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• The capabilities of enemy aircraft.
• The enemy’s basic methods for operational and tactical employment of
air power.
• The locations of enemy airfields, C2 centers, resupply bases, and pro-
duction facilities.
• Avenues of low-level flight.
• Locations of FARPs.
• Locations of ground stations for UAVs.
9-126. The second category includes data from which the OPFOR can develop
a clear picture of the air situation as it unfolds. This information is necessary
to determine the enemy’s plans, air order of battle, and air attack objectives.
The OPFOR can then assign targets to fire units or redeploy resources.
Necessary data also include the positions, types, numbers, direction, speed,
and altitude of aircraft in flight. Radio intercept provides some data, but
most comes from air defense radars.
MISSIONS AND EMPLOYMENT
9-127. Whatever the nature of combat being conducted by maneuver
forcesoffense or defense, most actions of supporting air defense units are,
as the term implies, inherently defensive. The essence of an air defense unit’s
combat mission is to provide area coverage and/or point protection. However, air
defense missions can also have an offensive nature, with the purpose of destroy-
ing certain enemy air platforms or denying or disrupting their employment.
9-128. The OPFOR recognizes that it may be unable to defend its entire
airspace adequately. Therefore, it must establish priorities to ensure denser
coverage in certain areas or increased protection for key assets. Priorities
include airfields, SSMs, artillery, maneuver units, headquarters and
communications centers, and critical logistics units and LOCs. The priority
assigned to a particular area, entity, or site may change during the course
of operations, as the tactical, operational, or strategic situation changes.
NATIONAL-LEVEL
9-129. National-level Air Defense Forces use their own air defense weapons
for various missions, depending on the situation. Some of these assets might
cover the air defense weapons of subordinate commands. Others might fill
gaps between operational-level commands. They usually are somewhere to
the rear of operational-level air defense weapons in order to engage aircraft
that penetrate forward air defenses. Some national assets might provide
general air defense coverage of the State and nearby airspace. In any event,
the intent is for Air Defense Forces to ensure continuous coverage in both
detection and engagement capabilities.
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL
9-130. Operational-level commands (primarily OSCs) can use their air de-
fense units in many ways. Some medium-range SAM units may augment
tactical-level assets. Others provide cover for gaps between tactical units or |
7-100.1 | 237 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
provide general area coverage of the OSC’s entire AOR. This area coverage
gives depth to the defensive effort and overlaps with envelopes of tactical
units. Where possible, this SAM coverage overlaps the envelopes of adjacent
operational-level commands.
9-131. The medium-range SAM units engage enemy aircraft at some distance
from tactical maneuver units and other high-value assets within the OSC’s
AOR. These SAMs and shorter-range AA guns also protect key targets such
as operational-level CPs, tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), long-range
rockets and artillery, and reserves.
TACTICAL-LEVEL
9-132. In the best-case situation, a division or DTG will have sufficient air
defense assets to provide area coverage over its AOR, including the AORs of
subordinate units. At brigade or BTG level, there is a significant element of
point protection in support of subordinate units and brigade- or BTG-level
assets. This is due to the nature of the units defended and the relatively
short range of air defense weapons at this level.
9-133. Tactical-level short- and medium-range SAMs provide area coverage for
the entire tactical-level unit, overlapping with the envelopes of flanking units.
Short-range AA guns and shoulder-fired SAMs can provide point protection.
AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA
9-134. Air defense assets from national down through tactical level create an
air defense umbrella. Radars can provide an unbroken detection envelope ex-
tending well into enemy territory and across the entire AOR. If OPFOR
fighter-interceptors are able to operate farther out against enemy aircraft in
the “flight area,” national-level long- and medium-range SAMs might be the
first to engage enemy aircraft that slip past fighters. When OPFOR fighters
must operate in “friendly” OPFOR airspace, the national-level SAMs proba-
bly would be the first air defense assets to engage the enemy aircraft. The
next layer of defense is operational-level medium-range SAMs. The final layer in
the battle zone would consist of tactical-level SAMs and AA guns. If enemy aircraft
escape air defenses in the battle zone, they may still encounter operational- or
national-level air defense systems protecting key assets in the support zone.
This deployment scheme causes enemy aircraft to run into overlapping defensive
systems as they approach and penetrate the airspace over OPFOR units.
9-135. There is no set pattern for the deployment of air defense assets. A
basic and flexible guideline is that, depending on their functions and weapon
capabilities, air defense units occupy positions at a distance from the battle
line that ensures the accomplishment of their mission and provides relative
safety from enemy fire. For area coverage, this generally means that weap-
ons at the operational level and below deploy rearward from the supported
unit’s battle line at from one-third to one-half of their engagement range.
However, the OPFOR recognizes that “rules of thumb” are just that, and the
operational or tactical situation and common sense may dictate that these
distances be modified. Actual deployment depends primarily on the supported
unit’s mission, terrain, and the ground and air situations at a given time and
place in the operation. Sometimes, air defense systems can be much closer to the |
7-100.1 | 238 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
battle line, realizing that such placement increases their vulnerability to enemy
direct fire systems. When necessary, tactical- or even operational-level air de-
fense systems may deploy beyond the battle line, out into the disruption zone.
9-136. As OPFOR units maneuver, the air defense umbrella also moves when
necessary, in order to prevent maneuver units from becoming exposed to enemy
ground-attack aircraft and armed helicopters. In a fluid, fast-developing
situation, textbook efficiency may not be possible. While the OPFOR strives
to maintain continuous area coverage, temporary gaps might appear in the air
defense umbrella, both in surveillance and in weapons coverage. Commanders
must be flexible and prepared to use standard and nonstandard solutions to
prevent gaps in air defense coverage from developing during combat. The
objective is to deny enemy aviation the ability to interfere with ground
maneuver units. Air defense forces can accomplish this either by destroying
enemy aircraft, by forcing them expend their munitions beyond effective
range, or by diverting the aircraft before reaching their targets.
30,000
25,000
20,000 OPERATIONAL-
STRATEGIC- LEVEL SAMs STRATEGIC-
LEVEL SAMs LEVEL SAMs
10,000
Height in
Meters
TACTICAL-
5,000
LEVEL
SAMs
3,000
2,000
1,000
250 200 150 100 50 0 50 100 150 200 250 km
Range in Kilometers
Figure 9-2. Air Defense Coverage (Example)
9-137. Figure 9-2 illustrates the vertical and horizontal coverage typically
provided by OPFOR air defense systems at the tactical, operational, and
strategic (national) levels. The example altitudes and ranges are illustrative
of a principle. The actual systems and their capabilities can vary. Although
not shown in this example, all SAM systems have a minimum range and a
minimum altitude. Of course, the range beyond the battle line or limit of
responsibility of supported forces depends on the situation and where the air
defense systems deploy within the supported unit’s AOR. |
7-100.1 | 239 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
ENGAGEMENT PROCEDURES
9-138. On a priority basis, the OPFOR engages aircraft posing the greatest
threat. The preferred technique is to fire at an already engaged target rather
than switching from target to target. This priority continues unless a later-
acquired target seriously threatens air defense units.
9-139. The OPFOR prefers to engage a hostile aircraft prematurely and
waste some ammunition rather than allowing the aircraft to expend its ord-
nance. The OPFOR fires on aircraft as long as they remain within range.
9-140. Air observers and weapon crews outside the attacked area maintain
observation and readiness to fire. This precludes enemy success through
simultaneous air attacks from several directions.
OFFENSE
9-141. Operations from the air have ceased to be auxiliary and have become
a critical component of combined arms combat. Thus, air defense is a
vital part of the combined arms operation. The OPFOR can successfully
execute operational offensive actions only if it can negate enemy air
power. Conversely, failure to provide effective air defense against enemy air
power can result in operational and tactical failures. Therefore, the OPFOR
has an extensive air defense system to protect attacking maneuver units. Air
defense weapons can fully support dynamic offensive combat.
DEPLOYMENT
9-142. In an offense, the exact location of air defense weapons depends on the
following factors:
• The assessment of the air threat.
• The mission of the supported unit.
• The commander’s chosen organization of forces.
• The tempo of operations.
• The terrain.
• Fields of fire and observation.
9-143. The shape of the air defense deployment can change as supported
units maneuver. The most common methods follow:
• Where the air threat is low, the commander assigns the complete air
defense unit lines of deployment to occupy in succession.
• When the air threat is continuous, air defense units may move forward
in bounds into successive firing positions, maintaining continuous
coverage of supported units.
• In a highly mobile, fragmented operation, the OPFOR might integrate
air defense into combat formations and occupy temporary firing positions
on less likely approaches or in gaps between the coverage of the main
air defenses.
SAM units at the operational and tactical levels deploy where they can provide
area coverage for as much as possible of the supported maneuver unit’s AOR. |
7-100.1 | 240 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Disruption Zone
9-144. In many cases, dispersed ground ambushing forces and other key as-
sets in the disruption zone will require point air defense protection. Regular
infantry, SPF, and affiliated forces operating in the disruption zone should
have air defense systems as mobile and survivable as the force they are
protecting. This may require extensive use of man-portable, shoulder-fired
SAMs. Some forces may rely strictly on C3D for protection from enemy air.
9-145. Some air defense forces may be deployed in the disruption zone, par-
ticularly in the form of air defense ambush teams. Their purpose can be to
deny aerial attack and/or to prevent enemy reconnaissance platforms from
targeting forces in the disruption zone or battle zone.
9-146. Area coverage is desirable for protecting the overall disruption force.
When necessary, the OPFOR will move divisional assets or even OSC assets
(both normally located in the battle zone) well out into the disruption zone to
assist in area coverage or to provide early warning for other air defense units.
Battle Zone
9-147. Most air defense forces would normally be within the battle zone. In
order to provide continuous coverage for supported maneuver forces, air de-
fense systems need to have the mobility to move with those forces. Their
main role is to allow friendly ground forces the freedom to maneuver as the
operational situation develops rapidly. Air defense units in a fixing force can
help prevent enemy aviation from coming to the aid of the enemy formation
targeted for attack by assault and exploitation forces. Air defense action or
even an uncertain air defense environment can help create the window of
opportunity for an attack.
Support Zone
9-148. Some air defense units may be deployed in the support zone to help
keep this zone free of significant air action and thus permit the effective logistics
and administrative support of forces. Generally, commanders can afford to de-
fend the support zone with less mobile air defense assets than in the disruption
and battle zones. Throughout the support zone, the OPFOR makes extensive use
of passive air defense measures, including C3D, maneuver, and dispersal.
MOVEMENT
9-149. The OPFOR anticipates that its units may be subject to air attack
during movement. Accordingly, units engaged in movement are protected by
their constituent air defense assets and, in many cases, by additional air de-
fense assets allocated by their parent unit.
9-150. When a subordinate tactical unit is conducting tactical movement, an
operational-level command may order its own air defense assets to provide
cover for the moving unit. Due to their longer-range systems, operational-
level air defense units may be able to provide this coverage from their
original positions or with minimal repositioning. Alternatively, the opera-
tional command may direct that the subordinate unit conducting movement
receive air defense coverage from another, adjacent tactical subordinate
whose air defense assets are within range of the moving unit. |
7-100.1 | 241 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
9-151. Air defense units relocate as necessary to provide continuous and ef-
fective protection to the supported unit. OPFOR commanders maintain effective
protection by leaving at least one air defense battery in firing position to cover
the movement. Air defense units constituent to or augmenting a maneuver unit
usually move as a part of that unit if the air threat is high. If there is little or no
air threat, these air defense assets may move separately to a new location.
DEFENSE
9-152. Air defense units seek to provide coverage to all levels of the organiza-
tion. They must integrate this coverage with the ground operation and ensure
continuous air defense. Air defense must provide all-around security because
air attack can come from any direction. The OPFOR must coordinate fires
among all air defense units and supported maneuver units. This provides an
integrated air defense.
9-153. Under conditions when the OPFOR can employ integrated defense, it
generally can also employ integrated air defense, integrated both vertically
and horizontally. During transition and adaptive operations, however, decen-
tralized conditions may affect the ability to integrate horizontally and thus
provide mutual support. The same would apply to the commander’s ability to
achieve vertical integration between the tactical and operational levels.
DEPLOYMENT
9-154. Deployments closely parallel those in the offense, but there are some
differences. The positioning of operational-level air defense assets depends on
the overall organization of the battlefield for the defense. Operational-level
SAM units might deploy to provide point protection for the main CP, SSM
units, airfields, or other high-value assets. The SAMs might cover units in
sanctuary areas or sanctuaries into which maneuver units may deploy. They
might cover lines of commitment for an operational-level counterattack. The
OPFOR sees the threats posed by air reconnaissance and airborne or heli-
borne assault as being greater in the defense and devotes greater effort to
guarding against those threats.
Disruption Zone
9-155. Air defense in the disruption zone should provide area coverage to de-
fend forces in the zone and provide point protection for key assets involved in
conducting fires. Even the systems providing point protection must be highly
mobile and capable of moving with units as they displace to hides or new fir-
ing positions or conduct survivability moves.
9-156. Forces operating in the disruption zone are typically separated from
sanctuary areas in both time and space. This separation typically requires
the OSC commander to place air defense units in the disruption zone to sup-
port the disruption mission. Such deployment allows the OPFOR to detect,
track, and attack air platforms in the disruption zone and beyond. This can
involve deployment of divisional or even OSC air defense assets (radars as
well as weapon systems) well into the disruption zone. These forces occupy pre-
pared and camouflaged positions to support other units in the disruption zone.
As in the offense, they try to prevent enemy aerial reconnaissance platforms |
7-100.1 | 242 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
from targeting forces in the disruption zone or the battle zone. This is a key
part of the OPFOR’s aggressive and creative counterreconnaissance effort.
Battle Zone
9-157. In maneuver or area defense, air defense units provide protection for
the battle positions of DTGs or BTGs of the main defense force. In a maneuver
defense, they especially cover units maneuvering from line to line. Especially in
an area defense, they help preserve key components of OPFOR combat power or
assist units in the stubborn holding of tactically favorable defensive positions
that the OPFOR would prefer to retain. A typical battle position incorporates
air defense systems, in conjunction with extensive use of C3D. In any type of
defense, air defense units conduct air defense ambushes to provide opportunities
for other forces to conduct counterattacks or reconnaissance fires.
9-158. An OSC in the defense usually employs a strong reserve positioned in
an assembly area with good C3D measures and strong air defense protection.
The reserve must have sufficient air defense coverage to allow it to maneuver
from the assembly area in order to conduct a variety of contingency missions
the OSC commander might give it as the operation develops.
Support Zone
9-159. The OPFOR usually deploys some air defense units in the support zone
to protect key logistics units and administrative support elements. However, it
also relies heavily on passive air defense measures, including C3D and dispersal.
ANTILANDING DEFENSE
9-160. Air defense units have a significant role in defending ground forces
against attacks by enemy airborne and air assault troops. When the OPFOR
detects an enemy airborne operation, Air Force units (if available) attempt to
intercept and destroy enemy transport aircraft. They try to do this while the
enemy is at marshalling airfields or en route to drop zones.
9-161. Operational- and tactical-level SAM units engage transport aircraft
entering their respective air defense zones of responsibility. Short-range air
defense assets near the drop zones also engage transport aircraft. These air
defense forces typically act in the form of either air defense ambushes or roving
air defense units. Self-propelled AA guns, vehicle-mounted machineguns, and
small arms all fire on descending paratroops and equipment.
SANCTUARY AREAS
9-162. A sanctuary area may exist because of natural or manmade features.
However, it only remains a sanctuary if the OPFOR can prevent the enemy
from striking it with standoff weapons, including air power. Thus, OPFOR
units in a sanctuary area use all available C3D techniques to reduce likeli-
hood of detection or identification. They may also exploit political restrictions
placed on the enemy force.
9-163. The air defense of the sanctuary area is integrated into the overall air
defense scheme at the tactical, operational, and strategic (national) levels. The
net result is the requirement for enemy aviation to pass through overlapping |
7-100.1 | 243 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
coverage to attack the sanctuary area. Attacking enemy aircraft must first
penetrate the strategic (national), operational, and tactical engagement
envelopes. Then they must face the air defenses within the sanctuary itself.
9-164. Within the sanctuary area, the air defense unit commander and the
supported maneuver commander work closely together to integrate their
weapons into an effective air defense plan. The maneuver commander
provides guidance for the placement of all air defense systems, while the air
defense commander supervises the details of the placement of his weapons
and ensures that they remain within mutually supporting distance. As a
rule, one crew in each pair of air defense systems remains alert, except when
they have received warning of an air attack. Any available shoulder-fired
SAMs supplement the defense, and the supporting air defense commander
may exercise some degree of control over the SAM gunners. Air defense units
observe radio silence and light discipline and dig in, as time allows.
9-165. A 360-degree surveillance of the surrounding airspace increases the air
defense engagement envelope to the maximum extent possible. Air observation
posts and air defense firing positions are positioned to provide comprehensive
observation and interlocking fires on the most likely approach routes for low-flying
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. All other weapons, including vehicle-mounted
machineguns and ATGMs, are further integrated. Even planning for the use and
integration of massed small-arms fire is essential to an effective air defense.
MOUNTAINS AND WATER OBSTACLES
9-166. Air defense units operating in mountainous terrain have unique
problems. The rugged terrain makes it difficult to maintain the integrity of
maneuver and air defense units. This, in turn, makes maintaining compre-
hensive air surveillance and air defense fire support more difficult, resulting
in a greater degree of decentralization than normal.
9-167. Air defense forces play a major role in water obstacle crossings. They
protect crossing sites and forces from air attack by creating envelopes of
protected airspace above and around crossing sites. Major problems in air
defense of water obstacle crossings include
• Providing comprehensive radar and visual observation.
• Handling simultaneous threats on multiple approach axes.
• Maintaining continuous 360-degree fire coverage.
• Supplying ammunition to firing units on the far shore.
AIR DEFENSE AMBUSHES AND ROVING UNITS
9-168. The OPFOR recognizes the disproportionate effects that sudden, un-
expected destruction of an aircraft or small group of aircraft can have can on
enemy tactics and morale. For example, the surprise destruction of one or
two lead aircraft, on what the enemy perceived to be a clear avenue of ap-
proach, could cause an enemy air assault to be called off or seriously disrupted.
Air defense ambushes may set up at temporary firing positions to surprise and
destroy enemy aircraft and disorganize enemy fixed-wing aircraft and rotary-
wing operations. Ambushes and roving air defense units can cause the enemy to
believe that significant air defense assets are located in areas where actually |
7-100.1 | 244 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
there are only a few weapons. This can reduce the effectiveness of enemy recon-
naissance and the likelihood of enemy air attack in the area concerned.
AMBUSHES
9-169. Air defense ambushes usually comprise a single AA gun or SAM
weapon, section, platoon, or battery with the mission of engaging enemy air-
craft from a hidden or unexpected position. However, the OPFOR may also
employ antihelicopter mines.
Placement
9-170. By their very nature, the placement of air defense ambushes is unpre-
dictable. They might be placed on the most likely air avenues of approach or along
secondary and tertiary avenues. They can be along flanks, forward, behind, and
in gaps between maneuver units. Their purpose can possibly be to fill apparent
gaps in air defense coverage or to defend key units or sites. Typical missions in-
clude defending maneuver units, CPs, reserves, artillery and missile units, other
air defense units in firing positions, and water obstacle-crossing sites.
9-171. Ambushes can be placed
• In valleys or defiles likely to be used as ingress or egress routes by
infiltrating aircraft.
• On adjacent heights to shoot down into valleys or defiles.
• Just behind a crest to catch aircraft from behind as they clear a ridge.
Single-launcher shoulder-fired SAM ambushes may be set up on wooden plat-
forms built in treetops to catch aircraft flying over a forest. In urban areas,
AA guns could be set up within the top or middle floors of buildings to fire
laterally or even down on low-flying aircraft while remaining unseen from
almost every angle. Often, air defense ambushes are placed in complex ter-
rain that offers poor fields of observation but allows them to fire “window shots.”
Planning and Preparation
9-172. Air defense ambushes may be planned and executed on short notice
with little preparation. In other cases, they may involve elaborate prepa-
ration and camouflage, and tracking enemy aircraft over several days to
discern operational patterns and possible weaknesses, or optimum weather
patterns for a specific ambush site.
9-173. Weather conditions may facilitate the use of an air defense ambush.
For example, low cloud bases may force enemy aircraft down into the enve-
lope of a particular weapon. Ambushing units may work in concert with
smoke- or aerosol-dispensing units or ground-based jammers that jam a low-
flying aircraft’s terrain-following radar, forcing it up into the ambush
weapon’s optimum engagement envelope. The OPFOR may create a deception
position using decoys or derelict weapons and vehicles, to draw the attention
of enemy aircrews and cause them to enter the ambush zone of an air defense
ambushing unit positioned nearby.
9-174. The unit or weapon assigned to an air defense ambush usually occu-
pies a temporary firing position in hours of darkness or under the cover of
poor visibility conditions. It may assume a hide position near the firing position |
7-100.1 | 245 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
and establish local ground security and air observers. The unit or weapon is
carefully camouflaged and keeps all its emitters off or in “dummy load” until
ordered to engage a target. While in this mode, it can receive automated sur-
veillance and target tracking data from its parent air defense unit or be
alerted by air observers posted nearby. All this can allow the ambushing unit
to delay using its own radars and other emitters until the last possible mo-
ment, in order to achieve surprise.
9-175. Occasionally, AA guns may choose not to employ their radars, using
strictly electro-optical sights. This tactic takes into account the capability of
modern aircraft, including attack helicopters, to detect radar and IR systems.
9-176. More than one air defense ambush, involving more than one weapon
type may be established along the same air avenue of approach. These may
work independently or in concert depending on the situation. Target en-
gagement decisions may be left up to the ambushing unit commander.
Execution and Redeployment
9-177. When an air target is detected, the ambushing weapon or unit prepares to
engage. This may involve removal of some camouflage or a short movement from
its hide position to its firing position. It then fires on the target until the target
is destroyed or moves out of the firing zone. Then the ambushing unit or weapon
immediately displaces to a new ambush site or returns to its parent unit.
ROVING UNITS
9-178. Employment of roving units is similar to that of air defense ambushes.
The primary difference is that, while an ambushing unit lies in wait in one
position for approaching enemy aircraft, a roving unit moves to the most
likely areas of enemy air attack and occupies a series of predesignated
positions in the supported unit’s AOR. The commander of the roving unit
identifies these positions during his terrain reconnaissance and coordinates
them with the air defense and maneuver unit commanders. The roving unit
occupies these positions according to a prearranged schedule or on order of
the air defense unit commander. Roving units terminate their missions and
return to previously designated primary firing positions upon direction of the
commander of the parent air defense unit.
AIR DEFENSE AGAINST UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
9-179. The OPFOR recognizes the increasing importance of UAVs on the battle-
field, to both its own forces and those of the enemy. They can perform high- and
low-altitude missions, collect the full spectrum of intelligence, and immediately
downlink the data to a ground station. They have the capability to loiter or to fly
deep. They can collect against a predetermined target or look for targets of opportu-
nity. Their construction can make them difficult or easy to detect. Since UAVs can
support targeting for enemy long-range fires, their priority for destruction increases.
9-180. Typically the enemy conducts reconnaissance missions using UAVs
operating in the “window” between low-flying helicopters and higher-altitude
fixed-wing aircraft. This altitude window is between 300 and 4,000 m. The most
common technique is to approach the target area at high altitude and, once at
the target area, drop down to a lower altitude that optimizes the capabilities |
7-100.1 | 246 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
of the sensor package on board. Once the mission in the target area is com-
plete, the UAV climbs to higher altitude and departs the mission area.
TARGETED SUBSYSTEMS
9-181. Countering UAVs should not be viewed as just a defense against the aerial
vehicle, although that is important. Most UAV systems consist of three basic
subsystems: the air vehicle, the ground station, and the launcher. (In some
cases, the latter two may be one vehicle.) There are also a variety of communica-
tion data links between the ground station and the air vehicle. Some systems
also include satellite links. The air defense commander must coordinate with
other arms to ensure that UAVs are being attacked not just in the air, but that
their related subsystems are also addressed. The successful destruction of a UAV
ground station has a far greater impact than the destruction of a single air vehicle.
9-182. Thus, air defense against UAVs requires not only an IADS but also an
integrated all-arms approach. Air defense commanders and planners should
view the three UAV subsystems as three separate targets that can be coun-
tered through a variety of means. These means are both active and passive.
ACTIVE MEASURES
9-183. A wide variety and large number of active measures are available to
the OPFOR to counter UAVs. The effectiveness of air defense radars can vary
dependent on the radar cross section (RCS) and altitude of the vehicle. Of
course, this does not preclude the use of radar, since these factors are consid-
erations in detecting any aircraft. The relatively small size of many UAVs
obviously reduces their RCS.
9-184. A variety of sound-ranging systems are available that can provide
early warning and azimuth of an approaching UAV. This in turn provides air
defense weapons and maneuver unit weapons an opportunity to prepare for the
vehicle’s approach and to put up a large volume of fire, provided the UAV can
subsequently be visually detected. The early warning provided by sound ranging
increases the probability that visual observers will be able to spot the vehicle.
9-185. The location of UAV ground stations and launchers is typically a high
priority for reconnaissance. The OPFOR will use all available means (from
the civilian population to commercially available satellite imagery) to locate
these key targets. Reconnaissance assets for locating these targets can be
tied to artillery, MRLs, or aircraft that can quickly engage the targets once
the information is received. SPF operating in the enemy rear can also be a
valuable asset in locating launchers and ground stations. They can either
take direct action to destroy the targets or relay location information to allow
the OPFOR to employ other means against them.
9-186. The OPFOR can also use jamming techniques to counter UAV system
data links. In some cases, data links cannot be jammed but they can be
monitored. The effectiveness of these procedures varies according to the UAV
system being attacked. High-power spot or barrage noise jammers can be
effectively used to mask ground targets from side-looking airborne radars.
Many satellite up- and downlinks employed are through the use of the
commercial telecommunication infrastructure. This infrastructure and
supporting satellites can be jammed or monitored to some degree. |
7-100.1 | 247 | _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
PASSIVE MEASURES
9-187. Since the mission the UAV is executing may not be apparent, actions
should be taken to counter all possibilities. The integrated use of the passive
air defense measures described earlier in this chapter can reduce the ef-
fectiveness of UAVs. The use of a variety of decoys provides a false picture of
the mission area to the enemy and, to a large extent, can deny information or
distort the information collected by the UAV.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
9-188. The OPFOR accepts that, while it has a full range of capabilities to
deal with its neighbors, air defense against a technologically superior force is
problematic. It believes that comprehensive planning and the creative use of
all capabilities, including some normally not associated with air defense, can
serve to mitigate many disadvantages.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
9-189. Within the context of regional operations, the OPFOR views its air de-
fense system as fully capable of protecting ground forces and infrastructure
from air attack by any of its neighbors. To accomplish this, it believes that its
aircraft will be capable of conducting successful counterair operations, thus
denying any major encroachment into its territory or significant attacks by
fixed-wing aircraft against its military forces operating in enemy territory.
The ability to use ground-based systems to defeat any “leakers” and rotary-
wing attacks serves to reinforce this belief. This confidence does not preclude
the OPFOR from using a wide variety of other options, to include TBMs or SPF.
9-190. While desiring to attack its regional opponent with overwhelming
force, the OPFOR plans for the possibility of extraregional intervention. In
doing so, it may choose to husband certain assets that may not be essential to
accomplishing its air defense objectives against its neighbor.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
9-191. The first OPFOR combat actions against extraregional forces may be
against the enemy air threat. Past operations have shown that one of a major
power’s first steps in support of intervention is the deployment of aircraft to
third countries within range of the battlespace. Deployment could also in-
clude movement of aircraft to the territory of the regional neighbor with
which the State is already at war. Attacking sites within these countries, espe-
cially third countries or the extraregional enemy’s homeland, is a decision made
at the highest political levels. Once the State leadership has assessed this as a
viable option, however, the OPFOR will use every means available to preclude
deployment or, more realistically, limit access and delay deployment timelines.
9-192. Taking early action against the air threat is essential to forces
transitioning to adaptive operations. It provides time for ground forces to
reposition. It also allows the use of OPFOR fixed-wing aircraft against
targets they can range. Waiting too long to employ fixed-wing aircraft could
result in an effective loss of the capability. |
7-100.1 | 248 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
9-193. OPFOR air defense actions during transition and adaptive operations
are based on the premise that it is essential to attack aircraft while they are
on the ground. While defensive in nature, OPFOR air defense has an impor-
tant offensive component to it. Therefore, it must use every means available
to attack enemy air capability. TBMs provide the OPFOR with the means to
continue to attack after the effective loss or degradation of its fixed-wing ca-
pability. The key to the use of TBMs is that they are systems that have been
held in reserve during regional operations and positioned in hides. These
hides are dispersed and not tied to any operational pattern of the ground forces.
Armed with a mix of high-explosive and persistent chemical warheads, they can
destroy aircraft and make airfields unusable for extended periods of time.
9-194. Augmenting early OPFOR air employment and the continuous use of
TBMs is the employment of SPF, insurgents, and terrorist groups. These
forces can be a means of providing depth to the battlefield. SPF pre-
positioned in anticipation of intervention can operate in third countries or
within the theater. Typical SPF missions include air defense ambushes of
aircraft along routes of ingress or egress from airfields. Shoulder-fired SAMs
equipped with night-vision devices serve as the weapon of choice for these
ambushes. In some cases, the ambushing forces could be instructed to fire only
at certain types of aircraft. These may include Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS), reconnaissance aircraft, and fuel tankers. SPF can also con-
duct raids to destroy maintenance facilities and fuel storage sites. Insurgent
forces, advised by SPF, can conduct similar missions. They can ambush
cargo trucks en route to airfields or aviation facilities. SPF or insurgents
can intimidate local contractors and force them to contaminate fuel supplies or
sabotage air traffic control facilities. Where plausible deniability is important,
terrorists may be more suitable for conducting some of these operations.
9-195. Air defense by ground-based systems still plays a key role in both
transition and adaptive operations. The OPFOR recognizes that strategically
and operationally it cannot maintain a fully integrated air defense system
over all areas all of the time. However, it does believe that, through niche
technologies and creative means, it can achieve integration in some sectors
while taking a degree of risk in others. Longer-range systems, normally posi-
tioned deep, can be moved forward to cause enemy aircraft to operate from
greater standoff distances. By investing in key technologies, the OPFOR has
some capability to provide early warning and target information to firing
units from remote locations. This protects the firing units from detection and
significantly lowers their radar transmission times. There is heavier reliance
on the use of passive systems. Air defense ambushes along likely routes of
ingress serve as effective means of augmenting ground force protection. In
key areas, these ambushes would be positioned forward and in depth.
9-196. The use of other arms is an effective means of augmenting air defense
capability. An in-depth analysis of the battlespace is conducted to identify
likely helicopter firing positions. These can be sowed with antihelicopter mines
and remote sensors. The sensors serve to key artillery fires to attack these sites
and render them unusable or prevent effective fires by attack helicopters. |
7-100.1 | 249 | Chapter 10
Engineer Support
The OPFOR believes success in battle requires extensive engineer support
at every level. Engineer plans at the operational level support the various
strategic-level courses of action involved in the State’s strategic campaign.
Engineers facilitate the mobility and high rate of movement of combined
arms forces while enhancing the survivability of forces. Although the
OPFOR generally conducts engineer countermobility activities at the
tactical level, it also maximizes activities conducted at the operational
level to disaggregate, disrupt, delay, block, or canalize enemy forces. See
FM 7-100.2 for more information on tactical-level engineer actions.
ASSETS
10-1. Military engineers fall into two basic categories: combat engineers and
special-category engineers. Combat engineers are those whose tasks may
bring them in direct contact with the enemy. Special-category engineers (such
as bridge- and road-building units) do not normally engage the enemy and
generally use utility vehicles as their primary transportation rather than
engineer vehicles designed to survive close combat. Together, these two
categories of engineers are responsible for the more difficult and complex
engineering tasks. Their missions require specialized training and the use of
special equipment or munitions. Often the distinction of engineer categories is
blurred somewhat depending on task organizations and their mission-driven
employment.
10-2. At the operational level, the OPFOR plans the complete integration of
civilian and military engineer resources. For example, maneuver command-
ers may use civilian earthmoving, road-building, and construction equipment
and personnel, especially in support zones. This allows constituent combat
engineer equipment and personnel to accompany maneuver forces in battle.
Civilian workers or maneuver units can perform many basic combat engineer
tasks, with engineers providing guidance and technical expertise.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
10-3. Engineer units allocated to an operational-strategic command (OSC) in
constituent or dedicated relationships may be directly under the command of
the OSC commander. The OSC commander or his subordinate commanders
can controlbut do not commandother engineer assets that are allocated to
them in a supporting relationship. Rather than keeping all allocated engineer
assets under his direct command and control (C2), the OSC commander may
suballocate some engineer units to his subordinate maneuver units or to his
integrated fires command (IFC) and/or integrated support command (ISC). |
7-100.1 | 250 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
STAFF RESPONSIBILITY
10-4. Various staff elements under the operations officer advise him on
engineer matters and allow him to advise the commander on the employment
of engineer assets. The chief of force protection and the chief of infrastructure
management receive liaison teams from each constituent, dedicated, or
supporting engineer unit. These teams provide the staff with detailed
expertise on engineer functions and provide a direct communications conduit
to the engineer units executing such functions. Based on the advice of the
liaison teams and coordination with the engineer units through the re-
spective liaison teams, these functional staff chiefs advise the commander on
engineer employment within their functional areas. Other liaison teams may
fall under the chief of current operations, to advise and assist in mobility and
countermobility functions. The engineer liaison teams also coordinate, as
necessary, with other staff elements, including the chief of information
warfare (IW). Liaison team leaders speak for the commanders of their
respective units.
TASK ORGANIZATION
10-5. At each level of command, the commander or his operations officer de-
cides on the task organization of subordinate engineer units. Operational
employment of engineer units does not follow strict organizational lines. The
OPFOR does not always employ engineer units as complete entities.
10-6. Engineer tasks are integral to all OPFOR organizations. Although
engineer assets generally are constituent at no lower than brigade or brigade
tactical group (BTG) level, the OPFOR prefers to task organize for mission
success at even lower levels, when the assets are available. This may dictate
that, instead of maintaining large engineer units, the commander may choose
to break them down and combine them into smaller (sometimes much, much
smaller) multirole engineer support groupings. These engineer groupings
range in size from brigades down to multirole platoons and engineer squads.
An example of this flexible task organization would be the allocation more
minelaying assets on an exposed flank or a high-speed avenue of approach for
enemy armored vehicles. Another would be that an OSC that is task-
organized for operations in a desert environment would not receive water ob-
stacle-crossing units, but might add more mineclearing units.
10-7. There are no real doctrinal constraints on task organization for mission
success. The ability to allocate assets downward and to task organize is
restrained only by the availability of assets and the nature of the mission.
At the operational level, however, the primary responsibility of the engineers
is to support and ensure the mobility and survivability of operational
units while retaining a significant countermobility capability to impede
(or canalize) the enemy’s progress. The primary engineer reconnaissance
function at the operational level is route reconnaissance.
10-8. With advice from engineer experts on his functional staff, the operations
officer on the OSC staff uses the OSC’s engineer resources to form task-
oriented groupings according to the commander’s decision for the operation
and his instructions on engineer support. He forms groupings to |
7-100.1 | 251 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
• Conduct engineer support (reconnaissance, mobility, countermobility,
and survivability) at any level.
• Augment maneuver units.
• Augment other operational-level units.
• Support IW.
10-9. The most frequent operational employment of constituent or dedicated en-
gineer, engineer reconnaissance, and road- and bridge-construction units generally
involves the formation of one or more functional groupings. Some of these are—
• Obstacle detachments (ODs) to create minefields and other obstacles.
• Movement support detachments (MSDs) to perform route reconnais-
sance, route preparation, mineclearing, and route marking.
• Obstacle-clearing detachments.
• Engineer reconnaissance patrols.
An OSC may form several of each, and each may be based on an engineer
unit as large as a battalion. The OSC may also create an engineer reserve.
MISSIONS
10-10. The primary engineer missions performed in combat are in the catego-
ries of reconnaissance, mobility, countermobility, and survivability. The
OPFOR recognizes several basic combat tasks engineers perform in support
of combined arms operations. Some of these tasks are to
• Reconnoiter the enemy and the terrain.
• Prepare fortifications.
• Prepare and maintain movement routes.
• Clear passages through obstacles and areas of destruction.
• Equip and maintain gap crossings.
• Establish engineer obstacles.
• Support IW.
• Extract and purify water and establish water supply points.
• Carry out engineer measures to eliminate the effects of nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) and precision weapons.
For more detail, see the sections later in this chapter dedicated to Engineer
Reconnaissance, Survivability, Countermobility, and Support to Information
Warfare. For more detail on mobility support, see FM 7-100.2.
SUPPORT TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
10-11. In the offense, the engineers’ primary mission is to support the
operation plan. Emphasis is on
• Clearing and maintaining routes for maneuver units.
• Clearing or removing mines and other obstacles.
• Crossing gaps.
• Creating obstacles to assist in flank protection and protection against
counterattacks. |
7-100.1 | 252 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Preparation
10-12. To prepare for offensive operations, engineer tasks include
• Performing engineer reconnaissance of the terrain and the enemy.
• Preparing assembly areas and movement routes for maneuver forces,
including reserves.
• Constructing protective positions for systems, units, and command
posts (CPs).
• Establishing and improving road networks to support maneuver forces.
• Preparing alternative airfields and highway strips to support air assets.
• Ensure the integration of engineer support to IW.
Conduct
10-13. During the conduct of offensive operations, engineer support in-
cludes
• Providing tailored engineer support where it is needed, when it is needed.
• Continuing reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain.
• Maintaining airfields and roads.
• Improving road networks and other movement routes to support com-
mitment of reserves or follow-on forces.
• Providing support for the crossing of water obstacles and other gaps.
• Constructing protective positions for systems, units, and CPs, as they
relocate.
• Helping to repel enemy counterattack.
• Supplying engineer equipment, materials, and technical assistance to
maneuver units and other OPFOR units.
• Facilitate maneuver despite enemy and natural obstacles and possibly
NBC-contaminated areas.
SUPPORT TO DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
10-14. OSC engineer forces are heavily engaged in the preparation and con-
duct of an operational defense. Comprehensive engineer preparation in the
entire area of responsibility (AOR) is an important precondition for holding
battle positions, as well as for troop maneuver.
10-15. Engineer support for defensive operations places emphasis on fortify-
ing battle positions and assembly areas, performing engineer camouflage,
concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures, and adapting the terrain
for defense. The defense is also conducive to the extensive use of various ob-
stacles to interfere with the enemy’s advance.
10-16. The general aims of engineer support to defensive operations include
• Controlling access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canaliz-
ing enemy forces.
• Establishing conditions necessary for organizing the defense.
• Protecting personnel and equipment from the effects of conventional
direct and indirect fires, precision munitions, and NBC attacks. |
7-100.1 | 253 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
• Building fortifications, battle positions, and assembly areas.
• Preparing and maintaining maneuver and supply routes.
• Creating or improving existing obstacles.
• Preparing decoys and deception positions.
• Ensuring the integration of engineer support to IW.
10-17. The type and scale of engineer support depends on the operational
situation, enemy forces, and the conditions under which an OPFOR transitions
to the defense. If the OPFOR does so during the course of the offense, support
may have to begin with the protection of threatened axes by ODs and antitank
reserves (ATRs) and the route work needed for regrouping.
Preparation
10-18. Engineer support for preparing an AOR for defensive operations
consists of the following:
• Conducting engineer reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain.
• Preparing fortifications for protecting weapons, personnel, and equip-
ment.
• Preparing routes for counterattack forces.
• Constructing obstacles (coordinated with the fire support plan and
natural obstacles).
• Preparing C3D measures in support of IW.
• Maintaining the water supply.
Conduct
10-19. During defensive operations, engineer support consists of improving
on and expanding the scope of all the above measures and undertaking new
tasks as situations develop. Such tasks include clearing obstacles, crossing
gaps, and eliminating the effects of NBC and precision weapons.
SUPPORT TO INFORMATION WARFARE
10-20. The OPFOR has responded at all organizational levels to the chal-
lenge posed by enemy advances in sensors and weapons. A wide variety of
engineer activities contribute to IW, particularly in support of C3D measures.
This support involves three interrelated areas:
• Deception (signature-enhancing measures).
• Camouflage and concealment (signature-reduction measures).
• Obscurants (measures used both to conceal real equipment and en-
hance the effectiveness of decoy equipment).
10-21. OPFOR combat engineer units are a high priority for deception efforts,
since their composition and disposition on the battlefield are indicators of
how and where the OPFOR expects to conduct its main offensive or defensive
effort. Therefore, the OPFOR establishes deception positions and engineer
obstacles, supported by decoy vehicles. |
7-100.1 | 254 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
Offense
10-22. During the offense, engineer support of deception measures can
include
• Construction of decoys and deception positions.
• Preparation of false routes to provide misleading indicators.
Defense
10-23. The OPFOR uses various deception measures to mislead the enemy
about size and location of forces and weapon systems and about the nature of
defensive engineer preparations. Engineer support of deception measures can
include
• Use of screening characteristics of terrain, darkness, and other con-
ditions of limited visibility during engineer preparation of defensive
positions and positioning of forces.
• False actions to draw attention from actual defensive preparations.
• Construction of artificial screens and concealment (such as horizontal
and vertical screens, or corner reflectors).
10-24. Sufficient engineer support is critical to the success of any defensive
deception plan. Units in the main defense force receive the priority of effort.
However, engineers typically do not begin work supporting deception until they
have completed all measures required for camouflage, concealment, and cover.
ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE
10-25. The specific missions of engineer reconnaissance are to—
• Discover enemy engineer measures taken to fortify battle positions and
to lay and clear minefields and demolitions.
• Determine movement routes (by the conditions of roads, bridges, and
fording sites).
• Determine the characteristics of obstacles and locate bypass routes.
• Determine water availability (or add more robust capability).
• Observe enemy engineer activity.1
• Determine requirements for special engineer equipment, allocation of
engineer assets, and the subsequent task organizations of subordinate
and supporting engineer units.
• Report the locations of any enemy units encountered.
• Advise the commander and staff on locations the enemy is likely to
occupy, based on the presence of favorable conditions, such as accessi-
bility, concealment, and water supply.
1 The composition and disposition of enemy combat engineer units are important indicators of how and where the
enemy expects to conduct his main offensive or defensive effort. Positioning of bridging and mineclearing assets
may tip off planned enemy offensive action. When the enemy is preparing to defend, all obstacle-creating assets,
such as minelayers, are of particular interest. |
7-100.1 | 255 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
10-26. A primary goal of engineer reconnaissance at the operational level is
to provide comprehensive information on the suitability of movement routes.
Engineer reconnaissance, performed independently or with other reconnais-
sance forces, plays a significant role in ensuring freedom of movement and
access to various areas of the battlefield. Units performing engineer recon-
naissance make the following determinations:
• The degree of trafficability of the entire route.
• The location and nature of obstacles and forces or assets needed to
overcome them.
• The condition of crossing sites over rivers, canals, streams, and ravines.
• The location and quantity of material potentially useful for improving
the movement route.
• The nature of the terrain and location of areas without natural
concealment.
10-27. The purpose of route reconnaissance is to select suitable routes along
the axis of movement and to identify suitable halt areas that provide con-
cealment. Engineer reconnaissance can also identify possible infiltration
routes. The reconnaissance patrol relays topographical and terrain informa-
tion back to the unit that sent it out. Route reconnaissance can occur
throughout the AOR, in offense or defense.
OFFENSE
10-28. During the offense, the primary engineer reconnaissance mission is to
obtain more precise information on
• Battle damage created both during offensive preparation and during
the execution of the offense.
• Troop movement routes and trafficability of off-road terrain.
• Locations where the enemy established obstacles.
• Locations for establishing obstacles during enemy counterattacks.
• Water obstacles on friendly forces’ axes of advance.
10-29. Engineer reconnaissance during the offense seeks to obtain informa-
tion on the nature of enemy fortifications, defensive positions, and obstacles.
The basic methods for obtaining this information are observation and aerial
or ground photography.
DEFENSE
10-30. Engineers assist in reconnaissance and preparation of the defense by
determining the protective and camouflage features of the terrain and by
helping select positions for CPs and unit battle positions. Engineers also de-
termine road and bridge conditions in the AOR, availability of local materials
for construction of positions, and the status of the water supply. |
7-100.1 | 256 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
SURVIVABILITY
10-31. Preparing fortified positions is a task for engineers in both the offense
and defense. Fortified positions increase weapons effectiveness and protect
personnel, weapons, and materiel. Engineers give priority to digging in CPs
and key components of the OPFOR’s combat power. Fortification preparation
combines and uses to best advantage the terrain’s protective properties, local
construction materials, and engineer excavation equipment. The C3D meas-
ures discussed above, under Support to Information Warfare, also contribute
to survivability.
OFFENSE
10-32. In preparation for offensive action, the primary use of field fortifi-
cation is in the preparation of assembly areas. Even there, the tasks of
preparation typically exceed the capability of engineers in the limited time
available. Consequently, the preparation of assembly areas becomes a
shared responsibility involving all available personnel and equipment of
all branches.
10-33. Normally, the OPFOR locates assembly areas far enough from enemy
forces to deny the enemy ground observation and to lessen direct-fire effects.
It uses field fortification in a way that allows a smooth and protected move-
ment of troops and supplies in and out of the assembly areas.
DEFENSE
10-34. When the OPFOR is transitioning to the defense and preparing com-
plex battle positions or sanctuary areas, advance engineer deployment allows
better use of terrain features and constructed fortifications. Engineers also
have more time to construct or improve routes for movement of troops and
supplies and to conceal forces and caches or short-duration storage facilities.
In most cases, engineer units must concentrate their effort on only the most
important parts of the AOR.
10-35. The full preparation of defensive positions involving entrenchments,
communications trenches, positions for tanks and infantry vehicles, and pro-
tected CPs is a labor-intensive process. It often exceeds the capability of pure
engineer units. Consequently, the OPFOR’s approach is to use all available
personnel and equipment. Units of all arms and services receive training in
preparing field fortifications and emplacements.
COUNTERMOBILITY
10-36. Creating engineer obstacles and carrying out demolition activities are
significant engineer functions in all phases of combat. The obstacle plan is
tailored and integrated into the overall operation plan. Engineer obstacles in-
clude any actions taken to inflict losses and to delay and impede enemy
movement. In the offense, obstacles protect flanks, disrupt counterattacks,
and strengthen captured positions. In the defense, engineer obstacles may
strengthen the defense, disrupt enemy operations, and cover gaps. |
7-100.1 | 257 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES
10-37. The widespread use of landmines on today’s battlefields results from a
combination of mass production, plastic mines, improved battlefield delivery
systems, and development of sophisticated fuzing. Remotely-delivered mines
have expanded capability for changing the tempo of combat.
Minefields
10-38. The five basic types of OPFOR minefields are antitank (AT), anti-
personnel (AP), mixed, decoy, and antilanding. AT minefields are the
primary type of OPFOR engineer obstacle and serve to destroy or disable
armored and other vehicles. They are primarily established in belts consist-
ing of multiple rows on avenues that are favorable for armored vehicles.
Wherever possible, minefield belts will be tied into natural terrain obstacles
to reduce the mine requirement. The OPFOR sets up conventional AP mine-
fields in support of friendly battle positions, in front of AT minefields, or
along dismounted avenues of approach. Mixed minefields consist of both AP
and AT mines. Decoy minefields are a significant form of deception used to
slow movement or deceive as to true unit locations. Antilanding minefields
prevent landings by amphibious, airborne, or heliborne assault forces.
Minelaying
10-39. The methods and extent of minelaying depend on
• The OPFOR’s intentions.
• The operational and/or tactical situation.
• Terrain characteristics.
• The type of mine.
• Time available.
• Available engineer support.
10-40. Emplacement means may be manual, mechanical, or remote. Manual
emplacement is the most labor-intensive and time-consuming method and
may not always be possible in a fluid battlespace. The OPFOR not only will
use mechanical minelayers, but also will continue to develop methods of
remote minelaying, including delivery by minelaying helicopters, fixed-wing
aircraft, or cannon and rocket artillery. Rapidly laid and scatterable AT mines in
support of maneuver operations will predominate on most battlefields. The
same types of minefield may also support a situational defense. If the OPFOR
plans only a temporary halt or defensive action, it can mechanically surface-
lay small protective minefields. It may also use remotely-laid minefields
(probably with self-destruct options) and controlled minefields.
Remotely-Delivered Mines
10-41. The ability to remotely deliver mines provides the OPFOR with the
capability to respond rapidly with thousands of landmines at any point on the
battlefield. The OPFOR can employ remotely-delivered minefields against
choke points to delay and cause bunching that could create vulnerability to
air or artillery attack. Remotely-delivered minefields fill gaps created by enemy |
7-100.1 | 258 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
minefield breaching efforts and can cause confusion and delay in assembly
areas. They can halt enemy attacks in areas not covered by an OD (or gain
time for an OD to do its work). Maneuver forces use remote mining to protect
their flanks or to attack targets deep in enemy territory or anywhere in the
AOR. Remote minelaying can be useful against enemy columns, areas of con-
centration, CPs, firing positions, and other targets. Such unpredictable mine-
fields increasingly dominate OPFOR countermobility operations.
10-42. Remotely-delivered (or scatterable) mines are laid without regard to
classical patterns. They are designed to be delivered by aircraft, cannon
artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), or ground vehicles, or they can
be hand-thrown or emplaced by man-portable mine dispensers.
10-43. Artillery. Some cannon artillery systems are capable of delivering
both AP and AT mines. However, MRLs are the primary means of remote
minelaying. The principal advantage of MRL mine delivery is its ability to
quickly emplace large minefields in a single volley, while minimizing expo-
sure to enemy targeting and weapon systems.
10-44. Ground Vehicles. Within recent years, the trend has been to mount
scatterable-mine dispensers on ground vehicles. Both AP and AT mines can
be launched from ground vehicles. This also gives the engineers the ability to
re-seed or reinforce an obstacle without entering the minefield itself.
10-45. Infantry. OPFOR infantry units may employ man-portable remote
mine dispensers. These man-portable dispensers, weighing only a few pounds,
are ideal for installing small, defensive, AP or AT minefields. Infantry-fired
ground dispensers allow units to remotely emplace minefields to protect their
battle positions, flanks, and boundaries between units, or to cover firing lines
and gaps in combat formations. They can quickly close breaches in existing
protective minefields and increase the density of mines on armor avenues of
approach.
10-46. Aerial. Both AT and AP minefields can be laid using aerial minelay-
ing systems. Bombers or ground-attack aircraft can lay remotely-delivered
minefields throughout the AOR.
10-47. Helicopter minelaying systems are used to emplace small or large
minefields in the execution of offensive or defensive operations. This type of
aerial minelaying is normally conducted over friendly territoryalong flanks
or in support zones. When supporting an airborne or heliborne landing, heli-
copters may lay mines on enemy-held territory. Helicopter mine chutes are a
tool available to even low-technology helicopter forces for installation on a va-
riety of helicopters by low-echelon maintenance units.
OBSTACLE DETACHMENT
10-48. The OD is the basic building block of the OPFOR’s countermobility
effort. It is a task organization composed primarily of engineers. An OD can
vary in size depending on the operational situation and the needs of the
commander. An OSC may form several ODs based on its constituent or
dedicated engineer units. An OD formed at this level is typically based on an
engineer unit as large as a battalion. The OSC generally tries to create one
OD for each ATR formed from its AT assets. |
7-100.1 | 259 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
10-49. ODs formed by an OSC may be assigned in a supporting relationship
to the OSC’s subordinate maneuver units, or they can act independently at
the OSC level (for example, to protect an exposed flank). They are a standard
feature of tactical and operational task organizations. With their ability to
rapidly lay mines and construct obstacles, their mission is to deny the enemy
access to key terrain, particularly those avenues of approach most suitable
for armored vehicles.
10-50. Although the OD can operate independently, it usually operates with
an ATR to provide flank protection and to repel enemy counterattacks. ATRs
may provide covering fire over the minefields that the ODs emplace. The OD
sometimes operates with mechanical minelaying platoons.
Offense
10-51. In the offense, the OD usually moves with the ATR either on an open
flank or in a central position ready to deploy to any threatened axis. In the
latter case, it usually advances with maneuver units to ensure a prompt re-
sponse to any threat.
10-52. The OPFOR considers surprise a critical factor in mine warfare.
Enemy reconnaissance can discover minefields laid too long in advance and
can take measures to overcome them. Therefore, it is often more effective to
lay a minefield during the course of a battle, preferably at the last minute,
directly in the path of a developing threat. Using mines in this way is not
only tactically advantageous, but also economical. This may be an important
consideration when supplies are limited.
10-53. The OPFOR uses ODs aggressively, maintaining close contact with
the enemy and attempting to mine areas in which the enemy has already
committed himself. An OD may join an ATR to ward off enemy counterattack
threats.
Defense
10-54. In the defense, the OPFOR commander may hold the OD and other
forces in reserve and can quickly employ them during an enemy attack, to
mine potentially vulnerable gaps. Engineer tasks during the defense imple-
ment obstacle plans, particularly AT obstacles. Together with ATRs, ODs
provide a quick-reaction AT force to block enemy penetrations.
10-55. Engineers create obstacles on possible enemy approaches to OPFOR
battle positions or artillery and air defense firing positions, in the gaps
between battle positions, and on flanks. They normally construct barrier
systems in coordination with the overall fire support plan.
10-56. Engineers can lay mines and construct obstacles in the disruption
zone and on likely enemy armored avenues of approach. They can also lay
obstacles in the depth of friendly units in the battle zone, and at subsequent
defensive lines throughout the AOR. However, simultaneous obstacle
construction throughout the AOR can only occur when sufficient time, equip-
ment, and personnel are available. In any part of the AOR, minefields and
other obstacles require barriers, security, and marked maneuver passages. |
7-100.1 | 260 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
OFFENSIVE COUNTERMOBILITY
10-57. Engineer countermobility missions are not strictly an engineer function.
Rather, they are part of an overall, all-arms effort to deny the enemy freedom
of maneuver. For example, many remotely-delivered mines are emplaced by
means other than engineer assets. The OPFOR will also employ all means
available to attack the enemy’s mobility assets at every opportunity. The
elimination or degradation of key mobility assets (such as bridging and mine-
clearing assets) can severely limit the enemy’s progress, range, or sustain-
ability. This is part of the OPFOR’s systems warfare approach to combat.
10-58. Preemptive attacks against the enemy’s bridging and mineclearing
systems can occur at very early stages in the conflict, often well before the
foreseen usage of such mobility assets. The OPFOR might try to destroy all
mobility assets, thereby confining the enemy to his aerial or sea port of
debarkation (APOD or SPOD), or it might let the enemy commit his assets
and then destroy them piecemeal. Whichever method the OPFOR chooses, it
would attempt to mask the identity of the true target by also hitting what the
enemy may deem “higher-value targets,” such as maneuver troops and equip-
ment, during the same attack. Thus, the enemy may believe the destruction of
his mobility assets to be collateral damage rather than the intended target, and
he may not place a high priority on replacing these as critical items.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
10-59. Operational-level engineers support the State’s various strategic-level
courses of action and the OPFOR principles of operations versus an
extraregional power (discussed in Chapter 1 and in FM 7-100). Specific
engineer requirements are determined by the operational mission of the sup-
ported OSC within whichever strategic-level course of action is occurring in a given
AOR at a given time. That may be regional, transition, or adaptive operations.
Because of the requirement to transition rapidly from regional to adaptive
operations and perhaps back to regional operations, engineers assigned to
OSCs may be supporting more than one course of action simultaneously.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
10-60. Operational-level engineer units involved in regional operations facilitate
the mobility and high rate of advance of joint, combined arms, interagency,
and/or multinational forces while enhancing the survivability of forces.
Although the OPFOR generally conducts engineer countermobility activities
at the tactical level, it tailors the obstacle plan to the overall operation and
integrates it into the operation plan. It uses obstacles to disaggregate, delay,
block, and canalize enemy forces.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
10-61. Since transition operations can overlap both regional and adaptive
operations, engineer actions can be various combinations of those occurring
during regional or adaptive operations. The need for rapid transition from
regional to adaptive operations (and vice versa) presents the engineers
several challenges. For example, engineers still supporting regional
operations may be involved in water-crossing activities, while engineers |
7-100.1 | 261 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
supporting units transitioning to adaptive operations may be blowing up
bridges to preserve friendly forces. Engineers supporting joint, combined
arms, interagency, and/or multinational units transitioning to regional
operations may be laying minefields to fix an extraregional foe while other
engineers are providing mobility and survivability support to units launching
offensive operations against a regional foe. Therefore, some engineers in
transition operations may be involved in those tasks normally associated
with regional operations while other engineers units may be involved in tasks
normally associated with adaptive operations.
10-62. Several engineer missions become more critical during transition
operations when shifting to adaptive operations. For example, IW takes on a
more significant role with use of C3D measures to protect forces while they
are attempting to get into sanctuary and begin adaptive operations. Engineer
reconnaissance must locate clear, and preferably concealed, routes to expedite
units’ movement to sanctuary and limit their exposure to extraregional forces.
10-63. The State may have done some advance preparation of defensive
positions in peacetime or during regional operations. However, the OPFOR
takes advantage of any time required for the extraregional enemy to build up
combat power, using that time for additional engineer preparation involving
all means available. Engineer units or other forces supervised by engineers
provide fortified positions or repair or reinforce those positions already in
place. Caches and water sources, if not in place, will have to be prepared.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
10-64. During adaptive operations, several trends in engineer employment
may be at odds with one another. On the one hand, the dispersal of forces
may require task organization of engineer units into smaller groupings. With
dispersal and decentralization, however, the task organization of operational-
level engineer assets to support tactical-level missions becomes increasingly
difficult. As the OPFOR goes into a force-preservation mode, commanders
may tend to create larger engineer reserves and put into protected storage
some scarce engineer assets that will be critical to success in later operations.
Examples of such high-value assets could be bridging, route-clearing equip-
ment, mechanical minelayers, and other heavy engineer equipment. The
process begins during transition operations but has the largest impact during
adaptive operations. This equipment will be protected and might only be used
for high-priority missions or in areas shielded from the enemy. The shortage
of key equipment is further intensified by any combat losses.
10-65. Since requirements for engineer support do not change during the
absence of heavy equipment, the OPFOR has planned the complete integra-
tion of civilian and military engineer resources to help compensate for this
loss. The lack of engineer units and assets available to the lower levels is
compensated for by the sharing of engineer tasks and responsibilities
throughout the OPFOR branches and maximizing the use of manual labor
(military and civilian) and assets other than those of engineer units. Since
maneuver units or civilian workers may have to perform the majority of engineer
tasks, engineers are also responsible for supervising and providing guidance and
technical expertise to these groups. This allows the tasks to be performed with
the least amount of engineers and mitigates the loss of units and equipment. |
7-100.1 | 262 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
10-66. The basic engineer missions during adaptive operations remain
reconnaissance, countermobility, survivability, and mobility, along with the
task of support to IW. These all occur at all levels of command all over the
battlefield, and priorities of engineer effort vary according to the specific
situation, which can be unpredictable. Examples of how these missions and
tasks support adaptive operations are listed below.
Reconnaissance
10-67. The focus of engineer reconnaissance during adaptive operations
will be on areas that support the creation of windows of opportunity or the
exploitation of opportunities that result from existing conditions in the AOR.
Engineers can help determine the most likely routes the enemy might take,
as well as identify routes for OPFOR units undertaking counterattacks or the
maneuver component of a strike.
Countermobility
10-68. The OPFOR makes extensive use of countermobility operations to con-
trol access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canalizing enemy
forces. The obstacle plan is completely integrated with the maneuver, fire
support, and IW plans. Minefields and other obstacles used in support of
adaptive operations are extremely innovative, irregular-shaped, and thoroughly
merged with the terrain. Minefields also tend to be much smaller than those laid
in regional operations (especially linear operations). Many are nuisance mine-
fields, rather than being designed to destroy large numbers of enemy forces.
Survivability
10-69. The construction of battle and fighting positions is a labor-intensive
process and is therefore a shared responsibility of engineers and supported
units. Maximum use of civilian engineer assets and personnel continues dur-
ing adaptive operations. Survivability activities during adaptive operations
have several unique engineer requirements. Some examples are to—
• Take full advantage of the screening, protective, C3D techniques, along
with careful selection of terrain to passively deny the enemy the ability
to acquire OPFOR positions for targeting.
• Make extensive use of local building materials, equipment, and work force.
• Protect CPs and logistics sites.
• Bury communications lines.
• Construct false positions, equipment, movement routes, and lines of
communication.
• Assimilate minefields and obstacles to the terrain.
• Prepare caves, tunnels, and tunnel complexes in which troops can live
and from which they can fight.
Mobility
10-70. It is critical that the OPFOR maintain the ability to move unimpeded
during adaptive operations. This ability allows the OPFOR to control the ac-
cess and tempo of enemy forces. As long as the OPFOR has complete access to |
7-100.1 | 263 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
the battlefield, it will allow no sanctuary to the enemy and determine the na-
ture of the conflict. Engineer support can create opportunities for infiltration
of small forces into unexpected locations, to inflict damage or to support IW.
10-71. Rarely during adaptive operations would the OPFOR attempt the
classic opposed water crossings it can use during regional operations.
However, there may be times when the OPFOR must cross rivers in terri-
tory occupied by the enemy. Even then, it would attempt an opposed crossing
only if convinced of success and if the enemy did not believe the OPFOR
would attempt the crossing. Such crossings would be integrated into the
overall operation plan and the IW plan.
10-72. More likely, however, is that the OPFOR would attempt to cross the
river surreptitiously at night or during inclement weather. This would allow
the OPFOR to infiltrate units—a few vehicles at a timeacross the river.
The units would regroup at a designated area and continue operations. Engi-
neer support for this may be only engineer reconnaissance of the river and
routes. The situation may also call for the engineers to build (undetected) an
underwater bridge out of sandbags, or to make rafts rigged to transport vehicles.
10-73. The OPFOR may be required to breach enemy minefields. Although it
may breach them in the more conventional manner described in FM 7-100.2,
the OPFOR can also devise innovative methods the cross the minefield. One such
method might be to manually clear a path through the minefield surreptitiously.
Several paths could be cleared in this fashion. Then, at a time of the OPFOR’s
own choosing, dismounted troops could infiltrate through the minefield and
rendezvous at a designated location on the other side, undetected by the enemy.
Support to Information Warfare
10-74. The complete integration of engineer support to IW continues to be
critical in adaptive operations. Deception is one of the basic elements of IW.
Engineer support of the deception plan is vital for the deception to succeed.
Engineers’ largest role in an integrated deception plan is that of constructing
physical decoys (simulations in deception positions) enabling the enemy to
see what he expects to see. These decoys cover a wide spectrum of types and
must be introduced or allowed to be “discovered” in the same sequence in
which a “real or existing” unit would emplace them. The general priority of
engineer construction is from front to rear, beginning with the primary
fighting positions, then the temporary and alternate positions. The time
sequence in which these “appear” gives credibility to the deception.
10-75. However, engineer support to IW is not limited to C3D measures. For
example, engineers may support psychological warfare with activities to
lower morale and instill a sense of tentativeness among enemy soldiers or to
undermine confidence of “enemy-friendly” populations. This can be achieved
simply by the ubiquitous use of booby traps and AP mines. |
7-100.1 | 265 | Chapter 11
NBC and Smoke Operations
The use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons can have an
enormous impact on all battlefield operations.1 Not only does the sheer
killing and destructive power of these weapons affect the battlefield, but
the strategic, operational, psychological, environmental, economic, and
political consequences of their use affect strategic campaign plans and
operational design.
In response to foreign developments, the OPFOR maintains a capability
to conduct chemical, nuclear, and possibly biological warfare. However, it
would prefer to avoid the use of NBC weapons by either sideespecially
nuclear and biological weapons. Both nuclear and biological weapons
characteristically have lethal effects over much larger areas than do
chemical weapons. The effects of biological weapons can be difficult to
localize and to employ in operations without affecting friendly forces;
their effects on the enemy can be difficult to predict. Unlike nuclear or
biological weapons, chemical agents can be used to affect limited areas of
the battlefield. The consequences of chemical weapons use are more pre-
dictable and thus more readily integrated into operation plans.
Because chemical employment is more likely than nuclear or biological,
this chapter begins by focusing on OPFOR chemical capabilities. Because
the OPFOR may also have some nuclear and biological capabilities, these
also deserve discussion, despite of the lower probability of their em-
ployment. The chapter concludes with discussions of NBC protection and
employment of smoke.
PREPAREDNESS
11-1. Due to the proliferation of NBC weapons, the OPFOR must anticipate
their use, particularly the employment of chemical weapons. OPFOR plan-
ners believe that the best solution is to locate and destroy enemy NBC weap-
ons and their supporting infrastructure before the enemy can use them
against OPFOR troops or the State. In case this fails and it is necessary to
1 NBC weapons are a subset of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), although the latter exclude the delivery means
where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. WMD are weapons or devices intended for or
capable of causing a high order of physical destruction or mass casualties (death or serious bodily injury to a
significant number of people). The casualty-producing elements of WMD can continue inflicting casualties on the
enemy and exert powerful psychological effects on the enemy’s morale for some time after delivery. Existing types
of WMD include chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. However, technological advances are making it possi-
ble to develop WMD based on qualitatively new principles, such as infrasonic (acoustic), radiological (enhanced-
radiation), or particle-beam weapons. In addition, conventional weapons, such as precision weapons or fuel-
air explosives, can also take on the properties of WMD. |
7-100.1 | 266 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
continue combat operations despite the presence of contaminants, the
OPFOR has developed and fielded a wide range of NBC detection and
warning devices, individual and collective protection equipment, and decon-
tamination equipment.
MULTIPLE OPTIONS
11-2. Force modernization has introduced a degree of flexibility previously
unavailable to combined arms commanders. It creates multiple options for
the employment of forces at strategic, operational, and tactical levels with or
without the use of NBC weapons. Many of the same delivery means available
for NBC weapons can also be used to deliver precision weapons that can often
achieve desired effects without the stigma associated with NBC weapons.
11-3. The OPFOR might use NBC weapons either to deter aggression or as a
response to an enemy attack on the State. It has surface-to-surface missiles
(SSMs) capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. Most
OPFOR artillery is capable of delivering chemical munitions, and most sys-
tems 152-mm and larger are capable of firing nuclear rounds. Additionally,
the OPFOR could use aircraft systems and cruise missiles to deliver an NBC
attack. The State has also trained special-purpose forces (SPF) as alternate
means of delivering NBC munitions packages. The threat of using any or all
of these means to deliver NBC weapons is an intimidating factor that the
State can use against potential regional and/or extraregional adversaries.
TARGETING
11-4. The OPFOR considers the following targets to be suitable for the em-
ployment of NBC weapons:
• NBC delivery means and their supply structure.
• Precision weapons.
• Prepared defensive positions.
• Reserves and troop concentrations.
• Command and control (C2); reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance,
and target acquisition (RISTA); and communications centers.
• Key air defense sites.
• Logistics installations, especially port facilities.
• Airfields the OPFOR does not intend to use immediately.
Enemy NBC delivery means (aircraft, artillery, missiles, and rockets) nor-
mally receive the highest priority. The suitability of other targets depends on
the OPFOR’s missions, the current military and political situation, and the
NBC weapons available for use.2
2 The same list of targets would apply for enemy use of NBC weapons against the OPFOR. |
7-100.1 | 267 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
STAFF RESPONSIBILITY
11-5. On the functional staff of an operational-level headquarters (such as an
OSC), the chief of WMD is responsible for planning the offensive use of
WMD, including NBC weapons. (See the subsections on Release under Chemical
Warfare, Nuclear Warfare, and Biological Warfare below.) The WMD staff element
advises the command group and the primary and secondary staff on issues per-
taining to NBC employment. The WMD element receives liaison teams from any
subordinate or supporting units that contain WMD delivery means.
11-6. NBC defense comes under the chief of force protection. The force pro-
tection element of the functional staff may receive liaison teams from any
subordinate or supporting chemical defense units.3 However, those units can
also send liaison teams to other parts of the staff, as necessary (including, for
example, the chief of reconnaissance).
CHEMICAL WARFARE
11-7. The OPFOR is equipped, structured, and trained to conduct both offen-
sive and defensive chemical warfare. It is continually striving to improve its
chemical warfare capabilities. It believes that an army using chemical weap-
ons must be prepared to fight in the environment it creates. Therefore, it views
chemical defense as part of a viable offensive chemical warfare capability. It
maintains a large inventory of individual and collective chemical protection and
decontamination equipment. (See the NBC Protection portion of this chapter.)
WEAPONS AND AGENTS
11-8. Chemical delivery means include aircraft, multiple rocket launchers
(MRLs), artillery, mines, rockets, and missiles. Virtually all OPFOR indirect fire
weapons can deliver chemical agents. Other possible delivery means could in-
clude SPF, affiliated insurgent or terrorist organizations, or civilian sympathizers.
11-9. One way of classifying chemical agents according to the effect they
have on persons. Thus, there are two major types, each with subcategories.
Lethal agents, categorized by how they attack and kill personnel, include
nerve, blood, blister, and choking agents. Nonlethal agents include incapaci-
tants and irritants. (See FM 7-100.2 for more details on these agent types.)
11-10. Chemical agents are also categorized according to their persistency.
Generally, the OPFOR would use persistent agents on areas it does not plan
to enter and nonpersistent agents where it does.
11-11. Persistent agents can retain their disabling or lethal characteristics from
days to weeks, depending on environmental conditions. Aside from producing
mass casualties initially, persistent agents can produce a steady rate of attrition
and have a devastating effect on morale. They can seriously degrade the perform-
ance of personnel in protective clothing or impose delays for decontamination.
11-12. Nonpersistent agents generally last a shorter period of time than per-
sistent agents, depending on weather conditions. The use of a nonpersistent
3 Although the OPFOR calls these units are “chemical defense” or “chemical reconnaissance,” their functions actually en-
compass nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense or reconnaissance. |
7-100.1 | 268 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
agent at a critical moment in battle can produce casualties or force enemy
troops into a higher level of individual protective measures. With proper
timing and distance, the OPFOR can employ nonpersistent agents and then
have its maneuver units advance into or occupy an enemy position without
having to decontaminate the area or don protective gear.
OTHER TOXIC CHEMICALS
11-13. In addition to traditional chemical warfare agents, the OPFOR may
find creative and adaptive ways to cause chemical hazards using chemicals
commonly present in industry or in everyday households. In the right combi-
nation, or in and of themselves, the large-scale release of such chemicals can
present a health risk, whether caused by military operations, intentional use,
or accidental release.
Toxic Industrial Chemicals
11-14. Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) are chemical substances with acute
toxicity that are produced in large quantities for industrial purposes.
Exposure to some industrial chemicals can have a lethal or debilitating
effect on humans. The near-universal availability of large quantities of
highly toxic stored materials, their proximity to urban areas, their low
cost, and the low security associated with storage facilities, make them a
potentially attractive option for use as weapons of opportunity or weapons
of mass destruction. Employing a TIC against an opponent by means of a
weapon delivery system, whether conventional or unconventional, is consid-
ered a chemical warfare attack, with the TIC used as a chemical agent. The
target may be the enemy’s military forces or his civilian population.
11-15. In addition to the threat from intentional use as weapons, catastro-
phic accidental releases of stored industrial chemicals may result from collat-
eral damage associated with military operations, electrical power interrup-
tion, or improper facility maintenance or shutdown procedures. These events
are common in armed conflict and post-conflict urban environments.
11-16. The most important factors to consider when assessing the potential
for adverse human health impacts from a chemical release are acute toxicity,
physical properties (volatility, reactivity, flammability), and the likelihood
that large quantities will be accidentally released or available for exploitation.
Foremost among these factors is acute toxicity.
11-17. The following are examples of high- and moderate-risk TICs, based on
acute toxicity by inhalation, worldwide availability (number of producers and
number of countries where the substance is available), and physical state
(gas, liquid, or solid) at standard temperature and pressure:
• High-Risk. Ammonia, chlorine, fluorine, formaldehyde, hydrogen chlo-
ride, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, sulfuric acid.
• Moderate-Risk. Carbon monoxide, methyl bromide, nitrogen dioxide,
phosphine.
This list does not include all chemicals with high toxicity and availability.
Specifically, chemicals with low volatility are not included. Low-vapor
pressure chemicals include some of the most highly toxic chemicals widely
available, including most pesticides. |
7-100.1 | 269 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
11-18. Some of the high-risk TICs are frequently present in an operational
environment. Chlorine (water treatment and cleaning materials), phosgene
(insecticides and fertilizers), and hydrogen cyanide are traditional chemical
warfare agents that are also considered TICs. Cyanide salts may be used to
contaminate food or water supplies. Hydrogen chloride is used in the produc-
tion of hydrochloric acid. Formaldehyde is a disinfectant and preservative.
Fluorine is a base element that is used to produce fluorocarbons. Fluorocar-
bons are any of various chemically inert compounds that contain both carbon
and fluorine. Fluorocarbons are present in common products are refrigerants,
lubricants, and nonstick coatings, and are used in the production of resins
and plastics.
Household Chemicals
11-19. The OPFOR understands that some everyday household chemicals
have incompatible properties that result in undesired chemical reaction when
mixed with other chemicals. This includes substances that can react to cause
an imminent threat to health and safety, such as explosion, fire, and/or the
formation of toxic materials. For example, chlorine bleach, when mixed with
ammonia, will generate the toxic gases chloramine and hydrazine that can
cause serious injury or death. Another example of such incompatibilities is
the reaction of alkali metals, such as sodium or potassium, with water.
Sodium is commonly used in the commercial manufacture of cyanide, azide,
and peroxide, and in photoelectric cells and sodium lamps. It has a very large
latent heat capacity and is used in molten form as a coolant in nuclear
breeder reactors. The mixture of sodium with water produces sodium hydrox-
ide, which can cause severe burns upon skin contact.
CHEMICAL RELEASE
11-20. Among NBC weapons, the State is most likely to use chemical weap-
ons against even an extraregional enemy, particularly if the enemy does not
have the capability to respond in kind. Since the State does not believe that
first use of chemical agents against units in the field would provoke a nuclear
response, it is less rigid than other nations in the control of chemical release.
11-21. Initially, the use of chemical weapons is subject to the same level of
decision as nuclear and biological weapons. At all levels of command, a
chemical weapons plan is part of the fire support plan. Once the National
Command Authority (NCA) has released initial authorization for the use of
chemical weapons, commanders can employ them freely, as the situation de-
mands. Then each commander at the operational-strategic command (OSC)
and lower levels who has systems capable of chemical delivery can imple-
ment the chemical portions of his fire support plan, as necessary.
11-22. After a decision for nuclear use, the OPFOR can employ chemical
weapons to complement nuclear weapons. However, the OPFOR perceives
that chemical weapons have a unique role, and their use does not depend on
initiation of nuclear warfare. It is possible that the OPFOR would use chemi-
cal weapons early in an operation or strategic campaign or from its outset. |
7-100.1 | 270 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL EMPLOYMENT
11-23. The basic principle of chemical warfare is to achieve surprise. It is
common to mix chemical rounds with high-explosive (HE) rounds in order to
achieve chemical surprise. Chemical casualties inflicted and the necessity of
chemical protective gear degrade enemy defensive actions. The OPFOR also
may use chemical agents to restrict the use of terrain. For example, contami-
nation of key points along the enemy’s lines of communication can seriously
disrupt his resupply and reinforcement, while simultaneously keeping those
points intact for subsequent use by the attacking OPFOR.
11-24. Nonpersistent agents are suitable for use against targets on axes the
OPFOR intends to exploit. While possibly used against deep targets, their
most likely role is to prepare the way for an assault by maneuver units,
especially when enemy positions are not known in detail. The OPFOR may
also use nonpersistent agents against civilian population centers in order to
create panic and a flood of refugees.
11-25. Persistent agents are suitable against targets the OPFOR cannot de-
stroy by conventional or precision weapons. This can be because a target is
too large or located with insufficient accuracy for attack by other than an area
weapon. Persistent agents can neutralize such targets without a pinpoint attack.
11-26. In the offense, likely chemical targets include—
• Troops occupying defensive positions, using nonpersistent agents delivered
by MRLs to neutralize these troops just before launching a ground attack.
Ideally, these nonpersistent agents would be dissipating just as the at-
tacking OPFOR units enter the area where the chemical attack occurred.
• NBC delivery systems, troop concentration areas, headquarters, and
artillery positions, using all types of chemical agents delivered by tube
artillery, MRLs, missiles, and aircraft.
• Bypassed pockets of resistance (especially that pose a threat to the
attacking forces), using persistent agents.
• Possible assembly areas for enemy counterattack forces, using persis-
tent agents.
11-27. The OPFOR could use chemical attacks against such targets simulta-
neously throughout the enemy defenses. These chemical attacks combine
with other forms of conventional attack to neutralize enemy nuclear capability,
C2 systems, and aviation. Subsequent chemical attacks may target logistics
facilities. The OPFOR would use persistent agents deep within the enemy’s
rear and along troop flanks to protect advancing units.
DEFENSIVE CHEMICAL EMPLOYMENT
11-28. When the enemy is preparing to attack, the OPFOR can use chemical
attacks to disrupt activity in his assembly areas, limit his ability to maneuver
into axes favorable to the attack, or deny routes of advance for his reserves.
Once the enemy attack begins, the use of chemical agents can impede an attack-
ing force, destroying the momentum of the attack by causing casualties or caus-
ing attacking troops to adopt protective measures. Persistent chemical agents
can deny the enemy certain terrain and canalize attacking forces into kill zones. |
7-100.1 | 271 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
NUCLEAR WARFARE
11-29. The OPFOR believes a war is most likely to begin with a phase of non-
nuclear combat that may include the use of chemical weapons. The OPFOR
emphasizes the destruction of as much as possible of enemy nuclear
capability during this nonnuclear phase. To do so, it would use air and missile
attacks; airborne, heliborne, and special-purpose forces; and rapid, deep
penetrations by ground forces. The OPFOR hopes these attacks can deny the
enemy a credible nuclear option.
DELIVERY MEANS
11-30. Nuclear delivery systems may include aircraft from both national- and
theater-level aviation, and SSMs. Most artillery 152-mm or larger is capable
of firing nuclear rounds, if such rounds are available. Other possible delivery
means could include SPF. The OPFOR is unlikely to use affiliated forces for
nuclear delivery.
TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR
11-31. Even when nuclear weapons are not used at the outset of a conflict,
OPFOR commanders deploy troops based on the assumption that a nuclear-
capable enemy might attack with nuclear weapons at any moment. The OPFOR
continuously updates its own plans for nuclear employment, although it pre-
fers to avoid nuclear warfare. As long as it achieves its objectives, and there
are no indications that the enemy is going to use nuclear weapons, the
OPFOR would likely not use them either. However, it could attempt to pre-
empt enemy nuclear use by conducting an initial nuclear attack. Otherwise,
any OPFOR decision to go nuclear would have to be made early in the con-
flict, so that sufficient nonnuclear power would remain to follow up and to
exploit the gains of nuclear employment.
11-32. If any opponent were to use nuclear weapons against the State, the
State would respond in kind, as long as it is still capable. The same would
be true of any nuclear-capable opponent, if the State were the first to use
nuclear means. While the State recognizes the advantage of its own first use,
it may risk first use only when the payoff appears to outweigh the potential
costs. Therefore, it would probably avoid the use of nuclear weapons against
an extraregional power unless survival of the regime or the nation is at
stake.
11-33. The OPFOR is probably more likely to use its nuclear capability
against a regional opponent. The likelihood increases if that opponent uses or
threatens to use its own nuclear weapons against the State or does not have
the means to retaliate in kind. This could account for a nuclear or nuclear-
threatened environment existing at the time an outside force might choose to
intervene in the region. |
7-100.1 | 272 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
TYPES OF NUCLEAR ATTACK
11-34. The OPFOR categorizes nuclear attacks as either massed or indi-
vidual attacks. The category depends on the number of targets hit and the
number of nuclear munitions used.
11-35. A massed nuclear attack employs multiple nuclear munitions simul-
taneously or over a short time interval. The goal is to destroy a single large
enemy formation, or several formations, as well as other important enemy
targets. A massed attack can involve a single service of the State’s Armed
Forces, as in a nuclear missile attack by the Strategic Forces, or the com-
bined forces of different services.
11-36. An individual nuclear attack may hit a single target or group of
targets. The attack consists of a single nuclear munition, such as a missile or
bomb.
NUCLEAR RELEASE
11-37. At all stages of a conflict, the OPFOR keeps nuclear forces ready to
make an attack. The decision to initiate nuclear warfare occurs at the highest
level of the State government. National-level planners develop the fire plan
for the initial nuclear attack for approval by the NCA.
11-38. After the initial nuclear release, the NCA may delegate employment
authority for subsequent nuclear attacks to an OSC commander. The
commander of the OSC’s integrated fires command (IFC) submits to the
OSC commander, for approval and integration into OSC fire support
plans, recommendations for the subsequent employment of nuclear and
chemical weapons.
OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT
11-39. Once the NCA releases nuclear weapons, two principles govern
their use: mass and surprise. The OPFOR plans to conduct the initial
nuclear attack suddenly and in coordination with nonnuclear fires. Initial
nuclear attack objectives are to destroy the enemy’s main combat forma-
tions, C2 systems, and nuclear and precision weapons, thereby isolating
the battlefield.
11-40. Nuclear attacks may target and destroy the enemy’s defenses and set
the conditions for the exploitation force. Other fire support means support
the assault and fixing forces. The OPFOR may plan a high-speed air and
ground offensive operation to exploit the nuclear attack.
11-41. If the enemy continues to offer organized resistance, the OPFOR
might employ subsequent nuclear attacks to reinitiate offensive operations.
Nuclear attacks can eliminate the threat of a counterattack or clear re-
sistance from the opposite bank in a water-obstacle crossing. If the enemy
begins to withdraw, the OPFOR plans nuclear attacks on choke points where
retreating enemy forces present lucrative targets. |
7-100.1 | 273 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
Planning
11-42. Although the opening stages of an offensive operation are likely to be
conventional, OPFOR planning focuses on the necessity of—
• Countering enemy employment of nuclear weapons.
• Maintaining the initiative and momentum.
• Maintaining fire superiority over the enemy (preempting his nuclear
attack, if necessary).
11-43. In deliberately planned operations, the OPFOR plans nuclear fires in
detail. An exploitation force would probably receive the highest percentage of
weapons; however, the OPFOR may also reserve weapons for other large, im-
portant targets. In more fluid situations, such as during exploitation, the
commander may keep some nuclear weapon systems at high readiness to fire
on targets of opportunity. Nuclear allocations vary with the strength of the
enemy defense and the scheme of maneuver.
11-44. Since the enemy too is under nuclear threat, he also must disperse his
formations, which can make him more vulnerable to penetration by an at-
tacking force. However, the OPFOR realizes that enemy troops are also highly
mobile and capable of rapidly concentrating to protect a threatened area. There-
fore, it considers surprise and timing of operations to be extremely critical in or-
der to complicate enemy targeting and deny him the time to use his mobility.
Execution
11-45. Upon securing a nuclear release, the OPFOR would direct nuclear at-
tacks against the strongest points of the enemy’s formations and throughout
his operational depth. This would create gaps through which maneuver
units, in “nuclear-dispersed” formations, would attack as an exploitation
force. As closely as safety and circumstances permit, maneuver forces follow
up on attacks near the battle line. Airborne troops may exploit deep attacks.
11-46. An exploitation force would probably attack to take full advantage
of the speed of advance it could expect to achieve. The aim of these maneu-
ver units would be to seize or neutralize remaining enemy nuclear weapons,
delivery systems, and C2 systems. By attacking from different directions, the
maneuver units would try to split and isolate the enemy.
11-47. Commanders would ensure a rapid tempo of advance by assigning
tank and mechanized infantry units to the exploitation force. Such units are
quite effective in this role, because they have maneuverability, firepower,
lower vulnerability to enemy nuclear attacks, and the capability to achieve
penetrations of great depth.
DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT
11-48. Primary uses of nuclear weapons in the defense are to—
• Destroy enemy nuclear and precision weapons and delivery means.
• Destroy main attacking groups.
• Eliminate penetrations.
• Support counterattacks. |
7-100.1 | 274 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
• Deny areas to the enemy.
• Conduct preemptive attack.
If nuclear weapons degrade an enemy offensive, the defender could gain the
opportunity to switch quickly to an offensive role.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
11-49. The State closely controls information about the status of its biological
warfare capabilities. This creates uncertainty among its regional neighbors
and potential extraregional opponents as to what types of biological agents
the State might possess and how it might employ them.
11-50. Biological weapons can provide a great equalizer in the face of a nu-
merically and/or technologically superior adversary that the OPFOR cannot
defeat in a conventional confrontation. However, their effects on the enemy
can be difficult to predict, and the OPFOR must also be concerned about the
possibility that the effects could spread to friendly forces.
WEAPONS AND AGENTS
11-51. Biological weapons consist of pathogenic microbes, micro-organism
toxins, and bioregulating compounds. Depending on the specific type, these
weapons can incapacitate or kill people or animals and destroy plants, food
supplies, or materiel. The type of target being attacked determines the choice
of agent and dissemination system.
11-52. Biological weapons are extremely potent and provide wide-area
coverage. Some biological agents are extremely persistent, retaining their
capabilities to infect for days, weeks, or longer. Biological weapons can take
some time (days, weeks, or monthsdepending on the agent) to achieve their
full effect. To allow these agents sufficient time to take effect, the OPFOR may
use clandestine means, such as SPF or civilian sympathizers, to deliver
biological agents in advance of a planned attack or even before the war begins.
DELIVERY MEANS
11-53. It is possible to disseminate biological agents in a number of ways.
Generally, the objective is to expose enemy forces to an agent in the form of a
suspended cloud of very fine biological agent particles. Dissemination
through aerosols, either as droplets from liquid suspensions or by small par-
ticles from dry powders, is by far the most efficient method.
11-54. There are two basic types of biological munitions: point-source bom-
blets delivered directly on targets and line-source tanks that release the
agent upwind from the target. Within each category, there can be multiple
shapes and configurations.
11-55. Military systems, as well as unconventional means, can deliver biological
agents. Potential delivery means include rockets, artillery shells, aircraft spray-
ers, saboteurs, and infected rodents. Aside from SPF and civilian sympathizers,
the OPFOR might use affiliated insurgent or terrorist organizations to deliver
biological agents within the region, outside the immediate region (to divert enemy
attention and resources), or even in the homeland of an extraregional opponent. |
7-100.1 | 275 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
TARGETS
11-56. Probable targets for biological warfare pathogen attack are nuclear
delivery units, airfields, logistics facilities, and C2 centers. The OPFOR may
target biological weapons against objectives such as food supplies, water
sources, troop concentrations, convoys, and urban and rural population cen-
ters rather than against frontline forces. The use of biological agents against
rear area targets can disrupt and degrade enemy mobilization plans as well
as the subsequent conduct of war. This type of targeting can also reduce the
likelihood that friendly forces would become infected.
BIOLOGICAL RELEASE
11-57. The decision to employ biological agents is a political decision made at
the national levelby the NCA. Besides the political ramifications, the State
recognizes a degree of danger inherent in the use of biological agents, due to
the difficulty of controlling an epidemic caused by them.
11-58. The prolonged incubation period makes it difficult to track down the
initial location and circumstances of contamination. Thus, there is the possi-
bility of plausible deniability. Even if an extraregional opponent might be
able to trace a biological attack back to the State, it may not be able to re-
spond in kind.
NBC PROTECTION
11-59. The OPFOR’s ability to protect itself against NBC weapons and to op-
erate in contaminated environments is at least the equal of any force in the
world, including extraregional forces. OPFOR planners readily admit that
casualties would be considerable in any future war involving the use of NBC
weapons. However, they believe that the timely use of active and passive
measures can significantly reduce a combat unit’s vulnerability. These meas-
ures include but are not limited to protective equipment, correct employment
of reconnaissance assets, and expeditious decontamination procedures. The
OPFOR conducts rigorous training for chemical defense.
11-60. The OPFOR believes the best way to protect against NBC weapons is
to destroy delivery systems, which are always high-priority targets. Other
operational-tactical responses to the threat include
• Dispersion: Concentrations of forces must last for as short a time as
possible.
• Speed of advance: If the advance generates enough momentum, this
can make enemy targeting difficult and keep enemy systems on the
move.
• Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D): C3D measures
complicate enemy targeting.
• Continuous contact: The enemy cannot attack with NBC weapons as
long as there is intermingling of friendly and enemy forces. |
7-100.1 | 276 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
ORGANIZATION
11-61. Chemical defense units are responsible for nuclear and biological, as
well as chemical, protection and reconnaissance measures. In the adminis-
trative force structure, such units are organic to all maneuver units brigade
and above. Operational-level commands may provide some chemical defense
augmentation to subordinate units, particularly those conducting the main
effort. However, they must also retain some chemical defense assets at the
operational level to deal with the threat to the support zone and provide
chemical defense reserves.
11-62. Chemical troops are a vital component of combat support. They pro-
vide trained specialists for chemical defense units and for units of other
arms. Basic tasks chemical troops can accomplish in support of combat troops
include
• Reconnoitering known or likely areas of NBC contamination.
• Warning troops of the presence of NBC contamination.
• Monitoring changes in the degree of contamination.
• Monitoring the NBC contamination of personnel, weapons, and equipment.
• Performing decontamination activities.
• Providing trained troops to handle chemical munitions.
They perform specialized NBC reconnaissance in addition to supporting
regular ground reconnaissance efforts.
11-63. NBC protection functions are not limited to maneuver units. Artillery
and air defense regiments and brigades have their own chemical defense
units. Medical and SSM units have some decontamination equipment.
Engineer troops also are important, performing functions such as decon-
taminating roads, building bypasses, and purifying water supplies. Of course,
all arms have a responsibility for chemical reconnaissance and at least par-
tial decontamination without specialist support. However, they can continue
combat actions for only a limited time without complete decontamination by
chemical troops.
EQUIPMENT
11-64. OPFOR troops have protective clothing. Most combat vehicles and
many noncombat vehicles have excellent overpressure and filtration systems.
Items of equipment for individual or collective protection are adequate to pro-
tect soldiers from contamination for hours, days, or longer, depending on the
nature and concentration of the contaminant. Antidotes provide protection from
the effects of agents. Agent detector kits and automatic alarms are available in
adequate quantities and are capable of detecting all standard agents.
11-65. Chemical troops have a wide variety of dependable equipment that,
for the most part, is in good supply and allows them to accomplish a number
of tasks in support of combat troops. They have specialized equipment for de-
tecting and monitoring NBC contamination. They have some specialized
NBC reconnaissance vehicles, and they may use helicopters for NBC recon-
naissance. Decontamination equipment is also widely available. |
7-100.1 | 277 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
NBC DETECTION AND WARNING REPORTS
11-66. The OPFOR transmits NBC warning information over communica-
tions channels in a parallel form using both the command net and the air
defense and NBC warning communications net. Depending of what type of
unit initially detected the contamination, detection reports leading to such
warnings may go either through chemical defense and force protection chan-
nels or through the maneuver unit or ground reconnaissance reporting chain.
Detection Reports
11-67. Upon detection of contamination, an NBC observer or NBC reconnais-
sance patrol normally transmits an NBC detection report to the chief of force
protection on the staff of the commander that sent out the observer or patrol.
When NBC observers (whether from the chemical troops or another branch)
are attached to regular ground reconnaissance forces, security forces, or ma-
neuver units, the NBC observers that detect contamination would initially
pass the detection report through reconnaissance or maneuver unit reporting
channels. Of course, they would also report the detection to the commander
of the unit to which they are attached. When the maneuver unit chief of staff
or chief of reconnaissance receives an NBC detection report through his own
channels, he immediately passes it to the chief of force protection at that level.
Warning Reports
11-68. The chief of force protection and his staff evaluate the NBC detection
report and determine whether it warrants the issuing of a warning. If it does,
they inform the maneuver commander (or his chief of staff). At this point,
the NBC detection report changes into an NBC warning report. Then, the
maneuver commander (or chief of staff) disseminates the NBC warning re-
port via his command net to all subordinate unit commanders and via the
next-higher commander’s command net to the higher commander and other
subordinates of that command. Simultaneously, the chief of force protection
disseminates the same report to all of his own command’s subordinates over
the air defense and NBC warning communications net. He would also inform
the chief of force protection at the next-higher headquarters. The desired goal
it to disseminate the warning as rapidly as possible to all affected units.
11-69. The chief of force protection (and/or the chief of staff) may issue an
advance NBC warning based on the predicted development of an NBC
situation. NBC protective measures would change or be rescinded based on
subsequent NBC detection reports or on warning reports from higher, lower,
or adjacent units. Changes in the NBC protective measures are disseminated
by the maneuver commander or chief of staff and the chief force protection
using their respective communications nets.
SMOKE
11-70. The OPFOR plans to employ smoke extensively on the battlefield
whenever the situation permits. Use of smoke can make it difficult for the
enemy to conduct observation, determine the true disposition of OPFOR
troops, and conduct fires (including precision weapon fires) or air attacks.
The possible presence of toxic smokes may cause the enemy to use chemical |
7-100.1 | 278 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
protection systems, thus lowering his effectiveness, even if the OPFOR is us-
ing only neutral smoke.
ORGANIZATION
11-71. In the administrative force structure, army groups, armies, and corps
typically have smoke companies in their chemical defense battalions and/or
smoke battalions. In either case, the smoke companies each consist of nine
smoke-generating trucks. These assets are often allocated to OSCs, which
can then suballocate them to tactical-level subordinates.
AGENTS
11-72. Smoke agents may be either neutral or toxic. Neutral smoke agents
are liquid agents, pyrotechnic mixtures, or phosphorus agents with no toxic
characteristics. Toxic smokes (commonly referred to as combination smoke)
degrade electro-optical (EO) devices in the visual and near-infrared (near-IR)
wavebands; they also can debilitate an unmasked soldier by inducing water-
ing of eyes, vomiting, or itching.
11-73. The OPFOR may use a number of different smoke agents or other
obscurants together. For instance, obscurants such as fog oil block portions
of the electromagnetic spectrum more fully when seeded with chaff. The vast
quantities of white phosphorus (WP) on the battlefield also suggest that
random mixtures of this agent with other obscurants (both manmade and
natural) could occur, by chance or by design. The OPFOR recognizes the need
to counter target acquisition and guidance systems operating in the IR and mi-
crowave regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. It has fielded obscurants, in-
cluding chaff, capable of attenuating such wavelengths.
DELIVERY SYSTEMS
11-74. The OPFOR has an ample variety of equipment for smoke dissemina-
tion. Its munitions and equipment include—
• Smoke grenades.
• Vehicle engine exhaust smoke systems (VEESS).
• Smoke barrels, drums, and pots.
• Mortar, artillery, and rocket smoke rounds.
• Spray tanks (ground and air).
• Smoke bombs.
• Large-area smoke generators (ground and air).
Although not designed for this purpose, some decontamination vehicles with
chemical defense units can also generate smoke.
11-75. Smoke grenades include hand grenades, munitions for various gre-
nade launchers, and smoke grenade-dispensing systems on armored vehicles.
These grenades can provide quick smoke on the battlefield or fill gaps in
smokescreens established by other means. Some armored fighting vehicles
have forward-firing smoke grenade dispensers that can produce a bispectral
screen up to 300 m ahead of vehicles. |
7-100.1 | 279 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
11-76. All armored fighting vehicles can generate smoke through their ex-
haust systems. With these VEESS-equipped vehicles, a platoon can produce a
screen that covers a battalion frontage for 4 to 6 minutes.
11-77. Smoke-filled artillery projectiles, smoke bombs, spray tanks, and gen-
erator systems are also common. Artillery can fire WP rounds (which have a
moderate degrading effect on thermal imagers and a major one on lasers).
The OPFOR makes considerable use of smoke pots emplaced by chemical
troops, infantrymen, or other troops. The OPFOR still uses smoke bombs or
pots dropped by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.
TYPES OF SMOKESCREENS
11-78. The OPFOR recognizes three types of smokescreens: blinding, cam-
ouflage, and decoy. Classification of each type as frontal, oblique, or flank
depends on the screen’s placement. Smokescreens are either stationary or mo-
bile depending on prevailing winds and the dispensing means used. Each basic
type can serve a different purpose. However, simultaneous use of all types is
possible.
Blinding
11-79. Blinding smokescreens can mask friendly forces from enemy gunners,
observation posts, and target-acquisition systems. They can restrict the en-
emy’s ability to engage the OPFOR effectively. Delivery of WP and plasti-
cized white phosphorus (PWP) is possible using MRLs, artillery, mortars,
fixed-wing aircraft, or helicopters. The OPFOR lays blinding smoke directly
in front of enemy positions, particularly those of antitank weapons and ob-
servation posts. Blinding smoke can reduce a soldier’s ability to acquire tar-
gets by a factor of 10, and its use can reduce casualties significantly.
11-80. Likely targets for blinding smokescreens are enemy defensive positions,
rear assembly areas, counterattacking forces, and fire support positions. The
screening properties of a blinding smokescreen can couple with dust, HE
combustion effects, and the incendiary effects of phosphorus. This can create
an environment in which fear and confusion add to the measured effective-
ness of the smoke.
Camouflage
11-81. The OPFOR uses camouflage smokescreens to support all kinds of
C3D measures. Such screens can cover maneuver, conceal the location of
units, hide the nature and direction of attacks, or mislead the enemy regard-
ing any of these. The camouflage smokescreen is useful on or ahead of
friendly troops.
11-82. These screens are normally effective up to the point where forces de-
ploy for combat. The number, size, and location of camouflage smokescreens
vary depending on terrain, weather, and type of combat action. Camouflage
also forces enemy attack helicopters to fly above or around a screen, thus
exposing themselves to attack. Camouflage smoke can also cover assembly
areas, approaches of exploitation forces, or withdrawals. Smokescreens can
also cover a wide surface area around fixed installations or mobile units that
do not move for extended periods. |
7-100.1 | 280 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
11-83. Establishing camouflage smokescreens normally requires use of a
combination of smoke grenades, smoke barrels, smoke pots, vehicles mounting
smoke generating devices, and aircraft. Some decontamination vehicles also
have the capability to generate smoke.
11-84. Two smoke-generator vehicles can lay a smokescreen of sufficient size
to cover a battalion advancing to the attack. For larger smokescreens, the
OPFOR divides the smokescreen line into segments and assigns two vehicles
to each segment. Doctrinally, camouflage smokescreens should cover an area
at least five times the width of the attacking unit’s frontage.
11-85. The threat of enemy helicopter-mounted antitank systems concerns
the OPFOR. Consequently, its doctrine calls for advancing forces to move as
close behind the smokescreen as possible. The higher the smokescreen, the
higher an enemy helicopter must go to observe troop movement behind the
smokescreen, and the more vulnerable it is to ground-based air defense
weapons. Depending on weather and terrain, some large-area smoke
generators can produce screens up to several hundred meters high. There is
considerable observation-free maneuver space behind a screen of this height.
Conversely, smoke pots provide a screen 5 to 10 m high. This screen masks
against ground observation but leaves the force vulnerable to helicopters
“hugging the deck” and popping up to shoot.
11-86. The protection produced by camouflage smoke also interacts as a
protective smoke. Just as smokescreens can degrade enemy night-vision
sights, the protective smoke can shield friendly EO devices from potentially
harmful laser radiation. This protective effect is greater with a darker smoke
cloud because of the better absorption capability of that cloud. Protective
smokescreens are also a good means of reducing the effects of thermal ra-
diation from nuclear explosions. A protective smokescreen is useful in front
of, around, or on top of friendly positions.
Decoy
11-87. A decoy screen can deceive an enemy about the location of friendly
forces and the probable direction of attack. If the enemy fires into the decoy
smoke, the OPFOR can pinpoint the enemy firing systems and adjust its fire
plan for the true attack. The site and location of decoy screens depend on the
type of combat action, time available, terrain, and weather conditions. One
use of decoy smoke is to screen simultaneously several possible crossing sites
at a water obstacle. This makes it difficult for the enemy to determine which
site(s) the OPFOR is actually using.
OFFENSIVE SMOKE EMPLOYMENT
11-88. The OPFOR emphasizes the use of smoke during the offense to help
reduce friendly battle losses. However, it understands that smoke may hin-
der its own C2, battlefield observation, and target engagement capabilities. In
addition, the enemy may take advantage of OPFOR smokescreens to shield
his own maneuvers or to carry out a surprise attack or counterattack. Thus, a
smokescreen is successful when the OPFOR attackers are able to maintain
their assigned axis and retain sight of the objective. To prevent the smoke from |
7-100.1 | 281 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
interfering with friendly maneuver, OPFOR commanders must coordinate the
planned location and duration of smokescreens with the scheme of maneuver.
DEFENSIVE SMOKE EMPLOYMENT
11-89. In the defense, the OPFOR may use smokescreens for—
• Camouflaging or covering the maneuver of friendly units.
• Concealing engineer activities from enemy observation.
• Screening replacements of units under conditions of good visibility.
• Camouflaging the approach of friendly units for a counterattack.
• Providing flank and maneuver security.
• Misleading the enemy on the disposition of reserves and planned
counterattack axes.
11-90. Because a completely obscured environment tends to aid the attacker
more than the defender, an OPFOR defense uses smoke to minimize the
enemy’s vision while allowing the defenders a fairly clear view of the enemy’s
location. Smoke from artillery and mortar shells is the most effective means
of blinding an advancing enemy while keeping friendly forces out of the
obscured area.
SIGNALING SMOKE
11-91. Aside from smokescreens, the OPFOR also uses colored smoke for
signal purposes. Smoke can mark enemy positions or, occasionally, friendly
positions or movement routes for the information of supporting aircraft or
artillery. By prearrangement, colored smoke may—
• Identify friendly units.
• Identify targets.
• Control the commencing and lifting of fire.
• Coordinate fire and maneuver of combat units.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
11-92. During all strategic-level courses of action, the OPFOR will ensure
that the employment of NBC weapons is coordinated with perception man-
agement efforts. The purpose of this coordinated effort is to convey a message
of political and military dominance to the regional civilian populace as well
as to convey an adverse view of an intervening extraregional opponent.
11-93. The OPFOR may use the threat of employing NBC weapons as an in-
timidating factor. Any regional opponent with an NBC capability of its own
knows that the OPFOR is prepared to retaliate in kind. The fact that NBC
weapons may also place noncombatants at risk is a further intimidating
factora positive factor from the State’s perspective. Thus, it may use or
threaten to use NBC weapons as a way of applying political, economic, or
psychological pressure by allowing the enemy no sanctuary. This applies to
both regional and extraregional foes.
11-94. The OPFOR realizes that an extraregional force will possess a techno-
logical edge in the ability of its RISTA means to target OPFOR fire support |
7-100.1 | 282 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
assets capable of delivering NBC munitions. Additionally, the OPFOR real-
izes that its regional opponent may receive RISTA support (such as satellite
and fixed-wing signals intelligence and imagery) from an extraregional
power. Therefore, OPFOR fire support planners develop contingency plans to
preserve their NBC-capable fire support assets during all strategic-level
courses of action. Common countermeasures are to disperse fire support
assets and to use decoys and camouflage.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
11-95. During regional operations, the State may be able to employ NBC
weapons with little fear of retaliation from its regional neighbors. Thus, it is
possible that the OPFOR would use chemical weapons early in an operation
or from its outset, against key targets in a neighbor’s homeland. However, it
is aware that use of any NBC weapons could have both positive and negative
affects on its ability to achieve its strategic goals. On the one hand, it may be
concerned that NBC use during a strategic campaign against a regional
neighbor might lead to the intervention of an extraregional force. On the
other hand, the OPFOR could use NBC against a regional neighbor as a
warning to any potential extraregional enemy that it is willing to use such
weapons. The State would prefer not to use chemical weapons within its own
boundaries, except perhaps in an area populated by a particularly rebellious
dissident minority opposed to of the State government.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
11-96. During transition operations, the OPFOR may use NBC weapons to
attack unique or key targets in aerial and sea ports of debarkation in order to
disrupt the deployment tempo of the extraregional force. These targets in-
clude key C2 nodes, logistics operating bases, ground and airborne RISTA
platforms, and contractors and contractor-operated facilities. The OPFOR
will also seek to conduct these attacks in concert with the perception man-
agement portion of the information warfare (IW) plan, in order to leverage
the world media to report adverse perceptions of the extraregional force.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
11-97. When the OPFOR shifts to adaptive operations, it will employ all
means availableeven WMD against selected targetsto allow the enemy
no sanctuary. As in regional operations, the OPFOR would prefer not to use
even chemical weapons within the boundaries of the State. However, it would
contaminate its own soil if necessary in order to preserve the regime or the
State’s sovereignty.
11-98. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR seeks to use a nontraditional
approach to NBC warfare. This approach revolves around the creation of
WMD-like events in concert with the perception management portion of the
IW plan. For example, the OPFOR may seek to use the media to amplify and
embellish the results of a fire at a facility that produces chemicals used in
everyday households. The media campaign would seek to attribute the cause
of the fire to enemy action and would emphasize that injuries caused to the
civilian population are similar in nature to those caused by the release of a
chemical munition. |
7-100.1 | 283 | Chapter 12
Logistics
Operational logistics links strategic-level logistics resources with the
tactical level of logistics, thus creating the conditions for effective
sustainment of a combat force. It covers the support activities required to
sustain campaigns and major operations. A dependable logistics system
helps commanders seize and maintain the initiative. Operational
maneuver and the exploitation of operational or tactical success often
hinge on the adequacy of logistics and the ability of the force to safeguard
its critical lines of communication (LOCs), materiel, and infrastructure.
Operational logistics normally supports campaigns and provides theater-
wide logistics support, generally over a period of months. Operational
logisticians coordinate the allocation and distribution of resources within
the area of responsibility (AOR). They interface with tactical-level
logisticians in order to determine shortfalls and communicate these
shortfalls back to the strategic logistics complex to support operational
priorities. Operational logisticians coordinate the flow of strategic
capabilities within the theater based on the commander’s priorities.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
12-1. The State strategic logistics complex is the foundation for the logistics
system. Fundamental to the logistics concept are the twin notions of total war
and all means necessary. As a consequence, the State fully integrates civilian
and military components of both its materiel and service industries. Thus,
the State strategic logistics complex includes the national industrial base
with its supply points, distribution centers, arsenals, plants, manufacturing
facilities, medical support, and personnel support centers. The national
industrial base is capable of building everything from small arms to nuclear-
capable missiles. However, while the State has the ability to design, produce,
and field weapon systems, there are some serious qualitative shortcomings in
production and integration.
12-2. The State logistics system is designed to provide continuous support to
the civilian populace while simultaneously supporting military forces from
the strategic level to the individual fighting unit. The State’s national
security strategy requires that the OPFOR and the entire population be
constantly prepared for the sudden outbreak of war or natural disasters. The
State continues to make major improvements in all aspects of its logistics
system. This includes an increased emphasis on support zone security and
plans for stockpiling war materiel throughout the country.
12-3. For the OPFOR, all strategic logistics support is coordinated at the
national level through the Chief of Logistics in the Ministry of Defense |
7-100.1 | 284 | FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
(MOD). The responsibilities of the Chief of Logistics are the same during war
and peace. These responsibilities include
• Procuring of personnel, materiel, and services required by the military.
• Preparing the economy and the people to provide sustained support in
case of war.
• Ensuring that an uninterrupted flow of personnel, materiel, and equip-
ment reaches the individual fighting unit at the proper place and time.
12-4. Organizations within the national-level military logistics establishment
include materiel support and maintenance units, as well as mobilized civilian
resources, to include medical personnel and facilities. Some national-level
logistics units may be allocated to subordinate commands to augment the
units forming their logistics bases, while the remaining units are centralized
under General Staff control.
LOGISTICS STOCKPILES
12-5. In preparation for war, the State’s national security strategy includes
plans for stockpiling war materials, as well as critical civilian supplies and
materials, throughout the country. The logistics storage of war materials
consists of four major categories: national, strategic, mobilization, and mobile
reserves.
National and Strategic Reserves
12-6. Government warehouses store national-level reserves consisting of
foodstuffs, petroleum products, manufactured goods, and strategic raw
materials. While these stocks are separate from the military items held in
strategic reserve, the military will likely use part of these stocks.
12-7. Strategic reserves are stocks of supplies and equipment controlled by
the General Staff. These stocks are similar to stocks in national reserves and
are not planned for early use in a conflict.
Mobilization Reserves
12-8. The OPFOR holds mobilization reserves for issue to newly activated, large
military units and for resupply to combat units in the early stages of a conflict.
The Organization and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff determines
the level and configuration of these stocks. That directorate also is responsible
for accountability and maintenance. If the administrative force structure
includes military districts or regions, these geographic commands can coordinate
mobilization measures between military and civilian sectors. Mobilizing reserve
and militia units are generally dependent on stockpiled supplies.
Mobile Reserves
12-9. Deployed ground units hold and transport mobile logistics reserves
consisting of ammunition, fuel, rations, and equipment. Ground forces maintain
these supplies for use in the conduct of ground operations and distribute them to
both tactical and support units. Published planning factors establish quantities
of these supplies. Each OPFOR unit maintains an emergency reserve of supplies,
and only the unit commander can order the use of these supplies. |
7-100.1 | 285 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
DEPOT FACILITIES AND OPERATION
12-10. Depots are part of the
strategic logistics support structure Depot Categories
and hold national-level stockpiles and
The depots are generally divided
strategic reserves. They occupy fixed
into the following categories:
peacetime facilities, aboveground and
• Area distribution depots.
underground structures, plus dispersal
• Ammunition depots.
sites throughout the country. They
• Maintenance depots.
manage the distribution of war stocks
• Medical depots.
and armaments and materiel, and
perform any higher-level repair work
that is accomplished in country. Examples of these repairs include aircraft
instrumentation, optics, and electronics. The depots manage the distribution
of consumables such as fuel, food, and other items from the civilian economy.
Rocket and missile units, aviation support units, and air defense
maintenance units receive logistics support direct from the nearest depot.
12-11. A single depot may have one or more of the above missions. An area
distribution depot (ADD) receives, stores, and distributes items for units
operating or assigned within its geographic support area. Major end items
may also be stored in an ADD, but normally are stored in a maintenance
depot. The materiel stored within an ADD should accommodate a majority of
the demands placed on the distribution system for the units located in its
respective support area. An ammunition depot receives stores, renovates,
issues, and demilitarizes munitions of all types. Maintenance depots overhaul
major end items and repairable components and, as necessary, perform
limited fabrication and manufacturing. All overhaul items are stored at a
maintenance depot until disposition instructions are received from the MOD.
Medical depots are discussed in the Medical Logistics section of this chapter.
Aboveground Structures
12-12. Aboveground structures range from factory warehouses to
aboveground hardened structures. Hardened structures are reinforced for
protection against aerial and ground attack. Earth mounded bunkers are an
example of an aboveground hardened structure. The State uses extensive
camouflage and concealment techniques to reduce the detection signature of
these structures to enemy reconnaissance platforms. The State will also
develop sophisticated decoy sites.
Underground Structures
12-13. Underground structures include shallow buried and deep underground
bunkers and complexes. There are cases where the State uses underground
storage facilities to house its C2 complexes and medical facilities.
Underground structures are dispersed throughout the country and consist of
intersecting tunnels with multiple exits. Some of these exits may lead to
either external combat positions or other subterranean facilities. Large
camouflaged doors cover the entrances. The camouflage material matches the
surrounding rock so closely that one has to knock on the surface to determine
the difference. Normally, a complex may extend over a square kilometer or |
7-100.1 | 286 | FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
more. Auxiliary casements in the underground facility may hold fuel, water,
food, medical supplies, clothing, or life support equipment.
Short-Duration Facilities
12-14. Short-duration storage facilities play a central role in any strategic
campaign that may involve intervention by an extraregional power. For
example, prior to conducting adaptive operations, the State plans, develops,
and builds short-duration storage facilities for the pre-positioning of
equipment and supplies to sustain deployed forces. The State attempts to
anticipate outside intervention and plan accordingly. Logistics items are
stockpiled or cached in underground caves and dugout holes, tents, or
warehouses, and are dispersed over a wide area. These facilities can be
considered a mini-supply depot. They also undergo extensive camouflage and
concealment to reduce their detection signature.
THEATER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
12-15. Theater distribution is the
Theater Distribution Network
flow of personnel, equipment, and
materiel within a theater, which The theater distribution network
enables combat forces to accomplish consist of
their assigned missions. The theater • Physical network.
distribution network consists of the • Resource network.
physical and resource networks.
12-16. The physical network consists of fixed structures and established
facilities to support distribution operations. It includes roads, airfields,
railroads, hardened structures (warehouses and storage facilities), inland
waterways, ports, and pipelines. The quantity, capacity, and capability of
these structures and facilities determine the robustness of the distribution
network.
12-17. The resource network consists of personnel (military and civilian),
organizations, materiel, and equipment. These resources operate within the
physical network of the distribution system.
TAILORED LOGISTICS UNITS
12-18. The OPFOR concentrates the bulk of its logistics units at two
levelstheater and operational-strategic command (OSC). This concentration
supports the OPFOR philosophy of streamlined, highly mobile combat forces
at the tactical level. These higher levels maintain the responsibility and the
primary means for logistics support.
12-19. Tailoring allows allocation of logistics resources to the combat forces
most essential to mission success. It also allows the OPFOR to assign
priorities for logistics support. Subordinate units receive assets according to
the importance of their mission, the nature of the terrain, and the level of
fighting anticipated. Commanders not only can reallocate their own resources
in line with changes in the situation, but also can take away their
subordinates’ organic resources and give them to other subordinates if the
situation warrants. |
7-100.1 | 287 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE
12-20. The administrative force structure is the aggregate of military
headquarters, organizations, facilities, and installations that are designed to
man, train, and equip the OPFOR. After transferring control of its major
fighting forces to one or more task-organized fighting commands, an
administrative headquarters, facility, or installation continues to provide
depot and area support-level administrative, supply, and maintenance
functions. The logistics function of the administrative force structure is
extensive and complex, serving as the major connecting link between the
industrial base of the State and forces engaged in combat.
FIGHTING FORCE STRUCTURE
12-21. The OPFOR’s fighting force structure is a flexible organization. It
receives logistics assets from the administrative force structure and tailors
them to meet specific objectives, based on forces available, mission
requirements, enemy forces, and the geography of the AOR. Tailoring affects
both the number and type of subordinate combat units and the number and
type of logistics units allocated to support them.
LOGISTICS MISSIONS
12-22. In operational (and tactical) logistics, three terms describe how the
OPFOR provides support to the field. These terms are primary support, area
support, and depot support.
12-23. Primary support is a mission given to supply, services, transportation,
and maintenance units that normally provide support directly to other units.
This allows the primary support unit to respond directly to the supported
unit’s request for assistance or supplies.
12-24. Area support is a mission given to supply, services, transportation, and
maintenance units that normally provide support to primary support units and
other area support units. Lower-priority units may have to rely on area support,
rather than receiving supplies and services directly from the next-higher echelon.
12-25. Depot support is a mission given to national- or theater-level units
that normally provide support to area support units. Depot support
operations include the receipt, storage, and issue of war stocks and
domestically produced armaments and materiel, and the overhaul and
rebuilding of major end items.
OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS CONCEPTS
12-26. The OPFOR understands
Operational Logistics Concepts
that there is as much chance of
an operation being brought to The OPFOR relies on the following logis-
culmination by a lack of tics concepts:
sufficient logistics support as • Centralized planning and decen-
by enemy action. Therefore, it tralized execution.
considers thorough logistics • Support forward.
planning and preparation • Sustainment from other sources.
essential to executing operation |
7-100.1 | 288 | FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
plans. The OPFOR relies on three concepts: centralized planning and
decentralized execution, support forward, and sustainment from other
sources.
CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION
12-27. To ensure both priority of effort and efficiency in the logistics process,
the OPFOR’s logistics operations are characterized by the concept of
centralized planning and decentralized execution. Logistics plans are
developed at higher levels and executed by units and organizations at lower
levels. At OSC level, the resources officer has overall responsibility for
logistics planning. Centralized planning requires a focal point for logistics
planning and resource allocation at all levels. Regardless of whether the focal
point is an individual (the resources officer or his secondary staff) or a unit, it
must be constantly aware of requirements and capabilities. Decentralized
execution enhances the flexibility of lower-level commanders to meet local
requirements and to rapidly reprioritize support.
12-28. The concept of centralized planning and decentralized execution is key
to supporting reconnaissance fire (see Chapter 7) and strike operations (see
Chapter 3). The OPFOR uses reconnaissance fire to attack specific enemy
systems in order to destroy or degrade the combat potential of the enemy
force. It employs a strike to destroy an enemy formation after setting the
conditions for its destruction. The OPFOR uses a series of caches and short-
duration storage facilities to sustain fire support and maneuver forces during
these operations.
12-29. This concept of centralized planning and decentralized execution is
particularly important for supporting the deployment of special-purpose
forces (SPF). Generally, SPF deployed into the enemy’s strategic depth or
against his LOCs are inserted with the munitions and supplies their missions
require. Since SPF units are expected to sustain themselves for the duration
of their missions, the OPFOR relies on the careful planning and stockage of
supply caches to sustain these forces.
SUPPORT FORWARD
12-30. Logistics units are organized and deployed to support forward. The
guiding principle is that a combat force should retain its organic support
resources (such as trucks, recovery equipment, and ambulances) to support
its subordinate units. It should not have to use its own resources to go to
support areas to pick up supplies or to evacuate resources that can no longer
contribute to combat power.
SUSTAINMENT FROM OTHER SOURCES
12-31. Finally, the logistics system may have to rely on sustainment from
other than military sources. Supplies may be procured or obtained from social
groups, consumer cooperatives, government farms, or individual citizens, and
by coercion or foraging in the AOR. Captured enemy supplies and equipment
are another source of outside sustainment. |
7-100.1 | 289 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
COMMAND AND CONTROL
12-32. The General Staff may keep some national-level logistics units its
direct control. However, it normally allocates some national-level assets, as
well as logistics assets of operational-level commands in the administrative
force structure, to provide logistics support to an OSC.1 In some cases, these
allocated assets may remain under the command of their original parent
headquarters but become associated with an OSC in a supporting
relationship. In other cases, they actually come under the command of the
OSC in a constituent or dedicated status. (See Chapter 2 for a more detailed
explanation of the various command and support relationships.)
OPERATIONAL STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
12-33. At all levels of command, including the OSC, the resources section of
the primary staff is the principal office for the logistics integration of supply,
maintenance, transportation, and services. The resources officer heads this
section, with two subsections headed by secondary staff officers who support
him: the chief of logistics and the chief of administration. See Figure 12-1.
RESOURCES
OFFICER
CHIEF CHIEF
OF OF
LOGISTICS ADMINISTRATION
LOGISTICS ADMINISTRATIVE
SUBSECTION SUBSECTION
Figure 12-1. Resources Section
Resources Officer
12-34. The resources officer is responsible for the requisition, acquisition,
distribution, and care of all of the command’s resources, both human and
materiel. He ensures the commander’s logistics and administrative
requirements are met and executes staff supervision over the command’s
logistics and administrative procedures. One additional major task of the
resources officer is to free the commander from the need to bring his
influence to bear on priority logistics and administrative functions. He is also
the officer in charge of the sustainment command post (CP).
1 Unless otherwise specified, references to OSC in this chapter could also apply to a field group. |
7-100.1 | 290 | FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Chief of Logistics
12-35. The chief of logistics is responsible for managing the order, receipt,
and distribution of supplies to sustain the command. He is responsible for the
condition and combat readiness of armaments and related combat equipment
and instruments. He is also responsible for their supply, proper utilization,
repair, and evacuation. He oversees the supply and maintenance of the
command’s combat and technical equipment. These responsibilities
encompass the essential wartime tasks of organizing and controlling the
command’s recovery, repair, and replacement system. During combat, he
keeps the commander informed on the status of the command’s equipment.
Chief of Administration
12-36. The chief of administration supervises all personnel actions and
transactions in the command. His subsection maintains daily strength
reports; records changes in table of organization and equipment of units in
the administrative force structure; assigns personnel; requests replacements;
records losses; administers awards and decorations; and collects, records, and
disposes of war booty.
INTEGRATED SUPPORT COMMAND
12-37. The integrated support command (ISC) is the aggregate of combat
service support units (and perhaps some combat support units) allocated from
the administrative force structure to an OSC in a constituent or dedicated
command relationship and not suballocated in a constituent or dedicated
command relationship to a subordinate headquarters within the OSC.
Normally, the OSC further allocates part of its combat service support units
to its tactical-level subordinates and some, as an integrated support group
(ISG), to support its IFC. The rest remain in the ISC at OSC level to provide
overall support of the OSC. For organizational efficiency, other combat
service support units may be grouped in this ISC, although they may support
only one of the major units of the OSC. An ISC has six major functions:
• Materiel support (supply and services).
• Maintenance.
• Transportation.
• Medical support.
• Personnel support.
Sometimes, an ISC might also include units performing combat support tasks
(such as chemical defense, IW, or law enforcement) that support the OSC.
ISC Headquarters
12-38. The ISC headquarters is composed of the ISC commander and his
command group, an operations section, and a resources section. (See Figure
12-2.) The operations section provides the control, coordination,
communications, and IW support for the ISC headquarters. Located within
the operations section is the support operations coordination center (SOCC).
The SOCC is the staff element responsible for the planning and coordination
of support for the OSC. In addition to the SOCC, the operations section has |
7-100.1 | 291 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
subsections for future operations and airspace operations. The resources
section consists of logistics and administrative subsections which,
respectively, execute staff supervision over the ISC’s logistics and personnel
support procedures. The ISC headquarters includes liaison teams from
subordinate units of the ISC and from other OSC subordinates to which the
ISC provides support. These liaison teams work together with the SOCC to
ensure the necessary coordination of support for combat operations.
ISC
COMMANDER
COMMAND GROUP
ISC DEPUTY
COMMANDER
ISC CHIEF
OF
STAFF
OPERATIONS
RESOURCES
SECTION
SECTION
SOCC
Figure 12-2. ISC Headquarters
12-39. The ISC commander and his staff are the OSC logisticians. The ISC
commander advises the OSC commander, resources officer, and the rest of
the OSC staff on logistics matters. The ISC commander normally receives
guidance and direction from the OSC commander. The overall responsibility
for logistics planning belongs to the OSC resources officer. The OSC
commander tasks the ISC commander to evaluate the logistics supportability
of future operation plans or courses of action. The ISC commander tasks and
provides guidance to the ISC staff. The ISC staff gives the alternatives and
preferred solutions to the ISC commander for a decision. If necessary, the ISC
headquarters can assume the functions of the OSC’s sustainment CP, should
that CP containing the OSC resources officer be incapacitated.
Task Organization
12-40. The units allocated to an OSC and its ISC vary according to the
mission of that OSC and the support requirements of other operational-level
commands. The OSC resources officer (in consultation with his chiefs of
logistics and administration and the ISC commander) determines the proper
task organization of logistics and administrative support assets allocated to |
7-100.1 | 292 | FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
the OSC. He suballocates some assets to the IFC and to other OSC
subordinates based on support mission requirements. The remainder he
places under the ISC commander. Figure 12-3 shows a typical OSC
organization, with an example of the types of combat service support and
combat support units that might appear in an OSC ISC.
OSC
TACTICAL-
IFC ISC LEVEL
SUBORDINATES
ISC
ISG
HEADQUARTERS
MATERIEL HEAVY
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE
TRANSPORT BATTALION
BRIGADE
BRIGADE
CHEMICAL TRAFFIC
SMOKE
DEFENSE CONTROL
BATTALION
BATTALION BRIGADE
INFORMATION PERSONNEL
MEDICAL
WARFARE SUPPORT
BATTALION
BRIGADE BATTALION
Figure 12-3. Task Organization, with ISC Example
12-41. The number and type of units in the ISC and ISG will vary according
to the number and size of supported units in the OSC and its IFC,
respectively. For example, an ISC supporting an OSC composed mainly of
tank and mechanized infantry units will differ from an ISC supporting an
OSC composed mainly of infantry or motorized infantry units. When the
logistics units are no longer required for ISC or ISG functions, the primary or
area support units will revert to control of their original parent units in the
administrative force structure or otherwise will be assigned to other
operational-level commands, as appropriate. |
7-100.1 | 293 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
INTEGRATED SUPPORT GROUP
12-42. The integrated support group (ISG) is a compilation of units
performing logistics tasks that support the IFC in a constituent or dedicated
command relationship. For organizational efficiency, various units
performing other combat support and combat service support tasks might be
grouped into the ISG, even though they may support only one of the major
units or components of the IFC.
12-43. There is no standard ISG organizational structure. The number, type,
and mix of subordinate units vary based on the operational support situation.
In essence, the ISG is tailored to the mission and the task organization of the
IFC. An ISG can have many of the same types of units as shown in Figure 12-
3 for one example of ISC subordinates, but tailored in size and functions to
support the IFC.
MATERIEL SUPPORT
12-44. The OPFOR materiel support system comprises a mix of very modern
and less modern capabilities that vary depending on the priority of the
supported units. Generally, high-priority or elite units enjoy the benefits of a
robust materiel support system that affords a higher degree of flexibility and
responsiveness to rapid changes in plans. For such units, the system may be
fully automated to track requirements and control the issue of supplies. Less
capable units (including reserve and militia forces) typically have little or no
automation support. Both types of materiel support system are based on
allocating supplies and services to units in order to accomplish mission
objectives. However, the aim of the OPFOR is to continue the upgrade of its
less capable units to a robust supply system capable of sustaining the force in
all environments.
SUPPLY
12-45. Supply includes actions to acquire, manage, receive, store, and issue
the materiel required to equip and sustain the force from deployment through
combat operations and recovery into State territory. The allocation of
supplies is based on the unit mission, supply reports, and the availability of
supplies.
SERVICES
12-46. The OPFOR concept of services includes all troops, installations, and
duty positions that perform logistics support for combat arms units. Such
services are not specific to the ground forces, but support other Armed Forces
components as well.
METHODS OF DISTRIBUTION
12-47. During peacetime, the OPFOR operates under the “pull system” of
supply. For example, units in the field may request materiel from a depot
where they must pick it up and deliver it to the field. During wartime,
however, the OPFOR operates under the forward distribution or “push
system” principle, in which the higher echelon directly supplies and services
the next-lower echelon. Supplies and services are delivered directly to |
7-100.1 | 294 | FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
subordinate units using the organic transportation assets of the higher
headquarters. Lower-priority units may have to rely on area support or even
supply point distribution.
12-48. The three methods by which supplying units distribute supplies to
using units are supply point distribution, unit distribution, and throughput.
In supply point distribution, the supplying unit issues supplies from a
supply point to a receiving unit. The receiving unit must go to the supply
point and use its own transportation to move supplies to where they are
needed.
12-49. In unit distribution, the supplying unit issue supplies and delivers
supplies to the receiving unit’s area in transportation assets the supplying
unit has arranged. Throughput is a method of distribution in which
shipments bypass intermediate supply points or logistics sites. Throughput
eliminates the need for double handling, uses transportation assets more
efficiently, and is more responsive to the user’s needs.
MAINTENANCE
12-50. Maintenance includes actions taken to keep materiel and equipment
in a serviceable condition, to return it to service, or to update and upgrade its
capability. Since supplies are limited, the OPFOR stresses preventive
maintenance, technical inspections, and proper operating methods to extend
the life cycle of equipment. The maintenance system is designed to repair
vehicles and equipment in the battle zone or as close to it as possible. Repair
facilities and units move near the scene of combat rather than waiting for
damaged equipment to be evacuated to them. Fixed and mobile repair units
extend repair capabilities into the battle zone and provide service to the
customer unit. During wartime, the types of repair performed at each level
depend on the situation. Generally, they are of a lesser degree than in
peacetime. The OPFOR classifies three categories of repair: routine, medium,
or capital.
12-51. Routine repairssuch as replacements, adjustments, or repair of
individual componentsrequire a short time to fix. Generally, maintenance
personnel do not disassemble major components as part of routine repair.
Medium repairs include the minor overhaul of equipment and the repair of
individual components requiring a short time to fix. Capital repairs are
conducted at depot level and involve the major overhaul and/or assembly of
equipment.
TRANSPORTATION
12-52. Transportation is a critical function that cannot be looked at in
isolation; it is the one function that ties sustainment and all other battlefield
operations together. The OPFOR envisions an environment characterized by
dynamic, nonlinear operations; wide dispersion of forces; the need to
concentrate rapidly for battle and disperse quickly; and the need to conduct a
wide range of operations simultaneously.
12-53. Military logistics planners base their estimates on the use of all
movement resources available. These estimates include tactical combat |
7-100.1 | 295 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
vehicles as well as civilian transportation assets mobilized to move supplies,
equipment, and personnel. For example, during mobilization, civilian
trucking and bus companies may be organized as militia truck units to
provide transportation of cargo and personnel within the State or occupied
territory. The mobility of logistics units must match that of the supported
force. If the logistics support units fail to achieve this, they may jeopardize
the overall success of the operation. Traffic management at the operational
level is the responsibility of the military transportation center (MTC). The
MTC is subordinate to the OSC chief of logistics and is responsible for
managing OSC transportation requirements, using military and civilian
resources.
MOVEMENT PRINCIPLES
12-54. The principles of movement apply to all military transportation
services and remain constant throughout peace and war. Additionally, they
apply regardless of the planning level. During wartime, civilian personnel,
transportation assets (including farm animals, vehicles, aircraft, and water
vessels), and materiel-handling equipment are mobilized to support the war
effort.
Centralized Planning and Decentralized Execution
12-55. Movement control is centralized at the highest level at which
commanders charged with providing total logistics support and monitoring
the transportation system and infrastructure can exercise it. This requires a
focal point for transportation movement planning and resource allocation at
all levels. That focal point, whether an individual (the resources officer or
chief of logistics) or unit, must be constantly aware of requirements and
capabilities. Decentralized execution enhances the flexibility of lower-level
commanders to meet local requirements and to rapidly reprioritize support.
Regulated Movement
12-56. All movement is regulated according to command priorities.
Movements are not validated, approved, or initiated if any part of the
transportation system cannot meet the requirement. Regulating
transportation assets and LOCs is required to prevent congestion, confusion,
and conflict of movements. Unregulated use of the transportation system can
severely hamper the movement of critical cargo and personnel supporting the
operation or the overall strategic campaign. Therefore, traffic in the AOR is
programmed to provide fluid movement throughout the transportation
network.
12-57. The OPFOR employs a system of measures organized and executed for
the purpose of ensuring convoy and traffic regulation as well as maintaining
general order in areas where troops are deployed. A traffic control brigade is
responsible for traffic control and law enforcement at the operational level. It
is responsible for directing military traffic along convoy routes and ensuring
that the proper convoy speed and spacing are maintained. The State’s
Internal Security Forces support movement control through protection of
supply routes of movement in the State’s homeland and of key transportation
nodes and centers. |
7-100.1 | 296 | FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
12-58. A movement program is a directive that allocates the available
transport mode capability to satisfy the movement requirements in
accordance with the commander’s priorities. The program normally contains
detailed information concerning origins, destinations, weights, and cube of
cargo, and/or types and number of personnel to be moved.
Fluid and Flexible Movement
12-59. The transportation system is designed to provide an uninterrupted
flow of traffic that adjusts rapidly to changing situations. It is flexible enough
to meet the changing priorities of a fluid battlefield and reallocate resources
as necessary. Adjustments must be made to meet the variations in combat
intensity. For example, when units are in the offense, the transportation
system expands to maintain the tempo of the operation. Conversely, when
units are in the defense, the system is contracted, the mode changes, and
differing cargo priorities may be necessary. Changes in the operational
environment necessitate adjustments to operate in varying conditions and
operational and/or tactical situations that may dictate the types of convoys
and controls established for movement.
12-60. The availability and use of road and rail networks, airfields, inland
waterways, ports, and beaches not only allow the transportation system to
meet operational and tactical changes, but also provide redundancy within
the overall transportation network. For example, if a portion of a road
network is destroyed or rendered unusable, the mode could change to rail or
inland waterway.
Maximum Use of Carrying Capacity
12-61. The principle of making maximum use of carrying capacity involves
more than just loading each transportation asset to its optimum carrying
capacity. Transport capability that is not used in one day cannot be stored to
provide an increase in capability for subsequent days. Similarly, a situation
allowing fully-loaded transport to sit idle is just as much a loss of carrying
capacity as is a partially-loaded vehicle moving through the system. While
allowing for sufficient equipment, maintenance, and personnel rest, planners
should keep transportation assets loaded and moving as much as the
situation permits.
TRANSPORTATION MODES
12-62. Transportation operations may include motor vehicles, rail, aircraft,
and waterway (coastal and inland) transport vessels. The OPFOR generally
uses motor vehicles to move large quantities of general cargo, petroleum
products, and personnel throughout the AOR. However, waterway transport
vessels may be used to move large quantities of supplies and personnel along
coastal or inland waterways to remote areas that are not accessible to motor
vehicles.
12-63. As requirements for transportation fluctuate, each mode must be
properly used to accomplish the commander’s objective. For example, air
transport is employed if reaction speed is the priority. Motor transport is
considered the most flexible surface mode. It provides door-to-door delivery
service and an interface with all other transportation modes. |
7-100.1 | 297 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
12-64. Motor transport becomes essential as supplies are moved forward from
railheads, field depots, or supply points to combat units. After the relocation
of supplies from national-level depots, the OPFOR distributes them within
OSCs primarily by truck. Within an OSC, the heaviest truck transport
requirements are primarily above the division level.2
SUPPLY AND EVACUATION ROUTES
12-65. Within their AORs, OSCs establish and improve supply and
evacuation routes, using the network of military roads, and maintain them in
passable condition. Staff responsibility for this is shared by the OSC
resources officer and the chief of infrastructure management at that level.
Engineer units at OSC level may form road and bridge construction and
repair groups to prepare and maintain these and other movement routes. At
national level, the Strategic Integration Directorate (SID) also organizes civil
engineering and construction efforts required to sustain military actions.
During wartime, civil engineering units from the Ministry of the Interior, as
directed by the SID, may be employed at the national and/or OSC levels.
Employed on an area basis, these units are responsible for the upkeep of
supply and evacuation routes and for repair of battle-damaged roads and
bridges. The OSC chief of infrastructure management must coordinate and
prioritize the route construction and maintenance functions of both civil and
combat engineers within his AOR.
PERSONNEL
12-66. The MOD establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes
procedures for personnel readiness issues as they apply to all members and
components (standing forces, reserve, and militia) of the armed services. The
Manpower and Readiness Department under the MOD Chief of Logistics is
responsible for the administration and management of the personnel support
system.
12-67. During peacetime, the State may be unable to fully man the military
with critical professional and technical specialists to maintain an elaborate
support structure. Thus, the OPFOR may experience a shortage of doctors,
engineers, computer programmers, electronic technicians, and other support
professionals. Once the country has been mobilized, however, these critical
professionals are detailed into the military structure to augment existing
professionals.
12-68. The State considers people as one of the assets most critical to the
success of any military operation. Thorough planning and efficient personnel
support directly influence mission readiness. Therefore, the MOD requires
each of the armed services to resource personnel requirements in a timely
manner to support operational requirements. The State views “personnel
support” as all activities associated with assignment of personnel against
authorized billets and validated individual augmentation requirements, as
well as those administrative activities associated with personnel programs
within a command.
2 Throughout this chapter, references to division- and brigade-level logistics support may also apply to a division tac-
tical group (DTG) and brigade tactical group (BTG), unless specifically stated otherwise. |
7-100.1 | 298 | FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
PERSONNEL SUPPORT
12-69. Units may maintain strength by piecemeal replacement of casualties
during combat, particularly when lightly wounded personnel and damaged
equipment can return to parent units quickly. Once casualties are sufficient
to threaten total loss of combat effectiveness, the unit withdraws from
contact and reconstitutes. Timely replacement of ineffective units is vital to
maintaining momentum. The commander may choose to withdraw heavily
attritted units and consolidate them to form a smaller number of combat-
effective units.
12-70. The OSC chief of administration is responsible for all personnel
actions and transactions in the command. The personnel support battalion
provides the personnel to operate the personnel operations center. That
center’s major functions include providing personnel and administrative
support, finance support, and legal support.
REPLACEMENT
12-71. Replacement operations are based on unit strength reports and
include the coordinated support and delivery of replacements and soldiers
returning from medical facilities. The unit strength report is used to assess a
unit’s combat power, plan for future operations, and assign replacements on
the battlefield.
Individual Replacements
12-72. The OPFOR can use the system of individual replacements in both
peacetime and wartime. The sources of replacement personnel are school
graduates, reserve assignments, medical returnees, and normal assignments.
Incremental Replacements
12-73. The OPFOR may incrementally replace entire small units such as
weapons crews, squads, and platoons. Replacements can be obtained from
training units or reserve forces.
Composite Unit Formations
12-74. Composite units may be formed from other units reduced by combat
operations. Composite units may be constituted up to OSC level.
Whole-Unit Replacement
12-75. The OPFOR uses whole-unit replacement when massive losses occur
as a result of a combat action. Company-level and above units are brought
forward from reserve forces to replace combat forces rendered ineffective.
Replacement Training
12-76. OPFOR planners realize that personnel replacement requirements
may necessitate any of the aforementioned procedures. Individual and unit
replacement exercises are held semiannually to maintain established
proficiency standards for personnel units. During these and other training
exercises, troops are moved by various modes of transportation such as motor
vehicles, waterway, aircraft, or rail. |
7-100.1 | 299 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
MEDICAL SUPPORT
12-77. The basic principle of combat medical support is multistage
evacuation with minimum treatment by medical personnel at each unit level.
They treat the lightly wounded who can return to combat and those
casualties who would not survive further evacuation without immediate
medical attention.
12-78. The OPFOR divides the range of medical treatment into three
categories. The first category of procedures includes only mandatory
lifesaving measures. The second category includes procedures to prevent
severe complications of wounds or injuries. The final category of treatment
includes procedures accomplished only when there is a low casualty load and
reduced enemy activity.
12-79. In anticipation of an overtaxed combat medical support system,
OPFOR doctrine emphasizes the importance of self-help and mutual aid
among individual soldiers. This concept extends beyond the battlefield to
casualty collection points and unit aid stations. Self-help and mutual aid
reduces the demands made on medical personnel, particularly when there is
a sudden and massive influx of casualties. Each soldier is required to attend
a first-aid training session.
MEDICAL LOGISTICS
12-80. The medical logistics system operates on a “pull system.” Personnel in
the field request medical materiel (including repair parts for medical
equipment) from a medical depot where it must be picked up and delivered to
the field. Normally, medical supplies are transported from the support zone
to the battle zone on cargo-carrying transport vehicles, water vessels, or
aircraft. However, ground ambulances returning to the battle zone may assist
in transporting medical supplies. A medical equipment maintenance unit at
the medical depot provides all medical equipment maintenance.
Level Available Care
Platoon Platoon medic (corpsman) provides basic first aid.
Company Company medic (paramedic) provides advanced first aid, pain relief, intravenous fluids,
and treatment of most common illnesses.
Battalion Medical assistant (physician’s assistant) provides limited medical intervention, minor sur-
gery, and treatment of most common illnesses; limited inpatient capability.
Brigade, BTG, Medical officers (physicians) provide trauma stabilization and minor surgical intervention.
and Division
DTG or Higher A field hospital provides major surgery and extended care.
OSC or Theater Central Military Hospital and major civilian hospitals provide definitive care in fixed facili-
Support Zone ties.
Figure 12-4. Levels of Medical Care |
7-100.1 | 300 | FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
CASUALTY HANDLING
12-81. The OPFOR has shown success in handling combat casualties. This
success stems from emphasis placed on trauma training and close
coordination with the civilian medical sector. Evacuation is based on a
higher-to-lower method. The next-higher echelon provides transportation for
casualties. Each level has specific responsibilities for the care of the sick and
wounded. (See Figure 12-4.) Besides treating the wounded, medical personnel
handle virtually all of their own administration, especially at lower levels. As
casualties move through the combat evacuation system, medical personnel at
each level make effective use of medical facilities by repeated sorting of the
wounded (triage). Helicopters are used for all military and civilian search and
rescue missions, medical evacuations, and domestic disaster relief flights.
During wartime situations, most casualties arrive at a hospital within 6 to 12
hours after being wounded. The evacuation time is reduced to 2 hours during
peacetime.
MEDICAL FACILITIES
12-82. A field hospital is the first level in the evacuation system capable of
conducting major surgery and giving extended care. It is mobile and capable
of deployment near the battle zone. It constitutes the largest and most
extensive military facility with this capability.
12-83. The best medical facility is the Central Army Hospital. During
peacetime, military personnel receive treatment at this hospital, which also
is designated as one of the emergency medical care facilities for foreign
diplomats, their families, and tourists. The State also has designated some of
its major university hospitals as such emergency medical care facilities. This
ensures consistent high-quality medical staffing, care and treatment. A
majority of medical facilities or clinics in the outlying areas has sufficient
numbers of trained personnel, supplies, and reliable electric power and
water. The facilities also contain high-quality, sophisticated, domestic and
imported medical equipment. The pharmacies are stocked with high-quality,
domestic, and foreign-produced pharmaceuticals. During wartime conditions,
military personnel are treated at all of the major civilian hospitals in addition
to field hospitals.
NBC TREATMENT
12-84. Treating nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) casualties is a
standard OPFOR trauma protocol. The NBC medical plan is based on three
assumptions:
• Mass casualties will occur.
• Casualties will be similar to those that medical personnel have been
trained to treat.
• Medical personnel are able to treat the casualties in a decontaminated
environment.
The Central Army Hospital can be converted into a chemical decontamina-
tion center within 2 to 6 hours. Most of the remaining major hospitals require
up to 30 days to convert to a decontamination center. |
7-100.1 | 301 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
BLOOD MANAGEMENT
12-85. The Ministry of Health maintains a Blood Management Office to
oversee the collection, processing, storage, and distribution of blood (to
include liquid blood and blood components) to alleviate the effects of a
natural disaster or war. Blood management services are provided to support
both civilian and military establishments. The main source of blood to
support wartime casualty requirements comes from the collection and
processing of blood from the civilian populace during peacetime. The blood is
generally stored in pre-positioned underground structures throughout the
country.
SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS
12-86. During both offense and defense, OPFOR logistics units operate from
locations that are protected, concealed, and serviced by good road networks.
Commanders emphasize that logistics units make maximum use of urban
areas to conduct logistics operations. The dispersion of logistics sites is
consistent with support requirements, control, and local security.
12-87. Logisticians must be continuously informed of operation plans and
probable changes to those plans. They coordinate logistics preparations with
deception plans to avoid giving away the element of surprise. Commanders
emphasize passive security measures during the sustainment of combat
operations. Logistics unit commanders anticipate that at least 50 percent or
more of their work will be done in darkness or under other limited visibility
conditions. Therefore, noise and light discipline is a necessity when operating
under these conditions.
OFFENSE
12-88. The logistics objective in supporting offensive operations is to
maintain the momentum of operations by supporting in the battle zone or as
close to it as possible. Both the battle zone and the support zone can move as
the offensive operation progresses.
12-89. Planners must consider the nature of offensive operations as it affects
logistics activities. For example, high fuel consumption may dictate making
provisions to position substantial quantities in or near the battle zone
without signaling the OPFOR’s intention to attack to the enemy. Responsive
support is critical and is made more difficult by lengthening of supply lines
and by critical requirements for user resupply vehicles to stay close to their
respective units. Planning, coordination, communication, and above all
flexibility are key factors to consider. Therefore, planners develop logistics
plans flexible enough to meet the changing priorities of a fluid battlefield.
12-90. In considering the attack, materiel support units ensure that all
support equipment is ready and that supplies are best located for support.
They also ensure that sufficient transportation is available to support
maneuver and logistics plans. Normally, ammunition and fuel are the most
important supplies in the offense. However, consideration must be given to
all supplies, as well as other support procedures, specifically medical and
maintenance. |
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12-91. The following are examples of some specific considerations for
planners to use during the development of logistics plans supporting offensive
operations:
• Maintenance units should pre-plan maintenance collection points along
movement routes, in order to reduce recovery requirements.
• Supply points consisting of fuel and ammunition are positioned in the
battle zone or as close to it as possible.
• Arrangements are made in advance for aerial resupply of critical items
in order to maintain the operational tempo.
• Planners arrange to throughput obstacle-breaching and bridging mate-
rial if required.
• Planners must consider potential bypassed enemy units; they must
have the latest intelligence on the enemy situation.
DEFENSE
12-92. The logistics objective in supporting defensive operations is to sustain
the attrition of enemy attacking forces through support from dispersed sites
located in the support zone. An OSC support zone may be dispersed within
the support zones of subordinate divisions or brigades, or the OSC may have
a separate support zone site of its own.
12-93. During defensive operations, supply activity is greatest in the
preparation stage. Supplies generally are stockpiled or pre-positioned in
initial and subsequent defensive positions. Critical supplies such as
ammunition and barrier material should be as mobile as possible to ensure
continuous support as combat power is shifted in response to enemy attacks.
12-94. To support stay-behind operations, supply stockage levels may be two
to three times higher than normal amounts. This ensures a redundancy of
caches and needed equipment that cannot be readily resupplied. Stay-behind
forces may require unique maintenance support arrangements to ensure that
equipment remains operational.
12-95. Logistics units position themselves in relatively secure positions far
enough from maneuver and fire support units to be out of the flow of the
battle. However, they should not be so far removed as to render the logistics
effort less effective.
12-96. The following are examples of some specific considerations for
planners to use during the development of logistics plans supporting
defensive operations:
• Maintenance units should position maintenance teams in the battle
zone to return the maximum number of weapons systems to the battle
as soon as possible.
• Emphasis is on keeping supply and evacuation routes open.
• Nonessential logistics units and operations move into the depth of the
support zone as early as possible.
• In a maneuver defense, supply points consisting of fuel and ammunition
are positioned as far forward as possible and in successive battle posi-
tions. |
7-100.1 | 303 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
SUPPORT ZONE SECURITY
12-97. The OPFOR expects any enemy to make an effort to conduct
reconnaissance, espionage, and diversionary action in its operational support
zone. These enemy actions can be particularly effective in areas where the
local population is not sympathetic to the OPFOR’s cause. In addition to
these threats, the OPFOR anticipates attacks on its support zone by airborne
and heliborne forces as well as larger-scale attacks by enemy operational
maneuver forces.
12-98. The OPFOR uses a security force to counter any threats in its support
zone. Each OSC deploys a considerable counterintelligence effort. It can
assign up to an entire division for security tasks. The security force is
equipped and trained for conventional as well as unconventional warfare. As
airborne and amphibious threats grow, there is increasing stress on
deploying antilanding reserves, including, or even based on, heliborne units
to provide a rapid reaction.
MISSION SUPPORT SITES
12-99. A mission support site (MSS) is a temporary base used by units that
are operating at a considerable distance from their support zone, during an
extended mission. The MSS may provide food, shelter, medical support,
ammunition, or demolitions. The use of an MSS eliminates unnecessary
movement of supplies and allows a force to move more rapidly. When
selecting an MSS, consideration is given to cover and concealment, proximity
to the objective, proximity to supply routes, and the presence of enemy
security forces in the area. Security dictates that drop zones or landing zones
be a considerable distance from an MSS, cache, or support zonealthough
this may increase transportation problems.
POST-COMBAT SUPPORT
12-100. Strategic and operational logisticians are not only focused on
supporting units in combat. They are also focused on other post-combat
support requirements such as personnel replacement, weapon systems
replacement, reconstitution, and receiving and preparing reinforcements.
(For information on personnel replacement, see the Personnel Support
section of this chapter.)
WEAPON SYSTEMS REPLACEMENT
12-101. Weapon systems replacement is simply a procedure for providing a
weapon system to a combat unit. It involves processing the vehicle or
equipment from a storage or transportation configuration to a ready-to-fight
condition. It also involves the integration of a completely trained crew with
the weapon system.
RECONSTITUTION
12-102. Reconstitution is performed in support of all combat operations.
Although it is mainly a command and operations function, the actual
refitting, supply, personnel fill, and medical actions are conducted by logistics |
7-100.1 | 304 | FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
units. There are two methods for conducting reconstitution: reorganization
and regeneration.
Reorganization
12-103. Reorganization is action taken to shift resources internally within a
degraded unit to increase its level of combat effectiveness. Reorganization is
normally done at unit level and requires only limited external support such
as supply replenishment, maintenance assistance, and limited personnel
replacement. When continuity of the mission is of paramount importance,
composite units may be formed from other units reduced by combat
operations.
Regeneration
12-104. Regeneration is action taken to rebuild a unit through large-scale
replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Additionally, it is action
taken to restore C2 and conduct mission-essential training. Overall, the effort
is directed at restoring the unit’s cohesion, discipline, and fighting
effectiveness.
PREPARING REINFORCEMENTS
12-105. OPFOR strategic and operational logisticians prepare contingency
plans for the mobilization and reception of reserve forces. Once the unit
personnel and equipment are mobilized, they are sustained, configured, and
transported to their respective OSC. Normally, strategic-level logistics units
provide this type of support. Once units arrive at the OSC level, the OSC
assumes responsibility for their further sustainment and transport. |
7-100.1 | 305 | Chapter 13
Airborne, Special-Purpose Forces, and Amphibious
Operations
The OPFOR views airborne and special-purpose forces (SPF) as means to
carry the battle into the enemy’s depth. The General Staff uses these
highly mobile forces against strategic objectives or for regional power
projection. It may also allocate such forces down to the operational and
tactical levels. It has the capability to conduct amphibious operations,
which sometimes occur in conjunction with airborne or SPF operations in
a coastal area. Insertion of any or all these forces into enemy rear areas
can disrupt the stability and cohesion of his defense.
AIRBORNE AND HELIBORNE OPERATIONS
13-1. Airborne and heliborne forces have the capability to surprise the enemy,
rapidly envelop key objectives, or exploit targets weakened by the effects of
deep fires. Airborne and heliborne forces are especially critical given the fluid-
ity and rapid tempo that characterizes the modern battlefield. The OPFOR
expects to capitalize on the added vertical dimension that airborne and heli-
borne forces provide when working in concert with ground maneuver forces.
13-2. The OPFOR also uses airborne forces as a means of projecting power in
its region. Significant portions of invasion forces could consist of airborne
units, which are well suited for such roles. They train for operations in a
variety of geographical environments. They also train specifically to establish,
defend, and expand an airhead. Their equipment is air-transportable.
13-3. Airborne forces are particularly valuable as a means to control access
into the region by extraregional forces. The early seizure of ports and airfields
critical to enemy deployment can be an essential ingredient in the conduct of
access-control operations. Airborne and heliborne forces are especially suited
for operations conducted during the transition from regional to adaptive
operations. Their unique capabilities also render them especially useful in
support of adaptive operations. They can serve as fixing, assault, exploitation,
or deception forces when the rapid positioning of such forces in support of of-
fensive operations is critical.
13-4. Airborne landings require many valuable assets. Therefore, only after
careful consideration would a commander make the decision to use airborne
forces. If other units are capable of fulfilling a given mission, they execute it
instead of airborne units. Heliborne landings also require valuable assets but
are often more economical than airborne landings. |
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COMMAND AND CONTROL
13-5. Administratively, airborne forces are part of the Army. During wartime,
to allow flexibility in employment, they are directly subordinate to the
Supreme High Command (SHC), with control exercised by the General Staff.
When the OPFOR establishes more than one theater headquarters, the
General Staff may allocate some airborne units to each theater. A theater
commander with dedicated airborne assets could further dedicate airborne units
to an operational-strategic command (OSC) or, dependent upon the mission, he
could also place airborne units in support of an OSC. A theater commander
with constituent airborne assets can allocate them to an OSC in a constituent,
dedicated, or supporting relationship. These command and support relation-
ships ensure that airborne objectives support the overall mission of the theater or
OSC to which the airborne units are allocated. Even in a supporting relationship,
the commander of the theater or OSC receiving the airborne unit(s) establishes
those units’ objectives, priorities, and time of deployment.
13-6. The landing force commander is the commander of the airborne or
ground force unit forming the basis for the airborne or heliborne landing force.
He is responsible for preparing and positioning troops for loading. He shares
with the aviation commander the decision to proceed with the landing, based
on the assessment of the situation at the drop zone (DZ) or landing zone (LZ).
After the landing, the landing force commander is solely responsible for con-
ducting the operation, until linkup with ground maneuver forces. While the
landing force commander can plan the scheme of maneuver, final approval of
the plan comes from the OSC or theater commander.
MISSIONS
13-7. The OPFOR categorizes airborne or heliborne missions based on the
depth and importance of the objective, the size of forces involved, and the
level of command of the controlling commander. The three categories of
missions are strategic, operational, and tactical. The location of enemy
forces, the level of the controlling headquarters, the significance of the target,
weapons systems capabilities, and geography also determine the scope of the
operation. Many factors can affect the decision of where to insert an airborne
or heliborne force, including
• The size of the force.
• Anticipated enemy resistance.
• The air situation (presence or absence of air superiority).
• The potential for reinforcement of the force.
• The position and projected rate of advance of friendly forces designated
for linkup.
Strategic Missions
13-8. In wartime, the SHC establishes strategic missions, which the General
Staff controls. The outcome of a strategic mission should have significant im-
pact on the war or strategic campaign. The use of airborne forces in a regional
power-projection role is also a strategic mission. |
7-100.1 | 307 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
13-9. Airborne forces conduct strategic missions against deep targets. Forces
from other arms and services can also participate, but typically would not
arrive in the target area until a later time. Depending on the depth of the
airborne mission, linkup with ground forces may not occur for several days.
Since troops on the ground receive supplies by airdrop or airlift, the operation
requires substantial air combat and transport support.
13-10. Objectives of strategic missions could be national capitals or other
administrative-political centers, industrial or economic centers, ports or
maritime straits, or airfields. Strategic missions also may establish a new
theater or neutralize one member of an enemy coalition.
Operational Missions
13-11. An OSC does not necessarily include airborne forces in its task or-
ganization. However, the SHC or General Staff may allocate such forces to an
OSC for a given operation, in a constituent, dedicated, or supporting role.
Operational objectives could include
• Headquarters or command posts.
• Communications facilities.
• Enemy precision and nuclear weapons.
• Logistics facilities.
• Airfields.
• Ports.
• Bridges and other water- or gap-crossing sites.
• Lines of communications (LOCs).
An airborne force of brigade size is the most common force used to accomplish
operational missions. Typical missions can include deception operations,
blocking a withdrawing enemy, or enveloping enemy defensive positions.
Tactical Missions
13-12. While recognizing the need to limit the use of airborne forces to primar-
ily strategic and operational missions, the OPFOR also recognizes the need for
the capability to insert troops to perform tactical missions. A tactical airborne
mission could have the same types of objectives as an operational mission. On
occasion, airborne troops may be allocated for such missions, but the force is
more likely to consist of infantry troops. In either case, the units involved
would normally rely on helicopters for tactical insertions, rather than fixed-
wing aircraft. The primary function of these tactical airborne or heliborne
landings is to cooperate with ground maneuver forces in reaching operational
or tactical objectives. In other situations, heliborne insertions can serve as a
rapid means for positioning or repositioning forces on the battlefield.
13-13. Heliborne units can perform reconnaissance missions when inserted
into the disruption zone or the enemy rear area. They may perform tactical
security missions, or cover, delay, or defend against an enemy approach to a
vulnerable flank. Heliborne units can also serve in an antilanding reserve,
providing rapid reaction to the threat of enemy airborne or amphibious landings.
Ambushes, raids, sabotage, and deception activities are examples of other |
7-100.1 | 308 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
missions suited to heliborne operations. Heliborne units can also lay and clear
mines in the enemy rear.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION
13-14. Planning considerations for airborne and heliborne operations include
the mission, troops and support available, terrain, the depth of the operation,
flight routes, air superiority, DZs or LZs, surprise, security, and the enemy
situation. Deception operations are planned to mislead the enemy as to the
true purpose and location of air activity. Given routine readiness conditions,
the time required to prepare transport aviation and to plan a battalion-size
or larger airborne mission is, as a minimum, approximately 24 hours. This
planning time includes
• Notification of alert and moving out: 2 hours.
• Preparation of aviation units: 18 hours.
• Embarking troops and equipment and final aircraft preparation: 4 hours.
When exercising a preplanned contingency or starting from an increased
readiness condition, the preparation time is reduced by 5 to 8 hours.
13-15. The time required to plan for a battalion-size heliborne assault is similar.
Troop embarkation times can be reduced if few or no vehicles accompany the
force. The force selected to conduct a heliborne assault may require training,
and this adds at least one day to the preparation time. To avoid this delay, the
OPFOR trains selected infantry battalions for heliborne employment.
13-16. Preparation for an airborne or heliborne landing includes the following:
• Determining the composition, strength, and capabilities of the enemy
forces in the area of the DZ or LZ (or those near enough to interfere
with the landing operations and subsequent attack of the objective).
• Determining the nature of the terrain and condition of the road network.
• Locating natural and manmade obstacles that would interfere with air
drop of troops and equipment.
• Selecting suitable primary and alternate DZ or LZs.
13-17. Aerial reconnaissance, clandestine agents, sympathizers, maps, signals
reconnaissance, long-range patrols, or air-dropped reconnaissance teams all
provide intelligence information for an airborne operation. Reconnaissance of
the DZ or LZ, by both air assets and SPF, continues throughout the planning
and execution stages of the operation. If enemy troops are located in the area,
they are attacked and neutralized by aviation, artillery, or SPF. Reconnais-
sance takes place when the airborne or heliborne operation is first conceived,
when troops embark, and while aircraft are en route to the DZ or LZ. Enemy
armor, artillery, and air threats are of major concern. Reconnaissance activi-
ties also occur outside the projected objective area, as a deception measure.
13-18. Airborne and heliborne operations require extensive coordination between
the committed landing force and the controlling headquarters, supporting avia-
tion, and ground maneuver forces. The following principles contribute to success:
• Surprise should be used to advantage. Extensive security measures are
necessary in all phases of the operation to prevent early detection and |
7-100.1 | 309 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
to minimize enemy reaction time. Night airborne operations are a pri-
mary means of achieving surprise. False insertions aid deception and
surprise when conducting heliborne operations.
• Landings should be in undefended areas or in areas where enemy
defenses have been effectively neutralized.
• There must be effective air cover for the en route formation. Suppres-
sion of enemy ground-based air defense weapons along the flight route
is imperative.
• Airborne assaults receive fire support from aircraft, surface-to-
surface missiles (SSMs), and artillery, as the latter comes within
supporting range of airborne forces.
• Artillery fires are essential to the support of heliborne forces.
• Attack helicopters escort lift helicopters to prepare the LZ before the
landing of troops and to provide fire support once the landing force
is on the ground.
13-19. A typical DZ is three by four km; a typical LZ may be smaller. An air-
borne brigade normally receives one primary and at least one alternate DZ.
Within a brigade DZ, each airborne battalion has a designated, individual DZ.
The landing force commander designates alternate zones for emergency use.
Follow-on forces normally use the zones used by the initial wave. Heliborne
forces use one or more LZs depending upon the situation and size of the land-
ing force. The landing force commander designates at least one alternate LZ.
CONDUCT
13-20. The use of airborne forces in an operation depends upon whether it would
enhance the likelihood of surprise, deep penetration, and rapid exploitation. Also
essential is a favorable forces analysis in the DZ or LZ and the objective area.
These criteria, together with the achievement of at least temporary local air su-
periority and the availability of airborne and airlift assets, constitute the main
elements in a planner’s decision to conduct an airborne or heliborne operation.
Air Movement
13-21. The Air Force allocates the transport aviation units required for
deployment. Either transport aircraft or lift helicopters or a combination of
the two can air-land airborne units or insert airborne battalions. Lift helicop-
ters from army aviation can support heliborne landings. Aircraft of civil avia-
tion can augment military capabilities. Civil fleet equipment consists of some
medium- and long-range passenger transports and a number of short-range
transports and helicopters. Staging bases and associated airfields are located
at distances that protect aircraft and troop concentrations from enemy tactical
aircraft and short-range SSMs. Airfields and equipment are camouflaged and
concealed against aerial observation, and aircraft are placed in revetted positions.
13-22. The OPFOR considers the air movement phase of an airborne or heliborne
operation to be its most vulnerable phase. The OPFOR emphasizes the necessity
of creating a threat-free flight corridor from the departure area to the DZ or LZ.
All along the flight path, fire support assets target enemy air defenses. Fighters
escort transport aircraft during an airborne operation to protect them from |
7-100.1 | 310 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
enemy fighters and ground fires. Attack helicopters can escort lift helicopters
during a heliborne operation to protect them from ground fires.
13-23. Passive defense measures taken during the air movement phase in-
clude conducting movement during hours of darkness, using more than one
flight route, maintaining radio silence, and flying at low altitudes. The
OPFOR can use electronic warfare measures during air movement, including
escort jammers, which suppress enemy air defense and surveillance systems.
Air Drop or Heliborne Landing
13-24. Airborne forces normally conduct combat air drops at an altitude of
from 150 to 300 m. They emphasize the necessity of dropping at low altitude
to minimize the amount of time individuals are in the air. Low-altitude drops
also increase the likelihood that a unit’s personnel and equipment would land
close together.
13-25. Forces inserted by helicopter have the advantage of arriving on the LZ
as organized units. To minimize their vulnerability to ground fires, helicopters
remain on the ground in the LZ only long enough to disembark troops. If the
LZ is under effective enemy fire, the landing force commander, after consult-
ing the aviation commander, may divert the force to an alternate LZ.
Drop Zone or Landing Zone Procedures
13-26. The air drop or landing and reorganization phase is the second most
vulnerable period in an operation, following the air movement phase. The
airborne or heliborne force must clear the DZ or LZ quickly, before the enemy
arrives to counter it.
13-27. If the airborne force is dropped or landed during daylight hours,
personnel either move directly to their predesignated attack positions or, if
the DZ or LZ is not on the objective, first assemble in battalion assembly
areas. If the drop or landing occurs at night, personnel may first assemble as
companies and then move to battalion assembly areas, before occupying pre-
designated attack positions.
13-28. If the DZ is under strong enemy attack, personnel assemble and
move immediately to the perimeter to establish defensive battle positions.
Personnel use any available light armored vehicles to reinforce battle po-
sitions, and do not sort out the vehicles until after repelling the enemy attack.
13-29. If the DZ is not on the objective and units assemble first, they try to
avoid combat with enemy ground force units and hide from an air threat. If
required to actively defend against an air attack, at least one entire platoon
per company or one company per battalion is responsible for the mission. For
a planned follow-on air landing, the initial landing force leaves a rear detach-
ment at the DZ. This detachment provides security on the DZ for the landing
of the follow-on force.
13-30. The heliborne force lands on its objective if possible. If it is not on the
objective, the LZ should be as close as possible but outside of the direct fire
range of enemy forces at the objective. Once on the ground, the heliborne land-
ing force organizes rapidly in an assembly area. |
7-100.1 | 311 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
Movement to Objective
13-31. Speed and security are the primary concerns during movement to the
objective. If the landing force is moving at night, it can use established road
networks to reach the objective before dawn. If movement is during the day,
the unit moves cross-country using terrain features to provide concealment
when possible. During movement, the landing force maintains radio silence
until making contact with the enemy, with only the landing force commander
transmitting messages.
13-32. Since the information received before departure is perishable,
reconnaissance missions during the ground movement phase are ex-
tremely important. For airborne forces, these missions are performed by
reconnaissance teams from the brigade and/or battalion level. These teams
may have engineer or chemical defense personnel attached.
13-33. Rapid execution is especially important to the heliborne force. The force
departs the assembly area with reconnaissance in the lead and on the flanks.
The landing force attacks the target as quickly as possible in order to gain
surprise and maintain momentum.
Offense
13-34. Once on the ground, offensive tactics of airborne forces are similar to
those of similarly equipped infantry forces. Before the attack, the airborne
force deploys its fire support units to provide maximum support. Airborne
forces at the final objective attack to destroy the enemy or to seize control of
the enemy-held area or facility. A heliborne force can be augmented with
combat engineers, antitank weapons, artillery, and chemical defense troops.
The force usually attempts to attack its objective from several directions at
once. A heliborne force is generally assigned an objective less heavily defended
than that assigned to an airborne force.
Defense
13-35. Once the landing force has seized an objective, it must defend that
objective until the arrival of friendly ground maneuver forces. Usually, the
landing force establishes a perimeter defense. In some cases, the terrain and
the enemy’s situation may permit establishing a defense in depth, with a
small, mobile reserve. A number of factors influence the capability to remain
on the objective: days of supply on hand, a secure air resupply corridor, the
availability of air support, and the enemy’s ability to respond to the landing.
Heliborne forces, especially those drawn from the regular ground forces, have
little sustainability, and their ability to remain on the objective is limited.
Linkup with a ground maneuver force should occur as quickly as possible.
Linkup
13-36. Airborne or heliborne units either await a linkup with friendly forces
or, when necessary, fight their way back to friendly lines. The rule of thumb is
that the probability of overall success is greater the sooner the linkup occurs.
To accomplish linkup, the unit sends a reconnaissance patrol to meet the
approaching ground maneuver force units. The reconnaissance patrol provides
information on the best approaches into the area, the security situation on the |
7-100.1 | 312 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
objective, and the enemy situation. A linkup with ground maneuver forces
normally completes the mission of an airborne or heliborne force. Once linkup
occurs, control of the landing force unit returns to the parent headquarters.
SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES OPERATIONS
13-37. The OPFOR maintains a broad array of SPF. One of the six service
components, the SPF Command, provides the capability to attack both
regional and extraregional enemies throughout their strategic depth. In
addition to conducting direct action, this command fields strategic recon-
naissance forces with which it is able to support national intelligence re-
quirements. It also has a capability to support operations of terrorists and
other irregular forces. The SPF Command includes both SPF units and com-
mando units. Its units provide a balanced capability including some tactical
transport for use in inserting SPF or commando units.
13-38. In addition to the SPF Command, four of the other five service
components have their own SPF. The Army, Naval, and Air Force SPF are
intended primarily for use at the operational level and enable each service to
conduct reconnaissance and direct action to the opponent’s operational depth.
The Internal Security Forces also have their own highly-trained SPF units,
equipped to conduct direct-action missions in the enemy’s rear. All of these
SPF organizations provide the OPFOR a flexible and capable means of sup-
port to regional, transition, and adaptive operations.
13-39. The Air Force fields light transport aircraft for insertion of its own SPF
or those belonging to other service components, within the region. The Navy’s
submarine force may also insert SPF for reconnaissance or direct action out-
side the region.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
13-40. The SPF Command includes both SPF units and commando units.
(Command and control for the SPF Command’s commando units is discussed
under the subsection on Commandos later in this chapter.) The Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Internal Security Forces also have their own SPF. Any of these
various types of SPF units may remain under the command and control of
their respective service headquarters or may be suballocated to operational- or
even tactical-level commands during task organization.
Administrative Force Structure
13-41. The SPF Command is one of the six service components subordinate to
the SHC and is thus under the control of the General Staff. The General Staff
normally reserves some SPF brigades under its own control for strategic-level
missions as directed by its Intelligence Directorate. Likewise, the Army, Navy,
and Air Force could maintain some of their own SPF directly subordinate to
the service headquarters, although most of them are intended for use at the
operational level and thus can be subordinate to operational-level commands,
even in the administrative force structure.
13-42. In peacetime and in garrisons within the State, SPF of both the SPF
Command and other services are organized administratively into SPF companies,
battalions, and brigades. These organizations facilitate peacetime administrative |
7-100.1 | 313 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
control and training. However, even these administrative organizations do not
have a fixed structure. Each consists of a varying number of small SPF teams
normally composed of 5 to 12 men each. The number of teams contained in
each administrative organization depends on the team size required for spe-
cific missions that are envisioned for it. Every SPF operation is unique and
unlike any other, and thus requires forces organized not in a standard fashion
but rather adapted into a task organization based on the mission.
Task Organization
13-43. When the OPFOR establishes more than one theater headquarters, the
General Staff may allocate some SPF units to each theater. From those SPF
assets allocated to him in a constituent or dedicated relationship, the theater
commander can suballocate some or all of them to a subordinate OSC.
13-44. The General Staff (or a theater commander with constituent or
dedicated SPF) can allocate SPF units to an OSC in a constituent or
dedicated relationship or place them in support of an OSC. These command
and support relationships ensure that SPF objectives support the overall
mission of the OSC to which the SPF units are allocated. Even in a sup-
porting relationship, the commander of the OSC receiving the SPF unit(s)
establishes those units’ objectives, priorities, and time of deployment. The
OSC commander may employ the SPF assets allocated to him as constitu-
ent or dedicated as part of his integrated fires command (IFC), or he may
suballocate them to his tactical-level subordinates. Even SPF units allocated
to an OSC may conduct strategic missions, if required.
13-45. The SPF units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Internal Security
Forces may remain under the control of their respective services (or be allo-
cated to a joint theater command). However, they are more likely to appear in
the task organization of an OSC. In that case, the OSC commander may
choose to suballocate them to tactical-level subordinates. If necessary, SPF
units from any of these service components could become part of joint SPF op-
erations in support of national-level requirements. In that case, they could
temporarily come under the control of the SPF Command or the General Staff.
13-46. Regardless of the parent administrative organization, SPF normally in-
filtrate and operate as small teams. When deployed, these teams may operate
individually, or they may be task organized into detachments. The terms team
and detachment indicate the temporary nature of the groupings. In the course
of an operation, teams can leave a detachment and join it again. Each team
may in turn break up into smaller teams (of as few as two men) or, conversely,
come together with other teams to form a larger team (of perhaps up to 30
men), depending on the mission. At a designated time, several teams can join
up and form a detachment (for example, to conduct a raid), which can at any
moment split up again. This whole process can be planned before the opera-
tion begins, or it can evolve during the course of the operation.
13-47. When deployed outside the State, each SPF team or detachment is in
direct communication with a higher headquarters. The controlling headquar-
ters is at the very least an OSC, and some SPF units receive orders directly
from the General Staff or theater headquarters. Thus, the chain of command
during operations is simple and flexible. |
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SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
13-48. SPF are a major source of human intelligence (HUMINT), placing
“eyes on target” in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory. They
gather information to satisfy strategic and operational intelligence requirements
at extended distances (sometimes more than 100 km) or close to tactical recon-
naissance, in nonlinear and noncontiguous situations. Their priorities include
• Precision weapons.
• NBC delivery systems.
• Headquarters and other command and control (C2) installations.
• Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RISTA) systems and centers.
• Rail, road, and air movement routes.
• Airfields and ports.
• Logistics facilities.
• Air defense systems.
Once SPF teams locate such targets, they may simply monitor and report on
activity there, or they may conduct direct action or diversionary measures.
13-49. The SPF can train and employ affiliated forces and civilians to perform
HUMINT activities. They may also operate in conjunction with HUMINT
agents controlled by the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff.
DIRECT ACTION
13-50. Direct action involves an overt, covert, or clandestine attack by armed
individuals or groups to damage or destroy high-value targets or to kill or seize a
person or persons. Examples of direct-action missions for SPF units are assas-
sination, abduction, hostage taking, sabotage, capture, ambushes, raids, rescue
of hostages (civilian and military), and rescue of downed pilots and aircrews. Im-
plementation of direct-action missions depends on the size of the enemy’s defenses,
the element of surprise, and the assets available to the SPF unit commander.
13-51. The term diversionary measures refers to direct actions of groups or
individuals operating in the enemy’s rear area. These measures include the
destruction or degradation of key military objectives and the disruption of C2,
communications, junctions, transport, and LOCs. They could include misdi-
recting military road movement by moving road markers and generating false
communications. They also involve killing personnel, spreading disinformation,
destroying military hardware, and other actions to weaken the morale and will
of the enemy by creating confusion and panic. Diversionary measures may
contribute to the conduct of information warfare.
MISSIONS
13-52. While SPF belonging to other service components are designed for use
at the operational level, forces from the SPF Command provide a regional and
global strategic capability. Collectively, all these SPF assets can engage the
enemy simultaneously to his operational and even strategic depth. They are
prepared to attack enemy forces anywhere in the region, at overseas bases, at
home stations, and even in military communities. They can attack his airfields, |
7-100.1 | 315 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
seaports, transportation infrastructures, and LOCs. Targets include not only
enemy military forces, but also government agency heads, contractors, and
private firms involved in transporting troops and materiel into the region or
supporting enemy forces in any manner.
13-53. SPF are likely to be used against key political, economic, or population
centers or tangible targets whose destruction affects intangible centers of
gravity, rather than against military targets for purely military objectives.
These efforts often place noncombatants at risk and aim to apply diplomatic-
political, economic, and psychological pressure. The goal is to present the
enemy with a nonlinear, simultaneous battlefield. Attacking such targets can
not only deny the enemy sanctuary, but also weaken his national will, par-
ticularly if the OPFOR can attack targets in the enemy’s homeland.
13-54. SPF are capable of conducting the following basic missions:
• Neutralize weapons of mass destruction and precision weapons.
• Attack air defense facilities and airfields.
• Disrupt LOCs.
• Attack C2 and RISTA facilities.
• Exploit surprise to disrupt defensive actions.
• Undermine morale and spread panic.
• Disrupt enemy power supplies and transportation networks (power
utilities, POL transfer and storage sites, and internal transportation).
• Conduct reconnaissance for future ground force operations or for
airborne and/or amphibious landings.
• Organize local irregular forces.
• Prevent efficient movement of enemy reserves.
• Assassinate important political and military figures.
• Provide terminal guidance for attacking aircraft, missiles, and precision
weapons.
In addition to these basic missions, SPF may have specific missions in
peacetime, transition to war, and wartime.
Peacetime Missions
13-55. During peacetime, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
carefully coordinates reconnaissance programs geared to meet the intelligence
requirements of the State and of the OPFOR in war. Aside from SPF troops, it
maintains agent networks in the target country to support SPF operations.
Some of these agents actively engage in subversion; others are “sleepers,”
prepared to act on call in time of war. The SPF Command trains agents to
operate as political agitators, intelligence collectors, and saboteurs. The
agents establish residence near military targets such as airports, missile
bases, arsenals, communications centers, logistics centers and depots, and
routes used for troop movements. Just before the beginning of hostilities, SPF
teams link up with agents already operating in the target area. |
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13-56. Clandestine SPF sabotage agents do little intelligence collection. Their job
is to assimilate into the local culture, establish residences near transport and power
facilities, and when ordered, emplace explosive charges in preselected targets.
13-57. Another important task for clandestine SPF sabotage agents in
peacetime is to acquire houses and plots of land to prepare safe areas where
sabotage teams (civilian and military) can find refuge after landing behind
enemy lines in times of hostilities. These places are usually in the countryside,
in forested areas near the sea, or in the mountains.
13-58. Agents provide incoming sabotage and assassination teams with safe
areas, motor transport, fuel, and supplies. They then guide the teams to their
objective. Both intelligence and sabotage agents can come under the control of a
theater or OSC chief of reconnaissance. The chief of reconnaissance can transfer
agents from one category to the other at any time or order them to fulfill both roles.
Transition to War
13-59. Before hostilities begin, SPF conduct clandestine operations in the target
area. This increases the probability of destroying key targets well before enemy
force protection measures tighten. This is the most critical period because
clandestine agents or teams can efficiently use the enemy’s lack of awareness
as an opportunity to disorganize and disrupt troops and the local population.
Since the SPF often use terror tactics, direct action during this transition period
still allows plausible deniability. Missions generally include the following:
• Conduct strategic and operational reconnaissance.
• Train and assist insurgents operating in foreign countries.
• Organize local irregular forces.
• Weaken the target country’s military capabilities or will to fight
through either subversion or direct action.
• Assassinate key military and political figures.
• Sabotage enemy mobilization and deployment.
13-60. The General Staff directs the planning of SPF wartime missions, which
form an integral part of combined arms operations. Intended to support
theater-level campaigns as well as OSC-level operations, SPF are capable of
operating throughout enemy territory.
Wartime Missions
13-61. SPF play an important role in support of both the offense and defense.
They may perform their missions separately, in support of strategic objec-
tives, or in support of a theater-level campaign or an OSC-level operation.
Missions generally include some of the following:
• Conduct deep reconnaissance operations.
• Conduct direct action along strategic or operational axes, including
ambushes and raids.
• Destroy critical air defense systems and associated radars.
• Support follow-on conventional military operations.
• Assist local irregular forces to prepare for offensive operations. |
7-100.1 | 317 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
• Provide communications, liaison, and support to stay-behind partisan
operations in the defense.
13-62. The OPFOR conducts SPF operations in the enemy’s operational and
strategic depth to undermine his morale and to spread panic among the
civilian population and the political leadership. Refugees can hamper enemy
deployment, defensive maneuver, and logistics.
13-63. SPF allocated to an OSC often become part of the disruption force,
frequently operating in enemy-held territory before the beginning of an
operation or battle. They may become part of an OSC’s IFC, to assist in
locating and destroying key enemy formations or systems (see Chapter 2).
13-64. Regional Operations. In operations against the State’s regional
neighbors, Army SPF inserted in advance can support the ground forces
at the operational level and conduct reconnaissance and direct action to
the opponent’s operational depth. Naval and Air Force SPF can carry out
reconnaissance in support of landings or conduct raids against critical
targets. The SPF Command uses its assets to conduct missions throughout
the strategic depth of current regional opponents and to detect indicators of
possible outside intervention in the regional conflict. The SPF can also
support terrorist and insurgent operations in the region.
13-65. Transition Operations. During transition operations, when an
extraregional force begins to intervene, the SPF Command can use its re-
gional and global intelligence-gathering capabilities to the enemy’s strategic
depth. It can use SPF teams to conduct direct-action attacks against ports,
LOCs, and early-entry forces. The SPF can use terror tactics and are well
equipped, armed, and motivated for such missions. The SPF can also support
insurgent and terrorist operations to delay or disrupt the extraregional force’s
mobilization and deployment.
13-66. During transition operations, Army SPF conduct raids against enemy
logistics sites, LOCs, and vulnerable military targets in the region. The Navy
and Air Force can also insert Naval and Air Force SPF to conduct raids
against critical installations within the region. The SPF Command can
conduct attacks to the enemy’s strategic depth, to divert enemy resources to
protect politically or ecologically sensitive targets and to undermine the
enemy’s will to enter or continue the fight. Although these attacks are
characteristically part of transition operations, they are also conducted
during regional and adaptive operations if required.
13-67. Adaptive Operations. During adaptive operations, substantial gaps
may exist between the positions of dispersed OPFOR units. In these gaps, the
OPFOR may use SPF to destroy key systems, cause politically unacceptable
casualties, harass the enemy, and maintain contact.
13-68. Air Force SPF provide air base security in State territory or other areas
occupied by the OPFOR. They can conduct raids against enemy air bases and
installations within the region. They may also take part in joint SPF opera-
tions coordinated by the SPF Command as part of strategic operations. The
Navy could use its submarine force to insert SPF for direct action against a
high-payoff target outside the region. |
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13-69. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR may increase the level of
SPF actions in the enemy rear area. The national-level SPF Command provides
the ability to attack both regional and extraregional enemies throughout
their strategic depth. Strategic reconnaissance by SPF in support of national
intelligence requirements is an essential element of access-control operations.
In addition to its own direct action against enemy forces and installations, the
SPF Command can also support operations of irregular forces.
13-70. The OPFOR has trained SPF as alternate means of delivering nuclear,
biological, or chemical (NBC) munitions packages it may develop for them.
This provides a worldwide strategic means of NBC delivery that is not limited
to the range of the missiles of the Strategic Forces.
INTEGRATED FIRES COMMAND
13-71. An IFC may include an SPF unit as one of its many components (see
Chapters 2 and 7). At OSC level, the SPF component provides the OPFOR
the ability to attack both regional and extraregional enemies throughout
their strategic depth. They conduct operations to achieve strategic military,
political, economic, and/or psychological objectives or to achieve tactical or
operational goals in support of strategic objectives. Such operations may have
either long-range or immediate impact on the enemy.
COMMANDOS
13-72. The SPF Command also includes elite commando units. Like SPF units,
commandos normally operate in territory not controlled by the State. Normally,
personnel selected for commando units come from soldiers who have already
served 3 to 7 years in other combat arms. In addition to proficiency in various
infantry-type tactics, they receive training for more specialized commando mis-
sions, with emphasis on infiltrating and fighting in complex terrain and at night.
Command and Control
13-73. In the administrative force structure, commando battalions are
subordinate to the SPF Command. For administrative purposes, these battal-
ions may be grouped under a commando brigade headquarters. However,
commandos are employed as battalions, companies, platoons, and squads or as
small teams, depending on the type of mission. Commandos are elite units,
specially trained for missions in enemy territory. When assigned such mis-
sions, the commando units may disperse into small teams (typically 5 to 12
men). These small teams are harder to detect during infiltration and provide
the ability to attack many targets simultaneously to achieve maximum effect.
However, based on factors such as the enemy situation and the size of the tar-
get, the individual teams may come together temporarily to form commando
detachments. If necessary, they can re-form into platoon- to company-size
units to perform attacks against critical military and civilian targets.
13-74. Commando units can be allocated in a constituent or dedicated status
to be task organized as part of an OSC or of a division or brigade tactical group
(DTG or BTG) based on a regular ground forces organization. Even is such cases,
however, the reason for incorporating a commando unit into such an organization
normally would be to perform specialized commando missions that contribute to |
7-100.1 | 319 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
the overall mission for which that task organization was created. In other cases,
commando units may be allocated in a supporting relationship, while remaining
under the command of their parent commando unit or the SPF Command.
Infantry-Type Missions
13-75. Sometimes, particularly in defensive situations, commandos may be
called on to perform regular infantry missions, filling gaps between dispersed
regular forces. In this case, commandos would typically fight as companies or
battalions, using tactics similar to those of regular infantry units.
Commando Missions
13-76. Commando units generally conduct various types of reconnaissance
and combat missions in the disruption zone or deep in enemy territory, during
larger operations or tactical actions that are either offensive or defensive. The
reconnaissance missions include actions such as surveillance, monitoring, and
searches. Commando units are expected to conduct reconnaissance within the
context of any combat mission. Conversely, when employed as reconnaissance
forces, the commando units’ activities are not limited to reconnaissance. They are
also tasked with assaulting and destroying military or civilian targets.
13-77. Commandos provide the OPFOR with flexible, lethal forces capable of
employment in a variety of roles. Typical missions that are assigned to the
commandos include but are not limited to
• Collecting information on deployment of enemy forces and reserve unit
movement.
• Collecting information on logistics facilities and seaports.
• Collecting information on enemy aircraft operating from forward airfields.
• Conducting reconnaissance of terrain and enemy forces, in support of
the offense.
• Locating and destroying enemy weapons of mass destruction.
• Conducting team- or platoon-size raids and ambushes and destroying
critical military or civilian targets in enemy territory.
• Conducing larger-scale (company- or battalion-size) raids and ambushes
in the disruption zone or in enemy territory.
• Clearing LOCs for use by supported regular ground force units during
the offense or defense.
• Clearing or emplacing obstacles.
• Conducting surprise attacks on enemy forces and create disturbances
after infiltrating into enemy territory.
• Acting as a disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation, or security force.
• Acting as an antilanding reserve.
13-78. Offense. Commandos are employed as infiltration units during the of-
fense. Following overland, airborne, seaborne, or waterborne infiltration,
commandosoperating independentlymay perform various reconnaissance
and combat missions described above. However, they may also act in conjunction |
7-100.1 | 320 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
with regular ground forces. In the latter role, commandos can conduct the
following missions to ensure the success of the overall offensive action:
13-79. Commandos can act as a disruption force, or as part of such a force. In
addition to reconnaissance missions, they can be tasked with creating con-
fusion in the disruption zone or in enemy territory by
• Removing or emplacing obstacles.
• Raiding and destroying headquarters, LOCs, and tactical missile firing
locations.
• Occupying key terrain features (in advance of regular ground forces).
• Occupying ambush positions on enemy withdrawal routes.
13-80. Commandos can act as a fixing force. In this role, they can set up
ambushes or emplace obstacles to prevent further enemy forces from coming
to the aid of the target the regular forces’ attack. They can occupy key terrain
features that control choke points that hinder enemy reserve unit movements.
Such choke points may be valleys, bridges, and crossroads that are critical for
the enemy movement.
13-81. Commandos can act as part of an assault force. In this role, they can
conduct raids and surprise attacks against C2 sites, logistics elements, fire
support units (to include attack helicopter units), and other high-priority civilian
and military targets. They also conduct attacks against other objectives or seize
terrain that hinders enemy reserve unit movements or hampers his withdrawal.
13-82. As part of an exploitation force, commandos may attack a withdrawing
enemy force from his flank and rear. Commando units can be air-inserted
ahead of the withdrawing enemy force to establish ambush positions along the
enemy’s withdrawal route.
13-83. Defense. During a defensive operation conducted by an OSC, commando
units allocated to the OSC can support the action primarily in reconnaissance
and security roles. Commando units can conduct reconnaissance in the OSC
disruption zone or deep in enemy territory. They may also act as a security
force in the OSC support zone. When acting as a security force, commandos
are normally employed as companies or battalions. The commando unit can be
augmented with vehicles and/or additional forces (such as tank or mechanized
units, fire support, or aviation) to act as an assault force in limited-objective
attacks against enemy airborne, air assault, or special operations forces units.
13-84. A commando battalion or company is seldom used as a combat force in
the battle zone because of organization, equipment, and limited firepower.
However, if the defensive mission is more important than reconnaissance or
security, it may act as a combat force, using regular infantry or motorized
infantry tactics. Commando units may fill gaps between the battle positions of
regular forces. When performing such infantry-type missions, commandos are
normally employed as companies or battalions.
13-85. When OSC maneuver forces are forced to withdraw from an area, com-
mando units can remain deployed in the OSC’s original disruption zone and
battle zone to perform reconnaissance, raids, and ambushes. The stay-behind
commandos attempt to maneuver in small teams to conduct reconnaissance |
7-100.1 | 321 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
sance and limited-objective attacks against enemy targets such as C2 sites,
isolated combat units, LOCs, and logistics units.
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
13-86. The Navy has a limited amphibious capability that allows it to insert
either naval infantry or regular ground forces or SPF from the sea. It also
fields a submarine force that could insert naval infantry to conduct raids
against critical installations within the region. The Navy also fields its own
Naval SPF that are able to conduct reconnaissance in support of landings or
raids against critical targets. Thus, amphibious operations can play an impor-
tant role in regional, transition, or adaptive operations.
MISSIONS
13-87. Amphibious landings can be either operational or tactical in scale. However,
either type can influence the outcome of a larger operation or strategic campaign.
Operational Missions
13-88. Amphibious operations can occur when the objectives are of critical
value and the enemy surface warfare capability allows. Although these opera-
tions may be conducted independently of SPF or regular ground forces, they
may have air, naval gunfire, and missile support. Thus, it is possible for an
operational amphibious landing to have major strategic consequences.
13-89. These operational missions may have the following objectives:
• Conduct operations in concert with ground forces to envelop and
destroy enemy positions in a coastal area.
• Seize or destroy ports, islands, peninsulas, and/or straits, radar sites,
and other important objectives in coastal areas.
• Interdict enemy LOCs within the coastal areas.
• Conduct combined operations with or in support of airborne and SPF
units landed deep within enemy territory.
• Contribute to deception operations with amphibious landings mounted as
a feint to mislead the enemy about the direction of the OPFOR main effort.
• Block the approach routes of enemy reserves or counterattack forces
that might influence the outcome of the main operation or campaign.
• Establish coastal defenses on occupied coasts as other OPFOR forces
move deeper into enemy territory.
These objectives can be accomplished by conducting an unopposed, surreptitious
insertion of amphibious forces within striking distance of a lightly defended target.
Tactical Missions
13-90. Tactical amphibious landings probably are the most frequent form of
OPFOR amphibious operation. Their purpose is to attack the rear area or
flank of any enemy force along a coastline or to seize islands, naval bases,
coastal airfields, ports, and other objectives on an enemy-held coastline. This
diverts enemy attention and resources away from the decisive area of the |
7-100.1 | 322 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
battlefield. The amphibious landing force can be up to a detachment, operat-
ing independently or with ground force units.
13-91. In an offensive operation, tactical amphibious landing forces can seize
bridges or road junctions near the coast and hold them until the arrival of the
main land forces. Such landings can stop or delay enemy reinforcements or cut
off his line of retreat. They may also help to maintain the tempo of the OPFOR
ground forces’ advance, or they can be for deceptive purposes. Thus, landings that
are tactical in scale may nevertheless have important operational repercussions.
Reconnaissance and Sabotage Missions
13-92. Reconnaissance and sabotage amphibious landings are in a special
category. Seaborne raids may perform the multiple functions of
• Conducting reconnaissance.
• Damaging or destroying high-value installations located near a coast.
• Disrupting the enemy’s C2 and/or logistics.
• Tying down substantial numbers of enemy troops in the defense of
long, vulnerable coastlines.
Sea-delivered SPF teams may also perform deep reconnaissance and sabotage
tasks of operational or strategic importance.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
13-93. In the administrative force structure, naval infantry forces are part of the
Navy. However, they may conduct amphibious landings in support of an OSC or
theater command as part of joint and combined arms operations. The SHC or
theater command may allocate naval infantry units to an OSC in a given operation.
13-94. Some amphibious landings are conducted by naval infantry delivered
by naval transport, without support from or coordinated action with other ser-
vices of the Armed Forces. In this case, a naval commander could exercise
overall C2 of the amphibious operation.
13-95. However, most landings by naval infantry are part of a larger joint
operation or campaign in which they operate in conjunction with forces of other
services. When sufficient naval infantry forces are not available, the amphibious
landing force may consist of ground forces or SPF units that are transported by
naval vessels. In these cases, the OSC or theater commander normally organizes
and controls the amphibious operation, with expert advice from the chief of littoral
warfare on his functional staff. The OSC or theater commander coordinates the
joint actions of the naval and/or ground forces conducting the landing with support-
ing actions by airborne, SPF, Air Force, and air defense forces. The commander of
the naval transport unit and the commander of the transported unit usually share
responsibility for overall control during loading, transport, and landing.
13-96. The landing force commander is the commander of the naval infantry,
ground force, or SPF unit forming the basis for the amphibious landing force.
He is responsible for preparing and positioning his troops for embarkation on
naval craft that will transport them to the shore. He must coordinate with the
commander of the naval unit providing transport. After the landing, the land-
ing force commander is solely responsible for conducting the operation. While |
7-100.1 | 323 | ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
the landing force commander can plan the scheme of maneuver, final approval
of the plan comes from the OSC or theater commander.
CONDUCT
13-97. The preference for smaller-scale landings reflects the limited and
subordinate role amphibious landings play in OPFOR thinking. Also, the
OPFOR does not use its naval infantry in exactly the same way as other
countries use their marines. For the latter, the seizure of a beachhead is
often merely a prelude to extended action ashore. The OPFOR, by contrast,
generally intends to use its specialized naval infantry troops only to secure a
beachhead (and perhaps to raid inland). Any buildup of effort is by ordinary
infantry or mechanized infantry units, with supporting artillery and staying
power. The OPFOR withdraws naval infantry from combat as soon as possible
to keep it available to ensure the success of subsequent landings. This, along
with coastal defense, is the primary role of OPFOR naval infantry.
Joint Forces and Combined Arms
13-98. An amphibious landing usually takes on a joint and combined arms
character. Its success normally requires at least temporary local air and naval
superiority. (The exception would be small-scale raids conducted under condi-
tions of limited visibility.) Against all but the weakest of enemy defenses, a
heavy fire preparation is also necessary to suppress the enemy. Naturally,
much fire is air-delivered, including using fires of accompanying helicopters.
Also, the main ground forces’ long-range artillery and/or naval gunfire may be
able to provide support for shallow landings.
13-99. An airborne or heliborne landing normally precedes or accompanies
any important amphibious landing. If the amphibious landing is to be small in
scale and shallow, a heliborne force may suffice. However, a major deep
landing probably requires the aid of an airborne drop. These air-delivered
forces may either seize a beachhead or port, interdict the approach of enemy
reserves, or attack important targets.
13-100. For successful amphibious and supporting air landings, the OPFOR
must have an accurate picture of what enemy land, air, and naval forces are in
range to intervene. Intensive intelligence-gathering always precedes the landing.
13-101. In a landing conducted jointly with sea-delivered ground forces, naval
infantry units constitute the assault force. They have responsibility for
breaching antilanding obstacles in the water and on the shore, for seizing a
beachhead, and for securing the approach of the exploitation force to the landing
area. Once ashore, naval infantry units employ standard OPFOR tactics as they
fight their way forward to link up with air-landed troops. Their immediate mis-
sion is to provide protection for the landing and deployment of exploitation forces.
13-102. After the naval infantry secures a beachhead, infantry or mechanized
infantry units can land and take over the battle. They normally replace,
rather than reinforce, the assault force, even if the latter has taken only light
casualties. Thus, the naval infantry remains available to spearhead additional
landings. Once that is accomplished, the assault force assists the exploitation
force in achieving the overall objective of the landing. |
7-100.1 | 324 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
13-103. As pointed out, the OPFOR expects to commit infantry or mechanized
infantry units through a secure beachhead to perform combat missions inland.
However, these units may share in the assault landing role as well. If so, the
OPFOR recognizes the need for at least a degree of special training. The
ground force units may have attached naval infantry personnel to help over-
come the special problems of an assault landing.
Regional Operations
13-104. Against a regional opponent, the OPFOR may be able to conduct
amphibious landings as operational-level missions. In this case, a landing
force of battalion or even brigade size, once landed, could conduct large-scale
operations employing fixing, assault, and exploitation forces, as described in
Chapter 3.
13-105. The OPFOR’s naval infantry forces may be capable of forcible entry
against regional opponents. Amphibious operations may entail the landing of
a naval infantry battalion or brigade as the assault force. The exploitation
force, consisting primarily of infantry or mechanized infantry troops, follows
to exploit the opportunity created by the assault force.
13-106. Even in regional operations, larger-scale amphibious landings are
risky. Therefore, the OPFOR normally would not attempt them outside the
range of land-based air cover and support. Linkup with a ground maneuver
force should occur as quickly as possible.
Transition Operations
13-107. When an extraregional enemy has only early-entry forces deployed,
OPFOR naval infantry forces may still be capable of forcible entry. Their in-
sertion can complete the envelopment of a small enemy force. It could also
help control further enemy deployment from the sea.
Adaptive Operations
13-108. The OPFOR does not have the capability to conduct opposed amphibious
operations against a fully deployed extraregional force. It does, however, have
the capability to transport up to a regular infantry or naval infantry battalion
by sea, with limited amounts of supplies and heavy weapons. The unit is then
landed unopposed at a predetermined site, away from the enemy’s main
forces. In some cases, SPF or airborne troops may be inserted in lieu of using
conventional infantry or naval infantry.
13-109. During adaptive operations, amphibious operations typically comprise
small-scale landings conducted in detachment strength. These operations
include raids, ambushes, reconnaissance, and assaults, with detachment-
strength actions being the norm. The raids and ambushes in this case would
be small-scale actions conducted in a manner similar to those described for
SPF earlier in this chapter, against isolated small enemy forces. Because of
the extraregional force’s modern RISTA means, only shorter-range landings
conducted during hours of darkness have a chance of achieving the surprise
that is critical to success. Normally, linkup with friendly forces is planned to
occur within hours after the landing. |
7-100.1 | 325 | Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with joint definitions, and other
selected terms. Terms with specific OPFOR-related definitions for which
FM 7-100.1 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an
asterisk (*) and followed by the number of the paragraph (¶) or page
where they are defined. For other terms, refer to the document listed.
AA antiaircraft
*access limitation ..................................................................................................¶1-61
*adaptive operations ....................................................................................................¶1-6
ADCSINT Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
ADD area distribution depot
ADTDL Army Doctrine and Training Digital Library (now the General
Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library)
*administrative force structure ..........................................................................................¶2-23
AFCS automated fire control system
*affiliated ..................................................................................................¶2-14
AFL affiliated
AIRCP airborne command post
*air parity ...................................................................¶8-67 (see also FM 1-02)
*air superiority ....................................................................¶8-65 (see also JP 1-02)
*air supremacy ....................................................................¶8-64 (see also JP 1-02)
AKO Army Knowledge Online
ALR antilanding reserve
ALTCP alternate command post
*annihilation ..................................................................................................¶7-10
*antilanding reserve ..................................................................................................¶4-64
*antitank reserve ..................................................................................................¶4-63
AOR area of responsibility
AOS airspace operations subsection
AP antipersonnel
APC armored personnel carrier
APOD aerial port of debarkation |
7-100.1 | 326 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
APOE aerial port of embarkation......................................................¶1-60
*area defense ................................................................¶4-112 (see also FM 1-02)
*area of responsibility ...................................................................¶2-68 (see also JP 1-02)
ARM antiradiation missile
ASP aviation support plan
AT antitank
*assault force ..................................................................................................¶3-53
ATGM antitank guided missile
ATR antitank reserve
*attack ..................................................................................................¶3-69
*attack zone ...............................................................................¶2-79, 3-43, 4-42
AUXCP auxiliary command post
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
*axis ........................................................................................¶3-45, 4-42
*battle line ..................................................................................................¶2-71
*battle position ..................................................................¶4-44 (see also FM 1-02)
*battle zone ...............................................................................¶2-76, 3-37, 4-39
*brigade tactical group ..................................................................................................¶2-45
BTG brigade tactical group
C2 command and control
C2W command and control warfare
C3D camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception
CAO chief of airspace operations
CDR commander
CGS Chief of the General Staff
COE contemporary operational environment
*combat system ................................................................................................¶1-114
*command and control ....................................................................................................¶2-3
*complex battle position ..................................................................................................¶4-46
*complex terrain ....................................................................................................p. ix
*computer warfare ..................................................................................................¶5-28
*constituent ..................................................................................................¶2-11
*contact force ..................................................................................................¶4-98
*contemporary operational environment ...........................................................................p. vi |
7-100.1 | 327 | _________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
*contemporary OPFOR ..................................................................................................p. xiii
COP command observation post
COTS commercial off-the-shelf
*counterattack ..................................................................¶3-103 (see also JP 1-02)
*counterattack force ..................................................................................................¶4-59
CP command post
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CTC combat training center
DAS direct air support
DC deputy commander
DCP deception command post
DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
*decentralized defense ..................................................................................................¶4-85
*deception force .........................................................................................¶3-56, 4-66
DED dedicated
*dedicated ..................................................................................................¶2-12
*defense information infrastructure ...................................................................................¶5-6
*defensive information warfare ..........................................................................................¶5-61
*defensive maneuver ..................................................................................................¶4-98
*demolition ..................................................................................................¶7-11
*destruction ....................................................................................................¶7-9
DII defense information infrastructure
*direct air support ..................................................................................................¶8-49
*dispersed attack ..................................................................................................¶3-80
*disruption force .........................................................................................¶3-50, 4-52
*disruption zone ................................................................................¶2-75, 3-31, 4-35
*division tactical group ..................................................................................................¶2-45
DOD Department of Defense
DOS denial of service
DTG divisional tactical group
DZ drop zone
ECM electronic countermeasures
ECCM electronic counter-countermeasures |
7-100.1 | 328 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
*electronic warfare ...................................................................¶5-24 (see also JP 1-02)
*enemy ...................................................................................................p. xii
EO electro-optical
EW electronic warfare
*exploitation force ..................................................................................................¶3-54
FARP forward arming and refueling point
FCP forward command post
FG field group
*field group ..................................................................................................¶2-33
*fixing force ..................................................................................................¶3-51
FM field manual
FSCC fire support coordination center
*functional forces ..................................................................................................¶3-46
*functional staff ................................................................................................¶2-109
GII global information infrastructure
GPS global positioning system
*harassment ..................................................................................................¶7-13
HE high-explosive
HF high-frequency
HPT high-payoff target
HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high-value target
IA information attack
IADS integrated air defense system
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IFC integrated fires command
IFF identification, friend or foe
IFV infantry fighting vehicle
INFO information
*information attack ..................................................................................................¶5-48
*information warfare ..................................................................p. 5-1 (see also FM 1-02)
*integrated attack ..................................................................................................¶3-72
*integrated defense ..................................................................................................¶4-83 |
7-100.1 | 329 | _________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
*integrated fires command ..................................................................................................¶2-47
*integrated support command .................................................................................¶2-61, 12-42
*integrated support group ................................................................................................¶12-42
INTEL intelligence
IR infrared
ISC integrated support command
ISG integrated support group
IT information technology
IW information warfare
JP joint publication
*kill zone ................................................................................¶2-80, 3-44, 4-43
km kilometer(s)
LAN local area network
*limited-objective attack ..................................................................................................¶3-89
*limit of responsibility ..................................................................................................¶2-68
LOC line of communications
*local air superiority ..................................................................................................¶8-66
LOR limit of responsibility
LZ landing zone
m meter(s)
*main defense force ..................................................................................................¶4-56
*maneuver defense ..................................................................................................¶4-89
*maneuver reserve ..................................................................................................¶4-61
MCP main command post
*military strategic campaign plan .....................................................................................¶1-22
*military strategy ....................................................................¶1-81 (see also JP 1-02)
mm millimeter(s)
MOD Ministry of Defense
MRL multiple rocket launcher
MSD movement support detachment
MSS mission support site
MTC military transportation center
*national information infrastructure ..................................................................................¶5-5
*national security strategy ....................................................................................................¶1-1 |
7-100.1 | 330 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
*national strategic campaign ...............................................................................................¶1-15
*national strategic campaign plan .....................................................................................¶1-18
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA national command authority
NCO noncommissioned officer
*neutralization ..................................................................................................¶7-12
NGO nongovernmental organization
NII national information infrastructure
NOE nap-of-the-earth
OBJ objective
objective .............................................¶3-45 (see also FM 1-02 and JP 1-02)
OD obstacle detachment
ODCSINT Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
OE operational environment
*offensive information warfare ...........................................................................................¶5-58
operational art ..................................................................¶1-84? (see also JP 1-02)
operational environment ....................................................................................p. vi (JP 1-02)
*operational exclusion ..................................................................................................¶1-59
*operational shielding ................................................................................................¶1-63?
*operational-strategic command .......................................................................................¶2-36?
OPFOR opposing force
*opposing force (OPFOR) ...................................................................................................p. xii
OSC operational-strategic command
OTID OPFOR and Threat Integration Directorate
paramilitary forces ..............................................................................................JP 1-02
*perception management ..................................................................................................¶5-44
*personnel support ................................................................................................¶12-68
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
*precision weapon ..................................................................................................¶7-40
*protected force ..................................................................................................¶4-57
*protection and security measures ....................................................................................¶5-38
PSYWAR psychological warfare
PVO private volunteer organization
PWP plasticized white phosphorus |
7-100.1 | 331 | _________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
QRF quick reaction force
RCS radar cross section
*reconnaissance fire ..................................................................................................¶7-60
*regional operations ....................................................................................................¶1-6
RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
ROE rules of engagement
RPV remotely-piloted vehicle
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic-aperture radar
SATCOM satellite communication(s)
SCP strategic campaign plan
*security force .........................................................................................¶3-55, 4-58
SHC Supreme High Command
SHF super-high-frequency
*shielding force ..................................................................................................¶4-98
SID Strategic Integration Department
*simple battle position ..................................................................................................¶4-45
SIW strategic information warfare
SIWP strategic information warfare plan
SIWPO Strategic Information Warfare Planning Office
SLAR side-looking airborne radar
SOCC support operations coordination center
*sophisticated ambush ..................................................................................................¶3-93
SPF Special-Purpose Forces
SPOD sea port of debarkation
SPOE sea port of embarkation
spoiling attack ....................................................................¶3-98 (see also JP 1-02)
SPT supporting
SSM surface-to-surface missile
*strategic information warfare............................................................................................¶5-53
*strategic operations ...........................................................................................¶1-6, 1-27
*strategic preclusion ..................................................................................................¶1-57
*strike ................................................................................................¶3-110
*supporting ..................................................................................................¶2-13 |
7-100.1 | 332 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
*support line ..................................................................................................¶2-71
*support zone ...............................................................................¶2-78, 3-42, 4-41
SUSCP sustainment command post
*system ................................................................................................¶1-107
*systems warfare ................................................................................................¶1-108
*tactical group ..................................................................................................¶2-44
TBM theater ballistic missile
TECH technical
*theater ...................................................................¶2-19 (see also JP 1-02)
*threat ...................................................................................................p. xii
TIC toxic industrial chemical
TO&E table of organization and equipment
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
*transition operations ....................................................................................................¶1-6
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UHF ultra-high-frequency
VEESS vehicle engine exhaust smoke system
VHF very-high-frequency
WAN wide area network
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WP white phosphorus |
7-100.1 | 333 | Bibliography
The bibliography lists field manuals by new number followed by old
number.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
Available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/
FM 1-02 (101-5-1). Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: http://www.us.army.mil and
http://www.adtdl.army.mil
FM 7-100. Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy. 1 May 2003.
FM 7-100.2. Opposing Force Tactics. TBP.
FM 7-100.3. Opposing Force: Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and
Tactics. TPB.
FM 7-100.4. Opposing Force Organization Guide. TBP.
FM 7-100.5. Opposing Force: Worldwide Equipment Guide. TBP. |
7-100.1 | 334 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. After a page
reference, the subsequent use of paragraph reference is indicated by the paragraph symbol (¶).
A adaptive operations, 1-6, 1-13, logistics and administrative
1-47–1-53, 1-88–1-91 support, 2-26, 12-8, 12-20–
abduction, 13-50
12-21, 12-32, 12-36–
airborne forces, 13-3
access-control operations, pp. x, 12-37, 12-41
xix, ¶1-36, 1-55–1-62, 1-65, 1-74, air defense, 9-153, 9-193–
naval infantry, 13-93
1-104, 2-34, 2-57, 3-5, 3-8, 3-10, 9-196
4-13, 4-15, 4-23, 4-116, 5-81, amphibious landings, 13-86, smoke units, 11-71
5-89, 6-48, 7-76, 8-44, 8-71, 13-108–13-109 SPF, 13-41–13-42
9-82, 10-16, 10-68, 10-70, 13-3,
aviation, 8-73–8-77 administrative subsection, ISC
13-69, 13-107
staff, 12-38
defensive operations, 4-13–
access limitation, p. xix,
4-18, 4-25, 4-28, 4-69, advanced munitions, 7-42, 7-59
¶1-61–1-62, 4-13, 5-89,
4-76, 4-113 adversary. See enemy; opposing
7-77, 9-191, 11-96
engineer support, 10-59, force; threat.
operational exclusion, 1-59–
10-64–10-75 aerial ports of debarkation
1-60
fire support, 7-72, 7-79–7-81 (enemy), as targets, 1-62, 1-104,
strategic preclusion, 1-6, 1-12,
6-48, 7-77, 10-58, 11-96. See
heliborne forces, 13-3
1-30–1-31, 1-35–1-36, 1-40,
also airfields; ports.
1-57–1-58, 3-5, 3-9, 4-5, IW support of, 5-86–5-90
aerial ports of embarkation
5-79, 5-84, 9-191 logistics, 12-14
(enemy), as targets, 1-60. See
actor(s), pp. xivxv. See also NBC use, 11-97–11-98 also airfields; ports.
nation-state; non-state; third-
offensive operations, 3-14– aerial reconnaissance, 6-26, 6-34,
party actors.
3-16, 3-18–3-20, 3-22, 3-89, 6-37, 6-42, 8-3–8-4, 8-10–8-11,
adaptive, 3-95, 4-17, 4-69, 4-113 8-21, 8-35, 8-38, 8-45–8-47, 8-59,
approaches, pp. x, xvi, ¶1-43, paramilitary forces, 1-100, 8-69, 9-112, 10-29, 13-17
1-38, 1-50, 1-82–1-83, 2-98, 1-104, 4-18 aerial resupply. See aviation.
2-100, 3-66, 4-6, 4-14, 4-18,
reconnaissance, 6-50–6-51 affiliated forces, 1-73, 1-78, 2-14,
4-81, 8-73, 9-3–9-4, 9-95,
sanctuary-based. See 2-44, 2-135, 3-14, 3-22, 3-32,
9-195, 10-73, 11-13, 11-98,
sanctuary. 3-59, 3-95, 4-18, 4-25, 4-37,
12-59. See also flexibility;
4-52–4-53, 4-104, 4-119, 5-69,
initiative; opportunity. SPF, 2-57, 13-38, 13-67–
5-72, 6-1, 9-2, 9-52–9-53, 9-61,
13-70
operations. See adaptive
9-76, 9-144, 11-8, 11-30, 11-55,
operations. administrative force structure,
13-49. See also criminal orga-
2-23–2-29, 2-34, 2-37–2-38,
principles, 1-54–1-78 nizations; drug organizations;
2-40–2-43, 2-61
strategy, 1-53 insurgent forces; mercenaries;
airborne forces, 13-5 partisan forces; terrorists.
tactics, 1-53
air defense, 9-79 agents,
use of conventional forces,
pp. x, xix, ¶1-6 allocation to IFC, 2-56 biological. See main entry.
use of technology, p. ix allocation to OSC, 2-37–2-42 chemical. See main entry.
aviation, 8-1–8-2 intelligence and sabotage,
chemical defense units, 11-61 6-7, 13-17, 13-55–13-59
commando units, 13-73
fire support, 7-35 |
7-100.1 | 335 | ____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
air armies, 2-54 airborne jamming, 8-4, 8-52. See air defense, pp. 9-1–9-34
air army CP, 8-13 also heliborne jamming. air defense ambush, 1-76,
airborne landing, p. 13-1, ¶13-1– 4-53, 9-31, 9-61, 9-65, 9-69,
national-level air armies, 8-1,
13-36 9-77, 9-91, 9-145, 9-157,
8-3–8-4, 11-30
9-161, 9-168–9-177, 9-194–
airborne landing force, 2-221,
theater air armies, 2-25, 8-1,
9-195
13-6
8-5–8-7, 8-13, 8-23–8-24,
air defense and NBC warning
11-30 air defense protection for, 9-5
communications net,
airborne assault. See airborne air-landing, 13-21
2-222, 9-47, 9-120, 11-66,
landing. air movement, 13-18, 13-21– 11-68
airborne command post, 2-183, 13-23
Air Defense Forces, Air Force,
2-193, 4-50 annex in operation plan, 2-167 9-39, 9-68, 9-79, 9-81–
airborne forces, 2-26, 3-6, 11-29, departure area, 13-22 9-83, 9-129, 9-160
11-45, p. 13-1, ¶13-1–13-36
drop zone. See main entry. air defense jamming, 8-39–
access-control, 13-3 8-40, 9-7, 9-96–9-99, 9-173
embarking troops, 13-14–
airborne landing. See main 13-15, 13-17 air defense plan, 9-37, 9-164
entry.
fire support, 13-17–13-19 air defense sectors, 9-28–
air transport, 13-9 9-31, 9-195
landing force commander,
allocated to OSC, p. 13-1, 13-6, 13-19, 13-31 air defense umbrella, 8-10,
¶13-5, 13-11 9-20, 9-22, 9-24, 9-85,
landing zone. See main entry.
allocated to theater HQ, 13-5 9-134–9-137
linkup with ground maneuver
as deception force, 13-3 force, 13-6, 13-7, 13-9, air observers, 9-67, 9-113,
9-121–9-123, 9-140,
as assault force, 13-3 13-35–13-36
9-165, 9-174
as exploitation force, 13-3 movement to objective,
air surveillance, 9-23, 9-88,
13-31–13-32
as fixing force, 13-3
9-109, 9-112–9-113, 9-118,
objective area, 13-20, 13-27,
assembly area, 13-27 9-120, 9-134, 9-136, 9-165–
13-29, 13-34–13-36
command and control, 13-5– 9-167, 9-183–9-184
participation of other arms,
13-6 all-arms air defense, 9-1–9-4,
13-9
envelopment, 13-1, 13-11 9-12, 9-15, 9-19, 9-56, 9-73,
planning, 13-14–13-19 9-78, 9-84, 9-89, 9-93–9-95,
establishing a new theater,
preparation of DZ, 13-16– 9-165, 9-182, 9-195
13-10
13-17 antiaircraft guns, 9-73, 9-83,
expanding an airhead, 13-2
reconnaissance of objective, 9-86–9-88, 9-90, 9-92, 9-96,
in adaptive operations, 13-3 13-32 9-98, 9-108, 9-119, 9-131,
in regional operations, 13-2 9-133–9-134, 9-161, 9-169,
SPF support, 13-53, 13-64
9-171, 9-175
in transition operations, 13-3
supported by amphibious
antiaircraft machineguns,
operational missions, 13-11 landing, 13-89
9-93, 9-161, 9-165
reconnaissance, 6-41 airborne operations. See airborne
area coverage, 9-83, 9-87,
regional force projection, landing.
9-127, 9-130, 9-132, 9-135–
p. 13-1, ¶13-2, 13-8 aircraft. See attack helicopters;
9-136, 9-143, 9-146, 9-155
strategic missions, 13-7–13-10 bombers; electronic warfare
Army air defense, 9-79, 9-84
aircraft; fighter aircraft; ground-
strategic objectives, p. 13-1,
attack aircraft; helicopters; aviation. See counterair.
¶13-10
interceptors; reconnaissance basing area (Phase I), 9-48–
support of amphibious
aircraft; tanker; transport 9-49, 9-58, 9-63, 9-65
landing, 13-95, 13-99–
aircraft; transport helicopters.
command and control, 9-22–
13-100, 13-108
9-47
tactical missions, 13-12–13-13
control measures, 9-45
use in heliborne landing, 13-6 |
7-100.1 | 336 | FM 7-100.1________________________________________________________________________________
air defense (continued) in transition operations, 3-13, target acquisition, 9-34, 9-88,
9-153, 9-191–9-192 9-97, 9-109, 9-112, 9-114–
coordination with other arms,
9-115, 9-118
9-19–9-20 jammers. See main entry.
target area (Phase III), 9-48,
corridors, 8-26, 9-45 maneuver and dispersal
9-70, 9-73–9-74
techniques, 9-102, 9-105–
counterair, 8-37, 8-43–8-44,
9-107, 9-148 theater-level, 9-29, 9-79
9-2, 9-56, 9-73, 9-81, 9-189
missile defense, 2-112, 6-32, UAVs, air defense against, 9-5,
defense of high-value/key
9-41, 9-83, 9-86, 9-101 9-41, 9-125, 9-179–9-187
assets, 8-44, 9-81, 9-99,
9-128, 9-131, 9-134, 9-154– national-level assets, 9-63, zones of responsibility, 9-39–
9-155, 9-157, 9-159, 9-170, 9-79, 9-81–9-83, 9-115– 9-44, 9-161
9-189 9-118, 9-129, 9-134, 9-156 air dominance. See airspace
early warning, 9-21, 9-26, 9-67, nonlethal air defense assets, dominance.
9-83, 9-88, 9-109, 9-112– 9-96–9-101 air drop. See airborne landing.
9-114, 9-116–9-118, 9-121, offensive component, 9-6, airfields,
9-146, 9-184, 9-195 9-193
defense of, 9-99, 9-128, 9-154,
fixing force, 3-77, 3-86, 3-116 operational-level assets, 10-12, 13-21, 13-68
flight area (Phase II), 9-48, 9-20, 9-63, 9-79, 9-84–
enemy, as targets, 4-127, 6-20,
9-65–9-67, 9-134 9-85, 9-115–9-118, 9-130–
8-71, 9-48–9-49, 9-51, 9-55–
9-131, 9-161
force protection, 2-112 9-57, 9-59, 9-61–9-62, 9-67,
goal(s), 9-1, 9-5–9-21, 9-71, passive air defense measures, 9-125, 9-160, 9-193, 11-4,
9-136 9-30, 9-100, 9-102–9-108, 11-56, 13-3, 13-10, 13-11,
9-148, 9-159, 9-187, 9-195 13-48, 13-52, 13-54–13-55,
ground-based, 8-37, 9-40,
planning, 9-50–9-55, 9-66, 9-72 13-68, 13-77, 13-90
9-42–9-45, 9-189, 9-195
phases, 9-48–9-77 Air Force, p. 8-1. See also aircraft;
in adaptive operations, 9-153,
aviation.
9-193–9-196 point protection, 9-83, 9-87,
9-127, 9-133, 9-144, air armies. See main entry.
in antilanding reserve, 4-64
9-154–9-155 Air Defense Forces, 9-39,
in battle zone, 9-65, 9-70,
principles, 9-11–9-21 9-68, 9-79, 9-81–9-83,
9-134, 9-145–9-147,
9-129, 9-160
9-156–9-158 radars, See main entry.
Air Force SPF. See Special-
in complex battle position, 4-47 reconnaissance, 9-109–
Purpose Forces.
9-126. See also air
in defensive operations, 9-34,
surveillance. in IFC, 2-54, 2-577-16, 8-8
9-152–9-161
reserve (radars), 9-85, 9-117 in OSC, 2-40, 8-3, 8-8, 8-15
in disruption zone, 3-34, 4-53,
9-49, 9-57, 9-65–9-66, roving air defense units, in transition operations, 3-13
9-69–9-70, 9-74, 9-144– 9-161, 9-178 mixed aviation units, 8-2, 8-4,
9-146, 9-155–9-156 self-defense, 9-44, 9-86, 9-88 8-11
in maneuver reserve, 4-111 small arms, 9-93, 9-161, 9-165 national-level air armies,
in offensive operations, surface-to-air missiles. See 2-26, 8-2–8-4
9-141–9-151 main entry. organization, 8-1–8-8
in OSC, 9-27, 9-32, 9-79, support of airborne landing, 9-5 task organization, 8-2, 8-4,
9-85, 9-97 8-7, 8-9, 8-15
support of amphibious
in regional operations, 9-27, landing, 13-95 technological overmatch,
9-81–9-82, 9-189–9-190 p. 8-1, ¶8-37
support of IW, 5-27
in sophisticated ambush, 3-97 theater air armies. See air
tactical-level assets, 9-20,
in support zone, 9-70, 9-85, 9-69, 9-72–9-73, 9-79, armies.
9-134, 9-148, 9-159 9-89–9-95, 9-115, 9-132– transport for airborne landing,
in tactical groups, 9-32 9-133, 9-146, 9-156, 9-161 13-21
integrated air defense
system. See main entry. |
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