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3-55.93 | 26 | Chapter 1
of battle (OB), and practiced skill in identifying equipment to successfully execute missions.
• Team members depend on the use of stealth, cover, concealment, and their Infantry and
Ranger skills to remain undetected.
• Team equipment and supplies include only what the team can man-pack or cache, if
dismounted.
CAPABILITIES
1-40. Modular force LRSCs are fully self-mobile once deployed to the AO. The LRSC is not a modular
unit but can deploy detachments as independent units if provided additional support. LRSC and LRSD can
do the following:
• Establish long-range digital communications using HF or UHF radio systems.
• Transmit both voice and data.
• Use planned or emergency resupply drops.
1-41. LRS teams have additional capabilities:
• Collect and transmit near-real-time digital imagery.
• Operate in inclement weather and over difficult terrain.
• Evade.
• Use special equipment cache sites emplaced by the LRSU or other friendly forces.
• Use captured supplies and equipment.
• Demonstrate the “art of camouflage” by—
—Blending in with units and formations who have already established a presence.
—Using clandestine cameras and sensors.
—Shadowing blinds and false walls.
• Stay behind or infiltrate over land (dismounted or mounted), over water (small boat and
underwater), or by air (rotary wing, static line parachute, or MFF).
• Exfiltrate over land, water, or air; or link up with advancing friendly forces.
• Operate with the use of organic ground mobility assets and, if resupply is available, conduct
extended range and duration reconnaissance missions.
• Conduct dismounted operations for up to seven days with little or no external direction and
support.
• Conduct operations in all types of terrain and environments.
LIMITATIONS
1-42. LRSU have the following limitations:
• Neither the LRSC nor the LRSD are modular. Both require additional support in the areas of
medical, fires, communications, rigging, logistics, intelligence, and operations planning in
order to provide a full range of operational capability.
• They lack organic medical capability. The LRSC depends on attached medics from the R&S
squadron or on individual first aid. Ideally, LRS team members are certified emergency
medical technicians (EMTs). At a minimum, each team member must be a qualified combat
lifesaver (CLS).
• They are lightly armed and have limited self-defense capabilities. |
3-55.93 | 27 | Full-Spectrum Operations
• They require the support from the R&S squadron, BFSB S-2 and S-3, or division or corps staffs
and units. This support includes—
—Intelligence products.
—Integrated area communications.
—Access to a common-user telephone system.
—Frequency management.
—Satellite communications channel access.
—Packing, rigging, and loading supplies.
—Equipment for aerial resupply and parachute insertions.
—Air transport to the area of operations.
—Maintenance, supply, mess, administration, finance, personnel, and chaplain services.
• The tactical situation, equipment limitations, or enemy electronic surveillance or jamming may
prevent LRS teams from maintaining continuous communications with the controlling
headquarters. |
3-55.93 | 28 | Chapter 1
Example LRSU Operational Employment--ISR Task Force
Operational areas can be assigned, or remain unassigned, and thus the responsibility of the higher
headquarters such as the division or corps. When the higher headquarters leaves areas unassigned, that
portion of the AO requires a level of situational understanding (SU) sufficient to detect and classify threats.
During past operations, an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) task force, successfully
provided SU to the division or corps headquarters in an unassigned AO (Figure 1-2).
Figure 1-2. Concept of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
A key enabler of future warfighting concepts is enhanced situational awareness (SA) that leads to actionable
SU. This is achieved by fusing information obtained through a layered network of Soldiers, sensors, and
collection platforms with information on friendly forces, enemy forces, and the environment to obtain a common
operational picture that is shared across the force. The ISR task force integrated multiple intelligence-gathering
systems and provided information about the enemy or potential enemy to the decision maker.
The most successful use of the ISR Task Force concept and organization has occurred during stability
operations, due to the relative freedom of movement available to both friendly and enemy forces. The enemy
force often hides among the population, making them difficult to track and target. The ISR Task Force
integrated many sources to create actionable intelligence.
LRSU have typically been integrated into the ISR Task Force to provide combat information through persistent
surveillance on named areas of interest (NAIs) or targets. In addition to providing combat information, the
LRSU clandestinely emplaced, monitored, and recovered sensors for other units attached to the ISR Task
Force. The LRSU also acquired targets for artillery and close air support (CAS), and interdicted targets as part
of (sniper) operations against selected targets.
The BFSB is similar to an ISR Task Force in that it is organized to integrate intelligence, R&S and other
combat units to provide immediate response to actionable intelligence. The BFBS headquarters element is
sufficiently robust that it can accept attachment of combat forces. |
3-55.93 | 29 | Chapter 2
Command and Control
This chapter describes how LRSU use Infantry and Ranger skills, communications
operators, and intelligence personnel to collect and report battlefield information.
LRSU operations depend on effective command and control (Section I) and
communications, computers, and intelligence (Section II).
Section I. OVERVIEW
Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform C2 functions through a
C2 system (FM 6-0). The LRSU C2 system is structured for rapid deployment, and for collecting and reporting
information. This section discusses the LRSU internal C2 system and the functions and organizations that
provide mission taskings and support. It also discusses—
• Standard and nonstandard command and control.
• BFSB sections.
• R&S squadron.
• Command posts.
• Tactical operations centers (TOCs).
• Task organizations outside named areas of interest.
• Liaisons.
STANDARD LRSU COMMAND AND CONTROL
2-1. The LRSU commander receives missions in the tradition manner of mission-type orders. Based on
these orders, he assesses the situation, makes decisions, and directs actions like any other commander.
However, he employs individual LRS teams IAW separate mission taskings that specify areas, objectives,
or people to observe. LRSU can have multiple subunits spread out over hundreds of kilometers
simultaneously planning, conducting, and recovering from operations. To C2 these operations, the
commander depends on a robust communications system, detailed and well practiced SOPs, and subunit
leaders who are highly skilled in all aspects of R&S.
SUPPORT
2-2. Support to LRS teams includes intelligence, operations, communications, and sustainment:
Intelligence Support includes target information and IPB products.
Operations Support includes planning, coordinating and developing mission planning folders
(MPF), infiltration, exfiltration and fire support.
Communications Support includes frequency planning and positioning communications sites.
Sustainment Support includes planning facility, mess, medical, maintenance, and
general supplies.
COMPANY
2-3. The LRSC depends on the BFSB staff, the R&S squadron, and the BSC for most intelligence,
operations, and sustainment support. The LRSC deploys to an operational area as part of the BFSB. The
BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element produces target information and IPB products. If the LRSC deploys as an
attached element to a corps, division, JTF, or multinational headquarters without the BFSB, then the |
3-55.93 | 30 | Chapter 2
G-2/J-2 and G-3/J-3 must perform these critical functions, along with all other operations and
sustainment support.
DETACHMENT
2-4. A LRSD deploys to an operational area as part of a larger unit, normally the LRSC, because it
lacks the ability to plan and execute missions, or to sustain itself. A LRSD can be attached or OPCON to
almost any type of larger unit, and can be doctrinally employed, if the unit provides intelligence, planning,
insertion, extraction, and sustainment support.
BFSB STAFF
2-5. The BFSB has three staff sections, which the LRSU primarily interacts with and depends on for
planning and support: S-2, S-3 and the S-4.
S-2 SECTION
2-6. The BFSB S-2 section coordinates IPB for staff planning, decision making, and targeting. They
support the commander's and staff’s planning portion of the military decision-making process (MDMP).
To answer the commanders’ priority intelligence requirement (PIR) and other intelligence requirements,
the S-2 section processes and analyzes all information it collects, and then produces and disseminates
timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence. The S-2 also monitors the current threat situation and any
environmental factors that might influence friendly or enemy courses of action. The following elements in
the BFSB S-2 each provide specific products and services in support of LRS operations:
ISR Fusion Element
2-7. The BFSB ISR fusion element conducts all-source analysis and integrates (fuses) current
intelligence. Working under the supervision of the S-2, the ISR fusion element develops and maintains an
intelligence database consisting of all unprocessed information and other intelligence products. The ISR
fusion element keeps the commander and staff situationally aware, and provides intelligence to exploit
enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
Functions
2-8. The ISR fusion element—
• Produces the IPB and mission support products.
• Develops intelligence estimates.
• Analyzes the battlefield area.
• Develops situational and targeting data to support maneuver and fires.
• Prepares combat assessments.
Products
2-9. The ISR fusion element produces—
• Target information as part of the LRS team MPF.
• Country studies.
• Imagery.
• Threat data (objective, capabilities, composition, and disposition).
• Threat templates.
• Situational templates.
• Event templates.
• Modified combined obstacle overlays (MCOO) in coordination with the geospatial information
and services (GI&S) section.
• Environmental data, for example, edible plants and indigenous animals.
• Solar and lunar data in coordination with the combat weather team. |
3-55.93 | 31 | Command and Control
Geospatial Information and Services Section
2-10. The GI&S section supports the commander and staff with required geospatial information and
maintains databases up-to-date to support the unit with terrain and weather effects products and analysis.
Functions
2-11. The GI&S section—
• Provides a terrain visualization mission folder to determine the terrain's effect on both friendly
and enemy operations.
• Produces maps and terrain products.
• Helps the ISR fusion element prepare the IPB.
Products
2-12. The GI&S section produces—
• Hydrology overlays.
• Cover and concealment overlays.
• Soil composition overlays.
• Vegetation composition overlays.
• Obstacle overlays.
• Combined obstacle overlays.
• Special maps.
USAF Combat Weather Team
2-13. The USAF combat weather team provides weather forecasting support for organic and attached
units of the BFSB. They can also provide weather effects analysis as it pertains to military operations. This
greatly enhances the ability of the BFSB to conduct collection of information to support the commander.
Functions
2-14. The USAF combat weather team—
• Advises the task force commander on Air Force weather capabilities, support limitations, and
how weather information can enhance combat operations.
• Evaluates and disseminates weather data such as—
— Forecasts.
— Warnings.
— Advisories.
• Monitors the overall weather support mission for the commander.
• Serves as the commander's agent, identifying and resolving weather-support responsibilities.
• Determines weather-support data requirements.
• Advises the Air Force on the operational weather-support requirements of the supported Army
command.
• Participates in targeting meetings.
• Prepares climatological studies, and analyzes them in support of planned exercises, operations,
and commitments. |
3-55.93 | 32 | Chapter 2
• Coordinates weather support to subordinate units.
• Helps Army aircraft accident-investigation boards.
Products
2-15. USAF combat weather team produces—
• Weather forecasts.
• Climatological data.
• Solar, lunar, and darkness data.
• Weather effects on friendly and enemy operations and equipment.
BFSB S-3 SECTION
2-16. The following elements in the BFSB S-3 section each provide specific products and services in
support of LRS operations:
S-3, Operations
2-17. The S-3 manages training, operations, plans, force development, and modernization. The BFSB
S-3 section prepares and distributes orders to subordinate units. Normally it does not give specific orders to
the LRSC. The BFSB commander gives mission type orders to the R&S squadron. The R&S squadron then
conducts the MDMP and gives mission type orders to the LRSC. However, the BFSB S-3 section does
assist in the LRSC in mission planning and execution for individual LRS team employment.
2-18. The S-3—
• Supervises the tactical command post (TACCP) when deployed.
• Develops courses of action.
• Prepares, coordinates, and disseminates standing operating procedures, orders, and directives
(with other staff sections’ input).
• Synchronizes all operations, to include reviewing and coordinating subordinate plans and
actions.
• Coordinates with other brigades to place BFSB assets within their AOs as necessary.
• Requests and coordinates external assets for the R&S squadron’s insertion and extraction of
ground elements.
• Requests and coordinates joint personnel recovery assets as required.
• Coordinates and directs terrain and airspace management.
• Coordinates extended range multipurpose UAS support from the combat aviation brigade.
• Recommends priorities for allocating command resources and support.
• Directly assists the commander in controlling preparation for and execution of operations.
• Coordinates staff planning, execution, and supervision of information operations.
• Plans and coordinates stability operations.
• Conducts BFSB collection operations.
• Performs terrain management within the BFSB AO, when assigned.
• Supports sensitive site exploitation.
• Integrates risk management into operational planning. |
3-55.93 | 33 | Command and Control
2-19. The S-3 staff—
• Plans, executes, and supervises OPSEC.
• Conducts civil-military operations.
• Conducts BFSB collection operations.
• Performs terrain management within the BFSB AO, when assigned.
• Supervises the actions of the following special staff officers that have LRSU coordination and
support responsibilities:
— Air defense and airspace management/brigade aviation element (ADAM/BAE).
— Air Force tactical air control party attached to the BFSB.
— Fires cell.
Air Defense and Airspace Management/Brigade Aviation Element
2-20. The ADAM/BAE—
• Evaluates any air threat to BFSB operations.
• Analyzes aerial threat factors bearing on the OE.
• Analyzes the effects of weather and terrain on air operations.
• Determines threat aerial courses of action.
• Develops an air and missile defense (AMD) concept of support for each course of action
(COA), wargames the AMD concept of support, and compares courses of action.
• Maintains the AMD running estimate.
• Prepares the AMD annex.
• Synchronizes AMD operations.
• Plans and coordinates airspace command and control, and deconflicts airspace.
• Integrates aviation into BFSB sustaining operations, such as medical evacuation and aerial
resupply.
• Represents aviation during the MDMP and other planning processes such as IPB, ISR
synchronization, and targeting.
• Maintains the aerial portion of the common operational picture.
• Assists the fires element to analyze airspace control orders and air tasking orders.
• Coordinates directly with the aviation brigade or the supporting aviation task force for detailed
air mission planning.
Air Force Tactical Air Control Party
2-21. The TACP is the aligned US Air Force element that coordinates tactical air assets and operations
such as CAS, air interdiction, joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD), reconnaissance, and
airlift. Specifically, the TACP—
• Advises the commander and staff on the employment of tactical air (TACAIR).
• Operates and maintains Air Force TACAIR direction radio net and air request net.
• Transmits requests for immediate close air and reconnaissance support.
• Transmits advance notification of impending immediate airlift requirements. |
3-55.93 | 34 | Chapter 2
• Coordinates tactical air support missions with the fire-support element and the appropriate
Army airspace command and control (AC2) element.
• Recommends intelligence requirements to the S-2 through the S-3.
• Plans the simultaneous employment of air and surface fires.
• Supervises forward air controllers (FACs).
• Integrates air-support sorties with the BFSB's scheme of maneuver.
• Participates in targeting meetings.
• Serves as a member of the targeting cell.
• In the absence of a FAC, assists the fire support officer (FSO) in directing air strikes.
• Provides Air Force input into the AC2.
Fires Cell
2-22. The FC—
• Develops and recommends surface targets to attack.
• Employs fires to influence the will of and to destroy, neutralize, or suppress enemy forces.
• Plans, coordinates, disseminates, and maintains fire support coordination measures.
• Plans and requests CAS.
• Coordinates clearance of fires.
• Plans the employment of nonlethal fires.
• Synchronizes fires within the BFSB AO.
BFSB S-4 SECTION
2-23. The S-4 is responsible for planning brigade sustainment. The S-4 is the link between the BFSB’s
organic BSC and the theater support command for coordinating logistics support. Specific to LRSU
operations, the S-4 is responsible for coordinating riggers in support of Airborne (static line, MFF and
resupply) operations.
RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE SQUADRON
2-24. The R&S squadron is a multifunctional unit designed to collect and report information that
answers the BFBS commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and other information
requirements (IR) using manned ground assets and small UAS. It can also acquire targets and, on a limited
basis, interdict targets. The squadron has a headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT), one LRSC, and
two mounted ground reconnaissance troops. It has long-range communications that allow it to operate
dispersed and communicate throughout the division AO. The R&S squadron is designed to simultaneously
employ the LRSC and the reconnaissance troops dispersed within the higher unit's AO. Except for its
organic medical platoon, the R&S squadron depends on the BSC for all of its logistical support.
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP
2-25. The R&S squadron HHT has organic elements specifically designed to support the employment of
the LRSC: medics, forward observers (FOs), and the insertion and extraction section organic to the S-3
section. These Soldiers are distinguished by special qualifications identifiers and additional skill identifiers
(SQIs and ASIs) in the R&S squadron headquarters and headquarters troop's TOE.
2-26. The combat medic section of the medical platoon has six Soldiers identified for direct support
(DS) to the LRSC: the staff sergeant section NCO and five specialist medics. Each of these Soldiers is
Airborne and special operations combat medic qualified, so they can support LRS team missions. |
3-55.93 | 35 | Command and Control
2-27. Within the fire support platoon, two fire support staff sergeants, and two sergeant FOs are
Airborne and Ranger qualified. This gives them the basic skills needed to participate in LRS team missions
when target acquisition is required.
2-28. The insertion and extraction section helps plan and execute infiltration and exfiltration of LRS
teams, and provides general planning support for the LRSC and ground reconnaissance troops. The section
has five Soldiers: a Captain assistant operations officer, a sergeant first class assistant operations NCO, a
staff sergeant assistant operations NCO, and two specialist vehicle drivers. The Captain must be Airborne,
Ranger, and Pathfinder-qualified. The assistant operations NCOs are Airborne, Ranger, Pathfinder, and
underwater military diver-qualified. The section--
• Helps plan, coordinate, and develop MPFs.
• Keeps a list, overlays of, and additional information about possible landing zones (LZs), drop
zones (DZs), and pickup zones (PZs).
• Coordinates requests for any air operations with aviation support units.
• Posts the schedule of infiltration and exfiltration operations.
2-29. In addition to the R&S squadron, Soldiers and sections that directly support the LRSC, the S-2
and the S-4 have additional important support functions. The S-2 section collaborates with the BFSB ISR
fusion element to produce target information for LRS team missions. The S-4 section coordinates with the
BFSB S-4 section for riggers to support LRS team insertion operations through other sustainment units
as needed.
NONSTANDARD LRSU COMMAND AND CONTROL
2-30. LRSU are in high demand and limited in number. Therefore, even a LRSC or a task-organized
LRSD is often told to support units other than a BFSB or R&S squadron. However, support and functions
provided by the BFSB, the R&S squadron, and the BSC are essential and necessary to the successful
execution of a LRSU operation.
2-31. Without this support, the LRSU would be limited as to the spectrum of missions it could
successfully perform. These limitations should be explained clearly to the gaining unit commander and
considered during the conduct of the MDMP.
2-32. LRSDs can also be task-organized between LRSCs. For instance, if a LRSC requires additional
assets to perform its mission, a LRSD can be attached from another LRSC. For rapid interoperability,
communications SOPs (message formats, COMSEC, and reporting procedures) must be similar or, if
possible, identical.
COMMAND POSTS
2-33. LRSUs normally employ three types of command posts: a company operations base (COB), an
alternate operations base (AOB), and an MSS.
COMPANY OPERATIONS BASE
2-34. Figure 2-1 shows an example COB, which normally collocates with or near the R&S squadron
tactical operations center (TOC) or the BFSB main command post (MCP). A key consideration for the
location of the COB is the requirement for a secure location or facility for LRS team planning. Teams
should be separated from each other to preserve operational security and to allow them to conduct detailed
planning with minimal interruption. This location is called the planning facility. Most members of the
LRSU locate in the COB. |
3-55.93 | 36 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-1. Company operations base.
2-35. In addition to the planning facility, the COB includes areas for a TOC, the company headquarters,
the communications platoon or BRS, motor park, helicopter LZ, and LRSD and team living areas.
METT-TC determines whether the site should be a fixed or a field site.
2-36. The company commander selects the general location of the LRSU COB. Based on the
commander's requirements, the 1SG or XO determines the exact location. He oversees the setup of the base
and the implementation of security for it.
2-37. Each LRSD or LRS team is assigned an area, within which it sets up a CP. When a team deploys,
the platoon sergeant, or a designated team leader, provides for security in the team area and for any
equipment that the team did not take on the mission.
Operations Section
2-38. The operations section sets up, secures, and restricts access to the company TOC. The section
prepares and marks an LZ nearby. The operations NCO normally controls the LZ, however a LRSD or
LRS team can also be given the mission to set up and control it.
Communications Platoon
2-39. The communications platoon is assigned an area. It sets up required HF, UHF TACSAT, and very
high frequency (VHF) antenna systems; operates the company or detachment wire net; and provides
communication equipment maintenance and logistical support. The communications platoon coordinates
for the unit to be included into the local area network (LAN). This allows them access to the higher unit
switching system. |
3-55.93 | 37 | Command and Control
Company Headquarters
2-40. The company headquarters is assigned an area from which it provides administrative and
logistical support as required. The 1SG initiates and enforces the operations base security plan.
Base Radio Station
2-41. Intelligence reports (INTREP) received by the BRS go directly to the R&S squadron S-2 and the
BFSB ISR fusion element. The LRSU operation section neither delays nor changes any INTREP. If a BRS
receives a message at the AOB and not the COB, the operator sends it, exactly as received, by the fastest,
most secure means to the COB. Unit SOPs largely determines how INTREPs are processed once received
at the COB.
ALTERNATE OPERATIONS BASE
2-42. The primary mission of the AOB is to serve as a communications relay between the COB and
deployed LRS teams. AOB planning considerations derive from the communication requirements of the
COB and on the deployed LRS teams. Normally, the communication platoon leader controls the AOB but
is not necessarily located there. Selected personnel from the operations section also normally locate at the
AOB. The task organization for the LRSU AOB varies based upon METT-TC considerations and
unit SOPs.
2-43. The COB and AOBs maintain communication with employed teams using HF or UHF TACSAT
radios. For OPSEC purposes, each team has a separate frequency and cryptographic keys. The tactical
switching system between the two bases allows them to communicate. Depending on METT-TC
requirements, HF or line of sight (LOS) radio systems provide backup communications. (Figure 2-2 shows
an example C2 employment schematic for a LRSC.)
Figure 2-2. Example C2 employment schematic for a LRSC.
2-44. The AOB locates where it can best support communications with deployed LRS teams. Because
of its limited ability to provide for its own security, the AOB normally collocates with another unit. For
linkup operations, the LRSC can collocate a BRS-equipped liaison officer (LNO) team with the moving
unit.
MISSION SUPPORT SITE
2-45. If required, the LRSU can also use an MSS. An MSS is a temporary grouping of operations,
communications, and support personnel, formed to conduct a specific operation or mission. Normally, the
MSS commander is a LRS detachment leader. The only difference between C2 for a LRSD in an MSS and
a LRSC is that the LRSD may not use an AOB. (Figure 2-3 shows an example C2 employment schematic
for a LRSD in an MSS.) |
3-55.93 | 38 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-3. Example C2 employment schematic for a LRSD in an MSS.
TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER
2-46. The LRSU TOC sets up in the COB. The TOC gives commanders a C2 capability with higher
headquarters and subordinate elements.
LRSC
2-47. In the LRSC TOC, personnel perform specific functions as follows:
Battle Captain or NCO
2-48. The battle captain or NCO supervises operations in the TOC. In the LRSC, the battle captain is
normally a LRS detachment leader. This duty normally rotates between the three LRS detachment leaders.
The battle captain or NCO plans and coordinates the company's tactical operations based on the
commander's guidance and--
• Analyzes assigned missions.
• Plans employment of teams.
• Prepares or approves operations orders (OPORD) before they go to the commander.
• Updates the commander on current and projected tactical situations.
• Supervises the preparation of all operational and intelligence documents.
• Supervises coordination with higher and supporting headquarters.
• Reports the operational status of committed and uncommitted LRS teams.
• Ensures that the current situation is posted on all maps and charts.
• Collects and forwards combat information from the LRS teams to higher.
• Maintains the operations workbook.
• Approves the TOC personnel work schedule.
• Ensures preparation of the briefing area and maps.
• Posts the mission planning chart.
• Collects combat information from LRS team operations.
• Updates mission folders after receiving info from BFSB and R&S squadron staff elements.
• Posts and maintains the enemy situation overlay. |
3-55.93 | 39 | Command and Control
• Informs teams of critical information that could affect their missions.
• Conducts final security inspections of LRS teams before deployment.
Operations Sergeant
2-49. The operations sergeant supervises the TOC enlisted personnel. He assumes responsibility for the
TOC in the absence of the battle captain. He also--
• Helps prepare and edit all tactical operations plans.
• Supervises the operation of the planning area.
• Posts the current situation on the friendly situation overlay.
• Posts current data from deployed teams on mission-status charts.
• Establishes the TOC personnel work schedule.
• Coordinates with the 1SG for TOC messengers and guards.
• Ensures that only authorized personnel enter the TOC.
• Posts the manning chart.
• Prepares the situation report (SITREP) for the period.
• Helps maintain the operation workbook.
• Acts as a shift leader to maintain a 24-hour capability in the TOC.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear NCO
2-50. The CBRN NCO helps establish, administer, and apply defensive CBRN operations. He also--
• Supervises preparation of CBRN reports.
• Supervises maintenance of CBRN supply.
• Supervises unit and individual CBRN training records.
• Serves as principal NCO of the CBRN defense team.
• Collects CBRN information and data.
• Interprets and analyzes CBRN information and data.
• Disseminates CBRN information and data.
• Acts as a shift leader to maintain a 24-hour capability in the TOC.
Liaison NCO
2-51. The LNO coordinates test fire areas; rehearsal areas; communication equipment test areas; and
supply, medical, transportation requirements.
Ongoing Actions
2-52. During the mission, the TOC personnel monitor the progress of surveillance teams and are
prepared to coordinate for exfiltration, fire support, resupply, linkups or any other action that might arise.
They do this by sending updated SITREPs and any changes to the LRS team's mission. They also receive,
log, and disseminate combat and administrative information from the teams. In addition, they--
• Monitor the guard frequency 24 hours a day.
• Coordinate resupply for committed teams.
• Coordinate emergency extractions.
• Coordinate medical evacuations. |
3-55.93 | 40 | Chapter 2
• Coordinate other required support.
• Plan and coordinate additional missions as directed by the commander.
• Monitor scheduled communication times.
Debriefing
2-53. Immediately after exfiltration, personnel from the R&S squadron S-2 or the BFSB S-2, debrief
each LRS team. In addition, the LRSC communications platoon leader or a BRS section sergeant debriefs
the team on communications specific details.
Messages
2-54. The battle captain or NCO provides a receipt for all incoming messages. He forwards INTREPs
from LRS teams to the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element and R&S squadron S-2, as required. He also--
• Records in the staff journal the receipt of each message.
• Posts the information from each message to appropriate maps and charts.
• Files each message in the journal file by journal-entry number.
• Records in the journal all messages that go out of the TOC.
Journal
2-55. The Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer’s Log (DA form 1594) is a chronological record of events
pertaining to the unit during a given period. The battle captain or NCO maintains the journal. He
cross-references all items to the journal entries by journal item number. He posts all messages to the
journal, and notes the following information about each:
• Sender.
• Message number.
• Message title or a description of the event.
• Time of receipt.
• Journal item number.
• Message center number (if applicable).
• Action taken.
• His initials.
Security
2-56. Normally the 1SG or the operations NCO restricts and controls personnel access to the TOC and
to the planning facility. Unit SOPs establish procedures for controlling and identifying visitors. The TOC
and the planning facility should have only one secure entrance. The entrance to the planning facility should
have limited access and be secured at all times when LRS teams are conducting mission planning. Unit
SOP details appropriate security measures in the safeguarding and handling of all classified material, to
include preparing and rehearsing and emergency destruction.
Displacement
2-57. When directed to displace, the on-duty shift continues to operate; the off-duty shift breaks down
all equipment and loads it on the vehicles. The COB notifies the AOB of the departure time, route and
proposed relocation site. When the COB is ready to displace, it transfers control to the AOB. The AOB
monitors committed teams and controls operations. When the COB is again operational, it reassumes
control and the AOB sends an update of the situation. |
3-55.93 | 41 | Command and Control
LRSD
2-58. When employed at an MSS, the LRS detachment leader, detachment sergeant, and attached
communications personnel perform all functions. The LRSC commander may supplement the LRSD
personnel as needed to assist in planning and operation of the MSS.
TASK ORGANIZATION OUTSIDE NAMED AREAS OF INTEREST
2-59. All LRSU should use the same communication procedures. This facilitates task organizing LRSU
as battlefield conditions change. The rapid pace of some operations may require the LRSU to coordinate
C2 of deployed LRS teams and to exchange information to meet the commander's intelligence needs.
Special situations could include the employment of the LRSU outside the BFSB's area of operations or
area of interest.
2-60. During retrograde operations, the C2 of any LRS teams beyond the BFSB's area of interest is
temporarily transferred to the unit now responsible for that area. This action requires an LNO with a BRS
to locate with the new controlling headquarters. Once teams are extracted, they return to the parent LRSU.
TASK ORGANIZATION FOR BRIGADE, TASK FORCE, OR BOTH
2-61. For certain contingency operations, a LRSD, or portions of a LRSC, might be OPCON of a BCT.
This most often occurs in a stability operation and before the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element deploys to the
AO. It also occurs when BCTs expand control of a sector and deployed LRS teams are operating in that
sector. When the latter occurs, an LNO with a BRS locates with the BCT MCP. For mission planning, a
member of the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element or R&S squadron S-2 LNO can accompany the LRS control
element.
LIAISON DUTIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND COORDINATION
2-62. The term "liaison" refers to the contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of
military forces in order to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. A trained,
competent, trusted, and informed officer or noncommissioned officer is the key to effective liaison.
Normally, the unit provides its own LNO.
DUTIES
2-63. The commander must trust the LNO completely. The LNO must hold the appropriate rank and
have the appropriate experience for each particular mission. During LRS operations, he provides the
critical link between the LRSU and external agencies. He coordinates the planning process, assists as
needed, and generally supports the LRS operation.
EMPLOYMENT
2-64. The actual method of employing LNOs varies, depending on each unit's requirements and SOPs.
Corps, Division, or Both
2-65. The LRSU can be tasked to provide the corps or division headquarters with personnel to help
coordinate C2 between the LRSU and its controlling headquarters. The LNO can assist in the coordination
and tracking of LRS team operations, and provide other assistance as required.
Brigade or Task Force
2-66. When required, the LRSU might need to provide an LNO to work with a BCT or task force staff.
His duties would be similar to the duties provided to the corps and or division staff.
Headquarters or Operations Section
2-67. The headquarters or operations section of the LRSC normally employs internal LNOs to work
with LRS teams preparing for an operation. These LNOs help the LRS team plan and coordinate upcoming
missions. They can also help prepare and set up the planning facility and enforce security procedures.
To ensure the effectiveness of the LNOs, they should be senior in rank, and experienced in LRS |
3-55.93 | 42 | Chapter 2
operations. Each should work with his assigned team throughout the planning process and infiltration
phase. Because he knows that teams’ mission, he can serve in place of any injured or incapacitated team
member. After infiltration, if he is no longer needed on the team, he can help the operations section track
the battle and exfiltrate, extract, debrief, and recover the LRS team. However, until the supported team's
mission is complete, he should not be allowed to deploy on another LRS team mission until the supported
LRS team’s mission is complete.
COORDINATION
2-68. Specific LNO duties include--
• Internally, the LNO coordinates test fire areas; rehearsal areas; communication equipment test
areas; and supply, medical, transportation requirements. He also helps destroy excess LRS team
planning materials, and inventories and secures team equipment not needed for the mission.
• Externally, the LNO coordinates with any outside unit or element. He normally has the
authority to coordinate with all relevant staff agencies and sister service units.
Section II. COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE
The LRS team is a valuable combat information collection asset assigned to the BFSB. Rapid and efficient
information flow between the BFSB and the LRS TOC requires an efficient and timely dissemination link. This
section first discusses communications in general as it applies to LRSU, and then discusses computers and
intelligence.
COMMUNICATIONS
2-69. The rapid flow of information to the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element is vital for decision-making,
and directly affects the successful execution of operations. Once the BRS receives a message from a
deployed LRS team, it is forwarded to the COB for decryption and analysis. The BRS at the COB uses
organic wire lines or runners (when collocated) to relay team reports. If the BRS operator cannot collocate
with the COB, he must send messages by secure UHF TACSAT, VHF or HF radio.
2-70. The BRS at the COB must stay in constant communication with the AOB. If the BRS at the COB
is destroyed or otherwise incapacitated, then the AOB assumes the mission of the COB, or collocate with
them. The AOB battle tracks the entire mission. BRS-to-BRS communication systems include—
• HF radio.
• UHF TACSAT.
• DSVT with facsimile.
• VHF (needed if AOB must be collocated with COB).
• Local and wide area networks (LAN and WAN).
2-71. If a BRS collocates with a support unit that employs mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), the
AOB uses the digital secure-voice terminal (DSVT) with facsimile.
2-72. The COB and the AOB should also use a digitized, lightweight video-reconnaissance system that
can receive imagery from the deployed teams via HF, UHF TACSAT, and VHF.
2-73. When the COB receives a message from either BRS, it decrypts and analyzes it, and then, as
quickly as possible, sends it to the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element. They also send it to the R&S squadron
S-2. As a minimum, the link from the COB to the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element should include—
• Secure VHF (computer, voice, or both).
• DSVT with facsimile.
• LAN.
• Runner. |
3-55.93 | 43 | Command and Control
COMPUTERS AND INTELLIGENCE
2-74. The LRSC TOC connects to the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element and the R&S squadron S-2 LAN
via both secure and nonsecure links.
ISR COMPUTER WORKSTATION
2-75. The LRSC TOC requires access to an ISR computer workstation. This workstation is normally
linked to other intelligence network processors, which—
• Lets the LRSC report all ISR tasks and requests for information (RFIs) in real time. Sending
information directly to the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element updates the intelligence database and
promotes immediate analyzing and processing of the information.
• Allows the LRSC access to current information in the friendly database, including imagery,
enemy OB, situation maps, and enemy templates relevant to the LRSU mission. It also gives
the unit access to current information from other intelligence databases.
LOCAL AREA NETWORK LINE
2-76. The secondary link to the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element is a secure LAN line. This normally
requires a DSVT or an MSE tactical facsimile machine.
HUMAN COURIER
2-77. This is normally the final contingency means of disseminating information between the LRSU
TOC and the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element. However, if the LRSU TOC is located away from the BFSB
S-2 ISR fusion element, this takes more time than any other method. |
3-55.93 | 45 | Chapter 3
Mission Development
Successful LRS missions require detailed planning and coordination. The BFSB
commanders' collection plans describe the desired PIR and intelligence requirements.
The PIR drives the conduct of ISR operations. After the LRSU collects information,
the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element evaluates it during the continuous IPB process.
This chapter answers the questions: Why and how do the BFSB, R&S squadron and
the LRSC develop the LRS team mission? This chapter answers this question by
discussing ISR operations and mission orders (Section I), the mission planning folder
(Section II), and OPSEC (Section III).
Section I. ISR OPERATIONS AND MISSION ORDERS
ISR is defined as an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and
processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an
integrated intelligence and operations function. (JP 1-02). Mission orders is a technique for completing combat
orders that allows subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action to accomplish missions (FM 1-02). It
leaves the "how" of mission accomplishment to the subordinate. How these two concepts work together is
critical to understanding the mission development process for LRSU.
ISR OPERATIONS
3-1. The BFSB conducts ISR operations to enable the division commander to precisely focus joint
elements of combat power and simultaneously execute current operations while preparing for future
operations. Key to successful accomplishment of the BFSB mission is the targeted collection, analysis, and
dissemination of intelligence that satisfies the needs of the supported unit commander. All elements of the
BFSB are organized and trained for this purpose.
3-2. The BFSB fills two roles in conducting ISR operations. First, it executes the ISR plan for the
supported unit (division, corps, JTF, or multinational). Second, it augments BCTs and other supporting
brigades with ISR capabilities.
3-3. Collaborative planning is conducted between organizations so that at each level ISR plans are
synchronized and integrated early in the MDMP. This also allows subordinate units to task collection
assets as early as possible to collect the needed information.
ORGANIZATIONS ABOVE THE BFSB
3-4. As the BFSB's higher unit conducts the MDMP, the commander and staff identify information
that is needed to make informed decisions. This information is PIR, which along with friendly force
information requirements comprise the CCIR. As soon as the G-2/J-2 and the G-3/J-3 know the CCIR, they
start formulating an ISR plan. This plan includes seeking answers from higher-level organizations, and
tasking subordinate units. The MDMP process produces an OPORD or OPLAN. In addition to the main
body of the order, the process produces Annex B Intelligence and Annex L Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance. Included in Annex L is the ISR tasking matrix, which assigns to subordinate units specific
tasks associated with collecting information—the ISR tasks for which the unit is responsible.
BFSB PLANNING
3-5. As the BFSB receives its mission orders, it conducts its own MDMP. The BFSB follows the same
process as the higher unit, which results in the production of mission orders for its subordinate units.
However, unlike the ISR efforts of BCTs, the BFSB does not focus on internal requirements. It focuses on
gathering and disseminating information that meets the requirements and priorities of the higher-level
commander and staff. |
3-55.93 | 46 | Chapter 3
3-6. As part of the MDMP, the staff performs ISR synchronization and ISR integration to develop its
ISR plan (Figure 3-1). ISR synchronization determines the intelligence requirements that must be met,
compares them to the units or assets available and capable of collecting in the time and location required,
and balances them with the higher unit's priorities. The S-2 leads this coordinated staff effort. The product
is the ISR synchronization plan. The S-3 leads the ISR integration effort. The S-3 uses the ISR
synchronization plan to develop ISR tasks. These tasks are assigned to either the staff or subordinate units.
The ISR tasks—in conjunction with task organization, graphics, fire support plans, coordinating
instructions, and sustainment information—are merged together into the ISR plan. The BFSB ISR plan is
the basis for the BFSB operation order.
Figure 3-1. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
TARGET IDENTIFICATION
3-7. Potential LRS targets are first identified by the BFSB staff during the wargaming step of the
MDMP. The BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element OIC participates in the MDMP, and during war-gaming,
assesses which potential targets best suit the capabilities of LRS teams. He normally seeks the assistance of
the R&S squadron S-3 insertion and extraction section or the LRSC commander, in evaluating the
suitability and feasibility of potential targets. He then gains the concurrence of the BFSB S-2 and S-3. |
3-55.93 | 47 | Mission Development
3-8. The BFSB S-3 notifies the R&S squadron S-3, who consults with the LRSC commander again
regarding the suitability and feasibility of the targets. Notification of the LRS commander is recommended
before the LRS commander receives the OPORD from the R&S Squadron because this serves as a warning
order. This allows the LRSC to start troop leading procedures (TLP).
3-9. Simultaneously, the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element begins developing information on each
potential target for inclusion into target folders. The target information is an essential part of the LRS
team MPF.
R&S SQUADRON PLANNING
3-10. The same process is followed when the R&S squadron receives the BFSB OPORD, with one
exception. The R&S squadron S-2 in most cases does not have the capability to provide the target
information needed for LRS teams to plan missions. As a result, most LRS target information is developed
and disseminated by the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element.
MISSION ORDERS
3-11. The result of the ISR process is the need, for example, for a target to be surveiled. The higher-
level unit avoids dictating how the LRS team should conduct the mission.
LRSC PLANNING
3-12. The LRSC receives the target information from the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element as it becomes
available. This allows the LRSC commander to issue warning orders (WARNO) and begin to identify
assets required to conduct the anticipated mission.
3-13. The HQ section, communications platoon leader, LRS detachment leaders, the R&S squadron S-3
insertion and extraction section, and a LRS team LNO form the planning cell and assist the LRSC
commander in the conduct of TLP. The commander ensures the OPORD provides detailed information on
the friendly and enemy situation, communications and sustainment. The commander normally writes the
company mission statement and the intent, task and purpose for each LRS team with the assistance of the
LRS detachment leaders. This information is essential to answer the question "why" the individual LRS
team is deploying to a particular target to collect specific information for the supported unit commander.
3-14. Normally, LRS detachment leaders do not write detachment or individual LRS team OPORDs.
They act as members of the planning cell writing the company OPORD and assist in the production of
individual team MPFs. If a LRSD is deployed to an MSS, the detachment leader normally does write
an order.
3-15. The result of the company planning efforts is an OPORD and individual LRS team MPFs. The
MPF is mission order based. It does not dictate how the mission will be performed. It does provide the
who, what, when, where and why of the mission. (Figure 3-2 summarizes the LRS mission-development
process.) |
3-55.93 | 48 | Chapter 3
Figure 3-2. LRS mission development process.
ADDITIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3-16. Although LRS teams should not be held in reserve, the BFSB and R&S squadron should consider
the need to conduct continuous operations. LRS teams need to recover from missions and staffs must
anticipate needs for future operations. General guidelines for operational tempo are—1/3 of the teams
conducting missions, 1/3 preparing for employment and 1/3 recovering, training and preparing to receive a
new mission.
3-17. As information is collected and reported from deployed teams, each organization above the LRSC
analyzes it to determine if it met any intelligence requirements. This allows each organization to make an
initial determination if it can or must task new LRS teams or reallocate other assets to collect required
information or begin collection on other priorities.
3-18. LRS teams generally require 24 to 48 hours for deliberate planning. Planning time can be reduced
by well-written, understood, and rehearsed unit SOPs.
HASTY PLANNING
3-19. Sometimes, less than the recommended LRS team planning time of 24 to 48 hours is available.
Although LRS teams are capable of employment on short notice, the potential benefit must be weighed
against the risk associated with hasty planning and execution. At a minimum, the following information is
needed for hasty planning and execution:
• Mission statement, to include area or object to surveil, latest time information of value
(LTIOV), and anticipated length of mission.
• PIR, intelligence requirements, associated specific information requirements (SIR), ISR tasks,
and RFIs. |
3-55.93 | 49 | Mission Development
• Enemy situation in the target area.
• Commander’s intent for intelligence (can be stated by the BFSB or R&S squadron S-2 or S-3).
• Method of insertion, with abort criteria. Coordination time and place are included, if applicable.
• Fire support plan, to include assets available.
• Exfiltration plan.
• Communications plan (provided by the LRSC headquarters).
• Linkup, if applicable.
• Contingency planning guidance.
Section II. MISSION PLANNING FOLDER
The BFSB and R&S squadron S-2 and S-3 provide information and intelligence products to support the LRS
mission. The LRSC commander, the communications platoon leader, the R&S squadron insertion and
extraction section, and the LRS team LNO request information from the staffs. After developing, collating and
packaging the information and products, the LRSC headquarters section assembles the MPF. The MPF contains
primarily three products: the LRSC operations order, the team's mission specific information, and the target
folder.
DEVELOPMENT
3-20. The MPF is a stand-alone document prepared by the LRSC headquarters to help the LRS team
leader plan and execute his mission. It provides the LRS team leader with detailed information about his
AO and mission, including maps, photographs, sketches, climatology, area geography, and recent enemy
activity. It also provides coordination information, such as details about infiltration and exfiltration,
insertion and extraction means and corridors.
3-21. Development of the MPF begins as soon as the LRSC is notified of a potential mission. The LRS
headquarters section, communications platoon leader, LRS detachment leaders, the insertion and extraction
section, and the LRS team LNO coordinate the mission and assemble the MPF. Requesting information
from the BFSB and R&S squadron staff elements is a critical step for MPF development. As with any
order, the LRSC company commander is ultimately responsible for the completeness and accuracy of
the document.
3-22. Simultaneously, in writing the company order, the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element develops
specific information about the target and compiles it into the target folder for inclusion into the MPF.
CONTENTS
3-23. The MPF normally contains, at a minimum, base LRSC OPORD, team mission-specific
information, and target information. The MPF can also contain additional information or resources to assist
the LRS team in mission planning. This information includes: excepts from R&S squadron and BFSB
order (as required), unit SOP formats for briefings, orders, RFIs, reports, supply requests, logs, planning
area setup, and so on.
LRSC OPERATIONS ORDER
3-24. The LRSC operations order follows the standard five-paragraph order format with annexes. In
general, the order includes the enemy road to war/enemy situation, and the mission, intent, and concept
of operations for the BFSB, R&S squadron, and LRSC commanders. If a LRSD is operating independently
of the LRSC in an MSS, the detachment leader will substitute his mission, intent, and concept of the
operation for the LRSC commander. |
3-55.93 | 50 | Chapter 3
3-25. The LRSC operations order does not contain information that is specific to individual LRS team
missions. For example, paragraph 5, command and signal, will provide information on the location of
COB, AOB, frequency ranges used (which radios to carry) and when reports are expected. It will not
contain the specific frequencies or times for communications windows the individual teams will use.
LRS TEAM-SPECIFIC OPERATIONS INFORMATION
3-26. Operational security considerations require that each team knows only the specific information
that is pertinent to their mission. While commanders can make exceptions to this general rule, each team is
only provided the information they need to conduct their specific mission.
3-27. Normally, the LRS team specific operations information also follows the standard five-paragraph
order format with annexes. The information contained in this document will not repeat information
contained within the LRSC operations order but is formatted to supplement the company order. For
example, paragraph 5, command and signal, will specify the frequencies, communications windows and
code words the individual team will use.
3-28. The planning for a LRS team is largely a bottom-up process. The LRSC provides information and
packages the contents to assist the LRS team in analyzing and completing their plan. The information
should most importantly be complete and through. Also, the information should be presented in a form that
makes it easy for the team to reference and use. A common method of packaging is to provide annexes and
appendices to the base order that group information by the five phases of a LRS team operation. Examples
appendixes might cover insertion, extraction, evasion, and communications. Below is a list of items
normally covered in the LRS team base order, appendices or annexes:
Critical Times
• Time schedule during planning.
• Event times during operations.
Fire Support
• Task and purpose.
• Supporting units.
• Unit locations.
• Frequencies and call signs.
• Type and size of fire support.
• Target numbers.
• No-fire areas (NFA) or restrictive fire areas (RFA) numbers (method of control).
• High-payoff target (HPT) list.
• CAS (A- or C-type ordnance).
• Gun target lines.
• Danger close.
• Planning ranges.
Available Air Insertion and Extraction Platforms
• Air assault, Airborne, MFF insertion.
• Unit supporting and point of contact.
• Type and number of supporting aircraft.
• Aircraft capabilities such as Special Purpose Insertion and Extraction System (SPIES) and Fast
Rope Insertion and Extraction System (FRIES). |
3-55.93 | 51 | Mission Development
• Date-time group for aircraft availability.
• Air mission commander.
• Location of pickup zone.
• Tentative flight routes.
• Date-time groups for the initial planning conference and the air mission brief.
• Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) plan (lethal and nonlethal).
Vehicle or Ground Insertion
• Supporting unit and point of contact.
• Type and number of vehicles.
• Date-time group (DTG) for vehicle availability.
• Pickup location.
• Tentative routes.
• Passage point date-time group and location.
• Frequencies and call signs.
• Recognition signals.
• Fire support.
Host Nation or Partisan Forces
• Supporting personnel.
• Type of insertion platform (time available and capabilities).
• Coordination for linkup.
• Linkup.
• Recognition signals.
• Routes.
Waterborne Operational Information Requirements
• Supporting unit.
• Insertion platform.
• Tables showing currents and tides (blue water).
• Tables showing currents and depths (brown water).
• Terrain at beach-landing site.
• Fire support.
Communications Data
• Frequency modulations (signal operation instructions).
• UHF TACSAT frequencies and availability.
• HF propagation charts.
• HF list.
• VHF frequency list. |
3-55.93 | 52 | Chapter 3
• Reporting procedures from LRSC or LRSD to higher headquarters.
• IP address.
Evasion Plan
• Personnel recovery procedure and evasion corridors.
• DD Form 1833 TEST (V2).
• Location of selected area for evasion (SAFE) or designated area of recovery (DAR).
• Documents that describe SAFEs.
• Blood chits.
• General survival information.
• Civilian population information.
• Cache and air resupply.
• Medical information.
• Border information.
• Food sources.
• Water sources.
• Plant and wildlife data.
• Epidemic diseases.
• Air-tasking order, special instructions, and airspace-control order.
Maps, Products, and Imagery
3-29. These supplement target folder information.
• Gridded satellite imagery of possible LZs or PZs, recovery points, and linkup sites.
• Line of sight and field of view from the proposed surveillance site, 360 degrees from the
objective.
• Maps.
1: 250,000.
1: 100,000.
1: 50,000.
1: 25,000. |
3-55.93 | 53 | Mission Development
• Gridded satellite imagery.
• Multispace imagery products.
• Elevation tint.
• Slope tint.
• Surface drainage.
• Panoramic graphs.
• MCOO.
• Hydrology overlay and charts.
• Overlay of landing or pickup zone.
• Cover and concealment overlay.
• Operational graphics (friendly unit locations).
• Overlay of DARs (if used).
• Flight corridors and air control points.
• Enemy situational template (most dangerous and probable courses of action).
• Enemy event template.
• Photos or pictures of enemy weapon systems and uniforms.
TARGET FOLDER FORMAT
3-30. The target folder is created by and the responsibility of the BFSB S-2 fusion element. The R&S
squadron S-3 insertion and extraction section, the S-2 section, the LRSC operations section, and the LRS
team LNO assist in the development of the target folder. The target folder format is derived from
FM 3-05.102 (Appendix C). The advantage of using this format is the standardization of the information
the BFSB S-2 fusion element is required to produce (Figure 3-3). |
3-55.93 | 54 | Chapter 3
(Classification)
Section 1: Target Identification and Description
A. Target identification data.
B. Description and significance.
C. Detailed target description.
D. Target vulnerability assessment.
Section 2: Natural Environment
A. Geographic data (including terrain and hazards to movement).
B. Meteorological data (climatologically overview and tables and
illumination data).
C. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterway, lakes, luminescence, and
so on).
Section 3: Threat
A. Ground forces.
B. Paramilitary and indigenous forces (including intelligence and
security and police services).
C. Naval forces (including Coast Guard and maritime border guard).
D. Air forces.
E. Air defense forces (including radars, passive detectors, and
C2).
F. Electronic order of battle.
G. Space-based assets.
H. Counter Intelligence environment (efforts of indigenous forces
to collect against R&S forces).
I. Other.
(Classification)
Figure 3-3. Example format for target folder. |
3-55.93 | 55 | Mission Development
(Classification)
Section 4: Demographics and Cultural Features
A. Area population characteristics.
B. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.
C. Social conditions.
D. Religious factors.
E. Political characteristics.
F. Economic conditions.
G. Miscellaneous (for example, currency, holidays, dress, and
customs).
Section 5: Lines of Communications and Information Systems
A. Airfields.
B. Railways.
C. Roadways.
D. Waterways.
E. Ports.
F. Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL).
G. Power grid.
H. Public information media and telecommunications (print, radio,
television, telephone, and so on).
Section 6: Infiltration and Exfiltration. This includes potential DZs,
LZs, recover zones, seaward launch and recovery points, and
beach landing zones.
A. Potential zones.
B. Choke points between insertion point(s) and objective.
Section 7: Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape, Recovery (SERER)
Data. See JP 3-50.3, Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery.
A. SAFE data.
B. SAID data.
C. Survival data.
Section 8: Unique Intelligence (mission-specific requirements not
covered above)
Section 9: Intelligence Shortfalls
(Classification)
Figure 3-3. Example format for target folder (continued). |
3-55.93 | 56 | Chapter 3
(Classification)
Appendix A: Bibliography
Appendix B: Glossary
Appendix C: Imagery
Appendix D: Maps and Charts
Appendix E: Sensitive Compartmented Information (if applicable)
(Classification)
Figure 3-3. Example format for target folder (continued).
Section III. OPERATIONS SECURITY
LRS units' OPSEC measures are important planning considerations. LRS mission classification seldom falls
below SECRET during war or stability conditions. This section discusses security classifications; mission
classification; the need and procedures for separating teams during planning; and security during coordination.
PERSONNEL SECURITY
LEADERS
3-31. Leaders require TOP SECRET clearance and inclusion on the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element
access roster as well as TOP SECRET SCI access to national-level assets so that they can plan missions
in detail:
• LRSC commander.
• LRSC executive officer.
• LRS detachment leaders.
• LRSC communications platoon leader.
• First Sergeant.
• Operations NCO.
• Any LRSU Soldier acting as an LNO.
• The LRS team leader.
LRS TEAM MEMBERS
3-32. Each LRS team member must hold a current SECRET clearance and access level, or higher. The
information that a LRS team needs for planning purposes is sometimes classified above the individual team
member’s access level. When a LRSU Soldier fails the mandatory investigation for a required security
clearance, he receives a transfer to a position or unit with lower clearance requirements. Members of a
LRSU who frequently engage in alcohol- or drug-related incidents, demonstrate financial or mental
instability, or violate the law are reassigned or separated from military service. The BFSB commander must
entrust a LRSU Soldier with mission-sensitive and classified information. Mishandling of information, no
matter how innocent the compromise, constitutes a serious incident.
MISSION CLASSIFICATION
3-33. LRS missions receive SECRET-level classification due to the vulnerability of a six-man element,
which might be operating deep behind enemy lines. LRS team locations are seldom posted or mentioned on
a computer LAN, graphic or written OPORD, intelligence summary (INTSUM), or INTREP, regardless of
the classification of the dissemination vehicle. The BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element OIC, S-2s, S-3s, G-2, |
3-55.93 | 57 | Mission Development
G-3, R&S squadron, BFSB, division and corps commanders are normally the only personnel outside the
LRS operations cell that "need to know" LRS team locations. Teams working close together might need
collateral support and, therefore, might need to know. At a minimum, they publish NFAs or RFAs on the
FC's system. The system then automatically disseminates information to all units on the system. The BFSB
generally needs to coordinate with the special operations coordinator (SOCOORD) LNO at division or
corps as special forces and LRS teams might be operating in the same AO. Information provided to the
SOCOORD LNO prevents fratricide among LRS and SOF operating in the same AO.
SEPARATION
3-34. LRS teams plan independently. What they need to know (critical information) generally depends
on mission proximity. That is, LRS teams may require support from another team in the form of a
communications relay or contact team (Joint Pub 3-50.12). The planning facility separates teams and
insolates them from distractions and mission operational pace. Each team member keeps all information
about his mission from the other teams. He only acknowledges, mentions, or discusses it with other
members of his own team. Keeping mission information internal to the team ensures that, if one team is
compromised and later captured, the enemy can only obtain information about that team and its mission.
3-35. Teams on the ground-conducting missions avoid communicating with each other. Radio
communications are vulnerable to direction-finding (DF) equipment. Threat forces might target areas
where LRS teams could be templated to operate. The less that it knows about other teams' missions, the
more secure they and the LRSU as a whole remain.
SECURITY DURING COORDINATION
3-36. Coordination, such as air mission briefs, can also compromise a LRS team mission. The LRS
LNO must consider OPSEC when coordinating. During an air mission brief, everyone avoids discussing
the mission location, NAI, or duration. They only discuss details such as the infiltration route, checkpoints,
call signs, and logger area. |
3-55.93 | 59 | Chapter 4
Team Operations
The success of LRS operations depends on thorough planning, acquisition of ISR
tasks and RFIs, rapid and timely reporting, and avoidance of detection.
LRS teams collect critical information for the BFSB commander in support of
division commanders' PIR. Answers to the PIR directly affect the commander's
decision-making and dictate the successful execution of military operations. This
chapter discusses the following aspects of LRS team operations:
Phases (Section I)
Reconnaissance operations (Section II)
Surveillance operations (Section III)
Combat assessment (Section IV)
Target acquisition (Section V)
Urban terrain (Section VI)
Imagery collection and transmission (Section VII)
Stability operations (Section VIII)
Special missions (Section IX)
Section I. PHASES
LRS team operations have five distinct phases--planning, infiltrating/inserting, executing (actions on the
objective), exfiltrating/extracting, and recovering. Controlling or supporting deployed teams can overlap into
more than one phase.
PLANNING PHASE
4-1. Detailed planning at all levels helps ensure mission success and team survival. The planning
phase starts when the commander receives the mission folder from the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element. It
extends throughout the final inspection of the LRS team.
SEQUENCE
4-2. In most cases, the commander, XO, first sergeant, and operations personnel participate in the
initial S-2 planning. To ensure the LRS team completes each of its planning tasks, the team follows a
detailed timeline.
Type of Planning
4-3. The length of time available determines whether the team conducts deliberate or hasty planning.
Deliberate Planning (24 to 48 hours available for planning).
Hasty Planning (less than 24 hours available for planning).
Required Planning Events
4-4. The LRS team should cover the following events in each planning sequence, regardless of
time available:
• Alert notification.
• N-Hour planning sequence (the sequence followed before deployment).
• H-Hour sequence (the deployment sequence). |
3-55.93 | 60 | Chapter 4
ACTIVITIES
4-5. To make the best use of time for planning at company, detachment, and team levels, all leaders
use TLP. Table 4-1 (page 4-4 and 4-5) lists what each member of the company and detachment must do
during the planning phase.
LRSU Commander
• Receives WARNOs and OPORDs from the R&S squadron and BFSB headquarters as required.
• Reviews target information from the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element.
• Conducts TLP and mission analysis using METT-TC.
• Prepares and issues WARNOs as required.
• Prepares and issues OPORDs as required.
• Supervises the finalization of the MPF.
• Coordinates with BFSB and R&S squadron staff members.
• Approves the location of the COB, AOBs, and MSSs.
• Receives LRS team confirmation briefs.
• Receives LRS team decision briefs.
• Receives LRS team backbriefs.
LRSC Headquarters
• Receives WARNOs and OPORDs from the R&S squadron and the BFSB headquarters.
• Receives target information from the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element.
• Finalizes MPFs and issues to LRS team leaders as required.
• Helps commander conduct TLP to include developing and issuing WARNOs and OPORDs.
• Establishes COB (including the planning facility), AOBs and MSSs.
• Helps coordinate and finalize team mission support requirements
— Aviation.
— Fire support.
— Imagery.
— Sustainment.
• Prepares briefings as required.
Communications Platoon
• Receives company WARNOs and OPORDs.
• Helps commander conduct TLP to include developing and issuing WARNOs and OPORDs.
• Conducts TLP for the communications platoon.
• Prepares and issues WARNOs as required.
• Prepares and issues OPORDs as required.
• Supervises the finalization of the communications plan for each MPF.
• Establishes BRSs.
• Confirms all radio frequencies with R&S squadron S-6 or BFSB S-6. |
3-55.93 | 61 | Team Operations
• Develops communications plan for company WARNOs, OPORDs and communication
annexes.
• Coordinates and conducts communication rehearsals.
LRS Detachment Leader
• Receives WARNOs and OPORDs from the R&S squadron and BFSB headquarters as required.
• Receives WARNOs and OPORDs from the LRSU headquarters as required.
• Receives and reviews target information from the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element as required.
• Helps establish the COB (including the planning facility), AOB and MSSs as required.
• Helps commander conduct TLP to include developing and issuing WARNOs and OPORDs.
• Conducts TLP for his detachment.
• Prepares and issues WARNOs as required.
• Prepares and issues OPORDs as required.
• Supervises the finalization of the MPF.
• Coordinates with BFSB and squadron staff members.
• Approves the location of MSSs in support of his LRSD.
• Receives LRS team-confirmation briefs.
• Receives LRS team-decision briefs.
• Receives LRS team backbriefs.
LRS Team Leader and Team Members
• Receives the initial mission analysis from LRSC headquarters.
• Receives WARNO from LRSC headquarters or LRS detachment leader.
— The team leader and radio telephone operator (RTO) normally attend.
— The RTO serves as the recorder.
• Conducts TLP.
• Issues team WARNOs.
• Conducts initial inspections.
• Moves to and establishes team area in the planning facility.
• Receives the OPORD with mission folder from LRSC headquarters or LRS detachment leader.
• Issues confirmation brief.
• Receives decision brief.
• Issues COA or decision brief to commander (after mission analysis brief).
• Directs the activities of the team LNO.
• Delivers OPORD to the LRS team (LRS team leader).
• Coordinates as needed with operations personnel.
• Memorizes plan and prepares for backbrief.
• Backbriefs the commander or his representative.
• Conducts final inspection. |
3-55.93 | 62 | Chapter 4
Note: The entire team normally attends the OPORD.
Table 4-1. Actions and responsibilities of LRSU personnel.
Communications LRS detachment
Commander Operations Platoon Leader Team LNO
Receives OPORD [Select personnel] Platoon leader Accompanies commander
and MPF from R&S accompanies accompanies commander
Squadron S-3 or commander
BFSB S-3
Initiates alert Receives or relays Receives or relays the alert Receives or relays Receives or Receives or
procedures the alert the alert relays alert relays alert
Reviews mission Establishes the Begins mission preparation Begins preparations Begins Team LNO:
folder COB, to include for movement to planning preparations Starts preparing
planning facility facility for movement to move to
Conducts TLP to planning planning facility
facility
Company LNO:
Deploys to
higher
headquarters
Develops company Helps develop the Helps develop the WARNO Helps develop the Continues Team LNO:
WARNO WARNO WARNO (as required) preparations continues
for movement preparing to
to planning move to
facility planning facility
Issues company Receives the Receives WARNO Receives WARNO Receives Team LNO:
WARNO WARNO WARNO Receives
WARNO
Company LNO:
Establishes
contacts
Conducts mission Helps the Issues WARNO Issues WARNO Issues Team LNO:
analysis (METT-TC) commander WARNO Helps establish
conduct METT-TC Establishes base stations Moves to and establishes team area in
detachment area in the Begins initial planning facility
Helps the commander COB inspections
conduct METT-TC
Helps the commander Moves to and
Conducts mission analysis conduct METT-TC establishes
(METT-TC) for the PLT team area in
Conducts mission the planning
analysis (METT-TC) for facility
the PLT
Develops company Helps the Helps the commander Helps the commander Continues TLP Company LNO:
OPORD commander develop the OPORD develop the OPORD Begins
develop the coordination
OPORD Develop PLT OPORD Develops PLT OPORD
Finalizes MPF
Issues company Issues intelligence Issues communications Develops detachment Receives Team LNO:
OPORD annex annex, paragraph 5 OPORD (as required) company Receives
OPORD company
OPORD
Receives Begins mission Begins BRS operations Receives confirmation Issues Receives
confirmation brief development and brief confirmation guidance
coordination brief
Provides guidance Provides guidance
Leader--Issues
updated
WARNO to
team |
3-55.93 | 63 | Team Operations
Table 4-1. Actions and responsibilities of LRSU personnel (continued).
Communications LRS detachment
Commander Operations Platoon Leader Team LNO
Supervises mission Supervises mission Continues BRS operation Supervises mission Conducts mission Assists team
preparation preparation preparation analysis (METT-TC) with analysis
and conducts
coordination
Receives COA Supervises mission Continues BRS operation Receives COA Conducts COA Assists team
decision brief preparation decision brief decision brief with COA
Receives COA decision decision brief
Gives guidance Receives COA brief Gives guidance
decision brief
Supervises mission Supervises mission Continues BRS operation Supervises mission Develops OPORD Assists team
preparation preparation preparation with analysis
and conducts
coordination
Assists team
with OPORD
development
Supervises mission Supervises mission Continues BRS operation Supervises mission Issues team OPORD Receives
preparation preparation preparation OPORD
Receives team Receives team Continues BRS operation Receives team Conducts backbrief Helps team
backbrief briefback briefback conduct
Receives team backbrief backbrief
Provides guidance Provides guidance
Briefs R&S Squadron Helps commander Helps commander Helps commander Helps commander Helps team
or BFSB conduct briefing conduct briefing conduct briefing conduct briefing prepare and
commanders on coordinate
team mission and Continues BRS operation Supervises mission mission
execution (as preparation
required)
Supervises mission Supervises mission Continues BRS operation Supervises mission Continues mission Helps team
preparation preparation preparation preparation prepare and
coordinate
Checks mission
communications
Conducts rehearsals
Supervises mission Supervises mission Continues BRS operation Supervises mission Checks Helps team
preparation preparation preparation communications prepare and
coordinate
Conducts rehearsals mission
Supervises mission Supervises mission Continues BRS operation Supervises mission Sterilizes planning Helps team
preparation preparation preparation facility prepare and
coordinate
Conducts final mission
inspection
Briefs back as needed
ORDERS
4-6. LRSU OPORDs are very detailed and specific to LRS operations. To ensure mission success,
LRSU orders must contain all planning coordination conducted for the pending mission. For this reason,
OPORD format may deviate from the standard five-paragraph Army order format. Appendix B shows
some example orders formats used in LRSU operations. |
3-55.93 | 64 | Chapter 4
Movement Order--This stand-alone order facilitates an uncommitted, typically administrative,
unit movement. While the arrangement of the troops and vehicles should expedite their
movement and conserve time and energy, they should still maintain 360-degree security.
Warning Order--This notifies of an upcoming order or action. The WARNO can, but need not,
follow the standard five-paragraph OPORD format.
Confirmation Brief--No later than 30 minutes after receiving the unit OPORD, each subordinate
leader gives his higher commander a confirmation brief. This demonstrates his understanding
of the higher unit OPORD. It also ensures the correct focus during mission planning.
COA or Decision Brief--The team conducts a METT-TC analysis, analyzes possible COAs,
develops and compares war games. The team leader then briefs the commander on his chosen
COA, explaining the criteria he used to choose it over other possible COAs. When the team
leader finishes his briefing, the commander approves, disapproves, or modifies the COA and
gives guidance on finalizing the team plan.
Operations Order--The unit leader uses the OPORD to coordinate the actions of subordinates in
the execution of an operation. Sometimes called the five-paragraph field order, this order
describes, at a minimum, the task organization, situation, mission, execution, administrative
and logistics support, and command and signal requirements for the specific operation.
Fragmentary Order--An abbreviated OPORD, used to update the original OPORD. Fragmentary
orders (FRAGO) can be issued anytime. Although the FRAGO follows the five-paragraph
OPORD format, it normally only includes the paragraphs or items that have changed. New
missions or significant mission changes require a new OPORD rather than just a FRAGO.
Backbrief--A briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend to
accomplish their mission (FM 1-02). The backbrief can be a formal or informal presentation.
During the backbrief, each leader conveys detailed information about the planned mission as he
understands it. This gives the recipient of the briefing an idea of the leader and unit's ability to
conduct a planned mission. After listening to the subordinate leader's backbrief, each leader
briefs back his own understanding of the mission to his higher as required. The unit SOP
usually identifies who briefs whom and what must be briefed.
PLANNING PROCEDURES
4-7. The LRSU uses detailed planning procedures to enhance mission planning and OPSEC. Unit
SOPs and leaders cover planning procedures in detail. Each LRSU should have a planning facility, with
a separate planning area for each team planning for a mission. In the planning area, the team only sees
mission-essential personnel such as the LNO, members of the planning cell, or others on the access
roster. The unit maintains OPSEC at all times to avoid compromising the teams and the mission. "Need
to know" applies: The less each Soldier knows about the other teams' missions, the less can be divulged
in case of capture.
4-8. The planning facility location can vary, but the unit can locate it wherever they can achieve the
objective of separating a LRS team during planning from the remainder of the unit. A planning facility
can be located at an intermediate staging base, depending on the unit's deployment plan. The planning
facility can use tents, buildings, hangers, or navy vessels. The exact structures used matter less than the
ability to achieve and maintain security and separation. A planning facility should only have one
controlled entrance, and the unit must maintain an access roster.
4-9. An ideal planning facility has separate sleeping quarters, showers, electricity, heat or
air-conditioning, and a latrine for each team. If possible, the planning facility should be structured to
make the teams' accommodations comfortable. |
3-55.93 | 65 | Team Operations
TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES
4-10. The TLP provides leaders at company level and below with a framework to develop plans and
orders, and to prepare for operations. TLP is a dynamic process used by small unit leaders to analyze a
mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. These procedures enable leaders to maximize
available planning time while developing effective plans and adequately preparing their unit(s) for an
operation. The TLP have eight steps, shown in Figure 4-1. The sequence is not rigid. They can be
modified to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Some steps are performed concurrently,
while others may continue throughout the operation (FM 5-0).
Figure 4-1. TLP and METT-TC.
4-11. LRS teams use TLP slightly differently than do other units. Normally, Steps 3 and 4 reverse,
because the team moves to the planning facility before receiving the company OPORD and making a
tentative plan (mission analysis). After Step 7, the team usually must backbrief to gain approval to
conduct the mission. The following description of how TLP are executed uses the LRS team as an
example. However, other LRSU leaders use TLP the same way:
Receive the Mission
4-12. Detailed planning ensures mission success and team survival. On receipt of the WARNO, the
team begins an intensive preparatory phase at the unit area. The team leader has the team start initial
inspections and prepare for movement to the planning facility. Occasionally, the team may need to
receive the initial mission briefing (OPORD with MPF) at this time. However, it is preferred this briefing
occur after the team is in the planning facility. |
3-55.93 | 66 | Chapter 4
Perform an Initial Assessment--During the initial assessment, the team leader conducts a
METT-TC analysis with the available information. The team leader shares the results of this
analysis with the team that are necessary to complete details of the WARNO. Details of the
analysis may be withheld from the team for OPSEC reasons until arrival at the planning
facility.
Allocate the Available Time--The LRS team leader produces a time schedule based on the
information received in the company or detachment WARNO. Using the reverse planning
methodology, knowing critical times and experienced judgment on time estimates for events
are essential in creating a realistic time schedule. The team leader should also consider potential
changes to the time schedule. For example, if the team were ordered to execute the mission six
hours early, the team leader must determine what remaining critical must still be completed to
ensure mission success.
Issue the Warning Order
4-13. The team leader issues a WARNO to the team. This WARNO generally provides the same
information as the company WARNO, with the addition of both general and team-specific instructions
(Appendix B).
Initiate Movement
4-14. After the inspections, the team compiles a list of deficiencies and an initial supply request. The
team and LNO move to the planning facility area, where they set up the planning facility IAW unit SOP
(Appendix D).
Make a Tentative Plan
4-15. Making a plan combines mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, COA comparison,
and COA approval. The team leader and RTO normally receive the mission briefing from the
commander, detachment leader, or the operations section. At the same briefing, the team leader receives
the mission folder. Following the briefing, the team leader conducts a confirmation briefing. The team
leader, with the assistance of the team, conducts mission analysis using METT-TC.
Conduct a Confirmation Brief
4-16. Immediately following the OPORD, the team leader briefs the commander or detachment leader
to confirm that he understands the mission and the commander's intent. (Appendix B provides an
example confirmation brief.) Before mission planning begins, the team leader may give the team an
updated WARNO based on material in the company OPORD.
Begin Team-Planning Process
4-17. The team begins the planning process. The team leader might conduct a visual reconnaissance
of the AO. If feasible, the senior scout accompanies him. While he reconnoiters, the assistant team leader
supervises equipment and personnel preparation. TOC personnel make themselves available for
coordination throughout the planning phase.
Note: The OPORD, not the backbrief, drives planning. The backbrief is just a form
of rehearsal.
Analyze the Mission
4-18. The team leader reviews and studies the mission, first identifying the specified and implied
tasks. From the specified and implied tasks, the team leader identifies the essential tasks. These tasks
must be completed to accomplish the mission. Failure to complete an essential task results in mission
failure. He also identifies any constraints. The product of this part of the mission analysis is the restated
mission. |
3-55.93 | 67 | Team Operations
Mission Statement
4-19. The restated mission is a simple, concise expression of the essential tasks the unit must
accomplish, and the purpose to be achieved. The mission statement says who (the unit), what (the task),
when (either the critical time or on order), where (location), and why (the purpose of the operation).
Each mission statement has three distinct elements: operation, task, and purpose:
Operation
4-20. This is a military action. It consists of all the processes involved with combat: movement,
supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers to gain objectives. LRSU conduct the following four operations:
Surveillance--This is a systematic observation of airspace or surface area by visual, aural (hearing),
electronic, photographic, or other means.
Reconnaissance--This is any action taken to obtain information about the operational area. It
includes any visual or other detection methods taken to learn the enemy's or potential enemy's
activities and resources and the area's meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic
characteristics.
Target Acquisition--This is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail
to permit the effective employment of weapons against it.
Target Interdiction--This is any action taken to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface
military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.
Task
4-21. A task is a clearly defined, measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations.
(Table 4-2 identifies LRS tasks by operation.) A task includes specific actions that contribute to mission
accomplishment or other requirements. A task is definable, obtainable, and decisive; and it is either
specified or implied. A specified task is stated in the WARNO, mission order, annex, or overlay, or the
commander directs it. An implied task is neither specified, routine, nor included in the SOP, yet it is
inherent and mission specific. It is deduced from the order and its products:
Observe--This is the visual; audible; or mechanical, electrical, or photographic monitoring of enemy
activities. It applies to missions in which the enemy's location is known or strongly suspected, such
as an NAI where the enemy must pass.
Locate--This is to search or examine an area to find an enemy (or his equipment) known to be present
in the AO, but whose specific location is unknown.
Detect--This is to discover or discern the existence or presence of enemy activity. This task applies to
missions in which little, if anything is known about the enemy. The enemy may or may not
be present.
Determine--This is to decide or settle conclusively that this task applies to missions in which much
information is known about the enemy. However, some questions still exist about his exact
disposition, location, or content. This mission is to gather one or two specified intelligence
requirements.
Identify--This is to positively recognize enemy units, formations, equipment, and so on.
Evaluate--This is to examine and judge carefully and place a value or worth on the condition and state
of specified structures or enemy capabilities. Structures or enemy location are known.
Confirm--This is to support or establish certainty or validity.
Deny--This is to prove untrue or invalid.
Report--This is to communicate collected information accurately and in a timely manner.
Mark--This is to designate a target by using lasers or other marking devices.
Pinpoint--This is to locate and precisely identify a target for engagement without using lasers. |
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Measure--This is to estimate by comparing two distances.
Attack by fire--This is to use direct fires, supported by indirect fires, to engage an enemy without
closing with him to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive him.
Suppress--This results in the temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapons system
below the level needed to accomplish the mission.
Disrupt--This is to integrate direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy’s
formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in
piecemeal fashion.
Table 4-2. LRS tasks by operation.
Target Target
Operation Surveillance Reconnaissance Acquisition Interdiction
TASKS: • Observe • Report • Mark • Attack-by-fire
• Locate • Locate • Locate • Suppress
• Detect • Detect • Detect • Disrupt
• Determine • Identify • Identify
• Identify • Confirm • Pinpoint
• Evaluate • Deny
• Report • Pinpoint
• Confirm
• Deny
Purpose
4-22. The purpose generally supports the BFSB’s purpose and is the same as other Army operations.
LRSU study strengths, dispositions, composition, and capabilities of the friendly and enemy forces that
could affect the team's mission.
• Plan use of time and prepare a written schedule for required actions. Include--
— Time.
— Event.
— Place.
— Uniform.
— Personnel who will attend.
• Use the reverse-planning technique.
• Select and request equipment (routine and special).
Enemy
4-23. The MPF provides information about the enemy’s composition, disposition, strength, recent
activities, ability to reinforce, and possible COAs. The team also determines what they do not know
about the enemy and requests that information. It is likely the enemy situation will remain uncertain and
the experience and training of the LRS team becomes essential in determining a realistic enemy situation. |
3-55.93 | 69 | Team Operations
Terrain
4-24. This aspect of mission analysis addresses the military aspects of terrain: observation and fields
of fire; avenues of approach; key terrain; obstacles; and cover and concealment (OAKOC). The MPF
provides significant details about the operations area including hydrology, LOS data, and locations of
potential drop zones, landing and pick-up zones.
Weather
4-25. The five military aspects of weather include visibility, winds, precipitation, cloud cover,
temperature, and humidity (FM 34-130). The consideration of their effects is an important part of the
mission analysis. The team reviews the forecasts and conclusions available in the MPF and develops
their own conclusions on the effects of weather on the mission. The analysis considers the effects on
personnel, equipment, and supporting forces, such as air and artillery support. The team identifies the
aspects of weather that can affect the mission. They focus on factors whose effects they can mitigate. For
example, the team leader may modify SOP uniform and carrying loads based on the temperature. The
team leader checks for compliance during preparation, especially during rehearsals (FM 5-0).
Troops and Support Available
4-26. The team leader knows the status of the teams’ morale, their experience and training, and the
strengths and weaknesses. The team leader realistically determines all available resources. This includes
possible attachments like a sniper team, target acquisition or a medic. The assessment includes knowing
the strength and status of team members and their equipment. It also includes understanding the full
array of assets in support of the team. The team knows, for example, how much indirect fire, by type, is
available, when it will become available and the time it takes to employ. They consider any new
limitations based on level of training or recent fighting.
Time Available
4-27. The team leader continues to refine the time schedule. The team views its own tasks and enemy
actions in relation to time. Most importantly, the team leader monitors the time available. As the situation
changes, the team leader uses his experience to adjust the time schedule to ensure the team is best
prepared to accomplish the mission.
Civil Considerations
4-28. Civil considerations are how the man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and
activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO influence the conduct of
military operations (FM 6-0). Rarely are military operations conducted in uninhabited areas. Most of the
time, units are surrounded by noncombatants. LRS team operations are in fact even more complicated
because they often depend on effectively hiding among the civilian population. These noncombatants
include residents of the AO, local officials, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). Based on information from higher headquarters and their own knowledge and judgment, the
team leader identifies civil considerations that affect their mission. Civil considerations are analyzed in
terms of six factors, known by the memory aid ASCOPE (FM 6-0):
• Areas.
• Structures.
• Capabilities.
• Organizations.
• People.
• Events. |
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Develop Courses of Action
4-29. The purpose of COA development (Figure 4-2) is simple: to determine one or more ways to
accomplish the mission. Most missions and tasks can be accomplished in more than one way. However,
in a time-constrained environment, the team leader may develop only one COA. Normally, the team will
develop two or more. Usable COAs are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. To
develop them, the team focuses on the actions the team takes at the objective and conducts a reverse plan
to the point infiltration starts.
COA DEVELOPMENT
1. Analyze relative combat power.
2. Generate options.
3. Array forces.
4. Develop the concept of operations.
5. Assign responsibilities.
6. Prepare COA statement and sketch.
Figure 4-2. Development of courses of action.
Analyze (War-Game)
4-30. For each COA, the team thinks through the operation from beginning to end. They compare
each COA with the most likely enemy COA, given what the LRS team is doing at that instant. Normally,
small unit leaders visualize a set of actions, reactions and counteractions. The LRS team leader does this
also, but because the LRS team’s objective is to not make enemy contact, the result should minimize the
chance of contact. The team records the results of all wargames.
Compare
4-31. The team leader compares results of all the wargames and chooses the COA that has the best
chance of mission accomplishment and preserves the team for future operations. Criteria normally
include-- mission accomplishment, time to execute the mission, risk, and posture of the team for future
operations.
Approve
4-32. The team leader picks the COA that best supports successful mission accomplishment.
Normally, before the team continues plan development, the team leader must obtain approval for the
chosen COA. This briefing is given to the detachment leader or company commander. Once approval is
obtained and guidance given, the team begins development of the OPORD.
Conduct Reconnaissance
4-33. Ideally, the team leader reconnoiters the area visually. If this cannot be done, then the team
leader continues to study aerial reconnaissance photos, UAS video and satellite imagery (if available).
He confirms, clarifies, and supplements information gleaned from maps and other sources.
Complete the Plan
4-34. Complete detailed planning to include necessary coordination with all support elements
required for the mission. (Appendix G provides an example list of the necessary coordination.)
Issue the OPORD
4-35. Include all necessary annexes. Use a detailed OPORD format. (Appendix B provides an
example.) Use visual aids (terrain models, objective sketches, charts, photos, maps, and overlays) to
reinforce information and to help ensure the team fully understands all aspects of the mission. |
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Supervise and Inspect Soldiers
4-36. The team leader and the assistant team leader supervise the team throughout the preparation to
ensure timely completion of all required tasks. They inspect to ensure that--
• The team takes only the equipment required for the mission.
• All equipment is functional, complete, secured, and evenly distributed.
• Resupply bundles and packages meet SOP criteria.
• Cache meets SOP criteria.
• Insertion vehicle and aircraft preparation meet SOP criteria.
Check the Communications Equipment
4-37. Under the guidance of the team leader, the RTO checks all communications equipment on a
distant BRS (HF and UHF TACSAT). They also check--
• Internal communications with all VHF frequency modulation (FM) communications
equipment. Unserviceable and inoperable equipment is reported to the communications
NCOIC.
• For all radios, frequencies are confirmed with the frequency manager, and, if needed, more
frequencies are requested.
Rehearse Mission
4-38. After briefing the OPORD, the team leader conducts rehearsals. This includes inspecting
personnel and equipment. During the rehearsal, the team wears the full uniform and carries all
mission-essential equipment. The unit conducts detailed, full force rehearsals, because the team needs
them to reinforce complex procedures. Terrain and conditions should, as much as possible, replicate
those expected for the actual operation. Detailed rehearsals can include transportation and OPFOR, and
as many contingencies as can be anticipated. The team simulates casualties among key personnel, with
other team members assuming their duties. Leaders continually ask team members to answer
mission-specific questions. Sand table briefings, a map study, and photograph examinations should
complement all rehearsals. At a minimum, during hasty planning, the team should rehearse actions in the
objective area (entering; maintaining; and sterilizing the hide, surveillance, and communication sites).
Otherwise, rehearsals should cover as much as possible the following, also shown in Table 4-3.
• Off-loading and assembly procedures at points of insertion.
• Movement formations.
• "Lost-man" drill.
• Security halt procedures.
• Actions at possible danger areas.
• Reaction drill for aircraft flyover (friendly or enemy).
• Countertracking techniques.
• Actions on enemy contact such as chance, near/far ambush, sniper, air attack, indirect fire, flares.
• Loading procedures at the extraction site.
• Special actions (as required), and use of new or unfamiliar equipment.
• Procedures for emplacement and recovery of a cache.
• Actions at recovery points or contact points.
• Actions in the absence of a communications plan.
• Communications during scheduled windows and initial entry. |
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Table 4-3. Priority of actions for rehearsal.
Rehearsal Type
Hasty/ Minimal/ Detailed/
Rehearsal Actions Critical Important Useful
Actions in the objective area (entering, X X X
maintaining, and sterilizing the hide, surveillance,
and communication sites)
Off-loading and assembly procedures at points X X
of insertion
Movement formations X X
"Lost-man" drill X X
Security halt procedures X X
Actions at possible danger areas X X
Reaction drill for aircraft flyover (friendly or enemy) X X
Countertracking techniques X X
Actions on enemy contact (chance, near and far X X
ambush, sniper or air attack, indirect fire, flares)
Loading procedures at the extraction site X X
Special actions (as required) and use of new X X
or unfamiliar equipment
Procedures for emplacing and recovering cache X X
Actions at recovery points or contact points X X
Actions in the absence of a communications plan X X
Communications during scheduled windows X X
and initial entry
Transportation contingencies X
Sand table briefings X
Map study X
Photographic examinations X
Conduct Backbrief
4-39. When mission planning is complete, the team briefs back the entire mission to the commander
or to the commander's designated representative. The backbrief ensures the commander that the team
understands and is prepared for the mission. They can shorten the backbrief to accommodate condensed
planning time or as the commander requests, based on his knowledge of the team's experience and on
who attends the backbrief. The team rehearses the backbrief to ensure that all team members understand
all aspects of the operation. (Appendix B provides an example backbrief format.)
Conduct Final Inspection
4-40. The team always conducts a final inspection before the team leaves the planning area. The team
leader inspects personnel, personal equipment, and mission equipment, especially those items identified
during previous inspections or during rehearsals as needing correction. The team leader questions team
members to reinforce critical aspects of the mission. |
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Receive Intelligence Updates
4-41. The team leader receives intelligence updates from higher and adapts his plans accordingly.
CONTROL MEASURES
4-42. A control measure is a graphic or oral directive assigning responsibility, coordinating fires and
maneuver, and controlling combat operations. Each measure is shown graphically and easily identified
on the ground. Examples include boundaries, objectives, coordinating points, and contact points. Some
control measures that help the team leader control team actions during the mission are--
• Times of departure and return.
• Points of departure and reentry.
• Checkpoints.
• Routes.
• Forward line of own troops (FLOT).
• Phase lines (PLs).
• Restrictive fire lines (RFLs) and NFAs or RFAs.
• Decision points (DPs).
• Designated areas for recovery (DARs).
• Limits of advance (LOA).
• Recovery points.
• Contact points.
• SAFEs.
• Airspace-recovery activation signals.
• No-fly areas.
• Identification friend or foe (IFF).
FIELD PLANNING ACTIVITIES
4-43. Leaders can conduct field planning one of two ways:
Field Planning
4-44. This generally means conducting deliberate planning in a tent. Special considerations include--
• The number of tents required for all elements to have sufficient planning and sleeping space.
• Type and quantity of lighting required.
• Heating requirements.
• Latrine facilities.
• Dining facilities. Ideally, teams should receive at least two hot meals a day.
• Security considerations such as wire, field phones, and guards.
• Support required to construct the site and maintain it for the period required.
• Communications to supporting units during planning and conduct of the mission.
• Rehearsal areas. |
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Patrol-Base Planning
4-45. This refers to planning that occurs when the team receives a change of mission during the
conduct of an operation. LRS patrol-base principles apply. The team--
• Maintains security.
• Plans and issues a FRAGO.
• Plans resupply.
• Plans for continuous communications.
CONTINGENCY PLANS
4-46. The contingency plan covers alternate, anticipated major events that could occur before, during,
and after an operation, for example--
• Replacement of team members as needed to fulfill mission requirements.
• Transportation to the planning facility.
• The planning facilities (garrison or field).
• Direct support for unserviceable equipment.
• Acquisition of mission-essential equipment.
• Security during the mission planning process.
• Reposition to COB, AOB or MSS.
INFILTRATION PHASE AND INSERTION METHOD
4-47. The infiltration phase extends from the point of embarkation to arrival in the objective area.
Insertion method options include--
• High altitude, high opening (HAHO).
• High altitude, low opening (HALO).
• FRIES.
• SCUBA.
• SPIES.
• Air.
• Vehicle.
• Rubber boat.
• Stay behind.
• Rollover.
• Foot movement.
4-48. Any requested SEAD and CAS start when the insertion platform crosses the FLOT and starts
moving towards the insertion point. Insertion normally ends after the team caches nonmission-essential
equipment and the insertion platform leaves the loiter area. Generally, the infiltration phase continues
with team movement from the point of insertion to the security halt, and ends before the objective rally
point (ORP). Ideally, infiltration occurs during times of limited visibility. If the team must halt during |
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periods of increased visibility, they establish a clandestine patrol base. During infiltration, the team
leader records the team's movements in the patrol log. In the log, the team leader records in detail--
• The general direction of movement.
• Deviations from planned infiltration route.
• Information about terrain and weather.
• Enemy sightings en route.
• Signs of activity.
• Grid locations.
• Any peculiarities.
• Time of initial entry report.
EXECUTION (ACTIONS ON OBJECTIVE)
4-49. The LRS team establishes a security halt and the leader reconnoiters to identify an ORP. After
the team establishes the ORP, the leader moves out to pinpoint the objective or NAI, then to establish
surveillance. Once the reconnaissance is complete, other team members move to and establish the
tentative hide site and to set up communications with the COB or AOB. The surveillance team keeps
their "eyes on" the objective and maintains continuous communications with the hide site. The
surveillance site reports ISR tasks to the hide site.
4-50. If the LRS team cannot establish communications, the team and the LRS COB or AOB execute
the "no communications" contingency plan (developed during the planning phase).
4-51. The hide site sends information to the COB or AOB via HF or UHF TACSAT communications.
Once communications is established, the COB or AOB forwards the information to the BFBS S-2 ISR
fusion element over a LAN. The R&S squadron is copied on all reports.
4-52. The LRS team keeps sending reports to the COB or AOB until the team meets the mission
completion criteria or until the LTIOV. The LRS team reports during designated communication
windows or, if the report is information answering a PIR, out of those windows. After the team pulls
back from the objective they disseminate information, collect all surveillance logs and objective
sketches.
EXFILTRATION PHASE AND EXTRACTION METHOD
4-53. This phase starts after the team links up and disseminates information at the ORP and ends
when the team arrives at the debriefing location. Exfiltration routes normally differ from infiltration
routes. The team leader (again) keeps a patrol log, which details--
• The general direction of movement.
• Deviations from the planned exfiltration route.
• The terrain and weather.
• Enemy sightings.
• Signs of activity.
• Peculiarities.
4-54. Extraction method options include--
• Linkup (friendly or partisan).
• Air.
• SPIES.
• Vehicle.
• Watercraft.
• Rollover. |
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RECOVERY
4-55. This phase starts when the LRS team returns to the debriefing site, which is normally located at
the planning facility, and starts the multiphase debriefing process. It ends with the after action review
(AAR).
DEBRIEFING PROCESS
4-56. The whole LRS team attends all phases of the debriefing. The debriefing covers the team's
actions and all related details, chronologically, from the start of the infiltration phase, through arrival at
the debriefing site. The debriefing process normally includes the following in sequence: initial
debriefing, post initial debriefing, review of documents and other materials, follow-up debriefing, AAR
and team report of lessons learned.
Debrief Team
4-57. A trusted and knowledgeable intelligence representative, or LRS operations personnel conducts
the debriefing, which starts NLT two hours after the team returns. The timely collection, analysis, and
dissemination of information recovered in the debrief can provide many answers needed for follow-on
missions in the objective area.
Follow-up Actions
4-58. After the debriefing, the LRS team starts equipment maintenance, refit operations, and training
for follow-on missions.
Timing
4-59. Every LRS team is debriefed immediately after returning from a mission. The debriefing is
important in the intelligence collection effort, especially when used to clarify and expound on
information received via reporting.
Advantages
4-60. A debriefing can--
• Bring out unreported details that when collated with other information could alter the picture of
the enemy situation.
• Update terrain information.
• Reveal the location of downed or missing friendly aircraft.
• Highlight shortcomings in pre-mission planning in unit SOPs.
• Help reconstruct a mission in which casualties were sustained, either to recover remains or to
determine KIA, MIA, or POW status.
• Provide historical record of the mission for post-hostilities analysis.
Site
4-61. The LRS operations and the supporting intelligence section provide a facility for the debriefing.
They must choose a quiet, secure site with few physical, visual, or audible distractions. For example, if
they set up in a tent, they should do so away from generators. Before the LRS team arrives, the
debriefing team sets up everything they need such as maps, overlays and other planning materials. They
arrange for soup and coffee to keep team members alert and active during the debriefing process. If the
debriefing team plans to record the debriefing on audio or videotape, they should set up and test the
equipment before the team arrives. |
3-55.93 | 77 | Team Operations
Written or Taped Record of Information
4-62. Rather than recording the mission himself, the debriefer should delegate this task to two people
(written record) or one person (electronic record that is, audio or videotape). The recorder(s) should
concentrate on locations, times, direction of movement, and any other information the debriefer
identifies as important. For best results, the recorders should use two electronic recording devices so that
they can capture everything accurately. Voice and video recorders capture the facts of a debriefing and
serve as excellent historical records. When a patrol is in progress or the pace of an operation increases, a
unit can record the action and send copies of the tapes in place of formal patrol reports. Knowing that he
can hear or see a tape of the proceedings later keeps most requesters from asking to attend the live
debriefing. Operations provide the overlays produced during planning. These include the infiltration,
exfiltration, evasion and recovery (E&R), enemy situation map, and enemy SITEMP overlays. On a
clean overlay, the team records the actual routes taken. They also mark locations of key events such as
halts, enemy sightings, and signs of enemy presence or passage. On the overlay, they can add short
narratives of the events.
Protocol
4-63. Everyone attending must understand the rules. Although informal, the initial debriefing still
follows a strict protocol. Regardless of rank, the debriefer is in charge of the debriefing at all times. This
keeps the process orderly and prevents conflict. Interested parties may submit questions or comments for
the debriefer to address during the session. This ensures that all personnel receive as much information
as possible. "Strangers" may not interrogate the team. Only the debriefer may address them during the
debriefing. This allows rapport to build between the debriefer and the team. The LRS team sits together
in the center of the room or tent, in front of a map of their operational area. The debriefer sits or stands
near the team, where they can all see and reach the maps. Other participants, such as recorders, interested
staff members, and LNOs, sit in the second or third row of chairs from the map. This reinforces the fact
that the team members are the center of the debrief. This encourages them to speak out, especially when
attendance includes only a small group of people whom the team knows.
Attendees
4-64. The entire team, the debriefer(s), two recorders or one with an electronic recording device, the
LRSU commander, the operations sergeant, and a communications representative attend the debriefing.
A few interested parties, such as the R&S squadron or BFSB commanders, may also attend. If unable to
attend, the commanders may give their questions to the debrief team beforehand. Keeping the group
small helps the LRS and debriefing teams establish rapport. It also reduces the chance of hostilities.
Debriefer
4-65. The debriefer focuses on helping team members reconstruct their mission. Ideally, the debriefer
is an enemy OB analyst or technician who worked with the team before they infiltrated. An enemy OB
analyst will know the team's mission, the enemy situation in general, and how to deal with information
from other sources.
Raw Data
4-66. Before the debriefing, the team gives the intelligence section representative all team maps and
notes; patrol, surveillance, communications, and photo logs; film and sketches; captured material; and
any other relevant materials.
Time-Sensitive Information
4-67. The intelligence staff immediately exploits time-sensitive information critical to their
commander's, or higher level, decision-making process. For example, the debriefer might ask first about
the location of insurgent safe houses, so that friendly direct-action teams can target them. |
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TECHNIQUES
4-68. The debriefer can use several methods to gather information. A good technique is to use a map
of the team's AO. He starts at the team's point of infiltration and follows their routes and actions through
exfiltration. He monitors the flow of information to ensure the team covers all events, sightings, and
activities up to the point of arrival at the debriefing site. After going over the initial mission information,
he segments route information. He asks specific questions, emphasizing the specific WFF that affected
the team's mission. On a clean map overlay, the team leader and other members of the team annotate
route deviations, enemy sightings, or mission-sensitive information. Rather than leading participants
through the reconstruction of the mission, he keeps them focused and asks them questions for
clarification. The team leader is the key, but not the only, speaker. He helps ensure that each member
gets the chance to say what he saw.
Prepared Questions
4-69. The debriefer asks about observed target types.
Spot Reports
4-70. The team elaborates on their earlier reports.
Map
4-71. The team talks through the mission as executed.
INITIAL DEBRIEFING
4-72. The LRS operations section, a member of the BFSB S-2 ISR fusion element and a
representative of the R&S squadron S-2 section conduct this portion of the debriefing, but other staff
elements may also attend. This debriefing should help answer PIR, intelligence requirements, SIR, and
ISR tasks and RFIs. When the team arrives, the debriefer escorts them to the site. The initial debriefing is
quick and to the point. The debriefer chooses what format and line of questioning he will use.
POST-INITIAL DEBRIEFING
4-73. At the end of the formal debrief, a communications representative debriefs the RTO. He covers
communications-specific information when certain antennas worked best, which frequencies were best,
and other communications-specific issues. After the initial intelligence debriefing, the intelligence staff
gathers all maps, logs, notebooks, papers, exposed film, video tapes, photographs, recovered equipment,
and other material. If necessary, they inventory all rucksacks, map cases, and uniform pockets to ensure
that they have collected all items of intelligence interest. Then, they thoroughly review all of the
collected items for data and formulate more detailed questions for the next stage of debriefing. The team
remains separated from outside contact until after the follow-up debrief, but can start recovery operations
(showering, eating, sleeping, and conducting post-mission maintenance).
REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIAL
4-74. The BFBS and R&S squadron S-2 sections process all of the information the team collected.
Individual members of the team can be requisitioned to clarify a sketch or log entry. The LRS team also
begins to complete a debrief report and to collate their AAR notes. The R&S squadron and LRS
operations section collects information on the adequacy of MPF, intelligence and operations support.
The original overlays and maps should not be destroyed or discarded. After properly classifying and
annotating them, the squadron S-2 files them. Later, they will go into the unit historian's archives, for
reference in case of future missions into the same AO. These artifacts, consisting of actual operations
overlays, maps, orders, and debriefing records, should go into an historical database. Though considered
of little immediate value, the information in these items assumes increased importance over time, not
only for historical reasons, but also for reference for future operations. |
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FOLLOW-UP DEBRIEF AND AFTER-ACTION REVIEW
4-75. After individual debriefings, and not later than six hours after the team has recovered to the
debriefing site, the LRS operations section assembles the LRS team and the staff for a follow-up
debriefing and AAR. The commander may also attend. At this debriefing, the team leader summarizes
the operation, focusing on the team's stated and implied missions. He also briefs unanticipated team or
member activities such as actions to exploit a high-value source of information. Each staff section takes a
turn questioning the team members. This debriefing gives the team members the chance to raise issues of
support, communication, and coordination as well as any other perceived deficiencies in planning or
execution. The commander provides any further guidance and releases the team to prepare their AAR
and Report of Lessons Learned.
AFTER-ACTION REVIEW AND REPORT OF LESSONS LEARNED
4-76. The AAR identifies who, what, when, why, where, and how of the operation. It permanently
records the team's major activities from planning to debriefing. As such, it serves as an extremely
important template for comparison with past missions and planning of future missions. In his report, the
team leader reflects on the operation and makes recommendations for the future. He organizes them
IAW the WFF. He states what did and did not work, and identifies how the unit's existing TTP need to
change.
Section II. RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
The three forms of reconnaissance operations are area reconnaissance, zone reconnaissance and route
reconnaissance. Reconnaissance missions greatly increase a team's vulnerability and chances of compromise.
The team's mobility is generally limited to foot movement and the amount of equipment carried reduces the size
of the area they can reconnoiter. Appendix J provides example formats for reconnaissance of bridges and
routes.
AREA RECONNAISSANCE
4-77. Area reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance operation. It is a directed effort to obtain
detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (FM 1-02). The
location may be given as a grid coordinate or an objective on an overlay. The team leader organizes the
team to conduct the reconnaissance in one of two ways. Depending on the terrain and time, the team may
either use single or multiple separate reconnaissance and security elements (Figure 4-3). Reconnaissance
and security teams are normally used in any size reconnaissance patrol. When conducting reconnaissance
missions in team-sized units, the leader can organize the team in any of several ways:
• One two- to three-Soldier reconnaissance and security team conducts the reconnaissance. The
rest of the team stays at the release point and establishes a hide site.
• Two reconnaissance and security teams reconnoiter a separate portion of the objective, and then
meet at a designated linkup point.
• One reconnaissance and security team, followed closely by a security team, acting as a
quick-reaction force.
4-78. One or two Soldiers in a reconnaissance and security team can reconnoiter, while the rest of the
element provides security. However, the number of Soldiers in a reconnaissance and security team
varies, depending on the mission. Usually, three can provide both an adequate reconnaissance and the
required security. The information used may vary according to the terrain. The most important planning
consideration is that each member of the reconnaissance and security team knows the sector or area for
which he is responsible. |
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Figure 4-3. Reconnaissance and surveillance elements.
4-79. Before executing an area reconnaissance, the team develops a detailed plan using all available
information. They conduct this mission the same as they would a surveillance mission. First, the leader
pinpoints the reconnaissance objective or NAI, and second, he locates the best vantage points for a static
surveillance. The best static surveillance techniques include—
Long-Range Observation and Surveillance
4-80. Long-range observation and surveillance means "the observation of an objective from a point"
(an observation post [OP]). The OP is normally outside enemy small-arms weapons range and local
security measures. The LRS team can use this technique whenever METT-TC lets them gather
information from a distance. It is the best way to conduct an area reconnaissance, because the team
remains far enough away to avoid detection. Using this technique also keeps the team's no-fire or
restricted fire area from overlapping with the objective area. When the reconnaissance team cannot
gather information from one OP, they can move to a series of OPs until they gather the required
information. Observation posts require adequate cover and concealment and a good view of the
objective. Routes between and from OPs to the hide site or RP also require cover and concealment.
Short-Range Observation and Surveillance
4-81. Short-range observation and surveillance is "the observation of an objective from a place that is
within the range of enemy small-arms weapons fire and local security measures."
• Short-range observation works best when METT-TC requires a close approach to the objective
to gain information.
• The reconnaissance teams can conduct short-range observation and surveillance from OPs, but
they must usually move near the objective before they can find a place where they can observe.
In some cases, the teams may gather information by listening, even though they cannot see
the enemy. |
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• Observing at short ranges increases the chance of detection. The enemy might use
anti-intrusion devices and patrols near key installations. Inclement weather can reduce the
sounds of the reconnaissance team's movement, and limited visibility favors short-range
observation. When the team must observe at short ranges, they use every means available to
avoid detection.
4-82. To reconnoiter a road, the team leader selects multiple vantage points (OPs) along the road. The
reconnaissance element reconnoiters bridges, defiles, bends in the road, and urban areas. The
reconnaissance element reports the condition, trafficability, and width of the road; evidence of the
enemy, obstacles; bridge and ford locations and conditions; and tunnel or underpass locations and
dimensions.
4-83. To reconnoiter a wood line, the reconnaissance element uses concealed routes and stealth to
reach the wood line and avoids contact. The reconnaissance element checks for evidence of enemy
activity such as tracks, litter, old fighting positions, mines, booby traps, and obstacles. The
reconnaissance element determines if the woods are trafficable. The element checks all positions from
which the enemy could observe and fire on friendly elements in open areas, then reports.
ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
4-84. Zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles,
terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries (FM 1-02). The team obtains detailed
information about routes, obstacles, key terrain, and enemy activities in a zone established by lateral
boundaries. The team can use the fan, converging-routes, or successive-sectors method.
FAN METHOD
4-85. The team leader selects a series of ORPs throughout the zone. When the team arrives at the first
ORP, it halts and establishes security. The team leader confirms the team's location. He then selects
reconnaissance routes to and from the ORP. The routes form a fan-shaped pattern around the ORP
(Figure 4-4). The routes must overlap to ensure that the team reconnoiters the entire area. Once the
routes are selected, the team leader sends out reconnaissance elements. He keeps a small reserve in the
ORP. For example, if the team has three reconnaissance elements, he sends two, keeping the third in
reserve. The team leader also sends the elements out on adjacent routes. This keeps the teams from
making contact in two different directions. After the team has reconnoitered the area (fan), the leader
reports the information. The team then moves to the next ORP and repeats these actions.
Figure 4-4. Fan method. |
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CONVERGING-ROUTES METHOD
4-86. The team leader selects an ORP, reconnaissance routes through the zone, and then a linkup
point. He sends out a sub element on each route. He normally moves with the center element. The
subunits normally reconnoiter their routes by using the fan method. The entire team meets at the linkup
point at the designated time (Figure 4-5).
Figure 4-5. Converging routes method.
SUCCESSIVE-SECTOR METHOD
4-87. This method is a continuation of the converging-routes method. The team leader selects an
ORP, a series of reconnaissance routes, and linkup points. The actions of the team from each ORP to
each linkup point are the same as in the converging-routes method, that is, each linkup point becomes the
ORP for the next phase. When the team meets, the team leader again designates reconnaissance routes, a
linkup time, and the next linkup point. This action continues until the team has reconnoitered the entire
zone (Figure 4-6).
Figure 4-6. Successive sector method. |
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ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
4-88. Route reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route and
all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (FM 1-02).
4-89. Route reconnaissance obtains information about enemy activity, obstacles, route conditions, and
critical terrain features along a specific route. It is generally beyond the capability of a LRS team to
obtain precise data for road curves, widths and heights of underpasses, and dimensions of tunnels.
However, they can report the types of vehicles that use the roads, or that enter or exit the tunnels. From
this, intelligence personnel can estimate the weight limits, widths, and other information about the roads,
tunnels, and underpasses. The LRS team follows the example report formats provided in FM 5-170.
Example intelligence requirements for a LRS route reconnaissance include--
• The available space (in meters) in which a force can maneuver without having to bunch up to
avoid obstacles. The size of trees and the density of forests are reported due to the effect on
vehicle movement.
• The locations of all obstacles and of any available bypass(s).
• Any enemy forces that can influence movement along the route.
• The observation and fields of fire along the route and adjacent terrain.
• The locations along the route that provide good cover and concealment.
• Trafficability along the route.
• Landing and pickup zones along the route.
• Any bridges by construction and type, estimated dimensions of each, and any vehicles crossing
the bridge. This helps intelligence personnel estimate its load classification.
BRIDGE CLASSIFICATION
4-90. This is not a separate category of reconnaissance, but it might be a necessary part of an area,
zone, or route reconnaissance. The team follows procedures to ensure that they provide the dimensional
data needed to analyze the bridge's structure for repairs, demolition, or military-load classification.
Seldom can a team obtain precise measurements. However, if possible, they report the type and number
of vehicles that cross the bridge. Intelligence can then estimate the weight, height, and weight limit of the
bridge (FM 5-170).
LEADER RECONNAISSANCE
4-91. The leader plans and reconnoiters all primary and alternate surveillance and hide sites. The
criteria for selecting these sites is similar, except that the hide site must be sited to allow for long-range
communications, and the surveillance site must allow round-the-clock surveillance. Leaders evaluate all
primary and alternate sites based on the following criteria, then they establish and disseminate rally
points and break out plans for all sites:
HIDE SITE
• Does the site facilitate long-range (HF or UHF TACSAT) communications?
• Does the area provide concealment as well as routes of ingress and egress?
• Are dominant or unusual terrain features located nearby?
• Is the area wet, does it have adequate drainage, or is it prone to flooding?
• Is the area a place that the enemy would want to occupy?
• Is the site silhouetted against the skyline or a contrasting background?
• Are roads or trails located nearby? |
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• Are other natural lines of drift located nearby?
• Could the hide personnel become trapped easily in the site?
• Do obstacles, such as a ditch, fence, wall, stream, or river, prevent vehicle movement nearby?
• Are any inhabited areas located in the prevailing downwind area?
• Are any suitable communication sites located nearby?
• Is the site in the normal line of vision of enemy personnel in the area?
• Is there a source of water in the area?
SURVEILLANCE SITE
• Can the team place the designated surveillance target(s) under constant and effective
observation and within the range of surveillance devices to be used?
• Would the surveillance site have to move if weather and light conditions change?
• Does the area provide concealment?
• Does the area provide adequate egress routes?
• Are dominant or unusual terrain features located nearby?
• Is the area wet, does it have adequate drainage, or is the area prone to flooding?
• Would the enemy want to occupy this area?
• Is the site silhouetted against the skyline or a contrasting background?
• Are any roads or trails located nearby?
• Are any other natural lines of drift located nearby such as gullies, draws, or any terrain easy for
foot movement?
• Could the surveillance team become trapped easily in the site?
• Do any obstacles, such as a roadside ditch, fence, wall, stream, or river, prevent vehicle
movement nearby?
• Are any inhabited areas located in the prevailing downwind area?
• Is the site in the normal line of vision of enemy personnel in the area?
• Is there a source of water in the area?
• Does the site facilitate communications?
Section III. SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
This section discusses selection and occupation of sites; security and reports; linkup and dissemination of
information; contingencies and heavy team and platoon operations.
SELECTION AND OCCUPATION OF SITES
4-92. After he completes his reconnaissance (described in Section II), the leader selects the hide and
surveillance sites. While selecting the sites, he determines whether each site will have
nonmission-essential equipment. His decision determines the size of sites to construct and the type of
breakout drills that the team must perform, if required. |
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HIDE SITE
4-93. The team should test communications from the tentative site before they start constructing it.
Otherwise, they might have to start over with a new site.
SURVEILLANCE SITE
4-94. The leader selects each site based on the quality of its observation and communications with the
other site. To determine if the planned surveillance site (Figure 4-7) will work well for surveillance, the
team places all optics at the same levels they will use when they actually occupy the site, such as at
ground level. Seldom do circumstances allow for rebuilding of sites. Finally, try to minimize digging
signatures (sound and dust).
Figure 4-7. Example surveillance site.
OCCUPATION
4-95. Teams maintain security at all time. Security personnel must emplace far enough out to detect
intruders, but must remain close enough to alert the team. A technique to alert the site of an intruder is to
simply tug on a cord tied from the security position to a Soldier at the site.
4-96. The team should maintain all-round security, and pay close attention to the most likely avenues
of approach. Each site needs all-round observation and a view of anyone or anything in the area. This
helps prevent compromise, as it allows team members to detect movement and gives them the advantage
if they must break out of the site.
4-97. Appendix H discusses how to construct hide and surveillance sites. In most cases, the team
should only work on a surveillance site in limited visibility, but they can work on a hide site during the
day, if needed. Generally, the team must camouflage all sites well enough to escape detection from
greater than 10 meters. The sites should blend well with the surrounding terrain in texture and form.
4-98. The LRS team prepares and rehearses a complete breakout plan. Team members prepare
equipment for executing a breakout drill immediately. Pre-positioned M18 Claymore mines and smoke
grenades can facilitate a quick breakout of the site.
SECURITY AND REPORTS
4-99. The team prepares and sends reports during actions on the objective from on the start of
observation activities until the dissemination of information. The reports the team members at each site
must make depend on that site's specific tasking. |
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HIDE SITE
4-100. The primary mission of the hide site is to facilitate team internal and long-range
communications. On long missions, team members can rotate between the surveillance and hide sites
(Figure 4-8). It is usually more secure than the surveillance site, because it is farther from the objective
and designed for hiding. Antennas, a hide site's largest signature, should remain up only when in use.
Otherwise, they are lowered or removed. One team member serves as lookout while another one
constructs or adjusts the antennas. The lookout must be able to see the enemy before the enemy sees the
Soldier working on the antennas. To prevent detection, team members minimize movement around the
site. They use countertracking whenever someone moves around the site. They also minimize noise and
light. Although the site is well camouflaged, noise and light can easily compromise the team's location.
4-101. The team keeps detailed communications and patrol logs throughout the mission. The
communications log includes—
• Exact messages sent.
• Exact messages received.
• Antennas used or tried, and their configuration time(s) and location(s).
4-102. Before any element performs a shift change in the site, all information collected at the site by
the outgoing shift is disseminated, to include—
• Message traffic.
• The status of the surveillance site.
• Any enemy activity on the objective.
Figure 4-8. Example hide site. |
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SURVEILLANCE SITE
4-103. During periods of activity on the objective, all personnel should be awake and alert to aid in
security and recording. One person cannot record and conduct surveillance at the same time during
periods of increased activity. The team keeps detailed surveillance logs, to include sketches of the
objective. The more detailed the information and sketches are, the more successful the mission will be.
When the team recognizes PIR, intelligence requirements, SIR, ISR tasks and RFIs, they send it to the
hide site promptly for transmission to the COB or AOB either immediately (PIR) or during a scheduled
communications window. They can use either secure or nonsecure means, depending upon the
equipment or time available. The messages must be complete and well written to reduce time needed for
corrections or clarification. (Chapter 6 provides examples of communication orders formats.) The team
pays particular attention to the amount of movement, noise and light discipline, and the reduction of any
reflection that may come from using optics. The team must pack any equipment not in use so that they
can evacuate the site quickly. As with the hide site, the team must completely disseminate all information
collected before they change shifts. If the team plans to perform a breakout drill, they send a message to
the hide site first, if possible.
LINKUP AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
4-104. When the decision is made to leave the objective, the team must perform a number of actions.
The plan outlines the routes they will take, site breakdown procedures, and security during breakdown.
After they break down the site, they thoroughly sterilize it to prevent the enemy from detecting their
presence and knowing where to release tracker teams. The team must leave nothing behind that can give
the enemy any information. They take extra care with their security. The team is in great danger from
this point until the extraction is complete.
4-105. While the surveillance team moves out, the hide site team breaks down and sterilizes the site.
They follow the same procedures and precautions as described for the surveillance site.
4-106. The team rehearses linkup procedures before the mission begins. During linkup, the team is at
the greatest risk of fratricide. Everyone must understand all signals. Only one element may move into the
linkup site at a time. Who moves first is decided during rehearsals. Communications and night vision
capability assist in conducting linkups. After the linkup, the team disseminates all information gained in
case they become separated again before extraction.
CONTINGENCIES
4-107. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special
procedures to ensure safety and readiness of personnel and equipment. The team must consider the
following contingencies for the execution phase:
• Actions on enemy contact during insertion.
• Break in contact.
• Actions taken by the team if separated during insertion.
• Plan for priority of destruction of equipment.
• Rally or rendezvous plan to cover team during foot infiltration to objective, while on the
objective, and during exfiltration.
• Plan for avoiding all known or suspected enemy forces, danger areas, or civilian
concentrations.
• Security during movement, halts, cache, communications, and during hide or surveillance site
construction.
• Cross-loading of equipment, sensitive items, and construction material.
• Lack of a communications plan (team internal and external to the COB). |
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• Actions on enemy contact.
• Linkup plan for both teams internally, and with other friendly forces.
HEAVY TEAM AND PLATOON OPERATIONS
4-108. Some METT-TC conditions may require a LRS team to have additional Soldiers attached or in
support. A LRS team may require additional personnel to carry surveillance site construction materials
and water. These additional Soldiers (three to six) are known as a "mule team." They accompany the
team to the objective area, construct the subsurface surveillance site, and depart the objective area during
limited visibility. The advantage to using these TTP is that the LRS team is rested when starting the
surveillance mission.
4-109. METT-TC conditions may also allow for the use of a LRSD employed as a tactical platoon. The
LRSD establishes a patrol base, and then emplaces multiple surveillance sites. The LRSD acts both as
the sustainment base and as a quick reaction force in case a surveillance site is compromised. This
technique has been very successfully employed in desert environments when the objective area is far
from any support base and multiple surveillance sites are needed. Sustainment and rotation of
surveillance site personnel occurs during the hours of limited visibility.
Section IV. COMBAT ASSESSMENT
Combat assessment is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military
operations. Combat assessment has three major components: battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions
effects assessment, and reattack recommendation (JP 3-60 and FM 1-02). However, LRS teams only participate
in the BDA component. LRS teams are critical sensors for all fire-support platforms. At times, they may be the
only source of targeting information available for high-value targets (HVTs). Keys to a successful combat
assessment operation are using standardized report formats and sending the best possible information and
images of the damage observed for trained analysts to evaluate.
DEFINITION AND PURPOSE
4-110. BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military
force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a predetermined objective. BDA can be applied to the
employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapons systems)
throughout the range of military operations. BDA is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required
inputs and coordination from the operators (FM 1-02). BDA, in its most basic form, answers four
questions quickly and accurately:
• Was the target hit?
• What was the extent of physical and functional damage?
• Were the commander's objectives achieved in full, in part, or not at all?
• Should the target be reattacked?
4-111. The LRS team can make a recommendation to reattack, but it is the targeting planners, not the
LRS team, who decide whether the target should be reattacked.
CONSIDERATIONS
4-112. When assessing battle damage, the team should consider—
CONDITION OF THE TARGET
4-113. This includes the overall level of destruction or serviceability of the target and whether it was
occupied or unoccupied, and whether the enemy was withdrawing or reinforcing. |
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CASUALTIES
4-114. This includes the number of wounded or dead.
EQUIPMENT DAMAGE OR SERVICEABILITY
4-115. This lists destroyed and neutralized vehicles and weapon systems, and identifies which need
repair or recovery.
INSTALLATION DAMAGE OR SERVICEABILITY
4-116. This identifies damage levels and relative serviceability of runways, roads, buildings, lighting,
bridges, power and phone lines, and any repair and damage-control activities.
MISSION PLANNING FACTORS
4-117. In addition to normal planning factors, BDA missions include—
• Task organization (forward observers or combat controllers).
• Personnel markings.
• Position markings.
• Communications equipment and frequencies.
• BDA criteria.
• Special equipment such as lasers and thermals.
• Pulse repetition codes.
• Authentication codes.
• Training in the use of special equipment.
• Rehearsals and precombat inspections.
• Withdrawal.
CHARACTERISTICS
4-118. Initial post-strike BDA reports are sent to the COB or AOB, who sends them to the controlling
headquarters. The team is responsible for obtaining and reporting raw data about collateral, physical, and
functional damage.
WEAPON AND ORDNANCE MALFUNCTIONS
4-119. Because the team observes and reports any observed battle damage, the team can also report the
number and type of dud ordinance and any weapon malfunctions.
REPORTS
4-120. The team reports their BDA observations from the target area in either the SALUTER or
INTREP format. They should include digital imagery, if available.
DAMAGE TYPES AND LEVELS
4-121. The team reports the extent of physical and functional damage sustained by each target.
Physical damage assessments estimate the extent of physical damage resulting from the application of
military force, that is, from munitions blasts, fragmentation, and the effects of fire. The team bases their
assessment upon observed or interpreted damage. |
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COLLATERAL DAMAGE
4-122. The team reports any collateral damage that occurs during BDA missions. Collateral damage is
defined as unintentional or incidental damage to facilities or equipment, or casualties, that occur due to
military actions directed against a targeted enemy force or facility.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-123. Assessing physical damage is a judgment call. The key factors are the type and size of the target
and warhead used, and the location of the detonation. The team also considers whether the enemy's use
of camouflage, concealment, and deception reduced or increased the physical damage, because these
factors could distort the assessment.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-124. The team assesses the extent to which military force degraded or destroyed the ability of the
targeted facility or objective to perform its intended mission. The level of success is based upon the
operational objectives established against the target. Because assessment of functional damage is
subjective, the team need not associate a confidence level with it. However, they can include an estimate
of the time required for the recuperation or replacement of the target function.
No Functional Damage--Target is undamaged or has sustained little or no damage to critical
element(s), leaving normal functional capability intact. The target is fully operational or able to
act; it is mission capable. This damage level does not require recuperation or replacement
times.
Light Functional Damage--The critical element(s) of the target has sustained damage, causing
less than a 15 percent decrease in normal operational capability. This damage level requires an
estimation of the time required for recuperation or replacement of the target function.
Moderate Functional Damage--The critical element(s) of the target has sustained damage,
causing a 15 to 45 percent decrease in normal operational capability. This damage level
requires an estimation of the time required for recuperation or replacement of the target
function.
Severe Functional Damage--The critical element(s) of the target has sustained damage, causing
greater than a 45 percent decrease in normal operational capability. This damage level requires
an estimation of the time required for recuperation or replacement of the target function.
Functional Destruction--The critical element(s) of the target has sustained damage rendering the
entire target unusable for its original purpose. Target cannot support combat or production
operations without repairing or replacing critical elements. This damage level requires an
estimation of the time required for recuperation or replacement of the target function.
Abandoned--Regardless of physical damage, this facility or equipment is not being used for its
intended purpose. Target cannot support combat or production operations without being
reoccupied, re-equipped, or both.
Unknown Functional Damage--Although the critical element(s) of the target has been attacked,
insufficient data exist to assess whether functional damage occurred.
BRIDGES
4-125. A bridge is designed to allow movement of personnel and equipment across an obstacle.
Destruction of the bridge might not be required. For example, degrading the ability of the bridge to allow
movement of vehicles might be enough to accomplish the mission. |
3-55.93 | 91 | Team Operations
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-126. When reporting physical damage, report the number of spans that are damaged and destroyed
out of the total number of spans on the bridge. Note that the deck or floor of a railroad bridge can be
solid or open track.
No Damage--Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Light Damage--The bridge has sustained superficial damage, but the roadway remains
undamaged.
Moderate Damage--All spans remain intact, but one or more spans has sustained holes in the
deck or floor. For pontoon bridges, one pontoon section has been sunk.
Severe Damage--All spans remain attached, but one or more spans has sustained 50 percent
destruction to the deck or floor width. For pontoon bridges, two or more nonadjacent pontoon
sections has been sunk.
Destruction--At least one span has been dropped. Piers or abutments might have sustained
damage or they might have been destroyed. For pontoon bridges, two or more adjacent pontoon
sections have been sunk.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-127. Using the assessment of physical damage can help determine the level of functional damage.
Highway Bridge--When you report that a bridge has sustained moderate to severe damage,
identify the number of lanes that remain open (on a highway bridge) and what how much traffic
can still use the bridge.
Railroad Bridge--Moderate or greater physical damage to a railroad bridge generally renders
it unusable.
Pontoon Bridge--Recuperation time may be short in duration for a pontoon bridge that has been
destroyed due to the destruction of a few sections. Several factors such as the presence or
availability of spare sections, repair capability, or both, can rapidly reverse the effects of an
attack. Some might be repaired before the combat assessment report is completed.
Permanent Spanned Bridge--When a permanent bridge span sustains moderate to severe
physical damage, assessing the extent of functional damage is difficult. The combat assessment
analyst can seldom see under the bridge, but the damage there often exceeds the damage he can
see on the deck. This is due to the delayed fuses used on most bridges.
BUILDINGS
4-128. A building is designed to environmentally shelter an enclosed function or equipment.
Destruction of the building is not required. The point is to destroy the critical element(s) it houses.
TYPES
4-129. These include framed buildings, buildings with load-bearing walls, high multistory buildings,
and buildings with multiple wings.
Framed Buildings--Framed structures (such as military headquarters, office buildings, and
aircraft hangars) rarely collapse totally in an attack with conventional weapons. However,
regardless of external and overall damage, the building's frame tends to remain intact. On the
other hand, a steel or concrete frame need not collapse for the building to sustain damage at the
levels previously described.
Buildings with Load Bearing Walls--In contrast to framed buildings, those with load-bearing
walls, that is, walls that carry the weight of the floor and roof, generally sustain damage levels
equal to the amount of building collapse, and the damaged elements generally include the
load-bearing and non-load-bearing structural elements. |
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High, Multistory Buildings--For buildings with more than four stories or with multiple sections
(or wings), the team should report the level of damage for each story, section, or wing
individually and that of the structure as a whole. For example, if a ten-story building receives
severe damage to the upper three stories, they report the level of damage to those three floors
plus the level of damage to the structure as a whole, which in this case might be assessed as
moderate.
Buildings with Multiple Wings--For buildings with multiple wings, the team reports the
destroyed wings and the damage to the remainder of the structure. For example, they might
report that the North and South wings of a headquarters building have been destroyed, while
the center section sustained only moderate damage.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-130. Target-element-area damage includes damage to non-load-bearing elements such as facades and
external sheathing, as well as broken windows and glass, blown-out curtain walls, and blown-out
roof panels.
No Damage--Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Light Damage--At this level of damage, the target-element area has sustained up to 15
percent damage.
Moderate Damage--At this level of damage, the target-element area has sustained from 15 to 45
percent damage.
Severe Damage--At this level of damage, the target-element area has sustained from 45 to 75
percent damage.
Destruction--At this level of damage, the target-element area has sustained from 75 to 100
percent damage.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-131. The greater the extent of physical damage to the building, the greater the likelihood that the
critical element(s) within is damaged, hence the building requires a longer recuperation time to restore
the function.
Location and Hardness--Although the level of physical damage to a building and functional
damage to its critical element(s) correlate somewhat, the location and hardness of a building's
contents are the keys to a meaningful functional assessment. For example, in an industrial
building, the machinery may be less vulnerable than the structure in which it is contained. The
structure might be moderately damaged, while the machinery it houses sustains little or no
damage. On the other hand, fragile computer or other electronic equipment might be destroyed
while the building that houses it sustains far less functional damage.
Contents--Framed structures tend to show less apparent physical damage and is less likely to
collapse than other types of buildings. Thus, determining the functional damage to the contents
of a framed building is more difficult than assessing those of a wall-bearing structure. These
tend to show more physical damage, and they collapse more readily, causing greater functional
damage to their contents than do framed structures.
Recuperation--The team reports recuperation for both the structure and for the critical elements.
Structural Damage as Unusability Criteria--General weaponeering guidance considers a
building unusable (functionally destroyed) when it has sustained 50 percent structural damage.
Depending on the type and location of critical elements, a lesser percentage of damage may be
adequate to achieve the desired level of functional degradation. |
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Landmarks and Symbols--A building may also serve as an important landmark or other symbol
of national unity and resolve; in these cases, the entire building may be the critical element.
BUNKERS
4-132. Bunkers were formerly called hardened facilities. It can be very difficult for LRS teams to
provide accurate BDA on bunkers unless they are able to conduct a physical inspection.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-133. Target-element-area damage includes damage to non-load-bearing elements such as facades and
external sheathing, as well as to broken windows and glass, blown-out curtain walls, and blown-out
roof panels.
No Damage--Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Light Damage--At this level of damage, no weapon penetration has occurred, but exterior
damage is apparent.
Moderate Damage--At this level of damage, weapons have obviously penetrated the bunker.
Severe Damage--At this level of damage, part, but less than one-third of, the bunker roof or
sidewalls has collapsed.
Destruction--At this level of damage, more than one-third of the bunker roof and sidewalls have
collapsed.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-134. Assessing damage to all types of hardened structures requires analysis of aircraft cockpit video
(ACV) and a search for blown-off entrance doors, burn marks outside entrances, or smoke from fire or
secondary explosions. The results of this analysis must be compared to information about the internal
configuration of the bunker to determine the approximate location of the weapon detonation.
4-135. A single weapon is unlikely to collapse or partially destroy a large bunker built with lots of
thick concrete, burster slabs, and soil layers. However, a big weapon detonation inside the bunker
generally destroys the contents. Knowledge of bunker construction such as dimensions, wall placement,
and thickness of roofs, floors, or walls is required to accurately assess the extent of internal physical and
functional damage.
4-136. Functional damage to a bunker depends on its mission. If internal compartmentalization allows,
a round that penetrates the bunker has a good chance of damaging or destroying sensitive contents such
as aircraft or munitions. If the damage is not too great, the contents can be moved. In these situations,
depending on the level of physical damage, the contents can be removed and the bunker can be
reconstituted to reuse for protective storage of other equipment or supplies.
4-137. A successful weapon penetration and detonation generally damages or destroys both mission
and operations in a bunker serving in a production or C2 role. In any of these situations, the extent of
functional damage depends on estimates of physical damage to the internal structure, ventilation system,
to electronic or communications equipment, and to power supplies, lights, water lines, tools, and
equipment, for example. Generally, long recuperation times are associated with this type of internal
damage. As with buildings, when reporting recuperation, the team reports both the structure's
recuperation and the recuperation of the critical elements.
DAMS AND LOCKS
4-138. Dams and locks have one function: to contain water on the upstream side. Military action
can cause-- |
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NO DAMAGE
4-139. If no damage occurs, no loss of functionality occurs.
DAMAGE
4-140. A breach, break, or puncture in the face of the lock or dam affects functionality immediately in
the form of a leak, whose size depends on the amount of damage.
DESTRUCTION
4-141. Loss of the lock or dam causes an immediate flood, which is total functional failure.
DISTILLATION TOWERS
4-142. Distillation tower targets include the tower and all associated equipment.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-143. When reporting physical damage to a specific tower, also report damage level of equipment
directly associated with the tower. This equipment usually includes one or more furnaces, heat
exchangers, or condensers; and elevated pipe ways. If possible, also report damage level of the control
building associated with the distillation tower.
No Damage
4-144. Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Light Damage
4-145. Military action has caused no apparent penetration of tower shell or disruption to piping
connections. Portions of the insulation covering the tower shell appear damaged or scorched.
Moderate Damage
4-146. Military action has left the tower shell standing, but has penetrated the tower or deformed or
severed piping connections.
Destruction
4-147. Military action has at least partially collapsed or toppled the tower.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-148. The effects of damaging a distillation tower on the target’s production capabilities depend on
the specific functions of the towers such as primary distillation or secondary processing. The team
reports functional damage of a distillation tower in terms of the time required to repair or replace it and
the specific production capabilities denied in the meantime. The team must also report damage to
equipment directly associated with a distillation tower, because the results could compare to significant
damage to the tower.
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
4-149. This applies to equipment whether deployed or in depot:
DEFINITIONS
• Armored vehicles include tanks and armored personal carriers.
• Artillery includes field and antiaircraft artillery systems, both towed and self propelled.
• Trucks include all types of nonarmored vehicles, whether used for land transportation, and C2. |
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• Locomotives and rolling stock include all types of rail transportation.
• Aircraft include all types of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
• Rockets include single-round and multiround rockets and their associated launchers.
• Missiles include surface-to-surface and surface-to-air (fixed and mobile) missiles and their
associated launchers.
• Radar antennas include those that stand alone or are attached to a van or trailer. Radars may or
may not be associated with a missile site.
• Fire-control components include all vans or trailers (radar, guidance, power and computer)
associated with SSM, SAM, and AAA sites.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-150. The team must consider their observations carefully before they report "No damage" to military
equipment. They might not observe some of the physical deformations that happened to it. To determine
damage level, they must analyze as many sources and types of information as they can observe; for
example, a complete lack of either vehicular movement or radio transmissions for an extended period of
time. Then, when they are ready to report physical damage to military equipment, they must report the
total number of each type of equipment observed, the number of pieces of equipment damaged, and the
number destroyed.
No Damage
4-151. Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Damage
4-152. Military action has caused physical deformations to equipment such as holes, exterior scorch
marks, or broken or missing exterior equipment or components such as broken tracks or wheel or
missing armored plates. However, major components remain intact.
Destruction
4-153. Military action has left the equipment unrepairable, possibly scrappable. This qualifies as
catastrophic damage (K-Kill).
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-154. The level of functional damage of a missile or radar site depends upon the extent of damage, the
number of critical elements and their individual levels of damage, and the interconnectivity of the
various elements that make up the site. Visible damage might have little or no effect on equipment
functionality. Functional damage of equipment includes any damage that partly or completely reduces--
• The ability of the C2 nodes to effectively operate.
• The ability of the logistics nodes to--
-- Fuel,
-- Arm,
-- Fix,
-- Transport,
-- Operate, or
-- Protect. |
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• The ability of the engineering resources to provide--
-- Mobility,
-- Countermobility, and
-- Survivability support.
TYPES OF EQUIPMENT
4-155. Types of equipment whose reduction in capability can affect the functioning of a site or
element include--
Armored Vehicles and Artillery--Functional damage is an elimination of firepower capability
(F-kill), prevention of mobility (M-kill), or both, which the crew cannot repair on the
battlefield.
Trucks--Functional damage is a reduction in mobility (M-kill) or in ability to use the truck's
internal equipment for a number of hours until the crew can repair the equipment or vehicle.
Locomotives and Rolling Stock--Functional damage is prevention of mobility (M-kill) for a
number of hours until the crew can repair the locomotive or rolling stock cars. Functional
damage can also include damage or destruction of materials within the cars.
Aircraft--Functional damage prevents takeoff (PTO-kill) for a number of hours until the crew can
repair it.
Rocket, Missile, or Launcher--Functional damage prevents successful or effective firing of the
weapon (F-kill). The crew cannot repair this damage on the battlefield.
Radar Antenna or Its Van or Trailer--Functional damage prevents a radar system from
acquiring, firing, or tracking missiles (F-kill) until the system can be repaired.
GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL
4-156. Damaging or destroying an occupied position such as a bunker, trench, or other structure or a
vehicle such as a personnel carrier or truck usually causes casualties. FM 6-30 states that for indirect fire,
thirty-percent casualties or materiel damage inflicted during a short time span normally renders a unit
ineffective. However, a commander will stipulate the desired effects and percentages required for
success against specific target categories.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-157. In addition to reporting physical damage levels, the team should estimate the total percentage of
the ground force destroyed. For equipment, see the damage definitions provided for military equipment.
No Damage
4-158. Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Damage
4-159. Military action has caused up to 30 percent casualties to visible personnel or to occupied
positions or organic equipment.
Destruction
4-160. Military action has caused more than 30 percent casualties to visible personnel or to occupied
positions or organic equipment. |
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FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-161. The attrition of ground forces is influenced by factors in the domains of battle: physical
(personnel, weapons systems, and sustainment), cybernetic (C2), morale (will to fight), training, and
leadership. Generally, the greater the personnel casualties and damage to their equipment and
communications and supply networks, the greater the attrition of ground forces and the lower their
combat effectiveness. Desertions or POW losses may also render a unit ineffective. As part of
determining enemy combat effectiveness (ability to function), two factors must be addressed in clear and
simple terms:
• Reconstitution of forces and recuperation of facilities.
• Residual capabilities to perform defense, assault, and supply missions.
STORAGE TANKS FOR PETROLEUM, OIL, LUBRICANTS
4-162. Although a POL tank may sustain damage, its contents may be retrievable and usable.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
No Damage
4-163. Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Light to Moderate Damage, Aboveground Tanks
4-164. Military action has punctured top walls, sidewalls, or both; possibly spilled contents; caused no
evidence of sustained fire; left structural integrity intact.
Light to Moderate Damage, Partly or Completely Underground Tanks
4-165. Round has penetrated tank, but no secondary explosion or sustained fire has occurred.
Destruction
4-166. Military action has caused at least partial collapse or buckling of side wall; or, a secondary
explosion or a sustained fire has occurred, or both.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-167. Significant functional damage of a POL storage installation is expressed in terms of storage
capacity rendered unusable and time required to repair or replace this denied capacity.
POWER PLANT TURBINES AND GENERATORS
4-168. Power plant turbines and generators may be housed in separate structures or together in a single
structure called a "generator hall." Physical damage to the turbine or generator units can be difficult to
identify if the generator hall remains relatively intact. Therefore, damage estimates to the units are based
upon the location of the weapon detonation and on the physical damage to the building itself. The closer
to the floor a weapon detonates, the greater the probability of unit damage. The extent and location of
structural damage, as opposed to roof-panel damage, is another indicator of unit damage--the greater the
wall damage and structural collapse, the greater the likelihood that the unit(s) is damaged or destroyed
under the rubble.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-169. When reporting physical damage, the team reports the number of turbines or generators that are
damaged and destroyed out of the total number of units at the facility. When performing combat
assessment on a generator hall, they report physical damage to both the building (see previous
discussion), and they estimate damage to the turbines or generators located inside. |
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No Damage
4-170. Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Damage
4-171. Military action has caused no apparent weapon penetration of unit, but the environmental
housing over the unit has sustained damage and is disfigured. The unit may also have been displaced
from its foundation.
Destruction
4-172. Military action has breached or penetrated the turbine or generator unit, causing extensive
structural deformation, or completely tore the unit apart. This is a catastrophic kill (K-kill).
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-173. Power plants with free-standing, gas-turbine-generator units can operate independently of each
other. These units are housed in light metal structures that provide environmental protection only.
Destruction of one unit of these units only partly degrades electrical production. Also, because turbines
and generator units exemplify machines that are less vulnerable to damage than their housing,
moderately damaging a generator hall can have little or no effect on the units it houses, and thus on their
functioning. When reporting recuperation, the team reports recuperation both of the structure and of the
turbines and generators.
RAIL LINES AND RAIL YARDS
4-174. Recuperation time for destroyed rail yards may be short in duration, because new rails, repair
equipment, and repair personnel might already be onsite or readily available.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-175. These definitions also indicate the rail yard's functional damage.
No Damage
4-176. Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Cut
4-177. Military action has cratered one or more tracks, prohibiting movement around the damaged
area, although movement around or past the damaged area (choke point or rail yard) is still possible on
undamaged tracks.
Destruction
4-178. Military action has caused multiple cuts to multiple tracks, which keeps rolling stock from
moving around or past the damaged area (choke point or rail yard).
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-179. The location(s) of rail yard "cuts" and the ability of the yard to bypass the damage determine the
extent of functional damage to the rail yard.
ROADS
4-180. Where geographically possible, an alternate to damaging a road with crater(s) is to attack the
adjacent hillside to cause a landslide to cover the road.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
No Damage
4-181. Military action has caused no apparent damage. |
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Cratered
4-182. Military action has cratered the road, but vehicles can maneuver around the damaged section.
4-183. Cut
4-184. Military action has caused so many aligned and close-set craters that vehicles cannot pass.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-185. The effectiveness of attacks on roads depends on reducing or stopping traffic flow. Estimating
flow reduction and road repair requirements are based on whether and what vehicles the adjacent terrain
allows to bypass the damaged road section, on the depth and width of the cratered area, on the
availability of repair equipment and personnel (usually readily available), and so on.
RUNWAYS AND TAXIWAYS
4-186. To successfully assess runway or taxiway damage, the team must know the takeoff and landing
capabilities of the aircraft located at the airfield. They must also know what type or category of aircraft
can or cannot use the airfield. A fighter or bomber base may be considered interdicted if damage
prevents normal operation of the aircraft stationed there. However, the airfield may be usable by other
aircraft types that can operate on an unimproved runway. The team can refer to the appropriate aircraft
documents for specific aircraft minimum clear (takeoff) length (MCL) and minimum clear takeoff width
(MCW) dimensions. The team also assesses nearby roads for possible aircraft use.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-187. An assessment of physical damage to runways and taxiways implies its functional capability.
No Damage
4-188. Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Cratered
4-189. Military action has cratered runways or taxiways, but aircraft can maneuver around them.
Cut
4-190. Military action has caused multiple craters in line and close enough together to prohibit aircraft
movement around them. However, operations can occur beyond the cut.
Interdicted
4-191. Military action has caused multiple cuts close enough together to prevent any takeoff or landing
operations, either between the cuts, or between the last cut and the runway overrun.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-192. The effectiveness of an attack on a runway or taxiway depends on whether surface cratering
prevents aircraft takeoff or landing.
SATELLITE DISHES
4-193. Before assessing damage to a satellite dish (es), the team must know the dish type (fixed or
tracking) and the location of the damage.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
No Damage
4-194. Military action has caused no apparent damage. |
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Light Damage
4-195. Military action has blown off a few reflective panels.
Moderate Damage
4-196. Military action has blown off less than 25 percent of the reflective panels and either damaged
the dish support structure or the feed horn, or both.
Severe Damage
4-197. Military action has blown off between 25 and 60 percent of the reflective panels, changed the
antenna point, and either slightly deformed the dish or damaged its structural components, or both.
Destruction
4-198. Military action has blown off more than 60 percent of the reflective panels, destroyed the feed
horn, extensively deformed the dish, or knocked the dish off its base, or any combination of these.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-199. Functional degradation to sites depends on damage to the dish or its associated control
building(s), or both.
SHIPS
4-200. The types and locations of damage determine the ship's ability to continue offensive and
defensive operations as well as its need to return to the shipyard for repairs.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-201. The team must consider certain factors before determining the level of physical damage.
Factors
• Seaworthiness--Is the ship listing, capsized, or sunk?
• Firepower--What are the degrees of damage to the ship's guns, launchers, and magazines?
-- Surface-to-air guns.
-- Surface-to-surface guns.
-- Antisubmarine guns.
• Flight deck.
• Hangars.
• Aircraft elevators.
• Mobility--To what degree is the rudder (steering) damaged? How much does this degrade the
ship's sustained speed capability?
• Sensors--To what degree is the ship's search equipment damaged and capability reduced (air,
surface, and subsurface)? This assessment considers radar, sonar, and fire-control means.
• Command, Control, and Communications--What percentage, type, and level of damage was
inflicted on the pilot house, the bridge, the combat information center, the communications
center, antennas, computer systems, and data links? What is the reconstitution time for each?
Levels
No Damage--Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Moderate Damage--Military action has caused physical deformation, holes in the ship or its
equipment, reduced the ship's ability to move or maneuver, or any combination of these. |
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Severe Damage--Military action has destroyed or burned more than one-third of the
superstructure or deck area, rendered major subsystems (weapon sensors, radar) inoperable,
destroyed the ship's ability to move or maneuver, or any combination of these.
Destruction--Military action has flooded more than one-third of the ship's waterline length. This
indicates that the ship is experiencing uncontrolled flooding, and is sinking. In addition, the
ship's major subsystem that supports operations is destroyed.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-202. When assessing functional damage, the team considers the ship's ability or inability to move and
maneuver and the degree of disruption to particular ship subsystems such as its weapon-delivery
capability, the functioning of its sensors, and so on.
STEEL TOWERS
4-203. Steel towers transmit electric power and support communications antennas, for example.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
No Damage--Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Damage--Military action has damaged supports, but tower remains standing.
Destruction--Military action has caused tower to collapse or topple.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-204. The level of functional damage associated with a physically damaged steel tower depends on
the tower's function and on its connectivity with other target elements.
TRANSFORMERS
4-205. A transformer is a static electrical device that uses mutual electromagnetic induction to convert
AC power from one current on one circuit to a different current on another circuit. The team must report
the extent of external damage, if any, and the expected effects.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-206. When reporting physical damage, include the total number of transformers, and the number
damaged or destroyed.
No Damage--Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Damage--Military action has left the structure of the unit intact, but blackened as a result of a fire
or of leakage of oil.
Destruction--Military action has torn the structure apart or greatly distorted it. This is considered
catastrophic damage (K kill).
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-207. The effect of transformer damage on the target's function depends on the facility's power
requirements and on the enemy's ability to reroute the power.
TUNNEL ENTRANCES OR PORTALS
4-208. Tunnels at best are dangerous places for people, but some are used only for storage. Tunnels are
used for passage, operations, storage, or some combination of these. When reporting damage to tunnel
entrances, the team should also include, when possible, the estimated volume and size of the debris or
rubble pile that blocks the entrance. This can help in estimating clearing and recuperation times. |
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PHYSICAL DAMAGE
4-209. Physical damage to a tunnel entrance generally makes it impassable and can reduce the
protection afforded to anything or anyone in the tunnel during follow-on attacks.
No Damage--Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Light Damage--Military action has left the portal (the approach or entrance to the tunnel) intact,
but craters and debris partly block access. The doors, if any, operate as before the attack.
Moderate Damage--Military action has left the portal intact, but entrance to the tunnel is
completely cut off by craters or debris. The doors, if any, do not operate.
Severe Damage--Military action has partly collapsed the portal, and has completely blocked any
entrance to the tunnel.
Destruction--Military action has completely collapsed the portal, rendering access to the tunnel
impossible.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-210. The extent of functional damage depends on the size of crater(s), the degree of portal collapse,
or the amount of debris blocking the entrance. Degree of functional damage also depends on the purpose
of the tunnel facility. For example, a storage tunnel is much more vulnerable to entrance damage than a
C2 tunnel, which depends less on ingress and egress. The time required to repair tunnel entrances
depends on the extent of damage and the availability of personnel and equipment. In addition, the tunnel
might have many entrances. How many it has affects the level of functional damage. When reporting the
functional damage to tunnel entrances, the team considers accessibility based on how many entrances
remain useable.
TUNNEL FACILITY AIR VENTS
4-211. Air vents are vital for some tunnel facilities. They bring in fresh air and remove exhaust fumes
and other noxious byproducts. Closing off these vents can sometimes prevent usage of the tunnel or
facility altogether. The vents are less critical for facilities used for storage only, but more critical if they
contain operating equipment and people.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE
No Damage--Military action has caused no apparent damage.
Damage--Military action has partly blocked the vent opening with craters and debris. The vent
structure might not be damaged.
Destruction--Craters or debris completely block the vent opening.
FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE
4-212. Functional damage restricts or cuts off airflow through the vent(s) in the facility. Complete
elimination of airflow to or through the facility might require the destruction of multiple air vents. When
reporting the functional damage of the facility vents, the team must divide the number of damaged vents
by the total number of vents to determine the overall percentage of airflow blockage in the facility.
Section V. TARGET ACQUISITION
Target acquisition is conducted by a combat patrol. The intent of a combat patrol is to make contact with the
enemy, in contrast to a reconnaissance patrol where the intent is to avoid enemy contact. LRS teams seldom
conduct combat patrols. However, the capability to conduct a target-acquisition mission is inherent within a
LRS team. The team can serve as the initial eyes of a long-range targeting asset, by providing terminal guidance
using appropriate communication and signal such as a beacon or mirror by marking the target with a laser.
Normally, a LRS team is tasked to conduct surveillance or reconnaissance of an NAI. If a target of opportunity |
3-55.93 | 103 | Team Operations
is observed, the LRS team can be retasked to engage the target. Under these circumstances, the team guides the
munitions or aircraft onto the target, then moves out undetected.
COMBAT PATROL
4-213. The LRS team reorganizes into three elements: acquisition, communications, and security.
• When using a laser designator, the acquisition element has a two-Soldier laser team and a
communications element.
• When adjusting artillery, close air, AC-130, or attack helicopters, the acquisition element and
communications element can combine.
MISSION PLANNING FACTORS
4-214. Route planning and movement are the same for target acquisition as for a surveillance or
reconnaissance mission. A pickup zone close to the planned acquisition point allows for quick removal
from the area. The PZ must, at a minimum, support FRIES or SPIES operations, although air landing is
preferred. All team members must have a method to illuminate their position to assist in fratricide
avoidance. Teams need a positive ground-to-air communications means such as a VHF radio. All attack
helicopters and USAF CAS aircraft have VHF capabilities.
• Review all procedures for controlling available fires prior to mission execution.
• During mission coordination, confirm the PAVE Penny codes for laser designators with a
USAF or Army aircraft representative.
• Establish and confirm self-authenticators and code words for communicating with the USAF or
Navy on a nonsecure net.
• Quickly assess bomb damage before withdrawing.
• Know the rules of engagement.
• Plan for the effect on and reaction of the local populace.
• Coordinate no-fire and restrictive-fire zone for weapons systems operators.
EMPLOYMENT OF LASER DESIGNATORS
4-215. Lasers aid in target identification, location of aim point, site selection, and site illumination.
Aim Point Location—The laser aids in location of aim point by revealing—
— Target reflectivity.
— Ordnance type.
— Method of delivery.
Beam divergence—Offset should not exceed 7 degrees from either side -the aircraft must stay
within that cone.
Target Orientation—Laser energy reflects in an arc, but is strongest at the angle where it would
reflect if the surface were a mirror. If the laser designator is perpendicular to a surface the
reflection can be seen from all angles on the designated side, but can be detected best near the
laser designator to target line.
Weather conditions—Visibility of less than three nautical miles restricts the operation, regardless
of aircraft type. |
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Site Selection—The aircraft must be able to approach within 10-to 60 degrees to the left or right
of the team’s location. While maximizing standoff, the team needs to ensure they have both
optical and electrical LOS to the target. Observer to target distance should not exceed the
capabilities of the laser designator being employed.
Site Illumination—The laser aids in illuminating the site.
Function Check—Conduct a laser function check, and recheck the laser codes based on the type
of aircraft conducting the attack. Designate the target (paint) for not less than 5 seconds before
the aircraft releases its ordnance. For guns or other nonguided ordnance, you can use the laser
to identify targets for aircraft without the 5 second (paint).
FIRE SUPPORT
4-216. Fire support, particularly artillery and CAS, are excellent assets to use during target-acquisition
missions or in support while breaking out of a site or away from contact. Leaders must fully integrate
fire support into their plans. They must understand how fire support can assist or detract from the
execution of their assigned missions. They must understand fire support limitations.
INDIRECT-FIRE SUPPORT CAPABILITIES
4-217. Indirect fire support capabilities follow:
• Quick response time.
• Adjustability of fire.
• Variety of munitions, including precision munitions.
• Multiple strike capability.
• All-weather capability.
INDIRECT-FIRE SUPPORT LIMITATIONS
4-218. Indirect fire support limitations follow:
• Range.
• Naval gunfire availability limited to areas with naval assets.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (USAF FIXED WING) CAPABILITIES
4-219. Close air support (CAS, or Army fixed wing) capabilities follow:
• Long range.
• Visual target engagement and adjustment of fires.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (USAF FIXED WING) LIMITATIONS
4-220. Close air support (CAS, or Army fixed wing) limitations follow:
• Limited time on target.
• Limited compatibility with team radio systems (depending on aircraft type).
• Limited munitions.
• Limited ability to operate in poor weather.
CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK (ARMY ROTARY WING) CAPABILITIES
4-221. Close combat attack (CCA, or Army rotary wing) capabilities follow:
• Medium range.
• Longer time on target than fixed wing assets. |
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• Visual target engagement and adjustment of fires.
• VHF radio capabilities.
CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK (ARMY ROTARY WING) LIMITATIONS
4-222. Close combat attack limitations follow:
• Limited ability to operate in poor weather.
• Limited munitions.
• Vulnerability to enemy ground fire.
FIRE PLANS
4-223. Teams plan targets on infiltration and exfiltration routes, LZs, DZs, PZs, routes to and from the
objective, on the objective, between the objective and surveillance, and between the surveillance and
hide sites (contiguous targets work well). Teams plan RFAs and NFAs as needed. Coordination is done
using the team target list and coordination checklist. They consider the effects, the mission, the types of
targets, and the methods of engagement.
Section VI. URBAN TERRAIN
The LRS teams can be very effective in an urban environment. Their ability to gather information and report
timely information about the current situation is vital to the BFSB intelligence-collection plan. The LRS team
can help in two ways during an urban operation: First, the commanders can use LRS teams extensively and
effectively for surveillance. Second, he can use them on a limited basis for reconnaissance. Before committing
a LRS team to a mission in urban terrain, he must consider all aspects of the mission and the environment.
Specifically, he must consider the differences between LRSU support to offense, defense, stability and civil
support operations.
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
4-224. This is normally the primary mission a LRS team conducts in an urban environment. LRS teams
are most often used to report information received along main supply routes to and from the urban
environment. Depending on the size of the urban area and location of key buildings, the LRS team might
report information on specific buildings, motor pools, and so on. During stability operations, a LRS team
might surveil a specific target from inside the environment. Considerations include camouflage,
observation, security, and support.
CAMOUFLAGE
4-225. LRS teams are proficient in camouflage techniques specific to urban environments such as
window screening and false walls.
OBSERVATION
4-226. In built-up areas, windows provide readily accessible observation ports. However, care should
be taken to prevent optics from protruding beyond the window. This is an obvious sign of a surveillance
position. The team members must position themselves as far back in the room as possible to keep from
being seen. To lower their silhouettes, they can support their positions with a table or sand bags. Another
technique is to observe through a hole in the wall. When observing through the window, individuals
should stand well back in the shadows. At all times, care must be taken to avoid allowing light to reflect
off optics. |
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SECURITY
4-227. From the time the team leaves the last secure point until exfiltration, security remains a constant
and immediate concern. Teams plan constant and sustained security for every phase of the mission. In
the security role, the team can use both active and passive security devices. Teams can stage objects in
and around the site that will identify any presence. All security devices must be able to withstand
scrutiny.
PROTECTION AND SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT
4-228. In an urbanized AO, the LRS team can achieve protection and sustainment in stay-behind or
rollover missions.
RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
4-229. This is the second mission that a LRS team can perform in an urban environment. Due to the
increased chance of compromise in an urbanized environment, the commander should consider
employing LRS teams in a very limited reconnaissance role. The LRS team plans reconnaissance
missions on urbanized terrain in as much detail as possible. Considerations include—METT-TC, the type
of mission, planning time, specialized equipment need to accomplish the mission, and specialized
equipment weight and size.
PLANS
4-230. Urban areas are categorized in the following manner, by population size:
• Villages (population of 3,000 inhabitants or less).
• Towns (population of over 3,000 to 100,000 inhabitants and not part of a major urban
complex).
• City (population over 100,000 to 1 million inhabitants).
• Metropolis (population over 1 million to 10 million inhabitants).
• Megalopolis (population over 10 million inhabitants).
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
4-231. All LRS team members must receive a detailed briefing on the rules of engagement before
deployment in an urban environment.
VISIBILITY
4-232. Weather, smoke, and dust always obscure visibility. Military operations can change urban
terrain, shifting shadows and dead spaces around every time a building collapses or a new pile of rubble
forms.
SIZE, LOCATION, AND HISTORY
4-233. Within the city, urban terrain differs based on size, location, and history.
Industrial Areas and Residential Sprawl
4-234. Residential areas have some houses or small dwellings with yards, gardens, trees and fences.
Streets normally form rectangular or curving patterns. Industrial areas usually have low (one- to
three-story) flat-roofed buildings. Most of these are factories or warehouses, and they are generally
located on or along major rail and highway routes. Both types of terrain have many open areas.
Core Periphery—A core periphery has narrow streets (12 to 20 meters wide) and continuous
fronts of brick- and heavy-walled-concrete buildings. Most buildings are about the same height,
ranging between two and three stories in small towns and five to ten stories in large cities. |
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City Cores and Outlying High-Rise Areas—Typical city cores consist mostly of high-rise
buildings that can vary greatly in height. More modern buildings often have more space
between them than that do the buildings in older city cores. This open construction style is
more prevalent in outlying high-rise areas than in city cores. Streets generally form rectangular
patterns.
Commercial Ribbons—These rows of stores, shops, and miscellaneous structures are built on
either side of the major (at least 25 meters wide) streets that run through built-up areas. These
structures are uniformly two or three stories tall.
INSERTION AND EXTRACTION
4-235. Leaders must consider the distance of the insertion or extraction, and the training of all team
members. They consider support assets, their own experience, and internal and external assets. All types
of insertion and extraction means available in other environments are still viable in an urban
environment; however, considerations for their use may be different. For example, the use of
nonstandard tactical vehicles may be a good insertion and extraction platform in urban areas during
stability operations. Subterranean corridors such as sewers, subways, underground tunnels, or drainage
systems can be used with great effectiveness.
EVALUATION
4-236. When a LRS team evaluates urban terrain, it considers the following factors:
Observation
4-237. Buildings on the edge of a city generally offer better observation than those inside. There, tall
buildings with numerous windows often offer the best observation, especially if the buildings have
spaces between them.
Avenues of Approach
4-238. The best way to enter a building is from the top. Therefore, the most important avenue of
approach is one that quickly leads to the top from fire escapes, drainpipes, or adjacent buildings.
Key Control Points
4-239. Key control points in a building include entrances, hallways, and stairs. Whoever controls these
controls the building.
Doors and Fire Barriers
4-240. These are common in commercial buildings. They become obstacles when closed or secured.
Furniture and appliances can also become obstacles.
Cover and Concealment
4-241. Buildings with brick walls and a few narrow windows balance cover and concealment. Roofs
provide little protection—lower floors offer LRS teams better protection than do areas directly under the
roof. Additionally, floor layouts with many small rooms offer more protection than those with
larger rooms.
Intercity Distribution of Building Types
4-242. Leaders can generally determine the layout of a city by the distribution of the buildings within
the city. In built-up areas, mass-construction buildings (modern apartments and hotels) are the most
common structures. They comprise two-thirds of the total area, and they are usually constructed of brick.
Steel and concrete-framed multistory buildings comprise the city's core area, its most valuable land. As
centers of economic and political power, they have potentially great military significance. Open spaces,
such as parks, athletic fields, and golf courses, comprise about 15 percent of the average city's area. Most
of this 15 percent is suitable for air assault or Airborne operations. However, approaches to these areas
may have obstacles such as tall buildings, trees and wires, and should be carefully considered during |
3-55.93 | 108 | Chapter 4
planning. Additionally, rooftops complement this 15 percent since many can take the weight of aircraft
or the impact of men and equipment jumping on to them.
Sources of Information
4-243. Cities offer a wealth of useful information. This information is found in a variety of sources.
• Large-scale city maps.
• Diagrams of underground sewer, utility, transport, and other systems.
• Publicly available information about key public buildings.
• Rosters of key personnel.
• US government studies and data bases that detail—
— Size and density of the population.
— Police and security capabilities.
— Civil defense and air-raid shelters.
— Fire-fighting capabilities.
— Utility systems.
— Medical facilities.
— Mass-communication facilities.
Equipment
4-244. Some of the items a Soldier might consider carrying into an urban environment include—
• Camera.
• Communications equipment with various antennas.
• Spotting scope with stand.
• Binoculars.
• Dark cloth.
• Tape.
• Glass cutter.
• Complete cleaning kit.
• Multipurpose knife.
• Suppressed pistol.
• Notebook.
• Pencils.
• Tape recorder.
• Sleeping pad.
• Wasp and hornet spray.
• Bungee cord(s).
• Small saw.
• Crowbar. |
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COMMUNICATIONS
4-245. Probably the most important consideration in planning urban communications is type of antenna
placement.
Subsurface Surveillance Site
4-246. A team can split into surveillance and hide sites, with the hide site located outside of the urban
area. If so, team members at the hide site should be able to use their HF, UHF TACSAT, and LOS
systems normally. However, when the surveillance site operates subsurface, they need an antenna for
LOS communications with the hide site. Depending on the situation, the team members at the
surveillance site might be able to use the whip antenna that is normally issued with their inter team radio.
When the sites are split, the surveillance site can use any one of several methods to establish LOS
communications with the hide site.
4-247. Sometimes, the team will have to use remote equipment to communicate with the hide site.
Before the mission, they should try to obtain some field-expedient materials.
4-248. If the team is configured in a combined surveillance and hide site, and the entire element is in a
subsurface environment, then the team must remote the long-range antenna system to the surface area.
4-249. To make contact with the COB or AOB, the RTO might be able to attach the HF antenna wire
to some nearby metallic object that protrudes above the surface such as a light, a fence, or a storm drain
gate. The RTO must remember to place the antenna system towards the receiving station. If using UHF
TACSAT, the antenna must be placed so that no obstructions stand between it and the satellite.
4-250. Operating from a subsurface situation can be highly risky, because the enemy may be able to
detect the antenna.
4-251. Communications are easier to achieve from an elevated position such as a building or other
structure. In most cases, depending on distance, the surveillance team can use the whip antennas organic
to their radio system.
4-252. If a structure obstructs the LOS view between the two sites (surveillance and hide), then the
RTO can make a closed-loop antenna. He fastens Claymore wire to an interior wall in a loop from the
socket of the radio's whip antenna to the ground for the radio. He must remember to cut the antenna to at
least one full wave-length of the frequency he is using. This is an excellent antenna to use during urban
area missions.
4-253. VHF antennas are much shorter than HF antennas. In fact, the antennas used for HF
communications can also be used for VHF, except that they must be scaled down for higher frequencies.
However, constructing and placing them is much the same as it is for the LOS.
4-254. Other items that can be used for HF communications include—.
• Existing antennas on the structure.
• Existing electrical wiring (team has to test for conductivity).
• Metal plumbing pipes.
• Ceiling grids.
• Metal clothes lines.
• Metal building frames (if power to the building is off, otherwise damage to the radio could
occur). |
3-55.93 | 110 | Chapter 4
WARNING
Never construct antennas less than twice their length from power
lines and transformers.
HIDE AND SURVEILLANCE SITES
4-255. When selecting a suitable site, Soldiers tend to go for height. In an urban operation, this can be
a mistake. The greater the height attained, the more the LRS Soldier has to look out over an area and
away from his immediate surroundings. For example, to see the road below a tenth-floor surveillance
site, the LRS Soldier must lean out of the window, which reveals his location and exposes him to fire.
Though the observer cannot predict where incidents will occur, he can expect that the ranges will be
relatively short distances. A surveillance site must cover its surroundings as well as middle and far
distances. In urban areas, this is rarely possible: sites are often forced off ground-floor levels by passing
pedestrians. However, generally, the team should avoid going above the second floor.
CONSIDERATIONS
4-256. When considering possible hide or surveillance positions, the team should consider old, derelict
buildings as they are unlikely to be reoccupied by civilians in the area. Abandoned or unoccupied houses
or buildings also offer good sites, but could be booby-trapped or be reoccupied by civilians. The team
must search the building after they have occupied it. Buildings that provide protection from weather and
small arms are preferred. They should avoid isolated buildings as they tend to be obvious observation
positions. After carefully observing the inhabitants' daily routines, the team can occupy private
residences. They can occupy the home and establish hides or surveillance sites in the basement or attic,
or both, but the homeowner will pose a danger and the team should generally limit their stay to 12 to 24
hours. The team can use shops with empty accommodations on a second floor, but again should limit
their stay to 12 to 24 hours.
CONSTRUCTION
4-257. During the reconnaissance phase, the team plans the construction of an urban hide or
surveillance site in detail. They must prepare a view aperture, a viewing platform (if needed), and the
interior layout. Selection of the viewing aperture takes priority over construction of the viewing platform
or any interior work. When construction begins, the team must pull local security to warn of any excess
noise or act as early warning. If they have floor plans of the building or house during their planning
phase, the team can rehearse the construction and occupation of the site. Before constructing a hide or
surveillance site, the team records what the area looks like so that they can return it to normal before
departing.
CAMOUFLAGE
4-258. To survive in an urban environment, LRS Soldiers must supplement cover and concealment
with camouflage. To properly camouflage their positions, they must study the terrain in the surrounding
area. The site must blend in with the terrain. For instance, in an undamaged building, they should not
make a loophole for observation. They should use only the materials that they need-excess materials can
reveal their position. They should also consider—
Use of Shadows—Buildings in urban areas throw sharp shadows.
Color and Texture—The team needs to break up the silhouettes of their individual equipment.
They can use burlap or canvas strips for this. The predominant colors are normally brown, tan,
and gray. The team should evaluate the camouflage they need for each location separately. |
3-55.93 | 111 | Team Operations
Section VII. IMAGERY COLLECTION AND TRANSMISSION
The timely and accurate collection and transmission of imagery, video or hand drawn pictures of the objective,
plays a key role in the success of follow-on missions. The purpose of imagery collection and transmission is to
provide an accurate description of enemy strengths, positions and capabilities so that the commander can make
informed decisions. With the introduction of new technology and integration between digital cameras, global
positioning system (GPS) devices, laser range-finding equipment and other electronic devices, it is now easier
and of more tactical value to take digital imagery of objectives. The use of a digital camera with laser range-
finding equipment and GPS helps produce clear, real-time information.
IMAGERY LABELS
4-259. All personnel on the team should be proficient at labeling images according to the unit SOP.
PRINCIPLES
4-260. General principles of labeling imagery include (Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10) —
• Placement of letters or numbers on the image to correspond with the legend.
• Placing appropriate arrows and other graphics where needed.
• Ensuring the image has a title, including a name, DTG, and grid, for example,
• North-seeking arrow.
• Size of the picture (from East to West, North to South).
• Remarks page for details about what each number or letter means.
Figure 4-9. Example imagery labels. |
3-55.93 | 112 | Chapter 4
Figure 4-10. Example imagery legend.
IMAGE-GATHERING EQUIPMENT
4-261. There are many types of cameras and video cameras available. The majority of this equipment
becomes dated quickly, so it is important to stay proficient in the equipment available.
CAMERAS
4-262. Several different types of cameras may be used to gather imagery from an objective. Some basic
principles should be adhered to when considering what type and or kind to use—
• Durable.
• Waterproof.
• Number of images at a particular resolution.
• Film type, memory stick, or compact flash card.
• Weight and size measurements.
VIDEO CAMERAS
4-263. The introduction of the video camera recorder (a camera capable of taking video and still
images) has aided the R&S community in its ability to record information. Considerations for video
camera use are—
• Zoom.
• Quality and resolution.
• Battery life.
• Power converter for military batteries (BA-5590).
COMPRESSION SOFTWARE
4-264. The use of compression software can greatly enhance the effectiveness of a unit when it comes
to gathering and transmitting imagery and video. Compression software allows compression of files up |
3-55.93 | 113 | Team Operations
to 88% smaller then the original file. Being able to compress files aids in decreasing the amount of time
required to transmit.
OBJECTIVE SKETCH
4-265. In the case of loss of communication or enemy compromise, an objective sketch may be the
only piece of information about that objective available. The ability to draft a proper objective sketch is
an extremely important skill. It is important to understand the basics of objective sketch production.
Understanding the basics allows a novice or non-artist to draw an understandable objective sketch.
Types
Panoramic Sketches
4-266. Each of these represents an area or object, and is drawn to scale from the observer’s
perspective. It provides a useful way to record details about a specific area or structure (Figure 4-11).
Topographic Sketches
4-267. Each of these represents a large area drawn to scale as seen from above (bird's eye view). It
shows reliable distances and azimuths between major features. A topographic sketch can also be used as
an overlay on a range card (Figure 4-12).
Figure 4-11. Example panoramic sketch. |
3-55.93 | 114 | Chapter 4
Figure 4-12. Example topographic sketch.
Objective Sketch
4-268. Each of these, most easily drawn on a printed objective sketchpad, shows all useful information.
The pad includes reminders of what specific information should be placed on the objective sketch. The
sketch pad includes marginal information and remarks (Figure 4-13). |
3-55.93 | 115 | Team Operations
Figure 4-13. Example objective sketchpad.
Marginal Information
• Target number.
• Range from the preparer to the objective.
• Reference point, that is, the point of origin.
• Deflection angle from the preparer to the objective.
• Grid coordinates for the objective.
• Block scale, that is, the size of the blocks printed or drawn on the sketchpad.
• Mils latitude and longitude (for air strikes using fixed wing aircraft).
• Magnetic azimuth from the preparer to the objective.
• Sketch number (if more than one sketch).
• DTG when the sketch was prepared. |
3-55.93 | 116 | Chapter 4
• Name of the preparer.
• Rank and organization of the preparer.
Remarks
• Terrain on the objective.
• Vegetation, that is, whether it can provide concealment.
• Structural composition at the objective, for example, brick, mud, or wood.
• Tactical value of the objective; for example, what purpose it could serve such as prison camp,
training camp, or communications site.
• Additional information of tactical relevance such as whether buildings on the objective are
elevated and whether their windows have screens, the locations of power lines and
construction, types of sidings, building numbers, lighting, gaps, breach points, or any other
information that might help the chain of command plan follow-on missions.
Preparation
4-269. Sketching is an easy way to record information about an objective. The following are some
useful steps to take when preparing a sketch:
• Work from the whole to the part.
• Use common shapes to show common objects such as roads, buildings, and poles.
• Draw in perspective.
• Use vanishing points.
• Cross-hatch to show depth in the sketch.
• Avoid concentrating on the fine details unless used to clarify the drawing or emphasize
something of tactical importance.
Work from the Whole to the Part
4-270. Figure 4-14 shows an example drawing technique for whole to part. |
3-55.93 | 117 | Team Operations
Figure 4-14. Example drawing technique: whole to part. |
3-55.93 | 118 | Chapter 4
Use Common Shapes for Common Objects
4-271. Use common shapes to show common objects such as roads, buildings, and poles (Figure 4-15).
Figure 4-15. Example drawing technique: use of common shapes to show common objects.
Use Perspective Drawing
4-272. Draw in perspective (Figure 4-16).
Figure 4-16. Example drawing technique: use of perspective to represent depth.
Use Vanishing Points
4-273. Use vanishing points (Figure 4-17).
Figure 4-17. Example drawing technique: use of vanishing points to indicate distance. |
3-55.93 | 119 | Team Operations
Cross-Hatch to Show Depth
4-274. Use hatching to show depth in the sketch (Figure 4-18).
Figure 4-18. Example drawing technique: hatching.
Detail Only the Most Important Elements
4-275. Avoid concentrating on fine detail except to clarify the drawing or to emphasize something of
tactical importance.
Section VIII. STABILITY OPERATIONS
This section discusses LRSU activities in stability operations. LRSU are well suited to conduct stability
operations, because can they provide both overt and covert combat information. Both of these are critical to
success in stability operations. Stability operations occur unilaterally, or with offensive and defensive
operations. United States forces can participate in a stability operation while a host nation is at war. In addition,
stability can evolve into war, and leaders should be prepared in case this occurs. Stability operations influence |
3-55.93 | 120 | Chapter 4
the political, civil and military environments, and can disrupt illegal activities. Military operations in stability
are characterized by indirectness rather than directness.
TYPES
4-276. Stability operations typically fall into ten broad and often overlapping types. For example, a
force engaged in a peace operation may at the same time conduct arms control or a show of force to set
the conditions for achieving an end state. This paragraph introduces stability operations. (See FM 3-0
and FM 3-07 for more detailed information.) The LRSU can participate in any of the following
operations in a stability environment:
• Peace operations (POs).
• Foreign internal defense (FID).
• Humanitarian and civic assistance.
• Foreign humanitarian assistance.
• Security assistance.
• Support to insurgencies.
• Support to counterdrug operations.
• Combating terrorism.
• Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).
• Arms control.
• Show of force.
PEACE OPERATIONS
4-277. Peace operations (PO) support strategic and policy objectives and the diplomatic activities that
implement them. POs include peacekeeping operations (PKOs), peace enforcement operations (PEOs),
and support to diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Peace operations monitor and ease the
implementation of agreements, such as a cease-fire or truce. They can also support diplomatic efforts to
reach a long-term political settlement. They usually consist of observing, monitoring, or supervising and
aiding the parties to a dispute. The mission of a peace operation is fluid, and is based on a review of
METT-TC. LRSU activities supporting PKO include, among others—
• R&S of a demilitarized zone.
• Surveillance of confrontation areas.
• Surveillance of cease-fire areas.
• R&S of refugee camps.
• Damage assessment.
• Monitoring of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear activity.
• R&S of smuggling routes.
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
4-278. Foreign internal defense (FID) is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government
in any action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion,
lawlessness, and insurgency (FM 1-02). The main objective is to promote stability by helping a host
nation establish and maintain institutions and facilities responsive to its people’s needs. Army forces in
FID normally advise and assist host-nation forces conducting operations to increase their capabilities. |
3-55.93 | 121 | Team Operations
4-279. When conducting FID, Army forces provide military supplies as well as military advice, tactical
and technical training, and intelligence and logistics support (not involving combat operations). Army
forces conduct FID operations in accordance with JP 3-07.1 and FM 3-07. Army forces provide indirect
support, direct support (not involving combat operations), or conduct combat operations to support a
host nation’s efforts.
4-280. LRSU support during FID normally consists of the traditional role of information gathering, but
can also consist of training host nation combat information gathering units. LRSU can also provide
long-range communications capability to host nations or deployed US forces.
HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE
4-281. Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs provide assistance to the host nation
populace in conjunction with military operations and exercises. The very nature of HCA programs
frequently dictates that additional engineer units and support capabilities will augment units participating
in HCA operations. In contrast to humanitarian and disaster relief operations, HCA are planned activities
authorized by the Secretary of State with specific budget limitations and are appropriated in the Army
budget. Assistance must fulfill unit-training requirements that correspondingly create humanitarian
benefit to the local populace. HCA programs must be in compliance with Title 10, United States Code,
Sections 401, 401(E), (5), and Section 2551. For additional information on selected sections of Title 10,
US Code for medical support, see FM 8-42. See AR 40-400 for information on emergency medical
treatment for local national civilians during stability operations. Humanitarian and civic actions are
limited to the following categories:
• Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
• Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
• Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
• Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
• Specified activities related to mine detection and clearance, including education, training, and
technical assistance.
4-282. It is unlikely LRSU would participate in HCA activities. However, LRSU could provide
support to units conducting traditional HCA activities by providing search and rescue, and long-range
communications support.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
4-283. Security assistance includes the participation of Army forces in any of a group of programs by
which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign
nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives (JP 3-07).
Army forces support security assistance efforts by training, advising, and assisting multinational and
friendly armed forces. LRSU forces are well suited to provide training and advisory services in their
normal areas of expertise.
SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES
4-284. An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government
through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). At the direction of the President and/or
Secretary of Defense, US military forces may assist insurgents or counterinsurgents.
4-285. The US supports selected insurgencies that oppose oppressive regimes who work against US
interests. Major considerations include the feasibility of effective support and the compatibility of US
and insurgent interests. Because support for insurgencies is often covert, special operations forces are
frequently involved. Leaders may call upon general-purpose forces when needed. That is, when the
situation requires their particular specialties or when the scope of operations is so vast that conventional |
3-55.93 | 122 | Chapter 4
forces are required. LRSU activities in support of an insurgency or counterinsurgency consist of but not
limited to--
• Early warning for US and host nation forces.
• Reconnaissance for lines of communication (LOC).
• Surveillance of refugee camps.
• R&S of targets for future direct action.
• Training of insurgent forces in their normal areas of expertise.
SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS
4-286. Military efforts support law enforcement agencies (LEAs), other US agencies, state
governments, and foreign governments. The goal of counterdrug operations is to stop the flow of illegal
drugs at the source, in transit, and during distribution.
• DOD may provide training, assistance, equipment, and facilities as long as doing so does not
affect US military readiness.
• The Posse Comitatus Act applies only to federalized forces, and only within the US.
For example, federal military forces may not search US civilians, arrest US civilians, or
conduct any related law-enforcement activity involving US civilians.
• Title 10, United States Code, Sections 371-378, gives military forces the authority to assist
civilian LEAs.
• DOD may pass information collected during normal operations to law-enforcement agencies.
• Military efforts support and complement--not replace--the counterdrug efforts of other entities.
(These entities can include US agencies, states, and cooperating foreign governments.) The
Army can support any or all phases of a combined and synchronized effort to attack the flow of
illegal drugs at the source, in transit, and during distribution. In counterdrug operations, LRS
normally supports law-enforcement agencies. LRSU activities supporting counterdrug
operations include but are limited to—
— R&S of shipment facilities.
— R&S of shipment routes.
— R&S of marijuana, cocoa, and poppy fields.
— Surveillance of narcotics traffickers.
— Surveillance of air and vehicle traffic.
COMBATING TERRORISM
4-287. Joint Publication 1-02 defines terrorism as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of
unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit
of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological" (JP 3-07.2).
Categories
4-288. Terrorism is categorized three ways, based on where its control and support originate:
• Non-state supported terrorism.
• State-supported terrorism.
• State-directed terrorism. |
3-55.93 | 123 | Team Operations
Methods
4-289. Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures taken against terrorism. Counterterrorism refers to
offensive actions taken against terrorism.
Antiterrorism
4-290. The DOD Dictionary defines this as "defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of
individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military
forces." Typical antiterrorism actions include—
• Crime prevention and physical security actions that prevent theft of weapons, munitions,
identification cards, and other materials.
• Physical security actions designed to prevent unauthorized access or approach to facilities.
• Positioning and hardening of facilities.
• Coordination with local law enforcement.
• Policies regarding travel, size of convoys, breaking of routines, host nation interaction, and
off-duty restrictions.
• Protection from weapons of mass destruction.
Counterterrorism
4-291. The DOD Dictionary defines this as "offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to
terrorism." Specially organized and trained counterterrorism units usually conduct counterterrorism
operations. In some cases, conventional forces provide, at most, limited support. LRSU activities that
support combating terrorism include at a minimum—
• R&S to confirm terrorist activity.
• Surveillance of a terrorist safe house.
• Surveillance of suspected or known terrorists.
• Surveillance of individuals on the black, white, and gray lists.
• Force-protection surveillance.
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
4-292. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) relocate threatened civilian noncombatants to
secure areas. Normally, these operations remove US citizens from foreign nations where their lives are in
danger either from the threat of hostilities or from a natural disaster. In addition to US citizens, relocated
civilians can include selected host-nation citizens and third-country nationals. NEO has three basic
environments:
Permissive—A permissive environment has no apparent physical threat and no host-nation
opposition. Military assistance is normally limited to agency support. This operation (NEO in a
permissive environment) is slow and deliberate. It is the least likely environment in which an
NEO might occur.
Uncertain—An uncertain environment requires the commander to disseminate the ROE early.
The host nation may or may not be in control, but cannot ensure safety. An uncertain
environment increases the need for a reaction force.
Hostile—A hostile environment might require a large security element and a large reaction force.
The ROEs must be strictly enforced. The host nation or other threat will probably oppose
evacuation. The LRSU activities supporting NEO include, at a minimum—
— R&S of NEO sites.
— Early warning for host nation and United States forces. |
3-55.93 | 124 | Chapter 4
— PR and CSAR support.
— Perimeter security.
— Linkup force.
— Pilot and casualty removal from downed aircraft.
ARMS CONTROL
4-293. This stability operation is associated with weapons of mass destruction. For example, on 26
November 1993, Iraq agreed to long-term monitoring of its weapons programs. Under the resolution,
international weapons inspectors were authorized to roam Iraq freely and for an indefinite period. Their
goal was to prevent Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Inspectors monitored numbers,
types, and performance characteristics of the weapon systems at issue. The inspection also extended
beyond weapons to include C2, logistics support, and intelligence mechanisms. LRSU activities
supporting arms control include, at a minimum—
• R&S of ammunition holding areas.
• R&S of motor pools.
• R&S of suspected transshipment sites.
• R&S of weapon cache.
• Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear monitoring.
• Inspection of storage facilities.
SHOW OF FORCE
4-294. A show of force is a mission carried out to demonstrate resolve. Units conducting a show of
force must deploy rapidly due to the political need for timely action. As the word "show" implies, media
coverage is desirable and must be planned. Commanders must prepare in case a show of force evolves
into a combat operation.
• A show of force—
— Bolsters and reassures allies.
— Deters potential aggressors.
— Gains or increases regional influence.
— Defuses a situation that could damage US interests or national objectives.
—Lends credibility to US commitments and increases regional influence.
• It can take any of the following forms:
— Combined training exercise.
— Rehearsal.
— Forward deployment of military forces.
—Introduction and buildup of military forces in a region such as in Operation "Golden
Pheasant," conducted during a 1988 border incident between Honduras and Nicaragua.
• Some LRSU activities that support shows of force follow:
— Participation in Airborne operations.
— Surveillance from fixed observation posts.
— Route reconnaissance. |
3-55.93 | 125 | Team Operations
CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
4-295. Planning factors for stability include intelligence, rules of engagement, multinational
operations, OPSEC, demography, deception, technology, and COMSEC.
INTELLIGENCE
4-296. The nature of stability operations require detailed intelligence. LRS teams need this intelligence
before they infiltrate. It should include the target location and description; enemy equipment and
capabilities; any civilian personnel in the area; and a variety of terrain, weather, and other related facts.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
4-297. The commander must monitor the ROE to ensure that all teams know when and how to apply
force to meet specific situations. He must avoid vague or wordy ROE. Each Soldier must understand the
rules as they apply to him. LRS teams must adjust rapidly to changes in the ROE.
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
4-298. LRSUs must be prepared to coordinate and work with the host country's military and
paramilitary forces. Every situation is unique and depends on the extent of involvement of US forces and
the nature of the operations. Chief considerations when planning multinational operations are C2,
intelligence, operational procedures, and sustainment.
OPERATIONS SECURITY
4-299. OPSEC is critical for LRSU in stability operations. Due to the potential for other forces (US or
host nation) to operate near LRS teams, LRS commanders must carefully coordinate to reduce the risk of
fratricide. This requirement poses an equally dangerous risk to OPSEC for the teams.
DEMOGRAPHY
4-300. LRS commanders must study all aspects of the local population to understand the effect that it
might have on teams operating in the area. He can obtain information from a variety of sources, to
include area studies, intelligence staff agencies, local government, and the media.
DECEPTION
4-301. To reduce the risk to LRS teams, commanders should consider using deception, particularly
during insertion of the teams. Establishing false landing zones and sending dummy radio transmissions
are two techniques to deceive the enemy. Deception is limited only by the imagination, but leaders
should consider and coordinate all means of insertion or extraction through the R&S squadron S-3.
TECHNOLOGY
4-302. Technology is a proven combat multiplier. Advanced optics, thermal sights, and remote sensors
increase the capabilities of the LRS teams. Commanders must weigh the advantages against the inherent
disadvantages. These include increased Soldier's load and the impact of emitting the various equipment
signatures.
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
4-303. The threat of interception and direction finding exists in all levels of conflict. Foreign purchases
of threat equipment and relatively inexpensive off-the-shelf technology have enabled many third world
countries and indigenous forces to equip themselves with the ability to take advantage of poor
COMSEC. LRS commanders and team leaders must take appropriate measures to enforce COMSEC
procedures. |
3-55.93 | 126 | Chapter 4
Section IX. SPECIAL MISSIONS
Special missions include, among others, CBRN; Pathfinder; and personnel recovery (PR).
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR
4-304. LRSU may be called on to perform limited CBRN reconnaissance duties. The amount or type of
equipment available and the current qualifications of the team members help determine the nature of
these duties (FM 3-100).
PATHFINDER
4-305. Commanders sometimes require LRSU to perform limited Pathfinder duties. This capability is
limited by the team's pathfinding experience, number of radios, and signaling devices (FM 3-21.38).
PERSONNEL RECOVERY
4-306. The LRSU commander, with assistance from the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC), is
responsible for conducting PR operations in support of his own operations and should be prepared to do
so. He also coordinates with the rescue coordination center (RCC), advising them when his teams might
have to evade a threat. He relays information such as isolated personnel report (ISOPREP) cards and an
evasion plan of action (EPA) along with overlays of the evasion corridor. After he coordinates with other
evasion planning agencies, he might determine that the unit must make its own evasion plans. He starts
by identifying the team's evasion corridor and forms an evasion annex with the assistance of the JSRC
(JP 3-50.2 and FM 3-50.1). |
3-55.93 | 127 | Chapter 5
Insertion and Extraction Methods
The LRS team must be prepared to insert and extract by various means to accomplish
their mission. The team can insert and extract by water (Section I), air (Section II),
land (vehicle [Section III] or on foot [Section IV]); or it can stay behind [also covered
in Section IV]. Proficiency at inserting and extracting improves the team’s likelihood
of accomplishing—and surviving—the mission.
A member of the LRSU headquarters should accompany LRS teams on insertions and
extractions by air. The presence of a representative from headquarters emphasizes the
criticality of the air mission. He can also assist with navigation and other key duties,
as dictated by the unit SOP.
Section I. WATERBORNE OPERATIONS
Using inland and coastal waterways can improve the speed, stealth, and flexibility of a LRS team's insertion
and extraction.
CONSIDERATIONS
5-1. Waterborne insertion means include using surface craft, swimming on the surface, helocasting, or
a combination of these. Whichever they choose, they should execute during limited visibility for
maximum stealth. While planning waterborne operations, leaders must consider the following factors:
• Enemy situation.
• Civilian situation.
• Shipping.
• Beach landing site, which must allow the team to infiltrate and support movement to the inland
objective.
• Environmental factors; for example, winds, waves, fog, thunderstorms and lightning.
• Equipment.
• Time schedule. Leaders use reverse planning to schedule operational events.
• Drop site. The team debarks a larger vessel at a planned drop site then begins infiltration.
• Launch point. A point where swimmers enter the water and begin infiltration.
• Method of loading. Supervisors inspect to ensure loads and lashings, especially waterproofing,
adhere to unit SOP.
COMBAT RUBBER RAIDING RECONNAISSANCE CRAFT
5-2. Most LRS teams use a combat rubber raiding reconnaissance craft, commonly called a "rubber
boat," for small-boat operations.
TECHNICAL INFORMATION
5-3. Specifications and other information about the rubber boat follow:
Inflation—This boat is inflated with foot pumps, using four separate valves on the inside of the
gunwale. Each valve is used to section off the rubber boat into five separate air-tight
compartments. |
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