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3-55.93 | 336 | Appendix H
MALFUNCTIONS
H-8. If a team member's weapon malfunctions, he immediately moves and conducts corrective action
on the bound.
SAFETY
H-9. All team members keep weapons on "Safe" during bounds.
FORMATION
H-10. Team members bound on line so as to not cross into lines of fire.
ASSEMBLY
H-11. Once the team has broken contact, they reassemble on line and move out of the contact area.
CONTACT LEFT OR RIGHT
H-12. The team turns toward the contact, takes a knee, and returns fire. One element bounds back while
the other team suppresses the enemy. The second team bounds back and continues until contact is broken.
Both teams assemble on line and move out of the area (Figure H-3).
Figure H-3. Break contact left, right (diamond or file). |
3-55.93 | 337 | Battle Drills
REACT TO AIR ATTACK
H-13. The first Soldier who hears or sees an aircraft gives the "freeze" signal. The first Soldier who sees
an attacking aircraft alerts, "Aircraft, front (left, right, or rear)." The team moves quickly into a line
formation, well spread out, perpendicular to the aircraft's direction of flight. As each Soldier comes on line,
he goes prone, using available cover. Between attacks, the team should seek better cover and concealment.
If the team leader wants the team to move out of the area, he gives the clock direction and distance
(Figure H-4).
Figure H-4. React to enemy air attack.
H-14. After the team consolidates and reorganizes, it moves to the last rally point. The team should
engage the aircraft only as a last resort. Using the head-on method, they mass fires to engage attacking
aircraft. They engage slow-moving aircraft at 50 meters and fast-moving aircraft at 200 meters. If the team
receives fire, the team leader decides whether to continue the mission, move out of the area, or return fire
on the aircraft.
H-15. Another technique is to disperse into two groups of three Soldiers each or three groups of two
Soldiers each. On sight of the aircraft, the team leader designates a rally point and gives the command to
disperse. On linkup, the team leader assesses the situation and either calls for extraction or continues the
mission. |
3-55.93 | 338 | Appendix H
REACT TO INDIRECT FIRE
H-16. On receiving indirect fire, the team deploys and takes cover. If more rounds impact, the team
leader gives the clock position and the direction and distance to move. The team consolidates while moving
or at a distance given by team leader. Once the team consolidates and reorganizes, it moves out quickly.
The enemy might adjust fires as the team moves. The team should remain oriented on the 12 o'clock
position. They may elect to move to the last rally point or as directed by the team leader. He must also
decide whether to continue the mission or move out of the AO (Figure H-5).
Figure H-5. React to indirect fire or air attack.
REACT TO FLARES
H-17. If the team encounters flares, it should execute the following actions:
GROUND FLARES
H-18. The team moves out of the illuminated area and takes cover. Each Soldier closes his firing eye to
protect his night vision. The team leader decides the next direction to move.
OVERHEAD FLARE WITH WARNING
H-19. The team assumes a prone position--behind concealment, when available--before the flare bursts.
Each Soldier closes his firing eye to protect his night vision.
OVERHEAD FLARE WITHOUT WARNING
H-20. The team gets into a prone position, making the most use of nearby cover, concealment, and
shadows until the flare burns out. Each Soldier closes his firing eye to protect his night vision. The team
leader gives the direction of movement.
BREAK FROM HIDE OR SURVEILLANCE SITE
H-21. When a hide or surveillance site is compromised, the element involved might have to execute a
breakout drill. The drill must be well rehearsed to ensure speed, a base of fire, screening, and survivability. |
3-55.93 | 339 | Battle Drills
The type of breakout drill used depends on the type of site and the number of personnel in the site. Proper
rehearsals determine the best methods of site construction and the materials needed for a breakout. After
constructing the site, the team employs M18 Claymores and smoke to assist execution of the drill.
• Emplace smoke grenades in the ground around the site so they can be activated with a pull cord
instead of throwing them after clearing overhead cover.
• Rig Claymores in tandem for one-step activation.
• Keep equipment packed at all times. Prepare an assault pack with all of the site's
mission-essential equipment.
H-22. Upon site completion, the leader visually recons the immediate vicinity and designates covered
and concealed positions for each team member. The leader designates responsibilities and order of
movement from the time claymores are detonated. This helps eliminate confusion and increase battle drill
speed and effectiveness.
H-23. When compromise is inevitable, the element notifies other team members not in the position of
the situation. Claymores are rigged to all detonate at one time. Smoke grenades are thrown and each
Soldier moves to his designated covered and concealed position, and then he lays down a base of fire to
cover bounding team members. After the breakout, the element links up with the rest of the team or
continues the mission (Figures H-6A through H-6D, this page through B-11). |
3-55.93 | 340 | Appendix H
Figure H-6A. Break contact from hide or surveillance site. |
3-55.93 | 341 | Battle Drills
Figure H-6B. Break contact from hide or surveillance site (continued). |
3-55.93 | 342 | Appendix H
Figure H-6C. Break contact from hide or surveillance site (continued). |
3-55.93 | 343 | Battle Drills
Figure H-6D. Break contact from hide or surveillance site (continued). |
3-55.93 | 345 | Appendix I
Tracking and Countertracking
The LRS teams must learn crucial tracking skills and techniques for use while in
enemy territory. This allows them to provide immediate intelligence on the frequency
and flow of enemy traffic on a trail. Tracking is also useful when a LRS team
conducts a PR mission to retrieve a downed pilot.
Good tracking skills enhance countertracking skills, and good countertracking skills
assist in the success or failure of a mission by allowing the team to effectively evade
anyone tracking them while in enemy territory.
Both skill sets increase the Soldier's general awareness and reduces the chance of
being caught off guard.
CONCEPTS OF TRACKING
I-1. To become a tracker, the LRS Soldier must develop and refine traits such as patience, persistence,
acute observation, good memory, and attention to detail. These all help when tracking signs weaken and
the tracker must rely on intuition. As he evaluates sign, he forms an opinion about the enemy's training,
equipment, and morale. Six factors help the tracker form a picture of the enemy.
DISPLACEMENT-TYPE SIGN
I-2. "To displace" means "to move something from its original position." Thus, "displacement" means
"the act of displacing" or "the signs or evidence that something has moved."
Survey Area
I-3. The tracker looks for displacement signs in a full 15-meter deep, 180-degree arc and up to the
height of a tall man (Figure I-1). He evaluates all of the signs for trends and patterns.
Figure I-1. Areas surveyed for indicators by tracker.
Human Passage
I-4. Some displacement type signs that indicate the likely presence of other humans include footprints;
scraped and broken vegetation; bits of thread or clothing on the ground or on vegetation; limbs freshly |
3-55.93 | 346 | Appendix I
broken or grass bent over on a windless day; the sudden excited cries of animals or sounds of sudden
movement; disturbed insect life; and upturned rocks.
Armed Soldier
I-5. A footprint, found near a waist-high scuffmark on a tree, can indicate the passage of an armed
Soldier (Figure I-2).
Figure I-2. Examples of displacement.
Footgear
I-6. A footprint can reveal what footgear the enemy is wearing, if any; the lack of proper equipment;
the direction of movement; the number and gender of people moving and their rate of movement; the
weight of their loads; the amount of time passed since they made the track; and whether they know they are
being tracked (Figure I-3).
Rapid Movement
I-7. If the footprints are deep and the pace long, the party is moving fast. Long strides and deep prints,
with toe prints deeper than heel prints, indicate that they are running.
Heavy Load
I-8. If the prints are deep, short, and widely spaced, with signs of scuffing or shuffling, the party is
probably carrying a heavy load.
Gender
I-9. To determine the gender of the party, study the sizes and positions of the footprints. Women tend
to walk with their toes pointed inward, whereas men usually walk with their feet pointed straight ahead or
outward. Women's prints and their strides are usually shorter than those of men.
Backstep
I-10. If a party knows or suspects that someone is following them, they might try to hide their tracks.
Parties walking backwards have a short, irregular stride. The prints will have an unusually deep toe, and
the soil will be kicked backward, confirming the direction of movement. |
3-55.93 | 347 | Tracking and Countertracking
Figure I-3. Types of footprints.
Box Method
I-11. To use the 36-inch-box method, mark off a 30- to 36-inch cross-section of the trail, count the
prints in the box, then divide by two to determine the number of parties who used the trail. The M16 rifle is
39 inches long. You can use it to measure (Figure I-4).
Identify a Key Print
I-12. The figure shows the use of a left boot print as the key print. In this situation, you draw a line
from the heel across the trail.
Move Forward
I-13. Move to the key print for the opposite foot and draw a line through the instep. Your two lines
form two opposite sides of a box. The edges of the trail form the other two sides. Together, the four lines
form a box.
Count
I-14. Count every whole or partial print that falls inside of the box. Because any person who was
walking normally would have stepped in the box at least once, the number of footprints in the box will help
you to determine the total number of people in the party. |
3-55.93 | 348 | Appendix I
Figure I-4. Box method for determination of number of footprints.
STAINS
I-15. One obvious example of staining is blood on the ground or foliage. Other examples include mud
dragged by footgear and crushed vegetation on a hard object. Crushed berries also cause stains, and,
finally, the movement of water makes it cloudy.
EFFECTS OF WEATHER
I-16. The weather may help or hinder the tracker to determine the age of signs. Wind, snow, rain, and
sunlight all affect tracking. Assess recent weather aids in determining the age of a track. A tracker can use
the last rain or strong wind as a measure to show the amount of time it has been there.
LITTER
I-17. A poorly disciplined unit leaves a trail of litter.
DECEPTION TECHNIQUES
I-18. Deception applies when the followed party tries to slow the tracker by, for example, leaving false
trails, walking backwards, brushing out trails, splitting up, fading out, fanning out, and walking over rocky
ground or through streams.
INTERPRETATION OF COMBAT INFORMATION
I-19. The tracker makes a mental image of his quarry based on his learned concepts. When reporting to
the commander, he reports what he believes, but should not state it as a fact. The commander considers the
facts alongside the tracker's beliefs and any other information he has. |
3-55.93 | 349 | Tracking and Countertracking
ORGANIZATION OF TRACKING TEAM
I-20. Tracking units can be any size as long as they have these three elements: a leader, a tracker, and
security. Often tracking teams consist of two types:
TRACKER AND COVER PERSON
I-21. Each team member is equally skilled. They can move fast because they know each other's abilities
and weaknesses and can compensate for each other.
TRACKING TEAM LEADER, TRACKER, RTO, AND TWO SECURITY PERSONNEL
I-22. The advantages of a tracking team with this many members are increased observation and
security. The disadvantage is the size of the team.
TRACKER AND DOG TEAM
I-23. Trackers work more effectively with dog teams than without.
TRAITS OF A TRACKING DOG
I-24. The dog(s) follows a trail faster and can continue to track at night. Despite years of domestication,
dogs retain most of the traits of their wild ancestors. If put to controlled use, these traits are effective when
tracking.
Endurance
I-25. A dog can hold a steady pace and effectively track for up to eight hours. The speed can be up to
10 miles per hour, only limited by the speed of the handler. The speed and endurance can be further
increased by the use of vehicles and extra teams.
Mental Characteristics
I-26. Dogs are curious by nature. They can also be aggressive or lazy, cowardly or brave. Dogs' sensory
traits are what make them seem intelligent.
Aggressiveness
I-27. Tracking dogs are screened and trained to function as aggressive trackers, eager to please their
handlers.
SENSES OF A TRACKING DOG
I-28. Knowledge of the dog's senses and how he uses them helps the evader to think ahead of the dog.
Sight
I-29. A dog's vision is the lesser of the sensing abilities. He can see in black and white and has trouble
spotting static objects at more than 50 yards. He can spot moving objects at considerable distances, but he
does not look up unless he is trained. His night vision is no better than that of a human.
Sound
I-30. Dogs can hear quieter and higher frequencies than humans. A dangerous problem for the evader is
the dog's ability to hear. Even more dangerous is their ability to locate the source of a sound. Dogs can
hear 40 times better than a human.
Smell
I-31. The dog's sense of smell is about 900 times better than a human. It is by far the greatest asset to
the tracker and largest threat to the evader. Dogs can detect minute substances or disturbances on the
ground, or even in the air. Using distracting or irritating odors such as CS powder or pepper only bothers a
dog for 3 to 5 minutes. After the dog discharges the odor, he can pick up a cold trail even quicker. The dog |
3-55.93 | 350 | Appendix I
smells odors from the ground and air and forms scent pictures. He puts together these scent pictures from
several sources.
Individual Scent
I-32. This is the most important scent when it comes to tracking. Vapors from body secretions work
their way through the evader's shoes onto the ground. Sweat from other parts of the body rubs off onto
vegetation and other objects. Scent is even left in the air.
Reinforcing Scent
I-33. Objects that reinforce the scent as it relates to the evader are introduced to the dog. Some
reinforcing scents could be on the evader's clothing or boots, or they could be made of the same material as
is used in his clothing. Even the smell of boot polish can help a dog find a person.
Ecological Scent
I-34. For the dog, the most important scent comes from the earth itself. The strongest smell comes from
disturbances in ecology such as crushed insects, bruised vegetation, and broken ground. Over varied
terrain, dogs can smell particles and vapors carried by the evader wherever he walks.
UNFAVORABLE TRACKING CONDITIONS
I-35. Few conditions are ideal for dog tracker teams. During training, the teams learn the difficulties
that they will face and develop skills to cope with them:
Unverified Start Point
I-36. The dogs may follow the wrong route or scent.
Heat, Low Humidity, and Dry Ground
I-37. These all cause rapid evaporation of scent.
Wind
I-38. Wind disperses scent, causing the dog to track downwind.
Heavy Rain
I-39. This washes scent away.
Distracting Scents
I-40. These divert the dog's attention from the trail. Some distracting scents are blood, meat, manure,
farmland, and populated areas.
Elements that Cover Scent
I-41. Some elements in nature cover the scent picture partially or completely. For example, sand can
blow over the tracks and help to disguise it; snow and ice can form over the track and make it nearly
impossible to follow; and water can completely obscure a trail.
FAVORABLE TRACKING CONDITIONS
I-42. Some conditions favor the teams:
Fresh Scent
I-43. Scent is probably the most important factor for dog tracker teams. Fresh scent increases the
chance of success.
Verified Starting Point
I-44. Introducing a definite scent to the dogs early on increases the chance that the dogs will follow the
correct trail. |
3-55.93 | 351 | Tracking and Countertracking
Unclean Evader
I-45. An unclean evader leaves a more distinctive scent.
Fast Moving Evader
I-46. A fast moving evader causes more ground disturbances than a slower moving evader and, because
he is sweating more than the slower mover, he also leaves a stronger scent trail.
Night and Early Morning
I-47. At these times, the air is thicker, so scent lasts longer.
Cool, Cloudy Weather
I-48. This limits evaporation of scent.
Lack of Wind
I-49. This keeps the scent close to the ground. It also keeps it from spreading around, allowing the dog
to follow the correct route.
Thick Vegetation
I-50. This restricts the dissemination of scent and holds the smell.
COUNTERTRACKING
I-51. To avoid or evade the enemy, the LRS team must constantly use countertracking techniques.
Knowledge of tracking is probably the best way to successfully evade trackers. Knowledge of trackers and
dog teams greatly assists the survivor when evading the enemy. The two main types of trackers and
methods of evading each follow:
Visual Trackers
I-52. Visual trackers cue, obviously, on visible signs. Evading them requires that you reduce visual
signs and confuse the tracker(s):
Outdistance the Tracker
I-53. Put time and distance between you and the tracker. This increases the chance that the track will
disappear or the tracker team will track too slowly to keep up with you (the team).
Change Direction Frequently
I-54. Change direction often--at least every 1,000 meters--and cover your changes. This can confuse
less skillful trackers and buy you some time. If a tracker picks up sign, he can send a party ahead as far as
he feels confident that the tracks may be found on a track trap such as road or muddy bank. Track traps
allow trackers to gain time and distance on the evaders. Methodical tracking is slow and arduous. By
changing direction, you can prevent these cutting parties from finding sign where they expect it and can
enlarge the area that the tracker must cover. If you must cross a track trap such as a road, approach at an
off-angle to your azimuth and cross the road or track trap. After crossing, go a short distance, and then
change direction sharply, carefully covering the signs.
Use Streams for Deception
I-55. Approach a stream at an off-angle. Move downstream for 100 to 200 meters, leaving false trails
every so often. At the end of the false trail, leave a set of tracks and countertrack them just enough that the
tracks can be seen just barely. This will make the tracker think that he has found the right set of prints. Find
a place to enter the stream such as a log and move in the opposite direction from where you entered. Go to
a place where you can leave the stream without leaving sign and do so. This will buy you time, because the
trackers will have to check out false trails and scour the banks for tracks. |
3-55.93 | 352 | Appendix I
Move on Hard Surfaces
I-56. Any surface that is too hard to retain the indentations of feet makes visual tracking almost
impossible. Ensure that the soles of your footwear are as clean as possible to avoid leaving deposits on the
surface. Enter the hard-surfaced area from an off-angle, and leave as little sign as possible. Even as little as
100 meters of hard surface can gain you a great amount of time over a tracker team.
Camouflage Sign
I-57. Any deliberate attempt at camouflage will slow any following parties by making them look harder
for sign. It will also make the aging of sign more difficult. The best technique is to leave as little sign as
possible. This is an individual responsibility. One person at the rear of the formation cannot cover all the
sign left by a team of six. Each person must take special care at track traps and things such as ant mounds
that leave definite signs for trackers. When crossing roads or track traps, try to step in the footprints of the
Soldiers before you. This will make the job of countertracking for the last Soldiers easier. If you cannot
completely camouflage the tracks, try to age them by brushing them or sprinkling debris in them.
Walk Backwards
I-58. Walking backwards produces a different type of print than walking forward, but only the most
skillful trackers will pick up the difference. Used with other deception methods, this one can create some
confusion and buy some time.
Split Up the Team
I-59. Multiple sets of tracks slow the tracker team, because following six sets of prints takes much
longer than following one set. The team can then link up at a rally or rendezvous site. This is a great
technique for use in tall grass or other areas where leaving tracks is unavoidable. Animal tracks increase
the confusion.
Use Animal Trails
I-60. Wildlife that shares trails with the team will soon obscure any signs of human passage.
Set Booby Traps
I-61. Even if the tracker team fails to detonate the device, they will become more cautious. A few hasty
devices such as a grenade and trip wire will slow them down considerably. The more they encounter, the
slower they will move.
Dog Trackers
I-62. Dogs track by scent, so countertracking against them is more difficult than countertracking a
visual tracker. One of the main ways to defeat a dog is to defeat his handler. A dog is only as effective as
the handler allows:
Change Direction Frequently
I-63. One way to defeat the handler is to change direction frequently. A relatively inexperienced
handler might perceive the dog's resulting frequent direction changes as a sign of indecisiveness. He might
then think that the dog has lost the scent. Changing direction frequently in difficult terrain such as brush
has the added advantage of entangling dog and handler, thus fatiguing and stressing them.
Use Hard Surfaces
I-64. Dogs track best on loose textured surfaces. Hard surfaces seldom retain scent as well. Use these as
is tactically feasible. The effect of this technique depends on the experience of the dog.
Travel in More Frequented Areas
I-65. While not a preferred technique for a LRS team, traveling in more frequented areas might be
necessary to throw dogs off the scent. Having to differentiate between scents can cause them to lose the
scent of the team. |
3-55.93 | 353 | Tracking and Countertracking
Travel in Streams
I-66. While traveling in streams, avoid contact with anything that could catch and reinforce your scent
such as a branch or rock.
METHODS OF AVOIDING DETECTION
I-67. To avoid detection--
Wear Common Footwear
I-68. Some types of soles, such as the ripple type, are uncommon, which allows for easier tracking. Flat
soles leave less sign than treaded soles, but are impractical for traveling over rough terrain. Wearing
sandbags over boots reduces sign. However, burlap rips off and leaves telltale sign, so watch out for this
should you choose this method.
Leave No Scent
I-69. Avoid leaving scent. While in a position or on the move, leave as little scent picture as possible.
Food, blood, urine, and feces all leave strong, reinforcing scents for a search dog. Be especially careful in
areas where you must remain for some time and in areas that you know are patrolled by dog teams.
Behave Unpredictably
I-70. Go against everything that human nature tells you to do. Go into difficult terrain and behave as
most people moving through such an area would not do.
Practice Tracking
I-71. Know your enemy. Practice tracking and you will notice things that you should avoid doing when
you are the one being tracked. For the team to successfully countertrack as a unit, each team member must
have a basic working knowledge of tracking. |
3-55.93 | 355 | Appendix J
Night Operations
Night-fighting skills are necessary and are combat multipliers. Infantry forces use
these skills to gain tactical and psychological advantages. Night operations do not
rely on technology for success--commanders can plan and execute them with or
without the use of night vision devices. In fact, for LRSU, night operations are
the norm.
This appendix lists the psychological, physiological, and physical effects of
night-fighting. It also discusses the techniques used to maintain direction, control,
and surprise. Some of these apply in other limited visibility conditions such as fog,
rain, snow, and sandstorms.
NIGHT VISION
J-1. At night, the eye uses spiral eye cells called rods. These cells cannot differentiate color, and are
easily blinded by light. This creates a central blind spot, which causes the viewer to miss larger objects as
distances increase.
PROTECTION OF NIGHT VISION
J-2. Soldiers who work and perform tasks in daylight experience a reduction in night vision. Exposure
to intense sunlight for two to five hours significantly decreases visual sensitivity for up to five additional
hours. Sunlight magnified by reflective surfaces such as sand or snow reduces the rate of adaptability to the
dark and it reduces general night vision even more. These effects are cumulative and may persist for
several days. Consequently, Soldiers scheduled for night operations should wear military, neutral-density
(N-15) sunglasses (or the equivalent) in bright sunlight.
NIGHT-VISION SCANNING
J-3. Soldiers use the night-vision-scanning technique to overcome physiological limitations and reduce
illusions. It also protects their night vision and dark adaptation capabilities. The night-vision-scanning
technique involves scanning slowly and regularly from right to left or from left to right (Figure J-1).
Granted, this is the same as scanning in daylight. The difference is that, at night, Soldiers must also avoid
looking directly at faintly visible objects. |
3-55.93 | 356 | Appendix J
Figure J-1. Typical scanning patterns.
OFF-CENTER VISION
J-4. Looking straight at an object (using central vision) works in daylight, but not at night. This is due
to the aforementioned central blind spot. To compensate for this blind spot, Soldiers use off-center
(peripheral) vision. In other words, instead of looking directly at an object, they look 10 degrees above,
below, or to either side of it (Figure J-2).
Figure J-2. Off-center viewing technique. |
3-55.93 | 357 | Night Operations
ADAPTATION TO THE DARK
J-5. Adaptation to the dark means that as darkness increases, so does visual sensitivity. Just like the
aperture in a camera, the pupil opens to let in more light. Soldiers are unique, so they adapt to darkness at
slightly different degrees and rates. After the first 30 minutes in the dark, visual sensitivity maxes out (to
about 10,000 times that of normal), and it increases little after that time.
• Visual sensitivity in the dark is affected by exposure to bright lights such as matches,
flashlights, flares, and vehicle headlights. Full recovery from this exposure might take up to 45
minutes.
• Use of night vision goggles impedes dark adaptation. However, if a Soldier adapts to the dark
before he dons the goggles, then he will adapt to the dark fully about two minutes after
removing the goggles.
• Color perception decreases as light decreases. Soldiers can distinguish light and dark colors
only to the degree of reflected light intensity.
• Darkness reduces visual acuity to one-seventh of daylight levels, so Soldiers can see only
large objects.
BLEACHED-OUT EFFECT
J-6. Even when the Soldier practices off-center viewing, the image of an object that he views for more
than two to three seconds tends to bleach out into one solid color. As a result, he can no longer see the
object, which can increase operational risk. To overcome this effect, the Soldier must know about this
phenomenon and avoid looking at any object for more than two or three seconds. By shifting his eyes from
one off-center point to another, he can continue to see the object in his peripheral vision.
SHAPE OR SILHOUETTE
J-7. At night, Soldiers must identify objects by their shapes or silhouettes. Knowing the architectural
designs of structures common to the AO determines the success of this technique. For example, in the US,
a church is often characterized by a high roof and steeple, but churches elsewhere have different
architectures.
LIGHT SOURCES AND DISTANCES
J-8. Table J-1 shows how far the naked eye can detect light sources at night.
Table J-1. Light sources and distances.
Sources Distances
Vehicle headlight 4.0 to 8.0 kilometers
Muzzle flash from single cannon 4.0 to 5.0 kilometers
Muzzle flash from small-arms weapon 1.5 to 2.0 kilometers
Bonfire 6.0 to 8.0 kilometers
Flashlight 0.0 to 2.0 kilometers
Lighted match 0.0 to 1.5 kilometers
Lighted cigarette 0.5 to 0.8 kilometers
Note: From the air, these distances can increase two to three times. |
3-55.93 | 358 | Appendix J
HEARING
J-9. Hearing is more acute in the dark for several reasons: mental concentration increases; background
noises tend to diminish; and, lower temperatures and higher humidity carry sound farther. Practice and
training help the Soldier overcome fear of night sounds. Training helps him to discriminate (distinguish)
multiple sounds, faint sounds, and the directions from which sounds originate. Table J-2 shows how far
away the Soldier can hear particular sounds at night.
Table J-2. Sounds and distances.
Source Distance
Cannon shot 0.0 to 15.0 kilometers
Single shot from a rifle 2.0 to 3.0 kilometers
Automatic weapons fire 3.0 to 4.0 kilometers
Tank movement
On a dirt road 0.0 to 2.0 kilometers
On a highway 3.0 to 4.0 kilometers
Motor vehicle movement
On a dirt road 0.0 to 500.0 kilometers
On a highway 0.0 to 1.0 kilometers
Movement of troops on foot
On a dirt road 0.0 to 300.0 meters
On a highway 0.0 to 600.0 meters
Small-arms weapon loading 0.0 to 500.0 meters
Metal on metal 0.0 to 300.0 meters
Conversation between a few men 0.0 to 300.0 meters
Steps of a single Soldier 0.0 to 40.0 meters
Axe blow, sound of saw 0.0 to 500.0 meters
Blows of shovels and pickaxes 0.0 to 1,000.0 meters
Screams 0.0 to 1,500.0 meters
Oars on water 0.0 to 2,000.0 meters
SMELL
J-10. Smell is the Soldier's least used sense. Typically, he only uses two percent of its potential.
Different diets produce different human odors. For example, habitual meat eaters smell different from
habitual vegetarians. Most enemy have different diets from those of US Soldiers. Once US Soldiers learn
the enemy's characteristic odor, they can easily detect him at night. Practice improves skill and confidence.
J-11. Facing into the wind at a 45-degree angle makes sensing odors easier. The Soldier relaxes,
breathes normally, sniffs sharply, thinks about specific odors, and concentrates. Table J-3 shows the
distances at which the human nose can typically sense particular odors. |
3-55.93 | 359 | Night Operations
Table J-3. Odor sources and distances.
SOURCE DISTANCE
Diesel fuel 0.0 to 500.0 meters
Cigarette smoke 0.0 to 150.0 meters
Heat tab 0.0 to 300.0 meters
FATIGUE
J-12. Too much work and too little sleep make for a tired Soldier, especially in conditions of great
stress. Tired Soldiers affect the unit's capabilities. Following a work-rest schedule can help prevent
collective fatigue. It builds-in recovery time to maintain unit effectiveness. Leaders--
• Ensure that each Soldier sleeps or rests during part of each of his off-shift periods.
• Rotates cross-trained Soldiers through various duties to reduce errors.
• Should assign two Soldiers to each job that requires discrimination between factors, such as OP
procedures or writing and encrypting messages.
• Can experiment until he finds the best schedules. A four-hours-on, four-hours-off schedule
works in good weather; a two-hours-on, four-hours-off schedule works better for bad weather.
Other schedules can also help. No schedule suits everyone, but a particular schedule might
work best for a particular team.
J-13. Sleep order depends on task seriousness, complexity, and tedium level. For example, team leaders
and RTOs might rate Priority 1 or 2 in this system. So, if someone has to miss sleep to check the OP, the
team leader might check it once, his assistant twice, and an observer thrice. The team leader must get the
most sleep, since he makes the most serious decisions and processes the most complex information.
J-14. Some Soldiers operate at their greatest efficiency early in their awake cycle, and vice versa.
Leaders try to have decision makers perform their most critical tasks when they tend to think most clearly.
Leaders evaluate and plan this ahead of time.
CAUTION
The intense concentration required to use night vision devices
can degrade the other senses. Leaders should prepare Soldiers for
night operations by having them use all of their senses. On some
operations, this might require that some of them avoid using night
vision devices.
SELECTION OF ROUTE
J-15. The leader determines the route for night movement based on METT-TC. Since more than one
route might satisfy METT-TC, leaders should select the easiest one to navigate. Night travel is strenuous,
and often done when Soldiers are tired. This adds to physical and psychological stress. Simple navigation
is easier to direct and control.
J-16. He analyzes the selected route farther using the factors of OAKOC. METT-TC might weight
some of these factors, such as terrain, cover, or avenues of approach, over other factors.
J-17. Before analyzing the route, the leader divides it into segments or legs. Each leg starts with a
checkpoint and ends with a change in direction or prominent terrain feature. The leader orients and controls
the team's movement on the checkpoints along the route. He uses OAKOC to analyze each leg, and to |
3-55.93 | 360 | Appendix J
determine probable hasty ambush sites, likely areas for enemy movement, and locations with improved
observation.
J-18. The leader also identifies a contiguous feature, or catchpoint, such as a river, road, or ridge, on the
far side of each checkpoint. If the team misses the checkpoint, they head for the nearest catchpoint. This is
a quick, easy way to reorient movement.
J-19. The leader tries to reconnoiter the route before he moves the unit. Ideally, he reconnoiters day and
night. During his reconnaissance, he adds, confirms, or adjusts orientation aids. These can include any of
the following:
• Terrain features (hills, cliffs, rivers, ridges, draws).
• Man-made features (towers, buildings, bridges, and roads).
• Ground surveillance radar (GSR).
• Wire.
• Illumination rounds.
• Night vision devices.
• Machine gun tracer fire. When mortar illumination rounds or tracer fire is used to locate
positions, the leader plans the fire patterns so that the team can see them.
J-20. A reorientation plan is one of the final ingredients in route selection. The leader plans for
reorientation throughout the movement using checkpoints, catchpoints, and position locators. Nevertheless,
units do get lost. Therefore, the leader must plan how to recover and reorient his team and complete the
mission. He plans this during the reconnaissance and adds checkpoints as needed. He uses distant terrain
features to resection off indirect fire. Planning how to react should the unit become lost reduces the
negative effects should it occur.
NIGHT WALKING
J-21. Leaders must train their units to move silently. Night movement requires different muscles than
day movement, and so requires practice.
J-22. Whereas daylight travel stresses the calf muscles, walking at night places more strain on the
muscles of the thighs and buttocks. Soldiers must get used to taking short, careful steps, stressing the use of
the larger muscle groups in their thighs. This method of balanced, smooth walking at night reduces the
chance of tripping over roots and rocks, and it reduces noise. Sufficient practice helps make crossing
terrain at night seem as natural and easy as walking on a sidewalk in the daytime. Soldiers conditioned to
move this way can travel far with little fatigue.
J-23. To walk at night, the Soldier looks ahead, shifts his weight completely to his left foot, and then
slowly lifts his right foot about knee high. He balances on his left foot while he eases his right toes down
and out, feeling lightly for twigs or trip wires. Still keeping his weight on his left foot, he gently touches
his right toes to the ground about 6 inches to the front of his left foot. He lightly feels the ground under the
outside of the toes of his right boot. Then, he feels with his right boot for any twigs, loose rocks, or holes.
If he finds none, he finally settles his foot on the ground. Once he is confident of solid, quiet footing, he
slowly shifts his weight forward onto the right foot, hesitates until he has his balance, then repeats the
sensing process with his left foot.
J-24. Crossing fords and streams requires extensive team-level training. The team must establish and
maintain security when crossing these obstacles. To cross a ford, the Soldier slips silently into the water,
gains and maintains his footing, and remains alert. He starts crossing by sliding his leading foot forward
and dragging his rear foot, as if shuffling. This helps him keep his balance in the current. After everyone
crosses, the leader counts heads, and the team moves out. |
3-55.93 | 361 | Night Operations
SIGNALS
J-25. The team uses simple, familiar signals to pass information, identify locations, control formations,
or initiate activity. Each basic signal has alternate signals as backups, and everyone must know these as
well. Signaling at night helps the leader control what is happening. It supports security and surprise. It
requires different methods than daylight signaling, for example, arm-and-hand signals might not be visible
at night. The most common signals use sound, touch, and sight. The leader chooses signals based on the
unit's activity and desired results, then he briefs the Soldiers and has them practice.
AUDIO SIGNALS
J-26. These include radio, wire, telephones, messengers, and grating or clicking of objects.
Radio and Telephone Signals
J-27. When using the radio and telephone at night, operators take precautions. They know that noise
travels farther at night than during the day. They lower the volume as much as practical. They use
headphones or earphones to reduce unnecessary noise. They know the possibility of loud static. They use
signals such as breaking squelch a specified number of times.
Messages
J-28. Messengers carry written messages to avoid confusion and misinterpretation. When this is not
possible, leaders ensure the messenger understands the message by having him repeat it word for word.
Oral Signals
K-1. Oral communication at night should be whispered. To do this, the Soldier takes a normal breath,
exhales half of it, and then whispers into the other person's ear using the remainder of his breath.
VISUAL SIGNALS
J-29. These can be active or passive and include many options. For visual signals to work, everyone
must see and recognize them.
Passive Visual Signals
• Sticks indicating direction.
• Light-colored paint.
• Tape.
• Rock formations.
• Markings on the ground.
• Powder.
Active Visual Signals
• Flares.
• Flashlights.
• Illumination rounds (M203, mortar, artillery).
• Chemical lights.
• Infrared or incandescent strobe lights.
• Either AN/PVS-5 or -7 night vision devices (infrared), or both.
• Burning fuel (saturated sand in a can).
• Luminous tape or compass dial. |
3-55.93 | 362 | Appendix J
Uses of Visual Signals
J-30. These signals can be used to identify a critical trail junction, mark a rally or rendezvous point,
mark caches, or report that a danger area is clear. White powder can be used to indicate direction at a
confusing trail intersection. A flashlight with a blue filter (with an "X" cut out of the filter) can signal "All
clear" to a unit crossing a danger area. The possibilities are endless. However, the leader ensures that each
Soldier in the team understands every signal used.
TOUCH SIGNALS
J-31. These consist of wire, string, or rope used in the hide or surveillance position to communicate
without disclosing the position. They usually consist of wire loosely secured to an arm or leg. By
prearrangement, two pulls on the wire might mean that a ground-mounted force is approaching, while three
pulls might indicate a convoy.
TARGET DETECTION
J-32. Successful night movement and target engagement depend on knowing the enemy--how he
attacks, defends, and uses terrain. Studying the enemy's techniques and patterns aids in target detection.
Nature provides an endless array of patterns. Man invariably disturbs or alters these patterns so they are
detectable. Sensing the enemy at night requires leaders and Soldiers to exercise patience, pay attention to
detail, and practice. Patience and confidence are critical to effectively sense a target at night. While moving
through an area, Soldiers look calmly and methodically for patterns rather than on details. For example,
they look for straight lines, light variations, and any other odd-looking, obviously man-made, or disturbed
patterns. The team looks for sentries or positions at the entrances to draws, on hills overlooking bridges or
obstacles, and on the military crests of prominent terrain features. This is where the enemy will go for
observation. The team also looks for supporting positions. They must know the ranges of enemy weapons,
including supporting weapons, as well as the ranges of the enemy's night vision and line-of-sight
observation devices. They must search thoroughly for enemy positions and for any other signs of
enemy activity. Typical indicators of enemy activity include sounds, odors, displacement, weathering,
littering, and camouflage:
Sounds
J-33. A Soldier places an ear to the ground or drives a stick 6 inches into it. Ground is denser than air,
so sounds can travel farther through it, although determining direction is difficult. Rain and winds mask
sounds. Rain causes Soldiers to seek shelter in static positions or, if moving, to put down their earflaps.
Both actions degrade the ability to hear someone stalking them.
Odors
J-34. When the sun sets, the air cools and odors float downhill. When the sun and temperatures rise, so
do odors. The more odors rise, the more likely they are to be picked up and carried by the wind.
Displacement
J-35. The team checks for displaced stones, leaves, or logs. The undersides of these objects are usually
darker in color than their top sides, and they are usually also damp. Crumbled rocks have lighter colored
faces and chips. At night, Soldiers need flashlights to detect these signs, so the team must place security
well out. When viewed through infrared devices, broken and crushed vegetation look very different from
undisturbed vegetation.
Weathering
J-36. Weathering indicates a recent disturbance. At night, the team usually needs experience--and
light--to detect weathering. |
3-55.93 | 363 | Night Operations
Littering
J-37. Littering proves humans were present and can give clues about their discipline (or lack of it),
distraction, supplies, and morale. However, it might be deliberate, that is, litter and other items left behind
might contain booby traps.
Camouflage
J-38. Natures few straight lines tend to stand out. So do contrasting or unnatural colors, tones, and
textures such as green leaves among dead branches. For example, an infrared source will show newly
cut foliage.
MOVEMENT
J-39. Team leaders determine the best formation and movement techniques based on METT-TC. The
file works well at night--it is easy to control and allows rapid movement through dense terrain. The only
problem is that it does not allow the team to mass fire to the front. However, its advantages usually
outweigh its disadvantages. To aid in movement control and security—
• Each Soldier must be within reach of the Soldier to his front.
• No Soldier moves unless told to do so.
• The leader(s) does the talking.
• The leader(s) positions himself far enough forward to make timely decisions to eliminate
confusion. |
3-55.93 | 365 | Appendix K
Example Evasion and Recovery Plan
Figure K-1, page K-2, shows an example plan of action for an evasion.
Figure K-2 and Figure K-3, pages K-5 and K-6, show the front and back of an
example of DD Form 1833 TEST (V2). |
3-55.93 | 366 | Appendix K
Figure K-1. Example plan of action for an evasion. |
3-55.93 | 367 | Example Evasion and Recovery Plan
Figure K-1. Example plan of action for an evasion (continued). |
3-55.93 | 368 | Appendix K
Figure K-1. Example plan of action for an evasion (continued). |
3-55.93 | 369 | Example Evasion and Recovery Plan
Figure K-2. Example of DD Form 1833 TEST (V2) (front). |
3-55.93 | 370 | Appendix K
Figure K-3. Example of DD Form 1833 TEST (V2) (back). |
3-55.93 | 371 | Glossary
Section I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
1SG First Sergeant CAS close air support
A CATS combined arms training strategy
AAA antiaircraft artillery CBRN chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear
AC2 Army airspace command and
control CCA close combat attack
AES advanced encryption standard CCIR commander's critical information
requirements
ALE automatic link establishment
CLS combat lifesaver
ANDVT advanced narrowband digital voice
terminal COA course of action
AO area of operations COB company operations base
AOB alternate operations base COMSEC communications security
AOI area of interest COO combined obstacle overlay
ARNG Army National Guard CYRIL proword used to describe a
situation report
ARNGUS Army National Guard of the
United States D
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, DAG division artillery group (OPFOR)
organizations, people, events
DAMA demand-assigned, multiple access
ASI additional skill identifier
DAR designated area of recovery
ASIP Advanced System Improvement
DF direction finding
Program
DOD Department of Defense
ATOSPIN air tasking order special
instructions DP decision point
ATV all-terrain vehicle DSVT digital secure-voice terminal
B DTG date-time group
BCT brigade combat team DV digital voice
BDA battle damage assessment DZ drop zone
BFSB Battlefield Surveillance Brigade E
BLOS beyond line-of-sight E&E escape and evasion
BMNT begin morning nautical twilight E&R evasion and recovery
BRS base radio station ECCM electronic counter-
countermeasures
BSC brigade support company
ECW extreme cold weather
C
EMT emergency medical technician
CAB(M) combat aviation brigade (medium)
EOM end of message
CAF combat air force |
3-55.93 | 372 | Glossary
EPA evasion plan of action HC hexachloroethane
EW electronic warfare HF high frequency
F HHT headquarters and headquarters
troop
FAC forward air controller
HMMWV high-mobility, multipurpose
fax facsimile (graphics only)
wheeled vehicle
FC Fires Cell
HPT high payoff target
FH frequency hopping
hq headquarters (graphics only)
FID foreign internal defense
hr hour (graphics only)
F-Kill firepower kill
HUMINT human (collected) intelligence
FLIR forward-looking infrared
HVT high-value target
FLOT forward line of own troops
I
FM frequency modulation; field
IBCT Infantry brigade combat team
manual
IFF identification friend or foe
FO forward observer
IMETS Integrated Meteorological System
FOT frequency of transmission
IMINT imagery intelligence
FRAGO fragmentary order
IND individual
FRIES fast-rope insertion and extraction
system INTREP intelligence report
FRP final reference point INTSUM intelligence summary
FSO fire support officer IPB intelligence preparation of the
battlefield
G
IR information requirement
G-2 Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence IRP initial reference point
G-3 Assistant Chief of Staff, ISOPREP isolated personnel report
Operations and Plans
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and
G-6 Assistant Chief of Staff, reconnaissance
Communications
IWEDA Integrated Weather Effects
GI&S geospatial information and Decision Aid
services
J
GMV ground mobility vehicle
J-2 joint staff intelligence directorate
GPS global positioning system
J-3 joint staff operations and plans
GSO ground safety officer directorate
GSR ground-surveillance radar J-6 joint staff communications-
electronics directorate
H
jm jumpmaster (graphics only)
HAHO high altitude, high opening
JOG joint operations graphic
HALO high altitude, low opening
JPRA Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
HCA humanitarian and civic assistance |
3-55.93 | 373 | Glossary
J-SEAD joint suppression of enemy air M
defense
M meter
JSRC joint search and rescue center
MA mission analysis
JTF joint task force
MASINT measurement and signals
K intelligence
Kbps kilobits per second MBITR multiband intra-team radio
KIA killed in action MCL minimum clear (takeoff) length
K-Kill catastrophic damage MCOO modified combined obstacle
overlay
km kilometers
MCP main command post
kmph kilometers per hour
MCW minimum clear (takeoff) width
L
MDMP military decision-making process
LAN local area network
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and
lat latitude (graphics only)
weather, troops and support
LBE load-bearing equipment available, time, and civil
considerations
LCE load-carrying equipment
MFF military free fall
LEA law enforcement agency
MHz megahertz
LNO liaison officer
MIA missing in action
LOC lines of communication
MIJI meaconing, intrusion, jamming,
long longitude (graphics only)
and interference
LORAN-C Long-Range Navigation--
mm millimeter
Revision C
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
LOS line of sight
MPF mission planning folder
LQA link quality analysis
MRE meal ready to eat
LRAS3 Long-Range Advanced Scout
Surveillance System MSE mobile subscriber equipment
LRS long-range surveillance MSIP multispectral image processor
LRSC long-range surveillance company MSS mission support site
LRSD long-range surveillance N
detachment
NAI named area of interest
LRSLC long-range surveillance leaders
NCO noncommissioned officer
course
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
LRSU long-range surveillance unit
NEO noncombatant evacuation
LTIOV latest time information of value
operations
LWCSS Lightweight Camouflage
NFA no-fire area
Screening System
NIMA National Imagery Mapping
LZ landing zone
Agency |
3-55.93 | 374 | Glossary
NLOS non-line of sight POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants
NLT not later than POW prisoner of war
NM nautical mile (1,852 meters or PR personnel recovery
6,076 feet)
PSG platoon sergeant
NSA National Security Agency
PZ pickup zone
NSN national stock number
R
NSTV nonstandard tactical vehicle
R&S reconnaissance and surveillance
NVG night vision goggles
RAG regimental artillery group
NVIS near-vertical incidence sky wave (OPFOR)
O RASP recruitment, assessment, and
selection program
OAKOC observation and fields of fire,
avenues of approach, obstacles RCC rescue coordination center
key terrain, cover and concealment
RDF radio direction finding
OB order of battle
RFA restricted fire area
obj objective (graphics only)
RFI request for information
OE operational environment
RFL restrictive fire line
OIC officer in charge
RH-53 heavy assault, airlift, or
OP observation post minesweeping helicopter
OPCON operational control RII request for intelligence
information
OPFOR opposing force
ROE rules of engagement
OPLAN operation plan
RP release point or rally point
opn operation (graphics only)
RSLC Reconnaissance and Surveillance
OPORD operation order
Leader Course
OPSEC operations security
RTO radio telephone operator
ORP objective rally point
rv rendezvous (graphics only)
P
S
pax people (graphics only)
S-2 Intelligence Officer
PEO peace enforcement operation
S-3 Operations and Training Officer
PIR priority intelligence requirements
S-6 C2 Information Officer
PKO peacekeeping operation
SAFE selected area for evasion
PL platoon leader
SAID SAFE area intelligence description
PLGR precision lightweight GPS receiver
SALUTER Size, Activity, Location, Unit,
plt platoon (graphics only) Time, Equipment, and Remarks
PMCS preventive maintenance checks SAM surface-to-air missile
and services
SARDOT search and rescue point
PO peace operation |
3-55.93 | 375 | Glossary
SCI sensitive, compartmented TOE table of organization and
information equipment
SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
SEO sniper employment officer U
SERER survival, evasion, resistance, UAS unmanned aircraft system
escape, recovery
UHF ultra high frequency
SFG(A) Special Forces Group (Airborne)
UNDER proword used to describe a cache
SIGINT signals intelligence report
SINCGARS Single-Channel Ground and USAF United States Air Force
Airborne Radio Subsystem
USAR United States Army Reserve
SIR specific information requirements
USSOCOM United States Special Operations
SITEMP situation template Command
V
SITMAP situation map
VHF very high frequency
SITREP situation report
VoIP voice over Internet protocol
SOCOORD special operations coordinator
VSWR voltage standing wave radio
SOF special operations force
W
SOP standing operating procedure
WAN wide area network
SPIES Special Patrol Insertion and
Extraction System WARNO warning order
SQI special qualifications identifiers WFF warfighting function
SSB single sideband WWII World War II
SSM surface-to-surface missile wx weather (graphics only)
surv surveillance (graphics only) XYZ
T XO Executive Officer
TACAIR tactical air
TACCP tactical command post
TACP tactical air-control party
TACSAT tactical satellite
TAI target area of interest
TC training circular
tgt target (graphics only)
THFRS Transformation High-Frequency
Radio System
TLP troop leading procedures
tm team (graphics only)
TOC tactical operations center |
3-55.93 | 376 | Glossary
Section II. TERMS
B O
backbrief A briefing by subordinates to the outstation a remo te or outlying station
commander to review how
ordnance explosives, chemicals,
subordinates intend to accomplish
pyrotechnics, and similar
their mission
stores, such as bombs, guns and
C ammunition, flares, smoke, or
napalm
critical frequency the highest frequency bent back
to earth U
unilateral undertaken by one person or
party; one-sided
H
W
handshake the ex change of informtion
between two electronic devices waveform graphi c representation of a
wave shape that represents the
N
relationship between two
net a group of communications variables such as amplitude and
stations operating under unified frequency
control |
3-55.93 | 377 | References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
ARMY REGULATIONS
AR 40-400. Patient Administration. 06 February 2008.
AR 350-1. Army Training and Leader Development. 03 August 2007.
AR 385-63. Range Safety. 19 May 2003.
AR 600-9. The Army Weight Control Program. 27 November 2006.
FIELD MANUALS
FM 3-0. Operations. 27 February 2008.
FM 3-04.15. Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of
Unmanned Aircraft Systems. 03 August 2006.
FM 3-04.113. Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations. 07 December 2007.
FM 3-05.211. Special Forces Military Free-fall Operations. 06 April 2005.
FM 3-05.212. Special Forces Waterborne Operations. 31 August 2004.
FM 3-06. Urban Operations. 26 October 2006.
FM 3-06.11. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 28 February 2002.
FM 3-07. Stability Operations. 06 October 2008.
FM 3-09.32. (JFIRE) Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of
Firepower. 20 December 2007.
FM 3-11. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Defense Operations. 10 March 2003.
FM 3-11.3. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological
and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance. 02 February 2006.
FM 3-11.4. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Nuclear
(NBC) Protection. 02 June 2003.
FM 3-11.5. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Decontamination. 04 April 2006.
FM 3-11.19. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Reconnaissance. 30 July 2004.
FM 3-19.30. Physical Security. 08 January 2001.
FM 3-21.8. Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 28 March 2007.
FM 3-21.10. The Infantry Rifle Company. 27 July 2006.
FM 3-21.20. The Infantry Battalion. 13 December 2006.
FM 3-21.38, Pathfinder Operations. 25 April 2006.
FM 3-21.220. Static Line Parachuting Techniques and Tactics. 23 September 2003.
FM 3-24 . Counterinsurgency. 15 December 2006. |
3-55.93 | 378 | References
FM 3-34.210. Explosives Hazards Operations. 27 March 2007.
FM 3-97.6. Mountain Operations. 28 November 2000.
FM 4-01.011. Unit Movement Operations. 31 October 2002.
FM 4-02. Force Health Protection in a Global Environment. 13 February 2003.
FM 4-25.11. First Aid. 23 December 2002.
FM 4-25.12. Unit Field Sanitation Team. 25 January 2002.
FM 4-30.31. Recovery and Battle Damage Assessment and Repair. 19 September 2006.
FM 5-103. Survivability. 10 June 1985.
FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.
FM 6-22.5. Combat and Operational Stress Control Manual for Leaders and Soldiers. 18 March 2009.
FM 6-30. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire. 16 July 1991
FM 7-0. Training for Full-spectrum Operations. 12 December 2008.
FM 7-1. Battle-Focused Training. 15 September 2003.
FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 31 August 2003.
FM 7-85. Ranger Unit Operations. 09 June 1987.
FM 7-92. The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry).
23 December 1992.
FM 8-42. Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations. 27 October 1997.
FM 21-10. Field Hygiene and Sanitation. 21 June 2000.
FM 22-6. Guard Duty. 17 September 1971.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
GRAPHIC TRAINING AIDS
GTA 01-14-001. Battle Damage Assessment & Repair (BDAR) Smart Book. 01 March 2007.
HANDBOOK
SH 21-76. Ranger Handbook. 2006.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
JP 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). 10 July 2001.
JP 3-07.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID). 30 April 2004.
OTHER
Harris Corporation. Operator’s Manuals for the AN/PRC-117, AN/PRC-150, and AN/PRC-152, 2005
through 2007. http://premier.harris.com/rfcomm.
Thales Corporation. Operators Manual for the AN/PRC-148. October 2004.
https://secure.thalescomminc.com/customer_care_V2.asp.
USSOCOM Reg 350-6. Special Operations Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations. 25 August 2004. |
3-55.93 | 379 | References
SOLDIER TRAINING PUBLICATIONS
STP 21-1-SMCT. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks Skill Level 1. 18 June 2009.
STP 21-24-SMCT. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Warrior Leader Skill Level 2, 3, and 4.
09 Sept 2008.
TECHNICAL MANUALS
TM 11-5820-467-15. Operator's, Organizational, Direct Support, General Support, and Depot
Maintenance Manual for Antenna Group, AN/GRA-50. 19 July 1961.
TM 11-5820-887-10. Operator's Manual for Digital Message Device Group, 0A-8990/P. 20 August
1982.
TM 11-5820-919-12. Operator's and Organizational Maintenance Manual for Radio Set, AN/PRC-104A.
15 January 1986.
TM 11-5820-923-12. Operator's and Organizational Maintenance Manual Radio Set, AN/GRC-213.
14 February 1986.
TM 11-5820-924-13. Operator's, Organizational and Direct Support Maintenance Manual for Radio Set,
AN/GRC-193A. 14 February 1986.
TM 11-5820-1025-10. Operator's Manual for Radio Set AN/PRC-126. 01 February 1988.
TRAINING CIRCULARS
TC 21-24. Rappelling. 09 January 2008.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents are quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET
DA Pamphlet 350-38. Standards in Training Commission. 13 May 2009.
FIELD MANUALS
FM 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004.
FM 2-0. Intelligence. 17 May 2004.
FM 3-05.70. Survival. 17 May 2002.
FM 3-25.26. Map Reading and Land Navigation. 18 January 2005.
FM 3-50.1. Army Personnel Recovery. 10 August 2005.
FM 3-50.3. Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion and Recovery.
20 March 2007.
FM 3-90.15. Sensitive Site Operations. 25 April 2007.
FM 5-0. Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005.
FM 5-19. Composite Risk Management. 21 August 2006.
FM 5-33. Terrain Analysis. 11 July 1990.
FM 6-02.72. Tactical Radios Multiservice Communications Procedures for Tactical Radios in a Joint
Environment. 14 June 2002.
FM 6-02.74. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the High Frequency-Automatic Link
Establishment (HFALE) Radios. 20 November 2007. |
3-55.93 | 380 | References
FM 6-02.90. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Ultra High Frequency Tactical
Satellite and Demand Assigned Multiple Access Operations. 31 August 2004.
FM 6-99.2. US Army Report and Message Formats. 30 April 2007.
FM 7-92 . The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry).
23 Dec 1992.
FM 17-95. Cavalry Operations. 24 December 1996.
FM 23-10. Sniper Training. 17 August 1994.
FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 08 July 1994.
FM 90-4. Air Assault Operations. 16 March 1987.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 02 May 2007.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001
JP 3-50. Personnel Recovery. 05 January 2007.
OTHER
Combined Arms Center Publication Operational and Organizational Concept for the Battlefield
Surveillance Brigade (BFSB). 14 November 2000.
Technical Memo 5-87. Modern Experience in City Combat, US Army Human Engineering Laboratory,
March 1987.
REFERENCED FORMS
DA forms are available on the APD Web site (www.apd.army.mil); DD forms are available on the OSD Web
site (www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/formsprogram.htm).
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FORMS
DA Form 1594. Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 5752-R. Rope Log (Usage and History (LRA)).
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FORMS
DD Form 1833 TEST (V2). Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP).
INTERNET
Some of the documents listed elsewhere in the References, as well as all of the individual and
collective tasks referred to in this publication, may be accessed at one the following Army websites:
Air Force Pubs http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/
Army Forms http://www.apd.army.mil
Army Knowledge Online https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/index.html
Digital Training Management System https://dtms.army.mil/DTMS (individual and collective tasks)
DoD forms http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/formsprogram.htm
NATO ISAs http://www.nato.int/docu/standard.htm
Reimer Digital Library http://www.train.army.mil |
3-55.93 | 381 | Index
A antennas (continued) cold weather operations, 6-35,
unidirectional pattern, 6-23 6-36, D-2
actions
(illus) combat
and responsibilities, 4-4
whip antenna, 6-30 (illus) assessment, 4-30
(illus)
architecture management, 6-1 patrol, 4-44
on objective, 4-17
area rubber raiding
activities matrix, 7-14 (illus)
of influence, 7-3 reconnaissance craft, 5-1
air
of interest, 7-3 (See also rubber boat.)
assault, 5-24
of operations, 7-3 command and control
infiltration/exfiltration
reconnaissance, 4-21 Army operations, four types,
annex, B-46 (illus)
Army aviation, 5-24 1-1
AN/PRC-150
assessment, A-2 employment schematic
compatible radios, 6-3
association matrix, 7-12 (illus) LRSC, 2-9 (illus)
(illus), 6-6 (illus)
assumptions, B-14 (illus) LRSD in an MSS, 2-10
in vehicular
attack, electronic, 6-16 (illus)
AN/VRC-104(V)3
automatic link sequence, 6-4 LRSD and LRS team, 2-1
configuration, 6-7 (illus)
(illus) nonstandard, 2-7
analysis
command post, 2-7
assumptions, B-14 B
common types of antennas,
facts, B-13
backbrief, B-16, B-17 (illus) 6-26
mission, B-11, B-15 (illus)
base radio station, 6-2, 6-6 communications, 6-1
of threat factors, 7-9
battle drills, H-1 annex, B-41 (illus)
ANGUS (Initial Entry) Report,
battlefield surveillance brigade base, 6-6
6-13 (illus)
(BFSB) staff, 2-2 computers and intelligence,
antennas, 6-18
beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) 2-14, 2-15
bidirectional pattern, 6-24
equipment, 6-4 data wire diagram, 6-10
(illus)
bidirectional antenna pattern, (illus)
expedient insulators, 6-31
6-24 (illus) security (COMSEC), 6-15
(illus)
boat, rubber, 5-2 (illus) company operations base, 2-8
formula for calculating
BORIS (Intelligence) Report, (illus)
length of half wave dipole
6-13 (illus) computers, 6-2
antenna, 6-27 (illus)
box method, I-4 (illus) confirmation brief, B-10
half wave dipole, 6-26
branches and sequels, E-1 construction and selection,
(illus)
bridges, 4-25, 4-32 6-25
high frequency antenna
brief types, B-8 (illus), B-9 contingencies, 4-29
"V" type, 6-34 (illus)
(illus) contingency
half rhombic type, 6-33
buildings, 4-33 matrix, E-2 (illus)
(illus)
bunkers, 4-34 plan, E-1
long-wire type, 6-28
converging routes method,
(illus), 6-33 (illus) C
4-24 (illus)
inverted "V" type, 6-27
cargo straps, securing of, 5-18 coordination
(illus)
(illus) checklist, 5-28 (illus)
omni-directional pattern,
chain of command, 8-2 for army aviation, F-1
6-25 (illus)
chemical, biological, count, 5-4 (illus)
sloping antenna, "V" type,
radiological, and nuclear countertracking procedures,
6-34 (illus)
(CBRN), 4-66 I-1
sloping wire antenna, 6-29
classification, 6-22 courses of action, 4-12 (illus)
(illus)
of evasion, 8-3 CRACK (Battle Damage
terminated sloping "V"
of urban area by size, 7-2 Assessment) Report, 6-15
antenna, 6-29 (illus)
(illus) (illus) |
3-55.93 | 382 | Index
CYRIL (Situation) Report, example subsurface site, G-6 heavy team and platoon
6-14 (illus) (illus) operations, 4-29
execution (actions on helicopter operations, 5-9
D
objective), 4-17 helocasting operations, 5-7
damage types and levels, 4-31 exfiltration phase and HF, VHF, and UHF radios, 6-2
dams and locks, 4-35 extraction method, 4-17 hide site, 4-28 (illus)
data wire diagram, 6-10 (illus) expedient insulators, 6-31 actions in, G-9
databases (illus) high-frequency
debrief, B-33, B-34 (illus) extraction method, 4-17 ranges in ionosphere, 6-20
decision brief, B-16 (illus)
F
decision support template, skip zone and distance, 6-22
7-20 facilities, C-1 (illus)
desert operations, 6-35 facts, B-13 (illus) high frequency antennas,
desert operations, D-1 fan method, 4-23 (illus) directional, field-expedient,
destruction priority, fast rope insertion/extraction 6-33
communications devices, system (FRIES), 5-20 half rhombic type, 6-33
6-17 (illus) fatigue, J-5 (illus)
disguises, 8-6 field expedient antennas, 6-30 long-wire type, 6-33 (illus)
displacement, I-2 (illus) field site, C-1 "V" type, 6-34 (illus)
dissemination of information, finished subsurface site, G-4 HMMWVs
4-29 fire camouflaged, 5-42 (illus)
distillation towers, 4-35 plans, 4-46 procedures for loading into
drawing technique support, 4-45 CH-47 for infiltration,
common shapes, 4-59 support annex, B-42 (illus), 5-37 (illus)
hatching, 4-60 F-4 (illus) wedge formation, 5-40
perspective, 4-59 fishhook and dog leg methods, (illus)
vanishing points, 4-59 G-8 (illus)
I
whole to part, 4-58 (illus) fixed site, C-1, C-2 (illus)
duress codes, 6-11 (illus) footprints, I-3 (illus) identification of gaps in
forcible occupation of site, G-8 existing databases, 7-4
E
(illus) (illus)
electronic warfare, 6-16 Forms image-gathering equipment,
elements, reconnaissance and DA Form 1594, 2-12 4-53
surveillance, 4-22 (illus) DA Form 2028, xiii imagery, 4-52, 4-53 (illus)
employment, tactical, 6-7 DA Form 5752-R, 5-20 infiltration phase
environmental characteristics, DD Form 1833 TEST (V2), and insertion method, 4-16
7-1 K-5 (illus), K-6 (illus) insertion method, 4-16
environmental formula for calculating length intelligence, 1-2
effects on operations, 7-4 of half wave dipole antenna annex, F-5 (illus)
analysis, 7-4 applied to example, 6-27 estimate annex, B-39 (illus)
environmental effects, 7-9 (illus) gaps, 7-4
threat evaluation fragmentary order, B-8 (illus) preparation of the
environments, unusual, 6-35 frequency management, 6-1 battlefield, 7-1, 7-4
evaluation of threat, 7-9 intelligence, surveillance, and
G
evasion and recovery, 8-1 reconnaissance, 1-10 (illus),
evasion and recovery, K-1 geographic environments, D-1 3-2 (illus)
evasion plan of action, K-2 ground force personnel, 4-38 operations, 3-1
(illus) ground wave, 6-20 (illus) requirements, 7-20
evasion intent, B-11 (illus)
H
aids, 8-7 intermediate staging area
areas, 8-9 half wave dipole antenna, 6-26 use in planning, C-4 (illus)
evasion (illus) inverted "V" antenna, 6-27
classifications, 8-3 hasty subsurface sites, G-2 (illus)
example link diagram, 7-11 hearing, J-4 ionosphere, 6-20 (illus), 6-21
(illus) (illus) |
3-55.93 | 383 | Index
issues (illus) mission concept brief surveillance, 4-26
(MICON), B-19 team, 4-1
J
slides, B-20 through B-33 types, 4-61
jungle operations, 6-35, D-1 (illus) urban, 6-35
mission, intent, and priority
L
intelligence requirements, operations (continued)
landing point diameters, 5-26 B-11 (illus) vehicle, 5-31
(illus) missions, 1-3, 1-4 waterborne, 5-1
landing zones, 5-25 special, 4-66 OPORD, F-2 (illus)
laser designators, 4-45 mountain operations, 6-35, orders
leader reconnaissance, 4-25, 6-37, D-2 and briefs, B-1
G-7 movement, 8-4, J-9 fragmentary, B-8
liaison operation, B-4
N
duties, employment, and warning, B-1
coordination, 2-13 named areas of interest, 2-13 organization
light sources and distances, J-3 networks, 6-1 of LRSC, 1-5 (illus)
(illus) night of tracking team, I-5
linkup, 4-29 vision, J-1
P
and dissemination of walking, J-6
information, 4-29 panoramic sketch, 4-55 (illus)
O
annex, B-43 (illus) Pathfinder, 4-67
loading sequence, UH-60, 5-31 objective sketchpad, 4-56 pattern analysis plot sheet,
(illus) (illus) 7-18 (illus)
long-range surveillance occupation of hide site, G-7 personnel
company (LRSC), 1-4 odor, J-5 (illus) recovery, 4-67
long-wire antenna, 6-28 (illus) off-center viewing technique, security, 3-11
LRS tasks by operation, 4-10 J-2 (illus) petroleum, oil, lubricants
(illus) omni-directional antenna (POL), 4-38
LRSD and LRS teams, 1-7 pattern, 6-25 (illus) phase
capabilities and limitations, operation order, B-4, B-5 exfiltration, 4-17
1-8 (illus) planning, 4-1
command and control, 2-1 operational environment, 7-1 pickup zones, 5-25
operations, 5-45, 6-7 plan of action for an evasion,
M
Airborne, 5-46 K-2 (illus)
marking procedures, 5-26 bases, 6-1 planning area facilities and
(illus) capabilities and limitations, sites, C-1, C-3 (illus)
message 4-65 plans, 4-47, 8-2
and report formats, 6-9 cold weather, 6-35 polarization, 6-19
header, 6-11 (illus) desert, 6-35 polyvinyl chloride site, G-3
method of extraction, 4-17 foot movement, 5-47 (illus)
METT-TC, 4-7 (illus) heavy team and platoon, power plant turbines and
MIJI Report, 6-18 (illus) 4-29 generators, 4-39
military equipment, 4-36 helicopter, 5-9 primary missions, 1-4
mission helocasting, 5-7 primary, alternate, and
analysis brief, B-10 ISR, 3-1 contingency radios, 6-3
classification, 3-11 jungle, 6-35 priority intelligence
development process, 3-1, mobility platforms, 5-31 requirements, B-11 (illus)
3-4 (illus) mountain, 6-35 priority of actions for
orders, 3-1, 3-3 other, 5-45 rehearsal, 4-14 (illus)
planning factors, 4-44 reconnaissance, 4-21 priority of destruction,
planning folder, 3-5 security, 3-11 communications devices,
contents, 3-5 stability, 4-60 6-17 (illus)
development, 3-5 stay behind, 5-46 priority of work, G-9
format, 3-9 protection, electronic, 6-16
roadblocks (illus) |
3-55.93 | 384 | Index
Prusik knot, recovery line S surface sites, G-1
with, 5-19 (illus) surveillance
satellite
operations, 4-26
R dishes, 4-41
site, 4-27 (illus)
tactical, 6-9
radio wave propagation, 6-19 suspension line weave site,
scanning patterns, J-2 (illus)
radios, 6-2 G-3 (illus)
scout swimmers, 5-5
rail lines and rail yards, 4-39
secondary missions, 1-4
reassignment, A-4
security, 3-11
reconnaissance and T
and reports, 4-27
surveillance
selection, A-4 tactical
elements, 4-22 (illus)
and occupation of sites, 4-26 employment, 6-7
squadron, 2-6
of route, J-5 operations center, 2-10
reconnaissance operations,
separation, 3-12 tactical satellite, 6-9
4-21 through 4-25, 4-47
ships, 4-41 target
recovery, 4-18
short count, long count, 5-4 acquisition, 4-44
line with Prusik knot, 5-19
(illus) detection, J-8
(illus)
signals, J-7 folder, 3-9 (illus)
of personnel, 4-67
site task organization
types, 8-2
field and fixed, C-1 outside named areas of
recruitment, A-1
hide, 4-28 (illus) interest, 2-13
rehearsal
selection, 4-26, 6-8, G-6 tasks
area annex, F-6 (illus)
sterilization, G-9 break contact from hide or
priority of actions, 4-14
surface, G-1 surveillance site, H-8
(illus)
slides, mission concept brief, (illus)
relationship matrix, 7-13 (illus)
B-20 through b-33 (illus) break contact front
repair procedure, whip
(illus) (diamond or file), H-2
antenna, 6-30 (illus)
sloping antenna, "V" type, (illus)
report formats, 6-11 (illus),
6-34 (illus) break contact front, left and
6-12 (illus)
sloping wire antenna, 6-29 right (australian peel),
reports, 6-9
(illus) H-3 (illus)
resonance, 6-18
smell, J-4 break contact left, right
restated mission, B-15 (illus)
sounds, J-4 (illus) (diamond or file), H-4
rigging
special missions, 4-66 (illus)
fast rope
special operations forces react to enemy air attack,
other aircraft, 5-22 (illus)
comparison of LRSU H-5 (illus)
UH-60, 5-21 (illus), 5-22
operations to, 1-4 react to indirect fire or air
(illus)
organization, 1-4 attack, H-6 (illus)
of snap links, 5-17 (illus)
sustainment, 1-5 team operations, 4-1
of SPIES rope on UH-60,
subordinate organizations teams, 6-2
5-17 (illus)
and key personnel, 1-5 LRSD and LRS, 1-7
of wood block, 5-18 (illus)
Special Patrol terminated sloping "V"
SPIES, for CH-46 or
Insertion/Extraction System antenna, 6-29 (illus)
CH-47,
(SPIES), 5-9 terrain, urban, 4-46
5-20 (illus)
specified and implied tasks, threat
roads, 4-40
B-12 (illus) capability, 7-15
route
SPIES rope rigging on UH-60, courses of action, 7-16, 7-17
reconnaissance, 4-25
5-17 (illus) factors, 7-9
selection, J-5
steel towers, 4-42 time event chart, 7-15 (illus)
rubber boat, 5-2 (illus)
storage tanks for petroleum, topographic sketch, 4-55
ruggedized COTS laptop, 6-6
oil, lubricants, 4-38 (illus)
runways and taxiways, 4-40
success, elements of, 6-2 tracker and dog team, I-5
successive sector method, 4-24 tracking concepts and
(illus) procedures, I-1
transformers, 4-42 |
3-55.93 | 385 | Index
troop leading procedures UNDER (Cache) Report, 6-14 (illus)
and METT-TC, 4-7 (illus) (illus) movement coordination
tunnels, 4-43 unidirectional antenna pattern, annex, F-7 (illus)
two-man surface site, with 6-23 (illus)
W
ghillie suits, G-1 (illus) units
types of recovery, 8-2, 8-3 reconnaissance and warfare support, electronic,
(illus) surveillance, 1-2 6-16
unusual environments, 6-35 warning order, B-1, B-3 (illus)
urban waterborne operations, 5-1
U operations, 6-35, 6-37 wavelength, 6-18 (illus)
terrain, 4-46
UH-60 XYZ
loading sequence, 5-31 V
zone reconnaissance, 4-23
(illus)
vehicle
SPIES rope rigging on, 5-17
load, 5-35 (illus)
(illus)
movement annex, B-44 |
3-55.93 | 387 | FM 3-55.93 (FM 7-93)
23 June 2009
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0915309
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: To be distributed with initial
distribution number (IDN) 110804, in accordance with DA Form 12-11E, requirements for |
3-99 | 1 | FM 3-99
Airborne and Air
Assault Operations
MARCH 2015
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. |
3-99 | 2 | This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online
(https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html).
To receive publishing updates, please subscribe at |
3-99 | 3 | *FM 3-99
FieldManual Headquarters
No. 3-99 DepartmentoftheArmy
Washington,DC, 6 March2015
Airborne and Air Assault Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE .............................................................................................................. ix
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... x
Chapter 1 OVERVIEW .........................................................................................................1-1
Section I – Forcible Entry Operations ..............................................................1-1
JointPrinciplesforForcibleEntryOperations......................................................1-2
OperationalApplications of ForcibleEntryOperations........................................1-4
JointCommandandControl................................................................................1-6
JointOperation Planning.................................................................................. 1-13
JointEntryForce............................................................................................... 1-16
Section II – Vertical Envelopment ................................................................. 1-18
TacticalApplications......................................................................................... 1-18
CommandResponsibility.................................................................................. 1-21
SpaceOperation............................................................................................... 1-25
PART ONE AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
Chapter 2 ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT ..............................................................2-1
Section I – Airborne Assault Force ..................................................................2-1
OrganizationofForces........................................................................................2-1
EchelonEmployment...........................................................................................2-2
Section II – Airborne Assault Force Considerations ......................................2-4
AssaultForceFormation......................................................................................2-4
JointandArmyControlTeams............................................................................2-4
Section III – Capabilities, Limitations, Vulnerabilities ....................................2-5
Capabilities..........................................................................................................2-5
Limitations............................................................................................................2-5
Vulnerabilities.......................................................................................................2-6
Section IV – Airborne Command and Control Platforms ...............................2-6
AirborneWarningAndControlSystem................................................................2-6
JointSurveilanceTargetAttack RadarSystem...................................................2-7
Distribution Restriction: Approved for publicrelease;distributionisunlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 90-26, dated 18 December 1990 and ATTP 3-18.12, dated 1 March 2011. |
3-99 | 4 | Contents
Joint AirborneCommunicationsCenter/CommandPost.................................... 2-7
Chapter 3 AIRBORNE ASSAULT PLANNING ................................................................... 3-1
Section I – Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................ 3-1
HigherHeadquarters........................................................................................... 3-1
AirborneAssaultForce........................................................................................ 3-2
SupportingAviation............................................................................................. 3-2
Section II – Reverse Planning Sequence ........................................................ 3-2
GroundTactical Plan........................................................................................... 3-3
LandingPlan....................................................................................................... 3-3
Air MovementPlan.............................................................................................. 3-3
MarshallingPlan.................................................................................................. 3-4
Section III – Planning Considerations ............................................................. 3-4
PlanningMethodology......................................................................................... 3-4
PredeploymentPlanningandPreparation.......................................................... 3-6
X-hour/N-hourSequencesforDeployment......................................................... 3-6
OptimizeAvailablePlanningTime...................................................................... 3-6
ControlMeasures................................................................................................ 3-9
DetermineGo/No-GoCriteria........................................................................... 3-10
AirfieldOpening................................................................................................. 3-10
Section IV – Shaping Operations ................................................................... 3-11
CreateConditions............................................................................................. 3-11
PreserveConditions.......................................................................................... 3-12
Chapter 4 GROUND TACTICAL PLAN............................................................................... 4-1
Section I – Elements ......................................................................................... 4-1
TaskOrganization............................................................................................... 4-1
MissionStatement............................................................................................... 4-1
Commander’sIntent............................................................................................ 4-2
ConceptofOperations........................................................................................ 4-2
TaskstoSubordinates........................................................................................ 4-2
Section II – Plan Development ......................................................................... 4-3
MissionVariables of METT-TC........................................................................... 4-3
AssaultObjectiveandAirheadLine.................................................................... 4-5
Section III – Air-ground Operations ............................................................... 4-12
FundamentalConsiderations............................................................................ 4-12
CloseCombatAttack......................................................................................... 4-12
CloseAirSupport.............................................................................................. 4-14
UnmannedAircraftSystem............................................................................... 4-15
Section IV – Execution .................................................................................... 4-16
ConductoftheAirborneAssault....................................................................... 4-16
Developmentofthe Airhead.............................................................................. 4-17
Buildup ofCombatPower................................................................................. 4-17
Section V – Follow-on Operations ................................................................. 4-18
Section VI – Supporting Operations .............................................................. 4-18
RemoteMarshalling.......................................................................................... 4-19
IntermediateStagingBase................................................................................ 4-20 |
3-99 | 5 | Contents
Chapter 5 LANDING PLAN ................................................................................................. 5-1
Section I – Delivery Considerations ................................................................ 5-1
Organization........................................................................................................ 5-1
Requirements...................................................................................................... 5-1
Priorities.............................................................................................................. 5-2
Section II – Delivery Elements ......................................................................... 5-2
SequenceofDelivery.......................................................................................... 5-2
MethodofDelivery.............................................................................................. 5-3
PlaceofDelivery................................................................................................. 5-5
TimeofDelivery.................................................................................................. 5-9
Section III – Preparation and Supporting Fires .............................................. 5-9
FireSupportPlanning....................................................................................... 5-10
FireSupportConsiderations............................................................................. 5-11
Air Operations................................................................................................... 5-14
Section IV – Assembly and Reorganization .................................................. 5-17
Assembly........................................................................................................... 5-17
Reorganization.................................................................................................. 5-25
Chapter 6 AIR MOVEMENT PLAN ..................................................................................... 6-1
Section I – Joint Planning ................................................................................. 6-1
Section II – Elements of the Air Movement Plan ............................................ 6-1
Air MovementTable............................................................................................ 6-1
Types ofMovement............................................................................................. 6-2
AircraftRequirements......................................................................................... 6-2
Section III – Load Planning Considerations ................................................... 6-3
TacticalIntegrity.................................................................................................. 6-3
CrossLoading..................................................................................................... 6-3
Self-Sufficiency................................................................................................... 6-4
Section IV – Loading and Delivery of Forces ................................................. 6-5
LoadPlanning Sequence.................................................................................... 6-5
LoadPlanningofVehicles................................................................................... 6-5
Air MovementPlanningWorksheet..................................................................... 6-5
UnitAircraftUtilization Form................................................................................ 6-6
Section V – Aircraft Load and Air Movement Table ....................................... 6-6
Section VI – Manifests and Air-Loading Planning System ............................ 6-9
Manifests............................................................................................................. 6-9
Integrated ComputerizedDeploymentSystem................................................... 6-9
Chapter 7 MARSHALLING PLAN ....................................................................................... 7-1
Section I – Preparation ..................................................................................... 7-1
Section II – Movement ...................................................................................... 7-2
Section III – Protection ...................................................................................... 7-2
PassiveDefenseMeasures................................................................................ 7-2
Dispersal............................................................................................................. 7-3
Section IV – Departure Airfield-Marshalling Area ............................................ 7-3
SelectingDepartureAirfields............................................................................... 7-3
SelectingandOperating MarshallingAreas........................................................ 7-4 |
3-99 | 6 | Contents
FacilityRequirements.......................................................................................... 7-4
MarshalledUnitandSupportOrganizationActivities.......................................... 7-7
Section V – Outload .......................................................................................... 7-9
Outload PlanningConsiderations........................................................................ 7-9
OutloadControl................................................................................................. 7-10
PART TWO AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS
Chapter 8 ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT ............................................................. 8-1
Section I – Air Assault and Air Movements .................................................... 8-1
Section II – Air Assault Task Force ................................................................. 8-1
OrganizingForces............................................................................................... 8-2
BrigadeCombatTeams...................................................................................... 8-2
CombatAviationBrigades................................................................................... 8-2
Section III – Task Force Considerations ......................................................... 8-4
Section IV – Capabilities, Limitations, Vulnerabilities ................................... 8-5
Capabilities.......................................................................................................... 8-5
Limitations........................................................................................................... 8-5
Vulnerabilities...................................................................................................... 8-6
Section V – Airspace Control ........................................................................... 8-6
Concurrent Employment..................................................................................... 8-6
AirspaceCoordinating Measures........................................................................ 8-7
AirspaceDevelopment........................................................................................ 8-8
Section VI – Air Assault Task Force Mission Command ............................. 8-10
MissionOrders.................................................................................................. 8-10
CommandPosts................................................................................................ 8-12
PersonnelandKeyElementswithintheTask Force........................................ 8-13
MissionCommandSystem................................................................................ 8-15
Chapter 9 AIR ASSAULT PLANNING ................................................................................ 9-1
Section I – Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................ 9-1
HigherHeadquarters........................................................................................... 9-1
BrigadeCombatTeam........................................................................................ 9-1
SupportingAviation Units.................................................................................... 9-1
Section II – Reverse Planning Sequence ........................................................ 9-1
Section III – Planning Methodology ................................................................. 9-2
Deliberate Planning............................................................................................. 9-3
Time-Constrained Planning................................................................................ 9-4
RapidDecisionmakingandSynchronizationProcess......................................... 9-5
AllowableCargoLoad PlanningConsiderations................................................. 9-6
Section IV – Planning Process ......................................................................... 9-6
WarningOrder..................................................................................................... 9-6
InitialPlanningConference................................................................................. 9-7
Air MissionCoordinationMeeting....................................................................... 9-7
Air MissionBrief.................................................................................................. 9-8
Air MissionBriefDocuments............................................................................... 9-8
AirAssault Task ForceRehearsal....................................................................... 9-9
AircrewBrief........................................................................................................ 9-9 |
3-99 | 7 | Contents
AviationTask ForceRehearsal........................................................................... 9-9
ConditionChecks................................................................................................ 9-9
AbortCriteria..................................................................................................... 9-10
Section V – Control Measures ........................................................................ 9-11
Force-OrientedControl Measures..................................................................... 9-11
Boundaries........................................................................................................ 9-12
FireSupportCoordinationMeasures................................................................ 9-12
AirspaceCoordinating Measures...................................................................... 9-12
Section VI – Shaping Operations ................................................................... 9-13
Section VII – Medical and Casualty Evacuation ........................................... 9-14
MedicalEvacuationPlanning............................................................................ 9-14
CasualtyBackhaul............................................................................................ 9-15
MedicalEvacuationLandingZone.................................................................... 9-15
Chapter 10 GROUND TACTICAL PLAN............................................................................. 10-1
Section I – Elements ....................................................................................... 10-1
TaskOrganization.............................................................................................10-1
MissionStatement.............................................................................................10-1
Commander’sIntent..........................................................................................10-1
ConceptofOperations......................................................................................10-2
TaskstoSubordinateUnits...............................................................................10-4
Section II – Plan Development ....................................................................... 10-4
MissionAnalysis................................................................................................10-4
AssaultObjectiveandLandingZone Development..........................................10-8
Section III – Air-ground Operations ............................................................... 10-8
EffectiveIntegration...........................................................................................10-8
CloseCombatAttacks.......................................................................................10-9
CloseAirSupport............................................................................................10-11
UnmannedAircraftSystems...........................................................................10-11
Section IV – Execution .................................................................................. 10-12
ConductoftheAirAssault...............................................................................10-12
Buildup ofCombatPower...............................................................................10-12
Chapter 11 LANDING PLAN ............................................................................................... 11-1
Section I – Landing Zone Selection ............................................................... 11-1
CriteriaforSelectingLandingZones................................................................. 11-1
LocationofLandingZones................................................................................11-2
NumberofLanding Zones.................................................................................11-2
Section II – Landing Zone Updates................................................................ 11-3
LandingZoneCondition....................................................................................11-3
Fixed-wingSupport...........................................................................................11-3
UnmannedAircraftSystemSupport..................................................................11-3
Section III – Hot Landing Zone Considerations ............................................ 11-3
Scenarios..........................................................................................................11-3
ReactiontoEnemyContactAwayFromtheObjective.....................................11-4
ReactiontoEnemyContactontheObjective...................................................11-4
Section IV – Preparation and Supporting Fires ............................................ 11-4 |
3-99 | 8 | Contents
Section V – Landing Site Operations ............................................................ 11-5
LandingZoneandObstacleMarkings..............................................................11-5
Exitingthe Aircraft.............................................................................................11-6
Exitingthe LandingZone................................................................................11-11
Chapter 12 AIR MOVEMENT PLAN ................................................................................... 12-1
Section I – Development Considerations ...................................................... 12-1
Air Routes..........................................................................................................12-1
EnRouteFormations........................................................................................12-3
TerrainFlightModes.........................................................................................12-5
Fires..................................................................................................................12-6
SuppressionofEnemyAirDefenses................................................................12-6
AirAssaultSecurity...........................................................................................12-8
MissionCommand............................................................................................12-8
Section II – Air Movement Table .................................................................... 12-9
Air MovementTableDevelopment....................................................................12-9
Air MovementTableCriteria.............................................................................12-9
Chapter 13 LOADING AND STAGING ............................................................................... 13-1
Section I – Loading Plan ................................................................................. 13-1
PickupZoneSelection......................................................................................13-1
PickupZone Organization andControl.............................................................13-2
CoordinationWithSupportingAviationUnit......................................................13-3
PreparationofAirLoading Tables....................................................................13-3
DispositionofLoadsonPickupZone................................................................13-4
Lifts,Serials,andChalks...................................................................................13-5
BumpPlan.........................................................................................................13-6
Section II – Staging Plan ................................................................................. 13-7
PreparationforLoading.....................................................................................13-7
MovementtoPickupZone................................................................................13-7
Chalk Check-InandInspection.........................................................................13-7
LoadStaging.....................................................................................................13-8
Sling LoadOperations.......................................................................................13-8
GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ...........................................................................................................(cid:17)(cid:17) References-1
INDEX ...........................................................................................................................(cid:17) Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1.Jointphasingmodel..............................................................................................1-5
Figure 3-1. MDMPandairborneassaultplanningprocess.....................................................3-5
Figure 4-1.Assaultobjectives................................................................................................ 4-6
Figure 4-2.Airheadline.......................................................................................................... 4-7
Figure 4-3.Boundaries......................................................................................................... 4-10 |
3-99 | 9 | Contents
Figure 4-4.Baseoptions....................................................................................................... 4-19
Figure 5-1.Offsetandparalleldropzones.............................................................................. 5-7
Figure 5-2.Parallelon-linedropzones................................................................................... 5-8
Figure 5-3.AssemblycontrolpostsforABNIBCTforceslandingononedropzone............ 5-18
Figure 5-4.Movementofpersonneltocompanyassemblyarea.......................................... 5-19
Figure 5-5.Line-of-flight/clocksystem.................................................................................. 5-20
Figure 5-6.Stineraid............................................................................................................. 5-21
Figure 6-1.Cross-loadedaircraft............................................................................................ 6-7
Figure 7-1.Airbornetaskforcemarshallingarea.................................................................... 7-5
Figure 7-2.Heavy-droploadingareacontrolcenter................................................................ 7-6
Figure 7-3.Heavy-dropriggingsite......................................................................................... 7-7
Figure 7-4.Conceptofoutloadcontrol.................................................................................. 7-11
Figure 8-1.Gridlinemethod................................................................................................... 8-9
Figure 8-2.Attackbyfiremethod.......................................................................................... 8-10
Figure 8-3.Exampleofairassaultleadershippositioning..................................................... 8-12
Figure 9-1.Airassaultplanningstages................................................................................... 9-2
Figure 9-2.MDMPandairassaultplanningprocess.............................................................. 9-4
Figure 9-3.Time-constrainedairassaultplanning.................................................................. 9-5
Figure10-1.Organizationalframework.................................................................................10-3
Figure10-2.Weatherdata....................................................................................................10-7
Figure11-1.One-sideoff-load(UH-60)................................................................................11-7
Figure11-2a.One-sideoff-load(squadsinsamechalk)traillandingformation...................11-8
Figure11-2b.One-sideoff-load(squadsinsamechalk)staggeredtrailrightlanding
formation.................................................................................................................11-8
Figure11-3.Two-sideoff-load(UH-60)................................................................................11-9
Figure11-4.Two-sideoff-load(squadsinsamechalk)diamondlandingformation...........11-10
Figure11-5.Two-sideoff-load(chalkscross-loaded)heavyrightlandingformation..........11-10
Figure11-6. Rearrampoff-loadandlandingzoneexit(CH-47).........................................11-11
Figure11-7.One-sidelandingzonerush(squadsinsamechalk)traillanding
formation..............................................................................................................11-12
Figure11-8.Two-sidelandingzonerush(chalkscrossloaded)traillandingformation......11-13
Figure11-9.Two-sidelandingzonerush(squadsinsamechalk)traillanding
formation..............................................................................................................11-14
Figure12-1.Airrouteoverlay................................................................................................12-3
Figure12-2.Standardflightandlandingformations.............................................................12-5
Figure13-1.Examplepickupzonediagram..........................................................................13-4
Figure13-2.Lifts,serials,andchalks.................................................................................... 13-6
Tables
Table 1-1.Commandresponsibilityofairborneoperations................................................... 1-22
Table 1-2.Commandresponsibilityofairassaultoperations................................................ 1-24 |
3-99 | 10 | Contents
Table 7-1.Parachute issue.....................................................................................................7-2
Table 8-1.HeavyCombat AviationBrigadeorganization.......................................................8-3
Table 8-2.Medium CombatAviationBrigadeorganization.....................................................8-4
Table 8-3. Standardairassault radionetworksandmonitoringrequirements..................... 8-18
Table 9-1.Exampleofanairmissioncoordinationmeetingagenda......................................9-8
Table12-1. Exampleair movementtable..........................................................................12-10
Table13-1. Exampleair loadingtable..................................................................................13-3
Table13-2. Aircraftbumpinformation..................................................................................13-6 |
3-99 | 11 | Preface
Army Field Manual (FM) 3-99, Airborne and Air Assault Operations, establishes doctrine to govern the
activitiesandperformanceofArmyforcesinforcibleentry(specificallyairborneand airassaultoperations)and
provides the doctrinal basis for vertical envelopment and follow-on operations. This publication provides
leaders with descriptive guidance on how Army forces conduct vertical envelopment within the simultaneous
combinationofoffense,defense,andstability.These doctrinalprinciplesareintended tobeusedas a guideand
arenottobeconsideredprescriptive.
FM 3-99encompassestacticsforArmyairborneandairassaultoperations anddescribeshowcommandersplan,
prepare, and conduct airborne and air assault operations by means of joint combined arms operations. This
publicationsupersedesFM90-26,AirborneOperationsandArmyTactics,Techniques,andProcedures 3-18.12,
AirAssaultOperations.
To comprehend the doctrine contained in this publication, readers must first understand the principles of war,
the natureof unified land operations, and the linksbetween the operationaland tacticallevelsof war described
in JointPublication(JP) 3-0,ArmyDoctrine Publication(ADP) 3-0,and ArmyDoctrine ReferencePublication
(ADRP) 3-0. The reader must understand the fundamentals ofthe operationsprocess found in ADP and ADRP
5-0 associated with the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks contained in FM 3-90-1 and reconnaissance,
security, and tactical enabling tasks contained in FM 3-90-2. In addition the reader must also fully understand
the principles of mission command as described in ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0 and command and staff
organizationandoperationsfoundinFM 6-0.
The principal audience for FM 3-99 is the commanders, staff, officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
of the brigade, battalions, and companies within the brigade combat team. The audience also includes the
United StatesArmyTraining andDoctrine Commandinstitutionsand components, and the United States Army
SpecialOperationsCommand.Itservesasanauthoritativereferenceforpersonneldevelopingdoctrine,materiel
and force structure, institutionaland unittraining, and standard operatingprocedures(SOPs) for airborne or air
assaultoperations.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinatesensure their decisions and actionscomply withapplicable United States,
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their
Soldiersoperateinaccordancewiththelawofwarandtherulesofengagement.(RefertoFM27-10.)
FM 3-99 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and text. Terms for which FM 3-99 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an
asterisk(*)inthe glossary.Termsanddefinitionsfor whichFM 3-99is the proponent publicationare boldfaced
in the text and the term is italicized. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the
numberoftheproponentpublicationfollowsthedefinition.
This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United
States,andtheUnitedStatesArmyReserveunlessotherwisestated.
The proponent for FM 3-99 is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The preparing
agency is the United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE). Send comments and
recommendations by— mail or e-mail—using or following the format of DA Form 2028, (Recommended
ChangestoPublicationsandBlankForms). Pointofcontactinformationisasfollows:
E-mail: [email protected]
Phone: COM706-545-7114orDSN835-7114
Mail: Commanding General, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Doctrine
andCollectiveTrainingDivision,ATTN:ATZK-TDD,FortBenning,GA31905-5410
Unlessotherwisestated,wheneverthemasculinegenderisused,bothmenandwomenareimplied. |
3-99 | 13 | Introduction
Assured access is the desired conditions that the United States seeks to maintain in
potential areas of strategic importance throughout the world. Assured access is the
result of a combination of geopolitical factors that affect the United States’ability to
exert influence and project power in a variety of political, economic, humanitarian,
and military situations. While assured access includes the freedom of movement
through the global commons of international airspace and oceanic sea lanes,
operational access is the ability to project military force into an operational area with
sufficient freedom of action to accomplishthemission.
Operational access is the joint force contribution to assured access, the unhindered
national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory, waters, airspace
and cyberspace. Operational access challenges can be categorized in a number of
ways. They can be classified in terms of geographical, military, or diplomatic access
issues. They can be described in terms of anti-access challenges, capabilities
designed to prevent entry into an operational area, or area-denial capabilities
designedtolimitfreedom of actionwithintheoperationalarea.
Army forces, as part of the joint force, contribute to projecting military force into an
operational area and sustaining it in the face of armed opposition by defeatingenemy
anti-access and area denial capabilities. Projecting and sustaining forces require the
capability to secure multiple entry points into an operational area. As a major
application of forcible entry, the joint force uses vertical envelopment (airborne and
air assault operations), giving leaders flexibility and depth to set conditions for
decisive action. Vertical envelopment capitalizes on mobility to surprise the enemy,
seize a lodgment,and gaintheinitiative.
The joint force establishes several precepts for gaining operational access. Foremost
among them is “Conduct operations to gain access based on the requirements of the
broader mission, while also designing subsequent operations to lessen access
challenges.” Consistent with this precept, entry operations into enemy territory are a
means to military or political objectives, rather than an end in themselves. Entry
operations are planned within the larger context of the campaign’s overarching
purpose. Without considering the impacts of entry operations on the larger objectives
of a military campaign it is possible that entry may be gained through means that
decreasethelikelihoodofachievingpoliticalandmilitaryobjectives.
Operations during the last 25 years make clear that future entry of forces onto hostile
or uncertain territory will be necessary for a number of purposes, one of which is the
establishment of a lodgment. Joint doctrine defines forcible entry as the “seizing and
holding of a lodgment in the face of armed opposition,” and a lodgment as “a
designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized
and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides
maneuver space for subsequent operations.” Each service and functional component
hasanimportantroleinhowjointforcibleentryoperationsovercomeopposedaccess.
This manual provides doctrinal guidance for forcible entry operations at the
operational and tactical levels. It describes relationships within the operational joint |
3-99 | 14 | Introduction
task force; vertical envelopment, organizational roles, functions, capabilities, and
limitations; and responsibilities for the brigade combat team and its subordinate units
within the assault force during airborne and air assault operations. A summary of key
constructs to FM 3-99 follows:
(cid:120) Operational access—forcible entry and vertical envelopment—within the operational
environment.
(cid:120) Task force organization, mission, capabilities, and limitations as well as the duties and
responsibilitiesfortheconductofairborneandairassaultoperations.
(cid:120) Task force command and staff operations; cross-functional staff organizations (cells, working
groups,andcenters)toassistincoordination.
(cid:120) Meetings, working groups, and boards to integrate the staff, enhance planning, and
decisionmakingwithinthetaskforce.
(cid:120) Airborneand airassaulttask forceunique capabilitiesandplanningconsiderationsintransitioning
toothertacticaloperations. |
3-99 | 15 | Chapter 1
Overview
Adaptive adversaries and enemies will contest United States joint forces across all
domains— air, sea, land, space and cyberspace. Enemies are likely to employ anti-
access strategies to prevent friendly force ability to project and sustain combat power
into a region, and area denial strategies to constrain our nation’s freedom of action
within the region. Assured access— the unhindered national use of the global
commons and selected sovereign territory, waters, airspace and cyberspace, is
achieved by projecting all the elements of national power. Often the United States
requires operational access— the ability to project military force into an operational
area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. Operational access
is the desired condition that the United States seeks to maintain in areas of strategic
importance, to achieve assured access. Army forces, as part of joint forces project
forces into an operational area and conduct operations to defeat enemy anti-access
and area denial capabilities and establish security conditions and control of territory
to pressure freedom of movement and action for follow-on operations or deny that
area’s use to the enemy. Forcible entry operations are complex and always involve
taking prudent risk to gain a position of relative advantage over the enemy. Equally
critical is the transition between phases of the operation. This chapter discusses
forcible entryoperations and in particular the application of vertical envelopmentas a
tactical maneuver conducted by airborne or air assault forces to seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative.
SECTION I – FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS
1-1. United States forces gain access to sovereign spaces through invitation (humanitarian relief),
negotiations (basing rights), coercion (peacemaking operations under United Nation charter) or through
force. The joint force’s ability to project power and influence is challenged by proliferated anti-access
weaponswithincreasingrange, diversity,densityand sophisticationinthe handsofbothstateand nonstate
actors who are devising innovative approaches to contest joint forces in all domains. This evolving threat
necessitates the development of comprehensive joint force solutions for gaining and maintaining
operationalaccess.(RefertoJP 3-18formoreinformation.)
1-2. The composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that make up an operational
environment affects the employment of capabilities and impacts the decisions of commanders. The
operational environment of the access force includes all enemy, adversarial, friendly, and neutral systems
across the range of militaryoperations; it includes an understanding of the physical environment, the state
of governance, technology, local resources, and the culture of the local population. (Refer to JP 2-01.3 for
moreinformation.)
1-3. Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition (JP
3-18). A lodgmentis a designated area in a hostile or potentiallyhostile operationalarea that, whenseized
and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for
subsequent operations (JP 3-18). A forcible entryoperation is conducted to gain entry into the territoryof
an enemy by seizing a lodgment as rapidly as possible to enable the conduct of follow-on operations or
conduct a singular operation. The operations must be designed to provide maneuver space for subsequent
operations. This section addresses the principles and operational application of joint forcible entry |
3-99 | 16 | Chapter 1
operations. It discusses joint command and control, planning process and considerations, and the entry
force.
JOINT PRINCIPLES FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS
1-4. Fundamental principles are essential to plan, prepare, execute, and access joint forcible entry
operations.Jointprinciplesforforcibleentryoperationsare:
ACHIEVESURPRISE
1-5. Commanders and planners strive to achieve surprise regarding exact objectives, times, methods, and
forces employed in forcible entry operations. Surprise depends upon comprehensive information-related
capabilities[operationssecurity(OPSEC) and militarydeception]followedbydisciplined executionbythe
joint force. (Refer to JP 3-13.3 and JP 3-13.4 for more information.) Surprise is not a necessarycondition
for operational success (particularly when the force has overwhelming superiority), but it can reduce
operationalrisksignificantly.
CONTROLOFTHEAIR
1-6. Counterair integratesoffensive and defensive operationsto attainand maintain a desired degree ofair
superiorityand protectionintheoperationalareatoprotecttheforceduring periodsofcritical vulnerability
and to preserve lines of communications. At a minimum, the joint force must neutralize the enemy’s
offensiveair and missile capabilityand air defensesto achievelocalair superiorityand protectionover the
planned lodgment. The joint force controls the air through integrated and synchronized air and missile
defense operations. Air interdiction of enemy forces throughout the operational area enhances the
simultaneityanddepthoftheforcibleentryoperation.
CONTROLOFSPACE
1-7. Space superiority allows the joint force commander access to communications, weather, navigation,
timing, remote sensing, and intelligence assets without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.
Clearly defined command relationships are crucial for ensuring timely and effective execution of space
operations and provide depth, persistence, and reach capabilities for commanders at the strategic,
operational,andtacticallevels.
ELECTROMAGNETICSPECTRUMMANAGEMENT
1-8. Electromagnetic spectrum management is the planning, coordinating, and managing use of the
electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures (JP 6-01). It
includes the interrelated functions of frequency management, host-nation coordination, and joint spectrum
interference resolution that together enable the planning, management, and execution of operations within
the electromagnetic operational environment during all phasesof military operations. Theelectromagnetic
operational environment is the background electromagnetic environment and the friendly, neutral, and
adversarial electromagnetic order of battle within the electromagnetic area of influence associated with a
givenoperationalarea(JP 6-01).(RefertoJP 6-01formoreinformation.)
OPERATIONSINTHEINFORMATIONENVIRONMENT
1-9. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do
the same (JP 3-13). It enables the primary mission objective and information-related activities within
informationoperations.Informationoperationsistheintegratedemployment, duringmilitaryoperations,of
information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or
usurp the decisionmaking of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13).
(RefertoJP 3-13formoreinformation.)
1-10. Information in an operational environment is an important contributor to operational access as it
enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat power, |
3-99 | 17 | Overview
ultimately creating opportunities to achieve decisive results. Operations in the information environment—
the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on
information(JP 3-13)requires—
(cid:122) Complementarytasks ofinformationoperationsthatinformandinfluence a globalaudienceand
affectmoralewithintheoperationalenvironment.
(cid:122) Cyber electromagnetic activities (See FM 3-38.) to ensure information availability, protection,
and delivery, as well as a means to deny, degrade, or disrupt the enemy’s use of its command
andcontrolsystemsandothercybercapabilities.
(cid:122) Knowledge management capabilities to allow the commanders to make informed; timely
decisionsdespitetheuncertaintyofoperations.
(cid:122) Information management to help commanders make and disseminate effective decisions faster
thantheenemycan.
(cid:122) Informationsystemstounderstand,visualize,describe,anddirectoperations.
SEACONTROL
1-11. Local maritime superiority is required to project power ashore in support of the joint forcible entry
operation and to protect sea lines of communications (SLOCs). Protection of SLOCs ensures the
availability of logistic support required to sustain operations and support the transition to continuing
operationsbyfollow-onforces.
ISOLATETHELODGMENT
1-12. A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operationalarea that, when seized
and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for
subsequentoperations. The joint force attacksor neutralizes enemy capabilities with the potential to affect
theestablishmentofthelodgment.Thesecapabilitiesinclude—
(cid:122) Enemyground,sea,andairforcesthatcanbecommittedtoreacttojointforceassaults.
(cid:122) Indirectfiresystemsandtheatermissilesystemsthatcanrangethelodgment.
(cid:122) Relatedenemysensors,commandandcontrolsystems,anddigitalnetworks.
GAINANDMAINTAINACCESS
1-13. Gaining and maintainingaccess is a critical precondition for successful forcible entryand follow-on
operations. In any given operational area, numerous and diverse limitations to access present themselves.
Access may be restricted due to diplomatic, economic, military, or cultural factors. Ports, airfields, and
infrastructuresmaybephysicallylimited.Additionalaccesspreconditionconsiderationsinclude—
(cid:122) Leveraging established basing, access, and security cooperation agreements as well as the
regional and national expertise and partner capabilities developed through precrisis engagement
activitiesatthenationalandregionallevels.
(cid:122) Appropriate shaping operations or activities focused on identifying and neutralizing an
adversary’santi-accesscapabilitiesbalancedagainsttheneedforsurprise.
(cid:122) Operational access to expand the degree to which the full range of joint capabilities within the
jointoperationsareaisutilized.
NEUTRALIZEENEMYFORCESWITHINTHELODGMENT
1-14. The joint force must neutralize enemy forces within the lodgment to facilitate the establishment of
airheads(Refer tochapter3 ofthispublicationformore information.)and beachheads(Refer toJP 3-02for
more information.) within the operational area and to provide for the immediate protection of the force.
Planningconsiderationsshouldinclude—
(cid:122) Identificationofenemyinfrastructure,which maybeofvalueforfutureusebyfriendlyforces.
(cid:122) Limitingphysicaldamagetolessenthetimeneededtorebuild. |
3-99 | 18 | Chapter 1
EXPANDTHELODGMENT
1-15. Thejointforcequicklybuildscombatpowerinordertoenhancesecurityandtheabilitytorespondto
enemy counter attacks, enable continuous landing of troops and materiel, and facilitate transition to
subsequent operations. Analyze requirements to expand with regards to maximum on ground capabilities,
throughput,andinfrastructure.
MANAGETHEIMPACTOFENVIRONMENTALFACTORS
1-16. Managing the impact of environmental factors refers to overcoming the effect of land and sea
obstacles; anticipating, preventing, detecting, and mitigating threat use of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN), and weapons of mass destruction; and, determining the impact of
climate, weather, and other naturally occurring hazards. (Refer to JP 3-11, JP 3-40, and JP 3-59 for more
information.)
INTEGRATESUPPORTINGOPERATIONS
1-17. Reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations are critical to information
collection based on the commander’s critical information requirement. Information operations, civil-
military operations, and special operations (to include special reconnaissance missions) are keys to setting
conditions, and integrated into the operation at every stage from initial planning to transition. Logistic
services comprise the support capabilities that collectively enable the joint force to rapidly provide
sustainmentofentryforcesinordertoachievetheenvisionedendstateofthejointforcecommander(JFC).
OPERATIONAL APPLICATIONS OF FORCIBLE ENTRY
OPERATIONS
1-18. The Army combines campaign qualities and expeditionary capabilities to contribute decisive,
sustained land power to unified actions. Campaign quality extends expeditionary capability well beyond
deploying combined arms forces that are effective upon arrival. It is an ability to conduct sustained
operationsforas longasnecessary,adaptingto unpredictableand oftenprofoundchangesinanoperational
environment (OE) as the campaign unfolds. Expeditionary capability is the ability to promptly deploy
combinedarmsforcesworldwideintooperationalenvironments(OEs)andconductoperationsuponarrival.
Future conflicts, involving forcible entry operations, place a premium on promptly deploying land power
andconstantlyadaptingtoeachcampaign’suniquecircumstancesastheyoccurandchange.
CAMPAIGNQUALITY
1-19. The joint force commander (JFC) conducts campaigns to translate operational-level actions into
strategic results and exploits the advantage of interdependent service capabilities. Through operational art
and the principles of joint operations, the JFC determines the most effective and efficient methods for
applyingdecisiveoperationsinvariouslocationsacrossmultipleechelons.
EXPEDITIONARYCAPABILITY
1-20. Expeditionary operations require the ability to deploy quickly with little notice, shape conditions in
the operational area, operate immediately on arrival exploiting success and consolidating tactical and
operationalgains.Expeditionarycapabilities of anentryforce are more thanphysicalattributes;theybegin
with a mindsetthatpermeates the force.The Army provides entry forcesto the jointforcecommander that
areorganizedandequippedtorapidlydeployaswellasconduct sustainedoperations.
PHASINGANDTRANSITIONS
1-21. A phaseis a planningandexecutiontoolusedtodivideanoperationindurationoractivity (ADRP 3-
0). Phasing is critical to arranging complex operations. It describes how the commander envisions the
overall operation unfolding in time. Within a phase, a large portion of the force executes similar or
mutuallysupportingactivities.Achieving aspecifiedcondition orsetofconditionstypically markstheend |
3-99 | 19 | Overview
of a phase.Descriptionsofeffortsduringeachphaseshould emphasizeeffort,concentrate combatpowerin
timeandspaceat a decisivepoint,andaccomplishitsobjectivesdeliberatelyandlogically.
1-22. Phasing is critical to arranging all tasks of an operation that cannot be conducted simultaneously.
Commanders, with the assistance of the staff, visualize the mission, decide which tactics to use, and
balance the tasks of unified land operations while preparing their intent and concept of operations
(CONOPS). They determine which tasks the force can accomplish simultaneously, if phasing is required,
whatadditionalresources are necessary, and howto transitionfromone taskto another. Atthe operational
level,thisrequireslookingbeyondthecurrentoperationandprioritizingforcesforthenextphaseorsequel.
1-23. Transitions mark a change of focusbetweenphasesor betweenthe ongoingoperationand execution
of a branchor sequel. Transitions require planningand preparation wellbefore their execution to maintain
the momentum and tempo of operations. The force is vulnerable during transitions, and commanders
establish clear conditions for their execution. Transition occurs for several reasons. It may occur from an
operationdominated by combined arms maneuver to one dominated by wide area security. Anunexpected
changeinconditionsmayrequirecommanders to direct anabrupttransitionbetweenphases.Insuchcases,
the overall composition of the force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task
organization, and rules of engagement. Typically, task organization evolves to meet changing conditions;
however, transition planning also must account for changes in mission. Commanders continuously assess
the situation andtask-organize andcycletheir forcesto retainthe initiative. Theystrive toachievechanges
inemphasiswithoutincurringanoperationalpause.
1-24. TheJFC’svisionofhow a campaignoroperationshouldunfold andanticipatedenemyactiondrives
decisions regarding phasing. Generally, joint operations and campaigns involve six phases (shape, deter,
seizeinitiative,dominate, stabilize,and enablecivilauthority)asillustrated infigure 1-1.Phasingassistsin
framing commander’s intent and assigning tasks to subordinate commanders. Byarranging operations and
activities into phases, the joint force commander can better integrate and synchronize subordinate
operations in time, space, and purpose. Each phase represents a natural subdivision of the campaign or
operation. Within the context of the phases established by a JFC, subordinate JFCs and component
commanders may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. A creditable threat of forcible entry
operations can be an effective deterrence and may be applicable in both Phase 0 (Shape) and Phase I
(Deter).
Figure 1-1. Joint phasing model
1-25. A forcible entry operation normally is conducted during Phase II (Seize the Initiative) or Phase III
(Dominate) of a joint operation. A forcible entry operation may be the JFC’s opening move to seize the
initiative. For example, a JFC might direct friendly forces to conduct a vertical envelopment (airborne or
air assault operation) to seize and hold a lodgment to ensure the continuous landingof troops and materiel
and provide the maneuver space to conduct follow-on operations. The establishment of the lodgment,
followed bythearrivaland preparationoffollow-onforces, usuallymarksthe endofthe forcibleentrysub-
phaseoftheoperationand a transitiontofurtheroffensiveoperationstoseizetheinitiativeordominate. |
3-99 | 20 | Chapter 1
1-26. Forcible entry operations during the dominate phase of a campaign may be used for the following
purposes:
(cid:122) A suddenattackinforcetoachievedecisiveresults (acoupdemain).
(cid:122) Conductingoperationalmovementandmaneuvertoattainpositionaladvantage.
(cid:122) A militarydeception.
1-27. The defeat of enemy forces usually marks the end of the dominate phase of the operation and a
transitionto area securityand further operationsto stabilize and enable civilauthority. The mere existence
of a forcibleentry capabilitymaybe usedbythe JFCas a militarydeception operation, as a showofforce
ortoforceenemymovementevenwithoutmounting a forcibleentryoperation.
JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL
1-28. Joint and partner interoperability (to include communications, planning and operations processes,
staff functionality, language skills, and cultural knowledge) is critical to achieve unity of effort. Joint
command and control information systems must enable interoperability and help synthesize information
intoknowledge whileoperatinginaustereenvironments,onthemove,andacrosswideareas.
1-29. Joint command and control capabilities must maintain communications when networks are
compromised or degraded due to friendly or enemy actions as well as materiel breakdown, natural
atmospheric effects, or geospatial interference. The following paragraphs provide guidance on the
employment options, organization of the operational area, command relationships, and command and
controlfunctionsthatsupporttheconductofforcibleentryoperations.
FORCEEMPLOYMENT
1-30. The combinationof forcible entrycapabilitiesemployed depends onthe mission.Unityofcommand
is vital when multiple forcible entry capabilities are used or combined. Forcible entry operations are
complex and must be kept simple in concept and well understood by all elements of the joint force and
supportingcommands.
1-31. If the JFC decides to use a combination of forcible entry capabilities, he must decide whether to
conduct the forcible entries as concurrent or integrated operations. The distinction between concurrent and
integrated operations has implications for organizing forces, establishing command relationships, and
applyingforcetoaccomplishthemission.Hemustconsidertheuniqueaspectsofthe specificoperation and
should organize the force, establish command relationships, and apply force in a manner that fits the
currentsituation.
1-32. Concurrent operations occur when a combination of amphibious, airborne, or air assault forcible
entryoperationsareconductedsimultaneouslybutasdistinctoperationswithseparateoperationalareasand
objectives. Integrated forcible entry operations result when amphibious, airborne, or air assault forcible
entries are conducted simultaneously within the same operational area and with mutually supporting
objectives. Integrated forcible entry operations feature the complementary employment of forces and seek
tomaximizethecapabilitiesoftherespectiveforcesavailabletothecommander.
1-33. Dispersed joint forces use strategic and operational maneuver via air and sea to deploy or employ
fromtheglobalsystemofmainoperatingbases,forwardoperatingsites,cooperativesecuritylocations,and
amphibious and other sea-based platforms to project military force into an operational area with sufficient
freedomof action to accomplish the mission. The complementarycapability to employ from the air, with
airborne and air assault forces, and the sea, with amphibious and air assault forces, complicates the
adversary’s defense. Byrequiring the adversaryto defend a vast area againstour mobilityand deep power
projection, joint forces can render some of his force irrelevant while exploiting the seams created in his
defensivedisposition.
1-34. Advanced force operations include strike operations, clandestine insertion of special operations
forces and organic or supporting reconnaissance and/or surveillance teams, deception, counter-mine or
counter-obstacle operations, and information operations. These activities combine with efforts to gain
localized air and maritime superiority in the approaches to and entry areas. Joint strike operations along
with theater air and missile defense, computer network operations, and electronic attack help provide |
3-99 | 21 | Overview
protectionand select areasof domainadvantage allowing for the conductof entryoperations. (Refer to JP
3-05andADRP 3-05formoreinformation.)
1-35. To counter the enemy’s defensive capabilities, joint forces attack from multiple directions and
dimensions and disperse or concentrate forces depending on the intelligence preparationof the operational
environment. (See JP 2-01.3.) Ideally, they avoid enemy defenses and seize undefended entry points
throughverticalenvelopment, attackingtherearandflanksof a force,ineffectcuttingofforencircling the
force. In hostile environments, assault forces conduct simultaneous force projection and sustainment to
multipleunexpectedorausterelocationsalong a coastlineandunexpected orausterelandingzonesashore.
1-36. Operational maneuver requires the near-simultaneous movement and support of multiple tactical
formations by ground, air, and sea from separate staging areas to locations in depth from which their
militarycapabilitiescanbe focused againstcriticalenemyforcesandfacilities.Highoperationaltempoand
continuous pressure disrupts the enemy’s ability to regroup, reconstitute capabilities, or reconfigure forces
to support new plans. The primary means of maintaining continuous pressure is the rapid cycling of joint
functions,relatedcapabilitiesandactivitiesgroupedtogethertohelpJFCsintegrate,synchronize,anddirect
jointoperations.
1-37. Anintermediate staging base is a tailorable, temporarylocation used for staging forces, sustainment
and/or extraction into and out of an operational area (JP 3-35). Intermediate staging bases (ISBs) are a
critical capability that enables shorter range recycling of intra-theater lift capabilities, reorganization and
reconfiguration of capabilities to meet evolving tactical demands and recalibration of battle and logistical
rhythms. Obtaining ISBs remains a critical part of baseline condition setting for joint force employment
worldwideinaccessoperations.AbsentISBs,thejointforce’sabilitytomaintaincontinuouspressureinthe
faceofareadenialcapabilitiesisreducedsignificantly.
1-38. Joint commanders can employ forces in ISBs as a deterrent or as part of a forcible entry or other
combat operation to defeat enemy forces. Besides conducting forcible entry to secure a lodgment as a
prelude to a larger campaign, they mayconductlimited attacksto seize keyterrain upon whichthe enemy
has emplaced air and missile defenses and anti-satellite missiles to ensure freedom of action in other
domains.
1-39. Entry operations may rely on joint assets in an ISB for command and control, fires, protection,
intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and sustainment. Under austere conditions or when overcoming
anti-access capabilities joint ISBs help reduce the requirement for large ground-based sustainment stocks
and extended ground lines of communication, which could be vulnerable to enemy attack and which
requireadditionalforcestosecure.
1-40. Forcible entry may include an airfield opening to support air operations following the initial entry.
An airfield is an area prepared for the accommodation (including any buildings, installations, and
equipment), landing, takeoff of aircraft. (JP 3-17). As airfields are identified for use and the missions and
aircraft for which the airfield will be opened are determined; operators and planners generate options for
one of three operational environments: permissive, uncertain, and hostile. Once employment forces are
assigned by the joint task force, more detailed planning is conducted in coordination with the entry force
andUnitedStatesAirForce(USAF)first-responderairfieldopeningunits.
ORGANIZATIONOFTHEFORCIBLEENTRYOPERATIONALAREA
1-41. Gainingoperationalareaaccess. Jointforcesseektoachieveperiodsofadvantage ineverydomainto
counter enemy anti-access capabilities and gain access to an operational area. They attack enemy anti-
access capabilities and gain access to an operational area by conducting cross-domain operations in an
effort to maximize the advantages and negate the disadvantages encountered in a single domain. Gaining
totaldomaindominanceisrarelyobtainable,accessforcesfightfordomainsuperiority—
(cid:122) Togainanadvantageintimeandplacethatneednotbepermanentorwidespread.
(cid:122) At critical times and places within the operational area to achieve, the degree of freedom of
actionrequiredtoaccomplishobjectives.
1-42. Maintaining operational area access. The Army’s role in the joint fight for maintaining operational
area access is the integration of ground maneuver into a joint effort; conducting entry operations; and |
3-99 | 22 | Chapter 1
employing and sustaining forces while fighting to maintain freedom of action. The primary means of
maintaining continuous pressure on the enemy is the continuous and rapid cycling of capabilities under
operational-leveldirectionthroughoutthedurationofoperations.
1-43. Operational area. Operational area is an overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for
geographic areasin which militaryoperationsare conducted. Operationalareasinclude, butare notlimited
to, area of operations, amphibious objective area, joint operations area, and joint special operations area
(JSOA). The JFC may designate operational areas on a temporary basis to facilitate the coordination,
integration,anddeconflictionbetweenjointforcecomponentsandsupportingcommands. Operationalareas
have physical dimensions comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains and are
definedbygeographicalboundaries.
1-44. Area of operations. Definedareas of operations for land and maritime forces typically do not
encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for the land and maritime
component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders
withareasofoperationsmaydesignate subordinateareaofoperationswithinwhichtheir subordinateforces
operate. For example, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) may assign subordinate
commanders separate areas of operations within an assigned airborne or air assault area of operations.
These subordinate commanders employ the full range of joint and service doctrinal control measures and
graphics to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, safeguard friendly forces and civilians, and
promoteunityofeffort.
1-45. Amphibious objective area. An amphibious objective area is an area of land, sea, and airspace,
assignedby a jointforce commander to commander,amphibious task force (CATF)to conductamphibious
operations.The amphibiousobjective area should be specified in the initiatingdirective. Thisarea mustbe
of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission and must provide sufficient
area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. This three-dimensional area often is limited in
height(for example, up to 25,000 feet). Amphibiousobjective area air control proceduresare identicalto a
high-density airspace controlzone(HIDACZ)and CATF is theregional(orsector)air defensecommander
(RADC or SADC).The amphibious objective area extends below the water surface, and can have a depth
limitation.(RefertoJP 3-02formoreinformation.)
1-46. Joint special operations area (JSOA). A joint special operations area is an area of land, sea, and
airspace, assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special
operations activities. The JFC may establish a JSOA when geographic boundaries between special
operationsforcesand conventionalforces arethe mostsuitable controlmeasures. Establishmentofa JSOA
forspecialoperationsforcesto conductoperationsprovidesa controlmeasureandassistsin the prevention
of fratricide. The commander, joint special operations task force (CDRJSOTF) may request the
establishment ofa JSOA.When a JSOAisdesignated,the CDRJSOTFis the supportedcommander within
the designated JSOA. The CDRJSOTF may further assign a specific area or sector within the JSOA to a
subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces
mission, operational environment, and politico-military considerations all influence the number,
composition,andsequencingofspecialoperationsforcesdeployedinto a JSOA.Itmaybelimitedinsizeto
accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad
rangeofunconventionalwarfareoperations.(RefertoJP 3-05formoreinformation.)
1-47. Airspace control area. An airspace control area is that airspace laterally defined by the boundaries
that delineate the operational area. This airspace may include subareas. This airspace may entail an
operational area and is a means of planning and dividing responsibility. While an operational area is in
existence,airspacecontrolwithinthe operationalarea isdelegated accordingto JFCguidance,theairspace
controlplan,andairspacecontrolorder.(RefertoJP 3-52formoreinformation.)
1-48. Control and coordination measures. Control and coordination of forcible entry operations pose a
difficultchallenge to all elementsofthe joint force. Inaddressing this challenge, the JFCs and appropriate
commanders may employ various control and coordination measures that facilitate the execution of
operationsand, atthe same time, protectthe force tothe greatestpossibledegree. These measuresinclude,
but are not limited to, boundaries that circumscribe operational areas; control measures to facilitate joint
force maneuver; fire support coordination measures (FSCMs); and airspace coordinating measures. (Refer
toJP 3-52formoreinformation.) |
3-99 | 23 | Overview
COMMANDRELATIONSHIPSFORFORCIBLEENTRYOPERATIONS
1-49. The JFC has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination between
subordinate commanders to ensure unity of command. He may organize the forcible entry force as a
subordinate joint task force or the forcible entry force may be organized from a component. An initiating
directive provides guidance on command relationships and other pertinent instructions for the duration of
theforcibleentryoperation.Jointforcecommandersubordinatecommandrelationshipsmayinclude:
FunctionalComponentCommanders
1-50. Designating joint force functional component commanders, allows resolution of joint issues at the
functional component level and enhances component interaction at that level. Delegating control of the
forcible entry operation to a functional component commander permits the JFC to focus on other
responsibilities in the operational areas. Based on the JFC’s guidance, the forcible entry operation maybe
conducted by a functional component commander. (Refer to JP 3-30, JP 3-32, and JP 3-02 for more
information.)Responsibilitieswhenorganizedunderfunctionallinesincludethefollowing:
(cid:122) Joint force land component commander (JFLCC). Plans, coordinates, and employs designated
forces or capabilities for joint land operations in support of the joint force commander’s
CONOPS. Normally commands forcible entry operations that involve airborne or air assaults
thatoriginate from land bases, and typicallydesignates subordinate airborne and air assault task
forcecommanders.
Airborne task force commander (ABNTFC). Serves as the airborne assault force
(cid:132)
commander’s(ABNAFC) higherecheloncommander.TheABNTFCmaybethejointforce
commander or ground commander, depending upon experience and the scope of the
operation. Responsible for the planning, coordination, and employment of designated
airborne forcible entry forces or capabilities in the support of the joint force commander’s
CONOPS.The ABNTFChasoverallresponsibilityto synchronizeandintegratetheactions
of assigned, attached, and supporting air capabilities or forces in time, space, and purpose.
The command relationships established between the joint force commander, ABNAFC,
commander, airlift force; joint force air component commander (JFACC), and other
designatedcommandersoftheforcibleentryforcearekeytomissionsuccess.
Air assault task force commander (AATFC). Serves as the overall commander of the air
(cid:132)
assaulttask force (AATF) using fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft deploying fromland-based
facilities and ships. Responsible for the planning, coordination, and employment of
designated air assault forcible entry forces or capabilities in the support of the joint force
commander’s CONOPS. The AATFC ensures continuity of command throughout the
operation by forming and employing the AATF, which is a temporary group of integrated
forcestailoredto a specificmissionunderthecommandof a singleheadquarters.
(cid:122) Joint force air component commander (JFACC). Synchronizes and integrates the actions of
assigned, attached, and supporting air capabilities or forces in time, space, and purpose in
support of the joint force commander’s CONOPS. The JFACC coordinates with the supported
functional component commander or joint task force commander to establish airspace control
andairdefenseplansinsupportof a forcibleentryoperation.
(cid:122) Joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC). Plans, coordinates, and employs
designated forces or capabilities for joint maritime operations in support of the joint force
commander’sCONOPS.
Commander, amphibious task force (CATF) and commander, landing force (CLF)
(cid:132)
amphibious assault forcible entry operations include air and land assaults that originate
fromthe sea. The amphibious force is organized to best accomplish the mission based
onthe CONOPS.
Establishing command relationship between the CATF, CLF, and other designated
(cid:132)
commanders of the amphibious force is an important decision. An establishing directive is
essential to ensure unity of effort within the amphibious force. Normally, a support
relationshipisestablishedbetweentheCATFandCLFbytheJFCorestablishingauthority. |
3-99 | 24 | Chapter 1
SpecialOperationsForcesCommand
1-51. Whendirected,Commander,United States(U.S.)SpecialOperationsCommandprovidescontinental
U.S.-basedspecialoperationsforcesto aJFC.TheJFCnormallyexercises combatant command (command
authority) of assigned and operational control of attached special operations forces through a commander,
theater special operations command (TSOC), or a subunified commander. When a JFC establishes and
employs multiple task forcesconcurrently, the TSOC commander mayestablishand employmultiple joint
special operations task forces (JSOTFs) to manage special operations forces assets and accommodate joint
task force/task force special operations requirements. Accordingly, the joint task force commander, as the
common superior, establishes support or tactical control command relationships between the JSOTF
commandersand joint task force/tasks force commanders. The special operations forces liaison to the JFC
helpscoordinatethe operationsofthesupportedorsupportingspecialoperationsforceandadvisesthejoint
force commander of special operations forces capabilities and limitations. (Refer to FM 6-05 for more
information.)
Multinational Partners
1-52. Entry forces participating in a multinational operation always have at least two distinct chains of
command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. Although nations often
participateinmultinationaloperations,theyrarely,ifever,relinquishnationalcommandoftheirforces.
1-53. Forcibleentryoperationswithmultinationalpartnersareplannedandconductedmuchthesameas a
U.S. jointforceoperation.Attaining unityofeffortthroughunityofcommand fora multinationaloperation
maynotbepoliticallyfeasible, butitshould be a goal. Forcible entry objectives mustbe understood by all
nationalforces.(RefertoFM 3-16formoreinformation.)
AIRSPACECONTROL
1-54. The JFC normally designates a JFACC as the commander for joint air operations. In addition, to a
JFACC, the JFC maydesignate an area air defense commander (AADC) and anairspace control authority
orhe maydesignate theJFACCasthe AADCand airspace controlauthority.If a separateairspacecontrol
authorityorAADCisdesignated,closecoordinationisessentialforunityofeffort.
AirspaceControlAuthority
1-55. The airspace control authority plans, coordinates, and develops airspace control procedures and
operates the airspace control system. He monitors, assesses, and controls operational area airspace and
directs changes according to the joint force commander’s intent. The airspace control authority normally
controls the airspace through the theater air control system (TACS) and the Army air-ground system
(AAGS) in forcible entries. Situations may limit establishment of ground systems and require airborne or
sea-basedsystemsto conductairspace control. Commandersandstaffsshould closelymonitor andplanthe
employment of critical communication systems within TACS/AAGS. (Refer to JP 3-52 for more
information.)
ArmyAir-Ground System
1-56. Army components of the AAGS consist of airspace elements, fire support cells, air and missile
defense sections, and coordination and liaison elements embedded in Army command posts. Collectively
theycoordinate and integrate airspaceuse —joint,coalition, nonmilitaryand Army mannedand unmanned
aircraftsystems,directedenergy, munitions—fortheechelonstheyareassigned.Theseparticipantsconsist
of airspace elements, fire support cells, air defense airspace management/brigade aviation elements
(ADAM/BAEs), an Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC), battlefield coordination
detachments (BCDs), ground and reconnaissance liaison detachments, and air defense artilleryfire control
officers (ADAFCOs). Some participants of the theater air-ground system (TAGS) —such as the air
mobilityliaisonofficer, the tacticalair controlparty, and the air support operationscenter—remainunder
operational controlofdifferent Services but provide direct supportduring theconductofoperations. (Refer
toFM 3-52formoreinformation.) |
3-99 | 25 | Overview
AirspaceElementsbyEchelonandRole
1-57. Airspace elements are organic to brigade combat teams BCTs and higher. Corps and division
airspace elements are the same and both contain an airspace element in their main and tactical command
posts.TheBCTscontain a versionofanairspaceelementreferred toasanADAM/BAE.TheADAM/BAE
integratesbrigade airspace, includingair and missile defense (AMD) and aviation functions. Eachofthese
elements coordinates with higher, subordinate, and adjacent elements to maximize the effectiveness of
airspacecontrol.
1-58. The ADAM/BAE manages the airspace control working group to facilitate and synchronize
contributionsfromallthe elementsthatperformthe airspace collectivetasks.The airspace control working
group typically consists of an air liaison officer and representatives from the airspace element, aviation
element,AMDelement,firesupportcell,tacticalaircontrolparty,andunmannedaircraftsystemselement.
AirspaceCoordinationandLiaisonElement
1-59. The JFACC establishes one or more joint air component coordination elements (JACCEs). JACCEs
colocate with the joint force commanders headquarters and other component commanders’ headquarters.
When established, these elements act as the JFACC’s primary representatives to the respective
commanders and facilitate interaction among the respective staffs. The JACCE facilitates integration by
exchanging current intelligence, operational data, and support requirements. It also aids integration by
coordinating JFACC requirements for airspace coordinating measures (ACMs), FSCMs, close air support,
airmobility,andspacerequirements.
1-60. The battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), the Army liaison to the JFACC, is located in the
joint air operations center (JAOC). The BCD facilitates the synchronization of air and Army ground
operations within the area of responsibility. BCD personnel work with their counterparts in the JAOC to
facilitate planning, coordination, and executionof air-ground operations. The BCD expedites the exchange
of information through face-to-face coordination and digital interfaces with JAOC elements and with—
Armyground liaisonofficers atUSAFoperationscenters, the Armytheater maincommand post, thecorps
main command post (or if necessary the tactical command posts), and with subordinate unit command
posts,ifappropriate.Atthecorpsordivisionmaincommand post,theBCDexchangesinformationwiththe
integratingandfunctionalcellswithintheheadquarters.(RefertoFM 3-52formoreinformation.)
1-61. The BCD also supervises the Army’s reconnaissance liaison detachments and ground liaison
detachments that provide coordination among Army forces and USAF reconnaissance, fighter, and airlift
wings. The Armyassigns ground liaisondetachments to eachUSAF air wingoperations center supporting
groundoperations.TheArmygroundliaisondetachmentsprovideArmyexpertise,interpretingandbriefing
pilotsonthegroundcommander’sconceptofoperations, tactics,equipment,andthegroundsituation.They
also provide guidance on targetdesignation, help identify friendlytroops, and participate in the debriefing
ofpilotsontheir return frommissions. These detachments are also the principalpointsofcontactbetween
the USAF contingency response groups and Army airfield control groups for controlling Army theater
airliftmovements.(RefertoJP 3-17formoreinformationonairmobilityoperations.)
AirspaceControl Coordination DuringAirborneand AirAssaultForceOperations
1-62. Missions such as airborne, air assault and other incursions into enemy territory require specific
airspace control coordination. When supporting a forcible entry operation, the air component commander
for the operation or JFACC (if designated) may use airborne command and control assets to enhance
coordination and control of joint air operations and airspace management. Additional considerations
includethefollowing:
(cid:122) Force employmentandsysteminteroperabilitynormally determinesthesystemsavailabletothe
airspacecontrolauthorityindesignatingairspacecontrolsystemtocontroljointairoperations.
(cid:122) Distances involved and the duration require establishing special air traffic control facilities or
specialtacticsteamstoextenddetailedcontrolintotheobjectivearea.
(cid:122) Air traffic volume demands careful coordination to limit potential conflict and to enable the
successofmission-essentialoperationswithintheairhead. |
3-99 | 26 | Chapter 1
(cid:122) Establishment of a high-density air control zone around a drop zone or landing zone (includes
sufficientterrainandairspace)topermitsafeandefficientairtrafficcontrol.
(cid:122) A high-density air control zone can be nominated by the ground force commander and should
include,at a minimum,the airspacebounded bytheairheadline.(Refertochapter 4 andchapter
10ofthispublicationformoreinformation.)
(cid:122) Within the high-densityair control zone, all aircraft flights should be coordinated with the drop
zone,landingzone,andtheagencyresponsibleforcontrollingthejointairspace.
(cid:122) Air mission commander coordinates with the assault force commander to select the time on
targetandthedirectionofapproachintoandthroughtheairhead.
(cid:122) Environmental effects on airspace control coordination may dictate force employment
techniquesandaircraftselectionforspecificmissionprofiles.
AREAAIRDEFENSECOMMANDER
1-63. The JFC designates an area air defense commander (AADC) with the authorityto plan, coordinate,
and integrate overall joint force defensive counterair operations. The AADC normally is the component
commanderwiththepreponderanceof airand missile defense assets and thecapabilityto plan, coordinate,
and execute integrated air and missile defense operations. Additionally, the AADC is granted the required
commandauthoritytodeconflictandcontrolengagementsandtoexercisereal-timebattlemanagement.
1-64. As approvedbythejointforcecommander,the AADC maydesignatethe commander,Armyairand
missile defense command (AAMDC) as a deputy AADC for air and missile defense [DAADC (AMD)] in
support of the AADC for defense counterair operations. The AAMDC is responsible for balancing the
Army counterair assets/capabilities between the Army/JFLCC maneuver units and theater-level
requirements. The AAMDC ensures that Army theater air and missile defense operations are internally
coordinatedandproperlyintegratedwiththejointforceand multinationalforces.
1-65. The Army provides mission command, sensors, and weapon systems for the counterair operational
area, but does not provide the capability for regional or sector air defense commands within the land
component area of operations. Regional or sector air defense commands normally are provided by
command and controlelements [control and reportingcenter (AADC), tacticalair operationscenter United
StatesMarineCorps(USMC),orAegisUnitedStatesNavy(USN)]oftheothercomponents.
1-66. Theoperationalarea,toincludeingressandegressroutes,mustbefullyprotectedbyanintegratedair
defense system consisting of air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space assets. The joint force is
particularly vulnerabletoattacksbyenemyaircraftorsurface-to-surface missilesduringtheearly stagesof
a forcible entry. Accordingly, the primary objectives for air defense operations are to assist in gaining air
superiority.
1-67. TheAADCintegratesallavailablesurface-to-air assetsintotheoverallairdefenseplanandcomplies
with procedures and weapons control measures established by the joint force commander or JFACC. The
AADCexercisesthedegreeofcontrolofallsystemsthroughestablished guidelines;weaponscontrolstatus
andjointforcecommander-approvedproceduralcontrols.
1-68. During air movement to the operational area, the AADC controls air defense operations from an
airborne platform (for example, Airborne Warning and Control System). In practice, extended distances
from staging bases to designated areas of operation may require the AADC to delegate control
responsibilities to an air control element on board the airborne platform. Initial air defense assets may be
limited to fighter aircraft only. Control of these aircraft is exercised through established procedural
controls.
1-69. Forces initially entering the area of operation are accompanied by organic short-range air defense
systems that must be integrated into the air defense architecture. Planned procedural control measures and
guidelines may be established bythe AADC to expedite integration of assets. With force buildup and the
introduction of follow-on forces into the lodgment area, more robust high- to medium-altitude air defense
systems normally become available. These systems must establish communications with the AADC’s
commandandcontrolagencyandbeincorporatedintotheestablishedairdefensesystem. |
3-99 | 27 | Overview
COMMUNICATIONS
1-70. Communications systems supporting forcible entry operations must be interoperable, agile, trusted,
and shared. The complexity and tempo of assault force operations requires the technical capability to
supportanincreasedleveloflateralcoordinationandintegrationbetweenassault, specialoperationsforces,
and multinational forces in the operating area. Assault forces rely upon en route collaborative planning,
rehearsal, execution and assessment tools and beyond-line-of-sight, over-the-horizon, on-the-move
communications.
1-71. Typical forcible entryoperations communications employ single and multichannel tactical satellites
(TACSATs); commercial satellite communications (SATCOM); and single-channel ultrahigh frequency
(UHF), very high frequency (VHF), and high frequency (HF) radios. When operating in degraded
environments, assault forces must be prepared to operate using only line-of-sight or intermittent
communications.
CommunicationsSystemPlanning
1-72. Communications system planning must be an integral part of joint force planning. Once specific
command and control organization for the forcible entry operation is established, communications system
planningbeginsandinformationexchangerequirementsareestablished.
1-73. The communication directorate of a joint staff (J-6) is responsible for planning and establishing the
communications system and the communications estimate of supportability. The J-6 must be able to
integrate communication across the joint force among elementsconducting assault force operations, initial
assaultelementsforwardplanningatanISB,andthe mainassaultforcepreparingforoperationsfromhome
station.
1-74. Communications system planning is conducted in close coordination with the operations directorate
of a joint staff (J-3) and intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) to identify specialized equipment and
dissemination requirements for some types of information. (Refer to JP 6-0 and FM 6-02 for more
information.)
CommunicationsSupportDuringAirborneandAirAssaultForceOperations
1-75. Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography, and location of
forcibleentryforces andthe senior headquarters. Significantconsiderationsinclude the use ofintermediate
staging bases and airborne command and control platforms, to include en route mission planning and
intelligencesharing,whichcanaddtothecomplexityofmanagingthecommunicationsarchitecture.
1-76. Because communications systems must be built up at the objective area, some aspects of
communications support are unique in forcible entry operations. Assault force support considerations
includethefollowing:
(cid:122) Long-rangeradiocommunicationsthroughretransmissionandrelaysiteswithU.S.-based forces
orintermediatestagingbasestofacilitatecontrolofpersonnel,supplies,andequipment.
(cid:122) Interoperability with the overall joint force communications architecture—communications
redundancyforassaultforceandsubordinatecommanders.
(cid:122) Initialdeploymentcommunicationscapabilitylargelybased onUHFSATCOM,becomesmore
robustassignalunitsandequipmententertheoperationalarea.
(cid:122) Command relationships, networks, frequency management, codes, navigational aids, and other
communicationissuesmustberesolvedbeforetheassaultphasebegins.
JOINT OPERATION PLANNING
1-77. Joint operation planning includes all activities that must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated
operation: the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of
joint forces. It integrates military power with other instruments of national power to achieve a desired
military end state; the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives.
Joint operation planning connects the strategic end state to campaign design and ultimately to tactical
missions. The following paragraphs discuss the joint operation planning process and intelligence |
3-99 | 28 | Chapter 1
preparation of the operational environment, and planning considerations in support of forcible entry
operations.
JOINTOPERATIONPLANNINGPROCESS
1-78. In conducting joint operation planning, commanders and staffs apply operational art to operational
design using the joint operation planning process (JOPP). This includes forcible entry operation
requirements. The JOPP is an orderly, analytical planning process comprised of a set of logical steps to
analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative course of actions; select the best course of
action; and produce a plan or order. The process provides a methodical approach to planning at an
organizational level before and during the joint operation. It focuses on the interaction between an
organization’s commander, staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, and
supportingcommandersandtheirstaffs.
1-79. Through the application of operational art and operational design and by using JOPP, the JFC and
staff combine art and science (control) to develop products that describe how (ways) the joint force will
employitscapabilities(means)toachievethe militaryendstate(ends). Operationalartistheapplicationof
creative imagination by commanders and staffs— supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience.
Operational design is a process of iterative understanding and problemframing that supports commanders
and staffsintheir application ofoperationalart withtoolsand a methodologyto conceiveofand construct
viable approaches to operationsand campaigns. Operationaldesignresultsinthe commander’soperational
approach, which broadlydescribes the actions the joint force needs to take to reach the end state. JOPP is
anorderly,analyticalprocessthroughwhichtheJFCand staff translate thebroad operational approachinto
detailedplansandorders.(RefertoJP5-0formoreinformation.)
JOINTINTELLIGENCEPREPARATIONOFTHEOPERATIONALENVIRONMENT
1-80. The J-2 has the primary staff responsibility for planning, coordinating, and conducting the overall
joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) analysis and production effort at the
joint force level. The JIPOE supports decisionmaking and planning by identifying, analyzing, and
estimating the enemy’s centers of gravity, critical factors, capabilities, limitations, requirements,
vulnerabilities,intentions,andcoursesofactionthataremostlikelytobeencounteredbythejointforce.
1-81. Joint task force joint intelligence support element or joint task force joint intelligence operations
center (JIOC) is the intelligence organization at the joint task force level that is responsible for complete
air,space,ground,andmaritime threatcharacteristicsanalysisforthejointoperation.Itidentifiesadversary
centers of gravity; analyzes command, control, and communications systems, targeting support; collection
management;andmaintenanceofa24-hourwatchinafullJIPOEeffort.
1-82. The joint intelligence support element or JIOC continuously develops, updates, and tailors JIPOE
products while proactively seeking out and exploiting all possible assistance from interagency and
multinational intelligence sources. It directs the effort, integrating analyses with all products produced by
subordinate commands and other organizations and ensures the JIPOE process encompasses a systematic
analysis of all relevant aspects of the operational environment with tailored products continuously
developed and updated to support the planning process. (Refer to JP 2-0 and JP 2-01.3 for more
information.)
PLANNINGCONSIDERATIONSINSUPPORTOFFORCIBLEENTRYOPERATIONS
1-83. Forcible entry, which mayinclude airborne,air assault, andamphibiousoperations, or a combination
ofall three cancreate multipledilemmasbycreating threatsthatexceedtheenemy’scapabilityto respond.
Theseoperationsarecomplexandhighriskandshouldremainassimpleaspossibleinconcept.
1-84. Forcible entry operations require extensive intelligence, detailed coordination, innovation, and
flexibility. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all
participants. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and
employment. |
3-99 | 29 | Overview
1-85. Entry forces require seamless intelligence and operations integration from the small unit up through
national-level decision makers, enabling leaders at all levels to access relevant information at the proper
time and place. The JIOC ensures the intelligence staffs of subordinate component commands have
appropriate reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence products prepared for each domain in which
entryforcesoperate.
1-86. As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately
against the enemy’s center of gravity using conventional and special operations forces and capabilities.
Attacks may be decisive or may begin offensive operations throughout the enemy’s depth that can create
dilemmascausingparalysisanddestroyingcohesion.
1-87. When airborne, air assault, and amphibious operations are combined, unity of command is vital.
Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry. Participating forces need to be prepared to
fight immediately upon arrival and require robust communications and intelligence capabilities to move
with forward elements. The forcible entry force must be prepared to immediately transition to follow-on
operations,andshouldplanaccordingly.
1-88. Forceentryactionsoccurinbothsingular andmultipleoperations.Theseactionsincludeestablishing
forward presence, preparing the operational area, opening entrypoints, establishing and sustaining access,
receiving follow-on forces, conducting follow-on operations, sustaining the operations, and conducting
decisiveoperations.Additionalactivitiestoconsiderinclude—
(cid:122) Informationoperations.Thefullimpactofinformationoperationonfriendly,neutral,andhostile
forces should be considered with the key goal of information operations achieving and
maintaininginformationsuperiorityfor the U.S.anditsallies;andexploitingenemyinformation
vulnerabilities. Information operations are the integrated employment, during military
operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to
influence, disrupt, corrupt, orusurpthedecision makingofadversariesand potentialadversaries
whileprotectingtheentryforce.(RefertoJP3-13.)
(cid:122) Operationssecurity and militarydeception. Use to confuse the enemyand ease access. Actions,
themes,and messages portrayed byall friendlyforcesmustbeconsistentif militarydeceptionis
to be believable. Operations security helps foster a credible military deception. (Refer to
JP3-13.3andJP3-13.4.)
(cid:122) Specialoperationsforces.Mayprecedeforcibleentryforcestoincludethefollowing:
Identify,clarify,andmodifyconditionsinthelodgment.
(cid:132)
Conducttheassaultstoseizesmall,initiallodgmentssuchasairfieldsorseaports.
(cid:132)
Provideorassistinemployingfiresupport.
(cid:132)
Conductotheroperations:seizureairfields,reconnaissanceoflandingzonesoramphibious
(cid:132)
landingsites.
Conduct special reconnaissance and direct action well beyond the lodgment to identify,
(cid:132)
interdict,anddestroyforcesthatthreatentheconventionalentryforce (SeeJP3-05).
1-89. Entryforces must collect, process, and disseminate relevant information in near real time to support
fire and movement, and maintain the abilityto deliver and control joint firesthroughout the assault. Given
the distances from which entry forces are deployed and employed, ground forces require access to and
direction of joint fires during the assault, stabilization of the lodgment, and introduction of follow-on
forces.
1-90. Targeting intelligence supports forcible entry operations in verifying existing information and
making recommendations on targeting and collateral damage estimate with respect to intelligence
preparation of the operational environment, service capabilities, and rules of engagement. Targeting
intelligence analysis encompasses many processes, all linked and logically guided by the joint targeting
cycle, that continuously seek to analyze, identify, develop, validate, assess, and prioritize targets for
engagement in order to achieve the commander’s objectives and end state. (Refer to JP 3-60 and ATP 3-
60.1formoreinformation.)
1-91. Thethreata tactical missionmayposetothe civilian populacerequiresbalancedlethalandnonlethal
actionsduringforcibleentryoperations.Overcautiouspreventionactivitiesorprocedureslimitthe freedom |
3-99 | 30 | Chapter 1
ofactionjustasunrestrained actioncanresultinprovocationtacticsbyadversaries. (Refer to ATP 3-09.32
formoreinformation.)
1-92. Obtainingaccurate combatidentification provides the abilityto differentiate among friendly, enemy,
neutral and unknown personnel and objects. Combat identification is the process of attaining an accurate
characterization of detected objects in the operational environment to support an engagement decision (JP
3-09).
1-93. To achieve surprise or strike a decisive blow, entry forces focus on identifying and defeating enemy
area denial capabilities (mine development, emplacement and control network). Commanders must weigh
thebenefitofmassedfiresversustherequirementforprecisioninanareadenialenvironment.
1-94. Contingency response groups planners are integrated into the planning process as early as possible.
Contingencyresponse groups provide the USAF first-responder airfield opening unit capabilityto the JFC
regardlessof service or missionofthe field beingopened. Each contingencyresponse group canbe scaled
to meetspecifictaskingrequirements to supportair operationsatspecificpointsup to large-scale airfields.
(RefertoFM 3-17.2formoreinformation.)
1-95. Sustainment requirements can be formidable, but must not become such an overriding concern that
the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. Commanders and staffs must carefully balance the
introduction of sustainment forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to
establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment as well as forces required to transition to follow-on
operations.
JOINT ENTRY FORCE
1-96. Forcibleentryisexecutedas either amajoroperationor apartofa larger campaignto seizeandhold
a militarylodgmentinthe face ofarmed opposition for thecontinuouslandingofforces. Jointentryforces
can strike directly at the enemy and can open new avenues for other military operations. The entry force
employs distributed, yet coherent, forcible entry operations to attack the objective area or areas. The net
resultis a coordinatedattackthatoverwhelmstheadversarybeforetheadversaryhas time toreact. Awell-
positioned and networked force enables the defeat of adversary reaction and facilitates follow-on
operations,ifrequired.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE,ANDRECONNAISSANCE
1-97. Joint entry forces must operate a fully integrated and collaborative intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance enterprise that provides timely intelligence and counterintelligence to meet entry force
requirements. This enterprise must be sustainable and remain responsive and adaptive, and capable of
addressingnewchallengesandopportunitiesastheyemerge. (RefertoJP 2-01formoreinformation.)
1-98. Entry forces have to fight for and collect information in close contact with the enemy and civilian
populations through continuous physical reconnaissance, persistent surveillance, security operations, and
intelligence operations: to develop the contextual understanding to counter enemy anti-access capabilities
andgainaccesstoan operationalarea;counterareadenial strategiestoensurefreedomofaction;andadapt
continuouslytochangingsituations.(RefertoFM 3-55andATP 2-01formoreinformation.)
1-99. Human interaction on the ground must complement other intelligence to create contextual
understanding of events on the ground. This aids in the abilityto locate, target, and suppress or neutralize
hostile anti-access and area denial capabilities in complex terrain with lethal or nonlethal effects while
limitingcollateraldamage.(RefertoFM 2-22.3formoreinformation.)
1-100. Long-range surveillance and special operations forces support entry forces by conducting shaping
operations in support of forcible entry operations, to include reconnaissance and surveillance and raids.
Advanced force operations include strike operations, clandestine insertion of special operations forces and
organic reconnaissance teams, deception, counter mine or counter obstacle operations, and information
operations.(RefertoFM 3-55.93andATTP 3-18.04formoreinformation.) |
3-99 | 31 | Overview
INTEGRATIONANDSYNCHRONIZATION
1-101. The complex nature and operational tempo of forcible entry operations requires entry forces to
support an increased level of lateral coordination and integration throughout the application of unified
action within an operational area. The entry forces’ role in the operation for access is the integration of
ground and littoral maneuver into the joint effort; conducting entry operations; and employing and
sustainingforceswhilefightingtomaintainaccessthroughoutthedurationofoperations.
1-102. Integrating and synchronizing near simultaneous execution of a broad range of operations is
essential to presenting the enemy with the greatest range of challenges against which to react. Designing,
planning, and executing these operations require a philosophy that embraces decentralization of resources
and authority for portions of the force yet more centralized planning and execution for missions where
resources are scarce, or strategic sensitivities demand greater control. However, entry forces must be
prepared to operate with decentralized decisionmaking, as adversaries may attempt to isolate units by
attackingcommunicationscapabilities.
REHEARSALS
1-103. Forcible entry is a deliberate operation in that the situation allows for the development and
coordinationofa specified taskorganizationand a detailed plan, to include multiple branchesand sequels.
The processoflearning, understanding, and practicinga plan inthe time available before actualexecution
reducesandmitigatesoperationalfrictionsinherenttoentryoperations.
1-104. Rehearsing key entry force actions and sustainment activities allows participants to become
familiar with the operation and the visualization of the plan. This process assists in orienting joint and
multinational forces to their surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals provide a forum
for subordinate leaders to analyze the plan, but they must exercise caution in adjusting the plan. Changes
mustbecoordinatedthroughoutthechainofcommandtopreventerrorsinintegrationandsynchronization.
1-105. While the joint entry force may not be able to rehearse an entire operation, commanders should
identifyessentialelementsforrehearsal.Operationplanrehearsalbenefitsinclude:
(cid:122) Commonunderstanding.
(cid:122) Unityofeffort.
(cid:122) Articulatesupportingintents.
(cid:122) Subordinateandsupportingcommandersquestions.
(cid:122) Branchesorsequels.
(cid:122) Integrationandsynchronization.
OPERATIONALPHASING
1-106. As stated earlier in this chapter, forcible entry operations are conducted during the “Seize the
Initiative” or “Dominate” phase of a joint operation. Within the context of these phases established by a
higher-levelJFC,thejointentryforce commander mayestablishadditionalphasesthatfittheforcibleentry
CONOPS. Planning for each phase must include branch and sequel planning. Transitions between these
phasesaredesigned tobedistinctshiftsemphasizedbythe jointentryforce, oftenaccompaniedbychanges
in command or support relationships. Forcible entry operations may be planned and executed in the
followingfivephases.
PhaseI––PreparationandDeployment
1-107. Forcible entry operations are conducted by organizations whose force structures permit rapid
deployment into the objective area. Joint entry forces may deploy directly to the operational area or to
stagingareastoprepareforsubsequentoperations.Keyactivitiesinclude:
(cid:122) Planning.Allphases,includesDepartmentofDefenseagenciesandinteragencyparticipants.
(cid:122) Movement.Planningfrombothstrategicandoperationalperspectives.
(cid:122) Intelligence.Focusedonansweringthecommander’scriticalinformationrequirement.
(cid:122) Reconnaissanceandsurveillance.Insertionintooperationalarea. |
3-99 | 32 | Chapter 1
(cid:122) Transitiontoassault.Setsconditionsrequiredforsuccessfulassault.
PhaseII –– Assault
1-108. Assault phase, in airborne and air assault operations, a phase beginning with delivery by air of the
assault echelon—the elementof a forcethatisscheduled forinitialassaulton theobjectivearea,and
extendingthroughattackofassaultobjectivesandconsolidationoftheinitialairheadorlodgmentarea.Key
activitiesinclude:
(cid:122) Initial assault designed to surprise and overwhelmthe enemy with decisive force and to protect
assaultforce.
(cid:122) Overcoming natural and man-made obstacles intended to restrict or halt movement that allows
theenemytomassitsforcesandrepeltheassault.
(cid:122) Main assault entry by parachute assault and air assault, landed forces must have immediately
availablejointfiresupport.
(cid:122) Transitionto stabilizingthe lodgment, introductionof follow-on forcesto assist in securingand
preparingorrepairingthe lodgmentto allowthe landingof air assets, and continue to follow-on
operationswithoutanoperationalpause.
PhaseIII – Stabilizationofthe Lodgment
1-109. Stabilization of the lodgment involves securing the lodgment to protect the force and ensure the
continuouslandingofpersonnelandmateriel.
(cid:122) Organizing the lodgment to support the increasing flow of forces and logistic resource
requirements.
(cid:122) Expanding the lodgment as required, support the joint force in preparing for and executing
follow-onoperations.
(cid:122) Transitionto introducing follow-on forces intended to conduct follow-onoperations, in extreme
circumstances, follow-on forces may be required to assist assault forces in the seizure of initial
objectives,ormaybeusedtohelpsecureanddefendthelodgment.
PhaseIV – Introductionof Follow-OnForces
1-110. The introduction of follow-on forces is required when subsequent operations are planned for
conduct in or from the lodgment. It provides the joint force commander with increased flexibility to
conductoperationsasrequired.
Phase V – Terminationor Transition
1-111. Forcible entry operation to subsequent operations or termination must be an integral part of the
planningphaseofthejointdeploymentprocess. Completedinoneoftwoways:attainmentofthecampaign
objectives (termination), or completion of the operational objectives when a lodgment is established for
follow-oncombatoperations(transition).(RefertoJP 3-18formoreinformation.)
SECTION II – VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT
1-112. Operational experience has demonstrated that the rapid projection of combat power is the key to
successful ground and littoral maneuver. Experience and analysis have shown that the most effective
method of doing so is through a combination of vertical and surface means. These complementary means
provide flexibility in negating threats unique to operational access. This section addresses vertical
maneuverwithinforcibleentryoperations,theairborneorairassaultforce,andcommandresponsibilities.
TACTICAL APPLICATIONS
1-113. Forcible entry, composed of an entry force, together with other forces that are trained, organized,
and equipped for entry operations, project power. Forcible entry can be executed through vertical
envelopment, directly against the enemy in a sudden attack in force to achieve decisive results or to |
3-99 | 33 | Overview
establish a lodgment to allow for the introduction of follow-on forces. Besides serving as a forcible entry
assault force, such forces can conduct follow-on operations fromthe lodgment. The following paragraphs
discuss the application of vertical envelopment as conducted by airborne or air assault forces to achieve
operationalobjectives.
TACTICALMANEUVER
1-114. Vertical envelopment is a tactical maneuver in which troops that are air-dropped, air-landed, or
inserted viaair assault, attack the rearand flanksofa force,ineffect cuttingoffor encirclingthe force(JP
3-18). Commandersconductverticalenvelopment to occupy advantageous ground to shape the operational
area and accelerate the momentum of the engagement. An enemy may or may not be in a position to
oppose the maneuver. While the commander should attempt to achieve an unopposed landing when
conductingverticalenvelopment,theassaultforcemustprepareforthepresenceofopposition.
1-115. Vertical envelopment, airborne and air assault operations, allows a tactical commander to do the
following:
(cid:122) Threatenenemyechelonsupportareas, causingtheenemyto divertcombatelementsto protect
vitalbasesorinstallationsandholdkeyterrain.
(cid:122) Overcomedistancesquickly,overflybarriers,andbypassenemydefenses.
(cid:122) Extendtheareaoverwhichthecommandercanexertinfluence.
(cid:122) Disperse reserve forces widely for survivability reasons while maintaining their capability for
effectiveandrapidresponse.
(cid:122) Exploitcombatpowerbyincreasingtacticalmobility.
COMMONFACTORS
1-116. Planning results in establishing positions that support completing the assigned mission. Factors
that are common to vertical envelopments include reverse planning process, condition setting, and the
impactofmeteorologicalconditions(weatherandlightdata).
ReversePlanningProcess
1-117. Airborne and air assault commanders begin planning operations with a visualization of the ground
tactical plan and work through a reverse-planning sequence. Planning factors common to airborne and air
assaultoperationsareasfollows:
(cid:122) Ground tactical plan. A ground tactical plan is the basis for planning throughout the planning
process. Itisthe firstplan completed and itaddresses the destruction ofenemy forcesthatpose
animmediate threatto thelodgment area. However, eachplanaffectsthe others, and changesin
oneplancanrequireadjustmentsintheothers.
Note. For example, the amount of lift available determines the feasibilityof the ground tactical
plan. If there are not enough lift systems to put all the required forces in place at the required
time, the commander adjusts the ground tactical plan as well as the other plans. Therefore,
vertical envelopment planning requires the unit staff obtain vital planning data, such as the
availabilityoflift systemsandthetechnicalandtacticalcapabilitiesofthosesystems,asearlyas
possible.
(cid:122) Landingplan.
(cid:122) Movementplan.
(cid:122) Loadingandstagingplans.(Airassault.)
(cid:122) Marshallingplan.(Airborne.)
(cid:122) Additionalplanningfactorsinclude—
Inanalyzingtheplanthecommanderandstaffconsiderlodgmentterrainandinfrastructure,
(cid:132)
withaemphasisontheabilitytosupportfollow-onoperationsandforces.
Intelligence regardingtheenemyandterraincharacteristicsoftheobjectiveareaisvitalto
(cid:132)
thisplanningprocess.(RefertoADRP2-0andFM2-0formoreinformation.) |
3-99 | 34 | Chapter 1
Positivetargetidentificationvettedtoensurecorrectidentification.(Refer to ATP 3-09.32
(cid:132)
formoreinformation.)
Continuous coordination between the parallel echelons of the assault force and the
(cid:132)
supportingforces;fromthebeginningofanoperationuntilitscompletionorabandonment.
Maximized use of combined arms capabilities to ensure the assault force has sufficient
(cid:132)
powertoaccomplishitsmissionanddefenditself.
Shortplanningtimes oftenrequirestaffs to modifycontingencyplansandSOPsto meetthe
(cid:132)
exactsituationwhilestillensuringadequatecoordination.
1-118. The commander determines ifadjustmentsto anyofthese plansentailacceptable risk. Ifthe riskis
unacceptable,theCONOPSchanges.
ConditionSetting
1-119. Condition setting is an iterative process where the commander’s situational understanding
determines what part of the situation must change to ensure the success of the vertical envelopment.
Warfighting capabilities or functions continuallyassess until the commander is satisfied with the result or
operationalnecessity forces himto either cancel or conduct the verticalenvelopment. Conditions common
toairborneandairassaultoperationsareasfollows:
(cid:122) Posturetheairassaultorparachuteforceforsuccesswiththedegreeofacceptablerisk.
(cid:122) Suppressionofenemyairdefense,planpreparationanddeceptionfires.
(cid:122) Cross-serviceandechelon-staff,cell,andboardsynchronizationandintegration.
(cid:122) Exchangeliaisons.
(cid:122) Reconnaissance and surveillance detect systems that unacceptably endanger the operational
success.
(cid:122) Serviceandjointfires-detectedtargets.
MeteorologicalConditions(weatherandlightdata)
1-120. Meteorological conditions influence the conduct of operations. Conditions common to airborne
andairassaultoperationsareasfollows:
(cid:122) Impactsverticalenvelopment to a greaterextentthanotheroperations.
(cid:122) Long-rangeforecastsaffectplanningforforcebuildupandsustainmentbyaerialdelivery.
(cid:122) Currentandfutureforecastedimpactontacticaloperationsandaircraftperformance.
(cid:122) Currentweather informationatdeparture sitesandpickup zones,alongapproachroutes, and in
theobjectivearea.
(cid:122) Marginal weather conditions may enhance the element of surprise, but they increase the risk
ofaccidents.
(cid:122) Deteriorating weather condition: postponement of planned operation or reduced tempo of an
ongoingoperationwhenriskbecomesunacceptable.
(cid:122) Weatherconditionaffectsonjointfiresandmedicalevacuationorwithdrawalofforces.
(cid:122) Conditions that include wind shears, crosswinds, and the ambient temperatures throughout the
courseoftheoperation.
(cid:122) Hightemperatureand altitude degrade aircraft liftperformance—acombinationofthese factors
results in trade-offs in the operating parameters. (For example, a commander may insert
dismountedreconnaissance teamson mountainsidesin the coolof the morning, butbe unable to
executethesamemissioninthenoondayheat.)
AIRBORNEASSAULTFORCE
1-121. Airborneforcesmaybeusedasthe assaultforceorusedincombinationwithothercapabilitiesfor
a forcible entry; or they may conduct follow-on operations from a lodgment. As an assault force, airborne
forcesmay airlandorparachuteintotheobjectiveareatoattackandeliminatearmedresistanceandsecure
designated objectives. Airborne forces may be employed from a lodgment in additional joint combat
operationsappropriatetotheirtrainingandequipment. Airborneforcesofferthe JFCanimmediate forcible
entry option since they can be launched directly from the continental United States and/or forward |
3-99 | 35 | Overview
deployed location without the delays associated withacquiring intermediate staging bases or repositioning
ofsea-basedforces.(Refertothispublication,PartI,AirborneOperations,formoreinformation.)
AIRASSAULTFORCE
1-122. An air assault force is a force composed primarily of ground and rotary-wing air units organized,
equipped, and trained for air assault operations (JP 3-18). Air assault forces can deploy from land-based
facilities and ships. Fires from aircraft (manned and unmanned) or ships (surface and subsurface) take on
addedimportance tocompensatefor the lackofartillery. Anairassault forcemayrequiretheestablishment
of anintermediate stagingbase. These forcescanrapidlyprojectcombatpower throughoutthe depthof an
operationalarea.(RefertoPartII,AirAssaultOperations,ofthispublicationformoreinformation.)
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
1-123. Entry forces conduct airborne and air assault operations with a preference for decentralized
decisionmaking. The abilityto integrate and synchronize near simultaneous execution of a broad range of
operationsis essential to presenting theenemywiththegreatest rangeofchallengesagainst whichto react.
Designing,planningandexecutingtheseoperationsrequiresaphilosophythatembracesdecentralizationof
resources and authorityfor portions of the force yet more centralized planning and execution for missions
whereresourcesarescarceorstrategicsensitivitiesdemandgreatercontrol.
COMMANDRESPONSIBILITYOFAIRBORNEOPERATIONS
1-124. The airborne assault of a forcible entry operation is delivered by strategic airlift from the
continental United States or by strategic or tactical airlift from an intermediate staging base. An airborne
assault over intercontinental distance, places additional requirements on joint command and control.
Effective employment of an airborne assault force (ABNAF) requires an organizational structure with an
Army intermediate higher headquarters nested within the joint task force. This intermediate headquarters,
tailored to accompanythe assault force to the objective area facilitatesthe assaultforce inthe execution of
itsgroundtacticalplanbycontrollingenablingfunctionsandunits.(Seetable1-1,page1-23.) |
3-99 | 36 | Chapter 1
Table 1-1. Command responsibility of airborne operations
AIRBORNETF AIRBORNEASSAULTFORCE
JTF
CDR/HQ CDR/HQ
CDR/HQ
(Division) (IBCT)
Operationalplanning. Operational/tacticalplanning. Groundtacticalplanning.
JIPTLdevelopment. Jointfiresintegration. Jointfiresexecution.
JointISRintegration. LRS/SOFintegration. UpdateIPB.
Jointoperationalaccess. Receiptofassaultfires
Forcibleentrycondition C2/missioncommandpre-assault handover.
setting. fires. Enroutemissionplanningand
rehearsal.
APOESAandintegrationenroute Rig/outloadparatroopersand
missioncommand,airspacecontrol equipment.
Operationallevel aerialrelayusingjoint Conductairborneassault.
commandandcontrol communicationsbetween Seizeassaultobjective.
throughJOC,CAOC. JTF/APOEandIBCT/APOD
EstablishAPODC2/mission
commandnetwork.
APOE/APODC2/mission SecureAPOD.
command. Repair/maintainAPOD.
Airflowmanagement. RSOI. Expandlodgment.
Generationofcombatpower
Follow-onforces.
LEGEND
APOD – aerialport of debarkation IPB– intelligencepreparationof thebattlefield
APOE – aerialport ofembarkation ISR – intelligence, surveillance,reconnaissance
APOE SA – aerialportofembarkationstagingarea JIPTL – joint integratedprioritytargetlist
CAOC – combatairoperations center JOC – joint operations center
C2 – commandandcontrol JTF – joint task force
LRS – long-rangesurveillance
CDR – commander
RSOI – reception, staging, onwardmovement,andintegration
HQ – headquarters
SOF – specialoperations forces
IBCT – Infantry brigadecombatteam
COMMANDRELATIONSHIPSFORAIRBORNEOPERATIONS
1-125. The airborne assault force commander (ABNAFC) is responsible for seizing the airhead. He
accompanies the initial assault and focuses on the planning and execution of the ground tactical plan.
Although the size and composition of the assault force varies according to the mission, the ABNAF is
typicallyanAirborne(ABN)Infantrybrigadecombatteam(IBCT).
1-126. The airborne task force commander (ABNTFC) is a higher echelon commander. He may be the
joint force commander or ground commander, depending upon experience and the scope of the operation.
As the assault requires an ABN IBCT, for example, the BCT commander leads the assault force and the
parent Army headquarters (normally a division but could be a corps headquarters) provides the ABNTFC.
Thisensures that the commander fightingthe ground tactical plan cangive his full attentionto the fight in
the airhead without having to manage en route follow-on forces and support. An assault command post of
the ABNTFC accompanies the initial ABNAF in order to provide a command element in the airhead to
facilitatethesefunctionsandtoactasaninterfacewiththeairbornecommandpost.
1-127. The ABNTFC organizes the parachute assault force, strategic airlift force, supporting fires force,
and follow-on airland forces in such a way as to best accomplish the mission. The ABNTFC’s
responsibilities end upon achievement of a secure airhead line (Refer to chapter 4 of this publication for |
3-99 | 37 | Overview
more information.) and the establishment of either a JFLCC or designated ground commander command
postintheairhead.
1-128. En route mission planning and rehearsal systems allow the airborne force to maintain situational
awareness and to receive and disseminate updated intelligence while en route from load time until arrival
overtheairhead.
(cid:122) Ground commanders in airlift aircraft may communicate with the chain of command over the
Army secure en route communications package. Normally, the airlift mission commander and
theairborneforcecommander areinthesame aircraft.Thesenior groundcommandercanadvise
embarked ground commandersofchangesinthegroundtacticalsituationortotheairmovement
plan.
(cid:122) Airborne operations require the use of redundant airborne and ground command posts.
Normally, a joint force airborne command post operates from a joint airborne communications
centerand commandpost, whileacommandpost fromthe airborneforce operates froma fixed-
wingplatformwithrequiredcommunicationsinstalled.
(cid:122) TACSAT downlink and other en route communications systems can be used to communicate
with USAF special tactics teams, air mobility liaison officers, contingency response elements,
andcontingencyresponseteamsinobjectiveareas.
(cid:122) The use ofspecialnavigational aidsand homingdevices to directaircraftto specified areas(for
example, a designated drop zone) may be needed. Specialized airborne or air assault force
personnel (for example,special tacticsteamsor long-rangesurveillanceunits) are equipped with
navigational aids, global positioning systems, and homing devices. These teams are employed
early to guide the airborne units, and provide reconnaissance, surveillance, visual flight rules
service, and limited instrument flight rules air traffic control service. Other joint force assets
suchasspecialoperationsforcesarecapableofperformingsomeofthesefunctions.
COMMANDRESPONSIBILITYOFAIRASSAULTOPERATIONS
1-129. Air assault operations embody the combined arms concept through coordination and planning
betweenthe air and ground commanders. Infantryand air unitsare fullyintegrated with other members of
the combined arms team to form a powerful and flexible joint task force. An air assault operation
dramatically extends the commander’s ability to influence operations within the area of operations and to
execute operations in locations beyond the capability of more conventional forces. Effective employment
of an air assault force requires an organizational structure with intermediate higher headquarters nested
withinthejointtaskforce.(Seetable1-2,page1-25.) |
3-99 | 38 | Chapter 1
Table 1-2. Command responsibility of air assault operations
JTF CDR/ AIR ASSAULTTF AIR MISSION GROUNDTACTICAL
HQ CDR/ HQ CDR/ HQ CDR/ HQ
(Div/BCT/BN) (BDE/BN/CO) (BCT/BN/CO)
Operational Operational/tactical Airmovementand Groundtactical,
Planning planning. planning. landingplanning. loading,andstaging
planning
Airspace
management
PZ/LZselectionand Air movement of Conduct air assault.
OperationalC2 PZcontrol. personneland Seize assault OBJs.
Execution throughJOC, JFEcondition equipment. SecureLZ.
CAOC. monitoring. OPCONofall Expandlodgment.
Aerialrelayusing aviationelements.
jointcommsbetween
JTF/PZandBCT/LZ.
PZandfollow-on
Mission command Mission command of
forcescontrol.
Mission Airflow from PZtoLZ all elements cleared
Go/NoGocriteria
Command management. (AATFCcolocated from LZ.
assessmentand
withAMC).
decisions.
Jointfires
planning/integration.
JointIntegrated
Pre-assaultfires/Joint Enroutefires. Clear anddirectall
PrioritizedTarget
Fires SEAD/SEAD. Facilitationfrom firesinsidetheairhead
List(JIPTL)
Clearanddirectall PZtoLZ. line.
development.
firesoutsidethe
airheadline.
Personnelrecovery
Approve,disapprove,
operations
Decision ormodifyall
authority(above
Authority componentsofthe
immediateunit
assaultplan.
level).
Legend:
g etlist
AMB-airmissionbrief
AMC-airmissioncommander
AATFC–airassault taskforcecommander
BCT–brigadecombat team
CAOC–combatairoperations center
C2–commandandcontrol
CDR–commander
fenses
HQ–headquarters
JFE–joint fireselement
COMMANDRELATIONSHIPSFORAIRASSAULTOPERATIONS
1-130. The AATF is a combined arms force under the command of a single headquarters consisting of
Infantry, assault and attack reconnaissance helicopters, fire support, electronic warfare, and sustainment
assets.Thecommanderorderingtheairassaultdesignatesthe AATFcommander.TheAATFcommander’s
headquarters coordinates airspace with other airspace users, to include artillery, air defense, unmanned |
3-99 | 39 | Overview
aircraft, close air support, and other aviation units. It coordinates the AATF’s plans for maneuver and
sustainmentwiththoseofhigher,subordinate,andadjacentunits.
1-131. Normally, a BCT commander serves as the AATF commander for a ground maneuver battalion-
size air assault and a ground maneuver battalion commander serves as the AATF commander for a
company-size air assault. The air mission commander and the ground maneuver unit commander are
subordinatetotheAATFcommander.
1-132. The air mission commander is the aviation unit commander or his designated representative. The
air mission commander receives and executes the guidance and directives from the AATFC, and controls
all aviation elements. The air mission commander ensures continuity of command for all supporting
aviation units and employs attack helicopters and artillery along the air route, fighting the battle from the
pickup zone to the landing zone, while keeping the AATFC informed. The air mission commander has
operational control of assault helicopters providing lift to the ground maneuver force and the aviation unit
providingassault helicopters is either in direct support of the ground combat unit or under the operational
control of the AATF. The support relationship mayend at a predetermined point during the operation, on
orderofthehighercommander,ortheAATFcommander maydeterminewiththeairmissioncommander’s
inputwhentheoperationalcontrolrelationshipbeginsandends.
1-133. The commander directing the air assault normally does not attach aviation airlift or escort units to
the AATF, because it is unlikely that a ground unit can control the aviation unit and supply the aviation-
specific munitionsand large amountsof fuelrequired by aviationunits. Directsupport and the operational
controlcommandrelationshipsdonotplace logisticsresponsibilityforthesupportingunit onthe supported
unit. The operational control command relationship allows the AATF commander to reorganize the
aviation airlift and escorting units when necessary as dictated by the situation. The direct support
relationship allows the overall commander to shift the support of these aviation units to other units in
response to unexpected developments. Consequently, direct support or operational control is usually the
desiredrelationshipbetweenairandgroundunitsinairassaultoperations.
1-134. The commander ordering the air assault considers the availability and allocation of assault and
attack aviation assets when determining the AATF’s task organization. He ensures that the ground
maneuverforcecontainssufficientcombatpowertoseizeitsinitialobjectivesand defendits landingzones.
The ground maneuver force requires a mission specific balance of mobility, combat power, and
sustainment capabilities. The available rotary-wing aircraft must be able to insert the required combat
power into the objective area as quickly as possible to provide surprise and shock effect, consistent with
aircraftandpickupzoneandlandingzonecapabilities.
1-135. Airassaultoperationsrequirethe useofredundantairborneand ground command posts. Normally,
a joint force airborne command post operates from a joint airborne communications center and command
post, while a command post from the air assault force operates from fixed-wing or rotary-wing platform
withrequiredcommunicationsinstalledoraspeciallyconfiguredmissioncommandrotary-wingaircraft.
SPACE OPERATION
1-136. Airborne and air assault forces rely on space-based capabilities and systems for precision,
navigation and timing, communication, terrestrial and space weather, and intelligence collection platforms
to be successful during forcible entry operations. (Refer to JP 3-14 and FM 3-14 for more information.)
These systems are critical enablers to plan, communicate, navigate and maneuver, maintain situational
awareness,engagetheenemy,providemissilewarning,andprotectandsustaintheentryforce.
1-137. Space specialists supporting tactical planning by providing expertise and advice regarding
available space capabilities and limitations enable space operations. Planning and coordination of space
support with national, service, joint, and theater resources takes place with Army space professionals who
are attached at the corps and division levels to provide expertise and advice to the commander on space
relatedissuesthatmayimpactoperations.
1-138. Space support capabilities include receiving accurate status of positioning, navigation, and timing
forplanningoperations, providingcapabilitiesand limitations ofspace-based intelligence, surveillanceand
reconnaissance, weather, and communication systems, as well as providing assistance and notification of
deliberateenemyinterferenceactivitiessuchasattemptstojamorspooffriendlycommunications. |
3-99 | 40 | Chapter 1
1-139. Space-basedsystemsenableairborneandairassaultforcesandsubsequentfollow-onforcesby(cid:650)
(cid:122) Providingrapidcommunications thatenable a commandertogainandmaintaintheinitiativeby
developingthesituationfasterthantheenemycanreact.
(cid:122) Maintaining a sharedcommonoperationalpicture.
(cid:122) Retaining the ability to recognize and protect own and friendly forces, as well as synchronize
forceactionswithadjacentandsupportingunits.
(cid:122) Providingcommunicationlinksbetweenforcesandcommanderswithintheaterandworldwide.
(cid:122) Monitoring terrestrial areas of interest through information collection assets to help reveal the
enemy’slocationanddisposition,andattemptingtoidentifytheenemy’sintent.
(cid:122) Providingglobal positioning system status and accuracyof positioning, navigation, and timing
forplanningandconductingmissionoperationssuchassupportfortargeting.
(cid:122) Providing update of solar environment and the impact to both terrestrial and space-based
segmentsoffriendlycommunicationsystems.
(cid:122) Providing meteorological, oceanographic, and space environmental information which is
processedandanalyzedtoproducetimelyandaccurateweathereffectsonoperations. |
3-99 | 41 | PART I
Airborne Operations
Chapter 2
Organization and Employment
An airborne operation involves the air movement into an objective area of combat
forces and their logistic support for execution of a tactical, operational, or strategic
mission (JP 3-18). The means employed may be any combination of airborne units,
air transportable units, and types of transport aircraft, depending on the mission and
the overall situation. This chapter focuses on the role, organization, and capabilities
of the airborne assault force (ABNAF) as well as the duties and responsibilities of
personnel within or task-organized to an airborne (ABN) Infantry brigade combat
team(IBCT)forairborneoperations.
SECTION I – AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE
2-1. An airborne assault is the use of airborne forces to parachute into an objective area to attack and
eliminate armed resistance and secure designated objectives (JP 3-18). An ABNAF comprises an ABN
IBCT with capabilitiesorganized,trained,andequippedtogainentryinto an operationalareato enablethe
conductoffollow-onoperationsorconduct a singularmission.
2-2. TheABNAFseizesanairhead to destroyorcaptureenemyforces;repelenemyassaultsbyfire,close
combat, or counterattack; for follow-on forces; or for any combination. It can deploy rapidly and be
sustained by an austere support structure; and can conduct operations against conventional and
unconventional enemy forces in all types of terrain and climate conditions. This section addresses how an
ABNAF is organized to include distinct levels of echelon employment and application to conduct an
airborneassault
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
2-3. Once the commander determines the principal features of the ground assault plan (scheme of
maneuver and fire support), he task-organizes subordinate units to execute assigned missions and
determines boundaries. To ensure unity of effort or to increase readiness for combat, part or all of the
subordinate units of a command can be formed into one or more temporary tactical groupings (teams or
taskforces),eachunder a designatedcommander.Nostandardorganizationcanbeprescribedinadvanceto
meetallconditions. Infantryunits usuallyformthe tactical nucleusofthe team; Infantry unit commanders
leadthe teams.These teamsaretailored fortheinitialassaultbythe attachmentofsupportingunits. These
supporting units join the Infantryunits as soon as possible in the marshalling area to plan and prepare for
the initial assault. Dependent on the ground tactical plan, certain supporting units may be detached once
centralized control is gained. Other units such as higher echelon command posts can be attached for the
movementonly. |
3-99 | 42 | Chapter 2
INFANTRYBRIGADECOMBATTEAM
2-4. As the assault requires an ABN IBCT, the BCT commander leads the assault force and the parent
Army headquarters (normally a division but could be a corps headquarters) provides the ABNTFC. This
ensures that the commander fighting the ground tactical plan can give his full attention to the fight in the
airhead and not be consumed with managing en route follow-on forces and support. Although the size and
compositionofthe ABNAFvariesaccordingto the mission,theABNAF istypicallyanABNIBCT thatis
scalableandtailoredwithadditionalcapabilitiesandforcesasdeterminedbytheABNTFC.
INFANTRYBATTALION
2-5. For control, the airborne Infantry battalion usually is reinforced for the airborne assault and is
organized into a task force. This is especially true if battalions land in widely separated drop zones or
landing zones. A battalion task force usuallycomprises an airborne Infantrybattalion with reinforcements
based onthe IBCT commander’s estimate for the airborne assault. Follow-on echelon— those additional
forces moved into the objective area after the assault echelon. Follow-on echelon reinforcements may
include more Infantry, Armored, Stryker, cavalry, antitank, engineer, dedicated artillery, and other units or
detachments neededtoexpandthe lodgment. AsintheIBCT,attachmentstothe taskforcefortheairborne
assault are made early in the planning phase. They can be withdrawn as soon as the ground situation
stabilizes.
INFANTRYRIFLEUNITS
2-6. Airborne Infantry rifle companies and platoons can be reinforced for the airborne assault according
to the usual considerations governing a ground attack. Attachments are made before the move to, or on
arrivalin,themarshallingbase.
CAVALRY SQUADRON
2-7. The cavalry squadron of the airborne IBCT, assigned to perform reconnaissance and security
missions within the assault phase, usually is reinforced for the airborne assault into a task force. After the
ABNAF makes the initial assault landing into the objective area and consolidates the initial airhead, the
commander organizes the airhead line, confirms reconnaissance and securityplans, and task-organizes the
cavalrysquadronforoperationsinthesecurityarea.
ECHELON EMPLOYMENT
2-8. After the task organizationof units or Soldiers for the airborne assault or landing is announced, units
organize into assault, follow-on, and rear echelons. The airborne IBCT as the ABNAF, employs organic
forcesandotherattachedunitsassigned forthe missionover threeechelons:theassaultechelon,thefollow-
on echelon, and the rear echelon. Elements of the higher headquarters ABNAF are employed throughout
thethreeechelonsasdirectedbytheABNAFC.
ASSAULTECHELON
2-9. The assault echelon (airborne assault) referred to as the Alpha Echelon, is the initial entry force. It is
part oftheABNAFthatconductstheparachuteassault onanunsecured dropzonetoseizethelodgment or
initial assaultobjectives. The airborne assault echelon is composed of those forces required to conductthe
parachute assault to seize assault objectivesand establish the initial airhead, and ifappropriate, prepare an
airfield to receive follow-on echelons. This echelon is deployed with sufficient supplies to sustain
operations for 72 hours. It includes the assault command post of the ABNTF headquarters providing joint
interoperability.
FOLLOW-ONECHELON
2-10. The follow-on echelon comprises two elements. Referred to as the Bravo Echelon and the Charlie
Echelon,theseelementsaretheairlandportionoftheABNAF. |
3-99 | 43 | Organization and Employment
(cid:122) The Bravo Echelon is the reinforcing forces in the airhead. When needed, the Bravo
Echelon enters the objective area as soon as practical by air or surface movement, or a
combination of the two. It is manned and equipped for combat power augmentation and
lodgmentexpansion. Itincludesadditionalvehiclesand equipment fromthe ABNAF, plus more
forcestoincludesupportingpersonnel.Theexistenceofoneofthefollowingconditionsrequires
anABNAFtohave a follow-onechelon:
Shortageofaircraft.
(cid:132)
Aircraftthatcannotlandheavyitemsofequipment.
(cid:132)
Anyenemysituation,terrain,or weatherthatmakesitimpossibletolandcertainSoldiers or
(cid:132)
equipmentintheassaultechelon.
(cid:122) The Charlie Echelon includes the remainder of the ABNAF and the airborne task force
(ABNTF) required for operations after the establishment of the airhead and securing or
expanding the lodgment. The Charlie Echelon gives the ABNAF the capability to conduct
sustained combat operations within the limitations of the IBCT and provides additional combat
powerandequipmentfortheABNTF. Dependingonthe missionand subsequent operations, the
Charlie Echelon maybe either a reinforcing force or the first elements of what will become the
follow-onforce.
Note. Airborne Infantryunits canbe committed to anairborne assault withthe full complement
of the follow-onechelonaspartoftheassaultingforce;however, ifleaving a follow-on echelon
that mustbe broughtforward by meansother thanair, it is oftendesirable or necessaryto leave
certainpersonnelandequipmentbehind.
REARECHELON
2-11. The rear echelon is the echelon containing those elements of the force that are not required in
theobjectivearea.Therearechelonisnormallysmallfor a brigadeorbattalionandincludespersonnelleft
at its rear base to perform administrative and service support functions. A higher headquarters usually
controlsthe rearechelonfor allunits. Therearecheloncanremainattheremotemarshallingbase whenthe
unit is to be relieved at an early date; or it can rejoin the unit when the IBCT remains committed to
sustained combat for a prolonged or indefinite period. In addition, if the airborne force continues in the
groundcombatroleafterlinkup,therearechelonmaybebroughtforward.
DESIGNATIONOFRESERVE
2-12. The employment of the reserve element follows the normal employment of a reserve unit in a
groundoperation. Thelocationoccupied bythe echelon reservedependsonthe mostlikelymissionfor the
reserve on commitment. With the reserve element at the departure airfield, the reserve commander must
continue planning for possible future commitment of his forces as far as maps, photos, and information of
thesituationpermit.
TheBattalion as theReserve
2-13. The reserve can be held in the departure area ready to be committed by air when and where the
situation dictates. This usually happens in large-scale airborne operations when suitable airfields in the
airheadarenotavailable.However,itmaycausedelaysincommitment—
(cid:122) Ifsignalcommunicationsfail.
(cid:122) Iftheairmovementislong.
(cid:122) Ifflyingweatherisunfavorable.
(cid:122) Iftimeisaddedforcoordinationofaircover.
BrigadeandBattalionReserves
2-14. These reservesmaybeusedtoentertheairheadaspart of theassaultechelon.Theyprovidedepth to
the airhead by blocking penetrations, reinforcing committed units, and counterattacking. They consist of |
3-99 | 44 | Chapter 2
notmorethan a companyat BCT levelor a platoonatbattalionlevel. However, their smallsize isdictated
by tactical considerations and assigned missions. Commanders should organize, task, and position the
reserve,ensuringthat—
(cid:122) Thesizeofthereserveiscompatiblewithlikelymissions.
(cid:122) Thereservecomesfromtheunitwiththefewestprioritytasks.
(cid:122) Thereserveisnotassignedassaultobjectivesoranareaoftheairheadtodefend.
(cid:122) Thereserveispositionedinanareathatallowsforquickemployment.
(cid:122) Thereserveismobile.(Thiscanbeachievedusingorganicvehicles(suchas,weaponscompany,
forwardsupportcompany,orifaugmentedwithArmoredorStrykerforces.)
(cid:122) Thereserveislocatedinanassemblyarea,bothinitialandsubsequentassemblyareas,or a battle
position,sothatitdoesnotinterferewithunitsassignedassaultobjectives.
(cid:122) Thereserveisnearlinesofcommunicationin a coveredandconcealedlocationtoprovideease
ofmovement,toreinforce,ortoblock.
(cid:122) Thereserveislocatedwithinthe areaofoneunit,ifpossible.
(cid:122) Thereserve’slocationallowsfordispersionoftheforce.
SECTION II – AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE CONSIDERATIONS
2-15. The ABNAF can be part of a larger unit, or it can be comprised solely of the initial assault force,
preparingthe wayfor deployment of a follow-on force.Thissectiondiscusses assault force considerations
forformationandsupport.
ASSAULT FORCE FORMATION
2-16. The ABNAF is formed early in the planning stage by a directing or establishing headquarters that
allocates units and defines authorityand responsibilitybydesignating command and support relationships.
Predesignatedandwell-understoodcommandandsupportrelationshipsinclude(cid:650)
(cid:122) A task organization that provides a mission-specific balance of maneuver, combat power, and
endurancetoseizeandprotecttheairheadorlodgment.
(cid:122) Unit tactical integrity that is maintained when developing load plans and cross loading key
leadership, crew-served weapons and equipment followed by all other personnel to ensure unit
integrityuponinsertionintothedropzoneandassemble.
(cid:122) A sustainmentcapabilitytosupport a rapidtempountilfollow-onorlinkup forcesarrive,or until
themissioniscompleted.
JOINT AND ARMY CONTROL TEAMS
2-17. Terminal guidance aids and control measures are used on the ground in the objective area to assist
and guide incoming airlift aircraft to the designated drop zones or landing zones. Combat control teams
comprised of USAF personnel are organized, trained, and equipped to provide aircraft terminal guidance.
Armyteams from the long-range surveillance company(LRSC), a divisional or corps asset, are organized,
trained, and equipped to deploy into the objective area and conduct reconnaissance and surveillance tasks
beforethedeploymentoftheairborneforce.
COMBATCONTROLTEAM
2-18. The combat control team is a small task-organized team of USAF parachute and combat diver
qualified personnel. The combat control team’s mission is to establish assault zones (drop zones and
landingzones) inaustereandnon-permissive environments. The missionincludesinitiallyplacingenroute
and terminal navigational aids; controlling air traffic; providing communications; and removing obstacles
and unexploded ordnance with demolitions. Combat control teams provide command and control,
reconnaissance and surveillance, and limited weather observations. (Refer to JP 3-17 for more
information.) |
3-99 | 45 | Organization and Employment
LONG-RANGESURVEILLANCECOMPANY
2-19. The long-range surveillance company (LRSC) is a corps level asset for the purpose of long-range
surveillance. The LRSC comprises a headquarters section, a communications platoon, a transportation
section, a maintenance section, and three long-range surveillance platoons withthree teams each for a total
of 9 teams. The LRSC is modular in that it has the command, control, and communications capability to
supportmultipleoperationssimultaneously.(RefertoFM 3-55.93formoreinformation.)
SECTION III – CAPABILITIES, LIMITATIONS, VULNERABILITIES
2-20. Airborne forces deploy strategically, operationally, or tactically on short notice anywhere in the
world.They canbe employed as a deterrentor as a combatforce.The strategic mobilityof airborne forces
permits rapid employment to meet contingence across the range of military operations; and provides a
means by which a commander can decisively influence operations. This section discusses the capabilities,
limitationsandvulnerabilitiesuniquetoanABNAF.
CAPABILITIES
2-21. Since airborne forces are able to respond on short notice, airborne operations provide distinct
advantagessuchas—
(cid:122) Abilitytobypassalllandorseaobstacles.
(cid:122) Surprise.
(cid:122) Abilitytomassrapidlyoncriticaltargets.
2-22. Airborne forces can extend the area of operation, move, and rapidlyconcentrate combat power like
nootheravailableforces.Specifically,airborneforcescan—
(cid:122) Attackenemypositionsfromanydirection.
(cid:122) Conductattacksandraidsbeyondthe areaofoperation.
(cid:122) Conductlimitedexploitationandpursuitoperations.
(cid:122) Overflyand bypass enemy positions, barriers, and obstacles and strike objectives in otherwise
inaccessibleareas.
(cid:122) Provideresponsivereserves,allowingcommanderstocommit a largerportionoftheirforcesto
action.
(cid:122) Reactrapidlytotacticalopportunities,necessities,andthreatsinunassignedareas.
(cid:122) Rapidlyplaceforcesattacticallydecisivepointsinthe areaofoperation.
(cid:122) Conductfast-pacedoperationsoverextendeddistances.
(cid:122) Conductandsupportdeceptionwithfalseinsertions.
(cid:122) Rapidlyreinforcecommittedunits.
(cid:122) Rapidlysecureand defendkeyterrain(suchascrossingsites,roadjunctions,andbridges)orkey
objectives.
(cid:122) Rapidlyrepairorconstructinfrastructuretoreceivefollow-onforces.
(cid:122) Delay a muchlargerforcewithoutbecomingdecisivelyengaged.
2-23. Airborne forces, when augmented with appropriate support or augmentation, can conduct sustained
combatoperationsagainsttheenemy.
LIMITATIONS
2-24. Thecommander andplannersmust recognize thelimitationsofairborne forcesandplanaccordingly.
Theymustconsiderthefollowing:
(cid:122) An airborne force depends on USAF aircraft for long-range movement, fire support, and
sustainment. The availability and type of aircraft dictates the scope and duration of airborne
operations.
(cid:122) Aftertheinitialairdrop,thesustainedcombatpowerofairborneforces dependsonresupplyby
air. Any interruption in the flow of resupply aircraft can cause a potential weakening of the |
3-99 | 46 | Chapter 2
airborne force. Enemy air defense fires against resupply aircraft and long-range artillery and
mortar fires on the drop zone can hamper the delivery, collection, or distribution of critical
supplies.
(cid:122) Once on the ground, the airborne force has limited tactical mobility. That mobility depends on
the number and type ofvehiclesand helicoptersthatcan be broughtinto the objectivearea with
thefollow-onforce.
(cid:122) The airborne force has limited field artillery and air defense artillery support until additional
assets can be introduced into the objective area. Additional target acquisition assets are needed
toprovideaccurateandtimelytargetinginformation.
(cid:122) Evacuation of casualties from the airhead is difficult. Until evacuation means are available, the
BCT must be prepared to provide medical care through the attachment of its organic medical
companyortheattachmentofechelonaboveBCTmedicalelements.
VULNERABILITIES
2-25. Airborne forcesare vulnerable to enemyattack while enroute to the drop zone. Althoughthe USAF
can conduct limited airdrops without air superiority, large operations require neutralization or suppression
of enemy air defenses (SEAD). This may require SEAD, radar jamming, and fighter aircraft besides
transport and close air support sorties. Initial airborne assault elements are light and are separated from
weapon systems, equipment, and materiel that provide protection and survivability. An ABNAF is
particularlyvulnerabletoenemy—
(cid:122) Attack by aircraft and air defense weapon systems during the movement and airborne assault
phases.
(cid:122) Attack by chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons because of limited chemical,
biological,radiological,andnuclearprotectionanddecontaminationcapability.
(cid:122) Attackbyground,air,orartilleryduringtheassaultandlandingphases.
(cid:122) Airstrikesifairsuperiorityisnotgainedbeforetheairborneassault.
(cid:122) Electronicattack,toincludejammingofcommunicationsandnavigationsystems,anddisrupting
aircraftsurvivabilityequipment.
(cid:122) Small-arms fire that presents a large threat to the aircraft during the air movement, airborne
assaultandlandingphases.
SECTION IV – AIRBORNE COMMAND AND CONTROL PLATFORMS
2-26. Airborne operations require extensive coordination between the USAF, Army, and often, other
services.Duringforcible entry, airbornecommandandcontrolplatformsmay be employedseparatelyor in
combination to augment or even replace the ground-based elements when response time is critical. This
section discusses the airborne elements of the tactical air control system, consisting of the Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and
the Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command Post (JACC/CP) or "Jackpot" package, designed to
fitaboard a C-130aircraft.
AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM
2-27. TheAWACS,designatedbytheUSAFasthe E-3 radar,is a modifiedBoeing707thathouses a radar
subsystemand vastcommunicationsequipment. Itis under operationalcontrol ofthe tacticalairliftcontrol
center(TACC).The AWACS radarsystemcancompensate forthe majorlimitationsofground-based radar
systemssuchastheirinabilitytodetectlow-flyingaircraftduetoline-of-sightrestrictions.Otherlimitations
of ground-based radar systems include their susceptibility to electronic countermeasures and their
vulnerabilitytoattack.
2-28. The AWACScancommunicate with a wide range of systems. It hasextensive high frequency(HF),
very high frequency (VHF), and ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radios used to communicate with ground
controllers, airborne forces, and ground forces. The E-3‘s radar flexibility allows it to support tactical
missions, defensive missions, or both at the same time. The aircraft is used for weapons control or as a |
3-99 | 47 | Organization and Employment
surveillance platform. In an air defense role, the E-3 radar provides weapons control and surveillance
capabilities.Itprovidescontrolforweaponsandairdefenseregionsduringstagesofincreasedalerts.
JOINT SURVEILANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM
2-29. The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) is an airborne command and
control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform. Its primary mission is to provide theater
ground and air commanders with ground surveillance to support attack operations and targeting that
contributes to the delay,disruptionanddestructionofenemyforces. Whenavailable, JSTARSaircraft may
beemployedas a viableairborneassaultforcecommandplatforminsupportofforcibleentryoperations.
2-30. The E-8Cis a modified Boeing707-300 seriescommercialairframe extensivelyremanufactured and
modified with the radar, communications, operations and control subsystems required to perform its
operational mission. The most prominent external feature is the 27-feet (8 meters) long, canoe-shaped
dome under the forward fuselage that houses the 24-feet (7.3 meters) long, side-looking phased array
antenna. This aircraft is capable of in-flight refueling, allowing flexibility for extend operations in support
offorcibleentryoperations.
2-31. The radar and computer subsystems on the E-8C can gather and display detailed information on
ground forces. The informationis relayed in near-real time to ground command, control, communications,
computers and intelligence systems. The antenna can be tilted to either side of the aircraft where it can
develop a 120-degree field ofviewcovering nearly19,305 square miles (50,000 square kilometers) and is
capable of detecting targets at more than 250 kilometers (more than 820,000 feet). The radar has some
limitedcapabilitytodetecthelicopters,rotatingantennasandlow,slow-movingfixedwingaircraft.
JOINT AIRBORNE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER/COMMAND POST
2-32. The Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command Post (JACC/CP), or "Jackpot" package is
designed to fit aboard a military C-130 aircraft and has military and civilian band radios and Internet
access. Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) is the contingency support unit for the package
consistingofU.S. Army,Navy, AirForce,and MarineCorps personnelprovidingoperatorsupporttoassist
G-6 in managing the variety of communications equipment to include: SECRET Internet Protocol Router
Network(SIPRNET) servicesthroughaninternational maritime satellite antenna; as well as, a fullarrayof
FM and TACSAT networks. The JACC/CP canbe deployed within24 hours fromthe time the JCS issues
deployment approval messages. With most C-130 aircraft not being capable of in-flight refueling, time
available over an objective may be limited, possibly requiring basing from a forward area or an
intermediatestagingbase.(RefertoJP 6-0 formoreinformation.)
2-33. The JACC/CP has four major components: operations center (12 SIPRNET laptop workstations),
communications control, generator, and an air conditioner/accessorytrailer. The jackpot package provides
onehighfrequency,singlesideband(HF/SSB)voiceorteletype communicationchanneloverits 1-kilowatt
transceivers orhighfrequency, doubleindependent sideband with a total of fourindependent 3 kilohertz(3
SPKHZ) voice or teletype channels over its 10-kilowatt system. The 10-kilowatt system is limited to
ground operations only. The JACC/CP contains three radios, an AN/ARC-73 (VHF/AM), AN/ARC-54
(VHF/FM)andAN/ARC-51BX(VHF/AM),forground-to-groundandground-to-aircommunications.
2-34. The voice radio system may be connected to a 10-line, 20-line, or 30-line, four-wire/two-wire
telephone switchboard. The switchboard can connect any telephone subscriber to another telephone or a
JACC/CP.Thecomplete JACC/CP canbetransportedin a winchequipped C-130orlarger aircraft. A wide
lowboytrailermustbeusedtotransportthevansanydistanceoroverotherthanpavedorgravelroads. |
3-99 | 49 | Chapter 3
Airborne Assault Planning
Airborne assaults may be conducted as a rapid crisis response against less capable
enemies, where the conditions needed for the entry are quickly set with limited
shaping operations or where forward deployed and rapid response elements must
conduct the airborne assault mainly with their organic capabilities and minimal
reinforcement. They may be larger-scale entry operations where there is significant
shaping required to set the conditions for the airborne assault. Commanders begin
planning for an airborne assault with a visualization of the ground tactical plan and
work backwards through the landing plan, the air movement plan, and the
marshalling plan. Planning is conducted in this order regardless of the type and
duration of the mission or the size of the force. This chapter addresses roles and
responsibilities, planning sequence and considerations, and shaping operations for an
airborneassault.
SECTION I – ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
3-1. Airborne assault planning is as detailed as time permits and should include completion of written
orders and plans. Within time constraints, the ABNAFC carefully evaluates capabilities and limitations of
the total force and develops a plan that communicates a common vision and synchronizes the action of
forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. The planning should be
highly structured involving the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and others to develop a fully
synchronized plan or order. Planning time should abide by the one-third/two-thirds rule to ensure
subordinateshaveenoughtimetoplanandrehearse.
HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
3-2. The joint task force commander directs the composition of the ABNTF headquarters and the
ABNAF. This headquarters allocates units, defines authority, and assigns responsibility by designating
command and support relationships. The staff of this headquarters is responsible to develop the task
organization of the ABNAF and conducting the necessary steps of the military decisionmaking process
(MDMP). A division-level commander or hisequivalent is the approvingauthorityfor the formation of an
ABNAF.(RefertoFM 3-94formoreinformation.)
PLANNINGRESPONSIBILITIES
3-3. The joint task force commander initiates airborne operations with a planning directive to
participating units. The directive assimilates through normal command channels at the corps and division
levels;pertinentinformationthenispassedtoBCTs.Thedirectivemust—
(cid:122) Specifymissions.
(cid:122) Outlinethecommandstructure.
(cid:122) Identifyparticipatinggroundandairforces.
(cid:122) Listforcesinsupport.
(cid:122) Provide a scheduleofevents.
(cid:122) Stateconditionsunderwhichtheoperationbegins,isdelayed,isaltered,oristerminated.
(cid:122) Establishsupportedandsupportingrelationships. |
3-99 | 50 | Chapter 3
KEYPERSONNELRESPONSIBILITIES
3-4. The ABNTFC establishes mission command by ensuring that his concept is understood and by
definingtheresponsibilitiesofkeypersonnelfor—
(cid:122) Accomplishingthegroundmission.
(cid:122) Task-organizingandaircraftassignment.
(cid:122) Sustaining.
3-5. Thecommander,airliftforcefordefiningresponsibilitiesofkeypersonnelfor—
(cid:122) Aircraftallocationtosupportthegroundtacticalplan.
(cid:122) Assaultforceinsertion.
(cid:122) Resupplyandevacuation.
3-6. TheABNTFCandcommander,airliftfordefiningjointresponsibilityofkeypersonnelfor—
(cid:122) Establishingcontrolpartiesatdeparturelocation.
(cid:122) Loading(Soldiersandequipment).
(cid:122) Rehearsing.
(cid:122) Rehearsingcommunicationcoordinationandstandardization.
(cid:122) Selectingdropzonesandlandingzones.
(cid:122) Establishingcontrolpartiesatdropzonesandlandingzones.
(cid:122) Uploadingaircraft.
(cid:122) Planningaerialresupplyandevacuation.
(cid:122) Departingairfieldsecurity.
(cid:122) Workingorplanningairmovementtables.
(cid:122) Coordinatingmovements(Soldiersandaircraft).
AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE
3-7. TheABNIBCT isthecoreofthe ABNAFandthe ABN IBCT commanderisnormallythe ABNAFC
for a battalion or larger airborne assault. The primary role of the ABNAFC and his staff is to develop the
ground tactical plan by providing his staff and all supporting unit commanders and staffs with key tasks,
intent and guidance concerning the weight of the attack, reconnaissance coverage and the level of
acceptablerisk.
SUPPORTING AVIATION
3-8. Strategic location of the airhead or lodgment may limit what aviation support can be provided for
reconnaissance and attack of the airhead or lodgment before the airborne assault. Once the joint force
commander relinquishes control of the operation to the ABNAFC, both fixed- and rotary-wing supporting
aviationunitsareunderthe operationalcontrol ofthe ABNAFC.Notallfixed-wingaviationfallsunderthe
ABNAFC,onlythatwhichisindirectsupportofthegroundtacticalplan.
3-9. Once the airhead or lodgment is established, and dependent on the ground tactical plan, an aviation
task force maybe created to supportan ABNAF especially ifthe ground tacticalplan necessitates support
for follow-onoperations.However, thecombataviationbrigade commandertypicallyanticipatesthe needs
of the ABNAFC and provides the necessary aviation units to support the mission of the ABNAF. As the
supporting unit, the combat aviation brigade commander directs aviation units within his command or
requestsaugmentationfromhishigherheadquarterstomeettheneedsoftheABNAFC.
SECTION II – REVERSE PLANNING SEQUENCE
3-10. The ABNTFC and his staff develop, in this order, the ground tactical plan, the landing plan, the air
movement plan, and the marshalling plan. The ABNAF staff and all supporting units coordinate, develop,
and refine concurrently to make best use of available time and resources. They develop first the ground
tactical plan, which serves as the basis to develop the other plans. Each plan may potentially affect the
others.Changesinanaspect ofone plan mayrequire adjustmentsinthe other plans. The ABNAFC must |
3-99 | 51 | Airborne Assault Planning
determine if such adjustments entail acceptable risk. If the risk is unacceptable, the concept of operations
(CONOPS)mustchange.
GROUND TACTICAL PLAN
3-11. The ground tactical plan is the basis for the development of all other plans. The ABNAFC and his
staff give special consideration to the assembly and organization of the assault forces and to the
decentralized nature of initial operations in the objective area. The subordinate commander requires the
ground tactical plan of his higher headquarters before he can begin planning. He needs to know the type,
location, and size of objectives and the enemy situation at each one; the mission and intent of higher
headquarterstwolevelsup;andhistaskandpurpose.Thegroundtactical planisgenerated downthechain
of command as a mutual effort. (Refer to chapter 4 of this publication for more information.) The ground
tacticalplanincludes(cid:650)
(cid:122) Assaultobjectivesandairheadline.
(cid:122) Reconnaissanceandsecurityforcestoincludeobservationposts.
(cid:122) Boundaries.
(cid:122) Taskorganization.
(cid:122) Designationofreserve.
(cid:122) Supply(accompanying,follow-up,routine).
(cid:122) Firesupportplan.
(cid:122) Tacticalcrossload(forairlandorparachute).
LANDING PLAN
3-12. Thelanding plan is the ABNAFC’s plan thatlinks the air movementplan tothegroundtactical plan.
It is published at brigade level and below. Before the ABNAFC can prepare an overall landing plan, he
must know where the subordinate commander wants to place his assault force. The landing plan is
generated up the chain of command as a mutual effort. (Refer to Chapter 5 of this publication for more
information.)Thelandingplanincludes(cid:650)
(cid:122) Dropzone,landingzone,locationsanddescriptions.
(cid:122) Sequenceofdelivery.
(cid:122) Methodofdelivery.
(cid:122) Placeofdelivery.
(cid:122) Timeofdelivery.
(cid:122) Cross-loadingplan.
(cid:122) Assemblyplan.
(cid:122) Landingplanworksheet.
AIR MOVEMENT PLAN
3-13. The air movement plan provides the information required to move the airborne force from the
departure airfields to the objective area. This plan is the third step in the reverse planning process and
coversthe period fromwhen unitsload to whentheyexit the aircraft. The airborne commander designates
the subordinate unit’s sequence of airflow and allocates aircraft. This allows the subordinate commanders
to conduct air movement planning. The air movement plan is generated up the chain of command as a
mutual effort. (Refer to chapter 6 of this publication for more information.) The air movement plan
includes(cid:650)
(cid:122) Departureairfields.
(cid:122) Aircraftbyserial.
(cid:122) Parkingdiagram.
(cid:122) Aircraftmission(airmovementtablesandflightroutes).
(cid:122) Unitprovidingtheaircraft. |
3-99 | 52 | Chapter 3
MARSHALLING PLAN
3-14. Thisplanisdeveloped last in the reverse planningsequence and isbased onthe requirementsof the
otherplans.It providesthe neededinformationforunitsoftheassaultforcetoprepare for combat,to move
to departure airfields, and to load aircraft.The marshalling plan provides detailed instructions for facilities
andservicesneededduringmarshalling.It isgenerateddownthechainofcommand.(Referto chapter 7 of
thispublicationformoreinformation.)Themarshallingplanincludes(cid:650)
(cid:122) Movementtothemarshallingarea.
(cid:122) Passivedefensivemeasures.
(cid:122) Dispersalmeasures.
(cid:122) Departureairfields.
(cid:122) Marshallingoperations.
(cid:122) Confirmationbriefschedule.
(cid:122) Preparationforcombat(backbrief,inspection,supervision,rehearsal,andrest).
(cid:122) Communications.
SECTION III – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3-15. Whether done deliberatelyor rapidly, all planningrequires skillful use of available time to optimize
planning and preparation throughout the unit. Taking more time to plan often results in greater
synchronization;however,anydelayinexecutionrisksyieldingtheinitiative withmoretimetoprepareand
acttotheenemy.When allocatingplanningtimeensuresubordinateshaveenoughtime to planandprepare
theirownactionsbeforeexecution.
PLANNING METHODOLOGY
3-16. Planning for airborne operations mirrors the MDMP. (See figure 3-1.) It incorporates parallel and
collaborative planning actions necessary to provide the additional time and detailed planning required for
successfulexecutionofanairborneassaultmission. |
3-99 | 53 | Airborne Assault Planning
Figure 3-1. MDMP and airborne assault planning process |
3-99 | 54 | Chapter 3
PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND PREPARATION
3-17. Units must plan for and prepare internal deployment standard operating procedures (SOPs) and
continually update and rehearse them. These SOPs should include actions that are common to all
deployments, to include airland, parachute assault planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. They
mayinclude:
(cid:122) Conductrapid,shortnoticedeployment.
(cid:122) Emergencydeploymentreadinessexercise(commonlyknownasEDRE).
(cid:122) Preparepersonnelforoverseasdeployment. (RefertoFM 3-35formoreinformation.)
(cid:122) Updateandreviewallvehicleloadplans.
(cid:122) Validateandupdatemovementplanswithnexthigherheadquarters.
(cid:122) Updateaccessandrecallrosters.
(cid:122) Reviewfamilyreadinessgrouprostersandreardetachmentresponsibilities.
(cid:122) Ensure special team personnel are identified and trained (movement, chemical, biological,
radiological,andnuclear,outload,ammunitionhandling).
X- HOUR/N-HOUR SEQUENCES FOR DEPLOYMENT
3-18. The X-hour/N-hour sequences for deployment are developed and followed to ensure all reports,
actions, and outload processes are accomplished at the proper time during marshalling. They aid in
developing air and deployment schedules and are flexible to allowfor modifications based on the mission
andtheunitcommander’sconceptoftheoperation.
3-19. X-hour is the unspecified time that commences unit notification for planning and deployment
preparation in support of potential contingency operations that do not involve rapid, short notice
deployment.X-hoursequenceis an extended sequenceofeventsinitiatedby X-hour thatallowaunit
tofocusonplanningfor a potentialcontingencyoperation,toincludepreparationfordeployment.
3-20. N-hour is the time a unit is notified to assemble its personnel and begin the deployment
sequence. The N-hour sequence starts the reverse planning necessary after notification to have the
first assault aircraft en route to the objective area for commencement of the parachute assault in
accordancewiththeorderforexecution.
3-21. In anticipation of an order for execution; the ABNAF staff and its key leaders begin preparing or
updating an operations plan. The length of X-hour planning varies based on the contingency planning or
crisis action planning situation and the specific operations plan. It normally ceases with either the
designation of N-hour, or if political or military events warrant, no further action. Deployment planning
sequencesfallintooneofthreescenarios:
(cid:122) Unconstrained X-hoursequence.Usedprimarilyfordeliberateplanningorcrisis-actionplanning
thatisnotunder a timeconstraint.
(cid:122) Constrained X-hoursequence.Usedforcrisisactionplanning.
(cid:122) N-hoursequence.Maybeproceededbyan X-hoursequence.
OPTIMIZE AVAILABLE PLANNING TIME
3-22. Effective execution requires issuing timely plans and orders to subordinates. Timely plans are those
issued soon enough to allow subordinates time to plan, issue their orders, and prepare for operations. In
time-constrained environments, products contain just enough information for the commander to make a
reasoned decision and subordinates to assess the situation quickly and plan, prepare, and execute the
necessaryactions. Regardless ofwhether timeforplanningisconstrained ornot,tooptimizeavailabletime
and ensure the best possible synchronization, commanders encourage collaborative and parallel planning
betweentheirheadquartersandhigherandlowerheadquarters.
COLLABORATIVEANDPARALLELPLANNING
3-23. Both collaborative and parallel planning help optimize available planning time. Collaborative
planningisseveralechelonsdevelopingplansandorderstogether.Commanders,subordinatecommanders, |
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