target the
information systems, IAs target the information itself. Attacks on the commer-
cial Internet by civilian hackers have demonstrated the vulnerability of cyber |
7-100.1 | 164 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
and information systems to innovative and flexible penetration, disruption, or
distortion techniques. OPFOR information attackers (cyber attackers) learn from
and expand upon these methods.
5-49. IA offers a powerful tool for the OPFOR. For example, an information
attacker may target an information system for sabotage (electronically or
physically) or manipulate and exploit information. This may involve altering
data, stealing data, or forcing a system to perform a function for which it was
not intended, such as spoofing the air traffic control grid.
5-50. Likely targets for an IA are information residing in the critical in-
frastructures of an opponent: telecommunications links and switches, com-
mercial infrastructures, and economic infrastructures. The OPFOR will at-
tempt to manipulate, control, or monitor data and information that are criti-
cal for the infrastructures.
TOOLS AND TARGETS
5-51. Tools for waging IW can include conventional physical and electronic
destruction means, malicious software, denial-of-service attacks, news agen-
cies, television, radio, the Internet, traditional print media, communication
networks, and diplomatic activities and well as various types of reconnaissance,
espionage, and eavesdropping technologies. The OPFOR can employ IW tools
from both civilian and military sources and assets of third-party sources.
5-52. The OPFOR sees the targets of IW as decision makers, weapons and
hardware, an opponent’s critical information infrastructure, C2 system, in-
formation and telecommunications systems, and C2 centers and nodes. An
adversary’s national communications media are also among the important
targets in an OPFOR IA. Information links, such as transmitters, communi-
cation devices, and protocols, will be targeted. These targets may be more
susceptible to precision fires and more traditional forms of attack based on
EW. However, the OPFOR is extremely adaptive and will employ the best op-
tion available to degrade or destroy an information link.
STRATEGIC IW
5-53. Strategic information warfare (SIW) is the synergistic effort of the
State to control or manipulate information events in the strategic environ-
ment, be they political, economic, military, or diplomatic in nature. Specifi-
cally, the State defines SIW as any attack (digital, physical, or cognitive)
against the information base of an adversarial nation’s critical infrastructures.
The ultimate goal of SIW is strategic disruption and damage to the overall
strength of the opponent. This disruption also focuses on the shaping of foreign
decision makers’ actions to support the State’s strategic objectives and goals.
5-54. The National Command Authority (NCA) is responsible for determining
and articulating the State’s strategic goals. The Strategic Integration De-
partment (SID) then develops a strategic information warfare plan (SIWP) to
support the national security strategy. The SID has a special Strategic In-
formation Warfare Planning Office (SIWPO) dedicated to reviewing and
integrating information-related plans of all State ministries, both military
and civilian. The SIWPO can directly task information- or IW-related |
7-100.1 | 165 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
elements of any ministry to support the SIWP. In time of war, the SIWPO
continues to coordinate with all government ministries for further develop-
ment and modification of the SIWP. However, it works most closely with the
Ministry of Defense, specifically the General Staff, to ensure the development
of the SIWP in concert with the military IW plan.
5-55. In the General Staff, the Chief of IW handles IW functions that tran-
scend service component boundaries. He reviews and approves the IW plans
of all operational-level commands as well as any separate theater headquar-
ters that might be established. He drafts the overall military IW plan that,
upon approval by the Intelligence Officer, is forwarded to the Operations
Directorate of the General Staff for inclusion in the military strategic
campaign plan (SCP). Once approved by the Chief of the General Staff, the
military IW plan and the rest of the military SCP are forwarded to the SID
for incorporation into the national-level SIWP and the national SCP, respec-
tively. During peacetime and preparation for war, the Chief of IW continues
to review and refine the military IW plan.
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL IW
5-56. The OPFOR conducts IW actions at the operational level to support
strategic campaigns or operational objectives. The focus at this level is on
affecting an adversary’s lines of communication (LOCs), logistics, C2, and critical
decision-making processes. The OPFOR targets information or information sys-
tems in order to affect the information-based process, be it human or automated.
SYSTEMS WARFARE
5-57. In the systems warfare approach to combat (see Chapter 1), the OPFOR
often focuses on attacking the C2 and/or RISTA elements that are critical compo-
nents of the enemy’s combat system. It is often more feasible to attack these
types of targets, rather than directly engaging the combat power of the enemy’s
combat or combat support forces or even his logistics forces. Operational-level IW
can be a primary means of attacking C2 and RISTA assets, either on its own or in
conjunction with other elements of the OPFOR’s own combat system.
OFFENSIVE IW
5-58. Offensive IW involves the integrated use of subordinate and supporting ca-
pabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect an adversary’s
decision makers or to influence others in order to achieve or promote specific
OPFOR objectives. Using the elements of IW offensively, the OPFOR can either
prevent an adversary from exercising effective C2, challenge his quest for infor-
mation dominance, or leverage enemy information systems to its own advantage.
Purpose of Offensive IW
5-59. Simply put, offensive IW seeks to deny, degrade, destroy, disrupt, deceive,
and exploit an adversary’s information systems and capabilities. Offensive IW
helps the OPFOR seize and retain the initiative by degrading the enemy’s infor-
mation systems and forcing the enemy commander to be reactive. This can result
in slowing the enemy’s tempo, disrupting his decision cycle, and impacting his
overall ability to generate combat forces and execute and sustain operations. |
7-100.1 | 166 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Possible Actions
5-60. Possible OPFOR offensive IW activities and actions can include
• Denying the enemy the information necessary to conduct operations
(destroy, degrade, or distort).
• Influencing the information (misinformation, manipulation, or “spinning”).
• Disrupting the enemy’s ability to observe and collect information and
obtain or maintain information dominance.
• Degrading enemy information collection or destroying his collection means.
• Deceiving the decision makers by manipulating perception and causing
disorientation within the decision cycle.
• Neutralizing or destroying the opponents’ information capability by
physical destruction of critical communications nodes and links.
DEFENSIVE IW
5-61. Defensive IW is the integration and coordination of policies and procedures,
operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly informa-
tion and information systems. Defensive IW also seeks to conceal the physical lo-
cations of critical information systems. IW activities, particularly defensive
measures, play a significant role in ensuring the viability and survivability of
the OPFOR C2 process. IW defensive actions are planned at the strategic, op-
erational, and tactical levels. IW measures, combined with the mobility and
redundancy of C2 systems, can provide a high degree of survivability, even if
the enemy is successful in disrupting or destroying some elements of the process.
Purpose of Defensive IW
5-62. The objectives of OPFOR defensive IW activities and actions are
• Protecting the information environment.
• Detecting attack.
• Restoring capabilities.
• Responding to attack.
Specific objectives of defensive IW include misleading the enemy concerning
the OPFOR’s force structure, location, and intent; protecting all critical in-
formation and communication links; and ensuring maximum survivability of
friendly high-value assets and combat power.
Possible Actions
5-63. To achieve these objectives, the OPFOR conducts a variety of activities
and actions that can
• Provide for uninterrupted control of friendly forces.
• Ensure survivability through extensive use of signature-reducing
measures.
• Conceal the identities and locations of critical elements.
• Portray false force dispositions and OPFOR unit strengths.
• Portray false levels of preparation, readiness, and morale.
• Portray false impressions of OPFOR operational intent. |
7-100.1 | 167 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
IW Element Objectives Targets
Electronic Warfare Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the en- C2 and RISTA assets and
emy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum. networks.
Computer Warfare Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemy’s C2 and RISTA assets and
computer networks and information flow. networks (both civilian and
military).
Deception Mislead enemy decision makers. Key decision makers from
political, military, economic,
Cause confusion and delays in decision-
and diplomatic elite.
making process.
Persuade adversary’s population and inter- General population and in-
national community to support OPFOR ob- ternational media sources
jectives. and Internet sites.
Physical Destruction Destroy enemy’s information infrastructures C2 nodes and links, RISTA
(both civilian and military). assets, telecommunications,
and power sources.
Protection and Security Protect critical assets. Enemy RISTA assets.
Measures
Perception Management Distort reality or manipulate information to RISTA assets, media
support OPFOR goals. sources (international and
domestic).
Information Attack Objectives vary based on situational needs Information residing in net-
and objectives of the attack. works, software, data re-
positories, databases, and
any other electronic source
or conduit of communication
or information.
Figure 5-1. IW Elements, Planning Objectives, and Targets
IW PLANNING AND EXECUTION
5-64. An effective IW action demands the coordination of activities and capa-
bilities into a single, focused plan. Any or all elements of IW may be effec-
tively used in any given plan. Figure 5-1 provides examples of objectives and
targets.
5-65. OPFOR IW planning occurs at all levels of conflict and before and after
conflict. At the strategic level, the initial focus is achieving State objectives
and supporting the strategic campaign plan. Perception management, protec-
tion and security measures, and computer warfare activities are critical at
this level. |
7-100.1 | 168 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
5-66. As tensions escalate, IW at the operational level can be employed to
disrupt the enemy’s information systems, further demonstrating national re-
solve and military capability. The chief of IW formulates the IW plan as an
integral part of all ground, air, sea, and space operations.
STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
5-67. Just as there is a Chief of IW in the General Staff, there is a chief of IW
under the intelligence officer in all military staffs down to brigade level.
Within those operational- and tactical-level staffs, the intelligence officer and
chief of IW are responsible for ensuring that all IW actions undertaken at
their levels are in concert with the overall military IW plan and the SIWP.
As necessary, the Chief of IW in the General Staff can directly task each
operational- or tactical-level chief of IW to support the SIW campaign. (See
the Strategic IW section of this chapter.)
5-68. The intelligence officer heads the intelligence and information section
of the primary staff of an operational-strategic command (OSC). He ensures
that all intelligence requirements are met and coordinates all necessary
national- or theater-level assets for the IW plan. He must effectively task or-
ganize his staff resources to plan, conduct, and execute IW. Traditional staff
functions and relationships may be expanded or even redefined. (See Chapter 2
for a more detailed discussion of staff responsibilities and organization.)
5-69. The chief of IW belongs to the secondary staff, heading a subsection
under the intelligence officer. The chief of IW supervises the execution of the
OSC’s IW plan. He is responsible for
• Coordinating the employment of IW assets, including those subordi-
nate to the OSC or affiliated forces and any supporting assets available
at the national or theater level.
• Planning for and supervising all information protection and security
measures.
• Supervising the implementation of the deception plan and perception
management objectives.
• Working with the operations section of the staff to ensure that targets
scheduled for destruction support the IW plan, and if not, resolving
conflicts between IW needs and operational needs.
• Recommending to the intelligence officer any necessary actions re-
quired to implement the IW plan.
5-70. The chief of IW at each level of command submits his IW plan to the
chief of IW at the next-higher level. The senior chief of IW issues directives to
subordinate units’ chiefs of IW. These directives are part of the operation
plan or operational directive, and can be part of the SCP. What the subordi-
nates plan and execute must be in concert with the higher plan, and the
higher headquarters also needs to ensure that the IW plan of one subordinate
does not conflict with that of its adjacent units.
5-71. The chief of IW also plays a key role in coordinating IW activities with
other staff sections and subsections, particularly with members of the func-
tional staff. For instance, he coordinates with the chief of integrated fires to |
7-100.1 | 169 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
ensure that deception and protection and security measures contribute to the
success of fire support to offensive and defensive operations. He will also
work directly with the chief of the RISTA and IW section of the OSC’s IFC
headquarters to coordinate all necessary IW support to the IFC. IW activities
can support the overall fire support plan or provide a feasible nonlethal
alternative to destroying key enemy formations or systems. The chief of
IW also coordinates with the chief of force protection to prevent or mitigate
the effects of hostile actions on critical information and information systems.
He works closely with the chief of population management and representa-
tives from the Ministry of Public Information regarding coordination of
PSYWAR and other perception management activities.
PLANNING
5-72. The components of an IW plan include, at a minimum, the following:
• Statement of overall State and military objectives and goals.
• Definition of the missions of IW (public, private, military, and nonmilitary).
• IW objectives of the next-higher command.
• Use of affiliated forces.
• Use of civilians (individuals or organizations) on the battlefield.
• Identification of all applicable State elements of power to assist in the
execution of the IW plan.
• Potential targets and tools for destruction, degradation, or exploitation.
• Specific unit responsibilities.
Specific plan elements include a review of the enemy’s IW capabilities, an
operational analysis of all relevant information infrastructures (location,
ownership and vulnerabilities), requirements of IW capabilities, an organ-
izational plan and staff responsibilities, a deception plan, and perception
management objectives.
EXECUTION
5-73. Throughout the implementation of the IW plan, activities and success
are monitored, and may result in a revision of the plan. The intelligence offi-
cer and the chief of IW are providing feedback to the planning process.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
5-74. The OPFOR uses IW activities during all four strategic-level courses of
action: strategic, regional, transition, and adaptive operations (see Chapter 1
or FM 7-100). While certain elements of IW may be highlighted for a particu-
lar strategic course of action, all elements can be applied as necessary. IW
can support the OPFOR against a regional peer or a technologically superior
enemy. IW can also be used to create and/or exploit windows of opportunity
across all types of operations.
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
5-75. Strategic operations can occur before and after armed conflict and in
conjunction with any of the other three strategic courses of action during war.
The State recognizes the value of IW in peacetime actions as well as during |
7-100.1 | 170 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
actual conflict. At this level, the State employs all the elements of IW to sup-
port its strategic objectives.
5-76. Perception management, deception, and protection and security meas-
ures are especially critical during strategic operations. The State attempts to
use all forms of international media to support State actions and objectives.
It uses all types of information dissemination to project its desired “spin” of
events, to gather international support, to weaken its enemy’s resolve, and to
force key decision makers to rethink any potentially damaging action against
the State. In addition, the State develops a strategic deception plan to conceal
its intentions from both the international audience and its own population.
Once extraregional intervention begins, the military aspects of strategic
operations become more aggressive, including use of physical destruction
accompanied by other IW efforts to exploit its effects on enemy confidence
and resolve.
5-77. Strategic operations involve the application of any or all of the four in-
struments of power (including the informational) to target enemy strategic
centers of gravity. Thus, IW targets during strategic operations might include
• Key leaders and decision makers (military and civilian).
• All relevant media outlets.
• Diplomatic entities.
• Relevant private institutions or influential organizations.
• Public opinion (international and domestic).
• National will (enemy and friendly).
• Commitment of alliance and coalition members.
5-78. The Ministry of Public Information is responsible for the control and
appropriate dissemination of all political, diplomatic, economic, and military
information to the public and the international audience. That ministry is a
key player in the development and execution of all strategic IW campaigns.
At the operational level, the intelligence officer and chief of IW are responsi-
ble for ensuring that all IW actions are in concert with the national-level
SIWP.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
5-79. IW activities during regional operations focus on controlling foreign
perceptions of such operations and preventing the development of any inter-
national consensus to intervene. The State tries to keep foreign perceptions of
its actions below the threshold that could invite intervention by extraregional
forces. To this end, perception management and deception campaigns are
critical, for both domestic and international consumption.
5-80. During regional operations, the State also conducts an internal in-
formation campaign to help maintain and strengthen the national will.
The overall goal is to give the entire country a common focus and guarantee
internal support. All elements of IW are important in regional operations.
Depending on the specific conditions, EW, IAs, protection and security
measures, or perception management may dominate. |
7-100.1 | 171 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
5-81. During transition operations, the OPFOR focuses IW activities on
access-control operations, perception management and deception campaigns,
and protection and security of its IW assets. Deception activities focus on
concealing the intentions of the OPFOR as well as the likely course of the
transitioneither into adaptive operations or back to regional operations.
5-82. Denying an adversary information dominance is critical during transi-
tion operations. The OPFOR attempts to take advantage of the enemy’s
reliance on advanced C2 and RISTA technology. Such technology and related
communications and data links are critical to the enemy’s maintaining
enhanced situational awareness and thus become the key targets of all IW
actions.
5-83. The protection and security of OPFOR IW assets and related communi-
cations is always a critical element. However, its importance increases during
transition operations, since the OPFOR’s paramount goal is to preserve all
instruments of power and prepare for a possible move to more adaptive
operations.
5-84. The State’s internal IW goal might be to convince its citizens that
transition operations are necessary in order to exploit the many gains it has
already made and to prevent the intervention of an extraregional force. The
State also conducts a ubiquitous information campaign to strengthen its
national will by portraying the State as a victim of impending antagonistic
actions, thus rallying support for State actions.
5-85. In perception management campaigns targeting the international
community, the State increases its emphasis on popularizing the State
and its actions. If it is obvious that the OPFOR will be overmatched by the
extraregional force that is about to intervene, the State may depict the
intervening force as an unwanted aggressor involving itself in regional af-
fairs in order to support its own selfish interests. This may lead to intense
international media pressure. During transition operations, the State may
implement a cleverly developed plan to fracture alliance or coalition support
to extraregional intervention.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
5-86. Against extraregional threats, the OPFOR begins to use more offensive
and adaptive forms of IW. These include not only more aggressive information
campaigns, but also IA, EW, and increased emphasis on physical destruction. As
extraregional forces continue to deploy into the region, the OPFOR can use IAs
on enemy C2 systems and to strip away the enemy’s RISTA capabilities.
5-87. The OPFOR uses perception management and other tools to attack the
enemy’s will to fight or otherwise continue its intervention, and to manipulate
international opinion. If it still occupies territory of a neighboring country, it also
tries to turn the populace there against the intervening extraregional force.
5-88. The State continues to leverage international media to influence world
perception and public opinion within the extraregional power’s own populace.
It also continues to censor and manipulate the media. |
7-100.1 | 172 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
5-89. The specific focus of IW in adaptive operations may include
• Control access. Use all means necessary, including IW, to delay or
disrupt entry into the region and ultimately defeat the intervening force.
• Control tempo. Use IW to attack critical C2 and logistics links.
• Exploit atrocities of conflict. Use IW to weaken the enemy’s resolve
to remain committed while promoting the OPFOR’s position as a victim.
• Neutralize technological overmatch. Use IW to attack critical C2
and RISTA nodes and destroy supporting infrastructures.
• Attack reach-back links. Use IW to detect, jam, disable, or degrade
critical nodes of communication.
• Counter information dominance. (See the following paragraph.)
5-90. The very systems and links upon which technologically advanced ene-
mies rely for information dominance are also high-payoff targets for IAs or
physical destruction. Denial of these resources at critical times can deny
forces complete situational awareness. The OPFOR can also use the enemy’s
robust array of RISTA systems against him. His large numbers of sensors can
overwhelm his units’ ability to receive, process, and analyze raw intelligence
data and to provide timely and accurate intelligence analysis. The OPFOR
can add to this saturation problem by using deception to flood enemy sensors
with masses of conflicting information. Conflicting data from different sen-
sors at different levels (such as satellite imagery conflicting with data from
unmanned aerial vehicles) can confuse the enemy and degrade his situational
awareness. |
7-100.1 | 173 | Chapter 6
Reconnaissance
The OPFOR considers reconnaissance the most important element of
combat support. All commanders and staffs organize reconnaissance to
acquire information about the enemy’s reconnaissance, intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) assets, precision weapons,
force disposition, intentions, and terrain and weather in the area of
responsibility (AOR). This information is crucial to the planning process
in OPFOR command and control (C2). Reconnaissance can decisively
influence the outcome of an operation or even the strategic campaign.
MISSION
6-1. For the OPFOR, reconnaissance is a mission, not a force or unit. OPFOR
reconnaissance is an integrated combined arms effort, not solely the business
of reconnaissance troops. Besides reconnaissance units, the OPFOR will
use other arms for reconnaissance missions, as necessary. It will also use para-
military forces, affiliated forces, and/or friendly civilians to collect information.
CONCEPT
6-2. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection are critical to OPFOR military
operations. Commanders and planners place significant emphasis on the de-
struction of enemy precision weapons and on conducting high-speed, continuous,
combined arms operations throughout the depth of the theater. Reconnaissance
and intelligence collection has three distinct levelsstrategic, operational, and
tactical. These three categories overlap, mutually support, and differ primar-
ily by the level of command and the commander’s AOR.
6-3. Commanders require continuous, timely, and accurate intelligence on the
enemy, terrain, and meteorological situation. Thus, the OPFOR devotes sub-
stantial effort to all forms of reconnaissance. Commanders prefer to confirm
their plan only after thorough reconnaissance.
PRINCIPLES
6-4. The OPFOR uses six principles to guide its reconnaissance activities:
focus; continuity; aggressiveness; timeliness; camouflage, concealment, cover
and deception (C3D); accuracy and reliability. For the greatest likelihood of a
successful operation, OPFOR reconnaissance must satisfy all of these princi-
ples simultaneously and continuously.
Focus
6-5. The actions of reconnaissance must serve the commander’s needs and
focus on elements and objectives critical to the execution of combat operations. |
7-100.1 | 174 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Each level of command, from theater to battalion, develops a comprehensive
reconnaissance plan in accordance with the organization’s mission.
Reconnaissance resources are always scarce. The commander must care-
fully define and limit ground reconnaissance objectives and concentrate
reconnaissance assets on the critical areas of the battlefield.
6-6. To use reconnaissance assets effectively, the commander must be
flexible. If the situation changes, he must redirect the reconnaissance effort,
even altering the plan. The reconnaissance plan must coordinate all available
assets into an integrated plan.
Continuity
6-7. The modern, fluid battlefield demands continuous reconnaissance to pro-
vide an uninterrupted flow of information under all conditions. Reconnaissance
provides constant coverage of the enemy situation and helps prevent en-
emy operational surprise. To ensure continuity, the OPFOR employs a
wide variety of redundant assets with deep overlapping coverage ranging
from satellites to human agents to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
6-8. Reconnaissance attempts to maintain contact with the enemy at all
times. The OPFOR conducts reconnaissance in all directions and against all
key enemy formations. Reconnaissance collects information during all battle
phases, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in all weather conditions. Not only
must reconnaissance answer specific requests for information; it also must
continuously collect information on all aspects of the enemy, weather, and
terrain to fully meet future requirements.
6-9. Units conducting reconnaissance and intelligence collection must main-
tain a high state of combat readiness. Reconnaissance is a critical responsibil-
ity for all commanders at all times. In the event that a specialized reconnais-
sance unit is destroyed or becomes combat ineffective, commanders reassign
the mission to appropriate forces.
Aggressiveness
6-10. Aggressiveness is the vigorous search for information, including the
willingness to fight for it if necessary. The OPFOR recognizes that reconnais-
sance is an offensive combat operation, requiring successful penetration or
avoidance of enemy security forces to be successful. Reconnaissance must
conduct intelligence collection creatively and make maximum use of assets on
the battlefield to ensure success. The OPFOR vigorously employs all avail-
able collection resources and adheres carefully to the reconnaissance plan.
However, it will alter the plan when its own initiatives or enemy actions
dictate.
6-11. The OPFOR stresses initiative, resourcefulness, and daring in the
conduct of reconnaissance. Reconnaissance attempts to penetrate enemy
defenses, ambush and raid enemy forces, and as a last resort, draw fire to
determine enemy positions. In short, it does what is necessary to fulfill the
commander’s intelligence needs. |
7-100.1 | 175 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
6-12. Commanders use all available means to seek information. The informa-
tion requirement determines the techniques to use, such as clandestine infil-
tration by Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) or quick mechanized reconnaissance.
Ambushes and raids are fruitful means of gathering intelligence from prison-
ers of war, captured documents, and equipment. Such information-gathering
actions are generally more important than any associated damage, but there
are exceptions. Reconnaissance must sometimes destroy high-value targets
they find. Elements of enemy long-range fire systems, precision weapons,
multiple rocket launchers, and forward operating sites for attack helicopters
or ground-attack aviation are some high-priority targets.
Timeliness
6-13. Timely information is critical on the modern battlefield. Because of the
high mobility of modern armies, there are frequent and sharp changes in the
battlefield situation. As a result, information quickly becomes outdated.
Timely reporting enables the commander to exploit temporary enemy vulner-
abilities and windows of opportunity. He can adjust plans, using increased
data automation to fit a dynamic battlefield.
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover and Deception
6-14. The OPFOR is aware that the enemy may learn a great deal about its in-
tentions by discovering its reconnaissance plan. Therefore, OPFOR commanders
try to conceal the scale, missions, targets, and nature of reconnaissance efforts.
They understand it is not possible to hide the fact that reconnaissance is
being conducted. However, they do strive to prevent the enemy from dis-
covering where they are concentrating their main strength in the defense or
where they are preparing to launch their main attack.
6-15. The OPFOR can also use C3D to “paint a picture” that confirms the en-
emy’s stereotyped views of how the OPFOR fights. By showing the enemy
what he wants to see, the reconnaissance effort can help to establish the con-
ditions for success during ensuing operations.
Accuracy and Reliability
6-16. The OPFOR uses every available means to verify the accuracy and
reliability of reported information. A commander must base his decisions on
accurate and timely reconnaissance information. Reconnaissance must reliably
clarify the true enemy situation in spite of enemy C3D and counterreconnais-
sance activities. Multiple means of acquisition help defeat enemy counterre-
connaissance. To maximize results, the commander’s plan requires accurate
information on the enemy’s size, location, equipment, and combat readiness.
Accuracy is crucial to destroying high-value targets such as enemy precision
weapons, C2, and communications.
CHARACTERISTICS
6-17. OPFOR reconnaissance operations are characterized by—
• Flexibility. The OPFOR must be able to switch priorities from one
target to another without degrading the overall mission. |
7-100.1 | 176 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
• Sustainability. Reconnaissance forces must be able to sustain them-
selves wherever they are operating, without relying on others for
transport or subsistence.
• Security. A reconnaissance asset should be as secure as possible dur-
ing operations. This means operating in a manner that conceals activi-
ties and areas of interest at all times. Reconnaissance activity should
not reveal the parent unit’s plan of action.
• Communications. Reconnaissance forces must have reliable communi-
cations. An intelligence organization may successfully gather all necessary
information, but if it cannot transmit this information to the user (such as
the maneuver commander or an artillery unit), the entire effort is useless.
• Reserves. All levels should maintain a reconnaissance reserve to take
on unforeseen tasks or redeem failure on key missions.
PRIORITIES
6-18. Reconnaissance activities must support the information requirements
of the commander. Therefore, priorities vary at different levels of command:
strategic, operational and tactical.
Strategic
6-19. The highest priority of strategic reconnaissance is to provide indications and
warning of impending hostilities, as well as targeting information for weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). However, strategic intelligence can also gather informa-
tion useful to operational and even tactical commanders. In this case, the informa-
tion must pass down through reconnaissance staff channels to the potential user.
Operational
6-20. The operational commander conducts reconnaissance to locate the most
critical enemy targets, including the following:
• Precision weapons.
• Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) systems.
• Air defenses.
• Intelligence-collection assets.
• Higher headquarters and communications centers.
• General support artillery.
• Operational maneuver formations and their movements.
• Contents of airfields and army aviation forward operating bases.
• Major concentration areas of reserves.
• Unit boundaries.
• Location and extent of defended areas.
• The enemy’s combat capabilities and intentions.
Tactical
6-21. Tactical groups also address more local threats, including the following:
• Location of direct support artillery and mortars and attack helicopters. |
7-100.1 | 177 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
• Disposition of tanks and medium- and long-range antitank systems.
• Deployment of air defense weapons.
• Location of brigade and battalion command posts.
• Nature and extent of natural and manmade obstacles.
• Locations of field defenses.
STRATEGIC ASSETS
6-22. Strategic reconnaissance acquires and analyzes information about the
military-political situation in individual countries and coalitions of probable
or actual enemy nations; their armed forces; and their military, industrial,
and economic potential. Strategic reconnaissance provides the information
required by the highest military-political leadership. Needed information
concerning a potential enemy includes the following:
• Intentions and capabilities.
• Preparation and disposition of forces in various theaters.
• NBC capability.
• Diplomatic initiatives.
• Strength and weaknesses of alliances and coalitions.
SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES
6-23. The General Staff normally reserves some units of the SPF Command
under its own control for reconnaissance missions supporting national-level
intelligence requirements. It may control these units either through the SPF
Command or by placing them directly under the control of its own Intelligence
Directorate. SPF units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Internal Security Forces
could temporarily come under the control of the SPF Command or the General
Staff when they become part of joint SPF operations in support of national-level
requirements. If the General Staff creates a theater headquarters, it may dedi-
cate one or more SPF units to it. Even SPF units allocated to an operational-
strategic command (OSC) may conduct strategic missions, if required.
6-24. The SPF represent an important element in the total integrated recon-
naissance network planners try to achieve. These elite troops are a major
source of human intelligence (HUMINT). They provide reconnaissance and
combat capabilities for strategic and operational employment. They gather in-
formation to satisfy strategic and operational requirements at extended dis-
tances (sometimes more than 100 km) or close to tactical reconnaissance, in
nonlinear situations. For more information on SPF, see Chapter 13.
SIGNALS RECONNAISSANCE UNITS
6-25. Signals reconnaissance is an integral part of information warfare (IW).
The overall scope of signals reconnaissance includes the interception, analy-
sis, and exploitation of electromagnetic (radio and radar) emissions, coupled
with measures to disrupt or destroy the enemy’s radio and radar assets. Sig-
nals reconnaissance assets are found in two types of organizations. The ma-
jority are organic to signals reconnaissance units at all echelons and provide
significant support to the chief of reconnaissance. Additional assets are or-
ganic to jamming units, where they provide targeting support. |
7-100.1 | 178 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
AIR ASSETS
6-26. Aerial reconnaissance includes visual observation, aerial imagery, UAV
reconnaissance, and signals reconnaissance. Since most reconnaissance air-
craft must penetrate enemy airspace, many of these missions are possible for
manned aircraft only when the OPFOR has established air superiority. How-
ever, UAVs do not necessarily require air superiority. They are generally
harder to detect because they are smaller and fly at lower altitudes than manned
aircraft. Also, they are relatively low-cost and may be considered expendable.
Fixed-Wing
6-27. The Air Force has varying reconnaissance assets to meet specific needs.
These units use high-performance aircraft to conduct aerial reconnaissance,
including visual, photographic, radar, and signals reconnaissance missions.
Aircraft on photographic reconnaissance missions normally fly at high speed
and may fly at high or low altitudes. They fly in pairs or singly, out to about
600 km from their operating base. Aircraft with side-looking airborne radar
(SLAR) normally work at high altitude and may not need to cross the battle
line to achieve their objectives. Similarly, signals reconnaissance aircraft may
not need to cross the battle line to identify and locate enemy radar emissions.
Rotary-Wing
6-28. Helicopters are a primary means to transport and insert reconnais-
sance units behind enemy lines. They can emplace observation posts or
reconnaissance patrols rather than perform air reconnaissance, especially
when the OPFOR does not have air superiority.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
6-29. There are two types of UAV: drones and remotely-piloted vehicles
(RPVs). A drone flies a set course programmed into its onboard flight control
system prior to launch. An RPV, on the other hand, can be flown by remote
control from a ground station, over a flight path of the controller’s choosing.
Flight patterns can vary according to the mission. For surveillance missions, the
UAV typically uses a figure-eight or racetrack pattern to maintain it over the
assigned surveillance area. For reconnaissance, intelligence collection, target
acquisition, and battle damage assessment missions, a loop or zigzag pattern
allows thorough coverage over a specific target area. RPV operators can vary
these basic flight patterns by taking control of the RPV and changing its altitude,
speed, or direction of flight. This allows RPVs to search for high-priority targets
or to collect more detailed information on such targets once it locates them.
While the radio command link gives an RPV greater flexibility, it also limits the
range of the RPV to the line-of-sight transmission range from its control station.
However, many RPVs can also operate in a preprogrammed mode at longer
ranges. UAV operations are also described in greater detail in FM 7-100.2.
SATELLITES
6-30. The Intelligence Directorate controls satellite reconnaissance to support the
OPFOR. These satellites provide unique capabilities of noninvasive reconnaissance
(not violating enemy airspace), “free” access, and continuous communications or |
7-100.1 | 179 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
surveillance from their orbits. The OPFOR can use three basic types of reconnais-
sance satellites: photographic, early warning, and signals reconnaissance.
Photographic
6-31. Satellite reconnaissance is not as flexible as other types of reconnais-
sance, because a satellite only reconnoiters an area when its orbit takes it
into range. As a result, the OPFOR uses specialized photographic reconnais-
sance satellites to record designated enemy activity. Satellites may photo-
graph an area 40 to 50 km wide from an altitude of 200 to 250 km.
Early Warning
6-32. Early warning satellite orbits cross over foreign countries and the
oceans. The satellites might be used to detect infrared signatures from inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches or the deployment of enemy troops.
Signals Reconnaissance
6-33. The OPFOR could use several classes of signals reconnaissance satel-
lites to gather information on the electronic order of battle. Signals recon-
naissance satellites locate C2 nodes, battlefield radars, and forward units.
Some might also monitor transoceanic shipping and air traffic. Another func-
tion could be to detect unknown electronic signatures that might indicate the
presence of new equipment.
Distance in Kilometers
10 20 40 60 100 200 400 800
1. Satellite No Limit
2. Air
a. Photographic Reconnaissance 600
b. UAV (RPV and Drone) 300+
3. Electronic Intercept and Direction Finding Against
a. Artillery and Air Defense Radars 25 50
b. VHF/UHF (low / high power) 30 80
c. HF Ground Wave 80+
d. HF Sky Wave No Limit
e. Airborne Radar and Communications (Visual Limits)
4. Special Reconnaissance
a. Theater SPF Assets 100-500+
b. OSC SPF Assets 100-500
c. From Division Long-Range
100
Reconnaissance Company
5. Mechanized Reconnaissance
a. Patrols from Division
Reconnaissance Battalion 50+
b. Patrols from Brigade
Reconnaissance Company 50
6. Artillery Observation
a. Surveillance andCountermortar/
20+
CounterbatteryRadars
b. Sound Ranging 25
c. Flash Spotting (Visual Limits)
d. RPV 60
Figure 6-1. Effective Ranges of Reconnaissance Assets |
7-100.1 | 180 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
OPERATIONAL ASSETS
6-34. Operational reconnaissance forces support OSC commanders. They
acquire and analyze information about an actual or probable enemy, to
prepare for the successful conduct of combat operations. Operational recon-
naissance forces usually collect information throughout the entire depth of an
enemy corps area (300 to 600 km). Operational reconnaissance collection as-
sets include signals reconnaissance, aerial reconnaissance, and SPF. OSCs
conduct operational reconnaissance using their own resources, plus those of
their subordinate tactical groups. Figure 6-1 illustrates the effective ranges of
various reconnaissance means that may support OSC operations.
SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES
6-35. The General Staff often allocates SPF units to support the operations of
an OSC or to become part of the OSC in a constituent or dedicated command
relationship. Such units have SPF troops specially trained to insert by
parachute, helicopter, light aircraft, or infiltration to conduct reconnaissance.
Of course, commanders do not insert all of the assets at the outset to operate
simultaneously; they might retain some in the reconnaissance reserve to be
inserted against new targets or original ones left uncovered by the compro-
mise or destruction of a team inserting in the first group.
SIGNALS RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS
6-36. The OPFOR typically allocates radio and radar intercept and direction
finding units to OSC level. These assets report gathered information to
higher and lower levels.
AIR ASSETS
6-37. The theater commander normally controls aerial reconnaissance but
may allocate aircraft to lower headquarters to support a particular operation
or battle. The number and composition of units, and the types of fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft can vary greatly. The OPFOR also employs UAVs to con-
duct aerial reconnaissance.
ARTILLERY ASSETS
6-38. OSCs often have constituent target acquisition units to obtain and transmit
meteorological, topographic, and targeting information. This can include sound-
ranging systems, battlefield surveillance and countermortar/counterbattery radars.
NBC ASSETS
6-39. OSCs operating in potential NBC environments typically have chemical
defense units and chemical reconnaissance units allocated to them.1 These units
perform decontamination and detect, report, and mark all contaminated areas.
ENGINEER ASSETS
6-40. Engineer units have reconnaissance specialists to accompany maneuver
unit reconnaissance forces. There are specialized engineer reconnaissance
1 Although the OPFOR calls these units are “chemical defense” or “chemical reconnaissance,” their functions actually
encompass nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense or reconnaissance. (See Chapter 11.) |
7-100.1 | 181 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
patrols that assess routes, reporting on obstacles, road conditions, and the
general nature of the terrain. These engineer assets help units maintain a
rapid rate of advance or prepare for effective defense.
AIRBORNE FORCES
6-41. Airborne forces are elite troops whose primary purpose is to conduct active
combat operations in the enemy’s rear area. Airborne forces might conduct recon-
naissance operations and relay information directly to the main command post or
headquarters as they operate against targets in the enemy’s rear. See Chapter 13.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
6-42. At OSC level, UAVs provide aerial reconnaissance support. An OSC of-
ten is assigned one or more UAV units.
GROUND FORCES TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE
6-43. Reconnaissance is a combined arms responsibility. Thus, ordinary mecha-
nized infantry and tank units perform two functions: they perform their own close
reconnaissance tasks with organic resources, and they provide reconnaissance de-
tachments of up to battalion strength. Leading units may also conduct reconnais-
sance attacks (see FM 7-100.2). OSCs and tactical groups may also form task-
oriented reconnaissance detachments based on a combat arms battalion,
augmented by engineer and chemical reconnaissance and, often, by mecha-
nized infantry and tank units. Generally, these groups try to avoid combat in
fulfilling their tasks, although they may direct artillery fire or air attacks.
Typical missions might include
• Locating, identifying, and reporting enemy precision weapons and nu-
clear delivery means, headquarters, communications centers, troop
concentrations, and movements of enemy units.
• Determining the strength and disposition of the enemy’s defenses and
locating his boundaries.
• Providing topographical information concerning routes to, or bypasses
around, enemy positions as well as concerning lateral routes.
• Identifying the extent and depth of minefields and the types of mines
employed (assessing obstacles and possible crossing points).
• Establishing the extent of zones of NBC contamination.
• Identifying potential communications facilities and other sites for use
by their own forces.
6-44. The chief of reconnaissance, with input from other staff elements, must
prepare a detailed reconnaissance plan, specifying—
• The organization of reconnaissance activities for a specific time.
• Goals and mission for each reconnaissance activity.
• Completion times.
• Reporting procedures. |
7-100.1 | 182 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
6-45. Reconnaissance plays a critical role in all OPFOR strategic courses of
action. Targets of reconnaissance actions may be the same during different
strategic courses of action, but for different reasons.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
6-46. Military operations during regional operations attempt to achieve stra-
tegic political or military decision by destroying the enemy’s will and capabil-
ity to fight. This is often brought about by destroying the C2 and logistics sys-
tems the enemy needs for continued operations. Reconnaissance actions dur-
ing this period are therefore focused on locating and tracking enemy C2 nodes
and logistics centers.
6-47. Other targets of OPFOR RISTA during regional operations include the
enemy’s
• Precision weapons delivery means.
• Long-range fire systems.
• WMD.
• RISTA assets.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
6-48. A key reconnaissance task during transition operations is to support
the requirements of access-control operations. RISTA assets can gather in-
formation on likely enemy aerial and sea ports of debarkation and other
targets of access-control activities, such as potential operating or staging
bases.
6-49. Reconnaissance efforts are directed against vulnerable early-entry
forces before the enemy can bring his technological overmatch to bear. They
can also support sophisticated ambushes to destroy high-visibility enemy
systems or cause mass casualties.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
6-50. In adaptive operations, RISTA assets support the creation of windows
of opportunity that permit OPFOR units to move out of sanctuary and attack.
OPFOR RISTA can do this by locating and tracking key elements of the
enemy’s C2, RISTA, air defense, and long-range fires systems for attack.
6-51. RISTA assets can also play a direct role in supporting counterrecon-
naissance operations. Extraregional powers rely heavily on situational
awareness, both to employ standoff weapons and to preclude being deceived
by OPFOR IW efforts. |
7-100.1 | 183 | Chapter 7
Fire Support
The integration of air, artillery, and missile assets into a unified fire support
plan is a major task for the combined arms commander. Integration is a
decisive element, fundamental to the success of any operation on the
modern battlefield. The OPFOR does not consider itself to be an “artillery-
centric” army. Rather, it views itself as using various forms of fire support
to achieve success during offensive and defensive operations. In the offense,
fire support is important to the success of any attack. It can destroy key
systems; disrupt, immobilize, or destroy enemy groupings; and repel
counterattacks. Fire support is also the cornerstone of any defense, blunt-
ing attacks at the crucial point in the battle. It disrupts enemy prepara-
tions for the attack, causes attrition as he approaches, and repels forces.
FIRE SUPPORT CONCEPTS
7-1. Fire support is the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition,
indirect fire weapons, aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal means in
support of operational or tactical objectives. The goal is to synchronize all
available fire support systems to achieve the most effective results,
thereby maximizing combat power. Effective fire support enables OPFOR
ground forces to attack successfully and quickly to exploit weaknesses.
Commanders try to accomplish their missions using a combination of
maneuver and fire. The OPFOR continues to expand and upgrade fire
support systems to achieve a qualitative edge over its regional opponents.
However, it realizes that it may be at a qualitative disadvantage compared to
a modern extraregional force.
7-2. The OPFOR stresses that fire support should integrate air assets, surface-
to-surface missiles (SSMs), and artillery to attack enemy targets throughout the
area of responsibility (AOR). The combined arms commander always seeks to
increase the effectiveness of air and missile attacks and artillery fire to destroy
enemy formations, weapon systems, or key components of an enemy combat
system. (See Systems Warfare later in this chapter and in Chapter 1.) This
ensures continuous fire support for maneuver units throughout the AOR.
7-3. The OPFOR considers information warfare (IW) an essential element of
fire support. It provides a nonlethal alternative or supplement to attack by
fire and maneuver. It is integrated into the overall concept of the operation,
to confuse, deceive, delay, and disorganize the enemy.
FIRE SUPPORT PRINCIPLES
7-4. The principles of fire support are the framework for a thought process
that ensures the most effective use of fire support assets. These principles apply
at all levels of command, regardless of the specific fire support assets available:
• Plan early and continuously. |
7-100.1 | 184 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
• Exploit all available reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and
target acquisition (RISTA) assets.
• Consider airspace management and the use of all fire support (lethal
and nonlethal) means.
• Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support.
• Avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.
• Use the most effective means to accomplish the mission.
• Provide rapid and effective coordination.
• Provide for flexibility of employment.
• Provide for safeguarding and survivability of OPFOR fire support assets.
• Attempt to achieve surprise when possible.
• Deliver highly accurate and effective fire.
SYSTEMS WARFARE
7-5. The foundation of OPFOR planning is the systems warfare approach to
combat. Thus, the OPFOR analyzes its own combat system and how it can use
the combined effects of this “system of systems” to degrade or destroy the en-
emy’s combat system. In systems warfare, the subsystems or components of a
combat system are targeted and destroyed individually. Once a favorable com-
bat situation has developed, the targeted enemy subsystem is quickly destroyed
in high-intensity operations, thus making the enemy’s overall combat system
vulnerable to destruction or at least degrading its effectiveness. (See Systems
Warfare in Chapter 1 for further information.)
7-6. Within the systems warfare approach, the OPFOR employs a fire sup-
port concept centered on a phased-cycle of finding a critical component of the
enemy combat system and determining its location with RISTA assets;
engaging it with precision fires, maneuver, or other means; and recovering to
support the fight against another part of the enemy force. The primary
reason for attacking an enemy with fires is to degrade or destroy one or more
key components of the enemy’s combat system and/or to create favorable
conditions for degrading or destroying other parts of his combat system.
TECHNIQUES TO EXPLOIT ENEMY VULNERABILITIES
7-7. The OPFOR seeks to avoid enemy strengths and exploit his vulnerabilities.
In conflicts with extraregional powers, the OPFOR typically would be operat-
ing from relative strategic weakness. Therefore, it seeks to operationally
outmaneuver, overwhelm, and outpace the enemy. It also seeks to deny him
any sanctuary on the battlefield, as well as in the local theater or in his
strategic depth. (See Strategic Context later in this chapter.)
7-8. The OPFOR will also leverage the effects of its available fire support
means by integrating them into an integrated fires command (IFC) in or-
ganizations down to division or division tactical group (DTG) level. The
IFC (described in detail in Chapter 2) synchronizes and focuses the efforts
of RISTA and fire to destroy key enemy formations or systemsor key
components of an enemy combat system. Destroying such targets can not |
7-100.1 | 185 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
only shift the balance of power in the region in the OPFOR’s favor, but
also undermine enemy morale and resolve.
TARGET DAMAGE CRITERIA
7-9. Target damage is the effect of fires on a given military target. It results
in total, partial, or temporary loss of the target’s combat effectiveness.
The OPFOR categories of target damage are annihilation, demolition,
neutralization, and harassment.1 Of these categories, the first three fall
under the general term destruction.
Annihilation
7-10. Annihilation fires render targets completely combat-ineffective and
incapable of reconstruction or token resistance. For a point target such as
an antitank guided missile launcher, the OPFOR must expend enough
munitions to ensure a 70 to 90 percent probability of kill. For area targets
such as platoon strongpoints or nuclear artillery assets, the OPFOR must fire
enough rounds to destroy from 50 to 60 percent of the targets within a group.
These fires result in the group ceasing to exist as a viable fighting force.
Demolition
7-11. The OPFOR uses the term demolition in reference to the destruction of
buildings and engineer works (such as bridges, fortifications, or roads).
Demolition requires enough munitions to make such material objects unfit for
further use.
Neutralization
7-12. Fire for neutralization inflicts enough losses on a target to—
• Cause it to temporarily lose its combat effectiveness, or
• Restrict or prohibit its maneuver, or
• Disrupt its command and control (C2) capability.
To achieve neutralization, the OPFOR must deliver enough munitions to de-
stroy 30 percent of a group of unobserved targets. The expectation is that the
target is severely damaged but could again become capable of coordinated re-
sistance after the fire is lifted. The term neutralization applies only in an ar-
tillery context.
Harassment
7-13. The OPFOR uses a limited number of fire support systems and
munitions within a prescribed time to deliver harassment fires. The goal of
these fires is to put psychological pressure on enemy personnel in locations
such as defensive positions, command posts (CPs), and logistics installations.
Successful harassment fire inhibits maneuver, lowers morale, interrupts
rest, and weakens enemy combat readiness.
1 The use of precision weapons may render such target damage criteria obsolete, since precision weapons
are always supposed to “annihilate” the targets completely, not just destroying a certain percentage of them. |
7-100.1 | 186 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
COMMAND AND CONTROL
7-14. The nature of fire support units, with assets capable of long ranges and
their potential wide influence and flexibility on the battlefield, requires that
C2 be more complex than for maneuver units. The ability to engage and de-
stroy targets at longer ranges has generally resulted in C2 being retained at a
high level of command in order to maximize overall effectiveness. However,
the requirement for a rapid response between the detection of targets and their
subsequent engagement requires C2 to be exercised at a low level of command.
Low-level C2 facilitates accurate judgement in both the timing of engagements
and the fire support adjustments as the combat situation develops. The OPFOR
instituted the IFC as the principal fire support C2 structure to ensure flexibility
of C2 and response in meeting the fire support challenges on future battlefields.
CHIEF OF INTEGRATED FIRES
7-15. Within the operations section of the operational-strategic command
(OSC) staff, there is a chief of integrated fires. This officer is responsible for
coordinating and advising the commander on the effective integration of C2
and RISTA means with fire support means (including precision fires) to sup-
port the overall operation plan. He controls, but does not command, the fire
support units subordinate to or supporting the OSC. He advises the OSC
commander on how best to use available fire support assets.
INTEGRATED FIRES COMMAND
7-16. The IFC is a combination of a standing C2 structure and task organiza-
tion of constituent and dedicated fire support units. All division-level and
above OPFOR organizations possess an IFC C2 structurestaff, CPs,
communications and intelligence architecture, and automated fire control
system. The IFC exercises C2 of all constituent and dedicated fire support
assets retained by its level of command. This can include Air Force, army
aviation, artillery, and SSM units. It also exercises C2 over all RISTA assets
constituent or dedicated to it. There is one IFC per OSC.
7-17. An OSC-level IFC is capable of engaging designated operational and
strategic targets. However, there are circumstances where an IFC may be
formed at the theater level. For example, the theater could have two separate
campaigns, requiring a centralization of critical fire support assets at theater
level to achieve the strategic or theater campaign objectives. When this oc-
curs, the theater commander forms a theater-level IFC commanded by the
deputy theater commander. This IFC exercises C2 over all fire support assets
retained at the theater level of command.
7-18. The mission of the IFC is to execute all fire support tasks required to
accomplish the mission of the command to which the IFC belongs. The IFC is
designed to
• Exploit the combat power inherent in carefully integrated ground and
air fire support actions.
• Reduce to the absolute minimum the amount of time from target acqui-
sition to engagement. |
7-100.1 | 187 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
• Permit fire support assets to mass their effects without having to oper-
ate in concentrated formations.
• Ensure the optimal fire support asset(s) are assigned any given mission.
• Ensure the commander’s priorities for fire support are adhered to.
• Act, if necessary, as the organization’s alternate command structure.
• Integrate the effects of fires from units placed in support of the organi-
zation.
7-19. The number and type of fire support and RISTA units allocated to an
IFC is mission dependent. The IFC is not organized according to a table of
organization and equipment, but is task organized to accomplish the missions
assigned.
7-20. In addition to constituent or dedicated assets that become part of its
IFC, an OSC can receive fire support and/or RISTA assets allocated to it from
national or theater level in a supporting relationship. In that case, the OSC or its
IFC commander can position those assets and give them mission priorities, but
the supporting assets would still be commanded by their parent organization.
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER
7-21. A fire support coordination center (FSCC) is established at each
organizational level (maneuver battalion to IFC). The FSCC is the staff
element responsible for the planning and coordination of fires to support
the respective maneuver unit. It performs the following coordination functions:
• Acquire and identify high-payoff targets (HPTs).
• Recommend targets.
• Use target value analysis to identify target priorities.
• Determine fire support needs.
• Expedite fire support.
• Assess fire support effects.
• Change fire support plans.
• Coordinate the timing of fire support attacks (to include IW).
• Recommend the use of aviation.
SUPPORTING MANEUVER COMMANDERS’ FIRE REQUESTS
7-22. Requests for supporting fires may originate at any organizational level.
They are initiated when constituent or dedicated fire support means at that
level are fully engaged, when the range of the target exceeds the constituent
or dedicated fire support means, or when the constituent or dedicated fire
support means have suffered combat loss. There are two methods of request-
ing supporting fires. The preferred method is for the request to be forwarded
from the division or DTG commander to the integrated fires subsection in the
OSC headquarters. An alternate method is for the division or DTG com-
mander to request supporting fires from the OSC commander. The OSC
commander either approves or denies the request. If the request is approved,
the OSC commander tasks the IFC to provide the requested support. |
7-100.1 | 188 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
NAVAL FIRE SUPPORT
7-23. Naval fire support, when available, gives the ground maneuver
commander long-range indirect fires. Naval fire support includes shipborne
gunfire and sea-launched cruise missiles. Depending on the hydrography and
the orientation of the ground operation, naval fire support may provide deep
indirect fire attacks on enemy formations and installations.
7-24. Naval fire support assets allocated to a theater or OSC in a constituent
or dedicated relationship are under the command of the theater- or OSC-level
IFC. Another option is for naval fire support assets to remain under the
command of the Navy but to provide support for ground operations. During
the course of such a supporting relationship, if enemy actions threaten naval op-
erations, the target attack priorities of the ship may cause it to suspend or cancel
land fire missions until the other threats subside. Once the threats have sub-
sided, the fire support assets resume their support of the ground maneuver force.
7-25. A naval fire support liaison team augments the operations section of
the IFC staff when naval fire support is required to support the ground ma-
neuver force, whether in a constituent, dedicated, or supporting relationship.
The liaison team provides special staff representation and advice on naval
fire support to the IFC commander. Additionally, it coordinates requests for
naval fire support and operates the naval fire support nets in the IFC’s FSCC.
FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING
7-26. Fire support planning is the determination of the content, manner, and
sequence of delivery of fire on the enemy in an operation. The OPFOR accom-
plishes fire support planning at the highest possible levels. The fire support
plan also includes input from subordinate units. The fire support planning
process includes—
• Target acquisition.
• Organization of forces for combat.
• Assignment of fire support missions.
• Determination of ammunition requirements.
• Formulation of a detailed fire support plan.
7-27. Fire support planning includes consideration of the following:
• The scheme of maneuver of the supported forces.
• The enemy force to receive fire.
• The location and character of individual targets within the designated
enemy force.
• The required or desired level of target damage.
• Fire support assets available, both delivery systems and ordnance.
• Requirements for allocation of weapons and units (organization of
forces for combat).
• Missions assigned to IFCs, units, and weapons.
• The manner and procedure of delivery of fire during the performance of
missions. |
7-100.1 | 189 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
• Requirements and distribution of ammunition by missions.
• Organization of coordination and command and control.
• Preparation of appropriately detailed fire support plans at various levels.
7-28. In the OPFOR’s “top-down” approach to the planning and allocation of
fire support, fire support planning occurs at the highest level possible. The
IFC commander at the OSC or theater level plans and coordinates fire sup-
port, always under the direction of the maneuver commander. The highest
level of participating units coordinates and approves the fire support plan,
with input from subordinate units. The OSC headquarters performs general
fire support planning. Detailed planning occurs in maneuver units, IFCs, and
fire support units. The fires of all indirect fire support units within a brigade
or brigade tactical group (BTG) are incorporated into the brigade or BTG fire
support plan. In turn, brigade or BTG fire support plans become part of divi-
sion or DTG fire support plans. Division or DTG fire support plans become part
of OSC fire support plans.
7-29. In its simplest form, fire support planning is the process of determining
the best way to engage all of the enemy’s units with firesensuring that the
required level of damage is inflicted in a manner consistent with the com-
mander’s concept of the operation. Above all else, this means that the fire
support plan must match his concept for the sequence with which the opera-
tion will develop. The focus of fire support planning is on establishing and
maintaining fire superiority over the enemy. Therefore, timing is critical.
ESTIMATE OF SITUATION
7-30. The planning process begins with an estimate of the situation. This
estimate includes the following:
• Scheme of maneuver of supported forces.
• Locations and type of enemy targets.
• Required level of damage.
• Delivery means and ordnance available.
7-31. The OSC commander, his IFC commander, and other staff members
establish the basis for fire support planning during the commander’s
reconnaissance of the area of anticipated action. During this reconnaissance,
the commander refines the organization of forces for combat and the
means of coordination. The OSC commander gives the IFC commander the
information base to determine the following:
• Targets for fire support weapons to engage and fire upon.
• Priority of each target.
• Sequence in which to attack targets.
• Time to attack each target.
7-32. The commander of a fire support unit at any level coordinates the fires
under his control. He determines new requirements and missions and, with
the IFC commander, makes suggestions to the maneuver commander about
adjustments in organization of forces as the situation develops. |
7-100.1 | 190 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
IFC PLANNING
7-33. An IFC commander and members of his staff conduct their planning in
coordination with the rest of the OSC staff, concurrently with the OSC staff
developing the operation plan. The IFC has targets for each phase of the
battle. Planning considerations include target type, dimensions, degree of
fortification, mobility, and depth into the enemy’s defense.
Allocation Procedures
7-34. The OPFOR carefully calculates fire support requirements in terms of
weapons and munitions needed to produce a required effect on enemy targets.
If insufficient fire support or ammunition is available to achieve the neces-
sary result, the OPFOR does not fire less and hope for the best. Rather, if
necessary, it engages fewer targets, adjusting the fire support plan and the
operation plan.
7-35. The priority of allocation of fire support assets to the OSC from the ad-
ministrative force structure is normally to the OSC’s IFC. Fire support assets
that are allocated to the OSC and not used in the IFC are allocated, normally
in a constituent or dedicated relationship, to maneuver units such as DTGs.
Fire support units remaining under IFC command may provide fires for tacti-
cal maneuver units in a supporting relationship. The supporting relationship
allows the IFC commander the flexibility to task fire support assets to engage
key enemy targets throughout the AOR.
Synchronization
7-36. The IFC is synchronized at two levels. First, the OSC commander and his
staff are responsible for synchronizing fire support with ground maneuver.
The key element is to ensure that all fire support occurs at the right place
and time to produce the desired effect. The OSC commander’s maneuver plan
forms the basis for the synchronization of the IFC.
7-37. The commanders of the individual fire support components accomplish
the second level of synchronization when they plan and execute the fire sup-
port operations. They must synchronize the supporting fire components to
produce the concentration of combat power at the decisive point. For exam-
ple, the priority of initial attack helicopter fires may be to suppress enemy air
defense systems to protect attacking fixed-wing aircraft. The artillery may be
assigned missions to attack targets to assist the attacking ingress and egress
of aircraft.
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES
7-38. Fires from mortars, cannon artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs),
and SSMs pose a potential hazard to friendly maneuver forces and aircraft
activities. The highest probability of conflict between aircraft and indirect fire
weapons occurs at relatively low altitudes in the immediate vicinity of firing
positions and targeted areas. (See Chapter 8 for more information on air and
artillery coordination measures.) To reduce potential conflicts between indi-
rect fires and maneuver forces or aircraft, information pertaining to firing po-
sitions, targeted areas, and fire support plans is distributed to all involved |
7-100.1 | 191 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
commanders and their staffs. The fire support plan includes a map with
graphics outlining the following control lines:
• Coordinated Fire Line. A line beyond which indirect fire systems
can fire at any time within the AOR of the establishing headquarters
without additional coordination.
• Final Coordination Line. A line established by the appropriate
maneuver commander to ensure coordination of fire of converging
friendly forces. It can be used to prohibit fires or the effects of fires
across the line without coordination with the affected force. For
example, this line may be used during link-up operations between an
airborne or heliborne insertion and converging ground forces.
• Joint Fire Line. A line established by the appropriate OSC-level and
above commander to ensure coordination of fire not under his control
but which may affect his operations. The joint fire line is used to coor-
dinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapons systems using various types
of ammunition against surface targets.
• Safety Line. A line that denotes the fragmentation footprint of
indirect fire munitions or bombs/rockets released from aircraft.
This indicates the minimum distance between the impact area and
the nearest friendly troops.
ASSIGNING FIRE MISSIONS
7-39. When assigning missions, indirect fire support commanders and plan-
ners consider several variables, depending on the situation. These variables
include
• Type of target (for example, equipment or personnel, deliberate or
hasty defensive positions, hard- or soft-skinned vehicles, point or area
targets).
• Deployment of target (dug-in or in the open).
• Whether the target is stationary or moving.
• Whether the target is under direct observation during the artillery
attack.
• Range to the target.
• Type, caliber, and number of weapons engaging the target.
• Types of ammunition available.
• Time available to prepare for firing.
PRECISION MUNITIONS
7-40. The OPFOR defines a precision weapon as one capable of delivering
guided conventional munitions with a high probability of destroying enemy
targets with a first-round hit (within range of the weapon delivery system).
The presence of the precision munition transforms a weapon into a precision
weapon. However, a precision weapon system must also incorporate a target
acquisition and tracking subsystem and a missile or projectile guidance sub-
system. Some of these subsystems may be combined. Precision munitions are
primarily designed to effectively defeat armored vehicles; self-propelled artil-
lery systems; MRLs; C2 and RISTA centers; defensive fortifications; and bridges. |
7-100.1 | 192 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
7-41. Precision weapons have enabled the OPFOR to mass firepower at
critical points on the battlefield and simultaneously reduce ammunition
expenditure and mission time. Reconnaissance fire (defined later in this
chapter) is an effective form of precision weapon engagement. It is some-
times called a “unified precision weapon system,” because it links the
highly accurate weapon to an automated reconnaissance and control system.
7-42. Precision munitions delivered by mortars, artillery, missiles, and air-
craft can include—
• Homing and guided SSMs (some delivering advanced submunitions).
• Semiactive laser-guided artillery projectiles and bombs.
• Sensor-fuzed artillery submunitions.
• Terminally homing cannon and mortar projectiles.
• Terminally homing submunitions.
Air-delivered precision munitions include homing and guided air-to-surface
missiles (including radar-seeking antiradiation missiles); guided bombs and
cluster bombs containing homing elements; and air-launched cruise missiles.
7-43. Not all OPFOR artillery units have precision munitions, making it nec-
essary to allocate those rounds available against high-value targets (HVTs).
Even the units that do receive them do not distribute them evenly among all
delivery means, but typically designate one particular unit to fire them.
NBC WEAPONS
7-44. The OPFOR might use nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weap-
ons either to deter aggression or as a response to an enemy attack on the
State. The State considers the employment of NBC weapons as a responsibil-
ity of the National Command Authority. Delivery means such as long-range
missiles and rockets are political tools, first and foremost. The OPFOR
has SSMs capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads.
Additionally, it can employ aircraft systems and cruise missiles to deliver an
NBC attack.
7-45. OPFOR military doctrine distinguishes between fire support and an
NBC attack. However, the two are closely related. Strategic and operational
fire support units must plan and deliver the attacks. They must also adjust
the fire support plan to account for the effects of NBC attacks on the enemy.
Such attacks greatly affect the tempo of combat activity. This, in turn, influ-
ences the type of fire support required. It also influences the kind of logistics
support needed, such as fuel or ammunition.
7-46. If needed, the majority of OPFOR artillery (152-mm and above) is ca-
pable of firing nuclear or chemical munitions. However, continued improve-
ments in conventional munitions, especially precision munitions, increase the
likelihood that the OPFOR can achieve operational- or tactical-level fire su-
periority at the desired location and time without resorting to NBC weapons.
TARGETING
7-47. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appro-
priate response, taking into account operational requirements and OPFOR |
7-100.1 | 193 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
capabilities. Targeting requires constant interaction between maneuver,
reconnaissance, fire support, and IW, at all levels. Target value analysis is an
analytical tool that is used in the targeting process by which the supported
maneuver commander
• Provides focus for his target acquisition effort.
• Identifies priorities for the engagement of enemy targets that will
facilitate the success of his mission.
• Identifies the target damage criteria.
• Permits planning for identified contingencies based on enemy options
available when the enemy operation fails.
HIGH-VALUE TARGETS
7-48. HVTs are targets deemed important to the enemy commander for the
successful accomplishment of his mission. The loss of HVTs can be expected
to contribute to a substantial degradation of an important battlefield function.
HIGH-PAYOFF TARGETS
7-49. HPTs are HVTs that must be successfully acquired and attacked to
contribute substantially to the success of OPFOR operations. They are devel-
oped on the basis of factors such as enemy situation, unit mission, terrain,
and the time and resources available. They are not dependent on the ability
of the fire support unit to acquire or attack them. If an HPT is beyond the ca-
pability of the target acquisition or reconnaissance unit to acquire, it should
be passed to the next-higher headquarters as a priority intelligence requirement.
7-50. Based on a battlefield analysis, the OSC commander, with advice from
his IFC commander, selects HPTs and establishes a prioritized list of them.
The HPT list identifies the HPTs for a specific point in the operation in the
order of their priority for acquisition and attack. While their target value is
usually the greatest factor contributing to the target payoff, other considera-
tions include the following:
• Sequence or order of occurrence.
• Ability to locate and identify the target.
• Degree of accuracy and identification available from the acquisition system.
• Ability to engage and defeat the target in accordance with the estab-
lished target damage criteria.
• Resource requirements necessary to accomplish all of the above.
TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS
7-51. Time-sensitive targets are those targets requiring an immediate re-
sponse. The reason for this urgency is that they either pose (or will soon pose)
a clear and present danger to the OPFOR or are highly lucrative, fleeting
targets of opportunity.
TARGET ATTACK METHODOLOGY
7-52. The vast array of targets anticipated on the battlefield can generate
competing demands for fire support. These demands could exceed the capability |
7-100.1 | 194 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
of fire support assets to adequately respond to all requirements. Therefore, the
OPFOR uses the target attack methodology of plan, detect, deliver, and assess.
Plan
7-53. The plan phase provides the focus and priorities for the reconnaissance
collection management and fire planning process. It employs an estimate of
enemy intent, capabilities, and vulnerabilities in conjunction with an under-
standing of the OPFOR mission and concept of operations. During the plan
phase, the OSC commander, with advice from his IFC commander, makes a
determination of what HPTs to look for, when and where they are likely to
appear on the battlefield, who (reconnaissance or target acquisition assets)
can locate them, and how the targets should be attacked.
Detect
7-54. During the detect phase, the reconnaissance plan is executed. As speci-
fied targets are located, the appropriate command observation post (COP) or
delivery system is notified to initiate the attack of the target. Figure 7-1 illus-
trates the varying methods of reporting targets for attack from the point of
detection by a sensor through delivery. The figure displays the methods along
a range from the least to the most responsive.
WEAPON
PLATFORM
LEGEND
Units equipped with firing
systems with onboard manual
FIRING UNIT or automated fire direction
capability
COP/FDC
WEAPON
PLATFORM
OSC IFC
FSCC
FIRING UNIT WEAPON
OSC COP/FDC PLATFORM
INTEL & INFO
SECTION
SENSOR HQ OSC IFC FIRING UNIT WEAPON
OR DOWNLINK FSCC COP/FDC PLATFORM
SITE
HUMINT/TECH HUMINT/TECH HUMINT/TECH HUMINT/TECH
SENSOR OR
SENSOR MANEUVER CDR SENSOR SENSOR
Less Responsive More Responsive
Figure 7-1. Target Report Flow |
7-100.1 | 195 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
Deliver
7-55. Timely, accurate delivery is the culmination of synchronization of
fire support. The delivery is rapidly executed by having designated attack
systems respond to the maneuver commander’s guidance when the HPTs are
observed.
Assess
7-56. Following the attack of the target, the RISTA assets are cued to deter-
mine if the target has been defeated in accordance with the established target
damage criteria. If it is determined that the target damage criteria are not
achieved, delivery assets re-engage the target until the desired target dam-
age has been achieved.
METHODS OF FIRE
7-57. Critical to the success of OPFOR operations is the ability to plan, de-
tect, deliver, and assess fire (in accordance with the commander’s target
damage criteria) against enemy C2 and RISTA and weapons systems
throughout the AOR. The focus is a systems warfare approach to combat,
where the objective of the combat action is to deny the enemy’s combat sys-
tem its synergistic capabilities. Thus, the OPFOR is able to compel enemy
forces into multiple and rapid tactical transitions and to create opportunity
by keeping them off balance, breaking their momentum, and slowing
movement. The OPFOR uses various types of fires against the enemy. The
methods of fire may have different purposes in the offense and defense.
FIRE SUPPORT TO A STRIKE
7-58. At the operational level, a strike involves the employment of a combina-
tion of strategic- and operational-level RISTA systems with fire support, SPF,
and maneuver forces to conduct precision strike operations that can result in
a decisive operational victory. The strike can be employed in both defensive
and offensive operations.
7-59. Fire support to a strike involves the employment of a wide variety of
ammunition types (such as standard, course-corrected, advanced, and precision
munitions) to destroy an enemy formation after typically setting the conditions
for its destruction through reconnaissance fire. IFC fire support units are as-
signed interdiction fire missions to support the maneuver component throughout
the strike. Constituent and dedicated indirect fire support units (allocated to the
maneuver component) provide close support fire throughout the operation. Thus,
fire support to a strike incorporates other methods of fire.
RECONNAISSANCE FIRE
7-60. Reconnaissance fire is the integration of RISTA, fire control, and weapon
systems into a closed-loop, automated fire support system that detects,
identifies, and destroys critical targets in minutes. This integration capability
normally exists only within an IFC. One reason for this requirement for acceler-
ated engagement is that high-value targets may expose themselves for only
fleeting periods. Reconnaissance fire is primarily designed to attack and destroy
key enemy capabilities and/or set the conditions for a strike (see Chapter 3). |
7-100.1 | 196 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
7-61. Reconnaissance fire enables the OPFOR to deliver fixed- and rotary-
wing air, SSM, cruise missile, and artillery fires (including precision muni-
tions) on enemy targets within a very short time after acquisition. The
OPFOR can use reconnaissance fire in offensive and defensive phases of com-
bat. Assets designated for reconnaissance fire use are under control of the
IFC commander, and control remains centralized for planning, analysis, and
evaluation of reconnaissance data, and for execution of the reconnaissance
fire mission. This type of arrangement allows the assets to execute other mis-
sions or taskings until the desired HPTs are detected. The IFC commander
may establish a window of time for assets tasked to support reconnaissance
fire (based on an intelligence assessment of when the enemy targets should
be in designated kill zones).
7-62. The OSC commander selects and establishes the target priority and
target damage criteria of the combat system component or components to be
attacked in order to force the favorable condition to conduct a strike. The IFC
staff and fire support component commanders develop the fire support plan
designed to conduct reconnaissance fire necessary to create the favorable
condition. The IFC commander then briefs the fire support plan to the OSC
commander to ensure compliance with the overall operation plan. The IFC
executes reconnaissance fire in accordance with the approved fire support plan.
CLOSE SUPPORT FIRE
7-63. Close support fire is fire used to support maneuver forces and attack
targets of immediate concern to units such as battalions and BTGs. The re-
quirement is to provide a quick response time and accurate fires capable of
either neutralizing or destroying all types of targets.
INTERDICTION FIRE
7-64. Interdiction fire is fire designed to attack targets in depth (such as
logistics sites or assembly areas) and to prevent enemy follow-on or reserve
forces from reinforcing or influencing a battle or situation. Generally,
interdiction fire (when compared to close fire) has a slower response time,
especially for stationary targets; accuracy may be lower; and the targets are
generally not as well protected. However, technological improvements such as
course-corrected rockets, projectiles, and fuzes facilitate long-range precision
targeting.
7-65. The OPFOR employs long-range fire systems (operating from dispersed
areas) to continuously engage targeted forces and systems. Operational and
tactical RISTA systems direct them.
COUNTERFIRE
7-66. Counterfire is fire designed to destroy the enemy fire support infra-
structure throughout the battlefield. The fire support infrastructure includes
mortars, cannon, rockets, missiles, fire support C2 and RISTA, and logistics
assets. Counterfire enables the ground forces to achieve effective fire support
on the battlefield. It is especially important for the early destruction of the
enemy’s long-range and precision weapons. |
7-100.1 | 197 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
COUNTERBATTERY FIRE
7-67. Counterbattery fire is fire that accomplishes the annihilation or neu-
tralization of enemy artillery batteries. It enables ground forces to maneuver
on the battlefield with little to no suppression by enemy artillery. However,
combat with enemy artillery requires more than counterbattery fire.
FIRE SUPPORT OF MANEUVER OPERATIONS
7-68. The fire support of maneuver operations is characterized by the use of
all available fire support to carry out the commander’s plan. The OPFOR be-
lieves that fire support must be flexible to meet all contingencies during com-
bat operations. The OPFOR masses fires against an enemy objective with
available fire support assets, with the goal of achieving the OSC commander’s
specified target damage criteria in the shortest time possible.
OFFENSE
7-69. Fire support considerations for the offense apply to all types of offensive
action discussed in Chapter 3. The OPFOR plans and executes fires to sup-
port the offensive action and complete the destruction of the enemy. The use
of selected lines or zones controls the shifting of fires, and the displacement of
fire support units reflects changes in command and support relationships be-
tween fire support units and maneuver units. Fires are planned to
• Suppress enemy troop activity and weapon systems.
• Deny the enemy information about friendly forces.
• Prevent the enemy from restoring fire support, C2, and RISTA systems
neutralized during previous fire support missions.
• Deny the enemy the ability to use reserve forces to conduct a counter-
attack.
• If necessary, create favorable conditions for the conduct of a strike.
• Support the exploitation force.
DEFENSE
7-70. Fire support considerations for the defense apply to all types of
defensive action discussed in Chapter 4. Key is the application of fire support
as early as possible throughout the AOR in support of the defensive operation
plan. Emphasis is placed on RISTA assets locating enemy formations and
attack positions, with the goal of determining the direction and composition
of the enemy main attack. Carefully analyzing the terrain over which the
enemy will advance and canalizing his movement into kill zones can create
conditions for fires in the defense. Fires are planned to
• Deny the enemy information about friendly forces.
• Develop the situation early by forcing the enemy to deploy early and
thus reveal the location of his main effort.
• Maximize the effect of obstacles as combat multipliers.
• Create favorable conditions for the conduct of a strike or counterattack. |
7-100.1 | 198 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
7-71. During all strategic-level courses of action, the OPFOR may use various
fire support assets to attack the most vulnerable parts of the enemy’s combat
system. These attacks are coordinated with perception management efforts to
convey a message of political and military dominance to the regional civilian
populace as well as to convey an adverse view of an intervening extraregional
opponent.
7-72. The OPFOR is able to employ all of its methods of fire in regional and
transition operations. However, it is unable or finds it difficult to employ the
counterbattery method of fire during adaptive operations due to an extrare-
gional force’s technological advantage in ability to target OPFOR fire support
assets.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
7-73. During regional operations, the OPFOR can use fire support means
(primarily aviation, SSMs, and long-range rockets) to attack targets in the
homeland of a regional opponent. The OPFOR generally possesses an
overmatch in military capability against its regional neighbor and is able
to control the airspace, thus allowing it freedom of maneuver. However, the
OPFOR is concerned about the intervention of an extraregional force during a
strategic campaign against a regional neighbor.
7-74. The OPFOR realizes that its regional opponent may receive RISTA
support (such as satellite and fixed-wing signals intelligence and imagery)
from an extraregional power. OPFOR fire support planners also develop con-
tingency plans to preserve their fire support assets during transition and
adaptive operations, if necessary. Common countermeasures are to disperse
fire support assets and to use decoys and camouflage.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
7-75. During transition operations, the OPFOR is concerned about the
extraregional force’s military capabilities arriving or being established be-
fore the OPFOR can completely achieve its strategic objectives. Therefore, the
overall focus is on the disaggregation of the enemy’s combat system (see
Systems Warfare earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 1).
7-76. Starting with transition operations, the OPFOR may use various fire
support assets in access-control operations and attack of the enemy’s LOCs
and rear. It attacks the most vulnerable parts of the enemy’s combat system.
This may include attacks on the infrastructure or even civilian targets. The
OPFOR coordinates such attacks with perception management efforts to
convey the view that these terror tactics are no worse than enemy bombing
campaigns.
7-77. The goal of the OPFOR is to disrupt the deployment tempo of the ex-
traregional force by attacking unique or key targets in aerial and sea ports of
debarkation. These targets include key C2 nodes, contractors and contractor-
operated facilities, logistics operating bases, and ground and airborne RISTA
platforms. For example, the OPFOR can greatly reduce an extraregional
force’s combat power by attacking a logistics system that depends on “just-in-
time” or “reach-back” delivery. The OPFOR would also seek to conduct these |
7-100.1 | 199 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
attacks in concert with the perception management portion of the IW plan to
leverage the world media to report adverse perceptions of the extraregional
force.
7-78. During transition operations, the OPFOR begins to disperse its fire
support assets and emphasize the use of fire and decoy tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTP). The OPFOR employs the fire and decoy TTP to in-
crease survivability as well as to deceive the enemy as to the actual firing
unit location.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
7-79. An extraregional force must maintain a degree of information domi-
nance that enables it to use information systems to achieve an operational
advantage, while denying that capability to the OPFOR. Such systems pro-
vide battlefield visualization, situational awareness, combat identification,
spectrum supremacy, and C2 attack and protection. Therefore, the OPFOR
primarily shifts its emphasis to force preservation and seeks opportunities to
attack and destroy key components of the enemy’s combat system, including
his information systems.
7-80. The extraregional force may have the perception that the tempo of
OPFOR continuous fire support has substantially decreased, since the
OPFOR no longer possess the advantage of information dominance nor the
ability to control its airspace. However, the OPFOR mindset is that the tempo
has been adjusted to attack targets (using reconnaissance fire) at critical times
in order to preserve the force. For example, during adaptive operations, fire
support is centrally planned and executed. The OSC commander can establish
both the firing and target damage criteria and exercise C2 of units conducting
fire support. The IFC headquarters develops the firing orders and firing data
computation and transmits this information in a coded format to the firing
unit. Because the OPFOR’s communications are particularly vulnerable to
attacks, transmission may have to be via a civilian telephone system (to
include cellular phone), messenger, or even newspaper.
7-81. The OPFOR continues to emphasize the use of the fire and decoy TTP.
While using such TTP, it seeks to colocate its fire support assets with the ci-
vilian populace, especially in urban areas to create a moral sanctuary. If the
extraregional force attacks the fire support assets colocated with the civilian
populace, the OPFOR will seek to leverage the world media to report adverse
perceptions of the extraregional force through the perception management
portion of the IW plan. |
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Aviation
Aviation operations are an integral part of all OPFOR operations. Most
fixed-wing assets belong to the Air Force, while most of the rotary-wing
aircraft belong to the Army. The Air Force is the largest, best equipped,
and best trained in the geographic region. The capabilities of the
OPFOR’s fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft far exceed those of its neighbors,
allowing for regional air superiority. However, the Air Force is not strong
enough to defeat the air force of a modern power from outside this region.
Realizing this limitation, the OPFOR will modify its use of aviation assets
to ensure effective use against high-payoff targets. The air doctrine of the
OPFOR represents a blend of principles growing out of past experience
and doctrine adapted from foreign advisors.
ORGANIZATION
8-1. The State’s aviation organizations are structured similar to the ground
components. As with the ground forces, the administrative force structure is
a system in peacetime that mans, trains, and equips units to deploy for war.
In wartime, the Air Force’s peacetime air armies may be utilized in whole or
may be parceled to provide units to a theater- or operational-level command.
The Army’s aviation units are structured similarly to other Army units, with
brigades and battalions being the primary size of deployable units. This
structure provides timely and effective use of assets at all levels of combat
from the strategic campaign to the tactical ground maneuver plan.
AIR FORCE
8-2. The OPFOR has a variety of Air Force assets at national and theater
levels in the administrative force structure. It has organized these assets so
that each of these levels of command can have its own aviation forces to fulfill
mission requirements. The subordinate Air Force organizations are grouped
on a functional, mission-related basis, into divisions, regiments, and
squadrons. For example, a bomber division is composed primarily of bomber
regiments, and a fighter regiment is composed mainly of fighter squadrons.
Rotary-wing assets of the Air Force are organized along the same lines as
those of army aviation, with brigades and battalions. The Air Force also has
some mixed aviation units with a combination of fixed- and rotary-wing
assets; these follow the normal Air Force organization pattern, with mixed
aviation regiments and squadrons, although rotary-wing subordinates would
be battalions and companies. Various fixed- and/or rotary-wing assets of the
Air Force may be task organized as part of an operational-level command in
wartime. |
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National-Level Air Force
8-3. The State has subordinated air armies directly to the Supreme High
Command (SHC) for strategic missions. Aircraft include bombers, interceptors,
fighters, electronic warfare (EW) platforms, transport aircraft, and tankers.
Some bombers can deliver long-range, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)
with high accuracy and a standoff range of 3,000 km or more. Tankers
provide a capability for air-to-air refueling of bombers. A national-level air
army has the mission of inflicting losses on vital targets and conducting aerial
reconnaissance in support of the strategic campaign. The SHC can also allocate
these air armies to support a specific theater- or operational-level command.
8-4. The size and composition of an air army can vary greatly. However, most
air armies have one or more units each for
• Fighter aviation.
• Bomber aviation.
• Reconnaissance aviation.
• Mixed aviation (fixed- and rotary-wing).
• Heliborne jamming.
In addition, some air armies may have one or more units for
• Ground-attack aviation.
• Airborne jamming aviation.
• Transport helicopters.
• Air ambulance.
Generally, units with the term aviation in their titles are either fixed-wing
units or mixed aviation units with a mixture of fixed-and rotary-wing
aircraft. During wartime, some aviation divisions and regiments may be task
organized into aviation tactical groups.
Theater-Level Air Force
8-5. Theater air armies are subordinate to the theater headquarters (if
created) and play a key role in all types of combat, from participating in
theater-level campaigns to supporting low-level tactical units of the ground
forces. In the former role, they complement national-level aviation, and in the
latter, army aviation.
8-6. High-performance fighters, interceptors, and some light bombers com-
prise the air army of the theater. At theater level, the Air Force also controls
a substantial number of fixed- and rotary-wing EW aircraft, as well as
medium- and heavy-lift helicopters. Thus, a theater air army can have the
same types of units as found in air armies at the national level.
8-7. The size and composition of the theater air army vary greatly depending
on the theater’s needs. Those aviation assets retained to provide fire support
at the theater level are part of the theater’s integrated fires command (IFC).
Theater headquarters may also use these assets to support high-priority
operational-level actions. |
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Operational-Level Air Force
8-8. At the operational level, an operational-strategic command (OSC) is a
joint command. Therefore, the SHC may include Air Force units in the forma-
tion of the OSC. These units are sized and equipped according to the mission
assigned to the OSC. Those Air Force assets allocated to an OSC in a con-
stituent or dedicated relationship for fire support become part of the OSC’s IFC.
ARMY AVIATION
8-9. The OPFOR has a variety of attack, transport, multipurpose, and special-
purpose helicopters that belong to the ground forces (Army) rather than the
Air Force. Hence the term army aviation. In addition to these helicopters,
army aviation also owns a limited number of small fixed-wing aircraft to sup-
port transport and reconnaissance missions. Army aviation units may remain
under centralized control at theater level or may be task organized within an
OSC, division tactical group (DGT), or brigade tactical group (BTG).
Theater-Level Army Aviation
8-10. The theater headquarters’ army aviation assets are critical in theater
campaigns. Army aviation provides reconnaissance, lift for heliborne land-
ings, and direct air support (DAS) for ground forces. The OPFOR generally
uses helicopters for reconnaissance only within the protection of the ground
forces’ air defense umbrella. Helicopters perform such tasks as route or NBC
reconnaissance. In the DAS role, it is common for army aviation to supple-
ment theater’s fixed-wing ground-attack aircraft. All attack helicopter units
and perhaps some other army aviation assets retained at theater level would
be part of the theater IFC.
8-11. The type and number of army aviation brigades or battalions subordinate
to the theater headquarters or theater IFC varies according to the theater’s
needs and the importance of that theater in the OPFOR’s strategic campaign.
Army aviation assets at theater-level can include one or more units of each of
the following:
• Attack helicopters.
• Medium-lift helicopters.
• Heavy-lift helicopters.
• Reconnaissance, jamming, and command and control (C2) helicopters.
• Drones.
• Light and medium transport airplanes, replacing some lift helicopters
in mixed aviation units.
Other than these standing army aviation organizations, the OPFOR may also
form some task-organized army aviation tactical groups or detachments with
a mix of different aircraft types.
Operational-Level Army Aviation
8-12. As discussed in Chapter 2, the OSC is a standing headquarters. When
the OSC is formed for combat operations, an army aviation brigade or battalion
may be task organized under this command to provide agility, versatility, and
increased firepower. The type, size, and quantity of the units vary depending |
7-100.1 | 204 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
on the mission of the OSC. In some cases, the OPFOR may include a limited
number of army aviation assets in the formation of a DTG or BTG.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
8-13. The commander of the theater air army (Air Force asset) is subordinate
to the theater commander. If the majority of the air army’s assets retained at
theater level are allocated to the theater IFC, the air army commander may
also become subordinate to the IFC commander. The air army command post
(CP) is normally within 10 to 15 km of the theater’s main CP or IFC CP to
ensure a close relationship. This relationship ensures that there is no danger
of the air army conducting separate, divergent operations as opposed to sub-
ordinating the air effort to the needs of the ground operation.
8-14. The senior commander of the army aviation component is also directly
subordinate to the theater commander or the theater IFC commander. The
army aviation CP is located within 30 km of the theater main CP or IFC CP
to allow for rapid coordination from theater to the executing unit. The staff of
the aviation unit works closely with the theater staff to plan and coordinate
the employment of the theater’s army aviation assets.
8-15. The command structure at the OSC level is similar to that at theater
level. The OSC may have an air army, division, or regiment as the largest Air
Force organization. Depending on the type of aviation assets involved, the
commander of this unit is subordinate to the OSC commander or to the OSC
IFC commander.
8-16. The command structure for army aviation units in an OSC depends on
the types of aviation units assigned and whether or not they perform or support
fire support missions. Thus, the commander of the army aviation unit may be di-
rectly subordinate to the commander of the OSC or to the OSC IFC commander.
CENTRALIZED CONTROL
8-17. The OPFOR has a limited number of aviation units compared to the
size of the ground force. For this reason, it believes that maintaining centralized
control over its aviation assets is essential to the effective employment of both
fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. However, centralization is a relative term,
depending on what levels of command are involved.
Fixed-Wing
8-18. The OPFOR establishes relatively centralized control over its fixed-
wing assets. Centralization takes advantage of the mobility and maneuver-
ability of aircraft to concentrate them at the decisive point and time from
dispersed bases. Centralized control simplifies the coordination with ground
forces and allows for the integration of aircraft being used in different, but
complimentary roles (for example, reconnaissance, fighter, and ground attack). It
also allows a rapid reallocation of air support resources to accomplish the
more important missions that suddenly arise during an operation. Aviation
units not originally assigned for ground support may sometimes take part in
delivering air attacks against ground targets. To execute their missions, the
OPFOR uses centralized planning to allocate air support resources to the ground
commander by flights or aircraft sorties with the appropriate ammunitions. |
7-100.1 | 205 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8
Rotary-Wing
8-19. The OPFOR can use less centralized procedures for the allocation of its
helicopter assets, especially the combat helicopter in the DAS role. However,
if the number of assets in theater allows and the mission dictates, it may de-
centralize control over an aviation unit. It can do this in two ways. The first
is a constituent subordination of an aviation unit, or the higher headquarters
can establish a dedicated or supporting relationship for a specified period of time.
AIRSPACE OPERATIONS SUBSECTION
8-20. The chief of airspace operations (CAO) at theater, OSC, and tactical
group levels is the primary person in the staff responsible for the coordina-
tion of all airspace users. He, along with his staff, make up the airspace
operations subsection (AOS). They work directly for the operations officer in
the planning of future operations and the execution of current operations. At
theater level, this AOS generally consists of—
• An air controller team (Air Force).
• An intelligence team.
• A communications team.
• Liaison teams from subordinate units requiring airspace deconfliction.
8-21. At OSC level and below, the AOS is sized according to needs, but per-
forms the same functions. Some functions of this staff are to—
• Recommend the employment of air assets.
• Deconflict airspace for all users.
• Plan the effective suppression of enemy air defense.
• Transmit air support requests.
• Maintain communications with aircraft in the area of responsibility.
• Provide the commander with all air reconnaissance information.
8-22. The AOS at every level is manned and equipped to provide 24-hour
operations. Additionally, the AOS provides representation to the IFC CP and
to the forward CP when the latter is operational.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION
8-23. The theater air army and ground forces have an integrated C2 struc-
ture. This ensures close and continuous coordination in joint operations. The
CAO evaluates the situation based on the theater commander’s guidance. He
then plans the air portion of an operation and recommends the proper em-
ployment of air assets. The same process is being performed simultaneously
at the OSC-level AOS.
8-24. In addition to the air missions planned at theater level, the theater
staff allocates assets to integrate into the subordinate ground commander’s
plan. To achieve a coordinated operation plan, the theater air army sends
personnel and communications equipment to ground force units at battalion
level and above. These personnel forward requests for air assets through the
chain of command to the theater staff. The theater CAO then screens the |
7-100.1 | 206 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
requests and identifies the missions that can be supported by army aviation
and those that must be supported with Air Force assets. The allocations are
then sent to the theater commander for approval.
8-25. At OSC level, the commander consults his CAO and develops detailed
targeting plans for the current fight through the next 48 hours. He also
makes rough estimates for 5 subsequent days. Requests are formulated for
mission type, not for specific type of aircraft. For example, the OSC does not
identify helicopters in its request for DAS. These requests are forwarded to
the theater CAO and continually revised until 48 hours prior to execution.
Once approved, these become part of the published theater aviation support
plan (ASP). There can also be an ASP at OSC level, particularly when the
OSC is not subordinate to a theater headquarters.
8-26. Then, the theater or OSC AOS issues the ASP to the executing aviation
units. These orders cover targets, numbers of sorties, air approach corridors,
communications codes, and mission timing. Air Force representatives at sub-
ordinate levels then confirm, for their respective commanders, the allocation
of air resources. Normally, the commander holds a percentage of his air
power in reserve to meet the unforeseen demands.
8-27. Once the allocation is received by the OSC, the OSC commander may
assign specific air support to a subordinate unit or maintain control at his
level. The OSC AOS then continues to coordinate the effort until the end of
the mission.
MISSION REQUEST TYPES
8-28. The OPFOR recognizes the criticality of providing support to the
ground forces. Available air support is assigned missions according to the
following categories of requests: preplanned, on-call, and immediate.
Preplanned
8-29. A preplanned mission is a mission planned well in advance of its execu-
tion, usually 24 hours prior to launch. Such missions are normally planned
against static or non-moving targets with known locations.
On-Call
8-30. An on-call mission is one in which the target may be predesignated,
but the timing of the attack remains at the discretion of the ground force
commander. These missions are normally planned to support maneuver
forces not yet in contact with the enemy, but expected to make contact
once the aircraft are available. The on-call mission is planned the same as
preplanned missions, with the exception of the attack’s timing. A “window of
availability,” usually no longer than 4 to 5 hours, is established. The mission
can be launched at any time during that window. On-call missions are
planned with secondary targets in the event the window of availability
expires before the primary target becomes available for attack.
Immediate
8-31. The OPFOR designates a limited number of aircraft to respond only to
requests from ground commanders for unplanned immediate air support. |
7-100.1 | 207 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8
A request for immediate air support is forwarded through AOS channels.
As with preplanned support, the AOS at each command level participates
directly in the evaluation of each air support request.
LEVELS OF COMBAT READINESS
8-32. The OPFOR recognizes three levels of combat readiness for aircraft and
crews. (See Figure 8-1.) Aircraft in categories one and two respond to on-call
missions.
Category Crew and Aircraft Duration of Time
Readiness Before
Takeoff
One Aircraft are fully serviced and armed. Combat crews are briefed on 1-2 hours 3-5
their mission and are in the aircraft ready to start engines. Ground minutes
personnel are assisting the combat crews.
Two Aircraft are fully serviced and armed. Combat crews are briefed and 2-4 hours 15
are on standby in the vicinity of the aircraft, ready to take off within a minutes
specified short period of time after receiving a mission order.
Three Aircraft are refueled and serviced. Cannons are loaded. External sys- 2-4 days 1-2 hours
tems (bombs, rockets, missiles, fuel tanks, etc.) are not loaded. Com-
bat crews are designated, but not on standby; they have not been
briefed on the air and ground situation, but will be before takeoff.
Figure 8-1. Levels of Combat Readiness
CAPABILITIES
8-33. The priority for organizational strength and equipment modernization
depends on the importance of a unit within the overall strategic plan. Mod-
ernization, in particular, depends greatly on the economic capability of the
State to acquire the latest-generation fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. As
an example, the OPFOR helicopter combat units range from armed lift air-
craft employed as gunships to state-of-the-art attack helicopters. The OPFOR
continues to modernize units with aircraft having—
• Improved avionics.
• Improved electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-
countermeasures (ECCM) equipment.
• Increased payload.
• Longer combat radius.
• Increased night capability. |
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8-34. The OPFOR will continue to modify the employment of its aviation
units as the modernization continues. On the lowest level, for example, gun-
ship units are employed almost exclusively during daytime, while modernized
attack helicopter battalions can be effectively employed at night.
DIRECT AIR SUPPORT
8-35. Aviation continues to improve nighttime and poor-weather air recon-
naissance and ordnance delivery in support of ground maneuver formations.
With the heavy emphasis on night combat, the OPFOR recognizes limitations
in its ability to maintain continuity of air support at night and in poor weather.
8-36. The OPFOR is making efforts to correct these shortcomings. The all-
weather fighters and bombers are capable assets to support ground forces
even for night missions. They have the range and payload to attack deep targets.
Many modern fixed-wing aircraft and combat helicopters have electronic and in-
frared instruments that enable pilots to conduct sorties at night and in poor
weather at low altitudes. The pilots can search for, detect, and destroy targets.
COUNTERAIR
8-37. The Air Force has the most lethal air intercept aircraft in the region.
However, it would be challenged by air forces of a first-class power and would
modify its operations when required. The deployment of a wide array of
mobile and semi-mobile ground air defense systems has freed some aircraft
from air defense missions for ground support roles. (See Chapter 9 for more
details on air defense support.)
RECONNAISSANCE
8-38. Aerial reconnaissance includes visual observation, imagery, and signals
reconnaissance. Imagery reconnaissance encompasses all types of optical
cameras utilizing conventional fixed-frame and strip photography, infrared
photography, and television systems; it also includes side-looking airborne
radar (SLAR) and synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) capabilities. Airborne
signals reconnaissance includes communications and noncommunications
emitter intercept and direction finding.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
8-39. The OPFOR continues to improve its capabilities to conduct EW, in-
cluding sophisticated jamming equipment. It might deploy equipment on its
aircraft to—
• Jam multiple enemy radars.
• Jam only when the target radar reaches a certain intensity.
• Select the correct jamming signal for the specific target radar.
8-40. The OPFOR can jam the enemy air defense network’s major surveillance
and acquisition radars. It also uses advanced deception jamming techniques.
All these capabilities allow OPFOR aviation to provide increased support that
combines accuracy in ordnance delivery, greater flexibility in employment,
increased survivability, and increased responsiveness to combined arms
commanders. |
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UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE
8-41. The OPFOR is currently acquiring unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
As technology allows, it will develop doctrine for employing UAVs in the
reconnaissance, attack, deception, and resupply roles.
MISSIONS
8-42. Based on the capabilities outlined in the preceding section, the OPFOR
conducts a wide variety of missions with its aviation assets. This section
describes the typical missions assigned to aviation units.
COUNTERAIR
8-43. If engaged in a regional operations, the Air Force attempts to establish
and maintain the desired degree of air dominance. Air superiority is
established through a combination of offensive and defensive actions.
Preplanned attacks while the enemy’s aircraft are on the ground would be
an example of offensive air defense missions, while flying intercept missions
to engage enemy aircraft firing on air or ground troops is an example of a
defensive mission.
8-44. When the State is attacked by a major power, the Air Force will at-
tempt to defend strategic centers and conduct precision attacks early to inflict
politically significant damage on invaders. An invasion of the State may dic-
tate an “all-out” effort to control access to the region or harass the early-entry
forces before they build up sufficient air and air defense capabilities to domi-
nate the airspace. Alternatively, the OPFOR could save its Air Force assets
for a surge effort at a critical point later in the conflict. However, it will not
delay use of its air forces until such a surge unless it has means to ensure the
survivability of its aircraft on the ground. Survivability means may include
underground shelters. The OPFOR also will attempt to conduct missions from
more dispersed locations or from a safe haven such as neighboring country.
RECONNASSIANCE
8-45. Aerial reconnaissance is a principal method of gathering target in-
telligence. The theater and OSC staffs each prepare a reconnaissance plan,
which details tasks for Air Force and/or army aviation assets. Theater avia-
tion’s reconnaissance forces gather tactical and operational intelligence up to
a 300-km radius. They may also be tasked to collect strategic intelligence to
support national-level requirements.
8-46. Aircrews on any mission should immediately report observed enemy
activity or conspicuous inactivity. Specialized reconnaissance aviation
regiments have the primary responsibility for aerial reconnaissance. These
regiments have specially-equipped reconnaissance aircraft. Aviation assets
also can have airborne signals reconnaissance collectors.
8-47. The processing of data from an air reconnaissance mission can take 2 to
8 hours. To shorten this time, the aircraft transmit perishable target intelli-
gence by radio to ground CPs. OPFOR planners are also modernizing their
techniques to shorten the process. |
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COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
8-48. The OPFOR knows the significance of having reconnaissance forces on the
battlefield to ensure mission success. For this reason, it heavily emphasizes the
destruction of the enemy reconnaissance teams and dedicates numerous assets
to accomplish this mission. The OPFOR includes either armed or lift helicopters
in the counterreconnaissance plan to search for, locate, and report enemy
reconnaissance teams. Depending on the plan, the OPFOR may use the armed
helicopters, infantry, artillery, or other methods to destroy these teams.
DIRECT AIR SUPPORT
8-49. DAS is a mission to disrupt or destroy enemy forces in proximity to friendly
forces. This mission can be accomplished using fixed-wing assets and fire support
helicopters. Because these assets are centrally controlled, the missions are
formulated at various staff levels and allocated based on assets available and
significance of the mission. DAS missions are part of the fire support plan.
INTERDICTION
8-50. Air interdiction is planned and executed to destroy targets that are not
in proximity to friendly troops. These missions are planned at the theater or
OSC level to support the ground commander’s overall plan. Interdiction mis-
sions can be conducted in advance of ground maneuver to set the conditions,
or simultaneously to force the enemy to fight on different fronts.
HELICOPTERS AS A MANEUVER FORCE
8-51. As an exception to the rule, the OPFOR might employ a highly-trained
unit equipped with modern attack helicopters as a maneuver force in the
ground commander’s scheme of maneuver. In this role, the attack helicopter
unit can be used as the fixing, assault, or exploitation force in the offense or
as the disruption or counterattack force in the defense. In either offense or
defense, it could be a deception force or reserve. Such employment is among
the most complex missions conducted by aviation units and requires detailed
planning, rehearsals, and execution.
COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MISSIONS
8-52. Lift helicopters can support the ground commander in numerous
combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) roles. For example,
they can
• Transport ground units conducting heliborne assaults.
• Rapidly move forces on the battlefield.
• Insert reconnaissance teams.
• Conduct emergency resupply missions to isolated units.
The aircraft can also be equipped as a gunship, minelayer, electronic jammer,
or C2 platform.
8-53. The OPFOR has a variety of medium- and heavy-lift helicopters that
can provide transport capability throughout the battlefield. These aircraft are
lightly armed and are used to move troops, equipment, and supplies in the
relatively safe areas. Periodically, these aircraft are tasked to assist in CS |
7-100.1 | 211 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8
and CSS missions such as large heliborne assaults, combat search and
rescue, and forward arming and refueling point (FARP) emplacement.
PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT
8-54. The OPFOR’s use of aviation assets is guided by key employment prin-
ciples. Because the State has purchased aircraft (both fixed- and rotary-wing)
with a wide array of capabilities, some units are equipped with the latest
technology, while other units make do with older systems. This requires the
OPFOR to modify its operations based on the capabilities of the unit’s air-
craft, but within these employment principles.
PURPOSE
8-55. Every mission must be focused toward a clearly defined, decisive, and
attainable task. It must directly contribute to the higher commander’s imme-
diate plan. As an example, a lift helicopter unit is given a mission to insert a
reconnaissance team. All planning efforts should be aimed at accomplishing this
goal. Actions that do not contribute to achieving this mission must be avoided.
COORDINATION
8-56. The coordination of aviation with artillery, air defense, and maneuver
units is one of the most difficult tasks of modern combat, particularly in the
absence of air superiority. CAOs are assigned at various levels of command to
ensure a coordinate effort among the airspace users. Liaison teams from
aviation units also assist in this effort. The aviation commanders and staffs
develop detailed plans, working closely with the other members of the
combined arms team, not only to ensure the most effective use of all systems
employed, but also to prevent fratricide.
CONCENTRATION OF EFFECTS
8-57. The OPFOR does not distribute resources evenly throughout the theater.
A commander identifies goals to be achieved with his aviation assets and
organizes them accordingly. As an example, commanders can use fixed-wing
aviation to concentrate on opening a few corridors through enemy air de-
fenses to attack specific targets. The OPFOR makes every effort to maintain
air superiority over these corridors when it cannot do so over the entire theater.
ECONOMY
8-58. If the OPFOR hopes to achieve the principles of concentration and purpose,
it cannot use air assets to perform missions that can be adequately executed by
other means. The OPFOR must carefully assess the risks and payoff of using the
limited assets of aviation for each mission. For example, the OPFOR may employ
its artillery fires instead of ground-attack aircraft for targets within artillery
range. Additionally, the OPFOR can minimize the risk of all missions through
thorough planning and the use of artillery fires to suppress enemy air defense.
RECONNASSIANCE
8-59. Aerial reconnaissance is an important source of information for the
OPFOR commander. It can provide timely and accurate information that can |
7-100.1 | 212 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
have a significant impact on the outcome of an operation. For this reason,
every aviation mission has an implied task to conduct reconnaissance along
the route of flight and report any activity or inactivity that may affect the
ground commander’s plan. However, the execution of this implied mission does
not alter the specified mission plan, in keeping with the principle of purpose.
SURPRISE
8-60. To maximize the effects that aviation can bring to the operation,
surprise is an essential element of all aviation missions. Means of achieving
surprise include—
• Choosing unexpected or concealed axes.
• Attacking at unlikely times.
• Attacking in unanticipated strength.
• Using new weapons or tactics.
• Limiting or eliminating radio and radar emissions.
• Degrading the enemy’s early warning radar net.
• Making decoy raids.
• Using camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) on airfields.
RESPONSIVENESS
8-61. The OPFOR aviation assets provide the most agile, flexible, and reactive
firepower to the ground commander. Plans to employ aviation assets must
capitalize on these traits and provide the commander the responsiveness to
be employed in a timely manner across the entire area of responsibility
(AOR). An example to illustrate this principle is the attack helicopters used
as the reserve force in the operation plan. In addition to attack helicopters,
commanders can use lift aircraft with infantry soldiers. By using helicopters to
move ground forces, the OPFOR can use a smaller force to cover larger AORs.
DEGREE OF AIRSPACE DOMINANCE
8-62. The OPFOR uses standardized terms to define the degree of airspace
dominance of its airspace. This allows planners to best employ assets in the
theater to satisfy the requirements to support ground forces.
AIR SUPREMACY
8-63. Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is
incapable of effective interference. Through the complete destruction of the
enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of air operations. Yet, this
condition may be difficult or even impossible to achieve. It may occur, however,
through the establishment of a diplomatic “no-fly zone.” Under the condition of
air supremacy, the OPFOR commander employs all of his aircraft at will.
AIR SUPERIORITY
8-64. Air superiority is defined as the condition when the conduct of opera-
tions is possible at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by
the enemy. The most efficient method of attaining air superiority is to attack |
7-100.1 | 213 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8
early warning and C2 sites, ground-based air defense sites, and enemy
aviation assets close to their source of maintenance and launch facilities.
LOCAL AIR SUPERIORITY
8-65. Even though the OPFOR hopes to attain air superiority, it recognizes
the potential for only local air superiority to exist. Purely geographic in nature,
this condition is characterized by well-timed aviation missions to coincide
with enemy aircraft downtime, returning sorties, aircraft rearming, or gaps
in air defense coverage. This condition may also occur in areas across the theater
where the OPFOR or the enemy may not have adequate assets available to
ensure air superiority. In certain situations or against certain enemies, local air
superiority for a specified period of time may be a more realistic goal.
AIR PARITY
8-66. Air parity is defined as the functional equivalency between enemy and
friendly air forces in strength and capability to attack and destroy targets. Under
the condition of air parity, where neither side has gained superiority, some enemy
capabilities affect friendly ground forces at times and places on the battlefield.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
8-67. OPFOR aviation planners modify the employment of aviation assets
(both fixed- and rotary-wing) according to the strategic goals of the State and the
degree of airspace dominance attained by the OPFOR. This section examines
some of these differences as the OPFOR fights in regional, transition, and
adaptive operations.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
8-68. The OPFOR relies heavily on its aviation assets when planning its
strategic campaign against a regional enemy. It does not initiate hostilities
unless air superiority can be attained prior to ground combat. Because the
OPFOR has a superior aviation force, it is confident that it can attain air su-
periority quickly against any regional opponent.
8-69. In the initial days of any strategic campaign against a regional oppo-
nent, the OPFOR focuses the air campaign on attaining air superiority. Once
that is established, aircraft apportionment is gradually shifted to ground at-
tacks while maintaining air superiority. The ultimate goal of the OPFOR is to
dedicate minimal aircraft to maintaining air superiority while dedicating
maximum assets to ground attacks. Secondary missions include reconnais-
sance, transportation, logistics support, and insertion of troops.
8-70. Rotary-wing aircraft can fly missions with relative ease with few
restrictions during day and night operations while the OPFOR maintains air
superiority. The regional opponent’s limited air defense assets can be
targeted early to improve the survivability of all aviation missions.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
8-71. With the introduction of superior forces from an extraregional enemy,
the OPFOR cannot rely on the continued dominance of the airspace. In re-
sponse, it shifts its air operations to control the access of the enemy into the |
7-100.1 | 214 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
region and slow or alter the enemy’s deployment progress by attacking ports,
airfields, railheads, and other infrastructure. The OPFOR tries to maintain
air superiority as long as possible without losing excessive aircraft to the
extraregional forces. During this limited time of marginal airspace dominance,
it can use its aviation forces to support the ground forces’ transition to adaptive
operations by performing security, support, and deception missions. The
OPFOR transitions to maintaining local air superiority and even air parity to
support the ground transition to adaptive operations.
8-72. Transition operations can also be a shift from adaptive operations
to regional operations. In this case, the OPFOR uses its aviation assets to
regain air superiority once the air dominance of the extraregional force has
diminished. This process may be initiated by establishing and maintaining
local air superiority in a given area, followed by establishing air superiority
over the entire region.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
8-73. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR has realized that the domi-
nance of the airspace by the extraregional enemy has severely limited the
employment of its aviation forces in the conventional manner. The OPFOR is
not willing to lose its aviation assets and will find creative means to use its
air power during limited windows of opportunity. The primary concern,
though, is to preserve combat power in order to remain a dominant force
within the region after the extraregional force has departed.
8-74. As the OPFOR transitions to adaptive operations, it relies more on
helicopter operations and less on fixed-wing assets for ground attacks.
This allows the OPFOR to keep the fixed-wing assets in sanctuaries, while
helicopters use flight profiles minimizing the risk against enemy air defense
systems. Because helicopters do not require runways, they provide the
OPFOR the means to attack quickly from more dispersed locations.
8-75. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR can employ operational shielding
to protect its aviation assets. Helicopters will be more dispersed than in regional
operations. Fixed-wing assets may be shielded by positioning them in relative
safe areas of the regionsuch as neighboring neutral countries, areas of high
civil population, and areas that may cause high collateral damage if attacked.
8-76. The centralized control of aviation assets may be elevated to a higher
level during adaptive operations. Because of the high risk associated with fly-
ing missions against the extraregional force, theater and OSC commanders
may retain the authority to determine what targets are valuable enough to
risk aviation assets. This elevation of employment authority also allows for
windows of opportunity to be recognized or created in a timely manner using
other assets found at these levels.
8-77. In addition to scrutinizing the target selection, the theater or OSC
commanders closely analyze the mission planning. During adaptive opera-
tions, the OPFOR commander is more likely to plan and execute missions:
during periods of limited visibility, within specified ranges, and with minimal
numbers of aircraft. The objective of every aviation mission during adaptive
operations must support a strategic goal. |
7-100.1 | 215 | Chapter 9
Air Defense Support
The OPFOR system of air defense includes assets and actions at the stra-
tegic (national), operational, and tactical levels. The focus in this chapter
is on air defense of maneuver forces at the operational level. However, op-
erational-level air defense does not exist in isolation from the overall sys-
tem of OPFOR air defense. For more information on tactical-level air de-
fense, see FM 7-100.2.
ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE
9-1. The main objective of air defense is to prevent enemy air action from in-
terfering with mission accomplishment of the entire force. For the OPFOR,
air defense is not just a particular organization or branch of service. It is a
mission.
9-2. To do this, the OPFOR uses a combined arms and joint approach, involv-
ing not only air defense units, but also other forces such as
• Aviation.
• Special-purpose forces (SPF).
• Rockets and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).
• Artillery and mortars.
• Infantry.
• Engineers.
• Affiliated forces.
These forces are often used in combination or participate separately in at-
tacking targets, which in effect achieves a combined result.
9-3. Against a sophisticated enemy, the OPFOR recognizes that it will have
to adapt the operations and tactics employed by air defense units to improve
their chances of success. It also views the creative and adaptive use of other
arms to accomplish air defense objectives as part and parcel of the overall air
defense effort. This practical application of the combined arms concept calls
for the simultaneous employment of several arms, in some cases including air
defense systems, to achieve an effect against the enemy air threat that will
render greater results than the use of air defense assets and systems alone.
9-4. The extent to which the concept of all-arms air defense can be applied is
limited only by the commander’s and staff’s knowledge of the enemy air
threat, capabilities of their own systems, and their ability to apply that
knowledge to come up with innovative solutions. The air defense-related
activities of all arms are part of an overall campaign to defeat or at least
degrade enemy air capabilities. The results may produce effects at the
strategic, operational, or tactical levels. |
7-100.1 | 216 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
GOALS
9-5. Air defense forces and other arms work together to protect ground
units and other potential targets from attacks by fixed-wing ground-attack
aircraft, cruise missiles, and armed helicopters. They also try to deny aerial
reconnaissance platforms, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A
secondary mission is to protect OPFOR air and airborne or heliborne mis-
sions over enemy-held territory. OPFOR air defense focuses on destroying or
disrupting the activities of not only enemy aircraft, but also the command
and control (C2) systems associated with enemy air operations.
CONCEPTS
9-6. The OPFOR’s concept of air defense is not purely defensive in nature.
Destruction of enemy aircraft is not always linked to military objectives. The
destruction of high-visibility or unique systems employed by enemy forces of-
fers exponential value in terms of increasing the relative combat power of the
OPFOR. However, it also has possibly decisive effects in the information and
psychological arenas. Losses among these premier systems demonstrate the
vulnerability of even a technologically superior enemy and may undermine
enemy morale, degrade operational capability, and inhibit employment of
other enemy weapon systems. High-visibility (flagship) systems that could be
identified for destruction could include stealth aircraft, attack helicopters, or
aerial reconnaissance and surveillance platforms. The OPFOR can also at-
tack high-payoff targets such as high-technology communications nodes and
other information systems that support enemy air operations.
9-7. The OPFOR emphasizes that air defense does not necessarily have to
destroy aircraft to accomplish the mission, although that is obviously de-
sirable. The mission is accomplished if air defense prevents enemy aircraft
from conducting successful air activities. For example, air defense units can
force enemy aircraft to break off their attacks or to expend their ordnance
inaccurately without having to destroy the aircraft. In fact, the mere
presence of active and effective air defense weapon systems can reduce the
effectiveness of enemy air activities by forcing aircraft to avoid the systems
or otherwise use less than optimum procedures. The OPFOR can also use air
defense jammers, GPS jammers, and other electronic warfare (EW) methods
to disrupt the enemy’s air capability.
9-8. The role of air defense can be to create opportunity for fire and ma-
neuver by clearing or minimizing the air threat in the airspace above
friendly forces. This is especially important when the OPFOR lacks the air
power or air superiority necessary to create opportunity with air attacks. The
OPFOR can concentrate the fires of its air defense assets to create a window
of opportunity for a limited-duration and limited-objective offensive action
(such as a spoiling attack, counterattack, raid, or ambush). Likewise, air
defense can enhance the ability to defend or transition from defense to
offense. Air defense can also mass fires to protect the key reconnaissance
and fire assets that perform reconnaissance fires.
9-9. Another important OPFOR concept is that air defense is an integral part of
combined arms combat. The maneuver unit commander who disregards the enemy
air threat or fails to properly plan for defending against it risks mission failure. |
7-100.1 | 217 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
9-10. A closely related concept is that air defense weapons, radars, and asso-
ciated equipment cannot be regarded as single pieces of equipment or even
units engaged in combat actions but as parts of an integrated air defense system
(IADS). Proper integration of these assets in mission planning and execution is
the only way the commander can effectively deal with the enemy air threat.
PRINCIPLES
9-11. In pursuit of these goals and concepts, the OPFOR follows several basic
principles when conducting air defense: surprise, firepower, mobility, conti-
nuity, initiative, coordination, and security. Of these, the element of surprise
is the most critical.
Surprise
9-12. Achieving surprise is fundamental to successful air defense. Surprise
can be achieved by
• Positioning air defense systems in unexpected locations.
• Using other arms for air defense.
• Using camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D).
The OPFOR is aware of the potential physical destruction it can achieve by
attacking an unsuspecting and unprepared enemy. It is also aware of the
psychological effects of violent and unexpected fires on aviation crews. These
effects are often only temporary, but at critical moments they can reduce the
effectiveness of aircrews preparing to attack.
9-13. The element of surprise is also increasingly important because of
modern technological advances. The speed and evasiveness of modern air-
craft reduce engagement times. Modern aircraft also have a great amount of
firepower with which to suppress air defenses. These two factors make it
necessary for units to achieve some degree of surprise. Of course, the air
enemy also is trying to achieve surprise, and the OPFOR must consider how
enemy aircraft might exploit the terrain in making a concealed approach.
9-14. The principle of surprise is also important in the wider context of
denying the enemy's intelligence organization an accurate and comprehensive
picture of the deployment of air defense weapons and radars. Otherwise, the en-
emy also can use air defense formations as a principal means of determining the
organization for combat and organization of forces of supported maneuver units.
Firepower
9-15. The OPFOR force structure includes a wide variety of air defense
weapons (both missiles and guns). This mix of capabilities gives ground force
commanders outstanding firepower for air defense. It is important that air
defense planning consider and employ all assets available, across all arms, to
achieve maximum firepower.
Mobility
9-16. Air defense assets must have mobility comparable to the ground forces
for which they provide cover. When planning air defense, the commander
must always consider the mobility of air defense weapons and the time required |
7-100.1 | 218 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
for their deployment. The ground forces, for which air defenses provide cover,
are quite mobile and frequently change formation as they deploy. The air en-
emy is mobile and can attack from many directions or altitudes. Therefore,
the commander must use to the maximum the mobility and firepower of his
assets, creating optimum groupings and fire plans.
Continuity
9-17. Air defense forces must provide continuous protection of critical or-
ganizations and assets. Only constantly-moving air defense units that have
adequate logistics support can ensure comprehensive air coverage. They
must provide air defense day or night in all weather conditions. Mobility
contributes directly to continuity.
Initiative
9-18. The modern battlefield is a fluid and volatile environment. Air defense
unit commanders must respond to constant changes in the situation with ini-
tiative and aggressive action. Units must continue to operate efficiently even
when communications with other air defense units fail. For example, if the
supported unit receives a modified mission, the air defense commander must
reevaluate his own unit’s deployment in light of the new requirements. He also
must be aware of changes in the tactics that enemy air forces are employing.
Coordination
9-19. The OPFOR stresses coordination between air defense units and
supported maneuver units, other air defense units, and units of other arms
performing air defense functions. It views air defense as a single, integrated
system composed of various parts. Air defense is an integral element of the
air and ground battle.
9-20. All tactical-level air defense weapons must coordinate precisely with
flanking units, with operational-level air defense units, and with aviation
units. Failure to coordinate can result in gaps in the air defense umbrella,
excessive ammunition expenditure, and casualties to friendly air forces. To
achieve efficient coordination, the OPFOR stresses centralization of control,
with operational-level headquarters playing a key role as a land-air interface.
Security
9-21. The OPFOR recognizes that enemy air assets can attack from any
quarter. Therefore, it must provide security for units anywhere on the battlefield
or in sanctuary areas against air attack from any direction. Air defense must
function with unremitting reliability and overall security. This requires careful
deployment, uninterrupted ammunition supply, and a comprehensive early-
warning system. Commanders must factor security into air defense planning.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
9-22. The OPFOR combines ground-based national-, operational-, and tactical-
level air defense assets with fixed-wing aircraft forces to provide an integrated
air defense umbrella for ground units. Consequently, effective control of the |
7-100.1 | 219 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
airspace becomes more complex. The OPFOR stresses the need for operations
conducted with a single integrated plan under unified command and control.
INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
9-23. OPFOR air defense weapons and surveillance systems at all levels of
command are part of an integrated air defense system (IADS) that presents a
threat to any potential enemy. Air defense effectively supports the concept
and requirements of combined arms combat. The best way to accomplish this
is to integrate a large number and variety of weapons and associated equip-
ment into a redundant air defense system.
9-24. The OPFOR’s intent is to integrate air defense assets at all levels of
command into a continuous, unbroken umbrella of air defense coverage. In-
tegration can be vertical and/or horizontal. Vertical integration is between
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, while horizontal integration is
within each of those levels.
9-25. The dispersed positions of OPFOR units, as well as enemy actions to
suppress OPFOR air defense and C2 capabilities, may make it difficult to
maintain vertical or horizontal integration. Enemy capabilities may present
a situation where a vertically integrated system at the strategic or even
operational level is neither possible nor desirable.
9-26. An integrated communications system is established to provide target
information and early warning to air defense and ground maneuver units. If
communications with other air defense units fail, however, commanders may
have to use their own initiative and flexibility, in order to respond to fre-
quent changes in the ground or air situation.
National Level
9-27. Against regional opponents, the OPFOR may be able to use an IADS
that is centrally directed from the national level. Centralization of control
gives the OPFOR flexibility in the employment of resources to meet the over-
all goal of air defense. The national-level air defense organization can play a
major role in the control of air defense assets of operational-level commands.
Sector Level
9-28. Against a modern extraregional force, however, the OPFOR accepts
that it may not be able to employ a nationally integrated air defense system
to defend its entire airspace. In fact, a vertically integrated system centrally
directed from the national level could be a liability from a C2 standpoint.
Thus, the OPFOR is prepared to adapt its air defense operations to use IADS
at sector levels. Within sectors, it may be able to challenge the most modern
air forces, at least initially. It can prevent extraregional air forces from at-
taining air supremacy, for a time.
9-29. Air defense sector boundaries do not necessarily parallel geographic
boundaries or the boundaries of military areas of responsibility (AORs). It is
quite possible that boundaries could coincide, if air defense assets are allo-
cated to provide support for theater- or operational-level commands. In some
cases, however, an air defense sector could cover a larger area that includes |
7-100.1 | 220 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
the AORs of one or more operational-level commands and could cover air-
space not included in any of those AORs. It is possible that the OPFOR could
divide a large geographic area into air defense sectors even when it does not
establish multiple theater headquarters within that area.
9-30. Sector air defense can reduce the physical and electronic signature of
defensive systems. To the extent possible, the OPFOR disperses high-value
assets. Still, air defense assets may be close enough together to be hard-
wired. Sector IADS enables the OPFOR to mass the effects of air defense assets
from dispersed sites to protect the most critical targets. It also facilitates the use
of passive air defense techniques including dispersal, deception, and camouflage.
9-31. In choosing to fight within sectors, the OPFOR accepts risk, in that air
defense sectors present seams in the defenses and may be unable to provide
mutual support. Within sectors, the OPFOR develops air defense ambushes
along the most likely air avenues of approach.
Operational and Tactical Level
9-32. In most situations, an operational-strategic command (OSC) directs the
employment of the air defense assets of at least its immediate tactical-level
subordinatesdivisions and division tactical groups (DTGs) or separate bri-
gades or brigade tactical groups (BTGs). Brigades and BTGs that are part of
a division or DTG provide coverage for their own units and vertically inte-
grate with division or DTG coverage. When not part of a division or DTG,
they vertically integrate with OSC-level coverage, which would be their next-
higher level of command. There may be skip-echelon situations when the
OSC will specify how divisional maneuver brigades employ their air defense
batteries. Normally, however, the division or DTG will dictate that.
9-33. At the tactical level, the commander normally strives to achieve
horizontal integration. His ability to integrate or be integrated vertically will
depend on the air defense course of action taken at the next-higher level.
CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION
9-34. Air defense control relationships are subject to conflicting pressures for
centralization and decentralization. Factors favoring centralized control
include the greater efficiency and effectiveness of centralized target detection
systems and the increased ranges of modern surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
Centralized control is necessary, especially during defensive operations, to
ensure that the coverage of air defense units is mutually supporting and
comprehensive. Centralization of control gives the OPFOR flexibility in the
employment of air defense resources to meet the overall goal of an operation. In most
situations, therefore, an operational-level command directs the employment of
the air defense assets of at least its immediate tactical-level subordinates.
9-35. Nevertheless, the complexity and fluidity of the modern battlefield
require the possibility of some decentralization. Decentralized control provides
flexibility and shorter response times for supporting fast-paced operations by
ground maneuver units and the many contingencies that can arise in local
situations. The OPFOR expects its air defense commanders, like their
maneuver counterparts, to demonstrate aggressive action and originality,
responding to changes in the tactical situation and operating effectively when |
7-100.1 | 221 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
cut off from communications with other air defense units. In general, the
OPFOR imposes enough centralization to optimize efficiency while allowing
sufficient decentralization for effectiveness.
AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
9-36. When the OPFOR Air Force is able to fly, airspace management is the
most complex aspect of air defense operations. Commanders must divide the
airspace among ground-based air defense systems and aviation.
Staff Responsibility
9-37. A single operational-level commander must control the full scope of
combined arms and/or joint activity, including air defense within his AOR. It
is the combined arms or joint commander who is ultimately responsible for
the success or failure of air defense in his AOR. He approves the overall
operation plan prepared by his staff. The operation plan includes the air
defense plan and coordinating instructions.
9-38. The OSC is the lowest level of joint command with control of both Army
and Air Force units. On the staff of an OSC, under the operations officer, the
chief of airspace operations (CAO) is responsible for airspace management is-
sues and procedures. The CAO maintains the airspace control net for control-
ling the command’s airspace. OSC headquarters typically receive liaison
teams from all constituent, dedicated, and supporting Air Force, army avia-
tion, and air defense units associated with the command. All these units and
their liaison teams are on the airspace control net.
Zones of Responsibility
9-39. The OPFOR establishes zones of responsibility in order to minimize
mutual interference between its fighter aircraft and ground-based air defense
weapons. Zones of responsibility could also be used to determine areas or
altitudes to be covered by national-level Air Defense Forces, as opposed to
operational- or tactical-level air defense assets. However, the use of such
zones does not preclude engagement of high-priority targets by more than
one type of weapon system if there is centralized control of all weapon
systems involved.
9-40. The OPFOR may assign zones of responsibility in the vertical dimen-
sion. Thus, fighter aviation would engage enemy aircraft at certain altitudes,
while ground-based air defense assets would be responsible for engagement
at other altitudes. See example A in Figure 9-1.
9-41. In the horizontal dimension, zones of responsibility may be in terms of
the direction from which target aircraft are approaching (example B). The
OPFOR may also choose to delineate responsibility according to the type of
target (example C). For instance, fighter aircraft might engage manned
aircraft, while ground-based air defense might be responsible for engaging
enemy missiles or UAVs. Sometimes, specific targets are assigned to specific
systems. However, the latter is likely only in a very low air threat environment. |
7-100.1 | 222 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
(A) In terms of altitude (B) In terms of direction (axis) (D) In terms of lines (no air superiority)
30,000 m
Zone lll:
Zone of responsibility
of SAM units.
Fighter aviation may
operate only in complicated
situations and by special
permission.
7000 m
Zone ll: (C) In terms of targets (E) In terms of lines (with air superiority)
Zone of responsibility
of fighter aviation.
SAM units may
operate only
in complicated
situations and
by special
permission.
2000 m
Zone l:
Zone of
responsibility
of AA guns and
low-altitude
SAMs.
Legend:
Enemy Aircraft SAM Battalion SAM Battery AA Gun Battery
Coverage Combat Air Patrol
Figure 9-1. Coordination of Fighter Aviation and Ground-Based Air Defenses (Examples)
9-42. Another way of dividing air defense responsibility is in terms of lines.
Particularly when the OPFOR does not have air superiority, the first line(s)
of air defense responsibility could be for ground-based air defense weapons to
engage enemy aircraft. OPFOR fighter aviation would then operate in the
relatively safe airspace behind those lines, where its fighters would engage
only those aircraft that managed to get through the first line(s). See example
D in Figure 9-1.
9-43. If the OPFOR does have air superiority, it might establish a boundary
line parallel to and forward of the battle line. This boundary would be gener-
ally at the range limit of medium-range SAMs, possibly beyond the supported
ground force unit’s limit of responsibility. Ground-based air defense systems
would engage aircraft out to this boundary. Fixed-wing aircraft would engage
the enemy beyond this boundary. See example E in Figure 9-1. However, the
OPFOR is unlikely to use this technique unless it possesses air superiority.
9-44. There will never be sufficient specialized air defense assets to protect
all units and vital assets from air attack. Therefore, all units must be capable
of using their organic weapons for self-defense against air attack. Self-
defense is never denied. Thus, air defense units with short-range weapons
always have the capability to defend themselves from immediate air threats,
regardless of whether another aviation or ground-based air defense unit has
responsibility for the airspace above them. |
7-100.1 | 223 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
Air Defense Control Measures
9-45. The OPFOR uses various types of air defense weapons control status
and procedural controls to coordinate the use of airspace by aviation assets
and ground-based air defense. Primarily, it employs a system of identification,
friend or foe (IFF) between aircraft and air defense systems. When using
non-IFF-capable systems, it may enact strict procedural controls in order to
protect friendly aircraft from fratricide. The air defense coverage may be
“switched off” to allow friendly aircraft to pass on a mission planned in ad-
vance and then “switched on” as they exit the area. For other missions, air
defense coverage may allow aircraft to transit only on “safe corridors” based
on air routes or other procedural methods. In general, however, the OPFOR
would prefer to risk losing some aircraft through fratricide, rather than al-
lowing gaps in its radar and air defense coverage that the enemy might exploit.
COMMAND POSTS AND COMMUNICATIONS
9-46. The CAO and his staff are part of the OSC staff at the main command
post (CP). Also located there are Air Force, army aviation, and air defense
liaison teams with whom he closely coordinates for airspace management. A
deputy CAO and possibly an air defense officer from the liaison team may
also be present at the forward CP to advise the OSC commander.
9-47. The basic rule for the establishment of communications between
supported and supporting unit is that the higher command allocates
landline, radio relay, and mobile communication means, while radio equip-
ment is allocated by both higher and subordinate levels. This ensures proper
coordination of communications. If communication is lost, the commanders
and staffs of all units involved are responsible for the immediate restoration
of communication. An air defense and NBC warning communications net
is established to warn maneuver units, the staffs, and logistics units of
incoming enemy aircraft. The warning is communicated through signal
equipment that is specially allocated for this purpose.
PHASES
9-48. The OPFOR plans to employ its air defense units and all-arms air de-
fense in three phases. The phases are defined by where the enemy aircraft
are and what they are doing:
• Phase I: Actions against enemy aircraft and control systems on the
ground before they are employed.
• Phase II: Actions against enemy aircraft while in flight but before
they enter the airspace over OPFOR ground maneuver forces.
• Phase III: Actions against enemy aircraft that have penetrated into
that airspace.
While these phases may occur sequentially after the initiation of hostilities,
they are not wholly distinct. They may overlap, and all three may occur
simultaneously. The OPFOR roughly equates the three phases with where
they will primarily occur on the ground and in the air. Thus, phases I, II, and
III occur in the “basing area,” “flight area,” and “target area,” respectively.
The purpose of these phases and areas is to assist planners in rationalizing,
planning, and organizing the overall air defense effort. |
7-100.1 | 224 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
PHASE I
9-49. The first phase includes all actions taken to destroy enemy aircraft and
control systems before they are employed. It targets aircraft while they are
still on the ground at airfields or in marshalling or staging areas. This “basing
area” extends from enemy home territory, to allied basing and staging areas,
to and including in-theater enemy support areas down to enemy division
level.1 It is the area in which aircraft are based, refueled, maintained, and
resupplied. This area is the overall responsibility of the OPFOR theater
commander. A large part of it could be given an OSC. Part of the area as-
signed could fall within the OSC’s disruption zone, which can include enemy
airfields and attack helicopter forward arming and refueling points (FARPs).
Planning
9-50. Planning for Phase I begins at the national level, when the General
Staff is considering various contingency plans for possible strategic campaigns
before the actual threat of war or extraregional intervention. This planning in-
cludes any OSCs that might be involved in a particular contingency.
9-51. Each contingency plan developed includes detailed analysis of the area
involved, including the identification of key airfields, facilities, and lines of
communication (LOCs) that could support enemy air operations. In those
areas controlled by the OPFOR, preparations are made to support planned
missions. These include the identification of complex terrain in the vicinity of
identified targets, potential cache sites, and forces to perform missions.
9-52. Areas not in the direct control of the OPFOR, but anticipated to be
included in the contingency, are also analyzed. In this case, in addition to all
the factors mentioned above, planners would also examine potential means
and routes of infiltration and potential sources of supply. They would also try
to identify potential “affiliated” forces that could assist in attacking key
targets: insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to the OPFOR, groups that
sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers,
terrorist groups, and even criminal organizations.
9-53. Based on this information, planners identify key targets and missions
and task OPFOR units and/or affiliated forces to be prepared to perform
them. This information is shared with the OSCs assigned to the particular
contingency, and the planning effort is coordinated with them.
9-54. What is developed is an integrated plan consisting of a large number of
tactical actions that support air defense objectives at all levels. This is the
basic plan from which the OPFOR operates at the initiation of hostilities. It
is modified and updated and new missions are assigned as the contingency
situation develops.
9-55. Plans are developed which, taken as a whole, may constitute a battle or
operation within the designated area. This is particularly true in the basing
area, since most of the forces operating there will be small units. Their ac-
tions are timed to occur simultaneously or sequentially to achieve a result
over time. For example, a series of actions against an airfield, set to occur
1
For U.S. forces other than aviators, this phase may present the greatest threat. |
7-100.1 | 225 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
within certain timeframes, can have the net effect of not only destroying air-
craft and their support facilities but also degrading enemy air operations. An
additional payoff is the possible diversion of enemy forces from other areas to
secure the facility.
Participants
9-56. Attacks on airfields and related facilities feature coordinated opera-
tions by all available forces, and they are primarily not air defense units.
Aviation, SSMs, artillery, or SPF can destroy air C2 facilities, aviation
support facilities, and the enemy’s aircraft while they are still on the ground.
When the enemy is operating from bases in or near State territory, the de-
struction or degradation of these systems may be achieved through the use of
raids and ambushes by regular ground forces, insurgents, or partisans.
9-57. Disruption Forces. Typical targets for attack by all forces in the dis-
ruption zone include enemy airfields and attack helicopter FARPs. The forces
employed for such attacks consist almost exclusively of small units.
9-58. When the OPFOR is forced to withdraw from an area, this may become
a basing area for the enemy. In such cases, the OPFOR may leave behind
a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) in a hide position. In other cases, it can
infiltrate a single-round rocket launcher or single mortars to occupy hide
positions near the target. The hides are situated in complex terrain,
highly camouflaged, and dispersed over a wide area. Once given the order
to execute, the firing systems work on a predetermined firing schedule issued as
part of an overall plan.
9-59. MRL system hides might contain only one system, which is loaded and
ready to fire, with previously determined firing data set on the weapon.
Crews manning the systems bivouac away from the system to keep it cold.
Crews have communication capability but are kept on radio silence. When
monitoring and acknowledging one-time orders to execute, they do so away
from the system. Once given the order to execute, the firing systems work on
a predetermined firing schedule issued as part of an overall plan. Each MRL
may be assigned the mission of firing once. Firing occurs in a predetermined
sequence separated by time. The net effect of this tactic is to destroy or
damage facilities and/or aircraft on the ground and degrade the operating
capability of support personnel. Munitions loads can be mixed dependent
on the desired effect. They can include scatterable mines, delayed-fuzed
munitions, high-explosive (HE), and chemical.
9-60. This effort can be enhanced through the employment of single mortars
and/or single-round rocket launchers. The weapon crews operating from pre-
selected hides can move to firing positions where rounds are cached. Once
laid in, the mortars can fire rounds in rapid succession at targets on the air-
field and then move back to hides. Given range and terrain considerations,
larger-caliber mortars (120-mm) can be used in conjunction with laser target
designators to place rounds on point targets such as large aircraft, fuel stor-
age and ammunition facilities, and hangers.
9-61. Small SPF teams equipped with explosives or man-portable antitank
guided missiles (ATGMs) can target aircraft on the ground, or air traffic con-
trol or maintenance vehicles and facilities. SPF teams with shoulder-fired |
7-100.1 | 226 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
SAMs can engage enemy aircraft taking off or landing at airfields. OPFOR
SPF or affiliated insurgents or terrorists can conduct raids against enemy air
bases and other installations, using terror tactics to destroy enemy systems
and generate fear. The goal is to present the enemy with a nonlinear,
simultaneous battlefield. Attacking such targets not only denies the enemy
sanctuary, but also can weaken his national will to continue the conflict.
9-62. Infiltrated or stay-behind SPF and infantry can conduct on-call raids
against airfields and ground support facilities. These raids can be timed in
conjunction with other methods so that they assist in keeping the target
under constant pressure. SPF or infantry can also conduct ambushes along
LOCs to destroy certain types of vehicles or equipment related to air operations.
9-63. National- and Operational-Level Assets. Some of the means
available to attack these targets may be national- and operational-level
assets. Since the OPFOR may be unable to reach such targets with its own Air
Force aircraft, it may use long-range artillery, rockets, or missiles—possibly
to deliver persistent chemical attacks or other weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)—to disrupt or degrade enemy activities in the basing area.
9-64. Affiliated Forces. In each contingency area, OPFOR planners try to
identify insurgents, sympathizers, terrorist groups, and even criminal or-
ganizations that might participate in Phase I. Some of these affiliated forces
can conduct raids or ambushes and any of them can employ terror tactics to
disrupt enemy operations at bases. They can also intimidate host country
civilian contractors to force them to sabotage the enemy operations they
were hired to support.
PHASE II
9-65. The second phase of air defense aims at destroying enemy aircraft
while in flight and before they enter the airspace over OPFOR ground
maneuver forces. The “flight area” overlaps the basing area and extends
from enemy bases to the battle zones of OPFOR units. Thus, the OPFOR’s
disruption zone(s) are included in this area, since one of the missions per-
formed in this zone is to destroy aerial platforms before they get to the battle
zone. The OPFOR often plans air defense ambushes in the flight area.
Planning
9-66. As with Phase I, planning for Phase II occurs primarily at the national
and operational levels. This planning includes any OSCs whose AORs fall in
the “flight area.” Although tactical units in the disruption zone can carry out
air defense-related actions, these actions are part of a larger plan.
Participants
9-67. In Phase II, OPFOR SPF teams can infiltrate man-portable, shoulder-
fired SAMs close to airfields or along identified and potential flight routes in
the flight area. These teams are best employed in pairs. One team can over-
watch an airfield and transmit information on the departure of aircraft and
their direction of flight to another team with SAMs. Alternatively, the SPF
observers could pass this information as early warning to other air defense
units. |
7-100.1 | 227 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
9-68. After that, the Phase II mission is performed primarily by air defense
forces at the strategic and operational levels. Interceptor aircraft and long-
and medium-range SAMs conduct this phase of the air defense.
9-69. When the enemy aircraft enter an OPFOR disruption zone, shorter-range
operational- and tactical-level air defense systems can engage them. Such systems
often conduct air defense ambushes from positions within the disruption zone.
PHASE III
9-70. The third phase entails the destruction of enemy aircraft that have
penetrated into the airspace over OPFOR ground maneuver forces. Thus, the
“target area” consists of the area where enemy aircraft have penetrated over
the OPFOR disruption, battle, and support zones. The disruption zone is in-
cluded here, since part of the air defense mission in it is to protect forces on
the ground within that zone.
9-71. In Phase III, it is not always necessary to destroy the enemy aircraft.
After all, the objective is to deny enemy aviation the ability to interfere with
OPFOR ground maneuver units. The OPFOR can accomplish this either by
destroying enemy aircraft or by forcing them to expend their munitions beyond
effective range or by diverting the aircraft before they reach their targets.
Planning
9-72. Planning for Phase III extends down to the tactical level. However,
tactical efforts are typically part of a plan for integrated air defense at the
operational and perhaps the national level.
Participants
9-73. In Phase III, the OPFOR may be able to employ its own tactical fighter
aircraft, operating in the relatively safe airspace of the “target area.” These
fighters and fighter-interceptors can engage enemy aircraft that have “leaked
through” ground-based air defenses. However, the bulk of the air defense effort
in Phase III falls upon short- to medium-range SAMs and antiaircraft (AA)
guns of tactical air defense units, complemented by operational- and national-
level air defense assets and other weapons of the ground maneuver units.
9-74. In the “target area,” the OPFOR is particularly concerned about attack
helicopters using standoff firing techniques. It is critical to identify likely fir-
ing positions for these helicopters through terrain analysis. These sites will
be located primarily in the disruption zone. The planned combined use of
antihelicopter mines, artillery, and remote sensors by OSCs and their con-
stituent organizations can be an effective tactic against attack helicopters.
9-75. Once identified, potential sites for attack helicopter firing positions can
be seeded with antihelicopter mines. These are directional fragmentation
mines that function like a Claymore mine, but are larger. Once emplaced, the
mines can be left unattended. Built-in sensors detect approaching helicopters
and initiate the mine when a helicopter enters the lethal zone. Thus, the
antihelicopter mine systems can autonomously detect and engage enemy
helicopters. This technique can be used at some potential sites to economize
other air defense assets for use at the most likely sites. |
7-100.1 | 228 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
9-76. Another method is to emplace remote sensors to overwatch the sites,
and have the sites registered as preplanned artillery targets. Once the sen-
sors pick up the incoming helicopters, the information is relayed to artillery
units that take the sites under fire using variable-time-fuzed munitions. This
tactic can either destroy or damage the aircraft or cause the area to be unusable.
In lieu of remote sensors, small teams of SPF or affiliated forces can be posi-
tioned to overwatch the most likely sites and relay information back to the guns.
9-77. Another crude but potentially effective method is to have engineers
string cables across the helicopters’ avenues of ingress. Engineers can also
assist in the construction of deception positions to divert enemy air attack
from actual forces or to lure the enemy into air defense ambushes.
ASSETS
9-78. In the OPFOR’s approach to all-arms air defense, various services of
the Armed Forces and various branches within the services participate in the
mission of air defense. However, there are some forces that specialize in air
defense.
9-79. Both the Air Force and the Army maintain air defense forces. In
peacetime, all these air defense assets belong to the OPFOR’s administrative
force structure. Even in wartime, some of themsuch as the national-level
Air Defense Forcesmay remain centrally controlled at the national or
theater level. Other assets from the administrative force structure are
initially allocated to OSCs. An OSC, in turn, may allocate some of its air
defense assets to augment those of its tactical subordinates. Thus, it is
hard to predict where national-, operational-, and tactical-level assets may
actually appear in the wartime, fighting force structure.
9-80. Within the limits of its economic capabilities, the OPFOR has incorpo-
rated recent technological developments into its air defense weapons. It may
invest in a few high-technology systems that provide it a technological niche
that it can exploit against even the most modern enemy air forces. Deploy-
ment of advanced air defense systems, even in limited numbers, would affect
all enemy air operations.
NATIONAL-LEVEL ASSETS
9-81. National-level air defense forces focus their efforts on destroying enemy
aircraft, while protecting critical defensive positions and key political and
economic sites. National-level assets include fighter-interceptor aircraft of
the Air Force. Against a regional opponent, the OPFOR can use these aircraft
to prevent enemy aircraft from entering or operating in OPFOR airspace. It
can destroy enemy aircraft before they even take off by using air attacks and
the long-range rockets and missiles of the Strategic Forces or direct action
teams from its SPF Command.
9-82. The Air Force also includes Air Defense Forces with which the
OPFOR can successfully defend its airspace against regional opponents.
These national-level assets, along with operational-level air defenses, also
provide the capability to challenge or deny air access into the region by out-
side forces, at least initially. |
7-100.1 | 229 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
9-83. The State’s national-level Air Defense Forces have medium- and long-
range SAMs, some short-range AA guns, and early warning radar units.
These forces reflect the State’s force development philosophy. They combine
obsolescent and state-of-the-art air defense firing units to support area cov-
erage and point protection of high-value assets. The State is investing in
point-protection technology that it believes can prove effective in defending
against cruise missiles. This capability would include the ability to deploy
and use GPS jammers.
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ASSETS
9-84. The Army recognizes the importance of preventing or at least delay-
ing enemy air superiority. Therefore, it maintains its own operational- and
tactical-level air defense forces in addition to those subordinate to the Air
Force. Army air defense includes mobile air defense units and large numbers
of shoulder-fired SAMs. However, air defense involves use of all arms of the
ground forces, not just the specialized air defense units.
9-85. The inventory of operational-level air defense weapons includes a vari-
ety of missiles, guns, and support equipment. The numbers and types of air
defense assets vary with the size and composition of the OSC. An OSC may
have some air defense assets that it reserves for coverage of its own operational
support zone and for engaging enemy aircraft that get past tactical air defenses.
It also has assets it can allocate to subordinates to augment tactical air defenses
at critical points on the battlefield or to cover gaps in the air defense umbrella.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
9-86. Operational-level air defense systems include medium-range SAMs
(and perhaps some long-range SAMs) for medium- to high-altitude area cov-
erage. Some SAMs have the capability to engage ballistic or cruise missiles,
as well as aircraft. Medium-range SAM units typically have some AA guns or
shoulder-fired SAMs for self-protection.
Antiaircraft Guns
9-87. Operational-level commands may have some short-range AA guns for
point protection. The AA guns found at the operational level are typically
towed systems that lack the mobility of self-propelled SAM systems and
cannot fire on the move. These AA gun units are capable of only a limited
area coverage and are better suited for short-range, point protection of
individual locations. Within their range capabilities, however, these AA
guns are extremely lethal weapons.
Radars
9-88. OSCs normally have early warning units with a variety of air surveil-
lance and target acquisition radars, plus some AA guns or shoulder-fired
SAMs for self-protection. The majority of air defense surveillance radars are
at the operational level. (See the Air Surveillance section later in this chapter
for more detail.) |
7-100.1 | 230 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
TACTICAL-LEVEL ASSETS
9-89. Aside from air defense assets that might be allocated down from the
operational level, tactical maneuver units have a number of systems de-
signed for air defense. They also have systems belonging to other arms that
can contribute to the air defense mission.
Air Defense Systems
9-90. Tactical-level air defense includes short- and medium-range SAMs,
short-range AA guns, and shoulder-fired SAMs. Tactical assets may also
include some combination AA gun and missile systems, offering added
flexibility. The OPFOR’s tactical air defenses support the need to protect
ground forces and the desire to seize any opportunity to shoot down high-
visibility (flagship) enemy airframes.
9-91. The Army considers every soldier with a shoulder-fired SAM to be an
air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively
low cost. Therefore, the OPFOR is acquiring as many of them as possible,
within economic constraints, and issuing them in large numbers to a wide
variety of units. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides
the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in any area near
OPFOR units. The OPFOR could also employ them to set ambushes for enemy
helicopters in an attempt to bring down what it perceives to be an enemy flag-
ship system.
9-92. Radar-controlled self-propelled AA guns can fire on the move. Aside
from short-range air defense, they also can be employed against all but the
heaviest of enemy ground force systems, as well as against personnel, with
devastating effects. Shoulder-fired SAMs can also find use against light vehi-
cles when other, more likely systems are unavailable.
Other Arms
9-93. Throughout maneuver units, there are also a number of other systems
that can be used in an air defense role. The heavy AA machineguns on tanks
are specifically designed for air defense, although they can also be used
against ground targets. Machineguns on APCs and automatic cannon on
IFVs can engage both ground and air targets. Some ATGMs can be effective
against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can
also be integral parts of the air defense scheme.
9-94. A variety of relatively new systems, which significantly enhance air defense
capabilities, have entered the OPFOR inventory. These include remote heli-
copter infrared (IR) sensing devices and passive acoustic acquisition systems.
Antihelicopter mines are widely available and increase the OPFOR ability to
deny firing positions and landing sites to enemy rotary-wing aircraft. Another
example of OPFOR all-arms air defense is the use of artillery in conjunction
with antihelicopter mines against attack helicopter firing positions.
9-95. The OPFOR continuously looks for new and adaptive ways of employ-
ing not only air defense systems but also systems not traditionally associated
with air defense. It attempts to adapt these systems and develop new tactics |
7-100.1 | 231 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
that may help to fill the void when a more sophisticated enemy denies the
OPFOR a specific capability.
NONLETHAL AIR DEFENSE ASSETS
9-96. The OPFOR also uses nonlethal air defense-related systems, such as
air defense jammers, radar corner reflectors, and GPS jammers. Such sys-
tems are potential combat multipliers, when employed in conjunction with
SAM and AA gun systems, to defend high-value assets.
Air Defense Jammers
9-97. OSCs can have air defense jamming units. These units employ a vari-
ety of radar and communications jamming and target acquisition systems.
Electronic intercept systems provide targeting information to the jammers.
9-98. Air defense jammers target the onboard emitters of enemy aircraft
used for terrain-following, navigation, and radar-aided bombing, as well as
airborne radar reconnaissance systems. The goal of jamming these systems is
twofold. The primary goal is to force the attacking enemy aircraft to alter
their flight profile, bringing them into the targeting umbrella of SAMs or AA
guns. Jamming the terrain-following radars or radar altimeters employed by
attacking aircraft does this by forcing low-flying aircraft to gain altitude. The
secondary goal is to cause the aircraft to miss their target or abort the
mission through the disruption of radar-aided bombing and target acquisition
systems.
9-99. The OPFOR deploys air defense jamming assets, in conjunction with le-
thal systems, to defend what the OPFOR has identified as high-value assets.
Examples of these include air bases, major logistics centers, critical LOCs
and choke points, and higher-level military CPs.
Corner Reflectors
9-100. Radar corner reflectors provide a low-cost and effective addition to ex-
pensive air defense jammers. These passive systems can deceive enemy air-
borne surveillance and target acquisition radars by providing false or multi-
ple targets. Corner reflectors can also mask or distort radar reference points.
GPS Jammers
9-101. The OPFOR also can employ low-cost GPS jammers to disrupt aircraft
navigation and precision munitions targeting. GPS jammers are also effective
against cruise missiles.
PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE MEASURES
9-102. In addition to active air defense, the OPFOR practices a variety of
passive air defense measures. Many of these measures involve use of C3D or
maneuver and dispersal techniques. Sophisticated camouflage, deception, de-
coy, or mockup systems can degrade the effects of enemy systems. When con-
ducting actions against a superior foe, the OPFOR must seek to operate on
the margins of enemy technology and maneuver during periods of reduced
exposure. These and other measures constitute passive air defense. |
7-100.1 | 232 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception
9-103. The OPFOR emphasizes the use of natural terrain and vegetation,
camouflage netting and other artificial materials, smokescreens, and decoy
equipment to provide C3D. Deception includes deception positions and decoys.
The OPFOR can use quick-setup, high-fidelity decoys; derelict vehicles;
radar emitter decoys; quick-hardening foams; and many other types of
manufactured and field-expedient means. It also employs simple heat
sources to confuse IR sensors and weapons seekers.
9-104. The dispersion measures discussed below should be employed with
consideration of the protective and screening properties of natural and artifi-
cial screens, and would be combined with thermal camouflage and engineer
preparation of positions. Natural screens consist of vegetation, terrain folds,
populated areas, and local features or objects. Artificial screens include
camouflage nets that would enhance natural screens, and radar-opaque
screens using local features, radar nets, metallic nets, and corner reflectors.
Concealment would be combined with the use of deception positions, using
decoy equipment and activities. Like real positions, deception positions would
be changed periodically. Dummy emitters and jammers would be used to
attract enemy reconnaissance and targeting.
Maneuver and Dispersal
9-105. Maneuver and dispersal of air defense assets, both emitters and other
types of equipment, is important for their survival both during movement
and in combat formations. Sudden maneuver and periodic changes of position
are simple and effective means to counter enemy reconnaissance and preci-
sion weapons; these measures are planned and implemented at the tactical
level.
9-106. All, or only a portion of, an air defense unit may maneuver to alter-
nate positions, depending on such factors as the degree of air threat, time of
day, and meteorological conditions. The first parts of the unit to shift posi-
tions are those that have performed combat alert duty for an extended pe-
riod, or that have been deployed in the position they currently occupy since
before the onset of combat. The optimum configuration for shifting to alter-
nate positions involves no more than one-third of the assets of a given unit
shifting at one time, in order to maintain adequate air defense coverage.
9-107. The OPFOR uses certain rules of thumb for distances related to dis-
persion and distances of air defense units from supported units and from the
battle line. The OPFOR recognizes that these distances vary with the situa-
tion and the threat. Of special concern is the enemy ATGM and precision
weapon capability. If it is high, the OPFOR increases the spacing between
SAM launchers and the distances of air defense systems from the battle line.
Ideally, the degree of dispersal for units would be the same whether the en-
emy is employing conventional or precision weapons or even tactical nuclear
weapons. A general rule for the degree of dispersion is that the enemy attack
should not destroy two adjacent units simultaneously. A maximum of one-
third of a unit should be vulnerable to a single precision weapon attack. |
7-100.1 | 233 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
Other Survivability Measures
9-108. Other measures taken to improve the security and survivability of air
defense systems include the following:
• Signals security. SAM and AA gun system radars, which move forward
to cover the offensive or defensive action of a maneuver unit, remain
silent until after the maneuver unit begins to execute its mission.
• Frequency spread. Each of the air defense systems operates within
separate radar frequency bands. (No one jamming system could oper-
ate simultaneously against all bands.)
• Frequency diversity. Tracking and guidance radars change frequen-
cies to overcome jamming.
• Multiple and interchangeable missile guidance systems. Some
OPFOR systems work on pulsed radar; others work on continuous
waves. Some radar tracking systems also possess optical tracking for
continued operations in a high electronic countermeasures environ-
ment; others systems use IR homing.
• Mobility. All OPFOR tactical air defense systems and most opera-
tional-level systems are mobile. They can quickly change positions af-
ter firing or after enemy reconnaissance units detect them.
RECONNAISSANCE
9-109. Reconnaissance related to air defense takes two basic forms. First,
commanders conduct terrain reconnaissance to determine likely avenues of
approach for enemy aircraft and optimum positions for air defense weapons.
Then air surveillance seeks to detect approaching aircraft and provide early
warning and target information.
TERRAIN RECONNAISSANCE
9-110. The OPFOR places significant emphasis on identifying all potential
attack routes for low-flying enemy aircraft of all types. Routes of approach suit-
able for armed helicopters and positions from which these helicopters might em-
ploy ATGMs are of special concern. The OPFOR considers armed helicopters to
be a serious threat to its ground maneuver units. The OPFOR trains command-
ers to look for areas masked by trees or folds in the terrain where enemy aircraft
might use nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight techniques to avoid radar detection.
9-111. Both the commander of the supported maneuver unit and the com-
mander of the supporting air defense unit usually conduct terrain reconnais-
sance. A preliminary map reconnaissance can tentatively identify positions
for deployment of air defense weapons in defensive areas, along movement
routes, or in areas seized by advancing OPFOR units.
AIR SURVEILLANCE
9-112. The principle objective of air surveillance is to provide the earliest
possible warning of approaching enemy aircraft and to develop target informa-
tion for planning and conducting air defense. Forearmed with this information,
the OPFOR can ensure that it can mass the fires of dispersed air defense
units to engage the intruders. Ground-based and airborne reconnaissance assets |
7-100.1 | 234 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
at the operational level play a major role in gathering, integrating, and
disseminating information to tactical units. Continuous surveillance of
surrounding airspace ensures current data on the enemy air situation.
9-113. The OPFOR uses electronic and electro-optical means and visual
observation to conduct air surveillance. The air defense forces have a passive
early warning system based on a combination of radar systems and observers
that will serve them well in the early stages of combat operations against
even the most modern opponents. In later stages, the OPFOR accepts that it
will either lose many of its airborne and/or ground-based early warning systems
or at least not be able to use them with optimum effectiveness. When technical
early warning systems are not available, the OPFOR is prepared to continue air
defense operations while relying primarily on observers for air surveillance.
Radars
9-114. Air defense radars fall into two general categories: surveillance and
fire control. The category of surveillance radars includes early warning,
target-acquisition, and height-finding radars. Some fire control radars also
have limited target-acquisition capability.
9-115. National-, operational-, and tactical-level surveillance and target-
acquisition radars detect and monitor targets. The radars then provide the
necessary data for engagement. Radars work as part of the IADS rather than as
separate units. Air defense planners at all levels integrate radars into an overall
system of coverage.
9-116. Operational-level early warning units deploy their radars as close as
possible to the supported ground force unit’s battle line, in order to detect
enemy aircraft at maximum radar range. National-level early warning
units can establish a second line of radar posts behind the first line of op-
erational-level systems, in order to give depth. The types and capabilities
of the systems employed and whether the battlefield is linear or nonlinear
will determine the distances between lines.
9-117. Both national- and operational-level air defense forces maintain
reserves to expand coverage as the operation develops, to replace casualties,
or to establish a new line of radar posts. When the OPFOR is preparing for
offensive operations, operational-level early warning radars remain inactive
as part of C3D, and the national-level reserve radars deploy forward.
9-118. In many cases, long-range surveillance radars in early warning units
at the national and operational levels can gather target information long be-
fore the enemy aircraft come into the range of air defense firing units. These
radar units pass preliminary target data to air defense commanders and
their firing batteries. Commanders then select the weapon system that can
best engage a given target. The early warning units also pass warning infor-
mation to operational and tactical maneuver units and air defense firing units.
9-119. SAM systems and AA guns may have their own radars in the firing
positions or mounted on self-propelled systems. However, higher-level radars
can gather the information without unnecessarily exposing the air defense
firing units to detection and subsequent neutralization by enemy forces. This
practice reduces the vulnerability of battery radars and radar-equipped gun |
7-100.1 | 235 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
carriages and missile launchers to jamming or to destruction by antiradiation
missiles (ARMs) or other means.
9-120. The air surveillance radar network is difficult to avoid or defeat. Many
air defense radars are highly mobile and can displace quickly. Fire control
units turn on radars at the last minute to achieve surprise and to avoid exposing
themselves to enemy electronic or physical attack. The more advanced radar
systems have enhanced electronic protection from jamming and ARMs. The
wide spread of operating frequencies makes jamming difficult. Operator training
stresses electronic counter-countermeasure skills and the use of radio and elec-
tronic silence where possible. Units back up radar reconnaissance with visual
observation. Maneuver units have a radio net devoted exclusively to the passage
of air and NBC warnings. Radar provides an all-weather detection capability.
Visual Observation
9-121. Despite the presence of a technologically advanced early warning
system, the OPFOR continues to stress the importance of visual observation.
Air defense and maneuver units deploy air observers as a backup to radars
and so air defense units may not need to use their radars. In later stages of
combat against more modern opponents, the OPFOR may have to rely
heavily on observers after losing much of its radar capability.
9-122. An effective system of visual observation may often provide the first
warning of an enemy air attack, especially one conducted by low-flying aircraft
or armed helicopters using NOE techniques. When operating close to enemy
forces or in areas where enemy air attack is considered likely, all units post
air observers. In the defense, air observation posts are set up at suitable loca-
tions, usually on terrain offering good visibility, near CPs, and/or close to air
defense units in firing positions. During tactical movement and during both the
defense and offense, observers are posted on each vehicle. Observers are
changed frequently to reduce fatigue and maintain their effectiveness.
9-123. Whenever possible, the OPFOR tries to get SPF teams, human intelligence
(HUMINT) agents, or sympathetic civilians to visually observe enemy airfields
in or near the region. These observers report by radio or telephone the number
and types of aircraft taking off and their direction of travel. Other observers
stationed along probable approach routes can monitor and report the progress of
the enemy aircraft en route to their targets. Thus, OPFOR air defense units may
not need to use their radars to detect and track incoming aircraft.
REQUIREMENTS
9-124. The information required by air defense units falls into two categories:
information on enemy air actions and information that can complete the pic-
ture of the overall air situation. The first category is a joint responsibility of
all reconnaissance forces, and the second is the specific responsibility of air
defense reconnaissance units.
9-125. The first category includes data from which the OPFOR can determine
probable enemy air actions. This information is critical for planning and or-
ganizing the air defense system. Such information could include—
• The composition and strength of enemy air power. |
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