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3-24.2 | 213 | Stability Operations Considerations in Counterinsurgency
Support Development of Local Governance
7-47. Establishing effective governance at the local level is necessary before developing governance
institutions and processes throughout the HN. Initially, effective local governance almost depends entirely
on the ability to provide essential civil services to the people. Most stability tasks require an integrated
and synchronized effort across all sectors to achieve the desired end state. Tactical Units have often had
success when working with a city, district or tribal council, or city manager. Essential tasks may include—
• Establish mechanisms for local-level participation.
• Identify, secure, rehabilitate, and maintain basic facilities for the local government.
• Restore essential local public services.
• Provide resources to maintain essential local public services.
Support Anticorruption Initiatives
7-48. Corruption of government official could be a root cause that led to the insurgency. Providing legal
guidance and assistance to the transitional government mitigates the near-term effects of corruption.
Long-term measures ensure lasting success. Corruption and graft can hinder efforts to establish
governance, restore rule of law, or institute economic recovery. While some level of corruption is common
to many cultures, its existence can unhinge reform efforts and put the entire mission at risk. Essential tasks
may include an initial response in which military forces create mechanisms to curtail corruption across
government institutions. Units must decide if there is an acceptable level of corruption in the HN society.
Essential tasks may include an initial response to—
• Disseminate ethical standards for civil servants.
• Ensure transparency in the dispersal of government resources.
• Implement reporting procedures for corruption and intimidation.
Support Elections
7-49. The ability of the HN government and its local subdivisions to stage fair and secure elections is a
significant milestone toward establishing legitimate, effective governance. While civilian agencies that
maintain strict transparency guide the elections process, military forces provide the support that enables
broad participation by the local populace. Essential tasks may include—
• Provide security for polling places, voters, and ballots.
• Determine identification requirements for voter registration.
• Establish or verify voter registry.
TECHNIQUES
7-50. Two critical governance techniques are negotiating and mediating, and leader and meeting
security. See FM 3-07 for additional technique considerations.
Negotiations and Mediations
7-51. In a counterinsurgency, situations may arise that require counterinsurgency personnel to negotiate,
mediate, and perhaps arbitrate disputes. These usually involve minor points of contention between the
belligerents or disagreements about the daily routines of the counterinsurgent force. Unit leaders must
remain aware of their limitations. Larger points of contention or issues beyond their ability to resolve
should be referred to a higher authority. If possible, arbitration should be referred to the existing legal
system. Negotiations are made from a position of strength while mediation is made from a position
of impartiality. In the joint, combined, and interagency environment, negotiations and mediations can be
complex. Nonetheless, all negotiations and mediations require tact, diplomacy, honesty, patience, fairness,
effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning. For the purposes of this manual,
the following definitions are used:
Negotiation
7-52. This is a discussion between at least two parties, with the intention to produce an agreement. |
3-24.2 | 214 | Chapter 7
Mediation
7-53. This is an attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement or compromise between disputants through
the objective intervention of a neutral party.
Arbitration
7-54. This is the process by which disputants submit their differences to the judgment of an impartial
person or group appointed by mutual consent.
Usage in a Counterinsurgency
7-55. Unit leaders must be prepared to conduct negotiations or mediations with the leaders or members
of various groups. These groups may be political, ethnic, religious, tribal, military, or even family.
Understanding the composition of groups in the AO is vital for effective negotiations and mediations.
Analyzing civil considerations using ASCOPE of various groups can be extremely helpful in preparation
for these discussions. Furthermore, tensions or hostilities between groups may destabilize a society
and provide opportunities for insurgents. Negotiations and mediations may be broken down into two
categories: situational and preplanned.
Situational negotiations and mediations
7-56. These both allow immediate discussion and resolution of an issue or problem. For example,
members of a ground patrol might encounter two groups arguing at an intersection. To negotiate a
resolution to this problem, the patrol must thoroughly understand the ROE and rules of interaction (ROI).
Soldiers apply this working knowledge to the process of discussing and, when possible, resolving issues
and problems between opposing parties, which might include the unit itself. The leader on the ground must
know when he has exhausted his options under the ROE and ROI, and turn over the discussion to a higher
authority.
Preplanned negotiations
7-57. These allow discussion and resolution of an upcoming, specific issue or problem. For example, a
company commander may conduct a work coordination meeting between leaders of the belligerents
to determine mine-clearing responsibilities. As with situational negotiations, preplanned negotiations
require leaders to know and understand the ROE and ROI. Leaders must also know as much as possible
about every aspect of the dispute or issue. The negotiator’s goal is to reach an agreement that is acceptable
to both sides, and that reduces antagonism and the threat of renewed hostilities.
Considerations during Counterinsurgencies
7-58. Commanders should identify powerful groups both inside and outside their AOs, and obtain key
information about them to better prepare for negotiating and mediating. Analyzing civil considerations
using ASCOPE is a useful tool. This prior preparation can be especially beneficial for the day-to-day
situational negotiations and mediations that can easily arise during daily operations. This key
information includes—
• Formal relationships such as treaties or alliances between groups.
• Informal relationships such as tolerance or friction between groups.
• Divisions and cleavages between groups.
• Cross-cutting relationships between groups such as religious beliefs, political parties, and
business ventures.
Guidelines for Negotiations and Mediations
7-59. Credibility is key to success. As a rule, only communicate necessary information and those actions
that authorities and commanders intend to do or have the authority to do. Successful negotiating often
involves communicating a clear position on all issues. This includes visualizing several possible end states,
while maintaining a clear idea of the best end state and conveying a willingness to bargain on negotiable
points. Use tact to justify standing firm on nonnegotiable points while still communicating respect for other
participants and consider having points that are disposable to use for concessions. |
3-24.2 | 215 | Stability Operations Considerations in Counterinsurgency
Steps
7-60. Several steps are common to negotiations and mediations, especially preplanned negotiations:
Determine the Purpose
7-61. Before contacting leaders of the belligerent parties to initiate the negotiation or mediation process,
participants must know what they are trying to do, as well as the limits of their authority. Ensure that
participants can recommend that their superiors ratify the agreement.
Prepare
7-62. Thorough preparation is needed to ensure the success of the negotiation or mediation process.
Commanders must familiarize themselves with both the situation and the area in which their unit will
operate. They should consider selecting one person who understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural
issues to observe a negotiation or mediation and give advice. This individual can watch for body language
and other indicators of how the process is working. In turn, this person may be able to coach more effective
techniques to the negotiators or mediators. Leaders should also develop an agenda for the meeting
and consider the conduct, customs, and actions expected at the meeting
Communicate
7-63. Participants must establish an effective means of communicating with all parties. They should not
assume that a certain leader or element is opposed to their efforts without careful investigation. Instead,
they must ensure that facts are correct before forming any opinions. The commander must earn the trust
and confidence of any opposing party. This includes establishing an atmosphere (and a physical setting)
that participants will judge to be both fair and safe.
Execute
7-64. Always strive to maintain control of the session; be firm, yet even-handed, in leading the
discussion. At the same time, be flexible, with a willingness to accept recommendations from the opposing
parties and from assistants and advisors. Settle the easy issues first. Be prepared to precede issue-by-issue
in a predetermined order. Actions can have different connotations to individuals of other cultures. Culture
shapes how people reason, what they accept as fact, and what principles they apply to decision making.
Also, nonverbal behavior, such as the symbolic rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting,
is important. If participants cannot reach agreement, they must keep the dialogue going. At a minimum,
they must seek agreement on when the parties will meet again.
Leader and Meeting Security
7-65. Key leaders and important meetings, even in established nonviolent peaceful areas of the world,
need security. This security allows leaders to focus on the meeting’s purpose without distractions. During a
counterinsurgency, security becomes an absolute requirement as all key leaders and important meetings are
potential targets for insurgents. Successful counterinsurgency operations require active interaction with the
population. This interaction varies from formal meetings and negotiations to informal interactions with
local citizens. Formal meetings and negotiations are significant mission events and should be thoroughly
planned and properly resourced. Informal interactions happen with little or no planning but must still be
prepared for thorough training and SOPs. In most situations, unit leaders, from team leaders up are the
individuals who will be involved in regular interactions and meetings. These personnel are often placed
in exposed positions as they execute their mission. At the tactical level, a personal security detachment, MP
platoon, or squad will typically secure a leader, VIP, or meeting. Leaders and units consider several things
when preparing for meetings or negotiations:
Individual Soldier Interactions
7-66. In a counterinsurgency environment, individual Soldiers interact daily with the local population.
When doing so, they must maintain situational awareness and be prepared to react immediately to a range
of situations. While one Soldier interacts, another should provide security for the other. This is easy if the
buddy system is used. |
3-24.2 | 216 | Chapter 7
Considerations for Leader Security
7-67. At least one person should be ready to provide close-in, direct physical protection for the leader.
However, this should not interfere with the leader’s mission accomplishment, should not irritate to other
participants, and should not include behavior that could be seen as a threat. Planning must also determine
any restrictions on people approaching the protected leader, and should restrict the circulation of people
around the leader. If armed at all, the leader should carry a sidearm. This leaves the leader's hands free
to react to close-in threats. Security personnel should take positions where they can observe everything
and everyone near the leader.
Considerations for Meeting Security
7-68. Before a meeting, crowd-control measures should be planned and prepared, even if crowds are not
expected. Evacuation routes and EOF procedures should be planned for key personnel. Planning for outer
security should include coverage of inner and outer cordons.
• The inner cordon protects the meeting participants, controls access to the meeting, and controls
the immediate crowd.
• The outer cordon isolates and controls access to the meeting. This cordon may be close in
and visible or out of sight of the actual meeting, focusing on outside elements trying to gain
access.
7-69. If available, use special units or weapons such as snipers and shotguns or nonlethal weapons. Use
at least one interpreter (two are preferred). One actively interprets while the other observes body language
and listens to side conversations in the audience. All of these steps should be rehearsed before execution.
7-70. A typical technique for conducting a meeting includes reconnoitering the meeting site and also
conducting a pre-site clearance before the meeting. Forces also establish outer and inner cordons, secure
the meeting, collapse both cordons, and then conduct an orderly movement back to their base or combat
outpost. All of these actions should be rehearsed extensively prior to execution.
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES
7-71. Army forces establish or restore the most basic services and protect them until a civil authority or
the Host Nation can provide them. Here, the counterinsurgent force works toward meeting the population’s
basic needs. Ideally, the military is simply providing the security for the humanitarian assistance.
Normally, Army forces support other government, intergovernmental, and Host Nation agencies. When the
Host Nation or other agency cannot perform its role, Army forces may provide the basics directly
(FM 3-0). Tactical units focus primarily on addressing the immediate needs of a population and fostering
Host Nation efforts at restoring essential services. However, in the absence of Host Nation capability,
military forces may directly perform these tasks as the Host Nation develops the ability to do them on its
own. Tactical units will generally provide for the basic needs of the population, such as food, water,
shelter, and basic medical care. Should other agencies be present, close coordination between military
forces and those agencies will become paramount. (See FM 3-07 for technique considerations.)
SUBORDINATE TASKS
7-72. Typical subordinate tasks to restore essential services follow:
• Provide essential civil services.
• Tasks related to civilian dislocation.
• Support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.
• Support public health programs.
• Support education programs.
Provide Essential Civil Services
7-73. Although closely related to establishing and supporting effective local governance, efforts
to provide essential civil services to the HN population involve developing the capacity to operate, |
3-24.2 | 217 | Stability Operations Considerations in Counterinsurgency
maintain, and improve those services. This broader focus involves a societal component that encompasses
long-range education and training, employment programs, and economic investment and development. At
the tactical level, activities of military forces to provide essential civil services are often defined in terms
of the immediate humanitarian needs of the people: providing the food, water, shelter, and medical support
necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored. Once their immediate needs are
satisfied, efforts to restore basic services and transition control to civil authorities typically progress using
lines of effort based on the memory aid, SWEAT-MSO (sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash,
medical, safety, and other considerations). These lines of effort are vital to integrating efforts to reestablish
local HN services with similar, related actions to establish a safe, secure environment. Tactical units may
support the effort to provide essential civil services by conducting detailed infrastructure reconnaissance
or security for those types of reconstruction projects. Essential tasks may include—
• Provide for immediate humanitarian needs (food, water, shelter, and medical support).
• Ensure proper sanitation, purification, and distribution of drinking water.
• Provide interim sanitation, wastewater, and waste disposal services.
Tasks Related to Civilian Dislocation
7-74. In the fluid and uncertain nature of an insurgency, the population is often left homeless. The
presence and uncontrolled flow of dislocated civilians can threaten the success of any stability operation.
The treatment of displaced populations either fosters trust and confidence—laying the foundation
for stabilization and reconstruction among a traumatized population—or creates resentment and further
chaos. Local and international aid organizations are most often best equipped to deal with the needs of the
local populace but require a secure environment in which to operate. Through close cooperation, tactical
units can enable the success of these organizations by providing critical assistance to the populace. Nearly
80 percent of all dislocated civilians are women or children. Most suffer from some form of posttraumatic
stress disorder, and all require food, shelter, and medical care. Following a major disaster, humanitarian
crisis, or conflict, providing adequate support to dislocated civilians often presents a challenge beyond the
capability of available military forces. Therefore, military forces offer vital support—coordinated with the
efforts of other agencies organizations—to provide humanitarian assistance to the general population. The
list of essential tasks includes—
• Assist dislocated civilians.
• Support assistance to dislocated civilians.
• Support security to dislocated civilian camps.
Support Famine Prevention and Emergency Food Relief Programs
7-75. Famine vulnerability may cause an insurgency. An insurgency could certainly lead to a food
scarcity. The combination of weak institutions, poor policies, and environmental change often results
in famine. Famine may result in food insecurity, increased poverty, morbidity, malnutrition, and mortality.
Government agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), numerous
nongovernmental organizations, and the United Nations, are instrumental to response efforts
in famine-prone states. They oversee the major relief programs that provide emergency food aid
to suffering populations. Tactical unit of these efforts is vital to the overall success of the operation.
Essential tasks may include—
• Monitor and analyze food security and market prices.
• Predict the effects of conflict on access to food.
• Estimate total food needs.
• Assess the adequacy of local physical transport, distribution, and storage of food.
• Deliver emergency food aid to most vulnerable populations.
Support Public Health Programs
7-76. This enables the complementary efforts of local and international aid organizations. The initial
efforts of military forces aim to stabilize the public health situation within the operational area. These
efforts may include assessments of the civilian medical and public health system such as infrastructure,
medical staff, training and education, medical logistics, and public health programs. Achieving measurable |
3-24.2 | 218 | Chapter 7
progress requires early coordination and constant dialog with other actors; ultimately, this also facilitates a
successful transition from military-led efforts to civilian organizations or the Host Nation. Essential tasks
may include—
• Assess public health hazards within their AO including malnutrition, water sources, and sewer
and other sanitation services.
• Assess existing medical infrastructure including preventative and veterinary services, health—
physical and psychological—care systems, and medical logistics.
• Evaluate the need for additional medical capabilities.
• Repair existing civilian clinics and hospitals.
• Operate or augment the operations of existing civilian medical facilities.
• Prevent epidemics through immediate vaccinations.
• Support improvements to local waste and wastewater management capacity.
• Promote and enhance the HN medical infrastructure.
Support Education Programs
7-77. Military activities to support education programs generally focus on repairing or building physical
infrastructure such as classrooms, schools, or universities. In some cases, trained personnel with
appropriate civilian backgrounds provide additional services such as administrative or educational
expertise.
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT
7-78. This helps a Host Nation develop capability and capacity. It includes both short—and long-term
aspects. The short-term aspect concerns immediate problems, such as large-scale unemployment
and reestablishing an economy at all levels. The long-term aspect involves stimulating indigenous, robust,
and broad economic activity. The stability a nation enjoys is often related to its people’s economic situation
and its adherence to the rule of law. However, a nation’s economic health also depends on its government’s
ability to continuously secure its population.
SUBORDINATE TASKS
7-79. Typical subordinate tasks for support to economic and infrastructure development include—
• Support economic generation and enterprise creation.
• Support public sector investment programs.
• Support private sector development.
• Protect natural resources and environment.
• Support agricultural development programs.
• Restore transportation infrastructure.
• Restore telecommunications infrastructure.
• Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs.
• Use money as a weapon.
SUPPORT ECONOMIC GENERATION AND ENTERPRISE CREATION
7-80. Economic recovery begins with an actively engaged labor force. Insurgencies often gain recruits
by offering the unemployed a wage. When a tactical unit occupies its AO, the demand for local goods,
services, and labor creates employment opportunities for the local populace. Local projects, such
as restoring public services, rebuilding schools, or clearing roads, offer additional opportunities for the
local labor pool. Drawing on local goods, services, and labor presents the force with the first opportunity
to infuse cash into the local economy, which in turn stimulates market activity. However, this initial
economic infusion must be translated into consistent capital availability and sustainable jobs programs.
Thus, short-term actions are taken with an eye towards enabling financial self-reliance and the creation of a
durable enterprise and job market. |
3-24.2 | 219 | Stability Operations Considerations in Counterinsurgency
7-81. The local economy requires this stimulus to sustain economic generation and enterprise creation.
It includes efforts to execute contracting duties; identify, prioritize, and manage local projects;
and implement employment programs. Often, such programs reinforce efforts to establish security and civil
order by providing meaningful employment and compensation for the local populace. The assessment
of the economic sector must include developing knowledge and understanding of local pay scales; this
is essential to establishing jobs programs with appropriate wages. Inflated pay scales may divert critical
professionals from their chosen field in pursuit of short-term financial gains from new jobs created by the
force. Establishing appropriate pay scales is also significant when the environment includes illicit actors
willing to pay for actions or services in direct conflict with the aims of the force. Adversaries can easily
exploit relatively low pay scales and quickly undermine efforts to build positive perceptions among the
people.
7-82. HN enterprise creation is an essential activity whereby the local people organize themselves
to provide valuable goods and services. In doing so, they create jobs for themselves, their families,
and neighbors that are inherently sustainable after the departure of other actors. Host nation enterprises
may provide various goods and services, including essential services such as small-scale sewerage, water,
electricity, transportation, health care, and communications. The availability of financing through banking
or microfinance institutions is essential to enterprise creation. Essential tasks may include—
• Implement initiatives to provide immediate employment.
• Create employment opportunities for all ages and genders.
• Assess the labor force for critical skills requirements and shortfalls.
• Assess market sector for manpower requirements and pay norms.
• Implement public works projects.
• Support establishment of a business registry to register lawful business activity at the local
or provincial level.
• Provide start-up capital for small businesses through small-scale enterprise grants.
• Encourage the creation of small lending institutions.
• Enable the development of financial institutions.
Support Public Sector Investment Programs
7-83. Organizations such as the US Agency for International Development usually manage public sector
investment in a fragile state. However, the military force can also influence success in these programs.
Public sector investment ensures the long-term viability of public education, health care, and mass transit.
It also provides for development in industries—such as mining, oil, and natural gas—and hydroelectricity.
At the tactical level, units may spur investment through grant programs or direct public investment
projects. Essential tasks may include—
• Identify projects that require large amounts of labor.
• Prioritize public investment needs.
• Develop plans to allocate available resources.
Support Private Sector Development
7-84. Developing the private sector typically begins with employing large portions of the labor force.
In addition to acquiring goods and services from the local economy, the tasks that support private sector
development infuse much-needed cash into local markets and initiate additional public investment
and development. Essential tasks may include—
• Identify projects that require large amounts of labor.
• Assess the depth of the private sector and enterprise creation.
• Identify obstacles to private sector development.
• Facilitate access to markets.
• Strengthen the private sector through contracting and outsourcing.
• Provide investors with protection and incentives. |
3-24.2 | 220 | Chapter 7
Support Agricultural Development Programs
7-85. The agricultural sector is a cornerstone of a viable market economy, providing crops and livestock
vital to local markets and international trade. The development of this sector may be hindered by property
disputes, difficulty accessing nearby markets, poor irrigation, animal disease, minefields, or unexploded
ordnance. Therefore, development agencies prioritize and integrate projects with related tasks in other
stability sectors to establish and institutionalize practical solutions to the long-term growth of the
agricultural sector. The military contribution to agricultural development parallels related efforts to spur
economic growth in local communities. Together, they draw on local labor pools to help reestablish basic
services central to the agricultural sector. Essential tasks may include—
• Assess the state of agricultural sector.
• Secure and protect post-harvest storage facilities.
• Rebuild small-scale irrigation systems.
• Establish work programs to support agricultural development.
• Protect water sources.
• Identify constraints to production.
• Assess health, diversity, and numbers of animals.
• Establish transportation and distribution networks.
• Encourage Host Nation enterprise creation to provide goods and services to the
agricultural sector.
• Ensure open transit and access to local markets.
Restore Transportation Infrastructure
7-86. Even at the local level, this is central to economic recovery. An underdeveloped or incapacitated
transportation infrastructure limits freedom of movement, trade, social interaction, and development.
Goods must make it to the markets. Military forces often initiate immediate improvement to the
transportation and distribution networks of the Host Nation. These networks enable freedom of maneuver,
logistic support, and the movement of personnel and materiel to support ongoing operations. They also
may reduce the risk of IED attacks on security forces. These improvements facilitate the vital assistance
efforts of civilian agencies organizations that follow in the wake of military forces. Essential tasks may
include an initial response in which military forces—
• Assess overall condition of local transportation infrastructure (airports, roads, bridges,
railways, coastal and inland ports, harbors, and waterways), including facilities and equipment.
• Determine and prioritize essential infrastructure programs and projects.
• Conduct expedient repairs or build new facilities to facilitate commercial trade.
Restore Telecommunications Infrastructure
7-87. This exists to support every element of a society, from the government to the financial sector,
and from the media to the HN populace. The failure of this infrastructure accelerates the collapse of the
HN, isolates the HN government and populace from the outside world, and hampers development efforts.
The military contribution to reconstruction efforts in the telecommunications infrastructure is limited;
normally, few essential tasks exist in this area. Essential tasks may include military forces—
• Assess overall condition of the national telecommunications infrastructure.
• Determine and prioritize essential infrastructure programs and projects.
Support General Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs
7-88. General infrastructure reconstruction programs focus on rehabilitating the state’s ability
to produce and distribute fossil fuels, generate electrical power, exercise engineering and construction
support, and provide municipal and other services to the populace. Such capacity building spurs
rehabilitation efforts that establish the foundation for long-term development. As with the restoration
of essential services, support to general infrastructure programs requires a thorough understanding of the
civil considerations using ASCOPE. Civil affairs (CA) personnel support this information collection |
3-24.2 | 221 | Stability Operations Considerations in Counterinsurgency
to help prioritize programs and projects. Essential tasks may include an initial response in which military
forces—
• Assess overall condition of local energy infrastructure.
• Determine and prioritize essential infrastructure programs and projects.
• Assess condition of existing power generation and distribution facilities.
• Assess condition of existing natural resources conversion and distribution facilities.
• Assess condition of existing facilities needed to effectively execute essential tasks
in other sectors.
• Assess conditions of existing municipal facilities that provide essential services.
• Conduct expedient repairs or build new facilities to support the local populace.
Use Money as a Weapon System
7-89. Recent experiences have shown the effectiveness of using money to win popular support
and further the interests and goals of units conducting counterinsurgency operations. Money should be
used carefully. In most cases, higher authority will tightly control funds through strict accountability
measures that ensure the money is used properly. When used effectively, and with an end state in mind,
money can be an effective means to mobilize public support for the counterinsurgent’s cause and further
alienate the insurgents from the population. A counterinsurgency force can use money to—
• Fund civic cleanup and other sanitation projects, and the equipment to complete those projects.
• Fund small scale infrastructure improvements.
• Fund agricultural projects to improve farming practices and livestock health, or help implement
cooperative farming programs.
• Repair civic and cultural sites and facilities.
• Repair institutions and infrastructure critical to governance and rule of law such as prisons,
courthouses, and police stations.
• Purchase education supplies or repair infrastructure critical for educating the local populace.
• Pay rewards to citizens who provide information on enemy activities and locations
• Support the creation, training, and operation of Host Nation security forces.
• Fund events and activities that build relationships with Host Nation officials and citizens.
• Repair damage resulting from combined and coalition operations.
• Provide condolence payments to civilians for casualties from combined and coalition
operations.
TECHNIQUES
7-90. Two techniques include the USAID principles of reconstruction and development, which can be
used by tactical units for project selection and small-scale building projects. (See FM 3-07 for additional
considerations.)
Principles of Project Selection
7-91. The following principals apply to project selection and the corresponding use of resources,
especially financial resources, in support of counterinsurgency operations:
Host Nation Ownership
7-92. This principle holds that units must ensure that there is counterinsurgent and Host Nation
ownership of any project. The local population and the government officials who serve them should view
any project as their own and not one that has been imposed by outside agencies. A project that has been
locally conceived, funded, and constructed legitimizes the government and contributes to stability. |
3-24.2 | 222 | Chapter 7
Capacity Building
7-93. This principle involves the transfer of knowledge, techniques, and skills to the local people,
institutions, and government so that they develop the requisite abilities to deliver essential services to the
population. Ultimately, the local officials and institutions that gain capacity are better prepared to lead their
regions through political, economic, and security-related issues.
Sustainability
7-94. This principle says that commanders should design and select projects and services that will have
a lasting effect on the local population. In other words, the impact of the projects under consideration must
endure after the facility or service is handed off to local authorities and the unit (or contractor's) departure
from the site. Sustainability also implies that the local government has the necessary resources to staff
and maintain the project. There are examples where commanders have failed to conduct adequate analysis
and built new schools or medical clinics only to discover that too few teachers or doctors were available
to staff these facilities. Similarly, some commanders have purchased large generator systems to address
electricity shortfalls for neighborhoods within their AOs. However, without addressing the fuel,
maintenance, and service requirements of these systems, the machines eventually failed and were unable
to serve as a sustainable solution for the local electrical deficit.
Selectivity
7-95. The development community defines this principle as the allocation of resources based on need,
local commitment, and foreign policy interests. These strategic characteristics are equally important
tactically. Commanders seldom receive all of the financial resources they need when implementing their
essential service, economic, and governance lines of effort. Therefore, they must "mass" available
resources into select reconstruction projects that offer the following advantages:
• The local government strongly supports them.
• They will positively impact the most people
• They will achieve the commander's desired effects.
Assessment
7-96. This principle advises the commander and his staff to carefully research nominations, adopt best
practices, and design for local conditions in their proposed projects. Commanders should request
or conduct an assessment of local conditions before investing financial resources into any potential relief
or reconstruction program. Money should not be invested in an intelligence vacuum—all available
information about local conditions should be considered such as the population's requirements, animosities,
traditions, capabilities, economics, and so on. A detailed assessment of local conditions will best advise the
commander on the project's potential to deliver its desired effects.
Results
7-97. This principle relates directly to the principle of assessment and advises commanders to direct
resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and long-term focused objectives. This development
principle is analogous to the military principle of objective—direct every military operation toward a
clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. It is equally critical that the commander and his staff
also assess potential unintended results from their use of money. Many second or third order effects from a
project may potentially outweigh the benefits from the original intent.
Partnership
7-98. This principle encourages close collaboration with local governments, communities, donors,
nonprofit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities. Partnership plays a
central role in any relief, reconstruction, or development program as it supports each of the other principles
of reconstruction and development. In the context of money as a weapon system, effective partnership will
ensure the unit's financial resources are well invested and deconflicted with other programs from other
agencies. |
3-24.2 | 223 | Stability Operations Considerations in Counterinsurgency
Flexibility
7-99. This principle states that units must adapt to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities,
and maximize effectiveness as part of their reconstruction and development program. Just as the conditions
for offensive and defensive operations are often changing and uncertain, so are the relief
and reconstruction tasks associated with stability operations. These conditions will often require
commanders to change tactics to achieve desired objectives.
Accountability
7-100. Enforcing accountability, building transparency into systems, and emplacing effective checks
and balances to guard against corruption are important components to any relief, reconstruction,
or development program. Accountability in all actions, including the unit’s use of money, reinforces the
legitimacy of the commander and his operations, as well as the legitimacy of the local government, in the
eyes of the population.
Small-Scale Building Projects
7-101. Small-scale building projects encompass almost all construction, both permanent and temporary,
that is limited in scale. Examples include schoolhouses, clinics, simple irrigation works, farm-to-market
roads, or small police stations. These projects also try to provide immediate, short-term economic stimuli
and long term benefits to a local area. The HN should have the highest possible profile and participation
in all phases of these projects. Before construction begins, leader’s should understand the second and third
order effects of the project, such as which group(s) will profit from the project or use the project and any
conflicts of interest that arise from it. They should also consider the following:
• The local population should need or want the project.
• The project should support the Host Nation’s plan.
• The project should support the unit’s COIN mission and long-range plans.
• The project should support Host Nation civilian authority.
• The counterinsurgent unit should develop a sustainability plan.
Basic Technique Considerations
7-102. The following outlines a basic process to conduct a small-scale building project:
Concept Development
7-103. Identify needs and potential projects to fill those needs. Soldiers and leaders at every level
of responsibility should help in identifying potential projects that will further the unit’s and the Host
Nation’s interests in an AO. Leaders identify potential projects through meetings with local officials
and through interaction with the local populace, along with their own observations of their area
of operations. Concurrently, possible locations are identified, surveyed, and discussed with the local
population and leaders to ensure suitability.
Project Planning
7-104. Once the site has been selected and the project is ready to move forward, a plan for security
is developed and implemented. Whenever possible, Host Nation police forces should be used. The
counterinsurgent unit should also continually assess the security situation and adjust the security plan
accordingly based on the changing threat. Consideration should also be given to sustaining the security
forces for the duration of the project.
• Create the design and obtain approval of design.
• Determine resource requirements.
(cid:131) Material.
(cid:131) Equipment.
(cid:131) Personnel—Labor (professional, skilled, and unskilled). |
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(cid:131) Wages and payment system.
(cid:131) Infrastructure needs (SWEAT-MSO).
• Conduct available resource assessment.
(cid:131) Availability of local HN civilian resources.
(cid:131) Availability of National/regional HN civilian resources.
(cid:131) US civilian and international resources.
(cid:131) US government and military resources
• Determine project participants and division of responsibilities.
(cid:131) HN national and regional.
(cid:131) Local HN.
(cid:131) US Government employees and contractors.
(cid:131) NGO.
• Contract the services.
(cid:131) Material support.
(cid:131) Equipment support
(cid:131) Personnel support (individual labor).
(cid:131) Subcontractor support (specific service).
(cid:131) Infrastructure support (warehouses, electrical, sewage, water, and so on).
• Identify, design and incorporate information engagement theme and message.
Project Execution
• Execute the project.
• Establish periodic progress meetings or reviews.
Project Completion
• Hand over ownership to HN authority—preferably local officials.
• Plan on a follow-up visit to resolve questions or issues and ensure sustainability.
SUMMARY
The seven counterinsurgency lines of effort (LOEs), establish civil security, establish civil control, support
Host Nation security forces, support to governance, restore essential services, and support to economic
and infrastructure development are critical to the success of any stability consideration during a
counterinsurgency operation. Ultimate success in any counterinsurgency operation requires a
combination of military and nonmilitary efforts. As President Bush stated in 2007 in reference
to operations in Iraq:
“A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that
military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities.”
Stability operations during a counterinsurgency seek to bring about those community improvements
and create a safe, secure, and productive environment for the populace. |
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Support to Host Nation Security Forces
“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably
than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it
for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical
work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”
T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles
This chapter addresses the working relationship between US forces and Host Nation
security forces. It begins with a discussion of the benefits and challenges involved
and resources required. It provides a framework for successful US and Host Nation
operations that accomplish both HN and US objectives.
Section I—BENEFITS, CHALLENGES, AND GOALS
Success in counterinsurgency operations requires establishing a legitimate government, supported by the
people, and able to address the root causes that insurgents use to gain support. Achieving these goals requires
the Host Nation to secure the populace, defeat the insurgents, uphold the rule of law, and provide a basic level
of essential services and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective Host Nation
security force. A goal in any counterinsurgency operation is the eventual transition of the responsibility
for security to the Host Nation security forces. Many factors influence the amount and type of assistance
required in developing Host Nation security forces. These factors include—
• Existing HN security force capabilities.
• Character of the insurgency.
• Population and culture.
• Level of commitment and sovereignty of the Host Nation.
• Level of commitment from the United States and other nations.
• Impact of US forces on the local infrastructure and HN legitimacy.
BENEFITS
8-1. A Host Nation is a nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation,
government representatives, agencies, forces or supplies of another nation to operate in or to transit
through its territory under specified conditions (JP 1-02). A Host Nation naturally needs security forces.
Therefore, a primary goal of partnering is to get the best that both sides have to offer. Figure 8-1 shows a
typical flow of these benefits.
US ARMY ASSETS
8-2. These bring numerous assets to the counterinsurgency fight. They bring a professional military
with its training, leadership, targeting, technology, assets, resources, and expertise.
HN ASSETS
8-3. These also bring many assets to the fight. If properly measured, organized, rebuilt, trained,
equipped, advised, and mentored, an HN security force unit is uniquely able to protect the HN population,
because they understand the operational environment far better than US Forces. Their cultural
and situational awareness is a significant force multiplier during any counterinsurgency operation,
especially in HUMINT, information engagement, negotiations, and targeting. In terms of specific COIN
operations, HN security forces can aid or even take the lead on clear-hold-build operations. They should be |
3-24.2 | 226 | Chapter 8
completely integrated in the planning process, instrumental in the decision of what areas need to be
cleared, included in the site selection process for the hold phase, and leveraged in the decisions on what
stability operations need to be conducted during the build phase. Thus, a Host Nation unit potentially
brings to a counterinsurgency fight the abilities shown in Figure 8-2.
Figure 8-1. Partnership benefits.
Understand the Operational The AO is their home and their culture; they know the language, the
Environment different groups, the political situation, educational levels, economic
considerations, historical bad actors, and unofficial community leaders.
Provide Human Intelligence The HN security force is better able to gather information that leads
to HUMINT for a host of reasons, to include speaking the same
language, understanding the important players in the area, and so on.
Put the Pieces Together They can often better integrate the different fragments of intelligence
into the context of the operational environment.
Determine Credibility of They possess a vastly superior sense of cultural and situational
Intelligence Assets (Sources, awareness vital to managing and assigning credibility to sources.
Walk-Ins, Call-Ins)
Validate and Check They can confirm not only the interpreters' ability, but also the
Interpreters interpreters' loyalty.
Identify and Root Out They can pick out minute differences between normal and abnormal
Infiltrators behavior.
Gain Information Superiority They can write messages that resonate with the local populace.
Figure 8-2. Host nation contributions.
CHALLENGES
8-4. Most nations have at least some cultural obstacles to developing a professional military that
is responsive and accountable to the HN population. Part of the challenge is to design a professional
military that minimizes these culture obstacles. Most challenges arise from the differing perspectives of the
US and the Host Nation. |
3-24.2 | 227 | Support to Host Nation Security Forces
EXAMPLES
8-5. Common cultural challenges include the following:
• Nepotism, such as, rank or positions based on who you know.
• Denial of negative results or errors in the interest of saving face.
• Corruption, such as unofficial or under the table entitlements.
• Influence from competing loyalties (ethnic, religious, tribal and political allegiances).
CATEGORIES
8-6. These challenges fall under one of four broad categories of resources, leadership, abusing power
organizational structures.
Resources
8-7. Governments must properly balance national resources to meet the people’s expectations. Funding
for services, education, and health care can limit resources available for security forces. HN spending
priorities may result in a security force capable of protecting only the capital and key government facilities,
leaving the rest of the country unsecured. HN security forces will typically not have the same resources,
equipment, money, or salaries as US units. US units may not have the means to partially sustain the HN
security forces to maximize their effectiveness. Conducting effective COIN operations requires allocating
resources to ensure integration of efforts to develop all aspects of the security force.
Leadership
8-8. Counterinsurgents may need to influence the existing HN approach to leadership. HN leaders may
be appointed and promoted based on family ties or membership in a party or faction, rather than on
demonstrated competence or performance. Leaders may not seek to develop their subordinates or feel the
need to ensure the welfare of subordinates. In some cases, leaders enforce the subordinates’ obedience by
fear and use their leadership position to exploit them. Positions of power can lead to corruption, which can
also be affected by local culture. Ethical climate and decision making in the HN security force leadership
is often reflected in the HN security force organization’s treatment of detainees. This is a proven barometer
of the commander’s ability to guide his unit and provide lasting security for the HN population.
8-9. US Forces tasked to develop HN security forces should take special interest in how the Host
Nation appoints, promotes, and develops leaders. The best way US advisors and partner units can influence
leaders is to provide positive leadership examples.
Abuse of Power
8-10. The behavior of HN security force personnel is often a primary cause of public dissatisfaction.
Corrupting influences of power must be guarded against. Cultural and ethnic differences within a
population may lead to significant discrimination within the security forces and by security forces against
minority groups. In more ideological struggles, discrimination may be against members of other political
parties, whether in a minority cultural group or not. Security forces that abuse civilians do not win the
populace’s trust and confidence; they may even be a contributing factor of the insurgency. US partners
and advisors must identify and address biases, as well as improper or corrupt practices.
8-11. Abuse of power, such as hoarding property, extortion, or reprisal attacks on a specific group,
could be a root cause that lead to the insurgency or could worsen the insurgency. Units need to understand
issues in the OE and define the problem before attempting to “fix” problems. A current example is how various
groups may have a long cyclical history of conflict with other population groups. Ethnic, historical, political,
racial, religious, social, and territorial turmoil may contribute to cycles of violence in the Host Nation so
intractable that it will take establishing discipline, a code of honor, patriotic nationalism, and a merit based
promotion system inherent in a professional military to break this societal norm. Even then, these efforts may
not be sufficient to stop the abuse of power. |
3-24.2 | 228 | Chapter 8
Organizational Structures
8-12. Perhaps the biggest hurdle for US forces is accepting that the Host Nation can ensure security
using organizational and operational structures that differ from US practices. The goal is not to make the HN
unit a US unit, nor even to make it operate like a US unit. HN security force commanders must be given leeway
in resolving their own security problems. Mirror imaging HN security force structure is often impractical
and does not approach the problem from the perspective root causes that lead to the insurgency. The
population, and subsequently their military, will have cultural aspects that will differ with US norms.
8-13. Commanders must recognize that the “American way is best” bias is counterproductive with
respect to most Host Nation security forces. While relationships among US police, customs, and military
organizations and individual unit structure work for the United States, those relationships may not exist in other
nations that have developed differently. Units and advisors should develop innovative ways to maximize the
effectiveness of the Host Nation’s organization, units, and bureaucracy.
GOALS
8-14. Training HN security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a “quick
fix.” To ensure long-term success, commanders clarify their desired end state for training programs early. These
goals consist of a set of military characteristics common to all militaries. Those characteristics have nuances
in different countries. Figure 8-3 shows how well-trained HN security forces should be characterized.
Section II—THE FRAMEWORK
Developing HN security forces is a complex and challenging mission. The United States and multinational
partners can only succeed if they approach the mission with the same deliberate planning and preparation,
energetic execution, and appropriate resourcing as the combat aspects of the COIN operation. Accordingly,
COIN force commanders and staffs need to consider the task of developing HN security forces during their
initial mission analysis. They must make that task an integral part of all assessments, planning, coordination,
and preparation. This section discusses developing a plan and developing Host Nation security forces.
DEVELOPING A PLAN
8-15. To defeat the insurgency and be able to sustain success, the Host Nation should develop a plan,
with US assistance when necessary, to improve the unit’s organization, training, material, leadership, personnel,
and facilities. However, these elements are tightly linked, simultaneously pursued, and difficult to prioritize.
Commanders monitor progress in all domains. The HN security force plan must be appropriate to HN
capabilities and requirements. At the tactical level, the US advisors or partner units will outline goals, allocate
resources, and schedule events as part of the plan under the COIN line of effort—support Host Nation security
forces.
CONSIDERATIONS
8-16. Competently trained and led Host Nation security forces are vital to winning a counterinsurgency
and to sustaining a stable, secure, and just state. If local communities do not perceive US and HN forces
as legitimate, or that they cannot provide for security, then the population will not risk providing the timely
intelligence necessary to defeat the insurgency. In addition, if the populace does not see at least a gradual
transition to Host Nation responsibility, they may begin to view the HN security forces as an instrument
or puppet of US forces. Finally, these failures will result in HN security forces that are ill equipped to persevere
in a protracted struggle after US/coalition forces withdraw. |
3-24.2 | 229 | Support to Host Nation Security Forces
PROFICIENT
Security forces can work well in close coordination to suppress lawlessness and insurgency.
Military units are—
(cid:131) Tactically and technically proficient
(cid:131) Able to perform their national security responsibilities
(cid:131) Able to integrate their operations with those of multinational partners.
Nonmilitary security forces—
(cid:131) Can maintain civil order, enforce laws, control borders, secure key infrastructure, and detain criminal
suspects.
(cid:131) Are well trained in modern police ethics.
(cid:131) Understand police and legal procedures, including the basics of investigation and evidence collection.
WELL LED
Leaders at all levels—
(cid:131) Have sound professional standards and appropriate military values.
(cid:131) Are selected and promoted based on competence and merit.
PROFESSIONAL
Security forces—
(cid:131) Are honest, impartial, and committed to protecting and serving the entire population, operating under
the rule of law, and respecting human rights.
(cid:131) Are loyal to the central government and serving national interests, recognizing their role as the
people’s servants and not their masters.
(cid:131) Operate within a code of conduct and ethical behavior.
(cid:131) Recognize the merits of a trained and capable NCO and junior officer corps.
FLEXIBLE
Security forces can accomplish the broad missions required by the Host Nation—not only to defeat
insurgents or defend against outside aggression, but also to increase security in all areas. This requires an
effective command organizational structure that makes sense for the Host Nation.
INTEGRATED INTO SOCIETY
Security forces represent the Host Nation’s major ethnic groups. They are not seen as instruments of just
one faction. Cultural sensitivities toward the incorporation of women must be observed, but efforts should
also be made to include women in police and military organizations.
SELF-SUSTAINED
Security forces must be able to manage their own equipment throughout its life cycle. They must also
be able to provide their own administrative and sustainment support, especially fuel, water, food, and
ammunition.
Figure 8-3. Characteristics of well-trained HN security forces.
8-17. US leaders must gain trust and form bonds with HN security force units and personnel as part
of the partnership mission. Working towards cultural understanding improves the US forces relationship
with the partner units. Commanders must treat the individuals in partner units as they treat their Soldiers by
living, eating, sleeping, socializing, planning, and fighting side by side. The Host National security force |
3-24.2 | 230 | Chapter 8
must know that US forces care for them both individually and professionally. It is this bond, not the
materials or support that commanders provide, that inspires that level of commitment and loyalty. To
successfully train and support HN security forces, the US partner unit or advisor must—
• Ensure security forces understand that they support the HN government and the people.
• Maintain relevancy of security forces for their culture, their population, and their laws.
• Understand and define the security problem.
• Ensure credibility and legitimacy to all counterinsurgency operations.
• Provide a model for society by using military units of mixed ethnicity, religion, political
affiliation, for example, who can work together to secure and protect all the people.
• Conduct multinational operations with each newly trained security force.
• Promote mutual respect between US and HN forces and between the military, police,
and paramilitary.
• Train the trainers first, and then train the HN cadre.
• Support the HN cadre in training the whole force.
• Separate HN military and police forces, especially during their training.
• Place the HN cadre in charge as soon as possible.
• Recognize achievement, especially excellence.
• Train all security forces not to tolerate abuses or illegal activity outside of culturally
acceptable levels.
• Develop methods to report violations.
• Enable HN to assume the lead in counterinsurgency operations to alleviate effects of a large US
presence.
• Create, as needed, special elements in each force such as SWAT, waterway, border, or SOF.
• Establish and use mobile training teams.
• Ensure infrastructure and pay is appropriate and managed by the Host Nation government.
• Promote professionalism that does not tolerate internal incompetence. Develop methods
to redress.
ORGANIZING US FORCES
8-18. As planning unfolds, mission requirements should drive the initial organization for the unit
charged with developing security forces. To achieve unity of effort, a single organization should receive
this responsibility. Typically, these duties are undertaken by some form of an advisor team. Due
to manpower constraints, some functions are best undertaken by partner units.
Partner Units
8-19. This is a unit that shares all or a portion of an area of operation with an HN security force unit. US
forces operating as partner units to HN security forces need to be prepared to make some organizational
changes. US forces should consider establishing combined staff cells for intelligence, operations, planning
and logistics. These staff cells support transparent operations and unity of effort, enhance the relationship
between the BCT and the HN force by demonstrating a degree of trust, and develop HN capacity in key
staff areas by having HN personnel get intimately familiar with various staff procedures by performing
them alongside their CF partners.
8-20. Additionally, before deploying, US forces should train in partnering with HN security forces. This
will ease the transition to multinational operations. At a minimum, this should include cultural awareness
training, basic language training, and basic soldier skills training such as marksmanship and first aid.
Advisor Units
8-21. An advisor is a military member who conducts operations that train Host Nation military
individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills;
provide advice and assistance to military leaders, and provide training on tactics, techniques, |
3-24.2 | 231 | Support to Host Nation Security Forces
and procedures required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and develop
indigenous individual, leader, organizational skills. Advisor units can be internally or externally resourced.
Internally resourced advisor teams are created from the partner unit when they are required to establish
them on their own. Externally resourced teams are usually DA resourced for the duration of the advisor
team mission. One way of organizing for this role is to have an eleven person team with clearly divided
responsibilities. Each person's duties should reflect his responsibilities to the internal team, and to advising
their HN security force counterpart. In certain situations, the partner unit commander might need to provide
a security element to support an advisor team. This security element might need to be large enough
to guard a compound on an HN security force base and to crew several vehicles. A ten-person security
element has proved be useful in Iraq and Afghanistan. Figure 8-4 shows possible duties on the advisor
team.
Team Chief This Soldier is the principal advisor to the HN battalion commander and is
the Advisor team commander.
Team Sergeant This is the advisor team NCOIC, who also serves as principal advisor to the
HN command sergeant major or equivalent.
Executive Officer This Soldier is the principal advisor to the HN security forces executive
officer in addition to performing the same functions that any unit executive
officer would do in a traditional unit.
Intelligence Officer This Soldier is the principal advisor to the HN Intelligence Staff and provides
intelligence to the Advisor Team Chief.
Operations Officer This Soldier is the principal advisor to HN Staff for Operations and Training
(S3) and plans the advisor team operations.
Operations NCOIC This Soldier is the training NCOIC for the Advisor Team and is the principal
advisor to the Operations Staff NCO in the HN security force.
Operations NCO This Soldier is the advisor team armorer and principal instructor for basic
rifle marksmanship (small arms), short-range marksmanship
(SRM)/close-quarters battle (CQB), urban operations, patrolling,
checkpoints, and any other individual training deemed necessary based on
the OE.
Operations NCO This Soldier is the advisor team S1. He is also the principal instructor
for fires and effects considerations (CAS and artillery support).
Medical NCO This Soldier is the advisor team medical NCOIC and primary instructor
to HN security forces concerning medical issues.
Communications NCO This Soldier is the advisor team communications NCOIC and principal
communications instructor.
Logistics Officer This Soldier is the principal advisor to the HN staff for logistics and is the
logistics Chief for the advisor team.
Figure 8-4. Possible duties of the advisor team.
DEVELOPING HN SECURITY FORCES
8-22. The mission to develop HN security forces at all levels can be organized around seven tasks—
measure (assess), organize, rebuild/build facilities, train, equip, advise, and mentor. The memory aid
MORTEAM can help partner units and advisors. These tasks incorporate all doctrine, organization,
training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements
for developing the HN security forces. Although described sequentially, these tasks are normally
performed concurrently. For example, training and equipping operations must be integrated and, as the
operation progresses, assessments will lead to changes. If US forces are directly involved in operations
against insurgents, the development program requires a transition period during which major COIN
operations are handed over to HN security forces. Figure 8-5 shows the seven framework tasks as an
iterative and cyclical process, in which both advisor teams and partner units measure and mentor HN
security force units at each step. |
3-24.2 | 232 | Chapter 8
Figure 8-5. Seven framework tasks.
MEASURE (ASSESS) HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES
8-23. Commanders of advisor units and partner units must measure and assess the HN security forces
as part of the comprehensive program of analyzing the OE and the insurgency. The partner unit
and advisor team must work closely in assessing the quality of HN security forces. From the assessment,
planners develop short-, mid-, and long-range goals and programs. As circumstances change, so do the
goals and programs. In measuring the state of the Host Nation’s security forces, it may be determined that
some existing security forces are so dysfunctional or corrupt that the organizations must be disbanded
rather than rehabilitated. In some cases, commanders will need to replace some HN leaders before their
units will become functional. While every situation is different, leaders of the development program should
assess and measure the following HN security force factors throughout planning, preparation,
and execution of the operation:
• Social structure, organization, demographics, interrelationships, and education levels
of security force elements.
• Extent of acceptance of ethnic and religious minorities.
• Laws and regulations governing the security forces and their relationship to national leaders.
• Corruption, abuse of power, and nepotism.
• Equipment and facilities, with a priority placed on maintenance.
• Logistic and support structure, and its ability to meet the force’s requirements.
• The unit’s methods and proficiency at conducting COIN operations.
• State of training at all levels, and the specialties and education of leaders.
Assessment Techniques
8-24. HN security forces must be trained and tactically proficient for some time before they are
considered as ready to conduct operations on their own. US Partner units are responsible for the mentoring,
training, and welfare of their HN counterparts. Advisors assigned to the unit provide the day-to-day |
3-24.2 | 233 | Support to Host Nation Security Forces
connection, but are not sufficiently equipped to do everything required to build a well trained, well led,
sustainable and professional force. A nation's armed force that behaves unprofessionally can quickly lose
legitimacy, which is needed to conduct counterinsurgency operations and draw quality recruits. When the
US military mission fails to prepare HN security forces to take the lead—a key political objective—unity
of effort suffers at many levels. The results are often corruption, nepotism, and bureaucracy, which
generate obstacles to units who must rapidly adapt to the insurgent strategies and tactics. Due to these
factors, the HN will eventually lose the ability to persevere against a steadfast insurgent fighting a
protracted war.
8-25. US forces often choose to use a readiness assessment of an HN security force unit. Figure 8-6
shows an example format for a readiness assessment.
Figure 8-6. Example format for readiness assessment.
Assessment Periods
8-26. Assessing Host Nation security forces should be done for three distinct periods of time—short,
mid, and long. Considerations for each include—
Short
8-27. The advisor and partner unit are involved in the training of the Host Nation security force unit.
An example of a short term goal for an advisor unit would be ensuring that the HN operations officer
is tracking all of his units conducting missions. An example for a partner unit would be training the HN
Soldiers on marksmanship and room clearing.
Mid
8-28. The HN unit is more self-sufficient, but still not fully capable, and the advisor acts in a
supervisory role. An example of a mid-range goal for an advisor unit would be ensuring that the HN staff
plans for logistical support during missions. An example of a mid range goal for a partner unit would be
training platoon size units to move tactically during patrols. |
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Long
8-29. The HN unit can conduct training, planning, sustainment, and operations with little guidance
and the advisor provides oversight and mentorship. An example of advisor unit long-range goal would be
to ensure that the HN intelligence officer gathers, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence and is fully
integrated into the planning process. An example of a partner long-range goal would be to migrate
to providing only the additional forces and quick-reaction force (QRF) capabilities to the Host Nation
security force unit.
Assessing Methods and Proficiency
8-30. The training, leadership, equipment, logistics and operations of Host Nation security forces must
be assessed. If US advisors are not on the objective with the Host Nation forces, US forces may not know
their capabilities. Assessment of HN security forces may include their ability to—
• Plan and brief an operation.
• Perform correct actions on contact.
• Properly clear and mark rooms, halls, and stairwells.
• Perform other small unit tasks appropriate to the HN OE.
• Use NCOs.
• Employ fire control measures and maintain fire control.
• Call for air reserves or quick reaction force.
• Sustain themselves with Class I, III, and V supplies and provide medical support.
• Maintain vehicles and equipment.
• Maintain professionalism.
ORGANIZE
8-31. Organizing HN forces depends on the Host Nation’s social and economic conditions, cultural
and historical factors, and security threat. The development program’s aim is to create an efficient
organization with a command, intelligence, logistic, and operations structure that makes sense for the Host
Nation. Conventional forces with limited special-purpose teams, such as explosive ordnance disposal
and special weapons and tactics (SWAT), are preferred. Elite units tend to divert a large share of the best
leadership and remove critical talent from the regular forces. Doctrine should be standard across the force,
as should unit structures. The organization must facilitate the collection, processing, and dissemination
of intelligence across and throughout all security forces.
8-32. In many situations, simple personnel accountability is one of the greatest impediments to effective
organizations. The advisor team should mentor and advise the Host Nation security forces on keeping
better accountability. Formations, timelines, and uniform standards can be slow to be accepted, which can
stem from lack of supplies. Also, it is important that the unit can manage its leave and pass system. Once
achieved, this will further the capabilities of the Host Nation unit and allow them to focus on operations
and training, not troops to task.
Organizational Structure
8-33. As much as possible, the Host Nation should determine the security force organization’s structure.
The Host Nation may be open to proposals from US forces, but should approve all organizational designs.
As the HN government strengthens, US leaders and trainers should expect increasingly independent
organizational decisions. These may include changing the numbers of forces, types of units, and internal
organizational designs. Culture and conditions might result in security forces being given what may be
considered nontraditional roles and missions. HN police may be more paramilitary than their US
counterparts, and the military may have a role in internal security. Eventually, police and military roles
should clearly differ. Police should counter crime, while the military should address external threats.
However, the exact nature of these missions depends on the HN situation. In any event, police and military
roles should be clearly delineated. |
3-24.2 | 235 | Support to Host Nation Security Forces
Organizational Types
8-34. The day-to-day troops-to-task requirements and priorities of effort requires a wide assortment of
Host Nation security forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Although the police force should be
the frontline of COIN security forces, other units are required to assist the police on a temporary basis until
the police can conduct operations on their own. Police forces are not equipped or trained in operating
in high intensity situations.
Military
8-35. Military forces might have to perform police duties at the start of an insurgency; however, it
is best to establish police forces to assume these duties as soon as possible. Few military units can match a
good police unit in developing an accurate human intelligence picture of their AO. Because of their
frequent contact with populace, police often are the best force for countering small insurgent bands
supported by the local populace.
8-36. Although the long term objectives in training Host Nation militaries need to focus on foreign
defense, realities of counterinsurgencies often dictate that the military establish civil security and civil
control. Commanders must ensure that military units coordinate with local police with respect
to intelligence gathering, interacting with civilians, and civil affairs.
8-37. A Host Nation security force unit will be task-organized into elements that can accomplish one
of three functions—conducting offensive operations, conducting defensive operations, and implementing
civil control. These organizations’ sizes vary based on the operational environment; the components, the
elements and dynamics of the insurgency; and the phase of the counterinsurgency. A Host Nation security
force must also have C2, a reserve, and some form of sustainment support.
Offensive Force
8-38. A HN unit needs the capability to conduct offensive operations as well as specific
counterinsurgency operations, such as search and attacks, raids, cordon and searches, ambushes, and site
exploitation (SE). Due to the elusive nature of the insurgent, this force may be the smallest organization in
the unit.
Defensive Force
8-39. A HN unit needs to have the ability to conduct defensive operations. Typically, HN
counterinsurgency units focus on executing area defense at the tactical level that includes securing
important events, critical infrastructure, and bases. Depending on the phase of the counterinsurgency
and insurgent capabilities, this force may be quite large.
Civil Control or Constabulary Force
8-40. A HN unit needs to have a force that contributes to national security, as well as performs police
duties and civil functions. Typically, this type of force conducts tasks associated with the civil control LOE
such as manning checkpoints, gathering intelligence, conducting investigations into crimes and attacks,
and performing reconnaissance. Often the largest force, it has constant interaction with the population
which increases security of both the unit and the population. Historical and current examples include the
Philippine Constabulary, the Italian Carabinieri, the Iraqi National Police, and Haitian Constabulary.
Police
8-41. The primary frontline COIN force is often the police—not the military. However, the police are
only a part of the rule of law. Common roles of the police forces are to— investigate crimes, provide traffic
control, preserve the peace by resolving simple disputes and civil disturbance control. Police require
support from a code of law, judicial courts, and a penal system. Such support provides a coherent
and transparent system that imparts justice. Upholding the rule of law also requires other civil institutions
and an HN ability to support the legal system. If parts of the rule of law do not work, then commanders
must be prepared to meet detention requirements. |
3-24.2 | 236 | Chapter 8
8-42. Countering an insurgency requires a police force that is visible day and night. The Host Nation
will not gain legitimacy if the populace believes that insurgents and criminals control the streets. Well-sited
and protected police stations can establish a presence in communities, which secures communities
and builds support for the HN government. Daily contact with locals gives police a chance to collect
information for counterinsurgents.
8-43. Police might be organized on a national or local basis. Whatever police organization
is established, Soldiers must understand it and help the Host Nation effectively organize and use it. This
often means dealing with several police organizations and developing plans for training and advising each
one. A formal link or liaison channel must exist between the HN police, HN military forces, and US forces.
This channel for coordination, deconfliction, and information sharing enables successful COIN operations.
Police often consist of several independent but mutually supporting forces. These may include—
• Criminal and traffic police.
• Border police.
• Transport police for security of rail lines and public transport.
• Specialized police forces.
• Internal Affairs.
Paramilitary
8-44. Success in a counterinsurgency depends on isolating the insurgent from the population. Insurgents
intimidate the population into passive support and prevent the population from providing information
to counterinsurgent units. A technique to combat this is to establish a paramilitary organization.
Paramilitary forces are designed to support the rule of law and stabilize the operating environment,
particularly for when the HN police forces and military forces are standing-up organizing. Temporary
in nature, the paramilitary unit’s mandate should be two-fold.
• It needs to provide the population with a means of securing themselves.
• It should have the means to gather and report intelligence about the insurgency.
• It can sometimes be used covertly to target insurgents within higher headquarters guidance.
Organization
8-45. Once citizen leaders are identified, units can work with locals in organizing the paramilitary units.
The units need to have recognizable uniforms, standard light weapons, and a salary. The salaries will take
away from the insurgent recruitment base.
Limitations
8-46. Paramilitary organizations should be prevented from conducting offensive operations. They
should also be monitored closely for insurgent infiltration or abuse of power.
Demobilization
8-47. Eventually, the best way to demobilize a paramilitary force might be to integrate part of it into the
HN military or police force.
Corrections
8-48. If counterinsurgents seek to delegitimize an insurgency by criminalizing it, then the Host Nation
must establish a robust corrections system. A counterinsurgency with this goal, should be provided with a
more robust armament than in stable governments. |
3-24.2 | 237 | Support to Host Nation Security Forces
The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are not the first time US forces have
created Host Nation security forces from scratch and allowed them to win
in a counterinsurgency. The Philippine-American War began in 1898
and ended officially in 1902, but hostilities remained until 1913. The war was
not a popular one in the United States, but resulted in a stable and free
Philippine Republic.
The Philippine Constabulary (PC) was established on August 8, 1901,
to assist the United States military in combating the remaining Filipino
revolutionaries. The PC was entrusted into the hands of Captain Henry T.
Allen, named as the chief of the force and later dubbed as "the Father of the
Philippine Constabulary." With the help of four other army officers, Captain
Allen organized the force, trained, equipped, and armed the men as best
as could be done under difficult conditions.
General Henry Adler said it best when he said, “For some time to come, the
number of troops to be kept here should be a direct function of the number
of guns put into the hands of the natives…It is unwise to ignore the great
moral effect of a strong armed force above suspicion.”
The Constabulary was instrumental in defeating the insurgency. Originally
officered by Americans, the Filipinos slowly over took all operations of the
unit. At a tactical level, they were initially used to augment US forces
and moved into having their own area of operations. In July of 1901, the US
Army garrisoned 491 positions and by December it only garrisoned 372
positions. Although poorly armed with shotguns and revolvers, the
constabulary soon maintained ownership of entire provinces.
REBUILD OR BUILD FACILITIES
8-49. HN security forces need infrastructure support. Soldiers and police need buildings for storage,
training, and shelter. Often, requirements include barracks, ranges, motor pools, and other military
facilities. Construction takes time; the Host Nation needs to invest early in such facilities if they are to be
available when needed. Protection must be considered in any infrastructure design, including headquarters
facilities, since infrastructure is an attractive target for insurgents. (See FM 5-104 for information on
hardening measures to increase infrastructure survivability and improve protection.)
8-50. During an insurgency, HN military and police forces often operate from local bases. Building
training centers and unit garrisons requires a long-term force-basing plan. If possible, garrisons should
include housing for the commissioned officers, NCOs, and families; government-provided medical care for
the families; and other benefits that make national service attractive.
8-51. The easiest way for a partner unit to do this is to build a combined facility to house both itself
and the HN unit. As the situation improves, the Host Nation security forces can occupy the entire
compound once the partner unit leaves.
8-52. Advisor units can use funding that they have to build showers, tents, toilets, dining facility
equipment, barriers and minor building renovations. Improving the military facilities can result in an
increase in the morale and performance of the HN unit.
TRAIN
8-53. US and multinational training assistance should address shortfalls at every level with the purpose
of establishing self-sustaining training systems.
US Trainers
8-54. Soldiers assigned to training missions should receive training on the specific requirements
of developing HN forces. The course should emphasize the Host Nation’s cultural background, introduce |
3-24.2 | 238 | Chapter 8
its language, and provide cultural tips for developing a good rapport with HN personnel. The course should
also include protection training for troops working with HN forces. US trainees must become familiar with
the HN organization and equipment, especially weapons not in the US inventory. This training must
emphasize the following:
• Sustaining training and reinforcing individual and team skills.
• Using the smallest possible student-to-instructor ratio.
• Developing HN trainers.
• Training to standards—not to time.
• Providing immediate feedback and using after-action reviews.
• Respecting the HN culture, but learning to distinguish between cultural practices and excuses.
• Learning the HN language.
• Working with interpreters.
Establish Standards
8-55. The Host Nation unit and trainers must establish clear measures for evaluating the training
of individuals, leaders, and units. Insurgent strategies and their corresponding responses from targeted
governments vary widely. COIN operations require many of the same individual and collective skills
performed in conventional military operations, but also include additional requirements for COIN. Small
units execute most COIN operations; therefore, effective COIN forces require strong junior leaders.
Soldiers and Marines know how to evaluate military training. Metrics for evaluating units should include
subjective measures, such as loyalty to the HN government, as well as competence in military tasks.
However, the acceptance of values, such as ethnic equality or the rejection of corruption, is far more
difficult than evaluating task performance.
Soldiers and Police
8-56. Security force members must be developed through a systematic training program. The program
first builds their basic skills, then teaches them to work together as a team, and finally allows them
to function as a unit. Basic military training should focus first on Soldier skills, such as first aid,
marksmanship, and fire discipline. Leaders must be trained in planning tactics, including patrolling, urban
operations, or other skills necessary. Everyone must master the rules of engagement and the law of armed
conflict. Required skills include the following:
• Conduct basic intelligence functions.
• Manage their security.
• Coordinate indirect fires.
• Conduct logistic (planning, maintenance, sustainment, and movement) operations.
• Provide for effective medical support.
• Provide effective personnel management.
Advisor Teams
8-57. Advisor teams are generally responsible for initial Host Nation unit training and then provide
oversight as the Host Nation units implement their own training plan. Leader and ethics training should be
integrated into all aspects of training.
Partner Units
8-58. Partner units play an important role in advising. Advisors cannot go out with every Host Nation
operation, but, as almost all operations in COIN are combined, a partner unit can effectively advise a Host
Nation unit. Partner units can be most effective at advising Host Nation units in the planning process,
especially MDMP. The MDMP model may need to be modified to suit the HN security force. Staff
sections should work closely with their HN peers as part of the planning process. |
3-24.2 | 239 | Support to Host Nation Security Forces
8-59. Partner units might have to provide limited support or supplies to their Host Nation unit. For
example, a unit might provide its HN unit JP-8 or Class VIII, or it might help recover a disabled tank.
It should never create a reliance on partner unit support. The commander allocates partner support,
considering the realities of the situation.
8-60. HN security force staffs, when fully capable, should be able to achieve the following:
Operations
8-61. Plans are synchronized with consideration given to all Warfighting Functions. They are
disseminated to appropriate personnel in a timely manner and operate within a short-, mid-, and long-term
framework.
Intelligence
8-62. Intelligence is shared with other units and agencies. It is fully integrated into the planning process,
is bottom fed, and uses multiple sensors.
Sustainment
8-63. Units have synchronized methods for requesting supplies and sustainment assets. Planners
account for logistical capabilities during the planning process.
Command and Control
8-64. The command structure is unified. Leaders empower subordinate leaders within the commander’s
intent. Commanders visualize, describe, and direct their units.
Soldiers
8-65. Training can be divided into individual, unit, and staff training.
Individual
8-66. Individual skills training covers marksmanship, first aid, land navigation, and individual
movement techniques. Host nation security forces do not always have the institutional military instruction
that US forces have, so much of the individual skills training occurs at the unit. Marksmanship will be
of particular concern, due to the need for precise fires in COIN.
Unit
8-67. Unit training is focused on getting Host Nation battalions, companies, platoons, and squads ready
to conduct operations. This typically means training focused on three key tasks: checkpoint operations,
combat patrols (mounted and dismounted), and cordon and search operations.
Staff
8-68. Staff training involves training staffs to use and implement systems focused on planning, logistical
support, intelligence integration, and command and control.
Police
8-69. Police training is best conducted as an interagency and multinational operation. Ideally, leaders
for police training are civilian police officers from the Departments of Justice and State, along with senior
police officers from multinational partners. Civilian police forces have personnel with extensive experience
in large city operations and in operating against organized crime groups. Experience countering organized
crime is especially relevant to COIN; many insurgent groups are more similar to organized crime in their
organizational structure and relations with the populace than they are to military units. US military police
units serve best when operating as a support force for the professional civilian police trainers. However,
military police units may be assigned the primary responsibility for police training, and they must be
prepared to assume that role if required. |
3-24.2 | 240 | Chapter 8
8-70. Higher level police skills, such as civilian criminal investigation procedures, anti-organized crime
operations, and police intelligence operations—are best taught by civilian experts.
8-71. Effective policing also requires an effective justice system that can process arrests, detentions,
warrants, and other judicial records. Such a system includes trained judges, prosecutors, defense counsels,
prison officials, and court personnel. These people are important to establishing the rule of law.
8-72. Military police or corrections personnel can also provide training for detention and corrections
operations. HN personnel should be trained to handle and interrogate detainees and prisoners according
to internationally recognized human rights norms by the appropriate US personnel. Prisoner and detainee
management procedures should provide for the security and the fair and efficient processing of those
detained.
8-73. Police forces, just like military forces, need quality support personnel to be effective. This
requires training teams to ensure that training in support functions is established. Specially trained
personnel required by police forces include the following:
• Armorers.
• Supply specialists.
• Communications personnel.
• Administrative personnel.
• Vehicle mechanics.
Leaders
8-74. The effectiveness of the HN security forces directly relates to the quality of their leadership.
Building effective leaders requires a comprehensive program of officer, staff, and specialized training. The
ultimate success of any US involvement in a COIN effort depends on creating viable HN leaders able
to carry on the fight at all levels and build their nation on their own. One of the major challenges that
partner units and advisor teams may face is the perceived low quality of leader, especially the junior
leader ranks.
8-75. The leader training methodology must reinforce the different levels of authority within the HN
security force. The roles and responsibilities of each commissioned officer and NCO rank must be firmly
established so recruits understand what is expected of them. Their subordinate relationship to civilian
authorities must also be reinforced to ensure civilian control. In addition, training should establish team
dynamics. In some cultures, security forces may need training to understand the vital role of members not
in primary leadership positions.
Commissioned Officers
8-76. Officer candidate standards should be high. Candidates should be in good health and pass an
academic test with higher standards than the test for enlisted troops.
Officer Candidates
8-77. These should be carefully vetted to ensure that they do not have close ties to any radical
or insurgent organizations.
Basic Officer Training
8-78. Various models for basic officer training exist:
• One-year military college.
• Two-year military college.
• Four-year military college.
• Officer Candidate School.
• Military training at civilian universities. |
3-24.2 | 241 | Support to Host Nation Security Forces
Additional Training
8-79. In addition to tactical skills, commissioned officers should be trained in accountability,
decision-making, delegation authority, values, and ethics. Special COIN training should address—
• Intelligence collection and legal considerations.
• Day and night patrolling.
• Site security.
• Cordon and search operations.
• Operations with—
(cid:131) Other US Forces.
(cid:131) Other HN governmental agencies.
(cid:131) Intergovernmental organizations.
(cid:131) Nongovernmental organizations.
• Treatment of detainees and prisoners.
• Psychological operations.
• Civil military operations.
• Negotiations.
• Ethnic and religious sensitivity.
Noncommissioned Officers
8-80. Professional and effective security forces all have a professional NCO Corps. NCOs need training
in tactical skills, accountability, values, and ethics. Relations and responsibilities between the Officer
and NCO Corps should be clearly defined, and should empower the NCO Corps. Units often create special
NCO academies to train NCOs from partner Host National units.
Civilian Leaders
8-81. Additionally, Host Nation civilian leaders may need specific training to improve their skills
and performance. These key representatives might include—
• City mayor.
• Officials from public works, utilities, transportation, and communication.
• Local police chief.
• Fire-fighting officials.
• Superintendent of schools.
• Religious leaders.
• Health and medical officials and leaders.
• Judicial representatives.
• Editors of local news media.
• Business and commercial leaders.
Augmenting
8-82. This is an arrangement where the Host Nation provides either individuals or elements to US units
or vice versa. Augmentation can occur at a number of levels and in many different forms. For example, a
US squad can be augmented with HN individuals, a US company can be augmented with an HN platoon,
and a US battalion can be augmented with an HN company. The benefit of this type of training strategy
is that Host Nation security forces can emulate US forces in actual combat operations. In addition, US
forces can gain valuable cultural, language, and intelligence-gathering skills. Typically a chain of
command will be agreed upon prior to execution, however, command may be executed as a partnership.
Figure 8-7 shows an example of how augmenting a unit can be implemented. |
3-24.2 | 242 | Chapter 8
Figure 8-7. Augmentation of an example unit.
EQUIP
8-83. The requirement to provide equipment may be as simple as assisting with maintenance of existing
formations or as extensive as providing everything from shoes and clothing to vehicles, communications,
and investigation kits. If insurgents use heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, HN security
forces need comparable or better equipment. This especially applies to police forces, which are often
lightly armed and vulnerable to well-armed insurgents.
8-84. Primary considerations should include maintainability, ease of operation, and long-term
sustainment costs. Few developing nations can support highly complex equipment. In COIN operations,
having many versatile vehicles that require simple maintenance is often better than having a few highly
capable armored vehicles or combat systems that require extensive maintenance. Developing an effective
HN maintenance system may begins with major maintenance performed by contractors. The program then
progresses to partnership arrangements with US forces as HN personnel are trained to perform the support
mission.
ADVISE
8-85. Advisors are the most prominent group of US personnel that serve with HN units. Advisors live,
work, and fight with their HN units. Segregation is kept to an absolute minimum. The relationship between
advisors and HN forces is vital. US partner unit commanders must remember that advisors are not liaison
officers, nor do they command HN units. Additionally, partner units regularly advise their HN security
force counterparts.
8-86. Effective advisors are an enormous force enhancer. The importance of the job means that the most
capable individuals should fill these positions. Advisors should be Soldiers known to take the initiative
and set the standards for others.
8-87. Professional knowledge and competence win the respect of HN troops. Effective advisors develop
a healthy rapport with HN personnel but avoid the temptation to adopt HN positions contrary to US
or multinational values or policy. |
3-24.2 | 243 | Support to Host Nation Security Forces
8-88. Advisors who understand the HN military culture understand that local politics have national
effects. Effective advisors recognize and use cultural factors that support HN commitment and teamwork.
A good advisor uses the culture’s positive aspects to get the best performance from each security force
member and leader.
Guidelines
8-89. Important guidelines for advisors include—
• Remain patient. Be subtle. In guiding Host Nation counterparts, explain the benefits of an
action and convince them to accept the idea as their own. Respect the rank and positions of
Host Nation counterparts.
• Exercise diplomacy in correcting Host Nation security forces. Praise each success and work
to instill pride in the unit.
• Work to continually train and improve the unit, even in the combat zone. Help the commander
develop unit SOPs.
• Know light infantry tactics and unit security procedures.
• Use “confidence” missions to validate training.
• Understand that an advisor is not the unit commander but an enabler. The Host Nation
commander makes decisions and commands the unit. Advisors help with this task.
• Train Host Nation units to standard and fight alongside them. Consider Host Nation limitations
and adjust.
• Flexibility is key. It is impossible to plan completely for everything in this type of operation.
• Constantly look forward to the next issue and be ready to develop solutions to problems that
cannot be answered with a doctrinal solution.
• Remember that most actions have long-term strategic implications.
• Try to learn enough of the language for simple conversation, at a minimum, greetings.
• Keep Host Nation counterparts informed; try not to hide agendas.
• Remain prepared to act as a liaison to multinational assets, especially air support and logistics.
Maintain liaison with civil affairs and humanitarian teams in the area of operations.
• Remain ready to advise on the maintenance of equipment and supplies.
• Stay integrated with the unit. Eat their food. Do not become isolated from them.
• Remain aware of the operations in the immediate area to prevent fratricide.
• Insist on Host Nation adherence to the recognized human rights standards concerning treatment
of civilians, detainees, and captured insurgents. Report any violation to the chain of command.
• Remain objective in reports on Host Nation unit and leader proficiency. Report gross
corruption or incompetence.
• Maintain a proper military bearing and professional manner.
Advisor Teams
8-90. Advisor teams link Host Nation units and US partner units to fill the gaps of the HN's supply
system. They have the ability to bring attention to shortfalls in equipment both to their higher US chain
of command and, through their chain of command, the Host Nation higher headquarters. The advisor
should ensure that the Host Nation logistical system is being used properly first. In addition, the advisor
team may assist by hand walking his HN counterpart through the HN system.
8-91. Advisor teams often have authority to provide tactical equipment such as radios through their
appropriated funds. The advisor team must use this money since it is one of the few forms of leverage they
posses.
8-92. It is important to note that advisors should not use bribery or coercion, since results achieved from
these actions are only temporary. As soon as the “payment” is made, or the “force” is removed, the Host
Nation counterpart has no reason to comply. In practice, these techniques are not efficient and will not
achieve the long-term goal of developing proficiency, competence, and initiative in the counterpart. |
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Advisor Art and Science
8-93. The most important mission of an advisor is to enhance the military professionalism of his
counterpart. Rapport, credibility, and legitimacy can only be established through time, proximity,
and interaction. Advisors mentor HN leadership at every opportunity. Partner units are engaged in every
aspect of the HN’s development.
8-94. Advisors sleep and eat daily with HN security force units. They must “leave the wire.” The closer
they operate with the HN security force, the faster the unit will improve. The social and cultural aspects
of the mission are just as or more important than patrolling with the unit.
8-95. Just as the credibility of US advisors is critical for influencing the leadership and men of the HN
security force, the actions of these advisor teams are equally vital to winning the population’s confidence.
Advisors build their credibility by contact, visibility, technical and tactical proficiency, the ability
to provide resources, success in battle, and respectful interaction with civilians.
8-96. Often, to be successful, advisors partner with their HN equivalents. For instance, US leaders
partner with HN leaders, US staffs partner with HN staffs, US soldiers partner with HN soldiers.
8-97. Combat advisors go on patrol and operations in order to—
• Lead and advise by example.
• Share the risk.
• Improve legitimacy and unity of effort.
• Bond with the counterparts.
• Coordinate assets (CAS, QRF, EOD).
• Prevent fratricide.
• Provide accurate and specific AARs.
• Prevent, report, remedy human rights violations.
• Gather information for intelligence.
• Ensure site exploitation is thorough.
• Ensure evidence is correctly gathered and processed.
• Improve situational awareness.
Challenges
8-98. US advisors and units share the same challenges and often develop the same practices. Some
of these practices are negative while others are positive. Some challenges are common to all US advisors
and units. They include aspects often referred to as the American military culture.
8-99. Just as in counterinsurgency operations, advising is an iterative process. The advisor team and the
HN unit will not get it right the first time. However, both the HN unit and the advisor team must “learn
and adapt” faster than insurgents.
8-100. Some typical advisor challenges include—
• Adjusting to native cuisine can pose a problem for the advisor. Refusal to accept food and
beverages when offered might be considered an insult.
• The advisor does not become discouraged. Not all advice will be accepted. Some will be
implemented later.
• The advisor cannot forget that a careless word or action can cost the United States dearly
in good will and cooperation that may have been established with great effort and at
considerable cost. |
3-24.2 | 245 | Support to Host Nation Security Forces
• The advisor does not criticize HN policy in front of HN personnel. It is the advisor’s obligation
to support the incumbent government just as he does his own. This obligation is US
national policy.
• The advisor studies his counterpart to determine his personality and background. He makes
every effort to establish and maintain friendly relationships. He learns something about his
counterpart’s personal life and demonstrates an interest in his likes and dislikes.
• The advisor recognizes and observes military courtesy and local customs and courtesies. He
recognizes that in many cultures, observance of formal courtesies must take place before other
business can be conducted. When in doubt, he leans toward the polite.
• The advisor does not get caught up in personality clashes between HN officers/personnel.
• The advisor keeps in mind that HN partners may consider person-to-person relationships more
important than organizational frameworks.
• The advisor may have to deal with the HN norms regarding time and timeliness.
Advising Principles
8-101. Advising principles can best be described as shown in Figure 8-8.
By, With, Not counting immediate action battle drill responses, the mark of an effective
and Through advisory effort is the amount of stake the Host Nation security forces take in their
own operations.
Empathy Leads to Truly understanding other human beings and where they come from allows
Cultural Competence honest relationships to develop. These relationships are critical factors
of success.
Success is Built This relationship is likely to be tested on numerous occasions and challenges;
on Personal only one built on a solid relationship of mutual trust can survive and ensure
Relationships mission success.
Advisors Increasing the advisors’ level of frustration is the rapid realization that, when the
are not ‘Them’ dealing with partner units, advisors are not one of “them.” The advisors are often
alone navigating between two military systems and two cultures, never quite
fitting in with either of them.
You Will Never The advisor attaining a tactical objective does not achieve success; success
Win…Nor Should is achieved by the Host Nation forces achieving the objective.
You
Advisors are not Advisors are not intended to lead Host Nation security forces in combat; they are
Commanders ultimately responsible for command and control only of their own small TEAM
of US combat advisors.
Advisors Advisors are advocates for the Host Nation security forces with partner units.
are Honest Brokers
Living Advisors will likely find themselves isolated with great autonomy, often with no
with Shades of Gray supervision and will encounter moral and ethical dilemmas on a daily basis.
Talent is Everything, The paradox lies in that in some Host Nation forces, recognized talent can take a
but back seat to rank. Advisors must understand that rank on the uniform
Understand Rank is important to many armies, but it is skin deep; the ways around rank are the
relationship and talent.
Make Do Advisors will never have everything that they feel they need to succeed.
Scrounging, bartering, and horse-trading are daily activities of the combat
advisor. An enormous amount of energy must be devoted to these activities.
These efforts will not only help the advisor achieve mission success but also
endear him to his counterpart.
Figure 8-8. Principles of advising. |
3-24.2 | 246 | Chapter 8
Advisor Relationship with Host Nation Peers
8-102. The advisor spends maximum time with the unit so the troops get to know and trust him. The
advisor talks to and gets to know the troops, not just the unit leaders, so he receives excellent feedback
through the common Soldier’s candid comments. Such comments often reflect troop morale
and operational effectiveness. He stays abreast of what is going on in the unit by staying in close contact
with the commander and staff.
• The advisor encourages frequent command inspections by the commander. In some cultures,
this action is a new concept or not a common practice. Many HN commanders are reluctant
to inspect. They rely solely on correspondence and reports to evaluate unit effectiveness.
• The advisor continually stresses the obvious advantages of good military-civilian relations
to avoid the idea of military arrogance, which irritates the civilian populace. The development
of a proper Soldier-civilian relationship is a critical factor in counterinsurgency. Improper
behavior by Soldiers toward civilians must be immediately corrected.
• The advisor keeps training standards high so that the unit is prepared for combat at all times.
• The advisor stresses human rights and the consequences of mistreating suspects and prisoners.
• The advisor constantly promotes unit esprit-de-corps to sustain the unit in the face
of difficulties.
• The advisor persuades the HN personnel to pass information up, down, and laterally.
MENTOR
8-103. Effective mentorship is based on mutual respect, building relationships and trust. Maintaining
patience is the key in developing positive situations for Mentorship. All of which will go into the building
of an effective team. Both advisor teams and partner units have equal ability to mentor, if the conditions
have been set.
Respect
8-104. In order to get respect, mentors need to give it.
Relationship
8-105. Mentors need to have a good working relationship with Host Nation forces.
Trust
8-106. The best way to gain trust is through shared danger and hardship. Nothing builds trust faster than
facing the enemy together.
Team
8-107. The end state should be a unity of effort for the advisor team, the HN unit, and the partner unit. If
a recommendation is made to the Host Nation unit, mentors should move on. If every recommendation
becomes a point of contention, the mutual respect and relationship that has been carefully cultivated will be
damaged. Figure 8-9 shows the process that is needed to build a relationship that ultimately develops into
an effective team. Giving respect sets the conditions for trust and, finally, a good team, where mentoring
can occur.
Figure 8-9. Team-building process. |
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Host Nation AAR
8-108. First, an advisor should never take credit for an idea; instead, they should empower their
counterpart. Discuss the issue and come up with the solution together, even if he has the answer. The point
is that advisors are mentoring them to come up with solutions of their own in the future. Second, by giving
them the credit and making them look good the leader will more readily come to the advisors for advice
and take advice more readily in the future.
8-109. Advisors should cover all activities and salient points (sustainment and improvement) for each
phase of the operation, including information engagements. The AAR should conclude with a plan
to follow-up and make improvements as necessary. Just as with US forces, an AAR with the HN security
forces is not only potentially of great value but it is also potentially full of pitfalls. To evaluate the HN
security forces, the advisors should assess at a minimum—
• Leadership
• Level of training demonstrated on operations
• Use and effectiveness of administrative/logistics (as applicable).
• Professionalism to include human rights and dealing with civilians.
8-110. Advisors need to bring up general positive points with the groups, but they should refrain from
singling out a leader, staff, soldier, or unit to provide criticism in front of others. The US military culture
of group AARs to discuss all mistakes is a technique we find valuable because our culture accepts it
as important for improvement. Most other cultures do not accept pointing out criticisms of one person
or group to another. The advisor should take that member or unit aside and discuss the issue. Let them talk
about how to improve this point in a productive way. Figure 8-10 shows an example AAR for a Host
Nation security force after and operation.
Commander's One-on-One
8-111. Remember some AAR points are best kept between the advisor and the Host Nation commander.
Internal Advisor AAR
8-112. In order to effectively advise HN security forces, the US Advisor Team should also conduct an
internal AAR, focusing on what the Team must sustain and improve. An internal AAR is for the advisors
only and should cover three primary topics:
• Conduct of advisors and US partner
• Conduct of the HN security force
• Review ROE/EOF for effectiveness and compliance/training level
EMPLOYMENT OF NEWLY TRAINED FORCES IN COIN
8-113. Building the morale and confidence of HN security forces should be a long term objective.
Committing poorly trained and badly led forces results in high casualties and invites tactical defeats. While
defeat in a small operation may have little effect on the outcome of a conventional war, even a small
tactical defeat of HN security forces can have serious strategic consequences, since COIN is largely about
perceptions. Effective insurgent leaders can quickly turn minor wins into major propaganda victories.
In short, the HN security forces must be prepared for operations so that they have every possible
advantage. The decision to commit units to their first actions and their employment method requires careful
consideration. As much as possible, HN security forces should begin with simpler missions. As their
confidence and competence grows, these forces can assume more complex assignments. |
3-24.2 | 248 | Chapter 8
Figure 8-10. Example Host Nation security force AAR—operation summary.
8-114. Newly trained units should enter their first combat operation in support of more experienced HN,
US, or multinational forces. Partner units and advisor teams need to closely monitor the situation
and support each other and the Host Nation. It is paramount that the Host Nation security force not be
defeated in the initial stage of their operations. Host nation units can be broken down into smaller elements
and paired with US forces in order to put a Host National “face” on the operation and provide the Host
Nation with support and training experience.
SUMMARY
A successful COIN effort establishes HN institutions that can sustain government legitimacy. Developing
effective HN security forces—including military, police, and paramilitary forces—is one of the highest
priority COIN tasks. Soldiers and Marines can make vital contributions to this mission by training
and advising the HN security forces. Effective tactical commanders must understand the importance
of this mission and select the right personnel as trainers and advisors. Using the MORTEAM framework
may enable tactical leaders to successfully train, mentor and conduct operations with Host Nation security
force. |
3-24.2 | 249 | Appendix A
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
“In no class of warfare is a well organized and well served intelligence department
more essential than in against guerrillas”
COL C. E. Callwell, Small Wars, 1896
The complexity of an insurgency and increased number of variables (and their
infinite combinations) increases the difficulty of providing timely, relevant,
and effective intelligence support to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
Conducted effectively, however, the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
allows commanders to develop the situational understanding necessary to visualize,
describe, and direct subordinates in successfully accomplishing the mission.
OVERVIEW
A-1. IPB is the systematic process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic
area—the area of operations (AO) and its associated area of interest (Figure A-1). It provides the basis
for intelligence support to current and future operations, drives the military decision-making process,
and supports targeting and battle damage assessment. The procedure (as well as each of its four steps)
is performed continuously throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of a COIN operation.
Figure A-1. The steps of IPB.
INCREASED COMPLEXITY
A-2. Uncovering intricate relationships takes time, careful analysis, and constant refinement
to determine actual effects on friendly and threat courses of action (COAs). These relationships
exist among—
• Population groups.
• The infrastructure. |
3-24.2 | 250 | Appendix A
• The historical, cultural, political, or economic significance of the area in relation to surrounding
urban and rural areas or the nation as a whole.
• The physical effects of the natural and man-made terrain.
A-3. A primary goal of any IPB is to accurately predict the threat’s likely COA (step four—which may
include political, social, religious, informational, economic, and military actions). Commanders can then
develop their own COAs that maximize and apply combat power at decisive points. Understanding the
decisive points in counterinsurgency operations allows commanders to select objectives that are clearly
defined, decisive, and attainable.
REDUCED UNCERTAINTY AND ITS EFFECTS
A-4. Commanders and their staffs may be unfamiliar with the intricacies of a counterinsurgency
and more adept at thinking and planning in other environments. Therefore, without detailed situational
understanding, commanders may assign missions that their subordinate forces may not be able to achieve.
As importantly, commanders and their staffs may miss critical opportunities because they appear
overwhelming or impossible (and concede the initiative to the threat). They also may fail to anticipate
potential threat COAs afforded by the distinctive operational environment. Commanders may fail
to recognize that the least likely threat COA may be the one adopted precisely because it is least likely and,
therefore, may be intended to maximize surprise. Misunderstanding the AO’s effect on potential friendly
and threat COAs may rapidly lead to mission failure and the unnecessary loss of Soldiers’ lives and other
resources. A thorough IPB of the AO can greatly reduce uncertainty and contribute to mission success.
AMPLIFIED IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
A-5. In COIN operations, the terrain and enemy are still essential considerations, but the societal
component of the COIN environment is considered more closely and throughout the operational process.
Moreover, the human or civil considerations gain importance in COIN or stability operations. As discussed
in Chapter One, a key tool for the counterinsurgent unit is analyzing civil considerations using ASCOPE.
Overall, population effects are significant in how they impact the threat, Army forces, and overall
accomplishment of strategic and operational goals.
A-6. Describing the battlefield’s effects—step two in IPB—ascribes meaning to the characteristics
analyzed. It helps commanders understand how the environment enhances or degrades friendly
and insurgent forces and capabilities. It also helps commanders understand how the environment supports
the population. It also explains how changes in the “normal” environment (intentional or unintentional
and because of insurgent or friendly activities) may affect the population. Included in this assessment are
matters of perception. At each step of the IPB process, commanders must try to determine the HN
population’s perceptions of ongoing activities to ensure Army operations are viewed as intended.
Throughout this process, commanders, staffs, and analysts cannot allow their biases—cultural,
organizational, personal, or cognitive—to markedly influence or alter their assessment (see FM 34-3). This
particularly applies when they analyze the societal aspect of the operational environment. With so many
potential groups and varied interests in such a limited area, misperception is always a risk.
SIGNIFIGANT CHARACTERISTICS IN COIN
A-7. COIN intelligence analysis must include consideration of the AO’s distinguishing attributes—
terrain, society, infrastructure, and the threat. Because the COIN environment is so complex, it is often
useful to break it into categories. Then commanders can understand the intricacies of the environment that
may affect their operations and assimilate this information into clear mental images. Commanders can then
synthesize these images of the AO with the current status of friendly and threat forces, and develop a
desired end state. Then they can determine the most decisive sequence of activities that will move their
forces from the current state to the end state. Identifying and understanding the environment’s
characteristics (from a counterinsurgent, insurgent, and HN population’s perspective) allows commanders
to establish and maintain situational understanding. Then they can develop appropriate COAs and rules
of engagement that will lead to decisive mission accomplishment. |
3-24.2 | 251 | Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
A-8. Figures A-2 and A-3 are not all-encompassing lists of COIN characteristics. Instead, they provide
a starting point or outline useful for conducting a COIN-focused IPB and analysis that can be modified
to fit the specific operational environment and meet the commander’s requirements. Commanders
and staffs can compare the categories presented with those in the civil affairs area study and assessment
format found in FM 3-05.40 and the IPB considerations for stability operations found in ST 2-91.1.
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS
A-9. Since the COIN environment comprises an interconnected “system of systems,” considerations
among the key elements of the environment will overlap during a COIN intelligence analysis. For example,
boundaries, regions, or areas relate to a physical location on the ground. Hence, they have terrain
implications. These boundaries, regions, or areas often stem from some historical, religious, political,
administrative, or social aspect that could also be considered a characteristic of the society. Overlaps can
also occur in a specific category, such as infrastructure. For instance, dams are a consideration for their
potential effects on transportation and distribution (mobility), administration and human services (water
supply), and energy (hydroelectric).
A-10. This overlap recognition is a critical concern for commanders and their staffs. In “taking apart”
the COIN environment and analyzing the pieces, commanders and staffs cannot lose perspective of how
each piece interacts with any other and as part of the whole. Otherwise, their vision will be shortsighted,
and they will fail to recognize the second-and third-order effects of their proposed COAs; the actual end
state differing dramatically from the one envisioned by the commander. The increased density
of combatants and noncombatants, infrastructure, and complex terrain means that a given action will likely
have unintended consequences—positive or negative. Those consequences will be more widely felt
and their impact will spread in less time than in other environments. These unintended results may have
important strategic and operational consequences. The multiple ways these dynamic COIN elements
and characteristics combine make it necessary to approach each COIN environment as a unique challenge
for intelligence analysis.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
A-11. Earlier admonitions that civil considerations are more closely considered in COIN do not
necessarily mean that considerations for terrain and weather are deemphasized.
Terrain
A-12. In every COIN operation, terrain and its effects on both threat and friendly forces must be
assessed and understood. Then commanders can quickly choose and exploit the terrain (and weather
conditions) that best supports their missions. Effective terrain analysis thoroughly assesses structures
as well as the ground on which they stand (Figure A-2). An analysis of terrain first considers broader
characteristics and effects and then progresses to a more detailed examination.
Natural Terrain
A-13. Natural terrain features significantly influence unit operations. They dictate where buildings can
be constructed, the slopes and patterns of streets, and even the broad patterns that develop over longer
periods, all of which influence a unit’s scheme of maneuver. The military aspects of terrain—observation
and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC)—
remain critical to the analysis of natural terrain in, under, and around areas where COIN operations will be
conducted. Fortunately, commanders and their staffs are normally accustomed to this type of analysis. |
3-24.2 | 252 | Appendix A
Forms and Functions Construction and Placement Military Aspects of Terrain: OAKOC
Cores.
Construction. Observation and fields of fire.
Industrial areas.
• Mass or framed • Smoke (fire), dust (explosions), and
• Toxic industrial material production flying debris
• Light or heavy clad
and storage facilities
• Rubble
• Material (dirt, wood, stone, brick,
• Standard signs and markings for
cinder block, concrete, steel, and • Engagement ranges
toxic chemicals
glass) (including minimum safe distances
Outlying high-rise areas. and backblast factors) and
• Density and thickness (roofs,
obliquity/angles (ricochets)
Residential areas and shantytowns. floors, and interior and exterior
walls) • Elevation and depression
Commercial ribbon areas.
considerations
• Load-bearing walls and columns
Forts and military bases. • Lasers and reflective concerns
• Height (floors)
Broad Urban Patterns • Doors, windows, fire escapes, Avenues of approach
and other openings (mobility corridors).
Types. • Interior floor plan (including crawl • Airspace
• Satellite spaces, elevators, and stairs) • Surface
• Network • Supersurface
Placement.
• Linear • Subsurface
• Random
• Segment
Key terrain
• Close, orderly block
Dominant or central hub (if any). • Dispersed • Landmarks
• Buildings of significant cultural,
Area covered (square miles). Ownership.
social, political, historical, or
economic significance
Street Patterns
Obstacles
Basic types.
• Rubble and vehicles
• Radial
• Steep embankments
• Grid
• Medians
• Irregular (planned and unplanned).
• Inadequate bridges and overpasses
(destroyed, weight-restricted, or
Variations.
narrow)
• Rayed
• Tunnels and underpasses (destroyed
• Radial ring or narrow)
• Contour forming • Mines and roadside improvised
explosive devices
• Combined
• Masking of fires
Widths.
• Burning buildings or other fire
hazards
• Rivers and lakes
Cover and concealment.
• Building protection
• Weapon penetration (single shot and
multiple rounds) considerations
• Rubble and vehicles
Figure A-2. Significant terrain characteristics common to COIN operations.
Man-Made Terrain
A-14. Building composition, frontages, placement, forms and functions, size, floor plans, and window
and door locations affect maneuver, force positioning, and weapons deployment considerations. Angles, |
3-24.2 | 253 | Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
displacement, surface reflection, and antenna locations influence command and control. Structures also
influence ISR operations. The increased density and volume created by man-made structures increases how
much information commanders and their staffs collect and assess as well as the number of forces required.
Building materials and construction will also influence force structures to include weapons and equipment
required. Heavily constructed buildings combined with hot and cold extremes may affect target
identification for thermal sights. Thick walls, for example, may make combat vehicle identification
difficult by distorting hotspots. Additionally, the increased use of heaters and warming fires may clutter
thermal sights with numerous hotspots. The ability to maneuver through the urban dimensions—airspace,
supersurface, surface, and subsurface—and shoot through walls, ceilings, and floors also creates increased
psychological stress. The physical characteristics of man-made terrain can also be analyzed using OAKOC.
Weather
A-15. Weather and its effects are often considered when examining the military aspects of terrain.
Military aspects of weather include temperature (heat and cold), light conditions, precipitation (cloud
cover, rain, snow, fog, and smog), and wind. Their military effects during COIN are similar to any
operational environment (see FM 34-81 and FM 34-81-1). Extremes of heat and cold affect weapon
systems and the Soldiers that operate them. Precipitation affects mobility and visibility.
A-16. Commanders also analyze weather for its potential effect on civilians and civilian infrastructure
as well as Soldiers and military equipment. Rain might create sewage overflow problems in areas with
collapsed sewage infrastructure, increasing disease and even creating panic. Rain and flooding may also
make some subsurface areas impassable or extremely hazardous to civilian and military forces alike. Other
weather effects on COIN can include—
• Heavy snowfall may paralyze area transportation and distribution infrastructure, hindering the
government’s ability to provide vital human services (police, fire fighting, medical,
and rescue). Heavy rains and flooding may have similar effects especially on poorly designed
and constructed roads or roads that have been damaged by tracked vehicles.
• Extreme hot and cold weather climates, which increase the dependence (and military
significance) of many elements of the infrastructure. For example, the energy infrastructure
may be critical. Without it, civilians may be inadequately cooled or heated, or they may be
unable to cook their food.
• In tropical areas, rain can occur at the same time each day during the wet season. Threat forces
may attack during these periods knowing aircraft will have difficulty responding. Bad weather
also reduces the effectiveness of surveillance, direct and indirect fire, and logistic support.
• Inclement weather may preclude demonstrations or rallies by threats. Good weather may mean
a maximum turnout of civilians for events such as festivals, sporting events, and other social,
cultural, or religious activities.
• Severe weather may affect psychological, civil-military and humanitarian assistance operations.
Heavy rains and severe dust storms may disrupt leaflet drops, construction projects, food
and water distribution, and medical and veterinary assistance programs.
SOCIETY
A-17. This manual shows that societal considerations take on added importance in COIN. Critical
to operational success is knowing and understanding which groups live in an area, what relationships exist
among them, and how each population group will respond to friendly and threat activities. Often
determining any of this is very difficult. Cultural acuity is also essential in helping commanders and their
staffs to view the area as the residents view it. The demographics presented show what conditions exist,
while the other categories help to explain the root causes or why conditions exist (Figure A-3). Other
categories besides basic demographics that are important to gain this understanding include health, history,
leadership, ethnicity and culture, religion, and government and politics. |
3-24.2 | 254 | Appendix A
POPULATION HISTORY Exchanges of gifts.
DEMOGRAPHICS General and for a specific Displays of emotion.
General population size. group. Lines of authority.
• Village • Internal or external Dating and marriage.
• Town • Recent conflicts Greetings, leave-takings, and gestures.
• City
• Metropolis Relationship with U.S. Visiting practices.
allies and other
• Megalopolis participating multinational Alcohol and drug use.
Group size based on race, forces. Important holidays, festivals, sporting, or entertainment events.
age, sex, political affiliation,
Applicable international Eating and dietary practices.
economics, religion, tribe,
treaties.
clan, gang, criminal activities, Significance of animals and pets.
or other significant grouping. Status-of-forces Urban-rural similarities and differences.
agreements.
• Significant U.S. or Driving habits.
coalition populations Antagonists/protagonists
Clothing.
• Distribution, densities, Heroes.
RELIGION
and physical boundaries Events, facts, and dates
and overlaps considered important or Sects, divisions, and overlaps.
• Majority, minority, and celebrated. Religious biases and problems.
dominant groups Urban area’s historical Relationship and influence on government, politics, economics, and
Increasing or decreasing importance. education.
migration trends. LEADERSHIP AND Impact on ethnic and cultural beliefs.
• Dislocated civilians PROMINENT
Key events or celebrations (daily, weekly, monthly, or annually).
Nongovernmental PERSONALITIES
Funeral and burial practices.
organizations (NGOs). Identification, location, and
• Local prioritization of influential GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
• National leaders (exploitation, Present and past forms.
• International evacuation, protection,
etc.) Organization and powers (executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative
Languages (distribution divisions).
dialects, relationship to social Affiliation (ethnic, religion,
structure). military, government, Scheduled elections and historical turnouts.
industry, criminal, or Degree of control over the population
Educational levels and literacy
entertainment).
rates. • Identification required
Education attained. • Border-crossing procedures
Crime rates.
Organization and Relations with U.S. or multinational governments, national government, and
Birth and death rates.
distribution of power. criminal elements.
Labor statistics and
Associations among Political factions and boundaries.
considerations.
different leaders and
Political traditions.
• Skilled and unskilled groups.
Grievances.
• Imported and exported ETHNICITY AND
Censorship.
• Unemployment CULTURE
Nepotism and other clan, tribal, or social ties.
• Standard wages and per Values, moral codes,
capita income taboos, and insults Civil defense and disaster preparedness (organization, plans, training,
• Workday and workweek (verbal and nonverbal). equipment, and resources).
norms Attitudes towards age, Legal system.
HEALTH sex, and race (including • System of laws
same-sex interaction). • Applicable treaties
Diseases. Role of the clan, tribe, or • Courts and tribunals
Nutritional deficiencies. family. • Procedures
• Records (birth and deeds).
Local standards of care. Biases between ethnic
Pollution and environmental groups. Property control.
hazards (air, water, food, and Privacy and individuality. Monetary system (formal and informal).
soil). Recreation, entertainment, Domestic and foreign trade.
Health workers (types, and humor. • Taxation and tariffs
numbers, and degree of • Customs requirements
Fatalism or
skill). • Rationing and price controls
self-determination.
• Economic performance and contribution to gross national product
Economic aid.
Perception of relative deprivation.
Trade unions.
Competition with the black market and organized crime.
Figure A-3. Societal considerations. |
3-24.2 | 255 | Appendix B
Readings for COIN Tactical Leaders
in a Time-Constrained Environment
ARTICLES
“Best Practices in Counterinsurgency.” Military Review, May-Jun 2005, Kalev I. Sepp.
“COIN Cliff Notes: Techniques for the Conventional Rifle Platoon in Layman’s Terms.” Infantry
Magazine, July-August 2008, Craig Coppock.
“Counterinsurgency Redux,” Survival, Winter 2006-2007, David Kilcullen.
“The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Conduct Information
Tasks.” Military Review, May-Jun 2006, Ralph O. Baker.
“Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq.” Military Review, Jan-Feb 2006,
David Petraeus.
“‘Twenty-Eight Articles’: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency.” Military Review, May-Jun
2006, David Kilcullen.
“The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence.," Military Review, May-June 2006, Professional Forum
BOOKS
Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare—Theory and Practice. London: Praeger, 1964.
Hammes, T.X. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2004
Kitson, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping. London: Faber
and Faber, 1971.
Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare—A French View of Counterinsurgency. New York: Praeger, 1964.
Zedong, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare. London: Cassell, 1965. |
3-24.2 | 257 | Appendix C
Twenty-Eight Articles:
Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency
LTC David Kilcullen, PhD, originally submitted his essay, 28 Articles, to Military
Review for the CAC CG's Special Topics Writing Competition: Countering
Insurgency. However, he was asked to publish it immediately to help Soldiers in the
field. Even though doing so cost him the opportunity to compete—and possibly
win—the competition, the Australian Army officer graciously agreed, and pulled the
essay from the contest. The article is reprinted in this appendix, with permission,
from the May-June 2006 issue of Military Review, and formatted to fit this
publication.
INTRODUCTION
C-1. Your company has just been warned about possible deployment for counterinsurgency operations
in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence, and Robert Thompson. You have
studied FM 3—24, and now understand the history, philosophy, and theory of counterinsurgency. You
have also watched Black Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers, and you know this will be the most
difficult challenge of your life.
C-2. But what does all that theory mean at the company level? How do the principles translate into
action at night, with the GPS down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you
don’t understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos? How does
counterinsurgency actually happen?
C-3. There are no universal answers, and insurgents are among the most adaptive opponents you will
ever face. Countering them will demand every ounce of your intellect. But be comforted: You are not the
first to feel this way. There are tactical fundamentals you can apply to link the theory with the techniques
and procedures you already know.
WHAT IS COUNTERINSURGENCY?
C-4. If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: Counterinsurgency is a
competition with the insurgent for the right to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population.
You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything with less strength than
you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use
of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people, and societal disruption that fuel and perpetuate the
insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. For
your side to win, the people don’t have to like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions
benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their
security. In this battlefield, popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more
powerful than a hundred tanks.
C-5. Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience, the distilled
essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but
are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically. |
3-24.2 | 258 | Appendix C
PREPARATION
C-6. Time is short during predeployment, but you will never have more time to think than you have
now. This is your chance to prepare yourself and your command.
1. Know your turf. Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion, and culture.
Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your
task is to become the world expert on your district. If you don’t know precisely where you
will be operating, study the general area. Read the map like a book: Study it every night
before sleep and redraw it from memory every morning until you understand its patterns
intuitively. Develop a mental model of your area, a framework in which to fit every new
piece of knowledge you acquire. Study handover notes from predecessors; better still, get
in touch with the unit in theater and pick their leaders’ brains. In an ideal world, intelligence
officers and area experts would brief you; however, this rarely happens, and even if it does,
there is no substitute for personal mastery. Understand the broader area of influence, which
can be a wide area, particularly when insurgents draw on global grievances. Share out aspects
of the operational area among platoon leaders and noncommissioned officers; have each
individual develop a personal specialization and brief the others. Neglect this knowledge,
and it will kill you.
2. Diagnose the problem. Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose
the problem. Who are the insurgents? What drives them? What makes local leaders tick?
Counterinsurgency is fundamentally a competition between each side to mobilize the
population in support of its agenda. So you must understand what motivates the people
and how to mobilize them. You need to know why and how the insurgents are getting
followers. This means you need to know your real enemy, not a cardboard cut-out. The
enemy is adaptive, resourceful, and probably grew up in the region where you will be
operating. The locals have known him since he was a boy; how long have they known you?
Your worst opponent is not the psychopathic terrorist of Hollywood; it is the charismatic
follow-me warrior who would make your best platoon leader. His followers are not misled
or naïve; much of his success may be due to bad government policies or security forces that
alienate the population. Work this problem collectively with your platoon and squad leaders.
Discuss ideas, explore the problem, understand what you are facing, and seek a consensus. If
this sounds unmilitary, get over it. Once you are in theater, situations will arise too quickly
for orders or even commander’s intent. Corporals and privates will have to make snap
judgments with strategic impact. The only way to help them is to give them a shared
understanding, then trust them to think for themselves on the day.
3. Organize for intelligence. In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him
is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary. Your operations
will be intelligence-driven, but intelligence will come mostly from your own operations, not
as a product prepared and served up by higher headquarters. So you must organize
for intelligence. You will need a company S2 and an intelligence section (including analysts).
You might need platoon S2s and S3s, and you will need a reconnaissance and surveillance
(R&S) element. You will not have enough linguists—you never do—but carefully consider
where best to use them. Linguists are a battle-winning asset, but like any other scarce
resource, you must have a prioritized “bump plan” in case you lose them. Often during
predeployment the best use of linguists is to train your command in basic language. You will
probably not get augmentation for all this, but you must still do it. Put the smartest soldiers in
the S2 section and the R&S squad. You will have one less rifle squad, but the intelligence
section will pay for itself in lives and effort saved.
4. Organize for interagency operations. Almost everything in counterinsurgency
is interagency. And everything important, from policing to intelligence to civil-military
operations to trash collection, will involve your company working with civilian actors
and local indigenous partners you cannot control, but whose success is essential for yours.
Train the company in interagency operations: Get a briefing from the US Department |
3-24.2 | 259 | Twenty-Eight Articles:
Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency
of State, aid agencies, and the local police or fire brigade. Train point-men in each squad
to deal with the interagency people. Realize that civilians find rifles, helmets, and body armor
intimidating. Learn how not to scare them. Ask others who come from that country or culture
about your ideas. See it through the eyes of a civilian who knows nothing about the military.
How would you react if foreigners came to your neighborhood and conducted the operations
you planned? What if somebody came to your mother’s house and did that? Most
importantly, know that your operations will create a temporary breathing space, but long-term
development and stabilization by civilian agencies will ultimately win the war.
5. Travel light and harden your combat service support (CSS). You will be weighed down
with body armor, rations, extra ammunition, communications gear, and a thousand other
things. The enemy will carry a rifle or rocket-propelled grenade launcher, a shemagh (head
scarf), and a water bottle if he is lucky. Unless you ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a
culture of speed and mobility, the insurgents will consistently out-run and out-maneuver you.
But in lightening your load, make sure you can always reach back to call for firepower
or heavy support if needed. Also, remember to harden your CSS. The enemy will attack your
weakest points. Most attacks on Coalition forces in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, outside preplanned
combat actions like the two battles of Fallujah or Operation Iron Horse, were against CSS
installations and convoys. You do the math. Ensure your CSS assets are hardened, have
communications, and are trained in combat operations. They may do more fighting than your
rifle squads.
6. Find a political/cultural adviser. In a force optimized for counterinsurgency, you might
receive a political-cultural adviser at company level, a diplomat or military foreign area
officer able to speak the language and navigate the intricacies of local politics. Back on planet
Earth, the corps and division commander will get a political advisor; you will not, so you
must improvise. Find a POLAD (political-cultural adviser) from among your people—
perhaps an officer, perhaps not (see article 8). Someone with people skills and a feel for the
environment will do better than a political-science graduate. Don’t try to be your own cultural
adviser: You must be fully aware of the political and cultural dimension, but this is a different
task. Also, don’t give one of your intelligence people this role. They can help, but their task
is to understand the environment. The POLAD’s job is to help shape it.
7. Train the squad leaders—then trust them. Counterinsurgency is a squad and platoon
leader’s war, and often a private soldier’s war. Battles are won or lost in moments: Whoever
can bring combat power to bear in seconds, on a street corner, will win. The commander on
the spot controls the fight. You must train the squad leaders to act intelligently
and independently without orders. If your squad leaders are competent, you can get away
with average company or platoon staffs. The reverse is not the case. Training should focus on
basic skills: marksmanship, patrolling, security on the move and at the halt, and basic drills.
When in doubt, spend less time on company and platoon training, and more time on squads.
Ruthlessly replace leaders who do not make the grade. But once people are trained and you
have a shared operational diagnosis, you must trust them. We talk about this, but few
company or platoon leaders really trust their people. In counterinsurgency, you have no
choice.
8. Rank is nothing; talent is everything. Not everyone is good at counterinsurgency. Many
people don’t understand the concept, and some can’t execute it. It is difficult, and in a
conventional force only a few people will master it. Anyone can learn the basics, but a few
naturals do exist. Learn how to spot these people, and put them into positions where they can
make a difference. Rank matters far less than talent—a few good men led by a smart junior
noncommissioned officer can succeed in counterinsurgency, where hundreds of well-armed
soldiers under a mediocre senior officer will fail.
9. Have a game plan. The final preparation task is to develop a game plan, a mental picture
of how you see the operation developing. You will be tempted to try and do this too early.
But wait, as your knowledge improves, you will get a better idea of what needs to be done |
3-24.2 | 260 | Appendix C
and a fuller understanding of your own limitations. Like any plan, this plan will change once
you hit the ground, and it may need to be scrapped if there is a major shift in the environment.
But you still need a plan, and the process of planning will give you a simple, robust idea
of what to achieve, even if the methods change. This is sometimes called “operational
design.” One approach is to identify basic stages in your operation, for example “establish
dominance, build local networks, marginalize the enemy.” Make sure you can easily
transition between phases, forward and backward, in case of setbacks. Just as the insurgent
can adapt his activity to yours, so you must have a simple enough plan to survive setbacks
without collapsing. This plan is the solution that matches the shared diagnosis you developed
earlier. It must be simple, and known to everyone
GOLDEN HOUR
C-7. You have deployed, completed reception and staging, and (if you are lucky) attended the
in-country counterinsurgency school. Now it is time to enter your sector and start your tour. This is the
golden hour. Mistakes made now will haunt you for the rest of your tour, while early successes will set the
tone for victory. You will look back on your early actions and cringe at your clumsiness. So be it. But you
must act.
10. Be there. The most fundamental rule of counterinsurgency is to be there. You can almost
never outrun the enemy. If you are not present when an incident happens, there is usually
little you can do about it. So your first order of business is to establish presence. If you can’t
do this throughout your sector, then do it wherever you can. This demands a residential
approach: living in your sector, in close proximity to the population rather than raiding into
the area from remote, secure bases. Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night
patrolling—all these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals,
who see you as real people they can trust and do business with, not as aliens who descend
from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy, day-tripping like a tourist
in hell, degrades situational awareness, makes you a target, and is ultimately more dangerous.
11. Avoid knee-jerk responses to first impressions. Don’t act rashly; get the facts first. The
violence you see may be part of the insurgent strategy; it may be various interest groups
fighting it out with each other or settling personal vendettas. Normality in Kandahar is not the
same as in Seattle—you need time to learn what normality looks like. The insurgent
commander wants to goad you into lashing out at the population or making a mistake. Unless
you happen to be on the spot when an incident occurs, you will have only second-hand
reports and may misunderstand the local context or interpretation. This fragmentation
and “disaggregation” of the battlefield, particularly in urban areas, means that first
impressions are often highly misleading. Of course, you can’t avoid making judgments. But
if possible, check them with an older or a trusted local. If you can, keep one or two officers
from your predecessor unit for the first part of the tour. Try to avoid a rush to judgment.
12. Prepare for handover from day one. Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency
on your watch. Your tour will end, and your successors will need your corporate knowledge.
Start handover folders, in every platoon and specialist squad, from day one. Ideally, you
would have inherited these from your predecessors, but if not you must start them. The
folders should include lessons learned, details about the population, village and patrol reports,
updated maps, and photographs—anything that will help newcomers master the environment.
Computerized databases are fine, but keep good back-ups and ensure you have hard copy
of key artifacts and documents. This is and tedious, but essential. Over time, you will create a
corporate memory that keeps your people alive.
13. Build trusted networks. Once you have settled into your sector, your key task is to build
trusted networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase hearts and minds, which comprises
two separate components. Hearts means persuading people their best interests are served by
your success; minds means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you
is pointless. Note that neither concept has anything to do with whether people like you. |
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Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, if you successfully build
networks of trust, these will grow like roots into the population, displacing the enemy’s
networks, bringing him out into the open to fight you, and letting you seize the initiative.
These networks include local allies, community leaders, local security forces,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other friendly or neutral nonstate actors in your
area, and the media. Conduct village and neighborhood surveys to identify needs in the
community, and then follow through to meet them. Build common interests and mobilize
popular support. This is your true main effort; everything else is secondary. Actions that help
build trusted networks serve your cause. Actions—even killing high-profile targets that
undermine trust or disrupt your networks—help the enemy.
14. Start easy. If you were trained in maneuver warfare you know about surfaces and gaps. This
applies to counterinsurgency as much as any other form of maneuver. Don’t try to crack the
hardest nut first—don’t go straight for the main insurgent stronghold, try to provoke a
decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages that support the insurgents. Instead, start
from secure areas and work gradually outwards. Do this by extending your influence through
the locals’ own networks. Go with, not against, the grain of local society. First win the
confidence of a few villages and see who they trade, intermarry, or do business with. Now
win these people over. Soon enough the showdown with the insurgents will come. But now
you have local allies, a mobilized population, and a trusted network at your back. Do it the
other way around and no one will mourn your failure.
15. Seek early victories. In this early phase, your aim is to stamp your dominance in your sector.
Do this by seeking an early victory. This will probably not translate into a combat victory
over the enemy. Looking for such a victory can be overly aggressive and create collateral
damage—especially since you really do not yet understand your sector. Also, such a combat
victory depends on the enemy being stupid enough to present you with a clear-cut target,
which is a rare windfall in counterinsurgency. Instead, you may achieve a victory by
resolving long-standing issues your predecessors have failed to address, or by co-opting a key
local leader who has resisted cooperation with our forces. Like any other form of armed
propaganda, achieving even a small victory early in the tour sets the tone for what comes later
and helps seize the initiative, which you have probably lost due to the inevitable hiatus
entailed by the handover-takeover with your predecessor.
16. Practice deterrent patrolling. Establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy from
attacking you. Often our patrolling approach seems designed to provoke, then defeat, enemy
attacks. This is counterproductive; it leads to a raiding, day-tripping mindset or, worse, a
bunker mentality. Instead, practice deterrent patrolling. There are many methods for this,
including multiple patrolling in which you flood an area with numerous small patrols working
together. Each is too small to be a worthwhile target, and the insurgents never know where all
the patrols are—making an attack on any one patrol extremely risky. Other methods include
so-called blue-green patrolling, where you mount daylight, overt humanitarian patrols, which
go covert at night and hunt specific targets. Again, the aim is to keep the enemy off balance,
and the population reassured through constant and unpredictable activity, which, over time,
deters attacks and creates a more permissive environment. A reasonable rule of thumb is that
one—to two-thirds of your force should be on patrol at any time, day or night.
17. Be prepared for setbacks. Setbacks are normal in counterinsurgency, as in every other form
of war. You will make mistakes, lose people, or occasionally kill or detain the wrong person.
You may fail in building or expanding networks. If this happens, don’t lose heart, simply
drop back to the previous phase of your game plan and recover your balance. It is normal
in company counterinsurgency operations for some platoons to be doing well while others do
badly. This is not necessarily evidence of failure. Give local commanders the freedom
to adjust their posture to local conditions. This creates elasticity that helps you survive
setbacks. |
3-24.2 | 262 | Appendix C
18. Remember the global audience. One of the biggest differences between the
counterinsurgencies our fathers fought and those we face today is the omnipresence
of globalized media. Most houses in Iraq have one or more satellite dishes. Web bloggers;
print, radio, and television reporters; and others are monitoring and reporting your every
move. When the insurgents ambush your patrols or set off a car bomb, they do so not
to destroy one more track, but because they want graphic images of a burning vehicle
and dead bodies for the evening news. Beware of the scripted enemy who plays to a global
audience and seeks to defeat you in the court of global public opinion. You counter this by
training people to always bear in mind the global audience, to assume that everything they
say or do will be publicized, and to befriend the media. Get the press on-side—help them get
their story, and trade information with them. Good relationships with nonembedded media,
especially indigenous media, dramatically increase your situational awareness and help get
your message across to the global and local audience.
19. Engage the women, beware of the children. Most insurgent fighters are men. But
in traditional societies, women are hugely influential in forming the social networks that
insurgents use for support. Co-opting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social
and economic programs, builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually
undermine the insurgents. You need your own female counterinsurgents, including
interagency people, to do this effectively. Win the women, and you own the family unit. Own
the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the population. Conversely, though,
stop your people from fraternizing with the local children. Your troops are homesick; they
want to drop their guard with the kids, but children are sharp-eyed, lacking in empathy,
and willing to commit atrocities their elders would shrink from. The insurgents are watching:
They will notice a growing friendship between one of your people and a local child,
and either harm the child as punishment, or use them against you. Similarly, stop people from
throwing candies or presents to children. It attracts them to our vehicles, creates crowds the
enemy can exploit, and leads to children being run over. Harden your heart and keep the
children at arm’s length.
20. Take stock regularly. You probably already know that a body count tells you little, because
you usually can’t know how many insurgents there were to start with, how many moved into
the area, how many transferred from supporter to combatant status, or how many new fighters
the conflict has created. But you still need to develop metrics early in the tour and refine them
as the operation progresses. They should cover a range of social, informational, military,
and economic issues. Use metrics intelligently to form an overall impression of progress—not
in a mechanistic traffic-light fashion. Typical metrics include percentage of engagements
initiated by our forces versus those initiated by insurgents; longevity of friendly local leaders
in positions of authority; number and quality of tip-offs on insurgent activity that originate
spontaneously from the population; and economic activity at markets and shops. These mean
virtually nothing as a snapshot; it is trends over time that help you track progress
in your sector.
GROUNDHOG DAY
C-8. Now you are in “steady state.” You are established in your sector, and people are settling into that
“groundhog day” mentality that hits every unit at some stage during every tour. It will probably take you at
least the first third of your tour to become effective in your new environment, if not longer. Then in the last
period you will struggle against the short-timer mentality. So this middle part of the tour is the most
productive—but keeping the flame alive, and bringing the local population along with you, takes immense
leadership.
21. Exploit a “single narrative.” Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular
support, it pays to know how people are mobilized. In most societies there are opinion
makers—local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media personalities,
and others who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence, including the
pernicious influence of the insurgents, often takes the form of a “single narrative”: a simple, |
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unifying, easily expressed story or explanation that organizes people’s experience
and provides a framework for understanding events. Nationalist and ethnic historical myths,
or sectarian creeds, provide such a narrative. The Iraqi insurgents have one, as do Al-Qaeda
and the Taliban. To undercut their influence you must exploit an alternative narrative,
or better yet, tap into an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents. This narrative is often
worked out for you by higher headquarters—but only you have the detailed knowledge
to tailor the narrative to local conditions and generate leverage from it. For example, you
might use a nationalist narrative to marginalize foreign fighters in your area or a narrative
of national redemption to undermine former regime elements that have been terrorizing the
population. At the company level, you do this in baby steps by getting to know local
opinion-makers, winning their trust, learning what motivates them, and building on this
to find a single narrative that emphasizes the inevitability and rightness of your ultimate
success. This is art, not science.
22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not the Americans. By this stage, you will be
working closely with local forces, training or supporting them and building indigenous
capability. The natural tendency is to build forces in the US image, with the aim of eventually
handing our role over to them. This is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need
to mirror the enemy’s capabilities and seek to supplant the insurgent’s role. This does not
mean they should be irregular in the sense of being brutal or outside proper control. Rather,
they should move, equip, organize like the insurgents, but have access to your support and be
under the firm control of their parent societies. Combined with a mobilized population
and trusted networks, this allows local forces to hard-wire the enemy out of the environment,
under top-cover from you. At the company level, this means that raising, training,
and employing local indigenous auxiliary forces (police and military) are valid tasks. This
requires high-level clearance, of course, but if support is given, you should establish a
company training cell. Platoons should aim to train one local squad, and then use that squad
as a nucleus for a partner platoon. Company headquarters should train an indigenous
leadership team. This mirrors the growth process of other trusted networks and tends
to emerge naturally as you win local allies who want to take up arms in their own defense.
23. Practice armed civil affairs. Counterinsurgency is armed social work, an attempt to redress
basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes civil affairs a central
counterinsurgency activity, not an afterthought. It is how you restructure the environment
to displace the enemy from it. In your company sector, civil affairs must focus on meeting
basic needs first, and then progress up Maslow’s hierarchy as each successive need is met.
You need intimate cooperation with interagency partners here—national, international,
and local. You will not be able to control these partners—many NGOs, for example, do not
want to be too closely associated with you because they need to preserve their perceived
neutrality. Instead, you need to work on a shared diagnosis of the problem, building a
consensus that helps you self-synchronize. Your role is to provide protection, identify needs,
facilitate civil affairs, and use improvements in social conditions as leverage to build
networks and mobilize the population. Thus, there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian
assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency. Every time you help someone, you hurt
someone else—not least the insurgents—so civil and humanitarian assistance personnel will
be targeted. Protecting them is a matter not only of close-in defense, but also of creating a
permissive operating environment by co-opting the beneficiaries of aid (local communities
and leaders) to help you help them.
24. Small is beautiful. Another natural tendency is to go for large-scale, mass programs.
In particular, we have a tendency to template ideas that succeed in one area and transplant
them into another, and we tend to take small programs that work and try to replicate them on
a larger scale. Again, this is usually a mistake: Often programs succeed because of specific
local conditions of which we are unaware, or because their very smallness kept them below
the enemy’s radar and helped them flourish unmolested. At the company level, programs that
succeed in one district often also succeed in another (because the overall company sector |
3-24.2 | 264 | Appendix C
is small), but small-scale projects rarely proceed smoothly into large programs. Keep
programs small; this makes them cheap, sustainable, low-key, and (importantly) recoverable
if they fail. You can add new programs—also small, cheap and tailored to local conditions—
as the situation allows.
25. Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces. At this stage, if things are proceeding well, the
insurgents will go over to the offensive. Yes, the offensive, because you have created a
situation so dangerous to the insurgents (by threatening to displace them from the
environment) that they have to attack you and the population to get back into the game. Thus
it is normal, even in the most successful operations, to have spikes of offensive insurgent
activity late in the operation. This does not necessarily mean you have done something wrong
(though it may, it depends on whether you have successfully mobilized the population). At
this point the tendency is to go for the jugular and seek to destroy the enemy’s forces in open
battle. This is rarely the best choice at company level, because provoking major combat
usually plays into the enemy’s hands by undermining the population’s confidence. Instead,
attack the enemy’s strategy. If he is seeking to recapture the allegiance of a segment of the
local population, then co-opt them against him. If he is trying to provoke a sectarian conflict,
go over to peace-enforcement mode. The permutations are endless, but the principle is the
same: Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces.
26. Build your own solution—only attack the enemy when he gets in the way. Try not to be
distracted or forced into a series of reactive moves by a desire to kill or capture the
insurgents. Your aim should be to implement your own solution, the game plan you
developed early in the operation and then refined through interaction with local partners.
Your approach must be environment-centric (based on dominating the whole district
and implementing a solution to its systemic problems) rather than enemy-centric. This means
that particularly late in the operation you may need to learn to negotiate with the enemy.
Members of the population that supports you also know the enemy’s leaders. They may have
grown up together in the small district that is now your company sector, and valid negotiating
partners sometimes emerge as the operation progresses. Again, you need close interagency
relationships to exploit opportunities to co-opt segments of the enemy. This helps you wind
down the insurgency without alienating potential local allies who have relatives or friends in
the insurgent movement. At this stage, a defection is better than a surrender, a surrender
is better than a capture, and a capture is better than a kill.
GETTING SHORT
C-9. Time is short, and the tour is drawing to a close. The key problem now is keeping your people
focused, maintaining the rage on all the multifarious programs, projects, and operations that you have
started, and preventing your people from dropping their guard. In this final phase, the previous articles still
stand, but there is an important new one.
27. Keep your extraction plan secret. The temptation to talk about home becomes almost
unbearable toward the end of a tour. The locals know you are leaving, and probably have a
better idea than you of the generic extraction plan. Remember, they have seen units come
and go. But you must protect the specific details of the extraction plan, or the enemy will use
this as an opportunity to score a high-profile hit, recapture the population’s allegiance by
scare tactics that convince them they will not be protected once you leave, or persuade them
that your successor unit will be oppressive or incompetent. Keep the details secret within a
tightly controlled compartment in your headquarters.
FOUR “WHAT IFS”
C-10. The articles above describe what should happen, but we all know that things go wrong. Here are
some what ifs to consider:
• What if you get moved to a different area? You prepared for ar-Ramadi and studied Dulaim
tribal structures and Sunni beliefs. Now you are going to Najaf and will be surrounded by |
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al-Hassani tribes and Shi’a communities. But that work was not wasted. In mastering your first
area, you learned techniques you can apply: how to “case” an operational area and how
to decide what matters in the local societal structure. Do the same again, and this time the
process is easier and faster, since you have an existing mental structure and can focus on what
is different. The same applies if you get moved frequently within a battalion or brigade area.
• What if higher headquarters doesn’t “get” counterinsurgency? Higher headquarters is telling
you the mission is to “kill terrorists,” or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a
base-camp mentality. They just don’t seem to understand counterinsurgency. This is not
uncommon, since company-grade officers today often have more combat experience than
senior officers. In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create expectations that higher
headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage “first do no harm.” Over time, you will
find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher headquarters about your locations
or activities—they own the indirect fires.
• What if you have no resources? You have no linguists, the aid agencies have no money
for projects in your area, and you have a low priority for civil affairs. You can still get things
done, but you need to focus on self-reliance: Keep things small and sustainable and ruthlessly
prioritize effort. The local population are your allies in this: They know what matters to them
more than you do. Be honest with them; discuss possible projects and options with community
leaders; get them to choose what their priorities are. Often they will find the translators,
building supplies, or expertise that you need, and will only expect your support and protection
in making their projects work. And the process of negotiation and consultation will help
mobilize their support and strengthen their social cohesion. If you set your sights on what
is achievable, the situation can still work.
• What if the theater situation shifts under your feet? It is your worst nightmare—Everything has
gone well in your sector, but the whole theater situation has changed and invalidates your
efforts. Think of the first battle of Fallujah, the Askariya shrine bombing, or the Sadr uprising.
What do you do? Here is where having a flexible, adaptive game plan comes in. Just as the
insurgents drop down to a lower posture when things go wrong, now is the time for you to drop
back a stage, consolidate, regain your balance, and prepare to expand again when the situation
allows. But see article 28: If you cede the initiative, you must regain it as soon as the situation
allows, or you will eventually lose.
C-11. This, then, is the tribal wisdom, the folklore that those who went before you have learned. Like
any folklore it needs interpretation and contains seemingly contradictory advice. Over time, as you apply
unremitting intellectual effort to study your sector, you will learn to apply these ideas in your own way
and will add to this store of wisdom from your own observations and experience. So only one article
remains, and if you remember nothing else, remember this:
28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative. In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything.
If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the
population, you will win. If you are reacting to the enemy, even if you are killing or capturing
him in large numbers, then he is controlling the environment and you will eventually lose.
In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets you unexpectedly,
and withdraws too fast for you to react. Do not be drawn into purely reactive operations:
Focus on the population, build your own solution, further your game plan, and fight the
enemy only when he gets in the way. This gains and keeps the initiative. |
3-24.2 | 267 | Appendix D
Twenty-Seven Articles of T. E. Lawrence
T. E. Lawrence wrote that he expressed these notes, published in The Arab Bulletin,
20 August 1917, "in commandment form" for clarity and brevity:
They are, however, only my personal conclusions, arrived at gradually while I
worked in the Hejaz and now put on paper as stalking horses for beginners in the
Arab armies. They are meant to apply only to Bedu; townspeople or Syrians require
totally different treatment. They are of course not suitable to any other person's need,
or applicable unchanged in any particular situation. Handling Hejaz Arabs is an art,
not a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules. At the same time we have a great
chance there; the Sharif trusts us, and has given us the position (towards his
Government) which the Germans wanted to win in Turkey. If we are tactful, we can
at once retain his goodwill and carry out our job, but to succeed we have got to put
into it all the interest and skill we possess.
1. Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their
judgments on externals that we ignore. When you have reached the inner circle in a tribe, you can
do as you please with yourself and them.
2. Learn all you can about your Ashraf and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans and tribes,
friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect inquiry. Do not
ask questions. Get to speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours. Until you can understand their
allusions, avoid getting deep into conversation or you will drop bricks. Be a little stiff at first.
3. In matters of business deal only with the commander of the army, column, or party in which you
serve. Never give orders to anyone at all, and reserve your directions or advice for the C.O.,
however great the temptation (for efficiency's sake) of dealing with his underlings. Your place
is advisory, and your advice is due to the commander alone. Let him see that this is your
conception of your duty, and that his is to be the sole executive of your joint plans.
4. Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others
when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put
forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them
insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own
opinion. When you attain this point, hold him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them
forward as firmly as possibly, but secretly, so that no one but himself (and he not too clearly)
is aware of your pressure.
5. Remain in touch with your leader as constantly and unobtrusively as you can. Live with him, that
at meal times and at audiences you may be naturally with him in his tent. Formal visits to give
advice are not so good as the constant dropping of ideas in casual talk. When stranger sheikhs
come in for the first time to swear allegiance and offer service, clear out of the tent. If their first
impression is of foreigners in the confidence of the Sharif, it will do the Arab cause much harm.
6. Be shy of too close relations with the subordinates of the expedition. Continual intercourse with
them will make it impossible for you to avoid going behind or beyond the instructions that the
Arab C.O. has given them on your advice, and in so disclosing the weakness of his position you
altogether destroy your own. |
3-24.2 | 268 | Appendix D
7. Treat the sub-chiefs of your force quite easily and lightly. In this way you hold yourself above
their level. Treat the leader, if a Sharif, with respect. He will return your manner and you and he
will then be alike, and above the rest. Precedence is a serious matter among the Arabs, and you
must attain it.
8. Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too
prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too often with any tribal sheikh, even
if C.O. of the expedition. To do your work you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige
if you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds. Sharifs are above all
blood-feuds and local rivalries, and form the only principle of unity among the Arabs. Let your
name therefore be coupled always with a Sharif's, and share his attitude towards the tribes. When
the moment comes for action put yourself publicly under his orders. The Bedu will then follow
suit.
9. Magnify and develop the growing conception of the Sharifs as the natural aristocracy of the
Arabs. Intertribal jealousies make it impossible for any sheikh to attain a commanding position,
and the only hope of union in nomad Arabs is that the Ashraf be universally acknowledged as the
ruling class. Sharifs are half-townsmen, half-nomad, in manner and life, and have the instinct
of command. Mere merit and money would be insufficient to obtain such recognition; but the
Arab reverence for pedigree and the Prophet gives hope for the ultimate success of the Ashraf.
10. Call your Sharif 'Sidi' in public and in private. Call other people by their ordinary names, without
title. In intimate conversation call a Sheikh 'Abu Annad', 'Akhu Alia' or some similar by-name.
11. The foreigner and Christian is not a popular person in Arabia. However friendly and informal the
treatment of yourself may be, remember always that your foundations are very sandy ones. Wave
a Sharif in front of you like a banner and hide your own mind and person. If you succeed, you will
have hundreds of miles of country and thousands of men under your orders, and for this it is worth
bartering the outward show.
12. Cling tight to your sense of humor. You will need it every day. A dry irony is the most useful
type, and repartee of a personal and not too broad character will double your influence with the
chiefs. Reproof, if wrapped up in some smiling form, will carry further and last longer than the
most violent speech. The power of mimicry or parody is valuable, but use it sparingly, for wit
is more dignified than humor. Do not cause a laugh at a Sharif except among Sharifs.
13. Never lay hands on an Arab; you degrade yourself. You may think the resultant obvious increase
of outward respect a gain to you, but what you have really done is to build a wall between you
and their inner selves. It is difficult to keep quiet when everything is being done wrong, but the
less you lose your temper the greater your advantage. Also then you will not go mad yourself.
14. While very difficult to drive, the Bedu are easy to lead, if— have the patience to bear with them.
The less apparent your interferences the more your influence. They are willing to follow your
advice and do what you wish, but they do not mean you or anyone else to be aware of that. It
is only after the end of all annoyances that you find at bottom their real fund of goodwill.
15. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do
it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under
the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think
it is.
16. If you can, without being too lavish, forestall presents to yourself. A well-placed gift is often most
effective in winning over a suspicious sheikh. Never receive a present without giving a liberal
return, but you may delay this return (while letting its ultimate certainty be known) if you require
a particular service from the giver. Do not let them ask you for things, since their greed will then
make them look upon you only as a cow to milk.
17. Wear an Arab head cloth when with a tribe. Bedu have a malignant prejudice against the hat,
and believe that our persistence in wearing it (due probably to British obstinacy of dictation) |
3-24.2 | 269 | Twenty-Seven Articles of T. E. Lawrence
is founded on some immoral or irreligious principle. A thick head cloth forms a good protection
against the sun, and if you wear a hat your best Arab friends will be ashamed of you in public.
18. Disguise is not advisable. Except in special areas, let it be clearly known that you are a British
officer and a Christian. At the same time, if you can wear Arab kit when with the tribes, you will
acquire their trust and intimacy to a degree impossible in uniform. It is, however, dangerous
and difficult. They make no special allowances for you when you dress like them. Breaches
of etiquette not charged against a foreigner are not condoned to you in Arab clothes. You will be
like an actor in a foreign theatre, playing a part day and night for months, without rest, and for an
anxious stake. Complete success, which is when the Arabs forget your strangeness and speak
naturally before you, counting you as one of themselves, is perhaps only attainable in character:
while half-success (all that most of us will strive for; the other costs too much) is easier to win
in British things, and you yourself will last longer, physically and mentally, in the comfort that
they mean. Also then the Turks will not hang you, when you are caught.
19. If you wear Arab things, wear the best. Clothes are significant among the tribes, and you must
wear the appropriate, and appear at ease in them. Dress like a Sharif, if they agree to it.
20. If you wear Arab things at all, go the whole way. Leave your English friends and customs on the
coast, and fall back on Arab habits entirely. It is possible, starting thus level with them, for the
European to beat the Arabs at their own game, for we have stronger motives for our action,
and put more heart into it than they. If you can surpass them, you have taken an immense stride
toward complete success, but the strain of living and thinking in a foreign and half-understood
language, the savage food, strange clothes, and stranger ways, with the complete loss of privacy
and quiet, and the impossibility of ever relaxing your watchful imitation of the others for months
on end, provide such an added stress to the ordinary difficulties of dealing with the Bedu, the
climate, and the Turks, that this road should not be chosen without serious thought.
21. Religious discussions will be frequent. Say what you like about your own side, and avoid criticism
of theirs, unless you know that the point is external, when you may score heavily by proving it so.
With the Bedu, Islam is so all-pervading an element that there is little religiosity, little fervor,
and no regard for externals. Do not think from their conduct that they are careless. Their
conviction of the truth of their faith, and its share in every act and thought and principle of their
daily life is so intimate and intense as to be unconscious, unless roused by opposition. Their
religion is as much a part of nature to them as is sleep or food.
22. Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting. The Hejaz confounds ordinary tactics. Learn the
Bedu principles of war as thoroughly and as quickly as you can, for till you know them your
advice will be no good to the Sharif. Unnumbered generations of tribal raids have taught them
more about some parts of the business than we will ever know. In familiar conditions they fight
well, but strange events cause panic. Keep your unit small. Their raiding parties are usually from
one hundred to two hundred men, and if you take a crowd they only get confused. Also their
sheikhs, while admirable company commanders, are too 'set' to learn to handle the equivalents
of battalions or regiments. Don't attempt unusual things, unless they appeal to the sporting instinct
Bedu have so strongly, unless success is obvious. If the objective is a good one (booty) they will
attack like fiends, they are splendid scouts, their mobility gives you the advantage that will win
this local war, they make proper use of their knowledge of the country (don't take tribesmen
to places they do not know), and the gazelle-hunters, who form a proportion of the better men, are
great shots at visible targets. A sheikh from one tribe cannot give orders to men from another; a
Sharif is necessary to command a mixed tribal force. If there is plunder in prospect, and the odds
are at all equal, you will win. Do not waste Bedu attacking trenches (they will not stand
casualties) or in trying to defend a position, for they cannot sit still without slacking. The more
unorthodox and Arab your proceedings, the more likely you are to have the Turks cold, for they
lack initiative and expect you to. Don't play for safety.
23. The open reason that Bedu give you for action or inaction may be true, but always there will be
better reasons left for you to divine. You must find these inner reasons (they will be denied, but
are none the less in operation) before shaping your arguments for one course or other. Allusion |
3-24.2 | 270 | Appendix D
is more effective than logical exposition: they dislike concise expression. Their minds work just
as ours do, but on different premises. There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible,
or inscrutable in the Arab. Experience of them and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you
to foresee their attitude and possible course of action in nearly every case.
24. Do not mix Bedu and Syrians, or trained men and tribesmen. You will get work out of neither,
for they hate each other. I have never seen a successful combined operation, but many failures.
In particular, ex-officers of the Turkish army, however Arab in feelings and blood and language,
are hopeless with Bedu. They are narrow minded in tactics, unable to adjust themselves
to irregular warfare, clumsy in Arab etiquette, swollen-headed to the extent of being incapable
of politeness to a tribesman for more than a few minutes, impatient, and, usually, helpless without
their troops on the road and in action. Your orders (if you were unwise enough to give any) would
be more readily obeyed by Bedouins than those of any Mohammedan Syrian officer. Arab
townsmen and Arab tribesmen regard each other mutually as poor relations, and poor relations are
much more objectionable than poor strangers.
25. In spite of ordinary Arab example, avoid too free talk about women. It is as difficult a subject
as religion, and their standards are so unlike our own that a remark, harmless in English, may
appear as unrestrained to them, as some of their statements would look to us, if translated literally.
26. Be as careful of your servants as of yourself. If you want a sophisticated one you will probably
have to take an Egyptian, or a Sudani, and unless you are very lucky he will undo on trek much
of the good you so laboriously effect. Arabs will cook rice and make coffee for you, and leave you
if required to do unmanly work like cleaning boots or washing. They are only really possible
if you are in Arab kit. A slave brought up in the Hejaz is the best servant, but there are rules
against British subjects owning them, so they have to be lent to you. In any case, take with you an
Ageyli or two when you go up country. They are the most efficient couriers in Arabia,
and understand camels.
27. The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them. Keep
always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and your companions all
the time: hear all that passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their
characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything you find out
to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas except the work in hand,
so that your brain is saturated with one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough
to avoid the little slips that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be
proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it." |
3-24.2 | 271 | Glossary
Section I—ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
3C cross-cultural competency CORDS civil operations and revolutionary
(rural) development support
A CWIED command-wired improvised
explosive device
AAR after-action review
AI area of interest
D
AO area of operations
D3A decide, detect, deliver, and assess
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities,
DA Department of the Army
organizations, people, and events
DC dislocated civilian
B DCP detention control point
BCT brigade combat team DHA detainee holding area
BDA battle damage assessment DNA deoxyribonucleic acid
DOD Department of Defense
C
DOMEX document and media exploitation
C2 command and control DOTMLPF Doctrine
CA civil affairs Organization
Training
CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned
Materiel
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Leadership and Education
Relief Everywhere Personnel
CARVER-P Criticality Facilities
Accessibility DTG date-time group
Recoverability
DVD digital videodisk
Vulnerability
Effect
E
Recognizability
Psychological impact
EEFI essential elements of friendly
CAS close air support information
CASEVAC casualty evacuation EOD explosive ordnance disposal
CAT civil affairs team EOF escalation of force
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, EPW enemy prisoner of war
or nuclear
F
CCIR commander’s critical information
requirement
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of
CI civilian internee Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia)
CID combat identification
FCM fire-control measure
COA course of action
FFIR friendly force information
COIN counterinsurgency
requirement
COP common operational picture
FID foreign internal defense |
3-24.2 | 272 | Glossary
FOB forward operating base LOA limit of advance
FRAGO fragmentary order LOC line of communications
LOE line of effort
G
M
GIS geographic information system
m meter(s)
H
MASINT measurement and signature
HCT HUMINT collection team intelligence
HMMWV high-mobility, multipurpose MDMP military decision-making process
wheeled vehicle METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and
HN host nation weather, troops and support
available, time available, and
HOPE-P higher, operational, planning,
civilian considerations
enemy, and populace
MILVAN military van (container)
HPT high-payoff target
MOE measure of effectiveness
HQ headquarters
MOP measure of performance
HUMINT human intelligence
MORTEAM Measure (assess)
Organize
I
Rebuild/build facilities
IAW in accordance with Train
ID identification Equip
Advise
IDAD internal defense and development
Mentor
IDP internally displaced person
MWD military working dog
IE information engagement
IED improvised explosive device N
IGO intergovernmental organization NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
IPB intelligence preparation of the NCO noncommissioned officer
battlefield
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
IPI indigenous population and
NGA National Geospatial-Intelli-
institutions
gence Agency
IRA Irish Republican Army
NGO nongovernmental organization
ISR intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance
O
J OAKOC observation and fields of fire,
avenues of approach, key and
JDAM joint direct attack munition decisive terrain, obstacles, cover
JLENS Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile and concealment.
Defense Elevated Netted Sensor obj objective
System
OE operational environment
JTACMS Joint Tactical Attack Cruise
OP observation post
Missile System
OPORD operation order
L OPSEC operations security
LEP law enforcement professionals
LN local nationals |
3-24.2 | 273 | Glossary
ORP objective rally point S-5 Plans Staff Officer
OXFAM Oxford Committee for Famine S-7 Information Engagement
Relief Staff Officer
S-9 Civil Affairs Operations
P Staff Officer
PAO public affairs office SCT small capture team
PBIED person-borne improvised explosive SE site exploitation
device sec second(s)
PCC precombat check SIGINT signals intelligence
PCI precombat inspection SITEMP situation template
PID positively identify (a target) SKT small kill team
PIR priority intelligence requirement SOF special operations forces
PKC Russian-made machine gun; also SOP standing operating procedures
called PK or PKS
SOT small observation team
PMESII-PT Political
SVD Soviet semiautomatic sniper rifle,
Military
common throughout the former
Economic
Eastern Bloc
Social
Information SWAT special weapons and tactics
Infrastructure SWEAT-MSO sewers, water, electrical, academic,
physical environment, time trash, medical facilities, safety, and
PRC populace and resource control other considerations
PSYOP psychological operations
T
Q TACSAT tactical satellite
QRF quick reaction force tm team
terp interpreter
R
THT tactical human intelligence team
RAM random antiterrorism measure TLP troop-leading procedures
RCIED radio-controlled improvised TM team
explosive device
TOA transfer of authority
RCT route clearance team
TPT tactical psychological
RIP relief in place operations team
ROE rules of engagement TRP target reference point
ROI rules of interaction TV television
RPG rocket-propelled grenade
U
RPK a light machine gun
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, target UAS Unmanned Aircraft System
acquisition
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High
S
Commissioner for Refugees
S-1 Personnel Staff Officer USAF United States Air Force
S-2 Intelligence Staff Officer USAID United States Agency for
S-3 Operations Staff Officer International Development |
3-24.2 | 274 | Glossary
USMC United States Marine Corps W
UXO unexploded ordnance WARNORD warning order
WFF warfighting function
V
WIT weapons intelligence team
VBIED vehicle-borne, improvised
explosive device
X
VIP very important person
XO executive officer
Section II—TERMS
advisor
A military member who conducts operations that train Host Nation military individuals
and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime
skills; provide advice and assisstance to military leaders, and provide training on tactics,
techniques, and procedures required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness,
and insurgency, and develop indigenous individual, leader, organizational skills.
ambush
A form of attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving
or temporarily halted enemy (FM 3-0).
area defense
A type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated
terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (FM 3-0).
area of interest
(Joint) That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent
thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations.
This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the
accomplishment of the mission (JP 1-02).
area of operations
An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas
of operations do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force
commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their
missions and protect their forces (JP 1-02).
area security
A form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installation routes,
and actions within a specific area (FM 3-90).
assessment
(Army) The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an
operation (FMI 5-0.1).
*asymmetric warfare
Conflict in which a weaker opponent uses unorthodox or surprise tactics to attack weak
points of a stronger opponent, especially if the tactics include terrorism, guerrilla warfare,
criminal activity, subversion, or propaganda. |
3-24.2 | 275 | Glossary
auxiliary
In unconventional warfare, that element of the resistance force established to provide the
organized civilian support of the resistance movement. (AR 310-25).
avenue of approach
An air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key
terrain in its path (JP 1-02).
capacity building
The process of creating an environment that fosters Host Nation institutional development,
community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial
systems (FM 3-07).
center of gravity
(Joint) The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action,
or will to act (JP 3-0).
civil considerations
How the manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the
civilian leaders, populations, organizations within an area of operations influence the conduct
of military operations (FM 6-0). See also METT-TC.
civil-military operations
(FM 3-07) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit
relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations
and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area
in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives.
Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities
and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These
activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also
occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may
be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil
affairs and other forces (JP 3-57).
civil war
A war between opposing groups of citizens of the same country.
clear
(Army) A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces
and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area (FM 3-90).
close air support
(CAS) Air action by fixed—and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close
proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with
the fire and movement of those forces (DOD).
close combat
Combat carried out with direct-fire weapons, supported by indirect fires, air-delivered fires,
and nonlethal engagement means. Close combat defeats or destroys enemy forces or seizes
and retains ground (FM 3-0).
coalition
(Joint) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 5-0)
collateral damage
Unintended and undesirable civilian personnel injuries or material damage adjacent to a target
produced by the effects of demolition weapons. |
3-24.2 | 276 | Glossary
combat patrol
(NATO): For ground forces, a tactical unit sent out from the main body to engage
in independent fighting; detachment assigned to protect the front, flank, or rear of the main
body by fighting if necessary.
combat power
(Army) The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a
military unit/formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by
converting potential into effective action (FM 3-0).
combined arms
The synchronized and simultaneous application of the elements of combat power—to achieve
an effect greater than if each element of combat power was used separately or sequentially
(FM 3-0).
command
(Joint) 1. The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over
subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority
and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment
of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment
of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline
of assigned personnel.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the
purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual (JP 1).
command and control
(Joint) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control
functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,
facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating,
and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1).
(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform
command and control functions through a command and control system (FM 6-0).
commander’s critical information requirement
(Joint) An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical
to facilitating timely decisionmaking. The two key elements are friendly force information
requirements and priority intelligence requirements (JP 3-0).
commander’s intent
(Joint) A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state. It may
also include the commander’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent and an
assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation (JP 3-0).
(Army) A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force
must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the
desired end state (FM 3-0).
commander’s visualization
The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state,
and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state
(FM 3-0). |
3-24.2 | 277 | Glossary
comprehensive approach
An approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the
United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations,
multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared
goal (FM 3-07)
concept of operations
(Joint) A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force
commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The
concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. (JP 5-0, Army) A statement
that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission
and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. It
is normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations (FM 3-0).
condition
(DOD) Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system,
or individual is expected to operate and may affect performance.
control
(Joint) 1. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part
of the activities of subordinate or other organizations.
2. In mapping, charting, and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks
or objects on the Earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations (or both)
have been or will be determined.
3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group
will respond as directed. 4. An indicator governing the distribution and use of documents,
information, or material. Such indicators are the subject of intelligence community agreement
and are specifically defined in appropriate regulations (JP 1-02).
(Army) 1. In the context of command and control, the regulation of forces and warfighting
functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent (FM 3-0).
2. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a
specified area to prevent its use by an enemy (FM 3-90).
3. An action taken to eliminate a hazard or reduce its risk (FM 5-19).
4. In the context of stability mechanisms, to impose civil order (FM 3-0).
conventional forces
Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons (JP 1-02).
counterinsurgency
(Joint) Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions
taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02).
counterterrorism
(Joint) operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt,
and respond to terrorism (JP 1-02).
course of action
1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or a unit may follow.
2. A possible plan open to an individual or a commander that would accomplish or is related
to the accomplishment of a mission.
3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission.
4. A line of conduct in an engagement.
5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development
phase (JP 1-02). |
3-24.2 | 278 | Glossary
deception
Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification
of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests (JP 1-02).
decision point
(Army) An event, area, or point in the battle where and when the friendly commander will
make a critical decision (FM 3-0).
decisive operation
The operation that directly accomplishes the mission. It determines the outcome of a major
operation, battle, or engagement. The decisive operation is the focal point around which
commanders design the entire operation (FM 3-0).
decisive point
(Joint) A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted
upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute
materially to achieving success. (JP 3-0) [Note: In this context, adversary also refers
to enemies.]
defeat
A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost
the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling
or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly
commander’s will, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions
of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use (FM 3-90).
displaced person
(Army) A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country
or as an internally displaced person is a civilian involuntarily outside his area or region within
his country (FM 2-0).
disrupt
A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain,
and obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his
forces to commit prematurely or attack in piecemeal fashion (FM 3-90).
doctrine
Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions
in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application
(JP 1-02).
defensive operations
Combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces,
and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (FM 3-0).
demobilization
(Joint) The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment
and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national
security and economic vitality (JP 4-05).
destroy
In the context of defeat mechaisms, to apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so
that it can no longer perform any function and cannot be restored to a usable condition
without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-0).
2. A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it
is reconstituted (FM 3-90). |
3-24.2 | 279 | Glossary
effect
(Army) A result, outcome, or consequence of an action (FMI 5-0.1).
engagement
A tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelon maneuver forces (JP 1-02).
end state
(Joint) The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives
(JP 3-0).
enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (FM 3-0).
enemy combatant
A person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an
armed conflict. This term includes both “enemy combatants” and “unlawful enemy
combatants” (DODD 2310.01E. September 5, 2006).
execution
Putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using
situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions
(FM 3-0).
exfiltration
The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception,
surprise, or clandestine means (JP 1-02).
exploitation
1. Taking full advantage of success in military operations, following up initial gains,
and making permanent the temporary effects already achieved.
2. An offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed
to disorganize the enemy in depth (JP 1-02).
explosive ordnance disposal
The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal
of unexploded ordnance. It may also include explosive ordnance which has become
hazardous by damage or deterioration (JP 1-02).
fires
The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons (JP 1-02).
fix
(Army) 1. A tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy from moving any
part of its force from a specific location for a specific period of time. 2. An engineer obstacle
effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s movement within a
specified area, normally an engagement area (FM 3-90).
foreign internal defense
(Joint) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action
programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JP 1-02).
forward operating base
An area used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities (FM 0). |
3-24.2 | 280 | Glossary
full-spectrum operations
The Army’s operational concept: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability
or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve
decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the
mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational
environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the
situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces (FM 3-0).
goals (governmental planning)
Goals are more specific statements than objectives, they represent the actions or things to be
accomplished in order to achieve the established objectives. A goal is an observable
and measurable end result.
guerrilla
(DOD definition): A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. Dictionary definition: A member
of an irregular, usually indigenous military or paramilitary unit that operates in small units
and uses guerrilla warfare. Source: The Spanish diminutive form of guerra (war) that means
“small” or “little war." The word developed in reference to the tactics that the Spanish
resistance used against Napoleon's forces in Spain.
guerrilla force
(DOD) A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military
lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied
territory.
guerrilla warfare
(GW, DOD, NATO) Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile
territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.
host nation
(Joint) A nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government
representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions,
within its borders. (JP 1-02).
host nation support
Civil or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during
peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between
nations (JP 1-02).
human intelligence
(Army) The collection of information by a trained human intelligence collector from people
and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions,
composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities
(FM 2-22.3). [Note: trained HUMINT collectors are Soldiers holding military occupational
specialties 97E, 351Y {formerly 351C}, 351M {formerly 351E}, 35E, and 35F, and Marines
holding the specialty 0251.]
imagery intelligence
Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared
sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein
images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film,electronic display
devices, or other media (JP 1-02).
indigenous
Existing, born, or produced in a lor region. Synonym: Native. |
3-24.2 | 281 | Glossary
infiltration
(Army) A form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement
through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the
enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires (FM 3-90).
information engagement
The integrated employment of public affairs to inform US and friendly audiences;
psychological operations, combat camera, US Government strategic communication
and defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign
audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support both efforts (FM 3-0).
information warfare
Information Operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote
specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries (JP 1-02).
insurgency
(Joint) An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through
the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02).
insurgent
(DOD) Member of a political party who rebels against established leadership.
intelligence
1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation,
and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.
2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation,
investigation, analysis, or understanding (JP 1-02).
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific
geographic area. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is designed to support the
running estimate and military decision-making processes. Most intelligence requirements are
generated as a result of the IPB process and its interrelation with the decision-making process
(FM 34-130).
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(Army) An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors,
assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current
and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. For Army
forces, this activity is a combined arms operation that focuses on priority intelligence
requirements while answering the commander’s critical information requirements (FM 3-0).
interagency
(Joint) United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department
of Defense (JP 3-08).
interagency coordination
(Joint) Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that
occurs between elements of Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies
for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 1-02).
interdict
A tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use
of an area or route (FM 3-90). |
3-24.2 | 282 | Glossary
intergovernmental organization
(Joint) An organization created by a formal agreement, such as a treaty, between two or more
governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging
or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by
member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
and the African Union (JP 3-08).
internal defense and development
(IDAD, DOD) The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth
and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building
viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs
of society.
irregular forces
(DOD) Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces,
police, or other internal security forces (FM 3-07).
irregular warfare
A broad form of conflicts in which insurgency, counterinsurgency, and unconventional
warfare are the principle activities (FM 3-0).
isolate
In the context of defeat mechanisms, to deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that
enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action
(FM 3-0).
joint
Connotes activities, operations, organizations, and so on, in which elements of two or more
Military Departments participate (JP 1-02).
joint force
A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached,
of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander
(JP 1-02).
joint operations
A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces
in relationships, such as support or coordinating authority which, of themselves,do not create
joint forces (JP 1-02).
key terrain
Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either
combatant (JP 1-02).
leadership
The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while
operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization (FM 6-22).
line of effort
A line that links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to
focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions (FM 3-0).
line of communications
(Joint) A route, either land, water, or air, that connects an operating military force with a base
of operations and along which supplies and military forces move (JP 1-02). |
3-24.2 | 283 | Glossary
major operation
A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces
of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational and,
sometimes, strategic objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted
simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a
single commander (JP 1-02).
maneuver
(Joint) Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with
fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the
mission (JP 3-0).
measure of effectiveness
(Joint) A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational
environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an
objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0).
measure of performance
(Joint) A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task
accomplishment (JP 3-0).
METT-TC
A memory aid used in two contexts:
1. Information Management— the major subject categories into which relevant information
is grouped for military operations: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, civil considerations (FM 6-0). 2. In the context of tactics, major
variables considered during mission analysis (mission variables, FM 3-90).
milestone
A significant event in a project.
military decision-making process
A process that integrates the activities of the commander, staff and subordinate commanders
in developing and operation plan or order. It establishes procedures for analyzing a mission;
developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action; selecting the best course of action;
and producing an operation plan or order (FMI 5-0.1).
mission
(Joint) 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken
and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military
units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more
aircraft to accomplish one particular task (JP 1-02).
mission command
The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission
orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from
subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s
intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding
(FM 6-0).
movement to contact
A form of the offensive designed to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact
(JP 1-02).
multinational operations
(Joint) A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more
nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). |
3-24.2 | 284 | Glossary
neutral
(Army) A party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces
(FM 3-0).
nongovernmental organization
(Joint) A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human
suffering; or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental
protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; or encouraging the establishment
of democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08).
nonlethal fires
Any fires that do not directly seek the physical destruction of the intended target and are
designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, functions,
and facilities. Psychological operations, electronic warfare (jamming), and other command
and control countermeasures are all nonlethal fire options (FM 6-20).
objective
(Army) A location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate
changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort (FM 3-90).
objective area
(DOD, NATO) A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be
captured or reached by the military forces. This area is defined by competent authority
for purposes of command and control.
offensive operations
Combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources,
and population centers. They impose the commander’s will on the enemy (FM 3-0).
operation
1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training,
or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including
movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle
or campaign (JP 1-02).
operation order
(OPORD, DOD) A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the
purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called the five paragraph
field order.
operation plan
(DOD) Any plan for the conduct of military operations. Operation plans are prepared in either
a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN).
operating tempo
The annual operating miles or hours for the major equipment system in a battalion-level
or equivalent organization. Commanders use operating tempo to forecast and allocate funds
for fuel and repair parts for training events and programs (FM 7-0).
operations process
The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing,
executing, and continuously assessing the operation. The commander drives the operations
process (FM 3-0).
operations security
A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions
attendant to military operations and other activities to— a. identify those actions that can be
observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators hostile intelligence |
3-24.2 | 285 | Glossary
systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical
information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that
eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary
exploitation (JP 1-02).
order
A communication that is written, oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions from a
superior to a subordinate. In a broad sense, the terms “order” and “command” are
synonymous. However, an order implies discretion as to the details of execution, whereas a
command does not (JP 1-02). Combat orders pertain to operations and their service support.
paramilitary forces
Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them
in organization, equipment, training, or mission (JP 1-02).
partner unit
A unit that shares all or a portion of an area of operation with an HN security force unit. US
forces operating as partner units to HN security forces need to be prepared to make some
organizational changes.
patrol
A detachment of ground, sea, or air forces sent out for the purpose of gathering information
or carrying out a destructive, harassing, mopping-up, or security mission (JP 1-02).
phase
A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. A change
in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement.
Phasing helps in planning and controlling and may be indicated by time, distance, terrain,
or an event (FM 3-0).
plan
A design for a future or anticipated operation (FM 5-0).
planning
The process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the commander’s
visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the
expected results (FM 3-0).
PMESII-PT
A memory aid for the varibles used to describe the operational environment (operational
variables, FM 3-0):
Political
Military
Economic
Social
Information
Infrastructure
Physical (environment)
Time
populace controls
Controls that provide security for the populace, mobilize human resources, deny personnel to
the guerrilla, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of guerrilla agents. |
3-24.2 | 286 | Glossary
preparation
Activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation
includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement (FM 3-0).
procedures
Standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform a task.
program (governmental planning)
A program supports the plan and is a more detailed determination of specific objectives
established in the plan.
projects (governmental planning)
Projects comprise the components of programs and are the specific actions and tasks to be
accomplished.
propaganda
Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the
opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either
directly or indirectly (JP 1-02).
psychological operations
(PSYOP) Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the
behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose
of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable
to the originator’s objectives (JP 1-02).
public affairs
(PA) Those public information, command information, and community relations activities
directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department
of Defense (JP 1-02).
pursuit
An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with
the aim of destroying it (JP 1-02).
quick reaction force
(QRF) A designated organization for any immediate response requirement that occurs in a
designated area of operation (FM 3-90.6).
raid
(Joint) An operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an
adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability. It ends with a planned
withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission (JP 3-0) [Note: In this context,
adversary also refers to enemies].
rebellion
Open, armed, and usually unsuccessful defiance of or resistance to an established
government.
regular forces
Members of a nation’s armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.
reintegration
The process through which former combatants, belligerents, and dislocated civilians receive
amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing
members of the local populace (FM 3-07). |
3-24.2 | 287 | Glossary
relief in place
(Army) An tactical enabling operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part
of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit (FM 3-90).
reserve
Portion of a body of troops which is kept to the rear or withheld from action at the beginning
of an engagement, in order to be available for a decisive movement (JP 1-02).
resistance movement
An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally
established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability
(JP 1-02).
resource controls
Controls that regulate the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilize materiel
resources, and deny materiel to the guerrilla.
revolution
The overthrow or renunciation of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by
the governed.
risk
(DOD) Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards (JP 1-02).
risk management
The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors,
and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 1-02).
rule of law
A principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including
the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced,
and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights
principles (FM 3-07).
rules of engagement
(Joint) Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances
and limitations under which United States forces will initiate or continue combat engagement
with other forces encountered (JP 1-02).
running estimate
A staff section’s continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the
current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if future operations
are supportable (FMI 5-0.1).
search and attack
A technique of conducting a movement to contact that shares many of the characteristics
of an area security mission (FM 3-0).
sabotage
(DOD) An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a
country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national
defense or war materiel, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources.
security
(Joint) 1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against
all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from |
3-24.2 | 288 | Glossary
the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability
from hostile acts or influences (JP 1-02).
security force assistance
The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, Host Nation, or regional security
forces in support of a legitimate authority (FM 3-07).
security operations
Those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning
of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space
within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander
to effectively use the protected force.
security sector reform
The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve
the way it provides safety, security, and justice (FM 3-07).
shaping operation
An operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for the success of the
decisive operation (FM 3-0).
situational awareness
Knowledge of the immediate present environment, including knowledge of the factors
of METT-TC (FMI 5-0.1).
situational understanding
(Army) The product of applying analysis and judgment to the common operational picture
to determine the relationship among the factors of METT-TC (FM 3-0).
special operations
Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve
military, political, economic, or informational objectives employing military capabilities
for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require
covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the
rnage of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with
operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations
through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from
conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode
of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational
intelligence and indigenous assets (JP 1-02).
stability operations
(Joint) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities
conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power
to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental
services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0).
strike
(Joint) An attack to damage or destroy an objective or capability (JP 1-02).
support
(Joint) The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force
in accordance with a directive requiring such action.
2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects,
or supplies other forces in combat (JP 1, Army) In the context of stability mechanisms,
to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national
power to function effectively (FM 3-0). |
3-24.2 | 289 | Glossary
supporting range
The distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within
the maximum range of the second unit’s weapons systems (FM 3-0).
subversion
(DOD) Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political
strength, or morale of a regime.
synchronization
1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum
relative combat power at a decisive place and time (FM 3-0).
2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with
the operation plan (JP 1-02).
tactical questioning
(DOD) Direct questioning by any DOD personnel of a captured or detained person to obtain
time-sensitive tactical intelligence, at or near the point of capture or detention and consistent
with applicable law.
tactical mission task
The specific activity a unit performs while conducting a form of tactical operation or form
of maneuver. It may be expressed in terms of either actions by a friendly force or effects on
an enemy force (FM 7-15).
tactics
(Joint) The employment ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. (CJCSI
5120.02A)
target
(DOD) 1. An entity or object considered for possible engagement or other action.
2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which
intelligence operations are directed. 3. An area designated and numbered for future firing.
task-organizing
(Army) The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistic package of specific
size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when
task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to— training, experience, equipage,
sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility. For Army forces, it
includes allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their
command and support relationships (FM 3-0).
techniques
(Army/Marine Corps) The general and detailed methods used by troops or commanders
to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically, the methods of using equipment
and personnel (FM 3-90).
tempo
(Army) The rate of military action (FM 3-0).
(Marine Corps) The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to
the enemy (MCRP 5-12A).
terrorism
(Joint) The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate
fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that
are generally political, religious, or ideological (JP 3-07.2).
terrorist
(DOD) An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result. |
3-24.2 | 290 | Glossary
troop-leading procedures
A dynamic process used by small unit leaders to analyze amission, develop a plan,
and prepare for an operation (FM 5-0).
unconventional warfare
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration,
predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are
organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external
source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence
activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (JP 1-02).
underground
A covert unconventional warfare organization established to operate in areas denied to the
guerrilla forces or conduct operations not suitable for guerrilla forces FM 1-02.
unexploded ordnance
Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise prepared for action,
and which has then been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner
as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material, and remains
unexploded either by malfunction or design, or for any other cause (JP 1-02).
unified action
(Joint) The synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental
and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1).
unity of effort
(Joint) The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants
are not necessarily part of the same commor organization—the product of successful unified
action (JP 1).
vulnerable state
A nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services
to significant portions of the population (FM 3-07)
warfighting function
A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a
common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives
(FM 3-0).
weapons of mass destruction
Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction or of being used in such a manner
as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives
or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons, but exclude the means
of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part
of the weapon (JP 1-02). |
3-24.2 | 291 | References
ARMY REGULATION
AR 350-30, Code of Conduct/Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) Training.
10 December 1985.
FIELD MANUALS
FM 2-0, Intelligence. 17 May 2004.
SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
CALL HANDBOOKS
For Center for Army Lessions Learned (CALL) Handbooks go to
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/archives.asp
07-06, Southern Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Operations. November 2006.
07-08, CF/SOF Integration and Interoperability. January 2007.
FIELD MANUALS
FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004.
FM 3-0, Operations. 27 February 2008.
FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations. 29 September 2006.
FM 3-05.120 (S/NF), Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. 15 July 2007 (U).
FM 3-05.202, Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations. 2 February 2007.
FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 30 August 2007.
FM 3-05.302, Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 28 October 2005.
FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 28 February 2002.
FM 3-06.20, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations.
25 April 2006.
FM 3-07, Stability Operations. 6 October 2008.
FM 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Company. 27 July 2006.
FM 3-21.11, The SBCT Infantry Rifle Company. 23 January 2003.
FM 3-21.20, The Infantry Battalion. 13 December 2006.
FM 3-21.21, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion. 8 April 2003.
FM 3-21.75, The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills. 28 January 2008.
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 15 December 2006.
FM 3-90, Tactics. 4 July 2001.
FM 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion. 7 April 2008.
FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team. 4 August 2006.
FM 3-90.15, Sensitive Site Operations. 25 April 2007.
FM 3-90.119, Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations. 21 September 2007.
FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005. |
3-24.2 | 292 | References
FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management. 21 August 2006.
FM 5-103, Survivability. 10 June 1985.
FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.
FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict. 19 October 1992.
FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations. 29 August 1986.
FM 3-34.210, Explosive Hazards Operations. 27 March 2007.
FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 14 May 2007.
JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID). 30 April 2004.
JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 14 April 2006.
JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations. 17 October 2007.
JP 3-13, Information Operations. 13 February 2006.
JP 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations. 5 September 2003.
TRAINING CIRCULARS
TC 7-98-1, Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package. 5 June 1997.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
NAVMC 2890 (FMFRP 12-15), Small Wars Manual (Reprint of1940 USMC). 1 April 1987.
http://www.au.af/mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/full.pdf.
Counterinsurgency Operations Southern & Western Afghanistan. Task Force 31, January 2007.
Counterinsurgency Handbook. Multi-National Force—Iraq. 1st ed. Camp Taji, Iraq: Counterinsurgency
Center for Excellence, May, 2006.
Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance. Joint Center for International Security Force
Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 14 July 2008.
Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience. RAND National
Defense Institute. 2005.
INTERNET WEB SITES
Some of the documents listed in these References may be downloaded from Army websites:
Air Force Doctrine .............................https://www.doctrine.af.mil/.
Air Force Pubs ...................................http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/.
Army Forms .......................................http://www.apd.army.mil/usapa_PUB_formrange_f.asp.
Army Knowledge Online ...................https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/index.html.
NATO ISAs .......................................http://www.nato.int/docu/standard.htm.
Reimer Digital Library .......................http://www.train.army.mil.
CIVILIAN PUBLICATIONS
These books can be located in libraries or purchased at bookstores or online. The Combined Arms
Research Library at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/biblio/mildep.asp has some of these
publications.
Barber, Noel. The War of the Running Dogs: Malaya, 1948-1960. New York: Weybright and Tulley, 1971. |
3-24.2 | 293 | References
Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York:
Basic Books, 2002.
Callwell, Charles E. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska.
Ellis, John. From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary, and Counterinsurgency
Warfare from the Romans to the Present. London: Greenhill, 1995.
Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare—Theory and Practice. London: Praeger, 1964.
Hammes, T. X. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2004.
Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace. New York: Viking, 1977.
Krepinevich, Andrew Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
Larteguy, Jean. The Centurions. New York: Dutton, 1962.
Linn, Brian McAllister. The Philippine War, 1899—1902. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
2002.
Mao Zedong. On Guerrilla Warfare. London: Cassell, 1965.
McCuen, John J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005.
Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
O’Neill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Dulles, VA: Potomac
Press, 1996.
Taber, Robert. War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare. Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books, 2002.
Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare—A French View of Counterinsurgency. New York: Praeger, 1964.
United States Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987.
West, Bing. The Village. New York: Pocket Books, 1972.
MILITARY PUBLICATIONS
Military Review articles are located at
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/MREditions2006-English.xml
Baker, Ralph O. The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on the
Conduct of Information Operations. Military Review 86, 3 (May-Jun 2006), 13—32.
Chiarelli, Peter W. and Patrick R. Michaelis. Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum
Operations, Military Review 85, 4 (Jul-Aug 2005), 4—17.
Kilcullen, David. ‘Twenty-Eight Articles’: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency. Military
Review 86, 3 (May-Jun 2006), 103—108.
Petraeus, David. Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq. Military Review 86,
1 (Jan-Feb 2006), 2—12.
Lawrence, T. E. The 27 Articles of T. E. Lawrence. The Arab Bulletin (20 Aug 1917).
http://www.gwpda.org/1917/27arts.html
Sepp, Kalev I. Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review 85, 3 (May-Jun 2005), 8—12. |
3-24.2 | 295 | Index
A checkpoint layout culture, 1-19 (graphics)
activities matrix, 6-22 enduring, 7-11 (graphics) capability, 1-23, 1-24
(graphics) snap, 7-10 (graphics) (graphics)
competence, 1-18
advising, principles of, 8-21 civil
proficiency levels, 1-24
(graphics) considerations, 1-8
situational awareness, 1-25
ASCOPE, 1-9 (graphics)
advisor team, possible duties of,
overlay, 1-10 (graphics) D
8-7 (graphics)
control,
defense
after-action review, 8-24 security and control, 5-4, 6-2, area, 6-1
(graphics) 7-2, 7-5 base, 6-10, 6-14
ambush, 5-25 clear-hold-build, 3-17, 3-18 mobile, 6-1
linear formation, 5-29 (graphics), 5-3, 7-2 retrograde, 6-2
(graphics) combat outpost, 6-12, 6-13 defensive operations
L-shaped formation, 5-30 (graphics) area defense, 6-1
(graphics) mobile defense, 6-1
conduct information engagement,
retrograde, 6-2
analysis, course of action
5-40, 6-32
(wargame), 4-20 (graphics) drive-by shootings, 6-30
conspiratorial strategy, 2-18
area
E
defense, 6-1 coordinates register, 6-20
effectiveness, measures of, 4-2
matrix, 1-11 (graphics) (graphics)
end state, 4-1
ASCOPE, 1-8 (graphics), 1-9 cordon and search operations,
(graphics) 5-8 establish civil control, 7-5
methods, comparison of, 5-9
association matrix, 6-23 establish civil security, 7-2
(graphics)
(graphics)
organization, typical, 5-11 event matrix, 1-16 (graphics)
augmentation, 8-18 (graphics) (graphics)
F
cordon, urban
B facility categories, 6-6 (graphics)
establishment, typical, 5-14
base
(graphics) foreign internal defense, 3-2
command, organization of,
inner, 5-14 (graphics)
6-15 (graphics) formation ambush, L-shaped,
defense, 6-10, 6-14, 6-16 counter ambush, 6-17 5-30 (graphics)
(graphics)
counterinsurgency fostering sustainability phase,
brigade combat team, 7-2 bases, 6-8 3-28
(graphics) counterinsurgency targeting
framework tasks, 8-8 (graphics)
process, 4-28
build, 3-21
definition, 1-2, 3-1, C-1 full-spectrum operations, 3-6
C joint, interagency, (graphics)
intergovernmental,
Callwell, Charles, 3-10
multinational, 3-2 G
capabilities matrix, 1-13 operations, major, 6-2 Galula, David, 3-9
(graphics) preparation, C-2
getting short, C-8
theories, 3-9
Carver-P Vulnerability
golden hour, C-4
Prioritization Matrix countersniper, 6-26
example completed, 6-3 governance, legitimate, 7-16
course of action, 4-20 (graphics)
(graphics) (graphics)
criteria evaluation tool, 6-4
(graphics) |
3-24.2 | 296 | Index
governmental organizations, US, J organizations, 1-14 (graphics)
3-4 (graphics) joint, interagency, people, 1-15 (graphics)
intergovernmental, structures, 1-12 (graphics)
Groundhog Day, C-6
multinational, 3-2 synch(ronization), 4-22
guerrillas, 2-4 (graphics)
L vulnerability prioritization.
H
Lawrence, T.E., D-1 See Carver-P.
hold, 3-20
leaders, 2-2, 2-6 measures of performance and
host nation contributions, 8-2 auxiliaries, 2-4 effectiveness, 4-2
(graphics) insurgency, 2-3
military decision-making
mass base, 2-5
host nation security forces process, 4-15, 4-17 (graphics),
strengths and vulnerabilities,
characteristics, 8-5 (graphics) 4-29 (graphics)
2-24
development, 8-7
military-focused strategy, 2-17
employment, 8-24 legitimate governance, 7-16
support, 8-1 (graphics) mission variables, 1-6, 5-3
I lethal and nonlethal targeting, mobile defense, 6-1
identity-focused strategy, 2-18 4-28 (graphics)
movement, satellite patrol, 5-38
improvised explosive devices linear formation ambush, 5-29 (graphics)
(IEDs) (graphics)
O
countering, 6-18
lines of effort, 3-7, 4-6, 4-8
offense, characteristics of, 5-2
infiltration (graphics), 5-39
company, 5-7 (graphics) brigade combat team, 7-2 offensive operations, types of,
squad/platoon, 5-7 (graphics) (graphics) 5-2
conduct information
operational
initial response phase, 3-27
engagement, 5-40, 6-32
environment, 1-2
insurgency, 2-2 (graphics), 2-3 counterinsurgency, 3-8 prerequisites, 1-16
(graphics), 2-5 (graphics) (graphics) variables, 1-3, 1-6
definition, 1-1 restore essential services, 5-40,
dynamics, 2-5 6-31 operations
environment and geography, rheostat approach, 3-9 clear-hold-build, 3-17, 5-3
2-11 (graphics) company-level, C-1
ideology, 2-9 support, 5-39, 6-31 major, 6-2
offensive, 5-1
objective, 2-7
link diagram, example, 6-23
populace and resource control,
organizational and operational
(graphics)
3-24
patterns, 2-16
phasing and timing, 2-15 L-shaped formation ambush, search, 5-15
strategies, 2-16 5-30 (graphics) sniper, 5-31
strike, 3-23
strengths, 2-24
M
support, 2-11 organizations matrix, 1-14
major counterinsurgency
tactics, 2-20 (graphics)
operations, 6-2
vulnerabilities, 2-25
P
Malaysian insurgency, 2-2
insurgents, 2-24 (graphics), 2-26
(graphics) partnership benefits, 8-2
(graphics), 4-27
(graphics)
matrixes
intelligence preparation of the
activities, 6-22 (graphics) patrols, 5-33
battlefield (IPB), A-1
area, 1-11 (graphics)
(graphics) pattern-analysis plot sheet, 6-21
association, 6-23 (graphics)
(graphics)
interagency coordination, 3-5 capabilities, 1-13 (graphics)
Carver-P Vulnerability patterns, 2-16
internal defense and
Prioritization, 6-3 (graphics)
development, 3-2 people matrix, 1-15 (graphics)
event, 1-16 (graphics) |
3-24.2 | 297 | Index
performance and effectiveness, situational awareness, culture, targeting (continued)
measures of, 4-2 1-18 military decision-making
process, 4-29 (graphics)
phases, 2-20 (graphics), 3-27 snap checkpoint, 7-10 (graphics)
tasks, seven framework, 8-8
planning sniper
(graphics)
cycles, 4-4 (graphics) defeat, 6-26
horizons, 4-3 operations, 5-31 taxonomy of culture, 1-19
types, 6-27 (graphics) (graphics)
platoon requirements worksheet,
example format for, 3-15 societal considerations, A-6 team building, 8-23 (graphics)
(graphics) (graphics)
terrain, 3-10, A-4 (graphics)
populace and resource control stability operations, 7-1
Thompson, Robert, 3-9
operations, 3-24
stability tasks, 7-2
time
popular support, 2-12 (graphics) establish civil control, 7-5
constrained environment, B-1
establish civil security, 7-2
protection, 6-7 perspectives of, 1-6 (graphics)
restore essential services, 7-21
protracted popular war strategy, support to economic and transformation phase, 3-28
2-17 infrastructure development,
troop-leading procedures, 4-23,
7-23
R 4-24 (graphics)
support to governance, 7-15
raid, 5-23, 5-24 (graphics) troops, 3-14
strategies, 2-16, 2-20 (graphics)
readiness assessment, 8-9 Twenty-Eight Articles,
strike operations, 3-23
(graphics) Fundamentals of
structures matrix, 1-12 (graphics) Company-Level COIN, C-1
readings, B-1
support Twenty-Seven Articles of T.E.
restore essential services, 5-40,
economic and infrastructure Lawrence, D-1
6-31, 7-21
development, 5-40, 6-32, 7-23
typical enduring checkpoint
retrograde, 6-2 governance, 5-39, 6-31, 7-15
layout, 7-11 (graphics)
host nation security forces,
S
5-39, 6-31 U
satellite patrol movement, 5-38
(graphics) synch(ronization) matrix, urban strategy, 2-17
example expanded, 4-22
search and attack, 5-4 V
(graphics)
variables,
search operations, 5-15
T mission, 1-6, 5-3
seven counterinsurgency lines of tactical operational, 1-3
effort, 4-6 considerations, 3-10
vulnerability prioritization
design, 4-5
seven framework tasks, 8-8 matrix. See Carver-P.
(graphics) targeting
W
battle rhythm, 4-32 (graphics)
site
wargame, 4-20 (graphics)
counterinsurgency, 4-28
exploitation, 5-17, 5-18
(graphics)
insurgents, 4-27
lethal and nonlethal, 4-28
selection, 6-2
(graphics) |
3-24.2 | 299 | FM 3-24.2
21 April 2009
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
GEORGE W. CASEY, Jr.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0909005
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the |
3-50 | 1 | FM 3-50
ARMY PERSONNEL
RECOVERY
SEPTEMBER 2014
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. |
3-50 | 2 | This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online
(https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html).
To receive publishing updates, please subscribe at |
3-50 | 3 | *FM 3-50
Field Manual Headquarters
Department of the Army
No. 3-50
Washington, DC, 2 September 2014
Army Personnel Recovery
Contents
Page
PREFACE.............................................................................................................. iii
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... iv
Chapter 1 ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS ........................................... 1-1
Foundations ........................................................................................................ 1-1
Organizations ..................................................................................................... 1-1
Army Personnel Recovery Components ............................................................ 1-5
Army Personnel Recovery Proficiencies .......................................................... 1-16
Chapter 2 RESPONSIBILITIES AND SUPPORTING TOOLS ........................................... 2-1
Responsibilities ................................................................................................... 2-1
Supporting Tools .............................................................................................. 2-12
Chapter 3 PLANNING FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY ................................................... 3-1
Personnel Recovery and the Military Decisionmaking Process ......................... 3-1
Categories of Information for Personnel Recovery .......................................... 3-17
Chapter 4 CONSIDERATIONS FOR MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS .......................... 4-1
Characteristics of Major Combat Operations ..................................................... 4-1
Causes of Isolation Incidents ............................................................................. 4-2
Conducting the Operations Process ................................................................... 4-4
Chapter 5 CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY ............................................................... 5-1
Characteristics of Stability .................................................................................. 5-1
Isolation Risk in Stability ..................................................................................... 5-4
Isolation Risk Reduction Approaches ................................................................. 5-5
Department of State and Department of Defense Interaction ............................ 5-6
Interaction with Other Partners ........................................................................... 5-9
Chapter 6 CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES .... 6-1
Characteristics of Defense Support of Civil Authorities ...................................... 6-1
Personnel Recovery Capability Phases ............................................................. 6-3
Commander and Staff Focus in Defense Support of Civil Authorities ............... 6-4
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-50.1, 21 November 2011. |
3-50 | 4 | Contents
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Personnel recovery organization at the joint force level ...................................... 1-2
Figure 1-2. Interaction of functional and integrating cells ...................................................... 1-3
Figure 1-3. United States Government personnel recovery options ...................................... 1-6
Figure 1-4. Guide to execution for personnel recovery for Army headquarters ................... 1-10
Figure 1-5. Personnel recovery operations conducted concurrently ................................... 1-12
Figure 1-6. Shared personnel recovery proficiencies .......................................................... 1-16
Figure 2-1. Personnel recovery coordination processes for Army headquarters ................ 2-10
Figure 3-1. Personnel recovery appendix example ............................................................. 3-19
Figure 5-1. Risk curve ............................................................................................................ 5-4
Figure 5-2. Isolation risk ......................................................................................................... 5-5
Figure 6-1. Personnel recovery capability phase ................................................................... 6-3
Tables
Introductory Table 1. Modified Army terms ............................................................................... iv
Table 3-1. Receipt of mission staff actions ............................................................................ 3-1
Table 3-2. Mission analysis staff actions ............................................................................... 3-8
Table 3-3. Course of action development staff actions ........................................................ 3-13
Table 3-4. Course of action analysis (war game) staff actions ............................................ 3-15
Table 3-5. Course of action comparison staff actions .......................................................... 3-16
Table 3-6. Course of action approval staff actions .............................................................. 3-16
Table 3-7. Orders production, dissemination, and transition staff actions ........................... 3-17
Table 3-8. Sample evasion plan of action categories .......................................................... 3-25
Table 5-1. Partner responsibilities and relationships ........................................................... 5-10 |
3-50 | 5 | Preface
FM 3-50 is the Army’s doctrinal publication for personnel recovery. It presents doctrinal guidance and direction
for Army personnel recovery operations and is the foundation for developing tactics and techniques, handbooks,
and unit standard operating procedures (SOPs). It provides operational direction for commanders, staffs, and
trainers at all echelons, from company to theater army. This doctrine helps ensure all echelons of the Army
organize, train, and equip to conduct personnel recovery and prevent isolating events.
The principal audience for FM 3-50 is Army commanders and staffs responsible for the planning, preparation,
execution, and assessment of personnel recovery operations. This publication provides guidance for other
Service commanders and staffs who command and work with Army forces. This publication is also a resource
for United States government agencies and other unified action partners who seek to understand the role of the
Army in safeguarding and recovering Soldiers, Army civilians, and contractors authorized to accompany the
force.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States,
international and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their
Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement (see FM 27-10).
Army personnel recovery doctrine is consistent with joint personnel recovery doctrine, applicable Department
of Defense directives (DODDs) and Department of Defense instructions (DODIs), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff instructions and manuals, Army policy and regulation, and federal law. It is Department of Defense
policy, established in DODD 3002.01, to preserve the lives and well-being of individuals who are in danger of
becoming, or already are, beleaguered, besieged, captured, detained, interned, or otherwise missing or evading
capture while participating in activities or missions sponsored by the United States.
FM 3-50 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. The term for which FM 3-50 is the proponent publication (the authority) is marked with
an asterisk (*) in the glossary, and its definition is boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text,
the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
FM 3-50 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 3-50 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the
Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and
recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to
Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD
(FM 3-50), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to
[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. |
3-50 | 6 | Introduction
This publication is organized into six chapters:
Chapter 1 describes personnel recovery. It defines Army personnel recovery and discusses the foundations
of personnel recovery. It explains Army personnel recovery components and concludes with the Army
personnel recovery proficiencies.
Chapter 2 addresses the personnel recovery responsibilities and supporting tools of commanders at all
echelons and staffs at battalion level and above. The discussion applies to headquarters from battalion and
brigade to theater army.
Chapter 3 discusses the planning for personnel recovery. It discusses how the staff uses the military
decisionmaking process, the personnel recovery appendix format, isolated Soldier guidance, and the
evasion plan of action.
Chapter 4 discusses personnel recovery considerations for major combat operations. It emphasizes
personnel recovery in the context of offensive and defensive tasks. It discusses the characteristics of major
combat operations, the cause of isolation incidents, and conducting the operations process.
Chapter 5 discusses the personnel recovery considerations for stability. It discusses the characteristics of
stability as they apply to personnel recovery. It then explains the isolation risk in stability as well as
isolation risk reduction strategies. It elaborated on Department of Sate and Department of Defense
interactions. Lastly, the chapter discusses interactions with other partners.
Chapter 6 discusses the personnel recovery considerations for defense support of civil authorities
operations. It discusses characteristics of defense support of civil authorities tasks. It explains the personnel
recovery capability phases. It concludes with the commander and staff’s focus during defense support of
civil authorities.
This publication makes several major changes from FM 3-50.1 (now obsolete), which it supersedes. This
publication articulates the importance of the commander in successful personnel recovery operations. It
enlarges the scope of Army personnel recovery doctrine for stability and defense support of civil authorities
tasks. This publication incorporates the doctrinal concepts in ADP 1, ADRP 3-0, ADP 3-07 ADRP 3-07,
ADP 3-28, ADRP 3-28, ADP 3-90, and ADRP 3-90. Other changes from FM 3-50.1 include:
• The Army term and definition for personnel recovery are modified; the term is changed to Army
personnel recovery (see introductory table 1). The definition is limited to military efforts.
• Chapters 4 and 5 are combined to include personnel recovery operations during offensive,
defensive, and stability tasks in large-scale combat, and in defense support of civil authorities.
• Former appendixes are integrated into applicable chapters.
• Chapters are arranged to align appropriately with current joint personnel recovery doctrine.
• The publication is designed in accordance with Doctrine 2015 guidance.
Introductory table 1. Modified Army terms
Term Remarks
personnel recovery Changed to Army personnel recovery; definition modified.
For conciseness, personnel recovery doctrine uses isolation and related forms (such as isolating event and
isolated person) to include situations involving persons surviving, evading, and delaying contact, being
detained, or being captured. |
3-50 | 7 | Chapter 1
Army Personnel Recovery Operations
This chapter describes personnel recovery. It defines Army personnel recovery and
discusses the foundations of personnel recovery. It explains Army personnel recovery
components and concludes with the Army personnel recovery proficiencies.
FOUNDATIONS
1-1. Army personnel recovery is the military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery
and reintegration of isolated personnel. Army forces work together with Department of Defense (DOD)
and other unified action partners to recover individuals and groups who become isolated. Isolation refers to
persons being separated from their unit or in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape.
In addition, Army forces support the recovery of other persons designated by the President or the Secretary
of Defense. Preserving the life and well-being of persons working for the Army, or any DOD organization,
is one of the highest priorities of the United States Government. The personnel recovery mission includes
preparing Soldiers, other Service members, Army civilians, and contractors in danger of isolation while
participating in any activity or mission sponsored by the United States.
1-2. Army professionals have moral and legal responsibilities to train, educate, coordinate, and recover
isolated members of the Army (and other persons as designated) who are operating in the area of operations
(AO) or accompanying Army or unified forces. It is a principle embedded in the Army’s Warrior Ethos and
the Soldier’s Creed (see ADP 1).
1-3. Unified land operations is the Army’s warfighting doctrine and the Army’s contribution to unified
action. It describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position
of relative advantage (see ADRP 3-0). Army forces execute unified land operations through the elements of
decisive action: offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities’ (DSCA’s) tasks.
Within all these elements, alone or in any combination, Army personnel recovery doctrine guides Army
forces to adapt to conditions and successfully accomplish personnel recovery missions.
ORGANIZATIONS
1-4. Army forces conduct operations as part of a joint force and together with other Service and
government partners. The joint force cooperates and coordinates with unified action partners. Army forces
use established organizational structures coordinated with joint, other Service, and United States
Government (USG) entities. Each Service has its own personnel recovery policy, doctrine, equipment,
education, and training. Paragraphs 1-5 through 1-20 give an overview of organizational structures for
personnel recovery. JP 3-50 contains a detailed discussion of personnel recovery organizational structures.
JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
1-5. DODD 3002.01 assigns DOD responsibilities for personnel recovery. It identifies the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy as responsible for development of national personnel recovery policy,
strategy, and operational oversight, through the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Integration
and Chief of Staff and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel
Affairs. The United States (U.S.) Air Force is the DOD executive agent for personnel recovery (other than
policy). The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is the office of primary responsibility. The JPRA is
a chairman controlled activity, aligned under the Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development. The
JPRA provides joint guidance, develops and conducts joint training, provides support to deployed forces,
collects joint lessons learned, and supports joint policy and doctrine development. The JPRA supports
operational implementation of joint personnel recovery policy. |
3-50 | 8 | Chapter 1
1-6. Combatant commanders are responsible for planning and executing personnel recovery in their area
of responsibility. Figure 1-1 depicts the personnel recovery architecture in a combatant command organized
by function.
Figure 1-1. Personnel recovery organization at the joint force level
JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER
1-7. Each combatant commander establishes a joint personnel recovery center (JPRC). The JPRC plans,
monitors, and coordinates personnel recovery for the command. It coordinates with joint and Service
component staffs, DOD agencies, and other USG agencies and unified action partners to accomplish its
mission. The center’s composition varies. A JPRC is typically composed of senior leadership (director and
deputy), shift duty officers, noncommissioned officers, and subject matter experts in related disciplines.
These individuals act as liaisons to and from external organizations. The JPRC serves as the joint force
commander’s primary coordination center for assisting other nations or appropriate civilian entities.
JP 3-50 details the responsibilities of the JPRC.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY COORDINATION SECTIONS
1-8. At the Army Service component level, personnel recovery coordination sections (PRCSs) implement
guidance from higher headquarters. Army doctrine identifies the Army Service component personnel
recovery organization as a section; joint doctrine identifies the organization as a personnel recovery
coordination cell.
ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
1-9. Army headquarters above brigade are scalable, stand-alone entities. The Army’s division, corps, and
theater army commanders exercise mission command for any combination of modular brigades and smaller
forces. The Army organizes its headquarters at echelons above brigade as functional cells; integrating cells;
coordinating, special, and personal staff sections; and boards, working groups, and meetings. Figure 1-2
graphically portrays the layout and the interaction of the functional and integrating cells. The PRCS is a
staff section at echelons above brigade. The personnel recovery section is part of the protection functional
cell. A personnel recovery officer overseeing the PRCS may be designated a personal staff officer if the |
3-50 | 9 | Army Personnel Recovery Operations
threat of isolation is such that a personal relationship is required. There are staff personnel recovery
responsibilities associated with each of the Army warfighting functions. (Chapter 2 describes the
responsibilities of the PRCS.)
Figure 1-2. Interaction of functional and integrating cells
OTHER SERVICE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
1-10. DOD policy directs the Services to develop a personnel recovery capability. The Marine Corps,
Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard have long familiarity with personnel recovery because the nature of their
operations often requires them to recover the crews of ships and aircraft. Service doctrine and practice are
applicable for permissive environments, resulting from accidents or disaster, and nonpermissive
environments in combat or unfriendly situations. The joint force commander can task subordinates with
personnel recovery missions. All Service components staff, equip, and train personnel recovery sections for
24-hour operations.
Marine Corps
1-11. Marine Corps personnel recovery operations follow a tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel
(known as TRAP) concept. The Marine Corps does not dedicate personnel recovery assets but trains and
exercises all appropriate units for these missions. Marine Corps personnel recovery operations range from
single aircraft missions to a task force with fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, security elements, ground
search capability, and medical support. The Marine air-ground task force operates much like Army tactical-
level units for personnel isolated in ground operations. A Marine expeditionary unit is the standard
forward-deployed Marine Corps expeditionary organization. Marine expeditionary units have special
operations capabilities. Appendix D of JP 3-50 discusses Marine Corps personnel recovery.
Navy
1-12. The Navy conducts personnel recovery operations to support its surface, subsurface, and air assets.
Navy search and rescue doctrine discusses permissive and nonpermissive actions. The Navy deploys |
3-50 | 10 | Chapter 1
dedicated search and rescue units to respond to accidental and combat situations. Specialized vessels,
aircraft, equipment, and personnel provide round-the-clock personnel recovery capacity to the fleet.
Aviation safety, maritime safety, and medical activities support these specialized personnel recovery
activities. See NTTP 3-50.1 and Appendix E of JP 3-50 for details on Navy personnel recovery.
Air Force
1-13. The Air Force considers combat search and rescue a primary task. The Air Force equips and trains
dedicated forces for personnel recovery, organized under the numbered air forces. Combat search and
rescue personnel train and exercise for personnel recovery in permissive and nonpermissive environments.
Combat search and rescue units assist local, state, and other governmental bodies in civil search and rescue.
All components of the Air Force—Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard—have
rescue squadrons. Configured for global response, they are generally self-deployable or capable of
movement in tactical and strategic airlift assets with necessary communications and life support. Primarily
focused on the recovery of downed aircrews, Air Force personnel recovery assets also have the capability
to recover partners. Air Force Annex 3-50 and Appendix F of JP 3-50 details Air Force personnel recovery
operations.
Coast Guard
1-14. The Coast Guard conducts personnel recovery operations to support its surface and air assets. Coast
Guard search and rescue doctrine discusses permissive actions in maritime rescue. The Coast Guard
deploys dedicated search and rescue units to respond to accidental situations. Specialized vessels, aircraft,
equipment, and personnel provide round-the-clock personnel recovery capacity to maritime vessels.
Aviation safety, maritime safety, and medical activities support these specialized personnel recovery
activities. See Appendix G of JP 3-50 for detailed information on Coast Guard personnel recovery.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
1-15. Special operations forces sometimes conduct tactical missions with the potential for strategic impact.
Special operations forces extend the capabilities of conventional forces to recover isolated persons located
at extended ranges, to recover isolated persons located in environments difficult for conventional forces to
reach, or to capitalize on contacts with indigenous groups. Special operations forces in a combatant
command typically include forces forward deployed and trained to conduct urgent hostage rescue missions.
Special operations forces operate under their own chains of command but interface with conventional
forces when required, including operating under operational control or tactical control of conventional
force commanders for missions related to personnel recovery. Special operations forces conduct
unconventional assisted personnel recovery operations in cooperation with conventional forces or with
indigenous or surrogate forces.
1-16. An unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell is an entity of the special operations
component of the joint force. Typically located within the joint special operations task force or the joint
force special operations command, the unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell is responsible for
planning, coordinating, and monitoring personnel recovery activities of unconventional forces, including
unified action partners. This cell coordinates with the JPRC, the Service component PRCSs, and lower
echelon command and staff entities as needed. See Appendix G of JP 3-50 for more information.
MULTINATIONAL PARTNERS
1-17. When cooperating with multinational partners, the level of preparedness and the formal personnel
recovery structure vary depending on the nature of the relationships. Whether in a permanent formal
alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or an ad hoc multinational coalition such as during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, each situation’s requirements for personnel recovery planning, preparation,
execution, and assessment differ.
1-18. The armed forces of many nations have robust personnel recovery capabilities; Army forces
coordinate with them to take advantage of partner capabilities. This provides the joint or Army commander
more options to meet personnel recovery requirements. However, liaison with multinational partners adds |
3-50 | 11 | Army Personnel Recovery Operations
complexity. Through planning and coordination, the PRCS strives to overcome differences in language,
equipment, procedures, and rules of engagement while still maintaining security. Unit commanders and
staffs must decide whether to maintain a robust team at the remote location or keep the expertise at the
main command post.
OTHER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PARTNERS
1-19. The American Embassy or diplomatic mission serves as a base of operations for many governmental
organizations not a part of the Department of State (DOS). Partners typically represented at an embassy
include the Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Commerce, DOD, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of
Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal Aviation
Administration. The list varies depending on the situation and the requirement to project USG interests.
These representatives provide additional capabilities to address isolating events and more potential targets
to protect. Diplomatic personnel and others encounter elevated risk if they work at remote locations. The
embassy’s emergency action plan contains a personnel recovery annex.
1-20. During DSCA, other government agencies include state, county, and municipal agencies, including
the governor’s office and state police, the county administrator and sheriff, and city mayors and police.
DOD agencies and Services collaborate with these types of agencies during DSCA.
ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY COMPONENTS
1-21. Army forces conduct personnel recovery using the integrated Army personnel recovery components.
Figure 1-3 on page 1-6 depicts four general components for personnel recovery: focal groups, options,
tasks, and military methods of recovery.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY FOCAL GROUPS
1-22. The three entities most concerned with applying personnel recovery doctrinal principles are the
commander and staff, unit or recovery force, and isolated persons. These personnel recovery focal groups
apply the principles at the operational level and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) at the tactical
level. Together, these three groups integrate activities using the personnel recovery components to
accomplish missions.
Commander and Staff
1-23. Leadership and accountability are essential for effective personnel recovery. Leaders at every
echelon, from company and below, through battalion and brigade, to echelons above brigade are
responsible for the conduct of operations, including personnel recovery. At every echelon, the commander
and staff personnel recovery focal group integrates and coordinates several functions that affect all the
personnel recovery components. |
3-50 | 12 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-3. United States Government personnel recovery options
Develop and Disseminate the General Personnel Recovery Guidance
1-24. Commanders develop and disseminate general personnel recovery guidance. They periodically revise
it as conditions change. Subordinate leaders build and develop their personnel recovery guidance based on
that of the higher headquarters.
Produce Isolated Soldier Guidance Based on the Personnel Recovery Guidance
1-25. The commander and staff personnel recovery focal group produce isolated Soldier guidance (ISG)
based on the personnel recovery guidance. ISG is more developed and refined than the commander’s
personnel recovery guidance. It may exist for an AO, but leaders at all echelons force tailor the ISG for
each specific mission within the AO.
Maintain Personnel Accountability at All Times
1-26. The commander and staff personnel recovery focal group maintain personnel accountability at all
times. Accurate accountability and reporting narrow the focus of search operations and save time and
resources. Success of personnel recovery operations generally depends on how rapidly a recovery force can
respond. Constant and redundant communications are important in maintaining accountability.
Identify and Provide Guidance and Tasks to the Recovery Force
1-27. The commander and staff personnel recovery focal group identifies and provides guidance and tasks
to the recovery force. The recovery force may be designated in the execution document and given a
personnel recovery mission (the force will execute at a set time) or an on-order mission (the force will
execute at a time to be determined). Commanders sometimes give a be-prepared mission to a designated
recovery force. A unit with a be-prepared mission trains, obtains resources, and remains ready to execute
the mission. All three instances require guidance and preparation.
Exercise Mission Command of Personnel Recovery Tasks
1-28. Commanders—supported by their staffs—exercise mission command of personnel recovery tasks:
report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. This means that commanders are familiar with the tasks
and have adequately resourced the staff to conduct operations. |
3-50 | 13 | Army Personnel Recovery Operations
Unit or Recovery Force
1-29. The second personnel recovery focal group is the unit or recovery force. The immediate or deliberate
recovery of isolated Soldiers or others normally falls to the responsibility of the person’s unit of assignment
as designated in the operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). Units generally execute an
immediate recovery of any isolated unit member when practical. This is especially important for isolation
caused by enemy action where the friendly force can conduct the recovery before the enemy knows of the
isolation. If an immediate recovery is not possible, that unit or another designated recovery force may
conduct a directed recovery mission. The unit or other designated recovery force, as a personnel recovery
focal group, integrates several responsibilities within the personnel recovery components.
Receive the Mission and Conduct the Operations Process
1-30. The unit or recovery force receives the mission and conducts the operations process. As time is
critical in personnel recovery, this may be an abbreviated process based on guidance from higher
headquarters where mission analysis leads to a rapid (or directed) course of action (COA) development,
COA analysis and approval, and production of the order.
Execute the Order
1-31. The unit or recovery force executes the order. Execution includes an update on the friendly and
enemy situation or environmental hazard, marshalling the required unit resources and maneuvering to the
location of the isolated person. The recovery force may have to fight for the recovery and must come
prepared for combat. In the case of isolation by an environmental hazard, such as a chemical spill or
biological contamination, the force must prepare for contingencies, including the need for decontamination
or lifesaving medical treatment.
Deliver the Isolated Person or Group to Postisolation Reintegration
1-32. The unit or recovery force delivers the isolated person or group to reintegration. Postisolation
reintegration activities follow successful recovery of the isolated person or group. Depending on the
circumstances of and the length of time a recovered person was isolated or in the control of the enemy,
reintegration may be a short local activity requiring little planning or a long and involved process. If
possible, commanders ensure reintegration activities are planned in detail to avoid undue stress to the
isolated person or group.
Isolated Persons
1-33. The primary task of an isolated person is to try to regain contact with friendly forces as soon as
possible. When all three personnel recovery focal groups base their actions on the ISG, they facilitate the
coordination and synchronization of recovery efforts. Adherence to the ISG provides some predictability to
the isolated person or group that their actions will be more easily monitored, thus making recovery more
certain.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPTIONS
1-34. Joint personnel recovery doctrine describes three personnel recovery options: military, diplomatic,
and civil. The only option commanders can select is the military option; the other two are at the USG or
citizen level.
Military Option
1-35. In most cases, a unit conducts a recovery making full use of the in-place personnel recovery
capabilities and the designated recovery forces. Army commanders consider four general approaches
(sometimes referred to as methods) to conduct personnel recovery: unassisted, immediate, deliberate, or
external supported. |
3-50 | 14 | Chapter 1
Unassisted Recovery
1-36. Successful units train and equip all individuals to self-recover in the event recovery forces cannot
execute other recovery methods due to weather, threat, or operational necessity. Isolated personnel may
have the most complete knowledge of their situation and use individual Soldier skills to evade enemy
forces, awaiting the right time to return to friendly control. An unassisted recovery depends on the
condition of the Soldiers and the situation at the location where they are isolated. A wounded, injured,
exhausted, or disoriented Soldier, one endangered by enemy forces, or one without the proper equipment,
may be unable to self-recover. If possible, isolated individuals communicate if they cannot conduct
unassisted recovery to alert the responsible command to begin planning for an immediate, deliberate, or
external supported recovery.
Immediate Recovery
1-37. An isolated person’s unit is often in the best position to receive the report, locate the person, and
execute recovery. Unit leadership—knowing the mission and Soldier’s tasks—has the best idea of the
Soldier’s whereabouts. Immediate recovery aims to locate isolated persons, keep them under direct
observation, and recover them before the enemy understands the situation. Immediate recovery assumes
that the tactical situation permits a recovery with the forces at hand, and those forces have a clear enough
understanding of the situation to accomplish the mission. It also assumes that successful recovery occurs
without excessive casualties to the recovery force, without unduly imperiling the isolated person, and
without endangering the unit’s overall mission.
Deliberate Recovery
1-38. Deliberate personnel recovery is appropriate when an immediate recovery was unsuccessful or not
attempted due to the threat, asset availability, current operations, or isolated personnel situation. Such a
situation can arise when the enemy has a preponderance of combat power or when environmental
conditions such as weather, contamination, or flooding prevent immediate recovery operations.
Commanders conduct deliberate personnel recovery like any other deliberate operation, using the military
decisionmaking process and appropriate preparation. The operation can be a mission specifically to recover
an isolated person or a specified or implied task in another mission.
External Supported Recovery
1-39. When a recovery mission exceeds the capabilities of Army forces, they may request external support
from Service, joint, or multinational forces. When Army forces assist outside entities in personnel recovery,
it is external support. In addition to direct military support, host-nation (HN) security forces (military,
paramilitary, and national police) and multinational forces often support recovery operations. This external
support can include direct participation or indirect support in the recovery mission. Examples of indirect
support are intelligence; air, ground, and water transport; reconnaissance and surveillance; medical
evacuation and medical treatment facilities; fires; protection; and communications. At echelons above
brigade, the command’s PRCS coordinates external support with its appropriate counterparts. To facilitate
the external support entity’s activities, Army headquarters and forces provide necessary information, which
may include information entered on DD Form 1833 (Isolated Personnel Report [ISOPREP]) and ISG. (See
chapter 5 of JP 3-50 for more information about ISOPREP data for authentication.) The command and
support relationships for external support are normally coordinated and agreed upon during mission
planning. Some external support capabilities may be under the operational control of senior echelon Army
headquarters. The command relationship may also be tactical control in which the recovery force gets the
benefit of the support, but the unit remains under the command of its organization.
Diplomatic Option
1-40. The DOS has the lead for personnel recovery for military forces not directly under the command of a
geographic combatant commander. Following the DOS lead, U.S. forces provide support. The DOS and
other USG agencies associated with the mission often have the resources and HN contacts to support
recovery operations. This is especially true when diplomatic options require knowledge of HN laws and |
3-50 | 15 | Army Personnel Recovery Operations
agreements or internationally recognized territorial sovereignty. Modes of cooperation can be formal or
informal.
1-41. Units most often use direct government-to-government cooperation when formal diplomatic relations
exist between the United States and the host nation. Whether the isolation results from hostile action, an
accident, or environmental conditions, the HN government willingly assists in the recovery activities. At a
minimum, this assistance permits U.S. recovery forces access to ground and water or overflight rights to the
sovereign territory. Direct government-to-government support involving several governments complicates
a recovery effort.
1-42. Certain situations require an indirect approach. Coordination sometimes occurs through clandestine
contacts by American Embassy personnel in the host country or by meetings between envoys of affected
countries in other locations. The result of such contacts may be full and open support to recovery efforts or
permission to conduct the operations—including negotiations for release—without attracting public notice.
1-43. In situations when the USG has no direct diplomatic relations with a nation-state, or it appears more
advantageous for both parties to have no direct contact, third parties may act as surrogates. These
individuals act as diplomatic go-betweens for the United States and the nations involved.
Civil Option
1-44. Civilians or civilian organizations sometimes facilitate the recovery of isolated persons.
Occasionally, the USG requests the assistance of partners such as the United Nations, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, or the Organization of American States. In many locations, organizations
such as these have built trust with national, regional, and local governments. Occasionally, members of
partner organizations assume the responsibility to secure the release of an isolated person or group without
the request or sanction of the U.S. or HN governments. Influential private citizens—such as distinguished
individuals from the host nation or region—sometimes are asked or volunteer to facilitate personnel
recovery. Distinguished members of the international community, such as Nobel Prize laureates, revered
religious figures, or well-known retired politicians or military members sometimes become involved. The
decision to accept support from such partners usually lies beyond the authority of the geographic combatant
commander. Commanders do not use a civil option; they only use the military option. The military can
employ local forces or civilians to influence a recovery for an external supported recovery; however, the
military is still in the lead.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY TASKS
1-45. The PRCS and other elements of echelon above brigade Army headquarters respond according to the
unit’s SOP, the current OPLAN, and the latest changes to the order issued in the fragmentary order
(FRAGORD). The guide to execution in figure 1-4 on pages 1-10 and 1-11 uses the personnel recovery
tasks discussed in paragraphs 1-48 through 1-74. |
3-50 | 16 | Chapter 1
1. Report.
a. Receive the report. Establish communication with the movement and maneuver functional cell
and the protection functional cell to receive the initial report and subsequent reports. Record receipt of the
report or reports.
b. Transmit the report and alert all personnel recovery elements. Alert the points of contact.
Coordinate with the movement and maneuver functional cell to alert the on-call or designated recovery
force of a potential mission. Inform all key personnel of the personnel recovery structure.
c. Gather information. Establish situational awareness.
(1) Determine—
(a) The date-time group of the initial report.
(b) The who, what, where, when, why, and how of the incident.
(c) The evasion plan of action location and contents.
(d) The reported medical and behavioral health condition of isolated persons.
(e) The capability of isolated persons to self-recover.
(f) The ability of isolated persons to survive.
(g) Practical needs, such as communications, survival evasion aids, signaling devices, and
clothing or footwear.
(2) Analyze DD Forms 1833, Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP), data for information on the
isolated persons and their readiness to contribute to their own recovery.
(3) Determine the validity of the report by contacting the current operations integration cell or
the appropriate unit or organization of isolated persons. Determine if isolated persons are under
observation by hostile forces or the local population.
(4) Obtain updated intelligence on the incident.
(5) Review the current operation order and latest fragmentary order, and develop situational
awareness of the area of operations.
d. Request support. Determine needed augmentation of personnel or materiel for round-the-clock
operations during the incident or incidents.
2. Locate.
a. Confirm the location of the isolation event. Coordinate with the movement and maneuver
functional cell and the appropriate unit or individual to verify the event. Coordinate for continued
monitoring of isolated persons.
b. Establish communication. Determine exactly how communication with isolated persons is being
maintained.
c. Continue gathering information about the situation. Contribute to a fragmentary order or
operation order to execute the recovery.
(1) Identify the source of location information, such as local observation, information collection,
or an isolated person.
(2) Find out exactly how the source established the location of the isolated person or persons,
such as last-known point, Global Positioning System, or map estimation.
(3) Identify on-scene and nearby forces.
(4) Cross-cue intelligence capabilities and other disciplines, such as national, theater, and joint
or component assets.
(5) Obtain the personnel recovery word of the day, number of the day, and personal information
provided by the unit.
d. Maintain communication with all nodes of the personnel recovery structure. Continue to facilitate
situational awareness and decision making and to enable rapid adaptation.
3. Support.
a. Ascertain the continued viability and mobility of isolated persons.
b. Establish control measures. Establish air, ground, and fire control measures to ensure isolated
persons are safe.
c. Reauthenticate. Refer to data from the DD Forms 1833 and information provided about the
current mission by the unit. Follow appropriate authentication and identity validation procedures.
Figure 1-4. Guide to execution for personnel recovery for Army headquarters |
3-50 | 17 | Army Personnel Recovery Operations
d. Review isolated Soldier guidance. Determine if isolated persons know the isolated Soldier
guidance and if they can execute it unassisted.
e. Coordinate physical and behavioral support. Ensure isolated persons receive life-sustaining
support such as food, water, survival gear, radios, weapons, and ammunition by any possible means.
f. Continue recovery planning. Support a personnel recovery working group, if established, and
support the plans cell and future operations cell as they develop the execution documents.
g. Identify family support. Determine how to support the family of any isolated person.
4. Recover.
a. Plan. Develop or support plans and orders. Confirm responsibilities and determine who will
control the mission, who from the personnel recovery coordination section will accompany the recovery
force (if required), and how personnel recovery officers will monitor the operation.
b. Prepare. Synchronize, support, and monitor preparation of all participating organizations for
recovery and reintegration.
c. Execute. Monitor the operation through situation reports and other information sources.
Coordinate preparation for reintegration.
5. Reintegrate.
a. Confirm readiness. Refer to the appropriate operation order. Prepare personnel, facilities, and
materiel to support reintegration activities. Guide other organizations supporting reintegration.
b. Conduct reintegration. Ensure supporting organizations provide all appropriate and necessary
reintegration support for recovered persons. Complete the following tasks:
(1) Move persons to a secure location.
(2) Conduct initial processing, to include attending to the comfort and welfare of recovered
persons.
(3) Provide personnel and facilities for debriefings.
(4) Provide mental support.
c. Follow up. Monitor ongoing reintegration tasks even as concurrent missions continue with other
tasks. Complete the following tasks:
(1) Implement and complete the reintegration plan.
(2) Monitor medical and behavioral treatment.
(3) Monitor various debriefings.
(4) Monitor return of formerly isolated persons to their family, to duty, or to both.
6. Conduct postoperations activities.
a. Conduct after action review. Assess operations and share results of after action review with the
commander and staff of the headquarters and subordinate leaders and staffs.
b. Disseminate lessons learned. Make lessons learned available to the chain of command, to other
personnel recovery organizations, and to organizations such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned.
c. Prepare and store official records. Follow pertinent regulations and standard operating
procedures for recordkeeping.
Figure 1-4. Guide to execution for personnel recovery for Army headquarters (continued)
1-46. As shown in figure 1-5 on page 1-12, isolating events may not be discrete events leading to the
completion of the five personnel recovery tasks, each in succession. In this illustration, the four events in
the time window challenge the command to manage different personnel recovery tasks simultaneously. The
PRCS must apportion its people and other resources to manage several activities concurrently. The third
event includes a situation with a prolonged locate task. Successful management of overlapping tasks
requires command emphasis. |
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