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Figure 1-5. Personnel recovery operations conducted concurrently
1-47. Army doctrine reinforces the personnel recovery tasks established in joint doctrine. The tasks are
integrated with the Army core competencies—combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Through
these core competencies, Army forces balance the application of the elements of combat power within
tactical actions and tasks associated with offensive, defensive, and stability, or DSCA tasks. (ADP 3-0 and
ADRP 3-0 discuss combined arms maneuver and wide area security.) Within this context, the personnel
recovery tasks—report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate—provide a standard framework for
organizing the complex actions involved in executing Army personnel recovery. Paragraphs 1-48 through
1-74 discuss the personnel recovery tasks in more detail.
Report
1-48. DODI 1300.18 directs that the unit, detachment, or command report any isolating event to the chain
of command within twelve hours of knowing a person or group has become isolated. Units use standard
report formats discussed in FM 6-99. Reports of significant events augment the situation report or the daily
operations report.
1-49. Isolating events are significant; a prompt report allows the command and its higher headquarters to
assess the situation and marshal the necessary support. However, knowing that persons have become
isolated—especially Army civilians, contractor personnel authorized to accompany the force (CAAF), or
other designated persons—sometimes is challenging. For example, they may be part of a convoy composed
solely of local nationals and third country nationals with little or no communications capability.
Commanders emphasize the importance of personnel accountability through prompt and accurate reporting.
1-50. In a joint operations area, the theater army headquarters expects a status report—such as dead,
captured, held hostage, missing, or whereabouts unknown—within four hours in the approved casualty
report format (see FM 6-99). At each echelon above brigade headquarters, the commanders expect an
immediate report. In an area with a high risk of isolation, the commander may direct subordinate
organizations to report probable isolating events, even though the opportunity for a false positive is high.
Expending command resources to find someone who is not actually isolated may seem tactically wasteful,
but it communicates and reinforces a powerful message to the command—no unaccounted person will be
abandoned. These actions are consistent with the tenets of the Army profession and Warrior Ethos.
1-51. A related reporting activity is the operations security necessary to prevent information about an
isolating event from falling into unfriendly or unauthorized hands. This involves taking precautions so that
unit members or the staffs of higher headquarters do not inadvertently release classified information. The
requirement for operations security does not preclude the notification of the next of kin of those isolated,
but it does call for the cooperation of public affairs specialists to safeguard information. A report of an
isolated person or group leads to the next task: locate.
Locate
1-52. Forces complete the locate task by every appropriate means, including contact or clues from the
isolated persons, information from friendly observers, or monitoring of enemy communications. The
command may resort to a cordon and search, an aerial search, a route reconnaissance, or strategic
intelligence resources to locate the isolated individual or group. |
3-50 | 19 | Army Personnel Recovery Operations
1-53. Site exploitation supports the locate task. Systematic examination of the last known location of an
isolated person or group offers the opportunity to gather information and material that may lead to finding
those isolated or determining what happened to them. Isolated persons leave visible and invisible evidence
of their presence. They abandon equipment, scratch names and dates, write notes, or leave fingerprints,
hair, or body fluids. These clues can lead to forensic analysis and identification. Interviewing persons with
knowledge of the event or area, including members of the local population, contributes to information
collection. Site exploitation not only provides a recovery force with tactical information to assist an
ongoing recovery mission, but it may also lead to the discovery of information with operational or strategic
value. ATTP 3-90.15 describes a systematic and comprehensive approach to obtain information of value.
1-54. Enemies know Army forces will attempt to recover isolated persons. Therefore, Army forces
consider whether an enemy is luring friendly forces into an ambush based on its knowledge of the isolating
event. ISG must contain near and far recognition signals and means to determine if the communication
from isolated persons is genuine and the location accurate. Authentication is not just a single action.
Recovery forces authenticate isolated persons and verify location as many times as necessary. Effective
operations require authenticating the report and determining the precise location of isolated persons. Once
the locate task is completed, forces determine how to support isolated persons.
Support
1-55. The support task involves providing aid to the isolated person and to the isolated person’s family as
determined by operational objectives. The command provides all support necessary to enable isolated
persons to survive until recovered. Commanders ensure the forces selected to support isolated persons
know the objectives and can achieve them. Decision makers must properly assess and mitigate risks to
complete the support task successfully.
1-56. Support for isolated persons often requires physical security to keep an enemy force from finding and
capturing them. This support can be fire support or diversionary attacks against an enemy to divert its
attention from isolated individuals or groups. Support items may include food, shelter, clothing,
communications equipment, locator beacons and other position-locating equipment, medical supplies,
protective equipment, weapons, ammunitions, and maps. Units can air drop these items to the isolated
person.
1-57. If able, isolated persons inform the supporting force of their needs. While providing support, the
recovery force obtains information from isolated persons and combines it with available intelligence to
determine appropriate recovery actions. The recovery force adds appropriate information to the report of
isolation. Information requirements during this exchange include—
* An understanding of the ISG.
* Physical condition (wounded, sick, tired, exhausted, or unable to move).
* State of morale.
* Presence of the enemy.
* Equipment and supply status.
* Distance to closest friendly unit.
* Cause of the isolation.
* Ability to self-recover.
* Ability to escape and evade.
* Recognition of the individual’s own situation.
* Capability to signal or otherwise communicate with friendly and recovery forces.
* Availability of terrain suitable for access to the location by air, ground, or waterway.
1-58. The support task extends to the home front. The Army provides casualty assistance after the
member’s status is determined. Army senior commanders make a decision on the timing of notification of
next of kin. Guided by Army notification policy, the owning unit and supporting home station installation
provide the next of kin with accurate status updates of their family member. Further, they provide the
spiritual, moral, medical, financial, and administrative support the family needs to endure the crisis. The
Army does not task family, friends, or private groups to provide support or to act as a substitute for the |
3-50 | 20 | Chapter 1
casualty notification team. However, family support groups and well-meaning friends are critical to the
well-being of family members. DODI 1300.18 generally limits the amount of information releasable to the
public to biographical information.
Recover
1-59. The recover task requires detailed coordination among commanders and staffs, recovery forces and,
when possible, isolated persons. Recovery operations mark the end of the isolating event but not the end of
personnel recovery operations. Recovery forces ensure isolated persons are returned to friendly control,
whether by an unassisted, immediate, deliberate, or external supported approach. When overseas and in a
permissive environment, units recover isolated persons while working with the host nation and DOS, if
appropriate. In a nonpermissive environment, units do not require the host nation’s permission.
1-60. Recovery is most effective when conducted soon after the command confirms the isolation and
authenticates the identity of isolated persons. Forces work quickly to seize the initiative. Forces also take
prudent risk to recover isolated persons safely. Recovery forces ensure isolated persons receive the support
and protection they need. Recovery forces take steps to mitigate any threat to the safety of isolated persons
and recovery forces.
1-61. The recover task sometimes is a subordinate task of another mission. After completing the recover
task, personnel recovery forces perform the reintegration task.
Reintegrate
1-62. The goal of reintegration is to return the isolated person to duty with minimum physical and
emotional complications. It focuses on the needs of the returnee while also addressing the needs of the
Army. The first 72 hours following an isolated event are critical to reducing the long-term effects of
isolation or captivity. Returnees need to—
* Be medically stabilized.
* Regain their ability to predict upcoming events and establish a perception of control over their
life.
* Tell their story in a healthy manner.
* Have their emotions normalized.
* Develop a plan of action for addressing their circumstances.
* Re-engage in a healthy life style with family, social contacts, and coworkers.
1-63. Commanders force tailor reintegration to ensure individual needs are addressed. Reintegration
activities can last from a few hours to a few weeks, depending on the length of the event and conditions the
individual endured. Following an isolating event, units require several things. Properly structured
reintegration addresses both the returnee and unit’s needs simultaneously. The unit needs to—
* Gather time-sensitive information.
* Gather operational and strategic information.
* Capture lessons learned to better prepare the forces in future operations.
* Support the Department of Justice’s prosecution efforts for criminal incidents.
1-64. Regardless of the manner in which the formerly isolated person returns to friendly control, all
recovered personnel—military and civilian—participate in reintegration activities. CAAF and others are
encouraged to participate in reintegration. Reintegration activities include intelligence and survival,
evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) debriefings; medical and behavioral health evaluations; and
reconnection with family and unit members. Reintegration activities also attend to the spiritual needs of
recovered persons and provide assistance with the media if needed.
1-65. Reintegration is complex and can be a prolonged activity. No single PRCS performs all reintegration
tasks. Successful reintegration depends on effective coordination by the PRCS. Even with augmentation,
the PRCS seldom has sufficient staff to complete all the tasks required, especially for specialized areas of
expertise such as medicine, psychology, family sociology, public affairs, religion, finance, and law. Types |
3-50 | 21 | Army Personnel Recovery Operations
and timing of support needed depend largely on physical and psychological conditions of recovered
persons.
1-66. Initial reintegration actions secure recovered individuals, provide basic life support, and transport
individuals to a processing facility, normally at a division, corps, or theater army headquarters.
Subsequently, initial reintegration focuses on in-theater activities to provide remedial medical, behavioral
health, and spiritual care. The goal is to restore recovered persons to good health so they can return to their
unit or organization. Additional intelligence debriefings may occur. Family reunions are possible at this
point. Some individuals return to the United States to reunite with family or to receive medical and
behavioral health care, possibly for the long term.
1-67. The on-scene commander bases reintegration team composition on the situation and the number and
condition of recovered persons. A short, relatively trauma-free isolation may require only local team
members, while other situations require a large team with more specialties for long periods. Depending on
the situation, family contact initially may be limited. Commanders determine when and how to include
family members.
1-68. The commander determines who has access to recovered persons. Public affairs personnel coordinate
with the reintegration team for media access according to the commander’s guidance. Casualty assistance
and family assistance representatives contact families. These representatives may request the PRCS to help
arrange a reunion with family members when appropriate.
1-69. Two general considerations for reintegration include quickly assessing the condition and needs of
recovered persons—referred to as status determination—and arranging transportation. The recovery force
makes an initial status determination and communicates recovered persons’ status to its headquarters, the
appropriate movement and maneuver functional cell, and the reintegration team. The PRCS coordinates
with the recovery force to arrange transportation of recovered persons to locations in which reintegration
activities begin. This transportation may require a combination of modes. The PRCS ensures that a security
force and a knowledgeable escort (briefed by the PRCS) accompany recovered persons.
1-70. A seamless transition from recovery force to reintegration team facilitates an effective return to duty
or reassignment. The PRCS ensures that members of the reintegration team greet recovered persons at the
handover point and begin medical, behavioral health, and life-support services immediately. The PRCS and
the reintegration team inform the returnees about what to expect.
1-71. The reintegration team focuses on debriefing. The team, with the help of the PRCS, gathers
biographical information from recovered persons, the associated data from DD Form 1833, and unit records
to facilitate the reintegration teams understanding. The reintegration team develops a debriefing schedule,
including locations, times, and appropriate content and determines participants. Debriefing subjects can
typically include tactics, intelligence, personnel recovery, and criminal investigation, for example of
perpetrators or captors in a hostage-taking event involving nongovernmental organizations. The purpose of
reintegration is not the criminal prosecution of the returnee. Debriefing requires proper documentation.
Recovered persons sign a DD Form 2810 (Personnel Recovery Debriefing Statement). Recovered
individuals and all persons participating in reintegration sign a Standard Form 312 (Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreement).
1-72. The team ensures recovered persons receive needed medical and behavioral health care before
debriefings. The reintegration team collaborates with health experts to determine if recovered persons are
ready to conclude reintegration activities. If individuals are considered ready for duty, the reintegration
team consults with the appropriate authorities and recommends their return to duty. The PRCS continues to
coordinate reintegration activities until the commander determines they should end. Regardless of the next
step for recovered individuals, after completing reintegration, the PRCS arranges transportation. The chain
of command and human resources representatives determine final duty status for Soldiers.
1-73. The PRCS is responsible for fully documenting each isolating event and its aftermath, including
reintegration activities. This important task is challenging because a PRCS may be simultaneously tracking
and supporting all five personnel recovery tasks for concurrent incidents. Reintegration activities occur at
medical, behavioral health, and other facilities at many different locations. The chain of command expects
regular updates on the status of recovered Soldiers. In addition to ongoing monitoring and documentation
of reintegration, the PRCS maintains readiness for the next isolating event. This generally involves working |
3-50 | 22 | Chapter 1
with the plans cell or future operations integrating cell to contribute to contingency planning and transition
plans from one cell to another.
1-74. Government agencies or contract organizations participate in the reintegration of civilians who work
for them. Civilians have different legal statuses under international law, especially if they are not U.S.
citizens. Representatives of other governments or international corporations may be involved. Coordination
with other governments is the responsibility of the DOS. Regardless of citizenship or organization, the
PRCS recommends to the chain of command final reintegration activities for recovered civilians.
ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY PROFICIENCIES
1-75. Army forces maintain readiness for personnel recovery through the personnel recovery proficiencies.
The proficiencies shown in figure 1-6—structure, communicate, navigate, preserve life, and endure
hardship—contribute to the successful recovery of the isolated person or group. All three focal groups—
commander and staff, unit or recovery force, and isolated person—share and train the five personnel
recovery proficiencies. The proficiencies overlap. Structure is a commander and staff responsibility.
Communicate is shared by all three focal groups. The recovery force must communicate, navigate, and
preserve life. Finally, the isolated individual is responsible for all but structure.
Figure 1-6. Shared personnel recovery proficiencies
1-76. The principles of training articulated in ADRP 7-0 form the basis for those proficiencies on which
the focal groups build to ensure a successful outcome to each isolating event. Army initial entry training
introduces all Soldiers to the Warrior Ethos and basic combat skills. Individual and collective training in
units provide further instructions. Training and exercises in SERE contribute to the individual preparation.
STRUCTURE
1-77. Senior leaders establish and maintain the personnel recovery organizational structure. Commanders
and staff build a foundation for prevention of, preparation for, and responses to isolating events. The
personnel recovery organizational structure addresses and solves the problems associated with Soldiers,
Army civilians, CAAF, and other designated persons should they become isolated in a hostile or permissive
environment. Commanders and staff develop the structure from applicable doctrine, policy, procedures,
people, organizations, equipment, and information systems. At every echelon, the personnel recovery
structure is visible in two activities: maintaining the unit’s link to the chain of command and maintaining
personnel recovery within the unit.
COMMUNICATE
1-78. Communication is the responsibility of all three personnel recovery focal groups. Integrated
information systems and knowledge management procedures used to move knowledge from one
headquarters to another headquarters and one individual to another individual are important components in
successful personnel recovery. The planning, preparation, and execution of information exchange permits
sharing necessary information with the proper headquarters, groups, and individuals. The ability to
communicate goes beyond the physical network and systems developed to facilitate it. Although
communications systems hardware (computers, cell phones, radios, and signals) and associated software |
3-50 | 23 | Army Personnel Recovery Operations
remain key enablers in mission command, the quality of the information is equally important. Generally, a
command’s ability to improve situational awareness about an isolated person or group directly correlates to
a positive outcome of an isolating event.
1-79. Communication is most important to the isolated person or group. Isolated individuals expect that
higher headquarters and recovery forces have robust systems to identify and locate them. However, that
does not relieve those individuals of the responsibility to know how to communicate with these
organizations. Their knowledge results directly from their preparation. Knowledge of how to use
communications equipment is a basic Soldier skill. Knowledge of, and the ability to use, personnel
recovery related equipment such as a distress beacon is the key to a potential recovery. Low-tech
communications systems augment electronic systems. Effective units train each Soldier in the use of visual
signals such as colored panels, reflective mirrors, or signal fires.
NAVIGATE
1-80. Both personnel and units require strong navigational skills. The ability to identify one’s location and
reach another location without getting lost or being discovered by an adversary is critical in personnel
recovery. In a mission with the potential for isolation, all personnel must know how to locate and move to
friendly forces. Isolated forces with the ability to communicate can direct friendly forces to their location
only if they accurately know that location. Conversely, a unit conducts personnel recovery operations more
efficiently if it knows where the isolated personnel were when they lost contact. When isolated persons
have a communications link with a friendly headquarters or unit, they can use an azimuth or a bearing to
prominent objects such as a terrain feature to direct forthcoming help. Adept recovery forces know
navigation techniques to locate and vector to the isolated person. Global Positioning Systems and map
reading skills also prove valuable when conducting recovery missions.
PRESERVE LIFE
1-81. Preservation of life is a basic human drive. Individuals may find themselves in austere conditions that
challenge their ability to stay healthy and assist in their own recovery. Commanders and staffs must plan
and prepare for the situation in which the isolated person or group cannot remain under the conditions of
isolation for a long time. The unit or recovery force must act quickly to locate and recover the isolated
individuals without exposing itself to unnecessary danger from hostile forces or the environment.
1-82. Preservation of life in an isolating event is a shared responsibility. The chain of command has the
responsibility to provide the means for survival (security, food, water, shelter, clothing, medical, and moral
support) to those isolated. This is both an immediate need and a long-term challenge to the command. The
command can only succeed if it trains and equips individuals to survive isolation. The most valuable
proficiency for isolated persons is the ability to survive long enough to conduct unassisted recovery or to be
located and recovered by friendly forces.
ENDURE HARDSHIP
1-83. The psychological preparation for isolation is as important as the other proficiencies. Knowledge that
each isolated individual becomes the object of an immediate recovery effort mentally prepares that
individual for isolation. The articles of the Code of Conduct are a part of initial Army training. Periodic
retraining in units and other organizations reinforces the Code of Conduct. Training typically occurs more
frequently for those preparing to serve in an environment with a greater risk of isolation. Enduring hardship
is a personal responsibility, but the unit, recovery forces, and higher headquarters commanders and staffs
share responsibility to prepare the Soldier or other designated individual. |
3-50 | 25 | Chapter 2
Responsibilities and Supporting Tools
This chapter discusses the responsibilities of commanders, staffs, and organizations
conducting personnel recovery operations. It also outlines supporting tools to help
fulfill these responsibilities.
RESPONSIBILITIES
2-1. Commanders, leaders, and Soldiers understand and carry out their personnel recovery roles and
responsibilities so they can accomplish the mission. Army professionals are accountable to fulfill
responsibilities, whether defined or implied. Usually, a duty description specifies responsibilities;
sometimes the situation implies them. Each duty position has core responsibilities and associated
supporting responsibilities. However, responsibilities for a given duty position vary, depending on the
situation. For example, a personnel recovery officer provides doctrinally correct input to an Army unit
OPLAN or OPORD but also may serve as the officer in charge of a recovery operation. This field manual
is intended to provide flexible guidance that Army organizations can adapt to their specific situation.
2-2. In any Army unit or organization, the commander combines the art of command and the science of
control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. Staff members support the
commander and subordinate commanders in understanding situations, making decisions, and implementing
decisions. Paragraphs 2-3 through 2-35 detail personnel recovery responsibilities of commanders, staffs,
and organizations.
COMMON COMMANDER AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
2-3. All echelons of command, from the company to above brigade, regardless of the makeup of the
personnel recovery staff section, share core responsibilities. In every action, the commander and staff
exemplify the tenets of the Army profession and winning spirit espoused by the Soldier’s Creed: never
accept defeat, never quit, and never leave a fallen comrade behind. The commander and staff sections
consider their responsibilities concerning the operations process, training, guidance, coordination, and
equipment. The discussions are not all inclusive.
2-4. By integrating personnel recovery into all aspects of the Army operations process, the commander
and staff—
* Conduct personnel recovery operations to report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate
isolated personnel anywhere within the command’s AO.
* Use the tactical-level mission variables—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available, time available and civil considerations (known as METT-TC)—to refine their
understanding of a situation.
* Embed personnel recovery concepts and tasks in all plans and orders.
* Implement a communication plan for personnel recovery.
* Plan and prepare a designated area for recovery to serve as a focal point for short-term personnel
recovery operations or specific missions.
* Ensure all intelligence and reports on an isolating event are collected, preserved, analyzed, and
reported to proper authorities, including the lessons learned and assessments at the headquarters.
2-5. When training for personnel recovery, the commander and staff have the following responsibilities:
* Conduct predeployment, premission, annual Code of Conduct, and annual SERE training.
* Monitor, exercise, and rehearse all personnel recovery missions. |
3-50 | 26 | Chapter 2
* Implement, train, and apply personnel recovery doctrine.
* Facilitate training for commanders, staffs, and forces commensurate with their assigned roles.
* Emphasize unassisted recovery in all personnel recovery training.
* Develop and maintain a unit personnel recovery system, including SOPs, TTP, and training.
* Fully staff designated personnel recovery positions where they exist and train multifunctional
staff officers and noncommissioned officers in personnel recovery matters.
2-6. The commander and staff have the following responsibilities that apply to guidance and assessment:
* Develop and disseminate personnel recovery guidance to facilitate personnel recovery activities
based on guidance from higher headquarters.
* Know the higher headquarters personnel recovery guidance.
* Develop and disseminate ISG for each operation.
* Assess unit readiness to conduct personnel recovery activities, including equipment and recovery
aid status.
* Assess intelligence, information collection, and operations for their effectiveness after personnel
recovery missions.
* Assess civilian and diplomatic capabilities to support personnel recovery activities in the AO.
* Assess how HN security forces, intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations, and local
civilians can support or disrupt personnel recovery activities.
2-7. The commander and staff have the following responsibilities that apply to coordination:
* Coordinate personnel recovery issues vertically and horizontally, particularly with subordinate
personnel recovery staffs.
* Communicate necessary information that contribute to situational awareness of those associated
with a recovery operation.
* Coordinate with the appropriate staff for necessary support to personnel recovery missions.
2-8. The commander and staff maintain accountability for Soldiers and specialized personnel recovery
equipment. They maintain access to authentication information (entered on DD Form 1833 through the
Army’s PRO-File data entry system or on Personnel Recovery Mission Software Web site [only if
SECRET Internet Protocol Router is available]) on all Soldiers in the unit.
COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES
2-9. Commanders provide leadership and demand accountability. Personnel recovery missions require a
combination of approaches. Successful personnel recovery operations often depend on timely decisions and
rapid execution. The time available to conduct a recovery may be short, and the tactical situation may
change rapidly. Therefore, commanders exercise mission command and delegate personnel recovery
decision-making authority to subordinate commanders. This facilitates decentralized execution and
maximizes use of available time. Subordinate commanders often have the best situational understanding of
their AO and can respond quickly to an isolating event. Higher echelon commanders decentralize personnel
recovery decision making and allocate appropriate resources to subordinate commanders to accomplish the
mission. Commanders identify personnel recovery information requirements and focus the staff on
answering those requirements. Commanders provide direction and emphasis on personnel recovery
education and training.
2-10. While decentralized execution applies to many personnel recovery missions, situations occur in
which a centralized command approach may be appropriate. To illustrate, persons are isolated in a country
in which the host nation or the DOS has the lead in recovery and small joint or Army units provide support.
When facing these conditions, subordinate commanders may lack sufficient information to evaluate the
impact of conducting a recovery on the operation at large.
2-11. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess throughout personnel recovery
operations. They continuously develop, test, and update their understanding throughout the conduct of
operations. They actively collaborate with other commanders, the staff, and unified action partners to create
a shared understanding. As commanders begin to develop an understanding of an operational environment, |
3-50 | 27 | Responsibilities and Supporting Tools
they start visualizing the operation’s end state and potential solutions to solve problems. After commanders
visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates. This description facilitates a shared
understanding of the situation, mission, and commander’s intent. AR 525-28 directs that all commanders—
* Develop policies and procedures for their command to report, locate, support, recover, and
reintegrate Soldiers and Army civilians in the event they become isolated.
* Ensure deployable Soldiers and Army civilians plan with their families the actions families
should take if Soldiers or civilians become isolated.
* Develop policies and procedures to support the families of Soldiers and Army civilians in the
event they become isolated.
* Provide requirements to the contracting officer concerning personnel recovery for incorporation
into contracts. At a minimum, commanders identify any training (such as theater entry
requirements) and equipment needed by a CAAF for personnel recovery efforts.
* Establish a functioning PRCS for major exercises and operations at the division and corps levels.
Additionally, AR 525-28 directs that commanders at the brigade level identify a personnel recovery officer
or noncommissioned officer.
2-12. The primary responsibility of the commander—at the appropriate level—is to issue personnel
recovery guidance and ISG. The primary method for exercising this responsibility is face-to-face contact
with subordinate commanders and interaction with the staff. When required, this coordination extends
beyond the chain of command to host nations, multinational partners, and international or nongovernmental
organizations.
STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
2-13. A staff integrates information to support the commander’s situational understanding. Personnel
recovery staff members have similar responsibilities whether they are trained personnel recovery officers in
echelons above brigade headquarters, personnel recovery staff officers or noncommissioned officers at
brigade level, or multifunctional staff officers or noncommissioned officers at battalion level. A staff
analyzes the impact of an operational environment on personnel recovery operations in terms of the
operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical
environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT)—when serving at the appropriate command echelon.
Paragraphs 2-15 through 2-19 focus on personnel recovery operations at echelons above brigade
headquarters, but the discussion also applies to responsibilities at lower staff echelons. Each staff section in
the scalable headquarters has some personnel recovery responsibilities.
Functional Cells
2-14. Functional cells group personnel and equipment by warfighting function.
Movement and Maneuver Cell
2-15. The movement and maneuver functional cell, and especially its current operations integration cell,
helps the commander anticipate the possibility of an isolating event. This functional cell develops and
rehearses staff actions to react effectively to execute the schemes of maneuver to recover the isolated
person or group. This cell supports all personnel recovery tasks but is especially responsible for the
reporting necessary to establish that an isolating event has taken place. The cell also supports the
commander’s decisions by communicating direction to the force. Depending on the decisions of the
commander and the recommendation of the chief of staff, the personnel recovery officer may be located in
the current operations integration cell.
Intelligence Cell
2-16. The intelligence functional cell plays a critical role in the timely recovery of isolated personnel. It
coordinates before, during, and after an isolating event with higher, lower, and adjacent units and staffs. It
contributes to mission planning, provides real-time information and intelligence concerning the mission,
and participates in reintegration. Its analysis helps the command avoid isolating events, describe the hybrid |
3-50 | 28 | Chapter 2
threat or environmental concerns to the isolated person and the recovery force, and evaluate likely areas for
recovery and evasion. The intelligence staff integrates closely with the movement and maneuver functional
cell during operations.
Fires Cell
2-17. The fires functional cell and its elements (fire support element, electronic warfare, field artillery
intelligence officer, and the Air Force tactical air control party) provide staff support to joint and Army
fires. The fires functional cell coordinates missions to enable personnel recovery tasks. Fires can prevent
the enemy from observing or capturing the isolated person or group and protect the recovery force as it
accomplishes its missions. The fires functional cell coordinates the capability to destroy, neutralize, or
suppress enemy targets near isolated personnel. The cell also has the ability to clear fires to support
recovery operations. The fires cell integrates its efforts with higher, lower, and adjacent fires elements and
with all elements within the staff. Through its representatives in the current operations integration cell, the
fires cell is responsible for the input of fires information into the common operational picture so the
commander and staff can develop situational awareness.
Protection Cell
2-18. The protection functional cell is responsible for integrating or coordinating tasks and systems that fall
under the protection warfighting function. The protection cell advises commanders on the priorities for
protection and coordinates the implementation and sustainment of protective measures to protect assets
according to the commander’s priorities. One of the protection cell’s primary tasks and responsibilities is to
integrate personnel recovery into the operations process with the personnel recovery coordination center.
Personnel recovery officers are a part of the protection functional cell at echelons above brigade. When
directed, its responsibility extends beyond the headquarters and the chain of command to include
noncombatants, physical assets, and information. During an isolating event, the protection cell and its
personnel recovery staff have the primary responsibility to integrate or coordinate personnel recovery
activities into planning and execution. The protection cell becomes one of two focal points (the movement
and maneuver cell is the other) for completing the personnel recovery tasks: report, locate, support,
recovery, and reintegrate discussed in paragraphs 1-45 through 1-74. (See ADRP 3-37 for more
information on the protection cell and tasks.)
Sustainment Cell
2-19. The sustainment functional cell supports the commander, the unit, the recovery force, and isolated
persons. The sustainment cell is responsible for integrating sustainment and related activities into all phases
of personnel recovery operations. Related activities include supply, maintenance, transportation, personnel,
finance, and operational contract support. The cell coordinates its capabilities to ensure freedom of action,
extend operational reach, and prolong endurance of the force. It provides information and updates on the
state of its components and their impact on planned or current personnel recovery activities, the most
important of which is unit accountability. The sustainment cell is responsible for coordinating the logistic,
personnel services, resourcing, and health service support for the recovery forces. Finally, it provides the
support through units to the recovery forces to facilitate rescue and return of isolated personnel to friendly
control. Its responsibilities extend to reintegration when the sustainment functional cell supports all efforts
to return the formerly isolated person or group to duty or reassignment.
Integrating Cells
2-20. By definition, the three integrating cells—plans, future operations, and current operations
integration—are responsible for collecting the information to support the tasks and purposes of the
command (see figure 1-2, page 1-3). Based on three planning horizons—short, mid, and long—these
integrating cells coordinate daily with the commander, functional staff sections, personnel and special staff,
and the other integrating staff sections (including the meetings that serve as ad hoc integrating elements).
These coordination responsibilities occur in general operations and specific missions, including personnel
recovery. The integrating cells responsibilities are both horizontal (within the headquarters) and vertical (up
and down the chain of command). |
3-50 | 29 | Responsibilities and Supporting Tools
Personal and Special Staff Elements
2-21. Personal and special staff elements facilitate personnel recovery activities for the commander. The
personal staff normally includes the senior enlisted advisor, the inspector general, the staff judge advocate,
the public affairs officer, the chaplain, a political advisor, a cultural advisor, and a surgeon. This group
expands and contracts based on the needs and desires of the commander. The responsibility of this group is
to advise the commander and serve as a conduit of information to and from other staff elements. Other
important informal members of this group are interpreters (those who transfer the spoken word of one
language into another) and translators (those who render the written words of one language into another)
who accompany the commander and staff members overseas. Interpreters and translators can be key
members of the recovery force in a rescue operation.
2-22. The special staff elements provide guidance to the entire staff. They are special in that they are
important enough not to be subsumed into the activities of the functional or integrating staff cells. The
special staff elements at division headquarters and above—the provost marshal; knowledge management
officer; operational researcher; red team officer; staff weather officer; chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (known as CBRN) officer; engineer; and personnel recovery officer—interface with the rest of
the staff in all operations. This grouping also includes the command and functional liaison teams providing
a window on other commands. Command liaison represents the interests of the chain of command and
associated organizations (such as multinational, HN, DOS, and civilian organization partners). Functional
liaison teams support the virtual and physical systems on which the command depends, such as
intelligence, infrastructure, and life support.
The Personnel Recovery Officer’s Responsibilities
2-23. All echelons of command above battalion level have trained personnel recovery officers. At company
level and below, the commander or leader may not recognize a specific personnel recovery role; however,
leaders exercise this role as a part of their larger leadership role. At battalion level, a member of the training
and operations staff section typically serves as the point of contact (POC) for personnel recovery. The
brigade level is the lowest command echelon in which a staff officer serves in a recognized personnel
recovery role. While there is no fixed number of these staff officers, most battalion and brigade-sized
units—especially those in areas with an increased risk of isolation—identify an officer, warrant officer, or
noncommissioned officer as a personnel recovery officer. At echelons above brigade headquarters, the
personnel recovery officer coordinates the personnel recovery efforts and staffs the PRCS. The staffing,
grade requirement, and number of these officers constantly changes; however, commanders often augment
PRCSs based on the situation. These elements serve as POCs and fusion points for personnel recovery
matters at their respective commands. Responsibilities for personnel recovery officers fall into the
following four broad categories:
* Advisor to the commander.
* POC for personnel recovery efforts to the staff and others.
* Staff coordinator of personnel recovery activities across the command.
* Trainer.
Advisor
2-24. The personnel recovery officer is proficient in joint and Army doctrine and an expert in personnel
recovery. As such, commanders at every level seek counsel from this officer when confronted with an
isolating event. The personnel recovery officer provides personnel recovery expertise to the commander in
response to an isolating event.
Point of Contact
2-25. A personnel recovery officer—as an additional duty for a multifunctional staff officer at battalion or
brigade, or in a required and authorized position at large-unit headquarters—answers inquiries about the
doctrine and TTP for personnel recovery efforts within the command. Questions and comments may come
from within the headquarters, outside staff entities, or other commanders. Depending on the situation, this
may include contacts where a commander or staff members from lower or higher in the chain of command |
3-50 | 30 | Chapter 2
bypass the next level—or levels—of command in a request for information and guidance. In such cases, the
contact usually is an attempt to get information about a planned, ongoing, or accomplished personnel
recovery mission. POC responsibilities include obtaining the necessary training to be able to inform the
command of its personnel recovery responsibilities.
Staff Coordinator
2-26. Personnel recovery officers are responsible to establish staff relationships with coordinating,
personal, or special staff officers. Establishing and maintaining the interpersonal links and exercising the
communications systems enable the PRCS’s personnel recovery experts to be ready. The coordination
responsibilities can be routine or exceptional, depending on the situation. Routine coordination includes
being a part of the daily contingency planning cycle. The difference between the POC and staff coordinator
responsibility is the level of activity and personal involvement. Whether located within the staff of a
battalion or brigade, or one of the cells at echelon above brigade headquarters, the personnel recovery
officer is a member of the team that contributes to the successful accomplishment of the recovery mission.
As a staff coordinator, a personnel recovery officer provides doctrinally correct input to an Army unit
OPLAN or OPORD and may also serve as the officer in charge of a recovery operation.
ECHELON RESPONSIBILITIES
2-27. Personnel recovery is a priority at every echelon of the joint and Army commands. It is an essential
part of unit operations and planning. In addition to the actions of commanders, staffs, and personnel
recovery officers, each command echelon has personnel recovery responsibilities. Higher echelons are
typically competent not only in their own tasks, but also in those of subordinates. The responsibilities
discussed within each echelon are listed in no specific order.
2-28. Leaders at all levels fill a crucial role in the personnel recovery structure. Personnel recovery as a
discipline is more visible at higher echelons, including joint levels of command. At the lowest level,
personnel recovery is a part of the many tasks the individual Soldier must master. Commanders at this
echelon have no dedicated protection functional cell but are still responsible for integrating personnel
recovery into operations. The company-level Soldier may be familiar with the term personnel recovery but
is more likely to identify with the component skills necessary to avoid isolating events such as land
navigation, survival training, first aid, marksmanship, small-unit tactics, and physical fitness. At battalion
or brigade level, personnel recovery is an additional duty. The staff member with personnel recovery
responsibilities needs to be more knowledgeable in its doctrine and include personnel recovery information
in training and OPLANs and OPORDs. Protection integration at these echelons may require commanders to
designate a staff lead to assume the role of protection officer to carry out the responsibilities performed by
dedicated personnel at higher levels of command. Trained officers and noncommissioned officers at the
upper echelons of Army operational forces provide a greater capacity to manage personnel recovery events
and give greater visibility to the discipline. These headquarters also have the obligation to coordinate with
higher, lower, and adjacent echelons.
Tasks by Division, Corps, and Theater Army Headquarters
2-29. Division, corps, and theater army headquarters have organic personnel recovery staff support. The
personnel recovery officer of the PRCS requests augmentation if needed. Normally, the PRCS has the
responsibilities and organization described in paragraphs 2-38 through 2-44. Additionally, JP 3-50 offers
more detail on the specific responsibilities for Service component and joint commands. PRCSs at the
division, corps, and theater levels establish, adequately staff, and fully train other PRCSs. PRCSs at the
division, corps, and theater levels perform tasks associated with conducting Army operations, joint
operations, coordination, training, and support.
2-30. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels perform the following tasks associated with
conducting operations:
* Plan, prepare, and execute personnel recovery operations when supporting or conducting
operations under DOS chief of mission authority. |
3-50 | 31 | Responsibilities and Supporting Tools
* Prepare to conduct interoperable and cooperative personnel recovery operations with partners,
including leveraging HN capabilities to rescue personnel unilaterally whenever possible.
* Assess policies, processes, and programs that influence commanders’ ability to conduct
personnel recovery operations; recommend actions to enhance personnel recovery capabilities.
* Ensure that subordinate commanders routinely address actions planned when personnel become
isolated.
* Support the personnel recovery executive agent and others in the collection, reporting, and
dissemination of personnel recovery lessons learned.
* Provide the results of inspections that include findings or observations that pertain to personnel
recovery activities to the personnel recovery executive agent.
2-31. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels coordinate with the JPRC and perform the following
tasks associated with joint operations:
* Advise, assist, facilitate, standardize, and coordinate personnel recovery matters with other
departments and agencies of the USG in the joint operations area.
* Contribute personnel recovery-related data and information to the central historical repository
and archive and reference library, managed by the JPRA.
* Prepare to establish a JPRC if directed or if designated as the joint force supported commander
for personnel recovery. This will not negate the requirement to perform Army PRCS functions
as well. This requires personnel recovery staffs maintain education, training, and staffing
requirements.
* Coordinate isolated personnel authentication procedures with the JPRC and disseminate them in
ISG and subordinate personnel recovery contingency plans.
* Provide the JPRC with augmentees trained in personnel recovery as directed. These personnel
assist in coordinating and deconflicting the Army’s personnel recovery capabilities at the joint
level.
* Provide mutual support to the recovery operations of the other Services to the greatest extent
possible. Normally the JPRC requests and coordinates such support.
* Ensure unit PRCS SOPs align with JPRC and theater army personnel recovery contingency
operations.
* Gather and disseminate information concerning personnel recovery assets and capabilities to
adjoining PRCSs and the JPRC.
2-32. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels perform the following tasks associated with training:
* Ensure that military, Army civilians, and CAAF receive personnel recovery training
commensurate with their level of risk for becoming isolated or exploited.
* Ensure personnel recovery education and training preparation efforts keep pace with changes in
the operational area.
* Clearly define the circumstances needed to initiate SERE activities.
* Ensure subordinate units and key personnel—such as the PRCSs, personnel at risk of isolation,
and recovery forces—are familiar with unit SOPs, personnel recovery TTP, and directives.
2-33. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels perform the following tasks associated with
coordination:
* Coordinate for personnel recovery section support throughout the headquarters, including the
main command post, the tactical command post (where established), and any ad hoc facility,
such as a contingency or early entry command post.
* Coordinate and support joint, multinational, HN, and interagency personnel recovery activities.
* Coordinate for theater of operations and national intelligence support to personnel recovery
activities.
* Ensure that subordinate units are familiar with other PRCSs and immediately transmit
information on isolated personnel to the PRCS that coordinates personnel recovery operations.
2-34. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels perform the following tasks associated with support: |
3-50 | 32 | Chapter 2
* Assist personnel recovery staff officers and noncommissioned officers in subordinate command
echelons in the development of personnel recovery programs.
* Ensure that intelligence reports, running estimates, and products support personnel recovery
planning, training, and execution are available in a timely manner to subordinate units.
* Support higher headquarters and Service reintegration plans by writing plans and identifying
reintegration team key personnel.
2-35. Situations often dictate the responsibilities at each echelon of command. Commanders at lower or
higher echelons may need to undertake missions with responsibilities different from those they are
normally assigned. While functional commands do not have dedicated PRCSs on their table of organization
and equipment, they are expected to perform the personnel recovery duties listed paragraphs 2-36 and 2-37.
Tasks by Battalion and Brigade
2-36. Commanders at battalion and brigade levels frequently exercise their protection authority by
assigning personnel recovery responsibilities to a specific staff officer or noncommissioned officer, usually
in the operations staff section. In the role of advisor to the commander—as the POC for personnel recovery
activities and staff coordinator—the personnel recovery officer is accountable for the following common
personnel recovery responsibilities and tasks:
* Include personnel recovery responsibilities in unit execution documents.
* Establish personnel recovery staff capabilities and assign primary responsibilities in the
command post as the focal point for the commander and staff.
* Establish isolated person reporting requirements in the brigade and subordinate information
management systems.
* Recommend task organization and mission assignment to subordinate elements.
* Advise the commander on steps to ready subordinate units for personnel recovery missions.
* Synchronize and integrate all required assets for personnel recovery activities.
* Assist subordinate staffs and commanders in the development of their specific echelon’s
personnel recovery system.
* Support joint personnel recovery operations, if directed.
Tasks by Company and Below
2-37. Commanders and leaders of company, battery, or troop and below have personnel recovery
responsibilities no less important than the leaders at higher echelons. Small tactical organizations
(including ad hoc tactical units such as convoy march, serials, trailer transfer points, refuel and
maintenance points, and reintegration locations) often precede operational formations, placing them at
increased risk. Small-unit leaders should be keenly aware of the isolation risk associated with their specific
mission or circumstance and engage in risk management to mitigate that risk accordingly. When an
isolating event occurs, individuals and small units often have the best opportunity to make a quick
assessment and react or recover from the isolating situation. Leaders at the company level and below
complete the following tasks:
* Develop ISG or evasion plans of action for every member of the unit.
* Identify shortfalls in personnel recovery capabilities during troop leading procedures.
* Identify information requirements for potential personnel recovery operations.
* Evaluate each tactical situation and plan accordingly.
* Assess the unit’s ability to complete the personnel recovery tasks.
* Request the support required to address shortfalls in capability.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF PERSONNEL RECOVERY ORGANIZATIONS
2-38. At echelons above brigade, the personnel recovery officer serves in two separate but related staff
elements. First, the officer serves in the joint force headquarters—either a combatant command or
subordinate joint headquarters such as a joint task force—if it has a JPRC. Second, the officer serves in the |
3-50 | 33 | Responsibilities and Supporting Tools
subordinate Army headquarters in the joint force, the theater army, corps, and division to establish a PRCS.
The joint and Army elements have complementary responsibilities.
The Joint Personnel Recovery Center
2-39. The JPRC serves as the fusion point at the joint force level and maintains staff connectivity to the
PRCS. Personnel recovery officers from each Service and functional component of the joint force staff the
center. The JPRC responsibilities are similar to those in other combatant command staff elements:
* Implement personnel recovery policies at the joint force level.
* Develop personnel recovery SOPs for the joint force.
* Support personnel recovery planning in the combatant command’s area of responsibility.
* Exercise communication networks with higher, adjacent, and lower personnel recovery entities.
* Coordinate external supported recoveries with appropriate organizations, agencies, militaries,
and governments.
* Coordinate with national and theater assets to support personnel recovery.
* Participate in the decision-making processes for joint personnel recovery situations.
* Assist Service component personnel recovery coordination cells with their responsibilities.
* Establish which recovery coordinator has the authority should the JPRC go offline for any
reason.
* Provide information to the personnel recovery management system.
* Serve as POC with the unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell for unconventional
assisted recovery and nonconventional assisted recovery.
2-40. The number of personnel assigned to the JPRC varies based on the size of the operation and the level
of risk of isolation. See JP 3-50 for further information on staffing and training requirements for a JPRC.
The Personnel Recovery Coordination Section
2-41. The PRCS is the staff section in division, corps, or theater army headquarters that serves as the focal
point for all personnel recovery actions. It is responsible for synchronizing and integrating all personnel
recovery actions horizontally within the headquarters and vertically within the chain of command. The
commander must adequately staff and resource the PRCS. The PRCS requests augmentation if its
responsibilities increase to exceed the ability of the section to handle them. Typical augmentation includes
aviation, intelligence, ground operations, maritime operations, medical, behavioral health, human
resources, or communications expertise.
2-42. The location of the PRCS is a command decision. It typically is a section of the protection cell at
echelons above brigade headquarters. It maintains connectivity with the command post. Multiple PRCSs
can exist in the same command at multiple locations. Whether they report to a senior PRCS or are
independent organizations depends on the situation and the direction of the commander. During an isolating
event, the PRCS may become the focus of planning, preparation, and execution. It has to contend with the
time-sensitive actions taken by the command to respond to the isolation and recover the personnel. The
PRCS’s responsibilities increase during an isolating event. Regardless of where the section is located, the
commander and staff seek advice and task the section to provide expertise as the command performs the
five personnel recovery tasks. The PRCS participates in planning and preparation, provides liaison, and
accompanies the commander.
2-43. Specific PRCS responsibilities consist of the following:
* Advise the commander on the available personnel recovery forces and their capabilities and
limitations.
* Assist subordinate units and personnel to develop and maintain digital ISOPREP and evasion
plan of action data.
* Conduct or support recovery operations or other recovery-related activities, as directed or
requested. |
3-50 | 34 | Chapter 2
* Coordinate education and training of subordinate commanders, staffs, and individuals in their
personnel recovery responsibilities.
* Develop and maintain personnel recovery SOPs.
* Develop and review the personnel recovery content in OPLANs, OPORDs, and FRAGORDs.
* Establish the PRCS with multiple means of secure and nonsecure communications within the
command and with higher, adjacent, and lower personnel recovery organizations.
* Implement personnel recovery policies and programs.
* Maintain access authentication information (entered on the DD Form 1833 through the
Personnel Recovery Mission Software Web site) and evasion plans of action for all assigned
Soldiers.
* Notify the JPRC director of PRCS activation, unit’s ability to provide support to recovery
operations, and deactivation.
* Participate in the decision-making processes for personnel recovery situations.
* Provide staff supervision of personnel recovery officers at subordinate echelons.
* Provide the command with the identity, status, probable location, and personal authentication
and identity verification data of isolated personnel.
* Serve as subject matter experts and POCs for personnel recovery operations and issues at the
Service levels.
* Track personnel recovery events within the command.
2-44. The coordination process shown in figure 2-1, pages 2-10 through 2-12, for the PRCSs at Army unit
headquarters (theater army, corps, and division) and functional commands may also be used as a guide for
the personnel recovery officer at brigade level and the staff officer at battalion.
1. Administrative setup.
a. Task-organize. Select the staff of with the appropriate area of expertise and augment as
required. Assign based on expected risk. When working with a joint task force, include a director, a
deputy director, and controllers.
b. Develop a work schedule. Consider 24-hour operations, the potential for split-based operations
(personnel recovery expertise at a main command post and a tactical command post or other command
post), and the requirement to accompany the commander or a recovery force while staffing a personnel
recovery coordination section (PRCS) at the protection or the movement and maneuver cell.
c. Obtain reference documents. Establish a reference library with hard and electronic copies of the
necessary documents to maintain situational awareness. Include theater, command, and unit standard
operating procedures, policies, and rules of engagement. Maintain a master list, including regulations,
plans, orders, points of contact, and instructions.
d. Check computers and communications equipment. Establish a direct or shared access to voice,
image, and data systems to support situational awareness. Conduct the required user training. Identify
the points of contact for equipment support. Establish liaison with operators of other systems.
e. Set up a personnel recovery identification system. Use PRCS standard operating procedures or
other source documents. Establish a system for tracking activities of the PRCS to support situational
awareness, meet recordkeeping requirements, and support after action reviews.
Figure 2-1. Personnel recovery coordination processes for Army headquarters |
3-50 | 35 | Responsibilities and Supporting Tools
f. Establish display protocols. Develop the necessary display items for the PRCS for all types of
media in use by the command. Include information available on personnel recovery assets and
information on potentially isolated, missing, or captured persons. (Examples of items include logs, maps,
coordination requirements, and procedures.)
g. Review procedures. Review the standard operating procedures and other information sources,
including templates for various report and message formats per FM 6-99.
h. Conduct training. Conduct orientation and training for PRCS members and associated liaison
personnel. Coordinate with the chief of operations and the chief of protection to have personnel recovery
activities included in mission readiness exercises and other predeployment or mission rehearsals.
i. Develop point of contact list. Obtain and maintain contact information of all personnel recovery
organizations. Develop procedures for 24-hour contact of those with personnel recovery expertise in the
command post and throughout the chain of command.
2. Personnel recovery structure.
a. Conduct initial coordination. Coordinate with organizations in the personnel recovery structure,
including those at the joint personnel recovery center, Department of State regional security officer, and
adjacent and subordinate personnel recovery staff. Contact other unified action partners that have
expressed a willingness to assist.
b. Coordinate with the functional and integrating cells and other staff sections. (See FM 6-0 for
doctrine on functional and integrating cells.) Coordinate appropriately for the echelon. Ensure persons
representing the PRCS in functional and integrating cells are knowledgeable in personnel recovery
doctrine and capabilities.
(1) Intelligence cell. Coordinate with the chief of intelligence for intelligence and information
from unified action partners. (The theater-level joint personnel recovery center coordinates theater-level
intelligence support with the combatant commands.)
(2) Movement and maneuver cell. Clarify the authority and responsibility of personnel recovery
officers with respect to this functional cell and then maintain a close relationship with it.
(3) Fires cell. Become familiar with the activities of the fire support element, the field artillery
intelligence officer, and the electronic warfare sections of the cell. Coordinate for fires to fix enemy forces,
confuse and disorient potential threats, and provide the fires portion of the common operational picture.
(4) Protection cell. Maintain situational awareness and close coordination with other sections of
the protection cell (air and missile defense; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear; engineer;
operations security; personnel recovery; force health protection; explosive ordnance disposal; and
provost marshal).
(5) Sustainment cell. Coordinate with the sustainment cell (including logistics, personnel,
financial management, engineer, and surgeon sections) to facilitate the personnel recovery task each
supports. (The importance of coordination with the sustainment cell is second only to the movement and
maneuver cell.)
(6) The integrating cells (current operations, future operations, and plans). Coordinate with the
integrating cells as needed for situational awareness. At a minimum, maintain hourly contact with current
operations integration cell as it tracks operations. Provide expertise to the plans cell to support decision
making and ensure personnel recovery is a part of plans and orders.
(7) Personal, special, and coordinating staffs. Coordinate support needed from personal,
special, and coordinating staff.
(8) Meetings to include working groups and boards. Coordinate with collaborative groups
established for the command post.
c. Coordinate with unified action partners. Coordinate with personnel recovery staff officers and
their equivalents in partner organizations. Conduct liaison with the host-nation governmental and military
organizations and the Department of State regional security officer depending on the echelon of
command. Determine the command’s authority responsibilities, restriction on action, and procedures for
personnel recovery.
3. Information requirements.
a. Determine roles and responsibilities of the personnel recovery coordination section. Determine
exactly what the commander wants the section to do and how the section should function as part of the
overall mission.
Figure 2-1. Personnel recovery coordination processes for Army headquarters (continued) |
3-50 | 36 | Chapter 2
b. Establish answers to specific questions including—
(1) Who has the authority to direct a recovery operation?
(2) Who can terminate a recovery operation?
(3) Who is in charge of post recovery reintegration at the command level?
(4) Who maintains the authentication information from DD Form 1833, Isolated Personnel
Report (ISOPREP), and evasion plans of action?
(5) What are the current available air, ground, and maritime personnel recovery forces?
(6) Where are the critical personnel recovery locations (transload locations for recovered
personnel, medical treatment facilities, reintegration facilities, and recovery force leader)?
(7) What are the responsibilities of the personnel recovery points of contact at higher, adjacent,
and lower headquarters in the chain of command?
c. Validate communications information. Ensure effective information management, including the
use of personnel recovery contact lists, call signs, survival radio, and other frequencies or systems.
Figure 2-1. Personnel recovery coordination processes for Army headquarters (continued)
SUPPORTING TOOLS
2-45. The tools to support personnel recovery operations include joint and Army policy and doctrinal
principles, SOPs, and execution documents such as OPLANs and OPORDs. Tools also include
collaborative software used to conduct Army operations and the Personnel Recovery Mission Software
Web site used to obtain and manage ISOPREP data and evasion plans of action.
PLANS AND ORDERS
2-46. FM 6-0 contains the Army plans and orders formats. For Army plans and orders, Appendix 13
(Personnel Recovery) to Annex E (Protection) contains personnel recovery information. Personnel recovery
is always a consideration in the operations process (see discussion in ADRP 5-0). The Army is often a part
of a joint force and, as such, receives the joint force commander’s guidance, including that for personnel
recovery. Thorough planning combined with detailed preparation and flexible execution contribute to
mission accomplishment. Headquarters from battalion to theater army that have staffs use the military
decisionmaking process while company-level and below—those formations with no formal staffs—use
troop leading procedures. Troop leading procedures provide these leaders with a framework for planning
and preparing for operations.
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY
2-47. SOPs reduce the length of OPORDs. The personnel recovery portion of the SOP supplements the
information contained in the OPLAN or OPORD and allows internal and external elements to communicate
on personnel recovery based on common understanding and shared expectations. The personnel recovery
information contained in an SOP augments current planning and execution documents. The personnel
recovery information permits documents to be shorter and more specific because they reference the SOP
for routine matters. Personnel recovery SOPs cover routine tasks and serve as a starting point for new
personnel to learn the command’s routine as it applies to personnel recovery. For higher Army
headquarters, such as the theater army, the SOP information may be in a regulation or pamphlet. Unit
personnel recovery SOPs reflect—
* Introduction and general guidance.
* Organization for personnel recovery.
* PRCS description.
* Personnel recovery responsibilities for the functional and integrating staff sections.
* Personnel recovery responsibilities for subordinate commanders.
* Recovery force operations.
* Records management requirements.
* Points of contact in SOPs. |
3-50 | 37 | Responsibilities and Supporting Tools
Introduction and General Guidance
2-48. The personnel recovery portion of the unit SOP starts with the purpose of the document, the
command’s personnel recovery policy, references, and applicable abbreviations, acronyms, and terms. It
includes a template for personnel recovery guidance, ISG, and an evasion plan of action for the unit. While
the template is not prescriptive, it routinely identifies those items of information that facilitate successful
personnel recovery operations.
Organization for Personnel Recovery
2-49. This section of the SOP contains the structure of the command when responding to an isolating
event, identifying the staff elements and the procedures for selecting and training the recovery force. It lists
standard command and support relationships, including the reporting requirements for each echelon of
command; for example, all commanders and leaders must immediately report an isolating event.
Personnel Recovery Coordination Section Description
2-50. The SOP includes the organization, staffing, and responsibilities of the PRCS at the command’s main
command post and other command posts. The SOP states the training and qualification requirements for
those assigned to the PRCS. It identifies procedures for personnel augmentation, depending on the
situation, and specifies the physical location of the section. It identifies procedures for dividing the team if
the headquarters is conducting split-based operations.
Personnel Recovery Responsibilities for the Functional and Integrating Staff Sections
2-51. This section of the SOP lists the tasks required of the other staff sections in support of the five
personnel recovery tasks. This section addresses the five functional staff sections, the three integrating staff
sections, and the personal and special staff elements. The SOP includes the composition, duties, location,
and meeting schedule of any ad hoc personnel recovery working groups. The SOP should indicate the chair
of the personnel recovery working group—whether it is the personnel recovery officer of the PRCS, the
chief of staff, executive officer, the chief of operations, or some other staff leader.
Personnel Recovery Responsibilities for Subordinate Commanders
2-52. The SOP states the responsibilities of subordinate commanders. This section of the SOP should
include the size of the force, the expected readiness level (on-call, on-order, and be prepared), the
designated commander, and the command post identified to conduct the recovery operation.
Recovery Force Operations
2-53. This section of the SOP stipulates standard actions taken upon learning of an isolating event. It
includes the notification procedures, the organization of the information, and the communications means
acceptable. This section lists acceptable formats including the following reports: serious incident, casualty,
operation, personnel status, search and rescue incident, search and rescue situation summary, or some other
format (such as a spot report). This section also includes the staffing of the recovery force, required
communications capabilities, expected coordination with HN officials and multinational partners working
with the local population, the rules on the use of force, and the vertical and horizontal coordination. An
element of this section contains any special instructions for working with civil authorities in DSCA. It also
includes the procedures and formats for requesting external support for personnel recovery operations.
Records Management Requirements
2-54. Headquarters personnel accurately track and account for all documentation regarding isolating events
and recovery operations. The unit saves all related records for historical purposes. These records facilitate
the full accounting of all personnel involved in the isolating event. The command retains the information
from any isolating event, determines the element to receive copies of the documentation, and determines
the length of time to retain the records. |
3-50 | 38 | Chapter 2
Points of Contact in Standard Operating Procedures
2-55. SOPs list the vertical and horizontal offices required to receive and provide information about the
isolating event and the actions taken to resolve it. SOPs list POCs by position instead of by name.
AFTER ACTION REVIEWS
2-56. An after action review examines and assesses the isolating event and the actions taken by all
participants in the recovery. It includes a discussion of ways to improve individual and unit performance.
ADRP 7-0 discusses after action reviews. The results of an effective after action review contribute to
improving the unit SOP and developing more effective execution documents for the command.
2-57. Commanders conduct after action reviews throughout operations. Since concurrent personnel
recovery operations are probable, frequent after action reviews benefit the command immediately by
informing units about ongoing personnel recovery tasks and those of future operations. The personnel
recovery after action review can be tiered so that multiple echelons from senior commanders to small-unit
recovery forces can learn from the event. |
3-50 | 39 | Chapter 3
Planning for Personnel Recovery
This chapter discusses how personnel recovery is integrated into Army planning. It
first discusses the personnel recovery staff using the military decisionmaking process.
Then the chapter discusses the Appendix 13 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex E
(Protection) for an operation order. It then details isolated Soldier guidance. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the evasion plan of action.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY AND THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING
PROCESS
3-1. Commanders and staffs use the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) for planning during at
least three methods of personnel recovery—immediate, deliberate, and externally supported. The deliberate
method is the obvious method for use of the MDMP. During the deliberate method of personnel recovery,
the commander issues intent and guidance to the staff. They, in turn, use the MDMP to develop COAs for
recovering isolated persons.
3-2. When the headquarters is notified of an isolating event in battalion headquarters and above,
personnel recovery in the MDMP becomes a normal staffing action. An isolating event can include a
surviving, evading, or delaying contact with detained or captured person or persons. Sample staff personnel
recovery actions are organized into matrixes (tables 3-1 through 3-7 on pages 3-1through 3-17) based on
the steps of the MDMP. All actions are listed by responsibility and chronologically, as they would likely
occur during an isolating event. These matrixes enable the commander, staff, and PRCS to plan in a
deliberate or time-constrained environment.
RECEIPT OF MISSION
3-3. Table 3-1, pages 3-1 to 3-7, lists staff actions for step one, receipt of mission. Such staff actions
include alert the staff, gather tools, update the running estimates, conduct initial assessment, issue
commander’s initial guidance, and issue the initial warning order.
Table 3-1. Receipt of mission staff actions
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Alert the Staff
Battle captain • Provides a commander’s critical information requirement update to the
commander.
Chief of staff • Directs the staff to conduct parallel or collaborative planning, or both.
• Directs the staff to begin taking notes for the after action review (all staff
sections, units, and leaders). Schedules a formal after action review after each
phase and mission.
Note. The mission may be tasked by higher headquarters, identified through message traffic, or
received from an isolated person. Potential sources include operation plans or orders, search and
rescue incident reports, search and rescue situation reports, ground-to-air signals, or other staff
communications such as spot reports.
Commander • Emphasizes time on the run (isolation or captivity) of isolated persons.
G-3 (S-3) • Alerts the designated staff representatives for PR planning.
Battle captain
(Table 3-1 continues on page 3-2.) |
3-50 | 40 | Chapter 3
Table 3-1. Receipt of mission staff actions (continued)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Gather Tools
Staff • Begins parallel or collaborative planning, or both.
• Updates the common operational picture with isolating event information.
G-3 (S-3) • Identifies location and attendees (including liaison officers) for planning.
• Reviews current operation order and task organization.
• Compiles the standing request for information list for review.
• Reviews the current reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
• Compiles the reconnaissance and surveillance available assets.
• Directs a space officer to prepare for the military decisionmaking process.
PRCS • Alerts units near the isolating event.
• Provides a report that identifies the isolating event (such as a convoy overdue, a
personnel status report, or contact by isolated persons).
• Provides standard operating procedures, special instructions, and theater army
regulations related to PR.
• Assembles the PR code-word list for units not equipped with secured
transmission equipment.
• Verifies the PR code-word list for PR units.
• Updates the common operational picture near an isolating event.
• Compiles a list of all PR assets in theater of operations and time-phased force
and deployment data, to include information from unified action partners—the
other Services, the American Embassy, other government agencies, and their
PR points of contact.
• Status of all assets capable of supporting PR in vicinity of isolated persons.
• Provides a joint PR support product.
• Provides a PR decision support template.
• Retrieves isolated persons (ISOPREP) DD Form 1833 from the Personnel
Recovery Mission System Web site.
• Updates the PR point of contact information for all PR activities at higher
headquarters, to include Headquarters, Department of the Army and subordinate
units.
• Queries individual’s unit to determine the appropriate last known position and
rally point (if identified) to develop support plan for unassisted recovery later in
the military decisionmaking process.
Commander • Obtains orders and communications.
Chief of staff • Obtains higher headquarters order or plan and graphics.
Command
sergeant major
G-1 (S-1) • Develops a unit database and key personnel shortages list that affect PR
operations.
• Develops an Individual Ready Reserve augmentee plan for PR staff.
• Integrates PR into the family support plan.
• Updates the personnel database.
• Compares personnel status reports to the by-name rosters.
• Identifies key PR personnel shortages.
• Updates the status of Individual Ready Reserve augmentees to PR staff.
• Reviews the replacement system for accountability issues.
• Updates the status of Army civilians and contractors on the battlefield.
• Begins validating the identity of isolated persons and the circumstances of the
isolating event.
(Table 3-1 continues on page 3-3.) |
3-50 | 41 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
Table 3-1. Receipt of mission staff actions (continued)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Gather Tools
G-1 (S-1) • Develops the replacement plans attachment to the base plan or order.
G-3 (S-3)
G-1 (S-1) • Determines status of Army civilians and contractors.
G-4 (S-4)
G-2 (S-2) • Queries the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and prepares to facilitate
staff intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
• Directs the terrain detachment and staff weather officer to prepare for the military
decisionmaking process.
• Identifies selected areas for evasion—including intelligence description, evasion
plans of action, and DD Form 1833.
• Develops all-source intelligence plan and products for employment.
• Updates the selected areas for evasion, selected areas for evasion intelligence
description, evasion charts, and isolated personnel guidance.
Airspace • Disseminates synchronization management plan.
element • Provides reconnaissance and surveillance status and availability.
Commander
Airspace • Identifies airspace control measures.
control
Airspace • Checks isolating event via signals intelligence from rawinsonde subsystems.
element
PRCS
Terrain • Reviews the evasion chart.
detachment
Fires cell • Compiles the status of control measures in current operations and the status of
observers (that can be integrated into reconnaissance and surveillance).
• Provides the status of fires, restrictive fire area, no fire area, and observers
available for PR support near an isolated person.
G-3 (S-3) • Assesses considerations for emergency resupply for an isolating event including
G-4 (S-4) weapons, basic load of ammunition, food, water, communications equipment
(survival radios beacons, mirror, panel, infrared chemical lights, and smoke
obscurant or flare device), navigation supplies (compass, map sheets, and
Global Positioning System), environmental supplies (uniform, cold weather
equipment, and dry climate equipment), and medical supplies.
G-3 (S-3) • Provides tactical standard operating procedures (latest update) to the PRCS.
PRCS • Notifies the rear detachment to prepare for reintegration (message over secured
communications).
• Notifies the reintegration team.
G-3 (S-3) • Identifies procedures and equipment required to comply with air tasking orders
Aviation and special instructions.
PRCS
PRCS • Reviews maps and charts of other components and nations.
Staff • Standardizes maps and charts and data used.
PRCS • Determine availability of nonconventional assisted recovery and unconventional
Special assisted recovery capabilities to support this event.
operations
coordinator
(Table 3-1 continues on page 3-4.) |
3-50 | 42 | Chapter 3
Table 3-1. Receipt of mission staff actions (continued)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Gather Tools (continued)
G-4 (S-4) • Provides current maps and charts.
• Develops the logistic attachment to the base plan or order, to include traffic
control point procedures.
• Assesses the status of classes of supply.
• Reviews Army civilian and contractor accountability plans.
• Provides the status of Army civilians and contractors near the isolating event or
isolated persons.
G-9 (S-9) • Ascertains status of diplomatic and nongovernmental organizations.
• Assesses key facilities and host-nation support in country that can be used to
support PR operations (such as hospitals, police stations, and fire stations).
G-6 (S-6) • Determines the current communications architecture for the unit or theater of
operations for PR operations.
• Provides the status of information management system to display commander’s
critical information requirements and answers to them.
• Assesses PR communication plan of other components and unified action
partners.
• Compiles the list of frequencies and equipment used for PR.
PRCS • Compiles the list of chat service users.
G-6 (S-6) • Queries the other PR nodes.
Public affairs • Reviews command message.
officer • Updates and disseminates command message for PR events.
G-6 (S-6) • Assembles military information support operations and civil affairs plans
G-3 (S-3) including PR.
G-6 (S-6) • Assesses the status of electronic warfare assets, computer attack capability, and
G-2 (S-2) operations security plans.
• Assesses the status of information support of PR.
Surgeon • Provides a medical support plan, hospital locations, and beds available.
• Alerts SERE psychologist for support.
• Assesses medical training that affects PR capabilities.
Staff judge • Determines the rules of engagement (assists the G-3 [S-3]).
advocate • Reviews status-of-forces agreement.
• Determines the legal status of isolated persons (including civilians and
contractors).
• Reviews operational law concerning PR.
Chaplain • Assesses and reviews the religious support plan for PR support to isolated
persons and their families.
Commander • Emphasizes the time on the run for an isolated person.
Chief of Staff • Evaluates the status of the staff’s skill level in PR planning.
• Updates operational timeline and status of battle rhythm.
• Updates staff members on organization and capabilities of the other staff
sections by directing intrastaff briefs.
G-2 (S-2) • Updates the information collection plan.
Commander • Updates the status of reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
Commander • Reviews the mission and the command relationships.
G-3 (S-3) • Reviews the commander’s PR intent.
(Table 3-1 continues on page 3-5.) |
3-50 | 43 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
Table 3-1. Receipt of mission staff actions (continued)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Gather Tools (continued)
Staff • Updates the common operational picture.
• Updates the analysis of an operational environment and staff intelligence
preparation of the battlefield.
• Updates route and traffic control point information.
• Provides the status of traffic and traffic control points.
• Updates the availability of effects to support PR.
• Assesses requirements to move units and communications, reconnaissance
and surveillance, transportation, and support assets.
Command • Provides the institutional memory regarding operations that are PR-related
sergeant major (family support plans, replacement operations, 100-percent accountability
requirements, and shortfalls in past operations).
• Provides update on past shortfalls and best practices in PR operations.
• Updates the status of skill level in common Soldier skills related to PR.
• Provides an assessment of isolated persons and available units for recovery.
G-2 (S-2) • Queries the joint intelligence center, the joint intelligence support element, the
Airspace national intelligence support team, and national assets.
element • Updates the enemy situation and creates initial situation templates using all-
source intelligence (at, to, and from the site of the isolating event).
Terrain • Updates terrain products (at, to, and from the site of the isolating event).
detachment
Staff weather • Updates weather and light data.
office
PRCS • Retrieves the DD Form 1833 data.
G-2 (S-2)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Update the Running Estimates
PRCS • Determines PR execution authorities.
• Confirms PR execution authorities.
• Updates the status of staff members, units, and individuals trained for PR.
• Updates the status of isolated persons’ PR and SERE training.
• Updates the PR standard operating procedure and an isolating event numbering
convention.
• Updates the status of no radio communications procedures and nonstandard
navigational procedures.
• Updates the PR point of contact information.
• Provides current documents to include planning and execution checklists and
matrixes, after action reviews, and lessons learned.
• Retrieves the DD Form 1833 data; evasion plan of action, and special
instructions information for development of a contact and authentication plan.
• Extracts key information from the air tasking order and special instructions,
including search and rescue numerical encryption group, search and rescue
point (sometimes known as a search and rescue dot), and word of the day.
• Disseminates classified and unclassified information.
• Queries the PR architecture for information.
• Updates the reintegration team.
• Determines which airborne platforms are capable of monitoring and assisting
with an isolating event (for example, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack
Radar System, and Rivet Joint).
(Table 3-1 continues on page 3-6.) |
3-50 | 44 | Chapter 3
Table 3-1. Receipt of mission staff actions (continued)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Update the Running Estimates (continued)
PRCS • Updates the following isolating event information:
Leadership.
Communications status.
Medical status of isolated persons.
Equipment, environmental protection, and sustainment.
Operational status.
Weapons and ammunition status.
Enemy situation (whether isolated person is in contact with enemy).
Time and nature of event.
Reports: DD Form 1833, SERE, and evasion plan of action.
Essential elements of friendly information at risk.
Training and expertise.
Isolated person’s knowledge of contact and authentication procedures.
G-3 (S-3) • Updates the rehearsal schedule for staff and units.
• Updates the status of reconnaissance and surveillance.
• Begins consolidation of the staff’s information requirements.
• Updates the operational status of all units.
• Updates the status of PR training of Individual Ready Reserve augmentees to
staff.
• Establishes periodic reporting procedures to update lateral and higher
headquarters.
• Updates the operations security running estimate.
G-2 (S-2) • Updates the intelligence plan with information from unified action partners.
PRCS • Provides current information on unconventional assisted recovery and
Special unconventional assisted recovery plans.
operations • Updates the status of the plans.
coordinator
Airspace • Updates airspace coordination measures for PR.
element
Fires cell • Updates information on planned fires and initiates fire support control measures
in an isolating event area.
G-4 (S-4) • Updates PR equipment availability and accountability.
G-9 (S-9) • Updates civil considerations near an isolating event.
• Updates the status of diplomatic agencies and nongovernmental organizations in
the area of operations.
• Updates the status of host-nation hospitals, aid facilities, and police, fire,
ambulance, and emergency stations.
• Updates the status of supporting infrastructure.
G-6 (S-6) • Updates the status of PR communications architecture.
• Updates information management tools to prioritize information.
• Ensures the display provides relevant information to commander and staff.
G-3 (S-3) • Updates aircraft status, capabilities, and limitations for PR support.
Aviation
Staff judge • Updates rules of engagement and legal status issues.
advocate
(Table 3-1 continues on page 3-7.) |
3-50 | 45 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
Table 3-1. Receipt of mission staff actions (continued)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Update the Running Estimates (continued)
Public affairs • Updates the impact of isolating event.
officer
Surgeon • Updates the medical support plan to ensure that PR is addressed and up to
date.
• Confirms the status of the closest medical treatment facility.
• Updates locations of planned and in-country medical treatment sites (to include
Level III hospitals) and expertise and beds per site.
• Confirms the status of Level III hospitals.
• Updates the status of SERE psychologist availability.
• Updates the SERE psychologist.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Conduct Initial Assessment
Commander • Emphasizes the time on the run for isolated persons.
Chief of staff • Updates the operational timeline.
Battle • Posts the timeline that reflects the time on the run of isolated persons, planning
captain time with key tasks, and execution tasks and times (including rehearsal
schedule).
PRCS
G-3 (S-3) • Consolidates the staff’s information requirements.
Staff • Determines the time required to position critical elements including
PRCS reconnaissance and surveillance, fires, mission command system, and other PR
support assets.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Issue Commander’s Initial Guidance
Commander • Emphasizes the time on the run for isolated persons.
• Emphasizes initial operational timeline and steps in the military decisionmaking
process to abbreviate.
• Directs the necessary coordination to perform with affected units, PR points of
contact, and liaison officers.
• Authorizes movement of units and communications, reconnaissance and
surveillance, transportation, and support assets.
• Identifies additional staff tasks (to include PR-specific information requirements).
• Directs parallel and collaborative planning times and locations for PR.
• Provides commander’s critical information requirements and essential elements
of friendly information.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Issue the Initial Warning Order
G-3 (S-3) • Issue warning order.
Legend G-6 (S-6) signal staff officer
G-1 (S-1) personnel staff officer G-9 (S-9) civil affairs operations staff officer
G-2 (S-2) intelligence staff officer PR personnel recovery
G-3 (S-3) operations staff officer PRCS personnel recovery coordination section
G-4 (S-4) logistics staff officer SERE survival, evacuation, resistance, and escape
MISSION ANALYSIS
3-4. Table 3-2, pages 3-8 to 3-13, lists staff actions for step two of the MDMP, mission analysis. |
3-50 | 46 | Chapter 3
Table 3-2. Mission analysis staff actions
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Analyze the Higher Headquarters’ Order
Commander • Emphasizes the time on the run for isolated persons.
Chief of Staff • Directs the staff to identify specified tasks; guides staff to extrapolate the implied
and essential tasks.
Staff • Identifies gaps in information that will affect staff planning and PR mission
accomplishment.
• Nominates information requirements.
G-3 (S-3) • Coordinates missions of adjacent, supporting, and supported units to the higher
PRCS headquarters plan (to include PR missions).
PRCS • Acquires current special instructions and then disseminates to staff.
Planning • Coordinates parallel and collaborative PR planning sessions.
staff
G-1 (S-1) • Reviews the replacement system for accountability issues.
G-2 (S-2) • Assesses reconnaissance and surveillance operations for effects on PR.
Airspace
element
chief
G-2 (S-2) • Assesses the intelligence handover line for effects on PR operations.
• Assesses the common operational picture and higher headquarters’ products for
changes and enemy course of action to identify potential changes for effects on
PR planning.
• Assesses the enemy situation for employment of reconnaissance and
surveillance near an isolating event.
G-3 (S-3) • Assesses the positive and procedural control measures in effect that will prevent
additional isolating events.
• Assesses area of operations boundaries and control measures for effects on PR
planning.
• Assesses the time-distance relationship to isolated persons from all units.
Chief of staff • Assesses the operational timeline to determine time constraints.
G-3 (S-3) • Assesses the intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
G-6 (S-6)
G-4 (S-4) • Assesses the logistic plan for its impact on PR operations.
• Assesses PR equipment availability.
• Assesses the movement management center’s movement plan to determine its
impact on PR.
G-3 (S-3) • Determines positive and procedural control measures along routes and traffic
G-4 (S-4) control points.
G-9 (S-9) • Assesses the civilian and diplomatic capabilities to support PR.
• Assesses the infrastructure, population, police, and paramilitary to support or
disrupt PR operations.
G-6 (S-6) • Assesses the PR communications architecture and determine shortfalls.
G-5 (S-5) • Assesses the higher headquarters’ order to deconflict and update running
estimates.
G-2 (S-2) • Assesses the electromagnetic spectrum.
G-6 (S-6)
Surgeon • Assesses the medical support plan for PR (survival, evacuation, resistance, and
escape [SERE] psychology and Level III medical facility).
(Table 3-2 continues on page 3-9.) |
3-50 | 47 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
Table 3-2. Mission analysis staff actions (continued)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Analyze the Higher Headquarters’ Order
(continued)
Chaplain • Assesses the religious support plan for PR.
Surgeon • Assesses the medical plan to ensure that media contact is controlled and that
Public affairs medical personnel know of restriction.
officer
Public affairs • Assesses public affairs plan for PR.
officer
Staff judge • Assesses laws, regulations, treaties, international and interagency agreements,
advocate rules of engagement, and rules for the use of force.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Perform Initial Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield
Commander • Emphasizes time on the run for isolated persons.
G-5 (S-5) • Updates the common operational picture.
Staff • Determines the operational framework consisting of the arrangement of friendly
forces and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and
the enemy situation.
• Describes battlefield effects on the overall effectiveness on friendly operations.
• Updates all available information regarding the threat in the area of the isolating
event.
• Determines if there is a threat from nonmilitary forces (such as police, militia, and
angry civilians).
• Determines effects of these threats on support.
G-2 (S-2) • Establishes an area of intelligence (in coordination with the commander and the
G-3 [S-3]), area of intelligence responsibility, and intelligence handover line.
• Describes the battlefield effects on the overall effectiveness on enemy
operations.
• Determines the most likely, most dangerous, and other enemy courses of action
and the impact on PR.
• Develops situation and event templates for the isolating event.
G-3 (S-3) • Collates the staffs intelligence requirements and gaps in their knowledge of the
battlefield.
• Defines the area of operations and area of interest (in coordination with the
commander and the G-2 [S-2]) and their relation to operational boundaries.
Terrain • Evaluates terrain to, from, and near an isolating event.
detachment
Staff weather • Assesses the weather and light data.
office
G-3 (S-3) • Identifies high-payoff targets and high-value targets to support the PR mission.
G-2 (S-2)
Fire support
officer
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks
Commander • Emphasizes time on the run for isolated persons.
• Guides the staff in identifying specified, implied, and essential PR tasks in the
Chief of staff
order.
Chief of staff
• Identifies the essential rehearsals.
PRCS
(Table 3-2 continues on page 3-10.) |
3-50 | 48 | Chapter 3
Table 3-2. Mission analysis staff actions (continued)
Personnel Recovery Actions: Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks
Responsible
(continued)
• Researches the higher headquarters order, standard operating procedures,
policies, and directives to identify PR tasks.
PRCS • Ensures that the ability to report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate
isolated persons is addressed.
• Provides key information from the special instructions.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Review Available Assets
• Considers air, ground, and maritime units available for recovery operations.
G-3 (S-3)
• Considers multinational partners and adjacent nations.
• Considers geospatial intelligence assets.
• Considers human intelligence assets.
• Considers signals intelligence assets.
• Considers measurement and signature intelligence assets.
• Considers technical intelligence assets.
• Considers open-source intelligence assets.
G-2 (S-2) • Considers counterintelligence assets.
• Considers assets from Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency,
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, other
Service intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State,
Department of Energy, Department of the Treasury, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Coast Guard, commercial products (Synchronized Predeployment
and Operational Tracker and Teraserver), and international products (Cospas-
Sarsat Programme).
G-5 (S-5) • Considers nongovernmental organization assets.
Chaplain • Considers local religious leaders.
Surgeon • Considers host-nation medical personnel.
Public affairs • Considers multinational assets.
officer
Staff judge • Considers legal assets.
advocate
G-1 (S-1) • Considers contract company representatives.
G-4 (S-4) • Considers Army civilians.
G-3 (S-3) • Considers kennel master (military working dogs).
program
management
office
G-5 (S-5) • Considers host-nation assets.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Determine Constraints
Staff • Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on the mission.
PRCS • Determines how constraints might affect the PR mission.
• Determines if PR capability must be in place before initiating offensive tasks.
• Identifies which commanders have authority to plan, execute, and support the
PR mission.
• Determines if authority depends on general approaches (sometimes referred to
as methods) to conduct personnel recovery (unassisted, immediate, deliberate,
and external supported).
• Determines the requirement to maintain on-call or be-prepared unit for PR.
(Table 3-2 continues on page 3-11.) |
3-50 | 49 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
Table 3-2. Mission analysis staff actions (continued)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Identify Critical Facts and Develop Assumptions
Commander • Emphasizes time on the run for isolated persons.
Staff • Identifies each piece of information in the running estimate as fact or assumption
as it relates to PR mission.
PRCS • Reconfirms status of isolated persons.
Staff • If no communications with the isolated persons, determines running estimates,
location from last known position, direction of travel, and event template.
• Determines if isolated person can survive ongoing battlefield activities until
recovery via survival and evasion.
PRCS • Determines if support for recovery (unassisted or unconventional) is available in
Special the area.
operations
coordination
element
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Begin Risk Management
Staff • Identifies tactical hazards that affect the isolating event.
Command • Identifies historical information from other isolating events (from sources such as
sergeant major after action reviews).
PRCS • Determines potential enemy course of action that could lead to isolating events.
Staff • Reviews tactics, techniques, and procedures for convoy operations.
• Establishes traffic control post measures.
• Identifies enemy counterreconnaissance or counter PR measures and likely
enemy courses of action.
• Determines recovery force experiences during isolating event.
• Evaluates medical evacuation operations accounting and reporting procedures.
• Determines fratricide potential in recovery operations and develops
countermeasures.
• Identifies environmental hazards that affect PR operations.
• Evaluates information management shortfalls.
• Conducts mortuary affairs accounting and reporting.
• Evaluates accuracy of accounting for personnel.
• Evaluates effectiveness of PR operations.
• Evaluates effectiveness of transitions.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Develop Initial CCIRs and EEFI
Commander • Emphasizes time on the run of isolated persons.
Staff • Identifies the gaps in battlefield information that affects the PR mission.
• Focuses initial commander’s critical information requirements on decisions the
commander must make to focus planning and selects the optimum course of
action.
• After selecting the course of action, shifts commander’s critical information
requirements to information the commander needs to make decisions during
execution.
G-2 (S-2) • Identifies the indicators for each information requirement.
• Submits requests for information and latest time information is of value to close
gaps in information.
PRCS • Reviews the list of requests for information and the latest time information is of
value as developed during the predeployment phase and updated in theater of
operations to reflect current situation.
(Table 3-2 continues on page 3-12.) |
3-50 | 50 | Chapter 3
Table 3-2. Mission analysis staff actions (continued)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Develop the Initial Information Collection Plan
G-2 (S-2) • Researches and reviews all assets that can provide support to PR.
• Reviews the information gaps (requests for information and latest time
information is of value) and determines which reconnaissance and surveillance
assets can best obtain the information.
PRCS • Researches and identifies component capabilities to employ information
G-3 (S-3) collection plan for PR.
G-3 (S-3) • Develops a plan for employing each asset based on capabilities and limitations.
• Gives special consideration for employing unmanned technical capability to
locate and observe isolated persons and to identify enemy.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Update Plan for Use of Available Time
G-2 (S-2) • Identifies the enemy counterreconnaissance capabilities against the information
collection plan.
• Submits requests for information to higher headquarters if the organization’s
assets cannot obtain the information.
• Coordinates and deconflicts the plan with the assets.
G-3 (S-3) • Develops the information collection plan for this mission including effects to
mask movement.
PRCS • Identifies units in proximity to an isolating event and assesses their elevation,
angle of view, and viewing technology.
• Updates the isolating event.
Chief of staff • Updates overall timeline based on new information about the isolating event.
• Determines the time and location of PR rehearsals.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Develop Initial Themes and Messages
Commander • Approves all themes and messages used to support operations.
Chief of staff
Information • Deconflicts and synchronizes use of information.
operations • Adjusts and refines themes and messages received from higher headquarters.
officer
Public affairs • Receives approved themes and messages.
officer • Integrates themes and messages in planned activities designed to influence
MISO specific foreign audiences.
elements
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Develop a Proposed Problem Statement
Commander • Identifies correct problem to solve.
• Approves the problem statement.
Staff • Compares the current situation to the desired end state.
• Lists issues that impede the unit from achieving desired end state.
• Develops a proposed problem statement for commander approval.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Develop a Proposed Mission Statement
G-3 (S-3) • Writes the mission statement for this operation order.
PRCS
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Present the Mission Analysis Briefing
Chief of staff • Rehearses staff for mission analysis briefing to the commander.
Staff • Presents mission analysis briefing to commander.
(Table 3-2 continues on page 3-13.) |
3-50 | 51 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
Table 3-2. Mission analysis staff actions (continued)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Develop and Issue Initial Commander’s Intent
Commander • Issues the commander’s intent including PR intent.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Develop and Issue Initial Planning Guidance
Commander • Emphasizes the time on the run for isolated persons.
• Describes commander’s visualization of the battlefield.
• Directs that PR be incorporated into all phases of force projection.
• Directs the staff to task-organize a recovery force for initial deployment.
• Considers incorporating no radio communications and nonstandard navigation
procedures into the planning.
• Provides directives to the staff on courses of action to include or exclude and
how to abbreviate the military decisionmaking process.
• Directs the chief of staff to include PRCS in all planning meetings.
• Directs the staff to work with the command sergeant major to incorporate
measures for preventing isolation into standard operating procedures.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Develop Course of Action Evaluation Criteria
Commander • Adjusts criterion selection and weighting at the commander’s discretion.
Chief of Staff • Determines each proposed criterion with weights based on relative importance.
Staff • Scores each course of action using criteria.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Issue a Warning Order
G-3 (S-3) • Issues warning order.
Legend
G-1 (S-1) personnel staff officer G-6 (S-6) signal staff officer
G-2 (S-2) intelligence staff officer G-9 (S-9) civil affairs operations staff officer
G-3 (S-3) operations staff officer MISO military information support operations
G-4 (S-4) logistics staff officer PR personnel recovery
G-5 (S-5) plans staff officer PRCS personnel recovery coordination section
COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT
3-5. Table 3-3, pages 3-13 and 3-14, shows personnel recovery actions for step three of the MDMP,
course of action development.
Table 3-3. Course of action development staff actions
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Assess Relative Combat Power
G-2 (S-2) • Computes the force ratios (enemy that affect this mission versus friendly tasked
G-3 (S-3) with this PR mission).
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Generate Options
Staff • Develops general approaches (sometimes referred to as methods) to conduct
personnel recovery (unassisted, immediate, deliberate, and external supported).
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Array Forces
G-3 (S-3) • Ensures that the commander’s intent and planning guidance is considered. If the
course of action is not within parameters, seeks approval or change.
• Determines a proposed line of departure, command posts en route, and release
point. Determines a proposed forward edge of the battle area or line of
departure.
G-2 (S-2) • Considers available units against situation and event templates.
PRCS • Incorporates the mission profile into the established PR plan.
(Table 3-3 continues on page 3-14.) |
3-50 | 52 | Chapter 3
Table 3-3. Course of action development staff actions (continued)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Array Forces (continued)
Staff • Considers air, ground, and maritime avenues of approach.
• Identifies units and task organization.
• Evaluates forces arrayed using this course of action and the forces available that
can respond to this mission.
G-3 (S-3) • Identifies areas of operations and control measures for subordinate units.
Airspace • Validates the selection or determines recommended change to geographical
control control measures.
PRCS
Terrain
detachment
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Develop a Broad Concept
Staff • Integrates all warfighting functions into overall concept of operations supporting
PR.
• Ensures that the concept of operations supports all five PR execution tasks.
G-3 (S-3) • Develops PR concept of operations, incorporating decisive, shaping, and
sustaining operations.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Assign Headquarters
G-3 (S-3) • Recommends task organization by assigning headquarters to groupings of units
for PR operations.
• Recommends command relationships for PR.
Staff • Identifies shortages of headquarters to higher for resolution.
PRCS • Recommends requirements for PR operations.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Develop Course of Action Statements and
Sketches
Staff • Ensures that warfighting functions support each course of action statement and
sketch.
G-3 (S-3) • Prepares a statement and supporting sketch for each course of action (include
who [generic task org], what, when, where, why, and hazards (where) for each
subordinate unit.
• Ensures that, at a minimum, the sketch includes array of generic units and
control measures for PR operations (creates a notional sketch with all probable
control measures for air, ground, or maritime recovery operation).
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Conduct Course of Action Briefing
Staff • Conducts course of action briefing.
PRCS • Provides update on the isolating event.
Commander • Provides guidance for the mission.
• Accepts, eliminates, or directs further development of courses of action.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Select or Modify Courses of Action for Continued
Analysis
Commander • Selects or modifies courses of actions.
Legend
G-2 (S-2) intelligence staff officer PR personnel recovery
G-3 (S-3) operations staff officer PRCS personnel recovery coordination section
COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS AND WAR-GAMING
3-6. Table 3-4 shows personnel recovery actions for step four of the MDMP, course of action analysis
and war-gaming. |
3-50 | 53 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
Table 3-4. Course of action analysis (war game) staff actions
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Gather the Tools
Chief of staff • Updates running estimates.
Staff • Identifies threat templates and models.
• Modifies obstacle overlays and terrain effects matrixes.
• Selects a recording method.
• Provides completed COAs and supporting graphics.
• Identifies a means to post or display enemy and friendly unit symbols.
• Posts a map of the area of operations.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: List All Friendly Forces
Commander • Considers all units that are available for the operation.
Staff • Considers support relationships and constraints.
• Considers coalition or allied forces in an area of operations.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: List Assumptions
Commander • Reviews previous assumptions for validity and necessity.
Staff • Determines assumptions that can be turned to facts.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: List Known Critical Events and Decision Points
Commander • Identifies critical events that may trigger significant actions, require detailed study,
Staff and require essential tasks.
• Identifies points in time and space that require a key decision. (Staff helps identify
decision points, but commander makes the decision.)
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Select the War-Gaming Method
Commander • Selects war-gaming method: belt, avenue-in-depth, or box.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Select a Technique to Record and Display Results
Chief of staff • Selects the technique: synchronization matrix or sketch note. Records any
Staff discovered strengths and weaknesses.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: War-Game the Operation and Assess the Results
Commander • Visualizes the flow of operations based on friendly force strengths and enemy
Staff capabilities within the possible COAs.
• Foresees actions, reactions, and counteractions of all participants.
• Identifies strengths and weaknesses of each COA; adjusts as necessary.
• Considers how to create conditions for success, protect the force, and shape an
operational environment.
• Continually assesses risk.
• Identifies required assets to support the COAs. Modifies any COA depending on
war-gaming outcomes.
Staff • Recommends priorities to the commander if necessary.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Conduct a War-Game Briefing
Staff • Delivers a briefing to ensure that all staff members fully understand the results of
the war game.
G-2 (S-2) • Updates reconnaissance and surveillance and enemy situation.
PRCS • Provides update on the isolating event.
Legend G-2 (S-2) intelligence staff officer
COA course of action PRCS personnel recovery coordination section
COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON
3-7. Table 3-5 on page 3-16 shows personnel recovery actions for step five of the MDMP, course of
action comparison. |
3-50 | 54 | Chapter 3
Table 3-5. Course of action comparison staff actions
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Conduct Advantages and Disadvantages Analysis
Chief of staff • Leads this analysis.
Staff • Analyzes advantages and disadvantages for each COA using the war-gaming
evaluation criteria.
• Compares strengths and weaknesses of the COAs with respect to one another.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Compare Courses of Action
Chief of staff • Leads this comparison.
• Facilitates information themes and messages.
Chief of staff • Uses the decision matrix.
Staff • Selects a COA that should pose minimum risk, set the force in best posture for
future operations, and provide maximum latitude for initiative, most flexibility, and
most secure and stable environment.
Staff • Uses any technique that helps develop key outputs and recommendations for the
commander.
• Compares feasible COAs to identify the one with highest probability of success
against the most likely enemy COA, the most dangerous enemy COA, the most
important stability task, and the most damaging environmental impact.
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Conduct a Course of Action Decision Briefing
Chief of staff • Decides which COA to recommend.
Staff • Develops and delivers the COA decision briefing.
Legend
COA course of action
COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL
3-8. Table 3-6 shows personnel recovery actions for step six of the MDMP, course of action approval.
The staff prepares the order or plan by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of operations
and required supporting information. The PRCS assists the staff by preparing Appendix 13 (Personnel
Recovery) to Annex E (Protection) of the plan or order, using the COA statement that was produced,
analyzed, and compared in earlier steps.
Table 3-6. Course of action approval staff actions
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Commander Approves Course of Action
Staff • Identifies the preferred course of action for this recovery and makes a
recommendation.
Chief of staff • Highlights any changes to each PR course of action resulting from the war
game.
• Provides a decision briefing to commander.
PRCS • Provides update on the isolating event.
G-2 (S-2) • Updates enemy situation.
Commander • Selects the PR course of action.
• Issues final planning guidance for this recovery.
G-3 (S-3) • Issues a warning order.
Legend
G-2 (S-2) intelligence staff officer PR personnel recovery
G-3 (S-3) operations staff officer PRCS personnel recovery coordination section
ORDERS PRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, AND TRANSITION
3-9. Table 3-7 shows personnel recovery staff actions for the final step of the MDMP. |
3-50 | 55 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
Table 3-7. Orders production, dissemination, and transition staff actions
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Produce and Disseminate Orders
Commander • Approves the order.
Chief of Staff • Coordinates to assist the G-3 in developing the order.
Staff
Responsible Personnel Recovery Actions: Transition from Planning to Operations
Commander • If time available, briefs the order to subordinate units.
Staff
Staff • Reproduces and disseminates the order to subordinate units.
• Receives acknowledge receipt of order from subordinate units.
Legend
G-3 (S-3) operations staff officer
CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY
3-10. The MDMP outlined in tables 3-1 through 3-7 results in the development of Appendix 13 (Personnel
Recovery) to Annex E (Protection). This serves as the command’s personnel recovery guidance. The
command’s personnel recovery guidance then forms the basic guidance (or recommendations) from which
the ISG and evasion plans of action are developed.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY GUIDANCE
3-11. Personnel recovery guidance is contained in various parts of the order, including the base order, and
appropriate annexes, appendixes, tabs, and exhibits. Those reading the order must extract the information
necessary to execute their responsibilities. Most of the information on personnel recovery appears in
Appendix 13 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex E (Protection) of a plan or order.
3-12. In personnel recovery operations, the intent of guidance at any level of command is to communicate
how organizations or individuals should act in the absence of specific instructions. Army organizations
conducting recovery operations are bound to consider professional, moral, legal, and practical obligations.
Commanders use their personnel recovery guidance to link the joint force commander through theater army
and below to the lowest tactical echelon. Their guidance reflects the degree of risk of isolation. Higher-
level guidance typically directs the force to plan for personnel recovery operations. At lower echelons, the
ISG normally consists of directions to carry certain equipment, such as personal locator beacons and
survival radios, or to learn the location of rally points, safe recovery zones, or communications frequencies.
3-13. Joint and Army execution documents—OPORDs, OPLANs, and regulations—communicate
personnel recovery guidance and ISG to uniformed Service members. Personnel recovery guidance, ISG,
and evasion plans of action are also for civilians and CAAF. Because the isolated person may include
Army civilians, and CAAF, Army leaders and staff must develop a communications program to inform
these individuals. Civilian and contractor members of Army organizations need the guidance and
preparation necessary for their safety, especially the ISG that enables them to contribute to prevention,
preparation, and self-recovery if they become isolated. When working with third-country national CAAF or
other designated persons (for example, local national), culture and language complicate this format.
3-14. Commanders reinforce policy and doctrine, including the definition of personnel recovery, the
designation of isolated persons, and the requirement for staffing and coordination. Leaders develop and
include personnel recovery guidance in execution documents and modify it to fit the audience. These
execution documents include OPLANs, OPORDs, FRAGORDs, branches, sequels, and SOPs.
3-15. Below the combatant command level, the personnel recovery guidance—
* Communicates the commander’s concept of operations for personnel recovery.
* Establishes personnel recovery command, support, and liaison relationships.
* Specifies subordinate commanders’ personnel recovery responsibilities.
* Discusses initiatives needed to prepare the force. |
3-50 | 56 | Chapter 3
* Establishes isolation criteria.
* Establishes PRCSs, if not already established at theater army, corps, and division headquarters.
* Designates units to execute personnel recovery operations.
* Delegates authority to execute recovery operations.
* Incorporates personnel recovery activities in unit SOPs.
* Includes personnel recovery in OPLANs and OPORDs.
3-16. Planning results in a five-paragraph plan or order with appropriate annexes, appendixes, tabs, and
exhibits. The OPLAN format dedicates certain sections for instructions for personnel recovery operations.
However, leaders must read the entire plan to derive specified or implied guidance related to personnel
recovery in other sections. Major tasks, such as designating the personnel recovery coordinator for a task
force or the reintegration coordinator, should appear either in the unit SOP or in Appendix 13 (Personnel
Recovery) to Annex E (Protection) to the base order. Similarly, significant coordinating instructions and
control measures should appear in the base order. Most detailed instructions regarding personnel recovery
normally appear in Appendix 13 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex E (Protection). Portions are repeated as
needed in other annexes.
Paragraph One: Situation
3-17. The first paragraph (situation) discusses the AO, its terrain, the weather, the enemy or environmental
threat, and friendly forces and capabilities. Information pertinent to a personnel recovery operation may be
stated or implied. Information specific to personnel recovery forces may appear in the subparagraph about
friendly forces. It addresses the mission and intent of higher headquarters two levels up. The subparagraph
about interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations lists relevant operational
information regarding these organizations. It can include an assessment of their willingness to support
personnel recovery operations. The subparagraph about civil considerations may contain personnel
recovery information about the HN populace or civil organizations. If not discussed earlier, this
subparagraph identifies the population as enemy, adversary, supporters, or neutral.
Paragraph Two: Mission
3-18. The second paragraph (mission) concisely expresses the task and the purpose. In a plan or order
focused on personnel recovery, this paragraph contains the who, what, where, when, and why of the
operation.
Paragraph Three: Execution
3-19. The third paragraph (execution) discusses the how of the operation. This paragraph gives a clear
statement of what the force must do to accomplish the mission and establish conditions that define success.
It includes the concept of operations and may include personnel recovery tasks. The scheme of movement
and maneuver elaborates on the how. The force will follow the guidance in the absence of further orders.
Subparagraphs describe schemes of intelligence support and information collection.
3-20. The personnel recovery discussion directs the reader to Annex E (Protection) for detail. The “tasks to
subordinate units” paragraph lists the tasks each subordinate headquarters performs and could contain
specific instructions related to personnel recovery, such as who will provide intelligence and the dedicated
or on-call recovery force. The coordinating instructions subparagraph directs a menu of tasks applicable to
two or more subordinate commands and their staffs. Other coordinating instruction subparagraphs also
provide important information on risk, rules of engagement (or rules on the use of force), and
environmental considerations. The guidance on preventing isolating events may be addressed in this section
of the base order if it is not published in an administrative order. Examples of this guidance include
changes to minimum convoy size, changes to mobilization training guidance, and reporting requirements
for units transiting other units’ AO. |
3-50 | 57 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
Paragraphs Four and Five: Sustainment, and Command and Signal
3-21. The remaining paragraphs of the base plan or order (sustainment and command and signal) contain
information for the force as a whole and address logistic, personnel, health services, and communications
support. These sections include information important to personnel recovery operations, so too with the
annexes. Appendix 13 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex E (Protection) is a compilation of the personnel
recovery guidance, the ISG, and other planning, preparation, execution, and assessment activities required
to inform the commanders and staffs.
3-22. Commanders integrate personnel recovery responsibilities into premobilization, mobilization,
deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities. (FM 3-35 discusses deployment and
redeployment; ADP 4-0 discusses sustainment.) Personnel recovery fundamentals are included in the
Army’s cyclical readiness program—Army force generation—where personnel recovery is emphasized in
the train/ready and available force pools. (ADRP 7-0 discusses training in detail.)
3-23. Personnel recovery information may be contained throughout the execution documents used to
conduct Army operations: OPLANs, OPORDs, and FRAGORDs. For example, an annotated order may
include coordinating instructions for personnel recovery coordination. Appendix 13 (Personnel Recovery)
to Annex E (Protection) describes the personnel recovery concept of operations and responsibilities for
execution. The appendix can be subdivided to illustrate the entire personnel recovery structure. Plans and
orders must follow the format and guidance detailed in FM 6-0. (See figure 3-1, pages 3-19 through 3-22,
for an example of a personnel recovery appendix.)
(Change from verbal orders, if any)
Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number
Include heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.
APPENDIX 13 (PERSONNEL RECOVERY) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPERATION
PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment, including maps, charts standard
operating procedures, and doctrinal references. List any other applicable document that provides
essential information for conducting personnel recovery operations. Refer to higher headquarters’
operation plan or operation order and identify map sheets for operations (optional).
(U) Task Organization: Describe the organization of available personnel recovery forces if different
from the base order. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) of the operation plan or operation order if
they are stated there.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Appendix: State the time zone used in the area of operations. If
personnel recovery units will operate in different time zones, use Greenwich Mean (ZULU) Time.
1. (U) Situation. Include information affecting personnel recovery operations not covered in paragraph
1 of the operation plan or operation order, or that needs to be expanded in more detail. Cover special
personnel recovery conditions of an operational environment in the subparagraphs.
a. (U) Area of Interest. Describe the area of interest as it impacts personnel recovery, especially if
personnel recovery operations cross unit and international boundaries. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence)
and Annex C (Operations) as required.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Figure 3-1. Personnel recovery appendix example |
3-50 | 58 | Chapter 3
[CLASSIFICATION]
b. (U) Area of Operations. Describe the area of operations, including map references for both paper
maps and those on digital systems. Subparagraphs give detail. Refer to Appendix 2 (Operations Overlay)
to Annex C (Operations).
(1) (U) Terrain . Describe aspects of the terrain that impact personnel recovery operations.
Cover those terrain features that may contribute to isolation such as rivers, mountains, swamps, forest
cover, and other terrain that is difficult to traverse or impossible to drive over, thereby canalizing
evasion activities. Refer to Tab B (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.
(2) (U) Weather . Describe the aspects of the climate (such as cold, heat, humidity, or wind) and
the current and forecasted weather—including precipitation—that may affect operations. Refer to Tab B
(Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
c. (U) Enemy Forces. Identify all threats and their capabilities as well as associated environmental
conditions that can cause isolation. Describe hybrid threat disposition, location, strength, and probable
courses of action regarding the isolation of friendly forces. Discuss the recent experience of enemy
forces in isolating friendly forces, including the taking of hostages, or intelligence indicating a threat to
isolate friendly forces. Discuss enemy forces and their expected courses of action or capabilities that
may influence support and recovery force operations. Describe the attitude of the local population
toward friendly forces, especially to individual or small groups of evaders. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.
d. (U) Friendly Forces. Describe friendly forces, including host-nation and multinational partners,
and their expected capabilities to assist in personnel recovery of friendly forces. List the designation,
location, and outline of the plan of higher, subordinate, adjacent, and other personnel recovery assets.
Include an assessment of the willingness of these units to contribute to personnel recovery operations.
e. (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe
other organizations in the area of operations that influence personnel recovery operations. Include
anticipated coordination with the Department of State regional security officer, local American Embassy
crisis response center, or other United States government mission. Describe the interface between Army
forces and organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations.
Discuss how information is exchanged and updates are received. Refer to Annex V (Interagency
Coordination).
f. (U) Civil Considerations. Describe important aspects of civil society in the area of operations that
affect personnel recovery activities. Use the memory aide ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities,
organizations, people, and events). Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.
g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify
task organization. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) as required.
h. (U) Assumptions. List the assumptions used in the development of the personnel recovery parts of
the operation plan and this annex.
2. (U) Mission. State the personnel recovery activities supporting the base operation plan or order
mission with a short description of the who, what, when, where, and why of the operation. The how is
part of the concept of operations. The overall mission can be in support of another mission or a
personnel recovery-specific mission.
3. (U) Execution. Describe how the commander intends to accomplish the personnel recovery activities
in support of the overall mission of the unit, using the warfighting functions as a template.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Figure 3-1. Personnel recovery appendix example (continued) |
3-50 | 59 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
[CLASSIFICATION]
APPENDIX 13 (PERSONNEL RECOVERY) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPERATION
PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
a. (U) Scheme of Personnel Recovery. Describe the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to
accomplish personnel recovery operations, including phasing and principle tasks. In a word picture,
describe how the operation will proceed, including support from unified action partners. Discuss the
part played by specialized personnel recovery assets from other Services and special operations forces
(for unconventional assisted recovery). Normally, described in terms of shaping, decisive, and sustaining
operations, it can be one paragraph or several, depending on the complexity of the personnel recovery
mission. Explain how each element of the force cooperates to complete the personnel recovery tasks, and
how the element ties to supporting the personnel recovery operations of higher, lower, and adjacent
units as those units execute the tasks for the intended purpose. Use subparagraphs as necessary, based
on what the commander considers appropriate, the level of command, and the complexity of personnel
recovery operations. Refer to Annex C (Operations) as required.
b. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. List by specific subordinate unit those personnel recovery tasks
not contained in the base order. State the personnel recovery tasks assigned to each unit that reports
directly to the issuing headquarters. Each task must include what the task is, who performs the task,
when it must be performed, where it will occur, and why the task is assigned. Use separate paragraphs if
the mission is complex and has phases, or if it assigns a large number of tasks to the various units
supporting personnel recovery. Duplicate tasks from the base plan or order here for clarity.
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. List the personnel recovery tasks applicable to two or more units
not covered by unit standard operating procedures. These may be tasks not in the base order or repeated
for clarity. List the rules of engagement. Include special considerations for rules of engagement
regarding recovery of Department of Defense (DOD) civilians and DOD contractors. For defense
support of civil authorities, discuss rules for the use of force instead of rules of engagement. Describe
the specific control measures not included in the unit standard operating procedures to mitigate risk
during personnel recovery operations. Risk reduction control measures discussed here are normally
unique to the personnel recovery operations and not included in unit standard operating procedures.
Describe characteristics of the physical environment that may endanger the isolated individuals or
recovery forces. Include characteristics such as the consequences of chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosives activities, or disasters.
These instructions can include those appendixes in the base order, for emphasis. Refer to Appendix 5
(Environmental Considerations) to Annex G (Engineer). List the commander’s critical information
requirements that are unique to personnel recovery operations and not addressed in the base order. List
the essential elements of friendly information unique to personnel recovery operations and not
addressed in the base order. Identify physical locations important to the personnel recovery situation to
the isolated individual and the recovery force. Refer to Annex E (Protection) and its appendixes, as
required.
4. (U) Sustainment. Describe the concept of sustainment, including priorities of sustainment by unit or
area. Include the logistics, human resources, health services support, and financial management
considerations that influence personnel recovery operations. Sustainment information should include the
support provided by host-nation, multinational, and other unified action partners. This information can
be discussed in one paragraph or separate paragraphs, depending on the situation and the complexity of
personnel recovery operations support that are not covered in the base order and other annexes and
their appendixes, tabs, and exhibits. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) and Annex P (Host-Nation Support)
as required.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Figure 3-1. Personnel recovery appendix example (continued) |
3-50 | 60 | Chapter 3
[CLASSIFICATION]
APPENDIX 13 (PERSONNEL RECOVERY) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPERATION
PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
5. (U) Command and Signal.
a. (U) Command. Describe the command structure for the personnel recovery operation if not
addressed in the base order and other annexes. Include the personnel recovery organization—joint
personnel recovery center, component cells, and Army personnel recovery coordination section—at
senior levels of command, and information about the personnel recovery staff officers at lower echelons.
State the location of key personnel recovery leaders, including the recovery force commander. Identify
the personnel recovery liaison requirements not covered in the unit’s standard operating procedure.
Include liaison requirements for host-nation, multinational, and lower, adjacent, and higher echelons
involved in personnel recovery operations.
b. (U) Control. Describe the commander’s intended location during any personnel recovery
operation, including necessary support and recovery tasks. Describe the employment of personnel
recovery-specific command posts. Discuss the location of the recovery force commander during the
transitions, as the formerly isolated person or persons are handed over to higher echelons of command.
c. (U) Signal. Describe the concept of communications support, echelonment of signal nodes, and
movement of signal assets in support of personnel recovery operations. List signal instructions and
practices that are not specified in the unit’s standard operating procedure. List the reports germane to
personnel recovery included in the unit standard operating procedure, FM 6-99, or other sources. The
most common reports include the Accident/Serious Incident Report, Search and Rescue Incident Report,
Search and Rescue Situation Summary Report, Personnel Status Report, and Casualty Report. Refer to
Annex H (Signal) as required.
ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if the appendix is distributed separately from the base order.
[Commander’s last name]
[Commander’s rank]
[Authenticator’s name]
[Authenticator’s position]
Either the commander or coordinating staff officer responsible for the functional area may sign
attachments.
ATTACHMENTS: Include tabs if required to expand the discussion of the appendix. List tabbed
attachments.
DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order of a higher-level personnel
recovery appendix. Distribution may be restricted if there are issues of operational security.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Figure 3-1. Personnel recovery appendix example (continued)
ISOLATED SOLDIER GUIDANCE
3-24. Commanders translate the personnel recovery guidance into recommendations known as ISG. At the
brigade level, where there are no dedicated personnel recovery staff officers and noncommissioned officers,
the guidance is a part of the general protection guidance relayed to unit members. Higher echelon
headquarters may identify personnel recovery guidance. At the small-unit level, it is normally a part of
troop leading procedures.
3-25. ISG is a not a fixed set of rules. The commander gives guidance for developing ISG during initial
planning. Tactical commanders establish ISG for operations in any area with a risk of isolation. Effective
guidance addresses the challenges of isolation within a unit’s AO. It is concrete enough for Soldiers to
implement. ISG applies to the entire command since the uncertainty and complexity of military operations
expose everyone to risk of isolation, regardless of rank. ISG anticipates the potential situation. As with |
3-50 | 61 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
personnel recovery guidance, there is no set format. ISG focuses on awareness, accountability, rapid
reporting of isolating events, actions to take when isolated, and link-up procedures.
Awareness
3-26. Soldiers need objective means to determine if they or members of their unit have become isolated.
ISG includes criteria that define isolation in a given situation. Commanders set isolation criteria based on
the commander’s personnel recovery guidance, which they refine for use at the appropriate level. The
criteria consist of a short list of factors specific to the situation. Commanders ensure isolation criteria are
concise, direct, and easy to interpret. Fewer criteria are more easily remembered under stress.
3-27. Isolation criteria are simpler to define for air and vehicle crews forced to divert from their missions
by enemy action or mechanical malfunction. Isolation criteria are more complex for ground operations,
where separations from friendly forces and contact with the enemy are often a duty requirement.
3-28. Individuals determine if they or members of their unit have become isolated by analyzing the
situation against isolation criteria established by their commander. Based on the commander’s isolation
criteria, Soldiers or other covered individuals implement ISG. Examples of isolation criteria include the
absence of nearby friendly forces or the inability to communicate with expected organizations. Other
examples include—
* No communication with their unit or higher headquarters, by any means, for the time specified
in the ISG.
* No contact with fellow unit members for the time specified in the ISG.
* A forced or precautionary aircraft landing in hostile territory.
* A ground vehicle becoming separated from the rest of the convoy under observation in hostile
territory.
* An encounter with unexpected enemy, hostile, or criminal forces.
Accountability
3-29. A commander’s personnel recovery guidance emphasizes the priority of maintaining accountability
and recommends appropriate procedures and tools. Commanders require frequent, standardized reporting
using formats such as the Personnel Status Report as outlined in FM 6-99. When appropriate, commanders
and staff use technical applications for monitoring, such as Blue Force Tracking. In this way, they obtain
passive feedback on the location of individuals on air and ground vehicles. Using such applications also
helps commanders and staff monitor the risk of isolation. However, top-down monitoring does not relieve
individuals of responsibility for their own protection and awareness of their situation.
Rapid Reporting
3-30. Closely related to accountability is rapid reporting of isolating events. ISG addresses how isolated
persons will attempt to contact their unit—or recovery forces—and how units will report isolating events to
their command. Topics related to reporting include use of ground-to-air and ground-to-ground signals. The
signals component of ISG typically addresses the use of radios, distress beacons, and other electronic
devices. ISG may specify visual signals. To facilitate accurate reporting of isolating events, ISG may
prescribe specific items of equipment Soldiers will possess, such as maps of the AO. If Soldiers carry
distress beacons, the ISG directs when to activate them. In the field, a low-tech solution is frequently just as
effective as an electronic solution. Visual signals such as flares, signal lights (strobe lights, chemical light
sticks, and flashlights), colored panels, glint tape, reflective mirrors, signal fires, and the use of natural
materials (stones, snow, or vegetation, depending on the terrain and weather) augment electronic signal
means.
Actions to Take When Isolated
3-31. Soldiers identify their situation as an isolating event based on the isolation criteria in the ISG. When
the criteria are met, they implement the actions recommended. ISG normally requires isolated persons to
try to return to friendly forces unassisted, even if the situation and conditions on the ground require a |
3-50 | 62 | Chapter 3
deviation from the ISG. Isolated persons must attempt to inform friendly forces of their situation and of any
departure from the ISG or unit operating procedures.
3-32. Commanders analyze their operational environment, anticipate the isolation risk, and recommend
actions most likely to be effective. In their guidance, commanders provide straightforward instructions,
such as to—
* Stay with the vehicle until dark, unless discovered by enemy, hostile, or criminal forces.
* Move south along the river valley toward friendly forces if forced to leave the vehicle by enemy
pressure.
* Avoid populated areas to the west of the main highway.
* Move toward the rally point in the woods, when possible, to the east of the intersection of
Highways 1 and 9.
* Activate the distress beacon when in a covered and concealed location.
* Be prepared to authenticate identity by using the daily password and countersign.
3-33. Becoming isolated poses psychological challenges that ISG can mitigate. Soldiers who know the ISG
feel more confident in difficult situations because they already have a plan. Soldiers and other designated
individuals know that if they become isolated, they can take certain actions and a robust system will
operate to recover them. Commanders encourage Soldiers to draw on their education and training to reduce
the psychological challenges. Many of the initial actions taken by an isolated person are embodied in the
Warrior Ethos and the Soldier combat skills initially taught in combat training and advanced individual
training (see TC 3-21.75). Soldiers apply Soldier skills of cover, concealment, and camouflage; movement;
land navigation; first aid; marksmanship; communications; SERE; and chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosives response procedures.
Link-Up Procedures
3-34. Thorough understanding of ISG by the isolated person and the recovery force ensures reciprocal
understanding of link-up procedures. This is especially significant when the isolated person and the
recovery force come from different units. Procedures for the linkup are best predetermined, understood by
potentially isolated persons, and simple to execute. Where practical, the link-up procedures mirror the
signals used for recognition and operations security in normal combat operations identified in paragraph 5
of Appendix 13 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex E (Protection). This part of the ISG can be as detailed as is
practical. At a minimum, these procedures define near and far recognition signals and those actions isolated
personnel will take to identify themselves to the recovery force. Additionally, the ISG should direct
Soldiers to abide by all instructions given by recovery forces.
EVASION PLAN OF ACTION
3-35. Unit commanders determine if units or individuals accomplishing combat missions will prepare an
evasion plan of action before the mission. Evasion plans of action contain specific instructions typically
developed for short-term operations by aviation, special operations forces, ground convoys, combat
outposts, or civil affairs teams. Units or individuals develop an evasion plan of action when the risk of
isolation is elevated. They prepare a new evasion plan of action for each new mission or when conditions
change.
3-36. A unit forwards evasion plans of action up the chain of command. The goal is to improve the
probability of recovering isolated persons by giving recovery forces information about the isolated persons’
mission and intentions in case of isolation. This permits recovery forces to predict the actions and
movements of isolated persons on the ground. An individual, a crew, a convoy leader, or a commander
might complete and brief an evasion plan of action during mission planning. The unit retains a copy as a
reference for possible personnel recovery activities. The commander classifies evasion plans of action at
the same level as the OPLAN, OPORD, or FRAGORD for the mission the units support. The more
complete, accurate, and up-to-date the information is, the better the chances for successful recovery.
3-37. Source documents providing information for the evasion plan of action include the current air tasking
order and the personnel recovery special instructions that complement the air tasking order for aviation |
3-50 | 63 | Planning for Personnel Recovery
personnel. For both aviators and ground forces, the personnel recovery part of the unit SOP and the content
of the particular execution document give necessary information.
3-38. Before executing a mission, units sometimes prepare an evasion plan of action to establish how an
individual or group intends to evade capture in case they become isolated. It is a bottom-up information
document that units prepare in advance to inform the chain of command how isolated persons intend to
behave. Aviators, special operations forces, ground convoy leadership, and small teams working in remote
locations and combat outposts should prepare evasion plans of action. Units preparing evasion plans of
action refer to the current air tasking order and accompanying special instructions for aviation personnel.
The personnel recovery section of the unit SOP and the current OPORD or FRAGORD also give necessary
information. Commanders adjust the content of the evasion plan of action, depending on the situation. The
theater commander may dictate specific requirements. An evasion plan of action typically includes the
categories of information in table 3-8.
Table 3-8. Sample evasion plan of action categories
Categories of Information Examples
Identification. • Name, rank, social security number or Service number, and duty position of
unit members.
• Mission number, unit, date, and aircraft, vehicle, or convoy call sign or
identifier.
Planned route of travel • Direction of travel, route points, distance, and heading.
and waypoints. • Evasion plans for each part of the journey or activity.
Immediate evasion • Actions for hiding near the aircraft or vehicle.
actions to take for the • Rally points.
first 48 hours if uninjured. • Travel plans, including distance, pace, and time.
• Intended actions and length of stay at initial hiding location.
Immediate evasion • Hiding intentions.
actions to take if injured. • Evasion intentions.
• Travel intentions.
• Intended actions at hiding locations.
Extended evasion actions • Destination (such as recovery area, mountain range, coast, border, or
to take after 48 hours. friendly forces location).
• Travel routes, plans, and techniques (either written or drawn).
• Actions and intentions at potential contact or recovery locations.
• Recovery contact point signals, signs, and procedures (written or drawn).
• Back-up plans, if any, for the above.
Communications and • Duress word, number, color, or letter of the day, month, or quarter, or other
authentication. current authentication codes.
• Available communications and signaling devices—type and quantity of
radios; programmed frequencies; encryption code; quantity of batteries;
type and quantity of flares, beacons, mirrors, strobe lights; other.
• Primary communication schedule, procedures, and frequencies (initial and
extended contact procedures).
• Backup communication schedule, procedures, and frequencies.
Other useful information. • Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (known as SERE) training
Supplementary previously completed.
information includes • Weapons and ammunition. List of signaling, survival, and evasion kit items.
anything contributing to • Mission evasion preparation checklist.
the location and recovery
of isolated persons. • Clothing, shoe size, and resupply items.
• Signature of reviewing official. |
3-50 | 65 | Chapter 4
Considerations for Major Combat Operations
This chapter discusses general characteristics of major combat operations that
influence the conduct of personnel recovery. Then it describes typical causes of
isolation incidents. Finally, it discusses conducting the operations process for
personnel recovery.
CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS
4-1. The characteristics of major combat operations increase the complexity and uncertainty of personnel
recovery operations. Large-scale offensive and defensive tasks involve complex operations against the
uniformed armed forces of nation-states. Operations against hybrid threats can evolve into major combat
operations. In Vietnam, from 1954 to 1975, a nationalistic guerilla movement, with outside support, grew
into an intense conflict involving major ground and air combat. Military operations in Vietnam illustrate
the ongoing risk of isolation for air and land forces. During major combat, enemies may have large
standing armies with modern weapons or a combination of conventional and irregular capabilities. Some
possess nuclear weapons. U.S. forces continue to train for and remain committed to defeating conventional
enemy forces and hybrid threats in major combat operations. The principles of personnel recovery
operations guide adaptable Army forces to accomplish successful personnel recovery missions in major
combat.
THE COMPLEXITY OF PERSONNEL RECOVERY IN MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS
4-2. The complexity of major combat operations strains military capabilities, including personnel
recovery capabilities. Major combat operations may cover wide areas and involve large numbers of
personnel and equipment. Thousands of people and vehicles deploy to hundreds—if not thousands—of
locations. The enemy may field equal numbers. Battles and engagements may cause hundreds of potential
isolation incidents. Friendly forces face the risk of isolation daily.
4-3. Personnel, contractors, and others supporting friendly forces may become isolated. The availability
of diplomatic, civilian, and military personnel recovery options does not mitigate the risk. Commanders and
staff understand that the more partners participating in operations, the more complex the situation.
4-4. Wounds, injuries, and illness complicate isolation incidents, especially in the numbers associated
with major combat. The raid on the Pangatian prison camp near Cabanatuan, Luzon, in the Philippines
during World War II illustrates the transportation and medical challenges of rescuing large numbers of
prisoners held for long periods. On 30 January 1945, a mixed force of Filipino guerillas, Army Rangers,
and Alamo Scouts rescued over 500 prisoners from the camp. Some had been held since the fall of Bataan
and Corregidor almost three years earlier. All had been mistreated, most were malnourished, and many
were sick, wounded, or injured—including those held in the zero ward of the prison hospital, where they
were judged to have no chance of survival. After the successful fight, the rescue force had to carry the
liberated prisoners to a location remote from the camp before giving them food and water. From there the
recovery force put the weakest and sickest on carts. When they reached U.S. lines, Sixth Army trucks met
them and transported the group to freedom.
4-5. Even for persons isolated for short periods, personnel recovery operations must include adequate
transportation, prompt medical aid, food and water, physical security, and behavioral health remediation.
Captors may hold isolated persons in small groups or large numbers and even in a medical treatment
facility. Recovering isolated persons protected by the enemy requires adequate personnel, physical security,
and transportation resources. The terrain and environmental conditions add to the difficulty of transporting
the sick, wounded, and injured. |
3-50 | 66 | Chapter 4
4-6. Some individuals may actually choose isolation. For example, Captain (Chaplain) Emil J. Kapaun
made such a decision in November 1950. At the start of the Korean War in June 1950, he deployed to
Korea as the chaplain of the 3rd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry Regiment. During fierce combat with Chinese
forces in North Korea, his unit was under heavy pressure and preparing to withdraw toward friendly lines
when he was told that wounded 3rd Battalion Soldiers were surrounded and could not withdraw.
Accompanied by Captain (Doctor) Clarence L. Anderson, Father Kapaun left the secure perimeter and
found the men. He ministered to the Soldiers until captured by the enemy. He was the only member of the
group not wounded. He elected to remain with the Soldiers—to isolate himself—rather than evade and
return to friendly lines. Father Kapaun died in captivity.
4-7. The mission is always paramount. The Soldier’s Creed and the Warrior Ethos (see ADP 1 and
TC 3-21.75) make it clear that the Army values its members, but the mission is foremost. At the tactical
level, this often creates tension between accomplishing the mission and protecting those endangering their
lives for the mission. Major combat increases this tension for leaders and Soldiers because of an increased
tempo. Whereas stability or DSCA missions include episodes of high tempo, major combat operations
maintain a high tempo as the norm. The need to create and maintain combat power when and where it is
needed contrast with the requirement to preserve life. Expectations of life-saving personnel recovery
operations prove challenging to meet in the conditions of major combat.
THE UNCERTAINTY OF PERSONNEL RECOVERY IN MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS
4-8. Civilians within an operational area increase the uncertainty of personnel recovery activities,
particularly in densely populated areas. Complex or unfamiliar cultural factors make it difficult to predict
civilian behavior for or against isolated Soldiers. A local population or group opposed to friendly
operations make personnel recovery operations more challenging. Groups or individuals supportive of
enemy forces enhance the intelligence gathering capabilities of the enemy and increase the threat to isolated
persons. Conversely, friendly populations are a boon to allied intelligence and support networks. However,
modern communications enable anyone to secretly report the sighting of U.S. forces to their enemies.
4-9. Army commanders at every level are committed to the safety and security of their organizations.
They emphasize personnel recovery to prevent Army forces from becoming isolated, missing, or captured
and lessen the tactical, operational, and strategic impact of isolation incidents. Commanders and staffs at all
echelons must guard against treating personnel recovery as episodic. They must anticipate requirements.
Commanders who adequately resource personnel recovery elements with a full-time staff minimize the
adverse impact of personnel recovery operations on mission accomplishment. This is especially important
in major combat operations, where a robust recovery capability raises troop morale. This is because
Soldiers can execute their missions in extremely hazardous conditions with the confidence that they can
successfully avoid or contend with isolation incidents.
CAUSES OF ISOLATION INCIDENTS
4-10. Individuals or groups become isolated for various reasons, including their own behavior, enemy
actions, and interaction with the physical environment. Personnel recovery efforts must be effective
regardless of the reason or reasons for an isolation incident. Paragraphs 4-11 through 4-16 discuss common
causes of isolation incidents. This discussion applies mainly to major combat (offensive and defensive)
operations, but also to stability and DSCA operations. The categories are flexible and do not exclude other
possible causes.
ISOLATION BY FRIENDLY BEHAVIOR
4-11. The most frequent cause of isolation incidents is friendly force behavior, regardless of the situation.
The actions prescribed by warning orders, OPORDs, or FRAGORDs occasionally expose the force or
individuals to unknown, underestimated, or even unacceptable risk of isolation. The information available
for supporting situational awareness and decisionmaking may be incomplete or flawed. A leader exercising
individual initiative sometimes directs a COA that leads to isolation, such as deviating from a planned route
to take advantage of a just-discovered shortcut. An on-the-spot decision based on available information
seems appropriate for an urgent situation, such as autorotating a helicopter with an engine failure. |
3-50 | 67 | Considerations for Major Combat Operations
However, it could cause an individual or an aircrew to become isolated from friendly forces and at risk of
capture. Subsequent rapid decisions may compound the risk. Leaving the initial site of the isolation to
affect self-recovery, avoid enemy contact, or seek medical attention may exacerbate the situation. Rapid
decisions may cause forces to become lost. Once isolated, some forces do not receive orders to move, so
they stay in a vulnerable location. In major combat operations, the number of these types of isolation
incidents is proportional to the number of forces deployed.
ISOLATION BY ENEMY ACTION
4-12. Units sometimes become isolated when an enemy force separates them from other friendly forces.
Enemy forces observing the isolation incident race to the scene, seeking to kill or capture isolated Soldiers.
Friendly forces race to recover them. If an unassisted evasion or an immediate recovery by friendly forces
is not successful, commanders decide whether to mount a deliberate recovery operation. In major combat
operations, recovery operations compete for resources with other missions. Commanders weigh the
decision with other tactical decisions based on the current situation. They consider the prospects of success
against acceptable risk and the possibility of casualties. This decision is among the most difficult a combat
leader must make. Should isolated forces wait for the outcome of the current operation, or could a reserve
element not yet committed execute the personnel recovery mission? The decision affects the ongoing
mission as well as the morale of the organization.
4-13. In major combat, Army forces isolated by hostile action are frequently in the most dangerous
personnel recovery situation because they are typically under enemy observation. They may have the
means to resist, but if cut off from support for extended periods, they eventually may evade returning to
friendly control or even be forced to surrender. The personnel recovery structure, especially one strictly
based on search and rescue, can become overwhelmed. In these circumstances, extraction by aircraft is
generally impractical because of the number of aircraft necessary to move large groups. Furthermore, the
presence of enemy antiaircraft and other direct-fire weapons makes airborne recovery dangerous for
aircrews. Aircraft shot down during recovery attempts simply add to the number of isolated persons and the
complexity of the mission. Recovery of large numbers of Soldiers typically requires ground and air forces
in a deliberate attack, counterattack, raid, breakout from encirclement, or other tactical operation supported
by intelligence, fires, and sustainment. In effect, personnel recovery becomes the primary mission.
4-14. Enemy action threatens the isolation of more than just friendly armed forces. DOD regulations,
instructions, and directives place DOD civilians, DOD contractors, and other designated persons under the
protection of U.S. forces. Designated persons may include persons or members of organizations such as
friendly militias, volunteers, and organized resistance movement members fighting along with U.S. forces,
embedded journalists and other media representatives, civilian aircraft and seaborne vessel crews, and
members of intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations. The recovery of these persons is
complicated because the Geneva Conventions does not protect them. An enemy force may not give
designated persons the opportunity to surrender if it regards them as outlaws. Such persons may
spontaneously take up arms to resist the enemy. The enemy may not recognize designated persons as
belligerents, but Army leadership may direct their recovery nonetheless. Working with designated persons
may present significant challenges to the Army force. Their groups may be fragmented. They may not be
able to make detailed information readily available for identifying or authenticating their members.
4-15. Prisoners of war are initially isolated persons. All actions taken immediately after capture, before
movement to a prisoner of war camp, and after detention are personnel recovery activities. The Third 1949
Geneva Convention defines this status—while under the control of the detaining force but before entering
an incarceration facility—as being a prisoner of war. Any activity, large or small, involved in the
repatriation of prisoners of war is considered a personnel recovery operation.
ISOLATION BY THE ENVIRONMENT
4-16. The physical environment, including climate and weather conditions, can cause groups or individuals
to become isolated. Inclement weather, biological contamination, chemical pollution, and the damage to
terrain from combat cause isolation and complicate personnel recovery operations. A fast-flowing or deep
river, large lake, wide crevasse, sheer cliff, seemingly impenetrable swamp, or unrelenting mud caused by
heavy rain can create or contribute to isolation. Contamination, whether natural (such as water infected |
3-50 | 68 | Chapter 4
with Vibrio cholera, the cholera bacterium) or man-made contamination (such as chlorine gas spilled from
a ruptured storage tank) interferes with movement and contributes to isolation. When large or aggressive
enemy formations are present, the situation is especially challenging.
CONDUCTING THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
4-17. Army commanders and staffs conducting the operations process for personnel recovery missions use
judgment in applying the principles discussed in chapter 1. Paragraphs 4-18 through 4-24 discuss in detail
how they plan, prepare, execute, and assess personnel recovery operations.
PLANNING FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS
4-18. Commanders and staffs analyze their operational environments using the operational variables—
political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time.
Commanders and staffs use the mission variables as a filter to extract from the operational variables the
information staffs need to conduct an operation and commanders need to exercise mission command.
Higher command echelons ensure their personnel recovery guidance is appropriate for an operational
environment. Tactical-level commanders ensure the ISG is appropriate for the situation on the ground.
Several enemy characteristics are important in determining the risk of isolation such as composition,
disposition, capabilities, recruitment efforts, level of training, robustness of logistic support, and support
among the population.
4-19. Army planners use an Army planning methodology to focus the personnel recovery planning effort.
They define the problem, gather information, develop possible solutions, analyze and select the best
solution, and implement it. Often these steps take the form of the Army design methodology, the seven-step
military decisionmaking process, or troop leading procedures (see ADRP 5-0).
PREPARING FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS
4-20. Well-trained and experienced units typically perform better in the chaos of combat. The desire by
commanders and staffs at all levels to protect Soldiers and keep faith with the Soldier’s Creed is no
substitute for preparation. Preparation for personnel recovery is an integral part of the individual training of
each Soldier and the collective training of every Army unit. The foundation of readiness is training.
Personnel recovery training for several generations—at least since the Korean War—focused on SERE
training of aircrews and isolated Soldiers. Traditionally, training for the forces as a whole has focused on
Code of Conduct instructions. Analysis of the strategic impact of isolation incidents during Operation Iraqi
Freedom resulted in a broader approach to provide personnel recovery training to the entire force.
(ATP 3-50.3 discusses SERE in detail.)
4-21. Commanders ensure the recovery force is ready to execute the recovery mission. They supply the
force with necessary equipment, up-to-date intelligence, and information on weather conditions, the status
of the isolated persons, and other friendly forces providing support. If necessary, they augment the force
with air, ground, or water assets. They staff the PRCS and augment the current operations integration cell at
senior headquarters with personnel recovery specialists to assist in decisionmaking. Preparation for
personnel recovery operations includes mastering the shared personnel recovery proficiencies (see the
discussion beginning in paragraph 1-75).
EXECUTING PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS
4-22. The PRCS synchronizes and integrates all personnel recovery actions horizontally within the
headquarters and vertically within the chain of command. This includes monitoring execution of all
personnel recovery tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. Executing a personnel recovery
mission centers on the recover task. However, personnel recovery operations are not complete before the
execution of the reintegrate task. Paragraphs 1-62 through 1-74 discuss reintegration.
4-23. The story of the 507th Maintenance Company during the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi
Freedom illustrates Soldiers executing the Army personnel recovery approaches (sometimes called
methods): unassisted, immediate, deliberate, and external supported (also discussed in paragraphs 1-35 |
3-50 | 69 | Considerations for Major Combat Operations
through 1-39). In the morning hours of 23 March 2003, thirty-three Soldiers of the 507th Maintenance
Company, including two from the 3d Forward Support Battalion, entered the city of An Nasiriyah with
eighteen vehicles. Due to a navigation error, enemy forces surrounded the convoy. During a ninety-minute
struggle to fight off the enemy and return to friendly lines, the convoy divided into three smaller groups.
Each group had a different personnel recovery experience. The smallest group of six Soldiers in three
vehicles evaded roadblocks under fire and returned unassisted to friendly control when it met elements of a
Marine Corps tank battalion. The second group of ten Soldiers in five vehicles fought off attacking Iraqi
Soldiers, established a defensive perimeter, and treated its wounded. Advancing Marines rescued it in an
immediate recovery operation. The final group of seventeen Soldiers and ten vehicles was involved in a
vehicle crash under heavy enemy fire and was unable to move to friendly lines. It became fragmented and
several members were killed, wounded, and captured. On 1 April 2003, special operations forces supported
by Marines rescued one Soldier from an Iraqi hospital in an external supported recovery operation. Later in
April, the remaining captive members of the convoy, and two captured Apache pilots, were recovered when
word of their presence enabled nearby Marines to execute a deliberate recovery operation.
ASSESSING PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS
4-24. Commanders drive the operations process. They understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and
assess. They assess during the plan, prepare, and execute phases of the operations process. Likewise,
commanders assess throughout the conduct of personnel recovery operations to determine the progress of
the operation and adapt as required. Assessment helps commanders supervise recovery operations to better
understand current conditions and determine how the operation is progressing. The commander maintains
overall perspective, comparing the current situation to the one originally envisioned. Commanders use
information received from subordinates to develop indicators to determine progress toward a successful
outcome. When assessment reveals a significant variance from the commander’s original visualization,
commanders reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan as required. |
3-50 | 71 | Chapter 5
Considerations for Stability
This chapter discusses general characteristics of stability that influence the conduct of
personnel recovery. It explains isolation risk and risk reduction strategies. It discusses
DOD and DOS interaction and coordination with other partners.
CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY
5-1. Stability has distinct characteristics that influence personnel recovery operations. For example,
command and support relationships frequently vary. Army forces operate under joint command and control,
under the control of a multinational force, or under the operational control of a civilian entity, such as the
DOS. They may also operate in conjunction with HN forces. Soldiers and other designated persons are
among the population, they are vulnerable to hybrid threats, and they often operate under restrictive rules of
engagement or rules on the use of force.
5-2. Army forces conduct offensive, defensive, and stability tasks simultaneously. One unit may find
itself conducting offensive or defensive tasks, while another unit is establishing civil control, providing
support to governance, or training HN military forces. Soldiers scattered in remote areas are at increased
risk of isolation. Vulnerabilities increase when stability operations require the use of nonmilitary personnel
with little or no training in preventing isolation events. Personnel recovery characteristics in stability
include addressing the local national sovereignty, HN security forces, local populations, and
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. These factors interact to increase uncertainty and
the chance of isolation.
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
5-3. Supporting the national sovereignty of the host nation is an important consideration in any
deployment overseas. Nation-states are sovereign within their own territory. Army forces conducting
personnel recovery activities do not violate this right. When a functional, effective HN government exists,
Army and joint forces work with local civil and military authorities. Personnel recovery activities have a
greater chance of success when the host nation is permissive and encourages U.S. military operations or is,
at least, amenable to the presence of those forces on or over its territory. The worst-case scenario occurs
when the political and security environments are in chaos, the state is in crisis or has failed altogether, and
the host nation exercises little or no sovereignty over its territory. Normally, the situation hovers between
these two poles.
5-4. The host nation welcomes—or at least does not prevent—Army forces but imposes restrictions on
their actions in an effort to exercise its sovereignty or to make U.S. operations more acceptable to its
population. The restrictions for personnel recovery overseas fall into several categories:
* Force size.
* Force composition and capability employment.
* Length of stay.
* Scope of operations.
* Government-to-government contact.
* Mandatory use of local resources.
* Operational actions and locations. |
3-50 | 72 | Chapter 5
Force Size
5-5. It is common for nations to desire a light footprint of U.S. forces in stability operations for internal or
regional political reasons, especially during foreign humanitarian assistance. The leaders of nations want
control of activities within their nation’s borders. Nations affected by natural disasters or emergencies
prefer to control relief activities, especially those involving other nations. One way to do this is to limit the
number of foreign troops on sovereign soil. However, from the Army perspective, a smaller force size may
equate to fewer capabilities available for personnel recovery operations.
Force Composition and Capability Employment
5-6. Force composition determines personnel recovery capabilities. Host nations do not view all types of
forces the same. For many, lightly armed military police in wheeled vehicles are acceptable, while tracked
vehicles mounting large-caliber direct-fire weapons are not. In terms of the warfighting functions,
sustainment forces may be welcomed while movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, and some
protection forces are not. Likewise, local authority may prohibit use of certain weapons systems. For
example, the host nation may not permit use of helicopters or Army watercraft useful in personnel
recovery, or limit the hours of use.
Length of Stay
5-7. Host nations generally give U.S. forces a time limit to achieve their mission, granting an extension
only after a decision made through the local political process. Conversely, the Army may set a time limit on
its own activities in a nation, mindful of the negative consequences of overstaying its welcome.
Commanders strive to keep personnel recovery assets as long as possible.
Scope of Operations
5-8. Wary of the internal political consequences of giving carte blanch to foreign forces, a host nation
may limit the scope of Army operations, including personnel recovery activities. For example, Army forces
may be allowed to conduct operations against hostile irregular forces but prohibited from entering urban
areas.
Government-to-Government Contact
5-9. In nations with fragile relationships between the national government and subordinate governmental
entities, the national government may prohibit or severely restrict Army contact with local or regional
authorities. Motivations for this are as simple as a desire to control things from a central location, or
involve the complex political relations and long-standing mistrust between potential rivals for national
control. Army forces many need to coordinate through a convoluted chain of authority.
Mandatory Use of Local Resources
5-10. The deployment of U.S. forces to a nation for stability, even for a short time, will affect that nation
and region. The economic impact is substantial and creates opportunities for the HN government.
Understanding this may cause the local authorities to mandate the use of indigenous people, local resources
(such as coal, petroleum, water, and foodstuffs), or transportation assets.
Operational Actions and Locations
5-11. The host nation can require the activities of U.S. forces conform to certain procedures, such as
conducting operations only in conjunction with local police or military forces. The host nation may curtail
or severely restrict common military actions, such as the right of hot pursuit into neighboring countries.
The host nation may prohibit U.S. forces from entering certain areas, such as border areas or restricted
military operational areas. |
3-50 | 73 | Considerations for Stability
HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES
5-12. HN security forces represent a significant potential for personnel recovery support in stability. The
Army’s relationship with a host nation can be long or short term, depending on the situation. In long-term
relationships, the United States has a long-standing bilateral diplomatic, economic, and military partnership
with the host nation. In long-term relationships, the United States may have formed a more recent security
cooperation pact with the goal of stabilizing the overseas nation while advancing the national security
interests of the United States. In still other situations, an ad hoc relationship exists to address a temporary
state of affairs. An example of an ad hoc relationship is one resulting from a response to a natural or man-
made disaster. In each relationship, the Army as part of a joint force conducts synchronization and
coordination, and establishes liaison with the armed forces, national police, and other internal security
forces of the host nation as part of unified action.
5-13. A relationship with HN security forces is important for several reasons. They normally have several
capabilities important to the location, support, and assistance with recovery of isolated persons. National
security forces—police and armed forces—are the first responders. They have elements throughout most of
the country, including remote locations where U.S. forces may perform stability tasks. HN security forces
are generally politically well connected. They facilitate coordination in personnel recovery. Wide
distribution and political connectivity are important in timely intelligence collection and analysis. The most
important relationship is often the American Embassy’s relationship with the national police and
intelligence services. Such HN security forces understand the level of risk of isolation to U.S. forces. HN
security forces provide advice to mitigate that risk for Army forces working in remote areas, or in areas
with a high chance of encountering those with hostile intent.
LOCAL POPULATIONS
5-14. There is no empty battlefield. Soldiers interact with the local population in an AO. The relationship
between Army forces and the local population includes various intangible factors such as understanding the
culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, neutral, or friendly political and social systems.
While the local population may have reasons to interact with Army forces, HN authorities may have
reasons to discourage contact between Army forces and the local population. Reasons to limit association
include culture, religion, and economy. Commanders determine if they should limit troop interaction with
the HN population. For example, restrictions can allow business or operational contact only, with social
interactions prohibited.
INTERACTION WITH INDEPENDENT ACTORS
5-15. A number of independent actors influence stability. Joint and Army forces in stability operations
interface with entities that possess various experience, resources, mandates, and capabilities. Some global
organizations have broad mandates, while local organizations have specific, limited missions. These
organizations sometimes provide valuable assistance in personnel recovery.
5-16. Army forces at all levels aim to build strong relationships with independent actors through ongoing
cooperation and coordination. Examples of potential partners include the United Nations and the
International Committee of the Red Cross. The United Nations operates in most joint and Army operational
areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross serves as an impartial, neutral, and independent
organization to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence.
Such organizations develop experience in local environments and can share knowledge of the locale, its
people and their customs, and the government organization. Additionally, independent actors have
knowledge networks that can prove a valuable resource during isolation incidents.
5-17. Many organizations wish to maintain independent and separate from Army forces. However,
objectives of stability frequently align with those objectives of the independent actors. At the least,
reasonable deconfliction of purpose is possible. Frequently, the United Nations, DOS, or the United States
Agency for International Development facilitates the interface between Army forces and other
intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations. The interface includes Army efforts to recover or
prevent isolation of civilian members of these organizations, when required. |
3-50 | 74 | Chapter 5
5-18. Commanders do not delay initiating cooperation and coordination in advance of potential isolation
incidents. This includes the potential isolation of Soldiers or civilians. They anticipate the need and do not
allow inadequate coordination and training to limit effectiveness of recovery operations. They plan to
compensate for differences in communications equipment, signals, training, and procedures. Commanders
consider the makeup of the work force of potential partners.
ISOLATION RISK IN STABILITY
5-19. Risks impact personnel recovery operations. The most common type is accidental risk. Since military
operations are inherently dangerous, the chance of accidents increases. Accidents often cause or contribute
to isolation. Other types of risk include the presence of a threat from enemy forces, criminal elements, or a
hostile environment.
5-20. Stability tasks may not require the same level of protection as major combat operations. A
commander and staff still conduct risk assessments to determine the probability of an isolation incident
occurring and its potential impact on mission accomplishment. For instance, figure 5-1 demonstrates how
the risk of a Soldier becoming isolated may be very low, but its impact on the mission may be high
(condition A). Conversely, the probability of an isolation incident may be high but the immediate impact on
an ongoing operation may be low (condition B). With respect to personnel recovery operations, Army
commanders assess the risk, apply control measures, and supervise the operation.
Figure 5-1. Risk curve
5-21. Personnel recovery challenges commanders of stability operations to respond quickly to an isolation
incident with sufficient forces. In most stability situations, the final assessment of risk is a judgment call by
the commander. The commander considers not only the severity of the negative outcome but also its
probability. (See ATP 5-19 for more detailed information on risk management.) Generally, the risk of
isolation for the friendly force is proportional to the size of that force and the degree and distance of
separation from other friendly forces, including recovery forces. See figure 5-2 for an illustration of the
relationship between force size and isolation. |
3-50 | 75 | Considerations for Stability
ISOLATION RISK REDUCTION APPROACHES
5-22. Commanders consider stability characteristics when developing approaches to reduce the risk of
isolation incidents. First, large numbers of Soldiers, Army civilians, contractors, and other designated
individuals support stability operations. Usually, individual risk of isolation is low, but the net risk is
considerable in context of the number of exposures on a daily basis overseas. Second, because the scope of
stability operations is worldwide, the Army personnel recovery structure and training mission are
worldwide. Personnel recovery operations with unified action partners are the norm. Third, although
isolation risk is highly variable, personnel recovery planners can weight their effort in areas considered
high risk. However, in areas of high risk, frequently fewer partners help mitigate the risk. Forces adapt the
personnel recovery structure to an operational environment. In addition to providing personnel recovery
education and training, commanders use a mix of approaches for risk reduction. These approaches include
acceptance, protection, and deterrence.
Figure 5-2. Isolation risk
ACCEPTANCE
5-23. One approach to reducing the isolation risk from hybrid threats is to encourage acceptance of
activities of the USG. Acceptance aims to build relationships with local leaders and other authority
figures—clerics, elders, teachers, health care providers, and influential members of intergovernmental or
nongovernmental organizations. The Army has long understood that winning the “hearts and minds” of a
local population goes a long way to establishing conditions for eventual success and reducing the threat of
isolation. This approach takes time.
5-24. At the local level, commanders can prepare mutual agreements between Army forces and local
leaders. Special operations forces often use the acceptance approach. Such an approach led to the Sons of
Iraq awakening movement in Iraq’s Anbar Province in 2005. Sunni Muslim militias collaborated with
friendly forces to increase the level of security and reduce the risk of isolation in the region. However,
acceptance is conditional on formal agreements and does not lessen the need for protection and deterrent
measures. |
3-50 | 76 | Chapter 5
PROTECTION
5-25. Protection is the use of internal control measures to reduce the risk of isolation incidents by reducing
vulnerability. It is primarily passive. This approach emphasizes protection TTP to preserve the force and
maximize combat power. Such tasks as training and education in operations security, survivability, health
maintenance, safety, and chemical, biological, and radiological defense reduce the vulnerability. One
example of a protection control measure is the existence of a robust personnel recovery infrastructure,
staffed by competent people and interconnected with HN and regional governmental authorities. A
potential shortcoming of protection control measures is that they contribute to a bunker mentality. The
force fixated on protection looks inward and expends its resources on protection instead of reaching out to
accomplish the stability mission.
DETERRENCE
5-26. Deterrence is an external protection control measure using the counter-threat of force to discourage
enemies and mitigate isolation risk. Deterrence encourages the perception that Army forces can and will
reach out and retaliate against perpetrators. Deterrence at individual and small-unit levels takes the form of
presenting a hard target to a potential enemy. Brigade and below forces seek to convince the enemy that the
risk in attempting an attack is not worth the potential benefit. Soldiers and units that always appear vigilant,
travel with adequate security, and use every technological advantage to identify and track potential
enemies, contribute to deterrence for brigade and below units. At the operational level, a well-advertised,
rapid, and aggressive response to a kidnapping may give an actor pause in allowing operations in its district
or may convince it to assist in the locate and recover tasks.
5-27. A fine line exists between deterrence and the unnecessary use of force. Even for Soldiers serving at
brigade and below, deterrence goes beyond just the use of force. The employment of civil affairs and
military information support capabilities, frequent interaction with local tribal and political leaders, and a
threat to withhold the benefits of economic cooperation with U.S. forces can discourage action against
friendly troops and their mission.
5-28. Not all risk reduction approaches work in all situations, but a combination of control measures
contributes to the reduction of vulnerability and risk associated with operations in uncertain environments.
All isolation risk reduction approaches have a cost. The cost may be in money, in the loss of contact with
the local population, or the esteem of the international community. The situation in the presence of a hybrid
threat is more complex. Danger from disease, an incipient insurgency, an external military threat from a
nearby sanctuary, and an uncooperative HN government all call for a combination of risk reduction
measures. Regardless of the combination, efforts in risk reduction pay off in increased protection and an
improved climate for personnel recovery.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INTERACTION
5-29. The DOS mission includes helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous
world. All U.S. forces in a host nation support the DOS mission. The geographic combatant commander
coordinates with the chief of mission and the embassy staff. Normally, the DOS is the lead for personnel
recovery activities overseas. In a few narrow instances, normally involving an active military joint
operations area within a weak and beleaguered HN government, the DOD takes the lead.
5-30. The DOS is the lead for stability. The American Embassy establishes relationships with a wide range
of unified action partners to support reconstruction and stabilization activities. Partners include HN
government officials, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other groups and
individuals. Important actors include civilian, business, and religious leaders (even those in opposition to
the government); academics; and the diplomatic corps. Some of these relationships are formal, such as
diplomatic ties, while others are informal, such as those with certain nongovernmental organizations.
Access to all these partners supports the effectiveness of the personnel recovery structure within the host
nation. In addition, the embassy may maintain informal, indirect, or clandestine contacts with individuals
hostile to the existing government. |
3-50 | 77 | Considerations for Stability
5-31. The responsibility for recovering isolated persons within a host nation belongs with the government
of that nation. Therefore, the goal of the USG is to handle all personnel recovery operations diplomatically.
However, it uses a whole-government concept of personnel recovery operations. The concept recognizes
that all entities of the government have some level of responsibility for the recovery and safe return of
isolated and captured U.S. citizens. This includes DOD employees who are HN or third-country nationals.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORITY
5-32. The authority of the DOS to command and control personnel recovery operations overseas is found
in Sections 4801, 4802, and 4805, Title 22, United States Code (USC) (22 USC 4801, 4802, and 4805).
Section 4801 sets forth the responsibility of the Secretary of State to secure diplomatic operations overseas,
to include accountability of USG personnel. It directs the Secretary of State to evacuate U.S. citizens
endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster. Section 4802 directs the Secretary of State to protect
USG personnel on official duty overseas except those under the command of a U.S. military commander
and some other exceptions. These responsibilities include security of U.S. missions abroad, development of
emergency plans, liaison with overseas private sector security interests, and various training functions. Of
special interest is a stipulation to evacuate endangered private citizens. This is the origin of the requirement
to recover “designated individuals” whom the embassy chief of mission designates. Section 4805 directs
federal agencies to cooperate with the Secretary of State. The secretary may delegate operational control of
overseas security functions to other agencies—DOD, for example—but the authority remains with the
Secretary of State. The language in this paragraph enables the DOD and its representatives with the
American Embassies overseas—and geographic combatant commanders—to provide resources to
personnel recovery operations in a host nation.
5-33. Other authorizations under 22 USC include Sections 1732 and 4314. Section 1732 directs the
President, through the DOS, to use all means short of war to obtain the release of captured U.S. citizens
held by foreign governments. This language can include those held under the control of groups supported
by governments who support their efforts. Section 4314 directs the Secretary of State to fund HN law
enforcement agencies to protect diplomatic facilities.
5-34. Of the more than 250 U.S. diplomatic missions around the world, the overwhelming majority are in
host nations requiring emergency action plans accountable for personnel recovery operations within the
host nation. As directed in 22 USC 3927, the chief of mission has authority over all USG elements and
representatives in the host nation except military forces assigned to the appropriate combatant commander.
The chief of mission is the representative of the President in a host nation and is responsible for personnel
recovery activities in every case. The chief of mission is usually the ambassador. When no ambassador is
appointed, or the ambassador is out of the host nation, the deputy chief of mission assumes responsibility as
the chief of the mission.
5-35. The chief of mission establishes a country team composed of the various officers, directors, attachés,
counselors, chiefs, and senior government representatives. For personnel recovery operations, the chief of
mission and the country team executing responsibilities under 22 USC coordinate with the geographic
combatant commander executing responsibilities under 10 USC. The objective is to ensure a coordinated
response among the DOS, DOD, and host nation. Although the chief of mission is responsible for
conducting U.S. personnel recovery operations within the host nation, many resources for an immediate or
deliberate recovery reside with the geographic combatant commander. In stability, the chief of mission
coordinates the resources of the diplomatic, military, and civil authorities to execute personnel recovery
responsibilities.
5-36. The chief of mission and the embassy staff coordinate with resident defense attachés and the DOS
regional security officer (RSO). Members of these organizations are normally a part of the country team
coordinating recovery activities. The defense attaché is primarily responsible to foster good relations with
the HN defense and security establishment. Attachés establish networks within the local military and
paramilitary organizations to facilitate a rapid response to crises. The diplomatic security service special
agents staff the embassy regional security office supervised by a RSO. The RSO is responsible for the
physical, information, technical, and personnel security of the embassy. They assist the Marine security
guard detachments, other U.S. forces assigned to the embassy, contract security guards, and HN security,
intelligence, and law enforcement services. The team may include representatives of U.S. special |
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operations forces and members of the U.S. Coast Guard, if they are operating in the host nation. The RSO
is responsible for arranging training for local national police and security officials. The RSO serves as point
of contact and advises U.S. citizens travelling in the host country on safety and security procedures and
threats. The RSO’s everyday contacts with these groups are invaluable in the case of an isolation incident;
the contacts are already established.
5-37. Many host nations require emergency action plans accountable for personnel recovery operations
within that host nation. The embassy regional security office and its emergency action committee, with the
help of the defense attachés, assist the chief of mission to develop the embassy emergency action plan. This
tailored plan establishes procedures for contingencies including responding to natural disasters, evacuating
embassy and local U.S. citizens, and recovering isolated persons. The typical emergency action plan
requires the embassy to conduct periodic crisis management exercises and to maintain a list of the
estimated number of U.S. citizens living, working, or travelling in the host nation.
5-38. The emergency action plan addresses concerns of personnel recovery. The RSO, the defense
attachés, and other emergency action committee members develop protocols in the sections of the embassy
and with local law enforcement and security services to expedite a rapid response to any isolation incident.
The objective is to leverage the formal and informal connections the embassy has within the host nation.
The emergency action plan provides information on contact with local governmental agencies and lists the
permanent, semi-permanent, and temporary USG assets available within the host nation to respond to an
isolation incident.
5-39. As is often the case, especially in small U.S. diplomatic outposts overseas, the embassy may lack
adequate resources to exercise personnel recovery responsibilities. The DOS frequently relies on U.S.
forces in those locations. Serving under the operational control of the chief of mission, the geographic
combatant commander provides personnel recovery resources.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
5-40. The DOS bases its personnel recovery operational concept on the ideas that prevention and
preparation are the keys to mitigating the risk, and the type and degree of risk depend on the location. The
DOS focuses on preventing isolation and captivity through education, training, and information sharing.
Foreign service officers and other representatives of the USG receive extensive training at the Foreign
Service Institute before deployment overseas. These courses include information on individual security,
environmental threats, hostage awareness training, regional security office operations, and personnel
recovery roles and responsibilities. Department-level instruction includes courses on security operations in
nontraditional or high-risk environments designed to mitigate those threats. Department-wide education
and training combines with specific instructions on contingency planning at the embassy level. The
emergency action plan contains a personnel recovery annex. Its instruction includes local nationals and
contractors who work at embassies around the world. The DOS plans leverage all USG assets, including
those of the DOD.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORITY
5-41. The authority for the DOD to conduct personnel recovery operations overseas is contained in
10 USC 1501 and 1502. Section 1501 invests the DOD with the responsibility to investigate and recover
missing persons, including actions related to search, rescue, escape, and evasion. This section directs the
DOD to coordinate with other departments and agencies on all matters concerning missing persons. It
defines a covered person as a member of the armed forces who becomes involuntarily absent because of
hostile action or whose status is undetermined. Further, it identifies covered persons as members of the
armed forces, DOD employees, and contractors. Section 1502 stipulates that its components inform DOD
within ten days of all missing persons to establish accountability.
5-42. The DOD and its subordinates are responsible for establishing an effective personnel recovery
system for military personnel. The DOD has authority to recover an isolated Soldier or other designated
person within the context of daily military operations. The DOS has the lead in all other cases; the DOD
does not have authority to conduct personnel recovery operations unilaterally. Joint and Army forces
conduct stability under the authority of the President, in accordance with treaties, conventions, and |
3-50 | 79 | Considerations for Stability
executive and other agreements; statutory law; and federal and agency regulations. Often joint and Army
headquarters can pre-negotiate some of the personnel recovery tasks with the host nation before a major
exercise or operation. These may include authority to conduct medical evacuation, conduct immediate
search and rescue, and use blue force tracking, personal locater beacons, or preventive and protective
measures.
5-43. In stability, the DOD conducts many of the personnel recovery activities with the cooperation of
nonmilitary entities. The DOD coordinates with the DOS and the host nation to ensure that necessary
response capabilities are available. This underscores the need to establish a broad network of relationships
in an AO with not only the host nation’s security forces, but also with the diplomatic, humanitarian, and
political organizations. Establishing and nurturing these relationships are the responsibilities of the DOS
and other representatives of the USG. The DOD supports unified action.
5-44. The largest U.S. military entity in a host nation is the Office of Defense Cooperation. All DOD
personnel in a U.S. diplomatic mission fall under the leadership of the senior defense officer, including
those in the military group and the defense attaché office. Present in embassies where the United States has
an agreement to provide military assistance, the Office of Defense Cooperation is a DOD organization that
provides security assistance and advice to the host nation, supervises programs that strengthen
interoperability, serves as the primary point of contact for foreign military sales, and manages other
defense-related issues. It is one of the contact points between the DOS and DOD.
5-45. In some personnel recovery operations overseas, a special representative of the President or special
envoy of the United Nations Secretary General may be involved. Stability in the host nation remains the
responsibility of the chief of mission, who works closely with the geographic combatant commander to
plan, prepare, execute, and assess all efforts. Generally, the geographic combatant commander coordinates
with HN forces to execute mutually beneficial operations, while USG representatives implement the
nonmilitary aspects of the broader plan or directive.
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
5-46. For the protection of U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad, 22 USC 4865 directs the DOS and DOD to
develop a memorandum of agreement on rapid response procedures. This agreement provides the
framework for cooperation between the two departments. The geographic combatant commander performs
assigned tasks, per the agreement between the DOS and DOD, and activities coordinated with the chief of
mission in a host nation. Generally, the geographic combatant commander exercises command authority
through subordinate joint task force commanders or Service and functional component commanders. The
responsibilities of the DOS and DOD overlap. The DOD executes certain programs under the operational
control of the DOS, such as security cooperation activities. Chiefs of mission and country teams look to the
host nation and other partners, such as intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental
organizations, for personnel recovery activities. They also look to the geographic combatant command’s
JPRC and its joint personnel recovery coordinating cells. The JPRC looks to the JPRA and other entities at
the DOS and DOD for assistance.
INTERACTION WITH OTHER PARTNERS
5-47. Effective interaction with partners for personnel recovery requires commanders to understand both
the levels of responsibility and complex support relationships. Table 5-1 on page 5-10 outlines general
entities with primary, secondary, and coordinating responsibilities and the typical support relationships
among various partners (entities and individuals) conducting personnel recovery in stability operations.
5-48. In addition to coordination within the host nation, the embassy and its various representatives
conduct reachback coordination with the departments and agencies of the USG. Organizations such as the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Secret Service, and the Coast Guard can provide intelligence collection capabilities and contacts in the host
nation.
5-49. Certain groups and individuals may be willing to assist on humanitarian grounds when persons
become isolated, even if they normally avoid direct contact with the USG and U.S. military forces. For any
number of reasons, independent actors in the host nation often accept some responsibility to assist. They |
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may be in the host nation to provide humanitarian relief, economic assistance, or medical missions, for
example. They may represent news media organizations. Often, their main contribution to personnel
recovery is information. Their contacts sometimes include those responsible for the seizure of the isolated
person or group.
Table 5-1. Partner responsibilities and relationships
Responsibility Receives support from—
• Local, regional, and national governments.
• Security services (military, police, and intelligence services).
Host nation
• Civil society organizations (religious, social services, fraternal
(primary
organizations, and political parties).
responsibility)
• Influential private citizens.
• Logistics support.
• Department of State staff, under the chief of mission.
• Bureau of Diplomatic Security representatives.
• Other United States Government agencies and contractors in the
American Embassy
embassy.
(secondary
• Military attachés in the embassy.
responsibility)
• Geographic combatant commanders and Service component
commanders and staffs.
• Embedded journalists.
• Regional intergovernmental associations.
• Multinational forces operating in the host nation.
• Intergovernmental organizations (headquarters).
Ad hoc partners
(no formal • Local representatives of intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and
responsibility but national organizations.
often called upon to • Local, national, and international media.
coordinate) • Other governments with influence in the host nation.
• Influential persons.
• Other interested parties.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION PARTNERS
5-50. Intergovernmental organizations fully recognize the dangers involved in field operations. They
develop capabilities to prevent and respond to isolation incidents. For example, to maintain some control
over risk of fieldwork, the United Nations maintains a security office at Lokichokio in northwestern Kenya
to track the status of personnel operating in southern Sudan. Intergovernmental organization security
manuals normally emphasize that physical security is primarily an individual responsibility. Their security
measures include preparation before deployment coupled with steps to manage risk once in the AO. Active
measures include education on the local culture, development of a local security plan, thorough in-country
orientations, and the use of armed and visible security details. Passive measures include guidance to
maintain a low profile and avoid risks that are routine in high-threat areas. When their capabilities prove
insufficient to recover members, intergovernmental organizations sometimes request DOS and DOD
assistance.
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION PARTNERS
5-51. Nongovernmental organizations are mindful of the danger of field operations. Many of their
members register with the local American Embassy or consulate, or with local government officials. Most
nongovernmental organizations largely rely on the goodwill of the local population for safety and security.
They attempt to standardize procedures for the safety of their employees, volunteers, and contractors, but
rules are difficult to enforce. |
3-50 | 81 | Considerations for Stability
5-52. Most nongovernmental organizations look for trained and experienced individuals with the skill set
to operate at a remote location. Local hires provide cultural and regional knowledge. However, regarding
personnel recovery, local hires have benefits and costs. As members of the local community, they can
support the information and operations security efforts of the nongovernmental organization. Some
nongovernmental organizations are part of conflicts in the community or connected to adversarial groups.
NEWS MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS
5-53. International journalists risk jail, kidnapping, or death, particularly in areas of conflict. The danger
extends from the journalists to their staffs and families. The dangers and the risk of isolation become acute
in areas with persistent conflict, such as parts of Latin America and Asia. As joint and Army forces conduct
global operations, they encounter members of the news media. While not responsible for the protection and
security for any except those embedded with the military, sometimes Army forces conduct operations to
recover journalists designated by U.S. authorities. Recovery of journalists provides challenges for joint and
Army forces.
5-54. Journalists often have little training in SERE techniques. Even those working for large media
conglomerates may have had only limited training, such as briefings or informal orientations on how to
avoid being a target. News media organizations may learn of a journalist’s capture only when the hostage-
takers issue a ransom demand. Some news media organizations employ private security details, but often
hostage-takers simply overpower the security force and take the journalist, usually with dire consequences
for the locally hired security detail.
5-55. Occasionally a journalist or news media organization collaborates with U.S. forces for protection.
This is never more than an arrangement of personal security. Per 50 USC 3324, anyone with United States
or foreign press credentials is prohibited from formally collecting information or intelligence for U.S.
forces. However, this same section permits journalists to cooperate voluntarily if they realize they are
providing information to a U.S. intelligence entity. Journalists are never a part of military forces, but they
can be part of the information network. Journalists generally understand the local situation and can
volunteer information, including information on their colleagues who are isolated or held hostage.
5-56. Army forces sometimes allow news media representatives to embed, from field Army to platoon
levels. Embedded reporters can have a team with camera, sound, interpreter, and security support or be
single individuals. Most embedded journalists work either alone or in small teams of two or three.
Embedded journalists range from members of small local newspapers with limited distribution in the
United States to representatives of large media conglomerates with a global audience. News media
representatives vary in experience. Some representatives are veterans of multiple worldwide deployments
with military formations, while others are abroad for the first time. Their readiness for the hazards or field
operations with military units often correlates with their experience. A few news media organizations
prepare their representatives with SERE training. Other organizations send their journalists to the field
untrained, reliant on individuals’ previous military training, or dependant on a unit to provide training.
5-57. However, every combatant command establishes requirements for embedded journalists, ensuring
protection and operations security of the military force as well as protection of the journalists.
Occasionally, a combatant command establishes a basic training course for journalists interested in
accompanying troops. Generally, higher headquarters require embedded journalists to have media
credentials, have a visa from the host nation, receive and understand an information packet, and sign a
“hold harmless” agreement.
5-58. Commanders establish ground rules (stipulations) that protect information about operations, friendly
force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operations security.
Journalistic ground rules affect protection and personnel recovery. Joint and Army commanders do not
permit journalists to jeopardize the safety of their Soldiers, either by what they do or cannot do. The intent
is to protect Soldiers from the release of information that could potentially threaten their security or safety
during operations. The most important stipulations are that embedded journalists are physically fit, capable
of carrying their own equipment, able to withstand the rigors of field operations, and compliant with unit
requirements for field operations. Unit requirements include noise and light discipline, rules of
engagement, and any other requirements imposed by the local commander. Stipulations normally include a |
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prohibition against carrying personal weapons and filming or recording classified information. In addition,
embedded journalists must coordinate with the local public affairs officer.
5-59. Army echelons above brigade headquarters prepare journalists to accompany the force, which
includes preparing for potential isolation. The Army headquarters normally establishes a bureau or other
formal point of contact to manage the program. The Army headquarters collects vital information about the
embedded news media representatives and their employers, similar to the information collected through the
Army’s PRO-File data entry system. At the unit level, no formal program exists, but embedded journalists
typically receive a general orientation on the unit and its SOPs. Journalists participate in mission-specific
operations briefs and receive the personnel recovery guidance, ISG, and any evasion plan of action used by
unit members. By definition, embedded journalists become a part of the Army units to which they are
temporarily assigned. Embedded journalists are therefore under the protection warfighting function,
including personnel recovery.
HOST-NATION GOVERNMENTS
5-60. Not all nations view the isolation of U.S. personnel in the same light. The host nation may contribute
to the recovery, choose not to interfere with recovery actions, or prohibit access to the country. Assuming
that the host nation takes seriously its responsibility to recover persons and groups isolated on its territory,
HN governments assist personnel recovery operations as active partners, reluctant participants, or passive
nonparticipants.
Active Partners
5-61. Active partners normally include those nations allied with the United States. Normally, a host nation
actively helps recover isolated persons for humanitarian reasons or to maintain good standing with their
allies and the international community. Government entities in willing host nations facilitate personnel
recovery operations by providing logistic and communications support. These entities place the capabilities
of the HN security forces at the disposal of the personnel recovery operation, including intelligence and
information services. Long-standing diplomatic relations ease the detailed coordination needed to identify,
locate, recover, and reintegrate isolated persons. Cooperation makes it easier to marshal the resources
necessary to affect the recovery.
5-62. Cordial diplomatic relations may include commensurate military-to-military relations. Whether it is
HN military collaboration with the American Embassy security assistance office, HN military collaboration
with the defense and other attachés, or a formal bilateral military association based on common interests,
the ability to tap the local security apparatus facilitates personnel recovery operations. HN security services
may be willing to accommodate the need for permissive rules for the use of force or access to airspace and
military facilities. This is especially important for a rapid response when lives are at stake. Active partner
military forces are more inclined to conduct search and rescue and mount robust military operations,
including the use of special operations forces or other nonconventional means.
Reluctant Partners
5-63. Some nations support the recovery of U.S. persons reluctantly. The host nation may exercise
precisely its responsibility to recover isolated persons or groups, complying with international norms for
search and rescue but falling short of full cooperation. This reluctance may translate into limited assistance
from governmental entities such as the security services, restrictions on the use of airspace or landing rights
at airfields, and the imposition of extremely tight rules of engagement that inhibit use of personnel recovery
resources. A reluctant host nation may discourage intergovernmental organization, nongovernmental
organization, and other civilian society elements from full cooperation with the recovery effort.
Passive Nonparticipants
5-64. Some host nations are unwilling to collaborate with the United States. These nations differ from
reluctant partners in that they will not actively participate in the recovery of isolated persons. They may
provide overflight rights, access to their transportation network, and other relaxations of their national
sovereignty, but they will not dedicate governmental—especially security service—resources to assist in |
3-50 | 83 | Considerations for Stability
recovery, except in the most limited sense. As with reluctant partners, passive nonparticipants may
discourage intergovernmental organization, nongovernmental organization, and civilian society elements
from fully cooperating with the recovery effort. Changes in circumstances—such as a change in
government, re-examination of national interests, or pressure applied by allies—may change a passive
nonparticipant into a reluctant or active partner. At worst, passive nonparticipants may decide to prohibit
personnel recovery operations on their sovereign territory. In such cases, solutions must come from
diplomacy.
MULTINATIONAL FORCES
5-65. Joint and Army forces frequently operate as part of multinational forces. This cooperation is in a
formal command structure such as that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (known as NATO), or in
a temporary or ad hoc arrangement such as was found in the Multi-National Forces–Iraq. Combining joint
and Army capabilities with multinational partners expands the diplomatic, civil, and military options to
achieve success. Concerning personnel recovery, habitual relationships enable the exchange of liaison,
establishment of protocols, development of rules of engagement, identification of recovery equipment,
testing of procedures, and other actions.
CONTRACTORS
5-66. Contractors include defense contractors and employees of defense contractors and associated
subcontractors. Contractors are partners in the conduct of stability operations. Contractors include U.S.
citizens, U.S. legal aliens, third-country nationals, and local citizens who deploy with and support the force.
Required training for contractors normally includes Geneva Conventions, law of war, general orders,
standards of conduct, force protection, personnel recovery, medical care, operations security, antiterrorism,
and other subjects. Training for contractors (and DOD civilians) in force protection and personnel recovery
readiness normally has three levels:
* Introductory-Level Training (Level A) includes familiarization on isolation and the captivity
environment in combat and peacetime, including information on hostage detention.
* Intermediate-Level Training (Level B) focuses on survival in a hostile environment while
awaiting rescue, recovery, or repatriation.
* Advanced-Level Training (Level C) includes hands-on application of the principles and
techniques used in levels A and B.
(For additional information on isolated personnel training policy for DOD contractors and civilians, see
DODI 1300.23.)
5-67. The widespread use of contractors is both beneficial and detrimental to potential personnel recovery
operations. Many of those hired in the United States to serve overseas are former military members who
have SERE training. Many others may not have any training or experience in survival, including third
country national contractor employees. Normally, only Level A training is required for contractor
personnel. Personnel recovery planners must consider that most status-of-forces agreements that provide
protection to military members and DOD civilians do not apply to contractors. |
3-50 | 85 | Chapter 6
Considerations for Defense Support of Civil Authorities
This chapter discusses general characteristics of DSCA that influence the conduct of
personnel recovery. Considerations discussed also include personnel recovery
capability phases as well as commander and staff focus.
CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL
AUTHORITIES
6-1. The Army provides DSCA when requested for domestic emergencies, support to law enforcement,
and other domestic activities. DSCA includes support provided by the three components of the Army—the
Regular Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. Additionally, in DSCA there may be
civilians and Army contractors. The National Incident Management System (known as NIMS) and the
National Response Framework (known as NRF) establish the national policy for incident management.
This policy applies across federal, state, and local governments and the military Services. DODD 3025.18
establishes policy for DSCA. Army personnel recovery operations conform to the provisions of these
policies. See ADP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28 for thorough discussions of Army DSCA.
COORDINATION WITH PARTNERS FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES
6-2. Army commanders and staffs establish ongoing coordination with the appropriate unified action
partners, including other Services and civilian organizations. This coordination is critical to ensure proper
integration of military capabilities and procedures with civilian capabilities and procedures, to positively
affect interoperability between military and civilian organizations. The command and control structures and
procedures of federal and state military joint task forces facilitate the successful execution of personnel
recovery operations. However, commanders cannot assume a high degree of interoperability or the
existence of standardized personnel recovery procedures simply because they work with other Army units
and civilian emergency management agencies. Prior coordination, training, exercising, and habitual
relationships offer the best probability for success.
CHALLENGES AND THREATS IN DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES
6-3. Forces conducting DSCA face many challenges. Federal and state laws and regulations constrain the
use of military forces in domestic environments. Coordination with partners, if not established in advance,
will be difficult to arrange during response. Frequently, planning guidance requires minimal time between
notification and deployment, allowing minimal time for detailed planning. Additionally, Army units
typically deploy only elements of units with limited equipment. Most situations are more volatile and
uncertain early in the operation. Early responding Soldiers may begin operations immediately upon arrival.
Those unfamiliar with an operational environment may not recognize isolation hazards and inadvertently
place themselves at risk. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (known as CBRN) hazards could
pose a potential threat. Moreover, criminals could pose a threat to a response force. Destroyed
infrastructure and devastated terrain may also affect operations.
6-4. Because of the immature protection situation in the early phase of deployment, unassisted recovery is
the norm. This has implications for equipment and training of initial Army responders. Soldiers often
operate independently at a time when their commanders and staffs may not be able to influence task
organization arrangements for optimal personnel recovery operations. The risks of Soldiers becoming
isolated in a DSCA environment are not to be underestimated. |
3-50 | 86 | Chapter 6
ARMY DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES TASKS
6-5. The four core tasks in support of DSCA are—
* Provide support for domestic disasters.
* Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement.
* Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (known as CBRN)
incidents.
* Provide other designated domestic support.
6-6. Within these primary tasks, Soldiers may perform various tasks such as firefighting, responding to
civil disturbances, protecting critical infrastructure, or supporting federal and state counterdrug efforts.
Each task may include personnel recovery as an implied risk. In the domestic environment, training and
equipping only a few specialized personnel, such as aviators and special operations forces, does not
significantly mitigate risk to the force.
6-7. The response to any emergency always begins at the local level and grows from the bottom up, based
on the National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System (discussed in
ADP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28). Local first responders initiate response activities. If first responders cannot
manage the situation, they request support through their civil authorities at the state level. Normally, the
first Soldiers to provide response assistance are state National Guard forces. If additional forces are
required, civil authorities may request additional support from the joint force headquarters state. As the
need grows, so does the response. Eventually, National Guard units from several states through the
emergency management assistance compact (known as EMAC), federalized National Guard units, Regular
Army, and Army Reserve units may become partners in a coordinated response with federal, state, and
local civilian partners. Army leadership coordinates the command and support relationships among these
military and local, state, and national authorities based on the doctrine principles in ADP 3-28, ADRP 3-28,
and JP 3-28.
ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES IN DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES
6-8. Emergencies present significant personnel accountability challenges. Initially, Army leaders may
lack critical details on the numbers, types, and precise locations of military responders in the AO. Soldiers
potentially disperse across vast AOs in small teams. They may work in terrain encompassing multiple
regional, state, and local jurisdictions. Wide dispersion, coupled with the effects of a disaster, increases the
potential of isolation and complicates the personnel accountability challenge. This physical dispersion
precludes immediate accessibility to mutual support and reduces the responsiveness of the forces if
isolation incidents occur.
6-9. Accountability is one of the immediate challenges, as leaders coordinate the differing civilian and
military personnel accountability systems. Accountability proves difficult because of the desire to respond
to the incident and immediately begin operations. Individuals, units, and their associated headquarters
deploy, establish a presence in the operational area, and establish a chain of command. During initial
deployment, the risk of isolation is greatest since Army and civilian leadership may still be coordinating
who is working in what locations. The initial need to establish a personnel recovery structure with a
doctrinal foundation includes wide-ranging personnel recovery guidance. This critical time requires fully
staffed PRCSs and comprehensive ISG be provided to both military and civilian responders. Leaders must
remind Soldiers that the greatest danger of isolation is during the initial deployment in DSCA.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE
6-10. Circumstances of DSCA may require the use of force. Commanders employ the minimum necessary
force, in accordance with the rules for the use of force (known as RUF). These rules are similar to rules of
engagement (known as ROE) used by forces in combat, but they are more limiting. The rules of
engagement are permissive while the rules for the use of force are restrictive. Soldiers have the inherent
right to self-defense. The rules for the use of force relate directly to individual Soldier skills. The command
develops personnel recovery guidance and ISG concerning the use of force for each operation. The
authorization to use lethal force remains with the President for federal military forces (operating under |
3-50 | 87 | Considerations for Defense Support of Civil Authorities
10 USC) and with the governor for National Guard forces not federalized (operating under 32 USC or State
Active Duty). The use of armed National Guard forces from one state to perform civil defense or other law
enforcement operations in another state requires a memorandum of understanding on rules for the use of
force between the governors of the two states.
6-11. Limitations on military forces carry over to intelligence collection. Military forces cannot collect
information in the United States or its overseas possessions. However, military forces can collect and
analyze information provided by Soldiers, law enforcement, and other agencies. This affects the personnel
recovery locate task and the potential deployment of intelligence assets such as unmanned aircraft systems.
For more information on the use of information, see FM 3-55 and TC 2-91.7.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY CAPABILITY PHASES
6-12. A serious disaster often damages critical infrastructure severely enough to disrupt basic government
functions and emergency services. In these instances, communications, transportation, and commerce are
degraded, and local response capabilities may be overwhelmed. Local first responders sometimes become
isolated. The existing civilian capability naturally focuses on the affected population. In these transitional
circumstances, commanders may not be able to count on civil resources to augment military personnel
recovery capabilities. This is especially significant in the earlier stages of deployment when units may not
have their full complement of forces and structures in place.
6-13. In personnel recovery, capabilities change over time. Figure 6-1 shows the life cycle of Army forces
supporting civil authorities. The ability of Army forces to report, locate, support, and recover varies widely
over time. The cross-section of the response may not mimic the curve shown, but it generally proceeds
through the following four phases:
* Initial minimum personnel recovery capability phase.
* Optimal personnel recovery capability phase.
* Residual personnel recovery capability phase.
* Final minimum personnel recovery capability phase.
Figure 6-1. Personnel recovery capability phase
INITIAL MINIMUM PERSONNEL RECOVERY CAPABILITY PHASE
6-14. During this initial phase, response forces are least able to react to isolation incidents. Often response
forces contend with the confusion of the initial entry when Army forces are establishing themselves in the
AOs, understanding the magnitude of the disaster, and forming command and support relationships with
civil authorities. If the cause of the emergency is still present, such as an ongoing chemical spill or a
persistent outbreak of disease, this initial phase may extend well into the buildup of forces. During this
phase, the readiness of forces to assume the tasks and the buildup of the capabilities of the civil authority
tiered response depends on firm leadership. The commander establishes the personnel recovery structure
and expands it. Commanders and staffs become familiar with the mission. This is often when the initial
isolation incidents occur that force the personnel recovery system to operate. |
3-50 | 88 | Chapter 6
OPTIMAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY CAPABILITY PHASE
6-15. The second phase is the longest phase during the deployment. Having experienced—and survived—
the initial phase, the personnel recovery structure is mature, fully staffed, and has possibly addressed
isolation incidents. A response to the report of an isolated Soldier or other designated person often assumes
the characteristics of training. During this phase, the commander and staff write OPLANs and OPORDs,
execute them as required, draft and refine SOPs, and train response forces in personnel recovery.
RESIDUAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY CAPABILITY PHASE
6-16. During this phase, commanders draw down forces in tandem to successful emergency remediation.
The systems and procedures refined and exercised during the optimal personnel recovery capability phase
are still in place, but the attrition of the force by redeployment has removed some of the expertise that
characterized the previous phase. The personnel recovery system is in place, but it lacks the full capabilities
the forces once had.
FINAL MINIMUM PERSONNEL RECOVERY CAPABILITY PHASE
6-17. In this phase, the conditions are similar to those at the beginning of the response. The transition to
state or local control—or another military force—may add a measure of confusion to personnel recovery
activities. Transitions are always a time of both maximum attentiveness and the greatest confusion. The
transition may be from civil authorities to a response force, from one response force to another or—most
probably—a combination of the two. All three of these transitions call for increased awareness of the
potential for an isolation incident.
6-18. The length of each phase depends on the nature of the emergency. Factors such as the magnitude of
the disaster, the duration of the incident, the degree of perceived risk, the training and readiness of the
response forces, and the level of cooperation between civil authorities and the Army force concerning
personnel recovery determine its length. Regardless of the scope of a task and the discrete phases portrayed
in figure 5-1, Army commanders and staffs consider the entire duration in terms of personnel recovery
vulnerability and control measures to mitigate potential isolation events.
COMMANDER AND STAFF FOCUS IN DEFENSE SUPPORT OF
CIVIL AUTHORITIES
6-19. Military units supporting civil authorities follow military doctrine, including that for personnel
recovery. However, they adapt their procedures and liaison arrangements to interface with their civilian
counterparts. This is especially important in the case of an isolation incident. In DSCA, commanders and
staffs coordinate the plans and orders of the joint task force with the federal, state, and local authorities
before execution. When forces cannot attain unity of command, they strive for unity of effort.
6-20. DSCA typically requires small-unit operations that call for immediate decisions by junior leaders
who often lack the time or capability to confer with senior leaders. Leaders strive to make ISG clear,
concise, and current. Tactical leaders may have the clearest picture of an operational environment, but they
may not always have the capability to communicate with higher headquarters due to physical or procedural
impediments. Regardless of the scope or size of the operation, coordination and role delineation are a
critical factor in successful personnel recovery operations. With smaller units operating in a decentralized
and dispersed deployment, this coordination becomes critical. The response to the isolation incident and the
recovery of the isolated person may occur solely based on the organic assets of the local responder. In
effect, the civilian leadership, their staff, and their operational entities at that level become the personnel
recovery focal groups and become a part of the personnel recovery structure for any recovery effort. Both
civil authorities and Army leaders prepare their organizations to respond to an isolation incident by fully
assessing isolation risk for each mission. They reduce that risk through task organization, equipment,
education, and training.
6-21. In DSCA, commanders coordinate personnel recovery activities with the supported civilian agency
and joint and Army headquarters. Commanders address critical issues, such as communications and
procedural interoperability, mission priorities, recovery assets, roles and responsibilities, and information |
3-50 | 89 | Considerations for Defense Support of Civil Authorities
flow. Army commanders provide focused personnel recovery guidance and ISG to mitigate the expected
complexity from the beginning to the end of an incident response. Especially in the early phases of
operations, commanders and staffs help civil authority by stressing personnel accountability and integrating
status reporting of Army personnel with civilian incident management systems. Regardless of any other
personnel recovery support or interagency coordination, deploying units plan for personnel recovery
operations that maximize self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Leaders maintain situational awareness in the
AO, and prepare to execute immediate and deliberate recovery operations as necessary. Frequently, ISG in
a DSCA situation will read more like lost hiker guidance than combat ISG.
6-22. Commanders incorporate personnel recovery into planning, especially if they are supporting a local
responder and higher military headquarters have not yet deployed. Because of the physical separation
between headquarters, it is difficult to nest commander’s intent and communicate guidance at all levels to
ensure actions are consistent throughout the chain of command. In these instances, subordinate
commanders develop and disseminate ISG as well as identify recovery assets, whether they are under
military or civil authority. Interoperability with civil and military organizations facilitates coordination,
including the integrating of information management and airspace control.
6-23. Time constraints of early response by military forces initially influence the composition of a DSCA
force. Some unit combat capabilities may not deploy as part of a response force and, therefore, will not be
available for personnel recovery operations. Incomplete staff reduces the ability of a commander to
visualize an AO through running estimates. This is particularly important as it relates to the application of
information and intelligence. Information obtained from civil authorities supports planning for the
personnel recovery missions by defining the threats potential isolated persons may face, as well as the
threats a recovery force may encounter.
6-24. Early in a deployment, civilian and military organizations will have limited capabilities for to
maintain situational awareness and facilitate requisite reporting and accountability. Initial military
deployments often consist of medical, logistic, search and rescue, and infrastructure repair assets. This
early emphasis on rescue and relief capabilities limits a commander’s options for identifying and tasking a
recovery force. The infrastructure degradation also reduces the staff’s communication and coordination
effectiveness and limits the recovery force’s maneuver options.
6-25. Commanders adjust and disseminate updated guidance as the situation develops and ensure that
civilian leaders, military leaders, and their staffs receive modifications to the ISG. Tactical commanders
require adequate time to refine guidance from higher echelons as it pertains to their missions and their
specific AOs. The result is increased situational awareness and understanding of isolated personnel incident
response. |
3-50 | 91 | Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Terms for
which FM 3-50 is the proponent (authority) manual are marked with an asterisk (*).
The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADP Army doctrine publication
ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AO area of operations
AR Army regulation
ATP Army techniques publication
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
CAAF contractor personnel authorized to accompany the force
COA course of action
DA Department of the Army
DD Department of Defense (forms only)
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DOS Department of State
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
FM field manual
FRAGORD fragmentary order
HN host-nation
ISG isolated Soldier guidance
ISOPREP isolated personnel report
JP joint publication
JPRA Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JPRC joint personnel recovery center
MDMP military decisionmaking process
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
POC point of contact
PRCS personnel recovery coordination section
RSO regional security officer
SERE survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
SOP standard operating procedure
TC training circular
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
U.S. United States |
3-50 | 92 | Glossary
USC United States Code
USG United States Government
SECTION II – TERMS
*Army personnel recovery
The military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated
personnel.
decisive action
The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of
civil authorities tasks. (ADRP 3-0)
intergovernmental organization
An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global,
regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states.
(JP 3-08)
joint personnel recovery center
The primary joint force organization responsible for planning and coordinating personnel recovery for
military operations within the assigned operational area. (JP 3-50)
nongovernmental organization
A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or
promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and
conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.
(JP 3-08)
recovery force
In personnel recovery, an organization consisting of personnel and equipment with a mission of
locating, supporting, and recovering isolated personnel, and returning them to friendly control.
(JP 3-50)
unified land operations
How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative
advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability
operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable
conflict resolution. (ADP 3-0) |
3-50 | 93 | References
All URLS accessed on 25 August 2014.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These publications must be available to intended users of this publication.
ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.
Most Department of Defense issuances are available online:
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/index.html.
DODD 3002.01. Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense. 16 April 2009.
DODD 3025.18. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). 29 December 2010.
DODI 1300.18. Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures.
8 January 2008.
DODI 1300.21. Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education. 8 January 2001.
DODI 1300.23. Isolated Personnel Training for DOD Civilian and Contractors. 20 August 2003.
JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011.
JP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 31 July 2013.
JP 3-50. Personnel Recovery. 20 December 2011.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army publications are available online: http://www.apd.army.mil/.
ADP 1. The Army. 17 September 2012.
ADP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 10 October 2011.
ADP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.
ADP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 26 July 2012.
ADP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.
ADP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 14 June 2013.
ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ADRP 7-0. Training Units and Developing Leaders. 23 August 2012.
AR 525-28. Personnel Recovery. 5 March 2010.
ATP 3-50.3. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery.
11 September 2012.
ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014. |
3-50 | 94 | References
ATTP 3-90.15. Site Exploitation Operations. 8 July 2010.
FM 3-35. Army Deployment and Redeployment. 21 April 2010.
FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.
FM 6-99. U.S. Army Report and Message Formats. 19 August 2013.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
TC 2-91.7. Intelligence Support to Civil Support Operations. 26 January 2011.
TC 3-21.75. The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills. 13 August 2013.
NAVY DOCTRINE
Most Navy doctrine publications are available online: https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil/Default.aspx.
NTTP 3-50.1. Navy Search and Rescue (SAR) Manual. September 2013.
AIR FORCE DOCTRINE
Most Air Force doctrine publications are available online: http://www.au.af.mil/au/lemay/main.htm.
Annex 3-50. Personnel Recovery Operations. 1 June 2005.
UNITED STATES LAW
Most acts and public laws are available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php.
Title 10. United States Code. Armed Forces.
Section 1501. System for Accounting for Missing Persons.
Section 1502. Missing Persons: Initial Report.
Title 22. United States Code. Foreign Relations and Intercourse.
Section 1732. Release of Citizens Imprisoned by Foreign Governments.
Section 3927. Chief of Mission.
Section 4314. Extraordinary Protective Services.
Section 4801. Findings and Purposes.
Section 4802. Responsibility of Secretary of State.
Section 4805. Cooperation of Other Federal Agencies.
Section 4865. Security Requirements for United States Diplomatic Facilities.
Title 32. United States Code. National Guard.
Title 50. United States Code. War and National Defense.
Sections 3324. Prohibition on Using Journalists as Agents or Assets.
WEB SITES
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. http://www.jpra.mil.
PRO-File. https://medinah.sed.apg.army.mil/PRO-File/.
Personnel Recovery Mission Software (PRMS) (access only through SECRET Internet Protocol
Router). http://www.prmsglobal.prms.af.smil.mil.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
DODD 8521.01E. Department of Defense Biometrics. 21 February 2008.
DODI 3020.41. Operational Contract Support (OCS). 20 December 2011.
FM 1-04. Legal Support to the Operational Army. 18 March 2013. |
3-50 | 95 | References
PRESCRIBED FORMS
None.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate web site:
http://www.apd.army.mil/. DD Forms are available on the Office of the Secretary of Defense
web site: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/index.htm. Standard Forms (SF)
and Optional Forms (OF) are available on the U.S. General Services Administration web site:
http://www.gsa.gov/.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DD Form 1833. Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP).
DD Form 2810. Personnel Recovery Debriefing Statement.
Standard Form 312. Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement. |
3-50 | 97 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
civilians, effects from, 4-8
A D
reintegration, 1-74
acceptance, isolation risk debriefing, reintegration team,
Coast Guard, personnel recovery,
reduction approach, 5-23–5-24 1-71
1-14
accountability, commander and defense support of civil
combatant commanders,
staff responsibilities, 2-8 authorities, See DSCA
responsibilities, 1-6
DSCA, 6-8–6-9
deliberate recovery, 1-38
ISG, 3-29 command approach, 2-10
Department of Defense, authority,
actions, ISG, 3-31–3-33 commander and staff, 5-41–5-45
accountability, 1-26
active partners, 5-61–5-62 interaction with Department of
DSCA focus, 6-19–6-25
State, 5-29–5-46
advisor, responsibilities of, 2-24
focal group, 1-23–1-28
responsibilities, 1-5
after action review, 2-56–2-57 functions, 1-24–1-28
Department of State, authority,
Air Force, personnel recovery, general personnel recovery
5-32–5-39
1-13 guidance, 1-24
diplomatic option, 1-40
ISG, 1-25
American Embassy, 1-19 interaction with Department of
proficiencies, 1-77–1-79
approaches, isolation risk responsibilities, 2-3–2-8 Defense, 5-29–5-46
reduction, 5-22–5-28 training responsibilities, 2-5 operational concept, 5-40
personnel recovery, 1-35–1-39 deterrence, isolation risk reduction
commanders, actions, 3-32
Army core competencies, focus of, 4-9 approach, 5-26–5-28
personnel recovery tasks and, regulatory responsibilities, 2-11 diplomatic option, 1-40–1-43
1-47 responsibilities, 2-9–2-12 documentation, PRCS, 1-73
Army organizational structure, 1-9 subordinate, 2-52
DSCA, accountability, 6-8–6-9
Army personnel recovery, communicate, proficiency, 1-78– challenges, 6-3–6-4
components of, 1-21–1-74 1-79 characteristics of, 6-1–6-11
defined, 1-1 communication, 1-78 command and staff focus,
proficiencies of, 1-74–1-83 6-19–6-25
complexity, effects of, 4-2
Army planning methodology, 4-19 major combat operations, 4-2– partner, 1-20
tasks, 6-5–6-7
assess, personnel recovery 4-7
use of force restrictions, 6-10–
operations, 4-24 components, Army personnel
6-11
assessment, commander and recovery, 1-21–1-74
staff, 2-6 contractors, 5-66–5-67 E
awareness, ISG, 3-26–3-28 cooperation, 1-17 echelon, responsibilities of, 2-27–
diplomatic relations, 1-41 2-37
B
cooperation agreements, stability emergency action plan, 5-37–5-38
behavior, friendly, 4-11
and, 5-46 endure hardship, proficiency, 1-83
C coordination, commander and enemy, actions, 4-12–4-15
capabilities, partner, 1-18 staff responsibilities, 2-7 considerations of, 1-54
DSCA, 6-2, 6-21 diverting, 1-56
capability phases, personnel
PRCS, 2-44 isolation and, 4-12–4-15
recovery, 6-12–6-18
recovery, 1-59 observation, 4-13
casualty assistance, 1-58 SOP discussion of, 2-50
environment, isolation and, 4-16
challenges, accountability, 6-8– tasks, 2-33
evasion plan of action, 3-35–3-38
6-9 course of action analysis and
categories of, 3-38
DSCA, 6-3 war-gaming, staff actions, 3-6
goal, 3-36
individual survival, 1-81
course of action approval, staff source documents, 3-37
mitigate, 3-33
actions, 3-8
stability operations, 5-21 execute, personnel recovery
course of action comparison, staff operations, 4-22–4-23
chief of mission, responsibilities,
actions, 3-7
5-35–5-36
course of action development,
civil option, 1-44
staff actions, 3-5 |
3-50 | 98 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
execution documents, personnel ISG, 3-24–3-34 medical care, 1-72
recovery guidance and, 3-13– personnel recovery guidance complexity of, 4-4
3-14 in, 3-24–3-25 military option, 1-35–1-39
external supported recovery, 1-39 produce, 1-25 mission, 4-7
isolated persons, focal group, receive, 1-30
F
1-33
mission analysis, staff actions, 3-4
family, support to, 1-55, 1-58 proficiencies, 1-79–1-83
movement and maneuver cell,
final minimum, personnel recovery isolated Soldier guidance, See
responsibilities, 2-15
capability phase, 6-17–6-18 ISG
multinational forces, cooperation
fires cell, responsibilities, 2-17 isolating event, report of, 1-49
with, 5-65
focal groups, 1-22–1-33 isolation, causes of incidents, partners, 1-17–1-18
responsibility of, 1-78 4-10–4-16
force composition and capability criteria, 3-26–3-28 N
employment, restrictions, 5-6 enemy action and, 4-12–4-15 national sovereignty, support to,
friendly behavior and, 4-11 5-3–5-11
force size, restrictions, 5-5
isolation risk, stability and, 5-19– navigate, proficiency, 1-80
forces, assistance from, 1-39
5-21
multinational, 5-65 Navy, personnel recovery, 1-12
recovery by, 1-60 isolation risk reduction, news media organizations, partner
special operations, 1-15–1-16 approaches of, 5-22–5-28 with, 5-53–5-59
functional cells, 2-15–2-19 J nongovernmental organizations,
G joint operations, tasks associated, partner with, 5-51–5-52
2-31
general personnel recovery O
guidance, develop and joint personnel coordination
operation order, paragraphs,
disseminate, 1-24 section, See PRCS
3-17–3-23
government-to-government joint personnel recovery,
operational actions, restrictions,
contact, restrictions, 5-9 organizational structure, 1-5–
5-11
1-6
guidance, commander and staff
operations process, conduct,
responsibilities, 2-6 Joint Personnel Recovery Agency,
1-30, 4-17–4-24
1-5
H operations security, reporting and,
joint personnel recovery center,
1-51
headquarters, Army, 1-9 coordination with PRCS, 2-31
host-nation, security forces, 5-12– responsibilities, 2-39–2-40 optimal, personnel recovery
capability phase, 6-15
5-13 journalists, embedded, 5-56–5-59
host-nation governments, types of recovery of, 5-53–5-54 options, personnel recovery,
1-34–1-44
relationships, 5-60–5-64
L
order, execute, 1-31
I leaders, role of, 2-28 personnel recovery guidance
immediate recovery, 1-37 tasks, 2-37 in, 3-11
independent actors, interactions leadership, personnel recovery, order production, dissemination,
with, 5-15–5-18 1-23 and transition, staff actions, 3-9
individual, care to, 1-62 length of stay, restrictions, 5-7 orders, 2-46
unassisted recovery, 1-36 link-up procedures, ISG, 3-34 organizations, Army structure, 1-9
information, categories for local resources, restrictions, 5-10 civilian, 1-44
personnel recovery, 3-10–3-38 joint personnel recovery, 1-5–
locate task, 1-52–1-54
1-6
initial minimum, personnel
M personnel recovery, 1-4–1-20
recovery capability phase, 6-14
responsibilities, 2-38–2-44
integrating cells, 2-20 major combat operations,
SOP discussion of, 2-49
characteristics, 4-1–4-9
intelligence cell, responsibilities,
2-16 Marine Corps, personnel P
recovery, 1-11
intergovernmental organizations, partners, active, 5-61–5-62
partner with, 5-50 military decisionmaking process, capabilities, 1-18
personnel recovery and, 3-1– complexity of, 4-3
3-9 DSCA coordination, 6-2
interaction with, 5-47–5-67
multinational, 1-17–1-18 |
3-50 | 99 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
partners (continued) preserve life, proficiency, 1-81– report, related activity of, 1-51
reluctant, 5-63 1-82 status, 1-50
responsibilities, 5-47
professionals, responsibilities of, report of isolation, information
United States Government,
1-2 requirements, 1-57
1-19–1-20
proficiencies, Army personnel report task, 1-48–1-51
passive nonparticipants, 5-64
recovery, 1-74–1-83
reporters, See news media
personal staff elements, 2-21– commander and staff, 1-77–
organizations
2-22 1-79
residual, personnel recovery
personnel recovery, approaches, training for, 1-76
capability phase, 6-16
1-35–1-39 protection, isolation risk reduction
resources, complexity providing,
as a discipline, 2-28 approach, 5-25
4-5
capability phases, 6-12–6-18 stability and, 5-20
foundations, 1-1–1-3 responsibilities, combatant
protection cell, responsibilities,
leadership, 1-23 commanders, 1-6
2-18
MDMP and, 3-1–3-9 commander, 2-9–2-12
methods, See approaches R commander and staff, 2-3–2-8
options, 1-34–1-44 rapid reporting, ISG, 3-30 communication, 1-79
organization responsibilities, Department of Defense, 1-5
reachback coordination, 5-48
2-38–2-44 echelon, 2-27–2-37
organizations, 1-4–1-20 readiness, personnel recovery, personnel recovery, 2-1–2-44
other Services, 1-10–1-14 1-75 personnel recovery officer,
restrictions, 5-4–5-11 receipt of mission, staff actions, 2-23–2-26
SOP, 2-47–2-55 3-3 preserve life, 1-82
tasks, 1-45–1-74 staff, 2-13–2-26
records, management
personnel recovery guidance, requirements, 2-54 restrictions, categories, 5-4–5-11
3-11–3-23 recover task, 1-59–1-61 risk assessments, conduct, 5-20
criteria, 3-15
in operation order, 3-17–3-23 recovering persons, care of, 1-68 S
intent, 3-12 medical care, 1-72 scope of operations, restrictions,
personnel recovery officer, recovery, deliberate, 1-38 5-8
responsibilities, 2-23–2-26, external supported, 1-39 security forces, host-nation, 5-12–
2-36 immediate, 1-37 5-13
unassisted, 1-36
personnel recovery operations, self-recovery, 1-36
echelons above brigade, 2-15– recovery force, focal group, 1-29–
Services, organizational structure,
2-19 -1-32
1-10–1-14
guidance and tasks to, 1-27
physical security, support, 1-56 personnel recovery, 1-10–1-14
proficiencies, 1-79–1-82
planning, personnel recovery support from, 1-57 site exploitation, locate and, 1-53
operations, 4-18–4-19 transition from, 1-70 Soldiers, actions by, 3-31
results of, 3-16
recovery force operations, SOP SOP, 2-47–2-55
plans, 2-46 discussion, 2-53 general guidance, 2-48
point of contact, responsibilities of, recovery operations, 1-59 unit, 2-47
2-25
reintegrate task, 1-62–1-74 special operations forces,
SOP and, 2-55
personnel recovery, 1-15–1-16
reintegration, activities, 1-64, 1-73
populations, local, 5-14
civilians, 1-74 special staff elements, 2-21–2-22
PRCS, 1-8 considerations, 1-69 stability, characteristics of, 5-1–
conducting operations tasks, coordination and, 1-65 5-18
2-30 goal, 1-62 Department of State in, 5-30
coordination with, 2-31, 2-44 initial, 1-66 isolation risk in, 5-19–5-21
documentation by, 1-73 postisolation, 1-32
execution by, 4-22 staff, organic support, 2-29–2-35
location, 2-42 reintegration team, 1-67 responsibilities, 2-13–2-26
debriefing, 1-71
reintegration and, 1-65, 1-69– staff actions, course of action
media access, 1-68
-1-72 analysis and war-gaming, 3-6
responsibilities, 2-41–2-44 relationships, diplomatic, 5-62 course of action approval, 3-8
tasks, 2-30–2-34 independent actors and, 5-16 course of action comparison,
prepare, personnel recovery support, 5-47 3-7
operations, 4-20–4-21 reluctant partners, 5-63 course of action development,
3-5 |
3-50 | 100 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
staff actions (continued)
T U
mission analysis, 3-4
order production, tasks, DSCA, 6-5–6-7 unassisted recovery, 1-36
dissemination, and personnel recovery, 1-28, uncertainty, major combat
transition, 3-9 2-29–2-35 operations, 4-8–4-9
receipt of mission, 3-3 SOP identification of, 2-51
unconventional assisted recovery
staff coordinator, responsibilities tools, supporting, 2-45–2-57 coordination cell, 1-16
of, 2-26 training, personnel recovery, 2-5 unified land operations, 1-3
staff section, tasks, 2-51 proficiencies, 1-76
unit, focal group, 1-29–1-32
tasks, 2-32
standard operating procedure, immediate recovery, 1-37
See SOP transition, to reintegration team, military options, 1-35–1-39
status report, 1-50 1-70 reintegration activities, 1-63
responsibility of, 1-29
structure, proficiency, 1-77
use of force, DSCA restrictions,
support task, 1-55–1-58
6-10–6-11
sustainment cell, responsibilities,
2-19 |
3-50 | 101 | FM 3-50
2 September 2014
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1424002
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distribute in accordance with |
3-55.93 | 1 | FM 3-55.93
(FM 7-93)
LONG-RANGE
SURVEILLANCE
UNIT OPERATIONS
JUNE 2009
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
HEADQUARTERS |
3-55.93 | 2 | This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (AKO) (www.us.army.mil)
and the Reimer Digital Library (RDL) at |
3-55.93 | 3 | *FM 3-55.93 (FM 7-93)
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-55.93 (FM 7-93) Department of the Army
Washington, DC
23 June 2009
Long-Range Surveillance Unit
Operations
Contents
Page
Preface ................................................................................................................................................ xiii
Summary of Change ........................................................................................................................... xv
Chapter 1 FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS ...........................................................................1-1
Section I. TYPES AND COMBINATIONS OF ARMY OPERATIONS .....................1-1
Four Types of Army Operations ..........................................................................1-1
Intelligence ..........................................................................................................1-2
Section II. INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE UNITS .........1-2
Characteristics ....................................................................................................1-2
Missions and Organizations ................................................................................1-3
Section III. LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE COMPANY ......................................1-3
Primary Missions .................................................................................................1-4
Secondary Missions ............................................................................................1-4
Comparison to Special Operations Forces.........................................................1-4
Organization ........................................................................................................1-4
Sustainment ........................................................................................................1-5
Subordinate Organizations and Key Personnel..................................................1-5
LRSD and LRS Teams .......................................................................................1-7
Characteristics ....................................................................................................1-7
Capabilities..........................................................................................................1-8
Limitations ...........................................................................................................1-8
Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL....................................................................................2-1
Section I. OVERVIEW ..............................................................................................2-1
Standard LRSU Command and Control .............................................................2-1
BFSB Staff ..........................................................................................................2-2
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Squadron .....................................................2-6
Nonstandard LRSU Command and Control .......................................................2-7
Command Posts .................................................................................................2-7
Tactical Operations Center ...............................................................................2-10
Task Organization Outside NAMED Areas of Interest......................................2-13
Liaison Duties, Employment, and Coordination ................................................2-13
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 7-93, 3 October 1995. |
3-55.93 | 4 | Contents
Section II. COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE ............. 2-14
Communications ............................................................................................... 2-14
Computers and Intelligence.............................................................................. 2-15
Chapter 3 MISSION DEVELOPMENT ...................................................................................... 3-1
Section I. ISR OPERATIONS AND MISSION ORDERS ........................................ 3-1
ISR Operations ................................................................................................... 3-1
Mission Orders ................................................................................................... 3-3
Section II. MISSION PLANNING FOLDER ............................................................. 3-5
Development ...................................................................................................... 3-5
Contents ............................................................................................................. 3-5
Target Folder Format.......................................................................................... 3-9
Section III. OPERATIONS SECURITY .................................................................. 3-12
Personnel Security ........................................................................................... 3-12
Mission Classification ....................................................................................... 3-12
Separation ........................................................................................................ 3-13
Security during Coordination ............................................................................ 3-13
Chapter 4 TEAM OPERATIONS ............................................................................................... 4-1
Section I. PHASES .................................................................................................. 4-1
Planning Phase .................................................................................................. 4-1
Infiltration Phase and Insertion Method ............................................................ 4-16
Execution (Actions on Objective) ..................................................................... 4-17
Exfiltration Phase and Extraction Method ........................................................ 4-17
Recovery .......................................................................................................... 4-18
Section II. RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ................................................... 4-21
Area Reconnaissance ...................................................................................... 4-21
Zone Reconnaissance ...................................................................................... 4-23
Route Reconnaissance .................................................................................... 4-25
Bridge Classification ......................................................................................... 4-25
Leader Reconnaissance................................................................................... 4-25
Section III. SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS ........................................................ 4-26
Selection and Occupation of Sites ................................................................... 4-26
Security and Reports ........................................................................................ 4-27
Linkup and Dissemination of Information ......................................................... 4-29
Contingencies ................................................................................................... 4-29
Heavy Team and Platoon Operations .............................................................. 4-30
Section IV. COMBAT ASSESSMENT ................................................................... 4-30
Definition and Purpose ..................................................................................... 4-30
Considerations.................................................................................................. 4-30
Characteristics .................................................................................................. 4-31
Damage Types and Levels ............................................................................... 4-31
Bridges ............................................................................................................. 4-32
Buildings ........................................................................................................... 4-33
Bunkers ............................................................................................................ 4-35
Dams and Locks ............................................................................................... 4-35
Distillation Towers ............................................................................................ 4-36
Military Equipment ............................................................................................ 4-36 |
3-55.93 | 5 | Contents
Ground Force Personnel ..................................................................................4-38
Storage Tanks For Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants .................................................4-39
Power Plant Turbines and Generators .............................................................4-39
Rail Lines and Rail Yards..................................................................................4-40
Roads................................................................................................................4-40
Runways and Taxiways ....................................................................................4-41
Satellite Dishes .................................................................................................4-41
Ships .................................................................................................................4-42
Steel Towers .....................................................................................................4-43
Transformers .....................................................................................................4-43
Tunnel Entrances Or Portals ............................................................................4-43
Tunnel Facility Air Vents ...................................................................................4-44
Section V. TARGET ACQUISITION.......................................................................4-44
Combat Patrol ...................................................................................................4-45
Mission Planning Factors ..................................................................................4-45
Employment of Laser Designators....................................................................4-45
Fire Support ......................................................................................................4-46
Fire Plans ..........................................................................................................4-47
Section VI. URBAN TERRAIN ...............................................................................4-47
Surveillance Operations....................................................................................4-47
Reconnaissance Operations.............................................................................4-48
Plans .................................................................................................................4-48
Hide and Surveillance Sites ..............................................................................4-52
Section VII. IMAGERY COLLECTION AND TRANSMISSION .............................4-53
Imagery Labels .................................................................................................4-53
Image-Gathering Equipment .............................................................................4-54
Section VIII. STABILITY OPERATIONS................................................................4-61
Types ................................................................................................................4-62
Capabilities and Limitations ..............................................................................4-67
Section IX. SPECIAL MISSIONS ...........................................................................4-68
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear ..............................................4-68
Pathfinder ..........................................................................................................4-68
Personnel Recovery..........................................................................................4-68
Chapter 5 INSERTION AND EXTRACTION METHODS ..........................................................5-1
Section I. WATERBORNE OPERATIONS ..............................................................5-1
Considerations ....................................................................................................5-1
Combat Rubber Raiding Reconnaissance Craft.................................................5-1
Scout Swimmers .................................................................................................5-5
Helocasting Operations.......................................................................................5-7
Section II. HELICOPTER OPERATIONS ................................................................5-9
Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction System .........................................................5-9
Fast-Rope Insertion/Extraction System ............................................................5-20
Army Aviation and Air Assault...........................................................................5-25
Pickup and Landing Zones ...............................................................................5-25
UH-60 Loading Sequence ................................................................................5-31 |
3-55.93 | 6 | Contents
Section III. VEHICLE OPERATIONS..................................................................... 5-31
Mobility Platforms ............................................................................................. 5-32
Planning Considerations .................................................................................. 5-32
Section IV. OTHER OPERATIONS ....................................................................... 5-46
Airborne Operations ......................................................................................... 5-47
Stay-Behind Operations ................................................................................... 5-47
Foot Movement Operations .............................................................................. 5-48
Chapter 6 COMMUNICATIONS ................................................................................................ 6-1
Section I. NETWORKS ............................................................................................ 6-1
Architecture and Frequency Management ......................................................... 6-1
Operations Bases ............................................................................................... 6-1
Teams ................................................................................................................. 6-2
Section II. RADIOS, COMPUTERS, AND THE BASE RADIO STATION .............. 6-2
Elements of Success .......................................................................................... 6-2
HF, VHF, and UHF Radios ................................................................................. 6-2
Primary, Alternate, and Contingency Radios ..................................................... 6-3
Fundamentals ..................................................................................................... 6-4
Beyond-Line-of-Sight Equipment ....................................................................... 6-4
Ruggedized COTS Laptop ................................................................................. 6-6
Communications Base Radio Station Platform .................................................. 6-7
Section III. OPERATIONS ....................................................................................... 6-7
Tactical Employment .......................................................................................... 6-7
Site Selection ...................................................................................................... 6-8
Tactical Satellite ................................................................................................. 6-9
Section IV. REPORTS ............................................................................................. 6-9
Messages and Report Formats .......................................................................... 6-9
Communications Security ................................................................................. 6-16
Section V. ELECTRONIC WARFARE ................................................................... 6-16
Electronic attack ............................................................................................... 6-17
Electronic warfare support................................................................................ 6-17
Electronic protection ......................................................................................... 6-17
Section VI. ANTENNAS ......................................................................................... 6-19
Wavelength and Frequency ............................................................................. 6-19
Resonance ....................................................................................................... 6-19
Polarization ....................................................................................................... 6-20
Radio Wave Propagation ................................................................................. 6-20
Classification .................................................................................................... 6-23
Construction and Selection .............................................................................. 6-26
Common Types of Antennas ............................................................................ 6-27
Field-Expedient Antennas ................................................................................ 6-31
High Frequency, Directional, Field-Expedient Antennas ................................. 6-34
Section VII. UNUSUAL ENVIRONMENTS ............................................................ 6-36
Desert Operations ............................................................................................ 6-36
Jungle Operations ............................................................................................ 6-36
Cold Weather Operations ................................................................................. 6-37 |
3-55.93 | 7 | Contents
Mountain Operations.........................................................................................6-38
Urban Operations..............................................................................................6-39
Chapter 7 INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD .....................................7-1
SECTION I. DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..................................7-1
Identify Significant Characteristics of the Environment ......................................7-1
Identify the Limits of the Command's Area of Operations ..................................7-3
Establish the Limits of the Area of Influence and the Area of Interest ................7-3
Evaluate Existing Databases and Identify Intelligence Gaps .............................7-4
Initiate Collection of Information Required to Complete IPB ..............................7-4
SECTION II. DESCRIBE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS .........7-4
Analyze the Environment ....................................................................................7-4
Describe Environmental Effects..........................................................................7-9
SECTION III. EVALUATE THE THREAT .................................................................7-9
Analyze Threat Factors .......................................................................................7-9
Update or Create Threat Models ......................................................................7-10
Identify Threat Capabilities ...............................................................................7-16
SECTION IV. DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION .............................7-17
Identify the Threat's Likely Objectives and Desired Endstate ..........................7-17
Identify the Full Set of COAs Available to the Threat .......................................7-17
Evaluate and Prioritize Each Course of Action .................................................7-18
Develop Courses of Action ...............................................................................7-18
Identify Initial ISR Requirements ......................................................................7-21
Prepare Decision Support Template.................................................................7-21
Chapter 8 EVASION AND RECOVERY ....................................................................................8-1
Fundamentals .....................................................................................................8-1
Chain of Command .............................................................................................8-2
Plans ...................................................................................................................8-2
Types of Recovery ..............................................................................................8-2
Classifications of Evasion ...................................................................................8-3
Movement ...........................................................................................................8-4
Disguises.............................................................................................................8-6
Evasion Aids .......................................................................................................8-7
Evasion Areas .....................................................................................................8-9
Appendix A RECRUITMENT, ASSESSMENT, AND SELECTION PROGRAM ......................... A-1
Purpose and Organization ..................................................................................A-1
Recruitment .........................................................................................................A-1
Assessment ........................................................................................................A-2
Selection .............................................................................................................A-4
Reassignment .....................................................................................................A-5
Appendix B ORDERS AND BRIEFS ........................................................................................... B-1
Section I. ORDERS ................................................................................................. B-1
Warning Order ....................................................................................................B-1
Operation Order ..................................................................................................B-4
Fragmentary Order .............................................................................................B-8 |
3-55.93 | 8 | Contents
Section II. BRIEFS ...................................................................................................B-8
Types .................................................................................................................. B-8
Confirmation Brief ............................................................................................. B-11
Mission Analysis Brief.......................................................................................B-11
Decision Brief ...................................................................................................B-17
Backbrief ........................................................................................................... B-17
Mission Concept Brief ......................................................................................B-20
Debrief .............................................................................................................. B-34
Appendix C PLANNING AREA FACILITIES AND SITES ...........................................................C-1
Facilities ..............................................................................................................C-1
Fixed Site ............................................................................................................C-1
Field Site .............................................................................................................C-1
Appendix D GEOGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENTS ...........................................................................D-1
Jungle Operations ..............................................................................................D-1
Desert Operations ..............................................................................................D-1
Mountain Operations ..........................................................................................D-2
Cold Weather Operations ...................................................................................D-2
Appendix E CONTINGENCY PLANS .......................................................................................... E-1
Branches and Sequels ....................................................................................... E-1
Contingency Plan Matrix .................................................................................... E-1
Appendix F COORDINATION FOR ARMY AVIATION ............................................................... F-1
Appendix G HIDE AND SURVEILLANCE SITES ........................................................................G-1
Surface Sites ......................................................................................................G-1
Hasty Subsurface Sites ......................................................................................G-2
Finished Subsurface Site ...................................................................................G-4
Site Selection ......................................................................................................G-7
Leader Reconnaissance.....................................................................................G-7
Occupation of Hide Site ......................................................................................G-7
Actions in Hide Site ............................................................................................G-9
Priority of Work ...................................................................................................G-9
Site Sterilization ..................................................................................................G-9
Appendix H BATTLE DRILLS ...................................................................................................... H-1
Break Contact .....................................................................................................H-1
React to Air Attack ..............................................................................................H-5
React to Indirect Fire ..........................................................................................H-6
React to Flares ...................................................................................................H-6
Break from Hide or Surveillance Site .................................................................H-6
Appendix I TRACKING AND COUNTERTRACKING ................................................................. I-1
Concepts of Tracking .......................................................................................... I-1
Organization of Tracking Team ........................................................................... I-5
Tracker and Dog Team ....................................................................................... I-5
Appendix J NIGHT OPERATIONS .............................................................................................. J-1
Night Vision .........................................................................................................J-1
Hearing ................................................................................................................J-4
Smell....................................................................................................................J-4 |
3-55.93 | 9 | Contents
Fatigue ................................................................................................................ J-5
Selection of Route ............................................................................................... J-5
Night Walking ...................................................................................................... J-6
Signals ................................................................................................................ J-7
Target Detection ................................................................................................. J-8
Movement ........................................................................................................... J-9
Appendix K EXAMPLE EVASION AND RECOVERY PLAN ...................................................... K-1
GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. References-1
INDEX.......................................................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Organization of long-range surveillance company. ..........................................................1-5
Figure 1-2. Concept of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. ...........................................1-10
Figure 2-1. Company operations base. ............................................................................................... 2-8
Figure 2-2. Example C2 employment schematic for a LRSC. ............................................................2-9
Figure 2-3. Example C2 employment schematic for a LRSD in an MSS. .........................................2-10
Figure 3-1. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. ...............................................................3-2
Figure 3-2. LRS mission development process. .................................................................................3-4
Figure 3-3. Example format for target folder. .................................................................................... 3-10
Figure 4-1. TLP and METT-TC. ........................................................................................................... 4-7
Figure 4-2. Development of courses of action. ................................................................................. 4-12
Figure 4-3. Reconnaissance and surveillance elements. .................................................................4-22
Figure 4-4. Fan method. .................................................................................................................... 4-23
Figure 4-5. Converging routes method..............................................................................................4-24
Figure 4-6. Successive sector method. ............................................................................................. 4-24
Figure 4-7. Example surveillance site. .............................................................................................. 4-27
Figure 4-8. Example hide site. ........................................................................................................... 4-28
Figure 4-9. Example imagery labels. ................................................................................................. 4-53
Figure 4-10. Example imagery legend. ............................................................................................. 4-54
Figure 4-11. Example panoramic sketch. .......................................................................................... 4-55
Figure 4-12. Example topographic sketch. ........................................................................................ 4-56
Figure 4-13. Example objective sketchpad. ...................................................................................... 4-57
Figure 4-14. Example drawing technique: whole to part. ..................................................................4-59
Figure 4-15. Example drawing technique: use of common shapes to show common objects. ........4-60
Figure 4-16. Example drawing technique: use of perspective to represent depth. ...........................4-60
Figure 4-17. Example drawing technique: use of vanishing points to indicate distance. ..................4-60
Figure 4-18. Example drawing technique: hatching. .........................................................................4-61
Figure 5-1. Rubber boat. ..................................................................................................................... 5-2
Figure 5-2. Short count, long count. .................................................................................................... 5-4 |
3-55.93 | 10 | Contents
Figure 5-3. SPIES rope rigging on UH-60 ........................................................................................ 5-17
Figure 5-4. Rigging of snap links. ..................................................................................................... 5-17
Figure 5-5. Rigging of wood block. ................................................................................................... 5-18
Figure 5-6. Excess cargo straps secured. ........................................................................................ 5-18
Figure 5-7. Recovery line with Prusik knot. ...................................................................................... 5-19
Figure 5-8. SPIES rigging procedures for CH-46 or CH-47.............................................................. 5-20
Figure 5-9. Fast-rope rigging procedures for UH-60. ....................................................................... 5-21
Figure 5-10. UH-60 rigged for fast roping ......................................................................................... 5-22
Figure 5-11. Fast-rope rigging procedures for other aircraft............................................................. 5-22
Figure 5-12. Marking procedures for landing and pickup zones. ..................................................... 5-26
Figure 5-13. Example coordination checklist. ................................................................................... 5-28
Figure 5-14. UH-60 loading sequence. ............................................................................................. 5-31
Figure 5-15. Example vehicle load configuration. ............................................................................. 5-35
Figure 5-16. Procedures for loading HMMWV into CH-47 for infiltration. ......................................... 5-38
Figure 5-17. HMMWVs in wedge formation. ..................................................................................... 5-41
Figure 5-18. Single camouflaged HMMWV. ..................................................................................... 5-43
Figure 5-19. Multiple camouflaged HMMWVs. ................................................................................. 5-43
Figure 6-1. Automatic link sequence. ................................................................................................. 6-5
Figure 6-2. AN/PRC-150(C) in vehicular AN/VRC-104 (V)3 configuration. ........................................ 6-7
Figure 6-3. Communications data wire diagram. .............................................................................. 6-10
Figure 6-4. Report format. ................................................................................................................. 6-11
Figure 6-5. Example message header. ............................................................................................. 6-12
Figure 6-6. Measurement of a wavelength. ...................................................................................... 6-19
Figure 6-7. Components of ground wave. ........................................................................................ 6-21
Figure 6-8. Structure of ionosphere. ................................................................................................. 6-22
Figure 6-9. HF skip zone and distance. ............................................................................................ 6-23
Figure 6-10. Unidirectional antenna pattern. .................................................................................... 6-24
Figure 6-11. Bidirectional antenna pattern. ....................................................................................... 6-25
Figure 6-12. Omni-directional antenna pattern. ................................................................................ 6-26
Figure 6-13. Half-wave dipole antenna. ............................................................................................ 6-27
Figure 6-14. Formula for calculating length of half-wave dipole antenna applied to example. ........ 6-28
Figure 6-15. Inverted "V" antenna. .................................................................................................... 6-28
Figure 6-16. Long-wire antenna. ....................................................................................................... 6-29
Figure 6-17. Sloping wire antenna. ................................................................................................... 6-30
Figure 6-18. Terminated sloping "V" antenna. .................................................................................. 6-30
Figure 6-19. Repair procedure, whip antenna. ................................................................................. 6-31
Figure 6-20. Expedient insulators. .................................................................................................... 6-32
Figure 6-21. High frequency antenna, long-wire type. ...................................................................... 6-34
Figure 6-22. High frequency antenna, half-rhombic type. ................................................................ 6-34
Figure 6-23. High frequency antenna, "V" type. ............................................................................... 6-35
Figure 6-24. Sloping antenna, "V" type. ............................................................................................ 6-35 |
3-55.93 | 11 | Contents
Figure 7-1. Classification of urban area by size. ................................................................................. 7-2
Figure 7-2. Example link diagram. ..................................................................................................... 7-12
Figure 7-3. Example association matrix. ........................................................................................... 7-13
Figure 7-4. Example relationship matrix. ........................................................................................... 7-14
Figure 7-5. Example activities matrix. ............................................................................................... 7-15
Figure 7-6. Example time event chart. .............................................................................................. 7-16
Figure 7-7. Example pattern analysis plot sheet. .............................................................................. 7-19
Figure 8-1. Types of recovery. ............................................................................................................ 8-3
Figure B-1. Example warning order.....................................................................................................B-3
Figure B-2. Example operation order. .................................................................................................B-5
Figure B-3. Example fragmentary order. .............................................................................................B-8
Figure B-4. Brief types. ........................................................................................................................B-8
Figure B-5. Analysis of mission, intent, and priority intelligence requirements. ............................... B-12
Figure B-6. Analysis of specified and implied tasks. ........................................................................ B-13
Figure B-7. Analysis of facts............................................................................................................. B-14
Figure B-8. Analysis of assumptions. ............................................................................................... B-15
Figure B-9. Analysis of mission roadblocks, issues, and restated mission. ..................................... B-16
Figure B-10. Example backbrief. ...................................................................................................... B-18
Figure B-11. Slide 1, LRSC mission concept brief. .......................................................................... B-21
Figure B-12. Slide 2, statement of purpose. ..................................................................................... B-21
Figure B-13. Slide 3, LRSC insertion conditions check.................................................................... B-22
Figure B-14. Slide 4, agenda. ........................................................................................................... B-22
Figure B-15. Slide 5, recommendation. ............................................................................................ B-23
Figure B-16. Slide 6, ISR fusion element. ........................................................................................ B-23
Figure B-17. Slide 7, S-2/ISR fusion element................................................................................... B-24
Figure B-18. Slide 8, ATO slide. ....................................................................................................... B-24
Figure B-19. Slide 9, team insertion and extraction. ........................................................................ B-25
Figure B-20. Slide 10, LRSC insertion conditions check. ................................................................ B-25
Figure B-21. Slide 11, movement and maneuver. ............................................................................ B-26
Figure B-22. Slide 12, fire support. ................................................................................................... B-26
Figure B-23. Slide 13, air protection. ................................................................................................ B-27
Figure B-24. Slide 14, sustainment. ................................................................................................. B-27
Figure B-25. Slide 15, command and control. .................................................................................. B-28
Figure B-26. Slide 16, intelligence. ................................................................................................... B-28
Figure B-27. Slide 17, LRSC. ........................................................................................................... B-29
Figure B-28. Slide 18, "Do we know what to look for?" .................................................................... B-29
Figure B-29. Slide 19, LRSC IPB. .................................................................................................... B-30
Figure B-30. Slide 20, LRSC maneuver. .......................................................................................... B-30
Figure B-31. Slide 21, LRSC fire support. ........................................................................................ B-31
Figure B-32. Slide 22, LRSC sustainment........................................................................................ B-31
Figure B-33. Slide 23, LRSC C2. ..................................................................................................... B-32 |
3-55.93 | 12 | Contents
Figure B-34. Slide 24, LRSC C2, communications. .......................................................................... B-32
Figure B-35. Slide 25, LRSC abort criteria. ...................................................................................... B-33
Figure B-36. Slide 26, LRSC risk mitigation. .................................................................................... B-33
Figure B-37. Slide 27, LRSC recommendation.................................................................................B-34
Figure B-38. Slide 28, commander's decision. .................................................................................B-34
Figure B-39. Example debrief. .......................................................................................................... B-35
Figure B-40. Example intelligence estimate annex........................................................................... B-40
Figure B-41. Example communications annex. ................................................................................ B-42
Figure B-42. Example fire support annex. ........................................................................................ B-43
Figure B-43. Example linkup annex. ................................................................................................. B-44
Figure B-44. Example vehicle movement annex. .............................................................................B-45
Figure B-45. Example air infiltration/exfiltration annex. ....................................................................B-47
Figure C-1. Example fixed site for planning. ....................................................................................... C-2
Figure C-2. Example planning area. ................................................................................................... C-3
Figure C-3. Use of intermediate staging area for planning. ................................................................C-4
Figure E-1. Example completed contingency matrix. ......................................................................... E-2
Figure F-1. Example OPORD. ............................................................................................................ F-2
Figure F-2. Example fire support annex. ............................................................................................ F-4
Figure F-3. Example intelligence annex. ............................................................................................ F-5
Figure F-4. Example rehearsal area annex. ....................................................................................... F-6
Figure F-5. Example vehicular movement coordination annex. ......................................................... F-7
Figure G-1. Two-man surface site using ghillie suits. .........................................................................G-1
Figure G-2. Suspension line-weave site. ............................................................................................ G-3
Figure G-3. Polyvinyl chloride site. ..................................................................................................... G-3
Figure G-4. Example subsurface site. ................................................................................................ G-6
Figure G-5. Fishhook and dog-leg methods. ...................................................................................... G-8
Figure G-6. Forcible occupation of site. .............................................................................................. G-8
Figure H-1. Break contact front (diamond or file). ...............................................................................H-2
Figure H-2. Break contact front, left and right (Australian peel). ........................................................H-3
Figure H-3. Break contact left, right (diamond or file). ........................................................................ H-4
Figure H-4. React to enemy air attack. ............................................................................................... H-5
Figure H-5. React to indirect fire or air attack. .................................................................................... H-6
Figure H-6A. Break contact from hide or surveillance site. ................................................................H-8
Figure I-1. Areas surveyed for indicators by tracker. ........................................................................... I-1
Figure I-2. Examples of displacement.................................................................................................. I-2
Figure I-3. Types of footprints. ............................................................................................................. I-3
Figure I-4. Box method for determination of number of footprints. ...................................................... I-4
Figure J-1. Typical scanning patterns. ................................................................................................. J-2
Figure J-2. Off-center viewing technique. ............................................................................................ J-2
Figure K-1. Example plan of action for an evasion. ............................................................................ K-2
Figure K-2. Example of DD Form 1833 TEST (V2) (front).. ................................................................ K-5 |
3-55.93 | 13 | Contents
Figure K-3. Example of DD Form 1833 TEST (V2) (back). .................................................................K-6
Tables
Table 4-1. Actions and responsibilities of LRSU personnel. ...............................................................4-4
Table 4-2. LRS tasks by operation. ................................................................................................... 4-10
Table 4-3. Priority of actions for rehearsal. ....................................................................................... 4-14
Table 5-1. Minimum recommended landing point diameters. ...........................................................5-26
Table 6-1. Radios that work with AN/PRC-150 in various security modes. ........................................6-3
Table 6-2. Radio interoperability capabilities and characteristics. ......................................................6-6
Table 6-3. Procedure for use of duress codes. ................................................................................. 6-11
Table 6-4. Report formats..................................................................................................................6-13
Table 6-5. Typical format for an Angus (Initial Entry) Report. ...........................................................6-13
Table 6-6. Typical format for a Boris (Intelligence) Report................................................................6-14
Table 6-7. Typical format for a Cyril (Situation) Report. ....................................................................6-15
Table 6-8. Typical format for an Under (Cache) Report. ...................................................................6-15
Table 6-9. Typical format for a Crack (Battle Damage Assessment) Report. ...................................6-16
Table 6-10. Priority for destruction of communications devices. ...................................................... -6-18
Table 6-11. Contents of a MIJI report................................................................................................6-18
Table 6-12. High frequency ranges in ionosphere. ...........................................................................6-21
Table 7-1. Identification of gaps in existing databases. ...................................................................... 7-4
Table B-1. Comparison of brief types. .................................................................................................B-9
Table J-1. Light sources and distances. .............................................................................................. J-3
Table J-2. Sounds and distances. ....................................................................................................... J-4
Table J-3. Odor sources and distances. ............................................................................................. J-5 |
3-55.93 | 15 | Preface
This manual is primarily written for US Army long-range surveillance units (LRSU) and other Infantry
reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) units. It is also provided for use by corps, division, brigade combat
team (BCT); battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB); and reconnaissance and surveillance squadron
commanders and staffs; instructors of US Army corps, division, and BCT intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) operations. In addition, many of the subjects covered should be a ready and useful
reference for other branches of the US Army and US military, and for multinational forces working in a joint
environment.
This manual defines the organization, roles, operational requirements, mission tasks, battlefield functions, and
command and control (C2) relationships of LRSCs organic to the R&S squadron of the BFSB. It also provides
the doctrine for LRSU to use in combat training and combat. It establishes a common base of tactical
knowledge from which leaders can develop specific solutions to LRSU tactical problems. It increases the
effectiveness of LRSU operations by also providing doctrinal principles and selected battlefield-proven tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The Digital Training Management System (DTMS) contains the LRSC
combined arms training strategies (CATS) and collective tasks for training the LRSU. Before leaders can use
this manual to develop and execute training for, and to plan, coordinate, and execute LRS missions, they must
first know FM 3-21.8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, and LRSC CATS.
This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the
United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
The Summary of Changes lists major changes from the previous edition. Changes include lessons learned.
The proponent for this publication is the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The
preparing agency is the US Army Infantry School. Send comments and recommendations by any means, US
mail, e-mail, fax, or telephone, using the format of DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and
Blank Forms.
E-Mail [email protected]
Office/Fax (706) 544-6448/-6421 (DSN 834)
US Mail Commander, Ranger Training Brigade
ATTN: ATSH-RB/Edmunds
10850 Schneider Rd, Bldg 5024
Ft Benning, GA 31905
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns may refer to either men or women.
Some or all of the uniforms shown in this manual were drawn without camouflage to improve the clarity of the
illustration. |
3-55.93 | 17 | Summary of Changes
This manual provides a major update of FM 7-93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations. Most
significantly, this edition--
• Introduces--
—Full-spectrum operations.
—Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force concept.
—BFSB staff elements that provide products and services in support of LRS operations.
—R&S squadron units and staff elements that provide products and services in support of LRS
operations.
—Transformation High-Frequency Radio System (THFRS) as the interim replacement LRS team
and base station radio system.
—Automatic link establishment (ALE) in beyond line-of-sight LRSU communications.
• Details--
—The new Long-Range Surveillance Company (LRSC) organization organic to the
Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Squadron of the Battlefield Surveillance Brigade
(BFSB).
—The deliberate planning methodology in context with the BFSB and R&S squadron
organizations.
—The requirements for the next generation of LRSU base radio stations.
• Updates the chapters on—
—Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB, Chapter 7).
—Evasion and recovery (E&R, Chapter 8).
• Updates the chapters on—
—Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB, Chapter 7).
—Evasion and recovery (E&R, Chapter 8).
• Adds sections or paragraphs on—
—Combat assessment (Chapter 4, Section IV).
—Target acquisition (Chapter 4, Section V).
—Urban operations (Chapter 6, Section VII).
—Stability operations (Chapter 4, Section VIII).
—Collection and transmission of imagery, to include digital photos (Chapter 4, Section VII).
—Special missions (Chapter 4, Section IX).
—Vehicle infiltration and exfiltration (Chapter 5, Section III).
—Multiple LRS team and LRS detachment tactical operations (Chapter 4, Section III).
• Adds appendixes on—
—Planning area facilities and sites.
—Army aviation coordination.
• Expands—
—The appendix on personnel recruitment, assessment, and selection procedures.
—The explanations and examples of briefings that LRS teams may have to perform to gain
approval for mission execution.
—The purpose, contents and format for a LRSU mission planning folder (MPF), including the
target folder.
—The appendix on LRS team contingency planning.
—The section on message formats.
• Deletes all references to "isolation" or "isolation facility (ISOFAC)" and replaces these terms
with "planning" and "planning facility." Isolation and ISOFAC are special operations forces
terms and are not used by LRSU. |
3-55.93 | 19 | Chapter 1
Full-Spectrum Operations
Section I of this chapter discusses full-spectrum operations as a basis for
understanding the role of Infantry reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) units in the
modular force. Section II defines and discusses those units. It also overviews Infantry
surveillance and reconnaissance units, details LRSU organizations and missions, and
introduces R&S terms and concepts. Section III introduces the discussion of the
long-range surveillance company (LRSC) that will continue throughout the
remainder of the book. It also provides an example of how long-range surveillance
units (LRSU) have been successfully used in stability operations.
The term "long-range surveillance unit" (LRSU) includes all LRSC and subordinate
LRSD units, unless otherwise stated. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)
in this manual are also useful to all US Army R&S units, to include Ranger
reconnaissance units, Pathfinder companies, BCT scout platoons, reconnaissance
squadrons and troops, and special operations units.
Many of the subjects covered in this manual are common to all Infantry surveillance
and reconnaissance units and should be a ready and useful reference.
Section I. TYPES AND COMBINATIONS OF ARMY OPERATIONS
Full-spectrum operations involve the simultaneous conduct of any combination of the four types of Army
operations, offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support, across the spectrum of conflict. Two critical
components of each are the commander’s understanding of the enemy and the operational environment (OE).
Therefore, this section discusses how the commander can combine the types of Army operations based on the
area of operations (AO). The mission dictates which type predominates. Finally, because Infantry R&S units
are integral parts of the intelligence warfighting function (WFF), this section discusses how they directly
support the commander’s understanding of the enemy. (See FM 3-0 for more information about the four types
of Army operations.)
FOUR TYPES OF ARMY OPERATIONS
1-1. This paragraph defines each type of Army operation and its relationship to the others in full-
spectrum operations. The mission dictates which type predominates:
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
1-2. These operations carry the fight to the enemy by closing with and destroying enemy forces,
seizing territory and vital resources, and imposing the commander’s will on the enemy. To do this, the
commander focuses on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
1-3. These operations counter enemy offensive operations. They defeat attacks, destroying as many
attackers as necessary. They control land, resources, and populations. They also retain terrain, guard
populations, and protect key resources.
STABILITY OPERATIONS
1-4. These operations sustain or establish civil security and control over areas, populations, and
resources. They use military capabilities to reconstruct or restore essential services and governance, and
they support civilian agencies. Stability operations include both coercive and cooperative actions. They can
occur before, during, or after offensive and defensive operations, or they may occur separately, usually at
the low end of the spectrum of conflict. Stability operations lead to an environment in which, in
cooperation with a legitimate government, the other instruments of national power can predominate. |
3-55.93 | 20 | Chapter 1
CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS
1-5. These operations are conducted within the United States and its territories. They address the
consequences of man-made or natural accidents and incidents beyond the capabilities of civilian
authorities, or in support of homeland security. Homeland security provides the nation with strategic
flexibility by protecting its citizens and infrastructure from conventional and unconventional threats. It has
two components. The first is homeland defense. If the United States comes under direct attack, or is
threatened by hostile armed forces, Army forces under joint command conduct offensive and defensive
operations to defend the homeland. The other is civil support, which is the fourth type of Army operation.
Civil support operations take the following forms:
• Support to civil authorities.
• Support to civil law enforcement.
• Protection of military and civilian critical assets.
• Response and recovery.
COMBINATIONS BASED ON AREA OF OPERATIONS
1-6. The four types of Army operations are combined in full-spectrum operations, depending on the
area of operations (AO):
JOINT CAMPAIGNS ABROAD
• Offensive.
• Defensive.
• Stability.
HOMELAND SECURITY
• Offensive.
• Defensive.
• Civil support.
INTELLIGENCE
1-7. Key to fighting the Army’s modular organizations in full-spectrum operations is moving to
positions of advantage and acting before the enemy can respond. Essential to this operational concept is
timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence. Infantry R&S units are organized, trained and equipped to
provide the critical and timely information needed by the commander and his staff in order to
develop intelligence.
Section II. INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE UNITS
Infantry R&S units primarily collect combat information. However, these units also have organic equipment,
such as small-unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3),
low-light amplification systems, and digital cameras--that greatly assist in collecting information. The
information these and other systems collect can be enhanced, compressed, and sent immediately to the
commander or intelligence section of the supported unit. This section defines the characteristics, missions, and
organizations of Infantry R&S units.
CHARACTERISTICS
1-8. Infantry R&S units share many characteristics, capabilities, limitations, organizational structures,
and missions. Each unit is organized and equipped to address the specific information needs of the
commander. These units are typically lightly armed, operate in squad size or smaller, and are foot mobile, |
3-55.93 | 21 | Full-Spectrum Operations
but can conduct mobile reconnaissance. Their leaders and Soldiers must have special qualifications such as
Airborne, Ranger, military diver, military freefall, or Pathfinder.
MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
1-9. Infantry R&S unit operations directly contribute to the collection of intelligence at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels of war. The information these units gather is critical to successful
operations by combined arms, joint and multinational commanders, and units.
UNIT TYPES
1-10. Each of these six types of Infantry surveillance and reconnaissance units has a doctrinal manual
that covers its missions, organizations, and equipment:
Scout Platoons organic to Infantry battalions of an Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT).
Infantry Reconnaissance Companies organic to reconnaissance squadrons of IBCTs.
Ranger Scout Platoons organic to Ranger battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment.
Ranger Reconnaissance Company organic to the 75th Ranger Regiment.
Pathfinder Companies organic to combat aviation brigades medium (CAB(M)).
LRS Companies organic to R&S squadrons of battlefield surveillance brigades (BFSB). Each
LRSC has three LRSDs.
SCOUT PLATOONS AND INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE COMPANIES
1-11. Scout platoons and Infantry reconnaissance companies collect tactical combat information for
Infantry battalions and IBCTs. For detailed mission, capabilities, and organizations of these units, see FM
3-21.20 and FM 7-92. These units can conduct the following missions:
• Conduct zone, area, and route reconnaissance.
• Screen.
• Conduct surveillance.
• Conduct linkup and liaison.
• Guide maneuver forces.
• Detect, survey, and monitor chemicals and radiation.
RANGER SCOUT PLATOONS AND THE RANGER RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
1-12. These are special operations force (SOF) units. They primarily collect information for their parent
units. For missions, capabilities, and organizations of Ranger scout platoons and the Ranger reconnaissance
company, see FM 7-85.
PATHFINDER COMPANY
1-13. The Pathfinder company's primary mission is to provide navigational aid and advisory services to
military aircraft in areas designated by the supported unit commander. Inherent in this mission is the ability
to conduct R&S of these areas, and to report tactical combat information to the supported unit commander.
After the R&S mission, the primary mission of the Pathfinder can be conducted. Pathfinder companies can
also conduct R&S as a stand-alone mission. This mission supports the intelligence WFF needs of both
operational and tactical level commanders. For detailed missions, capabilities, and organizations of
Pathfinder companies, see FM 3-21.38.
Section III. LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE COMPANY
The LRSC serve the intelligence WFF needs of both operational and tactical level commanders. |
3-55.93 | 22 | Chapter 1
PRIMARY MISSIONS
1-14. LRSCs perform the following four primary missions:
• Surveillance.
• Zone and area reconnaissance.
• Target acquisition.
• Target interdiction.
1-15. Combat assessment, and its subcomponent battle damage assessment, is not a stand-alone LRSU
mission. It is an inherent capability in all LRSU missions (Chapter 4, Section IV).
SECONDARY MISSIONS
1-16. In addition to these primary missions, LRSU can perform the following secondary missions, given
time, training resources, additional personnel and equipment:
• Route reconnaissance.
• Emplacement and recovery of sensors.
• Pathfinder operations.
• Personnel recovery (PR) and combat search and rescue (CSAR).
• Chemical detection and radiological surveillance and monitoring operations.
Note: Providing security for other units is outside the range of a doctrinal or
organizationally supported LRSU mission. LRS teams are lightly armed and lack organic
automatic weapons necessary for defense and escort missions. In addition, LRS teams are
limited-in-number and should only be used for the stated purpose of combat
information-gathering.
COMPARISON TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
1-17. LRSU are not SOF, although they share many of the same tactics, techniques, procedures, terms,
equipment, and organizational structure. Similarly, scouts and cavalry units are not LRSU but also share
many TTPs and equipment. The clearest distinction between these units is who they work for and where
they operate on the battlefield:
Strategic Level--SOF, including Army Special Forces, when assigned a special reconnaissance
mission, generally operate at the strategic level.
Operational Level--LRSU generally operate at the operational level.
Tactical Level--Scouts and cavalry units generally operate at the tactical level.
ORGANIZATION
1-18. The LRSC has one organizational structure. The total active force structure will consist of
six LRS companies with 90 LRS teams. The reserve component also has six LRSC with 90 LRS teams
(Figure 1-1). |
3-55.93 | 23 | Full-Spectrum Operations
Figure 1-1. Organization of long-range surveillance company.
SUSTAINMENT
1-19. Sustainment for the LRSC is provided by the BFSB brigade support company (BSC). The LRSC
depends on additional outside support for parachute rigging, and on aircraft for insertion and extraction
operations.
SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS AND KEY PERSONNEL
1-20. The LRSC is not a designed modular unit. However, it shares many of the characteristics of a
modular unit. When supplemented with additional medical, fires, communications, rigging, logistics, and
operations planning support, the LRSC or a LRSD can be deployed and employed as a separate unit.
HEADQUARTERS SECTION
1-21. The headquarters section serves both a planning and logistics role for the LRSC. Due to the
austere nature of the headquarters section, the LRSC relies heavily on other organizations, such as the R&S
squadron, the BFSB S-2 and S-3 (for LRS team mission planning and execution), and general
logistics support. The section is composed of--
Commander
1-22. The LRSC headquarters section is led by the company commander. The LRSC commander is an
Airborne, Ranger-qualified Infantry officer. He should be a graduate of the Long-Range Surveillance
Leaders Course (LRSLC) or the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC). He should also
be qualified or familiar with military free fall (MFF), underwater military diver, Pathfinder, and sniper
(target interdiction) operations. The company commander is required in the course of his duties to regularly
interact with senior commanders and staff officers. Minimum qualifications include previous very
successful company command and staff experience. By table of organization and equipment, the company
commander is a Captain. However, experience and required duties indicate that the more appropriate rank
for the LRSC commander is that of Major.
Executive Officer
1-23. The executive officer (XO) is an Airborne, Ranger-qualified Infantry officer, who serves as
second in command and provides logistics planning and control. He should be a graduate of the LRSLC or
RSLC. The XO is required in the course of his duties to regularly interact with senior commanders and
staff officers. Minimum qualifications include previous very successful company XO and staff experience.
By table of organization and equipment, the XO is a Lieutenant. However, experience and required duties
indicate that the more appropriate rank for the LRSC XO is that of Captain. |
3-55.93 | 24 | Chapter 1
First Sergeant
1-24. The 1SG is the most experienced NCO in LRS operations. As such, he helps plan, operationally
control, and administer the unit. He should be a graduate of the LRSLC or RSLC, and both battle-planning
staff and MFF qualified.
Master Sergeant (Operations Sergeant)
1-25. The master sergeant, who serves as operations sergeant, should be a graduate of the LRSLC or
RSLC. He is both battle-planning staff and MFF qualified. He is the primary planner and is experienced in
LRS operations.
Supply Sergeant and Armorer
1-26. The supply sergeant and assistant are both Pathfinder qualified.
COMMUNICATIONS PLATOON
1-27. The communication platoon has a headquarters section and four base radio stations (BRSs).
Headquarters Section
1-28. The platoon leader is an Airborne and Ranger-qualified Signal Officer. The platoon leader is
required in the course of his duties to regularly interact with senior commanders and staff officers. At the
least, his qualifications must include very successful signal platoon leader and staff experience. The
platoon sergeant is a communications Master Sergeant who is Airborne, Ranger, and battle-planning staff
qualified. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant should be graduates of the LRSLC or RSLC. In addition
to the platoon leader and platoon sergeant, the headquarters section has two NCO radio
operators/maintainers--both are Airborne and Ranger qualified.
1-29. The communications platoon headquarters section is responsible for planning and executing all
aspects of the communications plan to link deployed LRS teams to the company operations base (COB) or
mission support site (MSS) and the supported unit headquarters. This includes frequency spectrum
planning, communications security (COMSEC) and unit-level equipment repair and evacuation. At least
two of the members of the communications platoon headquarters section should be graduates of the
Frequency Managers Course.
Base Radio Stations
1-30. Each of the four BRSs has a six-Soldier team, which is mainly responsible for maintaining
communication between deployed LRS teams, the COB or MSS and the supported unit headquarters.
Depending on the communications means used between LRS teams and the COB or MSS, the BRSs can
support three MSS or relay sites and the COB simultaneously.
SNIPERS
1-31. The sniper teams are organized into two teams of two men each: senior sniper and sniper. The
senior sniper is Airborne Ranger qualified and the sniper is Airborne qualified. Both the senior sniper and
the sniper should be graduates of the LRSLC or RSLC and of either the US Army Special Forces or
Marine sniper course. All the snipers should also be MFF qualified. The company sniper employment
officer (SEO) is normally the company commander, the XO or 1SG. (FM 23.10 gives more information
about sniper team training and employment.)
TRANSPORTATION SECTION
1-32. The transportation section is led by a staff sergeant, 88M. It is manned by five more transportation
Soldiers. The section has three trucks and two trailers. The section’s main duty is to transport personnel
and material at the direction of the company XO and 1SG. |
3-55.93 | 25 | Full-Spectrum Operations
LRSD AND LRS TEAMS
LRSD
1-33. The three LRSD are each led by an Airborne, Ranger-qualified Infantry officer. Each detachment
leader should be a graduate of the LRSLC or RSLC. Also, he should be MFF and Pathfinder qualified. He
is responsible for the training, readiness, and employment of the LRS teams in the detachment. The
detachment leader is required in the course of his duties to regularly interact with senior commanders and
staff officers. He is also required to be prepared to operate independent of the LRSC utilizing a MSS.
Minimum qualifications include: previous very successful platoon leader and staff experience. By table of
organization and equipment, LRSD leaders are Lieutenants. However, experience and required duties
indicate that the more appropriate rank for a detachment leader is that of Captain.
LRS TEAMS
1-34. Each LRS team is led by an Airborne, Ranger qualified Infantry Sergeant First Class or Staff
Sergeant. There is one Sergeant First Class per detachment and he doubles as the detachment sergeant
when his LRS team is not planning, on a mission or recovering. Team leaders should be graduates of the
LRSLC or RSLC. Normally, the team leader is also battle-planning staff, MFF, underwater military diver,
and Pathfinder qualified, or a combination of these qualifications.
1-35. LRS team members are, at a minimum, Airborne qualified. All team members should be graduates
of the LRSLC or RSLC. They should also have a combination of MFF, underwater military diver and
Pathfinder qualifications.
LEGACY LRSC AND LRSD
1-36. The legacy Army of Excellence LRSC was a unit normally organic to a Military Intelligence
Brigade previously found at corps level. This type of LRSC is not addressed in this manual as all are
currently scheduled for deactivation.
1-37. The legacy Army of Excellence LRSD was a unit normally organic to a Military Intelligence
Battalion previously found at division level. While these LRSD are all scheduled for deactivation, some
commanders have maintained them or they may be temporarily authorized while awaiting activation of the
BFSB R&S Squadron LRSC. This type of LRSD is not specifically addressed in this manual.
CHARACTERISTICS
1-38. All LRS operations are characterized by the following:
• They follow strict operations security (OPSEC) procedures before, during, and after mission
employment. This limits operational exposure of other LRS teams conducting missions.
• Units receive detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) from the BFSB S-2.
They plan and rehearse in detail with internal and supporting assets. This helps ensure
successful operations.
• Division- or corps-level assets, such as joint aviation, joint fire support, and communications,
must support planning, infiltration and insertion, exfiltration and extraction, and contingencies.
1-39. LRS teams are also characterized by the following:
• Teams provide persistent surveillance on targets that can be covered only intermittently by
most other systems.
• Teams avoid contact with enemy forces and local population.
• Team firepower is normally limited to small arms, grenades, and Claymore mines.
• Teams have organic ground mobility assets.
• Team members depend on an expert knowledge of digital high frequency (HF) and ultra high
frequency (UHF) tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications equipment, enemy TTPs, order |
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