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Figure 7-5. Example activities matrix.
Time Event Chart
7-60. Time event charts are chronological records of individual or group activities designed to store and
display large amounts of information in a small space. Analysts can use time event charts to help analyze,
for example, large-scale patterns of activity and relationships (Figure 7-6). |
3-55.93 | 230 | Chapter 7
Figure 7-6. Example time event chart.
IDENTIFY THREAT CAPABILITIES
7-61. Leaders identify broad COAs and supporting operations that the threat can take to influence the
accomplishment of the friendly mission. Use statements to define the capabilities, for example--
“The threat has the capability to attack with up to eight divisions supported by 150 daily sorties
of fixed-wing aircraft.”
“The criminal organization has the ability to pay off local law enforcement agencies (LEAs).”
“The threat can establish a prepared defense by 14 May.”
”The terrorists have the ability to conduct multiple car bombings simultaneously.” |
3-55.93 | 231 | Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
7-62. In a stability operation, the lack of, or a variety of, uniforms and equipment makes it more
difficult to identify the threat. Varying levels of organization increases the range of options afforded the
enemy threat. This makes it easier for the threat to conduct large-scale demolitions (car bombs and rigged
buildings) against friendly forces. The ability of the threat to collect information and conduct covert
operations is greatly enhanced in a stability operations. Sniper employment and booby traps are capabilities
that are often unpredictable and very dangerous to friendly forces.
SECTION IV. DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
This is the fourth and final step in the IPB process. Staffs identify and develop threat COAs, along with other
facts and assumptions about the OE, that drive the friendly COAs analysis (wargaming). This leads to
development of the friendly COA development. The LRS team uses these threat COAs to drive their own
war-gaming process, and to develop the LRS team COA. Developing threat COAs has five substeps:
• Identify the threat’s likely objectives and desired endstate.
• Identify the full set of COAs available to the threat.
• Evaluate and prioritize each COA.
• Develop each COA.
• Identify initial ISR requirements.
IDENTIFY THE THREAT'S LIKELY OBJECTIVES AND DESIRED
ENDSTATE
7-63. At a minimum, the staff determines likely objectives and desired endstate. Against a conventional
threat, the analysis should start at more than one level above the friendly echelon unit and work down. For
those threats that are asymmetrical in nature, the analysis should start at the lowest level possible.
7-64. The LRS leader starts with the threat command one level above that of the threat he expects the
LRS team to encounter. He then ensures the objectives of the threat commands at each level are identified.
The BFSB S-2 fusion element advises the LRSU on the threat's overall objective. A LRS team should
break down the threat objective to the level and detail appropriate for the team mission.
IDENTIFY THE FULL SET OF COAs AVAILABLE TO THE THREAT
7-65. The staff and the LRS team consider possible threat COAs.
CONSIDERATIONS
7-66. At a minimum they consider--
• The COAs that the threat's doctrine assumes that the threat will use in the current situation, and
the threat's most likely objectives.
• The threat COAs that could greatly influence the friendly unit's mission.
• The threat COA that may exceed the boundaries of known threat doctrine or TTP, even if threat
doctrine generally considers them unfeasible.
• The threat COAs indicated by recent activities and events.
CRITERIA
7-67. Each threat COA should meet five criteria:
Suitability--If the COA is successful, it will accomplish the threat's objective.
Feasibility--The threat has the time, resources, and space available to execute the COA. |
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Acceptability--The threat's tactical or operational advantage gained by executing the COA must
justify the cost. The threat might undertake an unfavorable COA if he believes there are no
other choices.
Distinguishability--Each threat COA must differ greatly from the others.
Completeness--The COA must show how the decisive operation accomplishes the mission, and
how shaping and sustaining operations support the decisive operation.
EVALUATE AND PRIORITIZE EACH COURSE OF ACTION
7-68. The commander and staff need to develop a plan that is optimized to one of the COAs, while
allowing for contingency options should the threat choose another COA. Therefore, the staff must evaluate
each threat COA and prioritize it according to how likely the threat will adopt that option. Use judgment to
rank the threat COAs in their likely order of adoption. Modify the list as needed as the current
situation changes.
DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION
7-69. Once a COA set is complete, develop each COA into as much detail as time allows. To ensure
completeness, each COA must answer six basic questions: who, what, when, where, how and why. Each
developed COA has three parts--
• Situation templates.
• Threat course of action and options.
• High value targets.
SITUATION TEMPLATES
7-70. Situation templates are developed on the threat’s current situation, for example, training and
experience levels, logistical status, losses, dispositions, the environment, threat doctrine. or patterns of
operations. The SITEMP is a graphic that shows the expected threat dispositions should the threat adopt a
particular COA.
Construction
7-71. To construct a SITEMP, start with the threat template and lay it over the MCOO. Adjust the
disposition of the arrayed force on the threat template to account for battlefield effects such as weather and
terrain. Try to array forces as the threat commander might. Construct the SITEMP in as much detail as
time allows:
• Conventional Threat--evaluate time and space factors to develop time phaselines showing
threat movement.
• Unconventional Threat--other tools such as pattern analysis. Pattern analysis uses multiple
map overlays and text assessing military, terrorist, or other threat activity in an urban area.
These events can be related by any of several factors to include location and time. These events
can be analyzed by plotting them on maps over time, using multiple historical overlays (analog
or digital) that can be compared to one another over time, and using a time-event wheel or other
analysis tools (Figure 7-7). |
3-55.93 | 233 | Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Figure 7-7. Example pattern analysis plot sheet.
Pattern Analysis
7-72. The pattern analysis is a technique that is based on certain characteristic patterns that can be
identified and interpreted. Pattern analysis can be critically important when facing an enemy whose
doctrine is undeveloped or unknown. It is necessary for the intelligence analyst to create or update the
threat model and threat templates.
7-73. A pattern analysis requires the organization and recording of large volumes of incoming
information and adding it to existing information so meaningful relationships are clarified. Often,
indicators can initially be ambiguous and incomplete. but over time patterns of activity or tip-offs that
characterize specific threat emerge. Expect to deal with a thinking threat that learns from previous success
or failures and will change or vary patterns of operations.
7-74. Once all related items of information from the intelligence files, sources, and agencies are
obtained, assemble the available information to form as many logical solutions or hypothesis as possible.
Assembly of information to develop logical hypothesis requires good judgment and considerable area
expertise. When developing hypothesis, avoid reaching conclusions based on prejudices or
preconceived notions. |
3-55.93 | 234 | Chapter 7
7-75. Pattern analysis tools consist of automation, situation map (SITMAP), incident map, IPB
templates, working files, hot files, resource files, coordinate register and time-event charts.
Automation--Automation provides immediate access to situational updates and execution
information and allow transmittal of situational understanding and execution orders.
Automation enhances situational awareness and enables friendly forces to share a common
picture while communicating and targeting in real or near-real time.
Incident Map--Working incident maps and overlays are considered informal. Post current
information on the incident map as received. This map is a working aid that graphically shows
threat activity in both AO and AOI considered important to the operation. Information on the
incident map can provide a good foundation for the SITMAP.
Situation Map--The SITMAP is built from the incident overlay. The SITMAP adds current
intelligence and activities indicating movement, resupply operations, or attacks.
Working Files--Working files are critical to properly store the research material generated.
Whether done manually or with automation, ensure the filing system is easily understood,
information is easy to retrieve, and includes cross-referencing.
Hot Files--Hot files are the most important working file. The hot file contains material pertaining
to a specific incident, as well as information from related incidents. Reports of planned
demonstrations, sabotage, or attack all initiate hot files. A hot file becomes inactive when the
event occurs, does not occur, or when the unit's priorities change.
Resource Files--Resource files includes all material which is important but not of immediate
value. It includes hot files that are obsolete, inactive incident files, inactive personality and
organization files, and photographs.
Level of Command, Operational Type, and Named Areas of Interest
7-76. The level of command and type of operation bears directly on the level of detail that goes into a
situation template.
Tactical Level--Templates at this level sometimes show individual vehicles in threat dispositions.
The NAIs are often pinpoint locations such as road junctions or small-unit battle positions.
Operational Level--Templates at this level focus on large reserve formations, major staging bases
and LOCs. The NAIs are often large dispersal areas, reserve assembly areas, or logistical
support areas.
Strategic Level--Templates at this level might focus on the shift of large forces from one theater to
another as well as political and economic developments. The NAIs can sometimes encompass
large regions.
THREAT COURSES OF ACTION AND OPTIONS
7-77. This describes the activities of the forces shown on the situation template. It can range from a
narrative description to a detailed synchronization matrix showing activities of each unit, WFF, or
asymmetrical activity in detail. It should address the earliest time the COA can be executed, timelines and
phases associated with the COA, and decisions the threat commander will make during and after execution
of the COA. Use the COA description to support staff wargaming and to develop the event template and
supporting indicators
HIGH-VALUE TARGET
7-78. As the SITEMP is prepared, mentally war-game and note how and where each of the WFF
provide critical support to the COA. This leads to identification of the HVTs. Note on the SITEMP where
the HVTs must appear or be employed to make the operation successful. Focus on times just before or
when the HVTs are most valuable. These HVTs lead to potential TAIs, engagement areas, and decision
points. |
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IDENTIFY INITIAL ISR REQUIREMENTS
7-79. After identifying the set of potential COAs, focus on which one the threat will most likely adopt.
This is crucial to identify ISR requirements for an effective ISR plan. At the LRSC and LRS team level,
they identify the COA RFIs and RIIs to send to the R&S squadron S-2 and the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion
element to "fill in the blanks" in the COA. The team identifies the areas where they expect key events to
occur. These are called "named areas of interest" (NAIs). Activities or events that reveal a COA are called
"indicators."
EVENT TEMPLATE
7-80. The event template is a guide for ISR synchronization and ISR planning. It shows the NAIs where
activity or lack of activity will indicate which threat COA the threat has adopted. It shows who, what,
where, and when to collect information that reveal the threat's chosen COA. Comparing and contrasting the
various NAIs and indicators associated with each COA helps identify the differences. These differences are
markers that help to recognize which COA the threat has chosen to execute. The selected NAIs are marked
on the event template. This initial event template focuses only on identifying which of the predicted COAs
the threat has adopted.
EVENT MATRIX
7-81. The event matrix complements the event template. The matrix provides details on the type of
activity is expected to occur at each NAI, when it is expected to be active, and how those activities relate to
other events (indicators) on the battlefield. The matrix contains the event (indicator) associated with each
NAI. It also includes the team phase lines from the SITEMP, and the LTIOV time line. Its main uses are in
collecting intelligence and aiding in situation development. The elements of the event matrix follow:
Information Requirement—IR includes all of the information elements that the commander and
staff need to successfully conduct operations, that is, all elements necessary to address the
factors of METT-TC.
Priority Intelligence Requirement—PIR includes all intelligence requirements for which a
commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making.
Intelligence Requirement—Intelligence requirements include knowledge of lesser importance than
the PIR.
Specific Information Requirement—SIR consists of indicators that will answer all or part of a PIR
or IR.
ISR Tasks and RFIs—ISR tasks and RFIs are the orders or requests that generate planning and
execution of a collection mission or analysis of database information.
Named Area of Interest—An NAI is a geographic area where indicators can be collected.
Target Area of Interest—A TAI is a geographic area where high-value targets (HVTs) can be
acquired and engaged.
Decision Point—A DP is a point in space and time where the commander or staff anticipates
making a decision concerning a specific friendly COA. A DP is usually associated with a
specific TAI, and is located in time and space to permit the commander sufficient lead time to
engage the enemy in the TAI.
PREPARE DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE
7-82. The decision support template is a graphic version of a war game. From this template, the BFSB
and R&S squadron S-2 and S-3 prepare a detailed ISR plan. This plan shows where and when R&S
elements such as LRS should look for the enemy. The plan directs specific tasks and priorities to LRSC,
which are then assigned as missions to individual LRS teams. |
3-55.93 | 237 | Chapter 8
Evasion and Recovery
Evasion is the process whereby people isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory avoid
capture and return to areas under friendly control. Recovery is the return of such
evaders to friendly control, either with or without aid, as the result of plans,
operations, and individual actions by recovery planners, conventional or
unconventional forces, and sometimes the evaders themselves. Evasion is considered
the highest form of resistance. Both E&R are integral to military operations
(Appendix K).
FUNDAMENTALS
8-1. Conduct of E&R operations requires Soldiers understand each kind of operation and the laws that
govern them. Soldiers participating in an evasion operation are classified as one of the following:
EVADER
8-2. An evader is considered a lawful combatant for the duration of the evasion, since evasion is an
extension of combat and a refusal to capitulate to the enemy. Evaders are obliged by the Code of Conduct
to do all they can to avoid capture and rejoin friendly forces. If needed, they may commit acts of violence
against legitimate military targets, without being prosecuted by the enemy for violating local criminal laws.
Code of Conduct. Article II:
I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the
members of my command while they still have the means to resist.
ESCAPEE
8-3. An escapee is someone who has escaped from a confinement facility. Escapees are
noncombatants, no longer able to commit hostile acts, who may be charged under the laws of the detaining
power for certain acts committed against its military or civilian population during escape or avoidance of
recapture. Such an escapee may carry no arms of any kind, nor may he try to arm himself. If he commits
any crime(s) of no specific military significance, he may be tried and punished for war crimes, not only by
the detaining country, but also by his own. The Code of Conduct and Law of Land Warfare both list the
responsibilities of the evader and escapee in an evasion. However, under Geneva Convention Articles
91-94, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, POWs have a national obligation
to escape and rejoin their own forces. Those apprehended during or after an attempted escape are subject to
disciplinary punishment only. This assumes that any offences they may have committed were for the sole
purpose of escaping, and that the offences entail no violence against life or limb, or the goal of
self-enrichment.
DETENTION OF EVADERS BY NEUTRAL COUNTRIES
8-4. The evader who crosses into a neutral country is subject to detention by that country for the
duration of the war. A neutral country that receives escapees may leave them at liberty. If it allows them to
remain in its territory it may assign them a place of residence. The neutral country is also authorized to
confiscate all equipment of the evader/escapee.
TIMES TO INITIATE E&R
8-5. These include—
• On order of commander.
• When considered "isolated personnel" by individual unit standards or SOP. |
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CHAIN OF COMMAND
8-6. The agencies, units and individuals within the E&R chain of command are responsible for the
successful planning for and execution of E&R operations.
JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY AGENCY
8-7. The JPRA develops joint E&R tactics, techniques, and procedures; E&R aids; tools; and
specialized equipment for E&R. They also provide expertise on E&R and survival to all services.
JOINT SEARCH-AND-RESCUE CENTER
8-8. The JSRC represents two or more services or countries. They coordinate recovery efforts among
joint services. They develop and distribute the Air Tasking Order Special Instructions (ATOSPINS). They
maintain ISOPREP cards for missing personnel.
RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER
8-9. A RCC is located at each service in the theatre of operation. The RCC notifies the JSRC of
isolated personnel. They help individual units develop their own EPA. They maintain a copy of ISOPREP
cards for isolated personnel. They coordinate recovery efforts for that service.
INDIVIDUAL UNITS
8-10. Each unit is responsible for developing an EPA, and for ensuring that all personnel properly fill
out their ISOPREP cards, after which the unit keeps the cards updated, stores them in a secure location,
and forwards a copy to the RCC.
INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER
8-11. Responsible for filling out the EPA and the ISOPREP card.
PLANS
8-12. Personnel assigned to LRSU are considered high-risk-of-capture and subject to isolation in hostile
territory. Therefore, they should prepare for the possibility of being in an evasion situation. Successful
evasion is dependent on detailed planning, as well as peacetime training and proficiency in survival and
E&R tactics, techniques and procedures.
8-13. The LRSC commander, with assistance from the RCC and JSRC, is responsible for and prepared
to conduct personnel recovery operations in support of their own operations. The commander also
coordinates with the RCC when elements are preparing to enter a possible evasion situation. He relays
information such as ISOPREP cards and EPA with overlays of the AO. After the LRSC commander
coordinates with evasion planning agencies, he may determine the unit must make independent evasion
plans. The LRSC commander starts by identifying the team's AO and formulating and evasion annex with
the assistance of the JSRC.
8-14. LRS team evasion planning begins with receiving the E&R annex to the OPORD along with any
evasion aids that will assist them in the planning phase. After receiving area briefings and examining E&R
area studies, the team formulates an EPA. The EPA is normally an annex to the team OPORD and briefed
to the commander. All available evasion aids are requested to assist the team if evasion is required. Finally,
the team reviews their ISOPREP cards before leaving the planning facility to start infiltration.
TYPES OF RECOVERY
8-15. The two types of combat recovery of isolated personnel are conventional and unconventional
(Figure 8-1): |
3-55.93 | 239 | Evasion and Recovery
Figure 8-1. Types of recovery.
CONVENTIONAL
8-16. There are three types of conventional recovery:
Unassisted--Unassisted recovery by isolated personnel requires evasion back to friendly lines.
CSAR--Available PR assets, controlled and initiated by the JPRA, can recover the isolated
personnel.
On-Scene--Assets already in the AO, such as aviation, ground or naval forces can recover the
isolated personnel.
UNCONVENTIONAL
8-17. There are two types of unconventional recovery: assisted and clandestine (aircraft). Assisted
evasion is the most likely of the two types that LRSU will have available. Planned recovery by SOF with a
dedicated recovery mission, or clandestine units may already be in place in the AO. Opportunists
sometimes perform unplanned recoveries in hope of receiving a reward for their actions. Civilians may
perform acts of mercy when evaders need medical attention. At other times, those sympathetic to the cause
will also provide accidental assistance.
CLASSIFICATIONS OF EVASION
8-18. In a short-range evasion, the evader is close to the main battle area and becomes isolated. The
evader usually has the means to return to the unit within a few days. In an extended evasion, which
involves greater distances behind enemy lines, the evader might have to travel an extended distance
through foreign terrain, possibly with little food and equipment. LRS teams generally fit into this group.
Characteristics of a successful extended evasion include— |
3-55.93 | 240 | Chapter 8
KNOWLEDGE OF THE AO
8-19. Study of the AO and detailed E&R are critical to success.
KNOWLEDGE OF SURVIVAL
8-20. These skills should be reinforced in the unit with thorough survival and evasion classes. Like most
perishable skills, survival training should be a regular training task.
SUPPLY ECONOMY
8-21. Limiting use and making the best use of available supplies.
ENDURANCE
8-22. The physical and mental conditioning of individuals and the team will largely determine the
ability to successfully execute E&R.
PATIENCE AND DISCIPLINE
8-23. Recovery may not be immediate--individuals and teams should be prepared to evade for days,
weeks, months or even years. Patience and discipline are often traits acquired though tough and realistic
training. Soldiers in an E&R and survival situation will be subjected to many physical and mental
hardships. These hardships are compounded if detailed area studies are not conducted during the planning
phase and Soldiers have limited survival skills. One major factor that has lead to more successful evasions
than any other is the individuals will to survive. Many factors affect evaders, they include—
• Family and home ties.
• Self-preservation.
• Material items.
• Religion.
• Sense of responsibility—to your family, to your team, and to your country.
Code of Conduct. Article III:
If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every
effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special
favors from the enemy.
MOVEMENT
8-24. The team must consider the following movement factors in order to ensure successful evasion:
TECHNIQUES
8-25. The movement techniques used during evasion are the same as with normal patrolling, as well as
the SOPs for movement.
ROUTE SELECTION
8-26. Route selection is an extremely important factor when conducting evasion. Avoid all major built
up areas and areas with high traffic.
CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT
8-27. Camouflage and concealment are crucial when moving, and should never be sacrificed. |
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RATE OF MOVEMENT
8-28. A rate of movement is established that allows the team to achieve goals established in the E&R
plan. Moving as fast as possible is seldom the preferred technique. Some of the goals and reasons for
them are--
Progress
8-29. The team moves to the terrain feature/location goals established in the E&R plan. Measure
progress on the ground by the hole-up areas that are reached. Be flexible--make adjustments to the E&R
plan based on METT-TC considerations.
Stealth
8-30. Although progress is extremely important, care should be taken so that the team is not rushed.
Speed should not be substituted for security.
Energy Conservation
8-31. Along with assisting in stealth, the slower you move, the more energy you conserve, and the
longer you will be able to evade.
PHYSICAL CONDITION
8-32. Physical condition is another deciding factor in how successful the team will be in the evasion.
Equipment cross loading may be necessary if some Soldiers are caring a heavier load than others, or if
there are wounded personnel on the team. The team is only as strong and fast as their weakest or slowest
Soldier. Since the goal of the team is to be recovered by friendly forces, at times it may be necessary to
cache equipment in order to assist the team in evading. This technique is highly discouraged since the team
should have a goal of extracting with 100 percent of Soldiers, weapons, and equipment.
TEAM MOVEMENT
8-33. The team may evade by whatever technique they have for a SOP, such as moving as a whole
element or by breaking up into two to three groups. There are advantages and disadvantages for both and
they must be considered when deciding how the team will move during E&R.
COUNTERTRACKING
8-34. The team should use counter tracking techniques throughout the E&R. During the course of the
evasion there are certain considerations that will greatly affect the routes that are taken and the way the
evasion is conducted.
OBSTACLES
8-35. Obstacles will be encountered throughout the evasion corridor. The two types of obstacles are
natural and man-made. Obstacles not only restrict movement, but they may also funnel movement.
However, some obstacles may serve as navigation aids for the evader, as well as aid in movement:
Mountains and Hilltops
8-36. Use these for navigation, but avoid traveling on them due to silhouetting.
Rivers and Streams
8-37. You can also use rivers and streams as guides and for water resupply, if the water is potable, but
remember that the local populace may also use it.
Roads or Trails
8-38. Avoid roads and trails, and never use them for movement. |
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Bridges
8-39. Avoid these, too, because, although they look like the easiest and fastest way across a water
obstacle, they are also used for checkpoints and roadblocks.
Populated Areas
8-40. Avoid entering populated areas, though if you are being tracked by dogs, traveling near a
populated area can throw off your scent.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
8-41. Here are some things to considered while evading:
• Know how the locals feel about your cause. If you are compromised during the evasion, this
information can improve your chances of survival.
• Blend in with the natives. Knowing and following their customs and habits will aid in your
survival during the evasion.
• Remember that pets and livestock will compromise your situation.
• Know local curfews. They may determine your movement in an evasion.
DISGUISES
8-42. The use of disguises, have been discouraged due to the belief that if captured you could possibly
be shot as a spy for treason. That is not to far from the truth, however there are ways that you may use a
disguise to your advantage.
WEARING OF ENEMY UNIFORMS
8-43. It is a violation of international law to make improper use of the uniform of the enemy. It is,
however, permissible for military personnel isolated in hostile territory to use the enemy's uniform to assist
in evading capture, as long as no other military operations are carried out while so attired.
WEARING OF CIVILIAN CLOTHING
8-44. It is a violation of international law to kill, injure, or capture the enemy by feigning civilian status.
As with the military disguise you should avoid conducting operations that might be defined as either
military or espionage. Even if the evader is within his legal rights to use the clothing to help him evade, he
might, if captured, have to identify himself as an American. If partisans are aiding his evasion, then he
could be treated as one of them and tried for acts of treason. Every Soldier must keep his ID card and blood
chit on his person.
PROTECTED EMBLEMS
8-45. The only disguises unauthorized for use in escape or evasion are protected emblems such as those
of medical, religious, or relief agencies.
IDENTIFICATION
8-46. According to the Geneva Convention, all Soldiers involved in armed conflict must keep control of
his ID card and ID tag at all times.
LOCAL CURRENCY
8-47. Soldiers are strongly discouraged from carrying any type of payment for helpers, partisan or
otherwise sympathetic to your cause, since this requires contact, which would compromise the team's
status. Higher echelons control payment to partisans; teams should not be concerned with this. |
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UNIFORMS
8-48. It has traditionally been the practice of LRS teams to go to the field wearing sterile uniforms. The
Geneva Convention only requires them to wear a nametag and US Army tags. The sole purpose of the
sterile uniform is to avoid giving away the major supported unit or command. Wearing of rank is
permitted. If captured, a Soldier must provide name, rank, SSN, and date of birth anyway.
EVASION AIDS
8-49. Evasion aids are easily accessible to the teams as long as the team knows where to request them.
Some of the evasion aids available and methods of requesting them are--
ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT (ISOPREP) (DD FORM 1833 TEST (V2))
8-50. This is the most important source of authentication data in the US and in some coalition countries.
When filled out, it becomes a classified document. JP 3-50.2 provides instructions for completing the
ISOPREP card. When an individual enters an evasion mode the ISOPREP card should be forwarded to the
RCC to assist in recovery (Appendix K).
BLOOD CHITS
8-51. The blood chit is a small piece of material imprinted with an American flag, control numbers in
each corner, and a statement in English and in several other languages (spoken by the indigenous populace
in the AO). This chit identifies the bearer as an American and promises a reward to any one or more people
who help him return to friendly control. The presenter of the blood chit may either tear the control number
off one of the corners, or he can let them write down the control number. He may also give them his name,
rank and SSN, to assist in identification. When the blood chit number is presented to friendly authorities
and the claim has been properly validated, it represents an obligation by the US government to provide
compensation to the claimant for services rendered to the evader. Blood chits are available through JPRA,
the office of primary responsibility for policy and authorizing the production, distribution, and use of blood
chits. The National Imagery Mapping Agency (NIMA) maintains the capability to produce and reprint
blood chits at the request of the combatant commander as coordinated through the JPRA.
POINTIE TALKIE
8-52. This is similar to language guides used by invasion forces in WWII. They are distributed by the
JPRA. Each English phrase has the same phrase in various languages to the side. Simply point to the
phrase you wish to use. One of the disadvantages of this are the same as the blood chit, which are you must
make contact with people in order to use it. Literacy is also a problem that might arise among the
local populace.
EVASION CHARTS
8-53. The National Imagery Mapping Agency (NIMA) distributes evasion charts. Each evasion chart is
actually a series of eight 1:250,000 scale joint operations graphic (JOG) charts. The National Imagery
Mapping Agency (NIMA) distributes evasion charts. Each evasion chart is actually a series of eight
1:250,000 scale joint operations graphic (JOG) charts. The JOG charts are usually printed four to a side.
The chart is overprinted with a camouflage pattern suitable for area terrain, and also includes an American
flag that allows the evader to identify himself. An evasion chart combines standard navigation charts and
includes evasion and survival information in the margins. In addition, it typically provides information on
local navigation, survival medicine, environmental hazards, personal protection, and water and food
procurement, plus photos of edible and poisonous plants and wildlife. The evasion chart is waterproof, and
can provide a make-shift shelter in an emergency. It folds up small enough to fit into a cargo pocket or
flight suit. If evasion charts are unavailable, tactical pilotage charts (1:500,000 scale) may be substituted.
INTELLIGENCE DESCRIPTION FOR SELECTED EVASION AREA
8-54. The term usually used for this is SAID, which means "SAFE area intelligence description" or,
spelled out completely, "Selected Area for Evasion Intelligence Description." The "SAID" (say each letter)
is distributed by the Defense Intelligence Agency for training and real-world contingencies. The SAID is |
3-55.93 | 244 | Chapter 8
an in-depth study of all-source evasion designated to help in recovering military personnel from a SAFE
under hostile conditions. The SAID includes a 1-to-1:50,000 scale map of the AO, colored photographs of
contact points within the SAFE, possible LZs and PZs, survival information, terrain surveys, a chart that
shows average rainfall by month, high and low temperatures, and any other information about the AO that
the evader might find useful.
AIR-TASKING-ORDER SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
8-55. The JSRC develops the ATOSPIN using information that will allow recovery to be conducted
with the least amount of problems possible. These instructions include--
• Point of contact for PR incident report.
• Communications report.
• Color of the day.
• Number of the day.
• Codeword of the day.
• Letter of the day.
• Search and rescue point (SARDOT).
EVASION PLAN OF ACTION
8-56. The individual units, not the team, develop the EPA. The RCC helps. Speed of recovery depends
on how closely everyone follows the EPA. All units operating in or over hostile territory should develop an
EPA or review their existing EPA each time a designated target or AO changes. Responsibility for properly
preparing and planning the evasion rests with the potential evaders. The headquarters element supports
planning, the team develops the plan, and joint theatre assets support the recovery effort. Successful
evasion depends on detailed planning, including contingency plans, initiation mechanisms, and
incorporates information from available reference sources. The EPA provides critical information to the
recovery force, such as the scheme of maneuver. The EPA format has six mandatory and five optional
components (Appendix K).
Mandatory Components
• Identification.
— Name and rank for each team member.
— Mission number.
— Team call sign or identifier.
— Team position.
— Call sign suffix.
— Other.
• Planned flight or travel routes.
— Describe routes for both ingress and egress.
— In-flight emergency plans for each leg of the mission.
• Evasion actions and intentions for first 48 hours, uninjured.
— Compare evasion to resupply and continuation of the mission.
— Plan for evading alone, in small groups, or with entire team. |
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— Plan travel, including such factors as distance, duration, and speed.
— Plan intended actions and length of stay at initial hole-up location(s).
• Evasion actions and intentions for first 48 hours, injured.
— Plan for treatment of the injured or self-aid.
— Considerations for movement techniques.
— Litters, canes, crutches, and so on.
— Rate of march.
• Evasion actions and intentions after 48 hours.
— Routes, plans to destination.
— Actions and intentions at potential contact or recovery locations.
— Contact and recovery point signals, signs or procedures.
— Contingency plans.
• Communication and authentication.
— Code words.
— Bona fides.
— Color or letter of the day, month, or quarter.
— Challenge or password and any number combinations.
— Available communications and signaling devices (day or night, near or far).
— Primary communication schedule procedures and frequencies.
— Alternate communication schedule procedures and frequencies.
Optional Components
• Weapons and ammunition carried.
• Personal evasion kit items.
• Listing of issued survival kit items.
• Mission evasion preparation checklist.
• Signature of reviewing officer.
EVASION AREAS
8-57. Evasion areas within the theatre or area of operation are decisive to mission accomplishment
should the team or individual become isolated from his unit. Using the evasion area within the study region
increases the evader's chance to reunite to friendly control.
SAFE
8-58. A SAFE is an area within a potentially hostile region where an individual may become isolated
and must evade to avoid capture by the enemy. This area will be pre-determined to have the best conditions
for evasion and survival opportunities. Within the SAFE will be contact points and usually a recovery site.
An area study of the SAFE will be found in the SAID and should be used when planning for a possible
evasion situation. |
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DESIGNATED AREAS FOR RECOVERY
8-59. The DAR can be any size or shape within a potentially hostile region where individuals may
become isolated and must evade to avoid capture. The DAR is issued when no SAFE is available in the AO
or can supplement the SAFE in the area of recovery. An area study will be used similar to the SAID during
the planning process. If a DAR is used, the contact points are called 'recovery points.' (For more
information on E&R see JP 3-50.2, JP 3-50.21, and JP 3-50.3.) |
3-55.93 | 247 | Appendix A
Recruitment, Assessment, and Selection Program
The physical and psychological demands on the LRSU Soldier generally exceed
those on conventional Infantry and reconnaissance Soldiers. Instead of operating near
friendly supporting units, they operate deep in the enemy's rear, surrounded by
hostile forces. They operate independently for long periods of time without support.
They must rely only on each other and on what they can carry. The pressure of
having to perform under such extreme circumstances requires more than
extraordinary physical capabilities--it also requires specific character traits. Ideally,
LRSU Soldiers are selected in three stages: recruitment, assessment, and selection.
This appendix covers the purpose, organization, and elements of the recruitment,
assessment, and selection program (RASP) as well as reassignment during and after
the 90-day probationary period. The purpose of the RASP is to ensure quality
personnel are assigned and maintained to meet the demands of the LRSU mission.
PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION
A-1. The purpose of a LRSU RASP is to identify and gauge the potential of individual Soldiers to meet
LRSU standards within a reasonable training period.
Memorandum of Understanding—The BFSB S-1, the R&S squadron S-1 and the LRSC should
develop a RASP Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The RASP MOU should have the
approval of the BFSB and R&S squadron commanders.
Three-Time Volunteers—Potential new Soldiers for a LRS team should be at least three time
volunteers: they have joined the Army, they are Airborne qualified, and they agree to be
assigned to a LRSC.
Assessment and Selection Board—The LRSU assessment and selection board consists of senior
LRSC leaders, R&S squadron and BFSB commanders and Command Sergeants Majors (or
their designated representatives). The board centrally reviews the candidate's qualifications and
results of the assessment process. Assignment to the LRSC ideally occurs only after the Soldier
successfully completes the assessment phase and receives a recommendation for assignment
from the selection board.
Phases—A LRSU RASP normally has three phases: recruitment, assessment, and selection.
RECRUITMENT
A-2. LRSU recruitment should not be used to reward or promote particular Soldiers. Neither should
other units reassign Soldiers with "problems" or marginal performance to the LRSC. For the LRSU to
properly perform its mission, Soldiers should volunteer or be chosen based on their proven ability or
potential to perform and thrive under the demanding conditions of LRS missions. LRSU recruitment
should be viewed as an extension of the Army's personnel-management program. It identifies Soldiers who
meet the requirements for specific LRSU needs.
A-3. Privates through specialists will be assigned to the BFSB by the Human Resources Command.
With very few exceptions, 11B1P Soldiers assigned to the BFSB are intended to fill slots in the LRSC. It is
unlikely that these Soldiers will initially all meet the unique characteristics of a LRS Soldier. The BFSB
S-1 needs to establish a relationship with units on the host installation that require 11B10s and institute a
reassignment policy so Soldiers not meeting the RASP standards can be transferred. A Soldier not meeting
the RASP standards does not necessarily mean he is a substandard performer. Likewise, RASP standards
should not be so stringent that the failure rate of potential new LRSU Soldiers puts an undue burden on the
BFSB, the host installation and the US Army Human Resources Command. |
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A-4. 11B2V through 11B4V Soldiers will be assigned to the LRSC or the R&S squadron insertion and
extraction section from the Human Resources Command, Ranger assignments NCO.
A-5. Officer RASP candidates are normally volunteers from other Infantry organizations. Experience
proves that for LRSC commanders to be successful, it must be a second or third company command, the
previous command(s) being very successful. LRSD platoon leaders are normally Captains and should have
had highly successful previous Infantry rifle platoon leader time including time on an Infantry unit staff.
The best candidates also having highly successful scout/reconnaissance platoon or company XO
experience.
ASSESSMENT
A-6. To be qualified for selection consideration, the recruit must meet all of the requirements and none
of the disqualifiers. The board assesses recruits to determine whether they qualify for consideration for
assessment.
QUALIFIERS
A-7. Recruits must meet all of the following criteria:
• Airborne qualified (privates first class and specialists).
• Airborne and Ranger qualified (sergeants and above).1, 2
• Earned a GT score of 110 or above (all).
• Willing to volunteer for Ranger School.
• Willing to volunteer for the RSLC.
• Has at least two years retainability in unit upon selection.
• Are eligible for Secret security clearance.
Notes: 1 MOS 11B sergeants and above should not be automatically disqualified if
they are not Ranger qualified.
2 Non-MOS 11B sergeants and above are not required to be Ranger qualified.
PHYSICAL SCREENS
A-8. A LRS Soldier normally carries over 100 pounds of equipment during an operation. This far
exceeds the normal Soldier's load, so the LRS Soldier needs extraordinary physical capabilities to meet the
physical requirements:
• Pass the Army Physical Fitness Test + (Ranger school standard for push-ups, sit-ups and chin-
ups).
• Pass the Combat Water Survival Test.
A-9. The LRS Soldier must have the potential to become experts in the following skills:
• Map reading and land navigation.
• Communications.
• Patrolling.
• Field craft.
• Threat equipment recognition. |
3-55.93 | 249 | Recruitment, Assessment, and Selection Program
• Medical.
• Planning and orders.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION
A-10. The success of the LRS Soldier is essential to success of the overall mission. LRS leaders must
understand the psychological characteristics of those most likely to succeed so that team composition will
provide commanders with the best possible resources. Studies such as that conducted by LTC (Dr.) John C.
Chin, United States Army Infantry Center command psychologist in 2002 indicate successful LRS Soldiers
have certain identifiable psychological characteristics. While not resource supportable in all cases, it is
recommended a psychological evaluation be included in the assessment phase of RASP.
Desirable
A-11. The Soldier is evaluated on the basis of the following mental and psychological criteria:
• Effective, functional intelligence.
• Conceptual complexity.
• Emotional stability and high stress tolerance.
• Trainability and situational awareness.
• Humor.
• Learned optimism.
• Self-efficacy.
• Moral reasoning and integrity.
Undesirable
A-12. The desirable mental and psychological criteria can also be contrasted with unacceptable
psychological criteria for LRSU Soldiers which include the following:
• Anxiety or mood disorders.
• Antisocial personality.
• Serious phobias.
• High substance abuse potential.
• Undue sensitivity.
• Impulsivity.
• Chronic relationship problems.
• Uncooperative family.
• Chronic financial problems.
• Low trainability.
• Rambo syndrome.
• Low motivation. |
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DISQUALIFIERS
A-13. To be assessed as eligible for consideration, the LRS recruit's record must not indicate a history of
any one of the following:
• Disciplinary problems.
• Drug use.
• Alcohol abuse.
• Financial irresponsibility.
• Emotional instability.
CONDUCT OF ASSESSMENT
A-14. The LRSC normally conducts the RASP with the support of the R&S squadron. Techniques to
conduct the RASP include—
• Training by consolidating cadre/trainers at the LRSC,
• Training conducted by LRSD, or
• Training by consolidating cadre/trainers with the program administered by the insertion and
extraction section in the R&S squadron S-3 under the supervision of the LRSC.
A-15. To maintain test standards, the LRSC should not have individual LRS teams conduct the RASP.
The RASP is conducted quarterly. It is normally three weeks long, divided into three phases. Phase 1
includes both classroom instruction and physical training. Phase 2 is field instruction on critical skills.
Phase 3 is testing, evaluation, and conduct of the selection board.
SELECTION
A-16. Soldiers selected for consideration as a LRS Soldier must meet—
• Earn at least 70 percent on the Army Physical Fitness Test in each event, within age groups.
• Meet height and weight or body fat standards in AR 600-9.
• Pass the Combat Water Survival Test.
• Complete 5-mile run within 40 minutes.
• Complete 12-mile foot march with LCE, weapon, and rucksack (with 35-pound load) within
3 hours.
• Pass a written test on map reading and land navigation.
• Complete practical exercises in day and night land navigation.
• Demonstrate proficiency following training in basic LRS team skills, including--
-- Communications.
-- Threat-equipment recognition.
-- Fieldcraft.
-- Patrolling.
-- Medical aid.
-- Planning and orders production.
• Pass psychological screening.
• Pass a comprehensive examination given by the unit selection review board. |
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REASSIGNMENT
A-17. Once the Soldier meets the RASP criteria for assignment to the LRSC, he must perform, and
continue to perform, his duties to LRSU standards.
90-DAY PROBATION
A-18. During the first 90 days of the Soldier's assignment to the LRSC, the commander should be
allowed to reassign him at any time, with adequate documentation, for failure to meet unit standards.
A-19. During the first 90 days it is recommended each Soldier attend the RSLC. Attendance and
graduation of the RSLC will greatly enhance the LRS Soldier skill set and provide a base for LRSU-
specific training.
SUBSEQUENT RELEASE AUTHORITY
A-20. After the 90-day probationary period, the LRS commander should be allowed to reassign any
Soldier whose performance or personal situation degrades the ability of the LRSU to accomplish
its mission. |
3-55.93 | 253 | Appendix B
Orders and Briefs
This appendix helps LRSU prepare orders (WARNO, OPORD, and FRAGO) and
briefs (confirmation, mission analysis, decision, and mission concept briefs;
backbriefs; and debriefs).
Brief and order types are distinguished by--
• Time--When the order or brief occurs.
• Contents--What the order or brief includes.
Briefs are also distinguished by--
• Briefer.
• Briefee.
Section I. ORDERS
This section discusses the three types of orders (FM 1-02). A WARNO is a preliminary notice of an order or
action that is to follow. A OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the
purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. A FRAGO is issued after an OPORD to change,
modify, or execute a branch or sequel to that order. WARNOs follow the five-paragraph OPORD format.
FRAGOs also follow the OPORD format, but seldom include all five paragraphs. For extensive changes, the
leader normally issues a new OPORD.
WARNING ORDER
B-1. Leaders issue WARNOs as soon as they complete their initial assessment of the situation and
available time. Leaders do not wait for more information. They issue the best WARNO possible with the
information at hand and update it as needed with additional WARNOs. The WARNO follows the
five-paragraph OPORD format (Figure B-1 (page B-3) shows an example WARNO). The WARNO
contains as much information as possible. Normally an initial WARNO includes--
• Mission or nature of the operation.
• Time and place for issuing the OPORD.
• Units or elements participating in the operation.
• Specific tasks not addressed by unit SOP.
• Time line for the operation.
B-2. The WARNO may also include--
• The higher unit's mission statement.
• Commander's intent.
• Commander's WARNO.
• Commander's operations brief or order.
• Task organization changes.
• Attachments/detachments.
• The unit AO.
• Initial intelligence requirements or CCIR. |
3-55.93 | 254 | Appendix B
• Risk guidance.
• ISR tasks and RFIs.
• Initial movement instructions.
• Security requirements.
• Security measures.
• Specific priorities.
• Movement time to planning site.
• Strength figures (for the XO and first sergeant) to support planning for movement and Class I.
• Class I planning.
• Coordination actions for communications.
• Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) DD Form 1833 TEST (V2).
• Times for--
-- For personnel and equipment attachments (communications, transportation, and medic).
-- For communication exercise.
-- For vehicle inspections and dispatches.
• Times and locations for--
-- For issue and turn-in of classified material.
-- For air-mission brief and coordination.
-- For issue of equipment.
-- For test-firing and zeroing of equipment (including night-vision devices).
-- For rehearsals (day or night, with or without equipment).
-- For distribution of ammunition.
-- For initial or final inspections.
-- For religious services.
-- For take-off and time on target. |
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Figure B-1. Example warning order. |
3-55.93 | 256 | Appendix B
Figure B-1. Example warning order (continued).
OPERATION ORDER
B-3. Figure B-2 shows the format used for operation orders. After briefing the OPORD body, the
leader issues annexes and schedules, then asks for questions. |
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Figure B-2. Example operation order. |
3-55.93 | 258 | Appendix B
Figure B-2. Example operations order (continued). |
3-55.93 | 259 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-2. Example operations order (continued). |
3-55.93 | 260 | Appendix B
FRAGMENTARY ORDER
B-4. A FRAGO provides timely changes to existing orders. A FRAGO includes only the items that
have changed since the last OPORD. The items in the FRAGO follow the five-paragraph OPORD format.
However, a significantly changed mission or a brand new mission requires a new OPORD. Figure B-3
shows an example FRAGO.
Figure B-3. Example fragmentary order.
Section II. BRIEFS
Briefs are presentations of information from one leader to another, either up or down the chain of command.
TYPES
B-5. Figure B-4 shows the types of briefs, and Table B-1 compares them based on who gives them to
whom and why, and on what elements each type must, should, or might include--
• Confirmation
• Mission Analysis
• COA Decision Brief
• Backbrief
• Initial GO/NO-GO Brief
• Mission Concept Brief
• Final GO/NO-GO Brief
• Debrief
Figure B-4. Brief types. |
3-55.93 | 261 | Orders and Briefs
Table B-1. Comparison of brief types.
Type Purpose Conditions Briefer Audience Time Elements
Con- Ensure team NA Team leader Company NLT 30 minutes • Restatement of mission (if
firmation understands commander after receipt of specified in OPORD)
OPORD (or unit rep) Company
• Restatement of commander's
before they OPORD
intent
analyze
mission • Initial issues or concerns
• Next key hard time
Mission Extract all Given a time-- Team leader Commander NLT 2 hours • Intent two levels up
Analysis critical and or an or his after receipt of
• Specified tasks
pertinent data operational representative Company
from OPORD paced- (IAW unit OPORD • Implied tasks
and conduct constrained SOP, number
detailed MPF environment-- of unit teams, • Facts about friendly, enemy,
before and and terrain, time
developing situational operational
• Assumptions about friendly,
team COAs awareness pace),
enemy, terrain, and time
or team only
• Facts that could hinder
execution
• Restatement of mission
Prepare team Commander Team leader After team • Assumed risk by phase
leader to (or rep) leader's Mission
• Criteria to evaluate (some
develop Analysis (MA)
or all)
COAs brief
• Number of COAs to develop
• Detailed instructions on
higher coordinations for
insertion and extraction
• Approval of mission
statement
COA Determine Team leader Commander • Intent of higher
Decision best possible or rep (PL,
• Restated mission
Brief COA for team PSG,
execution operations • Updated IPB (enemy
officer, or SITEMP)
1SG,
depending on • COA table or matrix with
operational criteria*
pace and
* Weighted criteria are allowed
number of
teams)
Team, if team After team • Residual risk by phase of the
leader does completes operation
not brief MA--developing
• Strengths and weaknesses of
higher; team COA and
each COA
then votes on preparing for
COA. COA decision • Team's recommendation
brief takes about
2 hrs • Issues and concerns
Commander • Commander or rep chooses
or represent- or refines COA
ative |
3-55.93 | 262 | Appendix B
Table B-1. Comparison of brief types (cont’d).
Type Purpose Conditions Briefer Audience Time Elements
Backbrief: To instill Audience Team leader Company NLT 4 hours • Initial GO/NO-GO brief
confidence in generally commander before insertion.
initial GO/ audience. understands and other • Team introductions (if
NO-GO To assure the mission guests such This gives the needed).
brief them that and knows as R&S detachment or
team under- the Squadron or company
• Orientation to facility.
stands plan presenters. BFSB commander time
thoroughly, Commander, to deliver the
and has or other VIPs. final GO/NO-GO • Announcement of who briefs
applied brief to his what topic.
contingencies higher before
and proper insertion. • Mission statement
risk mitigation
to ensure
• Commander's intent
mission
success and
team • Concept of the operation
preservation. (insertion, infiltration,
execution, fires, exfiltration,
abort criteria, extraction info,
and EPA)
• Risk mitigation (by phase)
• Team's recommendation
(issues and GO/NO-GO)
• Commander's decision
(GO/NO-GO)
Mission To obtain a Company or Decision NLT 2 hours • Overall recommendation
concept GO/NO-GO detachment maker prior to insertion.
• Purpose of NAI coverage
brief decision commander is normally
This gives the (BFSB S-2 ISR fusion
one of the
Final GO/ commander time element Warrant Officer)
following:
NO-GO to return to the
• Enemy situation (BFSB S-2
brief • LRSC Cdr team's location
ISR fusion element Warrant
and inform them
• R&S Officer)
of MIssion
Squadron
Concept Brief • Weather (BFBS S-2 weather
Cdr
results before team)
• BFSB Cdr insertion
• Mission statement (LRS
commander)
• Mission statement (if
applicable for aviation
commander supporting
insertion)
• Concept of the operation
(intelligence, movement and
maneuver, fire support,
protection, sustainment, C2,
risk mitigation)
• Decision (GO/NO-GO) |
3-55.93 | 263 | Orders and Briefs
Table B-1. Comparison of brief types (cont’d).
Type Purpose Conditions Briefer Audience Time Elements
Debrief To gather any Debriefer is Team NLT 4 hours • Appropriate team logs,
unreported officer from members after extraction, cameras, recorded messages
intelligence LRSU or so team can turned in
from the external collate patrol,
• Map
team, and to supporting R&S, and
create an agency communication • Recorder (manual or
historical (R&S logs, and to recording device)
record of the Squadron allow debriefing
mission S-2 or BFSB while information • Communications
ISR fusion might still remain representative
element fresh in the
• Debriefer in charge
member) minds of team
members
CONFIRMATION BRIEF
B-6. The leader gives a confirmation brief to ensure that he understands the company OPORD and to
focus the team's mission planning in the right direction. The confirmation brief should occur NLT 30
minutes after receipt of the OPORD. The confirmation brief should include three elements:
• Restated mission (team's mission statement).
• Restated commander's intent.
• Initial issues or concerns.
MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEF
B-7. Figure B-5 through Figure B-9 (this page through B-15) show example formats for mission
analysis worksheets. |
3-55.93 | 264 | Appendix B
Figure B-5. Analysis of mission, intent, and priority intelligence requirements. |
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Figure B-6. Analysis of specified and implied tasks. |
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Figure B-7. Analysis of facts. |
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Figure B-8. Analysis of assumptions. |
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Figure B-9. Analysis of mission roadblocks, issues, and restated mission. |
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DECISION BRIEF
B-8. The decision brief occurs after the team has completed its initial mission planning. Team members
present possible courses of action (COAs) and the criteria for evaluating each. The team leader chooses
one COA, explains why he chose it, and then presents all of the COAs to the commander. The commander
can approve the selected COA or provide additional guidance to the team leader for continued COA
development. The decision brief should include these six elements:
• Restated mission (the team's mission statement).
• Restated commander's intent.
• Two to three courses of action on the objective.
• The team's recommended COA.
• Limitations and constraints.
• Any issues or concerns.
BACKBRIEF
B-9. A backbrief is an informal transfer of information to one or more leaders, usually the commander
and his guests, about the impending and completed missions, respectively. The amount of information
briefed is usually set by SOP. All present should understand the mission before they arrive. The purpose of
the backbrief is only to demonstrate that the team understands the plan thoroughly and has applied
contingencies and proper risk mitigation procedures to ensure mission success and team preservation.
Figure B-10 shows an example backbrief format, with explanations. |
3-55.93 | 270 | Appendix B
Figure B-10. Example backbrief. |
3-55.93 | 271 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-10. Example backbrief (continued). |
3-55.93 | 272 | Appendix B
Figure B-10. Example backbrief (continued).
MISSION CONCEPT BRIEF
B-10. Generally 2 to 12 hours before the planned insertion time, the company commander briefs the
appropriate decision makers on the mission concept to obtain a final "GO" or "NO GO" on the mission.
This gives the commander time to conduct movement back to the team to inform them of the decision and
any modified guidance before the planned insert time. The decision maker is normally the R&S squadron
or BFSB commander. The mission concept brief includes the following elements, and an example brief is
shown in Figure B-11 through Figure B-38 (this page through page B-33).
• Overall recommendation.
• Purpose of NAI coverage (S-2 or ISR fusion element chief).
• Enemy situation (S-2).
• Weather (Air Force battlefield weather team).
• Mission statement (LRS commander). |
3-55.93 | 273 | Orders and Briefs
• Mission statement (if applicable for the aviation commander supporting the insertion).
• Concept of the operation (intelligence, movement and maneuver, fire support, protection,
sustainment, C2, risk mitigation).
• Request for decision (GO or NO GO).
Figure B-11. Slide 1, LRSC mission concept brief.
Figure B-12. Slide 2, statement of purpose. |
3-55.93 | 274 | Appendix B
Figure B-13. Slide 3, LRSC insertion conditions check.
Figure B-14. Slide 4, agenda. |
3-55.93 | 275 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-15. Slide 5, recommendation.
Figure B-16. Slide 6, ISR fusion element. |
3-55.93 | 276 | Appendix B
Figure B-17. Slide 7, S-2/ISR fusion element.
Figure B-18. Slide 8, ATO slide. |
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Figure B-19. Slide 9, team insertion and extraction.
Figure B-20. Slide 10, LRSC insertion conditions check. |
3-55.93 | 278 | Appendix B
Figure B-21. Slide 11, movement and maneuver.
Figure B-22. Slide 12, fire support. |
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Figure B-23. Slide 13, air protection.
Figure B-24. Slide 14, sustainment. |
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Figure B-25. Slide 15, command and control.
Figure B-26. Slide 16, intelligence. |
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Figure B-27. Slide 17, LRSC.
Figure B-28. Slide 18, "Do we know what to look for?" |
3-55.93 | 282 | Appendix B
Figure B-29. Slide 19, LRSC IPB.
Figure B-30. Slide 20, LRSC maneuver. |
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Figure B-31. Slide 21, LRSC fire support.
Figure B-32. Slide 22, LRSC sustainment. |
3-55.93 | 284 | Appendix B
Figure B-33. Slide 23, LRSC C2.
Figure B-34. Slide 24, LRSC C2, communications. |
3-55.93 | 285 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-35. Slide 25, LRSC abort criteria.
Figure B-36. Slide 26, LRSC risk mitigation. |
3-55.93 | 286 | Appendix B
Figure B-37. Slide 27, LRSC recommendation.
Figure B-38. Slide 28, commander's decision.
DEBRIEF
B-11. The commander, his representative, or someone from the S-2 interviews, or debriefs, the team to
obtain information about the mission. A debrief is usually conducted just after the mission is over by the
commander, his representative, or by someone from the S-2. Figure B-39 shows an example debrief, and
Figure B-40 through Figure B-45, pages B-36 through B-48, show example annexes to the same debrief. |
3-55.93 | 287 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-39. Example debrief. |
3-55.93 | 288 | Appendix B
Figure B-39. Example debrief (continued). |
3-55.93 | 289 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-39. Example debrief (continued). |
3-55.93 | 290 | Appendix B
Figure B-39. Example debrief (continued). |
3-55.93 | 291 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-39. Example debrief (continued). |
3-55.93 | 292 | Appendix B
Figure B-40. Example intelligence estimate annex. |
3-55.93 | 293 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-40. Example intelligence estimate annex (continued). |
3-55.93 | 294 | Appendix B
Figure B-41. Example communications annex. |
3-55.93 | 295 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-42. Example fire support annex. |
3-55.93 | 296 | Appendix B
Figure B-43. Example linkup annex. |
3-55.93 | 297 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-44. Example vehicle movement annex. |
3-55.93 | 298 | Appendix B
Figure B-44. Example vehicle movement annex (continued). |
3-55.93 | 299 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-45. Example air infiltration/exfiltration annex. |
3-55.93 | 300 | Appendix B
Figure B-45. Example air infiltration/exfiltration annex (continued). |
3-55.93 | 301 | Orders and Briefs
Figure B-45. Example air infiltration/exfiltration annex (continued). |
3-55.93 | 303 | Appendix C
Planning Area Facilities and Sites
The goal of planning with limited access is to allow LRS teams an environment
without distractions and a reduced risk of mission compromise. Facilities include
fixed sites (best) or field sites.
FACILITIES
C-1. Each LRSU benefits by having access to a secure planning facility. Ideally the facility should
enough space available to allow planning by the required number of teams to support operations. The
location and type of facility used depends on availability, security, and deployment requirements--detailed
planning is the same, regardless. Once the planning facility is established, the teams conduct detailed
mission planning. Access to the team is limited to such individuals as the team LNO, company commander,
BFSB and R&S squadron S-2 and others on the access roster. If available, the team rehearses in a secured
area nearby ideally on terrain similar to the area where they will operate.
FIXED SITE
C-2. When available, the unit conducts detailed planning at a fixed site on its home installation.
The next best option is to use a remote fixed site. The site should offer separate sleeping and planning areas
(Figure C-1).
SLEEPING AREAS
C-3. Each sleeping area has electricity, heating, air conditioning (if possible), cots and showers.
PLANNING AREAS
C-4. Each planning area should be large enough for a LRS team to plan the mission (Figure C-2). It
should have a place where the team can post all mission-essential information, a sand table, separate bins
for classified and unclassified trash, RFI logs, a time schedule, and an access roster.
COMBINED PLANNING AND SLEEPING AREAS
C-5. Due to any number of constraints, the team must be able to adapt to limited space, and be ready to
live in the planning area.
FIELD SITE
C-6. If no fixed site is available, or if the deployment plan dictates, the unit can conduct detailed
planning at a field site such as an aircraft hanger, a boat(s), or a tent(s) (Figure C-3). Everyone at the
planning site may be subject to the same restrictions and limitations--leaders, teams, and supporting
personnel. Each team needs--
• Separate field tents for planning and sleeping.
• Electrical source.
• Latrines.
• Passive and active security measures such as wire obstacles or guards.
• Site maintenance support.
• Communications with the LRSC operations section and with the rehearsal area.
• Planning aids. |
3-55.93 | 304 | Appendix C
Figure C-1. Example fixed site for planning. |
3-55.93 | 305 | Planning Area Facilities and Sites
Figure C-2. Example planning area. |
3-55.93 | 306 | Appendix C
Figure C-3. Use of intermediate staging area for planning. |
3-55.93 | 307 | Appendix D
Geographic Environments
Teams are greatly affected by extreme climates and terrain such as jungles, deserts,
mountains, extremely cold areas, and urban areas. Field manuals describe conditions
and operational techniques for each. Extreme temperatures, humidity, and elevations
also affect the lift capability of transporting aircraft.
JUNGLE OPERATIONS
D-1. Dense jungle restricts ground and air observation as well as electronic surveillance. None of these
observation methods work well for collecting information on a dismounted surveillance target. Such a
target leaves little evidence that it has passed. LRS teams have the dismounted skills, stealth, and
communications needed to collect battlefield information under such conditions. (FM 90-5 provides more
information on jungle operations.)
INFILTRATION
D-2. Dismounted, helicopter, and small boat insertion work well in jungle terrain. The limited
availability of LZs could require the team to insert by rappelling or FRIES. Careful coordination with
adjacent or friendly forward units is necessary for foot or boat movements to prevent fratricide.
EXFILTRATION
D-3. Teams may be recovered by all available means, but communication and coordination are key
when operating in a jungle environment. Dismounted exfiltration routes must be coordinated before the
teams use them. Linkup operations with friendly forces require careful and deliberate coordination to the
lowest element possible (company or platoon). The SPIES is ideally suited for extraction of a team from
dense vegetation.
COMMUNICATIONS
D-4. Dense vegetation, high humidity, and frequent rainfall make HF communications difficult. The
vegetation affects radio ranges and makes setting up antennas more difficult. Also, radio components
experience higher failure rates in wet environments. UHF TACSAT is best when there are holes in
the canopy.
DESERT OPERATIONS
D-5. To survive in the desert, LRS teams must approach each task systematically so that it becomes a
habit. Weather and terrain are the main enemies in any military operation. However, in the desert, these
threats greatly increase (FM 90-3).
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
D-6. Leaders must consider the following in planning LRS operations in a desert environment:
Batteries
D-7. Teams must test all batteries with a battery tester. The heat reduces battery life by one-third.
Teams must not leave batteries on the ground. The sand and other elements will cause a rapid drain of
power.
Water
D-8. Teams can conduct operations for only a few days without a resupply or cache of water. During
the 24 hours before insertion, each Soldier must ensure he is fully hydrated. Each Soldier should carry a
minimum of 11 quarts of water, which is how much water he must drink each day when moving. This is
three 2-quart canteens plus one 5-quart bladder. Even when not moving, a Soldier in a desert environment
requires 7 quarts of water a day. |
3-55.93 | 308 | Appendix D
Insertion
D-9. When inserting by helicopter, the team should consider using LZs that may provide a lower dust
signature such as a salt marsh or other hard-packed area. The distance from the LZ to the hide or
surveillance site must be carefully considered. Water consumption is a prime consideration.
Movement
D-10. Teams average 1 kmph/day and 3 kmph/night dismounted. They should use GPSs, because terrain
features may be few or shifting, and maps inaccurate. Walking on rocks and shale can help prevent the
enemy from tracking the team. Movement on wet or dark sand is generally quicker. Loose or dune sand
leaves clearer tracks and reduces movement speed.
Hide or Surveillance Site
D-11. Teams should consider locating hide and surveillance sites together due to potential extended
observation distances. Hide and surveillance sites can be camouflaged with a variety of materials including
the diamond desert net, burlap or bed sheets (color matched) pulled tight over a frame.
• Surveil from a point higher than the NAI; afternoon heat (between about 1100 and 1600 hours)
obscures optics at ground level due to the mirage effect, among other things. This makes
vehicles difficult to identify beyond 2 to 3 kms.
• To identify vehicles at night, consider moving the surveillance site to within 1 to 2 km of
the objective or NAI.
• When constructing subsurface hides, dig them in sandy soil. To prevent sides from caving in,
shore them up.
MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS
D-12. Irregular mountain topography normally provides good cover and concealment. Observation
varies depending on trees and scrub growth. Surveillance sites near ridges and peaks often provide broad
areas of observation. Helicopter movement of teams is often limited by altitude capability, erratic wind
conditions, and the lack of landing sites. Communications are generally difficult; relay stations might be
needed for communication between the teams and base stations (FM 3-97.6).
• During mountain operations, UHF TACSAT is best for primary communications, with HF as
secondary (FM 3-97.6).
• Use of mountaineering equipment is a must. Teams should also plan for scaling equipment and
other specialized gear.
• Teams must also be prepared to infiltrate by FRIES or SPIES due to rock formations.
HALO/HAHO insertion may also be considered if suitable DZs can be located.
COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS
D-13. In extreme cold, teams are hampered by the need to maintain body warmth. In deep snow, the
teams must operate on skis or snowshoes; dogsleds or skimobiles might also be required. Long-range
weather forecasts are an important planning consideration.
• Deep snow can conceal stationary surveillance sites, but increase the difficulty of orientation
and the concealment of moving teams.
• Magnetic storms, aurora effects, and ionosphere disturbances can seriously degrade radio
communications.
• Trafficability and load-bearing qualities of ice and snow crust are important planning
considerations.
• Survival is difficult in extreme winter conditions. To operate for extended periods at maximum
efficiency, the team must establish a warming area. They can use the heat from candles while in |
3-55.93 | 309 | Geographic Environments
a hide or surveillance site. Teams may require the use of extreme cold weather (ECW) sleeping
bags and tents. Goggles or dark glasses are required during operations due to the threat of
snow blindness.
• Northern summer conditions are characterized by long periods of daylight, numerous water
obstacles, and marshy areas. When aircraft or ground operations are restricted, the teams can
use boats designed to navigate northern waterways. |
3-55.93 | 311 | Appendix E
Contingency Plans
Operations seldom proceed as planned. LRSU operations are high risk conducted by
skilled and experienced Soldiers. Key to successful operations is the anticipation of
problems and opportunities that may arise. Visualizing and planning for
contingencies allow leaders to gain and maintain flexibility.
BRANCHES AND SEQUELS
E-1. A contingency plan provides for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated during the
course of an operation in a particular geographic area. Contingency plans normally take the form of
branches and sequels.
BRANCHES
E-2. A branch is a contingency plan (an option built into the basic plan) for changing the mission,
disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the current operation, based
on anticipated events, opportunities, or dispositions caused by enemy action. Branches are developed by
the LRSC, LRSD and the LRS team. For example: all three organization develop branch contingency plans
for loss of communications, the initiation of a LRS team E&R plan and the need to conduct resupply. The
LRS team will plan a branch in the case of compromise on the objective. The LRS team may also
anticipate a change of mission from surveillance to target acquisition if particular circumstances arise
during the conduct of a mission. LRS leaders must anticipate changes and plan accordingly.
SEQUELS
E-3. A sequel is an operation that follows the current operation. They are future operations that
anticipate the possible outcomes--success, failure, or stalemate--of the current operation. Sequels are
normally not planned for below the LRSC level. The LRSC is normally alerted to the need to plan sequels
for employment of LRSDs or LRS teams based on orders from the BFSB or R&S squadron.
CONTINGENCY PLAN MATRIX
E-4. A contingency matrix can help LRS leaders plan, brief, and track contingencies. Leaders can
identify events by phase, schedule planning and briefing logically or chronologically, and effectively
execute and monitor contingencies. Figure E-1, shows an example completed contingency matrix. |
3-55.93 | 312 | Appendix E
Figure E-1. Example completed contingency matrix. |
3-55.93 | 313 | Contingency Plans
Figure E-1. Example completed contingency matrix (continued). |
3-55.93 | 315 | Appendix F
Coordination for Army Aviation
This appendix provides an example OPORD (Figure F-1) and annexes for
coordinating the following:
• Army aviation fire support (Figure F-2).
• Intelligence (Figure F-3).
• Rehearsal areas (Figure F-4).
• Vehicular movement (Figure F-5). |
3-55.93 | 316 | Appendix F
Figure F-1. Example OPORD. |
3-55.93 | 317 | Coordination for Army Aviation
Figure F-1. Example OPORD (continued). |
3-55.93 | 318 | Appendix F
Figure F-2. Example fire support annex. |
3-55.93 | 319 | Coordination for Army Aviation
Figure F-3. Example intelligence annex. |
3-55.93 | 320 | Appendix F
Figure F-4. Example rehearsal area annex. |
3-55.93 | 321 | Coordination for Army Aviation
Figure F-5. Example vehicular movement coordination annex. |
3-55.93 | 323 | Appendix G
Hide and Surveillance Sites
During surveillance, which is the LRS team's primary mission, the team leader
reconnoiters, then selects positions for the surveillance and hide sites. Where to
construct the positions depends on his METT-TC analysis conducted during the
planning phase and his continued analysis once in the vicinity of the objective. The
two sites communicate by wire, VHF, or messenger.
Selected team members observe or surveil the objective from the surveillance site.
Some members rotate between the hide and surveillance sites. Others run the team's
HF or TACSAT directly from the hide site or from a separate location chosen
specifically for conducting communications.
SURFACE SITES
G-1. The enemy situation may prohibit moving to a subsurface site, so camouflage must be done
correctly during occupation of both sites and improved when circumstances allow (Figure G-1).
Figure G-1. Two-man surface site using ghillie suits.
ADVANTAGES OF SURFACE SITES
• Simple construction.
• Few materials.
• Quick setup.
• Little soil removal if any.
• Optical standoff.
• Quick escape.
DISADVANTAGES OF SURFACE SITES
• Little protection from small-arms fire.
• No protection from indirect fires or CBRN hazards.
• Risk of compromise by dogs, civilians, and enemy patrols. |
3-55.93 | 324 | Appendix G
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS FOR SURFACE SITES
• Natural vegetation.
• Ghille suits.
• Ground blinds.
• Poncho(s), waterproof.
• Yeti or camouflage net to prevent reflection.
• One 550-pound cord or bungee cords.
• Chicken wire (optional).
• Burlap or canvas cloth (optional).
CONSIDERATIONS FOR SURFACE SITES
G-2. Team members--
• Avoid cutting vegetation, use man-made or natural camouflage.
• Keep equipment packed when not in use.
• Remain in uniform and keep on load-carrying equipment.
• Maintain security around the clock.
• Construct small, easy to conceal two-man site or,
• Construct three-man site for longer stays (one rests while others surveil).
• Rotate surveillance teams just after dark and just before daylight.
• Set up communications between the hide and surveillance sites.
• Take their rucksacks to the surveillance site.
• Remain in hide site during day when conditions only allow limited visibility surveillance.
• Use nets or natural camouflage to construct all-round concealment for the surveillance site.
Ensure that site is hidden from every angle, including overhead.
• Determine the location of the hide, surveillance, and communication (if used) sites, based on
METT-TC, but especially based on terrain.
• Try to change direction when moving from the hide site to the surveillance site. For example,
move in a dogleg or fishhook, or take an indirect route.
• Never wear a ghillie suit during movement, because pieces can rip off in vegetation and leave a
trail. Instead, put the suit on just before occupying the surveillance site.
HASTY SUBSURFACE SITES
G-3. The team constructs a hasty subsurface site when they have too little time to construct a complete
subsurface site. A hasty subsurface site is especially useful in the absence of natural cover and
concealment. They plan the site so they can improve it to a full subsurface site as time and the situation
allow (Figure G-2 and Figure G-3). |
3-55.93 | 325 | Hide and Surveillance Sites
Figure G-2. Suspension line-weave site. Figure G-3. Polyvinyl chloride site.
ADVANTAGES COMPARED TO SURFACE SITE
• Lower profile.
• Better protection against small-arms and indirect fires.
• Excellent camouflage.
DISADVANTAGES COMPARED TO SURFACE SITE
• Requires more construction tools.
• Challenge of concealing removed soil.
• Greater construction time.
• More construction noise.
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS NEEDED
• Ponchos or other waterproofing material.
• Yeti or small camouflage net.
• Entrenching tool or D-handled shovels.
• One 550-pound or bungee cord.
• Sandbags.
• Polyvinyl chloride pipe with connectors.
• Fiberglass rod.
• Aluminum conduit. |
3-55.93 | 326 | Appendix G
• Plywood.
• Chicken wire (optional).
• Burlap or canvas (optional).
• Small saplings, stripped and lashed together in place of pipe or fiberglass rods.
FINISHED SUBSURFACE SITE
G-4. The team generally uses finished subsurface sites for stay-behind missions and when they
anticipate having to remain underground for extended periods of time.
LOCATION
G-5. Dig the site in a well-concealed area, away from enemy observation, and well away from any
populated areas.
CONSTRUCTION
G-6. Use any available containers, such as rucksacks, sandbags, or socks, to remove the dirt. Some of
the removed soil will later be placed on top of the site. Leftover dirt must also be camouflaged.
Overhead Cover
G-7. Overhead cover is constructed strong enough that it can be walked on.
Ingress and Egress
G-8. Construct two sets of entrances and exits, primary and secondary (emergency), and cover and
conceal each.
Size of Site
G-9. The site must accommodate the whole team. It must allow freedom of movement and have room
for separate and comfortable sleeping positions.
Materials
G-10. Materials needed depends on the design.
• Fifty 2 x 4 x 12's (2 inches by 4 inches by 12 feet boards).
• Six 4 x 4 x 6's (4 inches by 4 inches by 6 feet boards).
• Sufficient gravel to cover the floor.
• Eighteen inches of cover over entire site.
• Backhoe or Soldiers with shovels.
• Sandbags, 100 each.
• One large general-purpose tent to cover construction until complete.
ADVANTAGES OF SUBSURFACE SITES
• Little risk of compromise.
• Protection from artillery and small-arms weapons fire.
• Protection from nuclear attack.
• Excellent camouflage. |
3-55.93 | 327 | Hide and Surveillance Sites
DISADVANTAGES OF SUBSURFACE SITES
• Concealment of leftover soil away from the site.
• Construction noise.
• Construction resources (time, manpower, materials, and equipment).
USE OF EXISTING SITES
G-11. Look for and use depressions or predug holes, such as former fighting positions, and improve
them as the situation allows. During heavy rains, do not use streams and waterways as they could flood.
CONCEALMENT
G-12. To conceal the site, use yeti nets, man-made and natural camouflage, or chicken wire.
COVER
G-13. Build a barricade to provide shelter.
STOCKAGE
G-14. Stock it with rations, water, ammunitions, batteries, and so on, and arrange equipment, such as
rucksacks and communications equipment, so it can be grabbed in an emergency.
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
G-15. Have an SOP for exiting the site. If the team conducts surveillance from the site, then how the
team leaves the site depends on the location of the enemy objective (Figure G-4). The team should also
prepare a deception plan to cover exiting by the secondary (emergency) exit, in case the enemy finds the
primary entrance. |
3-55.93 | 328 | Appendix G
Figure G-4. Example subsurface site.
WASTE MANAGEMENT
G-16. Use a portable camping toilet or line an MRE box with a trash bag. Cover waste odor with lime
(best) or baking soda. Remove the waste in zipper storage bags, leftover MRE bags, or any other type of
sealable container.
PERSONAL EQUIPMENT
G-17. Disassemble shovels and carry them in rucksacks, and leave on load-carrying equipment. |
3-55.93 | 329 | Hide and Surveillance Sites
SITE SELECTION
G-18. When selecting a site, the leader should--
• Consider LOS to target.
• Ensure the site is in range of available observation equipment so that it can meet the reporting
requirements.
• Ensure the site has adequate overhead cover and concealment.
• Ensure the site is located away from natural lines of drift, roads, trails, railroad tracks, and
major waterways.
• Ensure the site is defendable for at least a short time.
• Ensure the site has primary and secondary (emergency or alternate) hasty exits.
• Ensure the site has a concealed and serviceable entrance, and that Soldiers make little noise
getting in and out of the hide site.
• Ensure the site works within the factors of METT-TC relative to other site positions (hide,
surveillance, and communication).
• Ensure the site is located well away from any man-made objects.
• Ensure the site is located downwind of inhabited areas.
• Ensure the site uses, but is not dominated by, high ground.
LEADER RECONNAISSANCE
G-19. The team leader selects tentative sites during the planning phase. He physically reconnoiters (in a
stay-behind); observes from aircraft; studies photographs, line-of-site data, soil and drainage data, or
conducts a map reconnaissance. At a minimum, he selects primary and alternate hide and surveillance sites
(thus, four sites in all). Before the team occupies the sites, the team leader physically reconnoiters the
tentative sites chosen during planning. If necessary, he moves the site to a better location.
OCCUPATION OF HIDE SITE
G-20. The leader can occupy the hide site by any of several methods:
FISHHOOK OR DOG-LEG METHOD
G-21. The team occupies the hide site off the direction of march (Figure G-5). |
3-55.93 | 330 | Appendix G
Figure G-5. Fishhook and dog-leg methods.
OCCUPATION BY FORCE
G-22. The team only occupies a hide site by force if it must, such as when time is a major limiting
factor. In such a case, the team leader reconnoiters and the team moves directly into the tentative site
(Figure G-6).
Figure G-6. Forcible occupation of site. |
3-55.93 | 331 | Hide and Surveillance Sites
ACTIONS IN HIDE SITE
G-23. The team maintains security at all times. Soldiers are positioned either back-to-back or
feet-to-feet, using all-round security.
• The team waits 15 minutes before moving or unpacking equipment--a listening halt. They do
not lean against small trees or vegetation. They place Claymores at least in the four cardinal
directions.
• If communication is to be conducted from the hide site, they construct the antenna before
daylight. They only raise it off the ground once they are ready to establish communication.
• Wear their load-carrying equipment at all times and camouflage all around the position.
• The best time to rotate teams is at dusk and dawn. The surveillance team takes their rucksacks
or assault packs. The team rests during the day.
PRIORITY OF WORK
G-24. Except for security, work priorities vary based on METT-TC. The team has security, alert, guard
and rest, evacuation, rendezvous, scheduling, maintenance, hygiene, and meal plans.
• Conduct stand-to starting before first light and continue until after full light. Conduct stand-to
again starting before dark and continue until after dark. Vary start times to avoid patterns.
Conduct stand-to at anytime a heightened level of enemy activity is expected.
• Maintain equipment, radios, weapons, and camouflage.
• Perform personal hygiene and preventive medicine. Conduct isometric exercises.
SITE STERILIZATION
G-25. Before departing hide and surveillance locations, team members must ensure sites and routes have
been sterilized.
• Carry out all foreign debris.
If possible, avoid burying waste and trash. Animals will uncover it and expose it to enemy
patrols. If it must be buried, enclose it in sealed containers or cover the scent with CS or lime,
then bury it at least 18 inches deep.
• Sterilize the sites with displaced earth. Bury the overhead materials in the site itself.
• Camouflages the area by blending the site with local surroundings.
• As team members withdraw from the site, ensure routes are camouflaged to prevent detection. |
3-55.93 | 333 | Appendix H
Battle Drills
A battle drill is a collective action executed by a platoon or smaller element without
the application of a deliberate decision making process. Well-rehearsed battle drills
are critical to the success of a LRS team. LRS teams are lightly armed, with limited
amounts of ammunition, and normally have no immediately available fire support.
Teams only have resources for basic life-saving first aid in the event of casualties. A
LRS team might only get one chance to defeat or disengage from an enemy force.
Therefore, it is critical all team members respond instantly and instinctively when in
contact. The team must rehearse battle drills thoroughly before actual enemy contact
is made. LRS team battle drills are a supplement to ARTEP 7-1-DRILL.
BREAK CONTACT
H-1. A team should break contact as soon it can, since it lacks the capability to stay and fight. The team
fires and maneuvers in two- or three-Soldier groups. Team members can use fragmentation or smoke
grenades to cover their withdrawal, continuing until they successfully break contact. Doing so could
require repeated bounds. After breaking contact, the team consolidates at a rendezvous or rally point and
reorganizes.
PRINCIPLES
H-2. General principles for breaking contact include--
• Maintaining a high initial volume of fire to kill or suppress the enemy.
• Using smoke to screen movement. Hexachloroethane (HC)smoke is best, but white
phosphorous (if available) kills, wounds, and screens.
• Dually priming Claymores (one command-detonated fuse or one timed fuse from 45 seconds to
2 minutes) and preparing them for immediate deployment. This can be integrated into a
rucksack destruction plan.
• Rehearsing "man down" (wounded) actions.
• Rehearsing “RTO down” vital communication retrieval actions.
H-3. Following the successful execution of the break contact battle drill, the team leader uses
METT-TC to determine the next action of the team.
INITIAL CONTACT
H-4. When the team makes initial contact, all team members seek cover and concealment. Each Soldier
makes every attempt to avoid masking the fires of other team members. The lead element (first, second,
and third Soldiers), deploy and take cover within a few steps of their original locations, and lay down a
base of fire. The trail element (fourth, fifth, and sixth Soldiers) deploy at the assistant team leader's
command. He calls left or right, depending on the direction of enemy contact and the location of the lead
element. The team deploys roughly on line, and starts firing. This lead element then bounds back
(Figure H-1 and Figure H-2). |
3-55.93 | 334 | Appendix H
Figure H-1. Break contact front (diamond or file). |
3-55.93 | 335 | Battle Drills
Figure H-2. Break contact front, left and right (Australian peel).
FIRST BOUND
H-5. The lead element (first, second, and third Soldiers) bound back first, followed by the trail element.
The elements can alternate bounds to keep the enemy guessing.
SMOKE
H-6. The elements throw smoke on all bounds.
RELOADING OF MAGAZINES
H-7. Everyone changes their magazines on the move. |
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