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3-99 | 156 | Chapter 9
are monitored constantly to ensure they exist for air assault execution. It is important to consider the
latencyoftheinformationwhenpresentingittothecommanderfor a decision.
9-44. Theinitialairassaultconditioncheckusuallyisconductedinthe AATForgroundtacticalforce main
command post. Allair assaultstaff principalsare represented. BCT and higher headquarter liaisonofficers
attend each other’s condition checks in person when possible and by video-teleconference or conference
call when necessary. The final condition check is conducted near the AATF’s pickup zone control
commandpost.Itincludes a reviewofthelatestfriendly,terrainandweather,andenemysituations.
9-45. Anair assault condition check considerscritical factorsto evaluate and recommend the executionof
an air assault. For example, air assaults planned for dawn and dusk periods are extremely dependant on
weather and visibility. Air assaults planned for these periods increase the risks to air assets. The S-2
evaluatesthe weather and visibilityconditionsand provides recommendationsto the AATFCbased onhis
assessment.
ABORT CRITERIA
9-46. Abort criteria is a predetermined set of circumstances, based on risk assessment, which makes the
success of the operation no longer probable; thus the operation is terminated. These circumstances can
relate to changes in safety, equipment or troops available, preparation or rehearsal time, weather, enemy,
lossesduring execution, or a combination of the above. The methodologyused in executing an air assault
involves setting the conditions, providing suppressive fires immediately before and on landing, and
continuouslymonitoringabortcriteriafrombeginningtoend.
CONSIDERATIONS
9-47. Abortcriteriaareimportantconsiderations when a change ofoneor moreconditionsintheobjective
area or landing zone seriously threatens mission success. As such, they are the friendly force information
requirement relating to ongoing air assault operations and requiring command consideration regarding
mission continuation. It is important that the air mission brief clearly defines abort criteria and that the
AATFCmonitorsthemthroughouttheoperation.
DECISIONPROCESS
9-48. Ifanabortcriterionismet, a decisionsequenceisusedbeforeabortingthe mission—
(cid:122) Delay. If time is available, delay a mission in order to correct a circumstance that may abort a
mission.
(cid:122) Divert. Iftime is not available or a delay does notcorrectanabortcriterion, the task force may
execute a divertcontingencyawayfromitsprimaryairassaultmission.
(cid:122) Abort. Ifanabort criterionexistsand a delayor diversionto the mission does not correctit, the
missioncanbeabortedbytheAATFC.Applythefollowing:
A liftisabortedwhenitreachesanabortcriterion.Themissionitselfisnotaborted.
(cid:132)
A mission isaborted whenan abortcriterionexists forthe entire missionand the AATFC
(cid:132)
decidestoabort.
9-49. Given the continued advantage of using the primary landing zone over the alternate, delay while en
routeoratthepickupzone ispreferabletodiverting.TheAATFC mustevaluatetheriskof such a delay in
lightoftime,fuel,enemy,andothermissionvariables.
9-50. Planners establish proposed abort criteria to assist commanders in deciding when success of the
operation is no longer probable. The AATFC retains authority for abort decisions. The six factors that
determineabortcriteriaforairassaultmissionsareasfollows:
(cid:122) Weather. Adverse weather conditions make flying unsafe and degrade the effectiveness of the
helicopter’s organic weapon systems. The support combat aviation brigade sets theater-specific
minimum weather conditions and establishes the appropriate approval authorities for risk
management.
(cid:122) Available aircraft. The ground tactical plan for an air assault operation depends on the rapid
massingofcombat power atthe critical place and time by helicopters. The supportingaviation |
3-99 | 157 | Air Assault Planning
task force manages combat power to support the AATF and keeps the staff informed of any
limitations.
(cid:122) Time. Refers to three distinct subjects: light and darkness, planning time, and fighter
management.
Light and darkness. U.S. armed forces gain a significant advantage over most military
(cid:132)
forces in the world by operating at night. Night operations may increase aviation
survivability, but may increase accidental risk in periods of low illumination. The aviation
task force standard operating procedure specifies illuminationthresholdsrelated to mission
approval.
Planning time. In general, less planning time equates to increased risk. Time-sensitive
(cid:132)
operations should be preplanned to the greatest extent possible and should rely on
establishedstandardoperatingprocedures.
Fighter management. Aircrew fighter management may impact the air assault timeline if
(cid:132)
the mission is delayed or extended. The aviation task force standard operating procedure
specifiesapprovallevelformissionextension.
(cid:122) Missionessentialcombatpower. Airassault missionplannersuse missionvariablestodetermine
the minimum combat power (to include Infantry, field artillery, and aviation) needed to ensure
mission success. Use abort criteria to ensure friendly forces have the required combat ratio for
theoperation.
(cid:122) Missioncriticality. Thesuccessof unitsand futureoperations maydepend onthe success ofthe
air assault mission. Therefore, some air assault operations may proceed despite the presence of
circumstancesthatnormallywouldabortthemission.
(cid:122) Enemy. Certain types of enemy activity, especially along air routes or near landing zones or
objectives, mayabort an air assault mission. Abort criteria usually is stated in terms of the size
or type of an enemy unit, the type of enemy equipment (especially air defense), and the
proximityoftheenemytopresentorfuturefriendlylocations.
SECTION V – CONTROL MEASURES
9-51. Acontrolmeasure isa means ofregulating forcesor warfighting functions(ADRP 6-0). Conductof
air assault operations is inherently complex and requires unity of command. Complexity of the operation
necessitateskeepingtheoperationassimpleaspossible withcontrolmeasures.
FORCE-ORIENTED CONTROL MEASURES
9-52. Coordinated force-oriented control measures are crucial and allow for maneuvering ground and air
elementsto operate withconfidence. Controlmeasuresare preplannedstepsthat establishboundaries of an
areaofoperation.
9-53. Commandersuse boundariesto assignunitstacticalresponsibilityof a designated geographicalarea.
They use control measures to govern airspace control and clearance on the ground of a diversity of fire
support ranging from artillery and naval gun fire (to close combat attacks and close air support.
Commanders try to use easily identifiable terrain as a reference aid to enhance fire support coordination
measures(FSCMs)andeasilyrecognizableterrainfeaturesonthegroundtoexpeditemaneuver.
9-54. Animportantpointonmaneuvercontrol graphics;is thatstaffsmustbeknowledgeableregardingthe
different maneuver control measures and their impact on clearance of fires. For instance, boundaries are
bothrestrictiveandpermissive,whilecorridors,routes,anddirectionofattackarerestrictive.
9-55. Sinceboundariesserveasboth permissive and restrictive measures,the decisionnotto employthem
has profound effects upon timely clearance of fires at the lowest possible level. This is important,
especiallyifmaneuverunitsarenotgivenareasofoperations meaningthatnoboundariesareestablished.
9-56. The higher echelon may coordinate all clearance of fires short of the coordinated fire line, a time-
intensive process. It allows the unit to maneuver successfullyand to engage targets ina swift and efficient
manner.Itrequirescoordinationandclearanceonlywithinthatorganization. |
3-99 | 158 | Chapter 9
BOUNDARIES
9-57. A boundary is a line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and
deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas (JP 3-0). (Refer to JP 3-09,
FM 3-09,andFM 3-90-1 formoreinformation.)Boundariesaffectfiresupportintwoways.Theyare(cid:650)
(cid:122) Restrictive.Boundariesare restrictive inthat normallyunits donotfireacrossboundariesunless
the fires are coordinated with the adjacent unit or the fires are allowed by a permissive fire
support coordination measure, such as a coordinated fire line. These restrictions apply to
conventional and special munitions and their effects. When fires such as obscuration and
illumination affect an adjacent unit, coordination with that unit normally is required. A
commander may employ direct fires without clearance at specific point targets that are clearly
and positively identified as enemy. Targets and their triggers should be kept within the same
unit’sboundarywithoutoverriding othertacticalordoctrinalconsiderations.
(cid:122) Permissive. Boundaries are permissive in that a maneuver commander, unless otherwise
restricted,enjoyscompletefreedomoffireand maneuverwithinhisownboundaries.Thus,units
may execute joint fires without close coordination with neighboring units unless otherwise
restricted.
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES
9-58. A firesupportcoordinationmeasure(FSCM)is a measure employed bycommanderstofacilitatethe
rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces (JP 3-0). The
followingrestrictiveandpermissiveFSCMs—areusedfrequentlyinairborneorairassaulttasks.SeeJP 3-
09,FM 3-09,andFM 3-90-1 for a discussionofFSCMs.
(cid:122) Restrictive Fire Support Coordination Measures. Restrictive measures impose requirements for
specific coordination before engagement of targets. Restrictive FSCMs are those that provide
safeguards for friendly forces and noncombatants, facilities, or terrain. Restrictive FSCMs
include the no-fire area, restrictive fire area, restrictive fire line, fire support area, fire support
station,andthezoneoffire.
(cid:122) Permissive Fire Support Coordination Measures. Permissive FSCMs facilitate the attack of
targets by reducing or eliminating the coordination necessary for the clearance of fires.
PermissiveFSCMsincludethecoordinated fire line,firesupportcoordinationline,freefirearea,
andthekillbox.
AIRSPACE COORDINATING MEASURES
9-59. Airspace coordinating measures (ACM) are measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of
airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneouslyprovide safeguards for friendlyforces (JP 3-52). Two
ACMs–the airspacecoordinationareaand therestricted operationsarea– arefrequentlyused in airborne or
airassaulttasks.RefertoJP 3-52,FM 3-52,FM 3-90-1 for a discussionofACMs.
(cid:122) An airspace coordination area is a three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area,
establishedbythe appropriate ground commander, in whichfriendlyaircraftare reasonablysafe
from friendly surface fires. The airspace coordination area may be formal or informal
(JP 3-09.3). The airspace coordination area isthe primary ACM whichreflects the coordination
ofairspaceforusebyairsupportandindirectfires.(RefertoJP 3-09.3formoreinformation.)
(cid:122) A restricted operations area (ROA) is airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the
airspace control authority, in response to specific operational situations/requirements within
which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted (JP 3-52). An ROA is used to
separate and identify areas, examples include but are not limited to artillery, naval surface fire
support, unmanned aircraft system operating areas, areas of combat search and rescue, special
operationsforces operatingareas, and areas whichthe area air defense commander hasdeclared
weapons free. Air defense missions generally have priority over ROAs. (Refer to JP 3-52 for
moreinformation.) |
3-99 | 159 | Air Assault Planning
SECTION VI – SHAPING OPERATIONS
9-60. A shaping operation is an operation at an echelon that creates and preserves conditions for the
success of the decisive operation. Shaping operations establish conditions for the decisive operation
througheffectsontheenemy,population,andterrain.
9-61. The AATFC determines the exact conditions that must be created and preserved according to the
mission variables of METT-TC and the level of risk associated with each air assault. When determining
theseconditions,theAAFTCconsidersthefollowingfactors:
(cid:122) Shaping operations are not limited to conducting ground and air reconnaissance, suppression of
enemy air defenses, and preparation fires. They may require additional augmentation from
higherheadquarters,thesupportingaviationunit,andthesupportedunitstaffstosucceed.
(cid:122) Assessingtheeffectsoflethalfiresbyconductingbattledamageassessmentofenemyforcesand
capabilities is not easy. Enemies often remove wounded or dead personnel and equipment to
makefriendlybattledamageassessmentmoredifficultandlessaccurate.
(cid:122) In weighing the validity of battle damage assessment projections, it is important to balance
confirmed intelligence against friendly combat power applied. More combat power may be
usefulagainstuncertainbattledamageassessment.
(cid:122) The threat, the ability to assess the impact of shaping operations, and the air assault execution
timemaydeterminethedurationofshapingoperations.Allocateasmuchtimeaspossible.
9-62. Conductingshapingoperations to create and preserve the proper conditions for air assault execution
is an iterative process. Based on his situational understanding, the AATFC decides what part of the
situationmustchange to ensure success ofthe air assault. The commander directs available reconnaissance
forces and surveillance assets to detect the location of enemy systems that unacceptably endanger the air
assault’s success. This allows lethal and nonlethal systems, such as artillery, jammers, attack
reconnaissance aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), to target and deliver the desired fires
and/oreffectsagainstenemysystemsbeforelaunch.
9-63. The AATF staffs continue to plan and prepare for the air assault. The AATFC considers employing
service and joint fires to help set the conditions. The commander requests assistance from higher
headquarters if sufficient organic assets and information are not available to accomplish the mission. The
commanderthenassessesthe progressofthe shapingoperations. Thisprocessrepeatsuntilthecommander
issatisfied withtheresultoroperationalnecessityforceshimtoeitherabortorconducttheairassault.
9-64. When available Army teams from the long-range surveillance company (LRSC), a divisional or
corps asset, are organized, trained, and equipped to deploy into the objective area and conduct
reconnaissance and surveillance tasks before the deployment of the air assault force. Special operations
forces may be inserted or already be operating in the objective area and become key components of the
initialefforttoshapeandsetconditions.Specialoperations(toincludespecialreconnaissancemissions)are
keys to setting conditions, and integrated into the operation at every stage from initial planning to
transition.(SeeFM3-05.)Refertochapter1ofthepublicationforadditionalinformation.
9-65. The AATFC employs his reconnaissance and surveillance forces (to include cavalry, scouts,
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear platoon, and UAS to conduct reconnaissance and
surveillance of proposed landing zones and the objective area to identifyand target enemy forces near the
landing zones and objectives. The field artillery battalion is positioned to provide fires throughout all
phases of the operation. Shaping operations should deny the enemy’s ability to conduct reconnaissance,
defeat his strike operations, and neutralize his ability to communicate and command. The supporting
aviation unit is prepared to conduct reconnaissance in coordination with reconnaissance forces or provide
lethalfirestoneutralizeordestroyenemyforcesintheobjectiveareaoncetheyhavebeenidentified.
9-66. The commander considers employing other capabilities that may not be in his task force, such as
close air support and electronic warfare assets. The purpose of these operations is to set and preserve the
conditions on the landing zone and objective area that allow the maneuver forces to launch the air assault
andexecuteasuccessfulattacktodestroytheenemyontheobjective. |
3-99 | 160 | Chapter 9
9-67. Successful execution of an air assault may be decisive to accomplishing the mission, but it is not
necessarily the decisive operation. Air assaults often are conducted as shaping operations to establish the
conditionsforthedecisive operationthroughthe effectsrenderedontheenemyandterrain. An exampleof
this is a company conducting an air assault to seize a bridge and secure a crossing site in support of a
combinedarmsbattalion-levelattackthatrequiresthebridgeas a crossingsite.
9-68. Similarly,the AATFsetsthe conditionsfor asuccessfulair assaultbyconductingshapingoperations
ofitsown. The AATFCmayemploygroundandairreconnaissanceunits, attackaviationunits, UAS,close
air support, and artilleryfiresto conductshapingoperationsto mitigate the levelof risk for executing the
airassault.
SECTION VII – MEDICAL AND CASUALTY EVACUATION
9-69. Medical evacuation refers to both air and ground casualty evacuation. Air medical evacuation
employs air assets from the air ambulance companies assigned to the combat aviation brigade and air
medical evacuation general support aviation battalions to evacuate casualties. Dedicated air medical
evacuation aircraft include specifically trained medical personnel to provide en route care. The nine-line
medicalevacuationrequestisthestandardmethodtorequestmedicalevacuation.
9-70. Casualty evacuation refers to the use of nonmedical vehicles or aircraft to evacuate casualties. Use
casualtyevacuationonly whenthe numberofcasualtiesexceeds the medicalevacuationassetsorwhenthe
urgency of evacuation exceeds the risk of waiting for medical evacuation assets to arrive. Typically, air
assaults plan for both air and ground evacuations. (Refer to FM 3-04.113 and ATP 4-02.2 for more
information.)
MEDICAL EVACUATION PLANNING
9-71. The combat aviation brigade allocates medical evacuation assets to the supported AATF for the
durationoftheairassault.However,thesizeanddistanceoftheplannedairassault dictates theduration of
medical evacuation support to the AATFC. As a rule, the supporting commander should provide medical
evacuationassetstothesupportedcommanderuntilgroundlinesofcommunicationsareestablished.
9-72. Typically, the evacuation platoon leader from the brigade support medical company and the air
ambulance platoon leader from the air ambulance company conduct the medical evacuation planning for
the airassault.Theydoso incoordination withtheAATF S-1,AATF S-4, BAE, AATF S-3,supportedunit
S-3, BCT surgeon section, and BCT support medical company commander. The air ambulance platoon
leader should briefthe medicalevacuationplanatthe AMCM, AMB, and health service supportrehearsal.
Whenplanningformedicalevacuationduringanairassaulttheyshould—
(cid:122) Integrategroundevacuationmeasuresintotheoverallmedicalevacuationplan.
(cid:122) Plan medical evacuation routes to Level II or III health care facilities. Ensure all aircrews
participatingintheairassaultknowtheseroutes.
(cid:122) Planformedicalpersonneltoflyoncasualtyevacuationaircraftiftimeandsituationpermit.
(cid:122) Ensure medical evacuation crews are available for air assault orders, rehearsals, and
preparations.
(cid:122) Briefcasualtycollectionpointlocationsandmarkingsduringtheairassaultrehearsal.
(cid:122) Plantomaintain a forwardarmingandrefuelingpoint(FARP)aftertheairassaultiscompleted
sothatmedicalevacuationaircrafthave a stagingplaceforfollow-ongroundtacticaloperations.
9-73. Medical evacuation aircraft are limited assets and should be scheduled and used accordingly. The
AATF’s casualty estimate provides planning guidance for the number of medical evacuation aircraft
needed to support the air assault. To maximize the amount of mission hours they can support the mission,
personnel should stage medical evacuation aircraft to support an air assault at the latest possible time.
Medical evacuation aircraftshouldsupportshortdistance air assaultsfromthepickup zone(PZ)or brigade
support area. Aircraft may stage at a FARP or use a restricted operations zone to expedite pick up of
casualtiesinlongdistanceairassaults. |
3-99 | 161 | Air Assault Planning
9-74. Medicaland casualtyevacuationaircraftnormallyare under operationalcontrolto the AATFduring
air assault operations. The air mission commander (AMC) controls the medical evacuation flights to
facilitate quick deconfliction of airspace. The AMC clears all medical and casualty evacuation aircraft
movements, to include launch and landings. The AATFC may retain launch authority, but the AMC is
responsibleformedicalevacuation.
9-75. Typically, requests for medical or casualty evacuation is over the combat aviation network for the
duration of the air assault operation until an evacuation network, if necessary, is established. This ensures
goodcoordinationfordeconflictionoffiresandairspace.Whenplanningmedicalevacuationoperations—
(cid:122) Sendmedicalevacuationaircraftintosecurelandingzones(LZs)ifpossible.
(cid:122) IntegrateattackreconnaissanceaviationunitstoprovideescortandLZoverwatchasrequired.
(cid:122) EnsureterminalguidanceintotheLZ.
(cid:122) Ensure redundant means of communication with the supporting medical evacuation assets
throughouttheairassault.
(cid:122) Designate a medical evacuation officer in charge, typically a medical officer from the
brigade support medical company, to ride on mission command aircraft to receive and
prioritizeevacuation mission requestsand forwardthis information totheAMCforlaunch.
CASUALTY BACKHAUL
9-76. The AATF staff and aviation unit staff plan the combined use of aerial and ground medical and
casualty evacuation assets during air assault planning. While assaulting aircraft may backhaul wounded
fromtheLZ,thetimerequiredtoloadandunloadcasualtiescoulddesynchronizetheairmovementtable.
9-77. Casualty evacuation during an air assault may cause delays in air assault missions unless spare
aircraft are committed to replace aircraft designated to backhaul casualties. Designating separate casualty
evacuation aircraft may prevent delays of follow-on lifts. Procedures for casualty backhaul during an air
assaultareasfollows:
(cid:122) Medical evacuation request goes to mission command aircraft. The medical officer onboard
relaysthe request to the AMC. Ifthe request isapproved, the AMCdirectsthe next serial’s last
two aircraft (dependent on METT-TC) to move to the LZ casualty collection point to pick up
casualtiesafterdroppingoffpersonnel.
(cid:122) AllbackhauledcasualtiesaretakenbacktothePZcasualtycollectionpoint.
(cid:122) BackhaulaircraftwithcasualtiesnotifyPZcontroltheyareinboundwithcasualties.
(cid:122) Lastserialofthe finallift makes the finalpickup ofcasualtiesbefore theconclusionoftheair
assault,ifnecessary.
MEDICAL EVACUATION LANDING ZONE
9-78. During air assault planning, the AATF staff and AMC plan the combined use of air medical
evacuationand aerial casualtyevacuation landingzones.The AATF plansa meansofmarking the casualty
collection point for air medical or assault aircrew identification. Preferred LZ signaling methods include
smoke or panel markers (VS-17 panel marker) during the day and strobe or chemical lights (not blue or
green which are not visible under night vision goggles) at night. If air assault crews evacuate casualties,
they must know where to take themand how to rejoin remaining lift aircraft for subsequent lifts. Using a
backhaul LZ within the normal assault PZ, FARP, or both can minimize disruption of the loading plan
whilehelpingmaintainserialintegrity.
9-79. Adedicated medicalevacuationLZmaybe used forbothair medicalandaerialcasualtyevacuation.
MedicalevacuationLZselectionandproceduresinclude—
9-80. Adedicated medicalevacuationLZmaybe used forbothair medicalandaerialcasualtyevacuation.
MedicalevacuationLZselectionandproceduresinclude—
(cid:122) SelectLZsthatarelevelandclear ofdebriswithina50-meterradius.
(cid:122) KeepallotherlightsourcesawayfromtheLZunlessinstructedotherwisebyaircrew.
(cid:122) Oncemedicalevacuationaircraftareinbound,makeanestimatedtime-of-arrivalcall. |
3-99 | 162 | Chapter 9
(cid:122) Ensure personnel communicating with the aircraft at the pickup site have visual on the LZ to
confirmthesignalortoassistthecrewasrequired.
(cid:122) Oncemedicalevacuationaircrafthaslanded,ifmanned withmedicalpersonneltoprovideenroute
care,keeppersonnelawayfromtheaircraft whilethemedicalpersonnelcometothepatient.
(cid:122) Theunitshouldprovidepersonneltoassistinloadingthepatientontheaircraft,and ifpresent,
underdirectionofmedicalpersonnel. |
3-99 | 163 | Chapter 10
Ground Tactical Plan
The ground tactical plan is the foundation of a successful air assault on which all
other air assault planning stages are based. It is the decisive operation for the air
assault task force (AATF) because it accomplishes themission assigned by the higher
headquarters. It specifies actions in the objective area that lead to accomplishment of
the missionandsubsequent operations.
SECTION I – ELEMENTS
10-1. The ground tactical plan may assume a variety of possibilities depending on the commander’s
evaluation of the mission variables of METT-TC. The ground tactical plan for an air assault contains
essentially the same elements as other terrain or enemy-oriented offensive operation. However, the
elements of the ground tactical plan are prepared to capitalize on speed and mobility to achieve surprise.
Thefollowingelementsarecriticaltotheplanningprocess.
TASK ORGANIZATION
10-2. Task organization is a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission
(ADRP 5-0).Whendeterminingthetaskforceorganization,airassaultplannersemphasizethefollowing:
(cid:122) Maximizing combat power in the assault to heighten the surprise and shock effect, which is
especiallyimportantiftheairassaulttaskforceplanstoland onornearthe objective. Assaulting
forces organize on or near the objective are prepared to rapidly eliminate enemy forces,
immediatelyseizeobjectives,andrapidlyconsolidateforsubsequentoperations.
(cid:122) Ensuringthe taskforce inserts enoughforce to accomplishinitial objectivesquickly. To prevent
being defeated by repositioning mobile enemy forces, air assault task forces must be massed in
the landing zone to build up a significant early combat power capability. If adequate combat
powercannotbeintroduced quicklyintothe objectivearea,the airassaultforce landsawayfrom
theobjectivetobuildupcombatpowerandthenassaultslikeothercombatunit.
(cid:122) Ensuring the air assault task force commander properly allocates his logistics assets to sustain
thetaskforceuntilfollow-onforcesarrive.
MISSION STATEMENT
10-3. The missionisthetask, togetherwiththepurpose,thatclearlyindicatestheactiontobetakenandthe
reason therefore. Commanders analyze a mission in terms of the commander‘s intent two echelons up,
alongwithspecifiedandimpliedtasks.Theyconsiderthemission ofadjacent units to understand howthey
contribute to the decisive operation of their higher headquarters. This analysis produces the unit‘s mission
statement.
10-4. A mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization‘s essential task
(or tasks) and purpose— a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The
missionstatementcontains the elements of who, what, when, where,and why,butseldomspecifieshow.It
isimportanttorememberthatanairassaultis a typeofoperationandnot a tacticalmissiontask.
COMMANDER’S INTENT
10-5. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the
desiredmilitaryendstatethatsupportsmissioncommand,providesfocustothestaff,andhelpssubordinate
and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even |
3-99 | 164 | Chapter 10
when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). It is critical that the AATF planners receive the
commander’sintentas soonas possibleafterthemission isreceived.Evenifthegroundtacticalplan is not
complete,airassaultplanningoftenbeginsaftertheAATFC issueshisintent.
10-6. During planning, the initial commander's intent drives course of action development. In execution,
the commander’s intent guides disciplined initiative as subordinates make decisions when facing
unforeseenopportunitiesorcounteringthreats.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
10-7. Theconceptofoperations is a statementthatdirectsthemannerinwhichsubordinate unitscooperate
toaccomplishthe missionandestablishesthesequenceofactionstheforcewillusetoachieve the endstate
(ADRP 5-0). The concept of operations expands on the commander’s intent by describing how the
commanderwantstheforcetoaccomplishthe mission. Itstatestheprincipaltasksrequired,the responsible
subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement one another. Commanders and staff use the
operationalframeworktohelpconceptualizeanddescribetheirconceptofoperation.
10-8. The operationalframeworkprovesthe commander withbasic conceptualoptions for visualizingand
describing operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. Commanders are not bound by any specific
framework for conceptually organizing operations; and use one of three conceptual frameworks listed
below or in combination. These operational frameworks apply equally to both operational and tactical
actions.
(cid:122) Thedeep-close-securityframeworktodescribetheoperationintimeandspace.
(cid:122) Thedecisive-shaping-sustainingframeworktoarticulatetheoperationintermsofpurpose.
(cid:122) Themainandsupportingeffortsframeworktodesignatetheshiftingprioritizationofresources.
10-9. The deep-close-security operational framework has historically been associated with terrain
orientationbutcan beappliedtotemporalandorganizational orientationsas well.Deep operationsinvolve
effortstopreventuncommittedenemyforcesfrombeingcommittedin a coherent manner.Closeoperations
are operations that are within a subordinate commander’s area of operations. Security operations involve
efforts to provide an early and accurate warning of enemy operations and to provide time and maneuver
spacewithinwhichtoreacttotheenemy.
10-10. The decisive-shaping-sustaining framework lends itself to a broad conceptual orientation. The
decisive operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission (ADRP 3-0). It determines the
outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. A shaping operation is an operation that establishes
conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain
(ADRP 3-0). A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or
shapingoperationbygeneratingandmaintainingcombatpower(ADRP 3-0).
10-11. The main and supporting efforts operational framework—simpler than other organizing
frameworks—focuses on prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore, leaders can use the main
and supporting efforts with either the deep-close-security framework or the decisive-shaping-sustaining
framework.Themaineffort is a designatedsubordinateunit whose missionat a givenpoint intime is most
critical to overall mission success. It usually is weighted with the preponderance of combat power
(ADRP 3-0). A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success
ofthe maineffort(ADRP 3-0).(RefertoADRP 3-0 for moreinformation.)
DECISIVE-SHAPING-SUSTAININGFRAMEWORKEXAMPLE
10-12. Commanders identify the decisive operation and unit(s) responsible for conducting the decisive
operation. This allows them to articulate their shaping operations and the principal task of the units
assignedeachshapingoperation.Commanderscompletetheir CONOPSwithsustainingactionsessentialto
thesuccessofdecisiveandshapingoperations.
DecisiveOperations
10-13. In figure 10-1, the AATF has been directed byits higher headquarters to conduct an air assault to
destroyenemyforcesonObjectiveHorse.TheAATFCdeterminesthathisdecisiveoperationis theattack |
3-99 | 165 | Ground Tactical Plan
to destroyenemy forceson Objective Horse. He further decidesthat the decisive pointofthis operationis
thesuccessfulairassaultofhisforcesintotheobjectiveareatodestroytheenemy.
ShapingOperations
10-14. In figure 10-1, the AATFC employs his reconnaissance force (to include scouts, CBRN platoon,
and UAS) to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of proposed landing zones and the objective area to
identifyandtargetenemyforcesnear the landingzonesandobjectivevicinities.Thefieldartillerybattalion
is positioned to provide fires throughout all phases of the operation. It is prepared to deny the enemy’s
ability to conduct reconnaissance, defeat his strike operations, and neutralize his ability to communicate
and command.The supportingaviationunitisprepared toconductreconnaissance in coordination withthe
reconnaissance force or provide fires to neutralize or destroyenemy forces in the objective area once they
havebeenidentified.The commanderconsidersemployingotherenablers thatmaynotbeinhis taskforce,
such as close air support and electronic warfare assets. The purpose of these operations is to set and
preserve theconditionsonthe landingzoneandobjectiveareathatallowthe maneuverforcestolaunchthe
airassaultandexecute a successfulattacktodestroytheenemyontheobjective.
Figure 10-1. Organizational framework
SustainingOperations
10-15. The AATFC considers how he refuels the supporting aviation unit, resupplies, and provides
responsive medicalandcasualtyevacuationtohistaskforce.Hedetermines thatthis operationmayrequire
bringing a forward logistics element from the brigade support battalion and some of its crucial elements
forward to conductcasualtyevacuation,resupply, andequipment recovery. He positions a forward surgical
teamor treatment team with a maneuver force to treat casualties before evacuation to a medical treatment
facility. |
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TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS
10-16. The BCT commander through his staff assigns tasks to subordinate units. The assignment of a task
includesnotonlythetask(what),butalsothe unit(who),place(where),time(when),and purpose(why). A
task is a clearlydefined and measurable activityaccomplished by individualsand organizations. Tasks are
specific activities that contribute to accomplishing missions or other requirements and direct friendly
action. The purpose of each task should nest with completing another task, achieving an objective, or
attaininganendstatecondition.
10-17. Examplesofdecisive,shaping,andsustainingactivitiesareasfollows:
(cid:122) Missioncommand. The AATFCdeploysina missioncommandaircrafttoallowthecommander
toobserveanddirecttheairassaultfrom a forwardposition.
(cid:122) Movement and maneuver. Maneuver force conducts an air assault and attack to destroy enemy
forces on objectives. Aviation units conduct air insertion of reconnaissance force near the
objective area and provide interdiction and close combat attack against identified enemy forces
intheobjectivearea.
(cid:122) Intelligence.Ensurestheinformationcollectioneffortfocusesonlandingzonesandtheobjective
area to identify enemy forces for targeting by fires and aviation assets to set conditions for air
assaultexecution.
(cid:122) Fires.Thefieldartillerybattalionprovidesfiresonidentifiedenemypositionsonornearlanding
zones and the objective to neutralize enemy forces and help set conditions for air assault
execution.
(cid:122) Protection. Suppression of enemy air defenses— plan, synchronize, and execute route lethal
suppressive fires and nonlethal suppressive effects on known or suspected enemy air defense
positionsthatareunavoidable.
(cid:122) Sustainment. The brigade support battalion establishes a forward medical treatment point
colocated with the maneuver force. Aviation forward arming and refueling points maycolocate
withbrigadesupportbattalionassetsforsecurityandtofacilitatetherefuelofaircraft.
SECTION II – PLAN DEVELOPMENT
10-18. The AATFC begins to visualize the application of his ground tactical plan to the battlefield by
definingthe tactical problem and thenbegins a processof determiningfeasible solutions withhisplanning
staff using mission analysis. The results of mission analysis (to include intelligence preparation of the
battlefield and running estimates) inform the commander as he develops his operational approach that, in
turn, facilitates course of action development during the MDMP. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more
information.)
MISSION ANALYSIS
10-19. Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, the commander supported by his staff, filters relevant
information categorized by operational variables into the categories of the mission variables used during
missionanalysis. The commander usesmissionvariablesto refine hisunderstandingof the situationand to
gather relevant information used for mission analysis. Incorporating the analysis of the operational
variables with METT-TC ensures the commander considers the best available relevant information about
conditions that pertain to the mission. The mission variables of METT-TC consist of mission, enemy,
terrainandweather,troopsandsupportavailable-timeavailable,andcivilconsiderations.
MISSION
10-20. The analysis of the mission is conducted early-on during mission analysis. The mission involves
the criticaltasksthat mustbe performed.The tasksare either specified tasksstated bythe orderorimplied
tasksthat the commander mustdeduce. Mission analysis determines notonly what must be accomplished,
the intent of the commander ordering the mission (the why of the operation), and the limitations (when,
where,how)placed bythehigherheadquarters,but isthebasisfordecidingon task organization.Oncethe |
3-99 | 167 | Ground Tactical Plan
missionisanalyzedanddeductionsaremade,allotherfactorsareconsideredintermsoftheirimpactonthe
mission.Itisthereforeimperativethatthemissionbeunderstood.
ENEMY
10-21. Examining enemy factors should be as detailed as possible depending on the time available.
Generalfactorstoconsiderare(cid:650)
(cid:122) Identification.Sizeandtypeofunit(regularorirregularforce,orsomecombination ofthetwo).
(cid:122) Location.Currentandfuturemovement.
(cid:122) Disposition.Organizationorformation.
(cid:122) Strength.Comparedtofriendlyforces.
(cid:122) Morale.Esprit,experience,stateoftraining,regularorreserve.
(cid:122) Capabilities. Electronic warfare, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, air defense,
airborne,airmovement,attackhelicopters,mobility(incomparisontotheairassaultforce).
(cid:122) Composition.Armored,Infantry,artillery,andsustainment.
(cid:122) Probablecoursesofaction.Likelymissionorobjective,probabilityofachievingit.
(cid:122) Mostdangerous course of actionas it appliesto the AATF missionand itspotential impacton
thegroundtacticalplan.
10-22. Whenplanninganairassaultoperation,thefollowingfactorsabouttheenemymustbeconsidered:
(cid:122) Airdefenseweaponsandcapability.
(cid:122) Mobility;particularlyhisabilitytoreacttoanairassaultinsertion.
(cid:122) Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capability; particularly his ability to influence
potentialflightroutesandlandingzones.
(cid:122) Capability to interdict or interrupt air assault operations with his helicopters or fixed-wing
aircraft.
TERRAINANDWEATHER
10-23. In air assault operations, terrain and weather must be analyzed in terms of their effect on the air
assault force. This includes the air assault force’s pick up, air movement, insertion, and movement to the
finalobjective,andintermsoftheoverallinfluenceonaviationoperations.
Terrain
10-24. Terrain preparation starts with the situational understanding of terrain through proper terrain
analysis. Terrain analysis described in terms of the military aspects of terrain includes observation and
fieldsoffire,avenuesofapproach,keyterrain,obstacles,andcoverandconcealment(OAKOC).
ObservationandFieldsofFire
10-25. Observation is the conditionof weather and terrainthat permitsa force to see friendly, enemy, and
neutral personnel, systems, and key aspects of the environment. An assault force’s field of fire is directly
relatedtoitsabilitytoobserve.Considerationsrelatedtobothenemyandfriendlyforcesand,forairassault
operations,include(cid:650)
(cid:122) Enemy visual observation or electronic surveillance of pickup zones, flight routes, and
landingzones.
(cid:122) Enhanced friendly observation provided by scout weapons teams and aerial field artillery
observationhelicopters.
(cid:122) Easeofnavigationalongflightroutesparticularlyfornightoradverseweatheroperations.
AvenuesofApproach
10-26. Air and ground avenues of approach are considered in both offensive and defensive operations
fromfriendlyandenemyviewpoints.Agoodavenueofapproachforairassaultforcesoffers(cid:650)
(cid:122) Areasonabledegreeofmobilityandfewnaturalobstaclestotheaircraft.
(cid:122) Littleornocanalization.
(cid:122) Terrainmaskingthatdecreaseseffectivenessofenemyairdefenseweapons. |
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(cid:122) Cover.
(cid:122) Concealment.
(cid:122) Goodlinesofcommunicationandlogistics.
(cid:122) Easeoflinkupwithotherforceswhenappropriate.
KeyTerrain
10-27. Keyterrain is mission-dependent; however, in air assault operations key terrain is not limited to
thatwhichinfluencesthegroundtacticalplan.Itmustbeanalyzedintermsofthefollowingactions:
(cid:122) Pickupzonesorlandingzones.
(cid:122) Flightroutes.
(cid:122) Attackweaponsteamandscoutweaponsteambattlepositions.
(cid:122) Occupationbyenemyairdefenseartilleryassets.
(cid:122) Potentialforwardarmingandresupplypoints.
(cid:122) Groundattackpositions.
Obstacles
10-28. Obstacles are any natural or man-made obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or
block the movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and
equipment on the opposing force (JP 3-15). While most obstacles can be bypassed by air assault forces,
obstaclesthataffectthegroundtacticalplan mustbeconsidered.
CoverandConcealment
10-29. Cover is protection from the effects of fires (ADRP 1-02). Concealment is the protection from
observation or surveillance (ADRP 1-02). Cover and concealment considerations which affect the ground
tacticalplaninclude(cid:650)
(cid:122) Terrainmaskingfornap-of-the-earthflightroutesandinsertions.
(cid:122) Coverforattackweaponsteamandscoutweaponsteampositions.
(cid:122) LandingzonesthatofferInfantrycoverandconcealmentfollowinginsertion.
Weather
10-30. Weather and visibilityinformationisanalyzedfor trends.(Seefigure 10-2.)Ifthe operationbegins
in marginal weather, the commander must consider the possibility that it deteriorates below acceptable
limits during the operation. This may result in interrupting helicopter support and requiring changes in
plannedoperations.Considerationsinclude(cid:650)
(cid:122) Fog,lowclouds,heavyrain,andotherfactorsthatlimitvisibilityforaviators.
(cid:122) Illuminationandmoonangleduringaviationoperationswithnightvisiongoggles.
(cid:122) Ice and sleet, and freezing rain that degrades aerodynamic efficiency, and impact the ground
tacticalplan.
(cid:122) High temperatures or density altitudes that degrade aircraft engine performance and lift
capability.
(cid:122) Darkness,normallyanadvantagetowell-trainedaviatorsandSoldiers.
(cid:122) Highwinds(large-gustspreads).
(cid:122) Weatherconditionsthatcreatehazardsonpickupzonesandlandingzones,suchasblowingdust,
sand,orsnow. |
3-99 | 169 | Ground Tactical Plan
FORMAT MAXIMUMWINDS
Weatherforecastsarereceivedinthefollowing Observationhelicopter(OH):30knots.
format: Utilityhelicopter(UH):40knots.
Ceiling.
Cargohelicopter(CH):60knots.
Visibility.
*Note.Gustingwinds,inexcessof15knots
Weather(forexample,clear,fog,rain,snow).
overthelullwind,mayavoidUHusage.
AdditionalinformationasrequestedbytheS-2
intelligencestaffofficer. Significantweatherpatterns(whichlimit
operations)aremoderateturbulanceand
CONSIDERATIONS icing.
ExtremesLimitingTacticalAir
AllowableWeatherLimits
Ceiling:1,000feet.*
(Applicabletocombatoperationsandtacticaltraining
Visibility:2miles.*
atamilitaryairfield).
Visibility:1/2mile. *Note.OperationaldesignofaA-10,closeair
Ceilings:Clearofclouds. support aircraft.Othertypeaircraft
requirebetterweatherconditions.
Figure 10-2. Weather data.
TROOPSANDSUPPORTAVAILABLE
10-31. Troops and support available include the number, type, capabilities, and condition of assault and
supporttroopsandsupportaviationavailableto conduct the air assault operation. Critical considerationsto
theairassaultoperationinclude:
(cid:122) The AATF should have enoughcombatpower to seize initialobjectivesand protect the landing
zonesuntilfollow-onechelonsarriveintheobjectivearea.
(cid:122) Assault (lift) helicopter capability is the single most important variable in determining how
muchcombatpowercanbeintroducedintotheobjectivearea.
10-32. Aircrew endurance must be considered. The aviation task force standard operating procedures
(SOP) outlinesaircrewdutydayand flyinghour limits. If those limitsare exceeded duringa single period,
thendegradedaircrewperformanceorlimitedaircrewavailabilitycanbeexpectedonthefollowingdays.
TIMEAVAILABLE
10-33. The commander assesses the time available for planning, preparing, and executing tasks and
operations. This includes the time required for pick up, air movement, insertion, movement to the final
objective, and delivery of follow-on forces in relationship to the enemy and conditions. Critical
considerationstotheairassaultoperationinclude:
(cid:122) Air assault planning must be centralized and precise, and takes more time than that for other
operations. Time must be made available for air-ground operations preparation, planning,
andrehearsals.
(cid:122) Allotadditional planningtime fornight operations and those involving multiple pickup zonesor
multiplelandingzones.
(cid:122) The AATFC must allowadequatetimeto ensurethat allsubordinatesunits,particularlyaviation
aircrews, are thoroughly briefed. Viable SOPs and previous training significantly reduce
briefingtime.
CIVILCONSIDERATIONS
10-34. The abilityto analyze civilconsiderationsto determine their impactonoperationsenhancesseveral
aspectsofthe air assaultoperationto includeair movement, insertioninto the objective area, movementto
the final objective, and follow-on operations. (Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for more information.) Civil
considerationscomprisesixcharacteristics,expressedinthememoryaid(cid:36)(cid:54)(cid:38)(cid:50)(cid:51)(cid:40)(cid:650) |
3-99 | 170 | Chapter 10
(cid:122) Areas.
(cid:122) Structures.
(cid:122) Capabilities.
(cid:122) Organizations.
(cid:122) People.
(cid:122) Events.
ASSAULT OBJECTIVE AND LANDING ZONE DEVELOPMENT
10-35. Theground tacticalplanfor anair assaultoperationcontainsessentiallythe same elementsasother
attacks but differs in that it is prepared to capitalize on speed and mobility to achieve surprise. Assault
echelonsareplacedonornear the objectiveand organized tobecapableofimmediateseizureofobjectives
andrapid consolidation forsubsequentoperations. Ifadequatecombatpower cannotbeintroducedquickly
into the objective area, then the air assault force must land away from the objective and build up combat
power. The air assault force then assaults like other Infantry units and the effectiveness of the air assault
operationisdiminished.(RefertoFM 3-21.20,FM 3-21.10,andFM 3-21.8formoreinformation.)
10-36. The scheme of maneuver may assume a variety of possibilities depending on the commander’s
evaluation of METT-TC to include, in particular, the availability of landing zones in the area. The
planincludes(cid:650)
(cid:122) Missionsofalltaskforceelementsandmethodsforemployment.
(cid:122) Areasofoperationswithgraphiccontrolmeasures.
(cid:122) Taskorganizationtoincludecommandrelationships.
(cid:122) Locationandsizeofreserves.
(cid:122) Firesupporttoincludegraphiccontrolmeasures.
(cid:122) Sustainment.
SECTION III – AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS
10-37. Employing aviation forces with ground maneuver forces requires detailed integration and
coordinatedforce- orientedcontrolmeasurestosupportgroundmaneuverwhileminimizingfratriciderisks.
This section discusses the integration of air and ground maneuver, close combat attack, close air support,
and unmanned aircraft system employment during air-ground operations. (Refer to FM 3-04.111 for
moreinformation.)
EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION
10-38. Integrating effective air and ground maneuver forces begins at the AATF and continues down to
thelowestunitlevel. Inan airassault,theAATFplansandcoordinateswiththesupporting combataviation
brigade through their aviation liaison officer and the ADAM/BAE to support the ground tactical plan.
Integration should start at the home station with implementation of effective SOPs, habitual relationships,
andtrainingifpossible.
10-39. Integration involves merging the air and ground fights into one to apply proper aviation
capabilities according to the supported AATFC’s intent. Integration ideally begins early in the planning
process with the involvement of the ADAM/BAE. The ADAM/BAE advises the AATFC on aviation
capabilities and the best way to use aviation to support mission objectives. Ensuring the aviation liaison
officer or brigade aviation element passes along the task and purpose for aviation support and continually
provides updates as needed is of equal importance. Simply stated, ensuring the aviation brigade and
subordinate unit staffs fully understand the AATF scheme of maneuver and commander’sintent is criticalto
successfulair-ground operations.
10-40. Employing attack reconnaissance aviation with ground maneuver forces requires coordinated
force-orientedcontrolmeasuresandtheCCA 5-Lineattackbriefallowingaviationforcestosupportground
maneuver withdirect fires while minimizing fratricide risks. Aviationliaison officers should identifyearly
in the planning process the minimum AATF graphics required for operations such as boundaries, phase |
3-99 | 171 | Ground Tactical Plan
lines,attackbyfire positions, andobjectives.Brigade aviationelementand liaisonofficer personnelshould
ensurethatsupportedunitsarefamiliarwithclosecombatattackrequestproceduresandmarking methods.
CLOSE COMBAT ATTACKS
10-41. A close combat attack is a coordinated attack by Army attack reconnaissance aviation aircraft
(manned and unmanned)againsttargetsthatareincloseproximityto friendlyforces. Inmostinstances,the
attackaviation may already occupyholdingareas, battle orsupport by fire positionsor are inoverwatchof
the ground maneuver force as it begins its assault. The AATF employs close combat attack procedures to
ensurethattheseaviationfiresdestroytheenemywithminimalrisktofriendlyforces.
10-42. Close combat attack is not synonymous with close air support flown by joint aircraft. Due to
capabilities of the aircraft and the enhanced situational awareness of the Army aircrews, terminal attack
control from ground units or controllers is not required. The most important factor of successful close
combat attacks is positive and direct communication between aviation and ground elements. Aviators and
ground elements need to understand the following to employ a successful close combat attack. (Refer to
FM 3-04.126formoreinformation.)
CLOSECOMBATATTACKREQUEST
10-43. When providing support to ground maneuver elements, Army aviation will operate on that
echelon's command network unless directed otherwise. The CCA 5-Line attack brief (Format 22) is the
standard brief for Army rotary wing and organic-armed UASs. The format is similar to the 5-Line RW
CASattackbrief,but willbeprefaced with“Fire mission”vice a typeofcontrol. Atcheck-in, Army attack
and scout weapons teams will brief the Format 23. CCA Check-in, Aircraft Transmits to Ground Unit.
(RefertoATP 3-09.32formoreinformation.)
10-44. Any element in contact uses the CCA 5-Line attack brief to initiate the close combat attack. The
CCA 5-Line attack brief allows the ground maneuver forces to communicate and reconfirmto the aircraft
the exact locationof friendly and enemy forces. The procedure remains the same regardlessofthe type of
unit in contact or the responding aviation element. The ground commander owning the terrain clears fires
during the close combat attack by giving aircrews the situational awareness of the location of friendly
elements. The ground commander deconflicts the airspace between indirect fires, close air support, UAS
andtheclosecombatattackaircraft.
10-45. Transmissionofthe briefconstitutesclearance to fire exceptin a danger close situation. For danger
close fire, the ground commander onthe scene acceptsresponsibilityfor increasedrisk. Danger close must
bedeclaredintheLine 5 when applicablebystating“ClearedDangerClose”andpassingtheinitials ofthe
groundcommanderonscene.
10-46. After receivingthe request for close combat attack, the aircrewinforms the ground maneuver force
leader of the battle position, attack- or support by fire position (or series of positions) the team is
occupying, and the location from which the attack aircraft engages the enemy with direct fire. The size of
this positionvariesdepending onthenumberofaircraftusingtheposition,thesizeoftheengagementarea,
andthetypeofterrain.
10-47. The position must be close enough to the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handover.
Aircraft leaders normally offset the position from the flank of the friendly ground position. This helps to
ensure that rotor wash, ammunition casing expenditure, and the general signature of the aircraft do not
interfere with operations on the ground. The offset position allows the aircraft to engage the enemyon its
flanks rather than its front. It reduces the risk of fratricide along the helicopter gun-target line. (Refer to
ATP 3-09.32formoreinformation.)
GROUNDMANEUVERFORCEANDTARGETMARKING
10-48. Marking methods for identifying targets and friendly positions vary from one ground maneuver
force to another. The close combat attack request should include a detailed description of all friendly
locations and target locations in relation to friendly positions. It should include the target description and
howitismarked. |
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10-49. For mutual protection and clarity on the appropriate target, the ground maneuver force does not
mark the targetuntilrequestedbytheaviationelement.Thisinno wayrestricts the groundmaneuver force
fromreturningfirefromthe enemy. However,thegroundmaneuver force should considerthattheaircrews
may not be able to distinguish the correct target fromother fires if they mark the target with fire. Ground
maneuver forcesshould have multiple meansof markingtheir positions. Ifthe targetis marked by fire, the
aviation element requests the ground maneuver force to stop marking. The aviation element calls when
clearoftheareaandreportsestimatedbattledamageassessment.
10-50. The close combat attack cannot be conducted without positive identification of friendlyand enemy
forces byboth the ground and aviation commander before attack aviation aircraft opens fire. The aviation
element tailors its attackangles and weaponselections baseduponthe target and friendly unitproximityto
thetarget.
TARGETHANDOVER
10-51. The rapid and accurate marking of a target is essential to a positive target handover. Aircraft
conductingclose combatattacks normallyrelyon a highrate ofspeed and lowaltitude for survivabilityin
the targetarea. Assuch, the aircrewgenerallyhasanextremelylimited amountof time to acquireboththe
friendlyand enemy marks. It is essentialthatthe ground maneuver force hasthe marking ready and turned
onwhenrequestedbytheaircrew.
10-52. Attack reconnaissance aircrews use both thermal sights and NVGs to fly with and acquire targets.
Afterinitiallyengagingthe target, the aircrew generallyapproachesfroma differentangle forsurvivability
reasons if another attack is required. The observer makes adjustments using the eight cardinal directions
and distance (meters) in relation to the last round’s impact and the actual target. At the conclusion of the
close combat attack, the aircrew provides its best estimate of battle damage assessment to the unit in
contact.
BATTLEDAMAGEASSESSMENTANDREATTACK
10-53. After the attackaircraftcomplete the requested close combat attack mission, the aircrewprovides a
battledamageassessment tothe groundcommander.Basedonhisintent, theground maneuvercommander
determinesif another attackis required toachieve hisdesiredend state.The closecombat attack operation
can continue until the aircraft have expended all available munitions or fuel. However, if the air mission
commander receives a request for another attack, he must carefully evaluate his ability to extend the
operation.If notable,hecallsforrelief onstation byanotherattack teamifavailable.Itisunlikelythatthe
originalteamhasenoughtimetorefuel,rearm,andreturntostation.
CLEARANCEOFFIRES
10-54. During an air assault with numerous aircraft in the vicinity of the landing zone, it is critical that
proceduresareinplacetodeconflictairspacebetweenaircraft andindirectfires,considerationsinclude(cid:650)
(cid:122) Ensure aircrews have the current and planned indirect fire positions (to include mortars)
supportingtheairassaultbeforethemission.
(cid:122) Plan for informal airspace coordination areas and check firing procedures and communications
to ensure artillery and mortars firing from within the landing zone do not endanger subsequent
serialslandingordeparting,closecombatattack,orcloseairsupport.
(cid:122) Ensure at least one of the aviation team members monitors the fire support net for
situationalawareness.
(cid:122) Advisetheaviationelementifthelocationofindirectfireunitschangesfromthatplanned.
(cid:122) Ensure all participating units are briefed daily on current airspace control order or air tasking
orderchangesandupdatesthatmayaffectairmissionplanningandexecution.
(cid:122) Ensureallunitsupdate firingunitlocations,firingpoint origins,and finalprotective firelinesas
theychangeforinclusionincurrentairspacecontrolorder.
10-55. The AATFC or ground commander can establish an informal airspace coordination area. For
example,hecandesignatethatallindirectfiresbesouthofandallaviationstaynorthof a specified gridline |
3-99 | 173 | Ground Tactical Plan
for a specific period. This is one method for deconflicting airspace while allowing both indirect fires and
attack aviation to attack the same target. The ground commander then can cancel the informal airspace
coordinationareawhenthesituationpermits.(RefertoFM 3-52formoreinformation.)
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
10-56. Close air support is air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in
close proximityto friendlyforcesand thatrequire detailed integrationofeachair mission withthe fire and
movement of those forces. Like close combat attack, close air support can be conducted at any place and
time friendlyforces are inclose proximityto enemy forces based onavailability. All leaders in the AATF
should understand how to employ close air support to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or
delay enemy forces. Nomination of close air support targets is the responsibility of the commander, air
liaisonofficer, and S-3 ateachlevel. The AATF mayreceive close air support fromUSAF, USN, USMC,
ormultinationalforce.(RefertoJP 3-09.3formoreinformation.)
CAPABILITIESANDEMPLOYMENT
10-57. In some cases, USAF aircraft are available to provide close air support. Requests for these aircraft
are processed through the TACP colocated with the BCT main command post. The TACP is organized as
an air execution cell capable of requesting and executing Type 2 or 3 terminal attack control of close air
support missions. The manning of the cell depends on the situation but, at a minimum, includes an air
liaison officer and a JTAC. To make a recommendation to the commander regarding the use of close air
support aircraft, the leader on the ground should be familiar with the characteristics of the aircraft
predominantlyusedinthecloseairsupportrole.(RefertoATP 3-09.32formoreinformation.)
BRIEFINGFORMAT
10-58. Twotypesofcloseairsupport requestsarelistedasfollows:
(cid:122) Preplannedrequeststhat maybefilled with eitherscheduledoron-callair missions.Those close
air support requirements foreseen early enough to be included in the first air tasking order
distributionaresubmittedas preplannedair support requestsfor close airsupport.Onlythoseair
supportrequestssubmittedinsufficienttimetobeincludedinthejointairtaskingcycleplanning
phasesandsupportedontheairtaskingorderareconsideredpreplannedrequests.
(cid:122) Immediate requests that mostly are filled by diverting preplanned missions or with on-call
missions. Immediate requests arise from situations that develop outside the air tasking order
planningcycle.
10-59. The air liaison officer and JTAC personnel in the TACP are the primary means for requesting and
controlling close air support. However, forces may have joint fires observer certified personnel who can
request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting information in support of Type 2
and 3 close air support terminal attack controls, and perform autonomous terminal guidance operations.
(RefertoATP 3-09.32formoreinformation.)
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
10-60. Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations provide surveillance capabilities to enhance the
AATFC’s situational awareness as he plans, coordinates, and executes the air assault. The commander can
employ UAS from his organic elements or he can request to have direct access to real-time feeds from
additional UAS support from his higher headquarters. They are particularly effective when employed
together withground and attackreconnaissance elementsas a teamduring shapingoperationsin whichthe
commanderis trying to create theconditionsforsuccessfulairassault execution.(Referto chapter 4 ofthis
publicationforUASdiscussion.) |
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SECTION IV – EXECUTION
10-61. An AATF is normally a highly tailored force specifically designed to hit hard and fast and is
employed in situations that provide the task force a calculated advantage due to surprise, terrain, threat, or
mobility.Thefollowingemploymentconsiderationsgoverntheexecutionoftheairassaultoperations.
CONDUCT OF THE AIR ASSAULT
10-62. The AATF normally should be assigned only missions that take advantage of its superior mobility
and should not be employed in roles requiring deliberate operations over an extended period. The basic
principlesthatapplytotheconductofairassaultoperationsinclude(cid:650)
(cid:122) Airassaultforcesalwaysfightas a combinedarmsteam.
(cid:122) Availabilityofcriticalaviationassetsis a majorfactorinanoperation.
(cid:122) Airassaultplanningmustbecentralizedandprecise;executionmustbeaggressiveanddecentralized.
(cid:122) Air assault operations may be conducted at night or during adverse weather, but require more
planningandpreparationtimeinthosecases.
(cid:122) Assault force tactical integrity must be maintained throughout an air assault. Squads are loaded
intact on the same helicopter, with platoons located in the same serial ensures fighting unit
integrityuponlanding.
(cid:122) Fires must provide for suppressive fires along flight routes and near landing zones. Priority for
firesmustbetothesuppressionofenemyairdefenses.
(cid:122) Infantry operations are not fundamentally changed by integrating aviation units with Infantry;
tempoanddistancearechangeddramatically.
(cid:122) Anairassaultoperationmaybethedecisiveoperation;examplesinclude river crossings, seizure
ofkeyterrain,raids,andsecurityareaactions.
(cid:122) An AATF is employed most effectivelyin environments where limited lines of communication
areavailabletotheenemy,wherehelacksairsuperiorityandeffectiveairdefensesystems.
BUILDUP OF COMBAT POWER
10-63. The availability of aviation assets is normally the major factor in determining AATF task
organization.The AATF mustprovide a mission-specific balance of mobilityand combat power to include
sustainment of combat power. Considerations for rapid massing and shifting of combat power during the
conductofanairassaultinclude(cid:650)
(cid:122) Delivery to the objective area as soon as possible, consistent with aircraft and pickup zone
capacities,toprovidesurpriseandshockeffect.
(cid:122) Arrival intact at the landing zone with assault force tailored to provide en route security and
protectionfromthepickupzone,throughouttheentireflightroute,andatthelandingzone.
(cid:122) Nonstandard command relationship, attached for movement, used extensively during air assault
operations. Elements, to include field artillery, air defense artillery, intelligence, and engineer
may be attached to maneuver elements for movement only, to facilitate mission command,
maneuver,andsecurity.
(cid:122) Task-organized with sufficient combat power to seize initial objectives and protect landing
zones,and with sufficientsustainment forrapidtempountilfollow-onor linkup forces arrive, or
untilthemissioniscompleted. |
3-99 | 175 | Chapter 11
Landing Plan
The landing plan supports the ground tactical plan. It provides a sequence for arrival
of units into the area of operation, ensuring that all assigned units arrive at designated
locations and times prepared to execute the ground tactical plan. General
considerations to developthelandingplanfollow.
SECTION I – LANDING ZONE SELECTION
11-1. Landingzones usuallyare selected bythe AATFC or his S-3 based ontechnical advice fromthe air
mission commander or the aviation liaison officer. The section addresses keys considerations for landing
zoneselection.
CRITERIA FOR SELECTING LANDING ZONES
11-2. Air assault landing zone selection is based on user requirements; type of environment; availability;
adequacy; securityof landing zoneson or near the objective area, or awayfrom the objective area; threats
totheobjectivearea;andaircraft/aircrewcapability.Criteriaforselectinglandingzonesinclude(cid:650)
(cid:122) Location.Ingeneral,twooptionsareviablewhenselectinglandingzones—landontheobjective
orlandawayfromtheobjective.TheselectionofeitheroptionisMETT-TCdependent.
(cid:122) Capacity.Sizedetermineshowmuchcombatpowercanbe insertedatone timeandtheneedfor
additionallandingzonesortimeseparationbetweenserials.
(cid:122) Types of loads. External loads generally require larger landing zones than landing zones for
personnelalone.
(cid:122) Elevation. The altitude of potential landing zones may not be supportable due to operating
restrictionsofcertainaircraft.
(cid:122) Alternates. Analternatelandingzoneshould beplannedfor eachprimarylandingzone to ensure
flexibilitytosupportthemission.
(cid:122) Enemy composition, disposition, and capabilities. Landing zone considerations include enemy
force concentrations, weapons systems, and their capability to react to an air assault task force
landingnearby.
(cid:122) Cover and concealment. Select landing zones to deny enemy observation and acquisition of
friendlygroundandairelementswhiletheyareenrouteto,from,orinthelandingzone.
(cid:122) Obstacles.Ifpossible,the airassaulttask force shouldlandontheenemy sideofobstacleswhen
attackingto negatetheir effectiveness.The air assaulttaskforce shouldconsider usingobstacles
toprotectlandingzonesfromtheenemyatothertimes.
(cid:122) Landing point. Landing zones should be generally free of obstacles. The landing point or
touchdown point must be free of obstacles (any object or hole greater than 18 inches high or
deep).(RefertoFM 3-21.38formoreinformation.)
(cid:122) Identificationfromthe air.Ifpossible, landingzones shouldbeeasilyidentifiable fromtheairor
markedbyfriendlyreconnaissanceforcesthathavereconnoiteredthelandingzone.
(cid:122) Approach and departure routes. If possible, approach and departure air routes should avoid
continuedexposureofaircrafttoenemyfire.
(cid:122) Weather. Reduced visibility or strong winds may cause aircraft to avoid or limit the use of
primaryoralternatelandingzones. |
3-99 | 176 | Chapter 11
LOCATION OF LANDING ZONES
11-3. The AATF plans to land on or near the objective when the assault force is able maximize combat
power in the landing zone to rapidly eliminate enemy forces, immediately seize objectives, and rapidly
consolidateforsubsequentoperations.Considerationsforlandingonorneartheobjectiveinclude—
(cid:122) Airassaulttaskforceisassigned a terrain-orientedmission.
(cid:122) Commanderhasaccurateup-to-dateintelligenceontheenemy.
(cid:122) Commanderhasaccurateintelligenceonterrain(especiallylandingzones),weatherisfavorable,
andsuitablelandingzonesareavailableonorneartheobjective.
(cid:122) Shapingoperationshavesetconditionsforairassaultexecution.
(cid:122) Timeinwhichtoaccomplishtheoverallmissionislimited.
(cid:122) CivilianpopulationisknowntobesupportiveofU.S.presenceintheareaofoperation.
11-4. When adequate combat power cannot be introduced quickly into the objective area, the air assault
force lands away from the objective to build up combat power and then assaults to seize objectives.
Considerationsforlandingawayfromtheobjectiveinclude—
(cid:122) Airassaulttaskforceisassignedanenemy-orientedmission.
(cid:122) Commanderhasincompleteorunknownintelligenceontheenemy.
(cid:122) Commander has incomplete information on terrain (especially landing zones), weather is not
favorable,ornosuitablelandingzonesareavailableneartheobjective.
(cid:122) Shaping operations have not set conditions for air assault execution or conditions cannot be
verified.
(cid:122) Timeisavailableuponlandinginthelandingzonetodevelopthesituation.
(cid:122) Civilianpopulationisunknownorhostileto U.S.presenceintheareaofoperation.
NUMBER OF LANDING ZONES
11-5. TheAATFCdecideswhethertouse a single landingzoneormultiplelandingzones. A largenumber
oflandingzones foranair assaultincreasesthe tacticalrisk and complexityofthe operationas wellasthe
difficulty of setting conditions at each landing zone before landing. The AATFC should plan for one
primary landing zone and one alternate landing zone according to the maneuver force regardless of
proximity to the objective. He should plan for more than one primary and one alternate landing zone
according to maneuver force only after careful analysis of the mission variables to determine if sufficient
forcesareavailabletoconductshapingoperationsateachlandingzone.
11-6. Using a singlelandingzone—
(cid:122) Requireslessplanningandrehearsaltime.
(cid:122) Allowsconcentrationofcombatpowerinonelocation.
(cid:122) Facilitatescontroloftheoperation.
(cid:122) Concentratessupportingfiresinandaroundthe landingzone.
(cid:122) Requiresfewerattackhelicoptersforsecurity.
(cid:122) Providesbettersecurityforsubsequentlifts.
(cid:122) Reducesthe numberofairroutesintheobjectivearea,making itmoredifficult fortheenemyto
detecttheairassaultoperation.
(cid:122) Centralizesrequiredresupplyoperations.
11-7. Usingmultiplelandingzones—
(cid:122) Avoids grouping units in one location, which creates a lucrative target for enemy mortars,
artillery,andcloseairsupport.
(cid:122) Allowsrapiddispersalofgroundelementstoaccomplishtasksinseparateareas.
(cid:122) Reducestheenemy’sabilitytodetectandreacttotheinitiallift.
(cid:122) Forcestheenemytofightinmorethanonedirection.
(cid:122) Reducesthepossibilityoftroopcongestioninone landingzone. |
3-99 | 177 | Landing Plan
(cid:122) Eliminatesaircraftcongestionononelandingzone.
(cid:122) Makes it difficult for the enemy to determine the size of the air assault force and the exact
locationofsupportingweapons.
SECTION II – LANDING ZONE UPDATES
11-8. Just before the start of the air movement and just before the lift aircraft reach the release point, the
attack reconnaissance aircraft or unmanned aircraft system (UAS) provide a landing zone update to the
AATF, informing the AATFC ground commander, and air mission commander of the status of enemy
activityonthe landingzone. Therequirementfor a landingzoneupdateisMETT-TCdependent andbased
on the need to preserve surprise on the objective. The manner in which the landing zone update is
conductedshouldnotdivulgetheexactlocationofthelandingzone.
LANDING ZONE CONDITION
11-9. The landingzone isconsidered coldifno enemy activityisobserved. Ifthe landingzone iscold,the
air assault is executed as planned. The landing zone is considered hot if enemy activity is occurring on or
nearthelandingzone.Ifthelandingzoneishot,theattackreconnaissanceaircraftprovide a situationreport
consistingofenemyactivity, their actionstoward the enemy and a recommendation for using the alternate
landing zone. Based on the recommendation of the attack reconnaissance aviation element, the AATFC
decides whether to use an alternate landing zone. As part of the mission analysis and rehearsal process,
aircrewsrehearseandexecutetheairmovementusinganalternate landingzone.
FIXED-WING SUPPORT
11-10. When available, fixed-wing aircraft can be used to provide a landing zone update or to eliminate
enemy activity. As long as lift aircraft or attack reconnaissance aircraft possess the proper communication
capabilities, fixed-wing aircraft can relay the update directly to the AATFC. If these capabilities are not
present, fixed-wing aircraft may relay the update to a command post that then relays the update to the
AATFC.Theplanmustaccountfortimeneededtorelaytheupdatetoallparties.
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SUPPORT
11-11. UAScanbe employed to monitor and relaythe updated statusofthe landingzone and surrounding
area duringthe air movement phase. Thisearlyinformation givesthe AATFC more time to adjustplans if
required. UAS that fly at higher altitudes may observe with negligible risk of revealing landing zone or
objectivelocations.
SECTION III – HOT LANDING ZONE CONSIDERATIONS
11-12. Sometimes thepresence ofenemyactivityis unknown orunclearuntilthefirstaircraftlandsinthe
landingzone. A unitshoulddevelopandrehearseitsplanfor reactingtoenemycontactinthatsituation.
SCENARIOS
11-13. The enemy may employ one or a combination of the following actions to oppose
landingoperations:
(cid:122) Conduct a nearambush.
(cid:122) Conduct a farambush.
(cid:122) Deliver indirect fires by mortars, artillery, or rockets directed by an observer that can see the
landingzone.
(cid:122) Emplaceobstacles,suchasantipersonnelmines,boobytraps,orotherbarriers.
11-14. TheAATFCconsidersfiveoptionsinresponseto a hotlandingzone.Theyare(cid:650)
(cid:122) Fightthroughthecontact. |
3-99 | 178 | Chapter 11
(cid:122) Diverttothealternatelandingzone.
(cid:122) Abortremainingserials.
(cid:122) Slowairspeedstodelayserials.
(cid:122) Racetrackserials.
11-15. Racetracking is considered a high-risk option. All serials orbit at their current position. Once the
enemyhas been neutralized or destroyed on the landing zone, the air assault resumes in the order outlined
in the air movementtable. The air mission commander determines whether enoughfuel, spacing, and time
isavailablebetweenserialstoconductthisoptionandadvisestheAATFCaccordingly.
11-16. The AATFC makes the final decision on all options involving a hot landing zone, and the air
missioncommander and ground commander execute. Whether landingaway from or onthe objective, itis
importantthatprimaryandalternatelandingzonesaremutuallysupportingtoallowthe AATFCtoshiftthe
maineffortifneeded.
REACTION TO ENEMY CONTACT AWAY FROM THE OBJECTIVE
11-17. When landing away from the objective, ground maneuver forces can more readily divert to an
alternate landing zone. In doing so, the main effort of the decisive operation may be shifted to the force
landingatthe alternate landingzone, and the force atthe hotlandingzone maybeextracted orcontinueto
fight through the enemy contact. If the alternate landing zone is hot as well, the AATFC should choose
whichforcetodesignateasthemainefforttoaccomplishthemission.
11-18. A force that encounters a near ambush, unless extremely successful in counteracting that ambush,
is usually extracted, reorganized, and reinserted into an alternate landing zone to continue the mission. A
forcethatencounters a farambush,hostileindirectfires,orobstaclesusuallycontinuesitsmission.
REACTION TO ENEMY CONTACT ON THE OBJECTIVE
11-19. When landingon the objective, unitsreact to contact and fight through. Because the landing zone
is on the objective, fighting for control of the hot landing zone is critical to mission accomplishment and
continuing the assault is the priority. The unit on the hot landing zone may be directed to fix the enemy,
while the maineffort is shifted to the unit that lands at an alternate landing zone and fights through to the
objective.
11-20. If the alternate landing zone is hot as well, the AATFC should choose which unit to designate as
the maineffort to accomplish the mission. Given the overall mission, breakingcontact or extraction is not
likelyforunitscaughton a hot landingzone.Incasesother than a nearambush, unitsfightthroughenemy
contactandcontinuethemissionwithoutdivertingserialstoanalternatelandingzone.
SECTION IV – PREPARATION AND SUPPORTING FIRES
11-21. Preparationfiresareplanned foreachlanding zone sotheycan beexecutedifneeded.However,it
isdesirabletomaketheinitialassaultwithoutpreparationfirestoachievetacticalsurprise.Plannedfiresfor
air assault operations should be intense and short but with a high volume of fire to maximize the surprise
andshockeffect.
11-22. Ground forces land ready to fight, with the integrated support of close air support, close combat
attack,andindirectfires.Supportingfires,directorindirect,aredirectedandclearedonthe landingzoneby
thegroundcommander.
11-23. Factorstoconsiderwhendevelopingfiresupportplansarelistedasfollows:
(cid:122) Deception. False preparations can be fired into areas other than the objective or landing zone
area to deceive enemy forces if rules of engagement allows. For example, some rules of
engagementmightpreventanyunobservedfires.
(cid:122) Duration of preparation fires. A preparation of long duration may reduce the possibility of
surprise.Thepreparation firesshouldbeginas the firstaircraft ofthe firstliftcrossesthe release
pointandendjustbeforethe firstaircraftlands. |
3-99 | 179 | Landing Plan
(cid:122) Availability of fire support assets. The ground commander coordinates with the artillery unit to
arrange the preparation of units that can fire. In some cases, where an air assault is executed
acrossextendeddistances,preparation firesbycloseair supportor attackhelicoptersmaybe the
onlyviablealternative.
(cid:122) Objective area fires. A known or suspected enemy force in the landing area, regardless of size,
warrantspreparationfires.
(cid:122) Effects of ordnance on the landing zone. Some ordnances used in preparation fires (such as
artillery, bombs, or infrared illumination) may be undesirable since they can cause craters,
downedtrees,fires,andlandingzoneobscuration.
(cid:122) Scheduling fires. Fires are scheduled to be lifted or shifted to coincide with the arrival times of
aircraftformations.
(cid:122) Collateral damage. The unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that
would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is
lawfulsolongasitisnotexcessiveinlightoftheoverallmilitaryadvantageanticipatedfromthe
attack.(RefertoJP3-60formoreinformation.)
(cid:122) Positivecontrolmeasures. Controlmeasuresmustbeestablishedforliftingorshiftingfires.
(cid:122) Additionalconsiderationsinclude:
Thegroundcommanderclearsallground,air,andindirectfiresinsidetheairheadline.
(cid:132)
Door gunners in assault aircraft fire only at the base of the tree line to avoid fratricide of
(cid:132)
overwatchinggunships.
As long as the air assault continues, attack aviation works for the AATFC. Attack
(cid:132)
reconnaissance aviationisplaced indirectsupport of the ground commander for air assault
security and close combat attack within the objective area. The ground commander passes
controlofattackaviationaircraftto subordinatecommandersfor close combat attack. Once
the threatiseliminated, attack aircraft are passed backto the ground commander‘s control.
Onlya ground commander can clear Apache or Kiowa fires into the tree line assaulted by
friendlyforces.(Refertochapter6ofthispublicationformoreinformation.)
Indirectfiresonthetreeline beingassaultedbyfriendlyforcesarealwaystreatedas danger
(cid:132)
close. (In other words, in a right door exit, a fire mission into the right tree line would be
dangerclose.)
Know the locations of all friendly forces in the area, to include reconnaissance and long-
(cid:132)
rangesurveillanceunits,pathfinders,andspecialoperationsforces.
SECTION V – LANDING SITE OPERATIONS
11-24. Aircraft formations on the landing zone should facilitate a rapid exit from the aircraft, an orderly
departure off the landing zone, and an organized deployment for the assault. The number and type of
aircraftand the configuration and size ofthe landingzone maydictate the formation. (See chapter12 for a
discussion of standard flight and landing formations.) If contact is expected in the landing zone, elements
mustlandreadytofightandmaneuverinalldirections.
LANDING ZONE AND OBSTACLE MARKINGS
11-25. For daylight operations, pathfinders use panels or some other minimal identification means to
marklandingzones.Smokemightalsobeusedtoidentifyalandingzoneandassist thepilotindetermining
wind conditions. However, smoke isalso easilyidentified bythe enemy. For daylightoperations, markthe
number one landing point using a single VS-17 panel, with the international orange side visible. Other
touchdown points might be marked, as coordinated. Mark obstacles using the cerise colored side of the
panel. For night operations, use chem-lights, lanterns, field expedients, or other methods to show the
direction of landing and to mark individual landing points. For day and night air assault operations, mark
allobstacles.(RefertoFM3-21.38formoreinformationondaylightlandingformations.)
11-26. At night, pathfinders can use lights of different colors (except red, which marks obstacles) to
designatedifferenthelicoptersitesortoseparateflights withinalargerformation.Alighted"T"orinverted |
3-99 | 180 | Chapter 11
"Y" indicates both the landing point for the lead helicopter of each flight and the direction of approach.
Otherlightsmark touchdownpoints fortheotherhelicopters intheflight.Eachhelicopter shouldland with
its right landing gear or its right skid 5 meters left of the lights. Large cargo helicopters (CH-47) land 10
meterstotheleftofthelights.(RefertoFM 3-21.38formoreinformationonnightlandingformations.)
11-27. Forsecurity,pathfindersand the ground unitturnoff,cover, orturnalllightsupsidedown untilthe
lastpracticalmomentbefore a helicopterarrives.Thentheyorientthelightsinthedirectionfromwhichthe
leadhelicopterisapproaching,and a signalmandirectsitslanding.
Note: Because the marking lights could be too bright for the aircrew member's night vision
goggles, crew members might have to look under the goggles to distinguish the colors. Also,
aircrew members wear night vision goggles with filtered lenses. These filters do not allow the
aircrews to see blue or green chem-lights. Colors such as yellow, orange, red, and infrared can
beseenbypilotswearingANVIS.
11-28. During daylight landing operations, pathfinders use red-colored panels or other red, easily-
identifiable means to mark any hard-to-detect, impossible-to-remove obstacles such as wires, holes,
stumps, and rocks. During nighttime, pathfinders use red lights to mark any obstacles within the landing
sitethattheycannotreduceorremove.
11-29. In most combat situations, the need for security keeps pathfinders from using red lights to mark
treetopsonthedepartureendof a landingzone. However,intrainingor in a reararea landingsite, theydo
use red lights. If they cannot mark obstacles or hazards, they must fully advise aviators of existing
conditionsbyground toairradio.Inanycase, the pathfinderlanding siteleadermakessure thatpathfinders
markthemostdangerousobstaclesfirstand,ifpossible,thattheyremovethem.
11-30. Pathfinders have a limited capability to secure a landing site. If they precede the initial assault
elements into a landing site, Soldiers from the supported ground unit can go with them for security. If
required to do so by the supported unit, pathfinders can mark initial assembly points for soldiers,
equipment, and supplies. They should choose locations that help ensure the quick, efficient assembly and
clearing of the helicopter landing site. If the unit uses assemblyareas, the ground unit commander selects
their locations. If needed, supported ground unit Soldiers go with the pathfinders to reconnoiter and mark
the unit assembly areas, set up assembly aids, act as guides, and help with landing and unloading
operations.Havingthishelpensuresthat thepathfinderscanrapidlyclearsoldiers,supplies,andequipment
fromthelandingpoints.
11-31. A landing zone formation may not have standardized distances between aircraft due to the size or
terrainonthelanding zone.Thegoal inlandingaircraftsuccessfullyis toselect a safe landingareaasclose
to cover and concealment as possible to reduce Soldier exposure. If possible, the aircraft formation on the
pickup zone is the same as the landing zone. This provides Soldiers and leaders a preview of the landing
zonelandingformationandgivesthemanideaoftheirlocationuponlandinginrelationtootherelements.
11-32. The lead elements lifted into the landing zone are responsible for clearing the landing zone to
support follow-on lifts. This can be accomplished using a number of methods, which are entirely METT-
TC dependent. The most common method for clearing the landing zone is to assign assault objectives,
which requires subordinate units to move through an assigned area to clear enemy forces before reaching
theirfinalobjective.
EXITING THE AIRCRAFT
11-33. The two methods for exiting a UH-60 aircraft are the one-side off-load and the two-side off-load.
Soldiers exiting a CH-47 do so fromthe rear ramp. In each method, Soldiers must be careful to avoid the
main and tail rotors of the aircraft they are exiting and the rotors of other aircraft in their serial. The
separation between serials and the number of serials that can fit into the landing zone at one time are
criticalplanningconsiderationswhendeterminingtheaircraftexitingmethod.
11-34. As part of an air assault, the mission may require the application of the fast-rope insertion and
extraction system (FRIES) for small units to infiltrate or insert into a confined area where a helicopter is
unable to land as an alternative method for exiting an aircraft. FRIES is the fastest method of deploying |
3-99 | 181 | Landing Plan
Soldiersfrom arotary-wingaircraftthatare unableto land.FRIESisnotapproved forArmy-wide useand
isrestricted to specialoperations forcesand long-range surveillance units.(Refer to FM 3-05.210 for more
information.)
ONE-SIDEOFF-LOAD
11-35. In this method, Soldiers exit from either the right or left side of the aircraft. (See figure 11-1.)
Soldiersexiting the aircraftshould step outward and take up a prone position, forming180-degree security
on that side of the aircraft yet remaining under the main rotor system and outside the landing gear of the
aircraft.Soldiersshould remainin the prone positionuntilthe aircraftliftsoff before departing the landing
zone.Thechalkleaderdirects hischalkto movetothenearestcovered and concealedpositionaccordingto
thelandingplanorSOPs.
11-36. A unit plans to execute a one-side off-load on the side away from known or potential enemy
positions but may be forced to exit the aircraft on the opposite side due to the enemy or other METT-TC
considerationsoncetheaircrafthaslanded.
Figure 11-1. One-side off-load (UH-60)
Advantages
11-37. Theone-sideoff-load simplifiesmissioncommandandtheestablishmentofzonesofresponsibility
on the landing zone. It allows the door gunners on the opposite side of the aircraft to engage enemy
positions during off-loading. (See figure 11-2a, page 11-8.) This allows the door gunners of follow-on
serials to engage enemy on the far side of the landing zone. Figure 11-2b on page 11-8 allows for
immediateestablishmentof360-degreesecurityuponlanding. |
3-99 | 182 | Chapter 11
Figure 11-2a. One-side off-load (squads in same chalk) trail landing formation
Figure 11-2b. One-side off-load (squads in same chalk) staggered trail right landing formation |
3-99 | 183 | Landing Plan
Disadvantages
11-38. The one-side off-load is the slowest of the off-loading methods. The Soldiers and aircraft are
exposed for a longer amount of time while exiting the aircraft, making them vulnerable to direct and
indirectfire.
TWO-SIDEOFF-LOAD
11-39. In this method, Soldiers exit from both sides of the aircraft. (See figure 11-3.) Soldiers exiting the
aircraft should step outward and take up a prone position, forming 180-degree securityon that side of the
aircraft yet remaining under the main rotor system and outside the landing gear of the aircraft. Soldiers
should remain inthe prone position until the aircraftliftsoffbefore departingthe landing zone. The squad
leader directs his squad to move directly to the nearest covered and concealed position according to the
landingplanorSOPs.
Figure 11-3. Two-side off-load (UH-60)
11-40. Cross-load options allow for pure unit integrity of chalks (See figure 11-4, page 11-10.) or mixed
loadstosupport movingtooppositesidesofalarge pickupzone.(Seefigure 11-5,page11-10.)Cross-load
planning considerationssupportthe missioncommand initiallyrequired onthe landing zone and follow-on
liftsintothelandingzone.
Advantages
11-41. The two-side off-load is the quickest method for exiting the aircraft. It simplifies control and the
establishmentofzonesofresponsibilityonthelandingzone.
Disadvantages
11-42. The two-side off-load has the slowest movement time off the landing zone of all off-loading
methods, which exposes Soldiers longer to enemy direct and indirect fire. This method masks both door
gunnerfireswhileSoldiersexittheaircraft,whichincreasesvulnerabilitytoenemydirectfire. |
3-99 | 184 | Chapter 11
Figure 11-4. Two-side off-load (squads in same chalk) diamond landing formation
Figure 11-5. Two-side off-load (chalks cross-loaded) heavy right landing formation
REARRAMPOFF-LOAD
11-43. Inthismethod,Soldiersexitfromtherearrampof a CH-47orotherrearexitingaircraft.Soldiers
moveoutfrom theaircraftanddropto a pronefightingposition,establishing360-degreesecurityuntilthe |
3-99 | 185 | Landing Plan
aircraft lifts to depart the landing zone. (See figure 11-6.) Once the aircraft departs the landing zone, the
unitmayexecuteaone-ortwo-sidelandingzonerushaccordingtothelandingplanorSOPs.
Figure 11-6. Rear ramp off-load and landing zone exit (CH-47)
EXITING THE LANDING ZONE
ONE-SIDELANDINGZONERUSH
11-44. Upon exiting the aircraft and dropping to the prone position, Soldiers recover from the prone
positionandmove immediatelywiththeirsquad to acovered and concealedposition(suchasatreeline)in
wedgeor otherformationdeterminedbytheirsquad leader.Squadsassembleat designatedrallypointsand
then move to assault objectives on the landing zone or to objectives off the landing zone. This is the
preferred method to use when touchdown points are near covered and concealed positions. The unit may
plana one-side landing zone rushaway froma potential enemyposition, allowing the door gunner closest
to the enemyposition to continue firing while Soldiers exit the other side of the aircraft. (See figure 11-7,
page11-12.) |
3-99 | 186 | Chapter 11
Figure 11-7. One-side landing zone rush (squads in same chalk) trail landing formation
Advantages
11-45. A one-sidelandingzonerush—
(cid:122) Movestheunitoffthedangerareaquickly.
(cid:122) Facilitatescontrol.
(cid:122) Maintainsmomentumandislessvulnerabletoindirectfires.
(cid:122) Simplifiesestablishingzonesofresponsibilityonthelandingzone.
(cid:122) Minimizesaircraftcross-loadingplans.
(cid:122) Allowsdoorgunnerofoff-loadingand follow-onserialsto engageenemyonthefarside ofthe
landingzone.
(cid:122) Clearsthelandingzonequicklyforfollow-onlifts.
Disadvantages
11-46. Theunitexecuting a one-sidelandingzonerushisvulnerabletodirect fireweaponswhilemoving
offthelandingzone.
TWO-SIDELANDINGZONERUSH
11-47. Aircraftloadingoptionstoconsiderwhenusing a two-sidelandingzonerushare:
(cid:122) Splitthesquadacrosstwochalks,witheachfireteamexitingthe samedoor.(Seefigure11-8.)
(cid:122) Keep each chalk as a pure squad, with even-numbered chalks exiting the right door and odd-
numberedchalksexitingtheleftdoororviceversa.(Seefigure11-9,page11-13.)
11-48. Upon exiting the aircraft and dropping to the prone position, Soldiers recover from the prone
position and move immediately with their squad to a covered and concealed position in wedge or other
formationdesignated by their squad leader. Squads assemble at designated rallypoints and then move to |
3-99 | 187 | Landing Plan
assaultobjectivesonthe landingzone or to objectivesoffthe landingzone. The aircraftlanding formation
canhelpfacilitatetheunitinrapidlyclearingSoldiersoffthelandingzone.
Advantages
11-49. Atwo-sidelandingzonerush—
(cid:122) Movestheunitoffthedanger areafastest.
(cid:122) Facilitatesclearingandsecuringofthelandingzone.
(cid:122) Facilitatesfirecontrolmeasuresonthelandingzone.
(cid:122) Maintainsmomentumandislessvulnerabletoindirectfires.
(cid:122) Establisheszonesofresponsibilityonthelandingzone.
(cid:122) Clearsthelandingzonequicklyforfollow-onlifts.
Disadvantages
11-50. Atwo-sidelandingzone rushis more difficultto planand controldueto itscomplexaircraftcross-
loading plan. It masks fires of both door gunners while departing the landing zone, which increases
vulnerabilitytodirectfirewhilemovingoffthelandingzone.
Figure 11-8. Two-side landing zone rush (chalks cross loaded) trail landing formation |
3-99 | 188 | Chapter 11
Figure 11-9. Two-side landing zone rush (squads in same chalk) trail landing formation |
3-99 | 189 | Chapter 12
Air Movement Plan
The air movement plan is largelybased on the ground tactical plan and landing plan.
It begins when the assault or lift helicopters cross the start point and ends when they
cross the release point. The air movement plan specifies the schedule and provides
instructions for air movement of Soldiers, equipment, and supplies from the pickup
zone to the landing zone. The air movement plan considers the impact of airspace
restrictions. It provides coordinating instructions regarding air routes, aircraft speeds,
altitudes,formations,andtheplanneduse ofattackreconnaissancehelicopters.
SECTION I – DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS
12-1. The air movement plan is developed by the air assault task force (AATF) and supporting aviation
unit staffs in coordination with technical assistance and recommendations from the brigade aviation
element,air mission commander, andtheaviationliaisonofficer.The aviationunit conducts allair mission
planning using the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS). This allows the aviation unit to plan
digitally, allowing rapid distribution of digital products between units within the AATF. However, the air
assaulttaskforce commander(AATFC)approvesthefinalplan.Theresultofair movementplanningisthe
completion of the air movement table, which specifies the AATF movement from the pickup zone to the
landingzone.
12-2. Importantconsiderationswhendevelopingtheairmovementplanare(cid:650)
(cid:122) Airroutes.
(cid:122) Enrouteformations.
(cid:122) Terrainflightmodes.
(cid:122) Fires.
(cid:122) Suppressionofenemyairdefense.
(cid:122) Airassaultsecurity.
(cid:122) Missioncommand.
AIR ROUTES
12-3. Componentsofanairrouteare(cid:650)
(cid:122) Startpoint.
(cid:122) Releasepoint.
(cid:122) Aircontrolpoints.
(cid:122) Flightpathbetweenthestartpointandreleasepoint.
STARTPOINTANDRELEASEPOINT
12-4. The air route starts at the start point and ends at the release point. The location of start points and
release pointsare usuallythree to five kilometers fromthe pickup zonesand landingzones respectivelyto
allowadequate flying time for execution of the flight’s en route procedures. The distance fromthe pickup
zone to the start point allows the aircraft to achieve the desired airspeed, altitude, and formation after
liftoff. The distance from the release point to the landing zone allows the flight leader to reconfigure the
formationand execute a tacticalformation landing.The designated locationsofthe startpointsand release
pointsshould— |
3-99 | 190 | Chapter 12
(cid:122) Profitfromfavorableweatherconditions.
(cid:122) Avoidobstaclesandknownenemypositions.
(cid:122) Facilitatetakeoffandlandingintothewindbythebestairroute.
AIRCONTROLPOINTS
12-5. Air control points designate each point where the air route changes direction. They include readily
identifiable topographic features or points marked by electronic navigational aids. A route may have as
many air control points as needed to control the air movement. The start points and release points are air
controlpoints.
12-6. Once identified, air routes are designated for use by each unit. When large groups of aircraft are
employed,dispersionisachievedbyusingmultipleroutes.However,withlargeserials,it isoftennecessary
tousefewer routesoreven a singleroutetoconcentrate availablesupportingfires.Thenumberofalternate
andreturnroutesmaybelimited.
CRITERIAFORSELECTINGROUTES
12-7. Regardless of direction or location, certain criteria apply. All characteristics are seldom present in
anyone situation,but allshould be considered. Give careful considerationto the terrainand enemyforces.
Air routes should assist in navigation (day or night) and avoid turns in excess of 60 degrees to facilitate
controloftheaircraftformationwhenformationflyingisrequiredorifslingloadsareinvolved.
12-8. Factorstoconsiderwhenselectingroutesasfollows:
(cid:122) Interferencewithground action.Overflyinggroundelementsmayinterferewiththeir supporting
fire.Clearairroutesofthegun-targetlinewhenpossible.Avoidover-flightofbuilt-upareas.
(cid:122) Supportoflandingplan. Toreducevulnerabilityoftheairassaultforce,airroutesfacilitaterapid
approach,landing,anddeparturefromselected landingzones.
(cid:122) Enemyground and air capabilities. Air routes maximize useofterrain,cover,and concealment
tominimizeexposuretoenemyobservation,targetacquisition,anddirectfire.
(cid:122) Availablefire support. Airroutesallowfiresupportfromallavailableresources.Avoid masking
friendlyfires,particularlysupportingfires.
(cid:122) Availableaircover.Airroutesareselectedtoprovideaircoverforfriendlyforcesenroute.
(cid:122) Weatherconditions.Prevailing weatherduringtheairassaultoperationsignificantlyaffectsthe
selectionofairroutes.
(cid:122) Terrain. Air routes use terrain to maximize the advantage of and reduce vulnerability of the
aircraft formations, providing cover by placing terrain mass and vegetation between the enemy
andtheaircraft.
(cid:122) Distancefrom pickupzonetolandingzone. Airroutesshould beas short as istacticallyfeasible
accordingtomissionvariablestoreduceflyingtime.
12-9. Maps or overlays containing air route information are prepared at aviation unit headquarters and
disseminated to subordinate and support units. Air routes and corridors are designated by a letter, number,
orword.(Seefigure12-1,page12-3.) |
3-99 | 191 | Air Movement Plan
Figure 12-1. Air route overlay
EN ROUTE FORMATIONS
12-10. Many factors dictate the flight’s formation, such as terrain, enemy situation, visibility, weather,
altitude, speed, type of aircraft mix, and the degree of control required. The air mission commander or
flight leader selects the en route formation and landing formation based on the mission analysis of the
ground tacticalplan.Ideally,allaircraftslandatthesametime inaplannedflightformationasspecified by
theair movement table.Thelandingsitecommanderincludesthisinformationinhis landinginstructionsto
the flight leader and the pathfinder establishing the landing zone. (Refer to FM 3-04.113 for more
information.)
12-11. The flight leader and pathfinder must understand the en route and landing formation and the
groundtactical plantobest support thegroundunitandfacilitate theair assaultoperation. Theflightleader
should try to match the landing formation to the flight formation. Pilots should have to modify their
formations no more than necessary to accommodate the restrictions of a landing site, but it might be
necessarytolandinarestrictivearea.Touchdownpointsareestablishedbythepathfinderinthesameorder |
3-99 | 192 | Chapter 12
asindicatedinthe formation. Thefollowingstandardflightandlandingformations (Seefigure12-2,page
12-5.)areusedwhenconductingairassaultoperations:
(cid:122) Heavyleftorrightformation.Requires a relativelylong,widelandingarea;presentsdifficultyin
pre-positioning loads; restricts suppressive fire by inboard gunners; provides firepower to front
andflank.
(cid:122) Diamond formation. Allows rapid deployment for all-round security; requires relatively small
landing area; presents some difficulty in pre-positioning loads; restricts suppressive fire of
inboardgunners.
(cid:122) Veeformation.Requires a relativelysmalllandingarea;allowsrapiddeploymentofforcestothe
front; restricts suppressive fire of inboard gunners; presents some difficulty in prepositioning
loads.
(cid:122) Echelon left or right formation. Requires a relatively long, wide landing area; presents some
difficulty in prepositioning loads; allows rapid deployment of forces to the flank; allows
unrestrictedsuppressivefirebygunners.
(cid:122) Trail formation. Requires a relatively small landing area; allows rapid deployment of forces to
theflank;simplifiespre-positioningloads;allowsunrestrictedsuppressivefirebygunners.
(cid:122) Staggered trail left or right formation. Requires a relatively long, wide landing area; simplifies
pre-positioning loads; allows rapid deployment for all-round security; gunners' suppressive fire
restrictedsomewhat. |
3-99 | 193 | Air Movement Plan
Figure 12-2. Standard flight and landing formations
12-12. The pathfinder chooses landing sites that have firm surfaces; are free of dust, sand, and debris that
might create problems when disturbed byrotor wash; and are cleared ofobstacles. The landing site is laid
out in a location where helicopters will not fly directly over aircraft on the ground. The layout of the site
also depends on the landing space available, the number and type of obstacles, unit standard operating
procedures, and prearranged flight formations. En route formation impacts how the formation lands,
impactingloadingandoff-loadingofaircraft.(RefertoFM3-21.38formoreinformation.)
TERRAIN FLIGHT MODES
12-13. A specific en route flight altitude is not designated and is usually below the coordinating altitude.
Factors affecting flight altitude include enemy, terrain, navigation, weather, flight distance, need for
surprise, and pilot fatigue. Pilots may use one or some combination of the three terrain flight modes as
dictatedbythemissionvariables. |
3-99 | 194 | Chapter 12
(cid:122) Nap-of-the-earth flight is conducted at varying airspeeds as close to the earth’s surface as
vegetation and obstacles permit. A weaving flight path remains oriented along the general axis
of movement and takes advantage of terrain masking. This is a general flight mode and may
likelybeincloseproximitytotheenemy.
(cid:122) Contour flight is conducted at low altitudes, conforming to the earth’s contours. Relatively
constantairspeedsandvaryingaltitudesasdictatedbyterrainandobstaclescharacterizeit.
(cid:122) Low-level flight isconducted at constant altitudes and airspeed dictated bythreat avoidance. Its
intent is to facilitate speed and ease of movement while minimizing detection. This mode of
flight is used when there is a lowthreat level. Fires along the air route are planned to suppress
knownorsuspectedenemypositions.Thesefiresshouldbeintense andofshortduration. Utilize
multiple target engagement methods as needed. On-call fires are planned along the air route to
ensurerapidtargetengagementifnecessary.
FIRES
12-14. Fire plans cover the pickup zones, air routes, and landing zones. Fire support plans include
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) systems and obscuration to protect formations from enemy
detection. Thisrequiresaggressive fire planning and direct coordination with field artilleryand mortar fire
directioncentersandotherfiresupportelements.
12-15. All available fire support is used to suppress or destroy enemy weapons, to include close air
support, artillery, and attack reconnaissance helicopters. Support may comprise concealment or other
countermeasuresfor suppressingor confusingenemy air defense systems.During nightoperations, the use
ofilluminationfirerequiresdetailedplanning.IlluminationcaninterferewithNVGscausingunsafeconditions.
SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES
12-16. In executing air movement, the air mission commander integrates air routes based on pickup zone
and landing zone locations, avoiding known or suspected enemy air defense positions. The AATF is
responsible for planning, synchronizing, and executing lethal suppressive fires and nonlethal suppressive
effectsonknownorsuspectedenemyairdefensepositionsthatareunavoidable.Lethalandnonlethalassets
availabletoconductSEADmissionsinclude(cid:650)
(cid:122) Mortarsandartillery(cannon,rocketandmissile).
(cid:122) Fixed-wingassets,toincludeunmannedaircraftsystems.
(cid:122) Navalgunfire.
(cid:122) Attackreconnaissancehelicopters.
(cid:122) Radarsuppressionandjamming(lethalandnonlethal).
(cid:122) Communicationssuppressionandjamming(lethalandnonlethal).
JOINTSEAD
12-17. The termJoint SEAD encompasses all SEADactivities provided bycomponents of a joint force in
support of one another. When operating as a component of a joint force, different assets and unique
planningrequirements mayexist. (Refer to JP 3-01 for more information.) Joint SEAD includes all SEAD
categoriesandadditionalclassificationstoinclude(cid:650)
(cid:122) Operational area system suppression comprises operations within an operational area against
specific enemy air defense systems to degrade or destroy their effectiveness. It targets high
payoffairdefensesystemswhosedegradationmostaffectstheenemy’stotalsystem.
(cid:122) Opportune suppression is a continuous operation involving immediate attack of air defense
targets of opportunity. It is normally unplanned suppression, includes aircrew self-defense, and
attacksagainsttargetsofopportunity.
(cid:122) Localized suppression can occur throughout the area of responsibility or joint operations area
and can be conducted by all components. However, it is limited in time and to geographical
areasassociatedwithspecificgroundtargets.
(cid:122) Corridor suppression is planned joint SEAD focused on creating an air defense artillery
suppressedcorridortomaneuveraircraft.Missionsthatnormally requirethis suppressionareair |
3-99 | 195 | Air Movement Plan
missions supporting tactical airlift or combat operations, search and rescue operations, and
operationsinsupportofspecialoperationsforces.
SEADPLANNING
12-18. Thegroundmaneuver,aviationunits,AATFoperationsofficers,AATFintelligenceofficers (Refer
to FM 2-0 for more information.), and electronic warfare officer (See ATP 3-36.) participate in SEAD
planning. SEAD planning is conducted as part of the military decisionmaking process and targeting
process.Considerthefollowingcriticalfactorsinmissionanalysis:
(cid:122) Ingressandegressairroutesandlocationsofaircontrolpoints.
(cid:122) Enrouteairspeed.
(cid:122) Time,distance,andheadinginformationforprimaryandalternateairroutes.
(cid:122) Expectedstartpointcrossingtimeoningressandegress.
(cid:122) Enemyairdefenseartillerylocationswithintheareaofoperation.
(cid:122) Locations,frequencies,andcallsignsoffriendlyartillery.
(cid:122) AvailableassetstodeliverSEAD fires.
12-19. Whendeterminingenemyairdefensecapabilities,missionplanners—
(cid:122) Plotthelocationofallknownenemyairdefenseartillerysystemsonamap.
(cid:122) Draw a circle (threat ring) around each air defense artillery system with a radius equal to the
maximumengagementrange.Dependingonthethreat systemanditsmeansoftargetacquisition
(optical,infrared, andradar)andfire control,thesizeofthethreat ringmaychangeduringhours
of limited visibility. Terrain that blocks electronic or visual lines of sight mayreduce the radius
ofathreatring.
(cid:122) UseAMPS,FalconView,orotherautomatedsystemstoreduceworkloadandensureaccuracy.
(cid:122) Plottheprimaryandalternateairroutesandalllandingzonesonthemap. Airroutesand landing
zonesshouldavoidthreatringswheneverpossible.
12-20. Plan SEAD fires to engage the two types of targets, planned targets and targets of opportunity
describedbelow.
Planned Targets
12-21. A planned target is a target that is known to exist in the operational environment, upon which
actions are planned using deliberate targeting, creating effects which support the commander’s objectives
(JP3-60).Thetwotypesofplannedtargetsare—
(cid:122) Scheduledtargetsthatareprosecutedataspecifiedtime.
(cid:122) On-calltargetsthathaveplannedactionsandaretriggeredwhendetectedorlocated.
12-22. One example of a scheduled target is a deception SEAD mission. Deception SEAD may be fired
into an area to deceive the enemy or cause him to reposition his air defense weapons away from where
actual operations take place. Another example is an electronic attack of enemy air defense radars and
commandandcontrolinformationsystemswhenenemyADAassetsareincivilianpopulatedareas.
12-23. Provisions should also exist for immediate on-call fires in the SEAD plan. Establish a quick-fire
network for this purpose providing a direct link between an observer and weapon system (normally field
artillery). Order observers based on their priority of fire. Conduct a fire support rehearsal with the
supportingunit.Briefandrehearsewithallparticipantsduringthecombinedarmsrehearsal.
TargetsofOpportunity
12-24. SEAD is conducted against ADA targets of opportunityand should reflectprioritiesestablished on
the high-payofftargetlistand attackguidancematrix.Deliverysystems andquick-fire networksarecritical
toengagingtargetsofopportunity. |
3-99 | 196 | Chapter 12
SEADEMPLOYMENT
12-25. SEAD firesshould beplanned againstanenemy ADAsystemthatthreatenstheairassault force. A
period of focused immediate SEAD is planned at each landing zone before the arrival of the AATF. If
possible,plandeceptionSEADtomitigatefurthertacticalrisk.
12-26. Scheduled SEAD missions are planned against threat systems along the ingressand egress route of
flight. The start time for each SEAD mission may be calculated if the assault aircraft’s en route airspeed
and SP time on the air route are known. These calculations may be made manually or with AMPS or
similarplanningsystems.
12-27. Factors that determine the duration of each SEAD mission include aircraft speed and the range of
eachenemyADAsystem(sizeofthe threatring).Thisinformation maybe used withplanningsoftwareto
determine howlongtosuppresseach ADAsystemalongthe airroute.Calculationsmay be made manually
orestimated. A goodplanningestimateisthattheairassaulttravelsthreekilometersinoneminute.
12-28. Position units to support as much of the area of operation as possible. To ensure synchronization,
organize all planned fires into an SEAD schedule or add them to the execution matrix. Assess the
effectivenessoftheSEADplanduringwar-gaming.
AIR ASSAULT SECURITY
12-29. Air assault security is conducted throughout the air movement phase. Air assault security is not
necessarily just an escort mission. The air assault security process can be conducted sequentially,
simultaneously,or over a periodof24 to72 hoursbefore the startof the air assaultmission. Thisprocessis
determined early in the mission analysis phase and is a direct result of the AATFC’s initial guidance and
keytasks.
12-30. UASshouldobservetheairroutesand landingzonesbeginning wellbeforelaunchtoprovideearly
warning to the AATFC. Just before the launch of the air movement phase, attack reconnaissance units fly
alongtheroutetoconduct anairassaultsecuritymission. Thismissionis muchlike a movementtocontact.
Usually, one to two attack reconnaissance companies conduct the mission just before the assault aircraft
launchfortheair movement. This allows theattackreconnaissance unitsopportunitytoconduct a reliefon
stationwithelementsthatmayalreadybeonstationprovidingreconnaissance.
12-31. The air assault security force generally makes the final landing zone update call, as the assault
forcesare enroute to the landing zone. Before assault forcesland on the landingzone, air assault security
forces maybe directed to shiftto a landingzone overwatch mission, ensuringtheydo notconflict withthe
air routes entering or exiting the landing zone. As the assault forces land on the landing zone, air assault
security forcesmaybe directedto move forward to thenextphaseline toconduct a screeningmissionor to
occupy a battleposition.
12-32. Attack reconnaissance units maintain the flexibility to execute on-call close combat attacks as
needed. Air assault security forces must maintain communications with the fires elements for immediate
suppressionmissionsasneeded.
MISSION COMMAND
12-33. In executing the air movement, the air mission commander takes operational control of all Army
aviationforces.Theairmissioncommandercontrolsall—
(cid:122) Timingfordeconfliction.
(cid:122) Enroutefires.
(cid:122) Initiationandshiftingoflandingzonepreparationfires.
12-34. Once the air assault force has cleared the landing zone and moved to its rally point, the tactical
commander on the ground assumes mission command of the element and continues his assigned mission.
Mission command should allow continued execution despite loss of radio communications. If the air
mission commander and lift flight leaders have air movement tables or the execution checklist in their
possession,theycancontinuethemissionwithoutradiocommunications. |
3-99 | 197 | Air Movement Plan
SECTION II – AIR MOVEMENT TABLE
12-35. The AATF staff and aviation unit staff develop the air movement table. (See table 12-1, page
12-10.) This table serves as the primary air movement document for the air assault operation.
AIR MOVEMENT TABLE DEVELOPMENT
12-36. The AATF S-3 Air and aviation liaison officer begin work on this document right after the initial
planning conference. This gives them an idea early in the planning process of challenges involved in
moving units to the landing zone. The table ensures that all personnel, equipment, and supplies are
accounted for in the movement and that each aircraft is fullyloaded, correctlypositioned in the flight, and
directedtotherightlandingzone.Theairmovementtable—
(cid:122) Containsaircraftallocations.
(cid:122) Designatesnumberandtypeofaircraftineachserial.
(cid:122) Specifiesdeparturepoint;routetoandfromloadingarea;andloading,liftoff,andlandingtimes.
(cid:122) Includestherefuelscheduleforallliftsifrequired.
AIR MOVEMENT TABLE CRITERIA
12-37. The air movement table regulates the sequence of flight operations from pickup zone to landing
zoneusingthefollowinglineinformation:
(cid:122) Linenumber.Quickreferencewithbrevitycodesnumberedsequentially.
(cid:122) Aviationunit.Aviationunitconductingtheairmovement.Depictedasunitdesignationovercall
signtosavespace.
(cid:122) Lifted unit. Unitbeinglifted or airassaulted. Ifmore thanone unitisintheload, use unit with
mostassetsintheload.Depictedasunit’sdesignationovercallsigntosavespace.
(cid:122) Lift.Serialsthat makeonecompleteturnouttoandbackfromthe areaofoperation.Numbered
sequentially.
(cid:122) Serial. A tactical grouping of two or more aircraft under the control of a serial commander
(aviator) and separated from other tactical groupings within the lift by time or space. The
capacityofthesmallestlandingzonedeterminesthenumberofaircraftineachserial.
(cid:122) Chalk.Eachaircraftequalsoneload.NumberUH-60andCH-47chalksseparately.
(cid:122) Pickupzone.Nameofthepickupzonewherechalkspickuptheloads.
(cid:122) Pickupzonearrivalandloadtime.Timethetroopsgetontheaircraftor whentheaircraftstarts
tohookuptheload.
(cid:122) Takeofftime.Timetheaircraftliftsoffthe pickupzone.
(cid:122) Startpointtime.Timetheaircrafthitthestartpoint(brigadeaviationelement-determined point
usuallythreetofivekilometersfromthepickupzone).
(cid:122) Releasepointtime.Timethe aircrafthitthe releasepoint(brigadeaviationelement-determined
pointusuallythreetofivekilometersfromthelandingzone).
(cid:122) Landingzone.Landingzonenameandlocationdeterminedbytheliftedunit’sground tacticalplan.
(cid:122) Landingzonetime.Timetheseriallandsinthelandingzone.
(cid:122) Landing zone degree. Compass heading at which the serial is landing, should be converted to
andshowninmagneticheadingfortheaircraft.
(cid:122) Landingzoneformation.Landingformation,normallythetrailformation.
(cid:122) Routes.Primaryingressandegressroutesforthemission.
(cid:122) Load. Personneland sling load configuration. Refer to the tadpole diagramto save space on
thispage.
(cid:122) Remarks. Additional remarks (such as scheduled delays, refuel, or other uncommon serial
characteristics). |
3-99 | 198 | Chapter 12
Table 12-1. Example air movement table |
3-99 | 199 | Chapter 13
Loading and Staging
The activities thattake place in or nearthe pickup zone are referredto as pickup zone
operations. These activities include both the loading and staging plan. Like the
previous steps in the air assault planning process, these plans support and are based
on the steps before them. Pickup zone operations are a collaborative effort between
the supported unit (maneuver forces that compose the assault force) and the
supporting aviation unit. The assault force is organized on the pickup zone. Every
serial and lift is a self-contained element that must understand what it does upon
landing at either the primary or the alternate landing zone and later in executing the
ground tactical plan. Planning for insertion and extraction follows the same process
and requires the same forethought and attention to detail. Insertion and extraction
plans are developed during the air assault planning process and coordinated with all
supporting units at the initial planning conference or air mission coordination
meeting (AMCM). Both insertion and extraction loading and staging plans should be
rehearsedattheairassaulttaskforce(AATF),aviation,and assaultforcerehearsals.
SECTION I – LOADING PLAN
13-1. TheloadingplanensuresthatSoldiers, equipment, andsuppliesareloaded onthe correctaircraftand
movedfromthe pickupzonetothelandingzoneinthepriorityorderdesignatedbytheairassaulttaskforce
commander (AATFC). The air movement table is the planning document that details how to execute this.
At the company level and below, leaders use an air-loading table to document how the loading plan is
executed. The basic information found in the air-loading table is found in the air movement table.
Considerationstodevelopaloadingplanaredescribedbelow.
PICKUP ZONE SELECTION
13-2. Operations requiring the pick up or extraction of personnel may require special considerations
dependent on the mission and or element requiring support. When the pickup zone or mission prevents a
helicopter from landing, the mission may require the use of the special patrol infiltration and exfiltration
system(SPIES).(RefertoFM3-05.210formoreinformation.)
IDENTIFYINGPICKUPZONES
13-3. Identifying pickup zones is the first step in developing a loading plan. The goal of pickup zone
identification is to locate suitable areas to accommodate the lift aircraft. Identify primary and alternate
pickupzonesatthesametime.
PICKUPZONEOPERATION
13-4. Establishing and running a pickup zone to standard is the first step in executing a successful air
assault. The number of pickup zones selected depends on the number and type of aircraft and loads
required to complete the mission. The mission may require the designation of both a light pickup zone
(UH-60) and a heavy pickup zone (CH-47). Based on his unit’s level of training, the air mission
commander may adjust the specifications for identifying and selecting pickup zones (such as degree of
slope,windspeeds,anddistancebetweenaircraft). |
3-99 | 200 | Chapter 13
SELECTIONCRITERIA
13-5. Once available pickup zones are identified, the AATFC and his S-3 selectand assign pickup zones
foreachunittouse.Pickupzoneselectioncriteriainclude:
(cid:122) Number.Multiplepickupzonesavoidconcentratingforcesinonearea.
(cid:122) Size.Ifpossible,eachpickupzoneshouldaccommodateallsupportingaircraftatonce.
(cid:122) Proximity to Soldiers. When possible, the selected pickup zones should not require extensive
groundmovementtothepickupzonebytroops.
(cid:122) Accessibility. Each pickup zone should be accessible to vehicles to move support assets and
assaultforces.
(cid:122) Vulnerability to attack. Selected pickup zones should be masked by terrain from enemy
observation.
(cid:122) Conditions. Surfaceconditionsofthearea(forexample,excessiveslope;blowingdust,sand,or
snow;andman-madeobstacles)createpotentialhazardstopickupzoneoperations.
Note.Usingpickup zoneslocated insecureforwardoperatingbaseandoutpostsprecludesmuch
oftheeffortrequiredtoidentifyandselectsuitable pickupzones.
PICKUP ZONE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL
13-6. Once the AATFC selects the pickup zones, he designates a pickup zone control officer (PZCO) to
organize, control, and coordinate pickup zone operations. The designated PZCO is selected based on
experience and the size of unit that is conducting the air assault. For example, at BCT level, the BCT
executive officer is usually the PZCO. At the battalion level, the battalion executive officer or S-3 Air are
usuallythePZCO.Atcompanylevel, thecompanyexecutiveofficerisusuallythePZCO.
13-7. Once designated, the PZCO is responsible for the overall success of all pickup zone activities, to
includethefollowing:
(cid:122) Forming a control party to establish control over the pickup zone by clearing the pickup zone
and establishing pickup zone security. The pickup zone control party comprises pickup zone
control teams and support personnel from subordinate units, typically to include a PZCO, a
pickupzonenoncommissionedofficerincharge(PZNCOIC),and—
Chalk guides guide the aircraft loads (Soldiers, vehicles, and equipment) from the chalk
(cid:132)
check-in point to their respective staging areas on the pickup zone once they have been
inspectedandapprovedforloadingbythepickupzonecontrolparty.
Ground crewteams provide visual guidance to the aircraft pilots and hook up the vehicles
(cid:132)
andequipment thatare externallyloaded(slingloaded) bythe aircraft.UH-60 groundcrew
teams typicallyconsistofonehook-upperson,onestaticprobeperson,and a signalperson.
CH-47 hook-up teams typicallyconsist of one hook-up person and one static probe person
accordingtoslinghook-uppoint.
Crisisaction teams are experienced officers or non-commissioned officers who are experts
(cid:132)
withriggingalltypesofloadsandhook-upproceduresforallaircraft.
Security teams provide local security for all pickup zone operations. These teams may
(cid:132)
includeairdefenseteamsiftheyareavailable.
Airtraffic controlteams (ifavailable) useradio ordirectional lightsignalsto provide flight
(cid:132)
information,expeditetraffic,andpreventcollisions.Pathfinderteamsarecapable ofserving
asairtrafficcontrolteamsifrequired.
Pathfinder teams (if available) provide air traffic advisories and navigational aid for fixed-
(cid:132)
and rotary-wing aircraft. They perform limited physical improvement and chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear monitoring and surveying within pickup zones, if
required. Pathfinder availability, the tactical plan, the complexity of the operation, the
terrain, and the air assault proficiency of the supported ground force may dictate
pathfindersupport. |
3-99 | 201 | Loading and Staging
(cid:122) Establishingcommunications on two primaryradio frequencies— one to control movement and
loading of units and the other on combat aviation net. Alternate frequencies are provided as
needed.
(cid:122) Planningandinitiatingfiresupportnearpickupzonesincoordinationwith the AATF to provide
all-round protection (from available support) without endangering arrival and departure of
Soldiersoraircraft.
(cid:122) Planning and initiating security to protect the main body as it assembles, moves to the pickup
zone,andis liftedout.Other forcesshouldprovide securityelementsifthepickupzoneiswithin
a friendly area. Security comes from AATF resources if a unit is to be extracted from the
objectivearea.
(cid:122) Markingthe pickup zoneas specifiedinunitstandardoperatingprocedure regardless ofthe type
of markers, pickup zone marking requirements depend on the type and number of aircraft and
arebasedontheminimumacceptabledistance betweenaircraft. Ata minimum,markthe pickup
zonetoindicate whereeachaircraft,bytype,istoland.
(cid:122) Clearingthepickupzoneofobstacles.
(cid:122) Executingthebumpplan.
COORDINATION WITH SUPPORTING AVIATION UNIT
13-8. Loadingplansarecarefullycoordinated withthe brigadeaviationofficerand aviationliaison.Copies
of the air movement tables and air loading tables should be distributed to the aviation liaison officer,
AATFCairmissioncommander,andPZCO.
13-9. Thesupportinghelicopter unit mustensurethataviationexpertiseispresent onthe pickup zone.The
brigade aviationofficer or aviationliaisonofficer (or another designated representative) should locate with
the PZCO during the pickup zone selection, setup, and execution phase. The aviation representatives
provide guidance on the pickup zone setup, considering aircraft factors. For example, the pickup zone
landing direction may change if the wind changes significantly. Additionally, the aviation representatives
canofferadviceonsurfaceconditionsandtheireffectsonhelicopteroperations.
PREPARATION OF AIR LOADING TABLES
13-10. The air-loading table assigns personnel and major items of equipment or supplies to a specific
aircraft (chalk) at the company and below level. The air-loading table is an accountability tool, a loading
manifest, for each aircraft. (See table 13-1)
Table 13-1. Example air loading table
13-11. When time islimited, the table canbe writtenona sheet ofpaper. Itshould containa list, prepared
bythe aircraftchalkleader, ofSoldiers(byname) and equipmentto be loadedoneachchalk. Thisensures
that information on personnel and equipment onboard is available if an aircraft is lost. The chalk leader |
3-99 | 202 | Chapter 13
gives a copyof the air-loading table to the pickup zone control partyupon arriving at the pickup zone for
check-in.
13-12. Duringpreparationoftheloadingtables,leadersatalllevelsmaintainthe—
(cid:122) Tactical integrity of units. Load a complete tactical unit, such as a fire team or squad, on the
sameaircraftor a platooninthesameserialtoensureintegrityas a fightingunituponlanding.
(cid:122) Tactical cross loading. Plan loads so that key personnel and critical equipment (for example,
crew-served weapons) are notloaded on the same aircraft. Thus, ifanaircraft islost to anabort
orenemyaction,themissionisnotseriouslyhampered.
(cid:122) Self-sufficiencyofloads.Ensurethateachunitloadhaseverythingrequired(weapons,crew, and
ammunition)tobeoperationaluponreachingitsdestination.Ensurethefollowing:
Theprimemoveraccompanieseverytoweditem.
(cid:132)
Crewsareloadedwiththeirvehicleorweaponsystems.
(cid:132)
13-13. Leaders must determine whether internal or external (sling) loading is the best delivery method for
equipment and supplies. Helicopters loaded internally can fly faster and are more maneuverable.
Helicopters loaded externally fly slower at higher altitudes and are less maneuverable but can be loaded
and unloaded more rapidly than internally loaded helicopters. The method used depends largely on
availabilityofslingloadingandriggingequipment.
DISPOSITION OF LOADS ON PICKUP ZONE
13-14. Positionpersonnel and equipment on the pickup according to the pickup zone diagram. (See figure
13-1.) Flight crews must understand the loading plan and should be prepared to accept Soldiers and
equipment immediatelyon landing. Pickup zone diagrams depicting the location of chalks and sling loads
inthe pickupzoneassistflightcrewsinloadingtroopsand equipmentquicklyonce theaircraftarrive inthe
pickupzone.Flightcrewsshouldbeprovided apickupzone diagram.
Figure 13-1. Example pickup zone diagram |
3-99 | 203 | Loading and Staging
LIFTS, SERIALS, AND CHALKS
13-15. The loading plan and pickup zone selection should aimto maintain ground unit integrity. Just as a
squad should not be divided between chalks, a platoon should remain in one serial and a company should
not be divided into different lifts or pickup zones. To maximize operational control, aviation assets are
designatedintolifts,serials,andchalks.(Seefigure13-2,page13-6.)
LIFTS
13-16. A lift is complete each time all aircraft assigned to the mission pick up Soldiers or equipment and
setthem downonthelanding zone.Thenextliftis complete, whenall liftaircraftplacetheirnextchalk on
thelandingzoneandsoonwithallsubsequentlifts.
SERIALS
13-17. A serial is a tactical grouping of two or more aircraft under the control of a serial commander
(aviator)and separatedfromothertacticalgroupingswithintheliftbytimeorspace.Theuseofserials may
benecessarytomaintaineffectivecontrolofaviationassets.Forexample,dueto METT-TCconsiderations,
it maybe difficultto control16 aircraftasa single serial. However, aliftof16 aircraftwith four serialsof
fouraircrafteachcanbemoreeasilycontrolled.
13-18. Multiple serials may be necessary when the capacityof available pickup zones or landing zones is
limited. If available pickup zones or landing zones can accommodate only four aircraft in a lift of 16
aircraft,itisbesttoorganizeintofourserialsoffouraircrafteach.
13-19. Multiple serials are employed to take advantage of available air routes. If several acceptable air
routes are available, the AATFC maychoose to employ serials to avoid concentrating his force along one
airroute.Ifthecommander wantsallhisforcestolandsimultaneously ina single landing zone,hedoesso
byhavingthe serialsconvergeatacommonreleasepointbeforelanding.With a liftof16aircraftand four
available air routes, the ABNAFC can use four serials of four aircraft each, with each serial using a
different air route. Each time there is a new lift, a new serial begins. For example, within lift 1, there are
serials1through4.Foreachliftthereafter, serialsstartagainwithone.
CHALKS
13-20. A chalk comprises personnel and equipment designated to be moved by a specific aircraft. When
planningthe air movement, eachaircraft within the lift is termed a chalk. For example, withina liftof 10,
there areaircraftchalks1through10.For eachlift thereafter,there are chalks 1through10.Each aircraft is
accountedforwithineachlift.
13-21. Chalks must be designated within serials just as theyare within lifts. Counting within the serials is
continuousupto thetotalnumber ofaircraft inthelift.For example,ina liftof16aircraft inlift 1,serial1,
there are chalks 1 through 4. In lift 1, serial 2, there are chalks 5 through 8. In lift 1, serial 3, there are
chalks9through12.Finally,inlift1,serial4,therearechalks13through16. |
3-99 | 204 | Chapter 13
Figure 13-2. Lifts, serials, and chalks
BUMP PLAN
13-22. The bump plan ensures that the most essential personnel and equipment arrive on time at the
objective area. It specifies personnel and equipment that may be bumped from an aircraft or serial, and
delivered later. Each aircraft load and serial has a bump plan sequence designated on its air movement
table.(Seetable13-2.)
Table 13-2. Aircraft bump information
13-23. If all personnel within the chalk cannot be lifted, individuals must know who is to offload and in
what sequence. This ensures that key personnel are not bumped arbitrarily. This ensures that key aircraft
chalks are not left in the pickup zone. When an aircraft within a serial or flight cannot lift off and key
personnelareonboard,theyoffloadandboardanotheraircraftthathaspriority.
13-24. Bumped personnel report to a pickup zone bump area specified bycompanyor larger units. Atthis
location, theyare accounted for, regrouped, andrescheduled bythe PZCO for later deliveryto appropriate
landing zones. Sometimes, spare aircraft are held in reserve for bumped chalks in the event a primary |
3-99 | 205 | Loading and Staging
missionaircraftisunabletoflydueto maintenanceorotherreasons.Thesespareaircraftremainstagedon
thepickupzoneforoccasionssuchastheseortoflyotherhighpriorityserials.
SECTION II – STAGING PLAN
13-25. The staging plan organizes the movement of Soldiers and loads into position for the forthcoming
airassault.It establishesthepickupzoneandspecifies the mannerin whichthe supportedunitorganizes to
execute the loadingplan.The stagingplanprescribesthe arrivalofground forcesatthe pickup zone inthe
proper order for movement. It prescribes what actions the ground force must complete to prepare to load
the aircraft. All vehicles and equipment to be lifted should be properlyconfigured, inspected, and readyto
load before the aircraft arrive at the pickup zone. Typically, ground forces arrive at the pickup zone and
posture in proper chalk order before their aircraft arrive. Considerations to develop a staging plan are
addressedinthissection.
PREPARATION FOR LOADING
13-26. Preparations for loading are conducted in a unit assembly area or other secure location that is near
the pickup zone. Before reporting to the pickup zone, units complete all preparations to successfully load
theaircraft,toinclude(cid:650)
(cid:122) Completing the air-loading table or manifest. The chalk leaders verify the air-loading table to
ensureitisproperlycompleted,makingchangestothemanifestbeforearrivingtothepickupzone.
(cid:122) Preparingandinspectingallequipmentfor loading.Thechalkleaders prerigallequipment to be
sling loaded and ensure vehicles have the proper equipment to rig and fly. The chalk leaders
inspect their loads and complete all necessary inspection records, to include DA Form 7382,
SlingLoadInspectionRecord,accordingtoTM4-48.09.
(cid:122) Conductingrehearsalsforloadingandoff-loadingtheaircraft.
MOVEMENT TO PICKUP ZONE
13-27. Once units have completed preparations for loading, they begin movement to the pickup zone
according to the air movement table so that the Soldiers to load arrive shortlyprior to the helicopter to be
loaded. This prevents congestion, preserves security, and reduces vulnerability to enemy actions on the
pickupzone.Tocoordinatethemovementofunitstothepickupzone,thePZCO—
(cid:122) Determinesmovementtimeofgroundforcestothepickupzone.
(cid:122) Specifiesarrivaltime(s).
(cid:122) Ensuresthatmovementofunitsremainsonschedule.
CHALK CHECK-IN AND INSPECTION
13-28. Uponarrivingto the pickup zone area, the unit first checks in withthe pickup zone controlpartyat
chalk check-in. The PZCO should plan adequate time for check-in based on mission variables. As a rule,
the greater the number of serials in a lift, the longer it takes check-in and inspection for loading. Serials
withlargenumbersofvehiclesandequipmenttobeslingloadedrequiremoretimetocheckin.
CHALKCHECK-IN
13-29. As the unit arrives at the check-in point, loads are identified by lift-serial-chalk. Chalk leaders are
briefed, and their air loading tables or manifests are inspected. The chalk leader provides one copyof the
manifesttothepickupzonecontrolparty.
LOADWEIGH-IN
13-30. The loads then are weighed with all personnel and equipment to ensure they meet the ACLs as
briefed intheair missionbrief.Overweightloadsaresenttoadesignated frustrated cargo areatodownload
equipmentbeforebeingreweighed. |
3-99 | 206 | Chapter 13
LOADINSPECTION
13-31. All items to be loaded are inspected according to TM 4-48.09. For emergency purposes only, the
pickup zone control party may maintain a parts box for on-the-spot corrections. Units are responsible for
theserviceabilityandcorrectivemaintenanceoftheirownequipment.
13-32. Loads with deficiencies are sent to a designated frustrated cargo area. Loads must remain in the
frustratedareauntildeficienciesarecorrectedandtheloadsareinspectedagain.Noloadisallowedtoleave
thefrustratedareawithoutpermissionfromthePZCO.
LOAD STAGING
13-33. Once a serial is complete, a chalk guide from the pickup zone control leads it into position on the
pickupzone.Loadsarestaged inreversechalkorderbyserial accordingtothepickupzonediagram.
13-34. Oncethechalkisstagedandinpickupzoneposture,thechalkleadershouldbriefhischalkon—
(cid:122) Seatingarrangement.
(cid:122) Loadingprocedures.
(cid:122) Useofsafetybelts.
(cid:122) In-flightprocedures.
(cid:122) Off-loadingprocedures.
SLING LOAD OPERATIONS
13-35. Thethreephasesof a slingloadoperationare—
(cid:122) Preparation and rigging. Loads are prepared and rigged according to TM 4-48.09 or unit
standardoperatingprocedures.
(cid:122) Inspection. A PathfinderSchoolgraduate,SlingLoadInspectorCertificationCoursegraduate, or
an Air Assault School graduate in the rank of specialist and above is qualified to inspect and
certifyeach load.Theindividualwho rigged theload cannotinspectthesame load.Thecontents
oftheloadarerecordedon a DAForm7382.
(cid:122) Slingloadoperation.Trainedgroundcrewshookuploads.
SLINGLOADUNITS
13-36. The three different elements involved in a sling load operation are the supported unit, the aviation
unit, and the receiving unit. In an air assault, the supported unit and the receiving unit are the same. The
responsibilitiesofeachelementareasdescribedbelow.
(cid:122) Supportunitisresponsiblefor—
Selecting,preparing,andcontrollingthepickupzone.
(cid:132)
Requisitioningalltheequipmentneededforslingloadoperations.
(cid:132)
Inspectingandmaintainingallslingloadequipment.
(cid:132)
Providing trained ground crews for rigging and inspecting, filing inspection forms,
(cid:132)
controllingaircraft,aircraftguides,hookinguploads,andclearingtheaircraftfordeparture.
Providing load dispositions and instructions to the aviation unit for the sling load
(cid:132)
equipment.
Verifyingtheloadweight(toincluderiggingequipment).
(cid:132)
(cid:122) Aviationunitisresponsiblefor—
Establishingcoordinationwiththesupportedunit.
(cid:132)
Advisingthesupportedunitonloadlimitations.
(cid:132)
Advisingthesupportedunitsonthesuitabilityofselectedlandingzonesandpickupzones.
(cid:132)
Providingassistanceintherecoveryandreturnofslingloadequipment.
(cid:132)
Establishingsafetyproceduresand understandingofduties and responsibilitybetweenthe
(cid:132)
flightcrewandgroundcrew.
(cid:122) Receivingunitisresponsiblefor— |
3-99 | 207 | Loading and Staging
Selecting,preparing,andcontrollingthelandingzone.
(cid:132)
Providingtrainedgroundcrewstoguidetheaircraftandderigtheloads.
(cid:132)
Coordinatingforthecontrolandreturnoftheslingloadequipment.
(cid:132)
Inspectingtheriggingofbackloads(slingloadequipmentreturningtopickupzone).
(cid:132)
SLINGLOADTEAMS
13-37. Three personnel are used for the ground crew in external load operations on the pickup zone or
landingzone.Theyare—
(cid:122) Signalperson.
(cid:122) Staticprobeperson.
(cid:122) Hook-upperson.
13-38. The static probe person carries an electricity probe an insulated contact rod joined by a length of
metallic tape or electrical wire to a ground rod. All ground crew personnel wear the following
protectiveequipment:
(cid:122) Advancedcombathelmet.
(cid:122) Goggles.
(cid:122) Earplugs.
(cid:122) Gloves.
(cid:122) Sleevesrolleddownandbuttoned.
(cid:122) Identificationcardandtags.
HOOK-UPSITE
13-39. The aircraft approaches the hook-up site, and the signal person guides it into position over the
load. The static probe person drives the ground rod into the ground and discharges the static electricity
fromthe aircraftbyholdingthecontactrod, which isconnected tothegroundrod,tothecargohookofthe
aircraft.Thehook-uppersonthenattachestheapexfittingtotheaircraftcargohook.
Note.Whenusingacargohookpendanttheuseofastaticdischargewandisnotrequired.
RELEASESITE
13-40. The aircraft approaches the release site, and the signal person guides it into position. The hook-up
release team stands bybut is not activelyemployed unless the slings cannot be released fromthe aircraft.
Thegroundcrewatthelandingzonecomprisesonesignalpersonandtworeleasepersonnel.
GROUNDCREWEMERGENCY
13-41. In an emergency, the ground crew moves to a predesignated rendezvous point identified during
prior coordination with the aviation unit. Thorough preparation and rehearsal enable ground crews to react
tochangestotheplanandunexpectedevents. |
3-99 | 209 | Glossary
The glossarylists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions.Where Army and joint
definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition.Terms for which FM 3-99 is the proponent
are marked with an asterisk(*).The proponent manualfor otherterms islistedinparentheses
after the definition.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Acronym Definition
A
AACG arrivalairfieldcontrolgroup
AADC areaairdefensecommander
AAGS Armyair-groundsystem
AAMDC Armyairmissiledefensecommand
AATF airassaulttaskforce
AATFC airassaulttaskforcecommander
ABCT Armoredbrigadecombatteam
ABN airborne
ABNAFC airborneassaultforcecommander
ABNAF airborneassaultforce
ABNIBCT airborneInfantrybrigadecombatteam
ABNTF airbornetaskforce
ABNTFC airbornetaskforcecommander
ACL allowablecargoload
A/DACG arrival/departureairfieldcontrolgroup
ADAM airdefenseairspacemanagement
ADP Armydoctrinepublication
ADRP Armydoctrinereferencepublication
AGL abovegroundlevel
ALCC airliftcontrolcenter
ALCE airliftcontrolelement
AMCM airmissioncoordinationmeeting
AMD airmissiledefense
AMPS AviationMissionPlanningSystem
ANGLICO Air-navalgunfireliaisoncompany
APOD aerialportofdebarkation
ATP Armytechniquespublication
ATTP Armytactics,techniques,andprocedures
AWACS AirborneWarningandControlSystem |
3-99 | 210 | Glossary
Acronym Definition
B
BAE brigadeaviationelement
BAO brigadeaviationofficer
BCT brigadecombatteam
BN battalion
C
CAN combataviationnetwork
CAOC combatairoperationscenter
CARP computedairreleasepoint
CATF commander,amphibioustaskforce
CBRN chemical,biological,radiological,andnuclear
CCIR commander’scriticalinformationrequirement
CDRJSOTF commander,jointspecialoperationtaskforce
CH cargohelicopter
CLF commander,landingforce
CONOPS conceptofoperations
D
DACG departureairfieldcontrolgroup
DACO departureairfieldcontrolofficer
DA DepartmentoftheArmy
DD DepartmentofDefenseform
DZ dropzone
E
EDRE emergencydeploymentreadinessexercise
EPLRS EnhancedPositionLocationReportingSystem
F
FAC(A) forwardaircontroller(airborne)
FARP forwardarmingandrefuelingpoint
FASCAM fieldartilleryscatterablemines
FBCB2 ForceXXIBattleCommand-BrigadeandBelow
FM fieldmanual
FRAGORD fragmentaryorder
FSCM firesupportcoordinationmeasures
FSC forwardsupportcompany
FRIES Fast-Insertion/ExtractionSystem |
3-99 | 211 | Glossary
Acronym Definition
G
GMRS GroundMarkedReliefSystem
H
HAHO high-altitudehigh-openingparachute
HALO high-altitudelow-openingparachute
HEPI heavyequipmentpointofimpact
HF highfrequency
HIDACZ high-densityairspacecontrolzone
HMMWV high-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicle
I
IBCT Infantrybrigadecombatteam
ICODES IntegratedComputerizedDeploymentSystem
ISB intermediatestagingbase
J
J-2 intelligencedirectorateofajointstaff
J-3 operationsdirectorateofajointstaff
JACC/CP jointairbornecommunicationcenter/commandpost
JFACC jointforceaircomponentcommander
JFLCC jointforcelandcomponentcommander
JFMCC jointforcemaritimecomponentcommander
JIOC jointintelligenceoperationscenter
JIPOE jointintelligencepreparationoftheoperational
environment
JOPP jointoperationplanningprocess
JP jointpublication
JPADS JointPrecisionAirdropSystem
JSOA jointspecialoperationsarea
JSTARS JointSurveillanceTargetAttackRadarSystem
JTAC jointterminalattackcontroller
L
LACC loadingareacontrolcenter
LZ landingzone
LRSC long-rangesurveillancecompany
M
MDMP militarydecisionmakingprocess
METT-TC mission,enemy,terrainandweather,troopsand |
3-99 | 212 | Glossary
Acronym Definition
supportavailable-timeavailable,andcivil
considerations
MILDEC militarydeception
MMEE minimummissionessentialequipment
N
NCO noncommissionedofficer
NVG nightvisiongoggles
O
OAKOC observationandfieldsoffire,avenuesofapproach,
keyterrain,obstacles,coverandconcealment
OPORD operationorder
OPSEC operationssecurity
P
POL petroleum,oils,andlubricants
PZ pickupzone
PZCO pickupzonecontrolofficer
PZNCOIC pickupzonenoncommissionedofficer-in-charge
R
RADC regionalairdefensecommander
RATELO radiotelephoneoperator
RDSP rapiddecisionmakingandsynchronizationprocess
RSOI reception,staging,onwardmovement,integration
S
S-1 personnelstaffofficer
S-2 intelligencestaffofficer
S-3 operationsstaffofficer
S-4 logisticsstaffofficer
S-6 signalstaffofficer
S-9 civilaffairsoperationsstaffofficer
SATCOM satellitecommunication
SBCT Strykerbrigadecombatteam
SDAC sectorairdefensecommander
SEAD suppressionofenemyairdefenses
SIPRNET SecretInternetProtocolRouterNetwork
SLOC sealinesofcommunication
SOP standardoperatingprocedure |
3-99 | 213 | Glossary
Acronym Definition
SPIES SpecialPatrolInsertion/ExtractionSystem
T
TACP tacticalaircontrolparty
TACSAT tacticalsatellite
TAIS TacticalAirspaceIntegrationSystem
TM technicalmanual
U
UH utilityhelicopter
UHF ultra-highfrequency
USAF UnitedStatesAirForce
USMC UnitedStatesMarineCorps
USN UnitedStatesNavy
U.S. UnitedStates
V
VHF veryhighfrequency
W
WARNORD warningorder
SECTION II – TERMS
airassault
Themovementoffriendlyassaultforcesbyrotary-wingaircrafttoengageanddestroyenemyforcesor
toseizeandholdkeyterrain.(JP3-18)
airassaultforce
Aforcecomposedprimarilyofgroundandrotary-wingairunitsorganized,equipped,andtrainedfor
airassaultoperations.(JP3-18)
airassaultoperation
Anoperationinwhichassaultforces,usingthemobilityofrotary-wingassetsandthetotalintegration
ofavailablefirepower,maneuverunderthecontrolofagroundorairmaneuvercommandertoengage
enemyforcesortoseizeandholdkeyterrain.(JP3-18)
airmovement
Airtransportofunits,personnel,supplies,andequipmentincluding airdropsandairlandings.(JP3-17)
airborneassault
Theuseofairborneforcestoparachuteintoanobjectiveareatoattackandeliminatearmed resistance
andsecuredesignatedobjectives.(JP3-18)
airborneoperation
Anoperationinvolvingtheairmovementintoanobjectiveareaofcombatforcesandtheirlogistic
supportforexecutionofatactical,operational,orstrategicmission.(JP3-18) |
3-99 | 214 | Glossary
airfield
Anareapreparedfortheaccommodation(includinganybuildings,installations,andequipment),
landing,takeoffofaircraft.(JP 3-17)
airhead
A designatedareain a hostileorpotentiallyhostileoperationalareathat,whenseizedandheld,ensures
thecontinuousairlandingoftroopsandmaterielandprovidesthemaneuverspacenecessaryfor
projectedoperations.(JP 3-18)
airheadline
A linedenotingthelimitsoftheobjectiveareaforanairborneassault.(JP 3-18)
airspacecoordinatingmeasures
Measuresemployedtofacilitatetheefficientuseofairspaceto accomplishmissionsand
simultaneouslyprovidesafeguardsforfriendlyforces.(JP 3-52)
airspacecoordinationarea
A three-dimensionalblockofairspacein a targetarea, establishedbytheappropriateground
commander,inwhichfriendlyaircraftarereasonablysafefromfriendlysurfacefires.Theairspace
coordinationareamaybeformalorinformal.(JP 3-09.3)
*assaultechelon
(Army)Theelementof a forcethatissecheduledforinitialassaultontheobjectivearea.
boundary
A linethatdelineatessurfaceareasforthepurposeoffacilitatingcoordinationanddeconflictionof
operationsbetweenadjacentunits,formations,orareas.(JP 3-0)
civilconsiderations
Theinfluenceofmanmadeinfrastructure,civilianinstitutions,andactivitiesofthecivilianleaders,
populations,andorganizationswithinanareaofoperationsontheconductofmilitaryoperations.
(ADRP 5-0)
closeairsupport
Airactionbyfixed- androtary-wingaircraftagainsthostiletargetsthatareincloseproximityto
friendlyforcesandthatrequiredetailedintegrationofeachairmissionwiththefireandmovementof
thoseforces.(JP 3-0)
closecombatattack
A coordinatedattackbyArmyattackreconnaissanceaircraft(mannedandunmanned)againstenemy
forcesthatareincloseproximitytofriendlyforces.Theclosecombatattackisnotsynonymouswith
closeairsupportflownbyjointaircraft.Terminalcontrolfromgroundunitsorcontrollersisnotdueto
thecapabilitiesoftheaircraftandtheenhancedsituationalunderstandingoftheaircrew.(FM 3-
04.126)
combatidentification
Theprocessofattaininganaccuratecharacterizationofdetectedobjectsintheoperationalenvironment
tosupportanengagementdecision.(JP 3-09)
commandgroup
Thecommanderandselectedstaffmemberswhoassistthecommanderincontrollingoperationsaway
from a commandpost.(FM 6-0)
commander’sintent
A clearandconciseexpressionofthepurposeoftheoperationandthedesiredmilitaryendstatethat
supportsmissioncommand,providesfocustothestaff,andhelpssubordinateandsupporting
commandersacttoachievethecommander’sdesiredresultswithoutfurtherorders,evenwhenthe
operationdoesnotunfoldasplanned.(JP 3-0)
conceptofoperations |
3-99 | 215 | Glossary
A statementthatdirectsthemannerinwhichsubordinateunitscooperatetoaccomplishthemission
andestablishesthesequenceofactionstheforce willusetoachievetheendstate.(ADRP 5-0)
concealment
Theprotectionfromobservationorsurveillance.(ADRP 1-02)
controlmeasure
A meansofregulatingforcesorwarfightingfunctions.(ADRP 6-0)
cover
Protectionfromtheeffectsoffires.(ADRP 1-02)
D-day
Theunnameddayonwhich a particularoperationcommencesoristocommence.(JP 3-02)
decisiveoperation
Theoperationthatdirectlyaccomplishesthemission.(ADRP 3-0)
electromagneticoperationalenvironment
Thebackgroundelectromagneticenvironmentandthefriendly,neutral,andadversarial
electromagneticorderofbattle withintheelectromagneticareaofinfluenceassociatedwith a given
operationalarea.(JP 6-01)
electromagneticspectrummanagement
Theplanning,coordinating,andmanaginguseoftheelectromagneticspectrumthroughoperational,
engineering,andadministrativeprocedures.(JP 6-01)
firesupportcoordinationmeasure
A measureemployedbycommanderstofacilitate therapidengagementoftargetsandsimultaneously
providesafeguardsforfriendlyforces.(JP 3-0)
*follow-onechelon
(Army)Thoseadditionalforcesmovedintotheobjectiveareaaftertheassaultechelon.
forcibleentry
Theseizingandholdingof a militarylodgmentintheface ofarmedopposition.(JP 3-18)
H-hour
Thespecifichouron D-dayatwhich a particularoperationcommences.(JP 3-02)
informationenvironment
Theaggregateofindividuals,organizations,andsystemsthatcollect,process,disseminate,oracton
information.(JP 3-13)
informationoperations
Theintegrated employment,during militaryoperations,ofinformation-related capabilitiesinconcert
withotherlinesofoperationtoinfluence,disrupt,corrupt,orusurpthedecisionmakingofadversaries
andpotentialadversarieswhileprotectingourown.(JP 3-13)
informationsuperiority
Theoperationaladvantagederivedfromtheabilitytocollect,process,anddisseminatean
uninterruptedflowofinformationwhileexploitingordenyinganadversary’sabilitytodothesame.
(JP 3-13)
informationsystem
Equipmentthatcollect,process,store,display,anddisseminateinformation.Thisincludes computers—
hardwareandsoftware—andcommunications,aswellaspoliciesandproceduresfortheir use.(ADP 6-
0)
intermediatestagingbase
A tailorable,temporarylocationusedforstagingforces,sustainmentand/orextractionintoandoutof
anoperationalarea.(JP 3-35) |
3-99 | 216 | Glossary
lodgment
A designatedareain a hostileorpotentiallyhostileoperationalareathat,whenseizedandheld,makes
thecontinuouslandingoftroopsandmaterielpossibleandprovidesmaneuverspaceforsubsequent
operations.(JP 3-18)
maineffort
A designatedsubordinateunitwhose missionat a givenpointintimeismostcriticaltooverallmission
success.(ADRP 3-0)
marshalling
Theprocessbywhichunitsparticipatinginanamphibiousorairborneoperationgrouptogetheror
assemble whenfeasibleormovetotemporarycampsinthevicinityofembarkationpoints,complete
preparationsforcombat,orprepareforloading.(JP 3-17)
missioncommand
Theexerciseofauthorityanddirectionbythecommanderusingmissionorderstoenabledisciplined
initiativewithinthecommander'sintenttoempoweragileandadaptiveleadersintheconductof
unifiedlandoperations.(ADP 6-0)
*N-hour
Thetime a unitisnotifiedtoassembleitspersonnelandbeginthedeploymentsequence.
*N-hoursequence
Startsthereverseplanningnecessaryafternotificationtohavethefirstassaultaircraftenroutetothe
objectiveareaforcommencementoftheparachuteassaultaccordingtotheorderforexecution.
obstacles
Anynaturalorman-madeobstructiondesignedoremployed todisrupt,fix,turn,orblockthe
movementofanopposingforce,andtoimposeadditionallossesinpersonnel,time,andequipmenton
theopposingforce.(JP 3-15)
P-hour
Thespecifichouron D-dayatwhich a parachuteassaultcommenceswiththeexitofthe firstSoldier
fromanaircraftover a designateddropzone. P-hourmayormaynotcoincidewith H-hour.(FM 6-0)
phase
A planningandexecutiontoolusedtodivideanoperationindurationoractivity.(ADRP 3-0)
plannedtarget
A targetthatisknowntoexistintheoperationalenvironment,uponwhichactionsareplannedusing
deliberatetargeting,creatingeffectswhichsupportthecommander’sobjectives. (JP 3-60)
*rearechelon
Theecheloncontainingthoseelementsoftheforcethatarenotrequiredintheobjectivearea.
reconnaissance
A missionundertakentoobtain,byvisualobservationorotherdetectionmethods,informationabout
theactivitiesandresourcesofanenemyoradversary,ortosecuredataconcerningthemeteorological,
hydrographic,orgeographiccharacteristicsof a particulararea.(JP 2-0)
reorganization
Allmeasurestakenbythecommandertomaintainunitcombateffectivenessorreturnitto a specified
levelofcombatcapability.(FM 3-90-1)
restrictedoperationsarea
Airspaceofdefineddimensions,designatedbytheairspacecontrolauthority,inresponsetospecific
operationalsituations/requirementswithinwhichtheoperationofoneormoreairspaceusersis
restricted.(JP 3-52) |
3-99 | 217 | Glossary
securityoperations
Thoseoperationsundertakenbyacommandertoprovideearlyandaccuratewarningofenemy
operations,toprovidetheforcebeingprotectedwithtimeandmaneuverspacewithinwhichtoreactto
theenemy,andtodevelopthesituationtoallowthecommandertoeffectivelyusethe protectedforce.
(ADRP3-90)
shapingoperation
Anoperationthatestablishesconditionsforthedecisiveoperationthrougheffectsontheenemy,other
actors,andtheterrain.(ADRP 3-0)
supportingeffort
Adesignatedsubordinate unitwithamissionthatsupportsthesuccessofthemaineffort.(ADRP3-0)
surveillance
Thesystematicobservationofaerospace,surface,orsubsurfaceareas,places,persons,orthings,by
visual,aural,electronic,photographic,orothermeans.(JP3-0)
sustainingopeation
Anoperationatanyechelonthatenablesthedecisiveoperationorshapingoperationbygeneratingand
maintainingcombatpower.(ADRP3-0)
taskorganization
Atemporarygroupingofforcesdesignedtoaccomplish aparticularmission.(ADRP5-0)
verticalenvelopment
Atacticalmaneuverinwhichtroopsthatareair-dropped,air-landed,orinsertedviaairassault,attack
therearandflanksofaforce,ineffectcuttingofforencirclingtheforce.(JP3-18)
*X-hour
Theunspecifiedtimethatcommencesunitnotificationforplanninganddeploymentpreparationin
supportofpotentialcontingencyoperationsthatdonotinvolverapid,shortnoticedeployment.
*X-hoursequence
AnextendedsequenceofeventsinitiatedbyX-hourthatallowaunittofocusonplanningfora
potentialcontingencyoperation,toincludepreparationfordeployment. |
3-99 | 219 | References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
Thesedocumentsmustbeavailabletotheintendeduserofthispublication.
ADRP 1-02.TermsandMilitarySymbols. 24September2013.
JP 1-02.DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms. 8 November2010.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Mostjointpublicationsareavailableonline:
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.>
JP 2-0.JointIntelligence.22October2013.
JP 2-01.JointandNationalIntelligenceSupporttoMilitaryOperations. 5 January2012.
JP 2-01.3.JointIntelligencePreparationoftheOperationalEnvironment. 21May2014.
JP 3-0.JointOperations. 11August2011.
JP 3-01.CounteringAirandMissileThreats. 23March2012.
JP 3-02.AmphibiousOperations. 18July2014.
JP 3-03.JointInterdiction.14October2011.
JP 3-05.SpecialOperations. 16July2014.
JP 3-09.JointFireSupport. 12December2014.
JP 3-09.3.CloseAirSupport. 25November2014.
JP 3-11.OperationsinChemical,Biological,Radiological,andNuclearEnvironments.4 October
2013.
JP 3-13.InformationOperations.27November2012.
JP 3-13.3.OperationsSecurity. 4 January2012.
JP 3-13.4.MilitaryDeception. 26January2012.
JP 3-14. SpaceOperations. 29May2013.
JP 3-15.Barriers,Obstacles,andMineWarfareforJointOperations. 17June2011.
JP 3-17.AirMobilityOperations. 30September2013.
JP 3-18.JointForcibleEntryOperations. 27November2012.
JP 3-30.CommandandControlofJointAirOperations. 10February2014.
JP 3-32.CommandandControlforJointMaritimeOperations. 07August2013.
JP 3-35.DeploymentandRedeploymentOperations. 31January2013.
JP 3-40.CounteringWeaponsofMassDestruction. 31October2014.
JP 3-52.JointAirspaceControl. 13November2014.
JP 3-59.MeteorologicalandOceanographicOperations.7 December2012.
JP 3-60.JointTargeting. 31January2013.
JP 5-0.JointOperationPlanning. 11August2011.
JP 6-0.JointCommunicationsSystem. 10June2010.
JP 6-01.JointElectromagneticSpectrumManagementOperations.20March2012.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Mostarmydoctrinalpublicationsareavailableonline:
https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/Active_FM.html.
ADP 3-0.UnifiedLandOperations.10October2011. |
3-99 | 220 | References
ADP 5-0.TheOperationsProcess.17May2012
ADP 6-0.MissionCommand.17May2012.
ADRP 2-0.Intelligence.31August2012.
ADRP 3-0.UnifiedLandOperations.16May2012.
ADRP 3-05.SpecialOperations.31August2012.
ADRP 3-37.Protection.31August2012.
ADRP 3-90.OffenseandDefense. 31August2012.
ADRP 5-0.TheOperationsProcess.17May2012.
ADRP 6-0.MissionCommand.17May2012.
ATP 1-02.1.Multi-ServiceTactics,Techniques,andProceduresforMulti-ServiceBrevityCodes.23
October2014.
ATP 2-01.PlanRequirementsandAssessCollection.19August2014.
ATP 2-01.3.IntelligencePreparationoftheBattlefield/Battlespace. 10November2014.
ATP 3-01.4.MultiserviceTactics,Techniques,andProceduresforJointSuppressionofEnemyAir
Defense(J-SEAD).19July2013.
ATP 3-09.32.JFIREMultiserviceTactics,Techniques,andProceduresfortheJointApplicationof
Firepower.30November2012.
ATP 3-36.ElectronicWarfareTechniques. 16December2014.
ATP 3-60.1.Multi-ServiceTactics,Techniques,andProceduresforDynamicTargeting.7 May2012.
ATTP 3-18.04.SpecialForcesSpecialReconnaissanceTactics,Techniques,andProcedures. 5
January2011.
ATP 4-02.2.MedicalEvacuation. 12August2014.
ATP 5-19.RiskManagement. 14April2014.
FM 2-0.IntelligenceOperations.15April2014.
FM 2-22.3.HumanIntelligenceCollectorOperations.6 September2006.
FM 3-01.UnitedStatesArmyAirandMissileDefenseOperations.15April2014.
FM 3-04.111.AviationBrigades. 7 December2007.
FM 3-04.113.UtilityandCargoHelicopterOperations.7 December2007.
FM 3-04.126.AttackReconnaissanceHelicopterOperations.16February2007.
FM 3-04.155.ArmyUnmannedAircraftSystem.29July2009.
FM 3-05.ArmySpecialOperations.9 January2014.
FM 3-05.210.SpecialForcesAirOperations.27February2009.
FM 3-09.FieldArtilleryOperationsandFireSupport. 4 April2014.
FM 3-14.ArmySpaceOperations. 19August2014.
FM 3-16.TheArmyinMultinationalOperations. 8 April2014.
FM 3-17.2.Multi-ServiceTactics,TechniquesandProceduresforAirfieldOpening. 15May2007.
FM 3-21.8.TheInfantryRiflePlatoonandSquad. 28March2007.
FM 3-21.10.TheInfantryRifleCompany. 27July2006.
FM 3-21.20.TheInfantryBattalion. 13December2006.
FM 3-21.38.PathfinderOperations.25April2006.
FM 3-35.ArmyDeploymentandRedeployment.21April2010.
FM 3-38.CyberElectromagneticActivities.12February2014.
FM 3-52.AirspaceControl. 8 February2013.
FM 3-55.InformationCollection.3 May2013.
FM 3-55.93.Long-RangeSurveillanceUnitOperations.23June2009. |
3-99 | 221 | References
FM 3-60.TheTargetingProcess.26November2010.
FM 3-90-1.OffenseandDefenseVolume1.22March2013.
FM 3-90-2.Reconnaissance,Security,andTacticalEnablingTasksVolume2.22March2013.
FM 3-90.6.BrigadeCombatTeam.14September2010.
FM 3-94.TheaterArmy,Corps,andDivisionOperations.21April2014.
FM 6-0.CommanderandStaffOrganizationandOperations.5 May2014.
FM 6-02.SignalSupporttoOperations. 22January2014.
FM 6-02.53.TacticalRadioOperations. 5 August2009.
FM 6-05.CF-SOFMulti-ServiceTactics,Techniques,andProceduresforConventionalForcesand
SpecialOperationsForcesIntegration,Interoperability,andInterdependence.
13March2014.
FM27-10.TheLawofLandWarfare. 18July1956.
TC 3-21.220.StaticLineParachutingTechniquesandTraining. 28April2014.
TM 4-48.09.MultiserviceHelicopterSlingLoadBasicOperationsandEquipment.23July2012.
WEBSITES
ArmyKnowledgeOnline,https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html.
ArmyPublishingDirectorate,http://www.apd.army.mil/.
CentralArmyRegistry(CAR)ontheArmyTrainingNetwork(ATN),https://atiam.train.army.mil.CACor
AKOloginrequired.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
Therearenoprescribedformsforthispublication.
REFERENCED FORMS
FormsareavailableontheAPDWebsite (www.apd.army.mil)
DAForm2028.RecommendedChangestoPublicationsandBlankForms.
DAForm7382.SlingLoadInspectionRecord.
DDForm1387-2.SpecialHandlingData/Certification
DDForm2131.PassengerManifest. |
3-99 | 223 | Index
5-21, 5-23, 5-24, 5-25, 5-26,
AACG, 7-9 airborneassaultforce, 1-9,
6-1, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-8,
AADC, 1-11, 1-12, 1-13, 3-10 1-22, 2-1, 2-2, 2-7, 7-1
6-9
AATF, 1-10, 1-26, 8-1, 8-2, 8-4, airborneassaultforce
drop zones, 2-2, 2-4, 3-2, 3-9,
8-5, 8-6, 8-7, 8-11, 8-13, commander, 1-23
4-3, 4-4, 4-7, 4-11, 4-12,
8-14, 8-15, 8-16, 8-17, 9-1, airbornetaskforce
4-16, 5-1, 5-2, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7,
9-2, 9-3, 9-4, 9-5, 9-6, 9-7, commander, 1-9, 1-23
5-8, 5-9, 5-10, 5-16, 5-25,
9-8, 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-13,
Airborne WarningandControl 6-1, 6-2, 7-9
9-14, 10-1,10-2,10-3,10-5,
System, 1-13, 2-6
10-7, 10-8,10-9,10-11, elementsofairmovementplan,
10-12,11-3,12-1,12-4, airspacecoordinating 6-1
measures, 1-9, 1-12, 3-9,
12-5, 12-6,12-7,13-1,13-3 fire support, 3-3, 3-9, 3-10,
3-11, 8-7, 8-14, 9-12
AATFC, 1-10, 1-26, 8-1, 8-11, 5-11, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 6-3,
8-12, 8-13, 8-14, 8-15, 8-16, ALCE, 6-6, 6-9, 7-9 8-8, 8-17,10-8,12-4
8-17, 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-5, 9-6, ALO, 8-15 Fire support, 5-10
9-7, 9-8, 9-10, 9-11, 9-13, AMCM, 9-5, 9-6, 9-7,13-1 fire supportcoordination
9-14, 10-2,10-3,10-4,10-7,
assemblyaids, 5-18, 5-19, measures, 1-9, 3-10, 8-7,
10-8, 10-12,11-1,11-2, 5-21, 5-22, 5-24, 5-25, 5-26 9-11
11-3, 11-4,11-5,12-1,12-6,
13-1, 13-2,13-3 aviationliaisonofficer, 4-13, FSCMs, 1-9, 3-9, 3-10, 9-12
air assaulttaskforce 8-8, 8-15, 9-2,10-8,11-1, fire supportcoordination
12-1, 12-7,13-3 measures, 3-9
commander, 1-25, 9-8,
9-10, 10-4,10-8,10-11, AWACS, 1-13, 2-6, 2-7 high-density aircontrolzone,
11-2, 11-3,13-2,13-6 1-12
casualty backhaul, 9-15
ABNAF, 1-22, 1-23, 2-1, 2-2, intelligencepreparationof the
casualty evacuation, 9-14
2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 3-1, 3-2, battlefield, 1-15, 1-16, 3-7
CATF
3-3, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, intermediatestagingbase,
commander,amphibious
3-12, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-13, 5-12
taskforce, 1-10
4-15, 4-16, 4-20, 5-1, 5-10,
IPB, 1-15, 3-7
6-1, 6-9, 7-1, 7-4 CCA 5-Lineattackbrief, 4-13,
4-14, 10-9 ISB, 1-14, 4-20
ABNAFC, 1-9, 1-23, 2-2, 3-1,
intermediatestagingbase,
3-2, 3-3, 3-8, 3-12, 4-1, 4-2, commanderoftheairassault
1-7, 2-7, 4-20, 4-22, 5-17,
4-3, 4-8, 4-13, 4-15, 4-16, taskforce, 1-10
6-2, 7-3, 7-8
5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-10, 6-9,13-6 commander,amphibioustask
JACC/CP, 2-6, 2-7, 2-8, 5-12
ABNTFC, 1-9, 1-23, 1-24, 2-2, force, 1-8
3-2, 3-3, 3-8, 4-16 commander,jointspecial JACCEs, 1-11
ACLs, 6-2, 7-9, 9-6,13-8 operationstask force, 1-8 JFACC, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 1-12,
1-13
ACMs, 1-12, 3-9, 9-12 conceptof operations, 1-5,
1-12, 3-3, 8-11, 9-2 JFC
ADAM/BAE, 1-11, 4-13, 8-8,
jointforcecommander, 1-4,
8-14, 8-15, 9-2, 9-5,10-8 CONOPS
1-5
conceptof operations, 1-5,
aerialcasualty evacuation,
1-9, 1-10, 1-18, 1-21, 3-3, JFLCC, 1-9
9-16
8-11, 9-2, 9-5,10-2 jointforcelandcommander,
Air assaulttaskforce 1-8, 1-13
counterair, 1-2, 1-12, 1-13,
commander, 1-10
5-11, 5-14, 5-15, 6-2 JFMCC, 1-10
air defenseairspace
Counterair, 5-11 JIOC, 1-15
management/brigade
aviationelement, 4-13, 8-14, DACG, 6-6, 6-9, 7-9 jointaircomponent
9-2 DACO, 7-8 coordinationelements, 1-11
air liaisonofficer, 1-11, 4-15, drop zone, 1-12, 1-24, 2-2, 2-4, JointAirborneCommunications
4-16, 5-4, 8-13, 8-15,10-11 2-6, 3-8, 4-9, 4-11, 4-12, Center/CommandPost, 2-6,
2-7
air missioncoordination 4-13, 4-15, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4,
meeting, 9-5, 9-7, 9-8,13-1 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-9, 5-10, jointforcecommander, 1-2,
5-11, 5-17, 5-18, 5-19, 5-20, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, |
3-99 | 224 | Index
1-11, 1-13, 1-19, 1-23, 3-2, landingzone, 1-12, 1-26, 3-3, remotemarshallingbase, 2-3,
3-10, 5-16 4-9, 4-13, 5-1, 5-5, 5-19, 4-20, 4-21, 6-2
5-26, 6-1, 6-8, 6-9, 8-4, 8-8,
jointforcelandcomponent sealinesofcommunications,
commander, 1-8 8-9, 8-10, 8-14, 9-3, 9-7, 9-8, 1-3
9-9, 9-10, 9-14,10-1,10-3,
Jointforcemaritimecomponent SEAD, 1-25, 2-6, 3-12, 4-12,
10-10,10-11,10-13,11-1,
commander, 1-10 5-15, 9-9,12-4,12-5,12-6
11-2, 11-3,11-4,11-5,11-6,
jointoperationplanning 11-7, 11-8,11-10,11-11, specialpatrolinfiltrationand
process, 1-14 11-12,11-13,12-1,12-2, exfiltrationsystem,13-1
JointPrecisionAirdropSystem, 12-4, 12-6,12-7,12-8,13-1, suppressionofenemyair
5-4 13-5, 13-6,13-9,13-10 defenses, 2-6, 6-2, 9-13,
jointspecialoperationstask marshallingarea, 2-1, 3-4, 4-1, 10-12,12-4
force, 3-8 7-2, 7-4, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8, TACC, 2-7
7-9
JointSurveillanceTarget TACP, 3-9, 3-10, 4-15, 4-16,
AttackRadarSystem, 2-6, marshallingplan, 3-1, 3-3, 3-4, 5-12, 5-13, 8-15,10-11
2-7 3-7, 4-1, 7-1, 7-4, 7-9 TACSAT, 1-24, 2-7, 7-12, 8-16,
jointtaskforcejointintelligence MDMP, 3-1, 3-4, 3-5, 9-1, 9-3, 8-17
operationscenter, 1-15 9-4, 9-5, 9-6,12-5
tacticalaircontrolparty, 1-11,
jointterminalattack controllers, medicalevacuation, 9-14 3-9, 4-15, 5-12
4-15 landingzone, 9-16 tacticalairliftcontrolcenter, 2-7
planning, 9-14
JOPP, 1-14 TacticalAirspaceIntegration
N-hour, 3-6, 7-1
JPADS, 5-4 System, 8-14
operationalenvironment, 1-1,
JSOA TAIS, 8-14
1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-7, 1-9, 1-14,
jointspecialoperations the fast-ropeinsertionand
1-15, 1-16, 8-2
area, 1-8 extractionsystem,11-6
PZCO, 8-15, 13-2,13-3,13-7,
JSOTF, 1-10, 3-8 UAS, 4-16, 4-17, 8-8, 8-14,
13-8
JSTARS, 2-6, 2-7 9-13, 9-14,10-3,10-9,
PZNCOIC,13-2
10-12,11-3,12-6
JTACs, 4-15
RDSP, 9-5
X-hour, 3-6
LACC, 7-6
regional(orsector)airdefense
commander, 1-8 |
3-99 | 225 | (cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:41)(cid:48)(cid:3)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:28)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:3)
(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:48)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:70)(cid:75)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:24)
By Order of the Secretary of the Army
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, UnitedStates Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistantto the
Secretary of theArmy
1(cid:24)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:20)
(cid:39)(cid:44)(cid:54)(cid:55)(cid:53)(cid:44)(cid:37)(cid:56)(cid:55)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:29)(cid:3)
(cid:36)(cid:70)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:49)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:3)(cid:42)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:56)(cid:17)(cid:54)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:29)(cid:3)(cid:39)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:87)(cid:85)(cid:76)(cid:69)(cid:88)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:3)(cid:72)(cid:79)(cid:72)(cid:70)(cid:87)(cid:85)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:76)(cid:70)(cid:3)(cid:80)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:68)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:79)(cid:92)(cid:3) |
7-100.1 | 1 | FM 7-100.1
OPFOR
Opposing Force
Operations
DECEMBER 2004
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY |
7-100.1 | 2 | FOREWORD
In today’s complicated and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of
future conflict that might involve the U.S. Army. So the Army must be ready to meet the
challenges of any type of conflict, in all kinds of places, and against all kinds of threats. This is
the nature of the contemporary operational environment (COE), and training for such an
environment requires a different type of Opposing Force (OPFOR) than that of the past.
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) is the Executive Agent for the development, management,
administration, integration, and approval functions of the OPFOR Program across the Army.
Thus, the TRADOC DCSINT is responsible for documenting the doctrine, organization, and
capabilities of a contemporary OPFOR that is appropriate for training the Army’s leaders,
soldiers, and units for the COE.
In the FM 7-100 series, the TRADOC Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(ODCSINT) has created a flexible baseline for an OPFOR that can be adapted to meet a
variety of different training requirements in a number of different scenarios that reflect the
COE. The OPFOR operational doctrine outlined in FM 7-100.1 represents a realistic
composite of potential adversaries the Army might encounter in the real-world situations of
the foreseeable future. However, the world is continually changing, as are the threats and
challenges for which the Army must be prepared. The Army must remain flexible, as must the
OPFOR designed to serve as a challenging sparring partner in the training environment.
This manual is approved for use in all Army training venues. However, as the contemporary
OPFOR and other aspects of the COE are integrated into Army training, the TRADOC
ODCSINT and the intelligence community will continue research and analysis of real-world
developments and trends. The goal of this continued effort is to keep our OPFOR and our
understanding of the COE truly contemporary and relevant as the world around us
changes. Thus, this manual is intended to be a living document, and the ODCSINT will
modify and change it as often as necessary in order to ensure its continued relevance in
light of changes and developments in the COE. In anticipation of such changes, this manual
will be published primarily in electronic format with only limited distribution of hard-copy,
printed manuals. The electronic version is available on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) at
http://www.us.army.mil and the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital
Library (ADTDL) at http://www.adtdl.army.mil. Users also need to monitor the TRADOC
ADCSINT-Threats Knowledge Center on AKO for information regarding periodic updates.
MAXIE L. MCFARLAND
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence |
7-100.1 | 3 | *FM 7-100.1
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 7-100.1 Department of the Army
27 December 2004
Opposing Force
Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE ..................................................................................................................v
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................vi
Chapter 1 STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK....................................................................................1-1
National Security Strategy........................................................................................1-1
Strategic Campaign..................................................................................................1-6
Strategic Operations.................................................................................................1-8
Regional Operations.................................................................................................1-9
Transition Operations.............................................................................................1-10
Adaptive Operations...............................................................................................1-12
Principles of Operations Versus an Extraregional Power......................................1-13
OPFOR Military and Operational Art......................................................................1-17
The Role of Paramilitary and Irregular Forces in Operations.................................1-20
Systems Warfare....................................................................................................1-23
Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL...................................................................................2-1
Concept....................................................................................................................2-1
Principles of Command and Control.........................................................................2-2
Command and Control Structures............................................................................2-3
Command and Control Process.............................................................................2-31
Command Posts.....................................................................................................2-42
Command and Control Systems............................................................................2-46
_______________
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 100-61, 26 January 1998. |
7-100.1 | 4 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS..............................................................................................................3-1
Strategic Context......................................................................................................3-1
Purpose of the Offense............................................................................................3-3
Planning Offensive Operations................................................................................3-4
Preparing for the Offense.......................................................................................3-12
Executing the Offense............................................................................................3-13
Types of Offensive Action......................................................................................3-14
Chapter 4 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS....................................................................................4-1
Strategic Context......................................................................................................4-1
Purpose of the Defense...........................................................................................4-4
Planning Defensive Operations...............................................................................4-5
Preparing for the Defense......................................................................................4-15
Executing the Defense...........................................................................................4-17
Integrated and Decentralized Defenses................................................................4-18
Types of Defensive Action.....................................................................................4-19
Chapter 5 INFORMATION WARFARE....................................................................................5-1
New Concepts of Information in Warfare.................................................................5-1
Elements of IW.........................................................................................................5-5
Tools and Targets..................................................................................................5-10
Strategic IW............................................................................................................5-10
Operational-Level IW.............................................................................................5-11
IW Planning and Execution....................................................................................5-13
Strategic Context....................................................................................................5-15
Chapter 6 RECONNAISSANCE...............................................................................................6-1
Mission.....................................................................................................................6-1
Concept....................................................................................................................6-1
Strategic Assets.......................................................................................................6-5
Operational Assets...................................................................................................6-8
Strategic Context....................................................................................................6-10
Chapter 7 FIRE SUPPORT.......................................................................................................7-1
Fire Support Concepts.............................................................................................7-1
Command and Control.............................................................................................7-4
Fire Support Planning..............................................................................................7-6
Targeting................................................................................................................7-10
Methods of Fire......................................................................................................7-13
Fire Support of Maneuver Operations....................................................................7-15
Strategic Context....................................................................................................7-16 |
7-100.1 | 5 | _________________________________________________________________________________Contents
Chapter 8 AVIATION.................................................................................................................8-1
Organization.............................................................................................................8-1
Command and Control.............................................................................................8-4
Capabilities...............................................................................................................8-7
Missions....................................................................................................................8-9
Principles of Employment.......................................................................................8-11
Degree of Air Dominance.......................................................................................8-12
Strategic Context....................................................................................................8-13
Chapter 9 AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT.......................................................................................9-1
All-Arms Air Defense................................................................................................9-1
Goals........................................................................................................................9-2
Command and Control.............................................................................................9-4
Phases......................................................................................................................9-9
Assets.....................................................................................................................9-14
Reconnaissance.....................................................................................................9-19
Missions and Employment......................................................................................9-22
Offense...................................................................................................................9-25
Defense..................................................................................................................9-27
Sanctuary Areas.....................................................................................................9-28
Mountains and Water Obstacles............................................................................9-29
Air Defense Ambushes and Roving Units..............................................................9-29
Air Defense Against Unmanned Aerial Vehicles....................................................9-31
Strategic Context....................................................................................................9-33
Chapter 10 ENGINEER SUPPORT..........................................................................................10-1
Assets.....................................................................................................................10-1
Command and Control...........................................................................................10-1
Missions..................................................................................................................10-3
Engineer Reconnaissance......................................................................................10-6
Survivability............................................................................................................10-8
Countermobility.......................................................................................................10-8
Strategic Context..................................................................................................10-12
Chapter 11 NBC AND SMOKE OPERATIONS........................................................................11-1
Preparedness.........................................................................................................11-1
Staff Responsibility.................................................................................................11-3
Chemical Warfare...................................................................................................11-3
Nuclear Warfare.....................................................................................................11-7
Biological Warfare................................................................................................11-10
NBC Protection.....................................................................................................11-11
Smoke...................................................................................................................11-13
Strategic Context..................................................................................................11-17 |
7-100.1 | 6 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 12 LOGISTICS............................................................................................................12-1
Strategic Context....................................................................................................12-1
Tailored Logistics Units..........................................................................................12-4
Logistics Missions..................................................................................................12-5
Operational Logistics Concepts.............................................................................12-5
Command and Control...........................................................................................12-7
Materiel Support...................................................................................................12-11
Maintenance.........................................................................................................12-12
Transportation......................................................................................................12-12
Personnel.............................................................................................................12-15
Medical Support...................................................................................................12-17
Support to Combat Operations............................................................................12-19
Post-Combat Support..........................................................................................12-21
Chapter 13 AIRBORNE, SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES, AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS..13-1
Airborne and Heliborne Operations.......................................................................13-1
Special-Purpose Forces Operations......................................................................13-8
Amphibious Operations........................................................................................13-17
GLOSSARY.................................................................................................Glossary-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................Bibliography-1
INDEX...............................................................................................................Index-0 |
7-100.1 | 7 | Preface
This manual is one of a series that describes a contemporary Opposing Force
(OPFOR) for training U.S. Army commanders, staffs, and units. See the
Bibliography section for a list of the manuals in this series. Together, these
manuals outline an OPFOR than can cover the entire spectrum of military and
paramilitary capabilities against which the Army must train to ensure success in
any future conflict.
Applications for this series of manuals include field training, training simula-
tions, and classroom instruction throughout the Army. All Army training venues
should use an OPFOR based on these manuals, except when mission rehearsal or
contingency training requires maximum fidelity to a specific country-based
threat. Even in the latter case, trainers should use appropriate parts of the
OPFOR manuals to fill information gaps in a manner consistent with what they
do know about a specific threat.
The proponent for this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to the OPFOR and Threat In-
tegration Directorate (OTID) of the TRADOC Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence at the following address: Director, OTID, ADCSINT-Threats, ATTN:
ATIN-T (Bldg 53), 700 Scott Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1323.
This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) at
http://www.us.army.mil and on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and
Doctrine Digital Library (ADTDL) at http://www.adtdl.army.mil. Readers should
monitor those sites and also the TRADOC ADCSINT-Threats Knowledge Center
on AKO for the status of this manual and information regarding updates.
Periodic updates, subject to the normal approval process, will occur as a result of
the normal production cycle in accordance with TRADOC regulation 25-36,
paragraphs 2-17 and 4-7. The date on the cover and title page of the electronic
version will reflect the latest update.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not re-
fer exclusively to men. |
7-100.1 | 8 | Introduction
This manual is part of the FM 7-100 series, which describes a contemporary
Opposing Force (OPFOR) that exists for the purpose of training U.S. forces
for potential combat operations. This OPFOR reflects the characteristics of
military and paramilitary forces that may be present in the contemporary
operational environment (COE). Like those real-world threats, the OPFOR
will continue to present new and different challenges for U.S. forces. The COE is
constantly changing, and it is important for U.S. Army training environments
to keep pace with real-world developments.
CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The DOD officially defines an operational
Contemporary Operational
environment (OE) as “a composite of the
Environment (COE)
conditions, circumstances, and influences
that affect the employment of military forces
The operational environment
and bear on the decisions of the unit
that exists today and for the
commander” (JP 1-02). The contemporary
clearly foreseeable future.
operational environment (COE) is the
operational environment that exists today
and for the clearly foreseeable future. There are some “constants” or common
threads that define the general nature of this COE:
• The United States in not likely to have a peer competitor until 2020 or be-
yond.
• However, nations will continue to field armed forces and use these forces
as a tool to pursue national interests.
• As nations use their armed forces (or other instruments of national power)
in pursuit of national interests, their actions may cause U.S. intervention,
either unilaterally or as a coalition partner, with or without United Na-
tions mandate.
• Nations that believe the United States may act to counter their national
interests will develop diplomatic, informational, economic, and military
plans for managing U.S. intervention.
• Nations will continue to modernize their armed forces within the con-
straints of their economies, but in ways that may negate U.S. overmatch.
• Advanced technology will be available on the world market for a wide va-
riety of nation-state and non-state actors.
• Non-state actors will play an important role in any regional conflictas
combatants or noncombatants.
• All combat operations will be significantly affected by a number of vari-
ables in the environment beyond simple military forces.
Thus, one of the constants is that there are variables. Those “variables” in the
COE result in a number of different OEs that can occur in specific circumstances
or scenarios. |
7-100.1 | 9 | ______________________________________________________________________________Introduction
CRITICAL VARIABLES
Any OE, in the real world or in the
Critical Variables of COE
training environment, can be defined
in terms of eleven critical variables. • Nature and Stability of the State.
While these variables can be useful in
• Regional and Global Relationships.
describing the overall (strategic)
• Economics.
environment, they are most useful in
• Sociological Demographics.
defining the nature of specific OEs.
• Information.
Each of these “conditions, circumstances,
• Physical Environment.
and influences” and their possible
• Technology.
combinations will vary according to
• External Organizations.
the specific situation. In this sense,
• National Will.
they are “variables.” These variables
• Time.
are interrelated and sometimes
• Military Capabilities.
overlap. Different variables will be
more or less important in different
situations. Each OE is different, because the content of the variables is different.
Only by studying and understanding these variablesand incorporating them
into its trainingwill the U.S. Army be able to keep adversaries from using them
against it or to find ways to use them to its own advantage.
Nature and Stability of the State
It is important to understand the nature and stability of the state (or states) with
which or in which the conflict takes place. Study of this variable measures how
strong or weak a country is and determines where the real strength of the state
lies; it may be in the political leadership, the military, the police, or some other
element of the population. Understanding this variable will allow U.S. forces to
better understand the nature of the military campaign and the true aims of an
enemy campaign, operation, or action. It also helps determine what kinds of
threats may be present in a particular country. The real threat to U.S. forces
may come from elements other than the military.
Regional and Global Relationships
Nation-states and/or non-state actors often enter into relationships, which can be
regional or global. These partnerships support common objectives, which can be
political, economic, military, or cultural. An actor’s membership or allegiance to
such a relationship can determine its actions of support and motivation. Virtually all
conflict will occur with alliances and coalitions, some involving the United States
and some involving its adversaries. When actors create regional or global alliances,
it can add to their collective capability and broaden the scale of operations and
actions.
As the world moves away from the traditional long-term, fixed alliances of the
past, regional and global relationships are much more fluid and unpredictable.
The choice of a state to be nonaligned does not mean that it will not become in-
volved in a conflict or crisis. It simply means that the state does not make a
commitment to another state, alliance, or cause before a situation arises. This
lack of precommitment makes it difficult to predict how actors and forces may
align when a situation does arise. Alliances can form or change rapidly, even dur-
ing the course of an operation or campaign. |
7-100.1 | 10 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Economics
The economic variable establishes the boundaries between the “haves” and the
“have-nots.” This gap of economic differences among nation-states and other ac-
tors can cause conflict. Economic superiority, rather than military superiority,
may be the key to power or dominance within a region. However, economic posi-
tion often represents a nation or non-state actor’s ability to buy military technol-
ogy or to conduct prolonged operations. Economics help define the relationship
between a nation or non-state actor and other actors at the regional or global
level. These regional or global economic relationships could result in military or
political assistance.
Sociological Demographics
The demographics variable includes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup of
a given region, nation, or non-state actor. Extreme devotion to a particular cause
or significant hatred of a particular group may provide an enemy with an unshak-
able will and a willingness to die for the cause. U.S. forces may also find that large
segments of the population around them are sympathetic to the same cause as the
enemy force. The needs of the local population can create heavy demands on U.S.
military units, particularly their supply and medical systems. Refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons may increase the complexity of the environment. The enemy
may use civilians as shields or obstacles or as cover for hostile intelligence services.
Information
Media and other information means can make combat operations transparent to
the world, visible to all who have access to data. Various actors seek to use per-
ception management to control and manipulate how the public sees things. They
will exploit U.S. mistakes and failures and use propaganda to sway the local
population to support their cause. Media coverage can impact on U.S. political
decision making, international opinion, or the sensitivities of coalition members.
Even without sophisticated sensors and information systems, actors native to the
area or region often have greater situational awareness than U.S. forces. Various
actors are able to access commercial systems (such as satellite communications
and imagery) for the larger picture. For a more detailed view, they can use hu-
man networks operating over normal telephone lines or with cellular telephones.
Physical Environment
The main elements in the physical environment are terrain and weather. Poten-
tial enemies clearly understand that less complex and open environments favor a
U.S. force with its long-range, precision-guided weapons and sophisticated re-
connaissance capability. So they will try to avoid the types of operations and en-
vironments for which such U.S. forces are optimized. They will try to operate in
urban areas and other complex terrain and in weather conditions that may ad-
versely affect U.S. military operations and mitigate technological advantages.1
1
Complex terrain is a topographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village and/or of two or more
types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same space. (Restrictive terrain or environ-
mental conditions include but are not limited to slope, high altitude, forestation, severe weather, and urbanization.)
Complex terrain, due to its unique combination of restrictive terrain and environmental conditions, imposes signifi-
cant limitations on observation, maneuver, fires, and intelligence collection. |
7-100.1 | 11 | ______________________________________________________________________________Introduction
Technology
The technology that nations or non-state actors can bring to the OE includes
what they can develop and produce, as well as what they could import. Access to
technological advances available on the global market is slowly eating away at
the technological advantage the United States has enjoyed in the past.
It is likely that some high-end forces in a particular region of the world could
field a few systems that are more advanced than those of the U.S. force deployed
there. Easy access to new technology allows potential adversaries to achieve
equality or even overmatch U.S. systems in selected niche areas. Many countries
are trying to acquire relatively low-cost, high-payoff, new technologies. In addi-
tion, upgrades and hybridization allow older systems to compete with more mod-
ern capabilities, thus neutralizing the technical advantage of many modern
forces. In urban areas or other complex terrain, less advanced systems may still
find effective uses. Various actors may find adaptive and innovative ways of us-
ing systems for other than their originally intended applications.
External Organizations
When the U.S. Army goes into a failed state or into areas torn by conflict, it is
likely to find international humanitarian relief organizations at work there.
These external organizations continue to grow in influence and power, as well as in
willingness to become involved in crisis situations that were previously purely mili-
tary operations. These external organizations can have both stated and hidden in-
terests and objectives that can either assist or hinder U.S. mission accomplishment.
The presence of transnational corporations operating in a country or region can also
place added pressure on U.S. forces to avoid collateral damage to civilian life and
property. U.S. forces may have to divert troops and resources from their assigned
missions to conduct rescues or provide security for various external organizations.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in a given region (or at least prior to U.S. mili-
tary intervention there), during such hostilities, or after the conclusion of hostili-
ties in a particular area, members of external organizations and other civilian
noncombatants from outside the region may be endangered. Diplomatic person-
nel, other government employees, or private citizens from the United States or
other countries might be present in one or more countries within the region. The
private citizens might be associated with an external organization (media, hu-
manitarian relief organization, or transnational corporation) or might be there on
private business or as tourists. If their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest,
or natural disaster, such U.S. citizens and their dependents, as well as selected
host-nation citizens and third-country nationals, could be eligible for evacuation
in noncombatant evacuation operations conducted by U.S. forces.
National Will
The variable of national will reflects how much each country’s people and gov-
ernment are behind what the military or paramilitary forces are doing. This can
influence the objectives of a conflict, its duration, and the conditions for ending it.
A country will try to attack its opponent’s national will and still preserve its own.
Clearly, most foreign countries view U.S. national will as a point of vulnerability.
Thus, a potential adversary may perceive the collective will of his people as a
comparative advantage against the United States. |
7-100.1 | 12 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
History has proven that battlefield victory does not always go to the best-trained,
best-equipped, and most technologically advanced force. Victory often goes to the
side that most wants to win, needs to win, and is willing to sacrifice to do so.
Time
In most cases, potential opponents of the United States view time as being in
their advantage. When U.S. forces have to deploy into the area over long time
and distance, the opponent can use this time to adjust the nature of the conflict
to something for which the U.S. forces are not prepared.
First, the opponent will try to control the entry of U.S. forces into the area. If ac-
cess control fails, the enemy still has the opportunity to oppose lightly equipped
U.S. early-entry units and try to prevent full deployment of the rest of the force.
The opponent will try to speed up the tempo, to rapidly defeat its local or re-
gional enemy or to defeat U.S. early-entry forces before the United States can
deploy overwhelming military power. If that fails, the opponent will try to pro-
long the conflict and to outlast the U.S. will to continue.
Military Capabilities
Military capabilities of a nation-state or non-state actor are measured in relative
terms, in comparison to the capabilities of other actors against which they might
be applied. Most of the military forces in the world continue to operate in conven-
tional ways, which remain sufficient against other local and regional actors.
However, once the United States becomes involved, these same military forces
may have to use adaptive or asymmetric approaches. Various nations and
other foreign entities around the world study the United States and its military
forces. They generally view the United States as a major power—the world’s only
superpower—with an overall advantage in technology and warfighting capabil-
ity. Despite these strengths, other actors see some weaknesses that they may be
able to exploit. They can use these perceptions as a guide to optimizing the effec-
tiveness of their own forces and to find ways to negate current U.S. advantages.
Military capabilities may be the most critical and the most complex variable that
affects military operations. However, the military variable does not exist in isola-
tion from the other variables that help determine the overall OE. It interacts
with the other variables, and all the other variables can affect military capabilities.
Potential enemies can use any or all of these factors against the Army as it tries to
accomplish its missions in various parts of the world or in various training environ-
ments.
REAL WORLD
In the real world, the COE is the entire set of conditions, circumstances, and influ-
ences that U.S. Armed Forces can expect to face when conducting military opera-
tions to further the national interests of the United States, its friends, and allies.
The COE is “contemporary” in the sense that it does not represent conditions that
existed only in the past or that might exist only in the remote future, but rather
those conditions that exist today and in the clearly foreseeable, near future. This
COE consists not only of the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of potential
real-world adversaries, but also of the manifestations of the ten other variables that
help define any OE. |
7-100.1 | 13 | ______________________________________________________________________________Introduction
TRAINING
In training environments, the COE is the OE created to approximate the de-
mands of the real-world COE and to set the conditions for desired training out-
comes. This involves the appropriate combination of an OPFOR (with military
and/or paramilitary capabilities representing a composite of a number of potential
adversaries) and other OE variables in a realistic, feasible, and plausible manner.
The purpose of the COE in training simulations is to produce the necessary training
outcomes.2
Even in the COE for training, it is possible to speak of an overall COE that ad-
dresses the qualities of virtually any OE in which the units or individuals being
trained might be called upon to operate. In this sense, there are the same “con-
stants” as in the real-world COE.
INTERACTION AND LINKAGE OF VARIABLES
The variables of the COE do not exist in isolation from one another. The linkages
of the variables cause the complex and often simultaneous dilemmas that a
military force might face. In order to provide realistic training, training
scenarios must try to simulate this synergistic effect to the maximum degree
that is feasible.
The COE is not just about the OPFOR. The COE variables and their interaction
provide the robust environment and context for OPFOR operations. The com-
plexity of the specific OE in training can be adjusted to keep it appropriate for
the required training objectives and the training state of various U.S. Army
units.
ADAPTIVE AND CHANGING
The nature of the COE is adaptive and constantly changing. As the United States
and its military forces interact with the COE in a real-world sense, the OE
changes. As the Army applies the lessons learned from training in a COE setting,
the OPFOR and potential real-world adversaries will also learn and adapt.
The development of the COE for training started with research to develop an un-
derstanding of the real-world COE and trends that affect military operations. Then,
taking into consideration the desired training outcomes and leader development
goals, the authors of the FM 7-100 series proceeded to document an OPFOR doctrine
and structure that reflect the real-world COE, and the Army began integrating this
OPFOR and other COE variables into training scenarios. Meanwhile, the authors of
the FM 7-100 series are continuing to research the real-world COE and to mature
the OPFOR and the COE in training in order to provide a richer, appropri-
ately challenging training environment and keep the OPFOR and the COE
truly “contemporary.”
2
The same type of COE conditions can be created to support some combat development activities that do not re-
quire simulation of a specific real-world potential adversary. However, some combat development activities may
require portrayal of an OE that extends further into the future than is typical for the COE. |
7-100.1 | 14 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
ENEMY, THREAT, AND OPFOR
Before going further into the COE, the contemporary OPFOR, and the intended
uses of this manual, it may be useful to define some key terms and the distinc-
tions among them. It is important to distinguish among the terms enemy, threat,
and OPFOR and to use them correctly.
ENEMY
From the U.S. perspective, an enemy is an individual, group of individuals (or-
ganized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or na-
tional alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multina-
tional partners. In other words, the enemy is whoever is actually opposing the
United States in a particular conflict.3 Thus, this term is synonymous with ad-
versary or opponent.
THREAT
A potential adversary is sometimes designated as a threat. In this sense, the
Army defines threat as “any specific foreign nation or organization with inten-
tions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or chal-
lenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies.” Once hos-
tilities actually begin, the threat becomes the enemy.
OPPOSING FORCE
An Opposing Force (OPFOR) is a training tool that should allow the U.S. Army to
train against a challenging and plausible sparring partner that represents the
wide range of possible opponents the Army could face in actual conflict. It en-
ables training of all arms of the Army and prepares the Army for potential
combat operations.4
During the road to war leading up to events in a training scenario, the OPFOR
may play the role of a “threat” (potential enemy) that is on the verge of becoming
an enemy. However, the actual training event usually deals with a state of hos-
tilities. Thus, once hostilities begin in the training event, the OPFOR acts as the
“enemy” of the U.S. force in the training environment.5
During the Cold War period, the Army employed OPFORs based on specific real-
world threats. However, the Army needs a different type of OPFOR to meet its
training requirements for the COE.
3
This definition of enemy is from the U.S. point of view. After this Introduction, the chapters of this manual address
their topics from the OPFOR point of view. So, friendly refers to the OPFOR and its allies, and enemy refers to the
enemy of the OPFOR, which may be an opponent within its own country or region or an extraregional opponent
(normally the United States or a U.S.-led coalition).
4
Although the OPFOR is primarily a training tool, it may be used for other purposes. For example, some combat de-
velopment activities that do not require simulation of a specific real-world potential adversary may use an OPFOR to
portray the “threat” or “enemy.”
5
From the OPFOR point of view, its leadership plans and develops forces and methods to deal with one or more
threats to its own interests, goals, or survival. |
7-100.1 | 15 | ______________________________________________________________________________Introduction
Cold War OPFOR
When the Army established its OPFOR program in 1976 with Army Regulation
350-2, it could hardly have envisioned today’s computerized constructive and vir-
tual simulations, or even the evolving requirements of live simulations. It de-
fined an OPFOR simply as “an organized force created by and from U.S. Army
units to portray a unit of a potential adversary armed force.” Thus, all OPFORs
were originally threat-based, in the sense that they replicated the forces, capa-
bilities, and doctrine of a particular country officially recognized as a threat or
potential adversary. In the midst of the Cold War, the 1976 regulation identified
only one potential adversary against which to train: the Soviet Union; by 1978, a
revision of the regulation added North Korea as a second threat for replication by
an OPFOR. Over time, the Army developed other OPFORs to replicate other
threats emerging in places ranging from Latin America and Southwest Asia.
In its time, the threat-based OPFOR served the Army very well, particularly for
units targeted against specific threats. The benefits of this training were borne out,
for example, in Operation Desert Storm. Techniques and doctrine, including deep at-
tack and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, developed to cope with spe-
cific threats and honed against the OPFOR, enabled the Army to achieve decisive
results on the battlefield. However, the OE is dynamic, and the pace of that dynamism
has increased with the end of the Cold War and the rapid advancement of informa-
tion technology.
Contemporary OPFOR
Training U.S. forces for the COE re-
Contemporary OPFOR
quires a different kind of OPFOR from
that of the past. The contemporary
A plausible, flexible military and/or
OPFOR must be less predictable and
paramilitary force representing a
not based on the armed forces of a par-
composite of varying capabilities of
ticular country. In today’s world, the
actual worldwide forces, used in
U.S. Army must be prepared to go into
lieu of a specific threat force, for
any OE and perform its full range of
training and developing U.S. forces.
missions. It must be ready to do so in
the face of a wide variety of possible threats and at the same time be prepared to
deal with third-party actors that may have other interests. Not all threats are
purely military in nature. Therefore, the U.S. Army now defines an OPFOR as “a
plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of
varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat
force, for training and developing U.S. forces.”
Thus, in some training environments, a military force alone may be the OPFOR.
In other cases, military forces may have paramilitary forces acting in loose affilia-
tion with them, or acting separately from them within the same training environ-
ment. These relationships depend on the scenario, which is driven by training re-
quirements.
Various agencies and experts have different lists of real-world threats the United
States might have to face. If the U.S. Army were to pick any one of these threats
as the threat against which to train, that threat would almost certainly not be
the one it would actually fight. What is needed is a composite that is representa-
tive of the full range and variety of possible threats and OEs. It must have a bit |
7-100.1 | 16 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
of everythingit could be virtually anybody, anywhere. Therefore, this manual de-
fines this representative composite in a way that is flexible enough to fit the most
demanding U.S. Army training requirements and provides a framework for training
that creates the leaders, soldiers, and unit skills necessary for success on the next
battlefield.
CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND OTHER ACTORS
There are many types of actors or participants in today’s complex world envi-
ronment. Some of the actors are countries (also called nation-states) and some
are not. Nation-states are still dominant actors. However, some power is shifting
to nontraditional actors and transnational concerns. There are many potential
challenges to traditional concepts like balance of power, sovereignty, national in-
terest, and roles of nation-state and non-state actors.
Of course, not all actors are threats. To be a threat, a nation or organization must
have both the capabilities and the intention to challenge the United States. The
capabilities in question are not necessarily purely military, but encompass all the
elements of power available to the nation or organization.
NATION-STATE ACTORS
Nation-states fall into four basic categories according to their roles in the inter-
national community. The categories are core states, transition states, rogue
states, and failed or failing states.
The category of core states includes more than half of the nearly 200 countries in
the world today. These are basically democratic (although to varying degrees)
and share common values and interests. Within this larger group, there is an
“inner core” of major powers. These are the advanced countries, including the
United States, that generally dominate world politics. Most conflict with global
consequences will involve the core states in some fashion or another.
Transition states are other larger, industrial-based countriesmostly emerging
regional powersthat are striving to become major powers. High-end transition
states are moving from an industrial-based society to an information-based soci-
ety. Low-end transition states are seeking to move from an agricultural-based so-
ciety to an industrial base. As states try to make this transition, there are cycles
of political stability and instability, and the outcome of the transition is uncer-
tain. Some transition states may successfully join the ranks of core states and
even become major powers within that context; others may become competitors.
Rogue states are those that are hostile to their neighbors or to core states’ inter-
ests. These countries can sponsor international terrorism or even confront U.S.
military forces operating in the region. Failed or failing states are fragmented in
such a way that a rule of law is absent; their instability is a threat to their neigh-
bors and the core states.
Countries can move from one category to another, as conditions change. Some-
times countries join together in multinational alliances and coalitions. Together,
they have more strength and can become a power to be reckoned with. |
7-100.1 | 17 | ______________________________________________________________________________Introduction
NON-STATE ACTORS
Non-state actors are those that do not represent the forces of a particular
nation-state. Such non-state elements include rogue actors as well as third-
party actors.
Like rogue states, rogue actors are hostile to other actors; however, they may be
present in one country or extend across several countries. Examples include
insurgents, guerrillas, mercenaries, and transnational or subnational political
movements. Particular sources of danger are terrorists and drug-trafficking or
criminal organizations, since they may have the best technology, equipment, and
weapons available, simply because they have the money to buy them. These non-
state rogue actors may use terror tactics and militarily unconventional methods to
achieve their goals.
Third-party actors may not be hostile to other actors. However, their presence,
activities, and interests can affect the ability of military forces to accomplish
their mission when operating in a foreign country. These third-party actors can
be refugees, internally displaced persons, and other civilians on the battlefield,
including international humanitarian relief agencies, transnational corporations,
and the news media. These individuals and groups bring multiple sources of mo-
tivation, ideology, interests, beliefs, or political affiliations into consideration.
They may be sources of civil unrest. Their presence may require military forces to
consider the potential impacts of traffic congestion, demonstrations, sabotage,
and information manipulation.
REAL-WORLD AND TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS
When U.S. forces become involved in a particular country or region, they must
take into account the presence and influence of these various types of threats and
other actors. In a training environment, an OPFOR can represent a composite of
those nation-state or non-state actors that constitute military and/or paramilitary
forces that could present a threat to the United States, its friends, or its allies.
Other, non-state actors that fall in the category of nonmilitary forces or elements
are not part of the OPFOR, but could be part of the COE used in the training
environment.
CONTEMPORARY OPFOR
This manual introduces the baseline operational doctrine of a flexible, thinking,
adaptive, contemporary OPFOR that applies its doctrine with considerable ini-
tiative. (See the definition of contemporary OPFOR above.) It is applicable to the
entire training community, including the OPFORs at all of the combat training
centers (CTCs), the TRADOC schools, and units in the field. It provides an
OPFOR that believes that, through adaptive use of all available forces and capa-
bilities, it can create opportunities that, properly leveraged, can allow it to fight
and win, even against a technologically superior opponent such as the United
States. |
7-100.1 | 18 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
BASELINE
As a baseline for developing specific OPFORs for specific training environments,
this manual describes an OPFOR that is representative of the forces of con-
temporary nation-states. This composite of the characteristics of real-world
military and paramilitary forces provides a framework for the realistic and
relevant portrayal of capabilities and actions that U.S. armed forces might
face in the COE.
The State
For this composite of real-world threats, the manual refers to the country in
question as “the State.”6 It describes this artificial country in terms of the eleven
critical variables of the COE. As the baseline for the contemporary OPFOR that
is representative of real-world forces, the State is not a peer competitor of the
United States. However, it is a dominant power in its region of the world and is
capable of challenging U.S. interests there. The general characteristics of the State
could fit a number of different types of potential adversaries in a number of different
scenarios.
Like most countries in the world, the State does not design its forces just to fight
the United States or its allies. It designs them principally to deal with regional
threats and to take advantage of regional opportunities. Therefore, the State’s
national security strategy (including its doctrine, force design, and investment
strategy) focuses primarily on maintaining and expanding its position as a re-
gional power. It develops its military forces in a way that ensures conventional
power superiority over any of its regional neighbors. These forces, together with
the State’s other instruments of power, make it a dominant force in its region.
At the same time, the State is aware that aggressive pursuit of its regional goals
might lead to intervention by a major power, such as the United States, from out-
side the region. To the extent possible, therefore, it invests in technologies and
capabilities that have utility against both regional and extraregional opponents.
The basic force structure of the OPFOR is the same for either type of threat. The
State must go to waror continue the war after extraregional interventionwith
whatever it had going into the war.
When an extraregional power intervenes with sufficient force to overmatch the
State’s, the State has to adapt its patterns of operation. It realizes that the forces
and technology that allow it to dominate its neighbors may not be a match for the
modern, high-technology forces of a wealthy extraregional power like the United
Statesat least not in a head-to-head conventional confrontation. However, it can
use those means in creative and adaptive ways. To the maximum extent possible,
the State plans and trains for adaptive operations and how it will make the transi-
tion to them. It is the combination of the State’s capabilities and its adaptive strat-
egy, operations, and tactics that make it believe it can take on such an extraregional
force and win.
6
In specific U.S. Army training environments, the generic name of the State may give way to other (fictitious)
country names such as Atlantis, Upper Flambokia, or Westland. |
7-100.1 | 19 | ______________________________________________________________________________Introduction
Broadened Context
At the strategic level, the State’s ability to challenge U.S. interests includes not
only the military and paramilitary forces of the State, but also the State’s dip-
lomatic-political, informational, and economic instruments of power. Rarely
would any country engage the United States or a U.S.-led coalition with purely
military means. It is also possible that the State could be part of an alliance or
coalition, in which case the OPFOR could include allied forces. These nation-
state forces may also operate in conjunction with non-state actors such as insur-
gents, terrorists, and drug or criminal organizations.
The FM 7-100 series, as a whole, covers not only the military and paramilitary forces
of the State, but also other, non-state paramilitary and nonmilitary organizations
present in the State’s region of the world. An extraregional power becoming involved
in that region may have to deal with any or all of these types of military, paramilitary,
and nonmilitary elements. It might encounter these elements individually or, more
likely, in combination with other such elements. Whether these elements operate in
concert or independently, they are an important part of the COE.
Trainers need to consider the total OE and all instruments of power at the
disposal of the State and the OPFORnot just the military element, but also
diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means. For a nation-state,
these are instruments of national power. For non-state actors whose forces are
paramilitary in nature, the other three instruments of power are generally
present to one degree or another. Together, these instruments represent the
power that actors can bring to bear against the United States.
Terminology
Since OPFOR baseline doctrine is a composite of how various forces worldwide
might operate, it uses some terminology that is in common with that of other
countries, including the United States. Whenever possible, OPFOR doctrine uses
established U.S. military termswith the same meaning as defined in FM 1-02
(formerly FM 101-5-1) and/or JP 1-02. However, the FM 7-100 series also in-
cludes some concepts for things the OPFOR does differently from how the U.S.
military does them. Even if various real-world foreign countries might use the
same concept, or something very close to it, different countries might give it dif-
ferent names. In those cases, the OPFOR manuals either use a term commonly
accepted by one or more other countries or create a new, “composite” term that
makes sense and is clearly understandable. In any case where an operational or
tactical term is not further specifically defined in the FM 7-100 series, it is used
in the same sense as in the U.S. definition.
FLEXIBILITY
As a training tool, the OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative sparring
partner, capable of stressing any or all battlefield operating systems of the U.S.
force. However, it also must be tailored to meet training requirements.
In the OPFOR baseline presented in this manual, the FM authors often say that
the State or the OPFOR “may” be able to do something or “might” or “could” do
something. They often use the progressive forms of verbs to say that the State has a
“growing” economy or “is developing” a capability or “is continually modernizing.” |
7-100.1 | 20 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
The State participates in the global market, which can allow it to acquire things
it cannot produce domestically. Such descriptions give scenario writers consider-
able flexibility in determining what the State or the OPFOR actually has at a
given point in time or a given place on the battlefieldin a particular scenario.
The composite example of this baseline may meet the OPFOR requirements for
many U.S. Army training environments. For cases that require an OPFOR based
on a type of nation-state with characteristics different from those of the State de-
scribed in this manual, this baseline provides a framework from which trainers
can develop an OPFOR appropriate for their particular training requirements.
The OPFOR must be flexible enough to fit various training requirements. It must
be scalable and tunable. Depending on the training requirement, the OPFOR
may be a large, medium, or small force. Its technology may be state-of-the-art,
relatively modern, obsolescent, obsolete, or an uneven combination of those cate-
gories. Its ability to sustain operations may be limited or robust.
THINKING
This manual describes how the OPFOR thinks, especially how it thinks about
fighting its regional neighbors and/or the United States. This thinking deter-
mines basic OPFOR operationsas well as strategy and tactics, which are the
subjects of other manuals in this series. It drives OPFOR organizational
structures and equipment acquisition or adaptation. It also determines how
the nation-state OPFOR that represents the armed forces of the State would
interact with other, non-state actors that may be present in the COE.
Just because the U.S. force knows something about how the OPFOR has fought
in the past does not mean that the OPFOR will always continue to fight that
way. A thinking OPFOR will learn from its own successes and failures, as well as
those of its potential enemies. It will adapt its thinking, its makeup, and its way
of fighting to accommodate these lessons learned. It will continuously look for
innovative ways to deal with the United States and its armed forces.
ADAPTABILITY
Like all military forces, the OPFOR has a basic, conventional design for dealing
with forces with capabilities equal to or inferior to its own. Prior to a U.S. force
becoming involved, therefore, the OPFOR can use the application or threat of ap-
plication of that conventional design to dominate or influence its regional neighbors.
The OPFOR plans these operations well in advance and tries to execute them as
rapidly as possible, in order to preclude regional alliances or outside intervention.
The OPFOR has developed its doctrine, force structure, and capabilities with an
eye toward employing them against both regional and extraregional opponents, if
necessary. It has thought about and trained for how to adapt once an extraregional
force becomes engaged. It has included this adaptability in its doctrine in the
form of general principles, based on its perceptions of the United States and
other threats to its goals and aspirations. It will seek to avoid types of operations
and environments for which U.S. forces are optimized. During the course of con-
flict, it will make further adaptations, based on experience and opportunity. |
7-100.1 | 21 | ______________________________________________________________________________Introduction
When a U.S. force or a U.S.-led coalition first begins to deploy into theater, the
OPFOR will seek to disrupt the deployment and thus create opportunity. In such
cases, the conventional design the OPFOR used in regionally-focused operations
may still provide the framework for military operations against an advanced ex-
traregional force. The OPFOR will not shy away from the use of military means
against such an opponent, so long as the risk is commensurate with potential
gains. As a U.S. or coalition force builds up power in the region, the OPFOR must
rely on adaptive applications of its basic design in order to mitigate its disadvan-
tages and exploit its advantages compared to this new opponent.
In general, the contemporary OPFOR will be less predictable than OPFORs in
the past. It will be difficult to template as it adapts and attempts to create oppor-
tunity. Its patterns of operation will change as it achieves success or experiences
failure. OPFOR doctrine might not change, but its way of operating will.
INITIATIVE
Like U.S. Army doctrine, OPFOR doctrine must allow sufficient freedom for bold,
creative initiative in any situation. OPFOR doctrine is descriptive, but not prescrip-
tive; authoritative, but not authoritarian; definitive, but not dogmatic. The OPFOR
that U.S. units encounter in various training venues will not apply this doctrine
blindly or unthinkingly, but will use its experience and assessments to interpolate
from this baseline in light of specific situations. Thus, U.S. units can no longer say
that the OPFOR has to do certain things and cannot do anything that is not ex-
pressly prescribed in established OPFOR doctrine. Doctrine guides OPFOR actions
in support of the State’s objectives; OPFOR leaders apply it with judgment and
initiative.
KEEPING THE COE AND THE OPFOR CONTEMPORARY
The COE is extremely fluid, with rapidly changing regional and global relation-
ships. New actorsboth nations and non-state actorsare constantly appearing
and disappearing from the scene. The OPFOR operational doctrine provided in
this manual should meet most of the U.S. Army’s training needs for the foresee-
able future. During the period covered by the COE, almost anyone who fights the
United States would probably have to use the same kinds of adaptive action as
outlined in this doctrine. As the geopolitical situation, forces, or capabilities
change over time, OPFOR doctrine and its applications will evolve along with
them, to continue to provide the Army a “contemporary” OPFOR. Thus, the
OPFOR will remain capable of presenting a challenge that is appropriate to meet
evolving training requirements at any given point in time. |
7-100.1 | 23 | Chapter 1
Strategic Framework
This chapter describes the State’s national security strategy and how the
State designs campaigns and operations to achieve strategic goals out-
lined in that strategy. This provides the general framework within which the
OPFOR plans and executes military actions at the operational level, which
are the focus of the remainder of this manual. The nature of the State and its
national security strategy are explained in greater detail in FM 7-100.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
1-1. The national security strategy is the State’s vision for itself as a nation
and the underlying rationale for building and employing its instruments of
national power. It outlines how the State plans to use its diplomatic-political,
informational, economic, and military instruments of power to achieve its
strategic goals. Despite the term security, this strategy defines not just what
the State wants to protect or defend, but what it wants to achieve.
NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY
PRESIDENT
MINISTER OF
NATIONAL
SECURITY
MINISTER MINISTER OF MINISTER OF MINISTER MINISTER
OF FOREIGN PUBLIC FINANCE AND OF THE OF
AFFAIRS INFORMATION ECONOMIC AFFAIRS INTERIOR DEFENSE
STRATEGIC
INTEGRATION
DEPARTMENT
MINISTRY MINISTRY OF MINISTRY OF MINISTRY MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN PUBLIC FINANCE AND OF THE OF OTHER
AFFAIRS INFORMATION ECONOMIC AFFAIRS INTERIOR DEFENSE MINISTRIES
GENERAL
STAFF
SUPREME
HIGH COMMAND
Figure 1-1. National Command Authority |
7-100.1 | 24 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY
1-2. The National Command Authority (NCA) exercises overall control of the
application of all instruments of national power in planning and carrying out
the national security strategy. Thus, the NCA includes the cabinet ministers
responsible for those instruments of power: the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Minister of Public Information, Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs,
Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Defense, along with other members
selected by the State’s President, who chairs the NCA. (See Figure 1-1.)
1-3. The President also appoints a Minister of National Security, who heads
the Strategic Integration Department (SID) within the NCA. The SID is the
overarching agency responsible for integrating all the instruments of national
power under one cohesive national security strategy. The SID coordinates the
plans and actions of all State ministries, but particularly those associated
with the instruments of power.
NATIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS
1-4. The NCA determines the State’s strategic goals. The State’s overall goals
are to continually expand its influence within its region and eventually
change its position within the global community. These are the long-term
aims of the State.
1-5. Supporting the overall, long-term, strategic goals, there may be one or
more specific goals, each based on a particular threat or opportunity. Exam-
ples of specific strategic goals might be
• Annexation of territory.
• Economic expansion.
• Destruction of an insurgency.
• Protection of a related minority in a neighboring country.
• Acquisition of natural resources located outside the State’s boundaries.
• Destruction of external weapons, forces, or facilities that threaten the
existence of the State.
• Defense of the State against invasion.
• Preclusion or elimination of outside intervention.
Each of these specific goals contributes to achieving the overall strategic
goals.
FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
1-6. In pursuit of its national security strategy, the State is prepared to con-
duct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action. Each course of action
involves the use of all four instruments of national power, but to different de-
grees and in different ways. The State gives the four types the following names:
• Strategic operationsstrategic-level course of action that uses all in-
struments of power in peace and war to achieve the goals of the State’s na-
tional security strategy by attacking the enemy’s strategic centers of grav-
ity. (See the Strategic Operations section of this chapter for more detail.) |
7-100.1 | 25 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
• Regional operationsstrategic-level course of action (including con-
ventional, force-on-force military operations) against opponents the
State overmatches, including regional adversaries and internal threats.
(See the Regional Operations section of this chapter for more detail.)
• Transition operationsstrategic-level course of action that bridges
the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contains some
elements of both, continuing to pursue the State’s regional goals while
dealing with the development of outside intervention with the potential
for overmatching the State. (See the Transition Operations section of
this chapter for more detail.)
• Adaptive operationsstrategic-level course of action to preserve the
State’s power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that
overmatch the State. (See the Adaptive Operations section of this chap-
ter for more detail.)
Although the State refers to them as “operations,” each of these courses of
action is actually a subcategory of strategy. Each of these types of “opera-
tions” is actually the aggregation of the effects of tactical, operational, and
strategic actions, in conjunction with the other three instruments of national
power, that contribute to the accomplishment of strategic goals. The type(s) of
operations the State employs at a given time will depend on the types of
threats and opportunities present and other conditions in the operational en-
vironment. Figure 1-2 illustrates the State’s basic conceptual framework for
how it could apply its various instruments of national power in the imple-
mentation of its national security strategy.
Peace War
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
Against Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity
REGIONAL
OPERATIONS
TRANSITION
OPERATIONS
ADAPTIVE
OPERATIONS
Against Opponents Against Opponents
the State that Overmatch
Overmatches the State
Figure 1-2. Conceptual Framework for Implementing the State’s National Security Strategy
1-7. Strategic operations are a continuous process not limited to wartime or
preparation for war. Once war begins, they continue during regional, transition, |
7-100.1 | 26 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter
three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain con-
ditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.
1-8. The national security strategy identifies branches, sequels, and contin-
gencies and the role and scope of each type of strategic-level action within
these modifications to the basic strategy. Successful execution of these
branches and sequels can allow the State to resume regional operations and
thus achieve its strategic goals. (See Figure 1-3.)
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
Against Opponents’ Strategic Centers of Gravity
ADAPTIVE
OPERATIONS
Against Regional
Opponents Against Extraregional Opponents
1 State achieves its strategic goals without combat, through strategic
operations that compel other actors to yield to State’s will.
2 State must react to a particular regional threat or seizes an
opportunity to change status quo in region.
3 While strategic operations continue, State achieves its strategic
goals through regional operations against weaker neighbors, without
extraregional intervention.
4 Extraregional power threatens to intervene.
5 State deters extraregional intervention through strategic operations.
6 State achieves its strategic goals after deterring intervention.
7 State unable to deter intervention; begins transition operations.
8 State defeats early-entry forces or causes extraregional forces to
withdraw from region; transitions back to regional operations.
9 Extraregional forces fully deployed and overmatch State forces;
State conducts adaptive operations.
10 Extraregional forces withdraw from region after defeat or stalemate;
State begins transition back to regional operations.
State achieves its strategic goals after extraregional intervention.
1-4
slaoG
cigetartS
seveihcA
etatS
1
REGIONAL and
OPERATIONS 2
3
or
REGIONAL 4 N
OPERATIONS 5 TIO
N
S
6 or
7 A
N SI
A
TIO
or
REGIONAL R R
T P E 8 9
OPERATIONS O
11
10
11 |
7-100.1 | 27 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
1-9. The national security strategy is designed to achieve one or more specific
strategic goals within the State’s region. Therefore, it typically starts with
actions directed at an opponent within the regionan opponent that the
State overmatches in conventional military power, as well as other instru-
ments of power.
1-10. The State will attempt to achieve its ends without resorting to armed
conflict. Accordingly strategic operations are not limited to military means
and usually do not begin with armed conflict. The State may be able to achieve
the desired goal through pressure applied by other-than-military instruments of
power, perhaps with the mere threat of using its superior military power against
the regional opponent. These actions would fall under the general framework of
“strategic operations.”
1-11. When nonmilitary means are not sufficient or expedient, the State may
resort to armed conflict as a means of creating conditions that lead to the de-
sired end state. However, strategic operations continue even if a particular re-
gional threat or opportunity causes the State to undertake “regional operations”
that include military means.
1-12. Prior to initiating armed conflict and throughout the course of armed
conflict with its regional opponent, the State continues to conduct strategic
operations to preclude intervention by outside playersby other regional
neighbors or by an extraregional power that could overmatch the State’s
forces. However, those operations always include branches and sequels for
dealing with the possibility of intervention by an extraregional power.
1-13. When unable to limit the conflict to regional operations, the State is
prepared to engage extraregional forces through “transition and adaptive
operations.” Usually, the State does not shift directly from regional to adap-
tive operations. The transition is incremental and does not occur at a single,
easily identifiable point. If the State perceives intervention is likely, transi-
tion operations may begin simultaneously with regional and strategic opera-
tions. Transition operations overlap both regional and adaptive operations.
Transition operations allow the State to shift to adaptive operations or back to
regional operations. At some point, the State either seizes an opportunity to
return to regional operations, or it reaches a point where it must complete
the shift to adaptive operations. Even after shifting to adaptive operations,
the State tries to set conditions for transitioning back to regional operations.
1-14. If an extraregional power were to have significant forces already de-
ployed in the region prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the State would not
be able to conduct regional operations using its normal, conventional design
without first eliminating those forces. In this case, the State would first use
strategic operationswith all means availableto put pressure on the al-
ready present extraregional force to withdraw from the region or at least re-
main neutral in the regional conflict. Barring that, strategic operations could
still aim at keeping the extraregional power from committing additional
forces to the region and preventing his forces already there from being able to
fully exercise their capabilities. If the extraregional force is still able to intervene,
the rest of the State’s strategic campaign would have to start with adaptive op-
erations. Eventually, the State would hope to move into transition operations. If |
7-100.1 | 28 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
it could neutralize or eliminate the extraregional force, it could finally complete
the transition to regional operations and thus achieve its strategic goals.
STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN
1-15. To achieve one or more specific strategic goals, the NCA would develop
and implement a specific national strategic campaign. Such a campaign is the
aggregate of actions of all the State’s instruments of power to achieve a specific
set of the State’s strategic goals against internal, regional, and/or extraregional
opponents. There would normally be a diplomatic-political campaign, an infor-
mation campaign, and an economic campaign, as well as a military campaign.
All of these must fit into a single, integrated national strategic campaign.
1-16. The NCA will develop a series of contingency plans for a number of dif-
ferent specific strategic goals that it might want or need to pursue. These
contingency plans often serve as the basis for training and preparing the
State’s forces. These plans would address the allocation of resources to a po-
tential strategic campaign and the actions to be taken by each instrument of
national power contributing to such a campaign.
Neutral Allied
Country Country Sea
CH oo us nti tl re y
Area CSo tf
o
r
uU
at
nn tr
e
ee
g ri
ist
c n
sG uro
gal:
e
ncy
Strategic Goal:
Defense Against Invasion
“THE STATE”
Strategic Goal:
Annexation of Territory
Sea
Sea
Figure 1-4. Example of a Strategic Campaign
1-17. Aside from training exercises, the NCA would approve only one strate-
gic campaign for implementation at a given time. Nevertheless, the single
campaign could include more than one specific strategic goal. For instance,
any strategic campaign designed to deal with an insurgency would include
contingencies for dealing with reactions from regional neighbors or an ex-
traregional power that could adversely affect the State and its ability to
achieve the selected goal. Likewise, any strategic campaign focused on a goal
that involves the State’s invasion of a regional neighbor would have to take
into consideration possible adverse actions by other regional neighbors, the |
7-100.1 | 29 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
possibility that insurgents might use this opportunity to take action against
the State, and the distinct possibility that the original or expanded regional
conflict might lead to extraregional intervention. Figure 1-4 shows an exam-
ple of a single strategic campaign that includes three strategic goals. (The
map in this diagram is for illustrative purposes only and does not necessarily
reflect the actual size, shape, or physical environment of the State or its
neighbors.)
NATIONAL STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN PLAN
1-18. The purpose of a national strategic campaign plan (national SCP) is to
integrate all the instruments of national power under a single plan. Even if
the State hoped to achieve the goal(s) of the campaign by nonmilitary means,
the national campaign plan would leverage the influence of its Armed Forces’
strong military presence and provide for the contingency that military force
might become necessary.
1-19. The national SCP is the end result of the SID’s planning effort. Based
on input from all State ministries, this is the plan for integrating the actions
of all instruments of power to set conditions favorable for achieving the cen-
tral goal identified in the national security strategy. The Ministry of Defense
(MOD) is only one of several ministries that provide input and are then re-
sponsible for carrying out their respective parts of the consolidated national plan.
1-20. In waging a national strategic campaign, the State never employs mili-
tary power alone. Military power is most effective when applied in combina-
tion with diplomatic-political, informational, and economic instruments of
power. State ministries responsible for each of the four instruments of power
will develop their own campaign plans as part of the unified national SCP.
1-21. A national SCP defines the relationships among all State organizations,
military and nonmilitary, for the purposes of executing that SCP. The SCP
describes the intended integration, if any, of multinational forces in those in-
stances where the State is acting as part of a coalition.
MILITARY STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN PLAN
1-22. Within the context of the national strategic campaign, the MOD and
General Staff develop and implement a military strategic campaign. During
peacetime, the Operations Directorate of the General Staff is responsible for
developing, staffing, promulgation, and continuing review of the military
SCP. It must ensure that the military plan would end in achieving military
conditions that would fit with the conditions created by the diplomatic-
political, informational, and economic portions of the national plan that are
prepared by other State ministries. Therefore, the Operations Directorate as-
signs liaison officers to other important government ministries.
1-23. Although the State’s Armed Forces (the OPFOR) may play a role in
strategic operations, the focus of their planning and effort is on the military
aspects of regional, transition, and adaptive operations. A military strategic
campaign may include several combined arms, joint, and/or interagency op-
erations. If the State succeeds in forming a regional alliance or coalition,
these operations may also be multinational. |
7-100.1 | 30 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
1-24. The General Staff acts as the executive agency for the NCA, and all
military forces report through it to the NCA. The Chief of the General Staff
(CGS), with NCA approval, defines the theater in which the Armed Forces
will conduct the military campaign and its subordinate operations. He de-
termines the task organization of forces to accomplish the operational-level
missions that support the overall campaign plan. He also determines whether
it will be necessary to form more than one theater headquarters. For most
campaigns, there will be only one theater, and the CGS will serve as thea-
ter commander, thus eliminating one echelon of command at the strategic
level.
1-25. In wartime, the MOD and the General Staff combine to form the Su-
preme High Command (SHC). The Operations Directorate continues to re-
view the military SCP and modify it or develop new plans based on guidance
from the CGS, who commands the SHC. It generates options and contingency
plans for various situations that may arise. Once the CGS approves a particular
plan for a particular strategic goal, he issues it to the appropriate operational-
level commanders.
1-26. The military SCP directs operational-level military forces, and each
command identified in the SCP prepares an operation plan that supports the
execution of its role in that SCP. The SCP assigns forces to operational-level
commands and designates areas of responsibility (AORs) for those com-
mands.
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
1-27. What the State calls “strategic operations” is actually a universal stra-
tegic course of action the State would use to deal with all situationsin
peacetime and war, against all kinds of opponents, potential opponents, or
neutral parties. Strategic operations involve the application of any or all of
the four instruments of national power at the direction of the national-level
decision makers in the NCA. They occur throughout a strategic campaign.
The nature of strategic operations at any particular time corresponds to the
conditions perceived by the NCA. These operations differ from the other op-
erations of a strategic campaign in that they are not limited to wartime and
can transcend the region.
1-28. Strategic operations typically target elements that constitute the en-
emy’s strategic centers of gravitysuch as soldiers’ and leaders’ confidence,
political and diplomatic decisions, public opinion, the interests of private in-
stitutions, national will, and the collective will and commitment of alliances
and coalitions. National will is not just the will to fight, but also the will to
intervene by other than military means.
1-29. The State will employ all means available against the enemy’s centers
of gravity: diplomatic initiatives, information warfare (IW), economic pres-
sure, terrorist attacks, State-sponsored insurgency, direct action by special-
purpose forces (SPF), long-range precision fires, and even weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) against selected targets. These efforts often place non-
combatants at risk and aim to apply diplomatic-political, economic, and
psychological pressure by allowing the enemy no sanctuary. |
7-100.1 | 31 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
1-30. Strategic operations occur continuously, from prior to the outbreak of
war to the post-war period. They can precede war, with the aim of deterring
other regional actors from actions counter to the State’s interests or compel-
ling such actors to yield to the State’s will. Before undertaking regional op-
erations, the State lays plans to prevent outside intervention in the region.
During the course of regional operations, the State uses strategic operations
primarily in defensive ways, in order to prevent other parties from becoming
involved in what it regards as purely regional affairs. At this point, the State
relies primarily on diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means in
a peacetime mode in relation to parties with whom it is not at war.
1-31. If preclusion of outside intervention is not possible, the State continues
to employ strategic operations while conducting transition and adaptive op-
erations. With the beginning of transition operations, the military aspects of
strategic operations become more aggressive, while the State continues to
apply other instruments of power to the full extent possible. The aim becomes
getting the extraregional force to leave or stop deploying additional forces
into the region. Successful strategic operations can bring the war to an end.
1-32. Once war begins, strategic operations become an important, powerful
component of the State’s strategy for total war using “all means necessary.”
What the various instruments of power do and which ones dominate in stra-
tegic operations at a given time depends on the same circumstances that dic-
tate shifts from regional through transition to adaptive operations. In most
cases, the diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means tend to
dominate. During strategic operations, military means are most often used to
complement those other instruments of national power. For example, the
military means are likely to be used against key political or economic centers
or tangible targets whose destruction affects intangible centers of gravity,
rather than against military targets for purely military objectives.
1-33. Even within the military instrument of power, actions considered part
of strategic operations require a conscious, calculated decision and direction
or authorization by the NCA. It may not be readily apparent to outside par-
ties whether specific military actions are part of strategic operations or an-
other strategic course of action occurring simultaneously. In fact, one action
could conceivably fulfill both purposes. For example, a demoralizing military
defeat that could affect the enemy’s strategic centers of gravity could also be
a defeat from an operational or tactical viewpoint. In other cases, a particular
action on the battlefield might not make sense from a tactical or operational
viewpoint, but could achieve a strategic purpose. Its purpose may be to inflict
mass casualties or destroy high-visibility enemy systems in order to weaken
the enemy’s national will to continue the intervention.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
1-34. The State possesses an overmatch in most, and sometimes all, elements
of power against regional opponents. It is able to employ that power in a con-
ventional operational design focused on offensive action. A weaker regional
neighbor may not actually represent a threat to the State, but rather an op-
portunity that the State can exploit. |
7-100.1 | 32 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
1-35. To seize territory or otherwise expand its influence in the region, the
State must destroy a regional enemy’s will and capability to continue the
fight. It will attempt to achieve strategic political or military decision or
achieve specific regional goals as rapidly as possible, in order to preclude re-
gional alliances or outside intervention.
1-36. During regional operations, the State relies on its continuing strategic
operations to preclude or control outside intervention. It tries to keep foreign
perceptions of its actions during a regional conflict below the threshold that
will invite in extraregional forces. The State wants to win the regional con-
flict, but has to be careful how it does so. It works to prevent development of
international consensus for intervention and to create doubt among possible
participants. Still, at the very outset of regional operations, it lays plans and
positions forces to conduct access-control operations in the event of outside
intervention.
1-37. At the military level, regional operations are combined arms, joint, in-
teragency, and/or multinational operations. They are conducted in the State’s
region and, at least at the outset, against a weaker regional opponent. The
State’s doctrine, organization, capabilities, and national security strategy al-
low the OPFOR to deal with regional threats and opportunities primarily
through offensive action.
1-38. The State designs its military forces and employs an investment
strategy that ensures superiority in conventional military power over any
of its regional neighbors. Regionally-focused operations typically involve
“conventional” patterns of operation. However, the term conventional does
not mean that the OPFOR will use only conventional forces and conventional
weapons in such a conflict, nor does it mean that the OPFOR will not use
some adaptive approaches.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
1-39. Transition operations serve as a pivotal point between regional and
adaptive operations. The transition may go in either direction. The fact that
the State begins transition operations does not necessarily mean that it
must complete the transition from regional to adaptive operations (or vice versa).
As conditions allow or dictate, the “transition” could end with the State conduct-
ing the same type of operations as before the shift to transition operations.
1-40. The State conducts transition operations when other regional and/or
extraregional forces threaten the State’s ability to continue regional opera-
tions in a conventional design against the original regional enemy. At the
point of shifting to transition operations, the State still has the ability to ex-
ert all instruments of national power against an overmatched regional en-
emy. Indeed, it may have already defeated its original adversary. However,
its successful actions in regional operations have prompted either other re-
gional actors or an extraregional actor to contemplate intervention. The State
will use all means necessary to preclude or defeat intervention.
1-41. Although the State would prefer to achieve its strategic goals through
regional operations, an SCP has the flexibility to change and adapt if re-
quired. Since the State assumes the possibility of extraregional intervention, |
7-100.1 | 33 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
any SCP will already contain thorough plans for transition operations, as
well as adaptive operations, if necessary.
1-42. When an extraregional force starts to deploy into the region, the bal-
ance of power begins to shift away from the State. Although the State may
not yet be overmatched, it faces a developing threat it will not be able to han-
dle with normal, “conventional” patterns of operation designed for regional
conflict. Therefore, the State must begin to adapt its operations to the chang-
ing threat.
1-43. While the State and the OPFOR as a whole are in the condition of tran-
sition operations, an operational- or tactical-level commander will still re-
ceive a mission statement in plans and orders from higher headquarters stat-
ing the purpose of his actions. To accomplish that purpose and mission, he
will use as much as he can of the conventional patterns of operation that
were available to him during regional operations and as much as he has to of
the more adaptive-type approaches dictated by the presence of an extrare-
gional force.
1-44. Even extraregional forces may be vulnerable to “conventional” opera-
tions during the time they require to build combat power and create support
at home for their intervention. Against an extraregional force that either
could not fully deploy or has been successfully separated into isolated ele-
ments, the OPFOR may still be able to use some of the more conventional
patterns of operation. The State will not shy away from the use of military
means against an advanced extraregional opponent so long as the risk is
commensurate with potential gains.
1-45. Transition operations serve as a means for the State to retain the ini-
tiative and still pursue its overall strategic goal of regional expansion despite
its diminishing advantage in the balance of power. From the outset, one part
of the set of specific goals for any strategic campaign was the goal to defeat
any outside intervention or prevent it from fully materializing. As the State
begins transition operations, its immediate goal is preservation of its instru-
ments of power while seeking to set conditions that will allow it to transition
back to regional operations. Transition operations feature a mixture of offen-
sive and defensive actions that help the OPFOR control the strategic tempo
while changing the nature of conflict to something for which the intervening
force is unprepared. Transition operations can also buy time for the State’s
strategic operations to succeed.
1-46. There are two possible outcomes to transition operations. If the ex-
traregional force suffers sufficient losses or for other reasons must withdraw
from the region, the OPFOR’s operations may begin to transition back to re-
gional operations, again becoming primarily offensive. If the extraregional
force is not compelled to withdraw and continues to build up power in the re-
gion, the OPFOR’s transition operations may begin to gravitate in the other di-
rection, toward adaptive operations. |
7-100.1 | 34 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
1-47. Generally, the State conducts adaptive operations as a consequence of
intervention from outside the region. Once an extraregional force intervenes
with sufficient power to overmatch the State, the full conventional design
used in regionally-focused operations is no longer sufficient to deal with this
threat. The State has developed its doctrine, organization, capabilities, and
strategy with an eye toward dealing with both regional and extraregional op-
ponents. It has already planned how it will adapt to this new and changing
threat and has included this adaptability in its doctrine.
1-48. The State’s immediate goal is survivalas a regime and as a nation.
However, its long-term goal is still the expansion of influence within its re-
gion. In the State’s view, this goal is only temporarily thwarted by the ex-
traregional intervention. Accordingly, planning for adaptive operations fo-
cuses on effects over time. The State believes that patience is its ally and an
enemy of the extraregional force and its intervention in regional affairs.
1-49. The State believes that adaptive operations can lead to several possible
outcomes. If the results do not completely resolve the conflict in the State’s
favor, they may at least allow the State to return to regional operations. Even
a stalemate may be a victory for the State, as long as it preserves enough of
its instruments of power to preserve the regime and lives to fight another day.
1-50. When an extraregional power intervenes with sufficient force to over-
match the State’s, the OPFOR has to adapt its patterns of operation. It still
has the same forces and technology that were available to it for regional op-
erations, but must use them in creative and adaptive ways. It has already
thought through how it will adapt to this new or changing threat in general
terms. (See Principles of Operation Versus an Extraregional Power below.) It has
already developed appropriate branches and sequels to its basic SCP and does
not have to rely on improvisation. During the course of combat, it will make fur-
ther adaptations, based on experience and opportunity.
1-51. Even with the intervention of an advanced extraregional power, the State
will not cede the initiative. It will employ military means so long as this does not
either place the regime at risk or risk depriving it of sufficient force to remain a
regional power after the extraregional intervention is over. The primary objec-
tives are to preserve combat power, to degrade the enemy’s will and capability to
fight, and to gain time for aggressive strategic operations to succeed.
1-52. The OPFOR will seek to conduct adaptive operations in circumstances,
opportunities, and terrain that optimize its own capabilities and degrade
those of the enemy. It will employ a force that is optimized for the terrain or
for a specific mission. For example, it will use its antitank capability, tied to ob-
stacles and complex terrain, inside a defensive structure designed to absorb the
enemy’s momentum and fracture his organizational framework.
1-53. The types of adaptive actions that characterize “adaptive operations” at
the strategic level can also serve the OPFOR well in regional or transition
operationsat least at the tactical and operational levels. However, once an
extraregional force becomes fully involved in the conflict, the OPFOR will
conduct adaptive actions more frequently and on a larger scale. |
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