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7-100.1 | 35 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION VERSUS AN EXTRAREGIONAL POWER
1-54. The State assumes the distinct possibility of intervention by a major
extraregional power in any regional conflict. Consequently, it has devised the
following principles for applying its various instruments of diplomatic-
political, informational, economic, and military power against this type of threat.
CONTROL ACCESS INTO REGION
1-55. Extraregional enemies capable of achieving overmatch against the
State must first enter the region using power-projection capabilities. There-
fore, the State’s force design and investment strategy is focused on access
controlto selectively deny, delay, and disrupt entry of extraregional forces
into the region and to force them to keep their operating bases beyond con-
tinuous operational reach. This is the easiest manner of preventing the ac-
cumulation of enemy combat power in the region and thus defeating a techno-
logically superior enemy.
1-56. Access-control operations are continuous throughout a strategic cam-
paign and can reach beyond the theater as defined by the State’s NCA. They
begin even before the extraregional power declares its intent to come into the re-
gion, and continue regardless of whether the State is conducting regional, transi-
tion, or adaptive operations. Access-control operations come in three basic forms:
strategic preclusion, operational exclusion, and access limitation.
Strategic Preclusion
1-57. Strategic preclusion seeks to completely deter extraregional involve-
ment or severely limit its scope and intensity. The State would attempt to
achieve strategic preclusion in order to reduce the influence of the extrare-
gional power or to improve its own regional or international standing. It
would employ all its instruments of power to preclude direct involvement by
the extraregional power. Actions can take many forms and often contain sev-
eral lines of operation working simultaneously.
1-58. The primary target of strategic preclusion is the extraregional power’s
national will. First, the State would conduct diplomatic and perception man-
agement activities aimed at influencing regional, transnational, and world
opinion. This could either break apart ad hoc coalitions or allow the State to
establish a coalition of its own or at least gain sympathy. For example, the
State might use a disinformation campaign to discredit the legitimacy of dip-
lomatic and economic sanctions imposed upon it. The extraregional power’s
economy and military would be secondary targets, with both practical and
symbolic goals. This might include using global markets and international fi-
nancial systems to disrupt the economy of the extraregional power, or con-
ducting physical and information attacks against critical economic centers.
Similarly, the military could be attacked indirectly by disrupting its power
projection, mobilization, and training capacity. Preclusive actions are likely
to increase in intensity and scope as the extraregional power moves closer to
military action. If strategic preclusion fails, the State will turn to operational
methods that attempt to limit the scope of extraregional involvement or cause
it to terminate quickly. |
7-100.1 | 36 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Operational Exclusion
1-59. Operational exclusion seeks to selectively deny an extraregional force
the use of or access to forward bases of operation within the region or even
outside the theater defined by the NCA. For example, through diplomacy,
economic or political connections, information campaigns, and/or hostile ac-
tions, the State might seek to deny the enemy the use of bases in other for-
eign nations. It might also attack population and economic centers for the in-
timidation effect, using long-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), WMD,
or SPF.
1-60. Forces originating in the enemy’s homeland must negotiate long and
difficult air and surface lines of communication (LOCs) merely to reach the
region. Therefore, the State will use any means at its disposal to also attack
the enemy forces along routes to the region, at transfer points en route, at ae-
rial and sea ports of embarkation (APOEs and SPOEs), and even at their
home stations. These are fragile and convenient targets in support of transi-
tion and adaptive operations.
Access Limitation
1-61. Access limitation seeks to affect an extraregional enemy’s ability to in-
troduce forces into the theater. Access-control operations do not necessarily
have to deny the enemy access entirely. A more realistic goal is to limit or in-
terrupt access into the theater in such a way that the State’s forces are capa-
ble of dealing with them. By controlling the amount of force or limiting the
options for force introduction, the State can create conditions that place its
conventional capabilities on a par with those of an extraregional force. Capa-
bility is measured in terms of what the enemy can bring to bear in the thea-
ter, rather than what the enemy possesses.
1-62. The State’s goal is to limit the enemy’ accumulation of applicable com-
bat power to a level and to locations that do not threaten the accomplishment
of a strategic campaign. This may occur through many methods. For example,
the State may be able to limit or interrupt the enemy’s deployment through
actions against his aerial and sea ports of debarkation (APODs and SPODs)
in the region. Hitting such targets also has political and psychological value.
The State will try to disrupt and isolate enemy forces that are in the region or
coming into it, so that it can destroy them piecemeal. It might exploit and
manipulate international media to paint foreign intervention in a poor
light, decrease international resolve, and affect the force mix and rules of
engagement (ROE) of the deploying extraregional forces.
EMPLOY OPERATIONAL SHIELDING
1-63. The State will use any means necessary to protect key elements of its
combat power from destruction by an extraregional forceparticularly by air
and missile forces. This protection may come from use of any or all of the fol-
lowing:
• Complex terrain.
• Noncombatants.
• Risk of unacceptable collateral damage. |
7-100.1 | 37 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
• Countermeasure systems.
• Dispersion.
• Fortifications.
• IW.
1-64. Operational shielding generally cannot protect the entire force for an
extended time period. Rather, the State will seek to protect selected elements
of its forces for enough time to gain the freedom of action necessary to prose-
cute important elements of a strategic campaign.
CONTROL TEMPO
1-65. The OPFOR initially employs rapid tempo to conclude regional opera-
tions before an extraregional force can be introduced. It will also use rapid
tempo to set conditions for access-control operations before the extraregional
force can establish a foothold in the region. Once it has done that, it needs to
be able to control the tempoto ratchet it up or down, as is advantageous to
its own operational or tactical plans.
1-66. During the initial phases of an extraregional enemy’s entry into the re-
gion, the OPFOR may employ a high operational tempo. Taking advantage of
the weaknesses inherent in enemy power projection, it seeks to terminate the
conflict quickly before main enemy forces can be brought to bear. If the
OPFOR cannot end the conflict quickly, it may take steps to slow the tempo and
prolong the conflict, taking advantage of enemy lack of commitment over time.
CAUSE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE CASUALTIES
1-67. The OPFOR will try to inflict highly visible and embarrassing losses on
enemy forces to weaken the enemy’s domestic resolve and national will to
sustain the deployment or conflict. Modern wealthy nations have shown an
apparent lack of commitment over time, and sensitivity to domestic and
world opinion in relation to conflict and seemingly needless casualties.
1-68. The OPFOR has the advantage of disproportionate interests: the ex-
traregional power may have limited objectives and only casual interest in the
conflict, while the State approaches it from the perspective of total war and a
threat to its aspirations or even to its national survival. The State is willing
to commit all means necessary, for as long as necessary, to achieve its strate-
gic goals. Compared to the extraregional enemy, the State stands more will-
ing to absorb higher military and civilian casualties in order to achieve vic-
tory. It will try to influence public opinion in the enemy’s homeland to the ef-
fect that the goal of intervention is not worth the cost.
NEUTRALIZE TECHNOLOGICAL OVERMATCH
1-69. Against an extraregional force, the OPFOR will forego massed forma-
tions, patterned echelonment, and linear operations that would present easy
targets for such an enemy. It will hide and disperse its forces in areas where
complex terrain limits the enemy’s ability to apply his full range of techno-
logical capabilities. However, the OPFOR can rapidly mass forces and fires
from these dispersed locations for decisive combat at the time and place of its
own choosing. |
7-100.1 | 38 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
1-70. Another way to operate on the margins of enemy technology is to ma-
neuver during periods of reduced exposure. The OPFOR trains its forces to
operate in adverse weather, limited visibility, rugged terrain, and urban envi-
ronments that shield them from the effects of the enemy’s high-technology weap-
ons and deny the enemy the full benefits of his advanced reconnaissance, intelli-
gence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) systems.
1-71. Modern militaries rely upon information and information systems to
plan and conduct operations. For this reason, the OPFOR will conduct exten-
sive information attacks and other offensive IW actions. It can also use the
enemy’s robust array of RISTA systems against him. A sophisticated enemy’s
large numbers of sensors can overwhelm subordinate units’ ability to receive,
process, and analyze raw intelligence data and to provide timely and accurate
intelligence analysis. The OPFOR can add to this saturation problem by us-
ing deception to flood enemy sensors with masses of conflicting information.
Conflicting data from different sensors at different levels (such as satellite
imagery conflicting with data from unmanned aerial vehicles) can confuse the
enemy and degrade his situational awareness.
1-72. The OPFOR will concentrate its own RISTA, maneuver, and fire sup-
port means on the destruction of high-visibility (flagship) enemy systems.
This offers exponential value in terms of increasing the relative combat
power of the OPFOR and also maximizes effects in the information and psy-
chological arenas. Losses among these premier systems may not only degrade
operational capability, but also undermine enemy morale. Thus, attacks
against such targets are not always linked to military objectives.
CHANGE THE NATURE OF CONFLICT
1-73. The OPFOR will try to change the nature of conflict to exploit the dif-
ferences between friendly and enemy capabilities. Following an initial period
of regionally-focused conventional operations and utilizing the opportunity af-
forded by phased enemy deployment, the OPFOR will change its operations
to focus on preserving combat power and exploiting enemy ROE. This shift in
the focus of operations will present the fewest targets possible to the rapidly
growing combat power of the enemy. Also, the OPFOR or affiliated forces can
use terror tactics against enemy civilians or soldiers not directly connected to
the intervention as a device to change the fundamental nature of the conflict.
1-74. Against early-entry forces, the OPFOR may still be able to use the de-
sign it employed in previous operations against regional opponents, particu-
larly if access-control operations have been successful. However, as the extrare-
gional force builds up to the point where it threatens to overmatch the OPFOR,
the OPFOR is prepared to disperse its forces and employ them in patternless op-
erations that present a battlefield that is difficult for the enemy to analyze and
predict.
1-75. The OPFOR may hide and disperse its forces in areas of sanctuary. The
sanctuary may be physical, often located in urban areas or other complex ter-
rain that limits or degrades the capabilities of enemy systems. However, the
OPFOR may also use moral sanctuary by placing its forces in areas shielded
by civilians or close to sites that are culturally, politically, economically, or
ecologically sensitive. It will defend in sanctuaries when necessary. However, |
7-100.1 | 39 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
units of the OPFOR will move out of sanctuaries and attack when they can
create a window of opportunity or when opportunity is presented by physical
or natural conditions that limit or degrade the enemy’s systems.
1-76. OPFOR units do not avoid contact; rather, they often seek contact, but
on their own terms. Their preferred tactics under these conditions would be
the ambush and raid as a means of avoiding decisive combat with superior
forces. They will also try to mass fires from dispersed locations to destroy key
enemy systems or formations. However, when an opportunity presents itself,
the OPFOR can rapidly mass forces and execute decisive combat.
ALLOW NO SANCTUARY
1-77. Along with dispersion, decoys, and deception, the OPFOR uses urban
areas and other complex terrain as sanctuary from the effects of enemy
forces. Meanwhile, its intent is to deny enemy forces the use of such terrain.
This forces the enemy to operate in areas where the OPFOR’s long-range fires
and strikes can be more effective.
1-78. The OPFOR seeks to deny enemy forces safe haven during every phase
of a deployment and as long as they are in the region. It is prepared to attack
enemy forces anywhere on the battlefield, as well as to his strategic depth.
The resultant drain on manpower and resources to provide adequate force-
protection measures can reduce the enemy’s strategic, operational, and tacti-
cal means to conduct war and erode his national will to sustain conflict. The
goal is to present the enemy with a nonlinear, simultaneous battlefield. Such
actions will not only deny the enemy sanctuary, but also weaken his national
will, particularly if the OPFOR or affiliated forces can strike targets in the
enemy’s homeland.
OPFOR MILITARY AND OPERATIONAL ART
1-79. The OPFOR embraces the concept that military strategy and opera-
tions are an important part, but not the whole, of the conduct of war. Military
strategy is not separate from politics and political leadership but a means to
support the State in achieving its political objectives. The national security
strategy is essentially a political document that sets forth the goals of the
State and informs military strategists. It is their responsibility to build,
train, and employ forces for the purpose of achieving those political goals.
1-80. When the political leadership makes the decision to employ military
forces to achieve a goal, the military strategy for that employment is closely
associated with diplomatic-political, informational, and economic strategies
to bring about a favorable political result. Thus, the military leadership re-
quires a broad understanding of the overall national strategy, and the politi-
cal leadership needs an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of
the military.
MILITARY STRATEGY
1-81. The OPFOR views military strategy as the art of developing the ways
and means for the application of military power to achieve State objectives.
Ways and means encompass the threatened or actual use of force. Military |
7-100.1 | 40 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
doctrine describes fundamental principles and provides guidelines for the use
of military forces in pursuit of national objectives.
1-82. Military and operational art is the theory and practice of conducting
armed conflict. It recognizes that war is a human endeavor and therefore not
amenable to quantifiable formulas that limit thinking and lead to unimagina-
tive and predictable solutions. It is the intellectual and intuitive synthesis of
military doctrine, military science, and intangibles to address the problem at
hand. Military science is not discarded but, like military doctrine, is seen as
providing tools that support the practice of military art. The single, most im-
portant ingredient in the practice of military strategy, and of military and
operational art, is the commander. The commander who develops creative so-
lutions to military problems is highly valued.
1-83. The study and analysis of political and military history has an impor-
tant place in the development of OPFOR military thought and doctrine. The
OPFOR views the role of history and past experience as one that provides in-
sights and observations into the present and future conduct of war. It is a
significant source for the development of new and adaptive ways of conduct-
ing military operations. The OPFOR has developed an effective method for
identifying, analyzing, validating, and applying new concepts. It is an inter-
active process that establishes a partnership between military colleges and
civilian institutions on one side and the active force on the other.
OPERATIONAL ART
1-84. Operational art links tactics and strategy to form a coherent structure
for the conduct of war. Some strategists have traditionally expressed opera-
tional art as the sequencing of battles and engagements so that the collective
outcomes will produce a specified military condition in a theater. Others de-
scribe operational art as the blending of direct and indirect approaches to
achieve necessary conditions in a theater. The OPFOR has developed a style
of operational art that is an amalgam of both theories, capturing the best
from each.
1-85. No particular level of command is uniquely concerned with operational
art. The Chief of the General Staff and the theater commander(s) normally
plan and direct strategic and theater campaigns, respectively, while field
group and operational-strategic command (OSC) commanders normally de-
sign the major operations of a campaign. The OPFOR recognizes the classic
division of warfare between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
However, the boundaries between these levels are not associated so much
with particular levels of command as with the effect or contribution to achiev-
ing strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.
OPERATIONAL ART AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
1-86. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the national security strategy can
involve four types of strategic-level actions: strategic, regional, transition,
and adaptive operations. In specific terms, OPFOR operational art consists of
the sequencing of the actions of military forces to attain strategic goals set
forth within and across this spectrum of strategic-level actions. In practical
terms, this is expressed in the strategic campaign plan. |
7-100.1 | 41 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
1-87. Regional operations are largely conventional actions against a less ca-
pable force. While dealing with such a regional opponent primarily
through offensive means, the State employs its economic, informational,
and diplomatic-political instruments of power in a peacetime, “defensive”
mode against other regional and extraregional parties with whom it is not at
war. This overall strategy constitutes a “strategic defense” that supports the
offensive military operations being conducted in the region while seeking to
preclude outside involvement. The practitioner of operational art must insure
that his plan for use of forces is congruent with the aims of the SCP and vice
versa. The soldier does not view the proper, coordinated use of these other in-
struments of power as a hindrance. From his perspective, their use to influ-
ence an extraregional power not to commit forces or to delay their commit-
ment is the equivalent of having extra divisions.
1-88. Transition and particularly adaptive operations are at the core of what
makes OPFOR military and operational art distinctive, if not unique. The po-
litical and military leadership recognizes that attempts to achieve national
strategic goals through the use of force can result in a military response from
within and outside the region. Strategic plans take this possibility into ac-
count and, depending on the degree of risk, contingencies are planned to ac-
count for such an eventuality.
1-89. Applying the principles of operation versus an extraregional power,
(discussed earlier in this chapter) and taking a “systems warfare” approach,
the State and the OPFOR seek to develop contingency plans that transition
to a “strategic offense” while conducting military operations that are, at least
initially, defensive in nature. The purpose of the strategy is to disaggregate
the enemy’s elements of power through the conduct of strategic operations,
while seeking to disaggregate his combat systems at the operational level.
The ultimate goal is to exhaust the enemy and destroy his will to continue
the fight.
1-90. In preparing contingency plans, the political and military leadership
conducts a detailed analysis to determine major actions that might be taken
by an intervening force to mobilize, deploy, and operate within the region.
Using this analysis (which is continually updated) and the assessed risk, they
further refine the plan. Actions to support the plan, prior to its execution,
could include increasing the readiness of units, organizations, and industry
required to support an intervention scenario. Other actions could include pre-
positioning forces, weapons, and logistics to those areas that support the con-
tingency plan. Plans for strategic operations in support of transition and
adaptive operations are developed while the military operational planners
continue to plan for the employment of tactical forces to achieve the aims set
forth in the strategy. All of this is set against a matrix that identifies key
events that would trigger execution of the contingency.
1-91. Inherent in the concept of adaptive operations is the idea that the op-
erational planner assigns missions and arrays tactical forces in such a way to
support the operation. Although the tactical commander will understand,
from a conceptual context, that he is involved in adaptive operations, from a
tactical perspective that will be transparent. It is through the manner in
which the operational commander arrays and employs his forces that adap-
tive operations are achieved. Tactical commanders are adaptive in the sense |
7-100.1 | 42 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
that they have the flexibility within the missions assigned by the operational
commander and within the techniques and procedures they develop to more
effectively accomplish those missions.
1-92. The OPFOR includes in its planning and execution the use of paramili-
tary forces. It is important to stress that, with the exception of internal security
forces, those paramilitary organizations that are not part of the State structure
and do not necessarily share the State’s views on national security strategy.
THE ROLE OF PARAMILITARY AND IRREGULAR FORCES IN
OPERATIONS
1-93. Paramilitary forces are those organizations that are distinct from the
regular armed forces but resemble them in organization, equipment, training,
or purpose. Basically, any organization that accomplishes its purpose, even
partially, through the force of arms is considered a paramilitary organization.
These organizations can be part of the government infrastructure or operate
outside of the government or any institutionalized controlling authority.
1-94. In consonance with the concept of “all means necessary,” the OPFOR
views these organizations as assets that can be used to its advantage in time
of war. Within its own structure, the OPFOR has formally established this
concept by assigning the Internal Security Forces, part of the Ministry of the
Interior in peacetime, to the SHC during wartime. Additionally, the OPFOR
cultivates relationships with and covertly supports nongovernment paramili-
tary organizations to achieve common goals while at peace and to have a high
degree of influence on them when at war.
1-95. The primary paramilitary organizations are the Internal Security
Forces, insurgents, terrorists, and drug and criminal organizations. The de-
gree of control the OPFOR has over these organizations varies from absolute,
in the case of the Internal Security Forces, to tenuous when dealing with ter-
rorist and drug and criminal organizations. In the case of those organizations
not formally tied to the OPFOR structure, control can be enhanced through
the exploitation of common interests and ensuring that these organizations
see personal gain in supporting OPFOR goals.
1-96. The OPFOR views the creative use of these organizations as a means of
providing depth and continuity to its operations. A single attack by a terrorist
group will not in itself win the war. However, the use of paramilitary organi-
zations to carry out a large number of planned actions, in support of strategy
and operations, can play an important part in assisting the OPFOR in achiev-
ing its goals. These actions, taken in conjunction with other adaptive actions,
can also supplement a capability degraded due to enemy superiority.
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES
1-97. The Internal Security Forces subordinated to the SHC provide support
zone security and collect information on foreign organizations and spies. They
perform civil population control functions and ensure the loyalty of mobi-
lized militia forces. Some units are capable of tactical-level defensive ac-
tions if required. These basic tasks are not all-inclusive, and within their
capability these forces can perform a multitude of tasks limited only by |
7-100.1 | 43 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
the commander’s imagination. While performing these functions, the Inter-
nal Security Forces may be operating within their own hierarchy of com-
mand, or they may be assigned a dedicated command relationship within an
OSC or one of its tactical subordinates.
1-98. During regional operations, the Internal Security Forces may serve to
control the population situated in newly seized territory. They are an excel-
lent source of human intelligence and can provide security for key sites lo-
cated in the support zones. The Internal Security Forces can either augment
or replace regular military organizations in all aspects of prisoner-of-war
processing and control. While continuing their normal tasks in the homeland,
they can assist regular military organizations in the areas of traffic control
and regulation.
1-99. During transition operations, the Internal Security Forces evacuate im-
portant political and military prisoners to safe areas where they can continue
to serve as important sources of information or means of negotiation. Traffic
control and the security of key bridges and infrastructure take on a higher
level of importance as the OPFOR repositions and moves forces transitioning
to adaptive operations. The Internal Security Forces can continue to gather
intelligence from the local population and assist in mobilizing civilians in oc-
cupied territory for the purpose of augmenting OPFOR engineer labor re-
quirements. Finally, the use of qualified personnel to stay behind as intelli-
gence gatherers and liaison with insurgent, terrorist, and criminal organiza-
tions can provide the OPFOR an increased capability during the adaptive op-
erations that follow.
1-100. Especially important in the conduct of adaptive operations is the abil-
ity of the Internal Security Forces to free up regular military organizations
that can contribute directly to the fight. The security of support zones within
an OSC area of responsibility is just one example of this concept. Where nec-
essary, some units can augment the defense or defend less critical areas, thus
freeing up regular military forces for higher-priority tasks. Stay-behind
agents working with insurgent, terrorist, and criminal organizations can
contribute by directing preplanned actions that effectively add depth to the
battlefield. Their actions can cause material damage to key logistics and
command and control (C2) assets, inflict random but demoralizing casualties,
and effectively draw enemy forces away from the main fight in response to
increased force-protection requirements.
INSURGENT FORCES
1-101. The OPFOR ensures that the exploitation and use of insurgent forces
operating against and within neighboring countries is an integral part of its
strategic and operational planning. Insurgent forces, properly leveraged, can
provide an added dimension to the OPFOR’s capabilities and provide options
not otherwise available. During peacetime, a careful balance is kept between
covert support for insurgent groups that may prove useful later and overt re-
lations with the government against which the insurgents are operating.
1-102. During peacetime, support to insurgents can consist of weapons, stag-
ing and sanctuary areas within the State, and training by OPFOR SPF. It is
during this time that the OPFOR attempts to cultivate the loyalty and trust |
7-100.1 | 44 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
of insurgent groups they have identified as having potential usefulness in
their strategic and operational planning. In all operations of the strategic
campaign, insurgent forces serve as an excellent source of intelligence.
1-103. During the conduct of regional operations, the decision to influence in-
surgents to execute actions that support operations will depend on a number
of factors. If the OPFOR views extraregional intervention as unlikely, it may
choose to keep insurgent participation low. A key reason for making this de-
cision is the potential for those forces to become an opponent once the OPFOR
has accomplished its goals. On the other hand, the OPFOR may plan to have
these groups take part in directly supporting its operations in anticipation of
further support in the case of an extraregional intervention. Insurgent in-
volvement during regional operations may be held to furthering OPFOR IW
objectives by creating support for the State’s actions among the population,
harassing and sniping enemy forces, conducting raids, and assassinating
politicians who are influential opponents of the State. Insurgents can also
serve as scouts or guides for OPFOR regular forces moving through unfamil-
iar terrain and serve as an excellent source of political and military intelligence.
1-104. The usefulness of insurgent forces can be considerable in the event of
extraregional intervention and the decision to transition to adaptive opera-
tions. During transition operations, insurgent forces can support access-
control operations to deny enemy forces access to the region or at least delay
their entry. Delay provides the OPFOR more time to conduct an orderly tran-
sition and to reposition its forces for the conduct of adaptive operations. The
principal means of support include direct action in the vicinity of APODs and
SPODs and along LOCs in the enemy’s rear area. Dispersed armed action for
the sole purpose of creating casualties can have a demoralizing effect and
cause the enemy to respond, thus drawing forces from his main effort.
OPFOR regular forces can coordinate with insurgents, supported by SPF ad-
visors, to execute a variety of actions that support the strategic campaign or a
particular operation plan. Insurgents can support deception by drawing at-
tention from an action the OPFOR is trying to cover or conceal. They can de-
lay the introduction of enemy reserves through ambush and indirect fire,
cause the commitment of valuable force-protection assets, or deny or degrade
the enemy’s use of rotary-wing assets through raids on forward arming and
refueling points and maintenance facilities.
TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
1-105. Through the use of intelligence professionals and covert means, the
OPFOR maintains contact with and to varying degrees supports terrorist and
criminal organizations. During peacetime, these organizations can be useful,
and in time of war they can provide an added dimension to OPFOR strategy
and operations.
1-106. Although the OPFOR recognizes that these groups vary in reliability,
it constantly assesses both their effectiveness and usefulness. It develops re-
lationships with those organizations that have goals, sympathies, and inter-
ests congruent with those of the State. In time of war, it can encourage and
materially support criminal organizations to commit actions that contribute
to the breakdown of civil control within a neighboring country. It can provide
support for the distribution and sale of drugs to enemy military forces, which |
7-100.1 | 45 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
creates both morale and discipline problems within those organizations. The
production of counterfeit currency and attacks on financial institutions help
to weaken the enemy’s economic stability. Coordination with and support of
terrorists to attack political and military leaders and commit acts of sabotage
against key infrastructure (such as ports, airfields, and fuel supplies) add to
the variety and number of threats that the enemy must address. The State
and OPFOR leadership also have the ability to promote and support the
spread of these same kinds of terrorist acts outside the region. However, they
must carefully consider the political and domestic impact of these actions be-
fore making the decision to execute them.
SYSTEMS WARFARE
1-107. The OPFOR defines a system as a set of different elements so con-
nected or related as to perform a unique function not performable by the ele-
ments or components alone. The essential ingredients of a system include the
components, the synergy among components and other systems, and some
type of functional boundary separating it from other systems. Therefore, a
“system of systems” is a set of different systems so connected or related as to
produce results unachievable by the individual systems alone. The OPFOR
views the operational environment, the battlefield, the State’s own instru-
ments of power, and an opponent’s instruments of power as a collection of
complex, dynamic, and integrated systems composed of subsystems and com-
ponents.
1-108. Systems warfare serves as a conceptual and analytical tool to assist in
the planning, preparation, and execution of warfare. With the systems ap-
proach, the intent is to identify critical system components and attack them
in a way that will degrade or destroy the use or importance of the overall system.
PRINCIPLE
1-109. The primary principle of systems warfare is the identification and iso-
lation of the critical subsystems or components that give the opponent the
capability and cohesion to achieve his aims. The focus is on the disaggrega-
tion of the system by rendering its subsystems and components ineffective.
While the aggregation of these subsystems or components is what makes the
overall system work, the interdependence of these subsystems is also a poten-
tial vulnerability. Systems warfare has applicability or impact at all three
levels of warfare.
APPLICATION AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
1-110. At the strategic level, the instruments of power and their application
are the focus of analysis. National power is a system of systems in which the
instruments of national power work together to create a synergistic effect.
Each instrument of power (diplomatic-political, informational, economic, and
military) is also a collection of complex and interrelated systems.
1-111. The State clearly understands how to analyze and locate the critical
components of its own instruments of power and will aggressively aim to pro-
tect its own systems from attack or vulnerabilities. It also understands that
an adversary’s instruments of power are similar to the State’s. Thus, at the |
7-100.1 | 46 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
strategic level, the State can use the OPFOR and its other instruments of
power to counter or target the systems and subsystems that make up an op-
ponent’s instruments of power. The primary purpose is to subdue, control, or
change the opponent’s behavior.
1-112. If an opponent’s strength lies in his military power, the State and the
OPFOR can attack the other instruments of power as a means of disaggre-
gating or disrupting the enemy’s system of national power. Thus, it is possi-
ble to render the overall system ineffective without necessarily having to de-
feat the opponent militarily.
APPLICATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
1-113. At the operational level, the application of systems warfare pertains
only to the use of armed forces to achieve a result. Therefore, the “system of
systems” in question at this level is the combat system of the OPFOR and/or
the enemy.
Combat System
1-114. A combat system (see Figure 1-5) is the “system of systems” that re-
sults from the synergistic combination of four basic subsystems that are inte-
grated to achieve a military function. The subsystems are as follows:
• Combat forces (such as main battle tanks, IFVs and/or APCs, or infantry).
• Combat support forces (such as artillery, SSMs, air defense, engineers,
and direct air support).
• Logistics forces (such as transportation, ammunition, fuel, rations, main-
tenance, and medical).
• C2 and RISTA (such as headquarters, signal nodes, satellite downlink
sites, and reconnaissance sensors).
1-115. The combat system is characterized by interaction and interdepend-
ence among its subsystems. Therefore, the OPFOR will seek to identify key
subsystems of an enemy combat system and target them and destroy them
individually. Against a technologically superior extraregional force, the
OPFOR will often use any or all subcomponents of its own combat system to
attack the most vulnerable parts of the enemy’s combat system rather than
the enemy’s strengths. For example, attacking the enemy’s logistics, C2, and
RISTA can undermine the overall effectiveness of the enemy’s combat system
without having to directly engage his superior combat and combat support
forces. Aside from the physical effect, the removal of one or more key subsys-
tems can have a devastating psychological effect, particularly if it occurs in a
short span of time. |
7-100.1 | 47 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
COMBAT LOGISTICS
FORCES FORCES
Examples: Examples:
Tanks, Transportation,
IFVs/APCs, Ammunition,
Infantry Fuel,
Rations,
Maintenance,
COMBAT Medical
SYSTEM
COMBAT C2 AND
SUPPORT
RISTA
FORCES
Examples: Examples:
Artillery, Headquarters,
SSMs, Signal Nodes,
Air Defense, Satellite Downlinks,
Engineers, Reconnaissance Sensors
Direct Air Support
Figure 1-5. Combat System
Planning and Execution
1-116. The systems warfare approach to combat is a means to assist the
commander in the decision-making process and the planning and execution of
his mission. The OPFOR believes that a qualitatively and/or quantitatively
weaker force can defeat a superior foe, if the lesser force can dictate the terms of
combat. It believes that the systems warfare approach allows it to move away
from the traditional attrition-based approach to combat. It is no longer neces-
sary to match an opponent system-for-system or capability-for-capability.
Commanders and staffs will locate the critical component(s) of the enemy com-
bat system, patterns of interaction, and opportunities to exploit this connectivity.
Systems warfare has applications in both offensive and defensive contexts.
1-117. The essential step after the identification of the critical subsystems
and components of a combat system is the destruction or degradation of the
synergy of the system. This may take the form of total destruction of a sub-
system or component, degradation of the synergy of components, or the sim-
ple denial of access to critical links between systems or components. The de-
struction of a critical component or link can create windows of opportunity
that can be exploited, set the conditions for offensive action, or support a con-
cept of operation that calls for exhausting the enemy on the battlefield. Once
the OPFOR has identified and isolated a critical element of the enemy com-
bat system that is vulnerable to attack, it will select the appropriate method
of attack. |
7-100.1 | 48 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
1-118. Today’s state-of-the-art combat and combat support systems are im-
pressive in their ability to deliver precise attacks at long standoff distances.
However, the growing reliance of some extraregional forces on these systems
offers opportunity. Attacking critical ground-based C2 and RISTA nodes or
logistics systems and LOCs can have a very large payoff for relatively low in-
vestment and low risk to the OPFOR. Modern logistics systems assume se-
cure LOCs and voice or digital communications. These characteristics make
such systems vulnerable. Therefore, the OPFOR can greatly reduce a military
force’s combat power by attacking a logistics system that depends on “just-in-
time delivery.”
1-119. For the operational commander, the systems warfare approach to
combat is not an end in itself. It is a key component in his planning and se-
quencing of tactical battles and engagements aimed toward achieving as-
signed strategic goals. Systems warfare supports his concept; it is not the
concept. The ultimate aim is to destroy the enemy’s will and ability to fight.
APPLICATION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL
1-120. It is at the tactical level that systems warfare is executed in attacking
the enemy’s combat system. While the tactical commander may use systems
warfare in the smaller sense to accomplish assigned missions, his attack on
systems will be in response to missions assigned him by the operational
commander.
APPLICATION ACROSS ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC-LEVEL ACTIONS
1-121. Systems warfare is applicable against all types of opponents in all
strategic-level courses of action. In regional operations, the OPFOR will seek
to render a regional opponent’s systems ineffective to support his overall con-
cept of operation. However, this approach is especially conducive to the con-
duct of transition and adaptive operations. The very nature of this approach
lends itself to adaptive and creative options against an adversary’s techno-
logical overmatch.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE C2 PROCESS
1-122. The systems warfare approach to combat is an important part of
OPFOR planning. It serves as a means to analyze the OPFOR’s own combat
system and how it can use the combined effects of this system to degrade the
enemy’s combat system. The OPFOR believes that the approach allows its
decision makers to be anticipatory rather than reactive. |
7-100.1 | 49 | Chapter 2
Command and Control
This chapter examines the OPFOR system and process of command and
control (C2). It explains how the OPFOR expects to direct the forces and ac-
tions described in other chapters of this manual. It provides insights into the
OPFOR theory and practice of controlling combined arms, joint, interagency,
and multinational forces in war. Most important, it shows how OPFOR com-
manders and staffs think and work.
In modern war, victory is likely to go to the side that acts most quickly.
The overriding need for speedy decisions to seize fleeting opportunities
drastically reduces the time available for decision making and for issuing
and implementing orders. The need to seize opportunities on the battle-
field, coupled with dispersion to avoid the threat of precision weapons,
dictates the replacement of concentration in terms of space by concentra-
tion in terms of time and effects. Moreover, the operational and tactical
situation is subject to sudden and radical changes, and the results of
combat are more likely to be decisive than in the past. OPFOR C2 par-
ticipants, processes, and systems are designed to operate effectively
and efficiently in this new environment. The successful execution of an
information warfare (IW) plan is critical to victory.
Although dealing briefly with strategic control of forces, this chapter fo-
cuses on operational command and control. All OPFOR levels of command
share a common decision-making and planning process. They also share a
parallel staff organization and command post (CP) structure, tailored to
match the differences in scope and span of control.
CONCEPT
2-1. The OPFOR’s C2 concept is grounded in the essential principles of the
States’ process for exercising command and control. At the core of the State’s
C2 concept is the assumption that modern communications are susceptible to
attack and/or monitoring. Accordingly, the State operates from the view that
centralized planning defines the means for assuring both command (estab-
lishing the aim) and control (sustaining the aim). It leads to strategic and op-
erational directions. Necessarily, then, the State relies on the loyalty of its
forces and accords far-ranging authority to act within the aim while foregoing
rigorous control as both unproductive and unlikely in the modern environment.
2-2. For the OPFOR, this concept translates into centralized planning and
decentralized execution, requiring a high degree of initiative at low opera-
tional and tactical levels. The OPFOR not only accepts this condition as neces-
sary, but also considers decentralized execution the essence of its operational |
7-100.1 | 50 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
doctrine. It requires the commander at each level of command to act flexibly,
exercising his judgment as to what best meets and sustains the aim of his
superior. The OPFOR believes that this approach provides an absolute ad-
vantage particularly when operating against a sophisticated enemy equipped
with advanced information technology. This view stems from the conviction
that, if the means to exercise control from the top exists, then there is a dan-
ger that it will be used to the extent that it stifles creativity and initiative.
The OPFOR seeks to avoid this pitfall in its own C2 process, while recogniz-
ing that even sophisticated opponents may fall prey to it. It realizes that sti-
fled initiative and creativity can ultimately preclude such an opponent from
acting decisively or quickly.
PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
2-3. The OPFOR specifically defines command and control at tactical and
operational levels as the actions of commanders, command groups, and staffs
of military headquarters to maintain continual combat readiness and combat
efficiency of forces, to plan and prepare for combat operations, and to provide
leadership and direction during the execution of assigned missions. The ob-
jective of command is to accomplish the mission. The objective of control is to
attain maximum combat effectiveness from all available resources. To obtain
this objective, the OPFOR identifies several principles of command and control.
CENTRALIZED PLANNING
2-4. OPFOR military art is fundamentally based on a system of political con-
trol and the presumption of loyalty among subordinates who have been pre-
pared for high position in either the civil or military structure. Thus, military
art and the principles of command within the military are closely related to
those found in the political system. Indeed, the State views military capabil-
ity as one of its four instruments of national power. Centralized planning
characterizes the State and its various components, including the military.
DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION
2-5. The State accepts that decentralized execution is essential to controlling
the tempo of operations. The OPFOR, therefore, is organized to provide ini-
tiative within the bounds of the aim as stipulated in the planning process.
The OPFOR accepts some risk in this approach, but mitigates that risk in the
planning process by determining branches (accommodations made to the plan
that require diversion from the central plan) and sequels (follow-on opera-
tions in accordance with the plan). This approach depends on clearly stated
aims and delineation of the limits of authority at the each level of command.
It provides considerable flexibility to subordinates and is deemed essential by
the State and the OPFOR for meeting the needs of the modern operational
environment.
DELIBERATE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
2-6. The OPFOR decision-making process consists of five phases: assess,
orient, decide, act, and adapt. (See the section on Decision Making for more
detail.) |
7-100.1 | 51 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES
2-7. C2 at each level of command is very similar, designed with the same ba-
sic structure and emphasis on survivability through mobility, redundancy,
and security. The higher the level of command, the larger and more complex
the staff. Supporting each staff is a series of multiple CPs and communica-
tions systems, providing the flexibility required on a highly fluid, lethal
battlefield.
2-8. The professional training of commanders and staffs emphasizes consis-
tency in staff planning procedures at all levels of command. Emphasis on re-
sponsive planning (assisted by automation) in the C2 process has produced a
cadre of professional, highly-trained staff officers. Thoroughly educated in all
aspects of strategy, operations, and tactics, these officers are capable of func-
tioning from the General Staff down to tactical level.
2-9. Operational commanders must be equipped to control the full scope of
combined arms, joint, interagency, and multinational activity. The OPFOR
operational C2 structure is designed to facilitate this control.
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
2-10. OPFOR units are organized using four command and support relation-
ships, summarized in Figure 2-1 and described in the following paragraphs.
These relationships may shift during the course of an operation in order to
best align the force with the tasks required. The general category of subordi-
nate units includes both constituent and dedicated relationships; it can also
include interagency and multinational (allied) subordinates.
Relationship Commanded by Logistics from Positioned by Priorities from
Constituent Gaining Gaining Gaining Gaining
Dedicated Gaining Parent Gaining Gaining
Supporting Parent Parent Supported Supported
Affiliated Self Self or “Parent” Self Mutual Agreement
Figure 2-1. Command and Support Relationships
2-11. Constituent. Constituent units are those forces assigned directly to a
unit and forming an integral part of it. They may be organic to the table of
organization and equipment of the administrative structure forming the ba-
sis of a given unit, assigned at the time the unit was created, or attached to it
after its formation.
2-12. Dedicated. Dedicated is a command relationship identical to constitu-
ent with the exception that a dedicated unit still receives logistics support
from a parent organization of similar type. An example of a dedicated unit
would be the case where one or two surface-to-surface missile (SSM) battal-
ions from an SSM brigade could be dedicated to an operational-strategic
command (OSC). Since the OSC does not otherwise possess the technical experts |
7-100.1 | 52 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
or transloading equipment for missiles, the dedicated relationship permits
the SSM battalion(s) to fire exclusively for the OSC while still receiving its
logistics support from the parent SSM brigade. In OPFOR plans and orders,
the dedicated command and support relationship is indicated by (DED) next
to a unit title or symbol.
2-13. Supporting. Supporting units continue to be commanded by and re-
ceive their logistics from their parent headquarters, but are positioned and
given mission priorities by their supported headquarters. This relationship
permits supported units the freedom to establish priorities and position sup-
porting units while allowing higher headquarters to rapidly shift support in
dynamic situations. The supporting unit does not necessarily have to be
within the supported unit’s area of responsibility (AOR). An example of a
supporting unit would be a fighter-bomber regiment supporting an OSC for a
particular phase of the strategic campaign plan (SCP) but ready to rapidly
transition to a different support relationship when the OSC becomes the
theater reserve in a later phase. In OPFOR plans and orders, the supporting
command and support relationship is indicated by (SPT) next to a unit title
or symbol.
2-14. Affiliated. Affiliated organizations are those operating in a unit’s AOR
that the unit may be able to sufficiently influence to act in concert with it for
a limited time. No “command relationship” exists between an affiliated or-
ganization and the unit in whose AOR it operates. Affiliated organizations
are typically nonmilitary or paramilitary groups such as criminal cartels, in-
surgencies, terrorist cells, or mercenaries. In some cases, affiliated forces
may receive support from the OSC as part of the agreement under which
they cooperate. Although there would typically be no formal indication of this
relationship in OPFOR plans and orders, in rare cases (AFL) is used next to
unit titles or symbols.
STRATEGIC-LEVEL ORGANIZATION
2-15. The National Command Authority (NCA) is responsible for the prepa-
ration and conduct of strategic campaigns. It also resolves issues regarding
the overall wartime situation of the State and the allocation of strategic re-
sources. The NCA allocates forces and establishes general plans for the con-
duct of national strategic campaigns.
General Staff
2-16. The General Staff is a major link in the centralization of military com-
mand at the national level, since it provides staff support and acts as the ex-
ecutive agency for the NCA. Together with the Ministry of Defense (MOD),
the General Staff forms the Supreme High Command (SHC) in wartime. (See
Figure 2-2.) The General Staff has direct control over the six services, and all
military forces report through it to the NCA. The Chief of the General Staff
(CGS) commands the SHC. The General Staff consists of three functional
directorates. These are the Operations, Intelligence, and Organization and
Mobilization directorates. |
7-100.1 | 53 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
NATIONAL
COMMAND
AUTHORITY
MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE
SUPREME
HIGH COMMAND
GENERAL
STAFF
ORGANIZATION &
OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE
MOBILIZATION
DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE
DIRECTORATE
STRATEGIC SPF INTERNAL
ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE SECURITY
FORCES COMMAND
FORCES
AIR
DEFENSE
FORCES
Figure 2-2. Supreme High Command
2-17. Working with the staffs of each of the services, the Operations Direc-
torate of the General Staff drafts the military SCP for the CGS. Once the
CGS approves the military SCP, it becomes part of the national SCP, and the
General Staff issues it to appropriate operational-level commanders. During
peacetime and preparation for war, the Operations Directorate continues to
review and refine the plan. The military SCP assigns forces to operational-
level commands and designates AORs for those commands.
2-18. During combat operations, the Operations Directorate is responsible,
along with the Intelligence Directorate, for maintaining a continuous esti-
mate of the situation for the SHC. Because of the uncertainties of combat, the
Operations Directorate continually reevaluates the military SCP and modifies it
or develops a new plan based on guidance from the CGS. The Organization and
Mobilization Directorate determines the assets that each component of the mili-
tary needs to execute its portion of the national strategic campaign.
Theater Headquarters
2-19. For the State, a theater is a clearly defined geographic area in which
the OPFOR plans to conduct or is conducting military operations. Within its
region, the State may plan or conduct a strategic campaign in a single thea-
ter or in multiple theaters, depending on the situation. The General Staff
may create one or more separate theater headquarters, even in peacetime,
for planning purposes. However, no forces would be subordinated to such a
headquarters until the activation of a particular SCP. |
7-100.1 | 54 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
2-20. A theater headquarters provides flexible and responsive control of all
theater forces. When there is only one theater, as is typical, the theater head-
quarters may also be the field headquarters of the SHC, and the CGS may
also be the theater commander. Even in this case, however, the CGS may
choose to focus his attention on national strategic matters and to create a
separate theater headquarters, commanded by another general officer, to
control operations within the theater.
2-21. When parts of the strategic campaign take place in separated geographi-
cal areas and there is more than one major line of operations, the OPFOR
may employ more than one theater headquarters, each of which could have
its own theater campaign plan. In this case, albeit rare, the SHC field
headquarters would be a separate entity exercising control over the multiple
theater headquarters.
2-22. Theater command provides flexibility to the OPFOR, since the exis-
tence of one or more separate theater headquarters enables the SHC to fo-
cus on the strategic campaign and sustaining the forces in the field. A
theater headquarters acts to effectively centralize and integrate General
Staff control over theater-wide offensive and/or defensive operations. The
chief responsibility of this headquarters is to exercise command over all
forces assigned to a theater in accordance with mission and aim assigned by
the SHC. A theater headquarters links the operational efforts of the OPFOR
to the strategic efforts and reports directly to the SHC.
Administrative Force Structure
2-23. The OPFOR has an administrative force structure that manages its
military forces in peacetime. This structure is the aggregate of various military
headquarters, organizations, facilities, and installations designed to man,
train, and equip the forces. In peacetime, forces are commonly grouped into
corps, armies, or army groups for administrative purposes. An army group
can consist of several armies, corps, or separate divisions and brigades. The
administrative force structure also has responsibility for disaster manage-
ment and support to other State agencies. In some cases, forces may be
grouped administratively under geographical commands designated as
military regions or military districts.1 Normally, these administrative group-
ings differ from the OPFOR’s go-to-war (fighting) force structure.
2-24. The administrative force structure includes all components of the
Armed Forcesnot only regular, standing forces (active component), but also
reserve and militia forces (reserve component). For administrative purposes,
both regular and reserve forces come under the headquarters of their respec-
tive service component. Each of the six service components is responsible for
manning, equipping, and training of its forces and for organizing them within
the administrative force structure.
2-25. If the General Staff or SHC elects to create more than one theater
headquarters, it may allocate parts of the administrative force structure to
each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. One example would be
to divide Air Force assets into theater air armies. Another would be to assign
1 A military district may or may not coincide with a political district within the State government. |
7-100.1 | 55 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
units from the Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Command to each theater, ac-
cording to theater requirements.
2-26. The administrative force structure also includes some assets centrally
controlled at the national level. For instance, major portions of the Air Force,
Navy, Strategic Forces, and the SPF Command often remain under the direct
control of their respective service component headquarters. The Army com-
ponent headquarters may retain centralized control of certain elite units of
the ground forces, including airborne units and Army SPF. This permits
flexibility in the employment of these relatively scarce assets in response to
national-level requirements. In peacetime, the internal security forces are
under the administrative control of the Ministry of the Interior. The pool of
national assets also includes major logistics facilities and installations.
2-27. In wartime, the normal role of administrative commands is to serve as
force providers during the creation of operational- and tactical-level fighting
commands. After transferring control of its major fighting forces to one or
more task-organized fighting commands, an administrative headquarters, facil-
ity, or installation continues to provide depot- and area support-level adminis-
trative, supply, and maintenance functions. (See Chapter 12.) A geographically-
based administrative command also provides a framework for the continuing
mobilization of reserves to complement or supplement regular forces.
2-28. In rare cases, an administrative command could function as a fighting
command. This could occur, for instance, when a particular administrative
command happens to have just the right combination of forces for executing a
particular SCP. Another case would be in times of total mobilization, when
an administrative command has already given up part of its forces to a fight-
ing command and then is called upon to form a fighting command with what-
ever forces remain under the original administrative headquarters.
2-29. Operational-level commands in the administrative force structure that
are called upon to fight will employ the doctrine in this manual. However,
they will not be able to employ joint or interagency forces effectively without
additional training, staff, and C2 systems.
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION
2-30. An SCP always contains both military and nonmilitary subordinate actions.
The operational level of command is that which executes military tasks as-
signed directly by an SCP. Operational-level commands translate actions di-
rectly supporting the SCP into an operation plan. The most common OPFOR
operational-level commands are field groups (FGs) and operational-strategic
commands (OSCs).2 Figure 2-3 shows one example of FG and OSC missions
within such a hypothetical SCP.
2 For the OPFOR, military actions above the tactical level will most commonly involve one or more OSCs, but could
possibly involve an FG as an additional level of operational command. In most cases, the statements about an
OSC in this manual would also apply to an FG, if one is created. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, references to
FG will appear only where it is important to make a distinction between the OSC and FG levels. |
7-100.1 | 56 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Neutral Allied
Country Country
Sea
U
nre
st
Are a
of
OSC AOR
Strategic Goal 3
Hostile
Strategic Goal 1
Country
“THE STATE”
OSC AOR
OSC AOR OSC AOR
Sea
Strategic Goal 1
Strategic Goals 1+2
FG AOR
LEGEND
Strategic Goals
Sea
1: Coastal Defense
2: Invasion of Hostile Country
3: Neutralization of Unrest
Figure 2-3. Example of FGs and OSCs in an SCP
2-31. There is also the possibility that a division or division tactical group
(DTG) could be directly subordinate to the SHC in the fighting force structure
and thus perform tasks assigned directly by an SCP. In such cases, the OPFOR
would consider the divisions or DTGs to be operational-level commands. More
typically, however, they perform tactical missions as subordinates of an FG or
OSC. (For more detail of divisions and DTGs and their tactics, see FM 7-100.2.)
2-32. The SCP specifies the geographic AOR within which the operational-
level command’s allocated forces are intended to operate. A single SCP could
include more than one strategic goal. Thus, a particular FG or OSC could be
task organized to achieve one or more goals within its assigned AOR.
Field Group
2-33. A field group is the largest operational-level organization, since it has one
or more smaller operational-level commands subordinate to it. An FG is a group-
ing of subordinate organizations with a common headquarters, a common AOR,
and a common operation plan. FGs are always joint and interagency organiza-
tions and are often multinational. However, this level of command may or may
not be necessary in a particular SCP. An FG may be organized when the num-
ber of forces and/or the number of major military efforts in a theater exceeds the
theater commander’s desired or achievable span of control. This can facilitate |
7-100.1 | 57 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
the theater commander’s remaining focused on the theater-strategic level of war
and enable him to coordinate effectively the joint forces allocated for his use.
Sea Neutral Country
XXX
OSC
F
G
L
O
R
“THE STATE” Mountains
XXX Strategic Goal 2: Invasion of
OSC F G Neighboring Country Hostile Country
/O
S
C
L
O
Sea
R
XXX
OSC
Strategic Goal 1:
Defense of
Homeland
Field Group AOR
OSC AOR
Neutral Country
Figure 2-4. Field Group in Control of Multiple OSCs in a Major Military Effort
2-34. The General Staff does not normally form standing FG headquarters,
but may organize one or more during full mobilization, if necessary. An FG
can be assigned responsibilities in controlling forces in the field during adap-
tive operations in the homeland, or forward-focused functionally (an FG may
be assigned an access-control mission). However, FGs may exist merely to ac-
commodate the number of forces in the theater.
2-35. FGs are typically formed for one or more of the following reasons:
• An SCP may require a large number of OSCs and/or operational-level
commands from the administrative force structure. When the number
of major military efforts in a theater exceeds the theater commander’s
desired or achievable span of control, he may form one or more FGs.
(See Figure 2-4.)
• In the rare cases when multiple operational-level commands from the
administrative force structure become fighting commands, they could
come under the command of an FG headquarters. (See Figure 2-5.) |
7-100.1 | 58 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
• Due to modifications to the SCP, a standing operational-level head-
quarters that was originally designated as an OSC headquarters may
receive one or more additional major operational-level commands from
the administrative force structure as fighting commands. Then the
OSC headquarters would transition into an FG headquarters.
In the first two cases, a separate FG staff would be formed and identified as
having control over two or more OSCs (or operational-level commands from
the administrative force structure) as part of the same SCP. In the third case,
the original OSC headquarters would be redesignated as an FG headquar-
ters. In any case, the FG command group and staff would be structured in
the same manner as those of an OSC.
“THE STATE”
Field
Field
Group
Group
Sea
XXXX
XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
Neutral XXXX XXX XXX XXXX XXX
Country
Hostile Country Sea
Figure 2-5. Field Groups Consisting of Multiple Operational-Level Commands from
the Administrative Force Structure
Operational-Strategic Command
2-36. The OPFOR’s primary operational organization is the OSC. Once the
General Staff writes a particular SCP, it forms one or more standing OSC
headquarters. Each OSC headquarters is capable of controlling whatever
combined arms, joint, interagency, or multinational operations are necessary
to execute that OSC’s part of the SCP. However, the OSC headquarters does
not have any forces permanently assigned to it. |
7-100.1 | 59 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-37. Figure 2-6 shows an example of allocation of forces to an OSC. The
units allocated from the administrative force structure to form the OSC typi-
cally come from an army group, army, or corps (or perhaps a military district
or military region) or from forces directly subordinate to a service headquar-
ters. There can also be cases where forces from the services have initially
been allocated to a theater headquarters and are subsequently re-allocated
down to the OSC. The organizations shown under the OSC, like those shown
under the theater headquarters in this example, indicate a pool of assets
made available to that command. The commander receiving these assets may
choose to retain them at his own level of command, or he may choose to sub-
allocate them down to one or more of his subordinates for their use in their
own task organization.
THEATER
AT IH RE AA RT MER Y BRS IGP AF DE T AO H SET SH A ETE TER SR GO A RT R OH M UE Y PR S
ARMY
OTHER FIGHTER-BOMBER
AIR FORCE AVIATION GROUP
ASSETS DIVISION
FIGHTER-BOMBER
RA EV GIA IMTI EO NN T ARMY OTHER ARMO YT H GE RR OUP AIRBORNE
ARMIES ASSETS BRIGADE
ARTILLERY
OTHER OTHER MECHANIZED TANK BRIGADE
DIVISIONS AA SR SM ETY S I DN IF VA ISN IT OR NY DIVISION
UAV HEC LO ICM OB PA TT ER SAM SSM
SQUADRON BRIGADE BRIGADE BRIGADE
ANTITANK OSC
BRIGADE
OSC MECHANIZED TANK AIRBORNE
HQ I DN IF VA ISN IT OR NY DIVISION BRIGADE
LEGEND
Theater assets
resubordinatedto
the OSC SPF ARTILLERY SSM SAM
Army group assets BRIGADE BRIGADE BRIGADE BRIGADE
resubordinated to
the OSC
A rer sm uy b oa rs ds inet as t ed to FIGH AT VE IR A- TB IO OM NBER ANTITANK HEC LO ICM OB PA TT ER UAV
the OSC REGIMENT BRIGADE BRIGADE SQUADRON
Figure 2-6. Allocation of Forces to an OSC (Example)
2-38. When the NCA decides to execute a particular SCP, each OSC partici-
pating in that plan receives appropriate units from the OPFOR’s administra-
tive force structure, as well as interagency and/or multinational forces.
Forces subordinated to an OSC may continue to depend on the administra-
tive force structure for support. |
7-100.1 | 60 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
2-39. If a particular OSC has contingency plans for participating in more
than one SCP, it could receive a different set of forces under each plan. In
each case, the forces would be task organized according to the mission re-
quirements in the given plan. Thus, each OSC consists of those division-,
brigade-, and battalion-size organizations allocated to it by the SCP currently
in effect. These forces also may be allocated to the OSC for the purpose of
training for a particular SCP. When an OSC is neither executing tasks as
part of an SCP nor conducting exercises with its identified subordinate
forces, it exists as a planning headquarters.
OSC
INTEGRATED INTEGRATED
DTGs DIVISIONS FIRES SUPPORT
COMMAND COMMAND
AIR FORCE MARITIME INTERAGENCY
BTGs BRIGADES UNITS UNITS UNITS
Figure 2-7. Possible OSC Organization (Example)
2-40. Figure 2-7 shows an example of the types of organizations that could
make up a particular OSC organization. The numbers of each type of
subordinate and whether they actually occur in a particular OSC can vary.
As shown in this example, the composition of an OSC is typically joint,
with Air Force and possibly maritime (naval or naval infantry) units,
and it can also be interagency. If some of the allocated forces come
from another, allied country, the OSC could be multinational. The
simplified example of an OSC shown here does not show all the combat
support and combat service support units that would be present in such an
organization. Many of these support units are found in the integrated fires
command (outlined below) and the integrated support command (outlined
below and in Chapter 12). Other support units could be allocated initially
from the administrative force structure to the OSC, which further allocates
them to its tactical subordinates. |
7-100.1 | 61 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-41. Once allocated to an OSC, a division or brigade often receives augmen-
tation that transforms it into a DTG or brigade tactical group (BTG), respec-
tively. However, an OSC does not have to task organize subordinate divisions
and brigades into tactical groups. Most divisions would become DTGs, but
maneuver brigades in the administrative force structure may be sufficiently
robust to accomplish their mission without additional task organization.
2-42. The OPFOR has great flexibility regarding possible OSC organizations
for different missions. There is virtually no limit to the possible permutations
that could exist. The allocation of organizations to an OSC depends on what
is available in the State’s administrative force structure, the mission re-
quirements of that OSC, and the requirements of other operational-level
commands.
TACTICAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS
2-43. In the OPFOR’s administrative force structure, the largest tactical-
level organizations are divisions and brigades. In wartime, they are often
subordinate to a larger, operational-level command. However, they may also
be directly subordinate to a theater headquarters or to the SHC. In either
wartime role, a division or brigade may receive additional assets that trans-
form it into a tactical group.
2-44. A tactical group is a task-organized division or brigade that has re-
ceived an allocation of additional land forces in order to accomplish its mis-
sion. These additional forces may come from within the Ministry of Defense,
from the Ministry of the Interior, or from affiliated forces. Typically, these
assets are initially allocated to an OSC or FG, which further allocates them
to its tactical subordinates. If the tactical group operates as a separate com-
mand, it may receive additional assets directly from the theater headquar-
ters or the SHC that are necessary for it to carry out an operational-level
mission. The same higher command that augments a division or brigade to
transform it into a tactical group can also use some units from one divi-
sion or brigade to augment tactical groups based on other divisions or bri-
gades.
2-45. The purpose of a tactical group is to ensure unity of command for all
land forces in a given AOR. Tactical groups formed from divisions are divi-
sion tactical groups (DTGs), and those from brigades are brigade tacti-
cal groups (BTGs).
2-46. If a DTG has a mission directly assigned by an SCP, it acts as an op-
erational-level command. If a DTG has a mission assigned by an intermedi-
ate operational-level command (such as an FG or an OSC), then it acts as a
tactical-level command. In either of those cases, the original division head-
quarters becomes the DTG headquarters. |
7-100.1 | 62 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
INTEGRATED FIRES COMMAND
2-47. The integrated fires command (IFC) is a combination of a standing C2
structure and task organization of constituent and dedicated fire support
units. (See Figure 2-8.) All division-level and above OPFOR organizations
possess an IFC C2 structurestaff, CP, communications and intelligence ar-
chitecture, and automated fire control system (AFCS). The IFC exercises
command of all constituent and dedicated fire support assets retained by its
level of command. This includes aviation, artillery, and missile units. It also
exercises command over all reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and
target acquisition (RISTA) assets allocated to it.3
OSC
IFC
IFC
HEADQUARTERS
ARTILLERY AVIATION MISSILE SPF
COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT
INTEGRATED
SUPPORT
GROUP
Figure 2-8. Possible IFC Components in an OSC
2-48. The mission of the IFC is to execute all fire support tasks required to
accomplish the unit mission. It is designed to
• Exploit the combat power inherent in carefully integrated ground and
air fire support actions.
• Reduce the amount of time from target acquisition to attack to the ab-
solute minimum.
• Permit fire support assets to mass their effects without having to oper-
ate in concentrated formations.
3 Based on mission requirements, the commander may also allocate maneuver forces to the IFC. This is most often
done when he chooses to use the IFC CP to provide C2 for a strike, but can also be done for the execution of other
missions. |
7-100.1 | 63 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
• Ensure the optimal fire support asset(s) are assigned any given mission.
• Ensure the commander’s priorities for fire support are adhered to.
• Act, if necessary, as the organization’s alternate command structure.
• Integrate the effects of fires from units placed in support of the
organization.
2-49. The number and type of fire support and RISTA units allocated to an
IFC is mission-dependent. The IFC is not organized according to a table of
organization and equipment, but is task organized to accomplish the mis-
sions assigned.
IFC Headquarters
2-50. The OSC IFC headquarters, like the overall OSC headquarters, exists
in peacetime in order to be ready to accommodate and exercise C2 over all
forces made subordinate to it in wartime. The IFC headquarters is composed
of the IFC commander and his command group, a RISTA and IW section, an
operations section, and a resources section. (See Figure 2-9.)
IFC
COMMANDER
IFC
COMMAND GROUP
DEPUTY
COMMANDER
CHIEF
OF
STAFF
RISTA/IW OPERATIONS RESOURCES
SECTION SECTION SECTION
FIRE SUPPORT
COORDINATION
CENTER
Figure 2-9. IFC Headquarters
2-51. The deputy commander (DC) of the OSC serves as IFC commander.
The RISTA and IW section provides the complete spectrum of intelligence
and IW support for the IFC. The operations section provides the control, co-
ordination, and communications for the headquarters. Located within the op-
erations section is the fire support coordination center (FSCC). To ensure the |
7-100.1 | 64 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
necessary coordination of fire support and associated RISTA, the operations
section of the IFC headquarters also includes liaison teams from subordinate
units. The resources section provides control and coordination of various
logistics and administrative support functions.
Artillery Component
2-52. The artillery component is a task organization tailored for the conduct
of artillery support during combat operations. In an OSC’s IFC, it is typically
organized around one or more artillery brigades, or parts of these that are
not allocated in a constituent or dedicated relationship to tactical-level sub-
ordinates. The artillery component includes appropriate target acquisition,
C2, and logistics support assets.
2-53. The number of artillery battalions assigned to an IFC varies according
such factors as mission of friendly units, the enemy situation, and terrain.
However, the number of artillery units also can vary based on the capabili-
ties of the supporting AFCS. For example, a multiple rocket launcher (MRL)
brigade AFCS can have enough command and staff vehicles for the brigade
commander and his chief of staff, as well as the subordinate commanders of
battalions and up to 18 batteries (6 battalions). An AFCS supporting a can-
non, MRL, or mortar battalion may consist of enough command and staff ve-
hicles to support 3 to 4 batteries (each consisting of 4 to 8 systems).
Aviation Component
2-54. The aviation component is a task organization tailored for the conduct
of aviation operations. The aviation component is task organized to provide a
flexible and balanced air combat organization capable of providing air support to
the OSC commander. It may be organized around an Air Force aviation
regiment or an air army, or parts of these, as required by the mission. It may
also include rotary-wing assets from army aviation. It includes ground attack
aviation capability as well as requisite ground and air service support assets.
The IFC commander exercises control through facilities provided by the airspace
operations subsection of the OSC staff and/or the aviation unit(s).
Missile Component
2-55. The missile component is a task organization consisting of long-range
missiles or rockets capable of delivering conventional or nuclear, biological,
and chemical (NBC) munitions. It is organized around an SSM or rocket bat-
talion or brigade and includes the appropriate logistics support assets. Mis-
sile and rocket units may come from the Strategic Forces or from other parts
of the administrative force structure (where they may be part of a corps,
army, or army group).
2-56. The State considers the long-range rocket and missile capability, even
when delivering conventional munitions, the responsibility of the NCA. For
example, the SHC or theater commander may allocate Strategic Forces as-
sets to an IFC in order to use long-range missiles and rockets to advance
State political ends during regional, transition, or adaptive operations. Un-
able to mount robust air campaigns, the State can use these weapons to
mount an equivalent effort. |
7-100.1 | 65 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
Special-Purpose Forces Component
2-57. The SPF component normally consists of assets from an SPF brigade.
Personnel of such a brigade are specially trained for insertion in small SPF
teams. These assets provide the OPFOR the ability to attack both regional
and extraregional enemies throughout their tactical, operational, and strate-
gic depth. SPF assets are inserted in advance of regional operations and in
support of transition and adaptive operations. They are an essential part of
the concept of using all means necessary and are critical to access-control
operations. SPF assigned to the Army, Air Force, and Navy are designed for
use at the operational level. The national-level SPF Command has its own
SPF units.
2-58. The SPF conduct operations to achieve strategic military, political, eco-
nomic, and/or psychological objectives or achieve tactical or operational goals
in support of strategic objectives. Such operations may have either long-
range or immediate impact on the enemy. The OPFOR concept of SPF opera-
tions includes reconnaissance, direct action, and diversionary measures. The
SPF component of the IFC has a capability to support terrorist and irregular
forces operations.
2-59. If an OSC has received SPF units, it may further allocate some of these
units to supplement the long-range reconnaissance assets a division or DTG
has in its own IFC. However, the scarce SPF assets normally would remain
at OSC level.
Integrated Support Group
2-60. The integrated support group (ISG) is a compilation of units perform-
ing logistics tasks that support the IFC. Other combat support and combat
service support units may be grouped in this component for organizational ef-
ficiency although they may support only one of the major units of the IFC.
The ISG is discussed in detail in Chapter 12. It can perform the same func-
tions as the integrated support command (see below and in Chapter 12), but
on a different scale and tailored to the support requirements of the IFC.
INTEGRATED SUPPORT COMMAND
2-61. The integrated support command (ISC) is the aggregate of combat ser-
vice support units (and perhaps some combat support units) allocated from
the administrative force structure to an OSC and not suballocated in a con-
stituent or dedicated command relationship to a subordinate headquarters
within the OSC. The OSC further allocates part of its combat service support
units to its tactical-level subordinates and some, as an ISG, to support its
IFC. The rest remain in the ISC at OSC level to provide overall support of
the OSC. For organizational efficiency, other combat service support units
may be grouped in this ISC, although they may support only one of the major
units of the OSC. Sometimes, an ISC might also include units performing
combat support tasks (such as chemical warfare, IW, or law enforcement)
that support the OSC. (See Chapter 12 for more detail on the ISC.) |
7-100.1 | 66 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
ORGANIZING THE OPERATIONAL BATTLEFIELD
2-62. The OPFOR organizes the battlefield in such a way that it can rapidly
transition between offensive and defensive operations and between linear
and nonlinear operations. This flexibility can help the OPFOR adapt and
change the nature of the conflict to something for which the enemy is not
prepared.
Battlefield Geometry
2-63. The OPFOR recognizes the complexity of the modern battlefield. This
will often lead to situations where part of the OPFOR may be able to effec-
tively operate in a linear fashion, while other parts may be able to (or need
to) conduct nonlinear operations. The OPFOR’s understanding of what makes
a battlefield linear or nonlinear is based on general military theory accepted
by the armed forces of many countries. Battlefield geometry can be described
in two dimensions: the relationship of units to each other, the enemy, and
their support base; and the expected effects of that relationship.
2-64. Linear Operations. Some military operations develop along a secure
line from a base toward a geographically-based objective. These linear opera-
tions are characterized by an easily definable front and rear across the entire
force. Orientation of the bulk of the force is in one general direction, defined
as the front, normally facing the enemy and/or the objective. (See Figure 2-
10.) During linear operations, the flanks of units are normally protected by
other units, natural terrain features, or manmade obstacles.
Rear Front
X
Base
Objective
X
Enemy
Figure 2-10. Linear Operations |
7-100.1 | 67 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
Objective X
Enemy
Base Enemy
X
Objective
Figure 2-11. Nonlinear Operations
2-65. Nonlinear Operations. Military operations that seek to complete a
force- or systems-based mission, with no secure connection to a base and no
easily defined front and rear across the force, are nonlinear. Orientation of
the force is determined by the location of the immediate threat or the objec-
tive. (See Figure 2-11.) In most cases, units in a nonlinear environment rely
on movement, deception, cover, and concealment to provide protection for po-
tentially exposed portions of the force.
2-66. Expected Effects. The OPFOR considers the difference between lin-
ear and nonlinear operations less in terms of geography and more in terms of
effects desired. Linear operations normally produce small effects from small
actions and large effects from large actions (or perhaps large effects from an
aggregation of small actions)a linear relationship. Linear operations are
proportional and additive, and typically produce a predictable, measurable
effect. In contrast, this relationship may not always be present in nonlinear
operations, which can produce large effects from small actions. In some cases,
small actions produce small effects or no effects at all. Thus, nonlinear opera-
tions produce disproportionate, often unpredicted effects.
2-67. The OPFOR believes the worst of all possible situations is for a force to
be operating in a linear mode against an enemy that can operate freely
throughout the battlespace with excellent situational awareness and signifi-
cant forces and fires. The OPFOR seeks, as a base case, to create such a
situation for its enemies. |
7-100.1 | 68 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Areas of Responsibility
2-68. OPFOR organizations are given a specific area of responsibility. An
AOR is a clearly defined geographic area with associated airspace. An AOR is
bounded by a limit of responsibility (LOR) beyond which the organization
may not operate or fire without coordination through the next-higher head-
quarters. AORs may be linear or nonlinear in nature (see Figures. 2-12 and
2-13 for examples; see Chapters 3 and 4 for additional examples). Linear
AORs may contain subordinate nonlinear AORs and vice versa.
2-69. AORs normally consist of three basic zones: the battle zone, the
disruption zone, and the support zone. An AOR may also contain one or
more attack and/or kill zones. Zones may be linear or nonlinear in nature.
These zones have the same basic purposes within each type of offensive and
defensive operation (see Chapters 3 and 4). The size of these zones depends
on the size of the OPFOR units involved, engagement ranges of weapon sys-
tems, the terrain, and the nature of the enemy’s operation.
2-70. An AOR is not required to have all of these zones in any particular
situation. A particular command might have a battle zone and no disruption
zone. It might not have a battle zone, if it is the disruption force of a higher
command. If it is able to forage, it might not have a support zone. (See exam-
ples in Figure 2-13.)
OSC
LOR
Support Battle Disruption
Zone Zone Zone
OSC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OSC
LOR
Attack Zone
OSC
LOR Axis Objective
Kill
Zone
Support Battle
Line Line
OSC
LOR
Figure 2-12. Linear AOR Example
2-71. Within the overall LOR, the OPFOR normally refers to two types of
control lines. The battle line separates the battle zone from the disruption
zone. The support line separates the support zone from the battle zone. LORs
give maximum latitude to the subordinate commander. Within the LOR, the |
7-100.1 | 69 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
commander has the flexibility to do as he sees fit unless the higher com-
mander also assigns a kill zone, which he proposes to support with additional
resources.
2-72. An operation plan or directive normally defines AORs and zones by
specifying boundary lines in terms of distinct local terrain features through
which a line passes, specifying whether each terrain feature is included or
excluded from the unit’s AOR or zones within it. Normally, a specified terrain
feature is included unless the order identifies it as “excluded.”
2-73. In either linear or nonlinear operations, military reason normally dic-
tates a contiguous force deployment. The OPFOR does not recognize the idea
of “‘noncontiguous operations.” Senior OPFOR commanders ensure that all
parts of a theater are within the assigned AOR of some subordinate organiza-
tion, whether or not ground forces are actually present or expected to operate
in any given area. A given AOR or zone might be not be contiguous with
other AORs of its level of command or with other zones of the same type, but
the geographic area between such control measures will be identified as be-
ing in the AOR of some other organization.
DTG OSC
Battle Line LOR
DTG OSC
Support Line
LOR
DTG
AD OTG R
B Sa Zutt
p
ole
p n o
eZ ro tne DTG LOR ZA ott na eck
Objective
AD OTG R
Enemy
SPOD
Highway Support
Enemy DTG Zone Kill
APOD Battle Zone Zone Sea
OSC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
DTG/BTG
LOR
DTG
Dis Zr ou np etion
DTG/
LBT ORG
Dis
ZO
r
ouS npC
etion
Kill Zone
BTG
AOR
way
High
OSC
LOR
Figure 2-13. OSC Nonlinear AOR Example
2-74. In his operation plan, the commander specifies the organization of the
battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. Within his unit’s
AOR, as defined by the next-higher commander, he designates AORs for his
subordinates, along with zones, objectives, and axes related to his own over-
all mission. (See Chapter 3 for further discussion of objectives and axes.)
Whether the overall operation plan is offensive or defensive in nature, some |
7-100.1 | 70 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
subordinate units are likely to be occupying defensive battle positions. (See
Chapter 4 for further discussion of simple and complex battle positions.)
2-75. Disruption Zone. The disruption zone is where the OPFOR sets the
conditions for successful operations by beginning the attack on the compo-
nents of the enemy combat system. A successful disruption zone operation
can create a window of opportunity that is exploitable in the battle zone. In
the disruption zone, the OPFOR attacks specific components of the enemy’s
combat system in order to begin the breakdown of the system. For example,
attack of all enemy engineer forces can leave a maneuver force unable to con-
tinue effective combat operations in complex terrainexposing them to de-
struction by forces in the battle zone. Actions of forces in the disruption zone
are detailed in Chapters 3 and 4. Disruption zones may be contiguous or non-
contiguous with other disruption zones, or they may be “layered.”
2-76. Battle Zone. The battle zone is the portion of the AOR where the
OPFOR expects to conduct decisive operations. Using all components of its
combat power, the OPFOR will engage the enemy and defeat him in this
zone. Units operating in the battle zone can have various missions and objec-
tives, depending on the nature of the overall offensive or defensive operation
(see Chapters 3 and 4).
2-77. An FG or OSC does not form an operational-level battle zone per
sethat zone is the aggregate of the battle zones of its subordinate units. In
a nonlinear operation, multiple, noncontiguous battle zones may exist, and
within each a certain task would be assigned to the OPFOR unit or units
charged to operate in that space. The battle zone provides the commander of
each of those units the battlespace in which to frame his operations.
2-78. Support Zone. The support zone is that area of the battlespace de-
signed to be free of significant enemy action and to permit the effective logis-
tics and administrative support of forces. Security forces operate in the sup-
port zone in a combat role to defeat enemy special operations forces and other
threats. Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures oc-
cur throughout the support zone to protect the force from standoff RISTA and
precision attack. The OSC support zone may be dispersed within the support
zones of subordinate tactical units, or the OSC may have its own support
zone that is separate from subordinate AORs. The support zone may be in a
sanctuary that is noncontiguous with other zones of the AOR.
2-79. Attack Zone. An attack zone is given to a subordinate unit with an of-
fensive mission, to delineate clearly where forces will be conducting offensive
maneuver. Attack zones are often used to control offensive action by a subor-
dinate unit inside a larger defensive operation.
2-80. Kill Zone. A kill zone is a designated area on the battlefield where the
OPFOR plans to destroy a key enemy target, usually by fires. A kill zone may
be within the disruption zone or the battle zone. In defensive operations, it
could also be in the support zone. |
7-100.1 | 71 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
COMMAND GROUP AND STAFF
2-81. Within the C2 structure, the headquarters includes the command group
and the staff. (See Figure 2-14.) These elements perform the functions re-
quired to control the activities of forces preparing for and conducting combat.
The primary functions of headquarters are to
• Make decisions.
• Plan combat actions that accomplish those decisions.
• Acquire and process the information needed to make and execute effec-
tive decisions.
• Support the missions of subordinates.
The commander exercises C2 functions through his staff and subordinate
commanders.
Command Group
2-82. The command group consists of the commander, deputy commander,
and chief of staff. Together, they direct and coordinate the activities of the
staff and of subordinate forces.
2-83. Commander. The commander directs subordinate commanders and,
through his staff and liaison teams, controls any supporting units. OPFOR
commanders have complete authority over their subordinates and overall re-
sponsibility for those subordinates’ actions. This centralized authority en-
ables the commander to maintain troop discipline and unity and to act deci-
sively. Under the fluid conditions of modern warfare, even in the course of
carefully planned operations, the commander must accomplish assigned mis-
sions on his own initiative without constant guidance from above.
2-84. The commander is responsible for the combat capability of subordinate
units, the organization of combat operations, the maintenance of uninter-
rupted C2, and the successful conduct of combat missions. He examines and
analyzes the mission he receives (that is, he determines his forces’ place in
the senior commander’s concept of operations). He may do this alone or
jointly with the chief of staff. He then gives instructions to the chief of staff
on preparing his forces and staff for combat. He also provides instructions
about the timing of preparations. The commander makes his own assessment
of intelligence data supplied by the intelligence officer. Then, with advice
from the primary staff officers, he makes an assessment of his own forces.
After discussing his deductions and proposals with the operations officer
and his staff, the commander reaches a decision, issues combat missions to
subordinates, and gives instructions about planning the operation. He then
directs coordination within his organization and with adjacent forces and
other units operating in his AOR.
2-85. During the course of operations, the commander must constantly
evaluate the changing situation, predict likely developments, and issue new
combat missions in accordance with his vision of the battlefield. He also
keeps his superiors informed as to the situation and character of friendly and
enemy actions and his current decisions. |
7-100.1 | 72 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
COMMANDER
CommandGroup
Deputy
Commander
Commanders of
Chief Subordinate
of Forces
Staff
Primary Staff
Intelligence Operations Resources
Officer Officer Officer
Secondary Staff
Chief of
Chief of Chief of
Current
Reconnaissance Operations Logistics
Chief of Chief of Chief of
Information Future
Warfare Operations Administration
Chief of Chief of
Airspace
Communications Operations
Functional Staff
Chief of Chief of Chief of
Integrated Special-Purpose Population
Fires Operations Management
Chief of Chief of
Chief of
Force WMD Infrastructure
Protection Management
Chief of
Littoral
Warfare
Figure 2-14. OSC Command Group and Staff |
7-100.1 | 73 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-86. Deputy Commander. In the event the commander is killed or inca-
pacitated, the DC would assume command. Barring that eventuality, the
DC’s primary responsibility is to command the OSC’s IFC. As IFC com-
mander, he is responsible for executing operational-level fire support in a
manner consistent with the commander’s intent.
2-87. Chief of Staff. Preeminent among OPFOR staff officers is the chief of
staff position (found at every level from the General Staff down to battalion).
He exercises direct control over the primary staff. During combat, he is in
charge of the main CP when the commander moves to the forward CP. He
has the power to speak in the name of the commander and DC, and he nor-
mally countersigns all written orders and combat documents originating from
the commander’s authority. He alone has the authority to sign orders for the
commander or DC and to issue instructions in the commander’s name to sub-
ordinate units. In emergency situations, he can make changes in the tasks
given to subordinate commanders. Thus, it is vital that he understands
not merely the commander’s specific instructions but also his general con-
cept and train of thought. He controls the battle during the commander’s ab-
sences.
2-88. The chief of staff is a vital figure in the C2 structure. His role is to serve
as the director of staff planning and as coordinator of all staff inputs that as-
sist the commander’s decision making. He is the commander’s and DC’s focal
point for knowledge about the friendly and enemy situation. He has overall
responsibility for providing the necessary information for the commander to
make decisions. Thus, he plays a key role in structuring the overall recon-
naissance effort to meet the commander’s information requirements.
Staff
2-89. A staff provides rapid, responsive planning for combat activity, and
then coordinates and monitors the execution of the resulting plans on behalf
of the commander. Proper use of this staff allows the commander to focus on
the most critical issues in a timely manner and to preserve his energies.
2-90. The staff releases the commander from having to solve administrative
and technical problems, thereby allowing him to concentrate on the battle.
The primary function of the staff is to plan and prepare for combat. Evalua-
tion and knowledge of the situational elements of combat is fundamental to
the decision-making process and the direction of troops. After the commander
makes the decision, the staff must organize, coordinate, disseminate, and
support the missions of subordinates. Additionally, it is their responsibility to
train and prepare troops for combat, and to monitor the pre-combat and combat
situations.
2-91. In the decision-making and planning process, the staff—
• Prepares the data and estimates the commander uses to make a deci-
sion.
• Plans and implements the basic measures for comprehensive support
of a combat action.
• Organizes communications with subordinate and adjacent headquar-
ters and the next-higher staff. |
7-100.1 | 74 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
• Monitors the activities of subordinate staffs.
• Coordinates ongoing activity with higher-level and adjacent staffs
during an operation.
2-92. All operational-level headquarters have the same basic organization,
although each differs in size and complexity. The higher the level, the larger
and more complex the staff. Therefore, the organization of command and
staff elements is similar at theater, FG, or OSC.
2-93. The staff consists of three elements: the primary staff, the secondary
staff and the functional staff. Figure 2-14 depicts the primary, secondary,
and functional staff officers of an OSC headquarters; it does not show the li-
aison teams, which support the primary, secondary, and functional staff.
Primary and Secondary Staff
2-94. Each member of the primary staff heads a staff section. Within each
section are two or three secondary staff officers heading subsections subordi-
nate to that primary staff officer.
2-95. Operations Officer. The operations officer heads the operations
section, and conducts planning and prepares operation plans and operational
directives. Thus, the operations section is the principal staff section. It
includes current operations, future operations, and airspace operations
subsections, as well as the functional staff.
2-96. The operations officer is responsible for training and the formulating of
plans and orders. He monitors the work of all other staff sections, remains
knowledgeable of the current situation, and is ready to present information
and recommendations concerning the situation. He writes combat orders and
important combat reports. In coordination with the information section, the
operations officer keeps the commander informed on the progress of the op-
eration. Specific duties of the operations section include—
• Assisting the commander in the making and execution of combat decisions.
• Collecting information concerning the situation of friendly forces.
• Preparing and disseminating operational directives, plans and reports,
summaries, and situation overlays.
• Providing liaison for the exchange of information within the headquar-
ters and with higher, subordinate, and adjacent units.
• Organizing the main CP.
• Organizing troop movement and traffic control.
• Coordinating the organization of reconnaissance with the information section.
2-97. The chief of current operations is a secondary staff officer who proac-
tively monitors the course of current operations and coordinates the actions of
forces to ensure execution of the commander’s intent. He serves as the represen-
tative of the commander, chief of staff, and operations officer in their absence
and has the authority to control forces in accordance with the operation plan.
2-98. The chief of future operations is a secondary staff officer who heads the
planning staff and ensures continuous development of future plans and pos-
sible branches, sequels, and contingencies. While the commander and the |
7-100.1 | 75 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
chief of current operations focus on the current operation, the chief of future op-
erations and his subsection monitor the friendly and enemy situations and their
implications for future operations. They try to identify any developing situations
that require command decisions and/or adaptive measures. They advise the
commander on how and when to make adjustments to the operation plan during
the fight. Planning for various contingencies and anticipated opportunities can
facilitate immediate and flexible response to changes in the situation.
2-99. The chief of airspace operations (CAO) is a secondary staff officer who
is responsible for the control of the OSC’s airspace. See Chapters 8 and 9 for
further information on his duties.
2-100. Intelligence Officer. The intelligence officer heads the intelligence
and information section, which consists of the reconnaissance subsection, the
IW subsection, and the communications subsection. The intelligence officer is
responsible for the acquisition, synthesis, analysis, dissemination, and protec-
tion of all information and intelligence related to and required by the OSC’s
operations. He ensures the commander’s intelligence requirements are met.
He provides not only intelligence on the current and future operational envi-
ronment, but also insight on opportunities for adaptive and creative re-
sponses to ongoing operations. The intelligence officer works in close coordi-
nation with the chief of future operations to establish feedback and input for
future operations and the identification of possible windows of opportunity.
2-101. The intelligence officer also formulates the OSC’s IW plan and must
effectively task organize his staff resources to conduct and execute IW in a
manner that supports the strategic IW plan. He is responsible for the coordi-
nation of all necessary national or theater level assets in support of the IW
plan and executes staff supervision over the IW and communications plans.
He is supported by three secondary staff officers: the chief of reconnaissance,
the chief of IW, and the chief of communications.
2-102. The chief of reconnaissance develops collection plans, gathers
information, and evaluates data on the battlefield situation. During combat,
he directs the efforts of subordinate reconnaissance units and reconnaissance
staff subsections of subordinate units. Specific responsibilities of the
reconnaissance subsection include—
• Collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on the enemy, terrain,
and weather to the commander and subordinate, higher, and adjacent units.
• Organizing reconnaissance missions, including requests for aerial re-
connaissance, in coordination with the operations section and in sup-
port of the IW plan.
• Preparing the reconnaissance plan, in coordination with the operations section.
• Preparing the reconnaissance portion of operation plans and opera-
tional directives.
• Preparing intelligence reports.
• Supervising the exploitation of captured enemy documents and materiel.
• Supervising interrogation and debriefing operations throughout the command.
• Providing targeting data for long-range fires. |
7-100.1 | 76 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
2-103. The chief of information warfare is responsible supervising the execu-
tion of the OSC’s IW plan. (Chapter 5 details the components of the IW plan.)
These responsibilities include
• Coordinating the employment of IW assets, both those constituent to
the OSC and those available at the national or theater level.
• Planning for and supervising all information protection and security
measures.
• Supervising the implementation of the deception and perception man-
agement plans.
• Working with the operations staff to ensure that targets scheduled for
destruction support the IW plan, and if not, resolving conflicts between
IW needs and operational needs.
• Recommending to the intelligence officer any necessary actions re-
quired to implement the IW plan.
2-104. The chief of communications develops a communications plan for the
command that is approved by the intelligence officer and chief of staff. He or-
ganizes communications with subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters.
The communications subsection plans the use of all forms of communications, to
include satellite communications (SATCOM), wire, radio, digital, cellular, and
couriers, to ensure that the commander has continuous and uninterrupted
control. Specific responsibilities of the communications subsection include
• Establishing SATCOM and radio nets.
• Establishing call signs and radio procedures.
• Organizing courier and mail service.
• Operating the command’s message center.
• Supervising the supply, issue, and maintenance of signal equipment.
2-105. An additional and extremely important role of the communications of-
ficer is to ensure the thorough integration of joint, interagency, and allied
forces into the OSC’s C2 structure. The OSC headquarters is permanently
equipped with a full range of C2 systems compatible with each of the services
of the State’s Armed Forces as well as with government agencies commonly
operating as part of OSCs (such as special police or border guard units that
were originally subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior). Other govern-
ment agencies and allied partners are also the responsibility of the communi-
cations officer and he plans and provides for their C2 integration.
2-106. Resources Officer. The resources officer is responsible for the requi-
sition, acquisition, distribution, and care of all of the command’s resources,
both human and materiel. He ensures the commander’s logistics and admin-
istrative requirements are met and executes staff supervision over the com-
mand’s logistics and administrative procedures. (Sustainment procedures are
detailed in Chapter 12.) He is supported by two secondary staff officers: the
chief of logistics and the chief of administration. One additional major task of
the resources officer is to free the commander from the need to bring his
influence to bear on priority logistics and administrative functions. He is also
the officer in charge of the sustainment CP. |
7-100.1 | 77 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-107. The chief of logistics heads the logistics system. He is responsible for
managing the order, receipt, and distribution of supplies to sustain the com-
mand. He is responsible for the condition and combat readiness of armaments
and related combat equipment and instruments. He is also responsible for their
supply, proper utilization, repair, and evacuation. He oversees the supply and
maintenance of the command’s combat and technical equipment. These respon-
sibilities encompass the essential wartime tasks of organizing and controlling
the command’s recovery, repair, and replacement system. During combat, he
keeps the commander informed on the status of the command’s equipment.
2-108. The chief of administration supervises all personnel actions and
transactions in the command. His subsection maintains daily strength re-
ports and TO&E changes; assigns personnel; requests replacements; records
losses; administers awards and decorations; and collects, records, and dis-
poses of war booty.
Functional Staff
2-109. The functional staff consists of experts in a particular type of military
operation or function (see Figure 2-15). These experts advise the command
group and the primary and secondary staff on issues pertaining to their indi-
vidual areas of expertise.
Operations
Officer
Chief of Chief of Chief of
Chief of
Integrated Force Special-Purpose
WMD
Fires Protection Operations
Chief of Chief of Chief of
Population Infrastructure Littoral
Management Management Warfare
Figure 2-15. OSC Functional Staff
2-110. In peacetime, the functional staff is a cadre with personnel assigned
from appropriate branches and services. It has enough personnel to allow
continuous 24-hour capability and the communications and information
management tools to allow them to support the commander’s decision-
making process and exercise staff supervision over their functional areas
throughout the AOR. In wartime, the functional staff receives liaison teams
from subordinate and supporting units that perform tasks in support of those
functional areas. |
7-100.1 | 78 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
2-111. Chief of Integrated Fires. The chief of integrated fires is responsi-
ble for integrating C2 and RISTA means with fires and maneuver. He works
closely with the OSC chief of reconnaissance and the IFC staff. He also coor-
dinates with the chief of IW to ensure that deception and protection and se-
curity measures contribute to the success of the fire support to offensive and
defensive operations.
2-112. Chief of Force Protection. The chief of force protection is responsi-
ble for coordinating activities to prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile ac-
tions against OPFOR personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information.
This protection includes air, space, and missile defense; NBC defense; defensive
IW; counterterrorism; counterreconnaissance; and engineer survivability
measures. This subsection works closely with those of the chief of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and the chief of IW. Liaison teams from internal se-
curity, air defense, chemical defense, and engineer forces provide advice within
their respective areas of protection.
2-113. Chief of Special-Purpose Operations. The chief of special-purpose
operations is responsible for planning and coordinating the actions of SPF
units allocated to an OSC. When possible, this subsection receives liaison
teams from any affiliated forces that act in concert with the SPF.
2-114. Chief of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The chief of WMD is re-
sponsible for planning the offensive use of WMD. This functional staff ele-
ment receives liaison teams from any subordinate or supporting units that
contain WMD delivery means.
2-115. Chief of Population Management. The chief of population man-
agement is responsible for coordinating the actions of Internal Security
Forces, as well as psychological warfare, perception management, civil affairs,
and counterintelligence activities. There is always a representative of the Minis-
try of the Interior, and frequently one from the Ministry of Public Information.
This subsection works closely with the chief of IW and receives liaison teams
from psychological warfare, civil affairs, counterintelligence, and Internal Secu-
rity Forces units allocated to the OSC or operating within the OSC’s AOR.
2-116. Chief of Infrastructure Management. The chief of infrastructure
management is responsible for establishing and maintaining roads, airfields,
railroads, hardened structures (warehouses and storage facilities), inland
waterways, ports, and pipelines. He coordinates with the OSC resources offi-
cer regarding improvement and maintenance of supply and evacuation
routes. He exercises staff supervision or cognizance over the route construc-
tion and maintenance functions of both civil and combat engineers operating
in the OSC’s AOR. He coordinates with civilian agencies and the OSC chief of
communications to ensure adequate telecommunications support.
2-117. Chief of Littoral Warfare. The chief of littoral warfare is responsi-
ble for planning and coordinating coastal defense and amphibious operations.
His subsection includes liaison teams from not only naval and naval infantry
units, but also any ground forces, aviation, air defense, airborne, SPF, or af-
filiated forces that participate in or support the coastal defense or amphibi-
ous operation. He also coordinates with border guard units assigned to patrol
coastal border areas. |
7-100.1 | 79 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
Liaison Teams
2-118. Liaison teams support the staff with detailed expertise in the mission
areas of their particular branch or service and provide direct communications
to subordinate and supporting units executing missions in those areas. Liaison
team leaders speak for the commanders of their respective units. Liaison teams
to OSCs are organized with a liaison team leader, two current operations officers
or senior NCOs and two plans officers or senior NCOs. This gives liaison teams
the ability to conduct continuous operations and simultaneously execute current
plans and develop future plans. The staff would also receive liaison teams from
multinational and interagency subordinates and from affiliated forces.
COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS
2-119. C2 is a continuous process at all levels of command. The OPFOR rec-
ognizes five elements in this process:
• Acquiring and processing information.
• Decision making.
• Planning.
• Preparation.
• Execution.
ACQUIRING AND PROCESSING OF INFORMATION
2-120. Acquiring and processing information is always the first function in
the C2 process. This function is a continuous, active process of requesting, re-
ceiving, collating, analyzing, and disseminating information commanders and
staffs need for decision making and planning. However, the physical collec-
tion of information is not actually part of the C2 process.
2-121. An operational-level commands receives information collected at
higher and lower levels, as the information relates to its own requirements.
Likewise, operational-level commands pass information to both those levels
to meet strategic or tactical information requirements.
Strategic-Level Information Requirements
2-122. At the General Staff level and above, military and political informa-
tion requirements are global in scope. The OPFOR has a continuous re-
quirement to evaluate changes in the military or political capabilities and in-
tentions of foreign nations in relation to the State. The accuracy of these as-
sessments can directly influence the selection of strategic military and politi-
cal goals, the structure of the State’s Armed Forces, and the strategic concept
for using military power.
Operational-Level Information Requirements
2-123. FG and OSC staffs are the focal points for detailed situation evalua-
tion and large-scale planning for combat units. Therefore, they have a par-
ticularly heavy demand for information to support the decision-making and
planning process. To function efficiently, operational-level staffs require high-
resolution data on both enemy and friendly forces. Required periodic and special
reporting is the primary source of detailed, accurate, and timely information on |
7-100.1 | 80 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
friendly forces. The availability and timeliness of such friendly force data de-
pends largely on the availability and efficiency of the necessary communica-
tions links. On the other hand, acquiring information on the enemy involves
collecting and reporting in a hostile environment. Operational staffs must
analyze conflicting and incomplete data and assess and correlate intelligence
provided by higher headquarters.
Tactical-Level Information Requirements
2-124. The commander and staff must bring together all available data ap-
plicable to their mission and use the data skillfully to achieve their objec-
tives. At a minimum, these data include information on enemy and friendly
forces, the combat environment, and the population in the AOR.
2-125. Enemy. Of these elements, information about the enemy is the most
important. An OPFOR commander must have continuous, reliable informa-
tion about the enemy’s effective combat strength and organization to conduct
forces analysis. He must receive information concerning enemy locations, re-
inforcing units, C2 systems, and defensive positions. Information pertaining
to the disposition and potential use of precision weapons is important. The
required degree of detail will vary in different situations and at various lev-
els of command. Constant attention is given to identifying enemy deception
efforts. The OPFOR emphasizes multi-spectral collection efforts to reduce the
potential effects of the enemy’s deceiving a single RISTA asset.
2-126. Friendly Forces. Information about friendly forces is necessary to
help the commander determine how best to use them and to identify re-
quirements for coordination. OPFOR planners consider training status when
making qualitative calculations of relative strengths of their own and enemy
forces. In addition, they must consider how missions of other friendly forces
may affect the accomplishment of their own assigned tasks.
2-127. Combat Environment. The NBC environment, terrain, weather,
and climatic and seasonal conditions also provide OPFOR planners insight as
to what they can and cannot do effectively during a combat action. Planners use
this information to determine routes, use of NBC weapons, and types of camou-
flage. This information can also help determine the effects these factors could
have on friendly actions and on the enemy’s possible courses of action.
2-128. Population. The economic and sociopolitical makeup of the AOR in-
terests OPFOR military planners. Information about potentially hostile, neu-
tral, and friendly populations in the AOR enables the OPFOR to exploit local
resources and to plan appropriate levels of security and perception manage-
ment strategies to manipulate the population.
DECISION MAKING
2-129. The military decision-making process consists of five phases: assess,
orient, decide, act, and adapt. These phases are not completely independent
processes or stages of thought. Each phase overlaps and relies on the others. |
7-100.1 | 81 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
Assess
2-130. The command group and staff develop estimates across the compo-
nents of the combat system, including combat, combat support, C2, RISTA,
and logistics forces. There are three separate purposes served by the assess-
ment process, including
• Develop situational awareness of forces and means at the disposal of
the OPFOR and the enemy.
• Determine possible enemy weaknesses.
• Develop an understanding of OPFOR requirements.
2-131. The assessment phase requires the staff elements responsible for the
discrete components of the combat system to conduct analysis and synthesis.
Typically the analysis includes
• Mission. The commander must understand the senior commander’s
concept of the campaign or operation and his own command’s role in it.
• Time and Space. The OPFOR considers time a factor it can use to its
advantage and prefers to exercise patience if that will achieve the goal.
The OPFOR views time as an ally in developing a strategy of exhaust-
ing the enemy in pursuit of the State’s goals.
• Environment. In the assessment of the environment, the OPFOR
includes terrain, population, and other physical dimensions of the
battlespace.
• Capabilities and Intentions. This is not limited to the immediate
opponent, but includes all relevant regional and global actors.
• Opportunities and Risks. In its decision making, the OPFOR at-
tempts to identify both risks and opportunity posed by the environ-
ment, time and space, or capabilities and intentions of other actors.
Orient
2-132. The orientation step or phase in the process enables the commander to
direct preparatory steps prior to determining his aim or making his final de-
cision. He first examines the mission given his unit and determines what
tasks must be performed to accomplish this mission. This phase also includes
activating RISTA assets to develop information requirements identified in
the assessment of the situation. Typically, the orientation phase would in-
clude preliminary instructions appropriate to the assessment of the situation.
If the assessment phase reveals shortfalls or information requirements es-
sential to reaching a final decision, orienting the command group, staff, and
units enables the OPFOR to develop “pace” prior to final decision. This phase
requires coordination with appropriate civilian authorities at the higher
echelons, particularly in support of transition operations or adaptive operations.
During the orientation phase, the commander and his staff develop several
courses of action and compare them, attempting to refine the information re-
quired for decision.
Decide
2-133. In the “decide” step, the commander determines his aim or decision
and communicates his concept for execution. He includes his directions for |
7-100.1 | 82 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
sustaining the aim. Typically, sustaining the aim involves assigning re-
sources and developing parameters for execution that define the limits of
subordinates’ discretion. In communicating his thinking, the commander al-
ways includes branches and sequels that he is able to anticipate. In establishing
the aim, he remains focused on the mission that he was assigned, but does so
in the context of the systems warfare approach to combat and how he may best
achieve the ends envisioned in his mission. He attempts to reach a choice that
enables the OPFOR to operate successfully by defeating an opponent through
disaggregating one or more components of the enemy combat system. Conse-
quently, the OPFOR is not very interested in classic calculations of correlation of
military forces, but more in finding a way to produce disproportionate effects.
2-134. When the commander has selected a base course of action with appro-
priate branches and sequels, he provides this decision to his staff for further
planning and for dissemination of the finalized missions to the troops. The
decision includes the concept, missions for major subordinates, the organiza-
tion of forces, and the organization of the AOR. The components of the deci-
sion are the following:
2-135. Objective (Subordinate Unit Missions). The commander deter-
mines the objective of the operation and the missions to be assigned to con-
stituent and dedicated forces. This part of the decision defines the priorities
for supporting and affiliated forces.
2-136. Opportunity. The commander describes how the unit will achieve
the necessary window of opportunity to execute the plan. This includes meas-
ures for protecting the force from standoff attack as well as creating or taking
advantage of an enemy vulnerability.
2-137. Method (Concept of Operations). The commander describes by
what means to accomplish the task or mission. He organizes the battlefield
and his forces. He lays out the method by which the OSC will support the
theater or national IW campaign.
2-138. End State. The commander describes his vision for how the operation
ends on OPFOR terms. He also describes how this operation sets the stage
for follow-on operations.
Act
2-139. On the basis of the available data and the recommendations from the
staff, the commander makes a decision. The decision may be one of the rec-
ommended courses of action, a combination of two or more recommendations,
or a new solution. The commander can also keep the more promising non-
selected variants as contingency plans.
2-140. Commanders avoid using stereotyped patterns that would make en-
emy templating and targeting easier. To aid in deception, they may create
courses of action that appear on the surface as established fighting methods
but are actually something else.
Adapt
2-141. Operational-level decision making is highly flexible. This flexibility
comes from mission-type orders from the General Staff (or SHC or theater |
7-100.1 | 83 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
headquarters) to the operational-level commands. The staff structure pro-
vides operational-level commanders the capability for rapid situation as-
sessment and decision making.
2-142. Since operational planning occurs well in advance, it would be difficult
for the enemy to disrupt the initial decision making and planning. However,
the operational-level commanders and staffs are continually updating and
adapting the operation plan. The OPFOR uses IW measures to help ensure
that the OPFOR commander has sufficient time to acquire and process in-
formation on the combat situation.
PLANNING
2-143. The commander conveys his decision to the chief of staff, who, with his
subordinates, fleshes it out with detailed planning tailored to the circum-
stances of the operation and the terrain. The chief of staff issues detailed,
precise orders for the initial phase of an operation only. At this point, there
usually is not enough hard data to allow an accurate forecast of how the
situation will develop. The plan includes intelligence, the commander’s deci-
sion, limits of responsibility, the missions of flanking forces, the missions of
combat support and combat service support units, coordinating instructions,
and the deployment of CPs.
2-144. Planning usually begins with the receipt of preliminary instructions
for execution of the SCP. The planning process is continuous and will be af-
fected by changes in the battlefield situation, amendments to orders and di-
rectives, or assignment of new missions. Situational intensity dictates the
planning method used.
2-145. Central to OPFOR planning is the concept of opportunity. In transition
or adaptive operations, the OPFOR recognizes that it will often be operating
in conditions where it is overmatched by enemy technological superiority. In
these conditions, the OPFOR will plan and conduct deliberate operations to
create windows of opportunity in which to operate proactively with freedom
of maneuver from enemy RISTA and standoff attack. Each OPFOR plan in-
cludes specific instructions to subordinate units concerning how this oppor-
tunity will be achieved and utilized.
2-146. Examples of means by which the OPFOR can create opportunity are
• IW activities, including selective denial of enemy situational understanding.
• Use of complex terrain.
• Freedom-of-movement operations (such as feints, ruses, demonstra-
tions, or ambushes).
Planning Framework
2-147. The military SCP developed and issued by the General Staff directs
operational-level military forces. Each operational-level command identified in the
SCP prepares an operation plan that supports the execution of its role in that SCP.
2-148. From the General Staff down through the operational and tactical lev-
els, the staff of each military headquarters has an operations directorate or
section that is responsible for planning. The plan at each level specifies the
AOR and task organization of forces allocated to that level of command, in |
7-100.1 | 84 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
order to best accomplish the mission assigned by a higher headquarters.
Once the commander at a particular level approves the plan, he issues it to
the subordinate commanders who will execute it. Figure 2-16 illustrates the
framework for planning from the national level down through military chan-
nels to the operational and tactical levels.
Decision-Making Staff
Executing
(Plan-Approval) Planning Plan
Organizations
Authority Organization
Strategic Level
National
National Strategic
Strategic All State
Command Integration
Campaign Ministries
Authority Department
Plan
Military
Chief of Operations Strategic Armed
General Staff Directorate Campaign Forces
Plan
Theater Forces
Theater Operations
Campaign Allocated to
Commander Directorate
Plan Theater
Operational Level
Forces
Field Group Operations Operation
Allocated to
Commander Section Plan
Field Group
Forces
OSC Operations Operation
Allocated to
Commander Section Plan
OSC
Tactical Level
Forces
Tactical-Level Operations Allocated to
Battle Plan
Commander Section Tactical-Level
Command
Figure 2-16. State and OPFOR Planning Framework |
7-100.1 | 85 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
Planning Factors
2-149. Planning factors serve as a basis for staff calculations and as meas-
ures against which to test and assess troops and units. The OPFOR sees
these planning factors as guides in planning rather than figures to which one
must adhere rigidly in all circumstances.
2-150. The OPFOR views planning factors as practical expressions of the re-
lationships dictated by military common sense and the principles of war. Op-
erations planning factors include space and time factors concerning the mis-
sions of forces and their areas of combat activity. For example, such planning
factors establish parameters for the time available to take advantage of a
window of opportunity, the space required to disperse forces, and the number
of ambushing forces necessary to ensure a key target is destroyed. The basis
for these planning factors is a close study of potential adversaries, military
history, field training exercises, and military simulations. The resulting plan-
ning factors are tailored to the makeup of OPFOR organizations, their
capabilities, enemy capabilities, and conditions on the modern battlefield.
2-151. Planning factors also express timeliness and quantitative and qualita-
tive factors. Examples include normal expenditures of ammunition to destroy
a given target, rates of fuel consumption under specific conditions, and the
number of halts in a road march of a given duration. Such factors ensure a
uniform and objective approach to expected performance in combat and a
standard for evaluating the training level of personnel and units.
Forces Analysis
2-152. For determining the amount and type of force required to accomplish
a given mission (for planning purposes), OPFOR planners use a very detailed
method known as forces analysis. This involves qualitative calculations of the
relative strengths of their own and enemy forces. Forces analysis includes study
of opponents previous military operations and the historical trends for application
of military power at all levels. Vulnerabilities and strengths are assessed for
potential exploitation by OPFOR operational forces. Forces analysis is seldom a
simple one-to-one comparison of combat systems. It involves an examination of
the enemy’s entire combat system and the linkages of military forces to national
strategies. By determining the relationships of the systems that give a military
force its strength the OPFOR can determine where, and now much combat
power to apply for desired effects. The results of forces analysis are used to rec-
ommend to the commander the organization of forces and the battlefield, as well
as to identify any shortfalls in the available components of combat power.
Advances in Planning
2-153. Advances in information technology have resulted in changes in the
OPFOR’s planning process. Some of the advances have resulted in the fielding of
new hardware providing increased capabilities, while others caused changes in how
the OPFOR conducts operations. The following paragraphs address these factors.
2-154. Timeliness. The high pace of modern combat imposes time con-
straints on the OPFOR decision-making process and planning cycle.
Commanders must expect the situation to be subject to sudden, sharp |
7-100.1 | 86 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
changes, or to be shrouded in obscurity and ambiguity. As a result, there may
be insufficient time to produce and disseminate intelligence and to formulate
and issue plans and orders.
2-155. Timely and rapid information collection and reporting are critical to
ensuring that commanders have constant, up-to-date knowledge of the situa-
tion. To be successful, the commander must be able to react swiftly to
changes, while updating subordinate unit missions.
2-156. To OPFOR decision makers and planners, time assumes a role of un-
paralleled importance on the battlefield. The effectiveness of their C2 is in-
separably linked to the ability to make and implement decisions that allow
the OPFOR to control the pace of combat.
2-157. Commanders and staffs must plan their available time carefully. The
OPFOR emphasizes parallel planning and action at all levels. Even when less
time is available for planning, it works out plans in as much detail as possible.
2-158. Staff Procedures. While the time available for making and commu-
nicating decisions has decreased, the quantity of information collected has
increased dramatically. Improved reconnaissance systems have increased the
volume of information to be processed and analyzed. Despite this information
explosion, commanders must still be able to make rapid decisions while
guarding against information overload and a resulting slowdown of the
decision-making process.
2-159. The OPFOR has increased automation of the staff calculations sup-
porting the decision-making and planning processes. Automation extends the
use of prepared calculations and formulas, while reducing paperwork.
OPFOR staff procedures are streamlined to provide commanders with more
time to prepare their forces for combat. The issuance of preliminary instruc-
tions outlining the broad concept of operations, along with the acceptance of
subordinates’ initiative, allows subordinate staffs to use parallel planning.
2-160. Detailed Planning. When the commander decides on the final con-
cept of operations, the staff begins detailed planning. Detailed planning is a
prerequisite for success. Modern combined arms, joint, interagency, and multi-
national operations integrate the actions of many types of forces and combat
equipment, as well as diverse support requirements. In terms of detail, OPFOR
planning considers forces an echelon below the immediately subordinate units to
which it assigns tasks in the operation plan. Thus, planning in an OSC with
division-size subordinates looks at brigade-level requirements in detail.
PREPARATION
2-161. Preparation links planning and execution. The commander supervises
the preparations of his subordinates, either personally or through his DC or
chief of staff. He issues instructions and directives.
Dissemination of Missions
2-162. The dissemination of missions to subordinates is a critical C2 task.
The commander usually establishes the general procedures of staffs and
other headquarters for disseminating missions to the troops. However, the chief
of staff is the main organizer for carrying out this work. He must accomplish |
7-100.1 | 87 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
this quickly, in order to give subordinate commanders and staffs, and units
as well, sufficient time to prepare for their combat missions. In order to de-
crease the time this task requires, the OPFOR applies technology, such as
graphic display panels and other sophisticated signal equipment.
2-163. Disseminating mission-type information concerning upcoming or
planned combat activity occurs at several points in the decision-making and
planning process. At any level, preliminary instructions from higher-level
commanders first present this information in general outline, allowing sub-
ordinate commanders and staffs to begin preliminary planning (as part of the
decision-making process). Only when they receive the senior commander’s fi-
nal decision in operational directives can lower-level commanders decide on
their own final concept of the operation. The process at a given level ends
when commanders issue combat orders to their own subordinates.
2-164. Preliminary Instructions. The means by which commanders can
make the earliest possible dissemination of information concerning an up-
coming operation are preliminary instructions. These instructions contain the
missions of the subordinate units and the higher commander’s general concept
of operations. These normally serve as a vehicle to provide the outline of the
commander’s decision, basic information on the situation, and the mission for
which the receiving headquarters should begin planning. These instructions
may revise a previous order or issue a new, time-sensitive mission. Similar to a
warning order in the U.S. Army, they allow subordinate units to prepare for the
flurry of activity demanded of headquarters on receipt of a new mission. They
enable subordinate headquarters to begin their planning process concurrently
with the higher command levels. The commander may issue preliminary in-
structions to subordinates in either oral or written form. However, it is normal
to transmit preliminary instructions by electronic, secure-voice means rather
than in written form.
2-165. Operation Plan. Operational-level commands prepare operation
plans to control execution of their portion of an SCP. The operation plan must
• Optimally allocate forces and resources to each mission.
• Provide concrete methods to coordinate the actions of maneuver, fire
support, and logistics support.
• Provide for a specific sequence and methods for conducting each sub-
task required to assure mission success.
From the completed operation plan, the staff creates operational directives or
combat orders to inform subordinates of their missions, roles, and time re-
quirements for executing the plan.
2-166. The operation plan details the commander’s thinking and reflects the
input of various subordinates and staff elements according to their functional
responsibilities. It normally includes the following specific areas:
• Assessment of the enemy situation and probable intentions.
• Scope, aim, and concept of operations.
• Organization of forces.
• Organization of the battlefield.
• Results of forces analysis. |
7-100.1 | 88 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
• Plan for commitment of reserves.
• Missions of subordinate units.
• Missions of supporting and adjacent units.
• Plan for logistics support.
• Locations of CPs.
2-167. The operation plan includes a varying number of annexes. There are
normally annexes for C2, SPF, airborne landings, preparation and occupation
of assembly areas, and movement routes, among others.
Execution Orders
2-168. After planning and preparation, it is time to issue directives and or-
ders for execution of the planned operation. The commander may continue to
revise and re-issue these during the course of the operation.
2-169. Operational Directive. An operational directive contains complete
information for accomplishing a particular mission. Commanders issue op-
erational directives during the course of an operation to implement upcoming
phases of the operation plan, implement a foreseen contingency, or to effect
changes in the operation plan. Time constraints necessitate heavy dependence
on verbal dissemination of missions and planning guidance. The operational-
level staff usually issues a formal, written directive to supplement the verbal
instructions the commander has already issued.
2-170. The operational-level staff may also prepare and issue annexes to op-
erational directives. If annexes are incomplete when the staff transmits the
directive, it sends them out separately to prevent delay in dissemination of
the directive. Types of annexes include coordination requirements, recon-
naissance, IW, force protection, communications, fire support, logistics, and
counterattack plans.
2-171. Combat Orders. Commanders at all levels issue combat orders both
during combat and during the preparation for combat. The orders are de-
signed to direct a unit to perform a specific task or to adjust a former mis-
sion. Combat orders typically include an estimate of the enemy situation, the
new (or revised) mission, the support available from the commander for the
mission, and the time when the unit must be ready to execute the task. Be-
cause they are time-sensitive, combat orders are usually disseminated orally
either by radio or in person.
Rehearsals
2-172. Rehearsals are an integral part of OPFOR preparation for combat.
OPFOR commanders expect all key phases of an operation to be well re-
hearsed using the most realistic means possible. OPFOR staffs take action to
relieve subordinate units of other time pressures to permit the maximum
time for rehearsals and other combat checks during preparation. OPFOR
commanders often forego planning detail in order to spend time with key
subordinates during their rehearsals. |
7-100.1 | 89 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
EXECUTION
2-173. Planning and preparation are important, but they alone are not suffi-
cient for success. The enemy’s actions can have a dynamic effect on executing
plans. Friction and uncertainty can distort the best of plans, imposing new
realities on the situation. Dealing with those realities is the art of execution.
Planned Flexibility
2-174. Operational-level C2 is highly flexible. This flexibility comes from mis-
sion-type orders from the General Staff (or SHC or theater headquarters) to
the operational-level commands. The staff structure provides operational-
level commanders the capability for rapid situation assessment and decision
making. A standardized, streamlined process, using automated support, pro-
duces the decision and the accompanying plans to implement it.
2-175. Since operational planning occurs well in advance, it would be difficult
for the enemy to disrupt the initial decision making and planning. However,
the operational-level commanders and staffs are continually updating of the
operation plan. By limiting a commander’s time to plan, an enemy could force
the OPFOR staff to forsake the preferable parallel or sequential planning
methods for less desirable executive planning. The OPFOR uses IW meas-
ures to help ensure that the OPFOR commander has sufficient time to ac-
quire and process information on the combat situation.
2-176. Planning continues during execution. The process of forecasting and
modeling the commander began in his decision process usually has produced
a series of variants, or contingency plans, which the commander can imple-
ment without completely changing his concept of operations. Such planning
also accounts for a range of probable enemy responses to OPFOR combat
actions. Each variant, however, must allow the achievement of the assigned
mission by the designated time; this aspect of the plan is not subject to
contingency planning.
Monitoring Execution and Sustaining the Aim
2-177. Issuing directives does not ensure they will be carried out or under-
stood. The OPFOR places great emphasis on supervision after the directive is
issued. The chief of staff is responsible to the commander for the overall or-
ganization of staff supervision. Each staff section is responsible for checking
on the execution of the directives it prepares and also ensuring that subordi-
nates have correctly understood the directives. The chief of staff may issue
additional directives, with the operational commander’s approval, to resolve
any misunderstandings.
2-178. Proper supervisory control takes many forms. These include observa-
tion from air and ground observation points, and instructions and questions
passed by radio, wire, or messenger. The preferred method is personal
contact. The OSC commander may personally supervise the most important
combat action. In fast-moving situations, control is somewhat looser. Subor-
dinate commanders then react as the situation dictates, realizing they are re-
sponsible for acting in accordance with the commander’s concept. |
7-100.1 | 90 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
COMMAND POSTS
2-179. The OPFOR plans to exercise strategic, operational, and tactical con-
trol over its wartime forces from an integrated system of CPs. It has designed
this system to ensure uninterrupted control of forces.
2-180. CPs are typically formed in three parts: a control group, a support
group, and a communications group. The control group includes members of
the command group and staff. The support group consists of the transport
and logistics units. Whenever possible, the communications group, is remoted
from the control and support groups, because of its large number of signal vans,
generators, and other special vehicles that would provide a unique signature.
2-181. Because the OPFOR expects its C2 to come under heavy attack in war-
time, its military planners have created a CP structure that emphasizes sur-
vivability through dispersal, stringent security measures, redundancy, and
mobility. They have constructed a CP system that can sustain damage with
minimum disruption to the actual C2 process. In the event of disruption, they
can quickly reestablish control. This extensive system of CPs extends from
the hardened command facilities of the NCA to the specially designed com-
mand vehicles from which OPFOR tactical commanders control their units.
Most operational-level CPs have been designed to be very mobile and smaller
than comparable enemy CPs. The number, size, and types of CPs depend on
the level of command.
COMMAND POST TYPES
2-182. OPFOR ground forces use five basic and three special types of CPs.
Not all levels of command use all types at all times. (See Figure 2-17, where
parentheses indicate that a type of CP may or may not be employed at a cer-
tain level.) The redundancy provided by multiple CPs helps to ensure that
the C2 process remains survivable.
Basic Special
Level of
Command
2-42
PC
niaM
PC
CFI
PC
drawroF
PC
tnemniatsuS PC
enrobriA
PC
etanretlA
PC
yrailixuA
PC
noitpeceD
OSC X X X X (X) (X) (X) (X)
Field Group* X X (X) X X (X) (X) (X)
Theater* X X (X) X X (X) (X) (X)
* When formed. |
7-100.1 | 91 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-183. FGs and OSCs can use the same basic types of CPs (main, IFC, for-
ward, sustainment, and airborne). FG and OSC airborne CPs may be aboard
fixed-wing aircraft. However, helicopters are more likely to serve this pur-
pose at OSC level.
2-184. A theater headquarters normally deploys main, IFC, and sustainment
CPs. An airborne CP will always be available to the theater commander. A
theater forward CP may be established. The main CP at this level may ini-
tially be in permanent, hardened bunkers; the other CP types may be at less-
protected sites. The airborne CP is most likely aboard fixed-wing aircraft.
2-185. For brevity, OPFOR plans and orders may use acronyms for the
various types of CP. Thus, main CP may appear as MCP, integrated fires
command CP as IFC CP, forward CP as FCP, sustainment CP as SUSCP,
airborne CP as AIRCP, alternate CP as ALTCP, auxiliary CP as AUXCP,
and deception CP as DCP.
Main Command Post
2-186. The main CP generally is located in a battle zone or in a key sanctu-
ary area or fortified position. It contains the bulk of the staff. The chief of
staff directs its operation. Its primary purpose is to simultaneously coordi-
nate the activities of subordinate units not yet engaged in combat and plan
for subsequent missions. The particular emphasis on planning in the main
CP is on the details of transitioning between current and future operations.
The main CP is the focus of control. It is less mobile and much larger than
the forward CP. It makes use of hardened sites when possible.
2-187. The chief of staff directs the staff in translating the commander’s deci-
sions into plans, directives, and orders. He also coordinates the movement
and deployment of all subordinate units not yet in combat and monitors their
progress and combat readiness. In addition to the chief of staff, personnel
present at the main CP include the liaison teams from subordinate, supporting,
allied, and affiliated units, unless their presence is required in another CP.
IFC Command Post
2-188. The DC directs the IFC from the IFC CP. The IFC CP possesses the
communications, airspace control, and automated fire control systems re-
quired to integrate RISTA means and execute long-range fires. Each secon-
dary staff subsection and some functional staff subsections have an element
dedicated to the IFC CP. The IFC CP includes liaison teams from fire sup-
port, army aviation, and Air Force units. The IFC CP is typically separated from
the main CP. Also for survivability, the various sections of the IFC headquarters
that make up the IFC CP do not necessarily have to be located in one place.
Forward Command Post
2-189. An OSC commander often establishes a forward CP with a small
group of selected staff members. Its purpose is to provide the commander
with information and communications that facilitate his decisions. The for-
ward CP is deployed at a point from which he can more effectively and per-
sonally observe and influence the operation. The need for this is less likely at |
7-100.1 | 92 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
the FG and theater levels. This CP is mobile, but at the operational level may
consist of a large number of command vehicles.
2-190. The personnel at the forward CP are not permanent. The assignment
of officers to accompany the commander is dependent on the mission, situa-
tion, availability of officers, communications, and transport means. Officers
who may accompany the commander include the operations officer and the
chief of reconnaissance. Other primary and or secondary staff officers may
also deploy with the forward CP, depending on the needs of the situation.
The secondary staff contains enough personnel to man the forward CP with-
out degrading its ability to man the main or IFC CPs.
2-191. When formed, and when the commander is present, the forward CP is
the main focus of command, though the chief of staff (remaining in the main
CP) has the authority to issue directives in the commander’s absence.
Sustainment Command Post
2-192. The resources officer establishes and controls the sustainment CP.
This CP is deployed in a position to permit the supervision of execution of
sustainment procedures and the movement of support troops, typically in the
support zone. It contains staff officers for fuel supply, medical support, com-
bat equipment repair, ammunition supply, clothing supply, food supply, pris-
oner-of-war, and other services. It interacts closely with the subordinate
units to ensure sustained combat capabilities. In nonlinear operations, mul-
tiple sustainment CPs may be formed.
Airborne Command Post
2-193. To maintain control in very fluid situations, when subordinates are
operating over a wide area, or when the other CPs are moving, a commander
may use an airborne CP. This is very common in higher-level commands and
typically employs fixed-wing aircraft above OSC level.
Alternate Command Post
2-194. The alternate CP provides for the assumption of command should the
CP containing the commander be incapacitated. The alternate CP is a desig-
nation given to an existing CP and is not a separately established entity. The
commander establishes which CP will act as an alternate CP to take com-
mand if the main (or forward) CP is destroyed or disabled. For example, the
commander might designate the IFC CP as the alternate CP during an op-
eration where long-range fires are critical to mission success. For situations
that require reconstituting, he might designate the sustainment CP instead.
Alternate CPs are also formed when operating in complex terrain, or if the
organization is dispersed over a wider area than usual and lateral communi-
cation is difficult.
Auxiliary Command Post
2-195. At OSC and FG levels, the operational commander may create an aux-
iliary CP to provide C2 over subordinate units operating on isolated or remote
axes. He may also use it in the event of disrupted control or when he cannot
adequately maintain control from the main CP. An officer appointed at the |
7-100.1 | 93 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
discretion of the commander mans it. The auxiliary CP may also find uses at
the theater level, when subordinate forces may be far from the main CP.
Deception Command Post
2-196. As part of the overall IW plan, the OPFOR very often employs decep-
tion CPs. These are complex, multi-sensor-affecting sites integrated into the
overall deception plan to assist in achieving battlefield opportunity by forcing
the enemy to expend command and control warfare (C2W) effort against
meaningless positions.
COMMAND POST MOVEMENT
2-197. Plans for relocating the CPs are prepared by the operations section.
The CPs are deployed and prepared in order to ensure that they are reliably
covered from enemy ground and aerial reconnaissance, or from attack by en-
emy raiding forces.
2-198. Commanders deploy OSC CPs in depth to facilitate control of their
AORs. During lengthy moves, CPs may bound forward along parallel routes,
preceded by reconnaissance parties that select the new locations. Normally,
the main and forward CPs do not move at the same time, with one moving
while the other is set up and controlling operations. During an administra-
tive movement, when there is little or no likelihood of contact with the en-
emy, a CP may move into a site previously occupied by another CP. However,
during a tactical movement or when contact is likely, the OPFOR does not
occupy a site twice, because to do so would increase the chances of an enemy
locating a CP. While on the move, CPs maintain continuous contact with
subordinates, higher headquarters, and flanking organizations. During
movement halts, the practice is to disperse the post in a concealed area, cam-
ouflaging it if necessary and locating radio stations and special vehicles some
distance from the control and support groups. Because of dispersion in a mobile
environment, CPs are often responsible for their own local ground defenses.
2-199. During the movement of a main CP, the OPFOR maintains continuity
of control by handing over control to either the forward or airborne CP or,
more rarely, to the alternate CP. Key staff members often move to the new
location by helicopter to reduce the time spent away from their posts. Before
any move, headquarters’ troops carefully reconnoiter and mark the new
location. Engineer preparation provides protection and concealment.
COMMAND POST LOCATION
2-200. The OPFOR locates CPs in areas affording good concealment, with
good road net access being a secondary consideration. It situates CPs so that
no single weapon can eliminate more than one. Remoting communications
facilities lessens the chance of the enemy’s locating the actual CP by radio
direction finding.
2-201. During some particularly difficult phases of an operation, where close
cooperation between units is essential, the forward CP of one unit may be col-
located with the forward or main CP of another. Examples are the commit-
ment of an exploitation force, the execution of a strike, or the passing of one
organization through another. |
7-100.1 | 94 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
COMMAND POST SECURITY
2-202. Security of CPs is important, and the OPFOR takes a number of
measures to ensure it. CPs are a high priority for air defense protection. Ideally,
main CPs also locate near reserve forces to gain protection from ground at-
tack. Nevertheless, circumstances often dictate that they provide for their
own local defense. Engineers normally dig in and camouflage key elements.
2-203. Good camouflage, the remoting of communications facilities, and the
deployment of alternate CPs make most of the C2 structure fairly survivable.
Nevertheless, one of the most important elements, the forward CP, often re-
mains vulnerable. It forms a distinctive, if small, grouping, well within en-
emy artillery range, even at OSC level. The OPFOR therefore typically pro-
vides key CPs with sufficient engineer and combat arms support to protect
them from enemy artillery or special operations raids.
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
2-204. The OPFOR commander’s C2 requirements are dictated generally by
the doctrine, tactics, procedures, and operational responsibilities applicable
to commanders at higher echelons. Battlefield dispersion, mobility, and in-
creasing firepower under conventional or WMD conditions require reliable,
flexible, and secure command and control.
2-205. Expanding C2 requirements include the need for
• High mobility of combat headquarters and subordinate units.
• Rapid collection, analysis, and dissemination of information as the ba-
sis for planning and decision making.
• Maintaining effective control of forces operating in a hostile IW envi-
ronment.
Supporting communications systems, which are the principal means of C2,
must have a degree of mobility, reliability, flexibility, security, and surviv-
ability comparable to the C2 elements being supported.
2-206. Modern warfare has resulted in a shift away from large formations
arrayed against one another in a linear fashion, to maneuver warfare con-
ducted across large areas with more lethal, yet smaller, combat forces. C2 must
provide the reliable, long-range communications links necessary to control
forces deployed over greater distances. In order to move with the maneuver
forces, the communications systems must be highly mobile.
COMMUNICATIONS
2-207. The chief characteristics of communications supporting the C2 struc-
ture are security, survivability, and flexibility. In the OPFOR view, centrali-
zation of operational planning is a prerequisite to achieving the flexibility re-
quired to ensure timely concentration of forces and fires. Redundancy in
equipment, as well as communications links and CPs, is the primary means
of ensuring the control structure’s security and survivability.
2-208. The organization of communications to meet operational requirements
is the responsibility of the commander at each level. Prior to combat, the OSC
chief of communications, under the personal direction of the intelligence officer, |
7-100.1 | 95 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
prepares the communications plan. After approval by the chief of staff, it be-
comes an annex to the operational directive for implementation by subordi-
nate signal units. OPFOR communications reflect the concern of commanders
to maintain uninterrupted C2, flexibility, and security.
Signal Assets
2-209. Communication systems employed include
• Manportable high-frequency (HF) and very-high-frequency (VHF)
radios.
• HF radio stations.
• VHF and ultra-high-frequency (UHF) multichannel radio relay.
• Super-high-frequency (SHF) troposcatter systems.
• Satellite communications (SATCOM).
• Wire and cable (landline as far forward as possible).
• Commercial communications networks (including cellular, microwave,
radio, wire, digital, and satellite)
• Local area networks (LANs) and wide area networks (WANs).
• Internet and Intranet.
Encrypted communications are common from brigade upward, but may ex-
tend to the lowest levels in the most modern OPFOR units.
2-210. At the operational level, headquarters normally task-organize their
signal assets to support the formation of forward, main, IFC, and sustain-
ment CPs. The numbers and types of signal units can vary greatly depending
on the size and makeup of the operational force grouping under a particular
headquarters.
2-211. Signal communications are organized through the communications
groups that are established to provide communications for the CPs. Telephone
exchanges and cable are used extensively to integrate the control and sup-
port groups of the CPs with the communications groups. It is possible to ex-
tend mobile communications through the integration of wire and wireless
and by connecting with fixed military and civil communications facilities.
2-212. The OPFOR also stresses the use of non-electronic means of communi-
cations. While radio must be the principal means of communication in a fluid,
mobile battle, the OPFOR is aware of the threat from enemy signals intelli-
gence, direction finding, and communications jamming. Also, wire and cable
are often not practical in fast-moving situations.
2-213. During periods of radio silence or disruption of radio communications,
the OPFOR employs messengers, liaison teams, and visual and sound signals.
Messengers are the preferred method for delivering combat orders at any
time. Representatives from the OSC staff may observe and supervise the exe-
cution of directives. Whenever possible, the OPFOR prefers personal contact
between commanders (or their representatives) and subordinates. |
7-100.1 | 96 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Communications Nets
2-214. C2 of OPFOR organizations relies on extensive and redundant com-
munications. The OPFOR primarily uses UHF/SHF SATCOM, radio relay
multichannel, HF radio stations, HF and VHF single-channel radios, and
wire or cable. In modernized OPFOR units, the command, operations, intelli-
gence, and logistics nets may operate over a digital network of linked com-
puters, obviating the need for voice communications.
2-215. The OSC operates two command nets. The commander normally con-
trols the primary command net from the forward CP, while the chief of staff
maintains control of the alternate net from the main CP. Depending on the
distances involved, the primary net may be either HF or VHF. All of the
command’s constituent and dedicated units monitor the command nets. The
IFC CP also monitors the command nets
2-216. The operations officer maintains an operations net monitored by
the commander, subordinate and supporting units, and any alternate or
auxiliary CP created. The resources officer also monitors this net from the
sustainment CP.
2-217. The DC, as IFC commander, maintains the integrated fires net. This
net is monitored by the subordinates of the IFC and RISTA assets assigned
IFC missions.
2-218. The resources officer maintains the support net. The OSC’s materiel
support, maintenance, and medical units monitor this net. Subordinate com-
bat arms units may also use this net when requiring additional, immediate
assistance that constituent support assets are unable to provide.
2-219. The chief of reconnaissance maintains an intelligence net, monitored
by reconnaissance units, maneuver units, the commander, DC, chief of staff,
and resources officer.
2-220. The CAO maintains the airspace control net for the purpose of control-
ling the command’s airspace. Organizations on this net include aviation
units, air defense assets, and army aviation and Air Force liaison teams.
2-221. When required, the commander can create a special mission net,
monitored by the chief of staff, that is employed to control the activities of
units conducting a special mission, such as a reconnaissance detachment or
an airborne or heliborne landing force deployed behind enemy lines. Specific
communications systems employed are dependent on the depth and type of
mission.
2-222. The chief of force protection maintains an air defense and NBC warn-
ing communications net, monitored by all constituent, dedicated, and sup-
porting units. This net is used for passing tactical alerts or NBC and air
warning reports. The chief of staff maintains a watch on the OSC-level warning
nets at the main CP; he then disseminates warning where appropriate.
2-223. The command establishes multichannel links between the main and
sustainment CPs and the CPs of subordinate units. These links are used for
high-capacity voice and data transmissions. The OSC also establishes
multichannel links between the main and sustainment CPs. |
7-100.1 | 97 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-224. The primary responsibility for maintaining communications of an
OSC with the General Staff or SHC (or a parent FG or theater headquarters)
rests with the main CP. With the larger staffs and greater communications
capabilities of the main CP, the commander is allowed to focus more on the
actual conduct of the operation from the forward CP. Obviously, when staff
members, such as the CAO or chief of reconnaissance, accompany the com-
mander, they will establish control over their respective nets as required.
2-225. The chief of IW may also control one or more deception nets designed
to mislead enemy signals intelligence analysis. Integrated into the IW plan
are a description of these nets and procedures for their use.
Procedures
2-226. Before making contact with the enemy, most radio and radio-relay
systems maintain a listening watch with transmission forbidden or strictly
controlled. OPFOR units usually observe radio silence when defending or de-
parting assembly areas. During radio silence, wire and courier are the pri-
mary communications means. While moving toward the enemy, units nor-
mally limit radio transmissions to various code words informing commanders
they have accomplished assigned tasks or have encountered unexpected diffi-
culties. The OPFOR also uses visual signals, such as flags and flares, to a
great extent during movement. Usually only the commander and reconnais-
sance forces have permission to transmit.
2-227. In the offense, OPFOR units maintain radio silence until the outbreak
of battle, when those authorized to transmit may do so without restriction.
When contact with the enemy occurs, units initiate normal radio procedures.
Subordinate commanders inform the OSC commander—usually by code
wordwhen they reach objectives, encounter NBC contamination, make con-
tact with the enemy, or have important information to report.
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY
2-228. Survivability of C2 systems is of great concern, since the C2 elements
are typically located within range of enemy standoff systems, with increased
potential for disruption or destruction. The OPFOR stresses the need to
maintain continuous, reliable control of its forces and has undertaken a
number of measures to prevent disruption and enhance survivability,
while remaining flexible enough to retain control of units in combat. These
include
• High mobility of C2 systems and facilities.
• Redundancy of the C2 elements and networks.
• Adherence to operations- and information-security measures.
• Deception
2-229. IW activities contribute to C2 survivability. So does the principle of
centralized planning and decentralized execution. The survivability of the
headquarters’ command group is facilitated by the fact that the commander,
DC, and chief of staff can be in separate CPs (forward, IFC, and main CPs,
respectively). |
7-100.1 | 98 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Mobility
2-230. C2 elements must be highly mobile, due to the emphasis on maintain-
ing combat at a rapid tempo. Because of their proximity to the enemy, CPs
and supporting communications must frequently relocate to avoid detection
and subsequent destruction.
2-231. CPs are usually mobile (that is, in vehicles) but may also be fixed. By
emphasizing the use of multiple, mobile CPs, planners minimize the disrup-
tion of C2 that would occur with the enemy’s destruction of this element of
the C2 structure. Highly mobile signal units employing transportable com-
munications equipment support mobile CPs. This gives OPFOR commanders
great flexibility in organizing and deploying their C2 elements. Thus, they
are able to provide effective control in varied situations.
Redundancy
2-232. The OPFOR has built extensive redundancy into the C2 structure.
Multiple CPs are fielded as low as possible. For communications between
levels of command, multiple communications types are employed. Providing a
variety of single- and multichannel links, these systems operate over a wide
frequency spectrum.
Operations and Information Security
2-233. The consistent adherence to operations- and information-security
measures is especially critical, given the increased capabilities of enemy re-
connaissance, the increased role of surprise, and the proliferation of precision
weapons. Given the high priority the enemy places on C2 elements as targets,
maintaining operations security is an important requirement for C2 nodes.
This is achieved by the stringent adherence to information-security proce-
dures and extensive use of C3D. |
7-100.1 | 99 | Chapter 3
Offensive Operations
The OPFOR sees the offensive as the decisive form of operations and the
ultimate means of imposing its will on the enemy. While conditions at a
particular time or place may require the OPFOR to defend, defeating an
enemy force ultimately requires shifting to offensive operations. Even
within the context of defense, victory normally requires some sort of of-
fensive action. Therefore, OPFOR commanders at all levels seek to create
and exploit opportunities to take offensive action, whenever possible.
In the context of the theater strategic or operational level of war, offensive
operations are often “conventional” in nature. Conventional operations
are not, however, the only form of offensive operations. Accordingly, this
chapter includes discussions of operational-level offensive actions that
do not rely only on large formations of mechanized or motorized units.
Offensive operations may include operations done by paramilitary or
irregular forces. The OPFOR recognizes the traditional forms of ma-
neuver: envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, and
frontal attack.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
3-1. Offensive operations are an important component of all OPFOR strate-
gic campaigns. However, the scale and purpose of offensive actions may differ
during the various types of strategic-level actions.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
3-2. Offensive operations during regional operations attempt to achieve stra-
tegic political or military decision by destroying the enemy’s will and capabil-
ity to fight. This is brought about by destroying components of the enemy’s
combat system. This may include discrete attacks on any of the four compo-
nents of an enemy’s combat system: combat forces, combat support forces, lo-
gistics forces, and command and control (C2) and reconnaissance, intelli-
gence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA). It may also include an
attempt to destroy one or more of the enemy’s systems simultaneously.
3-3. Due to its military superiority over a regional adversary in regional op-
erations, the State is able to pursue primarily offensive military courses of
action. It is also prepared to use offensive means against internal and possi-
ble extraregional threats.
3-4. The State’s military forces are sufficient to overmatch any single re-
gional neighbor, but may not be a match for the forces an extraregional
power can bring to bear. Thus, the State seeks to exploit its numerical and |
7-100.1 | 100 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
technological overmatch against one regional opponent rapidly, before other
regional neighbors or an extraregional power can enter the fight. Thus, a
characteristic of regional operations is a rapid tempo of offensive combat.
3-5. The State’s military goal during regional operations is to destroy its re-
gional opponents’ military power in order to achieve specific ends. The State
plans regional operations well in advance and executes them as rapidly as is
feasible in order to preclude intervention by outside forces. Still, at the very
outset of these operations, it lays plans and positions forces to conduct ac-
cess-control operations in the event of outside intervention. Extraregional
forces may also be vulnerable to conventional operations during the time they
require to build combat power and create support at home for their intervention.
3-6. In comparison to the forces of the State’s regional neighbors, the OPFOR
is a relatively large and modern force. Therefore, it is capable of offensive op-
erations against such opponents. The OPFOR will use armor, mechanized in-
fantry, airborne, and heliborne forces, when available. Generally, it will use
infantry forces suitable for operating in the complex terrain that dominates por-
tions of the region. When the OPFOR is dependent on infantry forces or ir-
regular forces, it will attack by infiltration or maneuver to conduct ambushes
of more capable enemy forces.
3-7. The OPFOR may attack along a suboptimal approach to exploit an en-
emy vulnerability or to achieve surprise. To maintain a high tempo of opera-
tions and reach key targets, the OPFOR often accepts the risk of bypassing
pockets of resistance.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
3-8. Offensive operations play two key roles in transition operations. First,
they are used to continue to achieve the State’s regional goals as rapidly
as possible, to make the act an extraregional power is trying to prevent a fait
accompli. Second, they are a component of access-control operations to ex-
clude the extraregional power from key areas and contain him in areas of the
OPFOR’s choosing. The OPFOR uses offensive operations to preclude or put a
quick end to expansion of the conflict and to either consolidate its previous
gains or conduct further operations against the original regional enemy.
3-9. During transition operations, military forces solidify gains made during
regional operations. However, the central aim is to prevent or defeat outside
intervention. Although transition operations are primarily defensive in
nature, attacks will continue. As a minimum, the OPFOR will maintain
counterattack forces at virtually all levels of command and will attempt to
physically attack one or more components of an enemy’s combat system. A
combination of operational and tactical offensive and defensive actions help
the OPFOR control tempo.
3-10. Military forces in the immediate vicinity of the point of intervention
move into sanctuary as opportunity allows, making use of existing C2 and
logistics. They conduct limited-objective attacks to secure positions, protect
flanks, and control access. They may attack vulnerable early-entry forces
before the enemy can bring his technological overmatch to bear. Even at this
stage, the State may be able to inflict politically unacceptable casualties that
could cause the extraregional power to terminate its intervention. |
7-100.1 | 101 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
3-11. During transition operations, the OPFOR plans and conducts sophisti-
cated ambushes to destroy high-visibility enemy systems or cause mass casu-
alties. These ambushes are not always linked to maneuver or ground objec-
tives, but are designed to have a huge psychological and political impact by
demonstrating enemy vulnerability. The OPFOR may use niche technology it
has acquired to achieve technological surprise and limited-duration over-
match in specific areas.
3-12. The OPFOR can use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to deny an
extraregional opponent the use of complex terrain for a period of time. This
creates opportunities for operational forces to destroy key enemy systems
with precision fires or to engage the enemy forces with fires and maneuver.
3-13. Transition operations are combined arms and/or joint efforts, although
the air and naval forces increasingly revert to defensive measures to preserve
their capability. Ground forces or, more often, Special-Purpose Forces (SPF)
conduct raids against logistics sites, lines of communication (LOCs), and
other vulnerable military targets in the region, along the routes to the region,
and to the enemy’s strategic depth. Occasionally, if the risks are worth the
costs, the OPFOR attacks such targets by air and sea. It may also use long-
range missiles or rockets to deliver conventional warheads or WMD against
these kinds of targets. Paramilitary forces, air defense forces, and precision
attack can also play important roles. The OPFOR may also use long-range
weapons or SPF to conduct attacks outside the theater, to divert enemy re-
sources to protect politically or ecologically sensitive targets.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
3-14. Once an extraregional power commits forces in the region, the OPFOR
does not avoid battle. It seeks it often, but on its own terms. Battles will occur at
a place and time of the OPFOR’s choosing and involve dispersed maneuver,
precision fires, and simultaneous actions by all services of the Armed Forces as
well as affiliated forces. Tactical counterattacks characterize adaptive opera-
tions, and larger counteroffensive operations are undertaken when feasible.
3-15. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR may conduct limited-objective
operational- and tactical-level offensive actions to prevent buildup of inter-
vening forces, to facilitate the defense, or to take advantage of an opportunity
to counterattack.
3-16. When the OPFOR can create a window of opportunity or exploit oppor-
tunity created by natural conditions that limit or degrade enemy capabilities, its
forces move out of sanctuary and attack. They try to force the enemy to operate
in areas where OPFOR interdiction fire can be most effective. The OPFOR uses
windows of opportunity to destroy key enemy systems or cause mass casualties.
PURPOSE OF THE OFFENSE
3-17. All offensive operations are designed to achieve the goals of a strategic
campaign through active measures. However, the purpose of any given offen-
sive operation varies with the situation. The primary distinction among types
of offensive operations is their purpose. Thus, the OPFOR recognizes three
general types of offensive operations according to their purpose: to destroy,
seize, or expel. |
7-100.1 | 102 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
ATTACK TO DESTROY
3-18. An attack to destroy is designed to eliminate a target entity as a useful
fighting force. Operational-level attacks to destroy usually focus on key en-
emy combat formations or capabilities. Not every soldier or system need be
destroyed for such an attack to be successful. Attacks to destroy are often fo-
cused on a single component of an enemy’s combat system. For example, it
may be enough to remove the enemy force’s ability to sustain itself or exer-
cise effective command and control. Therefore, attacks to destroy are often fo-
cused on the logistics and C2 systems of the target entity. Such attacks are
most often conducted during regional operations. However, an attack to de-
stroy may also occur during transition or adaptive operations, whenever the
OPFOR can recognize and exploit a window of opportunity.
ATTACK TO SEIZE
3-19. An attack to seize is designed to gain control of a key terrain feature or
man-made facility. The OPFOR does not adhere to the idea that seizure may
be accomplished simply by placing a feature in weapons range. In the
OPFOR lexicon, seize means to have OPFOR soldiers on and/or in the feature
in question. Attacks to seize can occur as part of all strategic-level courses of
action during OPFOR strategic campaigns. In regional operations, the sei-
zure may facilitate the movement of an exploitation force. In transition or adap-
tive operations, the seizure may be part of a campaign to control access into the
theater.
ATTACK TO EXPEL
3-20. An attack to expel is used to force the defender to vacate an area. At-
tacks to expel often have a strong information warfare (IW) component, so
that the enemy removes himself from the area largely through a loss of re-
solve. Attacks to expel typically focus on a key enemy capability or vulner-
ability. Attacks to expel are primarily conducted within the context of transi-
tion or adaptive operations.
PLANNING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-21. For the OPFOR, the key elements of planning offensive operations are
• Determining the level of planning possible (planned versus situational
offense).
• Organizing the battlefield.
• Organizing forces.
• Organizing IW activities (see Chapter 5).
• Determining the objective of the offensive operation.
3-22. Offensive actions during transition and adaptive operations are not
able to rely simply on massing combat power at a decisive point. Such actions
typically include increased use of
• Infiltration.
• Perception management (see Chapter 5) in support of operations.
• Affiliated forces in support of operations. |
7-100.1 | 103 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
PLANNED OFFENSE
3-23. A planned (deliberate) offense is an offensive operation or action under-
taken when there is sufficient time and knowledge of the situation to prepare
and rehearse forces for specific tasks. Typically, the enemy is in prepared de-
fensive positions and in a known location. The OPFOR plans an offense using
the method described in Chapter 2. Key considerations in offensive planning
are
• Selecting a clear and appropriate objective.
• Determining which enemy forces (security, reaction, or reserve) must
be fixed.
• Developing a reconnaissance plan that locates and tracks relevant en-
emy targets and elements.
• Creating or taking advantage of a window of opportunity to free
friendly forces from any enemy advantages in precision standoff and
situational awareness.
• Determining which component or components of an enemy’s combat
system to attack.
SITUATIONAL OFFENSE
3-24. The OPFOR may also conduct a situational (hasty) offense. It recog-
nizes that the modern battlefield is chaotic. Fleeting opportunities to at-
tack an enemy weakness continually present themselves and just as
quickly disappear. Although detailed planning and preparation greatly
mitigate risk, they are often not achievable if a window of opportunity is
to be exploited.
3-25. The following are examples of conditions that might lead to a situ-
ational offense:
• A key enemy unit, system, or capability is exposed.
• The OPFOR has an opportunity to conduct a spoiling attack to disrupt
enemy defensive preparations.
• An OPFOR unit makes contact on favorable terms for subsequent of-
fensive action.
3-26. In a situational offense, the commander develops his assessment of the
conditions rapidly and without a great deal of staff involvement. He provides
a basic course of action to the staff, who then quickly turn that course of ac-
tion into an executable operational directive. The situational offense relies
heavily on implementation of battle drills by subordinate tactical units (see
FM 7-100.2).
3-27. Organization of the battlefield in a situational offense is normally lim-
ited to minor changes to existing control measures. Organization of forces in
a situational offense typically requires the use of detachments or tactical
groups (see FM 7-100.2). The nature of situational offense is such that it of-
ten involves smaller, independent forces accomplishing discrete missions dis-
persed from the main body of the operational-strategic command (OSC). |
7-100.1 | 104 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR THE OFFENSE
3-28. In his operation plan, the commander specifies the organization of the
battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. Within his unit’s
area of responsibility (AOR), as defined by the next-higher commander, he
designates AORs for his subordinates, along with zones, objectives, and axes
related to his own overall mission.
Enemy Main Line of
Resistance
OSC
LOR
Initial Initial
Support Initial Battle Zone Disruption
Zone Zone
OSC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY Kill
Zone
OSC
LOR
Objective
Axis
Attack Zone
Kill
Zone
OSC
LOR
Initial Subsequent Initial Initial Subsequent
Support Support Battle LOR LOR
Line Line Line Subsequent
Battle Line
Figure 3-1. Example of an AOR (Linear Battlespace)
Areas of Responsibility
3-29. OPFOR AORs normally consist of three basic zones: the disruption
zone, the battle zone, and the support zone. These zones have the same basic
purposes in all types of offense. In the offense, AORs also may contain one
or more attack zones, kill zones, objectives, and/or axes. Zones may be linear
or nonlinear in nature. See Figures 3-1 and 3-2 for generalized examples of
AORs and zones. |
7-100.1 | 105 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
Kill G Battle Zone
Zone BTR II
O LOS RC AD OTG R
Attack
DTG/ LO S Zup op neort L O RO S C
Zone
Disruption
Zone BTG
AOR
Axis
X
X OSC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
S Zup op no ert LB OT RG
Battle Zone
BTG
G Battle Zone AOR
DTG/B LT
OR
Support
Zone
OSC
LOR
Figure 3-2. Example of AOR (Nonlinear Battlespace)
3-30. The intent of this method of organizing the battlefield is to preserve as
much flexibility as possible for subordinate units within the parameters that
define the aim of the senior commander. An important feature of the basic
zones in an AOR is the variations in actions that can occur within them in
the course of a specific offensive operation.
Disruption Zone
3-31. In the offense, the disruption zone is that battlespace in which the
OPFOR seeks to use direct and indirect fires to destroy the integrity of en-
emy forces and capabilities without decisive engagement. In general, this
zone is the space between the battle line and the limit of responsibility (LOR). In
linear operations, it typically begins at what the OPFOR anticipates to be the
enemy main line of resistance and extends to the LOR. The dimensions of this
zone are based on OPFOR weapons envelopes and the targets the OPFOR
wishes to affect. For example, counterreconnaissance activity may draw the at-
tention of enemy forces and cause them to enter the kill zone of a sophisticated
ambush (described later in this chapter) executed by long-range precision fires.
3-32. The OSC disruption zone may be the aggregate of the disruption zones
of subordinates, such as division and brigade tactical groups (DTGs and
BTGs). However, assets directly controlled by the OSC could also operate
throughout the OSC disruption zone. In that case, each subordinate would be
responsible for a portion of the OSC disruption zone, and that portion would
constitute the subordinate’s disruption zone within its own AOR. In other |
7-100.1 | 106 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
cases, an OSC disruption zone may extend beyond those of its subordinates,
to include an area occupied by forces sent out under direct control of the
OSC. OSC-level forces could include SPF and affiliated forces, which could be
operating in enemy-held territory even before the beginning of hostilities.
There could also be stay-behind forces in areas seized by the enemy. A field
group (FG) or theater commander controlling multiple OSCs can have a disrup-
tion zone and may assign an OSC to operate in that zone.
3-33. In the offense, the disruption zone exists to
• Disrupt defensive works and preparations.
• Delay or fix enemy counterattacks or response forces.
• Attack lucrative targets (key systems or vulnerable troops).
3-34. Disruption forces often maneuver to fix enemy forces and place long-
range fire on key enemy units. They can also strip away the enemy’s recon-
naissance assets (to deceive him of the location and configuration of the at-
tack) while denying him the ability to acquire and engage the OPFOR with
deep fires. This includes an air defense effort to deny aerial attack and re-
connaissance platforms from targeting forces in the zone. A disruption force
seeks to conduct highly damaging local attacks. It ensures that a covered
withdrawal route exists to avoid decisive engagement.
3-35. Typical systems, units, or facilities to be attacked by a disruption force
are
• C2 systems.
• RISTA assets.
• Aviation assets.
• Precision fire systems.
• Logistics support areas.
• LOCs.
• Mobility and countermobility assets.
• Casualty evacuation routes and means.
3-36. The disruption zone is bounded by the battle line and the LOR of the
overall AOR. In linear offensive operations, the higher headquarters may
move this LOR forward as the force continues successful offensive operations.
Thus, the boundaries of the disruption zone will also move forward during
the course of an operation. The higher commander can push the disruption
zone forward or outward as forces adopt a defensive posture while consolidat-
ing gains at the end of a successful offensive operation and/or prepare for a
subsequent offensive operation.
Battle Zone
3-37. In the offense, the battle zone is that battlespace in which the OPFOR
seeks to fix and/or destroy enemy forces through simultaneous or sequential
application of all components of combat power. The dimensions of this zone
are based on OPFOR objectives and the time-space relationships for the
forces involved. |
7-100.1 | 107 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
3-38. The battle zone is separated from the disruption zone by the battle line
and from the support zone by the support line. The commander may adjust
the location of these lines in order to accommodate successful offensive op-
erations. In a linear situation, those lines can shift forward during the course
of a successful attack. Thus, the battle zone would also shift forward.
3-39. In the offense, the battle zone exists to
• Control forces in proximity to the enemy.
• Define objectives.
• Support understanding of roles and missions.
3-40. Forces operating in the battle zone engage the enemy in close combat to
achieve a specific operational objective. This objective is typically one of the
following:
• Create a penetration in the enemy defense, through which exploitation
forces can pass.
• Draw enemy attention and resources to the action.
• Seize operationally significant geographic areas.
• Inflict casualties on a vulnerable enemy unit.
• Prevent the enemy from moving a part of his force to impact OPFOR
actions elsewhere on the battlefield.
3-41. In nonlinear offensive operations, multiple battle zones may exist, and
within each a certain task would be assigned to the OPFOR unit or units
charged to operate in that space. The tasks given to the units that operate in
the zone can range from demonstration to attack. The battle zone provides
the commander of those units the battlespace in which to frame his operations.
Support Zone
3-42. The support zone is that area of the battlespace designed to be free of
significant enemy action and to permit the effective logistics and administra-
tive support of forces. Security forces operate in the support zone in a combat
role to defeat enemy special operations forces and other threats. Camouflage,
concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures throughout the support
zone aim to protect the force from standoff RISTA and precision attack. If the
battle zone moves during the course of an operation, the support zone would
move accordingly.
Attack Zone
3-43. The attack zone is the assigned zone of action for an attacking force. In
operation plans and directives, the senior commander assigns attack zones to
subordinate units.
Kill Zone
3-44. A kill zone is a designated area on the battlefield where the OPFOR
plans to destroy a key enemy target. Kill zones are tied to enemy targets and
the OPFOR weapon systems that will engage them, and not a particular zone |
7-100.1 | 108 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
of the AOR. They may be designated by a senior commander in order to focus
combat power.
Objectives and Axes
3-45. An objective is a geographic location or physical object, the seizing
and/or holding of which is a goal of an offensive operation.1 An axis is a con-
trol measure showing the location through which a force will move as it pro-
ceeds from its starting location to its objective.
ORGANIZING FORCES FOR THE OFFENSE
3-46. In planning and executing offensive actions, the OPFOR organizes and
designates various forces according to their function. This provides a common
language for how the OPFOR fights functionally, rather than geometrically.
The functions do not change, regardless of where the force might happen to
be located on the battlefield. Thus, functional forces that perform the common
operational and tactical tasks of disrupting, fixing, assaulting, exploiting,
providing security, and deceiving are logically designated as disruption, fix-
ing, assault, exploitation, security, and deception forces, respectively. A force
held in reserve is designated as a reserve, until it receives a mission to per-
form a specific function.
3-47. In his operation plan, the operational-level commander specifies the
organization of the forces within his level of command. Thus, subordinate
forces understand their roles within the overall operation. However, the or-
ganization of forces can shift dramatically during the course of an operation,
if part of the plan does not work or works better than anticipated. For exam-
ple, a unit that started out being part of a fixing force might split off and be-
come an exploitation force, if the opportunity presents itself.
3-48. Each of the separate functional forces has an identified commander.
This is often the senior commander of the largest subordinate unit assigned
to that force. For example, if two DTGs are acting as the OSC’s fixing force,
the senior of the two DTG commanders is the fixing force commander. Since,
in this option, each force commander is also a subordinate unit commander,
he controls the force from his unit’s command post (CP). Another option is to
have one of the OSC’s or FG’s CPs be in charge of a functional force. For ex-
ample, the forward CP could control a disruption force or a fixing force. An-
other possibility would be for the IFC CP to command the disruption force or
the exploitation force or any other force whose actions must be closely coordi-
nated with fires delivered by the IFC.
3-49. In any case, the force commander is responsible to the OSC or FG
commander to ensure that combat preparations are made properly and to
take charge of the force during the operation. This frees the operational-level
commander from decisions specific to the force’s mission. Even when tactical-
level subordinates of an OSC or FG have responsibility for parts of the dis-
ruption zone, there is still an overall OSC or FG disruption force commander.
1 The term objective may also refer to the defined aim(s) of a particular operation. It is not always tied to ground or
places. It could be a desired effect on a particular enemy formation or capability. |
7-100.1 | 109 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
Disruption Force
3-50. In the offense, the disruption force would include the disruption force
that already existed in a preceding defensive situation (see Chapter 4). It is
possible that forces assigned for operations in the disruption zone in the de-
fense might not have sufficient mobility to do the same in the offense or that
targets may change and require different or additional assets. Thus, the dis-
ruption force might require augmentation.
Fixing Force
3-51. OPFOR offensive operations are founded on the concept of fixing enemy
forces so that they are not free to maneuver. The OPFOR recognizes that
units and soldiers can be fixed in a variety of ways. For example
• They find themselves without effective communication with higher
command.
• Their picture of the battlefield is unclear.
• They are (or believe they are) decisively engaged in combat.
• They have lost mobility to due to complex terrain, obstacles, or WMD.
3-52. In the offense, planners identify which enemy forces need to be fixed
and the method by which they will be fixed. They then assign this responsi-
bility to a force that has the capability to fix the required enemy forces with
the correct method. The fixing force may consist of a number of units sepa-
rated from each other in time and space, particularly if the enemy forces re-
quired to be fixed are likewise separated. A fixing force could consist entirely of
affiliated irregular forces. It is possible that a discrete attack on logistics or
C2 (or other systems) could fix an enemy without resorting to deploying large fix-
ing forces.
Assault Force
3-53. The assault force is charged with creating the conditions that allow the
exploitation force the freedom to operate. In order to create a window of op-
portunity for the exploitation force to succeed, the assault force may be re-
quired to operate at a high degree of risk and may sustain substantial casu-
alties. However, an assault force may not even make contact with the enemy,
but instead conduct a demonstration.
Exploitation Force
3-54. The exploitation force is assigned the task of achieving the objective of
the mission. It typically exploits a window of opportunity created by the as-
sault force. However, effective IW, a mismatch in system capabilities, or even
the enemy’s own dispositions may create a situation in which the exploitation
force is able to achieve the objective without a formal assault force. An exploi-
tation force could engage the ultimate objective with fires only.
Security Force
3-55. The security force conducts activities to prevent or mitigate the effects
of hostile actions against the overall operational-level command and/or its
key components. If the commander chooses, he may charge this security force |
7-100.1 | 110 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
with providing force protection for the entire AOR, including the rest of the
functional forces; logistics and administrative elements in the support zone;
and other key installations, facilities, and resources. The security force may
include various types of unitssuch as infantry, SPF, counterreconnais-
sance, and signals reconnaissance assetsto focus on enemy special opera-
tions and long-range reconnaissance forces operating throughout the AOR. It
can also include internal security forces units allocated to the operational-
level command, with the mission of protecting the overall command from at-
tack by hostile insurgents, terrorists, and special operations forces. The secu-
rity force may also be charged with mitigating the effects of WMD.
Deception Force
3-56. When the IW plan requires combat forces to take some action (such as
a demonstration or feint), these forces are designated as deception forces in
close-hold executive summaries of the plan. However, wide-distribution cop-
ies of the plan refer to these forces according to the designation given them in
the deception story.
Reserves
3-57. At the commander’s discretion, forces may be held out of initial action
so that he may influence unforeseen events or take advantage of developing
opportunities. OPFOR offensive reserve formations are given priorities in
terms of whether the staff thinks it most likely that they will act as a fixing,
assault, or exploitation force. The size and composition of an offensive reserve
is entirely situation-dependent. (See Chapter 4 for more detail on the various
types of reserves, some of which are more common in defensive operations.)
PREPARING FOR THE OFFENSE
3-58. In the preparation phase, the OPFOR focuses on ways of applying all
available resources and the full range of actions to place the enemy in the
weakest condition and position possible. Commanders prepare their forces for
all subsequent phases of the offensive operation. They organize their forces
and the battlefield with an eye toward capitalizing on conditions created by
successful attacks.
ESTABLISH CONTACT
3-59. The number one priority for all offensive operations is to gain and
maintain contact with key enemy forces. As part of the decision-making proc-
ess (see Chapter 2), the commander and staff identify which forces must be
kept under watch at all times. The OPFOR will employ whatever technical
sensors it has at its disposal to locate and track enemy forces, but the method
of choice is ground reconnaissance. It may also receive information on the en-
emy from the civilian populace, local police, or affiliated irregular forces.
MAKE THOROUGH LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS
3-60. The OPFOR understands that there is as much chance of an offensive
operation being brought to culmination by a lack of sufficient logistics support |
7-100.1 | 111 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
as by enemy action. Careful consideration is given to carried days of supply
and advanced caches to obviate the need for easily disrupted LOCs.
MODIFY THE PLAN WHEN NECESSARY
3-61. The OPFOR takes into account that, while it might consider itself to be
in the preparation phase for one operation, it is continuously in the execution
phase. Plans are never considered final. Plans are checked throughout the
course of their development to ensure they are still valid in light of battlefield
events.
REHEARSE CRITICAL ACTIONS IN PRIORITY
3-62. The commander establishes the priority for the critical actions expected
to take place during the operation. The force rehearses those actions in as re-
alistic a manner as possible for the remainder of the preparation time.
EXECUTING THE OFFENSE
3-63. The degree of preparation often determines the nature of the attack in
the execution phase. Successful execution depends on forces that understand
their roles in the operation and can swiftly follow preparatory actions with
the maximum possible shock and violence and deny the enemy any opportu-
nity to recover. A successful execution phase often ends with transition to the
defense in order to consolidate gains, defeat enemy counterattacks, or avoid
culmination. In some cases, the execution phase is followed by continued of-
fensive action to exploit opportunities created by the operation just completed.
MAINTAIN CONTACT
3-64. The OPFOR will go to great lengths to ensure that its forces maintain
contact with key elements of the enemy force throughout the operation. This
includes rapid reconstitution of reconnaissance assets and forces and the use
of whatever combat power is necessary to ensure success.
MODIFY THE PLAN WHEN NECESSARY
3-65. The OPFOR is sensitive to the effects of mission dynamics and realizes
that the enemy’s actions may well make an OPFOR unit’s original mission
achievable, but completely irrelevant. As an example, a unit of the fixing
force in an attack may be keeping its portion of the enemy force tied down while
another portion of the enemy force is maneuvering nearby to stop the exploita-
tion force. In this case, the OPFOR unit in question must be ready to transition
to a new mission quickly and break contact to fix the maneuvering enemy force.
SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES
3-66. The OPFOR places maximum emphasis on decentralized execution, ini-
tiative, and adaptation. Subordinate units are expected to take advantage of
fleeting opportunities so long as their actions are in concert with the purpose
of the operational directive. |
7-100.1 | 112 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
DOMINATE THE TEMPO OF OPERATIONS
3-67. Through all actions possible, the OPFOR plans to control the tempo
of operations. It will use continuous attack, IW, and shifting targets, objectives,
and axes to ensure that operational events are taking place at the pace it
desires.
TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION
3-68. The types of offensive action in OPFOR doctrine are both tactical meth-
ods and guides to the design of operational courses of action. An FG or OSC of-
fensive operation plan may include subordinate units that are executing different
offensive and defensive courses of action within the overall offensive mission
framework.
ATTACK
3-69. An attack seeks to achieve operational decision through primarily mili-
tary means by defeating the enemy’s military power. This defeat does not
come through the destruction of armored weapons systems but through the
disruption, dislocation, and subsequent paralyzation that occurs when com-
bat forces are rendered irrelevant by the loss of the capability or will to con-
tinue the fight. Attack is the method of choice for OPFOR offensive action.
There are two types of attack: integrated attack and dispersed attack.
3-70. The OPFOR does not have a separate design for “exploitation” as a dis-
tinct offensive course of action. Rather, exploitation is considered a central
part of all integrated and dispersed attacks.
3-71. The OPFOR does not have a separate design for “pursuit” as a distinct
offensive course of action. A pursuit is conducted using the same basic
course-of-action framework as any other integrated or dispersed attack. The
fixing force gains contact with the fleeing enemy force and slows it or forces it
to stop while the assault and exploitation forces create the conditions for and
complete the destruction of the enemy’s C2 and logistics structure or other
systems.
Integrated Attack
3-72. Integrated attack is an offensive action where the OPFOR seeks
military decision by destroying the enemy’s will and/or ability to continue
fighting through the application of joint and combined arms effects.
Integrated attack is often employed when the OPFOR enjoys overmatch
with respect to its opponent and is able to bring all components of offensive
combat power to bear. It may also be employed against a more sophisticated
and capable opponent, if the appropriate window of opportunity is created or
available. See Figures 3-3 through 3-5 for examples of integrated attacks. |
7-100.1 | 113 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
Enemy Main Line of
Resistance
OSC
XX
XX X
Enemy
Support
Area
Exploitation Assault Force
Force
X
X
Enemy Tactical
Fixing Force Airfield
OSC
Initial Subsequent Initial Initial Subsequent
Support Support Battle LOR LOR
Line Line Line Subsequent
Battle Line
Figure 3-3. Integrated Attack (Linear Battlespace Example1)
3-73. The primary objective of an integrated attack is the enemy’s will and
ability to fight. The OPFOR recognizes that modern militaries cannot con-
tinue without adequate logistics support and no military, modern or other-
wise, can function without effective command and control.
3-74. Integrated attacks are characterized by
• Not being focused solely on destruction of ground combat power but of-
ten on C2 and logistics.
• Fixing the majority of the enemy’s force in place with the minimum
force necessary.
• Isolating the targeted subcomponent(s) of the enemy’s combat system
from his main combat power.
• Using complex terrain to force the enemy to fight at a disadvantage.
• Using deception and other components of IW to degrade the enemy’s
situational understanding and ability to target OPFOR formations.
• Using flank attack and envelopment, particularly of enemy forces that
have been fixed. |
7-100.1 | 114 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Initial
Battle Line
Subsequent
OBJ B Battle Line
I I
X
X
X
Highway
X
OSC
Enemy OBJ A Objective Red Sea
APOD
I I X X
ay
hw XX
X X Hig X
Assault Force
OSC Fixing Force
Assault
X
Force
X X
I I
Exploitation Force
I I
Fixing
Force
Figure 3-4. Integrated Attack (Linear Battlespace Example 2)
3-75. The OPFOR prefers to conduct integrated attacks when most or all of
the following conditions exist:
• The OPFOR possesses significant overmatch in combat power over en-
emy forces.
• It possesses at least air parity over the critical portions of the battle-
field.
• It is sufficiently free of enemy standoff reconnaissance and attack sys-
tems to be able to operate without accepting high levels of risk. |
7-100.1 | 115 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
OOSSCC
(moves to capture the APOD
Exploitation X through the path created by assault
Force force)
X
Fixing
X X Force 2
Assault
Force
I I
Enemy
Base Enemy
Camp QRF
Enemy
Enemy Base
Support Camp
Area
APOD
X
Fixing
Force 1
Enemy
Base
Camp
OSC
Figure 3-5. Integrated Attack (Nonlinear Battlespace Example)
Organizing Forces for an Integrated Attack
3-76. An integrated attack employs fixing, assault, and exploitation forces. A
disruption forces exists, but is not created specifically for this type of offen-
sive action.
3-77. Fixing Force. The fixing force in an integrated attack is required to
prevent enemy defending forces, reserves, and quick-response forces (QRF)
from interfering with the actions of the assault and exploitation forces. The
battle will develop rapidly, and enemy forces not in the attack zone cannot be
allowed to reposition to influence the assault and exploitation forces. Maneu-
ver forces, precision fires, air defense units, long-range antiarmor systems,
situational obstacles, chemical weapons, and electronic warfare (EW) are
well suited to fix defending forces.
3-78. Assault Force. The assault force in an integrated attack is charged
with creating conditions that allow the exploitation force to rapidly penetrate
enemy defenses. Since the exploitation force is principally required to act
within the window of opportunity, the assault force may successfully employ in-
filtration of infantry to carefully pre-selected points to assist the exploitation |
7-100.1 | 116 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
force in its penetration. Smoke and suppressive artillery and rocket fires, com-
bat engineer units, and air-delivered weapons are also suited to this mission.
3-79. Exploitation Force. The exploitation force in an integrated attack
must be capable of penetrating or avoiding enemy defensive forces and at-
tacking and destroying the enemy’s support infrastructure before he has time
to react. An armored or attack helicopter unit is often best suited to be the
core of an exploitation force in an integrated attack due to the combination of
mobility, protection, and firepower possessed by such forces.
Dispersed Attack
3-80. Dispersed attack (also known as decentralized attack) is the primary
manner in which the OPFOR conducts offensive action when threatened by a
superior enemy and/or when unable to mass or provide integrated C2 to an
attack. This is not to say that the dispersed attack cannot or should not be
used against peer forces, but as a rule integrated attack will more completely
attain objectives in such situations. Dispersed attack relies on IW and dis-
persion of forces to permit the OPFOR to conduct tactical offensive opera-
tions while overmatched by precision standoff weapons and imagery and
signals sensors. The dispersed attack is continuous and comes from multi-
ple directions. It employs multiple means working together in a very in-
terdependent way. The attack can be dispersed in time as well as space.
See Figures 3-6 and 3-7 for examples of dispersed attacks.
3-81. The primary objective of dispersed attack is to take advantage of a win-
dow of opportunity to bring enough joint and combined arms force to bear to
destroy the enemy’s will and/or capability to continue fighting. To achieve
this, the OPFOR does not necessarily have to destroy the entire enemy force,
but often just a key portion of that force.
3-82. Selecting the appropriate portion of the enemy to destroy is the first
step in planning the dispersed attack. This element is chosen because of its
importance to the enemy and varies depending on the force involved and the
current military situation. For example, an enemy force dependent on one
geographical point for all of his logistics support and reinforcement would be
most vulnerable at that point. Disrupting this activity at the right time and
to the right extent may bring about operational decision on the current bat-
tlefield or it may open further windows of opportunity to attack the enemy’s
weakened forces at little cost to the OPFOR. In another example, an enemy
force preparing to attack may be disrupted by an OPFOR attack whose purpose
is to destroy long-range missile artillery, creating the opportunity for the
OPFOR to achieve standoff with its own missile systems. In a final example, the
key system chosen may be the personnel of the enemy force. Attacking and caus-
ing mass casualties among infantrymen may delay an enemy offensive in com-
plex terrain while also being politically unacceptable for the enemy command
structure.
3-83. Dispersed attacks are characterized by
• Not being focused on complete destruction of ground combat power but
rather on destroying a key portion of the enemy force (often targeting
enemy C2 and logistics).
• Fixing and isolating enemy combat power. |
7-100.1 | 117 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
• Using smaller, independent subordinate elements.
• Conducting rapid moves from dispersed locations.
• Massing at the last possible moment.
• Conducting simultaneous attack at multiple, dispersed locations.
• Using deception and other components of IW to degrade the enemy’s
situational understanding and ability to target OPFOR formations.
Neutral Country Hostile Country
Sea
XX X
X X
X X
X Enemy X
APOD
X
X
Mountains
OSC X
X
Sea “THE STATE” X
X
XX
Neutral Country
Figure 3-6. Dispersed Attack (Example 1)
3-84. The window of opportunity needed to establish conditions favorable to
the execution of a dispersed attack may be one created by the OPFOR or one
that develops due to external factors in the operational environment. When
this window must be created, the OPFOR keys on several tasks that must be
accomplished:
• Destroy enemy ground reconnaissance.
• Deceive enemy imagery and signals sensors.
• Create an uncertain air defense environment.
• Selectively deny situational awareness.
• Maximize use of complex terrain. |
7-100.1 | 118 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Neutral Allied
X
Enemy Country Country
APOD
Sea
X
CH oo us nti tl re
y
Area of
Unre st
NSX
F X X
XX
Mountains
X
XX
X
OSC
XX X XX “THE STATE”
Mountains
XX X X
X X City
City
OSC
X
XX
X X Sea
Enemy X LEGEND
SPOD
NSF = National Security
Forces
Sea
Figure 3-7. Dispersed Attack (Example 2)
Organizing Forces for a Dispersed Attack
3-85. A dispersed attack employs fixing, assault, and exploitation forces. A dis-
ruption force exists, but is not created specifically for this type of offensive action.
Deception forces can also play an important role in dispersed attack operations.
3-86. Fixing Force. The fixing force in a dispersed attack is primarily fo-
cused on fixing enemy response forces. Enemy reserves, response forces, and
precision fire systems that can reorient rapidly will be those elements most
capable of disrupting a dispersed attack. Maneuver forces, precision fires, air
defense and antiarmor ambushes, situational obstacles, chemical weapons,
and EW are well suited to fix these kinds of units and systems.
3-87. Assault Force. The assault force in a dispersed attack is charged with
creating favorable conditions for the exploitation force to rapidly move from
dispersed locations and penetrate or infiltrate enemy defenses. Since it is the
exploitation force that is principally required to act within the window of op-
portunity, the assault force may successfully employ infiltration of infantry
to carefully pre-selected points to assist the exploitation force in its penetra-
tion. Smoke and suppressive artillery and rocket fires, combat engineer
units, and air-delivered weapons are also suited to this mission. Dispersed
attacks often make use of multiple assault forces separated in time and/or space. |
7-100.1 | 119 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
3-88. Exploitation Force. The exploitation force in a dispersed attack must
be capable, through inherent capabilities or positioning relative to the en-
emy, of destroying the target of the operation. An armored force may be the
weapon of choice to maneuver throughout the battlefield as single platoons in
order to have one company reach a vulnerable troop concentration or soft C2
node. Alternatively, the exploitation force may be a widely dispersed group of
SPF teams set to attack exposed logistics targets simultaneously. Dispersed
attacks often make use of multiple exploitation forces separated in time
and/or space, but often oriented on the same objective(s).
LIMITED-OBJECTIVE ATTACK
3-89. A limited-objective attack seeks to achieve results critical to the strate-
gic campaign plan (SCP) by destroying or denying the enemy key capabilities
through primarily military means. The results of a limited-objective attack
typically fall short of operational decision on the day of battle, but may be vi-
tal to the overall success of the SCP. Limited-objective attacks are common
during adaptive operations in which the objective is to preserve forces and
wear down the enemy, rather than achieving a military decision.
3-90. The primary objective of a limited-objective attack is a particular enemy
capability. This may or may not be a particular man-made system or group of
systems, but may also be the capability to take action at the enemy’s chosen
tempo.
3-91. Limited-objective attacks are characterized by
• Not being focused solely on destruction of ground combat power but of-
ten on C2 and logistics.
• Denying the enemy the capability he most needs to execute his plans.
• Maximal use of the systems warfare approach to combat (see Chapter 1).
• Significant reliance on a planned or seized window of opportunity.
3-92. At the operational level, there are three types of limited-objective at-
tack: sophisticated ambush, spoiling attack, and counterattack. One of these
types, the sophisticated ambush, requires conditions similar to those needed
for a dispersed attack, but is executed by autonomous tactical-level forces
with the OSC providing coordination and support. The other two types, the
spoiling attack and counterattack, share some common characteristics, but
differ in purpose.
Sophisticated Ambush
3-93. A sophisticated ambush is the linking in time and task of RISTA, at-
tacking forces, and window of opportunity to destroy key enemy systems or
cause politically unacceptable casualties. What makes a sophisticated am-
bush “sophisticated” is not the actual attack means. In fact, the actual am-
bush is executed by tactical-level forces. (See FM 7-100.2 for examples.) What
makes it “sophisticated,” however, is the linking of sensor, ambusher, window
of opportunity, and a target that affects an enemy center of gravity. This
typically requires sophisticated ambushes to be planned, coordinated, and
resourced at the operational level. |
7-100.1 | 120 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
3-94. Like any other ambush, a sophisticated ambush is conducted against a
moving or temporarily halted target. In this case, however, the IW plan is de-
signed to facilitate infiltration or positioning of the ambushing forces and ex-
pose the target. The OSC will be involved in IW planning and the coordina-
tion of operational-level assets needed to support the ambush.
3-95. A sophisticated ambush is conducted by forces autonomous on the bat-
tlefield, but linked by C2 and purpose. It can often involve affiliated forces,
particularly when conducted as part of adaptive operations. A sophisticated
ambush is not necessarily tied to scheme of maneuver in that the larger part
of the OPFOR force may be involved in an operation not directly related to
the ambush.
3-96. Sophisticated ambushes are characterized by
• A key enemy target that, if destroyed, would significantly degrade the
enemy’s will or ability to fight.
• OPFOR sensor(s) with capability and mission to find and track the
target. Sensors are often ground reconnaissance, but may include un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or satellites.
• A C2 method to link the ambushing forces and sensors.
• Supporting operation(s)usually primarily IWto create a window of
opportunity for the ambushing forces to act.
3-97. A sophisticated ambush requires conditions similar to those needed for
a dispersed attack. However, since less combat power is typically at risk in a
sophisticated ambush, the window of opportunity does not need to be as ex-
tensive. The window of opportunity needed to establish conditions favorable
to the execution of a sophisticated ambush may be one created by the OPFOR
or one that develops due to external factors in the operational environment.
When this window must be created, the OPFOR keys on several tasks that
must be accomplished:
• Destroy enemy ground reconnaissance in the ambush area.
• Deceive enemy imagery and signals sensors.
• Establish effective air defense protection for ambushing forces.
• Selectively deny situational awareness.
• Maximize use of complex terrain.
• Locate and track enemy security and response forces that could inter-
fere with the ambush.
• Locate and track ambush target.
Spoiling Attack
3-98. A spoiling attack is designed to control the tempo of combat by disrupt-
ing the timing of enemy operations. This is accomplished by attacking during
the planning and preparation for the enemy’s own offensive operations. Spoil-
ing attacks do not have to accomplish a great deal to be successful. Con-
versely, planners must focus carefully on what effect the attack is trying to
achieve and how the attack will achieve that effect. In some cases, the pur-
pose of the attack is to remove a key component of the enemy’s force array or |
7-100.1 | 121 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
combat system so it is unavailable for the planned attack and therefore re-
duces his overall chances of success. More typically, the attack is designed to
slow the development of conditions favorable to the enemy’s planned attack.
See Figure 3-8 for an example of a spoiling attack.
3-99. Quite often, the spoiling attack develops as a situational attack (see
above). This occurs when an unclear picture of enemy dispositions suddenly
clarifies to some extent and the commander wishes to take advantage of the
knowledge he has gained to disrupt enemy timing. This means that spoiling
attacks are often conducted by reserve or response forces that can rapidly
shift from their current posture to attack the enemy.
OSC
DTG
X Battle
Zone X
Forest
Mountains
X
X X
X
Mountains
Marsh
DTG
Battle
I I Zone
Enemy X
PA ot sta itc iok n X Disruption
Zone
X
DTG
APOD Battle
X Zone
X
X
X
Mountains
X
X
OSC LEGEND
Complex
Battle
Position
Figure 3-8. Spoiling Attack (Example) |
7-100.1 | 122 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
3-100. Spoiling attacks are characterized by
• A requirement to have a clear picture of enemy preparations and dis-
positions.
• A number of independent subordinate unit actions.
• Highly focused objectives.
• The possibility that a spoiling attack may open a window of opportu-
nity for other operations.
3-101. The OPFOR seeks to have the following conditions met in order to
conduct a spoiling attack:
• RISTA establishes a picture of enemy attack preparations.
• Enemy security, reserve, and response forces are located and tracked.
• Enemy ground reconnaissance in the attack zone is destroyed or ren-
dered ineffective.
3-102. Spoiling attacks are actually executed using one of the other types of
offensive action as the base method: integrated attack, dispersed attack, or
sophisticated ambush. Thus, the forces engaged in a spoiling attack would be
organized accordingly. The primary difference between a spoiling attack and
the other types of limited-objective attack is the purpose of the attack.
Counterattack
3-103. A counterattack is designed to cause an enemy offensive operation to
culminate and allow the OPFOR to return to offensive operations. A counter-
attack is designed to control the tempo of operations by returning the initia-
tive to the OPFOR. Like a spoiling attack, a counterattack often develops as
a situational attack, when the commander wishes to take advantage of a
fleeting opportunity. The difference is that the counterattack occurs after the
enemy begins his attack. See Figure 3-9 for an example of a counterattack.
3-104. Counterattacks are characterized by
• A shifting in command and support relationships to assume an offen-
sive posture for the counterattacking force.
• A proper identification that the enemy is at or near culmination.
• The planned rapid transition of the remainder of the force to offensive
operations.
• The possibility that a counterattack may open a window of opportu-
nity for other operations.
3-105. The OPFOR seeks to set the following conditions for a counterattack:
• Locate and track enemy reserve forces and cause them to be committed.
• Destroy enemy reconnaissance forces that could observe counterattack
preparations. |
7-100.1 | 123 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
OSC
LOR
Support Zone Battle Zone Disruption Zone
I I
X X
Main
Defense
Force
OSC
LOR
Assault I I
Force XX
XX
I I I
Exploitation
Force
X X
X X
Fixing X X
Force (Former X X
Main Defense
Force)
Figure 3-9. Counterattack (Example)
Organizing Forces for a Counterattack
3-106. Since counterattacks develop out of a defensive posture, the organiza-
tion of forces involves the rapid shifting of some forces from their previously
defensive roles to attack the enemy. Generally, the disruption force was al-
ready part of a previous OPFOR defensive posture and continues to perform
the same functions during a counterattack. Like other offensive actions, a
counterattack employs fixing, assault, and exploitation forces. Within the
context of a larger defensive action, these forces come from the main defense
force and/or the reserve, and they collectively make up the counterattack force.
Other forces in the AOR may continue to perform their original defensive roles.
3-107. Fixing Force. The fixing force in a counterattack is that part of the
force engaged in defensive action with the enemy. These forces continue to
fight from their current positions and seek to account for the key parts of the
enemy array and sure they are not able to break contact and reposition.
Additionally, the fixing force has the mission of making contact with and
destroying enemy reconnaissance forces and any combat forces that may
have penetrated the OPFOR defense.
3-108. Assault Force. In a counterattack, the assault force (if one is used) is
assigned the mission of forcing the enemy to commit his reserve so that the
enemy commander has no further mobile forces with which to react. If the fixing |
7-100.1 | 124 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
force has already forced this commitment, the counterattack design may
forego the creation of an assault force.
3-109. Exploitation Force. The exploitation force in a counterattack ma-
neuvers through or bypasses engaged enemy forces to attack and destroy the
enemy’s support infrastructure before he has time or freedom to react. An
armored or attack helicopter unit is often best suited to be the core of an ex-
ploitation force in a counterattack due to the combination of mobility, protec-
tion, and firepower possessed by such forces.
STRIKE
3-110. A strike is an offensive course of action that rapidly destroys a key en-
emy organization through a synergistic combination of massed precision fires
and maneuver. The targeted enemy formation is usually a battalion task
force or larger. Defeat for the enemy does not come through the simple de-
struction of armored weapon systems or combat soldiers but through the sub-
sequent paralyzation that occurs when a key organization is completely dev-
astated in a small span of time. See Figures 3-10 and 3-11 for examples of
strikes. The overall objective is to destroy an enemy formation, typically after
carefully setting the conditions for its destruction. The strike can be em-
ployed in larger operations that are either defensive or offensive in nature.
3-26
Assault
Force
Enemy Main Line of
Resistance
OSC
Attack Zone
XX XX Kill
X Zone
X
Exploitation
Force
Enemy
Support
Area
X
X
Exploitation
Force Enemy Tactical
Airfield
X
X
Fixing Force
OSC
Initial Subsequent Initial Initial Subsequent
Support Support Battle LOR LOR
Line Line Line Subsequent
Battle Line |
7-100.1 | 125 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
3-111. The primary objective of a strike is the enemy’s will and ability to
fight. The OPFOR recognizes that modern militaries cannot rapidly reconsti-
tute entire combat formations and that significant destruction is both capa-
ble of removing all momentum possessed by a combat formation and elimi-
nating support at home for continued combat operations.
3-112. Strikes are characterized by
• Being focused on the complete destruction of a particular enemy for-
mation.
• Typically following a period of reconnaissance fire (see Chapter 7).
• Requiring effective and integrated C2 and RISTA means.
• The use of complex terrain to force the enemy to fight at a dis-
advantage.
• Significant reliance on deception and other IW measures.
OSC
X
X
DTG DTG
Battle Battle
Zone Zone
Disruption X
Ki Zll
o
ne
Zone
Disruption
Zone
Axis
Enemy
Attack
X Zone
DTG
Battle
Zone
LEGEND
Complex
O
S C Battle
Position
Support Zone
Figure 3-11. Strike (Example 2) |
7-100.1 | 126 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
3-113. The window of opportunity needed to establish conditions favorable to
the execution of a strike may be one created by the OPFOR or one that devel-
ops due to external factors in the operational environment. When this window
must be created, the OPFOR keys on several tasks that must be accomplished:
• Destroy enemy ground reconnaissance.
• Deceive enemy imagery and signals sensors.
• Create an uncertain air defense environment.
• Selectively deny situational awareness.
• Maximize use of complex terrain.
Reconnaissance Fire
3-114. In addition to the above, the OPFOR will typically precede a strike
with significant reconnaissance fire (see Chapter 7) designed to remove one
or more key capabilities from the enemy force. The targeted capabilities could
be ground reconnaissance, effective C2, effective logistics, or casualty evacuation.
Organizing Forces for a Strike
3-115. A strike employs fixing, assault, and exploitation forces. The disrup-
tion force can play an important role in determining when the target forma-
tion will enter the kill zone for the strike.
3-116. Fixing Force. The fixing force in a strike is primarily focused on fix-
ing enemy forces that might come to the aid of the target formation. The bat-
tle will develop rapidly, and enemy forces cannot be allowed to reposition to
influence the assault and exploitation forces. Maneuver forces, precision
fires, air defense units, long-range antiarmor systems, situational obstacles,
chemical weapons, and EW are well suited to fix defending forces.
3-117. Assault Force. The assault force in a strike is charged with creating
the conditions that allow the exploitation force to complete the destruction of
the target formation. Since the exploitation force is principally required to
act within the window of opportunity, the assault force may successfully em-
ploy infiltration of infantry to carefully pre-selected points to assist the ex-
ploitation force in its action. Smoke and suppressive artillery and rocket
fires, combat engineer units, and air-delivered weapons are also suited to this
mission.
3-118. Exploitation Force. The exploitation force in a strike has the mis-
sion of completing the destruction of the target formation. Strike exploitation
forces are almost always combinations of highly lethal ground maneuver
formations and precision long-range fire systems. A strike must be capable of
eliminating the target enemy force before the higher enemy commander has
time to react. An armored or attack helicopter unit is often best suited to be
the core of an exploitation force in a strike, due to the combination of mobil-
ity, protection, and firepower possessed by such forces. However, a strike
may be successfully executed without any maneuver forces, and the exploita-
tion force may consist entirely of long-range fire systems. |
7-100.1 | 127 | Chapter 4
Defensive Operations
While the OPFOR sees the offense as the decisive form of military action,
it recognizes defense as the stronger form of military action, particularly
when faced with a superior, extraregional foe. Defensive operations can
lead to strategic victory if the extraregional enemy abandons his mission.
It may be sufficient for the OPFOR simply not to lose. Even when an
operational-level commandsuch as a field group (FG) or operational-
strategic command (OSC)as a whole is conducting an offensive operation,
it is likely that one or more subordinate units may be executing defensive
missions to preserve offensive combat power in other areas, to protect an
important formation or resource, or to deny access to key facilities or geo-
graphic areas.
OPFOR defenses can be characterized as a “shield of blows.” Each force
and zone of the defense plays an important role in the attack of the en-
emy’s combat system. An operational-level defense is structured around
the concept that destroying the synergy of the enemy’s combat system will
make enemy forces vulnerable to attack and destruction.
Commanders and staffs do not approach the defense with preconceived
templates. The operational situation may cause the commander to vary
his defensive methods and techniques. Nevertheless, there are basic
characteristics of defensive operations (purposes and types of action) that
have applications in all situations.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
4-1. Defensive operations are an important component of all OPFOR stra-
tegic campaigns. However, the scale and purpose of defensive actions may
differ during the various types of strategic-level actions.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
4-2. The State possesses an overmatch in all elements of power against
internal and regional opponents. It is able to employ that power in regional
operations in a conventional operational design. This overmatch does not
imply, however, that regional operations are entirely offensive. Consolidation
of gains, security actions, and economy-of-force measures can all produce de-
fensive courses of action inside a larger offensive design.
4-3. The State’s military forces are sufficient to overmatch any single re-
gional neighbor, but not necessarily an alliance or coalition of neighboring
countries. They may not be a match for the forces an extraregional power
can bring to bear. Thus, the OPFOR seeks to exploit its numerical and |
7-100.1 | 128 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
technological overmatch against one regional opponent rapidly, before other
regional neighbors or an extraregional power can enter the fight. In some
cases, this may require defensive operations against one or more regional
neighbors who are not the main target of the strategic campaign, to mitigate
their ability to disrupt an OPFOR offensive against the one that is.
4-4. Regional operations include essentially defensive security actions to
maintain internal stability. In addition, the Internal Security Forces help
control the population in territory the OPFOR seizes or engage enemy forces
that invade State territory.
4-5. The State’s military goal during regional operations is to destroy its re-
gional opponents’ military power in order to achieve specific ends. The State
plans regional operations well in advance and executes them as rapidly as is
feasible in order to preclude intervention by outside forces. Still, at the very
outset of these operations, it lays plans and positions forces to conduct access-
control operations in the event of outside intervention. Extraregional
forces may also be vulnerable to conventional operations during the time
they require to build combat power and create support at home for their
intervention.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
4-6. If an extraregional force starts to deploy into the region, the balance of
power begins to shift away from the State. Although the OPFOR may not yet
be totally overmatched by the enemy force, it faces a threat it cannot handle
with normal, “conventional” patterns of operation designed for regional
conflict. Therefore, the OPFOR must begin to adapt its operations to the
changing threat.
4-7. As the State begins transition operations, its immediate goal is preser-
vation of its instruments of power while seeking transition back to regional
operations. Transition operations therefore feature a mixture of offensive and
defensive actions.
4-8. This combination of offensive and defensive actions can allow the State
to control the strategic tempo while changing the nature of conflict to
something for which the intervening force is unprepared. If these actions are
successful and the extraregional force is no longer a factor, the OPFOR may
be able to transition back to regional operations without having to complete
the shift to adaptive operations.
4-9. During transition operations, the State must decide whether to keep
its forces in any territory it has occupied in a neighboring country or to
withdraw them back to its home territory. The decision to stay or withdraw
at this point may be based on the presence or absence of complex terrain
suitable for defensive operations in the occupied territory against an
extraregional power with overmatch in technology and conventional forces.
The OPFOR is more likely to remain in the occupied territory if it has already
achieved its strategic goal in regional operations or at least achieved major
intermediate objectives leading toward that goal and can structure an
effective defense in that territory. Military forces in the immediate vicinity
of the point of intervention move into defensive positions as opportunity
allows, making use of existing command and control (C2) and logistics. |
7-100.1 | 129 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
4-10. The OPFOR can use the time it takes the extraregional force to prepare
and deploy into the region to change the nature of the conflict into something
for which the intervening force is unprepared. The OPFOR tries to establish
conditions that force the new enemy to fight at less than full strength and on
terrain for which his forces are not optimized. It seeks to take advantage of
complex terrain whenever possible, while controlling the enemy’s access to
such terrain. It plans operations to exploit the opportunities created by the
presence of NGOs, PVOs, media, and other civilians on the battlefield.
4-11. Meanwhile, transition operations permit other key forces the time,
space, and freedom of action necessary to move into sanctuary in preparation
for a shift to adaptive operations. These forces preserve combat power and
prepare to defend the State homeland, if necessary. Transition operations
usually include mobilization of reserve and militia forces to assist in defending
the State.
4-12. At some point, the OPFOR may conclude that it cannot deny entry or
defeat the extraregional force by destroying his early-entry forces. The
OPFOR then shifts its emphasis to completing the transition to adaptive
operations as soon as possible, before the enemy can deploy overwhelming
forces into the region.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
4-13. From the perspective of the extraregional power, any regional crisis has
the potential to expand into a major theater war. Therefore, it will try to
avoid crisis expansion by early engagement and rapid response. The longer
the State can delay effective extraregional response to the crisis in the region,
the greater its chances for success. Failing to limit or interrupt access to the
region, the State will attempt to degrade further enemy force projection, hold
initial gains, and extend the conflict, while preserving its own military capa-
bility and other instruments of national power.
4-14. When the OPFOR shifts to adaptive operations, these are more defensive
in nature than were regional or transition operations. When overmatched
in conventional power, the OPFOR seeks to preserve its own power and
apply it in adaptive ways. It expects its commanders to seize opportunity,
tailor organizations to the mission, and make creative use of existing
resourceseven more than they did in regional and transition operations.
4-15. Generally, the OPFOR conducts adaptive operations during the strate-
gic campaign as a consequence of intervention from outside the region. If it
cannot control the extraregional enemy’s access into the region or defeat his
forces before his combat potential in the region equals or exceeds its own, the
OPFOR must resort to adaptive operations. The primary objectives are to
preserve combat power, to degrade the enemy’s will and capability to fight,
and to gain time for aggressive strategic operations to succeed.
4-16. Adaptive operations occur as a result of an extraregional power
intervening with sufficient forces to thwart the OPFOR’s original of-
fensive operations in the region. The OPFOR disperses to the extent its C2
allows and conducts decentralized operations in both offense and defense.
The OPFOR views adaptive operations as temporary in nature, serving as a
means for the OPFOR to return to regional operations. |
7-100.1 | 130 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
4-17. Adaptive operations are often sanctuary-based. Sanctuaries are areas
that limit the ability of an opponent to apply his full range of capabilities.
The OPFOR can use physical and/or moral sanctuaries for preserving and
applying forces. It can defend in sanctuaries or attack out of them. It may
conduct limited-objective attacks from these positions to prevent buildup
of intervening forces, to facilitate the defense, or to take advantage of an
opportunity to counterattack. When defending, the OPFOR generally does
not employ fixed, contiguous defensive fronts.
4-18. The OPFOR uses flexible and unpredictable force structures task-
organized for particular missions. Forces may be combined arms, joint,
interagency, and possibly multinational. The State may fully mobilize all
available means to create large conventional force and paramilitary capability in
support of adaptive operations. Full mobilization involves all military and
paramilitary forces, including militia. During adaptive operations, the
State will use conventional forces in adaptive ways. It will also employ
unconventional and specialized forces tailored to the needs of combat against
an extraregional force with technological overmatch. Operations may also
involve various types of affiliated forces.
PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE
4-19. Defensive operations are designed to achieve the goals of the strategic
campaign through active measures while preserving combat power. However,
the purpose of any given defensive operation depends on the situation.
4-20. The primary distinction among types of OPFOR defensive operations is
their purpose. Therefore, the OPFOR recognizes three general types of defen-
sive operations according to their purpose: to destroy, preserve, or deny.
DEFENSE TO DESTROY
4-21. A defense to destroy is designed to eliminate an attacking formation’s
ability to continue offensive operations while preserving friendly forces and
setting the military conditions for a favorable political settlement. Such a
defense may be the entirety of an operation or may be used to defeat a
counterattack during a larger OPFOR offensive action. An operational
defense to destroy often has one or more tactical offensive actions as
subcomponents.
DEFENSE TO PRESERVE
4-22. A defense to preserve is designed to protect key components of the
OPFOR from destruction by the enemy. Such a defense may occur
• To preserve combat power for future operations.
• Before the outbreak of a war, or in its early stages, to cover the mobili-
zation and deployment of the main forces.
• When facing numerically or qualitatively superior enemy forces.
• During an offense, to economize force in one area and achieve superior-
ity in another. |
7-100.1 | 131 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
DEFENSE TO DENY
4-23. A defense to deny is intended to deny the enemy access to a geographic
area or use of facilities that could enhance his combat operations or provide
him substantial value for information operations. An example of this would
be enemy capture of a religious or cultural center. This type of defense is
most often used as part of an overall campaign of theater access control.
It may also be used to consolidate, retain, and protect critical positions that
attacking forces have captured.
PLANNING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
4-24. For the OPFOR, the key elements of planning defensive operations
are
• Determining the level of planning possible (planned versus situational
defense).
• Organizing the battlefield.
• Organizing forces.
• Organizing information warfare (IW) activities in support of the de-
fense (see Chapter 5).
4-25. Defensive actions during transition and adaptive operations will not be
able to rely simply on attrition-based operations in layered engagement
areas. Such actions will typically include increased use of
• Infiltration to conduct spoiling attacks and ambushes.
• Perception management (see Chapter 5) in support of defensive opera-
tions.
• Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures.
• Affiliated forces for reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, security,
and attacks against key enemy systems.
PLANNED DEFENSE
4-26. A planned (or deliberate) defense is a defensive operation undertaken
when there is sufficient time and knowledge of the situation to prepare and re-
hearse forces for specific tasks. Typically, the enemy is in a staging or assembly
area and in a known location and status. The OPFOR plans a defense using the
method described in Chapter 2. Key considerations in defensive planning are
• Selecting operationally significant areas in complex terrain from which
to dominate surrounding avenues of approach.
• Determining the method that will deny the enemy his operational
objectives.
• Developing a plan for reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and
target acquisition (RISTA) that locates and tracks major enemy forma-
tion and determines enemy patterns of operations and probable objectives.
• Creating or taking advantage of a window of opportunity that frees
friendly forces from any enemy advantages in precision standoff and
situational awareness. |
7-100.1 | 132 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
SITUATIONAL DEFENSE
4-27. The OPFOR recognizes that the modern battlefield is chaotic, and fleet-
ing opportunities to attack an enemy weakness will continually present
themselves and just as quickly disappear. If the OPFOR determines that, by
conserving resources in one area, it may be able to take advantage of a win-
dow of opportunity in another, it may assume a situational (or hasty) defense.
It may also do so when an OPFOR attack culminates prior to achieving the
objective.
4-28. The OPFOR may also be forced to employ a situational defense when it
has been conducting offensive operations against a regional neighbor and in-
tervention by a powerful extraregional force materializes more quickly than
anticipated. Thus, the OPFOR may have to make the transition from regional
to adaptive operations more rapidly than planned. Units may still be able to
move into preplanned positions in complex terrain, but without some meas-
ures they anticipated being able to take during transition operations. They
may or may not have fully-prepared, complex battle positions, with engineer
preparation, C3D measures, and logistics caches.
4-29. The commander develops his assessment of the conditions leading to a
situational defense rapidly and without a great deal of staff involvement. He
provides a basic course of action to the staff, who then quickly turn that
course of action into an executable operational directive.
4-30. Organization of the battlefield in a situational defense is normally lim-
ited to minor changes to existing control measures. Organization of forces in
a situational defense typically relies on minor modifications to existing
structure.
4-31. The following are examples of conditions that might lead to a
situational defense:
• The enemy gains or regains air superiority sooner than anticipated.
• An enemy counterattack was not effectively fixed.
• An attacking force makes contact with an enemy formation it did not
expect.
ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR THE DEFENSE
4-32. In his operation plan, the commander specifies the organization of the
battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. Within his unit’s
area of responsibility (AOR), as defined by the next-higher commander, he
designates AORs for his subordinates, along with zones related to his own
overall mission.
4-33. In organizing the defensive battlefield, the operational commander
organizes forces to begin attack of the combat system of the enemy force as
soon as feasible. By attacking subsystems or components of the enemy’s
combat system appropriate to the situation, the operational commander can
create windows of opportunity for offensive action. |
7-100.1 | 133 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
Areas of Responsibility
4-34. OPFOR AORs normally consist of three principal zones: disruption,
battle, and support zones. Zones may be linear or nonlinear in nature and
are designed to facilitate rapid transition between linear and nonlinear
operations, as well as between offense and defense. These zones have the
same basic purposes in all types of defenses. In addition to the basic zones in an
AOR, the operational-level commander may also employ attack zones and kill
zones to control subordinate offensive operations conducted in support of the
overall defensive scheme. See Figures 4-1 and 4-2 for generalized examples of
AORs and zones in linear and nonlinear defensive operations.
OSC
OSC DTG DTG OSC
Disruption Disruption Battle Zone X X Support
Zone Zone Zone
(if employed)
X X
Z
OKILL
KILL N E
Enemy
ZONE
X
X
DTG DTG
Disruption Battle Zone X X XXX
Zone OSC
(if employed)
X
X
X
ZOK NIL EL KI
ZLL
O NE
OSC
X Reserve
X
BTG
Battle Zone I I
Enemy
KILL
ONE
X OSC
Z
Antilanding
Reserve
OSC
Figure 4-1. Example of AOR (Linear Battlespace) |
7-100.1 | 134 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
OSC
DTG
Battle
Zone
DTG
Battle
Ki Zll
o
ne
Zone
Disruption
Zone Disruption
Zone
DTG
Battle
Zone
LEGEND
Complex
Battle
O
S C Position
Support Zone
Figure 4-2. Example of AOR (Nonlinear Battlespace)
Disruption Zone
4-35. In the defense, the disruption zone is that battlespace where opera-
tional forces begin their attack on the designated component or subsystem of
the enemy’s combat system. It is located between the OSC’s battle zone and
the limit of responsibility (LOR) that defines the extent of the AOR. Within
this battlespace, the OPFOR seeks to set the conditions for the defeat of the
attacking force in the battle zone. For example, the operational-level com-
mander may determine that destruction of the enemy’s mobility assets will
create an opportunity to destroy maneuver units in the battle zone. The dis-
ruption force would be given the mission of seeking out and destroying enemy
mobility assets while avoiding engagement with maneuver forces.
4-36. The disruption zone is the primary area in which the operational-level
commander will employ long-range joint fires and strikes. He may establish
kill zones within his disruption zone for the purpose of integrating the actions
of long-range fire elements and disruption force elements.
4-37. The operational-level disruption zone may be the aggregate of the disrup-
tion zones of subordinates. For example, an FG’s disruption zone could include
the disruption zones of one or more OSCs and/or tactical-level commands directly
subordinate to the FG. An OSC’s disruption zone could include disruption zones |
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