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law_stackexchange

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Can one lose their identity if their appearance changes drastically? If a person altered their appearance suddenly and drastically, their sex, apparent ethnicity, eye color, height, all of these changed, would that person be in peril of having their identity (citizenship and credentials) contested? If so, is there any evidence they could prepare in advance that would secure their identity? The person invented and would perform the procedure themselves, and their family may decide they're unrecognizable, so medical history and family testimony would not be helpful.	A US passport does not list height or make claims about ethnicity: what you have is a birth date and state, and photograph. A passport is taken to be strong proof of identity. You may apply for a new passport (turning in the old one), with a new photo. It may be necessary to provide "documentary evidence of identity" by appearing with an identifying witness (citizen or permanent resident) who has known you for 2 years and fills in an affidavit (both of you would need to bring some ID as well, so let's assume you also have a valid driver's license). It would be at the discretion of the accepting agent whether to believe that you and the "old" you are the same person. In the fictitious scenario, the person could videotape themselves undergoing the transformation, but ultimately, if one is sufficiently off the grid, then proving identity could be very difficult.	As someone with ties to the "foreign" community in the United States, I see these "marriages of convenience" from time to time. In their most "legitimate" form, the couple will move to the same address and "technically" live together, but without consummating the marriage so that it can later be legally annulled. American immigration authorities counter this by asking each spouse about the other's underwear (literally!). Some "marriages of convenience" are legal, insofar as they technically conform to the marriage documents, e.g. regarding "co habitation," even while violating the spirit of the law. Others don't. Your best chance of attacking such "marriages" is not regarding the marriage itself (basically only the couple can decide what constitutes a valid marriage), but rather "compliance" with the marriage documents. That's something any law enforcement officer can understand.	Yes and no. While there are no general laws that ban the display of offensive symbols, they are prohibited in certain circumstances. Significantly, this is in the workplace. It is illegal to discriminate on the following bases in the workplace: Race Sex Pregnancy Religion National origin Disability (physical or mental, including HIV status) Age (for workers over 40) Military service or affiliation Bankruptcy or bad debts Genetic information Citizenship status (for citizens, permanent residents, temporary residents, refugees, and asylees) For instance, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 US 742 (1998), the majority found: a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination based upon race could assert a claim for a racially hostile work environment, in addition to the classic claim of so-called "disparate treatment." Since you haven't been specific about the nature of the offensive symbol, some examples might be: displaying a swastika displaying sexually offensive material displaying racially offensive material These are likely only to apply if the employer ought to have known, or did in fact know, that an employee (or in some cases, the customers) of a business would be offended, or it would amount to discrimination. Of course, a single display of only the symbol is not likely, on its own, to create a hostile work environment - it would need to be considered with the rest of the facts - but it can certainly be a contributing factor. It's a bit difficult to list all the situations where similar laws might apply, but this is one of the most prominent (and, to be honest, one of the ones that I'm personally interested in).	A conviction isn't ever impossible, but it could well be highly unjust. Indeed, there is a current case where a man alleged that he was the murder, though his identical twin brother was convicted. This article indicates that identical twins are not necessarily genetically indistinguishable. Assuming there is a lack of positive evidence such as fingerprints or an alibi which clearly identifies one versus the other, then one would predict no conviction because there would be a highly reasonable doubt. See the case of Orlando Nemnhard, where one of two twins did it but the DA concluded that they couldn't prove which one, so the charges were dropped.	The cited provision is: A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person's sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex. This language originates in the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999. This statutory instrument was made in response to a 1996 decision of the European Court of Justice (P v S and Cornwall County Council, C-13/94) that Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 , regarding equal treatment of men and women, also covered discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment. The regulations were made in order to bring domestic law up to date with the EU requirement, by amending the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. The definition at the time, found in the amended section 82, was: "gender reassignment" means a process which is undertaken under medical supervision for the purpose of reassigning a person’s sex by changing physiological or other characteristics of sex, and includes any part of such a process So the idea of "other characteristics" or "other attributes" comes from the 1999 version of the law. I expect that the change to "attributes" is simply because the Equality Act 2010 uses the term "characteristic" to mean something else, as it consolidates many different regimes about discrimination on the basis of sex, race, disability, etc., all of which are called "characteristics". The more recent text removes the part about "medical supervision", and explicitly includes people at any stage of transition. Explanatory Notes to the 2010 Act give the example: A person who was born physically female decides to spend the rest of her life as a man. He starts and continues to live as a man. He decides not to seek medical advice as he successfully ‘passes’ as a man without the need for any medical intervention. He would have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment for the purposes of the Act. (These notes are not binding in law but they do give a good idea of what the drafters meant to say. The concept of 'passes' is also not the most sensitive language to bring in, since trans people do not necessarily want to measure themselves by their ability to pass undetected, and may present differently in different contexts.) The example shows that someone can have the protected characteristic without having, or contemplating, any change to their body. So from this example, the other attributes of sex would include all those ways in which the man "continues to live as a man". From general knowledge of trans men, that could include using a masculine name and pronouns; wearing traditionally-male clothes; wearing a binder, baggy clothing, padding in the crotch, or other ways to suggest a more masculine than feminine body; having a traditionally-male haircut; using traditionally-masculine body language; pitching the voice lower; and so on. The situation for trans women would be parallel. These things are all attributes of sex, in that our society abounds in stereotypes of what is a "manly handshake", or a "girly drink", or otherwise associated with a particular sex. They are to do with behaviour more than the body.	In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest.	Gaining UK citizenship at birth would not count, the law stipulates "after having attained the age of 18 years", so it is explicitly ruled out. (Also, gaining UK citizenship at birth involves no formal declaration.) The scout promise would not count. It doesn't involve swearing allegiance to the Queen, only promising to "do your duty to the Queen"; and an American could argue they have no duty to the Queen. (Also, you might well not have repeated it after 18.) On the face of it, the Oath of Allegiance for the OTC would count - it looks pretty much exactly what the law-makers had in mind. On the other hand, the oath is almost exactly the same as that taken by Members of Parliament, and Boris Johnson took it first in 2001 - but didn't renounce his American citizenship until 2017. (Perhaps it wasn't until 2017 that he finally drew the American authorities attention to the fact he had taken the oath.)	As far as I can tell, one can hold any beliefs or lack thereof, and there is no need to register your beliefs with the government per se. However, there are laws where religion is relevant, such as the Hindu personal laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or the Hindu Succession Act, such as stating who gets your stuff if you die intestate. These laws apply to Hindus, and since Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists are treated as legal Hindus (!), it applies to them; and to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. and don't ask me to interpret that "unless clause". That is, the Hindu laws do not apply to Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews. On the face of it, that would mean that Yazidis would be treated as Hindus, w.r.t. the subject matter of those laws. Registering a religion isn't relevant to the question: what matters is that the Indian Government decided to create these particular laws, and they have not created any Yazidi-specific laws. There are currently no national laws prohibiting religious conversion, and I can't find the state laws. This article discusses such laws, noting that some states require a person to register their conversion. I seems that the restriction is on A converting B, and not on B converting sua sponte.
Does the US Second Amendment grant the right to not bear arms? Does the Second Amendment in the United States grant the right to not bear arms? For example, if laws were enacted forcing ordinary people to bear arms, could they try to strike down the legislation as unconstitutional? Although this sounds very hypothetical, Kennesaw, Georgia, in the United States has a law mandating the ownership of firearms, with some exemptions, including on disability and religious grounds.	The 2nd Amendment does not grant a right not to bear arms. This is its text: A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. Read D.C. v Heller for the reasons the 2nd Amendment stands for an individual's right to bear arms. Most relevant to this question is what the phrase "keep and bear arms" means (internal citations removed): We turn to the phrases “keep arms” and “bear arms.” Johnson defined “keep” as, most relevantly, “[t]o retain; not to lose,” and “[t]o have in custody.” Webster defined it as “[t]o hold; to retain in one’s power or possession.” No party has apprised us of an idiomatic meaning of “keep Arms.” Thus, the most natural reading of “keep Arms” in the Second Amendment is to “have weapons.” ... “Keep arms” was simply a common way of referring to possessing arms, for militiamen and everyone else. ... At the time of the founding, as now, to “bear” meant to “carry.” When used with “arms,” however, the term has a meaning that refers to carrying for a particular purpose—confrontation. In Muscarello v. United States, in the course of analyzing the meaning of “carries a firearm” in a federal criminal statute, Justice Ginsburg wrote that “[s]urely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second Amendment … indicate[s]: ‘wear, bear, or carry … upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose … of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.’” If there is a constitutional argument against mandatory gun ownership laws, it does not stem from the 2nd Amendment.	In the United States, the constitutionality of a law can be challenged in any court. Unless and until the court is reversed by a higher court, then the law will be considered unconstitutional and invalid. A jury can also theoretically nullify a law for any reason, including unconstitutionality, however, the jury's finding will only hold for that one case that they are trying.	The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees assistance of counsel for the accused in all criminal prosecutions. The Fifth Amendment protects a person from being forced to self-incriminate. Taken together, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that police cannot continue interrogation after you have requested an attorney. Laughter is actually not a violation of your rights, the violation would come from continuing to interrogate you, or in prohibiting you from contacting your attorney or not providing an attorney if you cannot afford one (via the public defender's office).	Are minors allowed to possess handguns in Oregon? Yes, with exceptions, although they may not purchase or own handguns, and are not permitted to conceal carry handguns. Oregon Revised Statutes § 166.470 prohibits any person from intentionally selling, delivering, or otherwise transferring a handgun to anyone under 21 years of age, ORS § 166.470(1)(a), except the temporary transfer of any firearm to a minor for hunting, target practice, or any other lawful purpose. ORS § 166.470(3)(b). The other primary statute that is relevant is Oregon Revised Statutes § 166.250 which also provides that minors may possess any firearm temporarily for hunting, target practice, or any other lawful purpose. ORS § 166.250(2)(a)(B). But, despite this general rule, a minor may not possess a firearm if they are under 18 years of age, and while a minor, committed the equivalent of an adult felony or a misdemeanor involving violence, within four years of being charged with possession. ORS § 166.250(1)(c). (Source).	Let’s look at the full paragraph Neither the President nor Congress nor the Judiciary can disturb any one of the safeguards of civil liberty incorporated into the Constitution except so far as the right is given to suspend in certain cases the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. So what it actually says is: you can’t unless you can. The Constitution says this to say about habeas corpus: The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. The case decided that military commissions (and the denial of habeas corpus) were constitutional where there was no civilian court available. Because Indiana had never been in rebellion and civil courts continued to function there, military tribunals could not be used. However, they could be uses in states that had been in rebellion. You can’t unless you can. This is specifically about rights guaranteed in the Constitution In this particular case, the right of habeas corpus. There is no equivalent right applicable to face masks so a law mandating them in certain circumstances does no more infringe a Constitutional right than mandating the wearing of clothes in public. You can’t unless you can. Breaking the law doesn’t cause you to lose your job The second quote, the origin of which is unknown and definitely not in the case, is total fantasy. Even if a law against face masks was unconstitutional, the authors of that law have overreached and the remedy is to go to a court to have it declared unconstitutional. They don’t lose their jobs as a result. Even if they wrote the law with criminal intent, they must be removed from office in accordance with the normal procedures such as impeachment for the President, by a two-thirds majority vote of their house for a Congressperson etc.	No. The intent of the draft was to protect those who objected to bearing arms for religious/moral reasons from being forced by the government to bear arms against their will (essentially making any draft that didn't have consciencious objector allowance from being Constitutional). The line was removed at drafting because it was redundant: The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion and barrs the government from declaring religious tennents illegal without a very compelling government interest... the government making war was not compelling enough of an interest to force religious pacifists to take up arms for the government... better that the U.S. should suffer military defeat than violate the beliefs in individual liberty. It does not imply that the 2nd amendment was intended for military purposes, but rather for self-defense purposes (at the time, militia meant the able bodied men of a community who could muster to defend from attackers. While we think of the "Wild West" in terms of the Modern West of the U.S., in 1789 when the Bill of Rights was being drafted, the "Wild West" were the western most parts of the states that we today think of as the "East Coast" the French and Spain/Mexico and the British controlled much of what is West of the Appalachian Mountains today. The "wild west" was closer to home than we tend to think of it and people did live far enough into the wilderness that the "community" that could form the militia might just be the patriarch of the homestead. It was so important that not only did the founders think to make sure that the right to weapons was essential, not only did they draft this having just exited a sucessful war where their troops were just that and an armed rebellion that was even fresher in their mind, the match that ignited the powder keg of the Revolutionary war was the British attempting to sieze weapons from Lexington and Concord that the people in those towns needed for survival. The "Shot Heard 'Round the World" was shot over the right of the colonists to keep and bear arms and the founders were well aware of what they were fighting for. To further validate the individual right to the people, President Thomas Jefferson, who had a hand in writing the Bill of Rights, when asked about if this allowed a merchant to place cannons on his ship, responded with essentially "That's the reason I wrote the Amendment in the First Place."	There is no such law. The US Constitution provides that: The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; (Article II section 2) The congress shall have the power (Article I section 8) ... To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; These powers were used to create the military very early in the history of the United States, and the US Army and US Navy have existed ever since. Other branches of the military were created later.	So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense.
What legal options exist to enforce strict compliance with parenting agreements? Suppose a parenting agreement that is part of divorce in Georgia, U.S., specifies that parent A shall deliver a child to parent B in the morning before school. One day parent A, without notice to parent B, delivers the child directly to school. What legal mechanisms, if any, can B use to prevent future violations by A of the parenting agreement?	Beware: The details will depend not only on jurisdiction, but also on the details of the parents, the parenting agreement and, of course, on the situation of the child. However, here are some general guidelines (mostly independent of jurisdiction): Ideally, you should resolve the problem by non-legal mechanisms. However, you may have to resort to legal means if this fails. I would advocate a gradual escalation of your reaction: First, do not assume malice. Nicely ask parent A why the plan was not followed. Maybe it was a simple oversight, maybe there was an emergency? Try to find out, and decide whether the change was warranted. If there is no satisfactory answer, clearly remind A that the parenting plan is binding for everyone, and that it is important for both the child and the parents that they can rely on it. Stress that any last-minute changes must be discussed as soon as possible, even in emergencies. This should be done in writing, maybe even by registered mail. If the problem repeats, send a last letter indicating that you will seek legal remedy if the problem persists. This letter may work better when sent by a lawyer. A letter from your lawyer to A's lawyer (assuming you both have one) may also prompt A's lawyer to explain to A that they are hurting the child and themselves by violating the parenting plan. Finally, if all the above fails, go to court. You could ask for a change in the parenting agreement, maybe with less frequent changeovers, or with changeovers that are easier to arrange, or at an earlier time, such that a delay causes less problems. You could also ask for a formal permission to have the child fetched by the police or similar on subsequent violations (though that is a rather desperate option, and may not be available). If you reach this point, following the previous steps should give you a fighting chance to prevail in court, as you have demonstrated that you tried everything to make the agreement work. Courts generally take a dim view of people who violate an official agreement. In Georgia specifically, like in most US states, violation of a court-ordered parenting agreement by one parent is a serious matter. The other parent can ask the court to hold the parent in contempt of court. The court can then order a number of consequences for these violations, such as awarding the other parent extra visits or monetary compensation, up to and including sending the parent to jail (this only happens in extreme cases). The article Violation of Custody and Visitation Orders in Georgia gives a good overview.	In the US, no, courts would not enforce such a contract. It would be deemed not in the public interest, perhaps unconscionable. Of course, two willing adults could make and honor such an agreement but that would only work as long as the woman didn't change her mind. What is "fair" in a situation like this is a little tricky but, ultimately, any child's welfare is going to be a major consideration in any court decision.	canada Child support In Canada, under the Federal Child Support Guidelines (used when computing child support after a divorce, and in most or all provinces after a separation), the terms are defined as follows: majority of parenting time "means a period of time that is more than 60% of parenting time over the course of a year" (s. 2(1)); shared parenting time is when "each spouse exercises not less than 40% of parenting time with a child over the course of a year" (s. 9) split parenting time describes a situation where "there are two or more children, and each spouse has the majority of parenting time with one or more of those children" (s. 8). Which of these regimes a couple falls into is significant because it changes the approach to computing the amount owing for child support. "Primary parent" outside of child support Outside of the computation of child support, there is no concrete definition for what makes someone a "primary parent." Parenting arrangements or orders will just describe the division of parenting responsibilities, such as who has day-to-day care, control, and supervision of the child; decisions about residence, friends, activities, education, medical treatment, etc. Typically though, when the phrase "primary parent" is used, it describes the person with day-to-day care, control, and supervision of the child. But this isn't a descriptor that can be applied universally to the relationship. For example, a person might have "primary parenting of the children over the holiday" (Wilson v Wilson, 2023 ONSC 3387, at para 163). Some courts are careful to place the term in quotes to emphasize that it isn't a precise term (e.g. "she puts great stock in being the 'primary parent'": Begum v Klippenstein, 2023 ONSC 2970 at para 86).	I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation.	Is it possible/feasible for the child to retroactively sue the father for the child-support that was not paid throughout the 90s and 2000s? No. Child support is owed to the custodian parent, not the child. If at all, your mother would have to sue. Chances are, your parents, had a child support agreement in place and as long as your father abided by the terms of this agreement, there is absolutely nothing to sue about. Is it possible/feasible for the child to sue the father to get him to pay for his Australian university fees/debts which have accrued (and continue to accrue) over the 2010s? No. There is no legal requirement for any parent (divorced or not) to pay for college education. Once you are a legal adult you are responsible for your own expenses and actions. That's what "adult" means.	As a preface, while the best course of action isn't always clear and the reality of implementing some solution is often rocky, the bipolar diagnosis situation you describe is probably the single most common situation in which legal arrangements must be made for an adult child, and is almost as common as the need for children to make legal arrangements for the care of their declining parents. You aren't the only one going through situations like these. Probably 0.5%-2% of people in any given area experience bipolar, usually starting in adolescence or young adulthood, and difficulties managing it of the kind that you describe are the rule and not the exception. Also, just ignoring the problems you describe is a very bad idea. Premature death either from suicide or bad judgment related to the bipolar diagnosis is all too common in these situations. It is serious business, not something that should be thought of as bad character, or futile to do anything about, or blameworthy. It just is, and if someone doesn't do something when the plan gets off course, serious consequences often follow. There are really several intertwined issues present here. Realistically, given the nature of the concerns expressed, a limited guardianship may be necessary to accomplish the goals expressed. What Are Medical Powers Of Attorney? A healthcare or medical power of attorney gives the person who holds it (who is called an "agent" or "proxy") the authority to make medical decisions for someone called the principal (i.e. John Smith) when the principal lacks the capacity to give informed consent at that very moment to do so. This is because a power of attorney is an inherently revocable document expressing the wishes of the person writing it. You generally can't bind yourself in the future without court approval or a contractual relationship with a third party which a power of attorney is not. It isn't uncommon for medical personnel to decide on the spot when to and not to listen to someone with a medical power of attorney based upon how mentally competent the patient seems at the time on a decision-by-decision basis. For example, they might defer to the medical power of attorney agent when the patient is unconscious or heavily drugged, and listen to the patient when the patient is conscious, not drugged, and not acting erratically. Parents, incidentally, do not automatically have this authority, nor do spouses. A medical POA is a document that allows the agent to say "yes" when the patient (i.e. John Smith) cannot. Another name for a document that is very similar and sometimes used is a "health care proxy." It would typically cost a few hundred dollars to $1,000 to have a medical power of attorney drawn up after discussing the situation and the principal's needs in a meeting with a lawyer and might take an initial meeting and then a second one at which the document is signed after it is prepared following the initial meeting. Other lawyers might manage this in a single meeting and draft it while you wait. If all you need is a power of attorney, don't be penny wise and pound foolish by doing it yourself, unless the form is provided to you by the health care provider you will spend most of your time dealing with and they prefer their own form. Otherwise, the likelihood that you will have to pay more to a lawyer later cleaning up your own mistakes probably exceeds any money that you will save. Other Kinds Of Authorizations Many medical providers will allow someone to act on behalf of a patient in matters other than matters that call for the kind of medical decision that would normally require the informed consent of the patient, even when the patient is not manifestly incapable of making medical decisions at that very moment. This could simply be a note in the file that the patient has given that person authority to do so, it could be a written authorization to access HIPAA protected personal health information of the patient, and it could be a variety of other things (e.g., authority to make financial arrangements). Some of this is often incorporated in the same document as a medical POA. Picking Up Controlled Substances A Medical POA may, or may not, necessarily be sufficient to authorize someone to pick up a controlled substance on behalf of a patient if the patient is physically able to do so, without the presence of the patient. I don't know what the true rule of law under the controlled substances acts and pharmacy regulation is, but I do know that practice in real life varies quite a bit. The best practical solution to the issue of picking up controlled substances would be to ask the usual pharmacist what they require and to comply. (A legal guardian would generally have the power to pick up controlled substances for a ward.) Guardianships and Limited Guardianships What Is a Guardianship? A guardian of the person is someone appointed by a court who has the authority to make medical decisions and other personal life decisions for their ward (i.e. John Smith), even contrary to their apparent stated wishes. A guardian has the authority to say "yes" and also to say "no" to the expressed wishes of the ward, overruling the ward. A guardianship of an adult can be general, or can be limited on a customized basis. A guardian must be appointed by a court with jurisdiction over these cases, usually in the county where the ward resides. But, a guardianship can be requested by the ward as opposed to contested. Realistically, a court would be unlikely to grant a full guardianship or a contested guardianship in these circumstances, but might grant a limited guardianship with the consent of the ward in these circumstances. The parents and possibly any siblings, would have a right to notice of the proceedings and to object or to seek to be appointed instead. What Process Is Involved In Having a Guardian Appointed? This would realistically be a proceeding that should ideally involve a specialist lawyer (with experience in mental health or elder law and guardianships) and at least one medical professional's statement (probably a treating psychiatrist or psychologist). There would also probably be a court investigator or guardian ad litem appointed at the ward's expense, to confirm that the facts represented in the petition to have a guardian appointed really reflect the ward's intent. Usually, a proposed guardian selected by the adult ward during a lucid interval would have priority for appointment. The medical professional and lawyer should be able to provide good suggestions regarding what the scope of the limited guardianship needs to be, although don't ignore or fail to give full credit to your own layperson's practical understanding of the situation either. The guardian would have to provide information to the court in connection with the petition showing eligibility to serve (e.g. criminal record check, credit check, CV, nomination by ward). Often the guardian would have to demonstrate good intentions towards the ward in some way, especially if the guardian is a third party and not someone who serves as a guardian as a livelihood. Some courts would require the guardian to have insurance for liability in connection with the task or a surety bond up to some dollar amount. The final decision would usually be made in an in-person hearing at which the ward, the proposed guardian, the proposed guardian's lawyer, the medical professional, the guardian ad litem or investigator, the judge, a court clerk, a court reporter, and any family members who chose to appear (with their lawyers, if any), were present. If the guardianship was granted, perhaps with modifications requested by the judge to the terms of the guardianship, then the Court would issue what are called "Letters" that formally appoint the guardian to the post. Once appointed, the guardian would have to file periodic status reports with the court and would also be subject to the court's jurisdiction in the event of any future dispute regarding the guardianship, or any allegations of misconduct by the guardian, or any circumstance that requires court approval such as a change in the terms of the guardianship or in the person serving as guardian. The procedural details I am describing are approximate and aren't necessarily up-to-the minute correct, and might vary somewhat even from court to court within California under local rules and customs of practice; but they give you a gist of what the process would be like if it is working properly and with best practices. Typically, this might cost $3,000 to $10,000 all in for an uncontested proceeding, and many times that much in the event of a contested attempt to have a guardian appointed. Health Insurance Eligibility I'll defer to someone else's answer regarding health insurance eligibility, as I don't have time to look into that at the moment. My instinct is that this wouldn't be a problem in any case except a guardianship and probably wouldn't be a problem even in a case with a third party guardian, but I can't confirm that without doing research.	Disclaimer: I don't know the specific regulations of New Jersey, so this mostly describes the general practise in the United States. However, it seems the rules are roughly similar in all states. During a divorce proceeding the court ordered the father to pay 1xxx a month in child support through the court/state supervision arrangement. This is common in the United States - child support payments are usually not sent directly from one parent to the other, instead the paying parent sends money to a government agency (or has it taken from their wages). This agency is usually called State Disbursement Unit - though in New Jersey the agency responsible is the New Jersey Family Support Payment Center (NJFSPC). So the father was probably ordered to pay via NJFSPC. Will it harm the case if the mother retrieves the money? assuming she notifies the court or her attorney? Or should she refuse the money? No, this should not harm the case. As you write, the mother should definitely inform the court and / or NJFSPC about the payment (the lawyer should know how to handle this). If the court order requires the father to pay via NJFSPC, paying directly to the mother is already a violation - so the father is likely not acting legally. While the accepted payment will likely count against the child support owed, it will not reduce the claim for child support in any other way - in particular it does not invalidate or reduce the court order to pay via NJFSPC.	This depends entirely on which law applies to the divorce. For example, if this happens under Australian law then it falls within the jurisdiction of the Family Court (a Federal court as the Commonwealth has power over marriage, not the states). They say: You can agree and not involve the court. If you agree you can, but are not required to, have the court formalise the arrangement. If you cannot agree, then you can apply to the court for financial orders. In general, the court is happy to allow couples to agree on whatever they want - for your example this extends from "Bob gets everything" to "Alice gets everything" and anything in between those extremes. If the parties don't agree (which is the most common situation) then the court will hear the evidence and make a decision: There is no formula used to divide your property. No one can tell you exactly what orders a judicial officer will make. The decision is made after all the evidence is heard and the judicial officer decides what is just and equitable based on the unique facts of your case. Factors the court is required to consider are: working out what you've got and what you owe, that is your assets and debts and what they are worth looking at the direct financial contributions by each party to the marriage or de facto relationship such as wage and salary earnings looking at indirect financial contributions by each party such as gifts and inheritances from families looking at the non-financial contributions to the marriage or de facto relationship such as caring for children and homemaking, and future requirements – a court will take into account things like age, health, financial resources, care of children and ability to earn. So, for your example, the answer to how property will be divided up is: Nobody knows until it is agreed or the court rules on it.
Is it likely that I will be able to use short (1 second) video clips in my mobile app? In Android and iOS there are "GIF Keyboard" apps. Here's an example. These apps give their users the ability to search for and send a wide variety of GIFs to other people through messaging apps, such as Messenger or Google Hangouts. In the context of these apps, a GIF is a short - usually one second at most - video clip. Much of the time, these GIFs originate from TV shows. I'm creating my own GIF keyboard app (for Android, it will be released on the Google Play Store) that will, for the most part, be similar to these other GIF keyboard apps. By similar, I mean that my app will also allow the user to search for and send GIFs to other people through messaging apps. The only differences are that 1] My app will only allow the user to search for GIFs that are found in anime (Japanese film and television animation) and 2] The user will also be allowed to search and send static images from anime to other people through messaging apps. I am relatively confident that this app will not violate any sort of fair use law or copyright law because many other GIF keyboard apps already exist on the app store. However, I just wanted to make sure that the chance of anyone taking legal action against me for releasing this potential app is very low. As a sidenote - I have found these posts that seem to relate to the question of fair use and videoclips, but I wasn't entirely confident if my app would be legal based off of the information provided in these posts. Length of movie clip for fair-use? Is a video demonstrating a small portion of a movie sync fair use?	Under US law your proposed use would be considered copyright infringement of the film/TV copyrights unless it is considered "fair use." The evaluation for "fair use" defense can only be done by a Federal Court judge as part of a lawsuit. The judge will evaluate the fair use defense using a four part test that evaluates: (1) the purpose and character of your use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion taken; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market. This is a very fact specific inquiry, so it isn't amenable to easy yes or no answers. However, based on your description your use wouldn't be very transformative under step (1) since you are using frames from the movie unchanged, and you are using it for commercial purposes as opposed to criticism/commentary/education. Nor does step (2) seem to favor you since the anime films are not heavily based in facts that you would be reusing/publishing. Step (3) would likely favor you since the amount of material taken is very small (1 second) compared to the work as a whole. Likewise, step (4) would also likely favor you since your use is unlikely to impact the commercial market for the original film/tv show. If you intend to rely on the "fair use" defense, then you should definitely hire an attorney who can give you an individualized opinion rather than the generalities I've provided here. As to other GIF users in the App Store, they may (1) have licensed the underlying content, (2) be blatantly infringing the copyrights for the content and hoping not to get caught, (3) relying on fair use (see above), and/or (4) claim DMCA safe harbor as a message board so long as user are the ones uploading the GIF content.	Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on.	There are multiple issues with what you are trying to do, including issues with copyright, personality rights, and data protection. You are trying to use other people's content and likeness for your advertisement. Unless you are certain that you can do this in your relevant jurisdictions, without their consent, this sounds like a very bad idea. At least under GDPR, “but they made it public” is not an excuse. Personal data is personal data regardless of how you acquire it. The GDPR also has a very broad concept of identifiability that goes beyond direct identifiers or PII. If you want to use other people's personal data, you need a legal basis, and must provide them notice about your processing. Consent (informed opt-in) is one legal basis, legitimate interest (opt-out) another. You are suggesting to avoid this by blurring PII, but you may also have to blur other content that is indirectly identifiable. Real anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is a really hard problem. In some cases, a legitimate interest is able to avoid such problems. E.g. if I make a video with commentary about a Tweet, it would likely be OK to show surrounding personal data like the responses including the identities of the various accounts, to the degree that this is relevant to the commentary and/or necessary for proper attribution. However, that commentary likely has strong protections under freedom of expression. At least from an European viewpoint, a tutorial, demo, or advertisement would not have a freedom of expression argument that would shift a GDPR legitimate interest balancing test in your favour. Instead of blurring almost everything in your video or working on GDPR compliance, content licenses, and release forms, you should consider a different solution: create dummy content just for your videos. You can use your own content, and maybe add a dummy profile.	One reason could be because of the scènes à faire doctrine. Many of the things you notice as similarities are not infringement. I don't know the counts of lawsuits for music infringement vs screenwriting infringement. There may just be more songs than screenplays. Screenwriters/producers do get sued, though. See Cinar Corporation v. Robinson 2012 SCC 25.	It is not possible to say that this is generally fair use, although sometimes it would be. A copy for personal use is still a copyright right violation on its face, and fair use does not categorically exclude non-commercial or personal use of copyrighted works. It is a highly fact specific inquiry. The likelihood of anyone discovering that you have done so and deciding to sue over it is slight, but that doesn't mean that there isn't potential copyright infringement liability. Compare this to speeding. People do it all the time, and even driving one mile per hour above the speed limit is still a traffic violation. But it is rare for less serious violations to be ticketed.	This sounds like it would fall under the "extreme pornography" part of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Section 63: (7) An image falls within this subsection if it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, any of the following— (b) an act which results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a person's anus, breasts or genitals, and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that any such person or animal was real. (7A) An image falls within this subsection if it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, either of the following— (b) an act which involves the non-consensual sexual penetration of a person's vagina or anus by another with a part of the other person's body or anything else, and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that the persons were real. What you describe would likely result in serious injury to the victim, and the video appears to be non-consensual. Note that the actual origin is not relevant; if the videos were actually a brilliant piece of special effects and no anuses were harmed that gets you nowhere. The only thing that matters is what a "reasonable person" looking at the videos would have thought. Context might make a difference; if the videos were made by an identifiable company then a reasonable person might assume the producers would have at least obtained consent and complied with their local laws about safety. OTOH if they look like they were filmed on someone's phone and downloaded from some sketchy file-sharing site then a jury is likely to see this as suggesting to the "reasonable person" that the acts shown were real and non-consensual. Edit in response to comment: The law in question says 'An image is “pornographic” if it is of such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal'. So it can still be porn even if it wasn't filmed consensually. If "pornography" could only refer to consensual images then the prosecution would need to obtain evidence of the consent or otherwise of the participants. This might be impossible if a participant is dead or cannot be identified. Also the definition above matches both the dictionary definition and most people's idea of what makes something "porn"; the point of porn is sexual arousal.	My opinion is that the copying of a single API endpoint, "run" that takes a function as an argument is not infringement. I can think of several lines of argument that get to this same conclusion: Originality: It doesn't exhibit the modicum of creativity required by the originality test. (Feist) Short phrases doctrine: It is a short word or phrase, which both the copyright office (Copyright Office Circular, 37 CFR 202.1) and courts (e.g. Hutchins v. Zoll) have declared ineligible for copyright. Merger: The merger doctrine allows reuse of an expression if it is one of only a very few number of ways of expressing an idea. I can't think of many other ways to express a function intended to run a function other than with the verb "run". Scènes à faire: It is not infringement to use an expression if it has become standard, stock, or common in a particular setting. Naming a function "run" is common in the programming community. Any one of these alone would be enough to rule out copyright infringement by taking this individual component of Excel's API. Note: Whether merger and scènes à faire are part of the originality/copyrightability analysis or part of the infringement analysis is not uniform across circuits. For example, the 6th circuit considers both merger and scènes à faire part of the copyrightability analysis. But, the 2nd and 9th circuits treat them as part of the infringement analysis and in the 9th circuit, they are affirmative defenses.	The idea for an app is not subject to copyright. Only the artifacts of the app itself (sourcecode, images, texts, sounds, etc.) can be. So if one only copies the idea and creates their own version of all the other assets, then they are not violating copyright. However, in some cases, ideas can be subject to patents. But patents on software are tricky. First of all, only new ideas can be patented. When a supposed new idea was already published before, then that's called "prior art" and you can not patent it. Then getting a patent means a lot of investment in money and time (which is very different from copyright which you get automatically the moment you make something copyright-worthy). So not everything that could theoretically be patented gets patented. And then, many jurisdictions do not recognize software patents at all, and those which do have different limits on what is and is not patentable when it comes to software. This means patents are rarely a concern when copying the app idea of someone else, but not never. And another possible concern is the third pillar of intellectual property: Trademarks. This protects the name of the app. Trademark law oversimplified forbids to create a competing product with a name which might confuse customers. So if you created StevesSuperCoolAppForCoolPeople and I create StevesSuperCoolAppForCoolPeople - Simplified Edition, then I would be violating your trademark, because my product name sounds as if it was your product, when it is in fact an unrelated product with a similar purpose.
Is the GDPR applicable to data stored in human memory? If data is stored in human memory, is the GDPR applicable? Say, an employee of a company remembers an email address of a client, their date of birth, or even what their face looks like, does the client have a right of access to this data, or even a right for this to be erased?	GDPR forces companies and employees to keep personal data confidential and to use it only for its allowed uses. That obligation continues after the work contract ends. If the employee breaches confidentiality, it does not matter if he provides the data as a file in an USB-drive or if he provides it from memory; it is a breach of confidentiality. Access logs will help to determine which employees have had access to your data, in case a leak is suspected. The part of the question about human memory seems to come from a deep misunderstanding of how human memory works1. I can remember tomorrow something that I have totally forgotten now. Even worse, there is no telling of what can make me remember you; your name might not ring a bell but I may remember you by seeing someone walking a dog. And nobody will ever be able to tell if I have complied with any of your requests or if I am just lying. And of course, there is only one proven way to erase memories, and I am pretty sure the GDPR does not allow for the execution of employees (Disclaimer: IANAL and IANYL, check with a lawyer before murdering anyone if you have doubts). 1 The classical example: You can certainly delete a file from a disk. But just try to stop thinking about white bears	It depends. Can the data controller or another person, with "means reasonably likely to be used," (see clause 26 of the preamble of the GDPR) use that data alone or in combination with other data to identify a natural person? If yes, it is personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. If no, it is not personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. Anonymous data is not subject to the GDPR. "The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes." Assigning an unique alphanumeric code to a thing does not necessarily make the code and/or the thing "personal data". But if you have a set of data that is or can be linked by the unique alphanumeric code (e.g. as a primary key in a set of tables) and you can use it to identify a person, then it is personal data. Either way, to be GDPR-compliant / to mitigate risk you should make some kind of record to reflect that process of thinking and what you decided. And if the answer is Yes, it is personal data, then you should record your "lawful basis" for processing the data and how you decided that.	Is X considered personal data? Can you use X to directly or indirectly identify a natural person? In the data to which you have access can X be related to an identifiable natural person? If you answer yes to either of those questions then X is personal data. Article 4(1): ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Scenario 1: you want to count each user agent that comes to your site, that's the only data you have, then the user agent is not personal data (it cannot be used to identify someone - unless it has a name and address etc, which seems highly unlikely - and you cannot relate it to anyone). Scenario 2: you have customer records with names, addresses etc (clearly personal data) and want to record each customer's user agent then the user agent is personal data (it relates to the identifiable natural person). Scenario 3: in one dataset you record that a user agent was associated with order ID 123456 and in another dataset you record that order ID 123456 was for John Smith (plus address etc), then the user agent is personal data (it relates to the identifiable natural person). Is this considered storing personal data? If X is personal data. Do I need user's consent to record X? If you want to record X and X is personal data, then you must have an Article 6 lawful basis for recording X. Consent is one of the six lawful bases. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks.	It is absolutely not the case that Providers are not allowed to keep PII without consent. Article 6 of the GDPR identifies six possible lawful bases for processing personal information. These are: (a) the data subject has given consent ... (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. If a person requests services from an online service provider, basis (b) will apply, at least to some information. If there is evidence of criminal activity, basis (c) may well apply, as it also will for much routine record keeping. Any in many such cases, basis (e) or (f) will also apply. In short, article 6 does not create a "haven for online criminals/hackers". In a comment on another answer the OP writes: The offender has the right to not be identifiable and he can't be denied this right That is simply not correct. Nothing in the GDPR says anything of the sort. It is true that consent may not be forced, but if a user requests a service that service may require the user to identify him- or herself. For example, one cannot order physical goods without giving a name and a shipping address. And the provider may retain PI and even PII when it has a "legitimate interest" in doing so, although if challenged it must justify that legitimate interest.	Recital 47 contains: The processing of personal data for direct marketing purposes may be regarded as carried out for a legitimate interest. So even if you never explicitly gave your consent for any marketing purposes, they can send you marketing (e)mail. However, art. 21, paragraphs 2-4 contain: Where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, the data subject shall have the right to object at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or her for such marketing, which includes profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct marketing. Where the data subject objects to processing for direct marketing purposes, the personal data shall no longer be processed for such purposes. At the latest at the time of the first communication with the data subject, the right referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be explicitly brought to the attention of the data subject and shall be presented clearly and separately from any other information. So you can object, and they must stop sending marketing mail. They should also have told you that you can object. And it does not matter how the marketing is presented. A unique code does not change anything (regarding the GDPR). Also, they are not allowed to add marketing to any mail you want to receive, like service availability notifications, after you have objected.	Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway.	This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy.	The GDPR has an exemption for purely personal or household activity. Creating a family tree seems purely personal as long as you don't publish it. You're also allowed to freely share the tree as long as it stays within that purely personal scope. Your proposed restriction of only showing data of blood relatives seems excessively strict. But assuming that this exemption wouldn't apply, there'd probably still be no problem. The GDPR does not require you to always obtain consent. It requires that the purposes for which you process personal data are covered by some legal basis. Consent is one such legal basis, but legitimate interest is another. You can likely argue that you have a legitimate interest to create a tree of your (extended) family. The legitimate interest must be weighed against the rights and freedoms of the affected persons. For example, contact information could be used for stalking. The balance of the legitimate interest check can be changed if you adopt suitable safeguards. Your idea of only sharing data with close relatives would be such a safeguard, but it might not be necessary. When you rely on legitimate interest, the affected person can object to further processing, furthermore they can request to be erased from your records. A request for erasure can be denied if there are overriding grounds to keep the data. E.g maybe only contact information has to be deleted but names, dates, and relations might be kept. You should notify persons when they are included into your records. It is your obligation as the data controller to make these decisions. If someone disagrees they can sue you or lodge a complaint with a supervision authority. Note that dead persons are not natural persons in the sense of the GDPR, and have no privacy. However, national laws may provide such protections.
Is it illegal to create a scenario in which someone could inflict violence on another person, if said person had volunteered as part of the scenario? So, to cut a long story short. There's an employee I work with that has stolen money and property multiple times, and that has created a hostile environment for the rest of us via the use of intimidation and threats of violence. However, our HR have their hands tied regarding any form of further discipline due to our country's laws, and his threat of a lawsuit if he is ever fired. Some employees have decided to see if they can not provoke, more trick, him into losing his cool (he has a history of a foul temperament) and attack a colleague physically, ergo providing HR a credible excuse to finally fire him, and protect themselves at the same time. The main part of the plan is not to involve the cops, as we have no intention of causing unnecessary hassle, we just want rid of him. Would such an action be illegal under law?	In the United States, many jurisdictions have criminal offenses outlawing behavior that may include what you're describing here. In Ohio, for instance, disorderly conduct (R.C. 2917.11) includes "insulting, taunting, or challenging another, under circumstances in which that conduct is likely to provoke a violent response." In Indiana, there's the offense of provocation (IC 35-42-2-3), which is even broader and includes "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally [engaging] in conduct that is likely to provoke a reasonable person to commit battery." It looks like this has been interpreted to include even actions that don't directly involve the provoked person, such as kissing another man's wife. Beyond the criminal offense, there are also jurisdictions that will permit a civil suit for damages resulting from the criminal act. There are also states where this could constitute intentional interference with business relations or intentional interference with an employment contract. In any of those cases, your co-workers could be looking at damages for lost wages, loss of reputation, etc.	If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same.	In general, police have no special protection from being recorded; if it is legal to video or audio record a person in that jurisdiction then it is legal to record a police officer in that jurisdiction. Anything that it is legal to do with the recording of a person is legal even if that person is a police officer. As to if it is legal to record a person see: Is it legal to post a photograph that I captured of a stranger in the street? Model release for image without faces How do laws affect photography of non-humans in public when people may be in the frame? What are the legal repercussions of taking a stranger's picture in public? What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?	Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol.	Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics	Legally, they can kick you out for any reason that isn't illegal discrimination. They can't kick you out for being black. They also can't kick you out for being white. But they can kick you out for not liking your face. Now the question is: Who can kick you out? The store owner obviously can. Anyone who is given the authority by the store owner can. Actually, anyone with the apparent authority can kick you out. However, everyone other than the store owner has been hired to work towards making profits. If throwing you out is bad for business, then whoever did it would have to answer to the store owner. So the ex-friend can't go to court for throwing you out, but they might get into trouble with their boss about it. PS. I interpreted "kicking out" as saying "Please leave our premises. If you don't leave then you will be trespassing and I will call the police", not actually kicking the person with your foot which would be most likely assault.	Legal Context This kind of argument is often called a "defense of others" defense which is available in every jurisdiction of which I am aware. Almost every state has a specific description of when this is permitted as part of their criminal code, usually in a general principles section at the beginning, or in the sections pertaining to crimes of violence. Some details vary from one state to another, but none of the facts presented in this hypothetical really push the envelope in terms of distinctions between one state's law and another. Most of the differences involve situations when the use of deadly force is allowed. For example, states differ regarding when deadly force allowed to prevent a burglary of your home or business which is in progress, particularly if it is possible to avoid a use of deadly force at all by retreating in a manner that puts you at no one at any significant risk of bodily injury. But, the scenario presented does not appear to involve the use of deadly force (although the definition of "deadly force" can be slippery and lead to some subtle variations in what is permitted from state to state). Another common nuance of variation between states involves the circumstances under which physical force or deadly physical force is authorized to make a citizens arrest, but this situation is also not implicated by your hypothetical. Once Thug is beat up, the scenario ends without any effort to detain Thug until the police arrive. Generally speaking, a defense of others defense that justifies a use of force under criminal law will also not give rise to civil liability in a lawsuit for assault and battery as opposed to a criminal prosecution for it. A Sample Defense Of Others Statute The pertinent section of the Colorado Revised Statutes (2016), strongly influenced by the language of the Model Penal Code (which never adopted in full by any state but highly influential stylistically in how U.S. criminal codes are drafted) is very typical of the majority rule regarding the defense of others and reads as follows (emphasizing the language relevant to the scenario in the question): § 18-1-704. Use of physical force in defense of a person (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204 ; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force if: (a) With intent to cause bodily injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that other person; or (b) He is the initial aggressor; except that his use of physical force upon another person under the circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so, but the latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force; or (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law. (4) In a case in which the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction regarding self-defense as an affirmative defense, the court shall allow the defendant to present evidence, when relevant, that he or she was acting in self-defense. If the defendant presents evidence of self-defense, the court shall instruct the jury with a self-defense law instruction. The court shall instruct the jury that it may consider the evidence of self-defense in determining whether the defendant acted recklessly, with extreme indifference, or in a criminally negligent manner. However, the self-defense law instruction shall not be an affirmative defense instruction and the prosecuting attorney shall not have the burden of disproving self-defense. This section shall not apply to strict liability crimes. Analysis of the Hypothetical Facts Is Paul guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug, or would self-defense or some other standard defense apply? Paul is probably not guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug because a defense of others defense justifies his actions. Paul is using physical force to defend a third person (and presumably himself as well once once he is involved in the fray) from what he reasonably believes to be the use of unlawful physical force by Thug, and generally, under those circumstances Paul may use a degree of force which Paul reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. Paul is most vulnerable in this scenario on the question of whether he reasonably believed that the degree of force he used was reasonably necessary for the purpose of defending Emily and himself from Thug's unlawful use of physical force, or whether he went further than what was reasonably necessary for a few minutes that left Thug "incapacitated and thoroughly bloodied". For example, suppose that Paul had already caused Thug to try to flee the scene after the first minute at which point Thug was slightly bruised and afraid of Paul, but was not at all incapacitated. But, suppose that despite this fact that Paul, awash with adrenaline from the fight, continued to pummel Thug for a couple more minutes as Thug repeatedly tried to flee the scene only to be dragged back by Paul. Suppose that Paul continued the fight after it was no longer necessary because Paul wanted to punish Thug for his mistreatment of Emily and to discourage other people from trying to attack Emily in the future, even after Paul knew that there was already no real risk that Thug himself would continue to use unlawful physical force against Emily no or in the near future. Under these circumstances, which aren't inconsistent with the hypothetical facts, if this extra couple of minutes caused Thug to be much more badly injured than he otherwise would have been if Thug had been allowed to flee after the first minute, then Paul could still be guilty of assault and battery, even though his actions were legally justified for the first minute of the fight. There is no indication that either Paul or Emily provoked the attack on Emily, or that either Paul or Emily was the initial aggressor, or that this was actually a pre-agreed dueling situation. So each of these circumstances which would be exceptions to the general rule that the defense of others is justified do not apply to this case. There is likewise no indication that Paul used "deadly force" as opposed to mere "physical force" in handling the situation. It is likely that Paul would have committed a crime if he had shot and killed Thug instead of beating him up, if Paul knew perfectly well at the time that he was capable of beating up Thug and making Thug go away for good as a result without resorting to a firearm, unless the attack on Emily was severe enough for Paul to reasonably believe that the attack was putting Emily at a real risk of serious bodily injury.	A. Yes it is clearly illegal to fire employees for unionizing. B. Companies get around this all the time by closing the facility. That means the managers lose their jobs too, which is incentive for management to keep a union from forming.
GDPR, email lists, a few email subscribers in the EU Situation: Say you are an organization that regularly sends out e-newsletter updates to an email list that has been curated over the years by people signing up at events and/or through online sign-up forms. You are based in the US and most of the members of your email list are in the US, but a significant plurality are from abroad and a substantial number of those individuals reside in the EU. The GDPR is thus triggered for you (meaning you must comply). Question: Does this situation trigger the GDPR obligations (for example, the rights afforded to data subjects, the steps taken to protect their data, etc.) for every member of your email list regardless of where they live/reside/are or just for those individuals on your email list who are in/live in/were in EU at the time they signed up?	Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task.	This is a good question, as it raises an issue which places the controller's interest in providing a smoothly functioning customer sign up process against customers' right not to have their data leaked. Note that it is not necessary to consider "enumeration" here. Even just being able to check whether one person has a registered account raises the issue. The relevant provisions of the EU GDPR (or in the UK, the UK GDPR as defined in sections 3(1) and 205(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018) are (emphasis added): Article 4(2): 'processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction So, disclosure of the fact that a user has a registered account amounts to "processing". Article 6(1): Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of these, only (a) and (f) are likely to be of any relevance: (a) is not too useful since it isn't feasible to design a sign-up system that depends on the user's consent (which they may not give). That leaves us with (f). As noted by the Information Commissioner's Office, "Legitimate interests is the most flexible lawful basis for processing, but you cannot assume it will always be the most appropriate. It is likely to be most appropriate where you use people’s data in ways they would reasonably expect and which have a minimal privacy impact, or where there is a compelling justification for the processing.". The legitimate interest here would be that you need a sign up system which prevents duplicate registrations. Remember though that the processing has to be "necessary" for the purposes of the legitimate interest. One might argue that it is not since you could design the system to give the appearance of accepting the duplicate registration followed by sending an email to the account holder to inform them. On the other hand this will result in a less user friendly experience which could itself be a legitimate interest. Ultimately this is a balancing exercise and it is hard to say whether you have struck the right balance until someone complains to the ICO or the court and a decision is issued. The fact that the practice is widespread among well-resourced and large companies would tend to indicate that it is lawful albeit this is not conclusive in the absence of a court decision. I'm not aware of any cases involving this particular issue but would be interested to hear from others on this point. If the processing is unlawful then Article 18 is applicable: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller restriction of processing where one of the following applies: [...] (b) the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes the erasure of the personal data and requests the restriction of their use instead Where processing has been restricted under paragraph 1, such personal data shall, with the exception of storage, only be processed with the data subject’s consent or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or for the protection of the rights of another natural or legal person or for reasons of important public interest of the Union or of a Member State. In other words, the data subject could ask you not to disclose their registration status via the sign up page, and you would be obliged to comply with the request. Separately from the above points, in order to be lawful you must provide the data subject with certain prescribed information at the time when the data is collected. Of particular relevance here are the following items: Article 13(1): Where personal data relating to a data subject are collected from the data subject, the controller shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with all of the following information: [...] (c) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing; (d) where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party; So even if you conclude that the processing will be lawful you will have to give some consideration to the basis so that you can comply with the above provision.	Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite.	You wrote: As far as I believe, it is permitted under GDPR to record and store non-anonymized web server access logs, as these can be useful for security reasons. True, Recital 49 GDPR: The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response teams (CERTs), computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems. You asked: My question is whether this anonymization process counts as processing personally identifiable data under GDPR? IP addresses are personal data in some cases, so yes, you're processing personal data. Then, these anonymized logs will be fed into an analytics tool to provide stats on unique visitors, page hits, etc. These are purposes considered compatible with initial purposes according to Article 5.1.(b): Personal data shall be (...) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for (...) statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); As a matter of fact, you might be required to anonymize the data for those purposes, see Article 89.1: Processing for (...) statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. If I were to anonymize the logs and continue to use them exclusively for security reasons, would that change anything? No, you would be processing data in a manner compatible with initial purposes (ensuring network and information security). Or does it not matter what I do with them once they are anonymized? Yes, it does. If you're not using them for "archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes" then you're using them for purposes incompatible with initial purposes. You would need to find new legal basis for processing. does this extra anonymization process on top then take it over the line meaning that consent and a privacy notice would be required? It depends on what you want to do with anonymized data. In your case, for security purposes or security and statistical purposes, you don't need the consent and there is no requirement for the privacy notice (but sure, it would be nice to publish one). For other purposes it might be different.	I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope).	If you are not processing the personal information of EU citizens yourselves then you are unlikely to be classed as data processors under GDPR (check Article 3: Territorial Scope, p.32-33). If you were to operate a Software-as-a-Sevice (SaaS) solution then you would be a data controller/processor (or both) and GDPR would certainly apply if you have EU citizens as customers/users. While I can't see any reference to software vendors in the GDPR text, as a software vendor it would be in your interest to ensure your products meet the criteria set out in Article 25 (Data Protection by design and by default, p.48) in order to help your customers to comply, such as: Implement appropriate technical measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects. Implement appropriate technical measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons. These along with similar organisational measures are the responsibility of the data controller, but unless your software helps them to comply they may be forced to consider alternative solutions which reduce their overall risk. If your software already has a number of such controls in place it may be worth putting a white-paper or similar communication together which can inform your customers of how your software helps them to comply. There does not appear to be any direct liability to the software vendor through GDPR. If a data breach is the result of a design flaw or implementation bug in the software and your customer gets fined as a result, they may be likely to pursue you on grounds of the software not being fit-for-purpose and lacking the appropriate technical controls required to ensure data privacy. In this event, your defence will rely upon records of designing and implementing controls, records of software testing and remediation, and having in place suitable procedures to ensure security patches can be quickly deployed to your customers when required. Further clarification as requested: If your organisation doesn't process the personal data, doesn't have any third parties process it on your behalf (includes hosting companies) or have any access to it ever, then you're neither a controller or processor. However, if your customers ever send you personal data or grant you temporary access to personal data as part of troubleshooting issues with your software, then you would be a processor in this context and would need an appropriate contract in place and would need to ensure the appropriate technical and organisational controls are implemented to comply with GDPR and reduce risk of a personal data breach. Additionally, if international data transfers take place as part of this (e.g. sending/accessing files over the Internet) you would need to ensure your organisation is able to provide an equivalent level of protection for the rights of the data subjects - for example if you are in the U.S. you would likely need to voluntarily join up to the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield or use the EU's Model Contract Clauses within your contracts in order for it to be legal for EU-based businesses to use you as a data processor. For more information about international transfers read the EU's Data Transfers outside the EU page. Ref: GDPR	The obligation to notify the supervisory authority (CNIL in your case) no longer exists. It was part of the previous regulatory framework, but it is not part of GDPR (which takes affect tomorrow). If you use CCTV that may monitor employees (i.e. they sometimes enter the HQ to consult with the owner), your obligations under the GDPR is basically to inform the employees that the CCTV cameras are there. I.e. Data subjects are entitled to understand when their personal data is being processed, covering the transparency aspect of processing. The use of CCTV must be communicated via signage which indicates the areas covered and instructions for further information.	The tricky bit from a GDPR standpoint is that the US has a law that says a US-based company must hand over data to US government agencies even if the data is stored outside the US. This is US specific and a case where the US government gives itself jurisdiction outside the US but the EU can't directly do anything against it (outside of international negotiations). As you noticed this means if you store data at a US data processor there is no real difference whether the data is physically stored in the US or the EU. So to avoid transferring EU consumer data to the US several steps are needed. First the servers have to be physically located in the EU and second the company needs to be non-US based, EU based seems the obvious choice. AFAIK constructions of a US-based company creating a fully owned EU-based subsidary are currently used to achieve the second part. Whether this is sufficient may have to be decided in court.
Can a presidential pardon be overruled? I know a presidential veto on a law (or bill, since they didn't sign it) can be overruled by a two-third vote in both houses. Is the same, or a similar process, available to overturn a pardon?	No (with one exception, see bottom), there is not currently any limits to the power of a Presidential Pardon. Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution grants the power: The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. (Emphasis mine) Those are the only limits placed on this power: For offenses against the United States (Federal crimes, not State crimes) Except in cases of impeachment The judiciary or legislative branches, according to the constitution, do not have any granted power to override or veto a Presidential Pardon. There have been a few controversial pardons taken on by Presidents: Pardon of Richard Nixon by Gerald Ford Caspar Weinberger, pardoned by George HW Bush against congressional opposition Marc Rich by Bill Clinton Chelsea Manning by Barack Obama Just before Clinton left office for Obama, he granted over 100 pardons including one to his half-brother Roger Clinton Jr.. Andrew Johnson pardoned almost all Confederate's for crimes against the United States, which was very controversial at the time. Additionally this power (granted under State Constitutions) also extends to State-Level crimes for Governors of the respective states where this power is granted. These also do not have limits and have been used quite often. The only power to override the Presidential Pardon power comes from the to-be-pardoned person themselves. The Supreme Court ruled: "A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. It may then be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered; and if it is rejected, we have discovered no power in this court to force it upon him." This could probably be extended to State Pardons as well.	If the Senate took the extreme measure of attempting to abolish the Supreme Court, there's nothing in the Constitution that requires them to confirm any of the President's nominees. However, attempting to dismantle one of the three branches would be nothing short of a coup d'etat. The president has some options here: He [the President] may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses [of Congress], or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper. -- Article 2, Sec. 3 Basically, this means that, in an extraordinary circumstance (total defiance of the entire Senate would easily qualify), the President can lock the Senate in their chamber until they straighten their heads out. And when I say "lock them in", I don't mean that figuratively. The Constitution requires that a majority of each house be present to constitute a quorum to do business. The President could order up to 51 Senators to convene, and if they refused, could order the FBI or whoever to physically arrest them and drag them to the capitol building. This was actually done in Wisconsin by Gov. Scott Walker in 2011 when 14 Democrat Senators fled the state to avoid the quorum needed to vote on a controversial bill that they couldn't block. It would be messy for sure, and as far as I know, has never been done with the U.S. Senate. But there is precedent for it. Additionally, the President could use his vacancy power and just appoint a justice. Legally, he would have to wait for the Senate to be in recess, and the Senate would likely arrange things so that never happens. However, if there were no justices left, he could just appoint a Chief Justice (the Constitution provides that there be at least one justice). Even if he did this in the most "in-your-face" illegal way, with both middle fingers extended, the only judge that can tell him he did wrong is the guy he just seated. Of course, the Senate would move to impeach that judge, and probably the President too for having appointed him illegally, but you need a supermajority of both houses to remove them from office. If you had such a supermajority, then the game is over at this point; there's no way the President would step down in such a situation (who would force him?) and we're in a civil war because we don't have a functional government anymore. In reality, this isn't an "interesting twist in constitutional law that the Founding Fathers may not have considered." It's that if Congress ever went totally off the rails like that, the President, or the people would have to step up and hope they could end the standoff peacefully without resorting to violence, because this is the kind of thing that revolutions are fought over.	The simple legal answer is that the President has this power because the law gives it to them. Historically, the right of the head of state to grant pardons is a legacy of autocratic monarchical rule: this was a power that kings and queens had over their subjects. In France, this power ended with the monarchy during the French revolution but was reinstated by Napoleon, himself an autocratic monarch, and it has remained in the various incarnations of the French legal system ever since. Here is an examination of the concept in various jurisdictions. The concept of separation of powers is a much more recent concept. In particular, the tripartite separation into administrative, judicial and legislative power can be traced to Montesquieu in his The Spirit of the Laws in 1748. This Enlightenment point of view crept into many political systems, however, the specific expression of it reached full flower in the establishment of the United States. It is worth noting, that pardons at both state and Federal level are part of US law vesting in the Governor (or some other member of the executive) and the President respectively. The tripartite separation is supposed to provide checks and balances with each arm of government serving to limit the power of the other two. In this context, it is perfectly reconcilable that the executive branch should have the power to intervene and correct "mistakes" made by the judiciary just as the legislative branch does by being able to change the law in the light of judicial interpretation of existing law. In effect, the executive can correct "mistakes" in individual cases looking backwards and the legislature can correct "mistakes" in general going forward (the do in fact have the power to make laws retrospective [backwards looking] and specific but they tend not to do so).	No Section 2, Clause 1 says: ... and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Impeachment is explicitly carved out from the President's power to pardon.	I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand.	If the Senate has convicted by the necessary majority, Trump would no longer be the President - Mike Pence would be. There is no legal difficulty in removing ordinary citizens from the White House. Of course, President Pence might decide that he didn't mind ex-President Trump remaining in the White House, and I think the law enforcement agencies would be obliged to respect that.	Yes, the President can just fire them, or more commonly, request their resignation. The provision for impeachment by Congress exists in case the President doesn’t do what the President should do.	Could the acceptance of the pardon then have any bearing on the case in the other jurisdiction? Possibly, but not much. There is very, very little case law on this point since: (1) pardons are rare (especially federal ones), (2) people who are pardoned generally do so because everyone in the criminal justice process in the prior case agrees that the person is reformed and they are usually correct, (3) the statute of limitations has often run on a new prosecution, and (4) many cases where these issues arise, are probably not appealed (either because the neither parties attempts to, or because a defendant is acquitted and there is no appeal), but an appeal is necessary to give rise to binding precedents. Can the admission of guilt be used in the new case? The criminal collateral estoppel effects of a pardon flow from the adjudication on the merits which is vacated. Also, comity between sovereigns and public policy mitigate such a rule. The pardon power would not be very interesting if it routinely resulted in a new prosecution that was conducted on a summary basis via a preclusion doctrine such as collateral estoppel. In many cases, the statute of limitations will have run on the original crime or there will be no parallel state law crime, but this is not always the case. Also, I would disagree with the statement that a pardon always implies an admission of guilt to the crime for which a pardon was granted, even though that statement is often used rhetorically. For example, one important use of the pardon power is to commute the sentence of someone who asserts that they are factually innocent but have been convicted of a crime, potentially in a manner that is not subject to further judicial review, and treating that as an admission of guilt doesn't make sense. As the Wikipedia entry on Burdick notes in the pertinent part: Legal scholars have questioned whether that portion of Burdick [ed. about admission of guilt] is meaningful or merely dicta. President Ford made reference to the Burdick decision in his post-pardon written statement furnished to the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives on October 17, 1974. However, said reference related only to the portion of Burdick that supported the proposition that the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to cases of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders. I would read this as dicta, as this portion of the holding was not necessary for the court to reach its conclusion and the fact pattern in Burdick was a typical fact pattern where guilt was not disputed. It didn't raise the concerns present when a pardon is requested based upon a claim of innocence, and granted following a conviction. Instead, the holding of Burdick was that there was no pardon because the pardon was rejected (in a manner very similar to a common law disclaimer of a gift), so its holding didn't need to reach the effect of a pardon that is accepted to resolve the case. Can it be used as "reasonable cause" for various actions? This is a bit too vague to know what you are getting at. I suppose that a pardon could constitute reasonable cause for some things favorable to a defendant who is pardoned (e.g., potentially in a motion seeking to reopen a termination of parental rights entered on the basis of the conviction). I suppose it could also be used in a manner potentially unfavorable to a defendant (e.g. showing a pattern of past conduct that demonstrates modus operandi in connection with a prosecution for a new crime). I don't think it could be used as grounds to deny an occupational or business license for bad character. Still, without more clear context it is harder to know what you are really looking for in this regard and I'm not confident that my examples address that. Does the defendant lose their right to refuse to testify in the new case? I haven't reviewed the case law, but my intuition is that if it has never been waived before, it wouldn't be waived by the pardon, but that if it was waived in a previous proceeding resulting in a conviction that was then pardoned, that the prior sworn testimony might be admissible evidence in the new action since it is not hearsay and isn't itself evidence of a prior conviction. The context of the prior testimony might have to be concealed from the jury. As noted by @Putvi, the defendant could not claim risk of conviction for the federal crime as a ground for invoking the 5th Amendment if a pardon is accepted (something that is implied in Burdick), but if there was an overlapping state law crime, risk of conviction for the state crime could constitute a grounds upon which to invoke the 5th Amendment. Burdick does stand for the proposition that a pardon not solicited by the defendant, that is rejected, cannot provide a basis for removing the 5th Amendment protection with respect to a risk of conviction for federal crime. I would also be inclined to think that matters disclosed in an application for a pardon might be admissible evidence as a non-hearsay statement of a party-opponent, if the statement was stripped of the pardon application context (which would be unduly prejudicial since it would imply a prior conviction which otherwise wouldn't be admissible).
Would these contractual terms stand up in a court of law (US)? I was recently reviewing the contents of a contract agreement (US Based company) when two parts struck me as being particularly harsh. The parts of stick out to me in particular are: Clause 3: "Therefore agrees that during or after the term of this Agreement" – How can a company stipulate a condition after an agreement finished and over. Surely there must be a limit or it will be enforceable for the duration of the persons life. Clause 4: "If any court refuses to enforce this Agreement, or any provision hereof, because it is more extensive (as to time, definition of business of otherwise) than is necessary to protect the business and goodwill of the Company, Employee agrees that this agreement, or the offending provision hereof, shall be modified to the extent necessary to permit the terms to be enforced in any such legal proceeding" – This seems to state that even if a court decides that some parts are not enforceable, we reserve the right to change them until we can get damages from you in any way. This sounds very harsh. (Full image of the specific clauses are here and here.) I was wondering if: These statements would stand up in a court of law? Whether companies are allowed to make these types of statements? Whether employees have the right to push back and ask these to be changed?	Yes Yes Yes However, these are pretty standard contract terms. Many, many terms survive the end of the substantive agreement. For example, terms with respect to ongoing confidentiality, dispute resolution, warranties, termination itself etc. The second is so common it actually has a named legal doctrine: reading down. In the absence of such a clause, if the contract inadvertently exceeds what the law allows, it preserves the contract rather than leaving both parties without contractural protection.	Severability My understand [sic] of contract law in general, is that an illegal or unenforceable clause does not render the whole contract void, but rather that specific clause is essentially stricken out, as if it did not exist. This is not true. Or, at least, not necessarily true. The courts, when interpreting a contract, try to give effect to the parties intentions. Or, more precisely, what an impartial, reasonable person would conclude their intentions at the time were based on the evidence. A contract is a set of mutual promises - if one of those promises is unenforceable, was it the parties intention that: the remainder be enforced, or absent that promise, they would not have made a deal, or they would have made a different deal, say, at a different price? It’s hard to make general statements about severability because they turn on the particular facts of each case. However, the common law doctrine is that severance means severance - you can take words out, but you can’t add words in or change the meaning of words you left behind. If doing that leaves nonsense, then the clause can’t be severed, and the whole contract is void. Further, what’s left must still be a contract. If the severed portion leaves a remainder that does not meet the requirements of a contract (e.g. because the severance totally removed one party’s consideration), then the whole contract is void. Similarly, if the severed item is central to the purpose of the contract, then the whole contract is void. Finally, at least in Common Law countries, there is a difference between provisions that are unenforcable (e.g. unfair restraint of trade clauses) and those that are illegal (e.g. your murder before resignation clause). In most jurisdictions, if a provision is unenforcable at common law or through statute, severability is an option. However, if the provision is illegal, then responses differ. In England and Wales, a provision that requires criminality or the commission of a tort cannot be severed - the illegality 'infects' the entire contract and makes the whole thing void. However, in Australia, the degree of illegality matters - heinous illegality infects the entire contract, but incidental illegality may not. For example, see REW08 Projects Pty Ltd v PNC Lifestyle Investments PTY LTD [2017] NSWCA 269 [23 October 2017] - the NSW Court of Appeal ruled that a property sale that contained clauses designed (by both parties) to defraud the state of Stamp Duty was nevertheless enforceable against the vendor - this would likely have been decided the other way in England and Wales. Of course, many contracts make express provision for unenforcable terms in what are known as severability clauses. These can go further than mere severance and allow the court to add words or even redraft entire sections to preserve the contract. However, this is not a panacea because what you agreed to in your severability clause may not be what you thought you agreed to when the rubber hits the road. For example, when you are forced to sell your Picasso for the 1,000USD deposit only, and you can't get the 100,000,000,000 Iranian Rial balance due to US sanctions. Therefore, deliberately leaving unenforcable provisions in a contract is dangerous because you don't know what you are going to get. However, is it unlawful? Well, that depends. There is nothing wrong with making legally unenforceable agreements. You and I can agree to go to the movies this Thursday. That's an unenforcable social arrangement, not a contract. If you stand me up, I can't sue you even if I bought popcorn for you. Similarly, there is no prohibition on having unenforcable terms in an otherwise legally binding contract, particularly if everyone knows they are unenforcable. Indeed, many large contracts are accompanied by Memorandums of Understanding that are unenforcable statements about how various organisations intend to work together to give effect to the contract. However, if the term is included to be deceptive or misleading by one party against the other (intentionally or otherwise), there may be legal consequences. A person who was misled into entering a contract may be able to have that contract declared void. Also, many jurisdictions make misleading and deceptive conduct in trade or commerce an offence.	are contract terms enforceable that say the employee has to pay the employer if they leave without giving notice? Yes, as long as the penalization is not of punitive nature. The doctrine of at-will employment is only the default condition, but a contract may supersede it. As for the extra question, reciprocity of sanctions (as in leaving without notice) is not a requirement for enforceability of a contract. In general, the lack of reciprocity only signals that there is a difference in the parties' bargaining power, but usually that does not affect enforceability.	Generally, what you say you will do in a contract is what you must do - there is no "the dog ate my homework" excuse. For your examples: Employment contracts have so much government regulation that the common law contract is lost in the mists of time. It is unlikely that a court would interpret an employment contract as requiring exact timekeeping; it is also unlikely that the person would have worked exactly 38 hours on every week except the one where they worked 37.5. However, if it were proved that the employee owed 0.5 hours to the employer they could be required to provide it or refund the pay they had received, barring a law that changed this. The dog must be walked. Alice must find a substitute walker if she is unable to provide it. Falling sick is something foreseeable that Alice should have provided for either in the contract ("if I am sick I won't walk the dog") or by arranging for someone else to do it. For purely personal services, falling sick may frustrate the contract, however, dog-walking is probably not personal enough. There is a doctrine which allows termination by frustration where neither party is at fault, however, it is not clear that this would apply. The building burning down is foreseeable and could (should?) have been addressed in the contract. If the destruction of the building was without fault on the owner then the contract is frustrated. If there was some fault on the owner (smoking in bed, inoperative fire alarm etc.) and the cleaner stands willing, ready and able (that is able except for the absence of a building) to perform their obligations, the owner would probably be obliged to pay, at the least for unrecoverable costs (e.g. wages) and loss of profits - if they pay for the cleaning products the cleaner would be obliged to deliver them up. One of the main reasons for the length of contracts for non-trivial transactions is they deal with these contingencies.	Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise.	Caveat: This answer applies to private sector union workers in the U.S. The considerations that apply to public sector unions are very different. Also, as I discuss below, there are special labor relations law rules that apply to a few specific private sector industries that are pertinent to these questions. The legal framework largely flows out of the National Labor Relations Act and the cases decided under it by the National Labor Relations Board (which is the first instance trial court in most union-management disputes), the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the various circuits, and the U.S. Supreme Court. But, I have not cited chapter and verse of particular statutory sections and cases supporting this analysis for lack of space and time (it would normally take up about a third of a one semester law school class on labor law to cover the points summarily answered below). What are the lawful requirements of Company A in bargaining? There is an obligation to negotiate in good faith and to make available some information necessary to allow that to be possible. The employer also can't fire an employee for insisting on negotiations in good faith with the union or for union activity. Is there a minimal salary that must be offered (apart from minimum wage laws)? No. Also, in some industries, the employer needs to pay the "prevailing wage" in order to get government contract which are critical to its business and basically amount to the union negotiated wage at comparable firms. What happens if Company A and the union do not agree to terms? There is no collective bargaining agreement and the employer's terms are in force when the existing collective bargaining agreement expires. Usually, if this happens, the workers then go on strike rather than working under the unilaterally employer imposed contract terms, until a new collective bargaining agreement is negotiated (and the vast majority of the time, a new collective bargaining agreement is negotiated after some period of time when the workers are on strike). But, sometimes a prior collective bargaining agreement will establish an arbitration resolution if there is a deadlock. Arbitration is also used to resolve deadlocks, if I recall correctly, in a few key industries with large employers where avoiding a strike is critical to the nation's economy (outside the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act) that are established by statute. Can company A elect to hire people from outside the union "at-will" while negotiating with the union? Yes. These people are often pejoratively called "scabs" and neutrally called "replacement workers". Generally speaking, when a strike is over, the business has to take back all of the striking workers, and fire all of the replacement workers, except to the extent that the business whose workers went on strike had vacancies when the strike started. In part, this is because this is a term of the new collective bargaining agreement and in part as a consequence of the requirement that employers not retaliate against employees for union activities. In states that are not "right to work" states, the union can prevent non-union replacement workers from being hired at all after the strike is over. Could Company A continue to do so indefinitely, essentially no longer employing the union members and just hiring a new group? More or less. I can't easily summarize the case law on the point and prior collective bargaining agreement terms can be relevant. Also, there are a few sectors of the economy (mostly the stage play industry, the movie industry, and the construction industry), in which unionization is structured on the basis of professions for an entire industry, or the entire industry in a geographical region, rather than on an employer by employer basis. This tactic doesn't work in those industries. The common thread is that work in these industries is organized on a project by project basis (i.e. a particular play, a particular movie, or a particular construction project), in which the firm paying for the project is usually a single project only entity. Another important bright line rule is that an employer always has the right to shut down the business covered by the union entirely, rather than deal with the union. But, this is why unions tend to be more effective in industries with large employers who can't replace the employees very easily with non-union workers (like factories and ship yards, and grocery store chains). Is this basically saying that the only power unions ultimately have is to quite en masse and make it difficult for the company to hire replacements? Basically. But, the power to strike is considerable in most unionized employment contexts and many people won't "cross a picket line" in solidarity with striking workers. From a consumer's perspective, not crossing a picket line means not patronizing a business whose workers are on strike. But, not crossing a picket line can also mean that workers (usually at a unionized business that is a vendor to the business whose worker's are on strike, or that deliver things to the business whose worker's are on strike) will refuse to participate in doing business with the business whose worker's are on strike. So, even if enough replacement workers can be found to continue to operate the business, this doesn't necessarily mean that a business won't face very severe consequences for continuing to operate with replacement workers while its regular workers are on strike. Furthermore, unions can take other actions short of strikes, like staying on the job and "working to rule" strictly refusing to show any flexibility beyond the bare requirements of their existing contract or the new one, or pursuing every single minor bump and scratch as a worker's compensation claim, reporting every Occupational Safety and Health Administration violation, or pursuing unfair labor practices litigation against the employer. Private sector unions are declining, in part, due to the ability of employers to hire replacement workers. Still, this is one reason for the long and steady decline of unionization in the private sector U.S. labor market (although the trend has reversed a bit in the last several years). Consider, for example, the following chart (via Wikipedia): As I recapped the economic history of labor action in the American workforce as of December 2010: [There have been] six general strikes in U.S. history, one in 1919 in Seattle, and four in 1934, at the height of the Great Depression, one in Toledo, one in Minneapolis, one in San Francisco and one at West Coast Ports. There was also a general strike in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1998. The last one in the English Speaking United States was 76 years ago, and very few people living today remember it. The United States has never had a nationwide general strike and just two general strikes in its history, one restricted to a single industry, and the other to a U.S. territory, extended beyond a single city. Union-management relations in the United States used to look a lot like they do in Europe. Strikes were large, frequent and involved a large share of the work force. National guard forces or private security forces were frequently called in to put them down in bloody conflicts. Openly socialist political parties were organized. In 1950, a year that revisionist history remembers as a tranquil period in American history, there were 424 strikes involving 1,000 or more workers, in all involving 1,698,000 workers, which was more than one in nine members of the unionized workforce of 14.3 million workers who made up 31.5% of the total work force. In 2008, there were 15 strikes involving 1,000 or more workers, in all including 72,000 workers which was one in two-hundred and twenty-three members of the unionized workforce of 16.1 million workers who made up 12.4% of the total workforce. The public sector which is 36.8% unionized, is as unionized as the private sector was at its peak. The private sector, which is 7.2% unionized, has the lowest level of unionization in the private sector since the 1920s, if not earlier. The unionized workforce has remained more or less constant for half a century, despite a growing workforce, and that masks the fact that there has been substantial growth in public sector union membership and a substantial decline in private sector union membership over that time period. The United States, there has been only one year since 1983 that more than 3% of unionized workers went on strike (1986), and there has only been one year since 1998 (the year 2000) when more than one in eighty union members went on strike. In the entire United States from 1990 to 2008, there wasn't a single year that there were more than 45 strikes involving 1,000 or more workers in the entire United States, in a period that started with a labor force of 103 million workers and peaked at just short of 130 million workers. In contrast, there wasn't a single year from 1950 to 1987 that had less than 46 strikes, despite that fact that the workforce was significantly smaller. Prior to the 1980s there were a couple hundred major strikes in the United States per year, about ten times current levels of labor action. I updated this account in 2014 and 2015: There were thirteen major strikes that took place at least in part in 2015 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics monthly tables. This is just two more than in the year 2014, which had fewer major strikes which involved fewer workers than any year from 1947-2013 except 2009, a low point of the financial crisis. Most of the half century before WWII also had more major strikes (at least proportionate to the size of the population) than there are these days. In all of the United States in 2014, there were just 11 strikes involve 1,000 or more workers, which involved a total of 34,000 workers and resulted in 200,000 work-days idle, which was less than 0.01% (i.e. less than 1 day in 10,000) of the total working time of the American labor force. The year 2015 was the next most peaceful year in post-WWII labor history. The year 2010 also had just 11 major strikes, but those strikes involved more workers and produced more days idle. There were just 5 major strikes in 2009 in the United States which involved fewer workers than in 2014 and fewer days idle. This has a lot to do with the decline of private sector unions in the United States. . . . Just under half of union members are in the public sector and public sector unions, as a rule in the United States, have limited or non-existent rights to strike (although teachers unions which are a huge part of total number of public sector union members can frequently strike). In 2014, just 0.001% of the working time of the American labor was idle due to strikes or lockouts. The last year than more than 0.01% of the working time of the American labor force was idle was 2000. The last year that 0.10% or more of the working tie of the American labor force was idle was 1978. Only one year from 1948 to 1959, a time often nostalgically remembered as the "good old days" by conservatives was below the 0.10% threshold. Nationally, in 2014, the private sector 6.6% (7.4%) of employees were members of unions (represented by unions), while in the public sector 35.7% (39.2%) of employees were members of unions (represented by unions), with both percentages generally tending to fall over the previous decade. Within the public sector, nationally, union representation rates are highest with local government employees (45.5%), intermediate with state government employees (32.8%), and lowest with federal employees (31.6%). In the United States in the year 2020 the union membership rate (the percentage of wage and salary workers who were members of unions) was 10.8 percent. . . . the union membership rate in the public sector was 34.8 percent, while the rate in the private sector was 6.3 percent.	What do the contracts with your suppliers and the policy with your insurer say? Changes in government regulation do not ipso facto relieve Parties of the obligations under a contract under common (English) law. Contracts are allowed to allocate the risk of force majeure (and indeed, to define it because it has no common law meaning) but if they don’t, then each party bears their own risk and if they fail to honour their obligations they are in breach of contract. Common law does have the doctrine of frustration, however, that is much narrower and must result in the inability of the contract to be completed at all. And then there are consumer rights which may apply. When the dust settles, we are likely to see a lot of litigation around force majeure. Your venue appears to be complying with both the law and their obligations under the contract so you have no breach of contract claim against them and no trigger for the insurance policy. If you choose to cancel, then you broke the contract. Importantly, the position is reversed in civil law jurisdictions - a party unable to fulfil their obligations under a contract is not in breach.	Should I ask for a contract, when asking for the money? The proper time to define or formalize a contract is not when asking for the money, but when agreeing what tasks are expected from you and how much you will charge therefor. That way both parties will be clear on what is expected from each other. And if a dispute is brought to court, the fact-finder will have an objective document from which to identify who breached the contract. It is always recommendable that the contract be self-contained, and that relevant interactions between the parties be in writing or memorialized in some way that leaves no room for unverifiable allegations of the type "I said, he said".
Could a Judge or Attorney General or Similar Start a New 9/11 investigation? On May 11th, 2018 a request was made by one of the many 9/11 for truth platforms which is endorsed by nearly 3000 architects and engineers to the US congress to reopen a new 9/11 investigation. This is called the Bobby McIlvaine Act which acts in the name of many families who lost at least a relative during the 9/11 attacks. According to his platform over 100 representatives of congress have been reached in the past few weeks. They are going to attempt the same thing this week but congress keeps ignoring the requests. Would it be possible for a judge, lawyer, attorney general, etc. to start a new investigation or at least to subpoena the people who were in charge by that time, or is Congress the only way? Are there any other legal procedures to start a new investigation apart from Congress?	You don't really need any reasonable doubts about the currently available evidence to get it started. If an investigating authority thinks a crime has been committed and not yet been adjudicated, it is free to investigate, even if others disagree. There are plenty of avenues for starting an investigation: Congress can exercise its oversight power to initiate an investigation. State legislatures can do the same, so you could petition the New York Legislature, the Virginia General Assembly, or the Pennsylvania General Assembly. At both the state and federal level, attorneys general have the authority to initiate an investigation of crimes committed within their jurisdictions. At both the state and federal level, a judge's authority to appoint a special prosecutor is a power considered to be inherent in the courts, so nearly any court could appoint someone to pursue the investigation. Of course, the prosecutor's authority could be jurisdictionally limited -- if a New York state judge appointed a prosecutor, he wouldn't really have much authority to investigate federal crimes, and if a small-claims court judge in Idaho appointed a prosecutor, he'd be limited by both his lack of authority to investigate events outside his jurisdiction and the practical difficulties of enforcing a subpoena from out of state. Even at the local level, law enforcement and legislative bodies have the authority to launch investigations. If NYPD or the Somerset County Sheriff or the Arlington County Board want to investigate, they could do so. I don't know what the relevant rules are in each jurisdiction, but some states allow lawsuits for civil damages based on criminal activity. So if the gist of the sponsor's complaint is that someone used "explosives and/or incendiaries" to kill his son, it may be that he could bring a lawsuit over that, which would in turn open up the the tools of civil discovery. Of course, that's only if the claim isn't time-barred; now that we're nearly 17 years out, I'd guess that it would be too late. And there's always the possibility of continuing an independent investigation. Using the same tools that the press uses -- interviews, freedom-of-information laws, etc. -- any member of the public is free to make an inquiry into any matter of public concern. Obviously, I'd expect any of these authorities to be reluctant to take up the cause due to the investigatory consensus against the inside-job/cover-up theory, and I'd also expect -- for the same reason -- that any authority that tried to take it up would run into serious roadblocks from all the other authorities that have declined.	This would be a violation of 18 USC 1361, which prohibits destruction of federal property. See also the DoJ legal notes on this crime. The act does have to be willful, so dropping a cup accidentally is not a crime. If for example the act is mustaching Obama's portrait, the damage would probably rise to the quarter-million dollar fine and 10 years in prison level. It would of course be at the discretion of the (new) DoJ whether to press charges.	Since the treason statute is quite vague, you have to discover what the details of the law is by looking at precedent. Almost all federal treason convictions in the US have involved declared wars. There is the case of John Fries, an early tax rebellion case in 1800, who was pardoned by the president thus rendering the need for legal appeal moot, but this involved armed insurrection and is thus not analogous. All other federal cases have involved people supporting the enemy in case of a declared war. In this specific case, the allegation is that by advocating not working with Syrian Kurds in an assault on Raqqa (because it was thought to be in the best interests of the US in terms of our relationship with Turkey, given the position of the Turkish state w.r.t. Kurds), Flynn benefited ISIS. Compared to various wartime treason convictions, such as Tokyo Rose and Axis Sally, the difference between imaginary "aid" in the case of Flynn vs. actual aid in the other cases is so stark that there is no case to be made for a treason charge.	First of all, as noted in the comments, Babylon Bee is SATIRE. It's not intended to be news, just entertainment. But the real question is whether or not a President COULD do such a thing. Or perhaps better, could a President attempt to do something like this. If a President did attempt to do this, it would be totally without precedent and also without any constitutional authority. Since the US Constitution enumerates the powers between the branches and gives the President only the authority to appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a SCOTUS justice, trying to change things by giving an existing justice 2 votes would almost certainly be immediately challenged by the Senate. It also seems unlikely that such an action would be upheld as constitutional. Of course this is all speculative since nothing of this nature has happened.	You can't normally ask the court to "recuse" an attorney, because "recusal" is normally restricted to the judge leaving the case. The more common term is moving to disqualify opposing counsel.	Could DA Bragg have only charged Trump with 34 misdemeanor counts, without elevating the charges to felonies? Yes. if Trump's defense team argues that the law that elevates the misdemeanor charges to felony charges does not apply in this case, because the elevation option does not include federal laws, then since this is a matter of law and not a matter of fact, Judge Mercan (rather than the jury) will decide whether or not to dismiss the felony charges? Yes. Does Judge Mercan have the option of dismissing the felony enhancement but allowing the misdemeanor charges to proceed, or would Mercan have to dismiss all charges against Trump? Judge Mercan could probably choose either option if he found that the original charges were not supported by the law. There is law regarding how this decision is made but I personally don't know that area of law well. One of the reason that I am unfamiliar with it is that it is exceedingly rare for a judge to conclude that the prosecutor's charges are not supported by the law. I would be very surprised if that judge reached that conclusion in this case, in particular, because both federal election law violations and state and federal tax law violations are implicated by the indictment. The DA no doubt legally researched this issue exhaustively before presenting the charges to the grand jury and has made out a prima facie case for a felony under the applicable New York State law. If Trump is brought to trial, then would it be possible for a jury to return a verdict that Trump was guilty of the misdemeanor offenses of falsifying business records but innocent of doing so with an intent to commit another crime? If so, then could Trump still be found guilty of the misdemeanors, or would he be fully acquitted, since the jury ruled that he was not guilty of the exact charges that DA Bragg filed? Whether a jury is presented with a lesser included offense charge at the request of the defense, is partially a matter of the prosecution's election to make that option available or not, and partially a matter of the judge's decision on how to handle it. The body of law involved in how this decision is handled on a case by case basis is quite involved. Most of the case law involves homicide cases, assault cases, and property crime cases where there are charges with are identical except for aggravating factors for the most serious charges. But, lesser charges generally aren't presented if based upon the evidence presented at trial, either the more serious charge is established or no charge is proven. For example, if the defendant presents an alibi defense, and a witness whose credibility is disputed places the defendant at the scene intentionally committing a crime, a lesser included offense charge would not be appropriate. But, if the defendant admits hitting a pedestrian and causing the pedestrian's death, but claims that the pedestrian was at fault in the accident for jay walking, while the prosecution alleges that the pedestrian was intentionally struck as part of a mafia hit, multiple lesser included offenses would probably be charged involving different levels of intent of premeditated intent/aggravated circumstances killing (first degree murder), to a knowing killing (second degree murder), to a reckless killing (manslaughter), to a criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide charge. Typically, the decision on this point would not be made until all evidence was received and the judge in a hearing away from the jury but in the presence of the prosecutors and defense counsel crafted jury instructions based upon the evidence presented at trial and the arguments raised by counsel at trial.	The problem was that the arresting officer and the investigating officer were two different people. After American airlines misidentified Mr Lowe as the suspect a warrant was issued for an arrest, and it wasn't until about a year later when officers in New Mexico ran his name and found that he had a warrant that they detained him. So their actions were perfectly proper. The length of his detention was primarily because the USA functions as separate legal jurisdictions, so you can be held for some time on a warrant for another state. Possibly the investigating officer should not have relied on American Airlines identification of the suspect. However, Mr. Lowe would have to overcome the qualified immunity bar to sue the PD. The case against the airline is that of negligence: they had no duty to single out Mr. Lowe; they could just have turned over all the data, as requested. Having chosen effectively to carry out their own investigation, the claim is that they owed a common law duty of care to Mr. Lowe to do it competently. It's clear that misidentifying Mr. Lowe as the suspect was likely to do him harm, so it's a reasonable foundation for a claim. More than that, we will have to see.	Unequivocally yes. An Australian judgement asserted this by (happily) adopting the reasoning of the US courts: The matter also came up for discussion in the Communist Party case where Justice Dixon adopted the U.S. view that: ... it is within the necessary power of the Federal government to protect its own existence and the unhindered play of its legitimate activities. And to this end, it may provide for the punishment of treason, the suppression of insurrection or rebellion and for the putting-down of all individual or concerted attempts to obstruct or interfere with the discharge of the proper business of government ... A plane (or ship, or train etc.) that is not responding to hails and acting to put citizens at risk is a legitimate target of military force. It doesn't matter if it is acting that way because of a deliberate decision of its controllers (e.g. terrorists), because it's not under control or because it's controllers are idiots.
How to report a sham marriage in Sweden It makes sense to reject a sham marriage (marriage of convenience) arranged solely for the purpose of admitting foreigners to EU on false claims of "anknytningsperson" (loosely speaking "connected person"). It is not legal to pay a person to become an "anknytningsperson" and the Swedish authorities have been very clear that it is not legal. I've tried to report a so-called sham marriage that was approved solely for the purpose of admitting foreigners to Sweden. I spoke with the police, the immigration office and the immigration court, the tax authorities and they say that the case is not unique but that they don't have experience. The background is that some of my acquaintances started to fabricate and sell false documents which they have registered at the tax authorities and at the immigration offices. In one case, the lady got paid SEK 100 000 (what kind of money is that?) and the couple didn't live together but the lady registered at the foreigner's address for some time and they registered an intention of getting married with the Swedish tax authories to fake that they had a relation. Now in fact the couple was already married by convenience in Iran to begin with. They had not met before the marriage. There are several court cases where these cases are called crimes against the law of foreigners ("brott mot utlänningslagen"). The law is clear that it is not legal, and the immigration authorities even answered that if it is a marriage of convenience then the application for immigration is not legal, so the case seems clear but still the falsification has been approved which is not legal. Is there any advice what to do to complain? The Swedish criminal law is available in English here. The prosecutor agreed that one relevant jurisdiction is: A person who gives untrue information about his identity or about other than his own affairs in a certificate or other document, or for the sake of appearances prepares a document concerning a legal document shall, if the act jeopardises proof, be sentenced for false certification to a fine or imprisonment for at most six months. If the crime is considered gross because it involves misuse of official position or for other reasons, imprisonment for at most two years shall be imposed. A person who invokes or otherwise uses a false document referred to in the first paragraph, shall, if the act jeopardises proof, be sentenced, as there provided, for using a false document. Recent news about sham marriages is clear that it is not legal and the penalty is 3 years in prison in the UK. There was also a BBC article about sham marriages recently.	As someone with ties to the "foreign" community in the United States, I see these "marriages of convenience" from time to time. In their most "legitimate" form, the couple will move to the same address and "technically" live together, but without consummating the marriage so that it can later be legally annulled. American immigration authorities counter this by asking each spouse about the other's underwear (literally!). Some "marriages of convenience" are legal, insofar as they technically conform to the marriage documents, e.g. regarding "co habitation," even while violating the spirit of the law. Others don't. Your best chance of attacking such "marriages" is not regarding the marriage itself (basically only the couple can decide what constitutes a valid marriage), but rather "compliance" with the marriage documents. That's something any law enforcement officer can understand.	There is no law in the US that says you must tell the truth on the internet. Some places where one must tell the truth are: When speaking to police, the FBI, and most government agencies When filing your taxes with the IRS In certain business contracts When testifying before Congress But on the internet, you can claim to be the first man on the moon with impunity. If someone is gullible enough to believe you and send you money, that is their fault and responsibility. As far as eating a Pangolin, why should she "admit" it, when it was documented on Instagram? There is no duty to officially apologize for it. You can try to report her to the US Fish and Wildlife Service, which enforces the Endangered Species Act, but as it occurred outside the USA, they will be powerless. Her claims are dubious, and possibly incorrect. Her treatment of an endangered animal is reprehensible. However, you posted this to a law site, asking about "reporting it" (to some sort of authority), and tagged it "criminal law". Her behavior is troubling, but I don't see anything that is remotely illegal or criminal.	Jan Böhmermann faces prosecution in Germany for violating their penal code section 103 as discussed here. Lèse-majesté is not a crime in the UK, though apparently it was a common law crime in Scotland until 2010 (though not prosecuted since 1715). Though there is always the possibility of a defamation lawsuit, depending on what you say.	When you breach a contract, you can get sued in local court, and if you don't show up to defend yourself, default judgment will be entered against you. Then the aggrieved party will have to collect, but the court in Washington (to invent a jurisdiction) can't enforce an order against a person in Norway (to invent another jurisdiction). So the aggrieved party would need to take enforcement of the judgment to the Norwegian courts. In the actual case of Norway, this is fairly simple, you just call an attorney in Norway to do the paperwork. It might be harder if the other jurisdiction is Belarus. If you return to the US, even if there is a money judgment against you for the rent owed, you will not be arrested for that debt. Depending on the state (about half of the states), you might be arrested for failing to comply with a court order to pay the debt. The difference lies in refusing to comply with a court order, versus simply having a debt. The State Department conveniently lists the reasons for denying a visa. Owing money or having an uncollected judgment against you is not one of the possible reasons, in fact even having been ordered by a court to pay, ignoring the order, and the court issuing an arrest warrant does not make you inadmissible.	The question largely does not come up in the US, but it does in some officially bilingual jurisdictions such as Canada. If someone ventures to paraphrase law of the US into Farsi or Spanish, that could be a kind act on their part, but it has no official status: only the law as enacted has legal weight. Though India is officially multilingual in many ways, acts of parliament must be in English – the English version is authoritative, even though translations may be made. In Canada, both English and French versions are official; so in the case of R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265, a conflict is detected: The French version of the text, which translates could bring the administration of justice into disrepute, is less onerous than the more stringent English version, "would bring the administration of justice into disrepute", and consequently is preferable in that it better protects the right to a fair trial (invoking a separate principle of interpretation, lenity, in case of ambiguity). There is some indication that EU directives can be translated after the fact, so that the 1979 Wild Birds Directive was translated from English into Slovak some years later. In the case of the EU, the Directorate-General for Translation shoulders that responsibility.	No, and certainly not for the reason implied (essentially a one spouse per jurisdiction in which one has citizenship rule which doesn't exist anywhere). At least under the law of every U.S. jurisdiction, you cannot be married to more than one person at the same time (anywhere in the world), and it is a crime to do so. Several dozen countries in the world recognize polygamy as legal (mostly in predominantly Muslim countries, not all of which allow polygamy, and in Africa where pre-Christian custom permits it), of course, and this does not violate the laws of those jurisdictions. The U.K. does not generally permit polygamy, but gives some recognition to and does not criminalize, polygamous marriages entered into in a place where it is lawful. But the concept proposed in the question would still not be legal under U.K. law. UPDATE: A California court ruling concurs with this analysis.	They can't take his citizenship... Since he claims to be a born citizen, he has citizenship by birthright and nothing CBP can do can possibly revoke it. He can voluntarily renounce his citizenship, but he has to do that through the State Dept. (which CBP is not part of). And that is an elaborate and expensive process that can't even be done inside the United States. If someone could do it merely by entering without papers and asking for a self-deport, lots of expats would save a lot of money - and that's not gonna happen :) ...but they could put him to serious inconvenience In this particular case, CBP found his documents suspect. Probably because (if it's the case we've seen documented elsewhere) he was with two other people whose entry was illegal, and they had forged documents. So most likely, if he agreed to self-deport, CBP would use that as prima-facie evidence that he is not a bona-fide citizen, and therefore, that his papers are faked. They certainly will not give fake papers back to someone who has tried to pass them. So the victim would be obliged to go back to SSA, the state, etc. and re-acquire his identity documents. From outside the country. It's a pretty big chore.	In the general case, it seems unlikely, based on the wording (which is convoluted). In certain cases, if the president of Russia posts "My name is Vladimir Putin", that post is personal data. On the other hand, you might, based on my writing, conclude that I am from the US, and you might even conclude that I'm in Washington state, but that doesn't distinguish me from 7.5 million others, so on those grounds that is not personal data. Eventually, though, you might identify me specifically from other things that I may have said on SE. The definition depends on two parts. First, personal data is "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". Any "information" provided by a natural person is "related to" that person (as is any "information" that is about such a person). The second part defines "identifiable natural person", that is, who is an "identifiable person"? Every person can, in principle, be identified by reference to some label or description of fact about them, so every person is an identifiable person, under this definition. This means that every piece of text that refers to an individual (not even text which can identify the person) is "personal data". Obviously, any individual can be uniquely identified by some collection of identifiers; the problem is that the wording of the law does not explicitly say "using that supposed personal data". If I mention that I have a relative named Knudt, that would technically be personal data: I've given information that relates to a person, though you have no idea (and could not possibly figure out) who that person is. Another term that the regulation defines and uses in a few places is "pseudonymization", which is defined as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person The point of interest here is that this says that "personal data" which cannot be attributed to an individual is, nevertheless, still personal data. I think the most important part of the regulation is art. 6, which defines lawfulness of processing, especially para 4., which allows consideration to be given to safeguards such as pseudonymization.
Sister is living rent free in inherited property. Should she pay rent to other sibling? My father died in Jan 2015. My sister moved in with my mother Feb. 2015 to care for her. In April, 2015 my sister sold her home. She was now mortgage free. The following month, my mother added my sister on to the Title of her home, which she owned free and clear. Even though the will states that we have equal share of all assets, I live 3000 miles away so my mom thought it made the most sense to just add my sister on. My mom died in Oct 2015. My sister still lives there, mortgage-free and rent-free, and has no immediate plans to move out. I'm ashamed to admit this, but until recently, it had never even occurred to me how much she has been benefiting financially all this time and how much I have been losing. For 2 years, she has not had to pay rent or a mortgage payment. I believe she should be paying me an amount every month that is half of the fair market rent, which is $1950. And since she should have been paying that to me for the last 2 years, that total should be deducted from her share of the proceeds when the house is sold. I need to know what the law says about this before I talk to her.	These types of situations can, do and will get very messy and bitter fast. The key question here is actually two basic areas: What’s the legal situation now in terms of what you can actually claim etc? For this you need a lawyer familiar with the local laws. Second, and much more important, is how much you value your relationship with your sister. These types of situations can and do irreparably break families, and you need to think very hard about this element of the situation regardless of what your legal rights are. Personally I would err towards probing gently into what she thinks is fair/your mother intended etc and go from there, with the emphasis on extreme caution. Money can always be replaced. Families can’t.	The official website of the french administration gives details under which conditions a landlord can end a lease in France. As a general rule, the landlord cannot end a lease unless meeting certain conditions. The landlord has to send a letter to all of the tenant (all of them if multiple) named on the lease, and the spouse of the tenant even if not named on the lease. The letter has to be sent at least 6 month before the end of the lease if the residence isn't furnished, or 3 months if the residence is furnished. The letter must contain the reason for the ending of the lease. There are 3 causes the landlord may use to end the lease: The landlord plans to make the residence the primary residence of them, their spouse / partner (of at least 1 year) / PACS partner, or an ascendant or descendant of the landlord or their spouse. The landlord plans to sell the residence. In this case, the tenant has the priority to buy the residence if they wish. If the tenant take the offer, the landlord is obliged to accept the offer. The landlord can also sell the residence with the lease, in which case the lease is transfered to the buyer. Under legitimate and serious cause, including but not limited to not paying rent / regularly paying the rent late, causing trouble to the neighborhood, subleasing the residence... If the tenant contests the cause, the landlord will have to justify to a judge the reason the cause of termination. In this case, the landlord can have ground to end the lease before its end date. Otherwise, the landlord cannot end the lease, and the lease is automatically renewed at the end date without the need of explicit communication. A tenant can be protected if they fall under certain conditions. I don't find anything protecting people with a child, but if the tenant is older than 65yo / taking care of someone older than 65yo and the tenant earns an income lower than a certain limit a given year Then the tenant can be protected from these causes, unless the landlord is also older than 65 or earns an income lower than the same limit as the tenant or offers to help relocate the tenant to another residence close to the first residence which also accomodates to the need of the tenant. Note that, if the ex-tenant found that the cause given by the landlord was fraudulent (for example saying they'll use it as a primary residence but lease it to another tenant), then the tenant can bring the case to court and get indemnized as indicated here.	Ultimately yes, this can and does happen, but there are a few steps necessary before the bailiffs come to your door. In times gone by, the common law recognized a right to "distrain for rent", meaning that a landlord could come round to the tenant and seize some property as security (up to the value of the rent owed). If the rent is not then paid within a certain time, the goods could be sold. Various additional provisions of law covered the circumstances around forcing entry, breaking open locked cupboards, and searching off the premises for goods which the tenant had concealed. There were also special-case rules about what could be seized, such as a statute of the seventeenth century saying (among other things) that landlords could not harvest growing crops, but could take already-cut sheaves. Subsequent reforms for the protection of tenants have made it so that landlords cannot do this at their whim. They first have to go to the County Court for a judgement that there is an unpaid debt. (In fact, this and subsequent steps can happen with any debt.) On that basis, they can apply for a "warrant of control", under which an "enforcement officer", commonly called a bailiff, will take charge of collecting the money owed. There are quite a few steps and rules here, but the basic position is the same in terms of being able to take your stuff. And it is not the landlord walking around making those decisions, but a court-appointed officer. The previous common-law "distress" process is now totally abolished, for most tenants by the Housing Act 1988, and for everybody in 2014, because of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 section 71, which simply states The common law right to distrain for arrears of rent is abolished. Commercial property has its own legal regime since that Act, but previously functioned in the same way. So landlords can no longer seize your property on their own, but they can go through a few hoops and ask a court to do it. They also do not get to keep the specific property, but just get the money. As mentioned above, this is the general avenue for what happens when a court orders you to pay money, and you don't do it. The High Court has its own enforcement officers who are able to deal with larger amounts of money, as well as enforcing evictions. In Scotland, the same basic pattern applies but different words are used, and some of the detailed rules are different. "Attachment" is when a sheriff officer (= a bailiff) comes round to value your possessions and auction them off if you don't pay. There is also "arrestment" which is taking money out of your bank account.	As Polygnome points out in the comments, the first step is to determine who owns the original copyright on your mother's work now. This will be her heirs. If you are the sole heir then no problem. If the copyright was explicitly left to you in her will, also no problem. If there are multiple heirs and no explicit assignment of the copyright, then problem. The copyright will probably be considered part of the chattels of the estate (i.e. everything except real estate). If those are allocated fractionally (e.g. half each to two siblings) then the copyright probably followed that principle, unless you have already come to some agreement about it. If you are on good terms with the siblings then the best bet is to just make a deal for their part of the copyright. You could just ask them to sign it over to you, or you could cut them in for a percentage of future royalties. That makes the situation 100% clear, and any publisher is going to require 100% clarity before they consider offering a contract. Once you have the whole copyright you can go ahead and register. I've looked through the registration process and it doesn't actually ask about derivative works. What it wants to know is whether you own the copyright, and who were the authors (including works for hire). So just fill it in on that basis.	The thing I was trying to zero in on was the work/refresh/renovation that needs to be done between tenants, and if they landlord can expect to do it while Tenant A is still paying (up to the date of the 'lease change'), but expecting that Tenant A has vacated before that date, or allows the work to be done while they are still occupying? The first tenant is not required to relinquish possession of the premises while the first lease is in force. The landlord's right of access to the apartment remains unchanged from those specified in the lease and in state landlord-tenant law. So basically the landlord has to wait until the first tenant leaves before doing most of the work. If the first tenant relinquishes possession of the premises before the end of the lease period, the landlord can keep charging rent until the premises has been re-let to a new tenant. But if the landlord has agreed to stop charging rent when the first tenant moves out, the landlord may be bound by that agreement. If the landlord has signed a second lease with a new tenant beginning immediately after the first tenant's mutually agreed early move-out date, then the landlord basically has no time available to fix up the apartment except with the consent of one tenant or the other.	Insurance doesn't work the way you think it does Insurance indemnifies Bob from any liability he has towards Mary up to the value of the insurance. So, if a court finds that Bob must pay Mary $200k then Bob must pay Mary $200k. Bob can then turn to his insurer to indemnify him and, under the terms of the policy, they will pay out $100k for personal liability leaving Bob to find the other $100k wherever he can. The insurance company would not be a party to the litigation (although it would handle the defence on behalf of the insured) so a court cannot order it to do anything. Further there are many, many cases where the insured is found liable for something which the policy (allegedly) doesn’t cover - this often leads to litigation between the insured and the insurer. In parallel, the policy will cover the property damage in accordance with its terms. Assuming the house is adequately insured then the insurer will pay for the demolition, design & reconstruction. It is possible that by agreement or at the insurer's discretion that the insurance can cut Bob a check and leave him to do what he likes with the money: rebuild the home, go on a holiday, or pay a debt he might owe to someone. If the house is not adequately insured then Bob is a co-insurer and the cost of rebuilding is split. For example, if the cost of rebuilding is actually $150k and the total damage amounts to $90k then the insurer will pay $60k and Bob will have to pay the remaining $30k. Co-insurance terms usually have an error factor built in.	If you lived in a community property state, that would create responsibility for your late wife's debts (but Kansas is not one). If you signed a financial responsibility agreement you would be liable (but I assumed you did not). No matter what, her estate is liable, and that could eventually affect you (her debts must be paid first). However, there is one last criterion, the "doctrine of necessaries". This ruling notes Kansas recognizes the doctrine of necessaries, under which a spouse can be held liable when the other spouse obtains necessary items, like food or medical care, on credit. See also St. Francis Regional Med. Center, Inc. v. Bowles for support that the doctrine survives in Kansas.	Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this.
GDPR and local data storage in mobile app Let's say that I have a mobile app that tracks the user and saves his GPS coordinates locally only on a mobile device so that he can check where he was. The mobile application does not send this data to any server. Does GDPR affect me and my app in any way? Do I need for example to change my app in such way that it encrypts that personal GPS data on the device? Or GDPR has no influence on my app as I as a person do not have any access to that data?	No. As long as you don't see and have no means to access this data, but it is under the control of the user at all times, you are neither the controller or the processor of this personal data, and the GDPR does not apply to you.	From the GDPR's definitions: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; This blurred image would be "information relating to an identified ... natural person (‘data subject’)." It does not matter whether the person can be identified using the information in question. Therefore, the answer to your question Under GDPR, does blurhash of a profile picture count as personal data is yes.	Art. 17 GDPR Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: Assuming private messages contain personal data, if at least one of the following points (a..f) applies, it would have to be deleted. (a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; The original main purpose was probably Article 6(1)(b) (performance of a contract). If you delete your account, that would no longer apply. However, for the receiver of the private message, Article 6(1)(f) (legitimate interests pursued by a third party) would apply. The receiver might still want to read that message. So there is still a purpose to process this data. So point (a) does not apply. (Note that a Facebook private message can be considered a hosted version of SMS messages. A receiver does not expect SMS messages to be automatically deleted after they have reached the recipient's device. A receiver expects full control of the storage of SMS messages. I think a receiver expects the same for messages on facebook.) (b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing; Data processing was not based on consent, so point (b) does not apply. (c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); Article 21(1) allows you to object to processing based on Article 6(1)(f), unless there are compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject. While I think processing is based on Article 6(1)(f), I also think there are legitimate grounds to refuse your objection. As explained before, the receiver might still want to read that message. The receiver was able before to read your message, so one can assume he/she has already knowledge of the personal data in the message. As it is a private message, no one else will be able to read that message. (At least Facebook will not allow it). So if the message is not deleted, the privacy implications for you are low. That's why I think the interests of the receiver will prevail. However, in the end, a judge will be the only person which can make such a consideration. So you would have to got to court to get a final decision about this. Article 21(2) is for direct marketing, that does not apply to this situation. So I think point (c) does also not apply. (d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; (e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject; These points do not apply. (f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services referred to in Article 8(1). This data processing was not based on consent, so even if you are a child below the age of 16 years, point (f) does not apply. Article 17(2) and Article 17(3) wont help you either. So in my opinion Facebook is right in this case.	IANAL. (1) GDPR is certainly relevant. (2) This is certainly "personal data" under the definition in GDPR article 4. (3) Maintaining this data is probably lawful under article 6 sections 1(a) (consent) - provided that the Terms and Conditions of the site make clear that the user by signing up is consenting to this information being held (3) There is certainly an obligation under article 14 to disclose that the information exists, and to say how it used. (4) Article 15 says that data subjects are entitled to see the information and know what recipients or categories of recipient have access to the information (I don't know whether it's enough to just say "moderators", or whether the moderators need to be identified). (5) I can't see any reasons why the obligations under articles 16, 17, and 18 regarding rectification, erasure, and restriction of processing aren't relevant. This is exactly the kind of situation that GDPR is designed to address. If you're restricting the service available to particular users based on a record of their behaviour or on judgements made by moderators, then they absolutely have a right to know, and a right of redress.	Possibly, but probably not. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. The statement “Alice is sick” is information, and relates to Alice who is identifiable. Processing personal data is not inherently illegal, but does require a legal basis per Art 6 GDPR, such as a legitimate interest. Here, the information is data concerning health, processing of which is prohibited unless one of the explicit exceptions applies (such as explicit consent, or legal obligations). So it is legitimate to have concerns on whether disclosure of this information would be legal. If these rules were breached, that would be on the data controller. Here, the company would be the data controller, not Bob (unless Bob acted against training and instructions and processed the personal data for his own purposes). However, GDPR probably doesn't apply to this specific interaction. In Art 2(1), the GDPR says that This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. A conversation itself would not be subject to GDPR rules – there is no filing system or similar structured data involved. What GDPR would prevent is to keep records on Alice's health status, but doesn't necessarily prevent talking about it informally. For example, the EUR 35.3M fine against H&M in Germany was imposed not because managers talked with employees about personal matters, but because they then maintained detailed files about those personal matters. Data controllers are responsible though for ensuring security and compliance through appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs). TOMs can include things such as non-disclosure agreements and training for staff. If Bob acts against such training, there could be repercussions along the Bob–Company employment relationship. But that would mostly be an employment law thing, not so much a GDPR thing.	GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls.	The GDPR gives controllers a lot of latitude. They must decide on the correct course of action taking into account the possible risks to data subjects. Specifically, no notification of the authority is necessary if “the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.” In your scenario 1, you suggest that there is no breach because there is no evidence that the data was improperly accessed. This analysis is faulty: the controller is aware that the data was not properly secured, and cannot rule out that the data was improperly accessed. I would argue this fits the description of a “breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful … unauthorised disclosure of … personal data” (compare the definition of a data breach in Art 4(12)). Thus, a data breach has happened. The question whether the supervisory authority has to be notified of that breach is more debatable. The controller must assess the likelihood of risks to the data subjects. Here, they can perhaps argue that the risk of disclosure is low. However, the nature of the breached data would also be relevant. If in doubt, the controller should make the notification. The goal of the GDPR is not to punish unlucky companies that suffer a breach, but to protect personal data. Thus, fixing mistakes and cooperating with the supervisory authorities is likely the best approach for most companies. In your second scenario, the data is sensitive – its disclosure has a high risk for data subjects. However, the risk of someone intercepting this data is debatable. Does the risk of interception balance out the sensitivity of the data? That's the data controller's call, but I don't think so. A notification would seem appropriate here. As a technical remark, simply offering HTTPS is not sufficient to prevent MitM attacks – users must be forced to use encrypted connections. If a controller sees MitM as a risk, they are required by Art 24 to take appropriate technical measures. Here HSTS and HSTS preload would prevent the connections from being downgraded to HTTP. Instead of offering insecure connections, the site would become inaccessible. A complementary strategy is to not serve content over HTTP, but have the HTTP server only issue a permanent redirect to the HTTPS URL.	Art 13 GDPR is about information to be provided when data is collected directly from the data subject. This information can be provided directly during/before collection. It is not generally necessary or useful to send the data subject an email with this information. Usually, a SaaS website will provide the information under Art 13 as part of their privacy policy, and link it in easy to find places. Also consider the EDPB guidelines on transparency, which suggests a layered approach: in addition to a detailed privacy policy, summarize key information directly when the data is collected, e.g. next to an input form.
How is this not attempted murder? I am confused by this story. Someone fired a bullet, but it was stopped by a cop's belt. The shooter was not charged with attempted murder. Why might that be?	It's important to keep in mind that charges don't really tell us much about what crimes actually occurred. Sometimes cops file charges that aren't justified; sometimes they don't file charges that would be justified. There can be lots of reasons for the gaps between the evidence and the charges. My best guess is that the officers involved don't have quite as much information about his intent as they'd like to have when they go in front of a judge to argue for keeping this guy locked up. If they're going to hold him for attempted murder, they'll need to present evidence about what he was thinking and demonstrate that he intended to cause the officer's death (ARS 13-1104). That's possible, but it's a lot tougher than what they'd need to show for aggravated assault, which only requires a showing that he "intentionally [placed] another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury." (ARS 13-1204) They'll probably bring him up on murder charges, but they probably don't lose much by just booking him now on something easy to prove but serious enough to justify holding him, and then letting a grand jury indict him on the most serious charges.	None No law requires police to keep people apart when making statements. Doing so is good police practice. In some police organizations internal regulations or procedures may specify that officers should do so. But those are not laws. In some cases witnesses may have had a chance to confer and agree on a story before police arrive, the police cannot prevent that. The trier of fact can take into account that witnesses had a chanc to agree on a false story.	In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect.	There are literally hundreds of such laws. Most of them (perhaps all, if we exclude firearms-related crimes in Title 26) are contained in Title 18 of the US Code, part I. The problem is that your definition of "public insurrection" is too broad, since it would include lying to federal agents (a crime), insofar as the reason for 18 USC 1001 is to prevent impeding federal investigations by giving them false information. Assaulting a federal agent impedes government and is a crime. There is pretty much a federal version of any state-level crime of violence. There is the riot act, and a specific law against insurrection and rebellion. Chapter 115 is probably the most relevant: this is where the various "overthrowing the government" laws are.	I will only offer a general answer as I have no desire to enter the quagmire of potential sub-judice bearing in mind the cited case seems to be under investigation according to the BBC article: The Metropolitan Police has apologised and referred itself to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC). The IOPC has since instructed the Met to conduct the investigation, but said if the complainant was unhappy with the outcome he would have the right of review. Beyond the requirements to pass various courses and achieving regular re-accreditation to carry a Taser - either as an Autorised Firearms Officer (AFO) or an Autorised Taser Officer (ATO) - there are no specific rules covering its use not already covered by the OP's links. The relevant legislation is no different from, say, using a baton, applying handcuffs, spraying PAVA, or just by getting hold of someone to stop them running away - it must be reasonable in the circumstances. There are three areas of law that permit a police officer to use force, Taser or otherwise: Section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Where any provision of this Act — (a) confers a power on a constable [e.g. to make and arrest]; and (b) does not provide that the power may only be exercised with the consent of some person, other than a police officer, the officer may use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of the power. Section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967: (1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. (2) Subsection (1) above shall replace the rules of the common law on the question when force used for a purpose mentioned in the subsection is justified by that purpose. Common Law allows a person to use reasonable force to: (a) Defend himself from an attack. (b) Prevent an attack on another person [..] (c) Defend his property. All officers are trained to use the National Decision Model to assist with "dynamic risk assessment" when considering using force. If an officer cannot reasonably justify its use as being necessary and proportionate to a perceived threat then, in all likelihood, it may well be at the very least unlawful assault. What offences an officer commits, if any, will depend on the particular circumstances.	If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.	I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions?	First off, you cannot booby trap your property, period. It is both illegal and tortious. But, as you noted, there are already questions/answers that deal with this issue. Sure enough, if the police get a no-knock search warrant, that in and of itself is the Court order allowing entry by any means necessary. When the officers, there by right of law, breach the outer perimeter and stop at the warnings, they will not be seeking any other court orders to have you allow them "safe entry". Their warrant gives them all the right they need, as probable cause of crime and violent intent or intent to destroy evidence was already presented to a judge. If, in real life, you actually put up signage or state explicitly that they're being forewarned that you intend to harm, trap, maim, or otherwise make it unsafe to enter; or that doing so will result in an attempt to destroy evidence, that is something they have already assumed (hence the seeking and granting of the no-knock vs. a regular search warrant). However, the signs in and of themselves are not protected speech, but rather overt threats, and that would put you in a very precarious position indeed. If the police get a "no knock" warrant (the most invasive, difficult to get warrants, whereby there is a grave risk of destruction of evidence or injury to persons), the police will ensure they have safe passage – they've come prepared for dangerous entry long before your signs, but once they see them, you could rest assured they will take them as they are intended: as a direct threat to their safety, and they will deploy a SWAT or other heavily armed entry team (who is usually there anyway for these dangerous entries). You could expect things like smoke/out canister and teargas, flash bangs, and heavily armed and well armored officers attempting to force you from your dwelling. Presumably, if you need to disarm traps to escape the situation, they can enter. Assuming you're home when they invade with chemical weapons, whether you come out or not, they will force you to disarm whatever booby trapping you may have in place that may destroy evidence, likely walking you in as their human shield in the event you're lying about any dangerous ones. That is probably your best case scenario. They may just decide to throw you through the perimeter once they get their hands on you, just to see what happens! If you don't exit and are home or if you are lucky enough to be out, the bomb squad, ATF, and SWAT will converge on your property in less than typical means. Because from your warning they can assume some incendiary or explosive device exists, bringing it into the jurisdiction of other agencies. If they cannot disarm the trap, they would send a robot in first to set it off, or cut through your roof, or knock down a wall – whatever it takes to get in without using a typical means of ingress/egress, so as not to chance your trap. Regardless, you can rest assured that they will get in, and you will pay for the trap you set for law enforcement. Further, to whatever charges you'd have been faced with from evidence flowing from the original warrant will now be added additional charges like attempted murder of a peace officer; if you have any roommates or known associates: conspiracy to do those things; attempted destruction of evidence, criminal interference with a police investigation ... all at a minimum. If anyone is actually harmed, your signage offers you no shield from criminal or tort liability, and you will be lucky to live through the experience once they get their hands on you. Police tend to not like being the targets of intentional maiming, dismemberment or death. You have to understand that, according to this hypothetical, you are intentionally trying to harm law enforcement, or destroy evidence of your dangerous criminal activity. These are not invaders, or intruders according to the law; they are the people whose job it is to enforce the laws, collect the evidence (if you weren't getting arrested pursuant to the fruits of the warrant, you certainly would be at that point). The signs themselves would make excellent exhibits in the coming case of State v. you. BTW: The only reason they have left John Joe Gray alone is that he knows the Henderson County Sheriff Ronny Brownlow, who has been told that the ATF, FBI, and State SWAT, would all be happy to enter and get or kill Mr. Gray if need be. Since the Sheriff never filed any federal charges, and has determined that he doesn't want to breach (and it's in his jurisdiction to determine this), the Sheriff, aware that Gray's entire family is holed up in the "compound", decided it's not worth going in. It's as well known as it is anomalous. When the police want in, and have the right to get in, they will get in. That Sheriff just decided it's not worthwhile.
Can one claim unclaimed poultry living on their property? Some time ago I dug out a pond on my piece of land in a small rural town in New Zealand. The intention was to attract wild ducks there and maybe have some domestic ducks, which I told all my neighbours. Almost a year ago a couple of white domestic ducks showed up in the pond. They have been living there since then, occasionally fed by myself. None of my neighbours have any idea where they came from and who the owner could be (at least this is what they are telling me). The pond is rather prominent in the town so most locals now know that the ducks are there, still noone has ever shown up to say they are the owners. Can or could I ever legally claim the ducks?	From the picture, I believe those to be domestic geese rather than ducks. This is not needless pedantry; it is necessary pedantry because the Wildlife Act 1953 classifies geese as "Wildlife not protected" but ducks (relevant species) as "game". If they are game you need to abide by the relevant Fish and Game Council regulations (from a quick look it is legal to shoot them on your property but you need a licence to own and breed them; it seems unlikely anyone would worry about two waterfowl), but if they are geese they are as much, and as little, your property as a coin you found in the garden. There are no identifying marks and you have made a reasonable effort to find the owner, so you can treat them as your own. It is always possible for someone to claim they belong to him and should be returned, but the burden of proof will be on him to prove that these specific birds were concealed from him after escape or that you deliberately enticed them away, which seems hardly worth worrying about.	There's the question whether something is lost property or abandoned property. You'd be allowed to keep abandoned property, but keeping lost property without looking for the owner is in many places considered theft. A car on your land is quite likely abandoned by the last driver (people don't usually lose cars). But the question is whether it is abandoned by the owner; if the car looks like it has some value then it is unlikely to be abandoned by the owner and more likely that it has been stolen. I'd report the car to the police; then it's up to them to find the owner or not. If they can find him, and the car was not abandoned, but actually lost (unlikely) or stolen (more likely), you have the satisfaction of being an honest person helping either a very stupid car owner or a crime victim to get their property back. If they can't find him, usually the property will then belong to the finder.	I did the Googling: Prior to the case described in this article, a notice was to be deemed served if the sender can sufficiently prove that the letter was properly addressed, pre-paid and posted. Law - Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 The case made it clear that the same law also sets a condition, where if the letter was not received at said mailbox, or too late received, the notice is to be deemed not served. The receiver is not required to prove that the letter has not arrived in the mailbox. Also, if your mail has been tampered with, you should contact Royal Mail - they will perform an investigation and put your mailbox in order. I work with tenants and landlords, thus lots of official notices. In this practice, it's often a recommended action to follow up on a notice and make sure the receiver has indeed received and acknowledged the notice. I don't know if it's a legal requirement, but often in disputes (which go to arbitration by a 3rd party), if one party states they did not receive the notice and the other party can't sufficiently prove that they did everything in their power to contact and confirm the delivery of the notice, the notice is regarded as not served. I believe you cannot deny post. If it's in your mailbox, it's your responsibility to check and read it.	Providing the antenna was installed in accordance with the law it's hard to see what basis they could either void their lease or seek damages. The antenna poses no risk to health (non-ionising RF radiation is harmless) and you have no rights in any view it may be blocking there is no damage. The only thing that I can see is if there was misrepresentation at the time the lease was formed. That is, the developer knew that there was going to be an antenna and specifically said there wouldn't be. This falls flat if a) they never mentioned antennas or b) the decision to install it was made after the lease was formed.	You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.	Who Owns The Bunker? Your relative obviously owns the cellar up to their land property boundary. The people who own the other land would have originally been the owners of that portion of the bunker, assuming that it was not permissive (if it was permissive, an easement by estoppel probably would have arisen). So, then the question is, whether the people in the chain of title to the relative acquired ownership of that portion of the bunker by adverse possession. Normally, adverse possession is acquired when someone occupies land under a claim of right that is open, notorious and hostile. While the use of the bunker would be "hostile" in this case (because the other property owners didn't have access to the bunker), it is not at all clear that it was "open and notorious". Indeed, apparently, the other land owners weren't aware that it existed. So, there would probably not be "squatter's rights" in this situation. Also, adverse possession can't run against the sovereign, so to the extent that the bunker goes under public land (e.g. a public street), that also can't be adversely possessed and that portion of the bunker remains the property of the sovereign land owner. @PaulJohnson in a comment to another post notes that: It sounds like your relative has one of the secret bunkers built for the "Auxiliary Units" who were to wage guerilla war from behind the lines after a successful German invasion. bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-37947840/… If this were the case, and the government authorized its construction, there would probably be an implied easement that would allow the bunker to be the property of the person owning the entry to it, rather than the other property owners. But, as you note, proving that case would be difficult. It might be possible to scour declassified civil defense records from the WWII era to determine if this was the case, but you might need to employ an archivists or historian to get to the bottom of this question. What if they sell it? Suppose that they do sell it. What happens? Since title is certificated in Britain, there would be no title insurance company to compensate the buyer if someone later claimed to own the property. Your relative would have a warranty of title inherent in the deed to the portion of the property that is legally described in the deed (unless the property were sold by a quitclaim deed specifically disavowing any promise that what was sold was owned by the seller), but that warranty would probably not include the portions of the bunker outside the boundaries of their lot because that is not included in the legal description of the property on the property certificate or the deed. So, if it was sold, the buyer might not have any claim against the seller if the buyer did not get good title to the entire bunker, and would have no one to sue at all, if your relatives died before litigation over ownership of the bunker arose. The buyer might sue your relatives for common law fraud if the bunker were described in the marketing materials for the sale, but if they were told that some of the bunker went outside the lot and that its legal status was unknown, or if the property was sold by a quitclaim deed, that suit would probably not be successful. Other Options Depending upon whether the owner is on good terms with his neighbors, the owner could probably buy the subsurface rights or some sort of easement to that property from the neighbors under whose land it runs, and might even be able to purchase such rights from the local council where it runs under a street. Negotiating the price would be tricky. On one hand, it doesn't hurt the other owners at all. On the other hand, they have the power to deprive your relatives of all use of the property. Often deals like this are done for nominal consideration between people on good terms with each other, but for extortionate prices when people are not on good terms with each other.	The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date.	It is a false statement to claim to live in one county when you actually live in a different one. It becomes perjury (a crime) when you falsely swear to that statement on your status report, and you are required to report changes in "household situation" within 10 days. There isn't an exception allowing you to give a false address "in case it costs more to report truthfully". The only legal solutions are to report truthfully and pay more, or move again, report truthfully, and not pay more.
Does GDPR apply to internal employees data? Currently, our team has a number of internal tools that aid the testing and deployment of our products. These are used solely by internal employees, and record actions taken (such as when a file has been viewed). The recorded data contains identifiable information, such as their Windows username - which can be used to identify a specific individual. We also process this data, to provide statistics on individual's work, to managers who are also internal. Does this data, also need to comply with GDPR - or does GDPR only apply to data from the public?	Yes, it also applies. However, an employment implies they agree to having employment related data stored and processed (e.g., to be paid). When there are performance related bonuses in the contract, this will likely (but IANAL) imply they agree to performance data being collected and stored appropriately. Furthermore I would assume most of such data processing (such as knowing who is responsible for a certain change, who created a file, modified it etc.) falls into "legitimate interests" of the employer, as this information may be necessary for operations. I'd assume (still IANAL) that much of the consequence wrt. GDPR is the right to have your data erased. So a company should be prepared to remove such data when an employee leaves the company, e.g., by clearing the responsible person fields upon request. At least for data where there is no legal requirement to have such data provenance. But: consult your lawyer for a proper legal opinion!	The GDPR does not outlaw such processing of personal data. It merely regulates how and for what purposes you can process personal data. In general, you can conduct any processing activity as long as it has a clear purpose and a legal basis. Here, the purpose would likely be something like “conducting business with my clients” and the legal basis would be a “legitimate interest”. A legitimate interest always requires a balancing test that weighs your interests against the interests and rights of the affected persons. For example, can the affected persons reasonably expect such processing activities? In a professional setting, it can probably expected that business partners keep notes about contact persons so your intended processing could be fine. The GDPR does impose some general constraints. There are general principles like data minimization and storage limitation – you should only collect data that is necessary for your purpose, and shouldn't store it for longer than necessary. You should think about appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to protect the processing activity, for example about how your CRM is hosted, how backups are made and how security updates are installed, who has access to the personal data, and how the people with access to the personal data can be trained. For example, such training might inform your employees that they can only use the data in the CRM for business purposes, but absolutely not for personal purposes like asking Gina from reception out for a date.	According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. That is not correct. According to GDPR Article 2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data ... ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; GDPR Recital 18 states in relevant part: (2) Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. Personal data that is not processed by "automated means", for example data which is transmitted verbally, by hand writing, or by manually sent email, is not covered by the GDPR. Data which is used by a natural person for "personal activities" is also not covered. Consulting one's personal lawyer might well be a personal activity unless it is a business matter. Even if such a transfer of data were in scope for the GDPR, consent of the data subject (DS) is not the only available lawful basis. GDPR article 6 permits any of several possible lawful bases to be used, particularly paragraph 1 point (f) which reads: (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Also possibly relevant is point (c) which reads: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; In short, providing one's personal lawyer with the names and addresses of relevant people in connection with a legal issue is not at all likely to be prohibited by the GDPR, nor to require the consent of the people whose names and contact info are provided. However, a comment by user PMF reads: The Data Protection laws are mostly for companies, not for individuals. This is an overstatement. The laws do apply to natural persons as DCs, although enforcement is largely targeted at businesses, particularly large, for-profit businesses.	The GDPR allows the right to access to be limited if this access would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others” (Art 15(4) GDPR). However, access to the recording would not give you more information than you've already received during the phone call, so this exemption is quite unlikely to apply in any case. UK data protection law also has a large list of additional exceptions, as summarized here by ICO guidance. These exemptions also cover some aspects of trade secrets, and even mention insurance examples. However, not such exemption is likely to apply in your case: the recording would not give you more information than you already have. If the data controller is concerned about some parts of the conversation, they should provide a redacted copy and explain why the redactions were performed. They should not reject the request outright. If the data controller wants to reject the request entirely, they must do so within the time frame for the DSAR (one month), must explain their reasons, and must inform you that you're allowed to lodge a complaint with your supervisory authority or to sue them. However, ICO guidance is flexible on how detailed the reason for refusal can be: Where an exemption applies, the reasons you give to an individual for not complying with a request may depend upon the particular case. For example, if telling an individual that you have applied a particular exemption would prejudice the purpose of that exemption, your response may be more general. However, where possible, you should be transparent about your reasons for withholding information. Here, I don't see any reason why full transparency would be a problem, so I would expect that the data controller can point to a specific exemption in UK data protection law. If you are unsatisfied with the data controller's response, please consider lodging a complaint with the supervisory authority. In the UK, this is the ICO. On the ICO complaints page, you can fill out the online form about “your personal information concerns”.	Art 13 GDPR is about information to be provided when data is collected directly from the data subject. This information can be provided directly during/before collection. It is not generally necessary or useful to send the data subject an email with this information. Usually, a SaaS website will provide the information under Art 13 as part of their privacy policy, and link it in easy to find places. Also consider the EDPB guidelines on transparency, which suggests a layered approach: in addition to a detailed privacy policy, summarize key information directly when the data is collected, e.g. next to an input form.	I don't think you would be responsible for whether your software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner. For GDPR compliance, it is important who the data controller is. The data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of a personal data processing activity, i.e. the why and how. The data controller alone is responsible for their GDPR compliance. When a data controller wants to run some software, it's the data controller's responsibility to ensure that this software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner (or possibly not at all). Determining purposes and means of processing When someone other than the developer runs a software, the question is who might be a controller: you as the developer, they as the operator, or neither, or both? The operator is clearly a controller: they determine a purpose for data processing (e.g. to manage staff) and have determined means to perform that processing (e.g. to use the software). The developer may or may not be a controller. Clearly, the developer has made choices about how the processing of personal data will be performed, i.e. has determined some means of processing. E.g. the developer has developed a particular architecture, chosen a way to store personal data, and has implemented some security measures. But determining some means is not sufficient to be a data controller, see discussion below. Has the developer participated in determining the purposes of processing? I think this will depend on the specific functionality provided by the software in question. If the software just does what it says and processes the data for the operator's purposes, everything should be fine. If the software also processes data for the developer's purposes, that developer might be a controller. For example, if analytics or crash reports are collected by the developer, that would be a clear indication that the developer would be a (joint) controller. So depending on specific factors, the operator might be the sole controller, or the operator and developer might be joint controllers. Essential vs non-essential means What about the developer determining some means? When does this make the developer a joint controller? The EDPB has created a theory of essential vs non-essential means: 40. As regards the determination of means, a distinction can be made between essential and non-essential means. “Essential means” are traditionally and inherently reserved to the controller. While non-essential means can also be determined by the processor, essential means are to be determined by the controller. “Essential means” are means that are closely linked to the purpose and the scope of the processing, such as the type of personal data which are processed (“which data shall be processed?”), the duration of the processing (“for how long shall they be processed?”), the categories of recipients (“who shall have access to them?”) and the categories of data subjects (“whose personal data are being processed?”). Together with the purpose of processing, the essential means are also closely linked to the question of whether the processing is lawful, necessary and proportionate. “Non-essential means” concern more practical aspects of implementation, such as the choice for a particular type of hard- or software or the detailed security measures which may be left to the processor to decide on. – EDPB guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, added formatting for legibility Looking through that list of essential means, some might be determined by a software's developer, but I wouldn't expect this to be the case for this kind of open source software. types of personal data: the software certainly sets a framework for processing specific kinds of personal data, e.g. by providing database fields for names, contact details, and schedules. But ultimately, the developer does not control which data is actually collected and filled into those fields – the developer does not cause specific kinds of personal data to be processed with the system. duration of processing: unless the software is programmed with a fixed retention schedule, it should be impossible to argue that the developer has determined the duration of processing. Even then, it would also be the operator who has determined this duration to be appropriate, rather than editing the open-source software to change the duration. But typically, no such retention schedule is enforced, and retention would depend solely on the operator (who can use an admin interface or a database console to erase old records). categories of recipients: typically, the developer does not determine to whom the data in the system will be given. But if the system sends data to third parties by itself, this might change. For example, if the system is pre-configured to store data in an existing cloud database instance, or to a specific analytics server, the developer might be acting as a controller. Here, good software engineering and legal risk minimization coincide. Best practices for web apps state that account credentials and connection strings shouldn't be hardcoded or committed to a repository, and should instead be provided externally (e.g. via environment variables). categories of data subjects: this depends solely on how the software is used. The developer has no way to determine whose data the operator will enter into the system. If the developer isn't a controller, might they be a data processor instead? In a GDPR context, a data processor is whoever processes personal data on behalf of a controller. The developer is clearly not a processor in this scenario because both the “processing” and “on behalf” criteria fail. The developer has no access to the data in the operator's instance, so cannot process the personal data. There is no direct relationship between the developer and the operator. The operator has not delegated authority to the developer so that the developer would be acting “on behalf” of the operator. There is a legal relationship between the two roles (the developer has licensed the software to the operator) but that is entirely irrelevant in a data protection context. The GDPR isn't directly about cookies While the GDPR does cover how personal data can be processed with cookies, the famous “cookie law” is actually separate: those cookie consent requirements stem from EU member state's implementations of the ePrivacy directive. Instead of talking about “controllers”, ePrivacy has concepts such as the “provider of an information society service”. While this role fits perfectly to an operator/provider who runs a web app in a publicly accessible manner, it does not fit a developer who merely makes some source code available. Is the developer even subject to the GDPR? The GDPR can only apply to data controllers and processor who process personal data. As discussed above, the developer is probably not processing personal data at all. Even if the developer were processing personal data, it is questionable if GDPR would apply assuming the developer has no “establishment” in the EU (e.g. an office). Then, the question would be whether those processing activities are either related to offering goods or services to data subjects in Europe, or whether the processing activities involve monitoring the behavior of people who are physically in Europe. Unless the developer is actively targeting European businesses with marketing for this software, the answer is very likely “no”. Could the operator sue the developer for providing software that isn't GDPR-compliant? The operator can sue anyone for any reason, but is probably not going to win. As discussed, the operator is a data controller. They are responsible for ensuring that their purposes and means are GDPR-compliant. That involves selecting suitable software. The data controller would be neglecting their own responsibilities if they just download some random software and start feeding personal data into it. Things might be different if the operator specifically advertises GDPR compliance features but you're not going to do that. It's also worth noting that common open source licenses like the Apache License 2.0 include a warranty and liability disclaimer. To which degree they protect the developer ultimately depends on national laws, but they make it difficult for the operator to make a legal argument that they're entitled to a GDPR-compliant product. See also the related question: Do warranty disclaimers in software licenses carry any legal weight? What can you do? First, don't worry too much. Given how much bad software there is on the internet, surprisingly few developer get into legal trouble for writing source code that's buggy or missing some features. Second, consider choosing a license for your project that includes a reasonable warranty/liability disclaimer. Third, make the state of your project clear in your README file. If someone knows that this is alpha-quality software and that no compliance features were implemented, it's their own fault if they actually use that software.	You must get opt-in affirmative consent to process personal data, including tracking people's use of your site or providing targeted advertising. The banner on StackExchange is likely in violation of the GDPR. Do not copy it. It does not have an explicit opt-in, only an opt out which is onerous (leave the site, then manually go in and delete any cookies they set, which may be hard to identify if they are from 3rd parties). The sites you mention that have a gateway are a more correct implementation. Consent must be acquired before processing of data begins, and it must be explicit.	In order to process data (which includes storing data), a data controller must establish one or more of the lawful bases contained at Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR. Briefly, those are: a) Consent of the data subject b) Necessary for performance of a contract with the data subject c) Necessary for compliance with a legal obligation d) Necessary to protect vital interests of data subject or another person e) Necessary for public interest or exercise of official authority vested in the controller f) Necessary for controller's legitimate interests Clearly a) and d) don't apply. As you've settled the debt, it seems unlikely to me that b) or f) apply. That leaves c) and e). A common example under c) would be a requirement by Companies House or HMRC to keep accounting records for a certain period of time. Some public bodies may also find it necessary, under e), to retain records which they need to be able to carry out their other functions. It seems highly unlikely to me that either of these would justify retention for your "lifetime" however. I would start by sending them a written demand to have your data erased under Article 17(1). Make sure you also specifically request that they provide you with all the information (and in particular the purposes of the processing) under Article 15(1), and that, in the event that they refuse to erase your data, they explain the reasons why pursuant to Article 12(4). Their response on these points will be helpful in establishing whether there is a lawful basis. Your next step after that is either to complain to the ICO or to apply to court for a compliance order under Section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The former is free while the latter is not and carries risks of cost if you are unsuccessful. If you opt for one of these steps, make sure you cite the relevant provisions of the GDPR and explain why you think there is no lawful basis for the data retention (including by referencing any response you received from them). "I have read GDPR guides on how to request erasure, but I don't really feel this applies- I want to have my account deleted, not the track record of the loan and repayment" It doesn't matter whether we are talking about your account or your track record. What matters is whether the account constitutes personal data, which it almost certainly does, per the definition at Article 4(1): "‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;"
Can employer claim ownership of intellectual property made while not at work? I've heard in job contracts there can be clauses saying that all intellectual property created by the employee during their employment, belongs to the company, regardless if it's done during hours they are not working. So for example if a computer programmer works Monday to Friday but on the weekend he develops an app (without using company resources) the company can claim ownership of it. Would such a clause be enforceable? Would it make a difference if it's related to the job or not, for example if the programmer made a painting that became famous, could the company still claim ownership? What is the name of such clauses?	Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy.	Links are in French. As the author of a work, you would generally hold copyright unless there's a contract otherwise. L113 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle determines who is the rights holder of a given work and I don't see anything there that changes things for you as a contractor. Even if you assigned some rights to your employer through a contract, France has moral rights which can never be ceded. In fact, even if you were a salaried employee, you still hold the rights by default, unlike the US. There are a few exceptions to that though: software, inseparable joint works, and works where the creative process was purely directed by your superiors.	Yes, it also applies. However, an employment implies they agree to having employment related data stored and processed (e.g., to be paid). When there are performance related bonuses in the contract, this will likely (but IANAL) imply they agree to performance data being collected and stored appropriately. Furthermore I would assume most of such data processing (such as knowing who is responsible for a certain change, who created a file, modified it etc.) falls into "legitimate interests" of the employer, as this information may be necessary for operations. I'd assume (still IANAL) that much of the consequence wrt. GDPR is the right to have your data erased. So a company should be prepared to remove such data when an employee leaves the company, e.g., by clearing the responsible person fields upon request. At least for data where there is no legal requirement to have such data provenance. But: consult your lawyer for a proper legal opinion!	It's not fair use. Fair use is when you do something that normally only the copyright holder can do. Playing a video game is the ordinary, intended use of the work. In the United States, ordinary use is not protected by copyright. 17 USC 106 sets out the rights protected by copyright. The include copying the work, producing derivative works, distributing the work, and so on. None of these are ordinary use. Someone could perhaps argue that you are creating a derivative work. I doubt that argument would work because you are not taking any protectable elements from the work. But if anyone did argue that, it would make sense to also argue that if that's so, your use would still be covered under fair use because it's transformative, does not substitute for the original work in any way, and takes very little of the work.	Canada In Canada, "the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein" (Copyright Act § 13(1)). Also, "[w]here the author of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person, the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright" (Copyright Act § 13(3)). Nothing in your description of the situation describes to me an employer/employee relationship, so in my opinion, § 13(3) is not implicated. Even if there were an agreement or contract to transfer copyright to an LLC or assign it to the other individuals, absent an actual writen assignment, the original owner still owns the copyright. "[N]o assignment or grant is valid unless it is in writing signed by the owner of the right..." (Copyright Act § 13(4)). In University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd, there was a contract that required assignment of copyright. "The examiner was the first owner, and he has not assigned the copyright in writing signed by him or his agent. The copyright therefore remains in the examiners, subject to the obligation under the contract of employment to assign it to the University or as it may direct." Even though copyright was owed to the University, it didn't become theirs until the written assignment took place. United States Similarly, in the US, "Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.", and "in the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author" (17 U.S.C § 201). "A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent." (17 U.S.C § 204) Conclusion In both Canada and the US, transfer of copyright requires an affirmative act (a written, signed document, or a note or memorandum, etc.) Since nothing in your description indicates that the author has prepared a signed, written, instrument of conveyance or note or memorandum of the transfer of copyright, the copyright still belongs to the original author.	If it is open source code, then usually the requirement is that you produce the source code for the software that you release. Exactly for the software that you release. For example if you took open source software X, and added feature Y, and distributed the combined software outside your company, anyone can request the source code for X including Y. Handing them the source code for X only wouldn't meet the open source requirements. Now all this is not illegal, but it means the copyright holder of X could sue you for copyright infringement. They will do that if they have enough reasons to do so. So let's say you are continuously developing your software and occasional hand out your compiled software. Say you built versions 100, 101, 102, 103, 104 of the software, you gave versions 100 and 103 to customers, and anyone asking for the source code is given the source code for the latest, slightly improved version 104. The copyright holder of X might sue you but: 1. They wouldn't know you are doing this. 2. A judge might side with you and decide that newer, improved source code is good enough (I don't know this, but it seems not unreasonable). 3. The copyright holder might decide that they don't want to sue you for this because you are close enough to meeting the requirements.	Does this amount to the employer potentially paying the employee to lie to them, to no ultimate legal effect? Or will the employee have a problem if they end up with an obligation to sign a statement that is not in agreement with reality? Neither. Contract law contemplates a party's subsequent inability to comply with the terms that were established at the formation of the contract. In the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, this is referred to as supervening impracticability. See, for instance, the Restatement at § 261. In the hypothetical scenario you outline, the loss of a company laptop renders the employee's promise (namely, "to return any company-issued computers or devices") impracticable. Instead, the circumstances may entitle the employer to restitution (by the employee) for what the employee now is literally unable to return. That would be cognizable as compliance in substance.	There is no IP in ideas! There is copyright in writing it down - they can't use your exact words without permission. However, sending it to them in the form of a suggestion would give them a pretty much unassailable argument that you have given them an implicit licence. You can patent an invention (not an idea), claim IP in a trade mark (also, not an idea), register a design (again, not an idea) and hold copyright in an artistic work (once more, not an idea). They are required to keep confidences but offering them a suggestion probably doesn't count as supplying confidential information. I can see no risk in acting on customer suggestions. Hence, the idea to raise prices can be acted on or not at the discretion of the company.
What legally happens if the person being sued cannot pay the amount owed. (Special Case) Here's a situation related to a story that's been in the news lately. I have no experience with any legal situations, so apologies for using incorrect terms/vocab. Conditions: The person being sued is already in jail for life, they will not be able to pay the amount owed through future work, they do not have enough assets to liquidate/transfer (however its done) to pay off the amount. How does the party that makes the lawsuit get the money in this scenario? If the person cannot pay it off, does it transfer over to their relatives?	In the US it's very simple: How does the party that makes the lawsuit get the money in this scenario? They don't. Winning a lawsuit against a person is a legal confirmation that they really do owe you the money. It also gives you the ability to do certain things to try to collect: you could seize their assets or garnish their wages. If they don't have any assets or any income then you are out of luck. You can't take what doesn't exist. As the saying goes, "you can't squeeze blood from a turnip". A bit of legal jargon sometimes used here is to say that such a defendant is judgment proof. Even if you win a lawsuit against them, it won't do you any good, because they just don't have any money. If the person cannot pay it off, does it transfer over to their relatives? No. People are not responsible for the debts of their relatives.	It isn't explicitly prohibited so long as the amount claimed is in the aggregate less than $20,000. But, it would probably be better to file separately. First, very simple single party, single transaction cases are what small claims court is designed to do, and going against the flow often creates unforeseen confusion for the judge in the Justice Court who isn't a sophisticated civil litigation expert. The Justices of the Peace who preside over Justice Courts that handle small claims cases in Texas often aren't and don't have to be lawyers or even high school graduates. Second, if you sue as a group, and one of your group is the lead person handling the case (and that person isn't a lawyer), the lead person is at grave risk of being found to be practicing law without a license by taking actions in a lawsuit on behalf of your fellow plaintiffs.	IANAL. I am not your lawyer. The following is not legal advice. The insurance company, regardless of how you feel about their process, has it appears, to have discharged their duties, namely they have paid out two separate claims. The personal property claim has been paid to the estate as the beneficiary, while the property claim has been paid out with the mortgage company as the beneficiary. The mortgage company seems, to me (disclaimer, I work at a financial institution, albeit in an IT role), to also be reasonable. Six months is an extremely long time without contact or payment (where I work, the loss mitigation department is sent all loans that are 3 months delinquent); the fact that you, the estate executor were not aware of the passing of the debtor is of no consequence. Also, many loans contain clauses that allow the lender to accelerate the loan (i.e. demand "immediate" payment of the whole outstanding balance). So they've started foreclosure proceedings, probably about 3 months ago. As for the foreclosure proceedings: The received $45,000 will be applied to the loan. The property (not just the house, but the entire lot) will be sold at public auction, as all foreclosed houses are in the state of New York. Proceeds from the sale of the house shall be applied to paying off the loan. If the proceeds exceed the outstanding mortgage amount, the estate will be sent the remaining proceeds. If the proceeds are less than the remaining amount, the estate is retains (i.e. owes) the remaining debt. EDIT: As an example of why the noting of jurisdiction is important on this stack-exchange, Nate Eldredge has informed me that in New York, it is possible for a judge to reduce the "remaining debt" of the estate by declaring that the sold house had a higher "fair market value" than it sold for.	I'm assuming you're talking about U.S. federal bankruptcy law (Title 11). Once bankruptcy is declared, any claims against the debtor are subject to the bankruptcy laws, and any claims against the debtor in any other court are automatically stayed under 11 USC 362. That means if you bring an action against the debtor for conversion, a court will not hear it, because the debtor's bankruptcy stays any such action. It gets more complicated if you want to sue the brother. In general, except in limited circumstances, the brother is not protected by the bankruptcy stay. [source]. So you can likely sue the brother. Your question about "priority," however, may be based on a misunderstanding of how the law works. If you sue the brother and win, you will get a judgment against the brother, which you can then attempt to collect from the brother's assets. If the trustee convinces a court that the property in question is, in fact, the property of the estate, the trustee can recover it from the brother, or from anyone the brother subsequently gave it to, until it is transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value--who must be unaware of the fraudulent nature of the conveyance. See 11 USC 550. Because you were aware of the fraud, you are not a bona fide purchaser for value, and the statute seems to give the trustee the ability to recover the money from you, just as it would from the brother. In practical terms, this will rarely happen--but if it did, the bankruptcy estate would win, because the avoidance of a transfer means the property was never the brother's in the first place.	Ultimately, if they force you into bankruptcy, everything, except: tools of your trade household items (clothing, furniture), however, if these are worth significantly more than a replacement then they can be sold and you get given a replacement. Short of this they can: garnishee bank accounts garnishee wages and other income seize and sell personal property acquire liens over real property The cannot force you to borrow money pay them, however, this may be a better option than any of the above, particularly bankruptcy. If you are in such a situation you should seek advice on how to best deal with it. Most creditors are willing to negotiate over amounts and timing: something latter on is better than nothing ever.	Can a court order a large asset to be sold if the defendent lost the case on a relatively small amount? Say a defendent owns land worth $200,000. The defendant lost the case and has to pay $9,000. He does not have any money to pay. Could courts order the land to be sold? In most U.S. law jurisdictions, yes, a high value assets can be ordered sold to satisfy a small money judgment or a small secured claim (i.e. a mortgage or the equivalent in real of personal property), subject to some exceptions that don't precisely target this concern but do alleviate it somewhat. Forcing a sale is mostly a decision made by the collection lawyer and the judge has very little discretion in the matter in most cases, so long as all formalities are observed. In most U.S. jurisdictions there are not minimum dollar amount of a debt that can be collected by execution and levy (i.e. seizure and sheriff's sale) on property of arbitrary value (although I am sure there must be at least one out there that does have a minimum dollar amount). Some kinds of property are completely exempt from creditors claims (e.g. defined benefit pension plans). Some kinds of property are protected up to a certain dollar amount of equity (most exemptions for household property and for homesteads, although a small number of homestead exemptions are unlimited). This allows courts and parties to disregard homes with little equity and low value personal property, focusing collection efforts on higher value property. There are also laws in some states require that creditors attempt to collect the debt from all other known assets with equity that can be collected through a formal process (other than a personal residence), before attempting to sell the personal residence (unless the debt is a voluntary mortgage or mechanic's lien on the personal residence and no other assets). There are several ways that the injustice of this can be avoided, if the debtor doesn't simply have the cash to pay off the debt. First, the debtor may be able to borrow the small amount of the debt owed from someone else to pay it off and avoid the foreclosure of the asset. Second, the debtor can take out a loan with the property as collateral to pay the debt, even if the debtor has few other assets. Third, the debtor can sell their own property to pay the debt probably producing a better price than would be obtained at a sheriff's sale. Fourth, someone other than the debtor and the creditor could bid at a sheriff's sale an amount closer to the fair market value of the property than the amount of the debt. Usually, the sheriff's sale price is still far below the fair market value, but it could be a lot more than the debt, and in those cases the excess goes back to the debtor. In some jurisdictions, bids for personal residences must be supported by appraisals that show what the fair market value of the property is and can't be less than that (apart from litigation costs and costs of sale). Fifth, someone could file for bankruptcy and negotiate a payment plan for the small debt in that context.	You sue the legal person One of the things that distinguishes legal personhood from other structures is the ability to sue and be sued. You can't sue a business name or a trust for example but you can sue a company. I have in fact been required to make adjudication decisions that I know will be unenforceable in court because the applicant named a trust rather than the trustee.	at what point can you just leave? Is it always technically illegal in the UK to leave without paying the bill? Probably depends on what you mean with just leaving. If just leaving translates I haven't paid and I won't pay (because of the hassle with the card) then that's probably Making Off Without Payment, section 3 Theft Act 1978 (Thanks @bdsl). Could the restaurant just force you to wait until close of business if necessary? What if they still hadn't fixed the payment system by then? I don't think a restaurant can physically detain you. Not even the 45 min you have been waiting. But if you leave without paying and without an agreement with them how & when to pay they can of course call the police because again that looks very much like making off without payment. According to your post, they did provide a payment system (cash) which was working all the time and that moreover has the special status of being legal tender. if you don't physically have the cash on you, you can be sued? You can be sued if you don't pay your bill (assuming the bill itself is correct) when it's due. In order to avoid endless hassle of the "I tried to pay via x, but they wouldn't accept this." type, legal tender defines ways of payment of a debt that the creditor/seller must accept. In many legislations, cash in the local currency provides such a fallback if other payment methods fail. Note that cash payment is very robust against internet failure, broken devices and power The UK (+ US) meaning of legal tender is that the restaurant must accept this means of settling the debt (at this time, the food is already eaten but not payed) - but they don't have to accept any other means of payment. (Note that e.g. for the EUR-countries there is at least a recommendation to make acceptance of legal tender mandatory also in retail, which includes simultaneous exchange food vs. payment). The 2nd important implication of this is that any argumentation along the lines that no reasonable means of payment were available would be very weak. You are not required to have sufficient cash with you to pay your bill if you can reasonably assume that some other way of payment will be acceptable to the restaurant. I see that like a spare wheel for a car: if you have a flat tire (card doesn't work) having a spare wheel (cash) allows you to deal with the issue with less hassle than if you don't: change your wheel vs. having to get your car brought to a workshop and wait until they put on a new tire (pay cash instead of waiting for the card to work again or a tedious hunt for another payment method). I'd like to point out that card doesn't work and not sufficient cash at hand (or forgotten purse) is something that happens quite often in general (rarely for any given transaction, but we have lots of transactions). I'd expect a restaurant or a gas station to be experienced in dealing with that. In any case, there are several possibilities to resolve the issue short of "just leaving": The key to all this is communication: talk to the restaurant to find a way to resolve the issue. Reassure them that you're not trying to use the opportunity to defraud them - that's what they are afraid of in this situation. "Where can I find an ATM?" Possibly offering a deposit: "And would you mind looking after my bag [phone] until I'm back?" Possibly showing them your ID card (or similar, if you have any) so they have your address: remember that so far you are an anonymous customer for them: which means that suing you for the money would be somewhere between too expensive and impossible. If you are a group, it should be sufficient if only one of you leaves in search of cash. Credit cards can be charged in a total offline way (MOTO = mail order/telephone order) where the credit card data is entered manually by the seller: the restaurant may be able to charge your credit card if fill in a paper credit card payment form. They may accept settlement via other payment systems: paypal & Co. wire the money via your online banking account (even if that doesn't give an instantaneous transfer, ask them if that's OK with them if you show/forward them the "transfer accepted message" for now) allow them to withdraw the money from your account via direct debit or something similar I'd not expect a restaurant to accept this possibility as they're probably not familiar with it and it means a lot of hassle for them with their bank to get listed to receive money that way. if you are in a region where cheques are still in regular use, that may be a solution as well. Restaurants like any other business can write invoices. They usually don't like this because their risk of having costly trouble to get the money is high. While your printout bill is technically an invoice already, it can be turned into an invoice (+ copy for them) giving your name + address and specifying how and when you'll pay. Which would keep track of how you (pl. = you + restaurant) decided to settle the bill under the peculiar circumstances. This works even in case of e.g. a power outage that prevents you from getting cash from an ATM in the neighborhood.
Revocation or cancellation of declared divided Can dividend once declared be revoked or cancelled?and tell me some cases if any.	In the UK: "Under section 277 of the Companies Act 1985, where a shareholder knows or has reasonable grounds for believing that a dividend was improperly paid, he is liable to repay it to the company." So if the company declared a dividend based on incorrect knowledge of their financial position, and they find out their true financial position that wouldn't allow a dividend payment, not only can (and must) they revoke or cancel the dividend payment, they can even force shareholders to repay the dividend. But that only applies if the declared dividend is more than the company is legally allowed to pay. The company might say "we have enough cash in the bank and no debt, we could pay a £10.00 dividend without breaking the law, but we only pay £0.50". If they discover their numbers are wrong, and they could only pay £8.00 legally, then they can't change their declared dividend from £0.50 to £0.40. The declared dividend is legally binding, except when the dividend amount is too high to be legally allowed.	In general: If the contract specifies some term (or "duration"), then it can only be modified in accordance with its own terms. When the employment contract expires any future employment term is subject to negotiation, and benefits could certainly be modified at that time. There are exceptions to this in labor law, but those vary by jurisdiction and won't be addressed here. Generally "vested" benefits like accrued vacation time or pension balances are treated like the property of the employee: They cannot be unilaterally reduced by the employer. One notable exception would be bankruptcy of the employer. I don't know where employee claims rank in Canadian bankruptcy law, but they are one of the debts that might not be paid in full.	There is no federal rule barring union members from participating in employer-sponsored 401K plans. And as described at this site 401K plans are often offered by a union directly to its members. However, it is possible that your employer's plan is not (or is no longer) open to union members. You could ask for a copy of the written rules under which they say you are not eligible to make further contributions. If you cease to be an employee, the plan must allow you to withdraw your account. It must also allow withdrawals once you reach age 59 1/2. It is usual for a 401K to allow you to withdraw at any time, withholding the proper IRS penalty, or accepting a statement that you will roll the money over to a qualified IRA account within 30 days. Many plans allow direct rollovers, in which the plan sends the account balance (or part of it) directly to such a qualified account. This is often the best method, because it avoids any error that might trigger a 10% penalty. You might want to ask if direct rollovers are supported by your plan. Get the answer in writing, especially if it is "no". However, a plan is not required to support direct rollovers. In fact I cannot find any rule that requires a plan to permit withdrawals for current employees prior to age 59 1/2, although I have never encountered a plan that forbids all such withdrawals. You could ask for a copy of the plan's written rules on withdrawals. Once you have a copy of the rules, you can consult a lawyer with knowledge of 401K law as to whether the plan can deny your request, and what steps you might be able to take. See also the article Challenges of Retirement Plans for Union Members: The collective bargaining agreement rules from Plansponsor for some relevant information.	Of course it doesn't work. You haven't discovered an end-around to property ownership I gave someone a car and want it back (they refuse) You no longer own this car. It is now titled in their name. Your interest in the car is now exactly zero whether or not they paid for it. I use a shell company to buy my own debt Okay. This has nothing to do with the car. You're now out of the cash it took you to set up this new entity. How are you doing this? I assume it means paying off your creditors with money you already have. You will also have to come up with some type of bogus documents that explain to the future court why this was even done. If you have the money, why do you have debt? My shell company sues me for conveying the car to conceal it from creditors Um, Ok. Now you're also out filing fees. Let's assume you know how to do this without paying an attorney to do it for you. I settle Makes sense, since you're suing yourself. The shell company now gets a court order to seize the car Seize the car how? This is a stretch. A judgement would be against you for the value of the car. You can't settle a lawsuit using assets you do not own. A court won't order something repossessed because of an unrelated squirrelly lawsuit. An exception would be a bankruptcy court that rules the item was sold or disposed of outside the court's orders. I would expect an astute court to hit you with contempt or sanctions for trying to use it to further your interests with some sort of end-around to property ownership. Expect more fees for this use of the court's time. The shell seizes the car No. Now I have the car back No.	united-states They thought of that. See IRS Pub 550, page 36: You are treated as having made a constructive sale of an appreciated financial position if you: • Enter into a short sale of the same or substantially identical property, So when you short-sell 1 BTC while still holding 1 BTC, it's taxed as if you simply sold your 1 BTC. This makes sense as the transactions are essentially identical in effect. I don't think it matters that the 1 BTC you held was used as the collateral for the 1 BTC you borrowed. In particular, although short sales are usually reported and taxed as of the date when they close, constructive sales are an exception and are taxed on the date of the constructive sale itself: You must recognize gain as if the position were disposed of at its fair market value on the date of the constructive sale. This gives you a new holding period for the position that begins on the date of the constructive sale. Then, when you close the transaction, you reduce your gain (or increase your loss) by the gain recognized on the constructive sale. So this doesn't help in deferring your taxes.	A financial institution (including a pawnbroker) cannot unilaterally change the terms of an agreement and obeying the law. This section in particular limits the interest rate to 2% per month. It would be illegal and a misdemeanor to raise the interest rate above the statutory limit. They also cannot change (shorten or lengthen) the maturity date of the loan, nor can they obligate you to wait until the maturity date to pay off the loan. They are in a bit of a bind if they lost their FFL. There is nothing illegal about transferring inventory to another store. They cannot compel you to redeem the item immediately, and you cannot compel them to violate the law and keep the item without the required license. In case what happened is that you went past the original maturity date because there is no viable public transportation to the new location and you've gone over the 30 day "grace" period (hence the extra charges), you might successfully argue in (small claims) court that the shop is responsible for your tardiness. The fact that the item is located 40 miles away is not per se an unconscionable burden on you, but if it is impossible or very expensive for you to get there because of the new location, they could have some responsibility to mitigate the situation (e.g. give you a ride to and from).	Why do you think they have the same shareholders? There’s no reason to believe that they are related corporations just because they share an address. I am shareholder and director of 4 corporations. 3 have the same shareholders in the same proportion. The other has different shareholders. All of them have their registered office at my accountant’s premises. It’s a small suburban practice so there are probably only a few hundred companies at that address. A large city practice would have thousands or tens of thousands. The property management company probably provides the same service.	Every lot on the subdivision is and always will be acquired “through the Developer” Unless the developer still owns it. Somebody is the heir or assignee of the Developer - that’s who you need to seek approval from. Even if the Developer was at some point a company that got liquidated, the right of being the Developer would transfer to the creditors of that company.
How can I get my DNA tested without the results being kept by third-party? Mainly I'm interested in getting to know my ancestry, but I don't mind doing a lot of research on my own to classify it if I get raw results. The thing that I do not want is my DNA being stored somewhere, or something associated with my name in any way stored anywhere. Is there a way to avoid that and just get the only copy of the results while being sure that the DNA sample wasn't kept as well? I'm in Europe if that matters, but I've read you can usually send in samples. I can't afford something very expensive, but I am able to pay something (obviously, otherwise I wouldn't be posting about it).	Read the TOS (Terms of Service) for each DNA service you are considering. Each service will clearly outline the privacy of submitted samples, security of the process of analysis of samples, the storage and distribution (and possible destruction) of the resulting data, and linking of personal names (or the granting of anonymity, if available) to the data. The TOS will give you enough information to determine if you are comfortable with the privacy of the service. The TOS is a legal document; both you and the service are bound by that contract once you submit a sample and pay the fee. The TOS may outline any legal recourse you have against the company for violating the TOS. Each service is bound by the laws of the country where it is located and the countries where it might outsource the analysis, as well as relevant EU law - since you're looking at EU based-services - to provide security and privacy. Those laws will be outlined in the TOS. As an example, read https://dna.ancestry.com/en/legal/us/privacyStatement at ancestry.com about their DNA testing. It's an extensive TOS, and outlines US and EU law, including the Swiss Safe Harbor Framework https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Safe_Harbor_Privacy_Principles The DNA service, of course, can't guarantee the security of the data - or your personal information - in perpetuity. Companies are sold, TOS documents change (which would have to be subsequently approved by you), data storage systems "leak" information (by insiders and hackers), and on and on. ...but I don't mind doing a lot of research on my own to classify it if I get raw results. And, any kind of site that allows you to compare your DNA profile with others - if it is a different site/service than one that does the DNA analysis - will have its own TOS regarding the privacy of your data and the resulting metadata from comparisons to other DNA profiles.	It seems clear that this is personal information under the GDPR. If you are subject to the GDPR, you need to have a "lawful basis" to store or process such information. (You are subject to the GDPR if you are locates in the EU, or if your users are. My understanding is that it is location at the time the app is accessed that matters, not a user's citizenship. I am not totally sure about that, however. Unless your app is limited to non-EU access, it it probably safest to comply with the GDPR) The degree of precision of your location data will not matter -- a specific city is quite enough to make it personal data if it can be tied to a specific person. There are various lawful bases that may be relied on for processing and storage, but explicit consent is probably the one with the widest applicability. To use consent as the lawful basis, you must present an OPT-IN decision to the user, and record the results. If the user does nothing, the result must record lack of consent. You may not use a pre-checked consent box or another mechanism that has the effect of an opt-out choice. You should be clear about what information will be stored, and how it will or might be used. You will also need to consider how your app will function for those who do not consent, and how to handle requests to withdraw consent. So if an app obtains user consent to store location data in a manner that complies with the GDPR, it may store user location data. The consent should make the possible uses of the data clear. If the data is to be shared, the consent should make the possible extent of sharing clear. Some previous questions and answers here on law.se dealing with GDPR consent that seem possibly relevant: User consent required under GDPR What provisions should I make regarding GDPR consent when users do not sign themselves up? GDPR - Withdrawn user consent Opt Out Consent under GDPR	The picture shown is not fraudulent or problematic. Fraud involves using a false representation (or concealing a fact) in order to obtain a result that would not have been possible to secure without the misstatement or concealment. No one is using the photograph of the exterior of a passport (which is identical for all U.S. passports) to obtain any immigration benefit or for a non-U.S. citizen to obtain citizenship. All that is being done is visually associating international travel (which would usually be done using a passport) with a credit card that can be used internationally. Since a passport is a federal government document, it is also not protected by trademark or copyright laws -- the exterior, generic design of a passport is in the public domain. It can't be used for a purpose to mislead someone about citizenship or immigration benefits, but otherwise, it can be used for any purpose. I suppose that you could be interpreting the photograph (on a Spanish language speaker's facebook feed) as implying that by getting this credit card you will also get a U.S. passport and cool sunglasses, but that would be a patently unreasonable assumption in this context, particularly in light of the clarifying caption at the bottom, and, of course, many people who speak Spanish as a primary language have legitimate U.S. passports (including more or less all passport holders in Puerto Rico). You could also, I suppose, be interpreting the appearance of the passport as some sort of implicit government endorsement of the product when the government does not, in fact, endorse the product, but again, nothing in the advertisement that I can see that can be reasonably interpreted as conveying that message.	It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also.	The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture.	This is weird. Within the EU, a passport is proof of identity, and it is also proof that you are allowed to take a job in the EU. There is nothing that a birth certificate would add to this. Either the bar manager is badly misinformed, or he doesn't want to give your brother a job, and will come up with something even more ridiculous if he gets the birth certificate.	You didn't post the details of what exactly is involved with a "vampire initiation fee": is this simply the purchase of an physical object? Or the purchase of a service, such as the placing of a spell or the providing of the service of alleged protection from vampires? Or is this some form of a real "Advance-fee scam" where money and banking credentials or personal information is involved? (See link below). But in the big picture, one person's scam is another person's persuasive business sales pitch for an unusual item or service. Simply being able to pay for such an item or service doesn't make the sale - or the contract to sell it - illegal everywhere. It may be the case that selling an "vampire initiation fee" does not happen to be illegal in Nigeria. Illegal in the US, possibly yes. illegal there? Maybe not. Contract laws differ; in the US, contracting for something that is illegal voids the contract. In Nigeria, maybe not. Though the "vampire initiation fee" doesn't sound to me like a classic Advance-fee scam (Wikipedia), Google search on 419 scams and the results will tell you that it will be nearly impossible to get a prosecutor in that country to deal with anything like that, even if it is a real scam that promises lots of money for an upfront fee. Prosecutors have much better things to do. And you might have to go to Nigeria to make your case; see other answers that more fully outline the laws and legal aspects. Good luck. And it's better to spend your money on some garlic and a mirror. 7/03/18 Update re: the email transcript linked in question That's not a scam; the person is simply trying to sell you on the initiation fee. There is no crime. There is no promise of more money for a small fee (and bank credentials or personal information) like a typical 419 advance fee scam. You're not producing useful evidence for a prosecutor by engaging in the email and mostly agreeing to pay him. It's not illegal for you to send money by Western Union for the vampire fee. Even if you did send money, you're not being defrauded because you already know the vampire initiation is fake, and as a result you couldn't logically prove to a prosecutor or court that you were scammed. He's not guilty of fraud as no money has changed hands for a (fraudulent) service. Emailing with him might make you feel good by wasting his time, but that's all.	Chain of custody and testimony in this regard. Say there is a murder victim, with DNA of the suspect under the fingernails and a knife with the suspect's bloody fingerprints stuck in the chest. There would be testimony what happened to the knife. If a paramedic removed it to attempt first aid, the paramedic would testify. So would the officer who bagged it, and the forensic analyst who took the fingerprints. A pathologist would testify if the knife was consistent with the stab wound (a careful pathologist could never swear that the knife was the cause of death, just that it matches). The pathologist would also testify how DNA was collected under the fingernails, and how it was sent to the lab. The defense may claim that the suspect also tried first aid, or that a corrupt cop forced the suspect to hold the knife. The court or jury then draw their conclusions from this and other testimony. Same here. A lifelike picture found on the web proves nothing. A witness who takes the stand to testify that he or she took a certain picture would be more credible. So would a forensic officer who testifies how she or he removed the data from a surveillance camera, checked for common signs of tampering, and then signed a copy of the data with a private key. (The signing shows no third-party tampering after collection, it is not evidence of integrity before that.) Years ago, in germany, there was the case of a bank robber who claimed that a fleeing suspect had handed him a bag of money in the forest and then vanished. "Prove it wasn't so," he demanded. "You can't. So there is reasonable doubt." Well, the court found that the statement merely created unreasonable doubt, and the sentence was upheld on appeal.
If I consume cannabis and walk across the state line, can I get arrested? Cannabis is legal in some states. In others, not so much. So if I am in a state where cannabis is legal, smoke it and walk across state line, without taking any with me, just in me, can I get arrested for smoking it in a place that was legal?	A state's criminal jurisdiction normally applies to acts committed in that state's territory. So if you consume something in state A, you can't be charged in state B for violating state B's prohibition against consuming that thing. However, if state B has a prohibition against public intoxication, and you enter its territory while intoxicated, you could be charged for violating state B's prohibition on public intoxication. The fact that you're crossing state lines also increases the possibility that the federal government would want to get involved; the location of the federal prosecution could be in either state, although neither state's court system would be involved.	Knife laws in the United States are notoriously ambiguous, often vary at the municipality level, and enforcement can best be described as capricious. I can't put it better than this eye-opening answer I found on Quora: Don't ask anybody what the law is about knives. Not even the police. There's so much misinformation floating around out there. ... Check the law yourself. Not just state law, but local law for any county or city you stop in or pass through. I was tasked with writing a weapons policy for my security department, my former employer. I checked the Code of Maryland Regulations and found a mess. Knives are considered tools, not weapons, unless and until one uses or intends to use a knife as a weapon; knives are legal regardless of blade length; folding knives may be carried concealed, but fixed knives must be carried open; switchblades and balisongs are not OK, but no mention of gravity knives, locking mechanisms, or assisted-open mechanisms. I carried my S&W assisted-open knife everywhere, including into Baltimore City several times. Then Freddie Gray was arrested for carrying one and died in custody. A whole lot of people thought the arresting officer had made an unlawful arrest, based on the state law, including the Baltimore City prosecutor … until someone bothered to check the city law and found that assisted-open knives are illegal in Baltimore City. The arrest was a good one. And I left my knife in my car from then on whenever I went into that town. (I have on occasion asked police about knife laws. In every case the officer has declined to answer whether a particular knife or carry practice was legal.)	Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all "completely illegal" regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a "criminal conviction"). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been "decriminalised" - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority.	I think it's important to keep in mind the essence of your actions. @Mowzer gave a great answer on the matter in hand, but I'd like to add a point of view. Is it illegal to eat while driving? Like pointed out by @Mowzer, if no law prohibits it, it's allowed by default (lots of countries have this premise). But what about the consequences of your actions? Maybe there's no law against eating in the car, but there sure is one in my country that specific says that you are not allowed to drive without using both hands in the wheel. The only exception to this rule is to take out your hand from the wheel to use the stick to change gears. Another point of view to add is the liability. Let's say you're minding your own business while driving and a lunatic trying to commit suicide jumps in front of your car. It's a pretty straight-forward case, you have no reason to be blamed. Now, let's add to the same scenario your snack; with a small change, you are now facing a accident that may have been caused by reckless driving (another thing commonly illegal). To sum up, the law is not really like math that have axioms that determine true or false statements without any distinguishment. That's why every case is single handled in the law by it's particularities.	Firstly, yours is not a valid argument. What is meant by "generally accessible" is public places like plazas, stretches of green by the road, parks, parking lots, etc. The definition is kind of a negative and could be more easily phrased as: "You may camp at A) designated camping areas or B) private places where you are entitled to camp". This means you either have to find a camping area where you pay a fee for a period of time, or you may camp on private grounds that either belong to you, or you have been given explicit permission to camp, say in a private garden or field. Of course this is practically impossible if you don't know anyone in there. But, the screenshot explicitly restricts this rule with the leading prase "Im Gemeindegebiet" which means if you leave the legal boundaries of Werfen, Salzburg county law applies (Which may or may not be similar). Disclaimer: While I don't have legal background, I can tell from personal experience that local governments are touchy on this and striking up camp somewhere where you are not allowed to will at least (if detected) require you to leave the premises immediately and the police may charge you with trespassing.	This may be allowed, or prohibited, it all depends. At the federal level, there is no specific prohibition against asking this question, however it may be found to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act if the result discriminates in employment based on race. At the state level (in Washington), WAC 162-12-140 gives examples of fair and unfair pre-employment inquiries. W.r.t. arrests, it deems such questions as fair under limited circumstances: Because statistical studies regarding arrests have shown a disparate impact on some racial and ethnic minorities, and an arrest by itself is not a reliable indication of criminal behavior, inquiries concerning arrests must include whether charges are still pending, have been dismissed, or led to conviction of a crime involving behavior that would adversely affect job performance, and the arrest occurred within the last ten years. Exempt from this rule are law enforcement agencies and state agencies, school districts, businesses and other organizations that have a direct responsibility for the supervision, care, or treatment of children, mentally ill persons, developmentally disabled persons, or other vulnerable adults. See RCW 43.20A.710; 43.43.830 through 43.43.842; and RCW 72.23.035. In other words, asking just about arrests is unfair and illegal. You can look up the law of other states here. In California, you can't ask about an arrest until late in the process as part of an individualized investigation, and can't be an automatic "arrest? No job!" rule. In contrast, Arkansas has no prohibition against arrest as job disqualifier.	First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat.	The new law wins. That's rather the point of passing a new law-- the legislature wants to change the current law of the land whether that is based on statutes or court rulings. Of course, there are caveats. Prior judicial rulings may have relied on an interpretation of a source of law that supersedes the legislature in question (i.e. based on an interpretation of the state or federal Constitution or based on a federal law that supersedes the state law). In that case the new law would be found unconstitutional or ignored. Or the new law might have an ambiguous interaction with current law that courts would have to resolve. The new law might clearly make X illegal but there may be legitimate questions about whether it intended to make previously legal action Y illegal as well. It is, after all, very difficult to write a law that covers every possible fact pattern one would encounter in the real world.
Can my user agreement require end users to indemnify me for misuse of their data by third-party services embedded in my app? I have an Android App which is already in the Play Store. Now due to GDPR I am planning to improve my Privacy Policy and a Terms of service. I am planning to add certain terms in my Terms of service some of which are: I am not responsible for any damage/loss caused to your phone by using my app. I am using certain services such as X,Y and Z services. And any collection, use or misuse of the data collected by those service I am not responsible. I know that the above two points are not framed in an proper legal language but my question is that suppose the user is accepting those two points will it exempt me(My responsibility) from those two cases. Any help would be grateful.	Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite.	The status of any PII (Personally Identifiable Information) is the same in GDPR regardless of location, or who enters it. Its goals are (among others) to stop any actor (company / government or other) from hiding responsibility about their use and practices around people's data. GDPR does even apply to anything offline and on paper. Basically it means you have to validate any entry field is free of PII before processing it. Or make it clear in your privacy statement how you handle this use-case.	Corrections to your statements or quotations Your quotation "To fall within the remit of the GDPR, the processing has to be part of an "enterprise" (...)" is not from the GDPR, and is an erroneous statement. Also, the threshold of 250 employees you refer to, is only relevant with regards to the record-keeping obligations of Article 30. GDPR provisions relevant to your question The GDPR applies to individuals or students in accordance with the material scope of the GDPR, which is treated in Article 2 (2) c) where GDPR states that "This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (...) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity;" The Recital 18 of the GDPR gives some insight as to what would be a purely personal or household activity as follows: (18) This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity and thus with no connection to a professional or commercial activity. Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. However, this Regulation applies to controllers or processors which provide the means for processing personal data for such personal or household activities. Interpretation To my knowledge, there are no specific guidelines regarding this matter to date from WP29. Those may be adopted in the future, or some requirements may already exist in local laws in one of the EU countries or from documentation available from local data protection authorities. If you are based in the EU, you could check this with your local data protection authority. There is, however, case law from the European Court of Justice as pointed out by Free Radical, interpreting the scope of the "personal use exception" in Directive 95/46/EC (which provisions are similar to the GDPR in this matter). If your hobby is not limited to your personal circle (yourself and the persons in your household), and thus if you plan to share the results of your data collection and processing with third parties (possibly teachers, other fellow students, or anybody else if you publish the results of your work) resulting from your "hobby" activity, you certainly would not fall in this exception to the scope. Case C-101/01 is an example of publication on the Internet made by an individual claiming to use its "freedom of expression to create internet pages in the course of a non-profit-making or leisure activity". The court clarified that: exception must (...) be interpreted as relating only to activities which are carried out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of people Another, less optimistic interpretation from the examples given by the GDPR recitals, could derive from the spirit in which purely personal or household activity are to be understood. These examples actually refer to limited amounts of data and which are related to the individual itself (his own address book, his social networking activity, etc.), and creating limited risks relevant to the person herself and its contacts. In this view, there is a risk that a "hobby" in which you collect data about thousands of persons unrelated to you, could be considered as not being really purely personal. Actually, an interpretation of case law C-212/13 from the European Court of Justice also mentioned by Free Radical could support this reasoning. In this case, a video recording of people was stored from cameras installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes, but the cameras were also monitoring a public space. The court ruled that: To the extent that video surveillance such as that at issue in the main proceedings covers, even partially, a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the person processing the data in that manner, it cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely ‘personal or household’ activity (...) Extending this reasoning to your question, a "hobby" consisting of collecting "huge list of names, emails, zipcodes" unrelated to you could be regarded as "directed outwards from the private setting (...)". Conclusion As a hobbyist, or a student, if you can work on fake computer generated data and achieve the same results in your personal learning purposes you should definitely consider doing so.	If there is a trade mark and if Polaroid owns it and if you infringed it then yes they can force you to remove it. In addition, they could sue you for either damages (i.e. what they lost because of your infringement) or an account of profits (i.e. what you made because of your infringement). That is what trade mark law is for! If the trade mark is registered then this is trivially easy for them to demonstrate. If it is unregistered then it becomes a question of if the mark is clearly recognisable as Polaroid's; IMO they could probably show that it is - those particular border dimensions were distinctive of Polaroid instant cameras for many years. If you want to republish the app, you could probably avoid trade mark issues by allowing users to set the dimensions of the photograph and border, the colour of the border and the location of the caption.	Let's assume that I created a mobile app for iPhone that is tracking rides on a bike [...] So the app is processing that data in the way I programmed it but I as a person do not have access to that data. I assume in such case I am not the data controller according to GDPR because I do not have access to that data is that correct? Yes, as far as I can see that is correct. The GDPR defines a data controller as someone who "determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data" - you just provide a tool, you don't control for what purposes your customers use their ride data. This is also discussed in this question: How does the GDPR apply to software developed by one company and used by another? What if additionally to that I will program my app for example in such way that it will sometimes send current GPS coordinate to an online service controlled by external company such as Apple [...] But still my app would send this data directly to Apple server so I will still not have any access to that data. Does this change anything and does GDPR now apply to me? Yes, and yes. In that case, you are telling Apple to process data for you, so you would become the data controller (because you "determine[s] the purposes and means of the processing of personal data"), and Apple is a data processor for you. That means also the usual mechanisms kick in - you need to inform your users about this processing, you need to make sure Apple plays by the rules, etc. etc. I also do not know if Apple save this request on their servers or if they just automatically convert received gps coordinates to a name and return the answer without saving the request. This is exactly the kind of situation the GDPR is meant to address. Under GDPR, saying "I do not know what X does with the data" is not an option. This is something many companies tried in the past, that is why GDPR explicitly assigns responsibility to the data controller (i.e., you). As explained in a EU document, What is a data controller or a data processor?: The duties of the processor towards the controller must be specified in a contract or another legal act. For example, the contract must indicate what happens to the personal data once the contract is terminated. A typical activity of processors is offering IT solutions, including cloud storage. [...] So, no, you cannot just say "I do not know if Apple saves this request". Instead, you must make a contract with Apple which says whether (and how, and for how long...) they save the request, and you must inform your users about this in your privacy policy. And if Apple refuse to make such a contract with you, you must find a different company to work with.	NDA provisions in general are rather similar. In particular the ones covering the exceptions to the confidentiality obligations required to the receiving party. Such provisions normally have the following wording (more or less): Information shall not be treated as Confidential if: - at the time of disclosure is already in the public domain or becomes available to the public w/o breach by receiving party; - the receiving party receives it from a third party free to lawfully disclose such information; - was in the prior lawfull possession of the receiving party; - was independently developed by the receiving party; - is approved to be released by the disclosing party; or - the receiving party is required by law to disclose in response to a valid order of a court or by a government agency. Your particular case might not necessarily fall under any of this exceptions (i do not know the exact wording of the NDA you're referring to) but in any case, please note that simply telling a third party that you are discussing the development of "an app similar to x but with a better UX and simpler design", might already be considered as a breach of confidentiality. Surely the NDA is identified as being Confidential itself and it probably also contains a section saying something like: "This Agreement and its contents shall be treated as Confidential Information".	Yes, GDPR applies: you are a data controller established/living in the UK or are offering services to people in the UK you fall under the material scope of the GDPR. The Art 2(2)(c) exemption for “purely personal or household activity” does not apply since you're offering the service to the public. You must consider GDPR compliance here. This is especially important as you are showing personal data to the public. Don't do that unless you have a very good reason, appropriate safeguards, and are clear to users how their information will be shown. On a high level, GDPR compliance involves working on the following questions: For what purpose are you processing personal data? Context: purpose limitation principle per GDPR Art 5(1)(b) What is the legal basis for processing? GDPR Art 6(1) lists the available legal bases. Here, consent, necessity for performance of a contract, or a legitimate interest could be a legal basis. They may have further obligations attached. A legitimate interest requires a balancing test that considers the data subject's rights and freedoms. Consent must fulfil the conditions per Art 7 in order to be valid. What is the minimal data necessary to achieve the purpose? Per the Art 5(1)(c) data minimisation principle, it is illegal to process personal data beyond what is necessary and adequate. You must provide data protection by design and by default per Art 25. Special categories of data per Art 9 such as health data are illegal to process outside of narrow exemptions. You must delete data once it is no longer necessary. What appropriate safeguards and security measures should you apply? Per Art 24 and 25, you are responsible for determining and implementing appropriate measures. This depends a lot on your specific context, so there's no checklist you can apply. Per Art 25(1) you must pseudonymize the processed information if that is compatible with the processing purpose. What further compliance measures do you have to consider? There are additional GDPR and non-GDPR compliance measures. From the GDPR side: Use the answers to these questions to write a privacy policy, including the information that you must provide to data subjects per Art 13. Consider whether you have to maintain a Records of Processing document per Art 30, or if you have to make a Data Protection Impact Assessment per Art 35. If you use third party services, figure out whether they are a joint controller or data processor and apply appropriate safeguards. If you have data processors, ensure that you have a contract in place that covers the items from Art 28(3). If you share data with other controllers (not processors) you need a legal basis for doing so. If you transfer data into a non-EU/EEA country (after 2020: non-UK country) you need a legal basis per Art 44 and have to cover additional items in your privacy policy. Ideally, the target country is covered by an EC adequacy decision per Art 45. For US-based companies, this is the case only when they have self-certified under the Privacy Shield framework. Non-GDPR compliance steps could include cookie consent banners, or showing a VAT ID. How can you prepare for data subject requests? Data subjects have various rights per Arts 15–23, subject to the modalities in Art 12. For example, a data subject could request that their information is erased from your website. The exact rights also depend on the legal basis you selected. You should figure out in advance how to deal with such requests.	GDPR rights and obligations cover different things: A duty of the data processor towards the government of the country where they operate to present certain documentation, and to implement technical and organizational measures to protect data. These would be audited by government agencies, not the individual customer. A single data subject cannot waive them. A duty of the data processor to process and store personal data only with a legal justification. User consent is one possible justification, if it is informed, revokable, etc. So a single data subject can waive a "ban" on storing his or her data in a database along with all the other users who waived that "ban," but the duties towards the government regarding that data would still apply. A duty of the data processor to respond to an Article 15 request by the data subject in a certain way and timeframe. If a data subject writes a letter to the data processor and explicitly states that the letter is not an Article 15 request, then Article 15 does not apply. The data subject would of course have the right to make an Article 15 request at a later time.
Can you be shot in "self-defense" for attempting to disarm someone? "I'd like to see you try and take my gun" is a common mantra among 2nd amendment enthusiasts, the implied sentiment being they'll kill anyone who tries, but I'm interested in what would happen if this actually occurred. If, for instance, a student brought an AR-15 slinged across her back challenging others to take it, and another student abruptly tried to disarm her but was shot and killed, would the student who brought the gun be able to argue a successful self-defense case to a court, or would she likely be found guilty of homicide?	I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at 11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at 2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on.	The specific elements of the crime in question are going to be defined by Maltese law, which appears to be a blend of a European-style civil code with English-style common law. However, under ordinary Anglo-American standards, the alleged acts do seem to meet the legal definitions of these terms. At common law, an "assault" consists of placing someone in fear of an unwanted touching, and a "battery" is a completed assault; that is, an actual unwanted touching. If Mr. Suda, as alleged, took the victim's hand and touched it to his own genitals, without her consent, he committed an assault and battery. Any touching can constitute a battery, from a tap on the shoulder to a bullet in the head. Likewise, at common law, "violence" is any degree of physical force. If he tricked her into touching his genitals, that would not be a crime of violence; if he physically moved her hand to his genitals with his own hand, then he used physical force, or violence, to commit the crime. Again, what actually needs to be proven will depend on specifics you would need a Maltese lawyer to go into--but under general common law principles, neither "assault" not "violence" are particularly surprising.	The above is not quite accurate. First, assault. The correct definition is "a threat or physical act that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact." Therefore, no attempt at a battery is necessary. Rather, simply making someone subjectively believe that you are about to commit a battery against them is enough for an assault charge. Please note the following two points. One, that apprehension does not mean fear. Apprehension means that the victim has to believe that the actor's conduct will result in imminent harmful or offensive contact. Two, it's not necessary that the victim believes such conduct will actually be effective - rather, he only has to believe the conduct is "capable" of making the contact. I can't tell if by "other security personnel" you mean, in addition to bouncers, say, security at concerts or if you mean private security guards, such as ones who guard warehouses or other businesses. Nonetheless, for the warehouse/business "guards," they do not have a special privilege above or beyond what any random person may do. That is, you may use force to the extent you reasonably believe necessary to prevent a felony, riot, or serious breach of the peace. You may use deadly force only if it appears reasonably necessary to prevent a "dangerous felony" involving risk to human life, including, for example, robbery, arson, burglary. However, if the private security personnel are operating under authority vested to them by local ordinance or the state legislature, then their rights (and also any attendant restrictions, such as those provided to citizens under the Fourth Amendment) would apply instead. So where's the difference? It comes about at the standard a situation must meet to allow use of deadly force. A police officer can use deadly force to effectuate an arrest based on a reasonable belief that a suspect has committed a felony involving the risk of physical harm or death to others (murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape or burglary) or if there is substantial risk that the suspect was dangerous to the point that he may cause serious physical harm or death to someone if the arrest were delayed. On the other hand, as a private citizen, you may only use deadly force when attempting to effectuate an arrest if the suspect did indeed commit such a felony. Police can base their action on a reasonable belief and even if that belief is wrong, they will be safe from prosecution. A private citizen actually must be right about the suspect having committed the requisite crime. No matter how reasonable the belief was of a private citizen regarding a suspect, if that suspect did not actually commit the crime, the private citizen who used such force will be subject to prosecution. Bouncers are afforded no more rights than private citizens. They can issue verbal warnings, ask a patron to leave the establishment, check identification, refuse entry, call the cops, protect bystanders from violence, break up fights, and respond with equal force if necessary. They may not strike an individual with a punch or kick, push or physically toss someone out of the establishment, restrain them using chokeholds or other submission techniques, or use weapons or pepper spray.	Firstly, there is no jurisdiction in the US where rape is a potentially capital crime, and murder is not - so you are discussing a hypothetical (and rather implausible) jurisdiction. Given your jurisdiction is hypothetical, you can make the law be what you would like. Secondly, duress is accepted in almost all jurisdictions as a defence to a charge of anything except homicide (and some jurisdictions allow it to reduce the severity of a homicide charge). Courts can be reluctant to accept a charge of duress, but a bullet wound would probably be persuasive. I don't know if someone who had just been shot would be physically able to perform though. The precise crimes the perpetrator is guilty of would depend on your specific jurisdiction, but I would expect at least: rape (because they organized it) kidnap shooting the brother	There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.	This Question Is Tricker Than It Seems One of the things about being a non-expert in a field is that it is very difficult to know in advance what is a hard question and what is an easy question. Some questions that seem like they should have simple, straight forward answers are actually very hard to answer. Some questions that seem like they should be very difficult and have involved tricky answers are actually very easy. Without an in depth understanding of the field, you just can't know in advance. It turns out that this particular question is a quite hard question to answer. So, rather than really providing a clear answer, I will explain what about this question makes it hard to answer in this answer. Even this incomplete and ultimately inconclusive answer will require far, far more words (2,078 to be exact), than were necessary to pose the question (94 words). Essentially, the core difficulty is that there are several different principles of law that apply to this fact pattern, each of which, individually have specific things that have to be proved to establish that some legal consequence will follow (which in turn are often themselves intrinsically indefinite), and each of which has exceptions that could also be proved if specific things happen. In part, this is because, while the fact pattern set forth is not freakishly unforeseeable, it is also not a fact pattern that was contemplated when any of the individual legal principles that are implicated were conceived. Likewise, the interaction of these different legal principles in one fact pattern wasn't contemplated and there is probably no one clear controlling case precedent on point that involved this fact pattern. What the law does in cases like these (which come up all the time in real life) is to break down each legal theory individually and analyze it, possibly spread over multiple distinct court cases in different courts in front of different judges. I'll try to unpack the issues (dispensing with U.K. legal terminology in some cases, since I'm only trying to provide a sense of why this is complicated and not to provide a definitive answer to how it is resolved under U.K. law). Possible Claims, Charges, and Defenses; Traffic, Civil, and Criminal It is a crime to threaten someone with weapon or in another way that puts someone at risk of imminent harm. Depending upon the weapon and other circumstances, mere possession of the weapon might be a crime in the U.K. Someone who has been threatened with weapon or in another way that puts them at risk of imminent harm can be a civil lawsuit for money damages against the person making the threat which was called "assault" in historical common law. Someone who has been threatened by another can seek a restraining order/protective order directing that person to stay away from them in the courts in a civil action. Hitting someone else's car is a traffic violation, unless a defense to the traffic violation is present and proven. Hitting someone else's car with a statutorily mandated level of intent is a crime, unless a justification for the crime is present and proven. The person whose car was hit could credibly argue that hitting the door was a mistake, not because the door was hit, but because the driver intended to kill them and missed, so an attempted homicide charge could raised in a criminal proceeding. The person whose car was hit could argue that there was an intend to put them in imminent risk of harm providing a basis for a civil lawsuit for money damages for common law assault. Someone whose car is hit by another car through negligence or recklessly or intentionally can bring one or more claims in a civil lawsuit against the person who car hit their car for money damages. The standard of care for negligence is established by how a reasonable person would act under the circumstances. Self-defense is a possible defense to traffic offenses, criminal charges and civil liability related to harming another's property if the conditions for self-defense apply, which include a risk of imminent harm to oneself, another, or one's property, and if the action taken in self-defense is reasonably proportional under the circumstances as evaluated by a reasonable person in response to the threat. But, if the response of the person making the threat with the weapon was as a result of actions in which the person threatened with the weapon was the true aggressor, then the privilege of self-defense would be forfeited. In real life, good attorneys for the parties could almost certainly solicit and call attention to additional facts not mentioned in the question that would further muddy the waters and raise additional claims, charges, and defenses to claims beyond the ten listed above. I could analyze each of these issues on the facts in depth as best I could with references to statutes and case law (under a body of law other than U.K. law anyway), which would take a few lengthy and heavily researched paragraphs each that would take a fair amount of time each to prepare, but I won't. A full analysis would help you weigh the odds a little better, and if I was a lawyer of a party in this situation, I would do that since every little edge counts in litigation and negotiations of settlements. But even if I did that, it would still leave a lot of uncertainty regarding the final resolution of these questions on the merits. Decision-Making Regarding Bringing Claims The traffic and criminal charges would be brought or not brought largely in the discretion of the Crown attorney or some other government official. It is most likely that a government official making that decision is doing so because the offense was referred to them by the police officer who responded to the scene, or a police officer who received an informal complaint (as opposed to a civil court filing) from one of the parties, or through a complaint delivered directly to the prosecuting authority by an alleged victim. A prosecutor doesn't have to bring claims just because someone asks them to, and doesn't have to bring all possible claims even if some are pursued. The parties themselves would decide whether or not to bring civil claims against each other. Whoever is sued first would make the decision in the context of knowing that they will be a party to a civil lawsuit whether or not they bring civil claims of their own. Possible Forums The traffic offense would probably be resolved in one court. The criminal charges against the person making the threats would be resolved in another court. The criminal charges against the person who hit the car door would be resolved probably in the same court but in a different case, possibly with a different judge. The civil claims would be resolved in yet another court, probably with a different judge, although probably in a single case with the first person to make it to court as the Plaintiff and the other party as a Defendant bringing counterclaims against the Plaintiff. The civil claims might also involve other parties (e.g. the owner of the vehicles in question if not identical to the persons driving the cars at the time of the incidents). Issue Preclusion Some final decisions on the merits in some cases would resolve the outcome of other cases as a matter of law, other final determinations in some cases would not be binding on the other cases as a matter of law because burdens of proof are different, or the legal issue evaluated is not identical, or because other rules (like a rule against a traffic court decision resulting in a binding determination on civil liability for negligence) would apply. The exact rules are rather arcane and there are quite a few permutations of how it come up, but it is important to be aware that these kinds of rules are out there, exist, and would have to be analyzed by the parties as a matter of litigation tactics. Even The "Legal Issues" Are Fact Intensive Inquiries Almost all of the legal theories implicated above involve broad legal standards in which a lot of the substantive question of what is or is not legal is delegated to the finder of fact in a manner that cannot be reviewed on appeal. For example, in a negligence case related to damage to an automobile, even if there is a videotape and there is 100% agreement on precisely what happened, whether that conduct constitutes "negligence" that breaches the duty of care owed by a reasonable person to the general public to protect them from harm, is legally considered a "question of fact" to be determined by a judge on a case by case basis, rather than a "question of law" which will always have the same outcome and is subject to review by an appellate court if the judge gets it wrong. A similar "reasonable person" standard which must be resolved with a highly fact intensive inquiry that could be resolved more than one way by two different judges or juries hearing precisely the same facts and finding the same witnesses and evidence to be credible in exactly the same way, with both upheld on appeal, applies to the self-defense legal theory. This self-defense issue could also conceivably, based upon the order in which cases were tried and their resolution, be resolved one way in a criminal case and a different way in a civil case between the parties. In the same vein, when a threat is imminent is a highly subjective determination that could be resolved in a "legally correct" way that is not subject to being overturned on appeal on precisely the same facts, with precisely the same determinations as to credibility and weight of the evidence, by two different judges or juries. Again, the substantive question of whether particular conduct is or is not illegal is a "question of fact" that can't be resolved in the absence of a trial on the merits in a particular case before a particular finder of fact. Bottom Line The facts provided in the question aren't sufficiently detailed to provide a definitely correct answer to this question. Indeed, the nature of the facts is such that even an perfectly detailed factual statement regarding what happened might not be enough to definitively determine who has civil liability to whom, and to determine what charges each defendant is guilty of. Different judges and jurors could reasonably come to different legally correct conclusions in a case like this one when faced with precisely the same facts and resolving all issues of credibility and the weight of the evidence in precisely the same way. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the same facts would be analyzed with respect to different legal theory analysis in different forums by different people, when there is not, as a general rule (although there is in some cases) any mechanism for compelling those decisions to be made consistently on outcome determinative evaluations of the same facts regarding what was reasonable for the parties to do under the circumstances. The notion that a judge is just an umpire, and that every competent judge acting in good faith will always resolve a case presenting the same facts in the same way is a myth. This simply isn't true, even in the U.K. where the judiciary is (as a consequence of how the system for appointment and retention of judges is designed) not nearly as partisan and politicized as it is in the United States. The outcomes of even fairly simple cases in many cases, like the one in this question, are intrinsically and irreducibly uncertain in common law legal systems. The range of possible outcomes from a best case scenario to a worst case scenario, for each party in this fact pattern, is very wide. A desire to tame the myriad uncertainties involved for all parties, and the desire to avoid multiple time consuming and uncertain court proceedings arising out of the same incident, is one of the reasons that it is very common for civil lawsuits to settle out of court without a trial, and for criminal cases to be resolved by an agreement of the prosecution and the defense (sometimes reached even before charges are filed).	It will hinge on the specific facts, but if the pistol is not discernible by casual observation it will most likely be regarded as concealed. Michigan Open Carry Inc's FAQ #11 asks: Can I open carry with an inside the waistband/inside the pants (IWB) holster? The Michigan Court of Appeals appears to answer this in People v Curtis Phillips (1996) (unpublished): In the case, officers observed Mr. Phillips standing on a nearby porch with the butt of a gun protruding out of his waistband. The Court held that the pistol was not visible under "ordinary observation” and therefore "A casual observer may not have discerned the object in defendant’s waistband." Essentially, it's up to the "trier of fact", meaning open to interpretation for a judge in a bench trial, or a jury in a jury trial. The FAQ goes on to quote The Michigan Court of Appeals per curiam in People v Curtis Phillips (1996) Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “concealed” a handgun because the arresting officers could see the butt of a gun protruding from his waistband. We disagree. To determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). A conviction for carrying a concealed weapon without a license requires proof that the accused concealed a dangerous weapon. People v Pickett, 21 Mich App 246, 248; 175 NW2d 347 (1970). Concealment is a question of fact and exists when the weapon is “not discernible by the ordinary observation of [those] coming in contact with [the accused], casually observing him, as people do in the ordinary and usual associations of life.” People v Johnnie W Jones, 12 Mich App 293, 296; 162 NW2d 847 (1968). While searching the area for gunmen after a reported shooting, the arresting officers observed defendant standing on a nearby porch with the butt of a handgun protruding from his waistband. They were able to identify this object as the butt of a handgun based on their training and experience. The officers were not “casually observing” defendant “in the ordinary and usual associations of life,” and this was not “ordinary observation” because the officers were searching for armed suspects. A casual observer may not have discerned the object in defendant’s waistband. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude there was sufficient evidence that defendant concealed a gun in his waistband.	Under current federal law, we would have to wait for some legislative body to change the law. If ATF changes the federal regulations, they might be classed as "machine guns" (under the "frame designed for converting" clause), which are banned. As the above Docket No. 2017R–22 (from December 26, 2017) says, DoJ expects to plan to discuss changing the rules. They might then be outlawed by executive action (though a court test could be necessary, since executive wish is not the final word on interpreting statutes). The relevant part of the definition of machine gun, which could apply to bump stocks, is: The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. But "such" weapon is one that shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger The definition does not say anything about a single finger action, so there is a reasonable probability that including bump stocks within the scope of existing legislation would be held to exceed congressional authority.
Citation when trying to go to the mechanic to fix the flat tire. Part 2. I was in Massachusetts and had flat tires and was going to the mechanic to fix them. The police gave me a citation for "negligent operation of vehicles". I now find out that it has criminal application. I would appreciate your advice whether it is fair. What will be the expected outcome? Should I get a lawyer? I would appreciate your comments.	The law says don't drive an unsafe vehicle on the road. You disobeyed the law. There were methods of having your tyres fixed without driving on the road (e.g. taking the tyres to the mechanic in a different vehicle, calling a mobile mechanic etc.) so you have no defence of necessity. In all likelihood you will be convicted and penalised. You need legal advice. Whether it's fair or not is a philosophical consideration, not a legal one.	Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.	What you are talking about here is the tort of negligent misstatement, a subset of the tort of negligence. First, there is no presumption in any jurisdiction that I am aware of that anyone is or is not a lawyer (or doctor, or engineer etc.). If people knew that you were, however, then it is reasonable that they would give your statements more weight then if they did not know. It may also be reasonable if they suspected you were. The practical purpose of such a disclaimer is to ensure that they know you aren't. For the specific facts you give, you would certainly be in a better position if you said: "But I'm not a lawyer, so you should seek professional advice"; not so much because you told them you weren't a lawyer but rather because this changes your advice to "seek professional advice". It's impossible to be wrong with that advice! The standard form in Australia is: "this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice". If the statement is limited to "I'm not a lawyer" or if your neighbour knew you were, for instance, a dog catcher with no professional qualifications, then you could still potentially be liable. Your neighbour would need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; by giving advice you potentially do, however, a for negligent misstatement there must be a 'special relationship' [Hawkins V Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, MLC Assurance V Evatt]. You breached that duty; the advice given was "unreasonable". There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your advice there would have been no loss. There was a legal (proximate) cause; damage to the neighbour as a result of the advice must be foreseeable. Harm; the neighbour must suffer real loss. The main point of the disclaimers is on the 2nd point: what is "unreasonable" for a professional is different than for a "lay person". Oh, and by the way: this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice.	In general, you do not have civil recourse against the government for (lawful) legal process that you are the victim of. "Counterclaim" would only be applicable when A sues B, and B makes a counterclaim against A – the police don't sue you, they arrest you, and the prosecutor prosecutes you (or decides not to). If the police beat you up, you could sue them for violating your rights, under what is known as Section 1983. Given the scenario you describe, this comes closest to involving false arrest, meaning that there was no probable cause for arrest. Otherwise, the police have immunity for their actions. But if there is a legal arrest warrant, there is probable cause (existence of probable cause is the standard for issuing an arrest warrant), so no claim against the police will succeed. I am leaving out the anomalous concept of an unlawful arrest warrant, where a judge issued an arrest warrant but there is in fact no probable cause. Such a case would be covered by Section 1983, where either the judge or the swearing officer (or both) violated your rights.	Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.	If you were moving "with the flow of traffic" but over the limit, you were still breaking the law, and the cop can choose which car or cars to stop on any basis or none (except ones forbidden, such as racial in the US). This is almost surely not a valid defense, not in any jurisdiction that I know of at least. If you can show that to slow to the speed limit would have actually been unsafe, you might have a defense, but that is going to be hard to get a court to accept.	I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.	This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas).
Who can I turn to to have a newspaper article removed from the internet? I'm trying to get some information removed from the internet. It was an article which was published by a news publication called The Poughkeepsie Journal, which is located in a town called Poughkeepsie New York. They published a name in an article back in 2011 talking about a list of people set to graduate from a high school that year. I never attended the graduation ceremony because I was the victim of bullying, abuse and harassment by several teachers I had as a result of my disability, and being that I wasn't sure I'd graduate I instead opted to pick up my diploma. Although this article was published some years ago, at times it comes back to haunt me, as at the time the article was published it was under a name I no longer use. I did not give consent for that name to be published, and since the publishing of that article I had experienced harassment and bullying. Consequently, I moved away shortly afterwards and changed my name. I had contacted the Poughkeepsie Journal and asked very politely to remove that name from that article and stated my case in a clear, kind and professional manner. The editor, however, was very rude and quite egotistical about the whole ordeal. It ended with him telling me to contact the school district responsible for sending that information to the Poughkeepsie Journal. Upon contacting the school district, they told me there was nothing they could do at this point and that it didn't matter if I'd given consent or not, as they send photos to the newspaper and those photos contain names of those who either graduated or were set to graduate, and that name is in the article with all the others. Is there anyone who could help me find a pro bono attorney to get that info removed from the internet? The article no longer appears on the original website of the poughkeepsie journal, instead it appears as an archived version on the website newspapers.com. That archived link is what is making the rounds on all the search engines and I'm trying to remove that link. Any help would be greatly appreciated!	If a newspaper publishes an article that is actually defamatory (i.e. publishes false statements that cause you quantifiable harm), and you successfully sue the publisher, you might get a court order requiring them to retract the statements or remove them from their web page. An archive like newspapers.com isn't making false statements, it is making true statements about what the Poughkeepsie Journal published. At any rate, you name is not defamatory, it is (or was) a fact.	Any google review would be hearsay. That means, it would be proof that someone posted a review, and what was written in the review, but it wouldn't be proof that any facts claimed in the review were true. As it is proof of posting, anyone who feels slandered could sue for slander and be successful (depending on circumstances). But trying to claim that the contents of a review is a true fact will fail. You can of course try to contact the person writing a review, and they might be willing to appear in court as a witness. That would make it a statement by a witness which would be taken seriously, and not just hearsay. Since lying in a court as a witness is a serious matter, someone posting a false review will very likely not be willing to appear in court for you.	There is language, but not a mechanism, covering this. Section 3(a)(3) of version 4 licenses says If requested by the Licensor, You must remove any of the information required by Section 3(a)(1)(A) to the extent reasonably practicable. If you become aware of a person using your material and attributing you, and you want the attribution removed, you would accordingly notify them (somehow), and they are required to remove the offending material. The removable informations includes: i. identification of the creator(s) of the Licensed Material and any others designated to receive attribution, in any reasonable manner requested by the Licensor (including by pseudonym if designated); ii. a copyright notice; iii. a notice that refers to this Public License; iv. a notice that refers to the disclaimer of warranties; v. a URI or hyperlink to the Licensed Material to the extent reasonably practicable;	The notice has a lot to do with legacy requirements in the United States to claim the copyright to a work. Up until 1989, the copyright notice was required. Today, the statements are mainly maintained to protect against "innocent infringement" which might reduce what a content owner can get in court. What exactly do those terms entail? That the owner stated owns all rights and you may do nothing with the content. My biggest concern is this: by writing that, is the company claiming to own everything on the website, even potentially copyrighted user-submitted material? That's exactly what they are doing. Depending on the terms of the specific site, content contributors generally either assign copyright to the site owner or license the content in a way that allows the site owner to do exactly what they want with it. Site creators with the smarts or money to do it right/get someone to do it right usually state something like: Copyright [Site Owner] and contributors. Other sites (like this one) state specifically what they hold the copyright to: site design / logo © 2015 Stack Exchange Inc THIS IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE. CONSULT AN ATTORNEY REGARDING YOUR SPECIFIC SITUATION.	Submit emails in their totality Your testimonial affidavit can quote or cite them as applicable. There is no protection of anyone’s privacy in court. By the way, the email where admissions were made is probably inadmissible if it was sent were in the course of bona fide negotiation to resolve the dispute. If the other party objects they will be thrown out - I wouldn’t hang my case on them.	If you wrote for example "I had thoughts about taking the axe from my garage and decapitating my neighbour", and your neighbour read that, he would reasonably be worried and contact the police. I would take that as a death threat, and the death threat is by itself illegal. There would be some range where I could claim that you were making a death threat and making excuses to avoid legal responsibility. You can have all the thoughs you like, you can write them into your private diary where nobody can read them, but as soon as you publish it, it becomes "speech" and some speech is illegal.	The purpose of that disclaimer is not to prevent reprimands or legal action. It's really as simple as it appears -- it's to inform the readers that the tweets in fact contain the opinion of the person who wrote them and are not intended to be understood as the official position as that person's employer. This is especially important for people who occasionally or frequently convey their employer's official position. It's not supposed to be some kind of magic word that causes something to happen. It's just an attempt to convey accurate information and avoid misunderstandings.	Probably Not In general, the law gives a school significant discretion on how to run its courses and grade its exams. And it is unlikely that getting into a lawsuit over a grade will be a good way to proceed. You could explain more fully to your instructor why you feel unfairly treated, and if not satisfied by the response, go to the department chair or other higher authority as the structure of the school may provide. I would suppose that the instructor had permission to require the 3rd party software, or that school policy gives an instructor that option. It might be worth confirming that, however. For future tests you might be able to shutdown or suspend all popups to avoid the problem happening again. A "game mode" sometimes will do that.
Can I refuse to turn over my digital devices at the border? Let's say I'm coming into the USA. A border guard says they want to inspect my digital devices. Can I refuse, turn around, and just not enter the USA ,get back on a plane, turn around and drive back, or do I have to give over my devices just because I showed up?	Can I refuse, turn around, and just not enter the USA ,get back on a plane, turn around and drive back, or do I have to give over my devices just because I showed up? In theory you can refuse and turn around. At a highway check point or in a private boat disembarking context, that is fairly feasible. If you turn around before you are searched and get back across the border, the border control officers can't pursue you. In a commercial airplane or commercial boat disembarking context, this is as a practical matter, not a very feasible thing to do, because you can't as a practical matter, turn around and even if you plan to return, the only way you can make it to a return trip without passing through customs is if the border control officer refuses to admit you. The law is that non-probable cause searches are permitted at border checkpoints (and indeed even near a border checkpoint on the in country side), but this isn't much clarity about when that authority ends (short of returning across an international boundary) when deciding not to enter at a border checkpoint. Also, there is also a split of authority over whether a cell phone search is allowed in the first place. The Second Circuit in the U.S. has held that it is not, but the law is unresolved in many U.S. states at this time.	How I understand your question You have asked about mechanisms to "ensure the return" or something that will "trigger a law-enforcement or legal action if the child does not leave the US on the end of the submitted trip schedule." So I take it as premises of your question that there is a parenting agreement regarding schedule and return, and this trip will happen. Dale M's answer provides advice about what he recommends to a person in such a situation. However, I recognize that many parenting orders include a term that allows international travel that can't be unreasonably refused by the other parent,1 or that allow international travel with no consent necessary.2 There is no mechanism There is no mechanism to pre-register a potential violation of a parenting agreement with a foreign state. I cannot cite to a source to prove a negative, but I am familiar with the operation of the Hague Convention and non-Hague Convention regimes and none that I have encountered have such a mechanism. I have also spent some time looking to see if I have missed something, and am still convinced there is no such mechanism. 1. 2020 BCPC 16: "He shall not unreasonably withhold his written consent to such a trip. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, Y.N. has liberty to apply for a court order. If the court, on such application, finds that W.G. has unreasonably withheld his consent to such a trip, he is hereby put on notice that he may be ordered to pay Y.N.’s expenses incurred in bringing the application." 2. 2018 ABQB 1031 ("Each party shall be entitled to travel internationally with the children without the consent of the other party upon providing 30 days notice of such travel along with a full itinerary including flight information, destination, where the parties are staying and contact information."); 2010 ABPC 410 ("I will allow T.C. to travel outside the country without the written consent of the father."); 2021 ONCJ 440 ("Either party may travel with the Child outside of Canada during his or her parenting time. The Father requires the consent of the Mother, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The Mother may travel internationally with the Child without the consent of the Father, but she must advise him accordingly."); 2020 ABQB 434 ("either party may travel during their respective vacation or ordinary parenting time in Canada or internationally to any Hague Convention Country, without the consent of the other party"); 2017 BCSC 1463 ("The claimant is at liberty to travel with the Children both in Canada and internationally without the consent of the respondent.")	The picture shown is not fraudulent or problematic. Fraud involves using a false representation (or concealing a fact) in order to obtain a result that would not have been possible to secure without the misstatement or concealment. No one is using the photograph of the exterior of a passport (which is identical for all U.S. passports) to obtain any immigration benefit or for a non-U.S. citizen to obtain citizenship. All that is being done is visually associating international travel (which would usually be done using a passport) with a credit card that can be used internationally. Since a passport is a federal government document, it is also not protected by trademark or copyright laws -- the exterior, generic design of a passport is in the public domain. It can't be used for a purpose to mislead someone about citizenship or immigration benefits, but otherwise, it can be used for any purpose. I suppose that you could be interpreting the photograph (on a Spanish language speaker's facebook feed) as implying that by getting this credit card you will also get a U.S. passport and cool sunglasses, but that would be a patently unreasonable assumption in this context, particularly in light of the clarifying caption at the bottom, and, of course, many people who speak Spanish as a primary language have legitimate U.S. passports (including more or less all passport holders in Puerto Rico). You could also, I suppose, be interpreting the appearance of the passport as some sort of implicit government endorsement of the product when the government does not, in fact, endorse the product, but again, nothing in the advertisement that I can see that can be reasonably interpreted as conveying that message.	I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy.	This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.	It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power.	Yes When you enter the jurisdiction of a country, you are subject to its laws. You are not, in general, subject to punishment for things you did before you entered its jurisdiction but if possession of bitcoin (or anything else) is illegal in that country, then possessing that thing makes you subject to prosecution.	I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.
HOA forcing family to pay for facilities which we are prohibited to use A large debt was accrued by our family with our Home Owners Association, which was paid off. However, the HOA still insists that there are additional debts, thus stripping our rights to a community parking permit, and a community pool key. Both of which are services that are provided and maintained with each homeowner’s $500 monthly fee. Is it unlawful for the HoA to be charging my household for services which we are not allowed to use?	There are two issues. First, can the HOA deny access to its facilities and common areas for an unpaid HOA assessment. There might be exceptions in particular jurisdictions, but the general rule would be that it is not unlawful to deny someone who isn't current on their dues use of facilities and common areas. Second, do you have an unpaid HOA bill? This is obviously a factual question. The HOA takes the position that you do and is acting accordingly. You could sue the HOA for a determination that your bill is paid in full, or could try to work with the HOA treasurer to determine why the amount that you believe is owed differs from the amount that they believe is owed. I've seen cases where the HOA failed to credit payments that were made or miscalculated the amount due, and I've seen cases where, for example, the homeowner has paid the principle, but not additional amounts owed for late fees, interest and attorneys' fees incurred in collecting the balance that are also owed.	Washington's HB 1474 actually does not give low interest loans to all but white borrowers. It initiates the process of creating a bureaucracy that will eventually provide loans for down payment and closing cost assistance for first-time home buyers (a loan that must be repaid when the house is sold). There are various qualifications that a program participant must meet, such as below-average income, being a resident, and also they must be a state resident before April 11, 1968 or a descendant of someone who was, and was or would have been excluded from homeownership in Washington state by a racially restrictive real estate covenant on or before April 11,28 1968 The "would have" part refers to the fact that a person may have been interested in buying a particular house but gave up when they were told that there is a racially restrictive covenant associated with the property. It is then the duty of the covenant homeownership program commission to determine what such covenants may have existed, and also to what extent existing programs and race-neutral approaches have been insufficient to remedy this discrimination and its impacts The law simply states that eligibility is based on a recorded covenant or deed restriction that includes or included racial restrictions on property ownership or use against protected classes that are unlawful under RCW 49.60.224 which would include any covenants against sale to Irish or any other anciently discriminated-against Europeans, if such are found to exist. Referring to Wynn v. Vilsack, it was noted that A strong basis in evidence cannot rest on an amorphous claim of societal discrimination, on simple legislative assurances of good intention, or on congressional findings of discrimination in the national economy. However, a governmental entity can justify affirmative action by demonstrating gross statistical disparities between the proportion of minorities hired and the proportion of minorities willing and able to do the work. Analogous reasoning would apply to government action that deprived individuals of the opportunity to purchase a home based on their race. If (when) this new law is challenged, one of the central questions would be what remedial actions the government(s) took to correct this past discrimination. While it is clear that such discrimination was ended in 1968, it is far from clear that there was any remedial action taken by the state. Of course there is always the possibility that SCOTUS will discover new law that changes the landscape, but as it stands, such corrective actions are legal.	It looks like the gym was allowed to take the money out of your bank account and didn't. They didn't notice that they didn't take your money, so they can't really expect you to notice it. So you haven't done anything that would be criminal. The bigger question is how much you owe them. If you used the gym all the time, like someone paying monthly would do, they will most likely have the right to payment. That's not unlimited, there will be some "statute of limitations" so they can't ask you for 30 years back payments, but with less than two years they probably have a right. If they raised prices, it's unlikely the would have a right to that because they never told you. The situation while your subscription was frozen is interesting. Basically you just walked in, used the gym without paying, but they didn't stop you in any way. I could walk into your gym, ask if it is Ok to use it, and if they say "yes" and don't mention payment, I'm in. So for this time you can argue whether or not you owe them money. Summary: You haven't done anything criminal. You most likely owe them money. About the money, they can take you to court if you don't pay which will cost both sides money. Since you did use their service and other users did pay, the morally right thing would be to pay what seems fair to you, possibly with some negotiation. And legally, you might consider paying them enough to make both sides happy enough so you can stay a gym member and don't get sued for the money.	You would report unpermitted lock replacement to the home owner. The building code regulates new construction and renovations, and is not a requirement of any and all residences. This seems to correspond to a "secondary suite", which is supposed to be registered with the city (if it is allowed in your city). Here is a link for Vancouver, for instance. Such suites are supposed to be registered and inspected, the inspection being carried out by Development, Building and Licencing: By-Law Compliance & Administration (a division of the city government). This article discusses some of the legal problems that can arise from an illegal secondary suite, however the penalties would land on the property owner, and he may not have approved of this subletting or the basement suite. A less-nuclear first step would therefore be reporting it to the property owner.	I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney.	It might be illegal, depending on where you are. If it is known to the person who owns the vehicle occupying your space prior to doing so that wheelclamping may be the result, then the common law doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to a willing party, harm is not done") would lead to a conclusion that one who knowingly places themselves in a situation where harm may befall them is not entitled to bring a claim of tort against the other party (in the United States assumption of risk is a similar doctrine, but doesn't apply here because wheelclamping is an intentional act). In your situation, this means that the owner occupying your space cannot bring a case in tort against you. While it is generally applied to harm to people, there is precedent (albeit in British case law) for the doctrine to be applied to vehicles, and specifically, to the situation you describe - see Arthur v Anker and Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest. While cases from other jurisdictions are not binding, I have not been able to find any similar cases in the United States, and so it is possible that such cases will be persuasive. Note that this is highly jurisdiction-specific, and there may be laws in your state that make it unlawful - at least one high-profile case involving a McDonalds and its parking lot operator cites California law authorising only law enforcement to impound vehicles, and considering wheelclamping such an act. However, I have not been able to find the record of a judgement on this matter. It is also likely that if the payment you request is excessive, the owner would be able to seek relief, in the form of reducing the payment owed to a reasonable amount. However, if the parking space was not marked in some way to signal that it was reserved for use, then the owner of the vehicle may be entitled to seek injunctive relief and damages from a court. This would be on the basis of, if you only wheelclamped the car and declined to remove the wheelclamp upon the owner's request, the tort of detinue. But, if you attempted to request payment from them, then as Dale mentioned in his answer, you have committed extortion (wheelclamping is actually listed as a crime of extortion).	Yes, in Orange County, CA, in a residential zone or on residentially-developed property, this is a code violation. Specifically you are looking at Title 3, Division 13, Article 1, Sec 3-13-4(11): Sec. 3-13-4. - Prohibited Conduct. Except as provided in section 3-13-6, exemptions, it shall be unlawful for any responsible party having charge or possession of any real property in county territory to:... (11) Keep, store, or maintain upon any premises under his/her control any abandoned, wrecked, dismantled, or inoperative vehicle, or part thereof, except as permitted by Table 3-13-6(c). You may store/work on this vehicle from a building or location that is not visible from the street, but you cannot work on or store the vehicle on the street or driveway. You might also be able to erect a 6' tall opaque fence around the car, provided the fence meets standards. The code making this illegal is a county ordinance for Orange County, CA, which is not applicable to other counties in California (other counties/cities may have their own ordinances). Codes which cover this sort of activity are generally made at the county or city level. They vary dramatically from location to location, and are often different based on the zoning of the property within the county or city.	You can contract to do anything that is not illegal. In many jurisdictions unconscionability is a thing that statute or case law makes illegal. These clauses may be unconscionable, however ... In most jurisdictions real estate rental agreements are highly regulated; particularly as regards eviction. So, even if these don't cross the line into unconscionable (and for what it's worth, they're nudging it at least) they are probably prohibited anyway. There probably is an independent third party that decides on evictions anyway in the form of a court or rental tribunal.
GDPR and deleting users from wiki changelogs According to the GDPR §17, users have a right to request the deletion of personal data. I am wondering how this applies to wikis. In my case, when users edit a page, that edit is associated with their username by writing it to a changelog of that page. Users can delete their account which will remove their profile data but it will not remove the name from the changelog. Is the their username alone, without any attached profile (like their email address or real Name) still considered personal data that has to be deleted?	Is the their username alone, without any attached profile (like their email address or real Name) still considered personal data that has to be deleted? For something to be ‘personal data’ it must information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. An identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly. In other words: If the natural person can be indirectly identified from the username, it is personal data. If he cannot, it is not personal data. This obviously depends on the circumstances. If the user used something very similar to his real name, or his email address or uses the same nickname on a lot of different systems, then it probably is personal data. If it is an unique pseudonym that is not used elsewhere, it is less likely. If you want to make sure you comply with the right to erasure, you may want to scrub your wiki database, replacing all the username of the deleted user with "anonymous" (or something like that). If you want to be able to treat these as separate users, your scrubbing process may use unique anonymous identifiers ("anon-1", "anon-2", and so on).	The "Contribution activity" is extracted from repositories hosted on Github. Looking at the privacy statement, Github considers itself as a hosting service for those repositories. See EU Directive 2000/31/EC Article 14 for the exact definition and conditions: Article 14 Hosting Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information. Article 2(4) GDPR defines that the GDPR does not apply (to Github) in this case This Regulation shall be without prejudice to the application of Directive 2000/31/EC, in particular of the liability rules of intermediary service providers in Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive. Extracting data from the repositories to create a nicely formatted contribution activity list, would still be considered hosting as defined at Directive 2000/31/EC, because Github does not (manually) redact or modify commits. So if you want to hide your contribution activity, you must delete the contributions. And you should not ask Github to do that, but ask the owners of the repositories. And they might have good reasons to deny your request. If an owner of a repository denies your request without a good reason, you can ask Github to do so. But Github would then probably deny that request, because they explain in their privacy statement that modifying the history is not possible: The email address you have supplied via your Git commit settings will always be associated with your commits in the Git system. If you chose to make your email address private, you should also update your Git commit settings. We are unable to change or delete data in the Git commit history — the Git software is designed to maintain a record — but we do enable you to control what information you put in that record. edit To further clarify why Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC applies, see case C-236/08 (Google v. Louis Vuitton) where the European Court of Justice clarifies the meaning of that article (ECLI:EU:C:2010:159): In that regard, it follows from recital 42 in the preamble to Directive 2000/31 that the exemptions from liability established in that directive cover only cases in which the activity of the information society service provider is ‘of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature’, which implies that that service provider ‘has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored’. Accordingly, in order to establish whether the liability of a referencing service provider may be limited under Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, it is necessary to examine whether the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data which it stores. The way Github creates/shows the contribution activity is in my opinion technical, automatic and passive. That means it is not liable, and that implies that the GDPR does not directly apply, unless data is unlawful, and someone notifies Github of that: The restriction on liability set out in Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31 applies to cases ‘[w]here an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service’ and means that the provider of such a service cannot be held liable for the data which it has stored at the request of a recipient of that service unless that service provider, after having become aware, because of information supplied by an injured party or otherwise, of the unlawful nature of those data or of activities of that recipient, fails to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to those data. Surely the GDPR might be the reason data is unlawful. But you need a reason, in particular based on Article 17 ("right to be forgotten"). For example if personal data of a 12 year old child is processed without permission of it's parent. Without such a reason the legitimate interest of the repository owner will probably prevail (who wants to keep the git history complete).	Is there any sources of information where extraction of data from a closed source application and provided to a data subject is further defined? No, the GDPR is based on "general principles" and does not concern itself with implementation details for such matters. It's possible there's EU case law on this, but I can't find any. Am I within my rights to insist on this, even if to comply they would have to do some software development? Yes you can demand it, but they don't have to comply with your demand. The information only has to be provided in a "concise, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language." and they only have to provide the information electronically where "reasonably practical" to do so, and they only have to take "reasonable steps" to do all this per Section 52 of the Data Protection Act 2018 which implements GDPR into UK law. You can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office, and they will decide if Section 52 has been complied with or not. 52 Form of provision of information etc (1) The controller must take reasonable steps to ensure that any information that is required by this Chapter to be provided to the data subject is provided in a concise, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. (2) Subject to subsection (3), the information may be provided in any form, including electronic form. (3) Where information is provided in response to a request by the data subject under [the Right of access by the data subject], the controller must provide the information in the same form as the request where it is practicable to do so.	It may be legal or it may not For example, if any of the users are in the European Union, then the GDPR applies and the person storing the information is a data controller and has legal obligations. These include, having a legitimate reason for storing them, storing them only for as long as necessary for that reason, notifying the individuals that the data is being stored and why, deleting it upon a users request etc.	Keeping logs of chats would not necessarily be against the GDPR as you have suggested. For the IRC service provider/operator: these chats/logs would be within scope if EU-based users are involved and this means the data controller/processors would have legal obligations to comply with GDPR. The IRC service provider/operator would be the data controller and would be held ultimately responsible for the data stored/processed through the IRC service, including backups and logs kept etc, and this would mean any sub-processors they select (such as hosting provider) would also have to be GDPR compliant. Due to the nature of IRC chats being entirely public in the same way forum board posts and comments are public, the contract terms between the IRC service provider and the IRC users would need to be very clear that this is the case, and the IRC users would need to give consent for this processing (this is more complicated for children, see Article 8 regarding consent from the holder of parental responsibility). For IRC users (personal use): If you wish to keep the chat records for personal use only (i.e. not in connection with a business or your employment at a business), then an exemption applies: This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; ... (GDPR, Article 2: Material Scope, Paragraph 2(c), p.32) For IRC users (commercial/business use): In this case I don't think you would have any legal basis to store/process these chats/logs if they contain personal data without a legal agreement with the data controller which would require you to put in place the same protections they have to under GDPR but then allow your business to access the data for specific purposes. While the information may be published or considered to be in the 'public domain', for you to take a copy of it without permission and use it for a purpose they haven't consented to would not be allowed under GDPR. Additionally, to go through the process of removing personal data from the chats/logs would in itself be considered 'processing' under GDPR and therefore would be unauthorised without a legal agreement with the data controller. Practically therefore, your best options under this circumstance would be if: The IRC service provider implemented a 'favourites' feature to save within their own system the chat conversations you wish to retain and refer back to in future. Since they hold the data and you already have a user agreement with them there is no further complications (this is probably the best option); The IRC service provider implemented a feature to download an anonymized copy of a chat conversation (not ideal as there are no guaruntees a user will not include personal data in their messages, though the user agreement could state that message content will be considered to exclude personal data, in a similar way to how StackExchange do for this website, see the paragraph titled "Information You Choose to Display Publicly on the Network" on the StackExchange Privacy Policy). Your business considered an alternative communications solution, such as hosting its own real-time chat system or forum boards system, in which case your business would be the data controller, and while subject to GDPR you could then define the purposes for which the data will be used in your own user agreement.	It is absolutely not the case that Providers are not allowed to keep PII without consent. Article 6 of the GDPR identifies six possible lawful bases for processing personal information. These are: (a) the data subject has given consent ... (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. If a person requests services from an online service provider, basis (b) will apply, at least to some information. If there is evidence of criminal activity, basis (c) may well apply, as it also will for much routine record keeping. Any in many such cases, basis (e) or (f) will also apply. In short, article 6 does not create a "haven for online criminals/hackers". In a comment on another answer the OP writes: The offender has the right to not be identifiable and he can't be denied this right That is simply not correct. Nothing in the GDPR says anything of the sort. It is true that consent may not be forced, but if a user requests a service that service may require the user to identify him- or herself. For example, one cannot order physical goods without giving a name and a shipping address. And the provider may retain PI and even PII when it has a "legitimate interest" in doing so, although if challenged it must justify that legitimate interest.	The GDPR doesn't generally distinguish public from non-public personal data. If you have a good reason to contact the professor, do send them an email. GDPR does not prevent this. If you're sending this email for “purely personal or household purposes”, then GDPR doesn't apply anyway. There are rules in the ePrivacy Directive against unsolicited emails, but these specifically relate to emails for direct marketing purposes. A company is not allowed to send out spam marketing, regardless of whether they obtained the email address from a public data source. Companies can send email marketing to their own existing customers, or to people who have given consent. Consent is defined in a fairly restrictive way (as a specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes), so that mere publication of an email address cannot be interpreted as consent to receive marketing from a particular company.	No. Art. 17(1) GDPR lists conditions when erasure can be requested. None of the listed grounds would apply in this case. However, you might have to explain why you process the data (for moderation purposes as you explained above), and why that is lawfully. In particular Art. 5 and Art. 6 need to be taken into account. In your case, processing will be based on Art. 6(1)(f): (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Even if the data subject would be a 9 year old child, the legitimate interests of you and other forum users outweigh the objection of the data subject. Based on Art. 5, there will be a moment when the data has to be deleted. For example 1 year after the last login attempt.
Would GDPR affect my own personal website? I am developing my own website with a blog, portfolio and tutorials, which will be accessible to the public. As I am the only person who is in charge (my personal site), would I have to oblige to GDPR? What I want to do is make an administrator panel and track user IP address ONLY if they go to that page. I would then block their IP if there is suspicious activity. I would also need to store cookies to ensure that the person using the administrator page is authorised. As I understand GDPR make IP addresses personal information. Also, there is the EU cookie law too. Is the GDPR and Cookie Law applicable to me or not? Also, would I have to make Terms and Conditions?	The conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. As for it being legal for website operators to log the IP-addresses of visitors, this is covered by the following paragraph (also pointed out by phoog in a comment). The paragraph says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) You are not the only web site that logs IP addresses for the purpose of security. Every web site I've ever worked on - from those controlled by large corporations to tiny NGOs - do this. This security practice will not be impacted by the GDPR (if it were, I am sure we would have heard about it by now). there is the EU cookie law too If your website are going to be accessible to European citizens and not only accessible by your friends and familiy, you have to comply with the EU cookie directive of 2002 (a exemption for "personal websites" does not exist).	You need a privacy notice for any website (if you're subject to GDPR). Having a PayPal button alone does not trigger such an requirement, since any website is already processing personal data such as IP addresses even if there's no third party content. But it's good that you think about issues for including third party content. As rulings such as the Fashion ID case and the more recent Google Fonts judgement have clarified, you are responsible having a suitable legal basis when you cause visitor's personal data to be disclosed to third parties. Even just embedding/loading a button or logo can cause personal data such as IP addresses to be disclosed to the recipients. You might have a legal basis if earlier, the user already opted in to payment with PayPal (could be consent per Art 6(1)(a) GDPR, or necessity for performing the contract per Art 6(1)(b)). Loading the embedded content just because the user might want to use it is probably not compliant though. For example, the common PayPal donation button is problematic. Thus, instead of linking a PayPal SDK, you might want to host the code + assets for the PayPal payment functionality on your own servers, or only load the PayPal content after the user unambiguously indicated that they want to use this content. I've discussed the PayPal donate button previously, as well as background on the Fashion ID case and click-to-consent wrappers for embedded content. What the Fashion ID case made very clear though is that you're only responsible for compliance for those data processing activity where you can actually influence the “purposes and means” of processing. You have no control over what PayPal does with the data on their servers, so they are solely responsible for that. And if the PayPal button navigates to a PayPal website, you're not responsible for what cookies PayPal sets on its own website. It is thus correct that the PayPal popup has its own cookie banner – you are not responsible for the contents of the popup. You also don't need to collect consent for cookies and similar technologies that are strictly necessary to provide a service that was explicitly requested by the user. For example, session cookies, XSRF protection cookies, and cookies containing a shopping cart are often such strictly necessary cookies. You must still be transparent about the use of such cookies, but you probably don't need a banner to announce this. So I think that you can probably go without a cookie banner, though you should probably get consent before loading PayPal content into your page, and you will likely want to be transparent about cookies as part of your privacy notice.	Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data	the statute only applies to EU residents Wrong. GDPR applies to everyone in the EU (Art. 3). This means tourists are also covered. Residence status is completely irrelevant (Recital 14(1)): The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence There is no provision for data processors/controllers to demand proof from data subjects of them being located in the EU. You can challenge them, but if they refuse to provide proof you will still be liable to fulfill their GDPR request should they indeed be present in the EU.	The intention of the GDPR is to minimize the amount of personally identifiable information (PII) you store. So the GDPR never tells you that you have to log certain events. The simplest way to make sure you comply with the GDPR is to simply not store any PII at all. But that might of course conflict with legitimate business interests and with other legal obligations you might have. So when you do store PII, then the GDPR regulates under which conditions you are allowed to store PII, for how long and what you are allowed to do with that PII. So when you receive a GDPR request from a customer to see their data, then you can say that you only have that one timestamp of their registration, because you didn't log their subsequent logins (assuming this is the truth). I hope your privacy policy says that you store all that PII on registration and that you have some good arguments why storing that information is a "legitimate interest" of your organization.	The GDPR only mentions cookies once (Recital 30). (It says that cookies are personal data if they are associated with natural persons.) As far as cookies go, nothing has really changed since 2002, and the exception granted in the EU cookie directive Article 5(3) is still valid: This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the service. If your site complies with the 2002 directive today, it will be GDPR compliant. All the "EU Cookie Law Compliance" plugins I've checked out let the admin configure the site to comply with the 2002 directive, and most let you choose between implicit consent (which is, and still will be, OK if you or third party services do not use cookies for profiling or to collect personal data), soft consent, or hard consent. The latter is however mandatory if you or third party services use cookies to for profiling or to collect personal data. However, if at least one of your cookies are used for profiling (and if you use Google analytics, you are), or if they are used to collect personal data, the exception from explicit consent quoted above does not apply and implicit consent (i.e.: "continued use of the site amounts to implicit consent to the use of cookies") has never been legal for the site. So while nothing has changed since 2002, there is a lot of misinformation about cookies floating on the Internet, and a lot of sites have their cookie banners set up wrong. You may want to do a new cookie audit for your site to verify that you comply with existing legislation.	If you merely provide software for your client to use, you are not processing personal data on behalf of the client. But if you have access to systems that store personal data, then you must consider the GDPR. Or more accurately: your client must consider the GDPR. Under what legal basis can they give you access to the data in these systems? The easiest way to solve this is indeed if you act as the client's processor. Processor status is never the default, but requires a binding contract with the data controller. This contract will require you to only process personal data as explicitly instructed by the client, and may require you to take certain security measures as a precaution. Without such a contract you aren't a data processor, but possibly a data controller of your own (with all the compliance obligations that implies).	Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive.
Can I use the rating of different restaurants from different websites like Yelp on my own website? I am thinking of creating a website with restaurants ratings. You would be able to search for restaurants and in the result list you would see the name of the restaurant and the ratings of different websites like Yelp, TripAdvisor, OpenTable, Facebook, and Google (for that restaurant). I am little confused about the rules here. First, I have read that if you use facts from websites it's not copyrighted and it is fair use. Second, I see Google results with the Yelp rating (with stars) in the search result. Third, they are plugins for WordPress that let you show ratings (https://wordpress.org/plugins/widget-yelp-reviews/, https://en-ca.wordpress.org/plugins/yelp-widget-pro/) Fourth, in Yelp API TOS they have: Enhance your app with Yelp ratings, reviews, photos and much more With a check mark in front.. But later it says: display or use Yelp user review ratings (numerical, star or any other representation of the Yelp user review rating calculation) alongside or in conjunction with restaurants where Eat24 is not providing ordering and delivery services (i.e. don’t use Yelp user review ratings for the benefit of an Eat24 competitor); I only want to use the overall rating of a restaurant not every single rating of each users. Does that include review rating calculation and Yelp user review ratings? So is my idea fair use of these websites data or is not because of the TOS?	It is not clear from your question whether you intend to make use of the Yelp API to display Yelp ratings on your own website. You ask: So is my idea fair use of these websites data or is not because of the TOS? The ToS is not for Yelp data, it is for the Yelp API. The ToS will only apply to you if you agree to it. However, if you agree to the ToS for the API, fair use is irrelevant. The ToS is a legally binding contract that trumps fair use. You also brings up Google's display of Yelp stars. This display is not based on the Google using the Yelp API, but on Yelp opting in on a mechansim created by Google called Rich Snippets. Returning to Yelp ToS, it is clear that its purpose is permit re-use of their "ratings, reviews, photos" etc. by to promote your own Yelp-rated business. Also what they clearly do not allow you do do, is to build a competitor to Yelp. Since your planned restaurant rating site would compete with Yelp, you will not be able to use the Yelp API to get the data. What if you didn't use the Yelp API, but simply scraped their site - would fair use apply? What constitutes fair use in borderline cases such as yours is mainly decided by case law. Case law differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. My general impression is that it is not fair use if the use is commercial in nature (i.e. you create something intended to directly compete with the site you scrape the data from) and your product or service does not communicate something new and different from the original or expands its utility. As always: If you want specific advice, hire a lawyer.	The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture.	Google is very helpful in this regard. I typed nyc restaurant bath and it suggested nyc restaurant bathroom law, the first result being http://www1.nyc.gov/nyc-resources/service/2360/restaurant-bathroom-requirements. It says: You can make reports about any food establishment with 20 or more seats that has no toilet and was established after 1977. These establishments must provide toilets for their patrons. Food establishments that have been in operation since 1977 or before are exempt from this requirement. Food establishments with 19 or fewer customer seats are not required to provide bathroom access to the public. Food establishments are not required to allow public access to their employee toilets. Patrons are not permitted to use any toilets where the patron must walk through the kitchen or any food storage or food preparation area. Call 311 to report a restaurant with 20 or more seats that has no toilet and was opened after 1977.	england-and-wales Yes it is legal. There is no law prohibiting such behaviour. A restaurant menu invites people to ask for items on the menu. People are free to make other offers too, e.g. "no cheese" or "will you add an egg?" or "will you accept £10 for the burger, it's all I have?" The customer is free to make an offer and the restauranteur is free to accept or refuse the offer. "No I don't want to sell you a burger patty on its own for £3." Unfair contract terms seem irrelevant because there is no contract at the stage when the customer asks the restauranteur for a food item.	We cannot dispense personalized legal advice: that is what your attorney is for. However, I agree with your analysis that this is most likely covered by fair use, and indeed it is not obvious that you have taken anything that is protected. There is no creativity behind a number such as entries in the "I did N pushups" column. The arrangement of data into a web page passes the smidgen of creativity test, but "210" is not a creative number. The terms of service of a website cannot negate your right to use the website however you want in a non-infringing way. If your use is "fair use", then they can't tell you that you can't use it. In case it turns out that "fair use" fails, the matter would hinge on what exactly the TOS says. They may have granted you permission to make use of their "information". So there are three positive avenues for you to consider: not protected, fair use, and permitted. A practical difficulty is that a university lawyer is only interested in the interests of the university, and they are as likely to say "don't do that" or "get permission" as they are to say "that is fair use". You can hire a lawyer who is paid to care about your interest, though there is never a guarantee that the lawyer's advice is correct. I think it is likely that the lawyer will tell you to not say anything until legally forced to, given the apparent rebuff of your request for special permission.	My opinion is that the copying of a single API endpoint, "run" that takes a function as an argument is not infringement. I can think of several lines of argument that get to this same conclusion: Originality: It doesn't exhibit the modicum of creativity required by the originality test. (Feist) Short phrases doctrine: It is a short word or phrase, which both the copyright office (Copyright Office Circular, 37 CFR 202.1) and courts (e.g. Hutchins v. Zoll) have declared ineligible for copyright. Merger: The merger doctrine allows reuse of an expression if it is one of only a very few number of ways of expressing an idea. I can't think of many other ways to express a function intended to run a function other than with the verb "run". Scènes à faire: It is not infringement to use an expression if it has become standard, stock, or common in a particular setting. Naming a function "run" is common in the programming community. Any one of these alone would be enough to rule out copyright infringement by taking this individual component of Excel's API. Note: Whether merger and scènes à faire are part of the originality/copyrightability analysis or part of the infringement analysis is not uniform across circuits. For example, the 6th circuit considers both merger and scènes à faire part of the copyrightability analysis. But, the 2nd and 9th circuits treat them as part of the infringement analysis and in the 9th circuit, they are affirmative defenses.	If the image is protected by copyright (as most modern images are), the uploading it as a profile picture or using it on a web site is copyright infringement unless one has permission from the copyright owner, or an exception to copyright applies. If copyright infringement occurs, the owner can sue for damages, or issue a takedown notice, or both, but does not have to do either. In the vast majority of cases, no one will do anything about such infringements if the owner (or the owner's authorized agent) does not. All the above is true in all of Europe and North America, ad in most other countries as well. Permission can be granted directly by the copyright owner to a user, or granted by the owner releasing the image (or other wrk) under a license. Google's general developer TOS Document](https://policies.google.com/terms#toc-content) reads (in relevant part): Google content Some of our services include content that belongs to Google — for example, many of the visual illustrations you see in Google Maps. You may use Google’s content as allowed by these terms and any service-specific additional terms, but we retain any intellectual property rights that we have in our content. Don’t remove, obscure, or alter any of our branding, logos, or legal notices. If you want to use our branding or logos, please see the Google Brand Permissions page. Other content Finally, some of our services give you access to content that belongs to other people or organizations — for example, a store owner’s description of their own business, or a newspaper article displayed in Google News. You may not use this content without that person or organization’s permission, or as otherwise allowed by law. The views expressed in other people or organizations’ content are theirs, and don’t necessarily reflect Google’s views. It would seem that each Google service has its own terms which indicate in what ways one may use Google content. It would further seem that content originally obtained from others and distributed by Google will have some set of permissions granted by the uploader. These must be checked for each image, I would think. There is no single one-rule-fits-all answer. I gather that the APIs will have methods for determining which images are from Google itself, and which from others, and some method for indicating the permissions that accompany an image. A user of these APIs must learn how to extract ownership and permissions metadata for an image obtained via the API, and how to use it (or not use it) in accordance with the available permissions. Now let us look at exceptions to copyright. These vary by country. Several European countries have an exception for "personal use" which might cover the profile pictures, but probably will not cover general use on a web site. There are exceptions for "news reporting" which might cover images illustrating recent news events. Some have exceptions for educational or instructional use. The UK (and several othe countries) have the concept of fair dealing which bundles several exceptions together. This might cover an image used in a personal profile, use of images in news reports, and limited educational use, but will probably not cover general use on a website. The US has the concept of fair use which is rather complex, but does not specifically include a "personal use" exception. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and other threads here tagged with fair-use for more on this. It is somewhat unlikely that any of these exceptions will cover general use on a web site of images obtained via Google APIs and used beyond the permissions listed in the metadata accompanying the image. But it will very much depend on the specifics of the case. If the image fetching is doe not by you in building a site or an app, but by your app's users who may then use them improperly, strictly speaking that is each user's own responsibility, you cannot effectively police what your users do, and have no duty to try. It will be a good practice if you include text explaining to your users that not all images are free for general use. You might want to link to the Google TOS. If the API returns metadata indicating the permissions status of each image fetched, yo0u might well want to provide this metadata in a useful form to your users. You might even want to allow a user to filter images obtained by permission status. But whether this is practical or useful to users will depend on the purpose and design of an app.	Yes One could certainly put up a site whose only content was a link to another domain. And I can't find any law which this would violate. If the link is a "deep link", and if it bypasses a log-in page, while the other site is so designed that all access is intended to go through the login, I believe (but cannot at the moment verify) that the owner of the other site could claim that this violates their copyright. In any case it is not a good idea.But a link to an appropriate page should have no problem, nor should pointing your domain at an appropriate entry page. Therefor, since simply re-pointing a domain should have the same effect as simply linking, in those cases where it works at all, it should be legal. Doing it with an iframe, which would truly open another site within your site, may not be if the other site forbids such use, as in the ToS. The case law on that is not settled, but many sites object to it, as the answer by @BlueDogRanch points out. I don't see a good reason why one would want to do this, but that isn't the question. Copying the HTML of another site and modifying the URLs while keeping the content the same would pretty clearly be a copyright infringement, besides being a lot of work to little obvious point. It also isn't what the question asked about. Building a one-page site that has only a simple link or a redirect would clearly be legal, and would serve the purpose of causing your domain to lead a user to another site, but it isn't, strictly speaking, what was asked about either.
Can I amend boilerplate contracts by mail? I am party to a number of contracts (website terms of service, for example), where a service operator writes the contract, and I agree to the contract by using the service. If the other party wants to amend the contract, they make available to me a new version of the contract, and the new contract is binding when I next use their services. Intuitively, two should be able to play at this game, no? I can write up my own contract, or an amendment to the existing contract, and give them reasonable notice, and it should become binding on them if they continue to provide services to me when I request them. Under this theory, it's their responsibility to read and understand my contract, and refrain from doing business with me if my terms are not to their liking. Is this likely to hold up in court? Or, better yet, is it likely to convince the other party to comply with my contract? Or is this sort of agreement-by-performance only binding in certain contexts, or for certain types of services? (For example, is the situation different between a web site that I browse and a service I subscribe to that sends me something in the mail every month in exchange for money?) If in theory a contract can be amended by giving notice of terms and waiting for the other party to perform, what kind of notice is reasonable to give a large entity like a corporation? Presumably shooting off an e-mail to their automated support system would be insufficient.	Offer and Acceptance For a contract to be a contract there must be an intention on both parties to create legal relations - this is usually considered in terms of an offer and acceptance. When Website Co makes an offer to the world, you accept it by clicking the ToS acknowledgement and using the service. This is explicit acceptance of the offer. The ToS contain provisions that Website Co may amended or replace the ToS by giving you notice, when this happens the contract is still in force as the contract contemplattes its own variation: it doesn't need to be varied by another contract. They do allow you to opt out of the contract by no longer using the service but they are not obliged to do so. The ToS do not contain provisions allowing you to modify them. Therefore when you write to them you are making an offer to vary the contract. They can accept it explicitly or by conduct. They won't accept it explicitly. They aren't engaging in any conduct that is not already subject to the existing contract so they aren't accepting it by conduct.	You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do.	Contracts are generally assignable, meaning that one company can assign their rights, duties and obligations under the contract. Assignment may be specifically barred by the contract, or it may have certain terms (prior written consent, etc.) attached, but if not, a contract is likely freely assignable. Though a contract is not necessarily "automatically transferred" the reason Company C buys Company A is for its ability to earn Company C over time, which includes the contract between A & B. So unless the original contract has a "no assignments clause" or if an assignment is otherwise impossible or illegal, it is likely that A can freely assign the contract to C.	It depends on what you mean by backdated. If you mean that the terms of the contract provide that they apply to a period which pre-dates the date on which the contract was entered into then this is fine. The parties are free to negotiate terms which govern their past behaviour. If instead you mean that the contract purports to have been entered into in the past then no, that is not legitimate. Depending on the circumstances this can amount to fraud or forgery. In practice it is common for people to misunderstand the difference and so you will often find contracts backdated by inserting the past date as the date of the contract (the 2nd type) when the correct approach is to have a clause which specifies that the terms apply from an earlier date (the 1st type). There is also an implied question here about what those terms should be for the backdated period. The parties are free to agree what they like in order to "rewrite history" but failing that, what are the terms governing the period after the fixed term contract came to an end? The contract itself may contain an automatic renewal clause. Failing that there are a number of possibilities. From Practical Law (pay-walled): In the circumstances you describe (the parties have continued to deal) one of the following legal outcomes is likely: A new agreement has been entered into. A contract may be created by actions as well as words. For more information about contract formation, see Practice note, Contracts: formation The old agreement has been continued, on the same or varied terms. Just as a contract may be created by actions, it can be varied by them too. Contract clauses seeking to limit the parties' freedom to vary the contract, for example by imposing formal requirements for a variation, may themselves be varied. For more information on variation generally, see Practice note, Contracts: variation. There is no contract, but only a duty to pay a reasonable sum for services requested. For more information on restitution generally, see Practice note, Remedies: restitution In determining which of the above applies, a court will look at: What the parties have said and done about extending the contract or continuing to deal. The extent to which their behaviour is consistent with the terms of the old agreement. If the parties continue to do business in a way which is consistent with the terms of the expired agreement, this will support an argument that their relationship is governed by its terms. Whether a court will hold that the expired agreement has been extended in its entirety or that just some of the old terms apply will depend on the facts. However, the following cases suggest that where there have been no disputes over specific terms in the post-expiry period, the entire original agreement may apply: [rest omitted for brevity] Disclaimers: my answer is based on general contract law. Landlord and tenant law is complex and specific rules may well exist in your case. The terms of your lease may also affect the situation. We don't give specific legal advice here and you should speak to a solicitor about you situation if in any doubt.	Yes From clause 7 of the Ebay agreement: When you enter into a transaction you create a legally binding contract with another user, unless the item is listed in a category under the Non-binding bid policy. You have a contract, if you don't fulfil your obligations under it you can be sued. You can only terminate a contract a) if the contract provides for termination and the relevant circumstances have happened, or b) due to a breach of a condition (but not a warranty) of the contract by the other party or c) some very limited and highly technical circumstances at law. The fact that the other party is rude doesn't fit within b) or c) and, barring some very unusual contract terms, won't fit in a) either. Make good on your legally enforcable promise.	No, there is no general publicly accessible directory of lawsuits against private individuals, even if it concerns yourself. The complaint must identify you as the defendant indicating a ladungsfähige Anschrift, § 253 Ⅱ, Ⅳ, 130 ZPO. Commencing an action requires service of process, § 253 Ⅰ ZPO. I presume you are not a De-Mail user. So you will get a hardcopy. You may not know that, but such mail in Germany is usually sent in yellow envelopes. The mailman will carefully compare the mailbox label and in case of a match record the date and time of successful delivery on the envelope as well as a slip of paper returned to the sender, the court in this case. Now this will obviously fail in your case (unless the landlord maliciously attached a corresponding label to a mailbox). In a civil action the court “pretends” to be dumb regarding facts. The landlord must try to track you down. Evidently he knew your email address, so he had some contact details. If he was evil, the next option would be to ask the court for an öffentliche Zustellung, § 185 ZPO. If the court agreed, this means there will be, for instance, in the city hall a paper on a bulletin board “To the attention of Coala, last known address …: There is mail for you to pick up at my office.” Two weeks later the letter is automatically considered to be delivered.Some cities (example: Cologne, NRW) also publish these documents on the internet, but due to GDPR considerations delete them after a certain period now. If there was a lawsuit, there will have been a default judgment by now, i.e. you will have lost just by being a no‑show. However, you said you have never received the bill. This means the landlord must have produced false evidence, claim to have sent the bill and a subsequent warning notice, but there was none. But this is an entirely different issue.	If this requirement was not made before rendering the service, you are under no obligation to accept the term. You and the service provider must now find an agreeable method of payment. You still owe the provider but if you are compelled to pay then the provider will be compelled to be more accommodating in their allowed payment methods (cash, at least). As a general rule, if you are providing a service for any significant amount of money, you should require payment up front or at least a deposit and payments at milestones. Especially if you're 7,000 miles away from your client and put any restrictions on method of payment.	Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy.
Is it against German law to oppose the existence of the state of Israel? If in the German jurisdiction a person, without inciting violence, states in writing or in speech that they are opposed to the existence of the state of Israel and advocates that other people should also be so opposed, are they breaking German law? I am interested in two cases: first, the general case (has the person committed a crime?); second, the case of a German civil servant (can or must their employer discipline them or even sack them in response to their action?)	General case - legal or not? It is hard to prove a negative - however, as far as I can see: It is not illegal to state your opinion that the existence of the state of Israel is unjustified, or that the state should be dissolved. Such a position would be considered outrageous by most Germans, in particular it is against the stated position of pretty much all political parties, except for the extreme right or left, and of most other organizations. It is not, however, illegal. In general, the dissolution of a state is not in itself illegal according to national or international law, as long as it happens voluntarily. There are some precedents: For example, during the German Reunification of 1989, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) under the (old) Article 23 of the Grundgesetz. One could argue that the German Democratic Republic effectively dissolved itself by that accession. What would probably be illegal would be to call for a violent end of the state of Israel, or even for a war. The relevant laws: §130 Strafgesetzbuch -- Volksverhetzung (incitement to hatred) §13 Völkerstrafgesetzbuch -- Angriffskrieg (war of aggression) and, only applicable to the state: Art. 26 Grundgesetz -- Angriffskrieg (war of aggression) Special case - civil servants Civil servants are citizens, too, so mostly the same laws apply to them. However, for civil servants specifically there are higher requirements when it comes to respect for the German constitution, specifically for the "freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung" (literally: "basic free and democratic order"). That means that opinions which are "extremist" but not illegal may not be tolerated. Applicable laws/regulations: §7 Beamtenstatusgesetz §9 Richtergesetz §3 of the Tarifvertrag der Länder (TV-L) As far as I can see, the rules for whether something violates these rules would be similar as above. Note that there are even some Israelis who think that the state of Israel should not exist, at least not in its present form, so such a position is not totally unthinkable. The Wikipedia articles Right to exist and Existenzrecht Israels (German) give a good overview.	International law is always subordinate to domestic law. In the Westphalian world we live in, all power rests with each and every Sovereign nation. International law is a creation of those nations and only has force where the affected nation acquiesces to it. For example, the US and Russia have refused to sign up to the International Criminal Court so that court has no jurisdiction in their territory or over their citizens. North Korea has refused to sign the Berne convention so there is no protection of foreign copyright there. Similarly, a nation, having entered a treaty, can revoke that treaty. There would be consequences but these would be geo-political, not legal. Of course nations can and do behave hypocritically - insisting that others follow the law they ignore.	For the same reason you can’t ask the parties to a contract what they meant Legislation, once enacted, stands on its own independent of the people who drafted it, introduced it to Parliament and voted for or against it. These are not the same people in any event and since the legislation might have been passed anywhere between the 13th and 21st centuries, a lot of them will be dead. There’s a fundamental issue of fairness here. The people who are obliged to comply with the law (you and I) can’t ask the politicians so neither can the judges who have to decide if we did. Further, the judiciary cannot interact with the executive or the legislature in this way without violating the principle of separation of powers. Imagine you are charged with a crime and your guilt or innocence turns on the interpretation of the statute. Do you really want politicians who are looking at how the case plays out on Twitter telling the judge which interpretation to use i.e. effectively telling them whether you are guilty or not?	Questions about "why a law is ..." are political questions not legal questions and you may get better traction on politics. However, I will address the legal issues and offer some speculation on the politics. The states named in the preamble to the Constitution (an Act of British Parliament) as original states were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Western Australia was not named at the time of the passing of the Act or Royal Assent because the people of that colony had not vet made their mind up. Legal Issues WA decided to join in a vote held on 31 December 1900 and Australia came into being on 1 January 1901. Therefore, even though not named as such, WA was an "original state". Since all 6 states in the Federation are "original states" the clauses have no practical effect at present. However, there have been a number of proposals to add new states, either by subdividing existing states or by granting statehood to the territories of Northern Territory and/or the Australian Capital Territory. If such were to come to pass, the clauses would have practical effect. In 1998, Norther Territorials rejected an offer of statehood that would have given them 3 senators as a state and 2 representatives based on population (currently they have 2 senators and 2 representatives). Clearly, they were not being given the same privileges as an "original state". In 2015 all Australian governments agreed in principle that the NT should become a state by 2018, however, as it is now 2017 and no action has been taken this seems unlikely. Political Issues Politics is complicated: just as much in the late 19th century as it is in the early 21st. Negotiations between the colonies were fraught and federation was by no means a certain outcome. New Zealand and Fiji dropped out early and each forged its own path to nationhood. However, by the late 1890s it was clear that the 5 eastern colonies would federate with or without Western Australia. It seems likely that this provision served multiple purposes including: putting pressure on WA to join at the outset - the deal they got as a "Johnny come lately" may not have been as good. protecting "white" Australia - the drafters of the Constitution were men of their times, that is to say: racist, misogynist bigots. Any non-original states were likely to be former British colonies in the Pacific or South-East Asia, this clause would allow the nation to reduce the influence these non-white states might have.	Here is an excellent (and extensive) explanation of jurisprudence regarding the "good faith exception" to the admissibility of evidence found due to an error. In short: Yes, the contraband found in Unit B would be evidence admissible in court. (Of course, evidence found in Unit B would only support charges against whomever had a nexus to that property. If the owner of Unit C had no access to Unit B, then evidence in Unit B would not per se implicate him in a crime.) Law enforcement will not return seized property if it believes the property is "contraband." As an example, in Pennsylvania a person can petition a court for return of property seized by law enforcement: Rule 588 requires the petitioner to establish entitlement to lawful possession of the property, but the motion will be rejected if the State successfully argues that the property is contraband, or "derivative contraband" (which has been defined in case law to mean there is "a specific nexus between the property and criminal activity").	Immigration and naturalization is pretty far out of my comfort zone, but I'm confident that the answer is yes. Although people often believe that a foreign embassy is considered the territory of that country, I don't know of any law that supports that belief. Instead, through the Vienna Convention, the embassy grounds remain the territory of the host state but are provided a variety of protections and immunities because of their diplomatic status. With the embassy on U.S. soil, the child would therefore satisfy the "born ... in the United States" prong of the 14th Amendment's Citizenship Clause.* But that would not be the end of the analysis, as birthright citizenship also requires not just that the child is born in the United States, but also that the child be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." So if the child were born to an American citizen who had entered the Indian embassy to get a travel visa, the child would be both born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, making it eligible for birthright citizenship. But if the child were born to Indian ambassador or to diplomatic staff, who would generally be able to claim diplomatic immunity, that child would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and would not be able to claim birthright citizenship. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73, (1872) ("The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States."). * I haven't been able to find any cases saying this explicitly, but all the cases involving children born in foreign embassies sort of skip over the question as though they just assume that the child was born in the United States. See, e.g., Raya v. Clinton, 703 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2010); Nikoi v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 939 F.2d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1991) These cases also go on to conclude that those children are not citizens of the United States, because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."	While @jqning is absolutely correct in stating that truth is always an "absolute defense" to a claim of defamation, keep in mind that truth can be a subjective thing. What is one person's version of the truth, may not be another's, even with regard to the same exact experience. Also, while "statements of opinion are not defamation" is typically regarded as true, it has very broad exceptions and is not something that can be relied on in isolation. Defamation is generally defined as a false, published statement that is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. An online posting, even on an obscure website, will likely be seen by a few people, thus satisfying the publication requirement. A plaintiff cannot succeed in his or her online defamation claim if the defendant's defamatory statement is true. So, for example, if a customer posts a review of your restaurant on Trip Advisor claiming that there were roaches crawling around, you may sue them for defamation. You would then have to prove that there was no roach infestation, and thus, the defendant's statement was false. However, what if there was only one? What if he has a witness who saw it? His truth may be different from yours, and it is up to the trier of fact to decide. Also, getting sued, whether or not you prevail, is at minimum a pain and can be a very expensive ordeal. Opinions are exempt? OK: Following that line of reasoning, restaurant owner shows he's had monthly inspections and prophylactic measures to ensure against pests and the exterminator testifies. The defendant, fearing he's in trouble now, claims that his assertion of roach infestation was just his opinion based on his experience. Opinions are privileged under the law of defamation, right? Not always! Importantly, an opinion may be viewed, generally, as a statement of fact (employing the "reasonable person" standard) if it is something that is either provable or disprovable. What this means is that if the reasonable person would construe your statement to be factual, and not mere opinion, it will be deemed as such and if untrue then you're liable for defamation. The courts may interpret, "I think that [restaurant] has a roach infestation problem," as a statement of fact. This has occurred in numerous cases where people think they can say what they want as long as they couch it as an opinion, with words like "I think..." or "In my opinion...". But when someone says something that factual in opinion form, that is not protected. So, if Jane says, "In my opinion Joe Schmoe is a pedophile..." without absolute proof that Joe is, in fact, a pedophile, then this is libelous (defamation if published or spoken to another). This is because the statement in and of itself is one of "verifiable fact couched in opinion" and it is so damaging to Joe's reputation that if it's not true it is libel per se (defamatory if published – meaning shared). A statement of verifiable fact is a statement that conveys a provably false factual assertion, such as someone has committed murder or has cheated on his spouse. While the law varies some, and sometimes substantially, from state to state, here are some often used examples arising from California courts. Libelous (when false): Charging someone with being a communist (in 1959) Calling an attorney a "crook" Describing a woman as a call girl Accusing a minister of unethical conduct Accusing a father of violating the confidence of son Not-libelous: Calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar" in chance encounter (because hyperbole in context) Calling a TV show participant a "local loser," "chicken butt" and "big skank" Calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch" Changing product code name from "Carl Sagan" to "Butt Head Astronomer" Since libel is considered in context, do not take these examples to be a hard and fast rule about particular phrases. Generally, the non-libelous examples are hyperbole or opinion, while the libelous statements are stating a defamatory fact. Modified photos that can be shown to scandalize persons or businesses are clearly defamation, and are quite popular on social media. So, for example, if you threw the flyers (I assume you didn't but as an example) all over, and then photographed and published your opinion about the business littering neighborhoods, this would be libelous. The less obvious and absurd the modification, the more likely it is that a court will find it defamatory. So, a picture of a woman with a man's naked torso photoshopped on will not be defamatory, a version photoshopped showing what is to be purported to be her naked body, is. In your case, you face two issues that you should ask yourself: Is your opinion really verifiable (or non-verifiable) facts couched in words that try to make it opinion, or is it truly just your opinion. If fact, is it absolutely true? If the answer is yes, it's fact and yes, it's absolutely true, you're OK. Keep in mind though what I mentioned about truths differing: What if the business didn't know they were put there, or, what if they were placed on cars in a public place and blew in the wind? That could be a problem. While you are most likely fine, you may want to just say, X business's fliers are all over the place, littering the neighborhood and (assuming you called and asked them to pick them up, or wrote them) they refuse to pick up the litter. It sounds like the statements you made are fine, because you don't say that the business littered, or that they put them there; you say they are "plastered" all over, but you don't accuse them openly. That isn't to say it wouldn't be found to suggest fact that they would have to show isn't true (or that they didn't get permission from the property owner). My point is only that, in general, be careful. If he felt that you misrepresented what he did by way of distributing fliers, or if he thought you doctored the photo or set it up, he could sue you if he felt it damaged his business's reputation.	In the United States, I would strongly expect that an accurate depiction of historical fact (even if uncomfortably graphic) would be protected under the First Ammendment. Otherwise, the government could functionally censor the worst parts of history (as being too awful to discuss or depict), which is exactly the kind of thing the First Amendment is designed to prevent. There are three important categories of speech that are not protected: (1) "fighting words" directed at a person intended to provoke a fight, (2) words that infict emotional distress such that it qualifies as a tort, and (3) speech that court finds to qualify as "obscenity". Of these three, your game probably will not qualify for the first, since it generally requires speech directed at a specific person or people. I also suspect (less confidently) that an emotional-distress tort would not succeed since your game is not directed at any particular living people. Even if the game caused emotional distress to someone, your public release of the game probably could not qualify as a tort against that specific player who happens to experience emotional distress. The Miller test is used to determine if a work is obscenity. Wikipeida summarizes its three parts, all of which must be satisfied to constitute obscenity: Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards", would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law, Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The first two are explicitly sexual in nature. I don't know if there is any similar prohibition against hyper-violence, but even if there were, as long as your game does not run afoul of the "lacks serious artistic value" condition, you will be on the safe side of the line. Note that none of this stops anyone from initiating legal action against you (which may cause headaches for you); it only stops those legal actions from succeededing.
Why is sports gambling not considered interstate commerce? It is generally agreed that the United States can prohibit intrastate sales of goods it feels might affect interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. How does intrastate gambling differ? Obviously gambling isn't a tangible good, but I would imagine it could affect the interstate demand for the service. related	From the holdings of May 14, 2018 in NJ. v. NCAA, As the Tenth Amendment confirms, all legislative power not conferred on Congress by the Constitution is reserved for the States. Absent from the list of conferred powers is the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States. The federal law in question forbids legislatures from passing certain laws, but PASPA’s anti-authorization provision unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do. The distinction between compelling a State to enact legislation and prohibiting a State from enacting new laws is an empty one. The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event. The anti-authorization provision does not constitute a valid preemption provision. To preempt state law, it must satisfy two requirements. It must represent the exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution. And, since the Constitution “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States,” New York, supra, at 177, it must be best read as one that regulates private actors. There is no way that the PASPA anti-authorization provision can be understood as a regulation of private actors. It does not confer any federal rights on private actors interested in conducting sports gambling operations or impose any federal restrictions on private actors. The Commerce Clause does not enter into the majority opinion, though in Thomas' concurring opinion, he indicates he is not entirely happy with purely in-state applications of the Commerce Clause. But, at present, interstate gambling does not differ.	Short Answer Barring facts discussed below which aren't assumed to be present in the question, a barter of goods in international waters between people from different countries is legal. But, lurking in this question appears to be one or more misperceptions about the legal consequences of this transaction. The question seems to assume that there are tax or other legal benefits to conducting the transaction in this way that usually aren't present. There are basically no differences in the legality of a barter v. a cash sale for any purposes. Conducting the deal in international waters could have tax consequences, but the fact that the deal is conducted in international waters only sometimes results in tax reductions. This is not a major tax loophole. Conducting the deal in international waters could have an impact on which regulatory laws apply to the deal, but rarely prevent the deal from being subject to any country's regulatory laws. This is all subject to the caveat at the bottom of this answer. The caveat explains that there are indeed lots of major legal loopholes in international commerce. But private barters of goods in international waters rarely benefit from any of these major legal loopholes. Long Answer Barter v. Cash Transactions Very Rarely Matter For Tax Purposes A barter transaction is not tax free. In U.S. tax law, for example, a barter transaction is treated as though the goods that you part with were sold by you for cash at fair market value, with the cash then used to purchase the goods received. In general, there is no tax benefit achieved from bartering under U.S. income tax laws and there is a duty to report significant barter transactions (i.e. those in which the things parted with in any one year with the same person have a fair market value of $600 or more per year) on a Form 1099. U.S. federal income tax law has some narrow exceptions excluding certain barters from income taxation. The most common of these, however, is limited to barters of investment real estate located in the United States. Other exceptions apply mostly to basically fungible financial assets (like barters of economically identical shares of stock in the same company, or of economically equivalent life insurance policies). The fact that the transaction is a barter rather than two reciprocal cash sales is irrelevant for all tax purposes in most countries. This isn't only relevant for income tax purposes. If a transaction would otherwise be subject to sales taxes or to a value added tax, the fact that it is structured as a barter transaction only rarely provides any sales tax or VAT benefit. Bartering may increase the tax compliance costs involved, however, and undermines the certainty of the legal tax treatment of the deal, because usually, if there is a barter transaction, there will also have to be a professional third-party appraisal done to determine the fair market value of the goods bartered for tax purposes that will be subject to litigation with tax authorities. For Customs Duties And Import Regulations Similarly, a barter transaction does not change the treatment of the transaction for purposes of customs duties or for purposes of import regulations. Some customs duties are imposed "in kind" based upon the volume or weight or number of items subject to the duty (e.g. per liter of alcohol imported). But other customs duties are imposed based upon the dollar value of the goods imported posing the same practical difficulties of having to appraise the value of the goods exchanged to determine the proper customs duty. This could lead to major delays in importing the goods because often the valuation dispute would have to be resolved before the goods would be allowed to clear customs. Also, many non-customs duties regulations of imports require someone bringing goods into a country (even if they are citizen of that country) to document the source of those goods. In ability to do so due to a lack of documentation in a barter transaction conducted in international waters could also make it difficult to get the goods to clear customs. In cases where goods are brought in without formally passing through a customs station, for example, if an American docks his ship directly at his residence on a coast rather than at a port, the goods could be seized, either in national waters once they are entered by the Coast Guard after an intent not to declare the goods becomes evident, or from the place in the country where the goods are unloaded, and held in some sort of storage until the customs process is completed and the good clear customs. In the U.S., if the good has reached American soil, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security would seize the goods. If the goods were still on a boat, the U.S. Coast Guard would be responsible for handling it. Historically, the U.S. Coast Guard was formed as an enforcement agency for customs duties and import regulations at a time when almost all international trade with the U.S. was conducted by sea and customs duties were the primary source of federal tax revenues. For Regulatory Purposes A transaction which is illegal if conducted for cash is also illegal if conducted by barter, and a transaction which is legal if conducted for cash is also legal if conducted by barter. It also doesn't change whose law and which legal forums govern legal disputes between the parties. Currency Regulations A tiny number of countries, possibly including Venezuela which has had such regulations at some points in the history of that country, but may or may not now, and Russia (in response to international sanctions related to the Ukraine War) impose some restrictions on the use of domestic and/or foreign currency in international commercial transactions. A barter would get around the currency restrictions in those countries (although not necessarily other regulations of those countries on foreign trade). But none of the other countries expressly mentioned in the question or in this answer impose limitations on the use of any kind of currency in international commercial transactions. Legality To the extent that no illegal technology transfers or international trade sanctions are violated, it is legal to conduct this barter or sale, although it has legal consequences even if it is legal. But, an American or an American firm or anyone else who purchased technology transfer restricted goods from a seller in the U.S. can't go into international waters to trade barred microchips to China in exchange for shipping containers full of fast fashion, because this would violate U.S. technology export laws. Similarly, one can't trade American beef for Russian oil, because this would violate laws that the U.S. has imposed as a diplomatic sanction against Russia. One of the most circumstances where this is most likely to come up is in a transaction between someone from Cuba and someone from the U.S. due to U.S. embargoes of trade with Cuba. I don't know the specifics of that law well enough to know whether or not, or under what circumstances, the contemplated transaction would be legal. But I strongly suspect that selling Cuban sourced goods directly to an American would violate U.S. sanctions laws against Cuba. Income Taxation U.S. Federal Income Taxation The fact that the transaction takes place in international waters is irrelevant for the income taxation of U.S. citizens and U.S. residents who are taxed on their worldwide income. U.S. income taxes generally don't apply to people who are neither citizens nor residents of the U.S. who engage in commerce or earn income outside the U.S. For Other Income Taxes While doing the transaction in international waters doesn't change the federal income tax treatment of the transaction for a U.S. citizen or U.S. resident, it could impact which U.S. state, if any, is entitled to impose its income tax on the sale and could impact whether the sale is subject to national income taxes in some countries. Normally, sale income tax is due on income earned in a state and income earned by people who reside in the state which is not earned in another U.S. state, although the details are tricky and are not always 100% consistent between U.S. states and localities that impose income taxes. Sale Taxes, Use Taxes And VAT In International Waters Transactions For U.S. Style Sales And Use Taxes In the U.S., state and local sales taxes are usually imposed only upon retail sales of goods to final customer that take place in the state or locality in question. Wholesale purchases of goods (i.e. purchases of goods for resale to third-party customers) are sales tax free in most U.S. states, as are purchases of goods by non-profit entities and governments. So, a sale in international waters avoids A sale in international waters also probably avoids all state and local sales taxes in the U.S. on the goods. But, most U.S. state and local sales taxes are backstopped by what is called a "use tax" on retail purchasers who are not non-profit entities or governments, who buy something in a place other than the place where they live and then bring that thing home to their residence in which there is a sales and use tax. So, for example, suppose that you buy office supplies (not for resale) for your accounting firm someplace in Alaska where you take delivery of the goods that doesn't have a sale tax, and bring it back to your office in Denver where there is an 8% sales and use tax, to use in your business. Neither you nor the seller in Alaska owe any sales tax in Alaska or Colorado, but your accounting firm owes an 8% use tax on the good you brought back from Alaska to use in Denver, Colorado which is imposed on you but not on the Alaskan seller. Use taxes are typically not really rigorously enforced, but are imposed when government sales and use tax collection agencies become aware of systemic and economically significant failures to pay a use tax obligation. For VAT No U.S. jurisdiction has a true value added tax (VAT) but most countries in the world do have a VAT. A Value-Added Tax (VAT) is a consumption tax assessed on the value added in each production stage of a good or service. Every business along the value chain receives a tax credit for the VAT already paid. The end consumer does not, making it a tax on final consumption. No VAT would typically be paid on a purchase of goods in international waters. But if the goods purchased in international waters are purchased for resale, the seller would not receive any credit for VAT paid on the inventory purchased, so effectively this increases the VAT that the reseller of the goods purchased in international waters will bear when the goods are sold. This benefits the seller of the goods in international waters, except that the price in international waters would usually be discounted in order to shift the incidence of the higher VAT that the buyer will eventually pay economically back to the seller. Not paying a VAT does benefit a final retail consumer purchaser of the goods purchased in international waters, however, unless there is a customs duty owed on the goods when they are brought back into the country. Often, however, countries with a VAT impose a customs duty on imported goods not imported for resale equal to the VAT that would have been imposed if the goods had been sold in the country into which they are imported. The inconvenience of going to international waters to buy things and the possibility of a customs duty on good returned to the retail buyer's domicile, however, makes this loophole a modest one. Customs Duties And Regulations Whether or not you pass through a regularly staffed port of entry in an airport or seaport, you usually have a legal duty to declare and pay any applicable customs duties on anything brought into the country, even if you are a citizen of that country. In the U.S., the law states that items not declared are subject to civil forfeiture, although there is case law under the excessive fines clause of the U.S. constitution that provides that civil forfeiture can sometimes amount to an unconstitutionally severe fine for a mere technical non-reporting violation. Often customs duties are paid by someone who buys something abroad and then imports it, either in a more than ordinary middle class personal consumption amount, or for resale. The only benefit from a customs perspective to conducting the deal in international waters (which has nothing to do with it being a barter v. a transaction for credit or cash) is most easily illustrated with an example. Suppose you are a U.S. person who lives in Maine. You go into international waters and buy $100,000 of escargot from a French snail products company and conclude the purchase at sea in international waters. You then deliver the escargot from your ship in international waters to your customer in Mexico. Even though you are U.S. person, since the goods never entered the U.S., the goods are not subject to U.S. customs duties or regulations, only to Mexican customs duties and regulations. So, for example, if the U.S. had a 10% customs duty on imported escargot, and banned escargot from France due to public health concerns, but Mexico only had a 5% customs duty on imported escargot and did not ban imports of it from France, it would be desirable to take delivery of the escargot in international waters or in France, and to ship them from international waters or France directly to Mexico rather than taking delivery of the goods in Maine and then shipping them to Mexico from there. You couldn't legally take delivery of French escargot in Maine at all, and if you too delivery instead of Belgian escargot which was not embargoed for public health reasons, you'd still pay a 10% U.S. customs duty in addition to the 5% Mexican customs duty. To avoid the inconvenience of having to actually do a business sale of commercial quantities of goods at sea, or the need to ship directly, there are a handful of ports under the laws of many countries in which goods placed in specially regulated warehouses are treated as not yet having entered the country for customs duty and inspection purposes until the goods are removed from the warehouse and brought into the country. So, in those places, sometimes called duty free zones or "free ports" one can avoid customs duties and inspections in the country where the port and warehouse where delivery of goods is taken when the goods are still in transit to a final destination outside the country where the port is located. Countries allow this because these duty free zones still allow the country to make money from income taxes on the people involved in the operation of the warehouse and ports in the duty free zone, and to make sales tax income from sailors and/or airline crew who enter the country after their work for the day is done, even though the country doesn't get the customs duties. If the customs duties and inspections had been required, the country wouldn't have gotten any income from this commerce at all because the deal would have been done in international waters or with a direct shipment or via a different third-party intermediary country. Choice of Law And Transactional Law Issues The common belief that no country has international jurisdiction over the kind of private exchange you present is not true. At a minimum the country or countries under whose flag the party's ships are flying would have jurisdiction. All countries have jurisdiction for some purposes (e.g. piracy and war crimes), sometimes under international treaties (there are a series of "law of the sea" treaties, for example, and there are also treaties that govern interactions between people affiliated with signatory nations like the Convention on the International Sale of Goods), and sometimes under what amounts to international common law. These legal rights can often be enforced in the domestic courts of a country where the person who violated those laws is domiciled or organized (under a legal theory of personal jurisdiction known as "general jurisdiction"), or where the person who violated those laws owns property (under a legal theory of personal jurisdiction is called "quasi-in rem" jurisdiction). Some countries have extraterritorial jurisdiction over their citizens and/or residents for some purposes, and over people who harm their citizens (for other purposes), which they enforce in their own courts. For example, the U.S. government claims and acts upon its claim of authority in its own courts over acts of terrorism committed against U.S. persons outside the U.S. When you do a business deal in international waters, a choice of law issue arises if there is a dispute in the transaction giving rise to a possible lawsuit. Continuing the example above, suppose that you agreed to buy 1000 kg of large escargot which was worth $100 a kilogram and the seller misled you and only gave you small escargot which is worth only $50 a kilogram. Whose law and whose courts govern this dispute? If the buyer and seller are from different countries, the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) provides the substantive law if both buyer and seller are citizens of signatory countries, and the buyer would probably have to sue the seller in the courts of the seller's country. Portugal, France, Canada, the United States, and Mexico are all parties to the CISG, as are many other countries. The signatories are a minority of countries in the world, but account for most of the world's international trade. It is also possible, for example, if the CISG did not apply because the seller was from a country that wasn't a signatory, that the law of the country under which the ship involved was flying under the flag of applied. So, if the deal took place in international waters on a Panamanian ship, the laws of Panama would apply. As a result, in practice, it doesn't matter that much if the CISG applies or not, because most countries which are not signatories have domestic laws governing the sale of goods which are substantially similar to the CISG in most respects. Caveat For the sake of clarity, it is important to note that there can indeed be major tax loopholes involved in legal international commerce, and there can also be significant regulatory law consequences that arise from legal international commerce that can benefit some of the parties to that international commerce. But, those loopholes can only rarely be benefitted from with a transaction structured as a barter of goods conducted in international waters between private persons. Many of the tax and regulatory benefits associated with international trade arise from conducting actual economic production activity, like manufacturing, in a country with low taxes on that activity and in a country with weak regulation of that activity. But these benefits aren't so much a legal loophole to close, so much as they are the product of a substantive policy decision made collectively by the laws of countries all over the world over which countries should have tax and legal jurisdiction over which kinds of activities. Most of the other tax benefits associated with international trade arise from manipulation of intangible financial assets and liabilities between countries to take advantages of loopholes in the tax laws for these types of intangible asset transactions. Usually, these loopholes in the treatment of intangible assets were not contemplated when the tax legislation containing these loopholes was drafted. Sometimes these loopholes persist because legislative authorities are not aware of the loopholes or don't understand what is happening. Sometimes legislative authorities lack the time and expertise to figure out a good solution to the problem that doesn't create a greater problem in some other part of the tax law. Sometimes the loopholes persist once the loopholes are discovered because they are deliberately ignored as a legislative boon to a special interests because this boon is not very visible or salient to most members of the general voting public. I saw all three of these reasons play out first hand when I was working as an aide in Congress for a House Ways and Means Committee member for a while in the early 1990s.	Generally, no. Legislatures pass laws. The fact that someone else knows more about the thing they're passing laws about is utterly irrelevant -- the power to make laws is given to the legislature, not to experts. If the legislature thinks experts should make the rules on something, they can delegate (this is why the FDA approves medicine rather than Congress), but the legislature of a state generally has the power to pass any law that is not unconstitutional. Your analogy to paper money is a poor one: that's a federalism thing, not an expertise thing. Congress has established a system of paper money, and states can't interfere with that. It's not that the Fed thinks paper money is good, it's that Congress said paper money shall be a thing. That could stop a state from banning an FDA-approved drug; however, since marijuana is illegal under federal law, it would be odd to conclude that banning it at the state level as well is preempted. Legislators aren't inherently experts on anything (except being elected). That doesn't matter. They have the authority to pass laws, even if those laws directly go against the views of people who are recognized experts in the area. You appear to think there must be a judicial remedy against bad policy. You would be wrong. The role of the courts is not to decide what policies are good or bad; they are concerned only with what is legal. Deciding what policies are good or bad is a matter for the democratically elected representatives of the people, or for the people themselves in states with ballot questions. It is not the job of the courts.	In the USA, there is no federal law that expressly prohibits bribes in a commercial context ("commercial bribing"), but there are laws in many states - so it depends on the state. Most states do have laws about it. For example, the law in the state of New York is quite strict. What you describe would qualify as "commercial bribing in the second degree". You would be liable under § 180.00: A person is guilty of commercial bribing in the second degree when he confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon any employee, agent or fiduciary without the consent of the latter's employer or principal, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs. Commercial bribing in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor. New York Penal Law § 180.00 - Commercial bribing in the second degree The employee receiving the bribe would also be liable, under § 180.05 - Commercial bribe receiving in the second degree: An employee, agent or fiduciary is guilty of commercial bribe receiving in the second degree when, without the consent of his employer or principal, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs. Commercial bribe receiving in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.	18 USC 922(g) says that it is illegal for various persons to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. (5) refers to "being an alien", specifically one who has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26))) with an exception as provided in subsection (y)(2), The (y)(2) exceptions covers foreign officials and law enforcement (not a typical tourist), and one who is (A) admitted to the United States for lawful hunting or sporting purposes or is in possession of a hunting license or permit lawfully issued in the United States; which pretty much covers simple tourists, if not typical tourists.	Generally, such sanctions prevent certain sorts of transactions in goods and services with nationals or entities of the nation under sanction. The exact list of transactions prohibited or restricted varies. If Open source software were being provided as a service, so that the recipient paid directly for a license, or for customization or configuration work, or for some sort of consulting or assistance, such transactions could be banned or restricted by a sanctions regime, but might not be. (If the sanctions included that particular class of transactions.) However, if it is merely a matter of an open source product being published, for anyone to download, install, and use, I don't see how that would be barred or restricted by any sanctions of the sort recently in use.	UCC section 2-509 is the law pretty much everywhere in the United States, and it addresses your situation: Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by carrier ... if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular destination, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to the carrier. Although the statutory language is a bit convoluted, it all boils down to whether you have a shipment contract or a destination contract, i.e., whether the contract calls for the seller to ship something to you or deliver something to you. Because you asked for a shipment contract, the risk of loss shifts to the buyer upon delivery to the shipping carrier (USPS). If the package is destroyed in transit, that becomes a problem for you and USPS to sort out. If you didn't purchase insurance for the shipment, you're probably screwed. Note that because this is the statutory default, the seller didn't "contract away" anything; instead, it alerted you to what was already true, giving you an opportunity to contract around the rule, purchase insurance, or otherwise mitigate the risk you were taking on.	Constitution of the USA, Article IV, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. and the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3): [The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; SCOTUS has found the former to mean that states that do not allow same-sex marriages in their laws must recognize same-sex marriages registered by other states - Obergefell v. Hodges. Maybe one could argue that driver licenses are not equivalent among states, but I would expect judges (SCOTUS) to require a very well reasoned explanation. For example, maybe Alaska could refuse to recognize licenses from Florida because Florida drivers do not know how to cope with snowed roads. But even in that case Alaska probably would need to produce data showing that these measures aim to serve the public interest (avoid accidents) and that there are no other ways of getting the same result. OTOH the Commerce Clause has been successfully used to avoid states mandating racial segregation of travellers, so it is quite reasonable to see it being used to prevent a state from trying to limit the mobility of citizens from other states (again, in the supposition that the state restricting it cannot show a compelling reason to do so). AFAIK, only the Federal Government could invoke the Commerce Clause; I would expect a lot more people (in your example, the PA government or maybe even any PA driver) would have standing.
Must Cops Read Rights to Spouse? Suppose a man is arrested but then stays silent. Can the police go and talk to his wife without reading her her Miranda rights? For example, if they don't notify her of her right to stay silent and she admits (in an interrogation room, but without herself ever being suspected of a crime) that she washed blood out of his clothes, can that admission be used in court?	The Miranda warning only has to be given to a person being interrogated in custody, and on the premise that the wife is not in custody, the police do not need to read her the warning. Therefore, anything she says can be used against her, or somebody else, unless there is a separate reason why the statement could not be used. The wife may invoke the spousal testimony privilege, in which case she cannot be compelled to testify against the husband. The officer could theoretically testify that the wife said "I washed blood out of his clothing", but this is an assertion made by an out-of-court declarant to prove the truth of the question at hand, i.e. hearsay. There are numerous exceptions to the definition so that in some cases, the statement would not be hearsay. If the wife refuses to testify, that cuts out half of the exceptions, but maybe the wife is a co-conspirator.	I suspect that you would not be convicted in the present case, because the jury would be sympathetic to the plight of the person being dragged out and unsympathetic to the behavior of the draggers. However, we should set aside the emotional elements of a jury trial and focus on legal principles. The basic question is whether a person has the right to use force to defend against an unlawful battery: "a person is privileged to use such force as reasonably appears necessary to defend him or herself against an apparent threat of unlawful and immediate violence from another". This right to defense also extends to defense of others. But it has to appear to be to unlawful, which is to say, you have to reasonably believe that the force used against the victim is unlawful. If a couple of thugs try to drag a person away, then an observer probably has a reasonable belief that this is an unlawful battery. But if a couple of police officers are observed dragging a person away (arresting him), apparently acting officially, the force used (up to a point) is apparently lawful and would not constitute battery of the victim. For defensive force against police to be lawful, the forced used by the police must be excessive. The outcome then depends on what a reasonable person would conclude (this is where the jury or judge makes a rather subjective decision). If a reasonable person would conclude that the assailants are acting lawfully in arresting the person, then a higher bar must be clear to justifiably use force in defense of others. Wearing a jacket that says "Police" favors the "appears lawful" side (though if you happened to know for a fact that the person wearing the jacket is not a police officer, then the "police exception" would not be applicable). In the relevant case, the facts point to the appearance of a lawful arrest (even if were to turn out to be judged unlawful). In the case that this is an apparent arrest, it would have to be the case that a reasonable person would find the force used to be excessive. Generally speaking, force used by officers is held to be reasonable, except in some cases where it is not. See for example the matter of Eric Garner, where the officers involved were not indicted. On the third hand, in this case, it might matter what the actual legal status of the "officers" is (they are not Chicago police).	The legal question here is whether police have an enforceable power to enjoin a person from visiting a particular person or from entering a particular jurisdiction (especially the one where they have police powers). The obligation to obey police orders generally ends at matters regarding arrest, traffic orders, or crowd control. Freedom of travel is a fundamental constitutional right, along with freedom of association. That does not mean that you can go absolutely anywhere you want and do anything you want with whoever you want, but it does mean that any restriction have to be encoded in law, and such laws have to pass strict scrutiny. Any enforceable legal restrictions would have to emanate from the courts.	In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe).	united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority.	I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.	No If she has probable cause, yes. The question is whether "a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts [Bob is a thief] are probably true"? Its likely that the answer to this question is yes. None No Charlotte listens to Alice, Charlotte asks Bob questions which Bob may or may not answer. Charlotte can ask Bob to produce the receipt, Bob doesn't have to. Charlotte can ask to search Bob, Bob doesn't have to consent. If Bob tries to leave, if Charlotte has reasonable suspicion the Bob has committed a crime (which she could certainly justify) she may detain him temporarily without arrest. If Charlotte has probable cause to believe that Bob has committed a crime (which she could probably justify) then she can arrest him.	Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.
Are businesses in Wisconsin required to accept waste oil? This morning I stopped by a Jiffy Lube with a couple gallons of waste oil, as I had just changed the oil in my car over the weekend and I had dropped this sort of thing off at this location in years past with no issue. I was surprised this time when the attendant curtly explained that they do not accept waste oil. My grumbles that I had come there many times in years past were to no avail. So I stopped by a nearby Valvoline oil change shop, and they accepted the waste oil. The attendant there also explained that in Wisconsin any business which sells oil is required to accept waste oil. I found this pleasantly surprising, but wanted to verify it myself. I've been searching through the Wisconsin State Statutes but haven't found anything to confirm this. The closest thing I could find was 2009 Wisconsin Act 86, but that talks more about requirements on consumers for proper disposal - not requirements on businesses. Is what the Valvoline guy said a real law? Perhaps a federal law? Or is it just an old wives' tale?	Wisconsin requires retailers of automotive oil to either accept household "do-it-yourself" used oil or post a sign at the location of sale indicating the location and hours of operation of the nearest DIY used oil collection center. The applicable statutes are 287.15 (2)(a): (2) Waste Oil Collection (a) Retail Sales Establishment. A retail sales establishment: 1. Shall maintain an engine waste oil collection facility for the temporary storage of engine waste oil returned by consumers and post at least one sign at the location of sale which contains wording similar to: “Engine waste oil collection facility. Please return your waste oil here."; or 2. Shall post at least one sign at the location of sale which contains wording similar to: “Engine waste oil can be recycled. Please return your waste oil to a waste oil storage facility. The nearest waste oil storage facility is located .... and is open ....". The sign shall describe the location and the days and hours of operation. So the Valvoline guy was partially right, they do need to accept it or post a sign indicating where you can recycle it. The Jiffy Lube would have been within its rights to deny the acceptance of the old oil provided that they had a sign posted with the nearest facility and its hours. If that isn't the case, they would be in violation of the aforementioned statute.	It depends on where you are. Typically, rodents inside a rental must be removed by the landlord. In Tukwila, ch. 6.16.030 under health and sanitation says It is unlawful for the owner or occupant to fail to reconstruct or repair [buildings of various types, controlling in various ways] for the purpose of preventing rats, mice, or other rodents from gaining entrance thereto; and it is also unlawful for the owner of [things rats eat] to fail to adequately protect the same to prevent such rodents from gaining access to or coming in contact therewith. This does not govern rodent "outside" (either on private property or on public lands): the city has absolutely no responsibility for rat control. A similar ordinance exists in Kirkland, except that 21.41.302(e) says "The owner or occupant of real property shall keep buildings and premises free from rats, mice and other rodents", where "premises" includes the land (thus, it is the land-owner's responsibility). The "owner" is defined as any person, agent, operator, firm or corporation having a legal or equitable interest in the property; or recorded in the official records of the state, county or municipality as holding title to the property; or otherwise having control of the property, including the guardian of the estate of any such person, and the executor or administrator of the estate of such person if ordered to take possession of real property by a court so Kirkland must eliminate rats in its parks. But there is an exception that The provisions of this section shall not apply to wetlands, unimproved parks, greenbelts or other unimproved property if the property owner or occupant has not committed any acts or omissions that increase the likelihood of rat, mice or other rodent infestation and it's not clear whether there are any improved property owned by the city that has rats. King County (which contains Tukwila and Kirkland) does not appear to have any rodent control ordinances apart from one pertaining to kennels, not surprisingly since most of the county is out in the woods. There are often municipal agencies that provide "assistance" in rodent control (not that they do it, but they may tell you what to do), but generally the responsibility is on the property owner.	The answer is more complicated than you may think. The over riding controlling authority is the Law of the Seas treaty signed by almost all nations but not ratified by the US (mainly because the LOS requires equal distribution of mineral wealth in the oceans). A lot of what the LOS covers is what is called the COLREGS which are basically traffic laws for vessels on the oceans. But COLREGS are applicable in some, but not all US federal, state, and local harbors. While the US Coast Guard is the primary enforcer of these laws in the US plenty of other law enforcement agencies have agreements with the USCG to enforce the rules. While you mentioned a local county agency that has agreements to enforce this, and other laws, so do a host of other agencies. In Florida the FWC is the primary enforcement agency for Florida laws and has an agreement with the USCG and other federal agencies to enforce not just Florida laws but US laws as well. One historic area of conflict has been fishing laws. The US claims a 200 mile economic zone and enforces fishing laws, which sometimes conflict with Florida laws (things like how big a fish must be and how many you can catch and when you can catch them). The FWC has a much greater presence on the water and the USCG does not really deal that much with fishing. On the other hand the USCG spends lots of time with drug interdiction and illegal alien interdiction. As an example of how convoluted this can get I was in the Dry Tortugas when the FWC boarded a commercial fishing boat anchored close to me. The Dry Tortugas is a National Park so under federal jurisdiction and the fishing boat had anchored rather late at night and turned on it's working lights and and was loudly running a water pump during turtle egg laying season so the rangers in the park called the FWC to come down hard on the boat. The only violation the FWC found was a pistol on the commercial boat (firearms are prohibited in the National Park). Another example is that according to Florida Law a boat in a recognized anchorage on a mooring ball does not need to display an anchor light after sunset. While Boot Key Harbor in the Keys is a recognized anchorage run by the city of Marathon it is under COLREGs and you must display an anchor light on a mooring ball; something that I have seen enforced by both USCG and FWC. On the East Coast of Florida in the crowded ICW both city and county LEOs in boats enforce things like speed limits and boating while under the influence; not to mention drug enforcement. Bottom line is while federal, state, and local laws are not always the same there are wide spread agreements that agencies from all three levels of government can and do enforce each others laws.	This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas).	You paid a higher amount so you got to drive the latest model for a year. I can buy a lower amount right now, but I only get to drive last year's model. Or I can pay a higher amount to drive the latest model again. That's life. I have a Wii. I didn't buy it when people queued up for it, but when the shop was selling them off for half the price. That's life. You pay more for the latest and greatest, and then it gets cheaper. The protection you are talking about is this: If the shop advertises a motorbike for £8,000 and when you go into the store the price is suddenly £10,000 then there is some protection in place. The protection means the shop will get a major telling off from trading standards if you complain, and possibly a fine. It doesn't mean you get the motorbike for £8,000. And it most definitely doesn't mean you get money back when they reduce the price a year later.	An analogy to towing companies is tempting but misplaced, since towing is a statutorily-authorized and regulated activity (e.g. RCW 46.55). You therefore cannot just charge an arbitrary storage fee for uncollected equipment, and it is highly unlikely that there is any provision in the contract which authorizes you to charge for storage. The question is why you think you think they are responsible for picking up the excavator – presumably there is a clause in the contract that says that they will pick it up. Assuming that the contract doesn't say much, then your recourse would reside in the fact of their equipment trespassing on your property. You would need to officially withdraw permission for their equipment to be on your property (since you gave it in the first place). They would have a reasonable time to retrieve their goods, and if they don't do so, you would have a basis for suing them for damages. Also, the worst thing you could do is forcibly keeping their key until they pay you a storage fee: you'd need a court-ordered award, to get anything from them. The Connecticut towing law is here. Note that in order to call a towing company to get the equipment towed (if that's even possible), there has to be "conspicuous signage" warning of the possibility of towing "on such private commercial property"; but an overriding consideration is that you may tow if the vehicle is left for forty-eight or more hours. Two points to be noted are that although the law refers to "An owner or lessee of private property", the signage requirement implies that the property has to be commercial, not residential (this limitation to "private commercial property" is repeated in the statute, indicating a legislative intent to restrict the legal towing permission to commercial property). The law refers to "motor vehicles", but it is not clear whether an excavator counts as a "motor vehicle" (defined in para 54 of the definitions section). Although an excavator is a "vehicle propelled or drawn by any nonmuscular power", exceptions are carved out for agricultural tractors, farm implements, and "and any other vehicle not suitable for operation on a highway", which I think reasonably means that an excavator is not a motor vehicle. So since the towing statute does not authorize towing of something that is not a motor vehicle, that would not seem to be an option in this case (even if there were signage, and this is commercial property). And calling a towing company would only get the item removed from your property, but would not authorize you to collect a storage fee (the towing company can only do so after the police have been notified, which they must do withing 2 hours).	In general, a seller may make different and inconsistent sales terms with different customers on whatever basis the seller chooses. In some jurisdictions, for some kinds of transactions, specific laws may regulate this. They may require similar treatment, or advertised prices, or whatever. I do not know of any such laws governing the sale of oil, but there might be some. This will depend on the exact jurisdiction (country, state/province, and perhaps city or other locality). Please edit the question to specify the jurisdiction if you want a more specific answer. Price discrimination on the basis of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination laws, such as race or religion under US federal laws, would be illegal. Proving that the basis was unlawful might be hard, however.	The statute doesn't say much in detail (from the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law (unfortunately, the site works on javascript, so, you have to navigate by opening the "Laws" menu and then making your way from there): § 1128. Driving on roadways laned for traffic. Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply: (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. (b and c are not relevant) (d) When official markings are in place indicating those portions of any roadway where crossing such markings would be especially hazardous, no driver of a vehicle proceeding along such highway shall at any time drive across such markings. The last bit, (d), is of interest. Basically, you are allowed to change into the correct lane as long as the pavement markings permit it. The pavement markings at an intersection with a sign like the one you posted are generally solid white lines. These details are governed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, published by the Federal Highway Administration. Their information on pavement markings is available both in PDF and HTML format. Pertinently, it says: A double white line indicates that lane changes are prohibited. A single white line indicates that lane changes are discouraged. A dashed white line indicates that lane changes are allowed. Therefore, if the lines separating the lanes are, as usual, solid white lines, you are encouraged to get into the correct lane before the beginning of the solid white line, but you are permitted to change lanes across the solid lines. An example of such marking is in the right-hand example in the given image: One point of possible contention is that the New York State Driver's Manual describes the meaning of the solid white line somewhat differently: One solid line: You can pass other vehicles or change lanes, but you can only do so when obstructions in the road or traffic conditions make it necessary. I don't see any statutory basis for that description, but I may well have overlooked something. I suppose you know where the signs are specified, since you probably got the image from there, but for anyone reading this who does not know, they are specified in the publication Standard Highway Signs. This is available as a set of PDF files; the relevant file is the one containing regulatory signs; the sign in the question is 1-33, and it is in the midst of several similar signs. If a police officer ticketed you for getting into the lane too late, I suppose you should find a lawyer who specializes in fighting traffic tickets, and ask whether there really is such a thing as "too late." By my reading of the law, there isn't. (Of course, if it's dangerous to change lanes because of other vehicles, you shouldn't change lanes, but if you had, I would suppose the officer should have written a ticket for some other violation, like reckless driving.)
GDPR - Is having a PDF with fields to fill out classed as data? I have a website which has a link to a PDF form which users can print out and fill in. I'm wondering if somewhere I need to a statement in my privacy policy which justifies this?	There is no requirement about "data" in the GDPR, so provided this is just "data", no. An empty form with fields for personal data contains no personal data. On the other hand, if the form is filled in by the user with personal data (as defined in GDPR article 4), and you receive a copy of the filled in form and process these personal data (as defined in GDPR article 4) - then the answer is: Yes. However, if you do not process the personal data (i.e. the form is just printed out on paper and filled in with a pen, and nobody except the data subject has access to the piece of paper with the filled in form - then the answer again is "no").	Since you are from Europe, GDPR applies to all your processing activities per Art 3(1) GDPR, regardless of where the users are located. If you would like to avoid GDPR compliance, you would have to manage your business from abroad so that you no longer have an European establishment, and would have to avoid offering your services to people who are in Europe. So let's assume that you have no European establishment. Then, GDPR can only apply per Art 3(2) to those processing activities that relate to offering goods or services to people who are in Europe. For determining this, IP-based geolocation is indeed common. Very likely, you do not need consent for this. GDPR does not require consent for everything, just a legal basis. There are six potential legal bases in Art 6(1), though the relevant ones are consent, necessity for performing a contract, legal obligations, and necessity for a legitimate interest. For things like security checks, it would be common to claim a legitimate interest. Complying with GDPR can hurt revenue. However, data subjects have a right to data protection, but you do not have a right to a particular business model. Similarly, paying taxes can "hurt revenue", but it's not really optional. If your business model can't deal with GDPR compliance (or with taxes), it might not be a sound business model. In Europe, many newspapers have since moved from advertising-only to a consent-or-pay model. That is, the user is given a choice: You can read articles without tracking if you buy a subscription. You can access articles for free if you consent to tracking. The legality of this is hotly debated. In principle, such an approach can be compliant, but the details are problematic, for example that you can only buy subscriptions rather than individual articles, and that these subscriptions are often orders of magnitude more expensive than what would be earned through ads. But this might actually be easier to solve for a mobile application than for a website, due to the availability of in-app payment and micropayment infrastructure. In any case, GDPR limits how much you can "encourage" consent – per Art 7(4), you cannot make access to your service conditional on consent. There must be a way to use your app without consenting to anything, unless that consent is actually necessary for the app to work. For example, consenting to camera access is necessary for a QR code reader app to work. It is extremely unlikely that ads would be necessary in this sense. Users also must not suffer detriment for declining or withdrawing consent. From this, the EDPB has developed the concept of "permissible incentive" in their guidelines on consent. In this post, "Europe" means EU/EEA/UK as appropriate.	As I understand it, the GDPR does not permit sending of personal information (which includes the IP address) without prior consent by the user. That's not exactly true, consent is merely one of six possible legal basis for processing (article 6). For example, processing of personal data can also be lawful if it necessary to perform a contract, legally mandatory, or in the public interest. The court decision acknowledges that but rules out another basis in this case because it considers that it is possible to serve fonts without relying on a third-party ([…] der Einsatz der Schriftarten auch möglich ist, ohne dass eine Verbindung von Besuchern zu externen Servern hergestellt werden muss). Confusingly, it only refers to article 6(1)(f) when it seems to me that (b) would also be plausible but maybe this wasn't raised during the proceedings? If the data controller cannot invoke any other basis for the lawfulness of the processing then yes, the only thing left is asking for consent, i.e. invoking article 6(1)(a). But that doesn't mean that you should expect to be asked for consent each and every time your personal information is being used. The consent form on the site also implicitly assumes consent, which I thought was also a violation. Yes, implying consent doesn't really make sense under the GDPR definition (article 4, see also article 7): ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action European data protection authorities have issued guidelines that detail what that means and clearly reject “bundling” different data processing. The regulation also makes it clear that data subjects should be able to withdraw consent at any time, which does not seem possible with the fonts on golem.de My reading of all this is that assuming consent because you are using a service (or even created an account or checked a box at some point) simply isn't valid consent. Either you don't need consent at all in the first place or what you need is freely given, specific consent and “implying” consent or bundling it with a registration process achieves exactly nothing. But this is still extremely common and it might take some time before enforcement and case law definitively settle this question. Smart data controllers trying to avoid collecting consent (like Meta) have abandoned any claim that signing up to the their services would constitute consent (because that's transparently not the case) and try to bypass the issue entirely using another basis like contractual necessity. This is also being litigated. I know that a EU regulation can be implemented and interpreted differently from country to country, and that a single court ruling in Germany doesn't even mean that the national law was correctly applied. From what I've read, I get the impression that this particular ruling was not unlikely to be overturned by a higher instance, if it came down to it. So my question probably both pertains to German law specifically and the EU regulation itself. That sounds more like the way EU directives work. Regulations are supposed to be immediately applicable (no implementation in national law necessary) with minimal differences between countries (except when they explicitely provide for that). Of course, enforcement would still mostly be in the hands of national court systems and (in Germany) provincial data protection authorities but there are mechanisms to ensure consistency (the European Data Protection Board, prejudicial questions to the CJEU, infringement proceedings from the European Commission…).	The GDPR does not prescribe how information should be pseudonymized and does not even define the term properly. Yet, pseudonymization is suggested as an safety measure in various places, so that pseudonymization should be implemented wherever appropriate. The most useful guidance the GDPR gives is by contrasting pseudonymization with anonymization, where it says that pseudonymized data is still personal data because the data subjects can be identified using additional information (see Recital 26 GDPR). In contrast, re-identification is not reasonably likely for truly anonymized data. A common technique for pseudonymization is to replace identifying information with a pseudonym, for example replacing a name with a random numeric ID. However, this can only be considered pseudonymous if the mapping between the ID and the real value is not available to whoever uses this data. Replacing individual fields in a data set might not be sufficient for pseudonymization because apparently non-sensitive fields could still enable indirect identification. This requires careful analysis taking into account the entire context of the data, so it isn't possible to say whether merely removing names + email addresses achieves pseudonymization or anonymization. What you are doing is redacting parts of sensitive data. I think this is a pretty weak pseudonymization method since it still leaks partial information about the true value, and leaks information about the length of the redacted value. It is possible to argue that this is OK (e.g. if you can show that you have multiple similar redactions so that you achieve a level of k-anonymity). But by default, such partial redactions are likely to be unsafe. Completely removing the sensitive data is much safer. The “Article 29 Working Party”, a pre-GDPR EU body, has published an opinion on anonymization techniques in 2014 (PDF). It does not account for the GDPR's specific phrasing, but provides an overview of pseudonymization and anonymization techniques and puts them into context of European data protection law. It considers how such guarantees guard against attacks such as singling out data subjects, linking multiple records of the same individual, and making inferences about the data subject. In this guidance, pseudonymization techniques that are suggested include encrypting or hashing the sensitive data. However, the guidance warns that such techniques do not provide strong protection against singling out or linking records of the data subject. A bit earlier, the UK ICO had published guidance on personal data, including on the matter of anonymization and pseudonymization (PDF) with some good examples. For determining whether a data set has been successfully anonymized (or pseudonymized), they suggest a motivated intruder test: could someone without specialist knowledge or skills re-identify the data subject? In your example, such a person should not be able to infer that a record about Stxxx Axxdxrxn is about a Steve Anderson. In my opinion, your pseudonymization approach would fail the motivated intruder test unless you have multiple records that could all be about Steve Anderson (compare k-anonymity).	Please note that Google Analytics do not anonymize the data you collect on its behalf unless you configure it to do IP-anonymization. If you use Google Analytics and do not use this feature, you need to have a DPA (Data Processing Addendum) in place with Google in order to comply with the GDPR. This is a real hassle, so unless you absolutely need fine-grained demographic data, it is strongly recommended that you use IP-anonymization. According to our data protection supervisory authority, this is sufficient to comply with the GDPR vis-a-vis Google Analytics. Does data that is anonymized need to be collect in the event of a GDPR Subject Access Request? No. But as the controller, you need to make sure that is is anonymized.	I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!	You could, but how should the companies that want to handle your data know this? If they have no affirmation from you that you allow them to process your data in any way, other than those they are already allowed to because of the exceptions, they have to - under GDPR - assume you don't want them to process your data, and thus have to ask you.	The intention of the GDPR is to minimize the amount of personally identifiable information (PII) you store. So the GDPR never tells you that you have to log certain events. The simplest way to make sure you comply with the GDPR is to simply not store any PII at all. But that might of course conflict with legitimate business interests and with other legal obligations you might have. So when you do store PII, then the GDPR regulates under which conditions you are allowed to store PII, for how long and what you are allowed to do with that PII. So when you receive a GDPR request from a customer to see their data, then you can say that you only have that one timestamp of their registration, because you didn't log their subsequent logins (assuming this is the truth). I hope your privacy policy says that you store all that PII on registration and that you have some good arguments why storing that information is a "legitimate interest" of your organization.
Is the British Queen not allowed to sit on a foreign throne? I read on http://www.radiotimes.com/news/2015-03-30/heres-why-queen-elizabeth-ii-didnt-sit-on-the-iron-throne : “Apparently the Queen of England [sic] is not allowed to sit on a foreign throne,” explained Benioff during an interview with Late Night host Seth Meyers. “This is an esoteric rule we didn’t know about until that moment.” Is the Queen of the United Kingdom not allowed to sit on a foreign throne? If so, does that apply to fictional thrones?	There's no law as such; it's just an age-old mark of respect that a visiting Royal not sit on your throne. The Queen has encountered other royal families so it makes sense that she'd know this tradition, and was likely just being humorous on the Game of Thrones set. That or she decided the Iron Throne didn't look very comfy!	It may very well be illegal, depending on the laws of the country. Most people have the right to enter their own country (except for practical problems, like not being able to prove you have the right) because you list your passport and/or other ID). But it may be illegal to enter outside official border crossings, for example. Or illegal to enter without having the entry registered. Or soon, it might be illegal to enter the U.K. while avoiding quarantine, whether you are British or not. But it wouldn’t be the fact that you entering that’s illegal, it would be how you did it. If you are the Dutch owner of a Ferrari then entering the Netherlands on the A40 from Germany at 170mph is very, very illegal :-)	The BBC iPlayer restrictions are not, as far as I'm aware, based on regulations; they are based on licensing agreements (in fact, the page you link to says this explicitly). Whether the same is true of programs from other services in other countries--or even other services in the UK--is going to depend on the contracts between those services and you and the contracts between those services and their content providers.	Important story, but BoingBoing also doubts the BBC's wording. It could be an attempted summary of a previous story on BBC Newsnight on 18 July: Lord Porter of Spalding, a former bricklayer, alleged corporations were running tests on the safety of their high-rise building materials but refusing to share the results. Releasing the results could allow residents and local authorities to know if their buildings are at risk of a fire following the Grenfell catastrophe which claimed the lives of at least 80 people. There Lord Porter was talking about results commissioned by private companies including manufacturers, where the labs wouldn't provide information because of 'intellectual property rights' of the client, or presumably commercial confidentiality. Under these situations, it is said the private concerns have no obligation to disclose. If this is what the BBC story was referring to, then at least investigations by government or third parties wanting to reveal characteristics of the products wouldn't have a copyright (or patent etc) problem.	The theatre is a private place. You may enter it only with the permission of the owners. They are not obliged to grant you that permission. They have the right to refuse admission on almost any grounds they choose. I say "almost" because many jurisdictions have laws about things like race or gender discrimination. I suspect in India it would be illegal to say "You can't come in because you are Hindu." The point is though, that there is a short list of reasons which they aren't allowed to use. Any other reason is legal.	Sure, but Qatar is not in the jurisdiction of the ECHR! For the ECHR to apply in a jurisdiction, Qatar would need to have signed it or be in the EU or at least have been in it. It never has been. In fact, not even Den Haque would have power over Qatar unless they allowed it to - and that court rules on matters of war crimes... Qatar does not guarantee the same rights you might be familiar with from most western countries. In fact, not even all western countries are the same. In America, you can use the Sieg Heil gesture, in Germany, you can end in jail for it.. Same for Propaganda materials.	Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies.	This is more a political question than a legal one, so the answer is more political than legal. Countries are sovereign, and thus can decide which treaties affect them. The UK does not need to agree to any treaty with the EU. It can just refuse to sign the agreement, and just go on its own. Of course, this works both ways. In the same way the EU cannot impose a treaty on the UK about movement of people or the North Ireland borders, the UK cannot impose a treaty on the EU allowing it trade without tariffs. If the UK does not want the deal, the path is straightforward: the Parliament1 rejects the treaty proposal. Of course, then probably the EU will be way less amenable to a free trade pact. Someone being free to do something does not exempt that someone from the consequences of doing that something. If the treaty is put into effect, then at any moment the UK (either from action by the Executive1 or the Parliament1, that is to be internally decided by the UK) can just decide that EU trade is not worth following EU regulations and just withdraw from the treaty. Happens all the time. That the UK cannot unilaterally withdraw from the treaty means is that, should the UK unilaterally decide to leave the "backstop", the UK will be in breach of the treaty and so the EU can ask in international courts for compensation3. In contrast, in many treaties there are explicit clauses explaining the conditions (e.g. notification in advance to the other parties) that allow for a signatory to "lawfully" withdraw from the treaty. But certainly the EU cannot impose its laws on the UK against the decision of the Parliament (again, this is pretty much what "the UK is a sovereign country" means). 1 Elected by British citizens2. So much for "political discrimination". 2Actually it is something more complicated but not because of the EU but of the Empire, as there are some rules allowing citizens of British Overseas Territories or Commonwealth to vote. But that is a question completely internal to the UK. 3And of course, cancel the tariff-free part of the treaty and the agreements for after the backstop ends.
Is it legal to force a atheist student to read a prayer in a Church of England UK academy? At my school, which is a Church of England academy, instead of assemblies, we do "Collective Worship" (although everyone still calls them assemblies). With whole-school assemblies, each class takes turns to pick a few students to read Christian prayers to the whole school. However, in my class, nobody has volunteered, so our teacher is threatening to pick names out of a hat. We (myself and a few other friends who agreed) argue that we cannot be forced to preach the existence of God when we are atheist, as that could violate freedom of speech or a law on religion. Our main points are that we would begin with "Dear Lord," implying that we believe in a God, then end with "Amen," which translates to "I agree/believe," which we don't. Is forcing an atheist student to read a Christian prayer illegal or prohibited in any way? Would Article 14 of the UNCRC apply?	Although an academy is state-funded, it is not the government, so limitations on what a government is allowed to do are not applicable, and anyway there is no First Amendment separation of church and state in the UK. I presume your school has a formal faith designation, which means that it is not subject to Section 85 of the Equality Act 2010, which might maybe be a path for escaping the requirement. The "collective worship" requirement is mandated by the government under Section 70 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998, which is extended to academy schools by the funding agreements. The requirement is that "each pupil in attendance at a community, foundation or voluntary school shall on each school day take part in an act of collective worship". Section 71 provides an exception: If the parent of a pupil at a community, foundation or voluntary school requests that he may be wholly or partly excused from receiving religious education given in the school in accordance with the school’s basic curriculum, from attendance at religious worship in the school, or both from receiving such education and from such attendance, the pupil shall be so excused until the request is withdrawn. Since a religious academy is not subject to the national curriculum, deviation from whatever the religious requirements are stated in that curriculum is allowed.	There's nothing that makes it illegal to ask others to give you money to donate to a third party. But if you want to say you're fundraising on behalf of another organization, obviously you need its permission. And if you want contributions to be considered charitable for tax purposes, and you want to make sure you don't wind up paying taxes on contributions "sent to" you but then passed on, then you may need to start worrying about a separate entity. It would be more straightforward to offer to create, host and administer the website for the church, with it receiving the contributions directly.	Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower.	Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.	34 CFR Subpart D covers this topic ("Under what conditions is prior consent not required to disclose information?"). This includes The disclosure is to other school officials, including teachers, within the agency or institution whom the agency or institution has determined to have legitimate educational interests so that raises the question of whether there is a legitimate educational interest. Additionally, the question is raised as to the status of an SRO (they are not teachers). Disclosure is allowed to A contractor, consultant, volunteer, or other party to whom an agency or institution has outsourced institutional services or functions may be considered a school official under this paragraph provided... the conditions being that the person Performs an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution would otherwise use employees; Is under the direct control of the agency or institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; and Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a) governing the use and redisclosure of personally identifiable information from education records I would take this model memorandum as the most likely agreement, though your district may have a totally different memo where SROs are purely security guards. An SRO is to advance the program objective which include "Education of children regarding the role of laws, courts, and Police in society", which is the hook into "legitimate educational interest". This nothwitstanding the part that says that they "are police officers and not school teachers, school administrators, nor school counselors. The officers will assist teachers with classroom presentations on relative topics when requested and able" (there is no principle that only teachers, administrators, or counselors can have a legitimate educational interest). This model memo does not say anything that indicates that the conditions "Is under the direct control" and "Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a)" are true, but those conditions could be satisfied external to the MOU. There are some additional exceptions of the "if required by law" type, such as a state law "adopted before November 19, 1974, if the allowed reporting or disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve the student whose records are released"; or, after that date, is "subject to the requirements of §99.38" which refers you to §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). If that is confusing, here are the two self-referring sections: §99.38(a) If reporting or disclosure allowed by State statute concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are released, an educational agency or institution may disclose education records under §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). The disclosure is to State and local officials or authorities to whom this information is specifically...Allowed to be reported or disclosed pursuant to State statute adopted after November 19, 1974, subject to the requirements of §99.38. So state law is one possibility; "legitimate educational interest" is a remote possiblity. Massachussetts law does include governmental third party disclosures: 603 CMR 23.07(4)(c) A school may release information regarding a student upon receipt of a request from the Department of Social Services, a probation officer, a justice of any court, or the Department of Youth Services under the provisions of M.G.L. c. 119, sections 51B, 57, 69 and 69A respectively. That does not directly apply to local police, but it is possible that a police officer is operating as a probation officer or an agent of the Department of Youth Services. Under paragraph (e), A school may disclose information regarding a student to appropriate parties in connection with a health or safety emergency if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals. This includes, but is not limited to, disclosures to the local police department Mass. law allows the possibility of treating a police officer as "authorized school personnel" if they are "providing services to the student under an agreement between the school committee and a service provider, and who are working directly with the student in an administrative, teaching counseling, and/or diagnostic capacity" – which is not completely out of the question but is a bit of a stretch (especially in the context of a blanket statement "we share records", not "we may share yours, if you get special counseling"). Tne law also says "Any such personnel who are not employed directly by the school committee shall have access only to the student record information that is required for them to perform their duties", so sharing of all records would not be allowed.	No it is not illegal A school can ban or block online content from its own computers or connections as its administrators or teachers think proper, and does not need any law that authorizes or requires them to do so. The US Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) requires schools and libraries which receive discounts for Internet access or internal connections through the E-rate program to adopt an "Internet safety policy" This must include measures to block or filter Internet access to pictures that are: (a) obscene; (b) child pornography; or (c) harmful to minors. The policy also "must include monitoring the online activities of minors" and must address several other issues, including "access by minors to inappropriate matter". It does not however, require tracking of usage by specific individuals. But the school may, if it chooses, adopt a policy broader than the requirements of CIPA, which are a minimum standard. The school may block content thought to distract from school work, for example, or that the relevant school authorities think unhelpful or contrary to its goals. This is in no way required by CIPA (unless it is part of addressing the issues CIPA demands be addressed), but is also in no way prohibited, it is the school's choice. Institutions that adopt a CIPA Internet safety policy must "provide reasonable notice and hold at least one public hearing or meeting to address the proposal." But there is no legal requirement for the school to accurately describe which of its policy items are in fact required by CIPA. The only penalty for failing to comply with these CIPA requirement is loss of the E-rate discounts. A school may choose not to comply and forgo the discounts. Knowingly providing obscene content to minors might well be in violation of other laws, however. In short, the school can block whatever it sees fit, for whatever reasons school authorities think proper, unless some other law or constitutional right prevents this. I do not know of any such law or right, although I am researching the matter further. There is not generally a constitutional right to unfiltered internet access in school, or indeed to any access in school at all.	There is ample reason to conclude that "non-commercial" would include a church, as well as advocating a political cause or candidate. The hard part of "personal". In the context of (Canadian) bankruptcy law, it can mean "non-business use"; in the context of "personal use property", it can be "A type of property that an individual does not use for business purposes or hold as an investment. In other words, property that an individual owns for personal enjoyment". US tax law takes "personal purposes" to refer to non-business purposes. But in the context of copyright (especially music downloading / copying), it is taken to refer to the use of or by an individual. Distributing free copies of a protected work does not get legally sanctioned due to the copying being non-commercial. The alternative term "private" is much clearer, in identifying "just you", but is probably avoided in this kind of context so as to avoid the wrong inference that you can only play Pokemon in the privacy of your own home. So the slightly less clear term "personal" is used instead of "private" especially in copyright-related contexts. "Personal" and "private" are not exactly the same, but when it's about use, I don't see any difference, and I think there is no question that use to attract to a church or political candidate is not "private", it is public. Since the license does not define "your own personal purposes" and there is not an existing crystal-clear definition of "personal purposes", the phrase could be given its "ordinary (plain) meaning". Of course, plain meaning has to give way to contractual intent, so we have to figure out what the parties intended. Except, you don't have a contract with Niantic, but still, plain meaning surely has some place in the law of licenses. At this point, in a lawsuit, both sides would hire an expert witness like a linguist or English teacher to make the case that a church or other non-commercial non-private use is / is not included in the meaning of "personal purpose". A silly argument could be made to the effect that if you personally have an interest in doing something then it is a personal purpose (if specifically commercial, it would be precluded by the term "noncommercial"). What makes this silly is that everybody does things for personal purposes (even acting in a way that benefits others, since you do so for the personal reason that you should do so), and thus "personal" would not mean anything. That is, "personal purposes" does not mean "whatever motivation or interest you personally have". You can also gain a certain understanding of what "personal purposes" means by looking at similar licenses. In the context of academic publishing, authors are typically granted license to copy "for personal, professional, or teaching purposes". Professional purposes and teaching purposes are things that the person has an interest in, so by mentioning these things separately, we must conclude that "teaching" is not a "personal purpose". And so: I would conclude that a court could find that using a product to support a political campaign, philosophy, or religion, is a "public" purpose, not a "personal" purpose. At the same time, at least as I understand it, a lure module is a thing that others besides yourself personally can see (I admit, I don't go), which implies that the purpose of the thing is not entirely private. In addition, there is a fair amount of buzz out there about how a lure could be good for business, which is (1) clearly in contradiction of the license terms and (2) clearly a golden opportunity for Niantic, perhaps in a few weeks after everybody gets hooked and then they will offer non-personal licenses. Their license terms also say that you will not "use the Services or Content, or any portion thereof, for any commercial purpose or for the benefit of any third party or in a manner not permitted by these Terms". I would say that that definitively says "No don't do it", and it also means that you can't be nice to a neighbor. So what they literally say and what they really intend are probably completely different things.	The First Amendment states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. It thus protects such videos. An analogous situation is that there is network news coverage of riots, bank robberies, terrorist attacks and assaults. Backpage was seized because it facilitated prostitution, not just reported or even encouraged it. That is basically where the line exists.
Why is the Queen of Canada known as Elizabeth II? The regnal numbers of the monarchy of the United Kingdom are combined from the regnal numbers of the separate kingdoms of England and Scotland. Hence, as there was a previous Queen Elizabeth in England, the current queen is known as Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It is a common mistake to call her the Queen of England: she is not, as England is no longer a kingdom in its own right, but instead forms part of the singular United Kingdom. However, Canada, Australia, and Jamaica, among others, are kingdoms in their own right, with their own monarchies (which merely happen to be vested in the same person). Elizabeth is not Queen of England, but she is Queen of Canada, Queen of Australia, and queen of many other countries. In these countries, why is she known as Elizabeth II? Elizabeth I of England never ruled any of these countries.	Actually, Queen Elizabeth I and Queen Elizabeth II are not sovereigns of any common state. QEI was sovereign of England and Wales and QEII is sovereign of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (among others). The numbering has nothing to do with the states they are sovereign over: it is familial number dating from William I (the Conquerer). It is no different from the numbering that would occur if I were named for my father and my son were named for me. Some monarchies use ordinals that include mythological kings or kings that ruled a completely different state that shared a common geography or culture, or were claimed to do so in the founding myths of a state. The only legal issue here is that the number that a monarch accepts is the legally relevant one - if the next Elizabeth decides she will be Elizabeth XVII then so she will be. There is actually a case about this relating to QEII in Scotland: A court case, MacCormick v Lord Advocate, contesting the style “Elizabeth II” within Scotland, was decided in 1953 that the numbering of monarchs was part of the royal prerogative, and that the plaintiffs had no title to sue the Crown. So, legally, she is Queen Elizabeth II in Scotland even though Scotland never had a Queen Elizabeth I. Practically, state owned assets in Scotland are not embossed with EIIR (Elizabeth II Regina) but with the crown of Scotland out of consideration of Scottish sensibilities on the matter. In any event, certainly in Australia (not sure about Canada), the head of state is the Governor General, not the Queen. You can read about they whys and wherefores here.	There are two approaches to determining citizenship: where you are born (jus soli – this holds in the US), and who you were born to (jus sanguinis – the case in India). There are mixes of these systems, such as where a person born to an American but not in the US is still an American citizen (e.g. Ted Cruz). Canada allows Canadian citizenship to be inherited outside Canada by 1 generation, so a child born outside Canada to Canadian parent born in Canada is a Canadian citizen. A child born outside Canada to Canadians born outside Canada is not a Canadian citizen. If that child is born in India and the parents do not have dual citizenship, the child is stateless because at least one parent has to be Indian to acquire Indian citizenship at birth. There are various exceptions to the generalization about only revoking citizenship with dual nationals. In 1962, about 20% of the Kurdish population in Syria had its citizenship revoked. Albert Einstein was stateless for 5 years, after he renounced his (German) Baaden-Württemberg citizenship. There is no law in the US that prevents you from renouncing your citizenship, there is simply a particular formality that has to be followed. Wikipedia names a half-dozen US citizens who relinquished their US citizenship and had no other citizenship (thus were stateless). The Japanese Nationality Law limits dual citizenship and requires children to make a decision at age 22. Iran, however, prohibits renunciation of citizenship to the offspring of an Iranian male (it is automatically assigned to the child). A Japanese-Iranian child born (in Japan) to an Iranian father would might seem to have to become Iranian; but apparently Japan requires you to perform the act of renouncing, and does not require that the other country recognize the renunciation. The point is that renouncing citizenship involves the laws of two countries: the country that you renounce may or may not accept the renunciation, and the country that you renounce in favor of may or may not accept the renunciation. Section 10 of the Norwegian Nationality Law exemplifies a further variation in concepts of renunciation as part of gaining Norwegian citizenship, and statutorily acknowledges the problem or countries not allowing citizens to renounce citizenship. There is a requirement of naturalization that "the applicant must be released from any other nationality before the application may be granted", which also allows that it's okay if you can be so released after being granted Norwegian citizenship: or, ultimately, "An exemption may be granted from the requirement regarding release if release is deemed to be legally or practically impossible or for other reasons seems to be unreasonable". (The law in Norwegian is here: a Norwegian lawyer would be better able to comment on the interpretation of the text, but my reading of the law, especially the requirement to be "løst fra annet statsborgerskap", specifies the realized result of being released, and not the act of renunciation, hence "release" in the translation). If a person has dual US-Ukrainian citizenship, they might symbolically renounce their Ukrainian citizenship to avoid an expected revocation of US citizenship and deportation to Ukraine. But the US has no law that says that it must recognize the renunciation of a foreign citizenship. Canada and Australia do not allow you to renounce your citizenship if it would result in statelessness, but not all countries have such a requirement. See for instance sect. 9 of the Citizenship Act of Canada: Subject to subsection (2.1), a citizen may, on application, renounce his citizenship if he (a) is a citizen of a country other than Canada or, if his application is accepted, will become a citizen of a country other than Canada... There is, however, no specific law that compels Canada to recognize a person's renunciation of some other country. So whether the described strategy would have any effect depends on the extent to which the "retained" state is compelled to recognize a renunciation of a foreign citizenship.	It may "seem[] normative" that "a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions." But in fact it is not generally the case. There are various kinds of laws that traditionally have named specific people or entities to define their scope. These include: In nineteenth-century England, a divorce could only be granted by a specific law passed by Parliament, naming the persons to be divorced. I am not sure when the practice stopped. In the US during the nineteenth century (and I think the early twentieth century also) a corporation was normally formed by a specific law granting a charter of incorporation to the named company. In the US during the period 1866-1870 there were a number of laws passed permitting former Confederate officers and officials who were presented by the 14th amendment from holding office under the US or any state to hold office again, as the amendment provides for. Eventually Congress passed a more general amnesty. It was once common for the English Parliament to pass bills of attainder. These were legislative declarations that a particular person was guilty of a particular crime, generally without any trial or other process. Sometimes the specific sentence was also imposed by such a bill. This was sufficiently resented that the US Constitution specifically forbids Congress or any state from passing such a bill. It was once common for actual laws to grant payments to specific people for specific purposes. This is no longer common, but there is no legal bar to it in either the UK or the US that I know of. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 contains a provision enabling Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children to continue to receive royalties for performances and adaptations, publications and broadcast of "Peter Pan" whose author, J. M. Barrie, had given his copyright to the hospital in 1929, later confirmed in his will. This right is to persist even after the expiration of ordinary copyright for the play, but is not a full grant of copyright. Laws or ordinances invoking eminent domain to take the property of particular individuals for particular purposes are common, mostly at the local level. In the US, the Equal Protection Clause generally forbids laws which treat people, or groups of people, differently unless there is some rational basis for the distinction. But in some cases a plausible basis is asserted and such laws are passed.	Letters patent are instruments issued by the monarch to publicly grant some specific rights to some person(s) with the backing of the royal power. It is also where the word patent (in its intellectual property sense) comes from, since the monopoly of invention was only granted by the authority of the monarch via a letter patent. Another use of the letters patent is to constituting certain offices, particular those exercising the royal power, for example, the Governor General of Canada. Under the British system, the courts are thought to be the monarch exercising their power over the bench. Many High Courts of India were constituted by the British monarch during the colonial rul. The British Parliament allows the monarch to issue letters patent for such purposes in the 1861 High Courts Act. Their jurisdictions were specified by letters patent. One of such jurisdiction is the power for a High Court to hear appeals from the decisions of one of its justices. For example, in the letters patent establishing the High Court in Calcutta: Appeal from the Court a of original jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction.- And We do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal from the judgment, in all cases of original Civil jurisdiction, of one or more Judges of the said High Court, or of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 13 of the said recited Act: Provided always that no such appeal shall lie to the High Court as aforesaid from any such decision made by a majority of the full number of Judges of the said High Court, but that the right of appeal in such case shall be to Us, Our heirs or successors, in Our or their Privy Council, in manner hereinafter provided. This clause grants appellate jurisdiction to the High Court over the High Court itself when the court makes a decision in its original jurisdiction (unless the decision was already made by the majority of the court's judges). Of course, India can establish its own courts now and the power comes from the Constitution (in particular arts. 226 and 227) instead of the monarch personally, although some letters patent remain legally in force. The Indian Parliament now regulates the High Courts according to the Constitution. But the term letters patent appeal remained, because the appellate jurisdiction came from the letters patent.	The sovereign has the power to prorogue parliament at will, but actually exercises the power only on the advice of the PM (actually, according to paragraph three of the decision, it is exercised on the advice of the privy council). Other of the sovereign's powers are delegated to the courts. The court is not unfamiliar with exercising the sovereign's power to void her own acts, as acts of parliament and acts of government ministers are also nominally acts of the sovereign. While the courts cannot void acts of parliament, they can indeed void executive acts. Two relevant quotes follow. From paragraph 30, relating to the sovereign's lack of discretion in exercising the prerogative to prorogue parliament: It is not suggested in these appeals that Her Majesty was other than obliged by constitutional convention to accept that advice. In the circumstances, we express no view on that matter. That situation does, however, place on the Prime Minister a constitutional responsibility, as the only person with power to do so, to have regard to all relevant interests, including the interests of Parliament. From paragraph 32, on the justiciability of questions concerning prerogative powers: ... political controversy did not deter the courts from holding, in the Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, that an attempt to alter the law of the land by the use of the Crown’s prerogative powers was unlawful. The court concluded at p 76 that “the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him”, indicating that the limits of prerogative powers were set by law and were determined by the courts.	The short answer, is "it's complicated". I can think of situations where any of the above options you listed might be true. (Another possible option is "The baby has no nationality at birth", and would therefore be considered stateless, and would fall under the birth country's rules regarding statelessness). To find a definitive answer for your specific situation, I would start with Wikipedia: British nationality law Spanish nationality law Although Wikipedia is not authoritative, it does give you a good overview of the situation for both countries. There are then links to authoritative sources in each article. In the case of a British and Spanish couple, their baby would probably be both British and Spanish at birth. Additionally, if the baby is born in a country (such as the US) which follows the jus soli rules, then the baby would also acquire the citizenship of their birth country.	While this isn't a simple and direct answer, it should point you in the right direction. There are countries which like the United States have parallel national and subnational court system, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, and Switzerland. Different rules of procedure for different courts within a larger overall court system for a federal jurisdiction are not that unusual even in nominally unitary court systems. But, the division between them is on something of a continuum with fine shades of differences between them. Only a few are as close to the extreme of power sharing and a "federalist" approach as the United States, however. Also even unitary court systems (in a geographic and federalism sense) often have parallel court systems on subject matter grounds. For example, France has both ordinary civil courts and labor courts whose rulings could overlap, and England historically had courts of law and courts of equity with a complex relationship to each other (and also ecclesiastical courts with jurisdiction of matters now vested in the civil courts of law like inheritance of tangible personal property). Similarly, Northern Ireland has or has had what amount to different parallel legal systems for terrorism and non-terrorism criminal offense. Most countries also have parallel criminal and quasi-criminal legal systems for civilians and soldiers respectively. I've seen this tension between the two systems as a plot point in contemporary English police procedural dramas, for example. On the other hand, systems with a more unitary legal system rarely are so fierce in their defense of protections against double jeopardy as the United States, and the dual sovereignty doctrine in U.S. double jeopardy law can be seen as a safety valve in practice and as applied in cases where the double jeopardy rule as interpreted under the U.S. Constitution is too strong a bar to legitimate second prosecutions. A comparative analysis of double jeopardy concepts can be found here. It is tricky to reduce the subtly differences between the rules in different countries to a clear yes or no kind of answer. A square answer to your question requires detailed examination of a dozen or more court systems that someone felt the need to write a book about to explain. If I can find a more specific answer I will update this one.	By volume, it's almost certainly Statutory Instruments (SIs). From the relevant page on legislation.gov.uk, we can see that the number since 2010 has ranged from 1241 to 3485 per year. Compare that to, say, Acts of Parliament (23 to 41 per year in that period). The EUR-Lex page has some numbers relating to EU law. For example, in 2018, there were a total of 430 "legislative acts", and 1496 "non-legislative acts". Note that while EU Regulations become law directly in member states, EU Directives have to be implemented by domestic legislation. In the UK, this is normally done with SIs, which contribute to the numbers in the previous paragraph.
Can I sell computer source code that I reuse in other applications that I still sell? I have several different versions of the same software (written in .Net/WPF) that interact with different brands of hardware. I decided to discontinue one of the platforms. The company that sells the hardware for that platform approached me about purchasing the software source code from me so they can continue to sell the software to their customers. So, I would rework the UI and rebrand it so it doesn't look exactly like the other versions of the software, and they could claim it as their own. My question is, is there a way for me to sell and give them the source, without putting myself in legal danger since 50% of the source code is still in use with the other versions of the program I will continue selling? The client is fully aware of the situation, and is not interested in exclusive rights to the code. They just want to be able to take it over (and modify it if need be) so they can continue to sell it.	The answer by Dale M. is correct, but a bit brief. "Selling" is not an exact phrase. What you do not want to do is to transfer ("sell") the copyright to the source code. If you did that, you would put yourself in legal danger because they now own the copyright to code that you use in other products, and can sue you for copyright infringement. However, you selling a copy of source code does not imply transfer of copyright in any shape of form. When you buy a copy of a book in a book store, the author's copyright is not transferred to you. Accepting this deal would put the other party in legal danger. Even if they have bought the source code, they still don't have a license to make further copies of it and sell those. This is why you need to license the software to them. In brief: Copyright grants the copyright owner a lot of rights. These rights are always licensed, not sold. The right that is relevant here is the right to create derivative works. A license is simply a contract between the two parties, describing a particular business arrangement in legally binding terms. If I were in your position, I would hire an IP lawyer to help drafting the license. But, basically, the license should say that you, as owner of the copyright to ABC software, grants XYZ company access to its source in its present form, and also grants XYZ company the right to create derivative works, but only for hardware platform DEF, and to create and distribute copies of their derivative work.	The DMCA prohibits circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to a copyrighted work. So you can't legally "crack" the software, period -- even if you own a disc containing the software and have a valid license to use it, a license to use the work is not authorization to circumvent access controls. So if the disc is copy-protected, by my understanding of the DMCA, you're kinda screwed. (The company might be willing to provide you a replacement copy, even if only to maintain the illusion that the software is "licensed, not sold". But you can't make one yourself.) Likewise, if you have a copy of the disc but have lost the license key, you're screwed. Even if you could prove beyond any doubt that you are the licensee, there's not any law i'm aware of that would compel the copyright owner to provide you another license key. And courts have held that distribution of license keys without authorization is a violation of the DMCA. So whoever might provide you another key, if they're not the copyright holder, has broken the law. If you managed to copy the disc from a friend (without circumventing any kind of copy protection), and had your own license key, you might be in a better position. Many EULAs allow you to make a backup copy. Even if they didn't, copyright law does, so there's a possible case for fair use.	You should probably get a lawyer, but my reading is this: The company whose SDK you use owns their SDK, owns their code, and is free to take any of your ideas how to improve their code without paying you. But they say that ideas are ten a penny, so this is mostly there to prevent pointless lawsuits. On the other hand, it says that everything you do with your product is yours. I might be completely wrong, that's why you should get a lawyer.	If running Linux on same physical computer as Windows, can one legally use Microsoft's files? Apparently not. The fonts would be considered a feature of the software. Even mounting the Windows file system in your Linux partition, as opposed to copying the fonts, would violate the terms of the license. That is because the terms of the license allow the inference that the licensed copy of Windows 10 is mutually understood as the active partition at the time of using its features. Therefore, using the fonts from elsewhere (including a different partition insofar as the license considers it a device on its own) constitutes using the feature separately.	You ask permission, preferably with legal counsel to handle the details. It really is that simple. Unsurprisingly, most companies don't want to give their code away- especially to a competitor. If you even get a response, they will expect something in return i.e. money. Realistically though, it's unlikely they will respond, much less deal with you.	You can't You agreed: by submitting Materials in any form to the Company, in addition to other provisions of the Terms, you automatically grant Company a royalty-free, world-wide, irrevocable, non-exclusive, and assignable right and license to use, copy, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, edit, translate, create derivative works from, transmit, distribute, publicly display and publicly perform such Materials for the purpose of displaying and promoting the Materials on any website operated by, and in any related marketing materials produced by, the Company and its affiliates. They can keep and use your data forever and give it to whoever they want. The clause you quote doesn't alter that. All it says is that once a year, if you ask, they will tell you what information they shared and with whom. If they feel like it they will tell you how to get the information deleted.	Copyright would generally protect all aspects of the Windows operating system. Therefore, to the extend that Kali is visually similar to Windows, it might be illegal infringement. It would not be infringement if those elements were used with permission from MS (note that the product is available on the Microsoft store). Since you semi-stipulate that they do not have permission, we can move to the possibility of a fair use defense. That defense might be successful since at least apparently there would be no effect on market and the copying is somewhat transformative. Finally, the finder of fact would have to decide if those elements of Kali are "substantially similar" to the Windows originals. It could be found that the similarity which you perceive is due to "copying the idea", not copying the expression. E.g. the idea of a manila folder as an icon is not protected, so it becomes a fairly technical discussion centering on copyright law and "look and feel".	If you are subcontracted, then some other company is going to use the code that you wrote, and since you were not paid for it, you are the copyright holder. A letter to that company's legal department might work wonders.
Using Personal data before consent I am having an Android App which is going to use some services such as Google Analytics, Firebase etc. I have a thought of having two different consent screens for different region user such as EU Users will have a screen in which the checkbox will be unchecked by default whereas users from other region will have the checkbox prechecked. I would be using the GPS location before taking the consent to find out the users region(Location may not be exact location). Now my question I will use the GPS location to only check the location and WILL NOT STORE IT OR COLLECT IT AT ANY COST. Does the GDPR or any other privacy law stop or disallow me to do that? Any help will be really useful.	Doing this is OK according to the GDPR and other European laws. The relevant bit is GDPRs rules for Lawfulness of processing, and in particular Article 6 (1)b, which says that it is legal to do this if processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; In your particular case, signing up for using your app is "entering into a contract" and it is the data subject who has requested to use your app that is subject to this processing.	You clearly cannot provide data that you haven't stored – and not storing data is a good thing under the Art 5(1)(c) Data Minimization Principle. Despite the Art 20 data portability right being conditional on that the data subject has provided data and not on that data has been stored, I think responding to such a request with “sorry, as per our privacy policy we do not store this data” would be perfectly fine. It is also curious that you are using consent as the legal basis for the purpose of selecting the website language. How do you obtain consent from visitors? How can you prove that you got consent? In many ways, consent is the legal basis of last resort, and I'd think that legitimate interest would be a much more straightforward approach in your case.	Yes, your transaction history is your personal data. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. Your transaction history relates to you, and you're definitely identifiable for the bank. You have access to the transaction history to the app, which would probably satisfy Art 15 GDPR. You do also have a right to data portability under Art 20 GDPR which allows you to get your data in a machine-readable format – but strictly speaking this right only applies to data you provided yourself. You could try to explicitly invoke this right. Your GDPR rights must be satisfied without cost. Your bank almost certainly does provide machine-readable API access, in conformance with the open banking mandate from the Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2, Directive (EU) 2015/2366). The Directive requires your EU member state to have passed a law that gives you “the right to make use of services enabling access to account information”, if you're already using online banking. However, the exact details of that right will depend on the laws in your EU member state. You might already be able to connect to your transaction history via Open Banking software such as GNU Cash.	In the question, you write: The GDPR requires consent of the subject for collection or storage of personal data (in this case, IP addresses in a log file). No, it does not. To quote Miss Infogeek: GDPR DOES NOT MAKE CONSENT A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR ALL PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA. Consent (Article 6 (1)a) is indeed one of conditions that can be used to comply with the GDPR requirement that processing must be lawful, but it is not the only condition available to the controller to ensure lawful processing – there are alternatives (before the list of conditions it says that "at least one of the following" must be satisfied). All the conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. One of alternatives are Article 6 (1)f. It says says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) As noted in the question, logging IP addresses for the purpose of security is an extremely widespread practice. It is a legitimate interest to comply with standard security practices. It is the default, and most (all?) web-sites do this. I.e. it is legal to do this without consent (if this is not the case, I am pretty sure the outcry had been heard all over the Internet by now).	GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls.	Yes. Article 4 GDPR Definitions (1) ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Recital 26 Not applicable to anonymous data The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes.	These are only tangentially related to the GDPR A government entity processing data in accordance with a member state law is ipso facto in compliance with the GDPR. That’s because lawful government data processing is a legitimate reason for processing data under the GDPR. If Germany, for example, passes a law saying German police can record every phone call in Germany, then that would be a lawful basis for processing under the GDPR. There may be constitutional or other legal limitations on such a law but as far as the GDPR is concerned, they’re fine.	Under GDPR Article 6 section 1(f), a lawful basis for processing is: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. It seems that informing a data subject of the availability of a possibly better-focused related site would be a "legitimate interest", and merely doing a broad geo-locate on the IP does not seem to impact the "interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject" so it would seem this could be done without specific consent in advance. I don't know of any legal case on this specific point, however.
How do I copyright songs under "Creative Commons?" I have some songs that I want to to copyright. Some of them I want to copyright under "Creative Commons" and some I want to copyright under "All Rights Reserved." I know how to copyright songs, but how do I apply "Creative Commons" or "All Rights Reserved" to a song?	To apply "All rights reserved" to a song, you write the three words "All rights reserved" in your copyright notice (see the "PS" below for the rationale for doing this). To apply a Creative Commons public license to a song, you use the Creative Commons License Chooser to generate a license for your song. Then you add the HTML-code generated by the License Chooser to the web-page where the song is available to the public (for streaming or for download). PS: Since the year 2000, adding the string "All rights reserved" no longer has a legal effect in any jurisdiction. According to the Berne convention, all rights are automatically reserved as soon as you create a song or any other creative work. However, I recommend that you assert your rights with this notice. I've come across people who believe that it is perfectly legal to use a work for non-commercial purposes if there is no assertion of rights attached to the work. They are wrong, but adding the notice may avoid some misunderstandings.	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	In the US, at least, facts - like the speed of light, the name of a dinosaur or the moons of Jupiter - are not copyrightable. But the words or pictures, designs and original work used to express and present those facts in books, websites and other publications by individuals and publishers are copyrightable. (Original work doesn't need to be published to be copyrighted; it is copyrighted at the moment of creation.) See How can "factual" intellectual property be protected? Plagiarism can be copyright infringement; it's copying and presenting work of someone else's as your own. But not all copyright infringement is plagiarism in the sense that someone is claiming others' work as their own: if you're selling a T-shirt with an unlicensed design, you're not really claiming the design is yours; you're just trying to make money. If you use all or part of an image or a quote or a song from a copyrighted source in your own work, you need permission and attribute the source. Or, you have to decide if the amount of the copyrighted material you are using might be Fair Use and you don't need permission. But decisions on what might constitute Fair Use are ultimately decided in court, because that's where can you end up when a person or a publisher sues you for alleged copyright infringement.	A song with the same melody and different lyrics is a derivative work. It does not matter whether the song is to be sung for money, or not. The copyright owner still retains the rights to the melody, and can deny anyone permission to use it in a derivative work. Furthermore, using the derivative song to make a statement does not restrict or reduce the rights of the copyright holder. Refer to Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), below. See: Derivative work Derivative works can be created with the permission of the copyright owner or from works in the public domain. (...) The copyright for the derivative work only covers the additions or changes to the original work, not the original itself. The owner of the original work retains control over the work, and in many circumstances can withdraw the license given to someone to create derivative works. And: Why is parody considered fair use, but satire isn't? As the Supreme Court explained in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., “Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.” Also: Mechanical license Within copyright law within the United states, such mechanical licenses are compulsory; any party may obtain a license without permission of the license holder by paying a set license fee, that as of 2018, was set at 9.1 cents per composition or 1.75 cents per minute of composition, whichever is more, which are to go to the composition copyright holder. (...) In American law, US Code Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 115(a)(2) states: "A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work ..." thus preventing mechanical licenses being used to make substantially derivative works of a piece of music. (...) For example: Puff Daddy wants to sample the opening riff from “Every Breath You Take” by The Police. (...) He is free to hire musicians to reproduce the Police's sound, but he cannot copy from any phonorecord with only a mechanical license.	I can see two points you might be confused about in your question. 1. Works can be in the public domain without having a CC license The Wikipedia statement and the government statement are not inconsistent with each other; just because something isn't available under a Creative Commons license doesn't necessarily mean that it is restricted by copyright. In fact, CC licenses are moot for material in the public domain: When a work is in the public domain, it is free for use by anyone for any purpose without restriction under copyright law. Public domain is the purest form of open/free, since no one owns or controls the material in any way. ... Creative Commons licenses do not affect the status of a work that is in the public domain under applicable law, because our licenses only apply to works that are protected by copyright. So if a work is in the public domain, you can use it for whatever purpose you wish (though see below), without restriction or attribution. This is less restrictive than the various Creative Commons licenses, which require various levels of attribution, non-modification, etc. depending on the license chosen by the creator. 2. Trademark protections are separate from copyright protections Your quote from the government website implies that these logos might be trademarked, even if they're not under copyright; this is entirely possible. Roughly speaking, trademark protections keep other people from trading on your good name & reputation; copyright protections keep other people from directly profiting from your creative endeavors. If another party creates a product that uses a trademark in a way that would create confusion among consumers, the trademark holder can sue for that. Depending on how you use the logos, you might run afoul of these protections. See this Q&A for futher details under US law. (Australian law may differ a bit but I would expect that the general principles are the same.)	Those posts are talking about making a modified copy of a copyrighted work. The key word is copy. You are not making a copy. Copyright is not about how a physical embodiment of a copyrighted work is treated. You can burn a book and shred a newspaper. Neither of those actions is making a copy. Also, cutting up a newspaper and pasting a picture on your wall has nothing to do with any “derivative works” issue.	Your question is whether you can copy instrumental portions of recorded music, and modify it to create a new work, without permission. The answer is that this is illegal. This would be creating a "derivative work", and under copyright law, only the copyright holder has the right to authorize creation of a derivative work. Whether or not you have paid for a copy of a recording, you would still need a separate license to legally extract and use part of a recording. This includes taking just one instrument, and includes taking just a part of one instrument. Material on Youtube is subject to different licenses: in some cases items are free of restrictions, in some cases, you can't legally copy them at all. The standard Youtube license does not allow any copying. Copyright infringement of music is rather common. Enforcement of copyright must be pursued by the copyright holder, and you would need to discuss your specific plans with a copyright attorney to determine your probability of getting sued. Ultimately, you might get away with minimal copying, relying on a fair use defense (you still get sued, but you might prevail and not have to pay). There are street rumors that there is an N-note threshold for copyright infringement, where people often pick numbers from 3 to 7, but in fact there is no clear rule. This resource assembles relevant case law. Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, in the 6th District, establishes the rule that any amount of copying is infringement, whereas VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone in the 9th District rejects that finding and allowed a case of .23 seconds (230 milliseconds) of copying. The "de minimis" doctrine is independent of "fair use" which has a statutory basis, but seems to have arisen from similarity doctrines which are involved in proving that copying took place.	You cannot. Ideas are not subject to copyright protection: see here. Your expression is subject to copyright protection, but if you intend to publish the expression (after you write it), you have to find a way to do so without surrendering your exclusive right, as you did for example with your question (read the TOS for Stackexchange).
Arbitration Clause: Account Credits vs Money Stipulation I'd like to start off by saying that this is somewhat of a follow-up to a previous question I had asked back in June, 2016. I've continued to struggle with trying to find an agreement that resolves the issue I've been having. In this time, I've fulfilled all the requirements to continue through to arbitration and have been preparing to do so. My question's focus pertains to the Customer Agreement clause, which explains how the arbitration reward is handled. Highlighted is the specific section: (6) WE MAY, BUT ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO, MAKE A WRITTEN SETTLEMENT OFFER ANYTIME BEFORE ARBITRATION BEGINS. THE AMOUNT OR TERMS OF ANY SETTLEMENT OFFER MAY NOT BE DISCLOSED TO THE ARBITRATOR UNTIL AFTER THE ARBITRATOR ISSUES AN AWARD ON THE CLAIM. IF YOU DON'T ACCEPT THE OFFER AND THE ARBITRATOR AWARDS YOU AN AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT'S MORE THAN OUR OFFER BUT LESS THAN $5,000, OR IF WE DON'T MAKE YOU AN OFFER, AND THE ARBITRATOR AWARDS YOU ANY AMOUNT OF MONEY BUT LESS THAN $5,000, THEN WE AGREE TO PAY YOU $5,000 INSTEAD OF THE AMOUNT AWARDED. IN THAT CASE WE ALSO AGREE TO PAY ANY REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE LAW REQUIRES IT FOR YOUR CASE. IF THE ARBITRATOR AWARDS YOU MORE THAN $5,000, THEN WE WILL PAY YOU THAT AMOUNT. To my understanding, this clause basically says if the arbitrator offers any amount of money more than what was formally offered by the business, I'll be rewarded a minimum of $5,000. The business has made a few offers, all of which are for account credits with them (and are certainly far too low to accept). Their exact response when I had asked about how their settlement offer would be paid was as follows: "This would be a direct financial adjustment to your [Phone Provider] account. You were properly advised that the promotional offers are not a cash value type of offer, but a direct financial adjustment to the account will save you the equivalent amount not having to pay your [Phone Provider] bill until the credit amount has been depleted." Questions: Since the account credit offers are worth no real cash value, would that mean that any real-money offer made by the arbitrator could/would cause me to win since money certainly gives the impression of actual currency? Is there any particular reason why an arbitration clause would floor the reward to such a notable amount? Is this number passing a threshold to prevent other legal grounds from following? Follow-up: 05/17/2017: I went through the arbitration process and was deemed an award of $900.00, along with $52.89 in interest. Both of these are going to be paid in US dollars. However, I'm still under the impression that being paid in US dollars is more "money" than the $1,300 in "non-cash value" credits they had offered prior. I sent them an email requesting they uphold the agreement, but I'm not sure if this is too much of a technicality. 05/30/2017: The business followed up with a statement of "The customer agreement does not address the delivery of the settlement offer, but the amount of it." I'm not sure if that statement is accurate since the clause denotes "money" as the medium, not a generic value. I'm just not sure if this is something that has enough foundation to fight for in another arbitration case or to potentially pursue in court. 03/09/2018: I opened a second arbitration case to contest that the business didn't conform to their customer agreement. My position was that $952.89 was worth more than $1,300 in account credits. I was found in favor and they were required to pay out the minimum value listed in the arbitration clause because account credits have no monetary value (the answer in this question helps explain why that result happened). 04/19/2018: I sent an intent-to-arbitrate letter again stating that I was looking to open a third case because they failed to pay the full amount of money in accordance with the arbitration clause below. The original approach was that they still failed to pay $5,000 each time I won a higher amount than they offered. I structured my claim that they were $5,000 short as I only received two payments, but both should have been raised to $5,000 individually. The other perspective was that they were technically only $952.89 short. 05/10/2018: We came to an agreement of a settlement amount. I am in the process of signing and finally being done with cycling arbitration claims over contract technicalities and oversights. Gathering about ten times the original claim amount was worth it, but it did take about two and a half years.	That is a bit of queer provision. I'm not going to answer your first question because I think that it is a gray area with no definitive answer. In answer to your second question, my strong suspicion is that it is drafted in the shadow of a particular state consumer protection act. An arbitration clause is allowed to change your procedural rights, but cannot change substantive rights that cannot be waived by a pre-dispute contractual agreement. If it does that, it is void and you can go to court instead of an arbitration forum. Many consumer protection laws provide that a prevailing party is entitled to minimum statutory damages in lieu of actual damages if they are smaller, in addition to your reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs if you prevail. This is done to make it economically viable for private citizens to sue over violations of the consumer protection law that would otherwise involve actual damages too small to be worth suing over, without having to bring a class action. If the relevant consumer protection law has a minimum $5,000 statutory damages amount for some claims covered by the clause, this clause would prevent it from being invalidated, while allowing the merchant to still have access to the consumer unfriendly arbitration forum in which class action lawsuits are probably also barred while class action lawsuits would not be in court. For a big merchant, it is far better to have to pay $5,000 and attorneys' fees to the handful of people who bring arbitrations and win them, than to lose a single class action lawsuit for millions of dollars.	I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney.	Please note that I can't provide legal advice and consider the following as suggestions you can and should discuss with a lawyer of your choice: You are probably member of a tax-advisory association (Lohnsteuerhilfeverein). These associations can only advise its members on their tax declarations. Therefore you are indeed a member, not a "member". As a member you are presumably obliged to pay a yearly membership fee, and from your initial question I infer that the membership cannot be terminated before three years have passed. That and when you have to pay your fee is most likely provided for in the association's constitution. Payment of the fee does not depend on an invoice, because the requirements of § 14 UStG are most likely not met: the association is not a trader (Unternehmer), nor is a membership a performance (Leistung). Whether you have to pay a penalty depends on the wording of the section regarding the fee in the constitution. If your membership rights have been infringed by not giving you notice of the annual general meeting, this would not give you a defence or objection against the payment of the fee. You could report this matter to the competent watchdog (Aufsichtsbehörde) under § 27(1) StBerG, though: Aufsichtsbehörde ist die Oberfinanzdirektion oder die durch die Landesregierung bestimmte Landesfinanzbehörde. 2 Sie führt die Aufsicht über die Lohnsteuerhilfevereine, die ihren Sitz im Bezirk der Aufsichtsbehörde haben. That is either the Oberfinanzdirektion or the Landesfinanzbehörde in the German state where the association has its statutory seat.	What you're talking about is a liquidated-damages clause, where the contract explicitly spells out the damages to be awarded in the event of a breach. The law will vary some from state to state, but these clauses are generally enforceable. Some courts limit their use to cases where calculating the damages resulting from the breach would be impossible or impractical. But in the United States, along with all other common law jurisdictions, courts generally agree that if the liquidated-damages clause appears to penalize the breach instead of simply compensating for it, it is not enforceable. See, e.g., Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass'n, 17 Cal.4th 970, 977 (Cal. 1998) (“A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671(b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.”) The trillion-dollar damages clause "bears no reasonable relationship" to the damages that would actually result from a breach of a software license, so you can safely expect a court to refuse to enforce it, and limit you to whatever damages you could actually prove in court. Even if you were to drastically reduce it to "all the money you have, and then some," "all the money you have," "half the money you have," or even " "1 percent of all the money you have," the language still makes clear that the contract is not aimed at compensating for the breach, but rather penalizing the breaching party. In the end, what you're talking about isn't going to work, because contract law is generally less concerned with penalizing people than with making them whole.	This aspect (and many others) of contract law is applicable in the US and various countries of the EU. can they renege after the candidate has begun their journey, thus saddling the candidate with the travel cost? No. The company would incur breach of contract. There is no need for a formal contract. The candidate only needs to prove that the company agreed (in writing, orally or clearly through its conduct) to cover or reimburse those expenses and that this elicited a meeting of the minds. The agreement would be void if the candidate incurred the expenses despite knowing (via timely notice) that the company changed its mind. Likewise, if the candidate lied on his CV, the contract (here, the company's agreement to cover the expenses) would be voidable by the company, since the candidate's intentional misrepresentations preclude the aforementioned condition of meeting of the minds. --Edited on 1/18/2019 to add ...-- Per suggestion by @KRyan, the aspect of void or voidable contract is expanded. But first, two disclaimers are pertinent: We need to be mindful that many of the follow-up concerns are either premised on or inspired by the situation described in the underlying Workplace SE post. These are somewhat beyond the scope of this Law SE question but addressed nonetheless, given their relevance as well as the OP's & audience's interest. The follow-up hypotheticals [in this Law SE question] and clarifications thereto neither speculate nor pass judgment on the stranded candidate who asked on Workplace SE. The Workplace SE post reflects a company's breach of contract. The subsequent comments here about fraud hypotheticals are mostly derivative inquiries beyond what is described in Workplace SE. In particular, we do not assume whatsoever that the stranded candidate committed fraud. The_Sympathizer commented: can the contract be voided on the spot like that without first proving in court? As it seems like it grants a rather "vigilante" justice power that is open to abuse, since effectively the "punishment" (cancellation of the flight and thus inducing a rather serious physical situation) is administered before any due process has been afforded the one accused. Yes, it can be voided on the spot (aka sua sponte). "Vigilante" justice denotes a self-attribution of punitive powers that exclusively belong to the state/government/court, whereas a party's voiding of a contract is the act of foreclosing his losses/exposures with respect to a contract that de facto never existed (such as when that contract was induced by fraud). I agree that unfortunately that is open to abuse: As a pretext to actually incur breach of contract, a company might allege that the contract was void. That is why (if taken to court) it will be the company's burden to prove that (1) it reasonably relied upon a candidate's representations (2) which were significant and blatantly false (3) given the candidate's knowledge that his lies contravened the job's core requirements. That can be quite burdensome. For instance, is the company handing out airfares without first conducting some competent corroborations about the candidate's credentials/skills? If so, one can hardly concede the company's allegation of reasonable reliance. The resulting finding would be that the contract was not voidable by the company, and thus that it is liable for breach of contract. Also, belatedly "informing" the stranded candidate that the company "is going in a different direction" falls short of evidencing that the contract was voidable. That applies even if the candidate performed very poorly in the interview or screening process. Given the hardship imposed on a stranded candidate, a company has to be morally and legally very judicious about its method and timing for "going in a different direction". But absent any representations or [company's] bylaws to the contrary, a company generally does not have the obligation to afford due process to a candidate. The court is the entity with an obligation to enforce due process as provided by law (although many of us in the U.S. have repeatedly experienced the courts' disavowal of due process). --End of edit on 1/19/2019-- a binding agreement requires both sides to give something Here, the candidate's consideration is his time and effort to accommodate the company's interest in assessing the candidate's profile at a location that is convenient to the company.	In the United States, is it required by law for a company offering a long term service contract to include an option to opt-out of their arbitration agreement, if the customer chooses to exercise that option? No. (There may be isolated exceptions to this principle for very particular kinds of services, but the exceptions are rare and this is not the general rule.) Does it benefit the customer to use arbitration over the regular courts or is the arbitration clause in place purely for the benefit of the company? It almost never benefits the customer to use arbitration in lieu of regular courts. This is put in place primarily to prevent consumers from bringing class action lawsuits and because arbitration forums are routinely biased in favor of the company. Usually, an arbitration clause has the practical effect of denying the consumer any legal recourse whatsoever, and the consumer almost never actually utilizes this right. Also, an arbitration decision can't be overturned by a court even if it clearly and obviously misstates the facts and applies legal rules that are clearly contrary to the law.	A settlement can include whatever terms the parties agree on, short of terms prohibited by law. Usually one party gives up at lest some claims. Then other party nay also give up,claims, or make a payment, or both. There may be other terms as well, including confidentiality of the details. It is not uncommon for both parties to give up all claims against each other. Settlement agreements are legally binding on both parties. We cannot advise on what kind of settlement a particular person should take in a particular case. For tht, consult a lawyer.	No, the only purpose of a money order is that it's effectively a form of guaranteed cash that only one person can access. There are no additional protections offered by it. However, given that you are amenable to paying a little extra to facilitate your payments, you may want to consider using a credit card in the future. Provided it's not an all the time thing, credit cards will withhold payments on your behalf if a vendor fails to fulfill their obligations. This means that you're not liable for the cost of the merchant sending you the wrong thing or ignoring your order requests. I've personally done this for several things: Hotel reservation that was borderline unsuitable for human habitation. When a vendor failed to send something I'd purchased. When proceeding with this, bear in mind that the credit card company will want you to make such a claim as soon as possible and to provide as much information as possible to support your claim. If you've e-mail chains, save them. If you've been communicating by phone, write down and provide a summary of your communications. If you have an issue, don't wait a month to raise the concern, do it within a week. Probably about once a year I need to do something like this. Generally what this does is it starts a dispute process whereby the credit company will contact the vendor to get their side of the story (usually they don't respond to them either). After 60 days, the charge is dropped from your bill and presumably the credit card company refuses to pay for the disputed item. Ultimately, this gets you the best possible result. You get your money back and you didn't have to go to court to do it.
Is it legal to carry any kind of weapon in the UK? Concealed or otherwise is it legal for a private citizen to carry any kind of weapon for self defence purposes in the UK?	JeffUK has quoted the relevant law. However the question then becomes "what is an 'offensive weapon'", and "what is a lawful excuse?". Almost anything can be classified as an offensive weapon if you can use it as a weapon. See https://www.askthe.police.uk/content/Q338.htm A lawful excuse is something like "I am going to play baseball, which is why I have a baseball bat". It is emphatically not "I want it for self defence". Specifically, https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/offensive-weapons-knives-bladed-and-pointed-articles cites Patterson v Block [1984] 81 LSG 2458 – carrying a weapon for defence can still amount to intent to cause injury So the answer to the OP's original question: Is it legal for a private citizen to carry any kind of weapon for self defence purposes in the UK? is "No".	An obvious example would be a contract that gives possession of something to someone else. It's normally legal to use some reasonable amount of force to protect or prevent trespasses against property you own, but if you give possession of that property to someone else you can lose that right. For example, you can use force remove a guest who refuses to leave real property you own, but can't use force to remove a tenant even if they broke the terms of your contract. In most jurisdictions you'd need to get a court order and have the police use force if necessary remove the tenant.	The relevant regulations in 49 CFR 1540 refer to weapons, not firearms, and unless you are specifically permitted, you cannot carry a weapon in your carry-on luggage. The interpretation of "weapon" is given here, which says Weapons are objects that may be used to attack another. TSA considers an item to be a weapon under 49 CFR 1540.111 if it is created for use as a weapon or is so similar to an item created as a weapon that it appears to be, or is easily used as, a weapon. Weapons include firearms, as well as realistic replicas of firearms that may reasonably be thought to be actual weapons. Such realistic replicas are prohibited because their similarity in appearance to real weapons may allow them to be used to intimidate passengers and flight crew. The screener has the discretion to determine when a replica is so realistic that it should be prohibited. Other toy weapons will be allowed in the sterile areas and cabin. Partial weapons and parts of weapons also are prohibited because they may be carried separately by collaborators for assembly subsequent to entry or boarding. In addition, partial weapons may appear to be operative and could be used to intimidate passengers and flight crew.	There are many regulations to consider, for the firearms themselves, the permits needed by potential customers, and licensing you will need as a business dealing with firearms and ammunition. Start with the Home Office: https://www.gov.uk/search?q=firearms I.e., https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/479794/Guidance_on_Firearms_Licensing_Law_Nov_2015_v16.pdf	Was or is possession of screwdriver illegal in the UK? Yes, if the screwdriver's intended purpose is for a criminal act. There's not enough detail in the article, but the most likely scenarios are: Offensive Weapon, contrary to section 1 Prevention of Crime Act 1953: (1)Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence ... [...] (4)In this section “ public place ” includes any highway, or in Scotland any road within the meaning of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 and any other premises or place to which at the material time the public have or are permitted to have access, whether on payment or otherwise; and "offensive weapon” means any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him or by some other person. Going Equipped to steal, contrary to section 25 Theft Act 1968: (1)A person shall be guilty of an offence if, when not at his place of abode, he has with him any article for use in the course of or in connection with any burglary or theft. (2)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. (3)Where a person is charged with an offence under this section, proof that he had with him any article made or adapted for use in committing a burglary or theft shall be evidence that he had it with him for such use. [...] (5)For purposes of this section an offence under section 12(1) of this Act of taking a conveyance shall be treated as theft. Possession with intent to destroy or damage property, contrary to section 3 Criminal Damage Act 1971: A person who has anything in his custody or under his control intending without lawful excuse to use it or cause or permit another to use it— (a)to destroy or damage any property belonging to some other person; or (b)to destroy or damage his own or the user’s property in a way which he knows is likely to endanger the life of some other person; shall be guilty of an offence. [with a maximum sentence of 10 years] NB in this jurisdiction, possession of a weapon for self-protection is not, except in some very narrow circumstances, a reasonable excuse to carrying one.	There is, as far as I can see, no legal definition of picnic in England and Wales. In the absence of such, the convention applied by the UK courts is to use the normal meaning of the word; usually by reference to the Oxford English Dictionary (which is behind a paywall so I've used its free online version here)... An occasion when a packed meal is eaten outdoors, especially during an outing to the countryside. (My emphasis)	Firstly, your "apartment" doesn't prohibit anything; Your tenancy contract does. A terminology nitpick, but one that can shed some light on what is actually happening. TLDR: Your right to bear arms isn't being infringed, its being traded away. An unreasonable trade may be invalidated by the courts. Firearms restrictions are far less likely to be voided than speech content limitations. Yes, you have the right to bear arms(whatever exact meaning of that is). You also have the right to voluntarily agree to a binding agreement limiting that right, in exchange for a consideration. Compare a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). You have the right to freedom in your speech: you also have the right to agree to binding limits on your freedom of speech, in return for consideration (such as money or access to information). Every contract is structured in the same general way: Party A agrees to do or avoid doing certain things, in exchange for Party B agreeing to do or avoid doing certain things. So, in essence, what the apartment contract says is, that you agree to do or not do some things (including paying rent), in return for your landlord temporarily granting you some rights(such as the right to reside(generally exclusive), the right to control the space, etc. ), and imposing some obligations on themselves (which vary from place to place). In your case, one of the things that you are trading is a limitation on your right to bear arms(note that you can still bear arms, just not on the property in question). Now one thing to note is that courts have the power to enforce contracts; they also have the power to void contracts, in part or in full, if they are illegal or "unconscionable". In general, restricting (the content of) speech is not reasonable (e.g. having a general noise level restriction is reasonable), so is more likely to be struck down than one restricting firearms on the rented property.	Let's put to bed the myth of privacy that is at the heart of your question: in R v Sotheren (2001) NSWSC 204 Justice Dowd said “A person, in our society, does not have a right not to be photographed" So they can ask you to stop; its bad manners if you don't but it is not illegal. If they are the controller of the property then they can stop you filming from their property but they cannot stop you filming into their property from outside (either public land or land where you do have permission). See How do laws affect photography of non-humans in public when people may be in the frame?
Can you provide free technical services to Iranians from America? Is it legal to provide free technical services to Iranians, or to grant them access to services such as websites and social media? Is it the duty of American Companies to actively prevent access from Iranian IPs and Users? To what extent can use be permitted? The question is about the exchange of information/services that would otherwise be freely offered to Americans under the scope of legal subject matter. I'm only concerned about the ramifications from the side of a corporation or person residing and operating in the USA.	It really depends on what "services" you are providing, but generally speaking you would be in violation of the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). These regulations are spelled out in 31 CFR §560.205 and 560.420 and apply to US citizens and residents wherever located. Specifically, the action that is prohibited is the "exportation, reexportation, sale or supply of goods, technology, or services to Iran. Here "Services" is broadly construed to mean anything of value even if no money is exchanged, including providing technical assistance to an Iranian national or Iranian institution. See See § 560.204; §560.410. The civil penalty for violation of these sanctions would be $250,000 or an amount "equal to twice the amount that is the basis of the violation". Criminal penalties may include fines up to $1 million and 20 years in prison. Now there are some exempt transactions outlined by § 560.210 (c) which may be applicable here, however it would be up to you to prove that these are "information or informational materials" as defined by § 560.315. For more information, 31 CFR Part 560, Subpart B refers to the prohibited transactions with Iran. Since you are not specifically spelling out what services you intend to provide, it is difficult to say for sure you would be in violation of them. It should be noted though that the US Government uses publicly funded money to run a proxy server through which Iranians can access otherwise blocked websites such as social media in Iran.	It is certainly possible to transfer a copyright or other IP without an explicit charge, indeed it can be a pure gift, and normally would be when it is left by will, as is common enough. From a paid consultant it might be clearer to include a statement that the transfer is part of the consulting assignment, rather than putting a price of zero in a blank. But one could instead convey a permanent non-exclusive license, granting permission to use or modify the work in any way desired, ans saying that this is provided as part of the consulting process. Then there would be no question of what rights the consultant retained, or that the same or a very similar solution could be provided to different clients. Indeed such a license would not be so very different from a CC-BY license, or any of several open source licenses, although I would not use one of those by name. But the legal effect would be much the same, and the wording could be similar. Otherwise there could be a later claim that the right transferred precluded the consultant from using the same solution for other clients. Even if such a claim was not legally sound, and was not upheld, it could be a distraction and costly of time and energy at least.	Such use might well be illegal, and subject the user to tort liability, or possibly even criminal liability. Parties For this discussion let us call the person or company that developed and wants to protect the information D, the person or company that downloaded and wants to use the information U, and the person who placed the information on the server P. Trade Secret One possible source of liability is if D considers the information to be a trade-secret. The law on trade secrets varies to some extent in different countries, although there is a general similarity. Since no jurisdiction is specified in the question, I am going to look at the united-states law. Definition The LII page on "Trade Secrets defines a trade secret under the US Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA") as: "information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. A similar definition is given by the USPTO page on "trade secret policy". Prior to the USTA, and still in those US states that have not adopted the USTA, trade secrets were/are protected under the common law. The LII page lists the common law factors, as given by the Restatement of Torts (1939) § 757, comment b: The extent to which the information is known outside the claimant's business The extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business The extent of measures taken by the claimant to guard the secrecy of the information The value of the information to the business and its competitors The amount of effort or money expended by the business in developing the information The ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others These factors may apply in other common-law countries. In either case, one must consider how the would-be user came to acquire the information, and thus how it came to be on the server from which it was downloaded. One must also consider whether it was the subject of "reasonable efforts" to protect its secrecy, under the circumstances. Circumstances If P was violating an obligation of confidentiality, such as an NDA or a duty as part of an employment relationship, then the placement of the info on the server was improper. In such a case its acquisition by another, such as U might constitute misappropriation. The same would be true if a person under an obligation of confidentiality arranged for the server to be indexed by a search engine, when it should not have been. The case for misappropriation would be stronger if U knew that the information was considered confidential by D, and also if P had informed U about where to find the info, or what search terms would uncover it. If P was acting with the permission of D, and P or someone else at D simply failed to realize that the server was, or might become, indexed, then the question is whether the steps taken by D to keep the info secret were reasonable. If this a case of "inadvertent disclosure resulting from the trade secret holder's failure to take reasonable protective measures" then there is no misappropriation, and the actions of U are lawful. That will depend of a judgement of whether D's actions were reasonable in light of the value of the info and the overall circumstances. If the placement of the info on the server is considered to constitute "general publication" of the info, so that it is no longer secret in any meaningful sense, then D may have a claim against P, but not against U unless U acted in collaboration with P. Copyright Law The documents downloaded from the4 server are almost surely protected by copyright. Directly incorporating them into an open source project without permission from the copyright holder would be copyright infringement, and would subject U to a suit for infringement. However, copyright does not protect ideas, methods, or facts. If U learns a method or idea from the document, and uses that knowledge without directly copying or closely paraphrasing the document, there is no copyright infringement and no claim under copyright law. Patent Law The question does not mention any patents. It is possible that D has patented the method describe in the downloaded documents. If so, and if the patent is valid, any use by U would be patent infringement, and the question of how U learned the info becomes irrelevant. However, most software developments such as data structures are not patented, so this is a somewhat unlikely, albeit possible, case. Notre that if the information is covered by a patent is is by definition not secret, as all patents must be openly disclosed. But they may not be widely publicized, and if U does not make a patent search, U may not realize that the document includes patented technology. This possibility is largely incompatible with the trade secret possibility, althogh it is possible to use trade secrets in connection with patented tech. Conclusion In short whether U may lawfully use then info, or is subject to a tort claim by D, or even criminal action, depend on the details of the overall facts. U would do well to take legal advice on the matter before proceeding to use the info.	Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.	To use an API over a network connection (as opposed to, e.g., the Windows API), a user communicates a request to the API host, or server, and awaits a response. The host of the remote API can refuse to serve requests from users for probably any reason. Such services often require users to accept a license as a condition of using the service, and they may charge a fee as a condition of the license. A license to use a service is obviously not necessarily bound to a license for the use of its source code, just as the ability to reach the service is not dependent on the ability to see (let alone use) the code in any format, whether it be the source code or some compiled form of the code. In essence, source licenses and service licenses have different primary goals, at least inasmuch as the source license seeks to restrict someone who has actual physical access to compiled code, and possibly source code. Service licenses do not have that concern, though I have seen service licenses that also prohibit decompiling. This is probably the result of a CYA attitude among lawyers: the language is already in the standard software license text, and it doesn't hurt anything to leave it in, and it could help if a service user somehow managed to download the program code.	Makerbot's explanation of the Terms is accurate This is comparable with most other services that host and display User-created content - even with SaaS providers, as per Interpretation of content ownership/usage in service provider agreement. They are correct that they are asking for the lots of broad rights, but it's all qualified with (my emphasis): 3.2 License. You hereby grant, and you represent and warrant that you have the right to grant, to the Company and its affiliates and partners, an irrevocable, nonexclusive, royalty-free and fully paid, worldwide license to reproduce, distribute, publicly display and perform, prepare derivative works of, incorporate into other works, and otherwise use your User Content, and to grant sublicenses of the foregoing, solely for the purposes of including your User Content in the Site and Services. That is, if they use your User Content for a purpose other than including it in the Site and Services (and you have not agreed to this use), you may be entitled to relief in the form of an injunction or damages.	I’m guessing you have seen a sign in a business that read - “Management reserves the right to refuse service to anyone”. At least in the US, they do not need a reason as long as the reason isn’t unlawful discrimination. They can decide not to serve you.	My remarks pertain only to US Law. Laws vary in other countries. Subject matter eligible for copyright protection in the US must be expressive and creative. To the extent data are merely measurements of observable fact in the world, they are not copyrightable. It may be that the presentation or interpretation of data is eligible for copyright protection (for example, artwork used in charts, graphs, graphics, etc., that is expressive and creative), subject to various equitable use provisions (in particular Fair Use, which is still a legal grey area). The methods by which data are gathered can be considered IP, but is the domain of patents. Methods are not copyrightable (17 USC 102(b)).
Visiting Texas would I have the right to defend myself with a Texas residents firearm whom I'm staying with? I will be visiting Texas and staying at my girlfriend's home. Would I have the right to defend myself with her firearm in the case of a burglary etc, or would I be in big trouble?	This is the Texas law pertaining to self defense, which says that "a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force". Relatively little of the law pertains to firearms, and none of it restricts the right to self-defense based on whether you are a resident, or you are using your own firearm vs. a borrowed one. The one provision, subsection (b)(5), that refers to firearms is an exception whereby force is not justified, namely if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences with the other person while the actor was: (A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02; or (B) possessing or transporting a weapon in violation of Section 46.05. (Sect. 46.02 is about conditions unlawful carrying of weapons, which covers such things as under-age carrying of certain knives, or not having control of your weapon, or being a felon in possession, etc. 46.05 is about machine guns, explosives, zip guns etc.) Deadly force is covered by a separate section, 9.32, adding the requirement that the actor "reasonably believe[] the deadly force [to be] immediately necessary". (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Note that "deadly force" is defined as "force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury". Sec. 9.33 likewise allows deadly force to be used analogously in defense of a third person, and intreestingly, in 9.34(b), "A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency". In addition, deadly force can be justified in defense of property, per sec. 9.41, if you "reasonably believe[] the force [to be] immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property", and you may also use force to recover or re-enter the property (as long as the force is used "immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession", and "the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or the other accomplished the dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor"). Sec. 9.42 then provides the possibility of justified use of deadly force in protection of property, if the force is immediately necessary (A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or (B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and (3) he reasonably believes that: (A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or (B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The short version is, if deadly force is justified in the particular circumstances, then deadly force with a borrowed weapon is justified. However, there are federal laws regarding non-resident aliens possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(B) says that It shall be unlawful for any person...who, being an alien (A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or (B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)))...to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce Under subsection (y) there are exceptions for licensed hunters, government representatives etc. You can also petition the Attorney General for an exception. The point is that federal law would make possession of a firearm illegal for most visa types: here is the list.	What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes	There are no cases interpreting the Second Amendment to have that meaning at this time. Even when regulations on corporate gun dealers are held unconstitutional, this holding, thus far, has always been because the regulations burden the rights of natural persons who own guns to bear arms. But, while corporations do not have the right themselves, they do have standing to bring suit regarding regulations of their corporations that burden the Second Amendment rights of their customers in a way that allegedly violated the right.	Firstly, your "apartment" doesn't prohibit anything; Your tenancy contract does. A terminology nitpick, but one that can shed some light on what is actually happening. TLDR: Your right to bear arms isn't being infringed, its being traded away. An unreasonable trade may be invalidated by the courts. Firearms restrictions are far less likely to be voided than speech content limitations. Yes, you have the right to bear arms(whatever exact meaning of that is). You also have the right to voluntarily agree to a binding agreement limiting that right, in exchange for a consideration. Compare a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). You have the right to freedom in your speech: you also have the right to agree to binding limits on your freedom of speech, in return for consideration (such as money or access to information). Every contract is structured in the same general way: Party A agrees to do or avoid doing certain things, in exchange for Party B agreeing to do or avoid doing certain things. So, in essence, what the apartment contract says is, that you agree to do or not do some things (including paying rent), in return for your landlord temporarily granting you some rights(such as the right to reside(generally exclusive), the right to control the space, etc. ), and imposing some obligations on themselves (which vary from place to place). In your case, one of the things that you are trading is a limitation on your right to bear arms(note that you can still bear arms, just not on the property in question). Now one thing to note is that courts have the power to enforce contracts; they also have the power to void contracts, in part or in full, if they are illegal or "unconscionable". In general, restricting (the content of) speech is not reasonable (e.g. having a general noise level restriction is reasonable), so is more likely to be struck down than one restricting firearms on the rented property.	Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.	This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate."	Does the castle doctrine apply in getting them to leave? No Short Answer: Reasonable force may be used to remove the guest as they have become a trespasser - killing them in the circumstances described would be unreasonable and excessive force. Long Answer: The Texas Castle Doctrine, referred to as Deadly Force In Defence Of Person at section 9.32 of the State Penal Code, can only be used in response to another's use (or attempted use) of deadly force or to prevent certain violent crimes: (a) A person is justified in using deadly force against another: (1) if the actor would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31 [Self Defence - see below]; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary: (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery [...] Deadly Force is defined by section 9.01(3) to mean: ... force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury. Note that justification for the Self Defence provisions at section 9.31 expressly exclude such things as mere "yelling and cussing" but (if the circumstances are such) "acting very unpredictable" may be applicable if it meets the criterion for attempted unlawful force: (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. [...] (b) The use of force against another is not justified: (1) in response to verbal provocation alone; [...] However As the guest "will not leave" it can be safely assumed that their conditions of entry in to the house have been withdrawn making them a trespasser which is covered by the Protection Of One's Own Property provisions at section 9.41: (a) A person in lawful possession of land or tangible, movable property is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property. [...] My links to the Penal Code may not go directly to the section described, so a word search using the section numbers may be required.	No Section 18-1-704.5. (1) says that : The general assembly hereby recognizes that the citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes. (*emphasis added) Subsections (2), (3), and (4) all refer to "any occupant of a dwelling" as the class authorized to use force by this section. An offie is not a dwelling. Section 18-1-901. Definitions says: (g) "Dwelling" means a building which is used, intended to be used, or usually used by a person for habitation. Section Section 18-1-704 provides that: (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203.of person's authored by this law to use force Under that provision, the use of deadly force does not seem clearly justified. It is highly questionable that "a lesser degree of force is inadequate". Any conclusion that the intruder represents an "imminent use of unlawful physical force" seems dubious, but I can't say what a court might find. This law is fairly recent, there may be no published case law for it.
Can a childless home owner living in rich neighborhood pay property tax to poor school districts? I bought a home in a rich neighborhood because it is close to my work place, but I think other school districts would benefit more from my money. Is there any chance to choose where the school funding part of my property tax goes?	TL;DR: No. In the United States, schools tend to be funded by property taxes locally, occasionally with an added income tax. Those funds go to the schools' local taxing authority. That taxing authority may cover multiple schools. At minimum, it will almost certainly cover an elementary school and a high school, but it often covers multiple elementary schools and may cover multiple high schools. For example, in many cities, all public (government-run) schools are funded by the same taxing authority. If you had children, you might, in some places, be able to choose the school they attended and thereby direct some money to that school or schools. But that wouldn't be related to the amount that you paid in any way. That amount may be more or less than the amount that you pay. It would have some relation to the amount that the child pays. There is no way to redirect the funds that you pay. They always go to the local taxing authority. If you want to pay a different local taxing authority, then you need to buy your property in an area covered by that taxing authority. For example, you might prefer to live in the city rather than a suburb. You can donate additional money above and beyond your taxes to an individual school. Contact the individual school for details. But this won't change the taxes that you owe. Schools also get funding from the state and federal governments, mostly state. Given that you are subject to taxation by a particular state, you can't transfer those taxes either. Same thing with the US as a whole. It won't allow you to choose to pay your income taxes to a different country without changing your residence (and might not then).	I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract.	If your friend thinks he can live there for free due to his unique interpretation of contract law, he is mistaken. He'll get evicted if he doesn't pay rent, and likely end up with a judgement against him for unpaid rent. At its core, a rental agreement ensures that in exchange for paying rent, he may occupy the property. You can argue up and down about payment methods, but the fact remains he must pay rent in order to live there. Your friend MAY have an argument that he could move out and not be subject to penalty for breaking the lease because the payment terms changed. He'd have to give notice and would still owe for the time he occupied the property. There's just no way he can live there for free. He may find this out the hard way.	A private college or university is allowed to grant preferential treatment to anyone they please, except for oen of the reasons prohibited by relevant anti-discrimination law. Such laws vary by state, but generally prohibit preferences based on race, national origin, or gender. Some also include sexual preference or other categories. But I have never heard of a law preventing discrimination based on wealth, or specific donations. None of the Federal civil rights acts have such a provision. Preferences for so-called "legacy" students -- that is students whose parent or parents (or possibly more remote ancestors) are alumni of the school are common, and I am not aware of any case in which they have been seriously challenged as unlawful discrimination. Preferences for military veterans are also common, and may be mandated for public schools. For public schools justifying discrimination might be harder, and any relevant legislative polices will need to be considered, but even they can be free to make "rational" distinctions at least. Not all discrimination is unlawful discrimination -- far from it.	It is certainly possible to give gifts to your relatives (or to anyone really). But, the harder question is whether or not it is really a gift. A characterization of a transaction as a gift is less likely to be questioned if it is between related parties, and it is less likely to be questioned if it isn't obviously a quid pro quo. If you told your brother that you would make a gift to him of all of the appreciation in the house, if he made the guarantee in advance, it would be a guarantee fee (or an equitable or nominee ownership) rather than a gift. But, with the timing and motives described in this post, it is certainly a closer call. The fact that the "gift" amount exactly matches the appreciation casts doubt on the theory that this is really a gift, but doesn't absolutely clearly require the conclusion that it is not. This could end up being resolved either way, and ultimately, could be very dependent upon the detailed facts and how they are presented to the person determining if tax is owed.	Is this true? Yes. can someone explain how this might work? You can form an LLC, and then fund it with money that would be used to purchase the home, and buy the home in the name of the LLC. One minor exception is that a handful of rural U.S. states prohibit limited liability entities from owning farm land, so if the home is part of a farm or ranch, this could be prohibited in those states. If there is a mortgage, this is more difficult, but not impossibly so. The primary debtor on the mortgage would be the LLC. Ordinarily the owner of the LLC would be required by the bank to guarantee the mortgage, but loan guarantees do not necessarily have to be made a matter of public record. If the LLC has only one member, it is disregarded for income tax purposes, so that isn't a problem. There may be issues in this case of a house not qualifying for residential property tax treatment in some cases (which is often a lower rate than commercial real estate). There is also sometimes an issue that property owned by an LLC isn't eligible for a "homestead exemption" of equity in the home from creditor's claims. It may also be treated differently in terms of eligibility for means-tested benefits like Medicaid nursing home coverage. But, it is allowed. I ask the question, for it seems to me that it should not be difficult to find out who the owner of any given LLC is. In the U.S., the owners of a manager managed LLC are rarely disclosed in the public record (although about half of U.S. states require one or all of the members of a member managed LLC to be disclosed). But all U.S. states allow LLCs to be manager managed. Also, all U.S. states are required as a matter of constitutional law to all LLCs organized in a state other than the state where the LLC owns real property or operates to do business in that state. States can imposed regulations on out of state LLCs to some extent, however. The main exception to these general rules is California. Although the California Articles of Organization do not list the members of the LLC in the Artiles, California requires the LLC to file a Statement of Information within 90 days of the approval of the LLC. The Statement of Information does require a list of the LLC's members, and it does become public record. Records of LLC ownership are maintained in the private internal records of the LLC. A contact person, called a registered agent and sometimes the managers of the LLC with authority to act on its behalf must be publicly disclosed, but neither of these posts has anything to do with ownership. Many states also require the "organizer" of the LLC to be disclosed, but that doesn't have to be an owner of the LLC either. Often it is a lawyer or accountant for the LLC. It will be necessary to disclose the ownership to federal tax officials, and often also to state tax officials. Also, soon, under a newly enacted federal law that has not yet taken effect because regulations have not been written, to federal money laundering officials. But, both of these pieces of information are confidential and not available to the general public. This information can be obtained by subpoena in pertinent litigation, however, must often be disclosed when filing federal lawsuits, and is often required to be disclosed by counter-parties in business transactions. Footnote The U.S. practice is not the global norm. In most civil law countries, for example, ownership interests in entities need to be reflected in a notarized document kept in the custody of the notary involved. In recent times, interests in transparency and avoiding tax evasion and money laundering for terrorism and crime have promoted additional, less decentralized records of entity ownership.	This could be a violation of the Fair Housing Act, but Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 says that we find that the FHA doesn’t apply to the sharing of living units The crux of the argument is that a room in a house is not a "dwelling", since it is not a complete living unit. Whether or not courts outside the 9th Circuit follow suit remains to be seen. Florida state law (760.29) states exceptions to its anti-discrimination laws, covering for instance Any single-family house sold or rented by its owner, provided such private individual owner does not own more than three single-family houses at any one time. If that is the case, then the exemption exists if the rental a. Without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate licensee or such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such licensee or person; and b. Without the publication, posting, or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice in violation of s. 760.23(3) Another exemption exists if Rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his or her residence. Your attorney (hint) will be able to interpret that complicated section of the law.	If it says "no pets" in the leasehold, then yes, that is enforceable. It doesn't have to be reasonable (in your opinion, or objectively) to be enforceable. Your choices are to either negotiate different leasehold terms, or to find a different leasehold.
What is difference between CC0 and Creative Commons Public Domain? I was going through this wikipedia article and I could not understand the real difference between the CC0 license and the CC Public Domain license. Basically if I am releasing my creation into public domain, would it not be enough if I just use CC Public Domain license? Why would anyone use CC0? What is their difference?	There are jurisdictions that do not allow authors to place their work in the public domain, such as Germany. Main reason is the strict monistic approach the German copyright law bases on. Key feature of this approach is the concept that, in principle, the copyright/author’s right itself can neither be transferred to another person nor waived by the author herself. The German author’s right consists of two parts, the moral rights and the exploitation rights. The moral rights are – as a rule – personal rights that are bound to the person of the creator (or, after her death, her legal heirs), i.e. they can neither be transferred nor waived. Since moral and exploitation rights are considered as inseparable parts of the author’s right as a whole (monistic approach) the exploitation rights cannot – in principle – transferred or waived by contract as well. CC0 is supposed to get you as close to the public domain as possible in your legal system. CC0 helps solve this problem by giving creators a way to waive all their copyright and related rights in their works to the fullest extent allowed by law. CC0 is a universal instrument that is not adapted to the laws of any particular legal jurisdiction, similar to many open source software licenses.	This sounds completely incorrect to me. First, subsequent research is not normally a "derivative work" for the purpose of copyright, since copyright doesn't protect your ideas but only the particular form in which you have expressed those ideas. Second, as the owner of the copyright, you can permit anyone to make any sort of copy or derivative work, or sell, assign, or license the ability to do so to other parties, without regard to whether the work has been published. The real reason that nonpublication of your work would stifle further research is that researchers will not have access to it.	They are claiming copyright protection so you cannot copy it unless fair dealing exemptions apply. However, there is no copyright in facts - only in they way facts are presented. If you present them in a different way ...	These files are not public domain Read it carefully, it only says “public domain musical compositions in a MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) file format.” The compositions are public domain, the MIDI files aren’t - they are a derivative work (a translation) covered by their own copyright. Specifically, “© Copyright 2001 University of Arizona. All rights reserved” right next to a big “Contact us” link. Literary and artistic works that are derived (legally) from existing works have independent copyright even if the original no longer does. Mozart, for example, did not write his compositions in MIDI format. Now, it may be the intention of the University of Arizona that you can use it but, if so, they have not made this clear. It’s possible that the authors (mistakenly) thought that because the originals were public domain, their derivatives would be too. The music school should have talked to someone from the law school. All of the purposes that they talk about on the “Purpose” page are equally applicable to widely licensed (e.g. everyone) or narrowly controlled (e.g. staff of the University). Overall, a prudent person would assume that these works are copyright of the University of Arizona and can’t be used without permission or a fair use exemption. Your proposed usage is not fair use. However, there is a big “Contact us” link on every page so you can always ask for permission.	Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence.	Whenever there is a license to share things, the license creator wants the license to be widely used, but absolutely does not want slightly different licenses that could be used to trick people, or that just cause legal problems when used. Normal copyright law applies. And for the reasons above, the GPL license as an example allows you to copy the license verbatim but absolutely doesn’t allow you to make any modifications other than changing who is the person licensing a work. I would be curious what happens legally if someone licenses something with a sneakily modified copy of the GPL and then makes claims against a licensee who assumed it was the original GPL.	No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though.	"Public domain" refers to things in principle copyrightable but where protection has lapsed, been repudiated, or is a statutory exception (such as government works). A website is not "in the public domain". The idea that a website is "public property" is (cough) mistaken. There are basically two ways in which a web interaction could be illegal. The first regards whether accessing another person's computer is illegally accessing a computer, which is a crime. Authorization essentially comes down to "permission": if the owner permits me to access the computer, I am authorized. Putting stuff out there on a web server is an open-ended grant of permission to look at a web page. That simply means that if I create a web page (with a bunch of links or not), I am granting you permission to interact with my computer to that extent. It does not create permission to hack into a password-protected subdirectory. An ordinary web crawler automates what a clicking human does. Copyright law is also relevant, in that the stuff I put on my webpage is not to be copied without permission. Any webpage access necessarily involves automatic copying from machine to machine: in putting stuff out there for the world to see, I am saying that the world can do that level of automatic copying that arises from normal html-and-click interactions. It does not mean that you can download and do stuff with my copyrighted content (i.e., it is not an abandonment of copyright: I did not put that stuff in the public domain). Putting a web page out there in an unrestricted fashion means that you've given a certain level of permission to "copy" (at least in the automatic server-to-browser viewing sense). I may want to impose conditions on peoples' access to my stuff, so I can impose terms on such material. For instance, I may require users to agree to certain conditions before accessing the CoolStuff subdirectory. Users then have to jump through a minor hoop and agree to those terms. In that case, my permission is conditional, and if you violate the terms of that agreement, I may be able to sue you for copyright infringement. It could then be a violation of my terms of service (TOS) if I say "you may not crawl my website" (in less vague language). A TOS gets its legal power from copyright law, because every webpage interaction involves copying (I assume that technical point is obvious), and copying can only be done with permission. You may technologically overcome my weak click-through technology so that the bot just says "sure whatever" and proceeds to illegally use my web page: I can sue you now for copyright infringement. The robot-specific methods of meta-tags and robots.txt have no legal force. Although there is a way to say "no you may not," which is tailored to automated access, the meaning and enforcement of these devices has not yet reached the law. If my page uses NOFOLLOW and your program doesn't know or care, you (your program) do not (yet) have a duty to understand, detect and respect that tag. Prior registration is also not a legal requirement, and very many pages that are on the master crawl list get there from being linked to by someone else's web page. Again, there is at present no legal requirement of pre-registration (and there is no effective mechanism for verifying that the site owner has registered the site). Archiving and especially re-displaying someone's content is, on the other hand, not legal. It would be plainly copyright infringement if you were to scoop up someone else's webpage and host it. You can analyze their material and somehow associate it with some search terms, and display a link to that page, but you cannot copy and republish their material. You can put very short snippets out there taken from a web page, under the "fair use" doctrine, but you can't wholesale republish a webpage. (It should be noted that the archive.org is an internationally recognized library, and libraries have extra statutory powers to archive).
Is it possible to discriminate in hiring if you never advertise? Small businesses often just hire people they know and trust, which just seems like sensible risk mitigation. But what about if the business keeps growing this way (above "small business" thresholds)? e.g. The owner only hiring people he discovers, and after that's infeasible, his highest trusted managers. I'm thinking of situations where you come to understand the skills somebody has and you say "Hey! You'd be really good at helping out with X work. You want a job?". You already know the person is timely, respectful, "fits the culture" etc. To say another way: the business never advertises, but instead only invites individuals to work for them. It could even include a non-discriminatory screening interview to check suitability for the business' goals. I can't find any information in any jurisdiction about discrimination related to selecting individuals for employment and "creating a role to fit" Added later: I think it helps if you let go of capitalism and the idea that an organisation's purpose would be to maximise it's profits by generating valuable goods. Think instead of an organisation that was founded with charitable intent and the business' value creation is of a more intangible manner: behavioural / relational / mental / spiritual. Imagine a Third World charity requiring personal alignment / investment: sponsoring a child perhaps. Or an anti-depression organisation requiring everybody to be kind and sensitive - even for less visible/interactive jobs like lawyers and accountants. I'm pretty sure these criteria would be discriminatory in a advertised position. I happen to be in New Zealand, but this really is theoretical.	The relevant bit of legislation — Human Rights Act 1993 s22 — protects applicants and employees: Where an applicant for employment or an employee is qualified for work of any description, it shall be unlawful .. to refuse ... offer .. terminate ... retire ... by reason of any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination. So, if you never advertise but always invite people (i.e. offer them job straight away) then there are no applicants (as at no point does anybody apply for the job), and hence no employment discrimination. If you invite them for a "non-discriminatory screening interview" then there is no discrimination by definition of "non-discriminatory" :) behavioural / relational / mental / spiritual I'm pretty sure these criteria would be discriminatory in a advertised position. None of those criteria are prohibited grounds of discrimination (s21). However, it would be a good idea to clearly define them as "a genuine occupational qualification for the position" by drafting a job description and explaining why those traits are crucial for the business.	The only excuse would be if you didn't know that your actions were a crime (not ignorance of the law, that's not an excuse, but ignorance of facts). For example, if your boss doesn't want you to serve a customer because that customer is gay, and your boss tells you "don't serve that customer, he was here last week and didn't pay the bill", you would be fine. Or if the boss of a demolition company sends a crew out to demolish the house of a personal enemy (surely a crime), the crew would have no idea that their action is a crime, so they should be fine. But if the boss of a bar or club orders a bouncer to beat up a customer, then the bouncer would know that he's committing a crime, and there is no excuse possible.	It seems like a lot of "punishments" can be applied to a person without having to go to court. Yes, because everyone has the right and freedom to associate, or dissociate, with other people, and the freedom of contract, at least when the state does not decide to interfere. The state, owing to its monopoly of legitimate violence, has a duty towards everyone under its rule and the people in many countries decided that the state's power should be significantly limited with judicial supervision where individual rights and freedoms are implicated. Other individuals or legal persons do not in general owe a duty to be friend with you or to sign or continue a labour or rental contract with you. At the same time, the people and their government have also decided in certain situations there exists a power imbalance (e.g. between the landlord and the tenant, the employer and the employee, groups suffering from discrimination and stereotypes) where unlimited freedom of association and contract not only harms the individual's human dignity but also harms the society as a whole (e.g. homeless and unemployment, which may lead to increased crimes etc.). Thus, in some situations, the law prohibits discrimination and provides for legal rights generally for the more vulnerable. However, this is a decision that is undertaken by each jurisdiction. A court order is only required if the law says that you normally have a legal entitlement but the state or someone else wants to take it away or limit it, or if the law explicitly requires a procedure before the court. Since you tagged the question with canada... Can a person be fired ... without a court order? Yes. However, in Canada, all jurisdictions have labour laws that regulate dismissal of an employee. Dismissal without cause usually requires notice period and/or severances, depending on the length of employment. Dismissal for cause can be challenged in court and the employer has the burden of proof to justify the cause on a balance of probabilities (more probably than not) and the terminated employee will have the right to have them heard before the court and present their evidences. If the person occupied a unionized position, they may also be able to file grievances with the union before an arbitrator, depending on the text of the collective agreement. The collective agreements also often provide for procedural requirements before the dismissal of an employee in a unionized position. Violation of these procedural requirements may lead to the annul of dismissal or awards of damages. Can a person be banned ... without a court order? Yes. You have no general right to be on another person's property in Canada. Your rights end where others' property (or other) rights begin. Like said in the beginning, this is a societal decision and an act of balancing particular to each jurisdiction, for example, in some places, there exists a right to roam over certain publicly accessible lands. The property owner or another person otherwise legally authorized has the authority to decide who they want on their property (which means what is one's own), subject to certain narrow exceptions, under common law and provincial trespassing acts. Your neighbour cannot prevent you from crossing on their land if you have a valid easement and are not abusing it. But if you are abusing your easement, your neighbour may take you to court for an order. Here the property owner includes the state. However, like almost all decisions made by the state, in Canada and many other countries with the rule of law, can be judicially reviewed for their reasonableness, and sometimes correctness. Like all decisions made by the state, trespassing notices may be challenged if the decision is arbitrary or without legal basis. Can a person be evicted ... without a court order? No. In all jurisdictions in Canada, eviction, that is, the forced removal of tenant from a premise, can only be carried out by sheriffs or other legally authorized officers upon an order from a court or tribunal (often called Landlord and Tenant Board or similar), with exceptions for certain tenancies (e.g. where the landlord and the tenant share living area). Court order is not required for the termination of a tenancy; but the termination of tenancy can only be achieved if the tenant agrees or a tribunal or court orders so. Does Habeas corpus come into play in any of these situations No. Habeas corpus means "that you have the body", which is an order from a judicial official to command the state to bring someone in its custody before the court, so that the legality of their detention by the state may be determined. In Canada, habeas corpus only protects liberty interests of an individual.	It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin A medical condition like an allergy is not necessarily a physical disability. The school is arguably fulfilling its obligations under WHS legislation by banning nut products if that is what a risk assessment indicates. It may also be necessary to ban milk products if that is required for your daughter's safety. If (and I do not know) nuts pose a greater risk than milk then banning the former and not the latter may be perfectly justified. Ask to see the risk assessment.	If I did not sign promotion bonus document, my career would be over. Is this duress? No. The premise is hardly true or even logical, and what you describe falls short of duress. Not every imbalance of bargain power implies duress. First, it seems that you could have declined the bonus, thereby preempting the sanction/remedy for leaving within 12 months. Second, it seems hard to prove (and unrealistic) that your career would have been over if you refused to sign the document. The employer can easily refute that allegation by pointing out that there are many others who did not sign that employer's document and yet work elsewhere as investment bankers. You would need certain, additional context to reasonably allow for a conclusion that your career altogether depends on what happens with this single entity. Third, your mention that "the bonus mitigates the horrendous weekly hours" reinforces the idea that signing the document was your preference (namely, for the purpose of obtaining some additional, non-compulsory stimulus) rather than employer-inflicted duress. The rationale and decision for acceptance of those conditions reflects that you knowingly exercised your freedom of contract. A party is not entitled to void a contract only because he belatedly changed his mind about conditions of which he was aware beforehand.	It is not uncommon for an employer to ask a former employee to assist with something as a courtesy, and sometimes the former employee will choose to do so. If it requires more than a small amount of time, this may be done under a short-term consulting contract for pay. But unless there was a contract of employment requiring such post-employment advice, there is no legal obligation for the former employee to provide such assistance. The most the former employer could do is give a poor reference if asked by potential future employers, and most large corporate employers now only give job title, salary range, and dates of employment to avoid claims of incorrect or defamatory statements in such references.	Canadian law defines "theft" thus: Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent (to deprive the owner, pledge as security, mess it up) In this case, you accepted what seemed to be an offer of a free pizza, so if you took and consumed the pizza you did so with a colorable claim of right and without fraud. Perhaps you misunderstood, but it is not a crime to misunderstand another person's intent. They could sue you for the cost of the pizza (assuming that you took it and did not pay), in which case the question would be whether whatever they said to you could reasonably be interpreted as an offer of a free pizza (if not, pay for the pizza). As an advertising stunt, this would not be unusual. However, if they fix the pizza but then demand money before handing over the pizza, you now know that you have no right to the pizza (if you abscond with the pizza in that circumstance, it would be theft). You may of course pay for the pizza, but you can also not pay and not take the pizza. Again, they could sue you, and in this case your defense would be that there was no contract (no agreement). An important question would be how reasonable it is to believe that you were offered a free pizza. People are offered "free" steak dinners all the time (at the cost of sitting through a sales pitch), so that is a reasonable belief. If a Lexus yacht salesman appears to be offering you a free $5M yacht, it is not reasonable to think that this is an ordinary advertising stunt, if you're not a celebrity.	Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you.
Is a fraudster liable for losses in this situation? The usual rule of law is that a fraudster is liable for all losses/restitution, due to their fraud, whether or not reasonably foreseeable. Suppose a fraudster's deception causes a person to take a course of action they wouldn't have otherwise taken. As part of that, they suffer losses due to a second person's tort. Is that loss recoverable from the fraudster as well? Specific situation: A person (A) seeks to buy an asset but is greatly deceived by the owner (F) of the asset. (I'm assuming that deceit, reliance, litigation etc are clear, see assumptions at end of Q). A attempts to be safe by asking a professional valuer (V) for an opinion on the asset before signing, but V was negligent and the valuation was defective. (I'm assuming blatant negligence, reliance, etc) As a result, A suffers a loss. If either (1) F had been honest, or (2) even with a dishonest seller had V not been negligent, A would not have bought the asset and therefore would not have suffered the loss. Usually A would seek damages for their entire loss from V, because professionals often carry insurance against negligence claims. But I am interested in whether, in law, F still remains liable for A's entire loss, despite any impact of V. Reasons for A wishing to hold F liable for the entirety of loss might be: V is now living overseas and hard to litigate against; V did not actually have insurance, or there would be no assets to pay the claim if successful; V is a personal friend of A and A wants to avoid suing his friend and breaking a friendship; A incurred various unrecoverable expenses in claiming against V, and he feels that F should be liable for all losses flowing from the deceit; An associate or relation of A (called "B") has also suffered from the deceit and purchase of the asset but B lacked a contractual relationship with V and was not foreseeably reliant on V's defective valuation, and therefore B's only recourse is against F for the loss flowing from a deceit, not V. Legal arguments A argues that, but for the deceit, neither A or B would have been exposed to a defective valuation or defective asset in the first place, so their entire losses flow from F's deceit and the subsequent valuation error is irrelevant: without F's deceit they wouldn't have put themselves in a position of relying on V in the first place. F argues that he isn't liable for any material amount of damages to A or B, or for any unrecovered outlay A incurred in suing V, because ultimately A and B only suffered loss in the end due to an unconnected third party's negligence (V). In the alternative, F argues that if found liable, he is only liable for part of the losses claimed by A and B, due to contributory negligence by V. Is there clear precedent in case law that backs either of their positions? Or, put another way, is there case law precedent for a deceiver being liable for loss due to a subsequent problem, on the legal ground that "but for the deceit the claimant would never have put themselves in a position where they would have been exposed to the risk of that subsequent problem, in the first place"? NOTE: Assume for this question that UK law applies, and all criteria for the claims are met: the fact of any deceit or negligence is blatant and uncontested, the fact of reliance or mitigation is uncontested, and so on. So the question is only about how the subsequent matter affects F's liability.	The underlying assumption in this question seems to be that because A received defective professional advice from V, F may be free of blame. I believe that assumption is wrong. The gist of the question is this: Suppose a fraudster's deception causes a person to take a course of action they wouldn't have otherwise taken. As part of that, they suffer losses due to a second person's tort. Is that loss recoverable from the fraudster as well? In the scenario given, there are clearly two parties that are to blame for the loss: The fraudster, who perpetrated the fraud. The professional attorney, who gave defective advice. The fact that there also exists a second party that may have contributed to the loss does not in any way absolve the first party from blame or from being liable for his actions. In a tort case, it is always the person that caused the loss in the first place (the tortfeasor) the victim (A) should seek relief from first. So F is in no way “safe from litigaton”. In the event that the tortfeasor is not being able make full restitution (e.g. he is already bankrupt), A may sue V for professional negligence to recover his loss. However, to prevail, A vould must be able to prove that V has made critical errors that no “reasonable attorney” would have made. That is sometimes pretty hard to prove (it obviously depends on how clever F's deception was, and whether the number of hours A allowed V to use for due diligence should have been sufficient to uncover the deception). As for legal precedent, I am not aware of a single case where a fraudster has not been held liable because the victim of the fraud has sought professional advice (but it is of course not easy to locate precedent for something has not occured).	Well ... the crime of fraud and the tort of deception. If you say you will do X and enter a contract on that basis knowing that you won't then that is fraud and it carries gaol time. Your bank could also revoke your contract and sue for damages.	You have been told that the other person's insurance may not be valid. Why it may not doesn't really matter, perhaps the other person didn't pay premiums or lied on an application. So the situation is much the same as if the other person is uninsured or under insured. Your p[olicy must cover things. And your policy has a deductible. So you have to pay the deductable amount. That is what a deductible is, the amount that you must pay before your policy coverage kicks in. The lower it is, the higher your premium is. You don't have any choice about that. Depending on your jurisdiction, you may be able to sue the other person involved in the accident, and get that person to pay. Your insurance company might do this for you, but if they won't you would have to hire a lawyer yourself to do that. Such a lawyer could get all the details of your case, and advise you of your options.	Broadly speaking, theft offences in common law jurisdictions are defined as the dishonest appropriation of property that belongs to another with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it, without proper authority (e.g. permission or legal right to do that). Appropriation means the assumption of the rights of ownership of the property, i.e. behaving as if you were now its owner, not simply or solely the taking of the property. Possible defences include absence of intent to deprive the rightful owner of the property and intent to search for the rightful owner of the property and return it to them. You say: The facts are presented as follows: One day, couple wakes up to $120,000 extra dollars due to teller error. The money was intended for a business. They are aware that this must be an error but spend the money anyway. The bank wants the money back. The couple quits talking to the bank. The couple is charged with theft and receiving stolen property. I don't know about the charge of receiving stolen property (unless that relates to how they transferred or spent the money) but on the facts presented it's certainly prima facie theft. Reportedly, by their own admissions they found money in their account that wasn't theirs, they knew it wasn't theirs and they spent it.	Unfortunately for you, the insurance company is right. Even with the rise of modern consumer protection law, caveat emptor ("Let the buyer beware") still largely applies to real estate transactions. Exceptions are where the building is new (not applicable), the seller gave a specific warranty (unlikely) or the seller deliberately concealed the defect (not applicable). If, as you say, the damage was "completely hidden" it is unlikely that your building inspector was negligent or breached their contract so you cannot recover from them. Sadly, this is at your cost. Your insurer may be liable but that would depend on the terms of your insurance policy.	what if it is established in court that you knowingly or through gross negligence included a falsehood, or a claim you have no evidence for, just to clear that initial hurdle? What would the consequences be for that? The case proceeds and if it goes to trial, the finder of fact determines if the case prevails or not. Also, note that except in the case of a verified complaint, a complaint in a civil case is not made under oath or under penalty of perjury. In the rare and unlikely event that it is established that you knew that your case had no factual basis at the outset, you (and your attorney in many cases), can be sanctioned by the court, usually in the form of the attorney fees incurred by other side as a result of the knowingly false statement.	Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges.	This is likely to depend on whether Person B is aware of what Person A is doing, regardless of any imputations Person A makes as to the nature of their business. If Person B is aware, or it is found that Person B ought to have been aware, that Person A is doing something illegal, then they may be held contributorily liable for damages suffered. For instance, in (what is still) a landmark case for copyright infringement, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001), Napster was found to be contributorily guilty of copyright infringement. A defense that they attempted is they weren't aware of it - which was thrown out on the basis that they should have, and could have, known that it was happening. I'm not a lawyer, but you'll need to give a lot more information about the situation for liability to be determined. Oh, and also — both of them could be held liable. It's not necessarily a case of one or the other.
Requirements for using email as evidence Someone told me you can "just send an email to yourself" as a means of proving non-disclosure, copyright, resolving disputes, etc. What I'm specifically wondering is whether this requires you to use an email service where you have absolutely no way of sending backdated email or altering already sent email? In other words, since you have full access to it at any given time, using your own email server for this purpose would render your evidence worthless, wouldn't it?	It doesn't really require anything beyond your say-so that it is what you say it is; that would be enough to satisfy the requirement for authentication. From there though, as with any evidence, it's going to be up to a jury to decide how much weight to give the evidence. So the more you can show them to prove that the record is real -- and to knock down any questions the opposing party will raise -- the more likely they are to believe it. So if you just bring a printout that looks like it could easily have been forged, the jury may be thinking about that. If you can bring in a data forensics expert to say the document couldn't have been faked, that's probably going to help. Addendum: As a practical matter, I wouldn't expect this to be much of an issue. Unless you're dealing with a savvy opposing party, the authenticity of e-mails seems to be generally assumed. Courts (1) generally assume that parties aren't perpetrating frauds; and (2) are generally run by judges with little to no technical savvy, who don't realize that one could forge an e-mail, let alone all the different ways it could be done. I've personally entered countless e-mail printouts without them being questioned, even though either party could have just gone down into the e-mail thread and changed what the other side had said earlier in the conversation. To avoid the issue, though, it might be that sending the e-mail to a Gmail account would elimimate the question.	The GDPR is about "processing" not "storing", so your actions definitely fall under the GDPR. Also you have stored the email address and the email you sent in your "Sent" folder. You need to reply with all the information you have associated with that email address. This will at least be the email you already sent. If you scraped the email address from GitHub then you have it in a table with (presumably) other information such as the repository where you found it, in which case send that row of the table with the associated column headers. If you really just have a list of email addresses then say so. If you merely saw the email address and then typed a fresh email then say so.	I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.	GDPR does not require consent. It requires a legal basis. Consent is only one legal basis among many. Some other legal bases are: legitimate interest (implying an opt out solution) necessity for performance of a contract If your customers pay you to deliver email updates, that contract is the legal basis for sending email updates. The only wrinkle is that as you describe your service, the emails aren't an essential part of the service. Alternatively, you might assert that there's a legitimate interest to deliver updates via email so that updates aren't missed. In that case you must allow the users to object, e.g. via ab unsubscribe link in the email and via their account settings. Because a prior business relationship exists, there's a strong case for legitimate interest – even if this were marketing emails (!). Legitimate interest requires you to balance the legitimate interest with the data subject's rights and freedoms though. Your updates are most likely not marketing, so any advice you might read relating to marketing emailings is irrelevant. GDPR applies because you are established in the EU. The regulation applies in relation to all your users, not just EU users. If and when Brexit happens you will still be covered by the Data Protection Act, which transcribes the GDPR's requirements into UK law. However, processing data from EU users will then count as an international transfer which requires extra compliance work, at least until the EU issues an adequacy decision for the UK.	what reasoning would the court use to evaluate the competing claims? Absent a verifiable contract, the dispute would require assessment of the extrinsic evidence and/or of other aspects reflecting the parties' credibility. Those types of factors would help for discerning whose position is meritorious. You are right in that Bella's co-signing of the loan is likely to render her hypothetical allegation of gift not credible. Bella's history of defaulting on her debts as well as her failure to keep up with insurance & tags are examples of prior act evidence. As such, these might be inadmissible for proving that she entered the contract with Abe. However, they are admissible both for proving Bella's pattern of missing her commitments and possibly for detecting inconsistencies in Bella's allegations (thereby weakening Bella's credibility). Unless Bella is able to point greater inconsistencies or weaknesses in Abe's credibility, a competent and honest court (where available) would rule in favor of Abe.	There is no public place to “file” that. When privilege is claimed and the other side challenges it then the person claiming privilege needs to establish somehow that the attorney client relationship exists and is pertinent to the question. In the normal course of things there would be an engagement agreement in the attorneys files. And not everything communicated between a client and attorney is protected by the privilege. It only covers legal advice and specifically does not cover discussions planning criminal activity.	Disclaimer: Not a lawyer or even living in US. I try to write the answer under US law. Other countries law may differ. Make sure you consult a lawyer in your jurisdiction. Here is my understanding of the individual examples: You don't need permission legally, because you are only accessing your own account and your own information. You are the only one damaged by the intrusion and therefore, nobody can really file a lawsuit against you. This is often used by security researchers when the subjects are uncooperative. That being said, if it is an actual pentesting client, you may want to refrain from it regardless. You don't need a permission to modify hardware you own. This is completely legal and not considered an attack. It would qualify as an upgrade, such as replacing a component in your laptop. You are allowed to do that. You should have a permission here. This is an intentional penetration test and you should have permission to do this. The same as 3. This is an intentional penetration test and you should get a permission. Though if you logout immediately and don't mess with the interface, it may not be illegal on the basis that you did not cause any damage or steal any information, or it may be illegal under some circumstances. It may also be impossible to prove that you did not do anything while there.	I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.
Can the mother of a child keep the father's name off of the child's birth certificate? A man and woman have a baby but they are not married. They split up before the baby is born. After the baby is born, the mother sues the father for child support, wins and the father is ordered to pay child support. Later the mother decides to not list the father on the birth certificate, and refuses to let the baby have his last name. Does this make legal sense for the mother to do this? Would the father be able to contest any of this?	Under 28 Pa. Code 1.6, The child of an unmarried woman may be registered with any surname requested by the mother. If no other surname is so requested, the child shall be registered with the mother’s surname Registration is the point at which there is parental discretion. Subsequently, a name change is possible by court order, however as maintained in numerous cases including in re: Niedbala, 36 Pa. D. & C. 3d 397 When the court, however, is confronted with the question of whether to amend or change the surname of a child, lacking sufficient understanding to choose for herself, then the court must not consider protectible parental interests or whether the parents are married, divorced or never married or whether they are male or female, but rather the child's best interests As stated in that ruling, the court will then consider the child's preference; the effect of the change on the preservation and development of the child's relationship with each parent; how long the child has used one vs. the other name. Pennsylvania law on child support is rather long, but there is no provision whereby only a married father or mother can be held liable for support. It is probable that the father was legally established as the biological father, and that would, according to these guys, allow you to have your name put on the birth certificate and perhaps even gain custody.	The following answers are based upon general U.S. law, I have not personally confirmed that they apply in Illinois in particular under its adoption law, or each of its welfare benefits programs, or its wrongful death statute. There is no affirmative duty of a mother to inform a father or potential father of the existence of his child, at least outside (1) the context of relinquishment of parental rights in anticipation of an adoption (where there may be a statutory notice requirement in some cases), (2) applications for certain kinds of welfare benefits (where identification of a father is required for some programs), and (3) possibly in the context of a lawsuit for the wrongful death of a child in which both parents are frequently vested with authority to bring the suit. Identification of a father on a birth certificate is not mandatory (and not infrequently omitted). In an adoption case, due process often requires some effort "reasonably calculated to give notice" to the father of the proceeding relinquishing parental rights, although failure to do so is generally not a jurisdictional defect that renders the adoption void ab initio. There is also generally a requirement to affirmatively state in adoption proceeding if the father is, or might be, a member of a Native American tribe, as that goes to the jurisdictional issue of the applicability of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, which requires notice, at a minimum, to the father's Indian tribe, even if notice cannot be given to the father. There is a presumption that a child born to a woman married to a husband is the child of the husband and after a certain number of years, for certain purposes (such as child support). This presumption is usually conclusive and cannot be rebutted even by DNA evidence to the contrary, on the theory that the husband is the psychological parent of the child and has assumed that responsibility, and in order to discourage after the fact denials of paternity simply to avoid child support when paternity was never disputed. There is also a presumption that a birth certificate's statement of paternity is correct, although this is in often not a conclusive presumption. And, birth certificates are a matter of public record, so a man can search the vital statistics records of a state to see if anyone has identified him as a father even if he has not been told of that fact, arguably giving him constructive knowledge of his paternity in that case. But, the identity of the person who is the child's father, or of persons who could be the child's father, is not privileged (other than under the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination where applicable), and so, a woman can generally be legally compelled to disclose this information by subpoena or in response to discovery in litigation. For example, a woman under the age of consent at the time her child was conceived can be incarcerated for contempt of court for failing to disclose the name of the father in connection with a criminal prosecution of a suspected father of the child for statutory rape.	Gifts that are sincerely given away are generally not part of the assets to be split up in a divorce. However, if you transfer assets to a parent, only to start receiving that value back from them after the divorce, this is considered hiding assets and is illegal Whatever the reason, hiding assets, income and debt is not only unethical; it’s also illegal and subject to severe penalties IF discovered. You’ll likely be deposed, which means you’ll have to provide live testimony, under oath, about assets and property. If you lie during discovery or your deposition in order to hide assets, you’ve committed perjury (a punishable crime). If your lies are discovered by your spouse, your spouse’s attorney, or a judge, you may face severe sanctions (monetary fines) or a perjury charge. in some states, you can even be arrested for very serious incidences of hiding assets	It is probably illegal in all of the jurisdictions in the US where a fetus is legally declared to be a person and where the murder statutes are written to not explicitly exclude abortion: that is, in no jurisdictions. No law existing or proposed for Georgia specifically addresses "travel for the purpose of getting an abortion". The underlying theory behind the claim (advocated by some Georgia attorneys) is that a person may be open to a conspiracy charge for taking a woman to another state to get an abortion, which would be a crime if committed in Georgia. If a conspiracy exists in Georgia to do something illegal (in Georgia), that is a violation of OCGA 16-4-8 ("when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy"). The substantially same law exists in Washington, and most if not all other states. The theory is apparently that "conspire to commit a crime" means something like "conspire to perform an act which would be a crime if performed in in this jurisdiction", e.g. "purchase marijuana, or take a job at certain payday loan companies". No state has successfully claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction, where a Georgia resident can be prosecuted in Georgia for a legal act carried out in another state, so this theory is a bit of a stretch.	Between your mother and you the bank does not care where the payments come from. If they do not get them, they can sue you, or your mother or (most likely) both of you and they will chase whichever of you has the most money and ultimately repossess the house to satisfy the debt. What matters between you is the contract or deed that you signed with your mother where you documented that you would each pay half of the mortgage. Unfortunately, agreements between family members are presumed not to be contracts. That is, the courts will not get involved to decide how much each of you owe - you have to sort that out for yourselves. A signed agreement will usually overcome that presumption. Other evidence may overcome the presumption - for example, evidence that you split the payments 50/50 for some period of time. Talk to your mother. And a lawyer.	This is a matter of state law, so the answer is not precisely the same in all jurisdictions. Many states have laws that prohibit child support orders from being modified retroactively. In those states, they can only be modified back to the date of the motion seeking to modify them. In the case of an adult child in college, where an agreement ends child support at a given date, simply not living in the home while in college or on vacations during college is not likely to be a valid basis for discontinuing child support or modifying it, because this was a circumstance that was foreseeable when the order was entered. The fact that a child has some support from others or from a part-time job does not necessarily discontinue the obligation.	Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces.	Generally, you would have to bring an eviction action just as you would for an ordinary landlord-tenant relationship. This means given written notice served as required by MA law of a deadline to leave, and then if the child did not leave, filing an eviction lawsuit and serving the papers on the child, and then attending an eviction hearing, and then, if you prevailed in that hearing as you probably would (probably with horrible TV and newspaper publicity that might go viral in social media), and then, arrangements would be made to remove him and his stuff from the house on an appointed day with law enforcement and movers and you would change the locks. It would probably take a few weeks start to finish. It is not something that a non-lawyer should try to do themselves. A lawyer would probably charge you a few thousand dollars for this proceeding. The main exception would be that generally a parent has a duty to support an adult disabled child who cannot provide for himself. You probably do not have the legal right to simply kick out your child without an eviction action, although few adult children would choose to push their legal rights not to be removed in that manner if they were. The fact that a child would likely end up homeless in some circumstances if you did this is something that most parents would not be at peace with and would regret later even if they felt good about the decision at the time, but that is a parenting decision and not a legal one.
Where do personal blogs stand with lawsuits? If a person were to setup a blog and got a few of their friends to also post on this blog. Who is to blame if one of those people were to get hit with a lawsuit for copyright infringement? Since this is not a registered business, or even a business, is the owner of the domain going to be the target of the lawsuit or is it the individual who stole and published copyright protected work?	This basically is about the legal responsibility a web-site owner has for user-created content that violate copyright or other laws (such as libel laws). In the USA, this situation is covered by the DMCA. In the EU, this situation is covered by the e-commerce directive. In other jurisdictions, other regulation may apply. The DMCA (USA) is the simplest of those regulations. It stipulates a protocol of Notice and takedown. A web-site owner that complies with this protocol is given Save Harbour. This means that a compliant web-site owner cannot be sued. This goes both for a web-site that is a registered business, and a site run by an individual. The owner of the IP may, however, take the individual who stole and published copyright protected work to court, and will do probably do so if the financial loss was substantial (e.g. a major motion picture was leaked before hitting the cinemas). In the EU, the law is much less explicit than in the USA. Basically, the Notice and takedown protocol works like in the USA, but since it is not part of the law, it is less formal. In the USA, you can safely not act on any complaint that does not strictly follow the protocol (you just have to give feedback so they can fix it). Not so in the EU. And as follows from Delfi AS vs. Estonia, you can be sued even if you take down stuff. In particular if you create an environment for anonymous postings that encourage transgressions and have no means of moderation in place. So if the web-site is located in the EU, the website owner need to exercise more caution when he lets friends publish content, than when a website owner in the USA.	First I should point out that the Google question is about a different situation, the "snippet" issue where a tiny part of a web page is redistributed, where the issue of resolved in the US by appeal to the "fair use" defense. The proposed scenario as written here is broader since it would go beyond a couple of lines, and goes up to the limit of copy an entire web page. That is copyright infringement, with or without an associated link. Copyright protection is not just about attribution, it is about control. If you can limit your copying appropriately, you may survive under a fair use analysis; but you need to hire a lawyer with experience in copyright litigation to vet your notions of what is "a small amount" etc.	If users were to copy dictionary definitions, for instance Oxford or Cambridge) and make the word lists public, is it a copyright infringement? If the dictionary entries are protected by copyright then your user has infringed that copyright by posting the dictionary entries. Am I responsible for this activity? No. But you may be responsible for removing it if you get a request. Can dictionary owners charge me against copyright issue? If you follow the procedures outlines in the DMCA you can be protected from liability.	No. You are correct in that this is not related to Copyright. Copyright is meant to protect expressions of an idea. An URL is simply an address, like a street address. Can you legally stop people referring to your home address? No. Can you legally stop people from passing by and looking at your house on the street? Also no. A famous case related to hyperlink is Ticketmaster v Tickets.com (2000). Tickets.com used information Ticketmaster's website and deep-linked to there. The ruling established that: use of information is not infringing hyperlinking cannot be copyright infringement because no copying is involved. deep linking is not unfair competition If you feel that it is necessary to avoid people linking to specific pages of your site, you may consider accomplishing this technically. UPDATE It does not matter whether your site is meant to be public or not. For example, an knowledge base meant to be shared internally in an organization, but accessible on the internet since staff are geographically distributed. Again, you may think of it like a street address. A private corporate building meant for employees only. An address, like Room C, 16/F, Example Corporate Complex, 4321 Lucky Avenue can be shared like any other address. You cannot demand people to never refer to your office address. You can, however, setup a security post at the entrance and only allow certain guests to visit you. In the case of a website, you may state in your terms that one cannot share access information to any external parties. This will include the sharing of any authentication data (e.g. password) which can be used to access content.	Do you have an explicit permission by the artist? Does the artist give a blanket permission to anyone which covers this kind of use of their work (a license)? If no, then you commit a copyright violation when you use their work for your blog. This applies to practically any country which signed the Berne convention which is almost everywhere in the world. Having no commercial interest is usually not an excuse to violate copyright. Regarding which jurisdiction applies when you, your website and the copyright holder are in different countries: I opened a new question about this.	If the suit is to be filed in the US, the first step is to officially register the copyright. No US copyright infringement suit can be brought until the copyright has been registered. The registration process includes a formal declaration as to who the author is (or authors are). (I believe this statement is made under penalty of perjury.) Once the registration issues, the certificate of registration is admissible evidence of the facts stated in it in a us court. Indeed 17 USC 410 (c) provides that: (c) In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court. In other countries, the testimony of the plaintiff in a copyright infringement suit is itself evidence that the work was created as stated. In either case, it is possible for the defendant to challenge the assertion and claim that s/he is the actual author. Showing when and where the work was first published can usefully corroborate the plaintiff's testimony. Having included a copyright notice in the initial publication may be of value, but if the notice only lists the pen name, it is not of much value. Records of the platform on which a work has been published may help in verifying the identity of the author. So may the testimony of others who saw or read the work, or who were told about it by the author. An author's own copies may be of value, if they carry a timestamp, as computer files generally do. But computer timestamps are not usually secure. Timestamps on email generally are reasonably secure, and could establish that the content existed and had been transmitted on a specified date by a specified person. But none of this will matter unless the defendant claims that the plaintiff is lying in claiming authorship. Unless that happens, the plaintiff's testimony will usually settle the matter. A person whose work seems to have been infringed would usually be wise to consult a lawyer with experience in copyright suits. Such a lawyer could advise if it is wise to bring suit at all, and if it is, what evidence will probably be needed.	The only real recourse you have is to contact the webhost and try to convince them your content is really yours and file a DMCA Takedown request. How you convince them might be an issue; do you have any old screenshots? Original photos? Any proof that the content and photos are yours? The webhost appears to be https://datacamp.co.uk/ , unless the DNS is being proxied, since DNS points to CloudDNS https://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=dns:marksmayo.com NZ and UK are members of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, so there don't appear to be any arguments about not applying copyright law. You willingly gave up the domain, so you have no recourse or valid reason to try and regain ownership of the domain. You could try and contact the new owner of the domain by filing a complaint via the abuse email listed by the domain registar at https://www.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?&domain=marksmayo.com But they may not do anything, even if you can prove a copyright violation, since they only handle the domain registration and not the webhosting. How they got the content is another question: who was your webhost when you owned the site? Datacamp? Did they not delete it when you closed your account? How did the new owner come to get it?	Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A.
Am I required to register as a foreign LLC in New York State? I live in New York State. I have created an LLC in Wyoming. The "Principal Office Address" for the LLC is listed as my registered agent's address in Wyoming. The "Mailing Address" for the LLC is listed as my home address in New York State. The LLC does not have any employees or office space. The LLC only exists to license intellectual property to a manufacturer. I will be opening a bank account for the LLC at a Chase Bank in my local town in New York State. I will be receiving royalty checks from the manufacturer, and depositing them into this Chase bank account. Do I need to register as a foreign LLC in New York State? If so, why?	Maintaining a bank account in NY does not constitute "doing business" for a foreign LLC: (a) Without excluding other activities that may not constitute doing business in this state, a foreign limited liability company shall not be considered to be doing business in this state for the purposes of this chapter, by reason of carrying on in this state any one or more of the following activities: ... (3) maintaining bank accounts; (NY LLC law section 803)	Most countries have compulsory or statutory licences for exactly these situations. You enter a licence agreement with a collecting society, pay them licencing fees, and give them a record of the music you perform. They in turn then distribute royalties to the rights holders. The exact details of which licence you'll need depends on your country, the types of events you will perform at, the frequency of the events, the size of the audience etc. It may be the venue's responsibility to obtain the licence instead of the performer, or both the venue and the performer may need to. I don't have any experience of this, and if I did my experience would be useless to yours in the UK ;). But luckily the UK has an easy to find website which tells you just where you need to go. You will need to get a licence from an organisation called PRS for Music.	An LLC is a legally distinct entity from your person. Basically, if your LLC is sued, and you lose, you can lose only what you put into your LLC. Your personal assets are untouched. A very sophisticated plaintiff may try to get around this suing both your LLC and you personally. (I've done this myself.) Even so, if you are careful to keep the business of your LLC separate from your personal business (no commingling of assets, no use of your LLC to pay your bills, but only a salary), then the law will often absolve you of personal liability for the "actions" of your LLC. The reason I warn against "commingling" is because if you do this, you can lose the protection of the LLC as a separate entity, and become personally liable for what the LLC does. This is known as "piercing the corporate veil." If you have home rental operations in more than one state, you may want to establish LLC's for each state. That's because some states are more tenant- and other states are more landlord- friendly than others, meaning that you may want to defend yourself differently in one state versus another.	Yes, in a sense. One patent is US 7444589 Automated patent office documentation by AT&T. Another is US 6434580B1 System, method, and recording medium for drafting and preparing patent specifications from NEC. In most locations patents on a business method are not allowed but, although controversial, they are allowed in the U.S. Of course the fundamental requirement for patentablity is to be new. Since patenting itself is very old any patent on the topic would need to cover some narrow aspect, like the AT&T and NEC patents. I do not understand the assumption that such a patent would necessarily be licensed freely.	You're forgetting city and county health codes, business permits, zoning regulations, fire and occupation regulations, business and property insurance, labor laws, etc. These can differ between the city and the county, and depending on if you own or lease the building. Best thing to do is start with your city/county business permit office; they can provide information. Call the fire department and ask. Ask the county health department. Find out if a business incubator exists in your city/county and ask them: https://esd.ny.gov/certified-business-incubator	You ask them explicitly, maybe adding that you need that info specifically to calculate tax. IP address is not reliable because your customers could be using VPN, Tor, or be on vacation overseas. (By the way, "IP" on a website about law would more likely be understood as "Intellectual Property", not "Internet Protocol address".)	Since sales are in dollar and the OP does not specify a jurisdiction, I will assume Washington state US. You may need a business license, depending on the municipality. There are various permits required for sale of certain wares, such as food, explosives or poisons, but otherwise no special municipal permits are required. A state money transmitter license is required, and there are a number of bond and auditing requirements that also have to be obeyed. The state has a website which implies the pertinent restrictions, but does not actually explain them or how to comply: you would need to hire a lawyer to determine what you have to to to be legal. Those restrictions are not limited to flea markets, they regulate all bitcoin sales in the state, including internet and yard sale.	You have two downvoted answers here. One of them is actually correct, one is nonsense. Question: Which one? Answer: Doesn't matter. If you provide this service without getting advice from a competent lawyer first, your risk is much too high. Making the wrong decision (either giving up on a good business idea without reason, or providing a banking service without license) will cost you much much more than paying a lawyer for advice.
I'm 16 years old and I want to move in with my 18 year old SO, am I allowed to decide this for myself? What can my parents do against this? I want to move in with my SO who is 18 years old and has his own place. My question is basically: When I run out of my home, what can my parents do against this? Can they "force" take me from his place? Can I decide they aren't allowed to touch me or force me to go to another place? What can they do against my SO? Will my SO get in trouble, if yes what kind of trouble and how to mitigate that? Can my mom / parents call the police against my SO and force them to take me from him? My parents are split. I live with my mom, and I can't live with my father because he is just as bad. The problem with my mom is that she doesn't cook meals, doesn't give me any money to buy food and yells at me for asking for food when I'm hungry. I don't eat much and I'm very skinny due to that, last year I was in hospital because I had severe anorexia. I'm recovering and my mother still calls me fat and always complains about everything I do. Sometimes - but that doesn't happen as often anymore - she hits me. My SO is very supportive and I need him, I want to be with him, I want to solve all this misery. I tried getting help via GGZ / Jeugdzorg / Kinderbescherming / School but my mother acts to the world like she is the perfect and good mother and she manipulates everyone into believing I am just complaining and that she does help me and that she is good for me. No one believes me. I need a way out, desperately. Help me, please, what can I do? My SO does everything to help me and make me happy, he is there for me, always, he is the only one I can go to, I can't wait for help from Jeugdzorg / Kinderbescherming because they think my mother is good and they won't put me into 'Woongroep'. My mother is just abusing me mentally every day, also calls me names, almost every day and anything I do is wrong - I wanted to make homework with the help of a friend of mine and called on skype at around 21:30, she wasn't even in bed but told me to go sleep and hang up (well told? shouted very hard angrily) and I couldn't make my homework. I told her this and she yelled even more. I also can't make too much noise in the night because she can't sleep then and yells at me for it - but when it's 1 a.m. and I need to be up for school the next day and I say I want to sleep, she yells at me and calls me names. I am also seeing a psychologist and I tell him everything, talk about these problems and my mom also talks with him, and they keep e-mailing each other, and even my psychologist is convinced that my mother is good and even managed to tell him that my SO is bad influence on me, when all my friends tell me I changed for so much better after meeting him! They try to separate me from my SO now, not going to happen. No one except my age relatives / friends believe me and we can do nothing about it (my best friend even really saw how my mother is, and her mother knows that too - how bad my mother can be). Please help.	Under the Dutch Civil Code article 1:245, "All minor children are subject to authority". Article 1:247 says that "Parental authority comprises the duty and right of the parent to care for and raise his minor child". This basically means that parents have the right to exercise authority over their children (until age 18). Art. 1:249 says that: A minor child must observe the rights and powers that are granted to his parent or guardian in connection with the exercise of authority and he must take into account the interests of the other members of the family of which he forms a part. There are some exceptions, under Art. 1:246, people who cannot exercise authority over a minor: ...minors, adults who are placed under guardianship and persons whose mental abilities are so disturbed that they are unable to exercise such authority, unless the disturbance is temporary. As for the latter, that is a determination that would have to be made by the court. Death and divorce of parents add complications. There is also subsection 1.14.2.2a, about emancipation of an underage mother, where a mother 16 or older can request emancipation ...to care for and raise her child under the right to exercise authority over it and then The Juvenile Court may award the request only if it thinks this is in the best interests of the mother and her child. If another person was charged with exercising authority over the child, then the emancipation of the underage mother has the result that she as of then shall exercise this authority exclusively. Under §1.14.4, the court can also order custodial control of a minor If the moral or mental developments of a minor or his health are seriously endangered and other measures to avert this danger have failed But such control is given to a Foundation under Art. 1(f) of the Youth Care Act (not an SO). Under Art. 1:266 Provided that this is not contradictory to the interests of the children, the District Court may remove a parent from the right to exercise authority over one or more of his children on the ground that this parent is unfit or unable to comply with his duty to care for and raise his children. Art 1:269 is more specific about grounds for depriving parental authority. Insofar as they have apparently denied your request under §1.14.4, that is about as far as one can go.	Once your rental contract starts, your landlord must give you access to the rented flat. If he doesn't do so he is in breach of contract. You could sue him, but that would be a bad start for a longer term contractual agreement. It might be less time and effort to look for a new flat. And do you really want to be in a long term contract with someone who breaches contract right from the start based on arbitrary reasons? In any case, you can and you should cut the rent proportionally for every day without access to the flat. Your landlord has by no means a right to check your luggage. Even if there would be such a regulation in the contract, it would be void, because of invasion of privacy. It looks to me that you are in for some bad times with such a landlord. I can assure you that most landlords are not like this. Another reason to probably look for a new flat. Legally you are right, but what does that help you if your landlord is trouble?	You signed a contract where you agree to not have pets and the landlord agreed to let you live there. If you decide to not follow your end of the deal, the landlord might not either. In simple terms, you can get evicted. There is probably a clause in the contract to the effect of "you will get evicted if you don't follow these rules". Depending on contract and local law, you may also be fined, forced to remove the pet, or have your security deposit withheld. One reason landlords don't want pets is that pets leave odors and fur in the apartment, requiring costly cleaning. Not to mention some cats love tearing up the carpeting and otherwise destroying the property. Thus the deposit is used to "repair the damage" caused by the pet. Some landlords charge an additional pet fee for tenants with animals, so if you secretly keep a pet you are cheating them out of the fee as well. If you want the cat for several months or more, then you probably shouldn't try to hide it from the landlord. There is a big risk you will be discovered and suffer repercussions. The landlord may also refuse to renew your lease later. In theory, and depending on your tenant, you could claim that the cat was there for a day and it will be removed right away. But as I said, landlords are concerned more about the damage to their property than policing you, so once the landlord gets suspicious (probably already happened since you asked him about it) they could inspect the place and demand you pay for damage regardless of how long the cat was supposedly there. Well being of the cat is unlikely to create an exception to the contract. However, you could have some recourse by claiming that the cat is an emotional support animal and vital to your well being. I am not familiar with the process for this in Austria, but presumably it will involve paperwork from a psychologist verifying the fact. Simply saying you really like the cat and don't want to give it away will not be a sufficient reason - you initially agreed to not have pets, so it can be argued that you should not have taken one in to begin with. I love cats too, but you probably shouldn't do it if your landlord already told you no. You could end up in a situation where you are forced to put the cat in a shelter, which wouldn't be good for the cat. If your landlord won't budge, your best option is to move somewhere else.	You sound like a lot of my dispute resolution clients on their first visit You seem upset, maybe even angry and you feel that you are being victimised and harassed and that the person you are in dispute with is an amoral scumbag with no integrity. I sympathise with your feelings and understand that this sort of thing is stressful and causes emotional turmoil. However, how you feel has very little to do with what the objective facts are. This is what I read: You agreed to pay 1/3 of the bills, You have been happy to let your roommate handle this, You have trusted your roommate to do this honestly, You have been paying what she asked when she asked for it, Your circumstances changed, You did not advise your roommate that this would make it difficult for the existing arrangement to continue, She continued doing what she had always done, You stopped doing what you had always done, Your roommate has been left out of pocket and probably is under financial pressure herself, She kept asking for the money, You saw this as unnecessary harassment, You showed that you no longer trusted her integrity and judgement, She reacted the way most people do to being indirectly called a liar and a thief, Things spiralled out of control. Put your outrage on the shelf and feel sorry for yourself when it's not happening on my time (unless you are paying me, in which case I'm more than happy to listen to all your troubles at $420/hour + GST). Yes, she can take you to court. She will almost certainly prove that you owe her whatever you owe her for the utilities. I think it's extremely unlikely that she has been dishonest about this (although anything is possible). You may be able to make an arrangement to pay through the court which means that she will get a pittance per week from now until forever. This won't make things better. You have to deal with the fact that, right now, you share a home with someone where your relationship has broken down and you will have to continue to live with that person. At least until one of you can move out. Take a deep breath. Work out how you are going to make the relationship at least tolerable. I suggest you start by apologising.	Is there a legal argument to force the father to repay the debt if he is supporting his grown son? No, if you wanted to be paid back by the father, you should have told the adult son to tell his father to ask you for the money. Is there a legal argument to force the father to repay the debt if he is supporting his grown son? No, not unless you can go back in time and have the father co-sign each loan. Over the years, I lent him small sums that added up over time, which we kept track of on a spreadsheet. Over how many years? Is some of the debt more than two years old? If you're going to sue the son in Small Claims court, you only have two years to file your lawsuit and you must exclude all the debt that precedes those two years. In New York city, you can only sue in Small Claims court for up to $10,000. And no, you can't sue the father. And no, if the son is not clean, he most likely won't pay you back even if there is a Small Claims Court judgment against him.	They cannot force a contract on you after the fact. You should leave these numbskulls alone, they are clearly up to something that makes them likely to be sued. I am adding the following: it's not illegal as far as I know to declare anything you want to a person as long as it isn't a threat. "You are now beholden to give me your firstborn makle child." lol, no.	A private college or university is allowed to grant preferential treatment to anyone they please, except for oen of the reasons prohibited by relevant anti-discrimination law. Such laws vary by state, but generally prohibit preferences based on race, national origin, or gender. Some also include sexual preference or other categories. But I have never heard of a law preventing discrimination based on wealth, or specific donations. None of the Federal civil rights acts have such a provision. Preferences for so-called "legacy" students -- that is students whose parent or parents (or possibly more remote ancestors) are alumni of the school are common, and I am not aware of any case in which they have been seriously challenged as unlawful discrimination. Preferences for military veterans are also common, and may be mandated for public schools. For public schools justifying discrimination might be harder, and any relevant legislative polices will need to be considered, but even they can be free to make "rational" distinctions at least. Not all discrimination is unlawful discrimination -- far from it.	It is a false statement to claim to live in one county when you actually live in a different one. It becomes perjury (a crime) when you falsely swear to that statement on your status report, and you are required to report changes in "household situation" within 10 days. There isn't an exception allowing you to give a false address "in case it costs more to report truthfully". The only legal solutions are to report truthfully and pay more, or move again, report truthfully, and not pay more.
Sleeping in a car whilst intoxicated If a person were to go out drinking, head back to their car, leave the keys on the front seat, the engine off and get in the back to sleep it off, would they have comitted an offense? There appears to be a significant amount of contradictory information on this issue, particularly surrounding the "drunk in charge" offense so it's not at all clear to me.	This would probably not be a drunk driving offense. Under the UK "drunk in charge of a motor vehicle" law: How is “in charge” defined? There is no definition of “in charge” and the courts have been keen to avoid an all-embracing test. In determining if a person is in charge the court will consider: Whether he was in the vehicle, if so where, or how far he was from it; What he was doing at the time; Whether he was in possession of the key for the ignition; Whether there was any evidence of an intention to take some form of control of the vehicle; Whether any person was in or near the vehicle and if so the particulars of that person. You could also be prosecuted if you are found in the passenger seat or the back seats. You do not have to be sitting in the driver’s seat to be considered “in charge”. However those that own or lawfully are in possession of the vehicle or have recently driven it are deemed to remain in charge unless it can be shown: that they had put the vehicle into someone else’s charge or can establish that they had ceased to be in control AND there was no realistic prospect of resuming control whilst unfit. Are there defences available? The law states that someone cannot be convicted of an “in charge” offence if they can prove there was no intention and / or likelihood of the vehicle being driven whilst the driver was over the prescribed limit. Unlike many other offences, with the offence of being drunk in charge, the accused must prove that they did not have any intention to drive the vehicle. The prosecution is not required to prove that the accused was likely to drive whilst unfit or over the limit. A defence is available if it can be shown that there was no likelihood of driving whilst over the prescribed limit and doing this should be established by expert scientific evidence or compelling circumstantial evidence. These defences are known as “statutory defences”. Section 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 states: “The defendant must prove that it was more likely than not that he had no intention of driving whilst the level of alcohol in his breath, blood or urine remained above the prescribed limit in which case, he is not considered to be in charge”. Our question is, if you "leave the keys on the front seat, the engine off and get in the back to sleep it off, would they have comitted an offense?" Since the person in the question had an intent to "sleep it off" rather than to operate the car while under the influence, he (or she) has not committed an offense. The burden of proof would be on him (or her) to establish that intent, but sleeping in the backseat with the engine off and the keys out of the ignition in the front seat, would be pretty compelling circumstantial evidence of a lack of an intent to operate the car while under the influence. There might also very well be a local ordinance prohibiting sleeping in a car in a particular place, but it wouldn't be a traffic violation.	How does the victim know that there is water in the bottle? And not some strong acid? I think there will be a difference between someone cleaning their windows and spraying someone with the same bottle they used for cleaning the windows, and some woman's jeaulous ex-boyfriend sneaking up on her in the night and spraying her in the face with fluid from an unknown container. In UK law: "An assault is committed when a person intentionally or recklessly causes another to apprehend the immediate infliction of unlawful force." So spraying water out of container labelled "acid" would be assault. Spraying water on a person after threatening them with an acid attack would most definitely be assault. If the victim expects to be injured then it is assault. Even if the victim fully expects that the fluid is water, I could imagine that you would be charged with assault if a bride to be just spent two hours getting her hair and makeup done, and you destroy the work just before the wedding by spraying her with water.	Can someone be arrested for not being ‘nice’ to police? Yes. The arrest may later be declared unlawful, and the cop could later be disciplined by his boss, but if a cop wants to arrest you now for any reason they just can. Seems weird and an abuse of power to me. The available means of dealing with abuse of power have never been in excess. Could they win such a case? Yes. So could your friend. It depends on many many factors.	If you were moving "with the flow of traffic" but over the limit, you were still breaking the law, and the cop can choose which car or cars to stop on any basis or none (except ones forbidden, such as racial in the US). This is almost surely not a valid defense, not in any jurisdiction that I know of at least. If you can show that to slow to the speed limit would have actually been unsafe, you might have a defense, but that is going to be hard to get a court to accept.	It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common.	If you are texting while driving and you kill someone, you can expect to be charged with vehicular homicide or manslaughter with an aggravating factor. The crime can potentially carry a penalty as high as any other manslaughter charge that arises from a gross indifference to the safety of others.It could be as high as 20 years in some circumstances. That said, it's usually much less. The penalty for such a conviction will differ based on the circumstances and the remorse/attitude of the defendant; the judge has wide discretion in sentencing. The charge may differ by state from vehicular homicide, to manslaughter, but the fact that you intentionally engaged in a distracting activity is an aggravating factor that gives rise to these type charges, where otherwise you may have been able to avoid the accident or limit the injury caused. In the state I practice in most, an 18-year-old was convicted just a couple of years ago for vehicular homicide, texting while driving, and negligent operation. He was sentenced to nearly 5 years, all but 1 suspended. He was 18 and he killed someone. In MA, texting while driving is its own offense, as it is in CA. In nearly every state in the union, texting while driving either is illegal under its own statute (or one is pending in legislature), or it is prima facie proof of reckless driving if you cause injury or death. In Santa Ana, just this past August, a 23-year-old CA woman killed someone texting while driving. After a first mistrial, due to a hung jury, she was finally convicted of manslaughter and inattentive or distracted driving causing injury or death as an aggravating factor. She got a similar sentence. The NTSB has recently released a report finding that more injury occurs in the 16-30 age group from texting while driving than drunk driving, causing nearly 3,000 deaths last year and nearly 300,000 injuries. There is no doubt with these statistics why nearly every state has either already regulated/banned this practice or has legislation pending. See these texting and driving statistics.	The statute reads (emphasis mine): A person is guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Suppose Alvin has sex with Betty while Betty is married to Charlie. Does Alvin's conduct satisfy the elements of the crime? Alvin engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (namely Betty) at a time when the other person (Betty again) had a living spouse (namely Charlie). So yes, Alvin has violated this law. Betty has also violated the law (the first clause instead of the second). Betty engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (Alvin) at a time when he (Betty; the pronoun "he" is meant to be gender-neutral in the statute's style of writing) had a living spouse (Charlie). However, this law is effectively unenforced in modern times. According to https://www.dbnylaw.com/adultery-is-still-a-crime-in-new-york-state/: It is extremely rare for anyone to be arrested just for adultery. Indeed, since 1972, only 13 persons have been charged with adultery. Of those 13 persons, only five actually were convicted of the crime. In virtually every one of those cases, there was some other crime that was committed and the prosecuting attorney added adultery as just one of many crimes committed. If Charlie files a complaint regarding the affair, it is almost certain that the police and prosecutors will ignore it, and that nobody will actually be charged with anything.	Is receiving intimate stimulation while driving illegal? Under Michigan law, it seems illegal. What you describe is one particular case of a general family of scenarios where recklessness or negligence are elements of a driver-related offense. Thus, it would be inefficient and redundant to enact a statute to prohibit that specific hypothetical situation. MCL 257.626(2) sanctions the operation of a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, and as you mention It's pretty obvious to me why this is a dangerous practice MCL 257.626b sanctions the operation of a vehicle in a careless or negligent manner likely to endanger any person or property, but without wantonness or recklessness. A prosecutor might try to file charges also on the basis of MCL 750.335, which sanctions "open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior".
The nature of burglary First situation: Out of curiosity about what the living room in a house looks like, you notice that while the inhabitants are not home a door is unlocked, so you enter and look at the living room and then leave. If I understand correctly, that is tresspassing, which is a misdemeanor. Second situation: Same as above, but instead of curiosity about what the living room looks like, your purpose is to smash a flower pot that you happen to know is in the living room. If I understand correctly, when this kind of trespass is for the purpose of committing some additional crime besides only trespass, then it's burglary, which is a felony. Third situation: Like the first situation above: your only motive is to see what the living room looks like. But while there, on a sudden whim, you decide to smash a flower pot that you see in the living room. This time the trespass was not for the purpose of committing the additional crime, but still the additional crime happened and would not have been possible without the trespass. Is it burglary then?	We need a jurisdiction, because burglary is a statutory crime. Since this is a residence, in Washington, under RCW 9A.52.025(1), the trespasser might have committed residential burglary: A person is guilty of residential burglary if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, the person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle. While other states may have a provision requiring intent to commit a felony, or intent to commit a crime other than trespassing, the Washington statute does not say "felony" or "other than trespassing". A person can enter unlawfully by accident, or with no intention to be there unlawfully, in which case the person committed the act without the requisite criminal intent. If a person intends to enter but not remain, and they enter, they have committed the misdemeanor of trespassing. The question of whether unlawful entering with the intent to unlawfully remain satisfies the "intent to commit a crime" called for in the Washington statute has not been directly addressed in case law, as far as I know. While the state generally shoulders the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime, in Washington, under RCW 9A.52.040, the accused may bear the burden of disproving intent (this is a permissive inference on the fact-finder's part): In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent. This does not mean that the state shoulders no burden of proof regarding intent, according to State v. Newton: A jury may, however, infer the defendant's specific criminal intent from his or her conduct if it is not "'patently equivocal'" and instead 'plainly indicates such intent as a matter of logical probability' In this instance, the burglary conviction was overturned because no evidence shows his intent was anything other than to show her she could walk The relevant fact is that the accused was under the influence of PCP, and believed that God had told him that his disabled mother could walk, and he broke into the residence to tell her this. Pursuant to State v. Bergeron where the conviction for attempted burglary was upheld, the court held that The intent to commit a specific named crime inside the burglarized premises is not an "element" of the crime of burglary in the State of Washington... The intent required by our burglary statutes is simply the intent to commit any crime against a person or property inside the burglarized premises The court observed in this case that "there is absolutely no evidence in the record to prove what specific crime it was the defendant intended to commit inside". What distinguishes Bergeron from Newton (the latter, not precedential, citing the former) is that there was a good case that Bergeron had an intent to commit some crime, though not a specific identifiable crime; but for Newton, there was no evidence that defendant intended to commit any crime whatsoever, even remaining unlawfully. In the hypothetical instance, the fact that the criminal smashed a vase is evidence of an intent to commit a crime (destruction of property). It's unlikely that a mere assertion "I just did that on the spur of the moment" would carry any weight. If the circumstances make it more likely that he entered intending to do something wrong, such as vandalism, the elements of burglary are present/ If the defendant claims some innocent reason for trespassing, such as escaping a riot, he may avail himself of a defense (RCW 9a.52.090) that The actor reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him or her to enter or remain If there is no evidence of a riot, such a defense is not credible. Alternatively, if the house is for sale, the "I thought it would be okay" defense is more credible.	I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with.	Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.	The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate.	In general, you cannot contract to do anything illegal. However, ... An argument could be made that permission has been granted to, for example, enter property and remove the item. If permission has been granted, entering property and taking an item is not a crime.	In the United States, the government has, multiple times, destroyed homes while trying to catch a fugitive. And the homeowner sometimes makes a claim in federal court that this is an unconstitutional taking without compensation in violation of the 5th Amendment. In Lech v. Jackson, the 10th Circuit decided that the police and city were not liable for destroying a house while trying to arrest a criminal who had fled there. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. But in Baker v. City of McKinney, Texas, less than 3 months ago, a district court declined to dismiss a case in which police destroyed a home to catch a fleeing criminal. Allegedly, in this case the police were given a key to the door, a garage door opener, and the code to the back gate by the homeowner - and instead of using those, they used explosives on the garage door and used a BearCat to knock down the fence and the front door. I'm not sure to what extent those facts, perhaps showing that the scale of the destruction was unnecessary, matter. To the best of my knowledge the case is still ongoing.	No Section 18-1-704.5. (1) says that : The general assembly hereby recognizes that the citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes. (*emphasis added) Subsections (2), (3), and (4) all refer to "any occupant of a dwelling" as the class authorized to use force by this section. An offie is not a dwelling. Section 18-1-901. Definitions says: (g) "Dwelling" means a building which is used, intended to be used, or usually used by a person for habitation. Section Section 18-1-704 provides that: (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203.of person's authored by this law to use force Under that provision, the use of deadly force does not seem clearly justified. It is highly questionable that "a lesser degree of force is inadequate". Any conclusion that the intruder represents an "imminent use of unlawful physical force" seems dubious, but I can't say what a court might find. This law is fairly recent, there may be no published case law for it.	Technically, yes: Whoever willfully or maliciously injures, tears down or destroys any letter box or other receptacle intended or used for the receipt or delivery of mail on any mail route, or breaks open the same or willfully or maliciously injures, defaces or destroys any mail deposited therein, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. That said, just because it's technically a felony punishable by up to 3 years in federal prison, doesn't mean you'll actually be punished that way. The Department of Justice's Criminal Resource Manual has a section on misdemeanor offenses that apply to postal crime: Among the misdemeanor dispositions available are: 18 U.S.C. § 1701 (obstruction of mails generally); 18 U.S.C. § 1703(b) (opening,destroying, or detaining mail without authority); 18 U.S.C. § 1707 (theft of property used by postal service); and 18 U.S.C. § 1711 (misappropriation of postal funds). When the charge might best lie under 18 U.S.C. § 1705 (destruction of letter boxes or mail) or 18 U.S.C. § 1706 (injury to mail bags) and in other appropriate circumstances, an applicable misdemeanor may be found in 18 U.S.C. § 641 (theft of government property); or 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (destruction of government property). That suggests (at least to me) that federal prosecutors are supposed to at least consider misdemeanor instead of felony charges for minor cases of mailbox destruction. Under normal circumstances, destruction of federal property only becomes a felony if the damage (or attempted damage) is more than $1,000. This is a pretty good example of how US laws are written with prosecutorial discretion in mind. In other systems, the law about destruction of mail or mailboxes would lay out when it's a serious crime and when it's minor. In the US, it's always considered a serious crime because the assumption is that prosecutors won't charge it in minor cases (in fact, official guidance to prosecutors lays out ways they can charge it without charging the felony). It's also possible to be prosecuted at the state level for this, and if you're actually a juvenile that's much more likely than federal prosecution. The feds don't really like handling juvenile cases; they normally leave those up to the states unless there's some good reason not to. Even if you're an adult, the feds may well leave the issue up to the state for prosecution. At the state level, the threshold for felony vs. misdemeanor vandalism would depend on the state. Whether you're prosecuted at the state or federal levels, there's a decent chance you wind up with at least a misdemeanor on your record. Vandalism is illegal, after all.
Legality of online publishing of public records containing home addresses of large #'s of people? Suppose that: (1) a person living in Washington state receives a large number of documents from a public records request, each containing names and mailing addresses (for hundreds of thousands of people in total), along with a variety of other data; and (2) they then publish this collection of documents onto their own (non-commercial) website, and make tools to search/filter the database in various ways, selecting/displaying lists of individuals based on criteria from data about them in the records; and (3) government agencies already provide all of these documents online for free download. But they only provide the records online one-by-one rather than in aggregate, and they offer limited ability to search/filter records. Is it illegal under Washington state, or Federal, law for an individual to publish large #'s of public records containing personal information (such as home address) like this, on their own website? Would the person publishing the records likely be open to civil suits by the individuals whose information was published on the website?	Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point.	There is a good chance that the letter in question is in the public domain. Prior to 1978, the copyright laws were very different. Also, if it was published in 1963 or earlier and there was an initial claim of copyright but the copyright was not renewed, it would also be in the public domain. A convenient table summarizing when various pertinent categories of works enter the public domain can be found here. It might be possible to construe depositing the work with the Library of Congress as either a "publication" of the work (which if it happened before 1964 would put it in the public domain), or as a relinquishment of the copyright to the public domain, although I am not a specialist familiar with the legal effect of different forms of donations to the Library of Congress and it could depend upon the facts and circumstances of that particular donation to the Library of Congress. If worse came to worse, I imagine it might be possible to seek a declaratory judgment that your use was a fair use with substituted service on the heirs, and seek a default judgment, although that would not be optimal. The general problem that you face is that the work in question is what is called an "orphan work". Many other countries have special procedures to allow the use of orphan works, but the U.S. has resisted such legislation except for a narrow exception applicable only to libraries and archives at 17 U.S.C. § 108.	Can you anonymise people It is valid to anonymise the data of people, instead of deleting all of the records. The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Source As long as the person is not identifiable, then you do not need to treat the data as personal under the GDPR. You do have to inform a person once they are no longer identifiable, and be able to identify them if they provide the missing information: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Where, in cases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in a position to identify the data subject, the controller shall inform the data subject accordingly, if possible. In such cases, Articles 15 to 20 shall not apply except where the data subject, for the purpose of exercising his or her rights under those articles, provides additional information enabling his or her identification. Source The articles covered by this are: 15 - Right of Access 16 - Right to rectification 17 - Right to erasure 18 - Right to restrict processing 19 - Right to be informed 20 - Right to data portability	Was the case Sealed? Or is it considered to be Private? Those are two different cases. I was not able to find any laws regarding sealing, or expunging records of Name Changes, but was able to find the Utah Law for Criminal Records. I can only assume they draw from one another. All that being said, assuming your whatever case is sealed, then Some records are sealed. In these kinds of cases, even information about the existence of the case is not publicly available. A person seeking access to a sealed record must petition the court for permission to unseal the records. Rule 4-202.03 states that, ....no one may access a sealed court record except by order of the court. A judge may review a sealed record when the circumstances warrant. From that I can assume that, The records are not public. The records will not show up in a routine check The records will be known only if a there is a court order. Comparing it with the Expungement Act, Continued Use of Sealed Records After sealing, BCI continues to index and maintain all expunged records of arrests and convictions, but the records will not be released to the public. BCI will not divulge any information contained in the expunged records to any person or agency without a court order, unless authorized by statute to do so. Upon request, the following organizations may receive information contained in expunged records: the Board of Pardons and Parole Peace Officer Standards and Training federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and the State Office of Education Both cases above require a court order to get that seal record information. However, from what I gather only expunged criminal records can be access upon request by the Division of Occupational Licences. Bottom line, it sounds like you are safe to mark is no previous name, but you may lose your license in the future if something goes south. I will recommend you to get a professional look into the word of the law and provide you with a written statement of the actual law. Another thing you can try is write to the court who sealed your case, present them the situation and explain what you have found so far, and ask for guidance.	Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive.	There is currently no law requiring a candidate for US President to release tax records to appear on the ballot. Nor is there any law requiring the President to release such records after taking office. There are laws requiring members of congress, and other Federal officials, to make public some limited information about their finances. This is much less than the information that would be included in an income tax return. Congress could pass a law requiring candidates to release their returns, but it seems unlikely that the current Congress will do so. States have broad authority over Federal elections. A state could pass a law requiring a candidate to release his or her returns as a condition of appearing on the ballot. Such a law might be challenged on Due process grounds. This would be an untested legal area, so there is no telling how a court would rule on such a challenge to such a law. Congress, or an individual house of Congress, may subpoena almost any information in pursuit of its investigation function. Investigations must be related to possible legislation, meaning it must be related to a subject about which Congress has power to pass a law. But the relation can be rather remote, as long as the information might inform the judgement of members of congress in considering a possible law. There does not have to be an actual law under consideration. Investigations have been challenged, and in a few cases there have been court rulings that an investigation was not related to possible legislation, and so Congress was not allowed to enforce subpoenas on that subject, nor to compel testimony. But such rulings have been rare. Previous Presidents have asserted, under the name of "Executive privilege", a right not to disclose information, such as internal discussions within the executive branch. This is not explicitly specified by the US Constitution, nor by any law, but has been generally accepted, and in some cases supported by court rulings. No court has ever clearly defined the extent or limits of Executive privilege. A House committee issued a subpoena this year for President Trump's tax records, or some of them. I forget whether this was addressed to the IRS or to the Treasury Dept. This has been challenged in court, and the matter is still in court. I be3live that one of the grounds asserted against the subpoena was that it was not to look into tax issues, as specified in the law authorizing the subpoena. No one yet knows how that case will proceed. The NY State Attorney General is investigating allegations that the Trump Organization, and various individuals, violated NY law, including by falsely reporting campaign expenses and contributions. In pursuit of that investigation, he issued a subpoena for various records which he claims will reveal possible evidence of those illegal actions. He pretty learly has the authority to subpoena records which might be evidence in a criminal case. This subpoena has also been challenged, but seems pretty likely to be upheld. However the subpoena was as part of a Grand Jury investigation, and Grand Jury proceedings, including evidence obtained by subpoena, are by law secret unless an indictment and trial results. So even if the subpoena is upheld, this should not lead to the public release of the records, unless someone is put on trial for some crime, and the records are evidence in that case. Even then the judge can order the records not to be released to the public.	Note: I am not familiar with Washington law, but I can make an educated guess as to what is happening here. I am guessing that the couple in question are the joint registered owners of the motor vehicle. In many jurisdictions, motor vehicles are treated differently from "normal" things, they are treated as inherently dangerous and thus ownership carries a certain set of responsibilities. (Similar to e.g. owning a firearm, which carries with it certain restrictions on how it can be stored, for example.) One of those responsibilities is to keep track of who is operating the motor vehicle. Therefore, unless the operator of the motor vehicle can clearly be identified without incurring unreasonable cost, tickets for traffic violations are generally addressed to the registered owner, who can then forward them to the responsible operator. (Note that "unreasonable cost" does not have to be monetary. It could also be an invasion of privacy: it is less invasive to just ask the owner to identify the operator than to e.g. surveil the owner's property to find out who is using the vehicle or run facial recognition against the owner's family, friends, and colleagues.) In many jurisdictions, there is a form attached to the ticket (or downloadable from some website) which will look something like this: I accept the ticket: [ ] I do not accept the ticket [ ] because … I was operating the vehicle, but I did not run the red light [ ] I was not operating the vehicle [ ] … the vehicle was operated by: name ___, address ___ … I do not know who was operating the vehicle at that time [ ] If you claim not to know who was operating the vehicle at the time in question, that might have other consequences. In some jurisdictions, you can then be ordered to keep a logbook, for example. If the vehicle then gets caught again and you again claim to now know who was operating it, or you cannot produce the logbook, you might get fined for violating the court order to keep a logbook.	It depends on whether you can identify the person to whom a username hash belongs. If you store both username and its hash in the same database row then yes. If it is impracticable for you to identify the person by their hash only, then no. This comes from the definition of personal data — "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person", and Recital 26: Not applicable to anonymous data. The hash is essentially anonymous data when it does not on its own allow to identify the person (with reasonable efforts i.e. without spending $$$ on detectives or forensic science).
Is it illegal to intentionally design a social network that can't comply with right-to-be-forgotten (and possibly other laws)? If I intentionally design (and program) a social network that uses a technology (blockchain,...) which does not allow for alteration / erasing of user data, what happens in case of a right-to-be-forgotten request? Were there already any cases like this? What happens for other cases where the technical design disallows compliance with government request (for example, using end-to-end encryption for all communication, meaning I can't give goverment agencies like FBI access to private data on request)?	As a designer and programmer you virtually have nothing to worry about apart from your wasted time. Such a network would likely never evolve (unless in Darknet) just because the would-be blockchain node owners would not have the balls to keep the nodes up. If a court in country A orders information deleted, the node owners residing in A would have to comply. Technically impossible? Well, then take the node down. Information will be available from nodes in other countries anyway? Does not matter — nodes in A will be taken down regardless. Note that the right-to-be-forgotten is only a small part of the obstacle. Defamation, hate speech, child pornography etc. published in a system that does not allow to delete information will cause the whole system to be deleted.	The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission.	You can design whatever this system is (leaving aside jurisdictions without First Amendment-like law that lets you design to your hearts content), the problem comes in implementing. The main legal question is whether you are operating a website. A website operator has to comply with various laws that require them to remove content. For example, if you operate a website that allows users to distribute content that they upload, they can distribute copyright-protected content, and you can be held liable for copyright infringement. DMCA in the US provides a way for you to not get sued, but you have to be able to remove putatively infringing content, so you could get sued if you can't remove illegal content. This may also include legal troubles over e.g. defamatory content where a plaintiff gets a court order to remove the content – you can't plead "I can't it down" if the court orders you to do so. Napster was sued for copyright infringement and racketeering for facilitating law-breaking by others ("secondary infringement"), and in MGM v. Grokster the Supreme Court annonced the general principle that One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device’s lawful uses Grokster's problems arose because they clearly intended the software to be used to violate copyright law, whereas it is unlikely that Github will get sued because it is possible to use the platform illegally. So it really matters exactly what this "platform" is and what your relationship to the platform is. Describing a system is generally not illegal, realizing and maintaining one can easily be.	I'd say it's definitely illegal. Here's what the cookie notice says on Facebook at the time of writing this answer: By clicking on or navigating the site, you agree to allow us to collect information on and off Facebook through cookies. And here's what the GDPR define consent: ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; Also consider this, by the way: When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. Facebook's notice is a small blue bar at the top of its blue header, and you might not even notice it (at least on a desktop computer where I'm seeing it). I see no way to easily deny consent, for example there is no button saying "I don't accept". All you can do is click on the link to their cookie policy, and still that policy does not present a clear and easy way to deny consent in all different cases, it looks pretty complicated (among other things, it depends on whether you have a Facebook account or not). So denying consent looks pretty difficult, if at all possible. On the other hand, to give consent, you'd only have to click on any link. I tried this. I opened my browser in private/incognito mode, so it should not use any previous cookies. On Google, I searched for "facebook John Doe". Clicked on a result bringing me to a Facebook page with a list of profiles of people named John Doe. The cookie bar appears at the top, but let's pretend I did not notice it. Then I click on a profile, supposing I'm interested in a certain John Doe, and... I land on John Doe's profile on Facebook, now without the cookie notice! What happened is I gave consent by clicking on any link, that is, clicking on John Doe. I can't see any way this "consent" could ever be considered "freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes". Why is Facebook not compliant? Well, they probably couldn't be compliant even if they wanted to, unless they wanted to go out of business. Lately I've been wondering what the purpose of Google Analytics would be if users were always given the option to freely refuse consent. Virtually every user would always be clicking on "I don't accept", every time everywhere, so lots of business models would be totally disrupted. By the way, as of now, the cookie bar of this community (stackexchange) does not comply with GDPR either. To tell you the truth, I'm afraid very few websites have a GDPR compliant cookie notice.	The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem.	There is not necessarily a contradiction. Information that they may keep may be: Account information Subscriber information Information on breaches of the Terms of Service or Agreement So yes, they might certainly not keep any logs – although that claim is doubtful, since they almost certainly keep at least error-level logs of their services – but that doesn't mean that they have no information to disclose to law enforcement. It's also questionable what "logs" refers to – would aggregate statistics be considered a log, by law? Would your last known IP address be considered a log, provided they don't keep any other history?	In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.	You are correct that facts in general are not protected by copyright, and most raw data are facts. However, a collection of data may be protected by copyright as to its selection and organization. A use which copies such selection might possibly be copyright infringement. If data constitutes a trade secret it may be protected as such, and "improper" access might be unlawful. This would not apply to publicly available data or collections of data. If, to access a data set, one must sign or agree to a contract, that contract may limit the use of such data. Again, this would not apply to most publicly available data.
Is i-doser legal in Singapore? Drug is illegal in Singapore. i-doser claims to be a musical drug. Namely it's music whose effect similar to drugs. Indonesian government say it's not a drug. It's just a marketing gimmick. Will it be legal? http://i-doser.com/ Will I get death penalty if I bring i-doser there? Plan to share that with a girl. Perhaps jokingly says (to the girl) I bring some drug. Anyway, what I want to ask is if there is any law or convictions in Singapore where people in jail because of i-doser	You will not get the death penalty because it is not really a drug. But, if you joke around with customs, you will no doubt find yourself in jail for a few days and experience unpleasant cavity searches. Never joke around with customs. A lack of a sense of humor is one of their hiring criteria.	It should be pointed out that smuggling doesn't just involve illegal goods but also includes legal goods that are brought in without following proper procedures such as paying required duties. https://www.findlaw.com/criminal/criminal-charges/smuggling-and-customs-violations.html False Declarations; Exporting violations; and Importing violations. False declarations can happen when a person returns to the U.S. or enters for the first time. They must declare the value of any goods they are bringing in from overseas. You can violate the law by misrepresenting the value of the goods, omitting them from the declaration form completely, or making false representations. Also, if you fail to disclose leaving or entering the country with $10,000 worth of currency, you can be criminally charged. While I am not a lawyer I could see that the authorities might have an issue with someone pulling a stunt like that in order to "test" them. Even if there is no legal issue the person could be put through a lot while they run tests to confirm that nothing illegal is being brought in and there is nothing preventing them from making the process as long and painful as they can. Something else to consider they also have rules in place for brining other legal objects on board planes if they resemble objects that are not allowed. https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/items/toy-guns-and-weapons Squirt guns, Nerf guns, toy swords, or other items that resemble realistic firearms or weapons are prohibited. We recommend emptying water guns, which must follow the 3-1-1 Liquids Rule. Replicas of explosives, such as hand grenades, are prohibited in checked and carry-on baggage. TSA officers have the discretion to prohibit any item through the screening checkpoint if they believe it poses a security threat. It is also possible to be charged with selling fake drugs and the local authorities can bring those charges and it can become their word versus your word about what your intentions are. In this case you might not be intending to sell them but it would be impossible to argue that you are not trying to pass it off as fake drugs. https://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/legal-advice/criminal-defense/drug-charges/jail-selling-fake-drugs.htm Question: I sold a baggie of aspirins that I said was OxyContin to a guy at a concert. After the show, I heard that there were undercover officers in the crowd. Could I be busted for selling fake drugs? Answer: Yes. States and federal laws make the sale of fake drugs illegal, and you can even be charged with an attempted drug sale under some laws.	british-columbia I am not aware of any judicial consideration of this issue. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 78(1) says: A minor must not, except as provided under this Act or unless the minor does so with other lawful excuse, ... consume liquor. (One of those exceptions are when the alcohol is supplied by the minor's parents, spouse or guardian in a residence for consumption in the residence. There are other exceptions, too. But I'll assume you're asking about a circumstance where no exception applies.) The Liquor Control and Licensing Act defines a "minor" to be a person under the age of majority established by the Age of Majority Act, which is age 19 today. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 57 makes it an offence to contravene s. 78(1). The Interpretation Act, s. 25.1 states that "A person reaches a particular age expressed in years at the beginning of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." The Interpretation Act also clarifies that the reference to time "is a reference to Pacific Standard Time" (or Pacific Daylight Saving Time, when it is in effect). Thus, a person is a minor until "the beginning [in Pacific time] of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." It is most clear in relation to the identification requirements when selling to a minor, but the Regulations (s. 158) refer to the date of birth as displayed on the person's identification card. This all suggests that when consuming alcohol in the greater Vancouver area, a person just about to reach the age of majority must wait until the date in the Pacific time zone is that which is displayed on their identification. Or barring any identification, until the date in the Pacific time zone is the date that is the person's birth date.	Generally speaking, what isn't illegal by law is legal. It's possible for law enforcement agencies to share crime rates, maps, and their data, but within any laws regarding access and sharing of that data. Such crime data may be publicly available, but that depends on local and state laws. The local or state agency would have to enter into a legal licensing agreement - if local and state laws allow such sharing - with the GPS company to provide the data, update it, and reasonably assure that it is accurate. The more realistic reason GPS systems might choose to not show crime data may be public relations. If a GPS user lives in an area that has been objectively identified by data as having a higher than baseline crime rate, i.e. for carjackings, that user may not be very happy with that designation. Worse, what happens to public relations when data errors show an area is wrongfully identified as high crime? What kinds of lawsuits could result? Real estate agents suing since bad data from a GPS unit soured the sale of a house?	What you're asking about is extraterritorial jurisdiction, and it will depend on the country and crime(s) involved. As an example, under Australian law, it is a crime to engage in sexual activities with minors barring specific exemptions, which are not relevant to this example. There are countries where the age of majority is less than that in Australia. If you were to travel to this country, you are not necessarily committing a crime there. However, Australia's sex tourism laws make it a crime to do this anywhere in the world. This is enacted (I believe) under the foreign affairs power of the Commonwealth Government. It will largely depend on the legal system of your country, as to whether laws have extraterritorial effect. In general, however, laws do not have extraterritorial effect unless explicitly stated.	Prompted by this recent similar question, I've revisited this question and deleted my original answer as it was completely off the mark. This is its replacement. It is illegal, and it turns out to be an international standard in the Berne Convention. Article 16 in full: (1) Infringing copies of a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected. (3) The seizure shall take place in accordance with the legislation of each country. Your scenario falls squarely within point (2) and the imported George Orwell book is to be treated as an infringing copy within the UK. The implementing UK legislation for (2) can be found in Section 27(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.	There is a slim chance that it is truish, depending on whose law you are asking about, and also depending on the facts (if the drug was in a baggie, it's unclear; it is was mixed with the soda, it's clear and it's true). As far as I know, the "baggie in can" theory has not been put to the appellate test (perhaps that is evidence that the can does not count). However, in the case Chapman v. US, 500 U.S. 453, defendant was convicted of the sale of LSD-laced blotter paper, and was sentenced accosting to the 5.7 gram weight of the blotter paper, not the 50 milligram weight of the LSD that it contained. SCOTUS upheld the sentencing based on the higher weight, holding that "The statute requires the weight of the carrier medium to be included when determining the appropriate sentencing for trafficking in LSD", because the statute is stated in terms of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" (here, 21 USC 841, are some of the current laws, which repeated use the formula "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of"). The question that would arise is whether a can containing a bag of something is a "substance" or "mixture". The ordinary meaning of "mixture" precludes that interpretation, but of course you also have to look at the legislative history to determine what Congress's intent was in writing these laws. Saying that a can with a bag is a "substance" is also counter-intuitive, but not as plainly unreasonable as calling a can and a bag a "mixture". In Chapman, the court observed that "Congress clearly intended the dilutant, cutting agent, or carrier medium to be included in the weight of those drugs for sentencing purposes", but again you might interpret "carrier medium" as referring to something other than "the means of carrying the drug" – "carrier medium" is not statutorily defined, and its "plain meaning" is broad (but also note that the statute doesn't mention "carrier medium"). In its ruling, the court appeals to "the history of Congress's attempts to control illegal drug distribution", and a careful study of all of the pertinent documents for this case might definitively rule in vs. out an interpretation that the weight of the container is to be included. An obvious ludicrous consequence of including container weight is that if you are arrested for possession of a trace amount of a drug, found in your car, the weight of the car is to be considered and you get life in prison. It is plausible that the officer has a vague acquaintance with the Chapman-type ruling, and has misapplied the law, thus he has a good-faith belief that his claim is legally correct (thus he did not lie, he was simply wrong). Perhaps some DA has pursued the "drug plus can-weight" theory, but I doubt that has happened.	IANAL, and I don't live in America, but some of this depends on their intent. If they gave the drugs away by mistake, they probably have not broken any laws. If they were given away deliberately (and you would need to prove this – which might be hard) then yes, he has broken laws. Either way, I expect you have a right to compensation (i.e. $900) from the physician to "make you whole again." If required necessary you could file for that in your local small claims court: The physician will either come to the party pretty quickly and sort it out, or the court will award you the money you need to buy the replacement meds. (But you will need to evidence the replacement cost, for a start....)
How is a USA marriage dissolved if neither spouse is resident in the USA? Consider the following sequence of events: A couple get married in a St. Louis, Missouri courtroom in 2002 (at which time they are residents in the USA). The couple begin living in a foreign country in the following year. They register their marriage in the foreign country through the appropriate legal mechanisms Within three years, they are no longer US residents. The couple separates after four years. They hire a local lawyer to annul the marriage in the foreign country, and this is done. The marriage is still valid in the USA, according to a US Embassy. A significant time later, the couple wants to dissolve the marriage in the USA too. However, neither the US Embassy nor any lawyers they consult with, either overseas or in the USA, can give them a straight answer as to how to effect such a divorce. The couple is told that there are "complicated jurisdictional issues" involved. For example, Missouri law seems to require that at least one of the spouses wanting to file for divorce must be resident in Missouri. How is this ex-couple supposed to file their (uncontested) divorce in the USA? EDIT: Let me clarify what I mean by "annulment". The marriage was registered in a notary in the foreign country so that it would have legal validity there. The "annulment" I refer to was then the standard process for "reversing" this registration, so that the marriage no longer held legal validity in the foreign country. The lawyer hired to do this actually referred to this process as a "divorce", so "annulment" was a bad choice of words on my part.	The general rule is that the ability to have a valid divorce has nothing to do with where the marriage was entered into, or the citizenship of the parties. Usually, any jurisdiction with sufficient contacts with either member of the couple has jurisdiction to enter a divorce. Hence, generally, people get divorced in the place that they live. The problem in this scenario is step 5. I think that it is highly likely that the U.S. Embassy is simply wrong, unless there is some serious irregularity in step 4. An annulment after four years of marriage, as opposed to a divorce, is highly irregular and would not be allowed in the vast majority of jurisdictions. But, maybe there are facts and circumstances that make it otherwise. This fact pattern, while it on one hand sounds like a "for a friend" question based on real facts, also sounds like some important details that may be outcome determinative have been omitted.	Regardless of whether the marriage is legal in A, you can get married in the US. No permission from A is required. If Las Vegas is where you want to do it, here is what you need to know: Requirements Neither blood tests nor waiting periods are required if you want to tie the knot. The legal age is 18 for both men and women (proof of age is required) and licensing fees are $77. Civil ceremonies can be performed at the Marriage Commissioner's Office at 309 S. 3rd St. Chapel fees vary depending on the services provided. Marriage License For marriage license information visit the Clark County Marriage License Bureau or call (702) 671-0600), 201 Clark Avenue (located on the northwest corner of Clark Avenue and Third Street). Marriage License Bureau hours are 8 a.m. to midnight, including holidays. You can get married in Vegas even if you're not a U.S. resident. Most countries require a certified copy of your marriage certificate ($15) and an apostille from the Nevada Secretary of State ($20). Contact home country's Consulate office located in the U.S., to inquire if additional certifications are required. http://www.lasvegas.com/planning-tools/weddings/online-marriage-pre-app/ When you return to A, your marriage may not be legally binding, according to the laws of A, but that has no bearing on your ability to get married in the US.	Can a divorced man win a downward modification of alimony and/or child support if he were tricked into a marriage by a child that wasn't his? The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. Will the man likely be able to get reduced child support and/or alimony on the claim that he was tricked into a marriage he would not otherwise have undertaken? Generally speaking, marriages induced by fraud about anything other than the extreme case of fraud involving who someone is marrying in the act of marriage itself (i.e. someone believed they were marrying John Smith from Denver but actually was married to John Smith from Los Angeles, whom they had never met before, because the marriage ceremony was conducted with disguises and they didn't look closely at the marriage certificate), has no impact on marital rights. Evidence regarding fraud to induce a marriage wouldn't even be admissible at trial because it wouldn't be legally relevant. This has no impact on alimony. Paternity can be contested by filing a paternity suit within the statute of limitations for doing so which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (usually within two to five years of the child's birth). If the husband prevails in a timely paternity contest, child support will not be owed. Otherwise, actual genetic paternity would be irrelevant. In California, the statute of limitations to disavow paternity of a child born to one's wife is two years from the date of birth. N.B. I am making some interpretations of inexact language in the question. It says: The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. But I assume that what is really meant is that one or both of the members of the couple file for divorce and that in the course of the divorce proceeding the wife seeks alimony and child support. If the divorce proceeding is concluded without an adjudication of paternity that would usually preclude a later lawsuit to disavow paternity.	The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in.	Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces.	Bob has to sue in a court of competent jurisdiction To enliven jurisdiction, there has to be some connection between the parties or the event and the jurisdiction. Since Bob, the manufacturer and (presumably) the harmful incident all took place in County X, of State Y or Country A then they are the only jurisdictions that might be competent. The courts of County Z, State M or Country B are all going to say "not my problem". For the USA, there are only State courts and Federal courts. States may have courts that are called county courts but they are enlivened by the state sovereign - counties and cites are self-governing administrative districts, not sovereign states. Federal courts have jurisdiction where the subject matter is about a Federal Statute, the Constitution or a treaty. This dispute would appear to be based on tort or contract law which is a state matter. Federal courts can have jurisdiction if the parties are in different states and the amount in dispute is more than $75,000. This would not appear to be the case. So, as a state matter, the plaintiff can bring the case to any competent court. The defendant can apply to have it moved to a more convenient court. Arguments will be heard and, at some cost, you'll probably end up where you should have started.	We do not have a law requiring you to renounce citizenships that you might hold, like the Nationality Law. I am not sure what you mean saying that renouncement is processed only within the Japanese legal system -- that is how it is everywhere, and there is no international authority or clearing house that handles citizenship renunciations. The effect of renouncing Japanese citizenship would be that you are then no longer a citizen of Japan: I can't find an explicit law prohibiting an exclusively-Japanese citizen from renouncing his citizenship and becoming stateless. A dual citizen would then be exclusively a citizen if "the other country", thus you would become strictly an Iranian citizen. According to the Civil Code of Iran you would be an Iranian citizen under clause 2 of Article 976. Article 977 allows accept a different citizenship but that would not apply if you have an Iranian father (and I guess does not actually get rid of your Iranian citizenship). Article 988 sets conditions for Iranians to abandon their nationality: you must be 25 or older, have renounced all property rights in Iran by transfer to Iranian nationals, have done your military service, and, have approval of the Council of Ministers. So yeah, not possible. Article 14 of the Japanese Nationality Law requires you to "choose either of the nationalities" before reaching 22, and furthermore Choice of Japanese nationality shall be made either by depriving himself or herself of the foreign nationality or by the declaration provided for in the Family Registration Law in which he or she swears that he or she chooses to be a Japanese national and that he or she renounces the foreign nationality (hereinafter referred to as “declaration of choice ”) Article 16 says "A Japanese national who has made the declaration of choice shall endeavour to deprive himself or herself of the foreign nationality". The bold part above seems to resolve that paradox, although that is based on a US-style interpretation of law and working from a translation of the law. That is, the requirement is that you try, not that you succeed (which is impossible in the case of a person with an Iranian father). There would be an effect in the US. If you renounce Japanese citizenship, you're strictly an Iranian national, and that has one consequence. What is not clear is whether the US recognizes, in any way, a renunciation which Iran doesn't recognize. This case features a person with renounced Iranian citizenship (he is also a US citizen), who was approved for a security clearance based in part on his renounciation. This gives some indication that the US does not care that Iran makes renunciation next to impossible. This is of course just for informational purposes and calls for an immigration attorney if it really matters.	As a general rule, countries tend to recognize marriages performed abroad - even if those marriages could not legally be performed in the country. (So a 14 year old couple from North Carolina would be considered "married" in the UK. Note: that doesn't mean they can legally have sex.) There are exceptions: countries which don't permit polygamy often don't recognize polygamous marriages performed where they are legal. There would need to be evidence of the marriage though (as Jerry Hall found to her cost when she "divorced" Mick Jagger, and he successfully claimed that their wedding in Bali was not official).
User consent required under GDPR I am having an Android app which uses certain Analytics services such as Google Analytics, Firebase etc. These services collect certain information from the user. For this reason I have drafted a Privacy Policy for my Android app. Now whenever the app starts I am asking the users consent(only once) using a tick box which IS NOT PRECHECKED. Now I am having certain questions - 1) Can I use an pre checked tick box under GDPR? 2) Since GDPR also requires the data collector to ensure that the user is not under the age of 13 so I am planning to ask the users age only for that region i.e. EU Region. Now will simply mentioning that "By continuing you acknowledge that you are above 13 years" will work or will I have to ask the users age? 3) The GDPR requires the data collector to have a proof of the users consent. Now what kind of proof will be required for my App? I am ensuring that the user cannot move forward without providing the consent(only once) is that sufficient as a proof or is any other proof required? Any answer would be really helpful.	"1) Can I use an pre checked tick box under GDPR?" Nope. "Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent." (Recital 32) "2) Since GDPR also requires the data collector to ensure that the user is not under the age of 13 so I am planning to ask the users age only for that region i.e. EU Region. Now will simply mentioning that "By continuing you acknowledge that you are above 13 years" will work or will I have to ask the users age?" You have to require some affirmative action. Implicit consent (just continuing) is not acceptable (ibid.) "3) The GDPR requires the data collector to have a proof of the users consent. Now what kind of proof will be required for my App? I am ensuring that the user cannot move forward without providing the consent (only once) is that sufficient as a proof or is any other proof required?" If you are collecting data about the user, you should record the time and date consent was given as part of the user profile. If you are not collecting data about the user (this is only done by third party services such as Google analytics etc.) and there are no user profile, then preventing the user from using the app will have to do. The GDPR also requires data-minimization, and creating a user profile to record consent when no user profile is otherwise required will violate data-minimization-principles.	Art 13 GDPR is about information to be provided when data is collected directly from the data subject. This information can be provided directly during/before collection. It is not generally necessary or useful to send the data subject an email with this information. Usually, a SaaS website will provide the information under Art 13 as part of their privacy policy, and link it in easy to find places. Also consider the EDPB guidelines on transparency, which suggests a layered approach: in addition to a detailed privacy policy, summarize key information directly when the data is collected, e.g. next to an input form.	The cookie consent requirement comes from the ePrivacy Directive, not from the GDPR. While the GDPR defines consent, cookie consent is required regardless of whether the cookie actually contains personal data. Instead, it says we can access information stored on an end users device under the following circumstances. Technical access to the information is used for the sole purpose of performing a transmission over a network, e.g. using a browser cache. Accessing the information is strictly necessary for providing a service explicitly requested by the user, e.g. session cookies or a consent-declined cookie. The user has given consent to the access, where consent is defined by the GDPR (freely given, informed, specific, …). The first scenario likely doesn't apply because your cookies aren't likely to be “technical storage or access” in the sense of ePrivacy, and because the tracking cookies wouldn't be used for the sole purpose of carrying out a transmission. The second scenario doesn't apply because tracking cookies are not strictly necessary to interact with the webshop, as evidenced by the possibility to opt out. The service explicitly requested by the user is the webshop or website, not the A/B testing. This only leaves consent as possible grounds for storing or accessing information on the user's device. It is already the storing or access that is covered by ePrivacy, not only later use as a persistent identifier. Your suggestion – to first set the cookie and then delete it if it shouldn't have been set – is more compliant than many set-ups I've seen, but is still technically non-compliant. It is also likely to fail in practice under non-ideal network conditions: if the request to see whether GDPR applies times out, or if the user closes the browser tab before the cookie will be deleted, the tracking cookie will remain without consent. I would instead suggest to consider the following points. It seems that by itself, Optimizely Web cannot be used in a compliant manner since it doesn't provide sufficient control over how cookies are managed. Thus, you should avoid loading such tracking scripts unless consent has been given, or unless this processing falls outside of EU/UK law. Currently, you defer loading of tracking scripts until you know if you have to ask for consent. This can be avoided if you always ask for consent :) This can also be avoided if you load the tracking scripts from a server that can independently determine whether the requests comes from the EU. For non-EU requests and for users with opt-in, the server can return the original tracking scripts. Otherwise, the server returns a dummy script. This server can be independent from your website's hosting. By combining the jurisdiction decision with the loading of the script, one roundtrip is saved and latency is reduced. Finally, no one is forcing you to use Shopify, and ePrivacy/GDPR is not required to accommodate their limitations. You do have different choices: use Shopify, at the cost of slow pages and limited A/B tests use a different A/B test provider that can be used without setting cookies use edge computing to do stuff in between of the browser and the original server use a different webshop platform ignore EU laws Well, one of them is clearly unethical. But you do have choices, and which choice you take is a business decision. Slow pageloads and consent banners are likely costing you conversions, but Shopify might be providing massive value that outweighs all that.	There are a few different grounds under which PII can be handled. Perhaps the most discussed at the moment of GDRP introduction is consent, because of the wave of consent-seeking. But there are a number of other grounds. "Necessary for contract execution" is a trivial one, to deliver a pizza you'll need an address. The relevant ground for sanctions lists is also pretty obvious in hindsight, you may process PII in order to comply with legal obligations. Note that this is still an integral part of the GDPR, not an exception to the GDPR. That means you need to apply all the basic GDPR rules. You need to explicitly store where you got the PII from, for which purpose, and you need to document how you're using it. Note that this might be hard - why do you need to store this data? Why can't you just check the list as the moment it's relevant? The GDPR for a large part depends on you justifying your actions, not just in hindsight but already up front.	It is not an either–or. You may have certain rights under both CCPA and GDPR, but they have rather different mechanisms for determining their scope. When does the CCPA apply? CCPA applies to certain businesses and consumers. It covers any business (regardless of legal structure) that that does business in the State of California and has a certain scale. A consumer means a natural person who is a California resident. These aspects are not influenced by your current location. When you as a California resident travel to the EU, you still have all your CCPA rights against businesses that do business in California. You do not have any CCPA rights against businesses that don't do business in California, for example a national rail company in the EU you've bought a train ticket for. When does the GDPR apply? Whereas the location of the user/data subject can be a factor in the GDPR context, their residency or nationality does not. The GDPR applies to all processing activities by data controllers who are established in the EU, including any businesses, non-profits, and individuals. This includes processing activities in the context of an EU establishment of a non-EU company. For example, GDPR would apply with respect to processing of personal data by a hotel you're staying at in the EU. The GDPR also applies to non-EU data controllers in the context of (a) offering goods or services to people who are in the EU, or (b) monitoring behaviour of people who are in the EU. Here, “offering” does not mean “doing business”, but “targeting or marketing”. For example, you might have installed a smartphone app that assists with sightseeing while in Paris. If this app monitors your behaviour while you are in the EU (such as by tracking your GPS position to alert you to nearby points of interest), that would fall under the GDPR while you are in the EU. The app may also fall under the GDPR per case (a) if it is marketed to / targeted at people who are currently in Paris. That the GDPR applies in such cases comes from the offering/monitoring while you are in the EU, not from your continued presence in the EU. You would be able to exercise your GDPR rights relating to this processing even after leaving the EU. Note that some service or processing activity can fall under CCPA and GDPR simultaneously. For example, this app would also fall under CCPA if the company also does business in California, e.g. if it also provides sightseeing information for Los Angeles or San Francisco. And both CCPA and GDPR could apply when an EU company does business in California. Under which privacy law would a deletion request be dealt with? In practice, most companies don't have this sorted out properly and results are unpredictable. Ideally, a company would just comply with both laws simultaneously, thus making it unnecessary to determine which law applies. Information that is only required under on law can be provided with conditional statements, e.g. “If this processing activity is covered by GDPR, you have the right to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority in your country”. As mentioned above, both laws can apply simultaneously. Whether GDPR applies and whether CCPA applies are independent questions. However, the answer to neither of these depends on your current location at the time of making the request. In this answer, any statement about the EU applies equivalently to the UK.	These are only tangentially related to the GDPR A government entity processing data in accordance with a member state law is ipso facto in compliance with the GDPR. That’s because lawful government data processing is a legitimate reason for processing data under the GDPR. If Germany, for example, passes a law saying German police can record every phone call in Germany, then that would be a lawful basis for processing under the GDPR. There may be constitutional or other legal limitations on such a law but as far as the GDPR is concerned, they’re fine.	A data controller is whoever determines the means and purposes of processing. It is possible that multiple controllers jointly determine the means and purposes. However, someone can only be controller over processing activities where they actually have the ability to influence these decisions (see e.g. the Fashion ID case). The provider of an app does not have any control over what Google does on its servers with the collected data, unless Google were a data processor for that particular processing activity. Thus, the app provider is not a data controller for Google's subsequent processing, and is not responsible for Google's GDPR compliance. HOWEVER, the app provider is a data controller regarding what happens within the app (including any SDKs, libraries, or frameworks). The app provider is data controller for processing activities such as “collecting data” and “sending data to Google”. These processing activities must comply with the GDPR (if GDPR applies), for example they need a legal basis. Under some circumstances there might be a legitimate interest for sending data to another data controller. But in the context of behavioural advertising, such a legitimate interest would be very weak and would not pass the required balancing test. Instead, the app provider would likely have to collect consent. This is very similar to the question of whether a website can embed content from Google services such as YouTube videos, which would necessarily share data with Google. I have written related answers here and there. You are correct that many apps do not collect valid consent before showing ads. GDPR/ePrivacy enforcement in this space is rather lacking, especially since many offenders are outside of the EU. However, this doesn't mean such illegal data processing by apps would be OK.	Well actually... I think you'll just need to wait a little more. I monitor the situation quite closely and I can tell you that it's just a matter of time. Microsoft was one of the first (if not the first) to communicate openly about the GDPR and the changes that follow. From the blog post: If your organization collects, hosts or analyzes personal data of EU residents, GDPR provisions require you to use third-party data processors who guarantee their ability to implement the technical and organizational requirements of the GDPR. To further earn your trust, we are making contractual commitments available to you that provide key GDPR-related assurances about our services. Our contractual commitments guarantee that you can: Respond to requests to correct, amend or delete personal data. Detect and report personal data breaches. Demonstrate your compliance with the GDPR. Microsoft is the first global cloud services provider to publicly offer you these contractual commitments. We believe privacy is a fundamental right. The GDPR is an important step forward to further clarify and enable individual privacy rights and look forward to sharing additional updates how we can help you comply with this new regulation and, in the process, advance personal privacy protections. Microsoft has set up an informational site on GDPR here. If your eyes are on any other provider, I think the only way to learn more is getting in touch and inquiring about their progress and process. Hope this helps.
Where to find brief for Jaffe vs Roberts I am interested in finding the brief of the petitioner in the US Supreme Court case "Robert J. Jaffe, Petitioner v. John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, et al." The case number is 16-1181. Here is the Supreme Court online docket for the case Where can I find the petitioner's brief? Moreover, I am also unable to find the petition and the opinion of the lower court (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). I surfed the Ninth Circuit website and searched for the case num. 15-56328 (number taken from the above mentioned SCOTUS online docket), but no results were found.	There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case.	It is the lower courts' interpretation of a senior court's judgment—specifically the ratio—that determines what is the precedent. If a court doesn't want its opinion to bind lower courts, it can be clear in its judgment that this is not what was intended. For example, a court could say that this judgment turns on the particular facts of this case, and should be interpreted narrowly by lower courts. Alternatively, a previous precedent could be narrowed by a later judgment of a senior court if it was later felt that the ratio was being applied too widely. (I have read examples of the explicitly narrow ratio, but haven't been able to find any today)	Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked & answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false & misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness.	canada The appellant would still be expected to file within the required time limits (30 days after the would-be appellant's judgment in the lower court). A judge of the court of appeal has the discretion to extend time, but this is subject to established criteria. For example, the criteria in British Columbia are (Morden v. Pasternak, 2022 BCCA 268; citing Davies v. C.I.B.C. (1987), 15 B.C.L.R. (2d) 256 (C.A.)): Was there a bona fide intention to appeal? When was the respondent informed of the intention? Would the respondent be unduly prejudiced by an extension of time? Is there merit in the appeal? Is it in the interest of justice that an extension be granted? If the highest court in the country had recently issued a decision clearly favouring the appellant, I predict this would weigh in favour of granting an extension of time under the "merit in the appeal" factor. However, that factor is not dispositive, and it will not excuse a long delay. This might seem harsh, but there is an interest in finality and a concern about prejudice to the respondent. And if the appellant thought they had an argument on appeal, they could have appealed within the time limit to potentially challenge the precedent themself.	One such case is People in interests of EB, 2022COA8 (Colo. App. 2022). The official syllabus of the case states: In this dependency and neglect proceeding, father appeals the juvenile court judgment terminating his parent-child legal relationship with his child. Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a continuance after it learned that he was having technical difficulties participating in the termination hearing, which was being conducted via Webex videoconference due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. A division of the court of appeals concludes that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the requested continuance. Accordingly, the division reverses the termination judgment and remands the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to the case are substantially identical to the parallel Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the same number. Harmless error analysis is fairly similar in criminal cases and civil cases, although not quite identical. In theory, the standard in a criminal case to ignore harmless error is stronger than in a civil case. In practice, lots of seemingly significant matters in criminal cases are discounted as harmless error anyway. The court doesn't explicitly make a harmless error or lack thereof determination, but its analysis makes clear that the error was not harmless. Issues related to a remote hearing are also discussed in People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4 (Colo. App. 2021), which is cited in this case. The official syllabus to that case tangentially discusses the issue: In this dependency and neglect proceeding, mother appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationship following a remote termination hearing via Webex. She claims that the court should have granted her a continuance so an in-person hearing could have been held, and the remote hearing didn’t afford her due process or equal protection of the law. The division concludes that the court didn’t abuse its discretion in denying the continuance. The court’s need to conduct the termination hearing via Webex didn’t establish good cause to continue the hearing when a judge presiding over a hearing held via Webex can address any technical difficulties with sound, video feed, or broadband issues as they arise; any delay in making an objection can be redressed by the court disregarding improperly admitted evidence; the court had extensively tested the virtual lobby and didn’t allow a sequestered witness to hear any of the proceeding; Webex, as a real-time videoconference platform in which all participants may view one another, allows the court and all counsel to observe a witness’s demeanor, determine if the witness is relying on documents or other information, and view admitted exhibits as well as other documents that may be used for impeachment; and the court ensured that an official record of the hearing was made in the same manner as during an in-person hearing. The division also rejects mother’s assertions that the remote hearing procedure failed to afford her due process and equal protection of the law. The division concludes that the juvenile court ensured that mother was provided substantially similar and fundamentally fair procedures as would have been available at an in-person termination hearing. So conducting the termination hearing via Webex afforded mother due process. The division didn’t consider mother’s equal protection claim because it is merely a bald assertion without argument or development. It is worth mentioning that many cases applying the harmless error standard don't expressly reference Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52. Not infrequently, cases don't even mention the buzzwords "harmless error", even though the case makes an analysis that implicitly addresses the issue. Probably the best place to look for relevant case law would be under annotations to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 which governs motions for new trials.	Lots of reasons The citing case may be in a higher court than the cited case but might not actually add anything. You always go for the highest authority on record. From time to time, a case makes a big review and consolidation of all the case law on a particular point. It is then easier to cite that case rather than half a dozen cases that it summarised. More recent cases are worth more, all else being equal. A case from 2002 shows the law hasn’t changed since the decision in 1997. Repeated precedents are worth more, all else being equal. By using the citing case you get the weight of two judges (or more for multi-judge appeals) for the price of one. Some judges write better than others. Citing their cases may better clarify the point.	In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment "standing"1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term "standing" in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis.	Here are the opinions I found which do not explicitly state that Regina is fictitious. University of Utah Hospital and Medical Center v. Bethke, 611 P.2d 1030, 101 Idaho 245 (Idaho, 1980) ...in my judgment, the majority seriously errs in using an esoteric, artificial and strained construction of the phrase "in Idaho" to hold that the legislature intended that phrase to mean "outside Idaho." When confronted with such linguistic legerdemain, I cannot but recall the unreported case of Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim.L.Q. 137 (Toronto 1965), wherein the court converted a pony, fortuitously saddled with a feather stuffed blanket, into a small bird, thus falling within the provisions of the Ontario Small Birds Act. Midland Management Co. v. Helgason, 630 N.E.2d 836, 158 Ill.2d 98, 196 Ill.Dec. 671 (Ill., 1994) Justice HEIPLE, dissenting: This case illustrates the resourcefulness of the judicial mind when confronted with the application of a rule of law which produces a result deemed to be undesirable. The straightforward approach to such a dilemma offers but two possibilities. The first option is to apply the law to the case and let the painful result occur. The second option, available to a court of last resort at least, is to change the rule of law. Make a new one. However, if neither of these two options is attractive, the resourceful judicial mind has yet a third option. It can redefine the terms so that the rule does not apply to the case at hand. This approach was chosen by the majority in the instant case. The application of this technique is well illustrated and perhaps reached its zenith in the Canadian case of Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Criminal Law Quarterly 137 (Toronto, 1965) in an opinion rendered by Blue, J. Doe v. See, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir., 2009) We hierophants of the law are adept at redefining ordinary concepts, but it is no more appropriate to declare that religious services are commercial activities than it would be to declare that ponies are small birds. See Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim. L.Q. 137 (Oct. 1965). Retail Flooring Dealers v. Beaulieu of America, 339 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir., 2003) Again, this creation of an intracircuit split is obscured with a fuliginous cloud made up of the conceit that the attorney here (allegedly unlike the attorneys in Estate of Bishop and Cabrera) is truly a party. It comes as no surprise to me that the legal mind is perfectly capable of reaching a result by declaring a non-party to be a party, just as it can declare a pony to be a small bird. See Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim. L.Q. 137 (Oct. 1965). While I am often taken by, sometimes even filled with admiration for, manifestations of scholastic mental agility, I think that agility is frequently misdirected. It is here. Thus, I respectfully dissent. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 531 S.W.2d 507 (Ky., 1975) This one is different because the asterisk points to another case which identifies Regina as "entirely fictional." It is readily apparent that the meaning of the equal protection clause cannot be ascertained from what it says, nor even from what the Supreme Court has said about it. As in Regina v. Ojibway* a pony was found to be a small bird, so under the 14th Amendment an illegitimate child may be either a speckled bird or a jackass, depending on its current aspect as (and when) viewed by the keeper of the royal secrets of the Constitution. Indeed it appears that here is a corner of the world Alice in Wonderland would not find unfamiliar. Here is a case which refers to Regina and acknowledges that the case's fictitious nature is not always understood. U.S. v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636 (C.A.7 (Ill.), 1990) See also Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim.L.Q. 137 (1965), convicting a person under the Small Birds Act, despite the fact that the animal involved was a horse and the defendant was unaware that Ontario defines horses as birds. (The horse in question was an animal "covered with feathers" because its rider used a pillow as a saddle. Although it is a tour de force of statutory "construction", Ojibway is mercifully fictitious, something not always understood. United States v. Byrnes, 644 F.2d 107, 112 n. 9 (2d Cir.1981).
Should offline users of an online video game be forced to accept ToS? In the context of a video game that has online and offline play. An account is needed to play online, but no account is required to play offline. Assuming the user must accept some terms while signing up, is it necessary to show a legal document for a user only playing offline? The game also uses CC 3.0 licensed assets. Are these valid reasons to create some terms the user must accept while playing offline? Could both online and offline documents be merged into one that the user must accept in the first launch of the game?	"Terms of Service" implies that you are providing a service. If it's offline, you probably aren't doing that. You can still have a license agreement that applies. If certain types of CC licenses are involved, you may even be required to.	It's not illegal to say things in your profile. SE requires you to license your content to them on a non-exclusive basis pursuant to CC BY-SA 4.0. "Non-exclusive" means that you can also license the material to others on some other basis, e.g. CC0. In that case, a person who uses your material can rely on the other license that you granted. If SE wanted to, it could prohibit putting licenses in a user profile, in which case you would have to promulgate your more generous license elsewhere.	For your example of items with Marvel characters on them for sale by people and companies not licensed by Marvel, Redbubble clearly states that We ask, rather we beg, that you remember this when you are posting work on Redbubble. If you make sure that all the works you upload consist of your very own, original ideas and are not infringing on the intellectual property or publicity rights of another... (from https://help.redbubble.com/hc/en-us/articles/201579195 ) and further, Redbubble has full contact information for the submission of Notice and Takedown Reports by each real trademark owner. There are many individuals who upload products which use unlicensed artwork in violation of trademarks, and Redbubble acknowledges this and gives recourse to the license holder to inform them so they can remove the items. It's not a perfect system, but Redbubble it seems makes every effort to help police their market. ( Teepublic has a very clear policy statement, too: https://www.teepublic.com/copyright-policy ) Many companies - such as Marvel - employ agents to regularly check such websites and issue takedown demands to the sites; the sites in turn remove the products, and in some instances, ban the individual from using the site again. In the case of Amazon, there can be two types of products sold that use trademarked artwork and characters: items sold by legitimate businesses that have license agreements with the trademark owners and who have the products sold by Amazon itself; and items sold on the Amazon marketplace by individuals who open Amazon Marketplace accounts themselves and don't have licenses. Amazon will be sure to check the products they sell; they will have a takedown notices system for their marketplace vendors. eBay is somewhat the same way; there is a mix of individuals and businesses on eBay, but eBay doesn't operate an umbrella sell/ship by eBay, like Amazon. It's kind of a whack-a-mole situation on the Interwebs. How much time/money does a company spend to chase down trademark infringement? Is it worth going to court for persistent violators? (These are, for the most part, civil cases, not criminal). Violators can always open a new account on sites such as Redbubble and eBay under a different name. And it starts all over again.	Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc.	The GCIDE dictionary itself is licensed under GPL-3.0. It consists of a bunch of files with markup, no software involved. Indeed, the GPL can also be applied to non-software works, though it is unusual. When you use material under some license, you must comply with the terms of the license. In case of the GPL, there are two highly relevant conditions: Everyone who receives a copy of the covered work (original or modified, in whole or in part) must receive the complete corresponding source code of the work, under the terms of the GPL-3.0. If you create a derivative work of the covered work, the derivative work can only be distributed under the GPL-3.0. However, selling the covered material is perfectly fine. The GPL does not forbid you to make money, however you must not profit from your requirement to provide the corresponding source code. Here, the core question is whether your mobile game would be a derivative work of the GPL-licensed dictionary. If your game merely loads the dictionary as a data file, I don't think they would form a single derived work. However, if you compile the dictionary into your app, this would be more difficult to argue. Ultimately, what is a derivative work will depend on a court. It could therefore be helpful to keep your app as clearly non-derivative as possible. I would avoid baking the dictionary into the app's binary but store it separately as a data file, would show attribution notices in reasonable places (e.g. a screen with attribution notices and the complete license text), and would make it possible for users to export a copy of the dictionary files. Furthermore, the GPL-3.0 may require you to allow users to modify this file, for example by making it possible to import a modified dictionary into your app.	The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.	According to the current version of the TOS: You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. This explicitly says you own your content, although Medium has some rights to do some things. And they won't sell it without permission, so unless Medium itself is publishing this book, it would seem to be copyright infringement. (Of course, I don't know what the TOS said when you originally wrote the article.) If what was copied was not copyrightable (like a quote from the Constitution, or a simple uncreative graph of something obvious) then it wouldn't be infringement. But your article was probably more than that.	Pretty much everything you need to know about the ownership and licensing of your material on Medium is in the Medium TOS you contractually agreed to when you signed up with the service. Basically, you granted Medium a license to use the work, but you did not agree to an exclusive license nor turn over copyright to them. Part of that Terms of Service – Medium Policy reads: Content rights & responsibilities You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. You’re responsible for the content you post. This means you assume all risks related to it, including someone else’s reliance on its accuracy, or claims relating to intellectual property or other legal rights. You’re welcome to post content on Medium that you’ve published elsewhere, as long as you have the rights you need to do so. By posting content to Medium, you represent that doing so doesn’t conflict with any other agreement you’ve made. By posting content you didn’t create to Medium, you are representing that you have the right to do so. For example, you are posting a work that’s in the public domain, used under license (including a free license, such as Creative Commons), or a fair use. We can remove any content you post for any reason. You can delete any of your posts, or your account, anytime. Processing the deletion may take a little time, but we’ll do it as quickly as possible. We may keep backup copies of your deleted post or account on our servers for up to 14 days after you delete it. Pertaining to presenting Medium content in an iFrame on another site, this is reasonably close to not allowing that: You may not do, or try to do, the following: ... (2) access or search the Services by any means other than the currently available, published interfaces (e.g., APIs) that we provide;... You can use Embed Code Generator \| Embedly to embed an iFrame of a Medium page on another site. But contacting Medium via the email at the bottom of the TOS would tell you for sure if it is OK. Comments on your pieces on Medium do belong to the owner. And You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. appears to cover the idea of copying your material from Medium to your own site. If in doubt, ask them.
Is it illegal to lie in an interview? Strange question. I had been contacted by a recruiter for a job. Tomorrow is my final round interview. I had been getting a strange feeling and today the recruiter basically told me that when I work for the company, they will rewrite my resume and I have to be ok with them lying on it (e.g. adding work experience where none actually exists). They asked me if I was ok with this, and they said I will be asked tomorrow in the interview to. The interview is by Skype. The company trains software developers and then gets them contracts with other companies. 2 questions: Is it illegal to lie in the interview? E.g., is it illegal to tell them that I am ok with them embellishing my resume, when in fact I am not and have no intention. If I did allow them to embellish my resume, would I be breaking the law? At this point I'm just curious to see where things go, but I'm wondering is it legal for me to say "yes, you can fake information on my resume" as it could be a verbal agreement?	There is no prohibition on lying in general. Misrepresentation If you misrepresent a fact and that misrepresentation is a material inducement to someone entering into a contract with you then there are a number of problems that follow: The (mis)representation may become a term of the contract and if not complied with can allow the aggrieved party to either sue for damages or rescind the contract. If the misrepresentation led to the contract being entered into by mistake then the contract is void for mistake The misrepresentation may have become a collateral contract an innocent or negligent misstatement may give rise to the tort of negligent misstatement misrepresentation may put you in breach of trade practices statutes. Fraud If you knowingly tell a lie with the intention of receiving a benefit then this is both the tort and crime of fraud. You receiving employment or your company securing a contract probably qualifies as intending to receive a benefit.	Can they? Yes Is it legal? No This is called constructive dismissal and it is as illegal as any other dismissal without legal cause.	Am i going to jail? I'm so scared. No, probably not. The details depend on jurisdiction, but normally the only crime you could be accused of would be that of forgery. However, forgery by definition requires an "intention to deceive". So my personal advice would be to come clean immediately: Go to your employer, and tell them you did not understand the checkout system and accidentally signed yourself, instead of having the customer sign. If you do that, what you did would not count as forgery, because (as you explain) you did not do it on purpose to trick someone. Now, your boss may still decide to discipline you in some way, maybe even fire you, but that's out of your hand. If they are reasonable, they'll hopefully understand a minor mistake on the first day. That said, it is possible your jurisdiction has special penalties for incorrectly filling out medical documents, so there may be more to it - but I doubt it. To be sure, try asking someone you know and trust who is familiar with the legal rules around medication. Or book a single consultation with a lawyer - this is not cheap (typically around $100 in the USA, or 100€ in the EU), but will give you peace of mind. You could also try asking around if there is a local initiative which offers legal help, possibly a professional organization or trade union.	Is it illegal to ask a company for money in exchange for information on a bug in their software/website? That in itself is legal. Indeed, the company would incur unjust enrichment if it coerced you to disclose your discovery for free. Only if you threatened the company to divulge to others your discovery unless the company pays you, it would be illegal and trigger charges such as extortion (likewise, legislations outlaw the unjustified delivery of programs or instructions for hacking a software/network/etc., although this goes beyond your actual question). Can the company take legal action against me? That seems doubtful, futile, and it could backfire (please note I have not done any research on legal precedents about this). Although the terms and conditions of the website or the End User License Agreement (EULA) of software might prohibit you to reverse engineer (RE)/decompile/etc. the application, anti-RE clauses are unenforceable and the remedies therefor are indeterminate because the sole act of conducting reverse engineering does not subject the company (or third parties) to any losses. The company's decision to take legal action for your discovery could backfire from two standpoints. First, it calls attention to the fact that the software at issue is defective and unsafe. And second, the bug is likely to be detected by someone else anyway, thereby potentially compromising customers' systems.	Can I sue if I was misled or lied to about the job I would be working Yes, but only if you can prove that your reasonable reliance on the employer's representations prompted to leave your former job and/or decline other projects/positions. You would need to persuade a court that your current employment (1) has worsened your circumstances in terms of compensation and/or career-wise; and, if employment is at-will, also that (2) resigning from your current job would not undo the loss you incurred as a result of taking this job position. The particulars of your situation would determine whether your claim(s) meet the prima facie elements of fraud and/or breach of contract.	If I did not sign promotion bonus document, my career would be over. Is this duress? No. The premise is hardly true or even logical, and what you describe falls short of duress. Not every imbalance of bargain power implies duress. First, it seems that you could have declined the bonus, thereby preempting the sanction/remedy for leaving within 12 months. Second, it seems hard to prove (and unrealistic) that your career would have been over if you refused to sign the document. The employer can easily refute that allegation by pointing out that there are many others who did not sign that employer's document and yet work elsewhere as investment bankers. You would need certain, additional context to reasonably allow for a conclusion that your career altogether depends on what happens with this single entity. Third, your mention that "the bonus mitigates the horrendous weekly hours" reinforces the idea that signing the document was your preference (namely, for the purpose of obtaining some additional, non-compulsory stimulus) rather than employer-inflicted duress. The rationale and decision for acceptance of those conditions reflects that you knowingly exercised your freedom of contract. A party is not entitled to void a contract only because he belatedly changed his mind about conditions of which he was aware beforehand.	In general, providing a false name or birthdate (DoB) is only actionable when there is a legal duty to provide the correct information, or when a provision of a contract to which the person agreed requires it. If the falsity is part of a common-law fraud, then it would be unlawful, and possibly criminal. In the cases listed in the question: Sign up for an online service with a false identity although the ToS requires an accurate identity: This would be a breech of contract. Whether there could be a successful suit for such a breech would depend on why the contract demanded an accurate ID, and what harm the lie did or might do. Use a false name at a restaurant or hotel, but with no intent to defraud or avoid payment. I don't think there is any duty to give an accurate name on a restaurant reservation. In some jurisdictions the law requires an accurate name be used on a hotel register, and valid ID presented. But such violations are rarely pursued, unless they are part of a fraud or some other criminal activity (theft, prostitution, or drug dealing, say). Giving a false name when opening a bank account or other financial account. In the US, and I think many other jurisdictions, the law requires accurate identification of all bank account holders, including a SSN, EIN, or TIN. It also requires a bank to make efforts to verify such IDs, and violation are prosecuted. There are legal ways to get an account under an alternate name such as a penname or DBA, but this must be disclosed to the bank and to the IRS. Other cases that occur to me: Giving a false name at a shop when not obtaining credit or avoiding payment: generally legal. Obtaining a credit card under a false name: Can be done legally if disclosed to the issuer. Giving a false name or DoB to a pharmacy for a prescription: unlawful if attempting to access the medical info of another, or rely on another person's history to get a prescription, but may be lawful if this is just an alias, such as a celebrity might use to avoid publicity. Unlawful if done to obtain a controlled substance, or if insurance fraud is involved. Putting a false name on a job resume: lawful, but if hired an I-9 form will require a valid name and SSN or TIN. Employers usually may not require that a DoB be provided. Giving false info as part of any credit application: usually considered fraud, even if there is no intent to avoid payment, as it can deceive the creditor as to the amount of risk involved; specifically criminal in some states. Giving a false name on a date: perfectly lawful, but may cause a problem if a long term relationship develops. Some states require a valid name on a marriage license.	Is this work for hire? There is an arguable case to be made that you are an employee for copyright law purposes and, if so, the copyright belongs to the company. The closer an employment relationship comes to regular, salaried employment, the more likely it is that a work created within the scope of that employment will be a work made for hire. But because no precise standard exists for determining whether a work is made for hire under part 1 of the definition in section 101 of the copyright law, consultation with a lawyer may be advisable. Second, if you do own the copyright, there is clearly an implied licence with the company to allow them to use it. It is arguable that the licence is exclusive since the software is bespoke and made specifically for the company. Can you sign an agreement now Yes, but … It is clear that the purpose of signing the agreement is to screw the company over (with the compliance of 2 of the directors). That’s a contract entered into in bad faith and possibly for an illegal purpose and would likely be found invalid. You need to understand that the company is a distinct legal entity from its owners and it has its own rights. People make the mistake of thinking the owners are the company: they aren’t. The two rebel founders are on dangerous legal ground. Assuming they are the directors of the company, they have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company. That is, they must put the company’s interests ahead of their own. It is clearly not in the company’s interest to have a rival business start so they cannot plan to do that while they are directors - they need to resign first. You are not so much at risk - as an employee/contractor your duty is to follow the directions of the company (the company - not a faction within the company). However, if you aid the other two in what might be a crime, you could be in trouble.
GDPR - Withdrawn user consent I have been reading alot about user consent management according to the GDPR and one problem I can't see solved anywhere is managing withdrawn consent. The user gives his consent to use his data and save personal information like his E-Mail address, IP address, ... If the user withdraws his consent I would have to somehow store this decission in my database to make sure I always have proof of a prior consent and at which date the user has withdrawn his consent. But how do I keep track of a withdrawn consent if I can't save any personal information to identify this person anymore. Isn't this a contradiction? Always having the ability to prove everything but being forced to delete all saved data records? Is there any part of the GDPR I am missing, that solves this specific problem?	This could be covered by point 1(c) of Article 6: Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: ... (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; ... It might also fall under point 1(f): ... (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. It is difficult to know whether any particular processing of data falls under either of these points because of the lack of relevant court decisions. The latter is particularly slippery, since whether any interest is "legitimate" is at least partly subjective, and whether any interest of the data processor overrides the data subject's interests, rights, or freedoms, is even more so. I should also note that point 1(a) is the point that requires user consent, so the other points explicitly take the place of consent rather than being somehow required alongside consent: (a) the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for one or more specified purposes, except where Union or Member State law provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data subject;	From a German perspective, it would be absolutely normal and expected that you're providing identity & contact information publicly. Per §5 TMG (Impressumspflicht / Anbieterkennzeichnung) this is required for German tele-media offerings, such as websites or email providers, even if non-commercial. Whereas for you as an upstanding and diligent email provider an abuse@... address should be enough, the German context expects a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit… There absolutely are privacy and free speech issues with this compelled self-doxxing. But by running an email service, you're not just acting as a private person. Your privacy interests and the transparency and security interests of other people have to be balanced. Now since you are not in Germany, the TMG does not apply to you. You have no legal obligation to provide this information. However, the ISP also has no legal obligation to to deliver your email. The ISP does have an obligation to apply appropriate organizational and technical safety measures. It seems that one organizational measure they have found appropriate is that they will only deliver emails from providers that provide public contact information, as would be the norm in Germany. I am not entirely sure how the GDPR applies here. The GDPR doesn't really allow or prohibit disclosures of personal data, it just requires that every purpose of processing for personal data has a legal bases per GDPR Art 6. One such legal basis is a legitimate interest, which boils down to a balancing test between your rights and freedoms and other people's interests. I'm also not sure if the contact information should be classified as personal data in this context, because the contact info primarily relates to your role as an email provider. I'm also not sure if the ISP is processing your personal data in the sense of the GDPR when they merely require you to publish it on your own site. They would be processing it as soon as they scrape, store, or otherwise use this info.	I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data?	The GDPR doesn't generally distinguish public from non-public personal data. If you have a good reason to contact the professor, do send them an email. GDPR does not prevent this. If you're sending this email for “purely personal or household purposes”, then GDPR doesn't apply anyway. There are rules in the ePrivacy Directive against unsolicited emails, but these specifically relate to emails for direct marketing purposes. A company is not allowed to send out spam marketing, regardless of whether they obtained the email address from a public data source. Companies can send email marketing to their own existing customers, or to people who have given consent. Consent is defined in a fairly restrictive way (as a specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes), so that mere publication of an email address cannot be interpreted as consent to receive marketing from a particular company.	How to properly ask for consent is an evolving issue. Your general consent flow is very common, but I don't think it's entirely compliant. Legal background on consent Consent is one of the Art 6 GDPR legal bases for processing. The ePrivacy directive (ePD) also mandates consent for accessing information on a user's device, where such access is not strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user. For example, this means that analytics cookies require consent. Consent is defined in Art 4(11) as: any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her Further conditions for consent are given in Art 7, such as that “It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent”. The EDPB guidelines 05/2020 on consent provide extensive interpretation of the GDPR that should be considered as effectively binding. First layer: accept / change preferences The first consent layer provides general information about the purposes that consent is being sought for. This seems to be mostly compliant, but I have some doubts. Consent must be freely given, and withdrawing consent must be as easy as giving it. I would therefore recommend having a “continue without consenting” option that is given roughly equal prominence to the alternatives. Consent must be informed. Even in the first layer, you must give basic information. In the EDPB guidelines, the following items are identified: controller's identity purposes of processing what type of data will be collected existence of the right to withdraw consent if relevant: that the data will be used for profiling/automated decision making if relevant: possible risks if international data transfers are made under Art 49(1)(a) I think this makes it difficult to collected an “agree to all” style consent that covers all purposes. It would be better to clearly distinguish between the analytics and advertising purposes even in your first layer. Consent must be specific to a purpose. You try to make this possible via a second layer where granular choices can be made. This isn't entirely bad, since you also need to make the consent flow simple enough as to avoid click fatigue. But since you only have two processing purposes, it would be better to show them separately on the first layer. You cannot generally make access to the app conditional on unrelated consent. The statement “This app uses tracking identifiers” suggests that there is no choice. It would be better to make it clear that the user can voluntarily consent to such processing. Together, this would mean that a design like the following could be more compliant. Text in [brackets] indicates buttons or links. Your privacy choices To support and improve this app, you can choose to give us access for the following purposes: Analytics: understanding how you use this app We would like to collect information on how you interact with the app, and store cookies on your device for this purpose. [more information] [decline / agree] More relevant advertising We will always show ads, but if you want we can build an interest profile to show you more relevant ads. [more information] [decline / agree] You can always change your choices in the app settings, but past use of your data remains legal after withdrawing consent. ExampleApp is provided by ExampleDeveloper Ltd. [full privacy notice] [continue] Second layer: detailed information about all services Your second layer sounds good, as it provides granular controls and more detailed information. As already mentioned, I would move some of this to the first layer. But one of your questions pertains to the defaults on this screen: It is OK if I set all of the options to enabled the first time that the user goes to the preference screen (enabled by default) ? No, this is not OK. Consent means opt-in, and requires an affirmative action by the user. You cannot have pre-checked checkboxes. The default is that no consent was given. If you have an “enable all” button, I would also expect a “disable all” button. Else, consent might not have been given freely. You also cannot rely on the consent until consent has been actually given. So you must not start collecting analytics in the background while the user is still on the consent choice screen. In addition to being non-compliant by itself, loading pre-ticked checkboxes increases the risk that your application accidentally considers the consent as already being given, which could easily lead to illegal processing if there's a bug in your app. You might have processing purposes that are based on a legitimate interest instead of consent. These can be enabled by default, but you generally have to make it possible for the user to object. Your relationship with third parties When using third party services, it is crucial to understand if they are a processor who is contractually bound to only use the data on your behalf, or a separate processor. You must disclose processors (or at least categories of processors) in your privacy notice, but not really during the consent flow. The GDPR does not distinguishing between doing processing activities yourself versus outsourcing them to a processor. In both cases, you are the controller, and only you are asking for consent. Thus, it's also superfluous to show third party privacy notices. It's your obligation as the controller to provide all necessary information. If you are collecting consent for other controllers with whom you have joint processing activities, you must make this much more prominently. You would have to disclose in the first layer that you are sharing the data with other controllers who can use the data for their own purposes. This sharing is part of the processing purpose. This is quite tricky to do correctly when it comes to ad networks, since ad networks generally won't be your data processor and can have many intransparent members. Demonstrating consent As the data controller, it is your obligation to be able to demonstrate that valid consent has been given. This implies process-level obligations such as being able to show that your consent flow is non-coercive and makes it possible to decline consent. This also implies individual-level obligations such as being able to show when a given user has given or withdrawn consent for which purpose. If you have a backend anyway, it could be sensible to store information there about consent/withdraw events. When the user returns to the consent management screen through the app settings, you could show a timestamp like “you consented to this purpose on 2021-08-22 17:14:23”. I have recently written a more detailed discussion about demonstrating consent.	This is clearly personal information (PI) , and indeed personally identifiable information (PII). and so is Personal Data under the GDPR. Under Article 6 of the GDPR any processing must have a lawful basis. There are 6 possible bases. The most likely ones here would be (a) consent, or (f) legitimate interst, but the private association may claim some other basis as well. They should tell you what basis or bases justify their processing of this information, which includes storing it and publishing it. Under Article 13, Paragraph 1(c) the association should have informed you of the purposes for which information was collected when it was first collected. Under Article 15 paragraph 1 you are entitled to request and obtain from the association (or any other Data Controller) a statement of what PI about you they hold. along with this they must supply various other information including; (a) the purposes of the processing; (b)the categories of personal data concerned; (c) the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed, in particular recipients in third countries or international organisations; (d) where possible, the envisaged period for which the personal data will be stored, or, if not possible, the criteria used to determine that period; (e) the existence of the right to request from the controller rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing of personal data concerning the data subject or to object to such processing; (f) the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority; and other specified information. Article 17 paragraph 1 provides that: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay ... if one the the specified conditions applies, particularly: 1(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing; 1(c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2) Article 21 paragraph 1 provides that: The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or her which is based on point (e) or (f) of Article 6(1), including profiling based on those provisions. The controller shall no longer process the personal data unless the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. Thus I would suggest that you send a written communication to the association, stating that you: Request access to all PI which they have about you, as permitted by GDPR article 15 paragraph 1; Request that they delete any such information from the public website and any other publications, as permitted by GDPR article 17 paragraph 1; State that you object to further processing of this information under GDPR article 21 paragraph 1; Request information on the name and contact info of the relevant supervisory authority under GDPR article 15 paragraph 1; State that you expect these requests to be complied with promptly, in no event later than 30 days. Mention your prior request for the public info to be deleted, and that several months have already elapsed. Give the exact date of the prior request. I would suggest sending these requests, together in a single email, specifically mentioning the relevant GDPR provisions. I would suggest sending a copy of this by registered mail, and retaining a copy, along with the identifying number of the registered letter. In the letter, mention the email. If the association does not promptly respond in a way you consider satisfactory, you may wish to file a complaint with the relevant data protection supervisory authority. You may also wish to consult a lawyer with experience in this area to determine if you have any legal recourse if the association does not comply.	[I'm not so well-versed on US and Russian law, thus I will limit my answer to EU law.] Your specific use of a user identifier, as I understood from your question, can be classified as personal data, so in your case, the GDPR seems to apply. This means that you need to have a) legitimate purposes to process that personal data (e.g. crash reporting) and b) a legal justification for each purpose of processing: it could be based on consent or another legitimate purpose (inc. your own legitimate interests). Consent might not be the best option for you, but it's up to you to decide. In any case, you need to assess the risks to the data subjects (your users) before you decide. How likely is it that you will get breached, and what potential harm will that cause to your users? These are some guidelines; my recommendation is that you read the law and the guidelines by the Article 29 Working Group and European Data Protection Board, or hire some good experts on this. There is no easy answer, or one size fits all solution. The GDPR isn't so hard to understand or implement, but it does require some change in mindset. With the new law, processing personal data carries a higher risk of penalties, so you should do it only when it's absolutely necessary, and with respect to the rights of your users.	Per GDPR Art 79, you can sue data controllers if you consider your rights to have been violated. Where you have suffered damages due to GDPR infringements, you also have a right to compensation per Art 82. However, your rights may not have been violate as far as the GDPR is concerned. Under the GDPR any kind of personal data processing needs a clear purpose, and that purpose needs a legal basis. One possible legal basis is consent, but there also are others (such as legitimate interest). Just because you didn't consent doesn't mean that your rights have been violated. Where processing is based on legitimate interest, you can object to that processing of your personal data – but your rights must be balanced against that legitimate interest (Art 21). If your friends post a photo and you only appear in the background, your friends' legitimate interest to post that photo likely outweighs your rights. In practice, suing Facebook because of GDPR infringement is not a sensible way to achieve the outcomes that you likely want. First, this is expensive. Second, it is arguable whether Facebook or your friends should be the defendant. Third, removal of existing data won't prevent the processing of new data in the future. It would be more sensible to treat this as an interpersonal rather than a legal problem, and to talk with your friends so that they don't include you in their photos that they would like to share online. I've focussed on photos because their situation is fairly clear. Voice snippets might not count as personal data when you are not identifiable in them. Personal assistant apps should not be listening continuously, but only start recording when a wake-word is recognized.
US Copyright registration questions + Non-US citizen Registering for a U.S. copyright: I saw that no where during registration you actually tell what your work does, you only fill up details, how exactly is it protecting you if you don't specify? For example I have a computer program/website that do something, how exactly the copyright protects you if you did not specify about it? If I am a non-us citizen, do I need to select in State "Non-US", or leave it blank on "Select"? Because it allows me to complete registration with either.	1) I saw that no where during registration you actually tell what your work does, you only fill up details, how exactly is it protecting you if you don't specify? For example I have a computer program/website that do something, how exactly the copyright protects you if you did not specify about it? A copyright protects a particular single expression of an idea and versions that are derived from that particular expression. When you copyright software you have to provide approximately 50 pages of printed code so as to make it possible to distinguish your code from someone else's and you generally deposit a full copy with the Library of Congress. The ideas in the computer program are not protected. You only protect the exact language of the code in the computer program and other programs that use that exact language as a starting point. If someone reverse engineers a way to achieve the same process or outcome with different code language (or even comes up with exactly the same code language without ever looking at the language used in your code) then their software does not infringe on your copyright. To protect the ideas in a computer program you need a patent. 2) If I am a non-us citizen, do I need to select in State "Non-US", or leave it blank on "Select"? Because it allows me to complete registration with either. State "Non-US" refers to where you are located, not to your citizenship. If you are located outside the U.S., then you select "Non-US" and if you are located in a U.S. state, but are a non-citizen, you select the state where you are located. The answer does not affect the validity of your copyright. It is used for economic statistics and to determine where the copyright office should locate its own offices to be maximally useful to the public.	Numbering is for the sake of clarity, and is not intrinsically required. If you refer to a section, you need a way to say which section you mean, and a vague description like "up there where I talked about copying" is insufficient. You can refer to a section by a title, if you need to refer to sections within the contract, as long as your titles match what you refer to them as (and you don't have two sections called "Your Rights").	Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly.	Provided you are in one of the 170+ countries signatory to the Berne Convention (the current 10 non-signatories are, exhaustively: Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan), then copyright comes into existence at the moment a work is fixed in a tangible medium, not when it is published. The initial copyright owner is the author of the work. In cases of employment, the "author" might be the natural person who authored the work, or the corporate person who employed the natural author. To clarify your thinking about registration: copyright registration is a public record of authorship (or copyright ownership). Registration does not create a copyright, but is merely a recording of the copyright that was automatically created at the moment of original authorship. Depending on circumstances and jurisdiction, Alan might have a legitimate claim to copyright on his own work. However, he will be quite hard-pressed to find a convincing theory of law that allows him to publish the unpublished copyrighted work of other people without their permission. This leaves him either to admit defeat -- he cannot possibly own the copyright of his coworkers' code, so he cannot have legally reproduced it -- or else make the baldfaced lie that the code has no other authors other than Alan himself. For your company to disprove such a claim, you may employ sworn testimony of your coworkers, you may employ code analysis to show differing coding styles (suggestive of multiple authors), or you may show code backups or version control history showing the progressive authorship of the work over time by many people. (Sure, a Git history is possible to fake, but a realistic history with feature branches, "whoops, undid the typo in the last commit" messages, etc. would lend significant weight to your company being the original authors.)	Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway.	Counter notices are described in 17 USC 512(g)(3). It starts with the requirement for "A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber" (and a statement under penalty of perjury...). Supposing that you can't get anywhere with finding the contributor even via a subpoena, then you're stopped there: you can't swear on behalf of someone else. Paragraph (f) also says that if a person files a false infringement claim, they become liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it but it's not immediately obvious that you would suffer damage by taking the material down (not immediately obvious doesn't mean obviously not true). A case could be made, but it's risky. In Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Diebold was hit with substantial damages basically for having made up a theory that certain email discussion was infringing when it was clearly fair use. If a person actually lies about being the copyright owner, that would probably be viewed even more dimly by the courts. Your 4th argument gives you no traction: if an infringer posts infringing material and transfers copyright on the web page, but they don't hold copyright, then that transfer mean nothing. As for the other arguments, your attorney will have to suggest an advisable course of action. S/he might advise that your evidence is so strong that you should just ignore the takedown; or that you should take the content down and then sue for damages; or take the content down and lobby your congressman for a change in the law. [Addendum] I will reiterate my recommendation to get a lawyer. I believe that under the law, the risk to you would be the situation where the person prevails in an infringement suit against you. Outside of the "mere conduit" safe harbor, you have to participate in the notice and takedown scheme in order to "stay safe" (also you have to do so quickly). You have identified a potentially huge flaw in the system. Theoretically, criminal charges of perjury and paragraph (f) damages would be enough to deter ordinary wrong-doers, provided that you can really prove that someone else is the copyright holder. But the cost of litigation is not zero and the chances of winning are not 100%. The law does assume that all parties tell the truth, indeed the law requires a "penalty of perjury" statement. Since counter-notice is also part of the legal dance, I would conclude that you do have to write yourself a counter-notice. Then if there is a suit, you have satisfied the requirements of the law.	That licence does not allow you to do what you want It’s a non-commercial licence and your usage is commercial (making money). You don’t need a licence to perform commentary or review of a book Providing that you use as little material as necessary from the original work, commentary and review is one of the exceptions to copyright carved out by fair dealing in most English speaking jurisdictions. In the USA, the fair use exemption is not so clear as it involves a four factor balancing test. Your planned use is in favour of being fair use, your commercialisation is against.	Under U.S. copyright law, the First Sale Doctrine protects such conduct. As the U.S. Justice Department explains: The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold that particular copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) & (c). U.S. law with respect to the First Sale Doctrine is typical, and copyright law is fairly uniform internationally due to some relevant intellectual property treaties. But there are hundreds of countries in the world, and some of them might not include the First Sale Doctrine in their jurisprudence. For example, I do not know how this would be handled under the laws of the People's Republic of China, or under Islamic law.
We think a former employee stole our code and started his own company with it. What can we do? What can we do? With respect to this topic, I found this anecdote. But I don't work for Facebook, and we have nowhere near the clout or the user base they do. I'm not 100% sure why Facebook was able to nail this kid so harshly, but obviously billions of people use Facebook whereas our smaller company is not such a security risk Nonetheless, can we sue our former employee? I'm surprised this kid even got jailed for it; I'm not interested in putting my former friend and colleague in prison. We just want them to stop stealing our business We have a one-man legal team and are just a startup Other resources I've looked at: https://embeddedgurus.com/stack-overflow/2012/02/why-you-really-shouldnt-steal-source-code/ http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/16/a-guide-to-patenting-software-getting-started/id=35629/ https://www.quora.com/Why-don%E2%80%99t-people-just-steal-open-source-code-do-a-quick-restructuring-and-sell-it-commercially-as-their-own-Is-there-a-way-to-prove-if-you-think-someone-is-using-your-OS-code-in-a-closed-source-code-format-for-profit https://softwareengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/154155/should-you-keep-a-copy-of-all-the-code-you-write https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-29/chinese-citizen-pleads-guilty-to-stealing-treasury-software	You should talk to an attorney, but based on what you've provided, there are potential claims for copyright infringement, trade secret misappropriation, conversion, unfair trade practices, and probably quite a bit more.	Yes, you do. But you should not base your claim primarily on copyright, but just on the license contract you agreed to. It's typically much easier to prove that a party did not fulfill its part of a sales contract (here: Pay the agreed amount) than to prove violation of a copyright you own. Also, you then only need to sue one guy, and not care about every platform your game might be hosted on. This is particularly difficult here, since they have not done anything wrong. It's not their fault that the publisher didn't properly pay the programmer. They (very likely) got their copy of the game legally. For details, you should consult a lawyer. We can't give you detailed legal advice.	What should I do? Don't get intimidated, don't sign/accept/submit to his "agreement" now that you are securing employment elsewhere, and make sure that henceforth all your communications with the CEO & his startup be --or continue to be-- in writing. The CEO's attempt to be reimbursed is pure non-sense because hitherto there is no mutually agreed clause between you two to that effect. Generally speaking, compensation is for the professional's work, not for his employment spanning "n" pay periods. Having there been no employment/founders agreement of any type, he will be unable to prove that this was agreed any differently in your case. Furthermore, the CEO's threat to seek reimbursement of your earned compensation unless you submit to his "mutual" agreement not only amounts to extortion, but it also reflects his cluelessness about contract law. For instance, that contracts which are signed under hardship or duress are voidable. By contrast, submitting to his conditions will needlessly impose on you the burden of proving duress once you decide the situation is unsustainable. This is in addition to the legal weight with which your acceptance and subsequent conduct would support the CEO's allegation(s) that you two have "at all times" been in a cognizable contractual relation. Being realistic, it is highly doubtful that a startup which pays you weeks late is able --or even willing-- to spend money on a lawyer for nonsense like this.	I wrote a letter to the Eclipse Foundation. The consultant pointed me to section 5 in their FAQ. My case falls under the term "linking". He warned that he isn't a lawyer, but offered the following short answer: The Eclipse Foundation does not consider linking with EPL content to be a derivative work and so you are not required to disclose your source code.	Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal.	First I should point out that the Google question is about a different situation, the "snippet" issue where a tiny part of a web page is redistributed, where the issue of resolved in the US by appeal to the "fair use" defense. The proposed scenario as written here is broader since it would go beyond a couple of lines, and goes up to the limit of copy an entire web page. That is copyright infringement, with or without an associated link. Copyright protection is not just about attribution, it is about control. If you can limit your copying appropriately, you may survive under a fair use analysis; but you need to hire a lawyer with experience in copyright litigation to vet your notions of what is "a small amount" etc.	You violated Facebook's Terms of Service, and it's entirely within your contractual agreement with them for them to close your account. You agreed to abide by the contract you "clicked through" when you signed up and opened a Facebook account. They didn't break any laws when you broke your contract with them. You clearly broke the contract by violating the TOS. They are not breaking any laws by not restoring your account. What you see as the value of your personal or business data doesn't really mean anything; it was your choice to use Facebook in the first place, and your mistake to break the TOS. You could try hiring a lawyer to make a case that you see a difference between the personal data you want to retrieve and the business data that caused the violation, but that's up to you; Facebook is under no legal obligation (this could be different, according to your jurisdiction and national laws) to restore any or all access to your account or data, but it's possible they could be persuaded.	It's really your client that should be asking these questions. Writing the app is perfectly legal. So you can enter a contract with that client to write the app and deliver it to them, ready to be put on the Google Play store or the App Store (entering a contract needs to be done carefully, obviously). I'd make 100 million percent sure that the contract states clearly that you have zero responsibility if the app is rejected or removed for non-technical reasons, and that the legality of actually selling and running the app is also not your responsibility. The reason is that I very much suspect that running the app might be illegal, and that the chances of getting it permanently on one of the stores are rather slim. And solving those problems is outside of what a software developer can competently do.
Can a Corporation Exercise a Fifth-Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination? So I googled "can corporations plead the fifth?" and I got a bunch of non-cited sketchy sources. Is there a precedent around a corporation refusing to produce documents as a result of a subpoena to prevent self-incrimination? A hypothetical would be if my corporation was consulting for a foreign government and had documents that said my company had used my position in my home government to help the foreign government. If the corporation had documents that proved it had intentionally mishandled that relationship or a conflict of interest would the corporation be able to invoke the fifth amendment to not have to produce those doucments?	As far as I know, the leading case on the matter is Hale v. Henkel, 201 US 43. There, the court explains While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, a corporation is a creature of the State, and there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. There is a clear distinction between an individual and a corporation, and the latter, being a creature of the State, has not the constitutional right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State; and an officer of a corporation which is charged with criminal violation of a statute cannot plead the criminality of the corporation as a refusal to produce its books. The court specifically denies that corporations have 5th Amendment rights: The benefits of the Fifth Amendment are exclusively for a witness compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case, and he cannot set them up on behalf of any other person or individual, or of a corporation of which he is an officer or employe. This contrast with protection against unreasonable searched of corporations, per the 4th Amendment: A corporation is but an association of individuals with a distinct name and legal entity, and, in organizing itself as a collective body, it waives no appropriate constitutional immunities, and, although it cannot refuse to produce its books and papers, it is entitled to immunity under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, where an examination of its books is not authorized by an act of Congress, a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of practically all of its books and papers is as indefensible as a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms. Similarly, in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, the constitutional privilege against testifying against himself cannot be raised for his personal benefit by an officer of the corporation having the documents in his possession. ... An officer of a corporation cannot refuse to produce documents of a corporation on the ground that they would incriminate him simply because he himself wrote or signed them, and this even if indictments are pending against him. Likewise, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 ("The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals") and Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85: Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination held not available to member of dissolved law partnership who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce the partnership's financial books and records, since the partnership, though small, had an institutional identity and petitioner held the records in a representative, not a personal, capacity. The privilege is "limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." So only natural persons can plead the fifth.	It should be legal (though I can't find an analogous case where the court has ruled that it is). There is a regulation summarizing the government's position (thus, what will be enforced in 17 CFR 240.10b, which prohibits use of "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in stock trading. Section 240.10b5-1 says: The “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78j) and §240.10b-5 thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information. The executives clearly have a direct duty of trust of confidence. Section 240.10b5-2 enumerates the following duties: (1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; (2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or (3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the person who was the source of the information expected that the person would keep the information confidential, because of the parties' history, pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information. In the hypothetical, (1) is plainly not applicable. (2) is predicated on having a relationship (which doesn't exist) and the information-having expecting you to keep the information secret (he doesn't know that you have overheard them). (3) is likewise not applicable. The basic rule is that you can't "misapproprate" information, but you can use information that falls into your lap (even from a person who has a duty to not disclose the information). This subsection starts saying "For purposes of this section, a “duty of trust or confidence” exists in the following circumstances, among others", which means they aren't necessarily giving you an exhaustive list. Still, there is currently no legal basis for prosecuting a person who overhears information from someone he has no relationship to, even if you are pretty confident that the information has not been made public.	Assuming that the documents were either true, or Manning reasonably believed that they were true, there would be no cause of action for defamation. Many of the documents disclosed would have been confidential in some sense, but usually a violation of a confidentiality statute has a criminal sanction associated with it, but does not carry with it a private cause of action – in part, because conceptually, the party actually harmed is considered to be the government and not the person about whom information is revealed. It is also possible that Manning could utilize the state secrets privilege as a defense and have such a suit dismissed on the grounds that a full and adequate defense of the claims would require the disclosure of official state secrets. For example, if a covert agent were murdered due to a wrongful disclosure of information, usually official disclosure of the fact of being a covert agent would be required to prove the case, and that evidence would be barred by the state secrets privilege, effectively barring the lawsuit entirely. Constitutional claims of privacy violations under the 4th Amendment generally relate to the wrongful acquisition of information and not its wrongful disclosure. The constitution bars unreasonable search and seizure, not unreasonable disclosure of information. The only privacy tort that might be applicable is "Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts." (A sister privacy tort, Intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into privacy affairs, is directed at the collection of data phase and not the dissemination phase). See Restatement of the Law (Second) of Torts, §§ 652B and 652D. But, this tort raises serious First Amendment concerns and has not been widely adopted. Realistically, this tort is unconstitutional in the absence of an affirmative contractual or quasi-contractual duty not to reveal facts that runs to the person making the disclosure, and in general, Manning would not have that kind of relationship. The classic public disclosure of embarrassing private facts case would involve a lawyer's or psychotherapist's revelations about a client. Also, in the case of the public disclosure tort the basis for damages is largely personal emotional distress and violation of trust, as opposed to damage to reputation, per se. The requirement is that the disclosure be embarrassing or breach of contract, not that it harm someone's reputation since you have no legal right to a reputation that differs from the truth.	A corporation can be criminally charged, this is not infrequent. If there is a guilty verdict in such a case, the penalty is normally a fine. Not infrequently, there would be a civil case over the same or related conduct, which might result in an injunction or other court order to address future actions and attempt prevent further actions of the same sort. In some cases, an officer, employee, ort agent of a company may also be criminally charged. This is not automatic by position in the company. For there to be a conviction on any such charge, it must be proved that the person charged had himself or herself actually committed a crime, with the usual element of intent for that crime. That would depend on the exact statute involved and its provisions. A person who had knowingly or willfully misused data protected under a privacy law would probably be guilty of a crime. Exactly what crime would depend on the country and the specific conduct alleged. Different countries have different laws on such issues, and many countries have several different privacy laws which apply in different situations. Without a more specific hypothetical indicating just what such a person had done, one cannot say just what charges might be valid or what evidence would be needed to establish guilt. A shareholder would not be guilty of anything just by being a shareholder. Such a person would need to have taken some action in violation of some law to be guilty of any crime.	If someone testifying before congress refuses to respond to appropriate questions (questions within the scope of the congressional inquiry), that person can be cited for contempt of Congress. One way to avoid this is if the witness can invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. That says that a person may not be compelled to be a witness against himself (or herself) in a criminal case, and has been interpreted to mean that if testimony might in future be used against the witness in a criminal case, it cannot be required, even if the current occasion is not a criminal case. However, if a person has been granted immunity in a particular matter, no testimony can be used against the person in a criminal case on that matter, and so there is no Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify on that matter. This applies to testimony before a court as well as before Congress. The grant of immunity must be at least as comprehensive as the refusal to testify would have been, or the privilege remains. Therefore, if a person has been granted immunity on a subject, that person cannot refuse to testify before Congress by invoking the Fifth Amendment. If the person does refuse, s/he can be cited for contempt of Congress. However, the person can raise a claim that the inquiry was not a proper one, for example because the subject was not a proper one fo Congressional inquiry, or that the Committee was not properly authorized. If the court upholds such a claim, the person will not be convicted of contempt. Also, while Congress can issue a citation, the Justice Department is not required to prosecute the person, and may choose to let the issue drop. Or the court might not convict on some other ground. And of course Congress (or one house of it) has to vote to issue the citation, which it might decide not to do, for political reasons, or indeed for any reason at all. So a grant of immunity alone is not enough to say that testimony will be compelled, but it is a significant step towards such compulsion. Note that under Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), a state grant of immunity also bars Federal use of the compelled testimony or its fruits, and under Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) a Federal grant of immunity bars state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits. See also This Justia essay on "the Power to Compel Testimony" which covers the whole subject with multiple case citations.	The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available.	This question and many related ones are analysed in detail by Eugene Volokh, in a long paper that is worth reading in its entirety if you are interested in the topic. The [Supreme] Court has offered “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” as one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” excluded from First Amendment protection. But if this exception is indeed to be well defined and narrowly limited, courts need to explain and cabin its scope. This Article — the first, to my knowledge, to consider the exception in depth — aims to help with that task. On threats, he says: Companies are generally barred from firing employees for voting for a union, and unions are generally barred from retaliating against employees for their speech. The Court therefore concluded that speech that threatens unlawful retaliation is itself unlawful. On blackmail, he says: [...] telling black citizens “stop shopping at white-owned stores or we’ll publicize your behavior to your neighbors and fellow church members” is similarly constitutionally protected. On the other hand, “vote for this civil rights bill or I’ll disclose that you cheated on your wife” is likely unprotected. In general the line where the First Amendment protections end and criminal speech begins is surprisingly vague. General advice to avoid self-incrimination by not answering questions from the police is clearly protected. Threatening a witness with violence is clearly not. In between are shades of grey.	It is like an affidavit of sort, sworn out without the jurat and not before a notary. The swearing out of a complaint or rebutting evidence in all Federal civil matters (some states allow for the same) must contain an affidavit or an "unsworn declaration" that swears out the facts to be true and accurate, even though not notarized, and is based on fact and not supposition. It is subject to the same penalties of perjury if one lies as if you swear on a bible and testify in court or on a "sworn" affidavit. Affidavits need not be sworn before God, or on a bible. You have a right to just "affirm" that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth....and not "so help me God". Many courts don't use a bible at all anymore. 28 U.S.C. 1746 relates to these "Unsworn Declarations Under Penalty Of Perjury" It is not b/c you don't believe in God that you'd use this...you always have the option of swearing out even a declared affidavit or testifying without swearing on a bible if you're an atheist. They just leave out the "before God" part. Affidavits are the norm, however, in Federal Courts that have an expedited docket this is typically used when it could take a while to get a notary and the evidence is due. (In some states lawyers are automatically notaries but in others they aren't). The ability to swear out a complaint or contest a deposition without having to wait on a notary can be the difference between making your deadline or not. It's commonly used when records custodians are called to certify the authenticity of documents produced pursuant to subpoena or other formal request. Under F.R.Civ.P 56 declarations usually are not within the type of evidentiary categories that can be used at the summary judgment phase. If it's a small misstatement you would probably be faced with a fine. If it's a total lie, outright, you'd be looking at jail time (say a records custodian removed evidence and swore out it was the complete business record in a fraud case). 18 U.S. Code § 1621 discusses perjury generally (in federal actions).
If I live in the US can I be prosecuted for answers describing illegal activities? The internet allows for some level of anonymity and occasionally you will find posts that give detailed descriptions of how to perform an activity that is illegal. Examples may include how to covertly grow marijuana, or swindle money. If I live in the US and make posts or provide answers to questions that explain how to perform an activity that is illegal in the US, can I be prosecuted? This question is about sharing the "how to" information only, not actually performing any illegal activity.	In general this is protected by the first amendment. It is not in general a problem describing how one can one can do something illegal. But there are special cases to be careful with. You might want to do some research into the limits on free speech. It would be hard to provide an answer that fully covers all your different cases and you would need to be more specific about what illegal activity you want to describe. In describing how to do something illegal, you might accidentally share information that you are not allowed to share. When you post things online, this can be considered as publishing or exporting. Therefore certain export restrictions might apply. Also, It is illegal to publish bomb making manuals, with the knowledge or intent that this information be used to commit a federal crime of violence. See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/842. There are restrictions on publishing material relating to cryptography without having an export license. Granted, this isn't necessarily related to publishing things that are illegal, but just to give an idea about how publishing/exporting knowledge can causes problems. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the_United_States ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) sets restrictions on what you can publish about arms. What you publish can't be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburg_v._Ohio. One might imagine that you could get into trouble if someone interprets what you do as inciting or producing a lawless action. It might sound obvious, but you want to make sure that you have the right to share the information that you have. The information that you are providing might be copyrighted in some way.	All laws (federal, state and local) apply to everybody, unless you have diplomatic immunity. That is, unless e.g. the federal government decides as a matter of policy to ignore certain federal laws. California does not have a law generally prohibiting the use of marijuana, though public consumption is illegal, minor consumption is illegal, and possession over 28.5 grams is illegal. So that is one less law to be concerned with violating. The federal law still exists, and has not been repealed for anyone. However, the federal government by policy is not pursuing marijuana cases in legal contexts in those states that have legalized marijuana. The complication for foreign students is that there are also immigration laws whereby you may be deported for a drug offense (that link is full of technical details on immigration and drug laws, worth reading). The immigration laws basically make it easy to penalize a foreigner (for example you might be deemed "inadmissible" so you cannot be re-admitted to the US if you leave; it just depends on what their grounds are for action). For example, "a noncitizen is inadmissible as of the moment that immigration authorities gain substantial and probative 'reason to believe' the noncitizen has ever participated in drug trafficking," which does not mean a conviction. It is reported that in California, DHS officers have treated minor infractions as "convictions," which means to be safe you have to avoid even infractions. It appears (and hire an immigration attorney if you want to test this) that trouble only arises if there is reason to believe you are trafficking, if you are a drug addict or abuser, if you are "convicted" (not necessarily "tried and found guilty," it also includes certain legal maneuverings), or if you admit to drug use (even in the case of home use under doctor's orders, i.e. a California-legal context). This incidentally includes non-use but working for the marijuana industry. It is possible that you could get stopped on the street by a random immigration search, and if you are in possession, then... it is not guaranteed that possession of a small amount of marijuana, when caught by federal authorities, cannot lead to immigration problems.	You might get away with it under federal law. But there are potentially also state laws to worry about. Under Texas law 17.461: "Pyramid promotional scheme" means a plan or operation by which a person gives consideration for the opportunity to receive compensation that is derived primarily from a person's introduction of other persons to participate in the plan or operation rather than from the sale of a product by a person introduced into the plan or operation. A person commits an offense if the person contrives, prepares, establishes, operates, advertises, sells, or promotes a pyramid promotional scheme. An offense under this subsection is a state jail felony. As you can see, there's no requirement under this law that there be fraud involved.	Some people seem to believe that just because something happens 'in the internet' it is somehow outside normal jurisdictions. Wrong. In may be harder to investigate and prosecute crimes in the internet, but the laws apply all the same. There are some problems when it is unclear 'where in the world' something did happen -- in the jurisdiction of the perpetrator, the victim, or the service provider? But problems of jurisdiction apply e.g. to international fraud cases in the non-web-world as well. In many jurisdictions, the informed and voluntary consent makes some things legal which would otherwise be illegal. For instance, if two boxers get into the ring, it is understood that each of them did consent to be hit by the other. But usually two fighters could not legally agree to a fight to the death, because even if there are laws on assisted suicide, they do not apply to a fight. Insults, libel, and slander are not on the same level as homicide. There are jurisdictions where they are not prosecuted without the request of the victim. But an insult might also violate other laws, e.g. disturbing the peace. So don't bet on such an app unless you know for sure which jurisdictions are involved.	No, a later trial is not allowed A prosecutor can, and often will charge multiple related crimes, and all will be addressed at the same trial. But once a person has been acquitted on a given set of events, the same jurisdiction cannot re-try the same person on what is often called a lesser included offense. Nor on a greater offense implied by the same events. Not even if additional evidence comes to light. However, if an act (or set of acts) is a crime under both state law and Federal law, for example theft by deception (state crime) and wire fraud (federal crime) one jurisdiction may try the person even after ther has been an acquittal in the other. I think the same rule applies if an act is a crime within the jurisdiction of two different states, that both can trey the accused. In many cases prosecutors will choose not to bring the second trial, but they can if they see fit.	Since there are cases where it is legal to break into a car, is it legal to publish a guide on how to break into a car online? It is legal to publish this guide. Indeed, it is legal to do so even if there are no cases where it is legal to do so. Does it need to have a disclaimer saying to comply with all applicable laws? No. Could the author be held responsible if someone uses the instructions to illegally break into a car? Generally not. I could imagine that there might be some very specific and exceptional fact pattern where it might, but that would be the rare exception. But see man sentenced to twenty-years in prison after pledging support to ISIS and uploading a bomb making video related to that pledge.	Most of the question has nothing to do with the law, it's about technical how-to or how-does, which should be asked in Information Security SE. There are two possible legal questions: is it legal to break into a computer system and take a database of passwords, and it is legal to acquire such a database obtained by someone else. As should be known in the US, per 18 USC 1030, breaking into a computer is illegal in the US. Given that, it is extremely unlikely that Google illegally breaks into other computer systems to obtain passwords. The aforementioned law criminalizes accessing computers without authorization, not (just) "taking" stuff from computers without authorization. The law does not criminalize receipt of illegally obtained material. Passwords are not protected by copyright. If Google were to induce someone to break into a computer system to get passwords, that would be legally actionable, however there is no law penalizing innocent receipt of illegally-obtained passwords (insofar as they are not protected by copyright). It is not illegal to access the dark web, at least in the US (probably it is illegal in Saudi Arabia). Using stuff gotten from the dark web can easily be illegal (e.g. logging in to someone's bank account, or forging a passport). There are many services which monitor the dark web and report breaches, which is totally legal.	You can be prosecuted for the crime in the U.S., both at the federal level and at the U.S. state level (or both), completely without regard to what happened in the criminal justice process elsewhere. This is true in all of the scenarios you pose, for any offense, and with or without an extradition treaty (of course, unless the treaty had some anomalous provision to the contrary or deprived the U.S. of jurisdiction by statute rather than constitutionally of this crime). The U.S. Supreme Court determined in Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) that the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution is applied separately with regard to each sovereign involved and that each state and the federal government count as separate sovereigns. In the pertinent part, it states: The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common law conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the government. When a defendant in a single act violates the "peace and dignity" of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct "offences." United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 260 U. S. 382 (1922). As the Court explained in Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 55 U. S. 19 (1852), "[a]n offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law." Consequently, when the same act transgresses the laws of two sovereigns, "it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence, but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable." Id. at 55 U. S. 20. In practice, the U.S. Justice Department and most state and local prosecutors are disinclined to prosecute a crime that has already been handled by another jurisdiction and often have official, but non-binding, policies to that effect. In part, this is because an acquittal in one jurisdiction makes it likely that it is a weak case, while a conviction in one jurisdiction often constitutes sufficient punishment. There could be an issue under the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (cruel and unusual punishment) over whether a punishment imposed in a U.S. conviction for a crime needs to consider the already severe punishment imposed in another jurisdiction for the same crime in order to prevent the cumulative punishment from being cruel and unusual. But, I am not aware of authoritative case law that resolves that constitutional question. Certainly, evidence of a prior punishment for the same offense could be presented at a sentencing hearing following a conviction in mitigation of the punishment that should be imposed. Indeed, in some states time served pursuant to a conviction for the same crime in another jurisdiction might statutorily count as "time served" for which the defendant is legally entitled to credit at sentencing.
Are companies allowed to lie about "offer expires in X days!!" Often companies online state that they have "limited time offers", where you can buy a product for a discount. However, i'm sometimes suspicious about this, and suspect that they're not limited offers at all. Are companies allowed to say "20% off! Offer expires in 4 days!", but then when those 4 days are over, simply wait a day or 2 and start the offer again? Or is this prohibited by consumer protection laws? Edit: the jurisdiction could be either the US or the UK.	The answer would vary considerably. Consumer protection laws in some jurisdictions would find such a scheme to be an actionable deceptive trade practice, while consumer protection laws in other jurisdictions would find that it was not an actionable deceptive trade practice. One of the trickier points is quantifying the injury. How are you harmed if you buy a good at 20% off when it is really 20% off? How are you harmed if you don't buy a good at 20% off and then later buy the same good at 20% off when you were expecting it to be full price? Some consumer protection laws require that you show injury, and in those cases, it probably wouldn't be actionable. But, other consumer protection laws make false statements actionable, even if there is no reliance upon the statement or harm caused, in which case statutory damages might be recoverable.	what would be the threshold for a lie to be actionable where you could claim a damage? There is no award for "lies" which clearly are inconsequential. A customer will never make decisions based on whether "menu options have changed" or whether the business is honest on the statement "your call is important to us". The impact that the duration of these statements have on the customer is negligible at best, since omitting these statements does not improve the company's response time anyway. The statement "your call is important to us" might not even be a lie. Many companies know that it is in their best interest to gather information from their customers on what to improve, lest customers switch to a competitor or file suit. The lack of objective standards renders statements such as "best pizza in town" unascertainable. Accordingly, it would be unreasonable for a customer to rely on criteria that are subjective, undefined, unclear, and/or palpably fictitious. Only statements like "scientifically proven" and "lose x pounds in y hours" might be within scope of consumer protection laws (see also unfair and misleading practices). The assessment of those scenarios requires more detail, including disclaimers and other "small letters" that are --or ought to be-- disclosed no later than the formation of the contract.	Are online stores supposed to state the true “order cost”/value of an order on the package/envelope for the customs? Yes Is it common practice to slash 10x off of the price for the customs to not add various fees? Common? Probably no. Uncommon? Also, probably no. Isn't that illegal? Yes Of course, they can claim it was a mistake if ever found out, but if they do it consistently, that seems difficult... Not to mention there must be electronic proof of how much each order actually cost the customer? Yes Look, robbing banks is illegal but people still rob banks. Similarly, ripping off HM Revenue & Customs is illegal but people still do that too. In fact, far more people do that than rob banks.	Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it.	All of this is illegal. You do not give a jurisdiction so I will use NSW, Australia as an example but many countries' laws have similar effect. Australian Consumer Law prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct: It is illegal for a business to engage in conduct that misleads or deceives or is likely to mislead or deceive consumers or other businesses. It doesn't matter that what you have said is strictly speaking factual - the way it has been said is likely to mislead or deceive. However, what you are proposing goes further and IMO crosses the line into fraud (s192E of the Crimes Act): 192E Fraud (1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly: (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person’s obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property. In addition to the illegality, stealing other people's money is morally wrong by any reasonable standards of morality.	Can a moderation team in a game extend a ban that you have just because they want to TL;DR Yes and no. It's their platform and you broke the rules that you agreed to. Therefore, you forfeited your right to use the service for as long as they deem appropriate up to and including forever. In exercising this power they must act reasonably which, in the absence of anything in the contract (and I can't see anything) means that their response must be proportionate and offer you procedural fairness. It's possible that they haven't done this - it may even be likely. However, in order to have this overturned, clause 24 of the EULA requires you to take the dispute to arbitration. Clause 24.4 sets out how to initiate this.	This doesn't sound like fraud (against you, at least), but it does sound like an unfair or deceptive trade practice, which is outlawed by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and perhaps the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, both of which prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices. I don't know about Pennsylvania, but the FTC has on many occasions taken action against companies for engaging in just this kind of behavior. To find out whether you would be able to take action against the other company, you'd want to find a good competition lawyer in Pennsylvania. For some more basic background on the FTC's rules, check out this primer.	I am not aware of any law making this illegal. You need to avoid any "bait and switch" tactics, though, like initially offering cola for $1 and then not actually letting them buy it for that price.
Stormy Daniels Extortion? How is the president Trumps payment to Stormy Daniels to keep quiet not extortion? Are you allowed to pay someone to keep quiet? How is that different that for getting paid from a company to keep quiet?	Yes, you're allowed to pay someone to keep quiet, as long as whatever they're keeping quiet about isn't evidence of a crime. Companies can do this too, and quite often do. Offering to keep quiet in exchange for money may well constitute blackmail. But that doesn't appear to be an issue here.	In principle, a verbal contract is just as binding as a written contract. The catch is that it can be difficult to prove what was said. Unless you have witnesses, it would just be your word against his. As DStanley says in the comments, if you have proof that you paid half -- canceled checks or receipts or whatever -- that would be evidence that there was some sort of agreement. Whether your daughter is allowed to drive the car on a specific day depends not just on who owns the car but who has legal custody of your daughter. If a friend of hers said that it is okay with him for her to drive his car to a wild party where there will be drugs and an orgy, the fact that he has full title to the car does not mean that her parents have no right to tell her she can't go! You didn't say what the custody arrangements are, but if you have full custody or shared custody, this would give you certain rights to tell her what she is and is not allowed to do.	The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.	"I don't recall" will protect you from perjury only if it's true. Let me try an example. You're asked: "Did Mr. Blatter hand you an envelope full of cash?" You say: "Not to my recollection." Now the government introduces a videotape of you receiving and counting the money, and a thank-you note you wrote to Blatter saying "Thanks for the awesome bribe!" You can defend yourself from perjury charges if you can convince the finder of fact that you had forgotten all of those things...but it's not very likely, is it? "I don't recall" isn't a magic bullet. It's like any other statement: it's perjury unless it's true.	There are basically two kinds of conduct that you identify. One is backing away from what you believe were oral promises made by the employer and lawyer regarding payment. Whatever the status of the promises made by the employer, the oral statements made by the lawyer would probably be viewed by a court or ethics board as settlement offers or proposals rather than actual binding agreements, and this is unlikely to be considered an ethical lapse. For purposes of ethics questions and fraud lawsuits, lies about what kind of deal you are willing to make with an adversary don't count as lies. This isn't a terribly logical rule, but is is a well established one. Given that: I was told (by employer), verbally and in text/email messages that I "would be paid when the deals closed." It is going to be very hard for the employer to take back those written statements and text and email messages are usually given the effect of signed writings in a court of law. This is going to be taken as a confession of the employer regarding the probably unwritten agreement of the parties regarding your right to be paid on these deals, so you would be well advised to stick to your guns on this issue. The percentages will be another point that is hard for the employer to fight if there is a course of dealings between the parties in which you receive a consistent percentage or there was a written agreement concerning your commission percentage. Also, even if the lawyer did make a promise and breached it, this would still only be a breach by the employer of a contract made on the employer's behalf by his lawyer. It is not an ethical lapse to breach a contract about future conduct, and a lawyer is not personally responsible for contracts he makes as a disclosed agent of your former employer. The second is making a false statement of fact about whom the lawyer has discussed the matter with. Lawyers do have an ethical duty to be truthful and failing to do so is an ethical lapse. But, this duty is generally interpreted to apply only to statements of fact which are material. If a lawyer lies to you about how old he is, or whether he's ever had an affair, in the context of a pre-litigation negotiation like this one, the ethical officials won't care. If a lawyer lies to you about something material to the transaction (e.g. claiming that the employer has money in the bank to pay a settlement when in fact it is overdrawn on all of its accounts and has no money coming in and the lawyer knows those facts), this is a serious ethical breach. It is hard to see how this information would be material, even though it casts doubt on his credibility. Ethically, he owes any duty of confidentiality to his client and not to you, so it isn't your complaint to make from a confidentiality point of view. Also, unless he discusses confidential advice that he provided to his client when no one else was present to you, he has not waived the attorney-client privilege, contrary to the answer by @IñakiViggers on that issue. Of course, proving that the lawyer said anything in an oral conversation at which no one else was present comes down to a credibility fight between your sworn statement and his if the lawyer testifies inaccurately about the discussion. A sworn statement from you is proof and would meet the "burden of production" to provide proof in support of your case at a trial, but wouldn't necessarily prevail easily at trial since the judge might not be convinced regarding who is accurate in their account of the discussion (I have avoided the word "lying" because there are a variety of reasons that people inaccurately recall discussions). What would be the sensible way to use this information to my advantage while trying to resolve these matters with having to bring suit and go to court? Is there anything that this lawyer should fear, if his unethical behavior was brought to light, either in court or to a bar association? The conduct you describe on the part of the lawyer will provide you with little or no leverage in your negotiations and is likely to not even be considered admissible evidence in court since it may be considered a form of settlement negotiations. Your strongest leverage will be the written statements from the employer. But, depending upon the amount in dispute, it may still make sense to compromise given the time and expense and uncertainty of going to court. Even in the clearest case, you probably only have a 90% chance of winning a contested case, and you wouldn't cross the street if you knew you had a 10% chance of being hit by a car as you crossed, even if you knew that the collision wouldn't be fatal. Unless your state has a wage claims act that covers you, you may have little or not prospect of an attorneys' fee award if you prevail, and representing yourself when the employer has a lawyer will always put you at a disadvantage in a court setting. If the amount in dispute is great (e.g. $50,000+), hiring a lawyer is probably worth it. If the amount in dispute is small (e.g. $5,000) you may want to file a suit in small claims court and only hire a lawyer for a couple hours of pre-hearing coaching.	What should I do? Don't get intimidated, don't sign/accept/submit to his "agreement" now that you are securing employment elsewhere, and make sure that henceforth all your communications with the CEO & his startup be --or continue to be-- in writing. The CEO's attempt to be reimbursed is pure non-sense because hitherto there is no mutually agreed clause between you two to that effect. Generally speaking, compensation is for the professional's work, not for his employment spanning "n" pay periods. Having there been no employment/founders agreement of any type, he will be unable to prove that this was agreed any differently in your case. Furthermore, the CEO's threat to seek reimbursement of your earned compensation unless you submit to his "mutual" agreement not only amounts to extortion, but it also reflects his cluelessness about contract law. For instance, that contracts which are signed under hardship or duress are voidable. By contrast, submitting to his conditions will needlessly impose on you the burden of proving duress once you decide the situation is unsustainable. This is in addition to the legal weight with which your acceptance and subsequent conduct would support the CEO's allegation(s) that you two have "at all times" been in a cognizable contractual relation. Being realistic, it is highly doubtful that a startup which pays you weeks late is able --or even willing-- to spend money on a lawyer for nonsense like this.	My understanding is that the syndicate would be committing an act of extortion. Under the RICO Act, IF the politician conspired with the syndicate OR IF the politician had something like an 'understanding' with the syndicate, then they (any, and all involved) could be charged with the crime (extortion), racketeering and conspiracy. Additional crimes/laws to consider: Campaign finance violations Money laundering Compelled speech (1st Amendment)	There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.
What did Flybe actually do wrong? Read an article recently regarding FlyBe, and their attempt to find out (from a list of unknown user data) who wanted to be contacted in the future with promotions, etc. They sent an email to this list of unknown users to determine just that, but they were later given a penalty for spamming (£70K). It is only fair to say that they did this because of the impending changes with the new GDPR rules. If this was a genuine attempt to ensure that the company remain within the remains of the law/GDPR rules, how else could they have gone about this? If we are talking millions of rows of user data that could bring in a large amount of business, would it have been better for them to dispose of this? I also wonder if a much larger company, e.g. Some big pharma company, did the same. Would they suffer the same sort of penalty?	Given a large database of email addresses that you can't prove have given consent to receive email, the only legal thing to do with it, is to (securely) delete it. (I am going to switch your question about a larger company to a bank: in the UK, big pharma is forbidden from advertising to individuals.) In principle the rules are the same for a huge bank and everything down to a self-employed plumber. In practice the plumber will be told "don't do that again" rather than fined. This case was treated under the Data Protection Act, which has a maximum fine of £500,000 – so a big bank would probably have been fined more, but not necessarily much more. Under GDPR, fines are related to turnover, so the fine would be a lot bigger for a large bank. The incident is a year old now. Details here.	In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say.	[I'm not so well-versed on US and Russian law, thus I will limit my answer to EU law.] Your specific use of a user identifier, as I understood from your question, can be classified as personal data, so in your case, the GDPR seems to apply. This means that you need to have a) legitimate purposes to process that personal data (e.g. crash reporting) and b) a legal justification for each purpose of processing: it could be based on consent or another legitimate purpose (inc. your own legitimate interests). Consent might not be the best option for you, but it's up to you to decide. In any case, you need to assess the risks to the data subjects (your users) before you decide. How likely is it that you will get breached, and what potential harm will that cause to your users? These are some guidelines; my recommendation is that you read the law and the guidelines by the Article 29 Working Group and European Data Protection Board, or hire some good experts on this. There is no easy answer, or one size fits all solution. The GDPR isn't so hard to understand or implement, but it does require some change in mindset. With the new law, processing personal data carries a higher risk of penalties, so you should do it only when it's absolutely necessary, and with respect to the rights of your users.	You are processing the users IP address in order to carry out the translation to a physical location (see my comment for the technical issues with that) and an IP address is most certainly considered personal information, so yes under the GDPR you are going to need a published policy because you are both data controller and data processor. You need to inform the user of what you are doing, and you need to tell them of the legal basis for the processing (there are several under the GDPR, of which consent is only one - but in your case its going to be the easiest to justify). If you use a third party service for the location translation, you also need to inform the user of that and make available the third party services data processing policy.	This would not be "legal jeopardy" per-se, really the only remedy that Stack Exchange would have in a case like this would be to ban both accounts. It would be different if you caused SE some kind of monetary/reputation damages to the site itself. From SE's Acceptable Use Policy: Identity Theft and Privacy. Users that misleadingly appropriate the identity of another person are not permitted. It seems your described scheme would violate that term. But this isn't a legal problem, just an operational one. You aren't violating any law (unless there are local laws against this) by paying somebody to "be you" on SE. The most that this would earn you and your cohort would be a ban and probably removal of the contributions.	Yes Businesses (and consumers) can choose who to do business with and what information they ask for and disclose and when they do that. If you’re uncomfortable with how they do business, don’t deal with them. If they don’t like how you do business, they are free not to deal with you. This is called discrimination. However, it is not unlawful because only discrimination against a person due to membership of a protected classes is unlawful. This person “won’t answer my questions” is not discrimination based on a protected class (unless they are a monk who has taken a vow of silence).	You call their employer and impersonate them The onus is on the employer to keep your personal data secure. If they do not take reasonable steps to verify that the caller is indeed you, they fail that duty and can be held to account. So, not a loophole.	There are no direct penalties per GDPR. The data controller must make sure that the person making the request is the data subject, or at least authorized by the data subject. If the controller has reasonable doubts about the identity, they should request additional information for identification purposes. The controller must find a middle ground between violating the GDPR by rejecting a potentially valid request and violating the GDPR by disclosing data to potentially unauthorized recipients. Having reasonable technical and organization measures that prevent unauthorized disclosure is part of the controller's responsibilities per Art 24. What the data controller can do is to block future requests from the alleged stalker. When a request is “manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character”, then the controller can charge a reasonable fee or refuse to act on the request (Art 12(5) GDPR). But it's up to the controller to prove that the requests are unfounded or excessive, it is not possible to reject potentially valid requests on sight. Depending on what the alleged stalker does with the obtained data, they would fall within the scope of the GDPR themselves and would probably be violating it because there is no sufficient legal basis. Also, the alleged stalker, as a data controller, would be required to inform the data subject about subsequent processing of the data per Art 14 GDPR. Attempting to obtain another person's personal data through an access request would have to be punishable by other laws. For starters, such attempts would likely involve identity theft, and successfully obtaining the data would probably be a kind of fraud.
Security deposit My landlord sold my house to a 3rd party. We moved after closing. Does the landlord have to refund the security deposit in full since he no longer owned the property when we moved?	The security deposit goes with the lease, so he will transfer the deposit to the new owner, who will return it to you when the time comes. Unless, in your state, security deposits are put in escrow accounts, and again you will get it back at the end of the lease..	you cannot be compelled to accept a modified lease that you never agreed to, and that was not even shown to you when you discussed the issue. You should notify the management in writing at once that you reject this "offer" and do not plan to transfer under those terms.	The person responsible for the leak pays This is a general principle that if your stuff causes harm, you are responsible for it as well of the costs of doing what’s necessary to stop it. This might or might not be you. Assuming the water is normal “splash” that is making its way into the unit below then it will be the person who is responsible for maintaining the waterproofing in your bathroom - that might be you or it might be the common property owner, you would need to check your by-laws. Of course, this assumes your building is new enough to have waterproofing - older buildings just relied on the tiling. If so, this is almost certainly your responsibility. If instead, it’s a leak from a pipe or fixture, then the owner of that is responsible. That could be you or the building owner or even your downstairs neighbour. Again, check your by-laws. Edit The OP has indicated they are a tenant, not the owner. In this case, it’s nothing to do with you unless your lease says you are responsible for building maintenance or you have been negligent. Residential leases almost never do the former and, unless you did something stupid, like allowing the bath to overflow or having water balloon fights, you probably haven’t been negligent. Refer the matter to your landlord and ask your neighbour to direct all future correspondence to them.	At common law, a tenant is entitled to "quiet enjoyment" of the property. This means that the owner can only interact with the tenant as spelled out in the lease or in an emergency situation. First, calmly and quietly write down a list of your grievances. Then check your lease to see what the landlord is entitled to do. Cross off any grievances that are permitted by the lease. Take this and the lease to your solicitor and pay him to write a letter to your agent advising them of your grievances and asking that they stop. Without knowing where you are, we do not know what additional rights and dispute resolution procedures are available in your jurisdiction. Very few jurisdictions still rely entirely on common law as real estate is one of the most highly government regulated areas of life wherever you are. Your solicitor will know and, for less that a week's rent will give you solid advice.	The key here is the provision "through no fault of his own". A landlord who relies on this provision would need to be able to demonstrate what the cause of the delay was, and that s/he had not been reasonably able to avoid it. Nor could a landlord simply fail to take steps to repair the problem, whatever it might be. If the problem will clearly take more than 30 days to fix (Isay the building burned down), the prospective tenant would have the right to cancel the lease at once. True, in such a case the tenant would be put to the trouble and expense of finding another place at short notice, but then the landlord would have lost his income from the property. The provision allocates the losses between the parties in such a case. If the property is not available at the specified time for the lease to start, but could be available a few days later, the quoted provision would not allow the landlord to just ignore the situation and end the lease. The landlord is allowed only a "reasonable time" to fix the problem, and taking significantly longer than is needed would not be "reasonable".	Generally speaking, you signature and delivery of the lease to the landlord makes it possible for the landlord to enforce. Particularly when, as in the question, the landlord presented the lease to you as an "offer" which you accepted without modification, it is probably binding upon the landlord even if the landlord does not sign it or return a copy with the landlord's signature. In jurisdictions that have a statute of frauds, your part performance by sending checks in the lease period consistent with the lease, and the landlord's part performance by continuing to allow you to occupy the premises without objection, would probably make the statute of frauds (which generally requires a signed writing by the party against whom a lease is enforced) to be inapplicable. On the other hand, if you materially changed a version provided by the landlord, there is a real question over whether there has been an offer and acceptance, or a meeting of the minds, agreeing to the new lease. Materially here meaning changes that are more than updating your contact details and go to the heart of the lease contract.	Is there a law requiring a landlord to respond to rental agencies request for information in regards to previous tenants? No. There is no such law.	Here is the Illinois Landlord and Tenant Act, and here are the Chicago Residential Landlords and Tenants ordinances. Neither set of law addresses application fees. So it would have to be covered in whatever agreement you have with the agent (assuming you paid the agent), or with the landlord (if you paid the landlord). Fees for a credit history check are generally not refundable since they are actual costs incurred by someone, no matter what the outcome is. Check the forms you signed, like this one, to see whether they explicitly say that the fee is not refundable.
Does modifying/improving a patented device extend the rights of the original patent in any way? Let's say that I invent and patent something, a computer chip for example. Then over the next 15 years I add a whole bunch of new features to that invention and patent each of the modified designs. Now my chip runs faster, handles new functions, etc. All of these modifications expand the chip's abilities but are useless without the underlying chip's original design. So what happens to my rights in the original design -- which is central and essential to the new designs -- when the original patent expires? Does that mean that as soon as the original patent expires everyone who wants to can start using my old design in unlimited ways without licensing (except of course for any uses that would run afoul of duplicating my newer devices)? Could they manufacture and sell chips identical to my first design even though that design is the core integrated into my newer designs? Would I have any rights to sue them for infringement of any kind?	Patenting a new invention doesn't extend the term of the patent on the old invention. The later patent covers the new parts of the new invention, but not the parts that were in the old patent. The whole point of patents is to provide protection against even independent reinvention for a limited time, after which the invention becomes free to use for everyone (and since you disclose how it works in the patent, other people actually can use it themselves).	Well, actually, fair use is maximally relevant. Copyright means, put simply, DO NOT COPY. Citing or not is irrelevant (plagiarism is a whole other non-legal kettle of fish). Technically, what you describe is violation of copyright. However, under section 107 of Title 17 (the copyright law), you could attempt to defend yourself against an infringement suit on the basis that your action was "fair use". See this LSE q&a for the essentials of fair use.	There are basically two kinds of things one could do. One could assign or transfer intellectual property rights and contracts related to the app to the entity, or one could license the intellectual property rights to the entity. Generally speaking, in a related party transaction, everything should be in a signed writing, and a notice of the transfer of an intellectual property right that has been registered or filed with a government agency should be provided to the government agency in question. Since there are potentially copyright, patent, trademark, publicity, and contractual rights that might be associated with the app, each aspect which exists should be transferred or licensed, as the case may be. While the forms to do this aren't particular long, the concepts involved and correct terminology are subtle, so this would not be a wise undertaking to attempt on a do it yourself basis.	Copyright requires originality Your infinity hard drive appears to be a machine designed to violate copyright by immediately copying anything presented to it. Damien Riehl and Noah Rubin were creating original melodies. These do not have copyright until they are fixed in a tangible medium. That's what the hard drive is for. This is insurance against them being sued if they release a song and someone claims it violates that person's copyright - they can produce in court the melody with a date stamp of 2015 (or whatever). GitHub or similar would be even better evidence. In this context there is a specific allegation that melody X infringes copyright. Riehl & Rubin can then go to their records (including metadata) and say no, here is melody X version 1 through n and they all predate your release so we didn’t violate your copyright.	The reason why I could not find the patent is that there are several different kinds of patents. Mechanical patents, for example, are "utility" patents. The cut glass pattern referenced in the question is not a utility patent, it is a design patent. Each patent type has its own numbering system. To search for a design patent, typically a "D" is inserted before the patent number, like "D63795". This results in the correct patent being discovered:	The Right to Repair generally talks about hardware, not firmware or software, and only to the point of restoring "original" functionality. For example, RTR would make it prohibited to have Apple require that they fix your phone battery for hundreds of dollars and make it impossible for you, or a third-party shop, to do the repair instead. In Sonos case, RTR would imply that if your speaker blew a fuse (or capacitor, etc), you should have the right to fix that yourself, and they should provide you with reasonable instructions and hardware to do so. That said, if you look at the Sonos OSS references, at least a few of the licenses suggest that you can't release derivatives under more restrictive languages. Unfortunately, I'm not aware of any case law that establishes this would work, and it would be really expensive to try and find out. There's also the problem of Intellectual Property and Copyright that they could try to argue as reasons why they can't release the proprietary bits that make their hardware run. Any other options would be, unfortunately, illegal, in part because of the DMCA. Edit: Looking further into this, I found that there is H.R.4006 - Fair Repair Act, which, if passed, would require manufacturers of some hardware to offer diagnostic tools and public copies of firmware. In addition, there are also actions being taken by iFixit at the Copyright Office to allow an exception to DMCA violations for the purposes of patching firmware. Also, the President of the United States issued an Executive Order that, among other things, instructs the FTC to set rules against anticompetitive repair policies. Much of this has moved forward in just the last year, so it's relatively new to me, but it sounds like an even stronger indicator that Sonos is probably not going to have that defense much longer, unless they totally abandon their old hardware, in which case, it may become legal to hack your own firmware.	You almost certainly can't (successfully) sue Apple because the license agreement that is part of the product you purchased almost surely gives it permission to do so. A tech support based solution would be a better alternative to litigation.	is contract text itself subject to copyright? What are my options? It largely depends on the originality of your contract. C & J Management Corp. v. Anderson, 707 F.Supp.2d 858, 862 (2009) points to multiple references against preclusion of "a copyrightable interest in a contract". But you would need to prove that your competitor copied "original elements" of your contract including "a minimum degree of creativity and originality required to support a valid copyright". See Donald v. Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 766 (1973). Your post provides no information that would help identifying or ruling out this issue in your matter. Without realizing, you might have paid dearly for boilerplate language that your lawyer copied from somewhere else. Indeed, there is so much regurgitation and copy/pasting in the legal "profession" (judges included, as is notorious in judicial opinions they release and in the similarities --verbatim-- among the procedure law of many, many U.S. jurisdictions). That regurgitation is not bad in and of itself, though, since what matters is the expeditious administration of justice and the protection of your rights, rather than obtaining creative expressions authored by some lawyer. You might end up wasting valuable energy and money if you went after the competitor for something like this without first assessing the extent of originality in your contract. Focus instead on the much more detrimental fact that your competitor "plays dirty in general".
Is the law in Indonesia adversarial? In US, the trial is adversarial. The court works with 3 parties One argue one way (The defendant is very evil and deserve punishment). Another argue another way (the defendant is a saint). Then a third neutral party, namely the judge, decides which one is right. Does this work in Indonesia? Is this possible that the judge thinks that the defendant is guilty anyway even if the prosecutor disagree? One case that comes to mind is Ahok case. Here the prosecutor think that Ahok is guilty of one verse in KUHP and recommend a probation. However, the judge declares that Ahok is guilty anyway.	No. Indonesia Law uses Civil Law structures which use an Inquisitorial Trial. The chief difference is that in the United States (which has a Common Law Structure) the judge usually does not decide the case, but interprets the law (Trier of Law) and with a few exceptions, will determine the sentence once guilt is found. The Jury decides the case (Trier of Fact) and pronounces guilt (It is the right of the defense to request a Bench Trial, which gives the Judge both roles. The prosecution cannot object to this request). In a Civil Court, the big difference is that their is no Jury and the Judge has both roles (Trier of Law, and Trier of Fact). As the name suggests, rather than two sides fighting each other (adversarial), the two sides are answering questions posed to them by the Judge or usually a panel of Judges are used and the Judge may initiate further investigation in the evidence. The United States does use Inquisitional Trials from time to time, but they are often seen in misdemeanors, traffic courts, and small claims courts. The latter is a popular daytime TV genre (think Judge Judy) while misdemeanors and traffic court decisions are often time funny and make great Youtube videos. There are not many great Adversarial media as many throw out rules for time sake (real U.S. trials have many long boring periods during testimony) and story/drama sake. I would recommend "My Cousin Vinny" which was written by two lawyers who were fed up with Hollywood messing up how court room drama works and is hilarious to boot. When viewing either, take them with a grain of salt.	No, but the legislature can (and does) Many jurisdictions have mandatory sentences where there is no judicial discretion in sentencing. In effect, the sentence is known when the charges are laid - if the defendant is found guilty.	In the US, the prohibition against double jeopardy provides a hard restriction against re-trial and appeal of an acquittal. The government cannot appeal an acquittal (U.S. v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, Ball v. U.S., 163 U.S. 662), and a verdict of acquittal without judgment is also a bar to re-prosecution. The exception is that if the defendant was never in jeopardy – the judge had been bribed – then there can be a new trial (Harry Aleman v. Judges of the Criminal Division, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois). However, Adam does not take Dave to court. Adam may make an accusation that motivates the prosecutor to file criminal charges. When Adam sues Dave (not a criminal matter), there is no acquittal or conviction, or guilt. There may be a finding of liability, or not. Either side can appeal to the top, as long as there is a legal basis for the appeal. If Adam is found not liable because the judge makes a legally erroneous ruling, if Dave objected properly to the ruling, Dave can appeal if successful, the court could then change its mind and find Adam liable.	This paper studies the question, in a restricted context of federal cases (the main problem is getting data, but turns out that some federal court clerks have been obliging). From that database, between 1998-2011 1,156,460 felony cases were resolved. 0.2% of those cases were pro se representations with virtually all cases having professional representation ("data missing" is 10 times more frequent than pro se, and the only thing rarer was pro bono attorney at 0.03%). As for outcomes, it is possible that pro se defendants had the charges dismissed at a higher rate (16.9% pro se vs. 6.1% represented -- "possible" is a way of simplifying the statistical problems in interpreting these numbers); with acquittals it's a wash, and with convictions pro se defendants may have done worse (14.8% pro se, 4.9% represented). There also seems to be a trend that juries convict pro se defendants more often than they do represented defendants (90% vs. 77.9%). Ah, and this paper follows up and contradicts the findings of the Hashimoto study, linked in the comments.	No, a later trial is not allowed A prosecutor can, and often will charge multiple related crimes, and all will be addressed at the same trial. But once a person has been acquitted on a given set of events, the same jurisdiction cannot re-try the same person on what is often called a lesser included offense. Nor on a greater offense implied by the same events. Not even if additional evidence comes to light. However, if an act (or set of acts) is a crime under both state law and Federal law, for example theft by deception (state crime) and wire fraud (federal crime) one jurisdiction may try the person even after ther has been an acquittal in the other. I think the same rule applies if an act is a crime within the jurisdiction of two different states, that both can trey the accused. In many cases prosecutors will choose not to bring the second trial, but they can if they see fit.	The appeals court has found that the county court judge made a decision that was consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial. As such, the decision is sound. It appears that the defendant tried to present additional/different evidence or different arguments about the law in the appeal than they did at trial - this is not permitted. As to responsibility, the defendant and their legal team were responsible for deciding how to run their case and what evidence to present and what arguments to run. What evidence to present and how to present it and what submissions to make on the law is a tactical decision for each party. You can get it wrong. That doesn't let you try again on appeal. If your barrister has been negligent, and that directly caused you to lose, you can sue your barrister. In terms of interpreting a particular paragraph of a judgement, the appeals court may or may not make comment on a particular paragraph but the reasons, while important, are not really subject to interpretation other than that. A judgement will give orders, these should be very precise and not open to interpretation - things like "the defendant will pay X to the plaintiff" or "the case is dismissed" etc.	First, while Law and Order should not be taken as an accurate depiction of a New York trial, it especially should not be taken as an accurate depiction of an Australian trial. Australian law, while it has some major similarities with US law (both ultimately derive from the law of England), is not US law. With procedural matters (such as "may jurors ask questions of witnesses"), it can potentially differ from court to court. In general, jurors may not simply ask a witness a question. The jury's job is not to investigate and figure out if the defendant was guilty or not; it's to evaluate the cases presented by each side. US (and Australian, as far as I know) courts use what's known as the adversarial model, where the prosecution and the defense both present the best cases they can and a neutral third party decides which case was stronger. In a US criminal trial, the state is expected to justify why someone should be in jail; the jury shouldn't be helping them justify it. This isn't how all jurisdictions around the world work, but it's how the US does. One concern with juror questions is that it has the risk that the juror will not be impartial. Jurors are not supposed to get into arguments with witnesses, or to go after them to try to prove a point. In your case, the juror might be introducing an entirely different line of reasoning from the one either side is presenting, and that's simply not their job. People have raised the concern that a juror thinking up questions might be deciding the case before they hear all the evidence, and might give too much weight to the answers to their own questions (or read a lot into it if a question is denied). There are also rules on what questions may be legally asked; lawyers know these and jurors generally don't, which is why jurors may almost never directly ask a question to a witness. Where they can ask questions, it's virtually always written questions, which the judge reviews, gives to both sides to see if anyone objects, and then reads to the witness in a neutral tone.	When people talk about the "American rule," they usually mean a system where every party pays their own legal costs, and the winner is not compensated in any way for the costs of litigation. Using that as your basis, the American system itself is actually a "hybrid." The details change a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But in general: The loser in many American civil cases is required to pay the actual court costs. These are not as substantial as the attorney's fees, but they can easily run into hundreds or thousands of dollars. These costs are for things like filing fees, process servers, witness fees, court recorders and transcripts, and other costs that, generally speaking, are going to be the same no matter how much your lawyer charges. (Again, what specifically is included in costs depends on your jurisdiction). This imposes a non-trivial expense on the loser of a lawsuit, without allowing the other side to run up the costs to an outrageous figure by hiring huge teams of expensive lawyer, as is possible under the pure English system. While the "American rule" is the default rule in most or all American jurisdictions, there are generally rules that allow the Court to shift part or all of a prevailing party's legal fees to the other side under certain circumstances. For example: in many courts, if you bring a frivolous motion, or a motion designed primarily to inflate the costs of the suit, the court can require you to immediately pay any attorneys' fees expended in responding to that motion, even if you eventually win the lawsuit as a whole. This is a more specific and targeted penalty for misconduct than the English rule. Similarly, if the Court finds that the entire lawsuit you brought – or the defense you presented – was frivolous, or presented in bad faith, or under certain other circumstances, the Court can include attorney's fees in the final damage award, just as would have been done under the English rule. The result is a hybrid system. The benefit of this hybrid system, at least in theory, is that frivolous lawsuits are discouraged, but lawsuits that have some merit – even if they are ultimately unsuccessful – do not have to worry about the imposition of massive costs. However, the disincentive is not as much as it might be, since the standards courts use to judge a motion or lawsuit "frivolous" are generally quite stringent.
Does the GDPR allow me to access data from public sources, store it and anaylize it? I've been researching about the GDPR on the internet to find an answer to my question, but I have not found a concrete answer. Does the GDPR allow me (my software/server) to derive data, store it and use it for any purpose? For example: perform an analysis of a person via their ex: (twitter feed) and store the analysis. All of this without needing to inform the person of the analysis or them having the right to transfer/remove/get a copy of the analysis from me(my software/server)? Could a loophole be to perform the analysis and store only the "connections"? Almost like giving a person a mathematical function without any plotted data, You give the end user a pre-made "template" (the analysis report) that they fill out by fetching the feed themselves?	Data can only be processed if there is at least one lawful basis to do so. The lawful bases for processing data are: the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes. processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract. processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject. processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person. processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. So unless you have some very compelling reason to need to process that person's data without their consent, you can't legally do it. Therefore it is hard to see how you could produce this "template", and even if you somehow did the person receiving it might not have a lawful basis for fetching (processing) that data anyway.	In order to process data (which includes storing data), a data controller must establish one or more of the lawful bases contained at Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR. Briefly, those are: a) Consent of the data subject b) Necessary for performance of a contract with the data subject c) Necessary for compliance with a legal obligation d) Necessary to protect vital interests of data subject or another person e) Necessary for public interest or exercise of official authority vested in the controller f) Necessary for controller's legitimate interests Clearly a) and d) don't apply. As you've settled the debt, it seems unlikely to me that b) or f) apply. That leaves c) and e). A common example under c) would be a requirement by Companies House or HMRC to keep accounting records for a certain period of time. Some public bodies may also find it necessary, under e), to retain records which they need to be able to carry out their other functions. It seems highly unlikely to me that either of these would justify retention for your "lifetime" however. I would start by sending them a written demand to have your data erased under Article 17(1). Make sure you also specifically request that they provide you with all the information (and in particular the purposes of the processing) under Article 15(1), and that, in the event that they refuse to erase your data, they explain the reasons why pursuant to Article 12(4). Their response on these points will be helpful in establishing whether there is a lawful basis. Your next step after that is either to complain to the ICO or to apply to court for a compliance order under Section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The former is free while the latter is not and carries risks of cost if you are unsuccessful. If you opt for one of these steps, make sure you cite the relevant provisions of the GDPR and explain why you think there is no lawful basis for the data retention (including by referencing any response you received from them). "I have read GDPR guides on how to request erasure, but I don't really feel this applies- I want to have my account deleted, not the track record of the loan and repayment" It doesn't matter whether we are talking about your account or your track record. What matters is whether the account constitutes personal data, which it almost certainly does, per the definition at Article 4(1): "‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;"	GDPR rights and obligations cover different things: A duty of the data processor towards the government of the country where they operate to present certain documentation, and to implement technical and organizational measures to protect data. These would be audited by government agencies, not the individual customer. A single data subject cannot waive them. A duty of the data processor to process and store personal data only with a legal justification. User consent is one possible justification, if it is informed, revokable, etc. So a single data subject can waive a "ban" on storing his or her data in a database along with all the other users who waived that "ban," but the duties towards the government regarding that data would still apply. A duty of the data processor to respond to an Article 15 request by the data subject in a certain way and timeframe. If a data subject writes a letter to the data processor and explicitly states that the letter is not an Article 15 request, then Article 15 does not apply. The data subject would of course have the right to make an Article 15 request at a later time.	I understand that storing any hash or IP that can identify "user uniquely" is against GDPR. That is not correct. However any data which is identifiably associated with a an individual human, including any data which could be used to identify that human, is generally "Personal data", and may not be processed (which includes storing it) without a lawful basis, if the GDPR applies. Any of the six lawful bases allowed by the GDPR may be used, including consent, and the legitimate interest of the data controller. The GDPR does not generally specify that particular technological solutions are permitted or forbidden. If this usage pattern could reasonably be used to identify a particular person, or to single out a person from among a group of people, it is probably personal data, and a lawful basis would be required. Otherwise, not. As for whether such a person is "identifiable" if use of this technique permits the Data Controller to identify two visits at separate times as having been made by the same person, when the later visit is still in progress or is recent, the IP for that visit will still be available, and thus could be associated with the first visit as well. And even if that is not done, such a technique could permit building a profile of such a person, including the actions taken on different visits. I think that would be enough to make this "personal data".	Names clearly are personal data and so a good question to ask for GDPR compliance is: Do you need to do what you want to do in order to offer your product or service? For your scenario a common answer seems to be that websites ask for the users first and last name during account creation. The reason is that they need this information to confirm the identity of the account creator. But the public profile only displays a user name that the user can pick freely. In general there is no good reason to publically show the legal names of users so websites don't do it. So for your website ask yourself, why do you want to publically show the names of your users? If you have a good reason to do that specify it in the user terms and go ahead. If you don't have a good reason don't do it.	Are my assumptions correct? Yes, this is precisely the sort of thing that would fall under the purview of "the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party", as it fundamentally enables you to deliver the service to the data subject, and its also difficult to argue that "such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject" given its a fundamental part of delivering the service before any consent can be given. Its not the intention of the GDPR to solely require a direct relationship between the data controller and data subject, its intention is to allow the data subject to control more of the relationship than they did previously - in some cases, that control remains with the data controller, which is why not all of the lawful basis for processing rest on consent. So long as you ensure that the CDN provider has a relevant privacy policy and is identified as a data processor in your privacy and data policy then you are good to go. In my mind, this is similar to the issue of how the data subjects packets get to you from their computer - we aren't including all of the network providers who carry the packets between the data subject and the processor (despite the fact that those providers will have access to much of the same information as the CDN, such as IP address, source, destination etc), even though in many cases we don't know that information (for example which route it will take over the internet). The only difference here is that as the data controller, you know about the CDN and can include it in your policies, so you should.	The GDPR has an exemption for purely personal or household activity. Creating a family tree seems purely personal as long as you don't publish it. You're also allowed to freely share the tree as long as it stays within that purely personal scope. Your proposed restriction of only showing data of blood relatives seems excessively strict. But assuming that this exemption wouldn't apply, there'd probably still be no problem. The GDPR does not require you to always obtain consent. It requires that the purposes for which you process personal data are covered by some legal basis. Consent is one such legal basis, but legitimate interest is another. You can likely argue that you have a legitimate interest to create a tree of your (extended) family. The legitimate interest must be weighed against the rights and freedoms of the affected persons. For example, contact information could be used for stalking. The balance of the legitimate interest check can be changed if you adopt suitable safeguards. Your idea of only sharing data with close relatives would be such a safeguard, but it might not be necessary. When you rely on legitimate interest, the affected person can object to further processing, furthermore they can request to be erased from your records. A request for erasure can be denied if there are overriding grounds to keep the data. E.g maybe only contact information has to be deleted but names, dates, and relations might be kept. You should notify persons when they are included into your records. It is your obligation as the data controller to make these decisions. If someone disagrees they can sue you or lodge a complaint with a supervision authority. Note that dead persons are not natural persons in the sense of the GDPR, and have no privacy. However, national laws may provide such protections.	IANAL, But the information commissioners office (UK) describe personal data as: (bolding mine) The GDPR applies to ‘personal data’ meaning any information relating to an identifiable person who can be directly or indirectly identified in particular by reference to an identifier. This definition provides for a wide range of personal identifiers to constitute personal data, including name, identification number, location data or online identifier, reflecting changes in technology and the way organisations collect information about people. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/key-definitions/ So I would say that in your case it is personal information. In principle, regardless of if you can identify an individual, personal data is that which can be used to potentially identify an individual. For an extreme example of why this is important: Lets say your app sells AIDs medication. Can a hacker who got in and stole your database, be able to use that with information they stole elsewhere to identify people with AIDs and blackmail them, in a way that they wouldn't if you had not stored this identifier? Plus, if you want to err on the side of caution, there's no legal penalty for telling the user about non-personal information you store.
GDPR with refusing medical information How does GDPR work with insurers in relation to refusing information about pre-existing medical conditions? Due to it being special category data. As in, which of the "conditions for processing special category data" would apply? https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/special-category-data/ My first thought was it would be consent-based (condition a), but under consent, it is noted that you should avoid making consent a precondition of service. The only other one that slightly fits is condition h) in "the provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems" But its a bit of a stretch. Are they likely to make consent a pre-condition of service anyway, or is there a more appropriate way?	How does GDPR work with insurers in relation to refusing information about pre-existing medical conditions? Due to it being special category data. As in, which of the "conditions for processing special category data" would apply? As far as I see, Article 9 (a) ("explicit consent") would apply. So the insurer would have to ask the customer for consent. My first thought was it would be consent-based (condition a), but under consent, it is noted that you should avoid making consent a precondition of service. Yes, that is often noted, but that is only partially true. The GDPR actually says (Article 7, emphasis mine): When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. So making consent a precondition of service can be ok, provided that the data is "necessary for the performance of that contract". Whether knowing about preexisting conditions is "necessary" for an insurance provider is something a court would have to decide, but on the face it does not seem unreasonable. Source: General Data Protection Regulation	You are processing the users IP address in order to carry out the translation to a physical location (see my comment for the technical issues with that) and an IP address is most certainly considered personal information, so yes under the GDPR you are going to need a published policy because you are both data controller and data processor. You need to inform the user of what you are doing, and you need to tell them of the legal basis for the processing (there are several under the GDPR, of which consent is only one - but in your case its going to be the easiest to justify). If you use a third party service for the location translation, you also need to inform the user of that and make available the third party services data processing policy.	GDPR defines consent like this in Art 4(11): ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; Further conditions on consent are given in Art 7 GDPR. For you, the important aspects are: Consent must involve an affirmative action (opt-in). Thus, consent cannot be the default and must not be pre-selected. The Planet49 judgement provides relevant case law on this. Consent must be an unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes. Consent must be informed. This requires access to the full privacy policy. Abuse is discouraged because the data controller has burden of proof that valid consent was collected (see Art 7(1)). How does the RedHat consent tool measure up? The consent appears to require an affirmative action and seems unambiguous: no option is pre-selected, and you need to click on “Out” or “In”. The selected option is then highlighted. However, I agree that the radio buttons are not entirely clear once a selection has been made. I also agree with you that the terms “Out” and “In” are not self-explanatory. They rely on the user knowing the terms “opt-out” and “opt-in”. This could indicate that the user's action isn't unambiguous. That the privacy policy page also shows a cookie consent popup could mean that consent isn't sufficiently informed. So together, this isn't a particularly good design for a cookie consent tool. There are some potentially fatal problems that could render the consent invalid. However, it isn't obviously non-compliant – I have seen far worse.	I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28).	Yes, you still need consent (opt-in). Cookies usually require consent, but not always. There are two relevant laws at play here: GDPR makes general rules about the processing of personal data, and ePrivacy has specific rules about cookies and similar technologies, regardless of whether the cookies involve personal data. The ePrivacy directive was implemented in your EU member state (or the UK) in national law. The national laws contain the authoritative rules on this matter. But in general: Accessing or storing any information (such as cookies) on the end user's device requires consent. Consent is defined by the GDPR. You do not need consent if the access/storage is strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user (“functional cookies”). Using cookies to store site preferences such as user language is strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user, so you do not need consent for this. You must still make your use of cookies transparent to the user. Setting cookies for marketing purposes is not strictly necessary to provide the service, so you always require consent for them. Registered users don't automatically give consent. You now raise the interesting question if this is also the case if the user is already registered. Yes, you still need consent (opt-in). This is due to the way how the GDPR defines “consent”. Consent is not general or vague agreement. Agreement with your terms of service or privacy policy is not consent in the sense of the GDPR. Instead, consent is defined in Art 4(11) GDPR to be (emphasis mine): any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her Art 7 GDPR adds further conditions for consent. (1) You are responsible for demonstrating that the user has given valid consent. (2) The request for consent should be clearly distinguishable from other matters (i.e. not buried in a larger document) and should be presented “in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.” (3) Withdrawing consent must be as easy as giving it. (4) In general, you cannot make access to a service conditional on unrelated consent. I.e. you can't force your users to consent to marketing cookies in order to use the app. The users must have an actual choice, or the consent isn't freely given. Supervisory authorities have produced extensive guidance on the matter of consent. If you're in the UK, consider the ICO Guide to Consent and Guidance on the use of cookies and similar technologies. If you're in the EU/EEA, consider the EDPB Guidelines 05/2020 on Consent (PDF). To summarize why agreement with your terms of service is not consent to marketing cookies: Agreement to such large documents is not sufficiently specific. The consent would not be sufficiently informed. You cannot expect users to actually read all your legal documentation. You must present information in an intelligible manner, possibly with multiple layers (compare WP29 Guidelines on Transparency, endorsed by EDPB). Agreement to your terms of service is not an unambiguous indication that the user wants these cookies. If consent to marketing cookies is a condition of using your service, the consent is likely invalid. The consequence is that cookie consent is usually obtained via separate consent management tools that provide detailed explanations about different categories of cookies, and let the user select which specifically categories of cookies they want to consent to, if any. Outside of cookies, consent is just one legal basis among many. In this context, you might ask “if getting consent is so difficult, but GDPR requires that I have consent, how does that work?” It is a common misconception that the GDPR requires consent for everything – the ePrivacy requirement that most cookies need consent is one of the exceptions. In general, GDPR offers a choice of six categories of legal bases for processing in Art 6 GDPR, and consent is just one of them. In many cases, an online service will process personal data because it is necessary to fulfil a contract with the user, or because there is a legitimate interest for the processing (and the legitimate interest outweighs the user's interests). For example, reasonable security measures such as keeping logfiles can be based on a legitimate interest and do not require consent.	Whether GDPR applies does not depend on the country of residence. Instead, GDPR applies to a non-EU site or service if the data controller offers products or services to people in the EU (see Art 3(2) GDPR). This depends solely on the behaviour and intent of the data controller / the provider of the website – compare also the discussion of the “targeting criterion” in EDPB guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR. While your proposed measures might not be entirely ineffective (in that they document an intent to not serve people in the EU), they are both unnecessarily restrictive and overly lax. For example, they would unnecessarily prevent EU tourists in the US from registering but would nevertheless allow US tourists in the EU. For the targeting criterion, it matters whether the data subject is in the EU at the time of the offer, not at all what their residency is. Even if a person who is currently in the EU registers with your service, that doesn't necessarily mean that you are targeting people in the EU. Instead of implementing signup restrictions, a better strategy might be to clarify in the copy on your website that you are only targeting the domestic US market, not the European market with your services. I have discussed this in more detail in an answer to “How can you block GDPR users from US based sites?” If you have a site where GDPR doesn't apply, and you receive a GDPR data subject request, you shouldn't deny it on the basis that the user must have lied – instead you can deny it on the basis that GDPR just doesn't apply to you.	GDPR does not require consent. It requires a legal basis. Consent is only one legal basis among many. Some other legal bases are: legitimate interest (implying an opt out solution) necessity for performance of a contract If your customers pay you to deliver email updates, that contract is the legal basis for sending email updates. The only wrinkle is that as you describe your service, the emails aren't an essential part of the service. Alternatively, you might assert that there's a legitimate interest to deliver updates via email so that updates aren't missed. In that case you must allow the users to object, e.g. via ab unsubscribe link in the email and via their account settings. Because a prior business relationship exists, there's a strong case for legitimate interest – even if this were marketing emails (!). Legitimate interest requires you to balance the legitimate interest with the data subject's rights and freedoms though. Your updates are most likely not marketing, so any advice you might read relating to marketing emailings is irrelevant. GDPR applies because you are established in the EU. The regulation applies in relation to all your users, not just EU users. If and when Brexit happens you will still be covered by the Data Protection Act, which transcribes the GDPR's requirements into UK law. However, processing data from EU users will then count as an international transfer which requires extra compliance work, at least until the EU issues an adequacy decision for the UK.	Where did California get authorization to receive my medical info from Walgreens? From HIPAA. Permitted Uses and Disclosures. A covered entity is permitted, but not required, to use and disclose protected health information, without an individual’s authorization, for the following purposes or situations: (1) To the Individual (unless required for access or accounting of disclosures); (2) Treatment, Payment, and Health Care Operations; (3) Opportunity to Agree or Object; (4) Incident to an otherwise permitted use and disclosure; (5) Public Interest and Benefit Activities; and (6) Limited Data Set for the purposes of research, public health or health care operations.18 Covered entities may rely on professional ethics and best judgments in deciding which of these permissive uses and disclosures to make. ... (5) Public Interest and Benefit Activities. The Privacy Rule permits use and disclosure of protected health information, without an individual’s authorization or permission, for 12 national priority purposes.28 These disclosures are permitted, although not required, by the Rule in recognition of the important uses made of health information outside of the health care context. Specific conditions or limitations apply to each public interest purpose, striking the balance between the individual privacy interest and the public interest need for this information. ... Public Health Activities. Covered entities may disclose protected health information to: (1) public health authorities authorized by law to collect or receive such information for preventing or controlling disease, injury, or disability and to public health or other government authorities authorized to receive reports of child abuse and neglect; (2) entities subject to FDA regulation regarding FDA regulated products or activities for purposes such as adverse event reporting, tracking of products, product recalls, and post-marketing surveillance; (3) individuals who may have contracted or been exposed to a communicable disease when notification is authorized by law; and (4) employers, regarding employees, when requested by employers, for information concerning a work-related illness or injury or workplace related medical surveillance, because such information is needed by the employer to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OHSA), the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MHSA), or similar state law. See: HIPAA Privacy Rule In plain English... A covered entity (Walgreens) is allowed to use and disclose your PHI without your authorization to public health authorities for controlling and preventing diseases. Additionally, they are allowed to receive this information for the purposes of adverse event recording (reactions to shots), tracking of products (tracking of shots), and notifying you of issues related to the product you were given. Is this legal, and can the State be indicted for breach of privacy? Yes, this is legal, and no, the State cannot be sued for it.
Would I have a reasonable cause of action to consider suing a science centre for violating disability rights law? As someone who is both totally blind and hard-of-hearing, I rely on tactile feedback a lot. I live in Oregon, and I heard that a new exhibit was going to be stationed permanently, so I wouldn't have to travel far. Yet, this website claims that they want to have Space Shuttle Endeavour under maximum conservation: http://californiasciencecenter.org/exhibits/air-space/space-shuttle-endeavour I was really disappointed because I was hoping to touch every inch of it, including walk inside of it and experience every detail firsthand. That way, if the audio or Braille information failed to clarify something, I could learn how certain parts and pieces moved to accomplish different tasks. People have various ways of learning, and one of them is through interaction and hands-on learning. A sighted person can watch videos and pictures of how things move, a blind person wouldn't be able to see that, so they would need to be told, both auditory and tactile, how something moved. I called the science centre's human resources department to file an internal grievance procedure, but I never heard back, so I contacted the US Department of Justice Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) hotline, who advised me to file a complaint if they didn't have any reasonable accommodations. Under title II of the ADA, all public entities, be it federal, state, local, private or non-profit, are obligated to modify any policy unless there are legitimate reasons to screen out a minority group. So I filed a complaint with the ADA DOJ, but I'm not sure if they will find it in my favour or the centre's favour. I mean, if I blindfolded you, and I took you to a great place you've always wanted to experience, but when we got there, we learned that you can only perceive it by seeing - You have an option. You can take your blindfolds and experience it. A totally blind person wouldn't have that option, so they would have to either require the business to make an exception, like wearing gloves to avoid getting fingerprints, or something else entirely.	I think there's a reasonable argument to be made. ADA requires reasonable accommodations for disabilities, but there's always going to be a fight over what is reasonable. What's pretty clear, though, is that the museum is not required to make accommodations that would "threaten or destroy the historic significance of an historic property." So they'd have to think about what accommodations they can make without endangering the exhibit. To me, anyway, asking to walk up and touch it with gloves sounds reasonable; asking them to build scaffolding so you can touch every inch of it that others can see does not sound reasonable. But I'm not a conservator. It may be that even a gloved hand would endanger the exhibit. If that's the case, the accommodation is probably not a reasonable one, and you'd probably need to think about other possible compromises.	There is a saying that you can't sue city hall: that is applicable here. Governments enjoy sovereign immunity, and cannot be sued for their errors of judgment unless they specifically allow it. Safety regulations are an example of a situation where the government hold all of the power and shoulders none of the responsibility. If a government forbids sale or use of a substance on some grounds (could be safety, could be economic impact, could be something about preventing the moral decay of society), and the grounds later turns to be false, you cannot sue the government because of lost business opportunities. Generally speaking, that which is not prohibited is allowed, so there would have to be an affirmative duty for the government to prevent all forms of harm. If there were such a legal duty, there is a miniscule legal foundation for suing the government for shirking its duty. That is not a completely hypothetical possibility, in that the state of Washington imposes a constitutional duty on the legislature to provide public education, and the Supreme Court has done things to enforce this duty (the contempt of court fines are up in the realm of $80 million). Since there is no jurisdiction that imposes a duty on the government to absolutely prevent all harm, you won't be able to sue the government if they fail to outlaw a thing that is eventually proven to harm someone.	Maybe, Hence the Lawsuits In the absence of clear statute law these all circle around tort law. For the scooter companies, trespass to chattels, and for the affected landowners (who hire the removalists) trespass to land and nuisance seem applicable. In essence, I can’t take your stuff (trespass to chattels) but you can’t leave your stuff on my property (trespass to land) or impeding access to it (nuisance). If you do, I am entitled to the reasonable costs of dealing with it. Note that, as owner, you remain responsible for you stuff even if you rented it to someone else. Both sides are pushing hard into unexplored areas of law so we await the judgement with interest. Then we’ll know.	That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.	In that case, Cruise-Gulyas was subject to a second stop, and the court found that the second stop was an illegal seizure. There is no qualified immunity since this was an exercise of a clearly established First Amendment right. The authority to seize her ended when the first stop ended. The finger is not a basis for a stop, since it does not violate any law ("This ancient gesture of insult is not the basis for a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or impending criminal activity", Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105.	Being disabled has nothing to do with it. If he is harassing students then after there is a complaint and investigation, then he can be banned from campus, and arrested for trespassing if he returns. But there would have to be a formal complaint made to the authorities first.	A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.	Did I lose possession of my goods? That seems unlikely. But enforcing it sounds complicated, at least from the standpoint of substantive law (the Code civil). I am not knowledgeable of French procedural law. The difficulty begins with identifying whether your claim is cognizable as unjust enrichment, or --per your subsequent oral agreement-- breach of contract. You might want to read sections "The French Law of Unjust Enrichment" and "Enrichissement sans Cause" in this post. Please note that the French Civil Code recently underwent significant reforms, whence references of its articles are likely outdated. Here I pointed out one example of statutory renumbering in the Code. In the second link, you will read that originally [...] the action in enrichissement sans cause would not be available to the claimant if he or she had any other cause of action, even if that cause of action was blocked for some reason. [...] [B]ut it is perhaps here that the law has relaxed most in recent cases. Thus, the subtleties of your matter can be decisive for identifying the type of claim that is applicable to your situation. Lastly, according to this treatise (on p.54), "[t]he French legal system does not have the principle of [reasonable] reliance as it exists in the American legal system" (brackets added). That makes it easier for a plaintiff to prove his claims under French law.
How could a mistrial trigger double jeopardy in the O.J. Simpson murder trial? The People v. O.J. Simpson is a series telling how this famous trial went. In the 9th episode, after Judge Lance Ito states that another judge should determine if the case can remain before this court or not, the prosecution figures have this conversation : CHRISTOPHER DARDEN : So... what should we do? MARCIA CLARK : Chris, I've been thinking about this constantly. The problem is, it's too risky. If it's perceived that we pushed for mistrial, it would trigger double jeopardy and it that version, O.J. walks. Can you image the public reaction? Is this dialog actually plausible? How could double jeopardy be triggered if the first trial wasn't completed?	Yes, this is plausible. To be doctrinally precise, "jeopardy" attaches when the jury is sworn in. Once jeopardy attaches, there can only be a second trial if: The defendant is convicted of a charge that is reversed on appeal or in a collateral attack on the conviction. There is a mistrial that is attributable to the defendant or the defendant's counsel's conduct (e.g. the defendant is observed by the bailiff trying to bribe a juror with cash in exchange for voting to acquit), or is requested by the defendant or his counsel (who has not been "goaded" into doing so by the government). There is a mistrial that is not attributable to the conduct of either the prosecution or the defendant. As explained here: Mistrials are generally not covered by the double jeopardy clause. If a judge dismisses the case or concludes the trial without deciding the facts in the defendant's favor (for example, by dismissing the case on procedural grounds), the case is a mistrial and may normally be retried. Furthermore, if a jury cannot reach a verdict, the judge may declare a mistrial and order a retrial as was addressed in United States v. Josef Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824). When the defendant moves for a mistrial, there is no bar to retrial, even if the prosecutor or judge caused the error that forms the basis of the motion. An exception exists, however, where the prosecutor or judge has acted in bad faith. In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982), the Supreme Court held that "only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion."	This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off.	united-states I am answering this in the case of a criminal jury trial (given the context of the previous question). It is my understanding that the judge must accept (almost?) all evidence admitted into court. So, this leaves me with three questions: What happens if an official shows evidence that the judge hadn't agreed to feature in the trial? . . . What happens if the evidence happens to be inadmissible? A trial in a criminal case takes place in a courtroom at a predetermined date and time, with the prosecutor physically sitting at one table in front of a judge and the defendant and the defendant's lawyer physically sitting at another table in front of the judge, and a jury physically sitting in a seating area to the side of the judge, and a witness (usually) physically sitting in a chair on the other side of the judge (in rare circumstances, for minor witnesses, testimony is provided by telephone with the phone put on speaker in the courtroom for all to hear), and a court reporter or tape recorder keeping track of what happens verbatim. In a trial, essentially all evidence comes in through witnesses sitting on a special the chair in front of the judge designated for witnesses (called the witness stand) at the request of either the prosecuting attorney, or the defense attorney. This is the only way the evidence is introduced (other than by stipulations of both side's lawyers). Prosecutors and defense attorneys don't testify or provide evidence themselves. The judge is usually not told what evidence will be offered at trial in advance, although sometimes a pre-trial hearing is held to consider a particularly important piece of evidence's admissibility prior to trial, in a hearing on what is called a "motion in limine" or a "motion to suppress". If that happens, the judge's decision made in advance will be honored by the judge when anyone tries to introduce the evidence at trial. But those are the exception and not the rule. Usually, any witnesses can be asked any questions at trial and the judge does not consider the admissibility of the answer to the question until it is asked and objected to by the other side's lawyer at trial. A defendant can choose to be, but is not required to be, a witness in his or her own case. In a trial, when it is their turn, the prosecution and defense, respectively, ask witnesses to sit at the witness stand one by one and ask them questions, which the witness answers under oath, absent an evidence objection from the other side's attorney. While a witness is on the stand, exhibits such as documents or physical objects can also be introduced into evidence in connection with the authenticating testimony of the witness (except in cases where both sides stipulate to the admission of the documents or other non-testimonial evidence). As the lawyers try to introduce evidence by asking a question to a witness on the stand, or by asking the judge for permission to introduce non-testimonial evidence, the other side's attorney can say, "I object". If that happens, the witness on the stand is not allowed to answer the question and the non-testimonial evidence (e.g. documents, or a knife allegedly used in a crime) is not made available to the jury until the judge rules on whether it is admissible or not in accordance with the rules of evidence. Usually, the judge rules on the evidence objection immediately in the moment, although in rare cases, the judge will let the jury have a break for a few minutes while hearing arguments from the lawyers for both sides on about the relevant evidence rules and/or researching the legal issue, before ruling on the evidence issue. Once the judge rules on the evidence issue, the trial continues immediately. If the judge "sustains" the objection to the evidence, then the question doesn't get asked and/or the jury doesn't get to see the non-testimonial evidence. The lawyer whose question or offer to introduce evidence was successfully objected to moves on to their next question (if any) for the witness instead. If the judge "overrules" the objection to the evidence, then the witness answer the question and/or the jury gets to see the non-testimonial evidence which is "received" into evidence by the judge. This process continues continuously, for as many business days as it takes, until all witness testimony and all non-testimonial evidence has been presented to the court and both sides have told the court that they have presented all of their evidence. Then each side makes closing arguments to the jury, the judge reads the jury instructions of law on how to resolve the case, and the jury is sent to closed room to discuss the case and decide whether to say "guilty" or "not guilty" with respect to each charge brought by the prosecution in the trial. This decision is called a "verdict" and when the jury has made up its mind on all charges present to it, the jury lets the judge know that it has made up its mind, and the judge calls everyone back to the courtroom, and the jury tells the judge what they decided in open court. If the verdict is "not guilty" on all criminal charges in the case, then the case is over, with no post-trial motions and no appeals. If the verdict is "guilty" the defendant is convicted, subject to post-trial motions to declare a mistrial and appeals by the convicted defendant. If the convicted defendant appeals the case, and the judge abused his discretion in overruling an objection to the evidence that is made by the lawyer for the defendant (or the defendant personally if the defendant is not represented by a lawyer), because no reasonable judge could have found that the evidence was admissible under the circumstances, then the appellate court rules that the judge has made an "error". The appellate court will not find that the judge's ruling is an "error" if the judge made the correct decision for the wrong reason. If it is reasonably possible that "error" possibly in combination with other errors made by the trial court judge could have caused a convicted criminal defendant to have been acquitted by the jury if the errors weren't made by the judge, then the defendant gets a new trial. The new trial usually before the same judge with a new jury. But the new trial is before a different judge and a new jury if the judge is no longer a judge on the court for any reason, or if the judge has been so defiant of the appellate court (typically ignoring its instructions in a retrial after a first appeal) that the appellate court decides it must remove the judge from the case. A criminal defendant is only acquitted by an appellate court if the appellate court finds that it would be impossible under any circumstances for the defendant to be convicted in a new trial, possibly with different evidence presented by the prosecution. What happens if a private citizen does the above? This doesn't make sense. Private citizens don't rule on the admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial, and can't introduce evidence in a criminal trial except at the request of a prosecuting attorney or defendant's attorney by being called as a witness and asking the questions that the lawyers (and sometimes the judge as well) asks the witness. Witnesses are not allowed to volunteer testimony or provide documents to a jury unless asked to do so by a lawyer in the case. What happens if someone provides evidence in court without the knowledge of the judge? As the process described above should make clear, this is basically impossible absent some extremely irregular event on the same level of irregularity as someone bribing a jury or threatening a jury with harm if he votes the wrong way.	If the prosecutor (P) knows or strongly believes based on this new evidence that A is innocent, ethically P should start proceeding to have A's conviction reversed or reviewed. But in far too many cases P does nothing of the sort. If P simply files a charge against B and proceeds to try B for the crime, P leaves it open to B's Lawyer to ask "Didn't you already convict A for this crime? what about that?" as part of a defense, which might well embarrass P and lose the case. So P may well choose to file charges against B claiming that A & B acted together as accomplices, even if this requires misstating the evidence, or suppressing part of it. Or, P may simply ignore the new evidence, leaving A in prison and B free. This is unjust, but requires no effort on the part of P, and may seem less likely to raise embarrassing questions about why P got the case against A wrong. P can always claim that s/he did not believe the new evidence. That might even be true, there is such a tendency to believe what we wish to believe. The relative frequency of these responses on the part of those in the position of P here is really not possible to asses. The last two responses involve P suppressing or at least burying relevant evidence, and unless it is brought to the attention of others who publicize it enough that action is taken, it will not be generally known and cannot be tabulated in any statistics. P's office will certainly not respond to any survey which asks "How many times this year did you suppress the true facts to leave in place an unjust conviction you had previously obtained?"	In general they are not told. In fact, I am not aware of any jurisdiction where they are told by the judge officially. In fact judges will normally charge a jury that they must accept the law as stated by the judge, and ignore any other source of the law, whether they like it or not. But the Judge has no way to enforce such a charge. According to the Wikipedia article The 1895 decision in Sparf v. United States, written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. It was a 5–4 decision. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present legal argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge. A 1969 Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Moylan, affirmed the power of jury nullification, but also upheld the power of the court to refuse to permit an instruction to the jury to this effect. We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge, and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused, is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision. Nevertheless, in upholding the refusal to permit the jury to be so instructed, the Court held that: …by clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that they may decide according to their prejudices or consciences (for there is no check to ensure that the judgment is based upon conscience rather than prejudice), we would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness. This should not be allowed. It is not so much that jury nullification is a right of the jury, as that there is very little right for the prosecutor or judge to inquire into why the jury acted however it did. If there is a suspicion that the jury was bribed, or influenced by prohibited communications, that can be looked into. But otherwise a jury is like an oracle, its actions have no specified reason or justification, they are whatever they are. The judge (or an appeals court) can set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that no rational jury could find in a particular way -- this is mostly used to overturn convictions based on insufficient evidence. But a jury has almost total freedom to believe of disbelieve any witnesses, so if it disbelieves, it could acquit, regardless of whether it rejects the law under which charges are brought. So there is no way to tell if a particular verdict was based on nullification, or on disbelief of the witnesses, or some other possible ground. In any case, there is no provision -- that I k now of -- to set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that it was an instance of nullification, so inquiring into whether it was would be of little point. This attitude toward jury verdicts goes back to the very early origins of trial by jury, when it was a replacement for Trial by Ordeal. The Ordeal had been considered a way of asking God to decide the issue, and there was no way to ask God to clarify the decision. When it was replaced by jury trial, no way to ask for clarification was considered possible there either -- the jury was said to voice the decision of the community at large: the formal term for jury trial was "to be tried by the country". See C. Rembar's The Law of the Land and H.C. Lea's The Duel and the oath for more on this history. This article reports on recent cases where juries have refused to convict in Marijuana cases.	The jury never finds there was “no crime” They either find that the state has proven that this particular defendant committed this particular crime (guilty) or they have not proven it (not guilty). Another jury at another time may find the opposite - this does sometimes happen where a guilty verdict is appealed and the appeals court orders a retrial. For another defendant charged with a different crime (e.g. accessory to the first crime) before another jury, the result of another trial is both irrelevant and inadmissible.	A case can be "dismissed" at (most) any time (however, the further along in the process a case is, the less likely a judge will allow a case to be dismissed without very good reason). A case can be dismissed with or without "prejudice", which in this legal context means essentially "finality". A case dismissed with prejudice cannot be brought again, while a case dismissed without prejudice can be refiled. (Compare the criminal law concept of "double jeopardy", though as phoog correctly notes, "double jeopardy" only applies in criminal trials, while prejudice can be applied in both civil and criminal courts). Many cases are dismissed without looking at the evidence (or even having the evidence admitted to the record); this is called "summary judgement" or "judgement as a matter of law". There are generally three cases when this happens: First, if the prosecution or plaintiff (i.e. the party bringing accusations) has "failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted", i.e. asked for something the court cannot grant. Second, is if the defendant can show, that even if everything alledged by the plaintiff is true, that the necessarily elements of the crime or offense have not been proven. Third, is if there are no facts in dispute, and only a disagreement on interpreting the law.	You're wrong in the first sentence So I agree, that a hung jury is in fact reasonable doubt by lack of concurrence, the defendant should be acquitted. No. A hung jury just means they can't decide on any item they should decide about, for whatever reason. Maybe they all want to see the defendant guilty but can't decide if it is murder 1st or 2nd degree, or one of them is just trying to stay out of work and just is contrarian to whatever the jury deliberates, wether guilty or not guilty. In either case they can not tell the judge what they can't agree about. They can only tell the judge that they can't agree on a verdict. Since the judge can't assume anything about the deliberations, he can only reset trial and swap the jury for one that actually might be able to decide. The whole Jury is tossed out, their deliberations don't matter anymore - their hung state does not influence the re-trial.
Indemnification clause in effect, but indemnified party refuses to cooperate Suppose a contract exists in which defendant D has indemnified party E. D and E currently dislike each other. Third-party plaintiff P, in a liability matter arising (indirectly) out of the contract, has sued defendant D. He could have chosen to sue E in addition to or instead of D, but he didn't; only D. D requires documents from E in order to prepare the defense. But party E, out of spite, refuses to provide them. D does not want to have to subpoena E, because it would reveal to the plaintiff that D and E are not on good terms; moreover, the plaintiff has not brought E into the case at all and D would rather just keep them out of it entirely. Does D have any other recourse against E in this matter? Does this possibly constitute bad faith on the part of E?	D should be subpoenaing anything and everything they need from anyone and everyone, including E. No matter how good terms you are on, if you are involved in a lawsuit you should not be relying on anyone's good faith to supply you what you need. Suppose you ask nicely and they say yes but, for whatever reason, they don't supply them by your court date. Without a subpoena, if you ask for a continuance the judge will say "tough t*^%^$s"; with a subpoena they will say " Yes certainly, oh, and Mr Sheriff, here is a warrant for the documents, go and get them for me please. Oh and a warrant for the arrest of the person who ignored my subpoena." Where do you want to be?	Yes, company A is liable for that; ignorance is not a defence. For this reason, a prudent company A would put an indemnification clause in their contract with company B so that if A is sues then company B pays. This is, of course, completely useless if company B is out of business at the time of the suit.	Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol.	In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded.	Termination. The binding provisions may be terminated by mutual written consent of the parties; Provided, however, that the termination of the Binding Provisions shall not affect the liability of a party for breach of any of the Binding Provisions prior to termination. It basically says that you and the company can free each other from the contract or any part of it — by signing another agreement. This is limited though: if either of you have breached the original contract and become liable (e.g. one of you owes the other heaps of money for damages), then those liabilities will remain. ... which is nonsense of course — because you always can free each other from any liabilities to each other if you both want it.	It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.	A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends.	Civil Procedure Rule 19.3 provides Provisions applicable where two or more persons are jointly entitled to a remedy: (1) Where a claimant claims a remedy to which some other person is jointly entitled with him, all persons jointly entitled to the remedy must be parties unless the court orders otherwise. (2) If any person does not agree to be a claimant, he must be made a defendant, unless the court orders otherwise. (3) This rule does not apply in probate proceedings. My reading is that it is a technical device to deal with circumstances where a number of people are severally jointly entitled to a remedy or redress but not all wish to make a claim for some reason or another. Imagine the simplistic scenario (but hopefully not too simplistic that it loses its meaning) where Dave the defendant destroys an asset jointly and severally owned by Alice, Bob and Carol thus causing a loss to all three. Carol does not wish to be a party to the claim so she becomes a co-defendant next to Dave, but she remains a joint and several owner - for now anyway. If Alice's and Bob's claim is successful one potential outcome is that an order is made to award Carol's "share" ownership of the asset jointly and severally over to Alice and Bob - in effect removing Carol from the equation. Dave is then ordered to pay Alice and Bob damages. One example of joint ownership is joint tenants who... ...have equal rights to the whole property – neither one [of you] has a specific “share” in the property
What is your liability if you hit a super expensive car? Assume you get in an accident that is your fault and cause $300,000 damage to a $1,000,000 Lamborghini. Your insurance pays up to $100,000 in property damage. Are you responsible for the remaining $200,000? What if it was a rare $10 million dollar car that was totaled (you just dented it, but the car is very fragile)?	Liability The concept of liability for damages is to place the wronged party in the same position that they would have been in but for the wrongful act. If restoring their car costs $300,000 then you are liable for $300,000. If the car is a total write off then you are liable for the cost of them getting an equivalent replacement, usually assessed at market value of the asset. Insurance Insurance is a different concept. An insurance company agrees to indemnify you for liability for your negligence within the limits of your policy: these usually include a deductable and a limit and sometimes a co-payment. You are liable to the wronged party - your insurer indemnifies you. If your insurance doen't cover all of your liability, you are responsible for the balance.	Your attorney can file a lawsuit against the other driver, and legal liability can be determined in court. Your want to let an attorney do this, because the one thing that keeps you from being (expensively) counter-sued for defamation is that you didn't name the driver and insurance company. It is extremely unlikely that the other driver accused you of liability ("liable" is a legal conclusion, not a fact). Instead, there is a dispute over the facts. During the trial, both sides get to present their evidence and the judge will determine who is actually liable. If you are found liable, your insurance company may have to pay up. If the other guy is found liable, his company will have to pay up. Or, fault can be split 50-50 (in which case you will be out of luck because you don't have collision insurance to cover your losses). If the insurance company believes that the facts support their client and that you will lose in court, they are not going to volunteer to pay your losses. If they believe that the facts support you, or are closer to 50-50 w.r.t. fault, they are unlikely to volunteer to give you money. If the driver makes a material plainly false statement to his insurance company, they might have recourse against him. Lying under oath is perjury which is a criminal offense. But mis-remembering facts or having incorrect beliefs is not a crime and won't lead to any legal problems for the driver. The belief that you are not at fault is not a lie. If the facts are as cut and dried as you make them out to be, the matter will be easily sorted out in court.	You always run some legal risk when you drive. As long as you are insured (you have a card in your hand) and you have permission to drive the car, it does not matter who owns the car. There is a difference between the legal minimum insurance coverage and actually adequate coverage, and since you are not getting separate insurance where control the insurance levels, you theoretically run some liability risk if you have an accident and the coverage is less than the damages (insurance doesn't mean that the other guy can't take you to court for the rest of the amount). There is also a risk that the housemate will do something crazy like cancel the insurance coverage for you, or report the car stolen, so you have to decide how worried you are about that possibility.	Almost everywhere, in any circumstances, it is the driver's responsibility to operate their vehicle so as not to get in an accident. When two drivers collide, responsibility can be divided among them depending on the details. However, when a driver hits a stopped object (including another vehicle), it is always the driver's fault for not operating his vehicle safely. It is possible the other vehicle may also receive a minor parking ticket or similar infraction for stopping on a shoulder or other invalid place. But that citation will not do anything at all to relieve your responsibility to operate your car without hitting obstacles.	As far as I know in the United States, no DMV provides test vehicles. You need a vehicle to take the driving test. Since you are not currently licensed, you can not legally drive yourself to the test alone... So logically, you must bring someone... anyone... willing to drive you to the test and provide a vehicle for you to test in. As others have stated in the comments above, worse case scenario is the hiring of a driving instructor. If you read the written instructions (and I remember correctly), it does state something along the lines of "must be accompanied by a licensed driver and provide an insured, registered, vehicle". Which is a bit more formal than the "bring a friend". Most people just naturally use more casual terms when speaking. I don't know your age, but it's probably more common to hear "bring a parent" than "bring a friend" when speaking face to face with the DMV staff. Also, not all insurance policies are driver limited. Some policies are on the vehicle regardless of driver. Typically Liability-only insurance is vehicle specific, not driver specific. [*1] You'd have to review the policies or call the insurance agents to confirm this. You may even do something as simple as add you to the current insurance for a month or two while you're practicing and testing. Just reimburse your friend for any increase in premiums during this time. Contact the insurance company/agent. The cost may be minimal. In addition, there are non-owner insurance policies which cover you even if you do not own a vehicle. This would provide insurance if none of your friends has a policy which would work. Realize that most people taking the test for the first time have probably already been added to a policy owned by their parents. So, your situation is a bit more unique. It's not meant to be inherently confusing but if you're "outside the norm" you have to do some deductive reasoning on your own. And finally, if an accident or damage were to happen during your practicing or testing, it would still be your responsibility. If you are in control of the vehicle, you are responsible for any damage to it or damage caused by the vehicle due to any negligence on your part, regardless of any insurance policy. You'd be a pretty bad "friend" if you caused damage and didn't financially make restitution leaving your "friend" holding the bag, so to speak. Restitution could be something as simple as paying the deductible on your friend's policy. Of course, if you are not covered by insurance any claim may be denied -- leaving you responsible for everything. The mindset that just because your friend owns the car they are totally responsible for anything that happens while your driving seem very, very self-serving and, well, I'd be apprehensive about loaning you my vehicle as well. In fact, I absolutely would not.	Hit and run, with no injury, is subject to Vehicle Code 20002. A person who fails to stop and notify has committed a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine. The description of the crime is that The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to any property, including vehicles, shall immediately stop the vehicle at the nearest location that will not impede traffic or otherwise jeopardize the safety of other motorists. Moving the vehicle in accordance with this subdivision does not affect the question of fault. The scary language of the statute notwithstanding, one element of the crime is missing, namely knowingly doing so. The corresponding jury instruction incorporates the full law including caselaw requirements, in particular To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: While driving, the defendant was involved in a vehicle accident; The accident caused damage to someone else’s property; The defendant knew that (he/she) had been involved in an accident that caused property damage [or knew from the nature of the accident that it was probable that property had been damaged]; AND The defendant willfully failed to perform one or more of the following duties: (a) To immediately stop at the scene of the accident; OR (b) To immediately provide the owner or person in control of the damaged property with (his/her) name and current residence address [and the name and address of the owner of the vehicle the defendant was driving] This means you either need to learn how to defend yourself in court against an experienced lawyer (if you didn't know this aspect of the law, you probably shouldn't assume you can carry off this defense), you give in and plead guilty and take your chances, or you hire an attorney. Just saying "I didn't know" is not good enough, so lawyer up.	Yes. You can file a police report. You can also sue for cost of repairing any damaged property.	A new car should be a new car, without any damage. But, if you did sign the contract after you saw the one scratch at night, the dealer may have needed to disclose in writing all of the damage (what you first saw and what you saw the next day) in writing before you signed. From NC Department of Justice - Disclosing New Car Damage • Dealers are required to disclose in writing any damage and repair that exceeds five percent of the manufacturer’s suggested retail price before you enter into a contract. • Dealers are not required to disclose any damage to glass, tires or bumpers if the damaged item has been replaced with original or comparable equipment. • If a new car has been repaired for damages that do not exceed five percent of the manufacturer’s suggested retail price, then the dealer does not have to tell you about the damage unless you ask. • If a new car has been damaged more than the five percent threshold, the North Carolina Automobile Dealer’s Association recommends that its dealers disclose it in writing on company letterhead. A copy of this disclosure should be submitted along with the title to the Division of Motor Vehicles. So if you are now in possession of the car, tell the dealer you have checked with the NC DOJ and ask the dealer about the total cost of the damages and see what they say. It's a good idea to take photos, and you may want to get a repair estimate from a body shop to calcuate yourself if the damage is over the 5% threshold. If you suspect the car may not be new and may be used, that's serious, and the dealer will have had to fully disclose that in writing. You can talk to the DMV or use the VIN number to check CARFAX. If you have problems with the dealer or suspect the car may not be new, you can contact the DOJ at the URL above or call them at 1-877-5-NO-SCAM.
can lawyers/senate public commitee meetings ask questions which might be covered by NDA's I'm just taking the recent Mark Zuckerberg Senate hearings which were held in the open in the United States. Is there some sort of fine line that the Senate has to follow? Can they ask any questions even if it may impinge upon any non-disclosure agreements signed by the defendant, e.g. regarding trade secrets?	Senators, and anyone else for that matter, can ask any questions they want. The witness is required to answer the questions only if under subpoena, and only if the answer of the question would neither require disclosure of privileged information nor violate a 5th Amendment right (which is a form of privilege). Many things that are the subject of an NDA are not privileged information, and the fact that someone claims that something is a trade secret does not automatically make it privileged information. Privileges can be established by statute, court rule or at common law.	No contract can limit a court's jurisdiction An NDA is a contract: it cannot prevent the application of the judicial process. Should your dispute reach a courtroom, the NDA and the documents it seeks to protect are all admissible and you should subpoena them from the defendant and submit those copies to the court (that way you are not breaking the terms of the NDA). What is not admissible is bona fide "without prejudice" documents: that is documents that contain admissions and offers made in a genuine attempt to settle a dispute. This privilege is established by the context of the document, not by if it does or does not have the words "without prejudice" on it (except, of course, that their presence/absence is part of the context).	It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.	The last part, about equal suffrage in the Senate, does not expire. The question is whether it can be itself amended out of existence. There has been no test of that possibility. This article argues that this may not be subject to amendment. There is only one way to find out for sure. The idea is that the original intent was that this is supposed to be an absolute clause, but of course that only speaks to original intention (and the original intention is not clear, as the article discusses).	National security letters can compel the production of some kinds of (non-"content") user data, and (according to Wikipedia) typically contain a nondisclosure requirement forbidding the recipient of the letter from disclosing it. I assume that a witness has received and complied with a national security letter, and a non-government party wants to ask the witness questions which outside the courtroom, the witness would be forbidden to answer by the national security letter. The witness, or the government if represented in the lawsuit in question, may object to the questions. The purpose which justifies the secrecy requirements of a national security letter is also likely to justify the exercise of state secrets privilege. If the judge thinks a statute might otherwise be violated, they might intervene in the absence of any objection, or consider alternative remedies like an in camera hearing. If the court does not intervene to prevent the evidence being given, and the witness is charged with breaching the secrecy law, this would raise complex questions about the interpretation of the law imposing criminal penalties. The common law doctrine of absolute privilege for witnesses giving evidence in judicial proceedings applies in the United States, and could be raised in defence to any criminal charges.	The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal.	There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.	In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.
Can I be sued for violating an NDA if I refund what I was paid? I have a client who ordered art from me that they asked be private between us, due to it's embarrassing nature. The extent of the agreement was "Don't post this online" to which I said "Okay." My commission rate is less than 50 dollars. After completing their work, I discovered that this client is a very wealthy and divisive politician. This presents challenges and risks to myself that, had I known prior, would've changed my price to reflect the burden. I have contacted them and made clear that I must increase my price to 150,000 USD, or I will have to refund them because I cannot reasonably secure the art against a sophisticated attack that a political opponent can mount, and may just release it to the public to eliminate their interest in me, for my own safety. They have threatened to sue me for defamation and black-mail. Do they have a legitimate case against me if I release the art and give them a full refund? I won't interpret any answers as legal advice, I am only doing preliminary research while I save money to consult an attorney. Addendum: It's worth noting that the "NDA" in question was very weak and never specified a duration, penalties, scope, and was never in formal writing, merely as a casual email exchange.	You have a contract - they have fulfilled their obligation (they paid you), if you do not fulfil their obligation (not to post it online) then you are in breach of the contract. Your obligation continues even if you gift the money back to them. If you breach the contract then they can sue you for the damage that they suffer. Presumably this would be damage to their reputation and for a public figure this could run into millions of dollars. In demanding additional money from them beyond what you are legally entitled to you are, at least, flirting with the crime of extortion/blackmail. This would not be a matter for them to sue you for, it would be a matter for the DA to prosecute if they chose to make a complaint. There doesn't seem to be a defamation issue here because you are not stating anything that isn't true. Now, the extent of the agreement appears to prohibit you posting it on the internet, however, the spirit of the agreement is that you will keep the information secret in all respects - that is likely how a court would look at it. Of course, if someone does steal the information from you then you haven't broken the agreement but you would probably have to prove that it was stolen when they sue you.	When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.	Written Contract If there was a written contract, the fact that it wasn't signed is not relevant. While a signature is evidence of agreement with the terms there are other ways that acceptance can be indicated: like you paying them $600. Wrong Information Where the error is fundamental to the performance - e.g. you needed shipment to Alaska and they were offering shipment to Alabama, the contract would be void ab initio. That is, it never happened and everyone needs to be returned to their original positions as far as possible. However, in general, an error by one or the other party in their understanding of what was agreed does not invalidate the contract. For example, if you told them it was a "small" dog because it was small for a Great Dane but under an objective classification, it is, in fact, a "large" dog the contract must be completed and either you or they wear the additional cost of doing so. Whether they are entitled to ask for additional payment "due to some wrong information" depends on who took the risk under the contract for its correctness? Barring a specific term, the risk usually lies with the party that provided the "wrong information" but some contract will assign the risk for one party's errors to the other party - subject to a requirement to act in good faith. If they are not entitled to additional payment, they have to perform the contract for the original fee. If they are entitled, then you have to pay a reasonable price increase - you are not generally entitled to cancel. All of this turns on the specific terms of the contract and the exact nature of the "wrong information". Consumer Protection Law CPL in your state or their state or both will almost certainly have something to say about this beyond common law rules of contract.	You cannot do this through any established public license that I know of, but you could write your own. The model would be any educational use or non-commercial use license, such as CC NC licenses. The main challenge is defining the excluded classes of usage. That is why you should engage an attorney to draft this for you. I don't think there is any point in adding a $5M penalty clause. You offer a separate paid license for individuals who do not want to comply with the particular terms of your license, and set the fee to whatever you want. Saying that you're gonna fine violators is a bad idea because penalty clauses are illegal. Instead, the standard approach is a liquidated damages clause, where you state what a reasonable estimate of your damages would be. In the case of software that is available for purchase, illegal copying of the software obviously results at least in the cost of the software qua lost revenue as damages. Plus shipping and handling.	I'm not a lawyer, but under the law as it's written, I see two problems: 17 USC 121 allows "authorized entities" to make and publish accessible copies of works. An "authorized entity" is defined as a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities. So if you, as a private citizen, decide to do this, it could conceivably be copyright infringement. You might have to set up some kind of non-profit organization to make it legal. It's also OK (I think) if you make such copies for your own personal use, so long as you don't redistribute them. So far as I can tell, nothing under 17 USC 121 requires the original publisher to provide an "authorized entity" with a copy in any particular format (PDF, paper, or otherwise) for making accessible copies. Basically, the law seems to have envisioned organizations of sighted people purchasing paper copies, transcribing them, and republishing them; not blind individuals doing electronic transcription for themselves. It might still be worth contacting Hal Leonard and asking what they can do for you, but unfortunately it doesn't look like the law requires them to do anything for you. As Nij points out in the comments, this really seems to be a question about the company's policy, rather than the law.	Could I get into legal trouble for this? No. Relax. Your three emails are very unlikely to cause a data privacy professor to feel harassed. Just move on regardless of whether he replies at all. Don't keep sending another email just because the recipient has not replied to your previous one. As for the issue that prompted you to start emailing the professor, what everyone else has told you is correct. And the other email user is unlikely to take court action for something like this. The effort and cost of drafting & filing suit, and then pursuing discovery would dissuade most people unless they are incurring actual losses (which is not the case with your messages). Just move on so that this other user also can move on.	I assume you are talking about this case: FORIS GFS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD vs THEVAMANOGARI MANIVEL. For that amount, most people would be willing to break the law to keep it, and good advice what to do would be “ask a lawyer”. Needs citation. I certainly wouldn't: a) I think taking money that I know doesn't belong to me is wrong, b) even if I didn't believe that, the amount is so large the bank will certainly eventually come after it. The amount is so large I won't credibly be able to claim an innocent mistake. Simply hiding the money won't work, since the bank will be able to demonstrate that the money was deposited in my account, and I did withdraw it. I would be required to make restitution. This is exactly what happened to the defendant in the above case: they split up the money among friends and bought a house. The house is now being sold by the court, with the proceeds used to reimburse the plaintiffs. Would a lawyer be allowed to give me legal advice to help me keeping this money, for example by giving 500,000 each to twenty reliable friends, moving to Panama, or whatever would allow me to keep and spend the money? (Not asking whether two strategies that I came up with in ten seconds would actually work). Especially if it is advice if the form “X is illegal, but you can get away with it”. No. For example, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & Lawyer states: (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. That's just a suggested ethical standard, but most countries will have something along those lines. Note also that in the US there is also a "Crime-Fraud" exception to attorney-client confidentiality. If a lawyer assists a client in carrying out a criminal or fraudulent scheme then their communications are no longer privileged and can be subpoenaed and introduced as evidence in court.	Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use".
If someone under investigation is told they are not a "Criminal Target", what are the ways that they can later become one? Background Back on April 3rd, the Washington Post reported that Donald Tump was not a Criminal Target in Special Council Mueller's probe. Special counsel Robert S. Mueller III informed President Trump’s attorneys last month that he is continuing to investigate the president but does not consider him a criminal target at this point, according to three people familiar with the discussions. I was curious as to whether one can become a criminal target after they are told that they are not one. The post states that Legal Experts speak of one way: A subject could become a target with his or her own testimony, legal experts warn. Question Given that someone under investigation has been told that they are not a Criminal Target of a probe, what are other events, circumstances, statements, legal actions, etc. would then make someone a Criminal Target?	A subject can become a target, and this happens all the time. The subject/target distinction is not a statement about whether a person has done anything wrong; it's only a statement about how much information the prosecutor has linking you to a crime he is investigating. That means that the subject himself need not do anything to move from one category to the other. Here's guidance from the DOJ's manual for U.S. Attorneys: It is the policy of the Department of Justice to advise a grand jury witness of his or her rights if such witness is a "target" or "subject" of a grand jury investigation. See the Criminal Resource Manual at 160 for a sample target letter. A "target" is a person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant. An officer or employee of an organization which is a target is not automatically considered a target even if such officer's or employee's conduct contributed to the commission of the crime by the target organization. The same lack of automatic target status holds true for organizations which employ, or employed, an officer or employee who is a target. A "subject" of an investigation is a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investigation. So the designation changes when the prosecutor has enough information to change it, not necessarily because the subject has done anything new. Imagine a prosecutor investigating a bank robbery. He watches surveillance footage showing a man checking out the bank repeatedly in the days leading up to the robbery. That's enough to bring him "within the scope of the investigation," but it's not really damning enough to link him to the crime or make him a defendant. So he remains a subject, and the FBI continues to investigate. All sorts of things could happen that might make him a target: someone else implicates him; video footage shows him robbing the bank; he admits to the crime; he denies the crime with an alibi that doesn't check out; he lies about something else, making him a target for making false statements to a federal investigator. Note that the change could come because of something the subject did himself, because of something someone else did, or just because the prosecutor happened upon some new information.	The question says: Callahan used torture to get the location of the hostage out of the suspect, and information acquired by torture is not admissible as evidence. In general, evidence obtained by torture is indeed not admissible in US courts. This is particularly true when the person doing the torture is a police officer. If it is done by a private citizen, with no prompting or encouragement by the police or any part of the government, different rules may apply. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) for the inadmissibility of confessions obtained through torture or physical coercion. The Mapp decision, cited below, would have extended this to information or evidence obtained via torture. The question asks: It was not merely information what Callahan acquired, but the physical body of the victim. Doesn't that change anything? No. If the evidence was obtained unlawfully, then the evidence so obtained and all other evidence or information indirectly obtained through the unlawful act is inadmissible. This is the "Fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. It applies just as much to physical evidence as to a confession. "Fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is an extension of the "exclusionary rule" and like the basic rule, is intended to deter unlawful actions on the part of law enforcement and government generally, and to ensure that the courts are not complicit in such unlawful actions. The rule was first fully established in US Federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) although versions of the rule go back before the founding of the United States. The rule was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) although some states applied a version of the rule even before the Weeks decision. There are exceptions, however, notably "inevitable discovery". That means if other, lawful, investigations already underway would certainly have uncovered the same evidence, then it may be admissible. Another similar exception is the "Independent source doctrine". This says that when the same evidence is later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality, it may be admissible. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), for both of these exceptions. There is also a good-faith exception where a warrant was obtained on invalid grounds but used in good-faith by offers who thought it valid. I do not see that any of these exceptions would apply in the situation described in the question. It does not matter how "clear" the evidence may be. If it is obtained unlawfully, and no exception applies, it will not be admissible. The question asks: In case of the hideout and the rifle, is such a clear evidence still inadmissible? Can't the "hot pursuit" rules be applied? He didn't have time for a warrant, he was running against the clock. The doctrine of"hot pursuit" alone does not justify entering a private dwelling without a warrant, but there are a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, one of which "Exigent Circumstances" is one, or rather a group of relates exceptions. In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), the Supreme Court wrote in its opinion, "A variety of circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless search, including law enforcement's need to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home . . . engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect . . . or enter a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause." Thus “hot pursuit” can be an exigent Circumstance and justify a warrentless entry, but this will depend on the precise facts of the case. It is not clear that the circumstances described in the question would qualify. The question asks: even if they decide not to press charges because they are afraid they can't win the trial, can't they at least put the suspect under surveillance? Legally, they probably can. Not even probable cause is required to continue an investigation, or to place a suspected criminal under surveillance There might be reasons other than the law of evidence not to use surveillance, for example if the police fear that the suspect will observe the surveillance and thus be alerted. But this seems like a place where the movie plot may have been unrealistic.	Will he break any laws by saying that (assuming the actual truth cannot be found out)? The statement made outside the courtroom is not itself perjury, since it is not made under oath. But that doesn't mean that there wouldn't be legal consequences. It would be powerful evidence in a perjury prosecution (surely enough for a conviction even standing alone long after the trial is over but within the statute of limitations for perjury in the jurisdiction from the date of the sworn statement, if any), and would be a waiver of 5th Amendment rights against self-incrimination, generally, in the perjury case. It might also be strong evidence (enough to convict standing alone) in a timely obstruction of justice prosecution. This statute of limitations could also run from the date of the sworn statement, or from the date of a false unsworn statement that caused a conviction to be reopened. If the statement made in court was favorable to the prosecution, it might bring these charges after the conviction in the underlying case is final. But, the out of court statement would probably be grounds for the party benefitting from the original statement to seek a mistrial or to have a judgment set aside if the verdict or judgment is consistent with the sworn statement. If the out of court statement was made before the trial was over, the witness could be recalled and the out of court statement could be used to impeach the in court statement. It might constitute a probation or parole violation. If the witness were testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement, the out of court statement would probably breach the deal and deny the witness the benefit of the cooperation deal. The out of court statement might constitute contempt of court if made while the proceeding in which the statement was made was still pending. Depending on the nature of the statement, the out of court statement might constitute defamation for which some one whose reputation was tarnished might sue for money damages. (There is immunity from civil liability for in court statements.) It would violate the ethical rules of many professions. For example, an attorney would probably be disbarred for doing that. Arguably, in this situation, the statute of limitations could run from the later unsworn statement date rather than the date of the sworn statement. If the witness is a state or federal government employee, this could lead to impeachment proceedings, in the state legislature, or Congress, respectively. The aftermath of the Lewinsky Scandal (link below) involving Bill Clinton touches on many of these possibilities: Further investigation led to charges of perjury and to the impeachment of President Clinton in 1998 by the U.S. House of Representatives. He was subsequently acquitted on all impeachment charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in a 21-day Senate trial. Clinton was held in civil contempt of court by Judge Susan Webber Wright for giving misleading testimony in the Paula Jones case regarding Lewinsky and was also fined $90,000 by Wright. His license to practice law was suspended in Arkansas for five years; shortly thereafter, he was disbarred from presenting cases in front of the United States Supreme Court. Easier and Harder Cases The easier cases are those where it is undeniably clear from other evidence that the witness lied under oath, and the out of court statement merely puts the cherry on top of an already solid perjury case. The hard cases aren't the cases where "the actual truth cannot be found out". Instead, the hard cases are the cases where there is strong evidence that the statement made in court, under oath was true. For example, suppose Ted Cruz is asked in court: "Were you the Zodiac killer?" (A crime ridiculously attributed to him despite the fact that it is something that happened when he was a small child who live many hundreds of miles away.) And he says, "No" in court, but then leaves the courtroom and says in a press conference on the court house steps: "I am the Zodiac killer, I lied about that under oath in court today." Similarly, suppose that a DNA test on a certain blue dress shows a perfect match to President Bill Clinton and Bill Clinton says under oath in court, that the substance tested came from him on a certain day, in a certain place, when a certain person was wearing it, in a certain way (also confirmed by a witness and surveillance video). Then, he leaves the courtroom and says in a press conference on the court house steps: "Someone else was the source of that genetic material. I never met that person, and I was in Kenya on the day alleged and I've never set foot in the White House. I lied about all of this under oath in court today." In these cases, there is no plausible way to make an obstruction of justice or perjury charge stick, or to upset a verdict or judgment consistent with the truthful sworn statement. Contempt of court is still possible, as would professional ethics violations, but other consequences would be less obvious, because the act would come across more as absurd instead of something that genuinely confounds the truth. The legal consequences associated with the conduct in the original post are mostly aimed at sanctioning genuinely fraudulent conduct. Our legal system is more confused about how to respond to lies so blatant that they only amount to feeble and ineffectual gaslighting that no reasonable person familiar with the circumstances would believe (but that might incite crazy conspiracy theory thinking supporters). The harder case would lie in the uncanny valley between a bad joke and a pathetically weak attempt to mislead people, even though the law is clear about how to deal with clear sarcasm and convincing attempts to lie that can't be clearly proven or disproven with other evidence.	Does the party have any legal leverage to engage the police (or other competent authorities apart from private investigators) to help locate the witness and serve the summons on them? Not really. Legal process is not infrequently served by a sheriff's deputy. But the deputy will not generally take any initiative to locate a person to be served beyond what it provided by the litigant. The main reasons to have a sheriff's deputy serve someone with process is the fear that the person served might react violently. Or is it just the party's bad luck that the witness cannot be located and served on? Pretty much.	united-states Bob could do any number of things to try to convince someone to prosecute Alice: call the prosecutor's boss, or the district attorney (or their equivalents in DOJ if it's a federal crime), or his elected representatives; he could also go to the media, or post on social networks... But if none of that works, the article is right: Prosecutors can't be legally compelled to prosecute someone Crime victims don't have any rights to control whether a prosecution happens—the government is the plaintiff. A prosecutor can even file charges over a victim's objections. Federal law and some states have Crime Victims' Rights Acts, which do grant some rights. But note the particularly relevant exception in that law: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction. This is also a separation of powers issue: the executive branch has the exclusive right to determine how the laws are executed. Neither the legislature nor the judicial branches can compel the executive to prosecute someone. Note that none of this affects Bob's civil remedies: he can still sue Alice for damages. But that won't result in her ending up in prison.	The Secret Service is primarily concerned with protecting the people and information they oversee, not enforcing laws. They have the power to arrest someone for any unlawful conduct, but unless a drug user is presenting as a threat to a protectee, they are unlikely to be arrested by the Secret Service. More likely the Service would simply escort the person off the premises and refer the matter to the DC Metro Police to handle. Edit: Such a case would not be turned over to the US Capitol Police (as originally written) It would most likely be referred to the DC Metropolitan Police Department.Corrected my answer above.	The first thing it depends on is where you live. The US has no law requiring niceness, but perhaps niceness-enforcement exists somewhere in the world. The second thing it depends on is exactly what he does, where and how. If he comes into people's houses uninvited and starts harassing them, that is generally a crime. If he makes nasty remarks to people walking down the street, you can't even sue him. If the person commits in a crime, you can report him anonymously. However, for there to be any prosecution, someone will have to testify in court: anonymous criminal testimony is inadmissible in the US. If there is no crime, just a potential civil action, the part would hire an attorney to file a complaint, etc. and that party would be named (not anonymous), would have to testify, and would also have to have been harmed. The police will not get involved in a civil dispute. Based just on what you have said here, your attorney would very likely say that there is no case to be pursued, and your only solution is to ignore him.	Where the President explicitly tells a newspaper that they should reveal their sources. Is this not illegal in the US? It is not illegal. Well, it would be a U.S. Attorney, rather than the President himself. You're thinking of shield laws, but no such law exists at the federal level. Moreover, although some people might think that the First Amendment ("freedom of the press") would protect a journalist in such a case, the Supreme Court has held that it doesn't, though the government is required to "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest". So if a reporter were subpoenaed in federal court to reveal a source, and they couldn't convince a court to quash the subpoena under the Branzburg test, they'd have to either reveal their source or be held in contempt. In practice, many reporters have chosen the latter, and served time in jail rather than reveal the source. For instance, Judith Miller. There've been a number of proposals to create such a federal law, but so far Congress hasn't seen fit to do it. According to the Wikipedia article, every state except Wyoming has some sort of shield protection for journalists, either in statute or case law, though the protections are not necessarily absolute. So a state court or prosecutor would find it much more difficult to enforce such an order.
Can an employer force a salaried employee to take a sick day if employee has worked 40 hours? My friend works for a company that is regularly asking for 50 hours of work a week from her. She recently had to take the day off due to illness, and the manager made a statement making it sound as if he expected her to use some of her very limited sick days for the day off. However, due to the 10 hour days she has already worked 40 hours in the week. She is salaried, and was told occasional overtime may be required, but it wasn't until the company fired many of her coworkers that they started trying to push her to do 10 hour days. I believe that legally they can't force her to use sick leave since she has met the 40 hours minimum required as a salaried employee. Is this correct? She lives in Atlanta, Georgia	I believe that legally they can't force her to use sick leave since she has met the 40 hours minimum required as a salaried employee. Is this correct? Unfortunately, as far as the Department of Labor (DoL) is concerned, the employer is correct here, provided that this is company policy. First, there is no "40 hours minimum required", the DoL simply says that a salaried (exempt) employee must be paid the full salary for any week in which the employee performs any work, regardless of the number of days or hours worked. This is then limited by the "allowable deductions: Circumstances in Which the Employer May Make Deductions from Pay Deductions from pay are permissible when an exempt employee: is absent from work for one or more full days for personal reasons other than sickness or disability; for absences of one or more full days due to sickness or disability if the deduction is made in accordance with a bona fide plan, policy or practice of providing compensation for salary lost due to illness; to offset amounts employees receive as jury or witness fees, or for military pay; for penalties imposed in good faith for infractions of safety rules of major significance; or for unpaid disciplinary suspensions of one or more full days imposed in good faith for workplace conduct rule infractions. Also, an employer is not required to pay the full salary in the initial or terminal week of employment, or for weeks in which an exempt employee takes unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. (Source: dol.gov) Emphasis Mine This means that as long as the employer has a policy or practice requiring the employee to use Paid Time Off (PTO) for sickness (sick-days), then the employer is allowed to make deductions from the employee's salary for those days. So in short, yes, the employer can require that the employee use PTO to cover sick days, regardless of the actual number of hours worked in that week, month, year, etc. There is currently no federal requirement for employers to provide paid sick leave, although some states like California may have local laws.	To my knowledge there is no actual law requiring a provider to file anything on your behalf. Most do it as a courtesy but if you read the terms of service that you almost certainly agreed to, it will say that YOU are the responsible party. If the insurance company doesn't pay, even if the provider doesn't submit a claim, the responsibility is still yours. There is nothing stopping you from filing your own claim using whatever forms or procedures that they have established. I'll also note that many provider networks have rules that providers must adhere to in order to remain in that network. Some may include language about timely filing of claims but that is in no way universal. These days many providers have taken to billing the patient the full amount immediately and then will issue a refund to you if/when the insurance pays.	If no such challenge has occurred to this day, who could potentially have a standing to bring it to court? Beside ohwilleke's points, such a challenge would only seem viable if the imposed timeframe for finding new job (60 days) was practically not sufficient to secure one for a person eligible for a H1B visa. These visas are not granted to random people most of which would struggle to find a job in the US. They are granted to qualified specialty occupation holders — taking into account the market demand for particular occupations/skills. The expectation is that H1B visa holders should not have trouble finding jobs and, if fired, should be able to secure a new job in a matter of few weeks. If they cannot do so it means they are not in demand, which means they no longer fit the visa grant criteria and therefore should leave. With the above in mind, "the power to coerce workers" is legally just bargaining power, not threat or force. The workers are welcome to accept offered conditions, or take chance to find better ones in 60 days if they think they are skilled and demanded enough. And if they do not think that, they should not be in the country on H1B visa in the first place.	When does a CEO (or the investor or the board) have to notify employees they will be unable to pay them for work already done? Directors and officers (which includes executive officers like the CEO) but not investors have a duty to ensure that the corporation does not trade while insolvent. In this context, "trading" means incurring new debts and "insolvent" means being unable to pay their debts as and when they fall due. Unfortunately, it is a judgment call by those directors and officers and the exact point where it occurred is generally only clear with hindsight, if then. For example, you describe a "tumultuous week"; quite likely the company was urgently seeking additional sources of funds and until it was clear they had no prospect of getting those, they weren't insolvent. The director's duty is to act reasonably (a broad range of activities) and not be overly pessimistic nor optimistic about the company's prospects. As far as I know, they don't have a positive duty to inform their creditors that they can't pay. If that happens their obligation is to file for bankruptcy and their obligations cease - the bankruptcy trustee then invites creditors to prove their debts. Does an investor have a responsibility to ensure all employees are paid? No. That is pretty much the purpose of limited liability corporations: to shield the investor from the debts of the company. Do the employees have any recourse? Yes. Employees are typically priority creditors in Colorado and rank ahead of many other creditors. However, if the company is not based in Colorado different laws will apply. Of course, you must be an employee of the company - this priority doesn't apply to true independent contractors. Also, the liquidator's fees rank ahead of anyone and unless the bankrupt company has adequate realizable assets, even employees are unlikely to get a dividend. You also need to be clear who you work for as you say "that last Friday was paid for/fronted by the HR company". Do you work for the bankrupt company or this (non-bankrupt) HR company? If the latter then they owe you your wages and the bankruptcy of their principal is their problem, not yours. Is "secured debt" real? And does that reduce the likelihood of receiving a paycheck in a bankruptcy settlement? Yes. There is a priority in the payment of creditors in liquidations and it varies by jurisdiction but a typical arrangement might go like: Liquidator's Fees Employee wages and entitlement accrued within the last 6 months Certain taxes Secured creditors (who may have a ranking among themselves) Unsecured creditors (including employee entitlements more than 12 months old, other taxes, trade creditors etc.) Shareholders (who may have a ranking among themselves) Basically, the lower you rank, the less likely you are to see a dividend. Does any of this change if the company doesn't file for bankruptcy? Sure. Until the company does this it is still a going concern and it has to pay its debts. If it doesn't it's creditors can sue and recover their monies as best they can which may include forcing the company into bankruptcy.	In general: If the contract specifies some term (or "duration"), then it can only be modified in accordance with its own terms. When the employment contract expires any future employment term is subject to negotiation, and benefits could certainly be modified at that time. There are exceptions to this in labor law, but those vary by jurisdiction and won't be addressed here. Generally "vested" benefits like accrued vacation time or pension balances are treated like the property of the employee: They cannot be unilaterally reduced by the employer. One notable exception would be bankruptcy of the employer. I don't know where employee claims rank in Canadian bankruptcy law, but they are one of the debts that might not be paid in full.	A special case is not paying the income tax that the company is supposed to be paying on behalf of its employees. If an employee makes £4,000 a month, and the employer is supposed to pay £1,000 tax and doesn't, that's not the employer's money, that's the employee's money. Not paying the employee's money is a much more serious matter than not paying your own taxes. A google search found this article http://www.gaebler.com/Not-Paying-Payroll-Taxes.htm which says that a person not paying taxes for employees is personally liable, that this liability does not go away with bankruptcy, and that jail is possible. So their advice is: Whatever other debt you have, paying taxes for your employees' payroll is the absolutely highest priority (higher priority than paying wages, paying the rent, paying company taxes and so on).	Is a text message legally binding? Yes, but the terms of the message need to be clear enough to ascertain the parties' intent at the formation of that contract or agreement. A contract does not even need to be in writing. There are also oral contracts and implied contracts, the latter referring to contracts which are inferred from the parties' conduct. A contract such as the agreement you describe here is binding regardless of its form. It is just easier to prove the existence of a contract if it is in writing. You did not specify your jurisdiction. If it is in the US, the price tag --rather than the downpayment-- of the object of the contract (i.e., the puppy you intend to buy) determines whether your complaint would need to be filed in Small Claims court. Generally speaking, parties to a dispute in Small Claims court have to represent themselves. Two remarks are pertinent. First, developing writing skills is utmost important not only for litigating a dispute, but also during the process of formulating the terms and conditions of a contract/agreement. Your post indicates that you seriously need to work on that. Second, the end of your post reflects that one of your managers violated labor law(s), which to most of us would be more worrisome than the controversy about the puppy. Legislation in most or all jurisdictions outlaws the act of withholding an employee's compensation regardless of its form (salary, commissions, and so forth). You might want to gain acquaintance with the labor laws of your jurisdiction so you can assess whether or how to proceed (does legislation require the employee to "exhaust administrative remedies" prior to filing in court? are administrative remedies optional? do these exist at all?), even if only to ascertain whether the deadline for filing the corresponding claim has elapsed.	could they make a realistic claim that I had voluntarily terminated my contract before the year was over? The employer's act would forfeit its entitlement to reimbursement of bonus. The clause clearly indicates that the triggering event is termination, not the anticipatory notification thereof. Furthermore, the employer's act would be a breach of the [contract law] covenant of good faith and fair dealing. That would be in stark contrast with your compliance with, and/or kindness in, giving a two-week notice. The employer's termination of your employment seems improper in equity insofar as it was aware of your notice and thus took advantage thereof.
When a U.S. Attorney files charges, does this mean it is automatically filed on behalf of the DoJ? Background Piggy backing off the question about two United State political bodies conducting an investigation, someone made a comment that the a U.S. attorney is always part of the DoJ. I understand that in the typical case, a lawyer (usually) represents someone who is the entity pressing charges. But I'm not sure if the same rules necessarily apply to U.S. attorneys of the Federal Government. Question When a U.S. Attorney files charges acting in his office, does this automatically mean that the DoJ itself is the party filing a charge?	No. The U.S. Attorney brings charges on behalf of the United States, which is the filing party, at least in criminal cases. That's why every criminal case is styled "United States v. [Whomever]."	Yes. The U.S. AG can decline to prosecute an indictment at any time until jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn in to consider the charges at trial. The AG can also abandon a prosecution mid-trial but then cannot retry those charges later. The AG might abandon charges, for example, because the evidence does not appear to support the charges when presented at trial, or because, for example, a prosecution might damage a diplomatic relationship of the U.S. with another country, or because a new administration has different priorities than an old one and recently had its AG appointed to office while the trial was pending. This said, there are some situations (e.g. when there is a special prosecutor, or after a lower level prosecutor has entered into a binding plea agreement) when the AG does not have the authority to overrule the decisions to prosecute or not prosecute an indictment that is made by a lower level prosecutor. The AG has line authority to give orders to lower level prosecutors in the AG's office 99% of the time, but not always.	Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect.	Double jeopardy does not bar him from facing federal charges, although U.S. Justice Department policy reserves such prosecutions for exceptional cases. Also, it depends to some extent upon whether there is a suitable federal crime that fits the conduct.	I know one can "make a complaint" but I'm wondering if there's generally any legal obligation for these complaints to be taken seriously, and if there's any feasible way a driver could validate the encounter. . . . Furthermore, even with evidence, is there any way a citizen could ensure that legal action be taken against the officer for a proven traffic violation? Beyond reporting it to the department and hoping for the best? A prosecutor is under no legal obligation to press charges (and police have no affirmative duty to enforce the laws on the books) ever, even if there is blatant and clear evidence of murder, let alone a traffic violation. Usually, there is absolutely no way to compel charges to be brought against the offender (with a handful of states providing an exception where one can seek the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute if the circumstances warrant that would never be invoked for a mere traffic offense). Very few states allow anyone other than a prosecutor (or sometimes in minor cases, a law enforcement officer) to bring criminal or quasi-criminal charges. Of course, if compelling evidence of a violation is found and shared with the media, there may be powerful political pressure to bring a prosecution, but how that is developed would entirely depend upon the circumstances. Still, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement is so symbiotic, that prosecutors are loathe to press charges against law enforcement officers in all but the clearest of cases, especially for offenses occuring while a law enforcement officer is on duty in his home jurisdiction. Legally speaking, do civilians have any right to apprehend an officer for a traffic violation? While this would depend upon state law, most states treat traffic violations as a class of offense different from other misdemeanors and infractions and never authorize a citizens arrest for a traffic violation. Normally, only law enforcement officers can stop and cite people for traffic violations that aren't actually misdemeanor crimes. For example, in Colorado, true traffic infractions are defined as civil matters for which someone may be stopped and subjected to a citation but not arrested (even by a law enforcement officer). See Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1701(1). In Colorado, only more serious traffic offenses (e.g. hit and run) are crimes subject to arrest. In the case of a traffic offense which is a crime (probably not speeding), the general rules applicable to citizens arrests would usually apply.	The Copyright Office has determined, in chapter 300 of the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, on page 36, that the copyright bar extends to works created by the President; Congress; the federal judiciary; federal departments, agencies, boards, bureaus, or commissions; or any other officer or employee of the U.S. federal government while acting within the course of his or her official duties. So the Senator is a US employee for copyright purposes, at least according to the US Copyright Office. Technically, this is interpretation rather than law, and in theory a court might disagree, but if anyone is qualified to speak on this issue, it's the Copyright Office. In my opinion, it is most reasonable to assume that the Copyright Office is correct in their interpretation unless there is case law directly contradicting them. The only question is whether the letter was created by the Senator "while acting within the course of his or her official duties." I'm not aware of any case law suggesting that constituent building is or is not an "official duty" of a US Senator, and there are reasonable arguments to be made in both directions. On the one hand, the letter is clearly beyond the scope of Congress's lawmaking and oversight Constitutional functions. On the other, the office of Senator is an inherently political office, and a case can be made that campaigning for reelection is part of the job. Perhaps surprisingly, that question was extensively litigated during E. Jean Carroll's first defamation lawsuit against Donald Trump, because Trump argued that his statements about Carroll were within the scope of his employment (and so a defamation claim would be effectively barred under the Westfall Act). To my understanding, the current disposition of that lawsuit is that this is considered a question of fact for a jury to decide (at least according to the Second Circuit). What can be said is who does not hold copyright: The US Senate and/or the US government as a whole. The only way the Senate could acquire copyright in this letter (short of the Senator directly granting it to them) would be as a work made for hire, but the work-for-hire doctrine requires that the work be prepared by an employee as part of their official duties, just like the federal copyright bar. So the Senate cannot acquire copyright in this manner. If anyone owns the copyright, it is most likely the Senator.	Yes, the role of a Representative is largely to serve as a point of contact for supervisory authorities and data subjects. Much of this could be done by a person who just scans and forwards any incoming mail. In practice, the Representative should be a lawyer or at least a compliance professional in order to fulfil their role effectively, in particular when it comes to a lawsuit or administrative proceedings against the controller/processor. These would be carried out against the representative on behalf of the controller/processor. Regarding liability, recital 80 explicitly says: “The designated representative should be subject to enforcement proceedings in the event of non-compliance by the controller or processor.” This doesn't shield the controller/processor from liability, this just simplifies enforcement and ensures that judicial remedies are in fact available to data subjects. There is a much more imminent consequence for the choice of Representative: which data protection agency will serve as main supervisory authority. Non-EU controllers might prefer the convenience of an English-speaking authority, otherwise (expensive) translation could be needed. Consequently, Representatives based in Ireland are effectively the default choice. Many representatives do offer extra services, such as offering to serve as a Data Protection Officer. That would help justify the fees. Unfortunately, the conditions for appointing a representative and for appointing a DPO are somewhat different: per the letter of the law many controllers would need a Representative but not a DPO. A Representative is needed as soon as data processing is non-occasional, whereas a DPO would only be needed for processing on a large scale. I'll just add that many controllers forget about that and only think about getting a representative when appointing a DPO. Since the Representative aids enforcement, enforcing against a controller without a Representative is rather difficult, and I don't know of any fines for failing to appoint a Representative.	An indictment is issued by a grand jury when they are convinced, on the basis of evidence presented to them by the government, that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime. However, the indictment only has to state the charges, i.e. the grand jury's conclusion; it doesn't have to describe the evidence that led them to this conclusion. In particular, the grand jury can hear the testimony of witnesses under oath, and has subpoena powers to compel testimony. But testimony before a grand jury is sealed and must not be revealed by anyone except the witness themself. A good source for learning more about the grand jury process is the Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors. The authoritative source is the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title III. So, there must have been some evidence that he committed a crime, at least in the grand jury's view. But we, the public, don't get to see it at this time. If the case goes to trial, evidence will be presented publicly at that time, though it won't necessarily be the same evidence that convinced the grand jury to indict. (Note that this answer is about the US federal criminal justice system, since that's what's involved in the Collins case. Some states may have a similar system; others may not.)
UK law - what is the process of convicting a defendant of a lesser offence than the charge? There is already an (unanswered) question on the site regarding this in US law, but I'm asking about UK law, so I felt it appropriate to ask again: Can a jury always convict on a lesser included charge? I'll lay out an imaginary scenario, similar to the original question. A jury is presented with a trial for murder. They decide that the defendant certainly killed the victim, but there is significant doubt among jurors that the murder was premeditated. Is there a process whereby the jury can return a verdict of guilty, but to the lesser charge of manslaughter? Or would it involve a retrial - presumably instigated by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) - against the lesser charge? In the latter or similar case, can the jury petition to ensure that trial goes ahead?	There is no answer to the question, as presented. The criminal law differs in various respects in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland: one cannot speak of 'UK law', because criminal procedure is really very different in the three separate jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the rules of criminal procedure are what govern the issue raised in the question, rather than the substantive laws relating to the various charges which might be brought; and while the substantive laws in England and Scotland are often fairly similar, the procedures are usually very dissimilar. In a trial at the Old Bailey, in London, a Jury has no role in the criminal procedure: once empanelled it performs its usual function of deciding the facts of the case, based upon the evidence presented, but it has no role in determining what charges are preferred against the accused (this is decided by a different court at a much earlier procedural stage), and the jury has no power to alter the charges on the indictment. Only the prosecution can decide what charges are made against an accused person. And if an amendment to the indictment is thought to be appropriate, only the prosecuting barrister can make such a change. If the case has come-on for trial, the permission of the Judge must usually be obtained to any alteration in the charges. The Judge might object to an attempt to add a charge carrying a more severe penalty at a late stage in the proceedings (as the case may of course have already taken many months to reach the Old Bailey). He will often be more accommodating to an application to reduce the charges, to a lesser offence, particularly if accompanied by an undertaking not to proceed on a more serious charge - e.g. due to a lack of evidence supporting it. Where several charges are brought in the alternative, then the jury has a function, since it can then convict of a lesser charge if the evidence on a more serious one does not satisfy it. But it cannot ask for the charges to be altered: the jury represents the layman, and jurymen are inevitably not legally qualified (at one time, being legally qualified was an automatic disqualification from serving on a jury). So the jury is assumed to be incapable of understanding the fine distinctions between different offences, and has no role whatsoever in deciding which offences shall be included on the indictment. Even the Barrister representing the accused has no role in determining which charges his client will face: that is purely a function of the Crown Prosecutor's office, and once the trial has come-on at the Bailey only the prosecuting Barrister and the Judge truly have a role in making any necessary amendments. The function of defending Counsel is to strike a plea-bargain, if he can, and where the opportunity arises: which is to say, if he can persuade his client to plead guilty to a minor charge (whether or not on the indictment), and can also persuade the prosecutor not to proceed on the more serious charge(s) on the indictment. A Judge will not usually object to a legally-represented defendant applying, by consent (i.e. through the prosecutor), to amend the indictment in order to enter a plea of guilty. He might refuse, if the accused has no legal representation, but not otherwise. The short answer, therefore, is that in England and Wales a defendant cannot be convicted on a charge that is not listed on the indictment, but a jury can convict of any charge on the indictment if the judge asks the jury to retire and consider a verdict - but the case may not get so far as that, if a plea-bargain is struck. There are rare occasions where a judge might withdraw a charge, if he desires, by directing the jury to acquit on that particular charge, but this only occurs if he considers that any conviction on that charge would be positively unsafe in all the circumstances of the case.	Fraud new-south-wales There are a number of offences that fall under the broad category of fraud. The most relevant for this type of behaviour is in s192E of the Crimes Act 1900: "Obtain financial advantage or cause financial advantage by deception" which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years. In order to understand what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt it is useful to look at the suggested jury direction from the Criminal Bench Book (a crib sheet for judges): [The accused] is charged that [he/she] by a deception dishonestly [obtained a financial advantage for himself/herself] or [kept a financial advantage that he/she had]. The Crown contends that the financial advantage is [set out the financial advantage]. It does not matter whether the financial advantage alleged was permanent or temporary. The deception that the Crown alleges that the accused perpetrated was [set out the deception]. It must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the financial advantage was obtained as a result of that deception and that the accused perpetrated that deception intentionally to obtain the financial advantage or acted recklessly in that regard. Here reckless means foreseeing the possibility that as a result of the deception [he/she] would [obtain a financial advantage] or [retain the financial advantage that he/she had] and carrying on with the deception notwithstanding that possibility. However, the Crown does not need to prove a particular person was deceived. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in [his/her] deceptive conduct. Dishonest in this context means that the accused acted dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people. You as ordinary members of the community determine what is dishonest conduct in this regard. You must not only find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in deceiving [the victim] but also that [he/she] knew that [his/her] conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. It is not enough that a person is shithouse at delivering on their contractual obligations: even repeatedly so. That just makes them a bad business person, not a criminal. They must have acted dishonestly and deceived their victims from the get-go with the intention of not fulfilling their bargain or have been reckless as to their ability to do so. If you believe that you have knowledge of criminal fraud, you should report it to the police who have the discretion to investigate and prosecute. As a general rule, police devote fewer resources to non-violent crime than they do to violent crime and less to crimes where the victim has handed over property/money than those where it was taken from them involuntarily so fraud tends to be lower on their radar.	Intent matters here, but yes. Alice could be considered guilty of either Second-Degree Murder or Manslaughter, though the latter is far more likely. Texas has no laws condoning assisted suicide that could absolve Alice. Second-degree murder requires the following: The defendant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of another person The defendant intended to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act that was clearly dangerous to human life and this act caused the death of an individual This is tenuous, but it could be argued this way if Alice intended to cause Bob's death. It certainly meets the second criteria: shooting oneself constitutes serious harm and giving a firearm to someone who has stated an intent to kill themself is reckless. It's more likely that Alice would be charged with manslaughter. The only definition is: A person commits an offense if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. As discussed above, giving someone who has announced an intent to kill themself a loaded gun is reckless. Alice's actions resulted in Bob's death.	The Crown Prosecution Service has said: Since deceased persons cannot be prosecuted, the Crown Prosecution Service will not make a charging decision in respect of a suspect who is deceased.	You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished.	No Once a state has accused a person and tried that person for a particular act or set of acts, the state can't later hold a different trial for the same act or acts. That is the Double Jeopardy rule (or the basics of it at least). Some limited exceptions: If a person is convicted and appeals, and the conviction is overturned, the appellate court may order a new trial. *If there is a mistrial, such as a hung jury (jury cannot agree) then there can be a new trial. If an act is both a state and a Federal crime (in the US) then both can have separate trials, and possibly two convictions. If the accused bribes the judge or jury, that trial will not count, and there may be a new trial. If an act is a crime in two different countries, each can have its own trial (but often they don't). If it is later discovered that the accused committed a quite different act than the one s/he was tried for, a new trial for that act may be possible. But otherwise, whether the accused is acquitted or convicted, only one trial for a given alleged crime. The state cannot later change its mind on what to charge the accused with for the act.	"Allowed" is not an applicable concept, since the few laws regulating juror conduct pertain to corrupt behavior (such as bribery). Instead, there are standards for juror conduct that the legal profession wishes to be adhered to, and the only way that impression is conveyed to jurors is through the judge's instructions (or lack therein). It is held in Sparf and Hansen v. United States 156 U.S. 51 that In the courts of the United States, it is the duty of the jury, in criminal cases, to receive the law from the court, and to apply it as given by the court, subject to the condition that, by a general verdict, a jury of necessity determines both law and fact as compounded in the issue submitted to them in the particular case. In criminal cases, it is competent for the court to instruct the jury as to the legal presumptions arising from a given state of facts, but it may not, by a peremptory instruction, require the jury to find the accused guilty of the offense charged, nor of any offense less than that charged. One of the "technical" rights of a jury is the right to judge the law itself (jury nullification). This arises in part from the Zenger trial and similar colonial events, and (in terms of legal precedent) from a famous instruction by Jay in Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1: It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the court: For, as on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that the court are the best judges of the law. But still both objects are lawfully, within your power of decision. Sparf v. US however finds that a judge is under no obligation to inform jurors of that right, and jury instructions say things like "you must apply the law as I give it to you, even if you disagree with the law". For examples, instruction 101 in the California criminal instructions manual says that trials are conducted in open court with the parties presenting evidence and the judge deciding the law that applies to the case. It is unfair to the parties if you receive additional information from any other source because that information may be unreliable or irrelevant and the parties will not have had the opportunity to examine and respond to it. Your verdict must be based only on the evidence presented during trial in this court and the law as I provide it to you. This is not an enforceable law, for instance if a juror (esp. an attorney) argues one way based on his version of the law, that is not a punishable offense, nor is it a punishable offense if a juror (who is an engineer) argues that some expert testimony on an engineering matter is factually wrong. Jurors are not supposed to do either thing, but there are no legal consequences if they do. Since the legal ideal is that a jury will evaluate the (allowed) testimony in court and applies the law as given by the judge, and attorneys have an ethical obligation to uphold the law, they thus have an ethical obligation to not restate the law and especially to not do so under the guise of being an attorney (who has expert knowledge of the law). This is basically an unenforceable principle. There was an instruction in California saying that: should . . . any juror refuse[] to deliberate or express[] an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty or punishment, or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the Court of the situation but People v. Engelman 28 cal 4th 436 nixed that instruction. That case says that jurors have no right to refuse to deliberate or to disregard the law in reaching their decision but Directing the jury immediately before deliberations begin that jurors are expected to police the reasoning and arguments of their fellow jurors during deliberations, and immediately advise the court if it appears that a fellow juror is deciding the case upon an "improper basis," may curtail or distort deliberations. This does not mean that in the rare instance that a lawyer is on a jury, he must suppress his conclusions, even when they are professionally informed. This article recounts a lawyer's experience on a jury and identifies a point of law (and how the issue was handled). In that case, the question is what to make of a statement that something is "not at issue". The non-;awyers interpreted that to mean "we aren’t supposed to award her anything for back and neck injuries". The lawyer said: I was pretty sure this was wrong. While it was true that the lawyers had said the back and neck injuries were “not at issue,” that was a phrase that I could recall uttering in court, too. When I said it, I meant that both sides agreed on a certain fact or point of law. I did not mean that the fact or point of law was not material to the case. No other juror interpreted the lawyers’ statements my way, and when we checked, we found that the jury instructions were silent on the issue. So, we wrote the judge a question. Turns out, “the lawyer” was right. The judge instructed us to consider any injury from the collision, whether it was an injury to the plaintiff’s back, to her neck, to her shoulder, or elsewhere. The lesson for attorneys: explain to the jury exactly what you mean. Don’t assume they understand your shorthand terms, like “not at issue.” In other words, the judge still determines what the law is, though in this case it looks like it took the expert knowledge of an attorney to figure out that the jury needed to ask the judge what "not at issue" means.	Does failure to present a charge to a grand jury leave that charge open for future indictment? Yes. Indeed, even if the charge is presented to a grand jury and it declines to indict, exactly the same charge that one grand jury declined to indict upon can be presented to a future grand jury and produce a valid indictment. I understand that normally when a Grand Jury declines to indict for an alleged crime, prosecutors may not present it again to a future Grand Jury. (I believe this rule is statutory, not constitutional.) While I won't rule out the possibility that such a statute exists, I am aware of no state where that is the case. A charge upon which is grand jury declines to indict is often not presented to a future grand jury as a matter of prosecutorial discretion or prosecutor's office policy, but generally this is not a mandatory rule. One reason that it is not a mandatory rule is that there is no practical way that a defendant could enforce the rule if it was a mandatory rule. Grand jury proceedings are secret (at least until an indictment is produced and then only as pertinent to the defendant indicted on the charges producing an indictment). Generally, even the judges in the court calling a grand jury have no access to its proceedings until it issues an indictment, and then has only slightly more latitude to review its proceedings than a defendant in the case.
How public a speech be so that it's in range of Indonesian anti blasphemy laws? http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/why-is-ahok-in-prison-a-legal-analysis-of-the-decision/ Ahok is convicted of insulting religion by saying people may use certain quranic verses for dishonest goals. The thing is, not one people that hear his speech claims that he is offended by Ahok's speech. However, his speech is videotaped. Some people claimed they are offended after watching the video. That leads to the question. How public your speech can be for Indonesian anti blasphemy laws to kick in? Say you talk in private to someone about religion. Say that someone record that. Say someone that watch the recording get offended. Does that count? And if so, where in the law is that written? A little background: https://steemit.com/ahok/@freeross/who-is-ahok-and-what-is-his-problems-in-indonesia Ahok is a very effective governor. With much less budget he can make rivers clean, fix all roads, give universal healthcare, and funds the poor's education. Oh, he also eliminates corruption due to his ebudgeting. And he is very popular. Duh. So, his political opponent use anti blasphemy laws to bring him down. Whether he blasphemes or not is very politically controversial. Not one that listen to him. So someone would seek his video, pretend to get offended, and sue him in court. Hence, the current question. How public your speech should be to get jailed by this rubber flexible law. If you say something privately, and someone record it, and publicly show it, will you be jailed? If so, should you not talk bad about religion anywhere privately? My concern is a hypothetical case. Say I talk something about religion. And I talk to a few people. Yet the talk is recorded and then latter people that want me death for totally unrelated reason use a youtube video and claim they are offended. If this is the case, then the law effectively prevent people from talking about religion in any place even when it's not public.	The English version of the law says By a maximum imprisonment of five years shall be punished for whosoever in public deliberately expresses their feelings or engages in actions that: a. in principle is hostile and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia; b. has the intention that a person should not practice any religion at all that is based on belief in Almighty God. from the Bahasa Indonesia law Dipidana dengan pidana penjara selama-lamanya lima tahun barangsiapa dengan sengaja di muka umum mengeluarkan perasaan atau melakukan perbuatan: a. yang pada pokoknya bersifat permusuhan, penyalahgunaan atau penodaan terhadap suatu agama yang dianut di Indonesia; b. dengan maksud agar supaya orang tidak menganut agama apapun juga, yang bersendikan ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa The law does not define "public", so it would normally mean what it means in ordinary language (and that is not at all easy to figure out: it might be considered "public" if the expression was made to a single person). However, in this case, it was clearly in public (at a speech with about 100 people) that the statement was made. The law does not say that those people who constituted "the public" that heard the statement have to have been offended. Rather, (first) the statement has to be made in public (it was), and second, it is "in principle is hostile and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia". That's a matter for the court to sort out. It appears, for example, that Shi'a teachings are legally blasphemous (case of Tajul Muluk). Unfortunately, there aren't any accessible resources here pertaining to the court decisions, so it's not clear if there are any concrete limits on what could be found to be blasphemous. However, it is established law that deviant teachings are legaly blasphemous, see the 39 case synopsis and the end here.	There's an interesting philosophical debate you can have. By the plain text of the First Amendment, it protects libel. Aside: Yes, the First Amendment does apply to libel cases. A libel case, like all lawsuits, involves the government's judicial branch using its coercive power to make you pay money as a result of your speech, based on a law requiring you to pay money for certain kinds of speech. Tort law is not optional; a libel case isn't "you promised not to say bad things and then said bad things," it's the government saying "what you did is bad, now pay the person you hurt because of your speech." The idea that "you can say it, you just have to face the consequences" isn't enough and hasn't been for quite a while now. Traditionally, the main point of freedom of speech was that a court couldn't stop you from saying something, but could only seek to punish you after the fact (and for that you get a jury, a public hearing, etc.) But more recently, courts realized that subsequent punishment had similar effects to prior restraint. If you're going to be punished for some kind of speech, you're going to steer clear of saying anything a jury might think is that kind of speech. Libel law is heavily influenced by the First Amendment, and has been for over 40 years. The First Amendment looks like it protects libel, but it also looks like it should protect your right to reprint any book you want. It also looks like it should protect your right to tell someone "go and murder this person." It also looks like it should protect your right to say whatever you want in court, whether or not it's true. It also looks like it should protect your right to falsely shout "fire" in a crowded hall, with the intent to cause a stampede (this isn't just a turn of phrase, there was an actual incident in which 73 people were killed which is believed to have started when someone falsely shouted that there was a fire). It also looks like it should protect your right to post a sign saying "There is a bomb at this elementary school." Yet the Constitution explicitly sanctions copyright, and no one would seriously conclude that Congress may not protect the integrity of the judicial process by punishing perjury. Ordering a hit, making bomb threats, intentionally causing panics -- the fact that speech is a key part of these can't mean that the government isn't allowed to criminalize them. You cannot run a civilized society in which death threats are legal. So, the courts interpret. Language in the Constitution that appears absolute is understood to have implied exceptions. The people writing the document were well aware that perjury was generally a crime. The same Congress that proposed the First Amendment passed a law criminalizing perjury. Sure, you're punishing someone based on their speech, but it's clearly not meant to be protected. You can't run a court system without perjury laws, and its absence from the First Amendment doesn't mean that the First Amendment thereby upended this basic principle. The courts have identified a number of kinds of speech that, by longstanding practice, are not protected. Intellectual property violations are one. Obscenity is another. So are threats. So is "speech integral to criminal conduct" (e.g. "what'll it be, your money or your life?") And so is defamation. The text of the First Amendment may not exclude it, but courts have uniformly held that it's not something the amendment was ever meant to protect. The First Amendment does still pose constraints, which are some of the most defendant-friendly in the world (interestingly enough, US law is descended from English law, and English libel law used to be among the most plaintiff-friendly in the world). It's not libel if it's true. It's not libel if it's an opinion (unless it's a statement of fact dressed up as opinion). It's not libel unless you were at least negligent; if it was about a public figure, you have to have known it was false or seriously doubted its truth. But these restrictions leave a core of speech that is and always has been punishable.	Art. 19 of the Indian Constitution states that (1) All citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression... from which is follows that you may advance any argument that you want in support of an idea. The courts have never questioned this. There is a potential grey area regarding verbal acts that cause the use of violence, but in terms of presenting reasons that such-and-such acts are good (or bad), that form of expression is absolutely protected. The grey area comes from clause 2: Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence whereby a law against inciting to violence might pass constitutional muster. "Justification" of an action is very different from "inciting" to do an act.	In the United States, at least, it's quite clear that merely arguing that the assassination of a leader would be a good policy decision is protected by the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court addressed this question in Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). McPherson was a clerical employee in a sheriff's office when someone attempted to assassinate President Reagan. During a conversation about Reagan's attempts to cut food stamps and Medicaid, she told a co-worker, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him." The sheriff fired her for the remark, and she sued, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The trial court held that her remarks were not constitutionally protected, but the Supreme Court disagreed: The statement was made in the course of a conversation addressing the policies of the President's administration. It came on the heels of a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of heightened public attention: an attempt on the life of the President. While a statement that amounted to a threat to kill the President would not be protected by the First Amendment, the District Court concluded, and we agree, that McPherson's statement did not amount to a threat punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) or 18 U.S.C. § 2385, or, indeed, that could properly be criminalized at all. ... The inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern. ... Debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. Note also that this case arose in the context of public-employee discipline, where First Amendment rights can be quite seriously curtailed. If the First Amendment protects the statements in that setting, imposing criminal penalties for the same speech is generally going to be out of the question.	I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire!	It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.	This is the cited article. Thankfully, the interviewee provided a scan of the police letter he received, so the rest of this question is relatively easy to answer. He was specifically charged with Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung (lit. Disturbance of the public order) persuant to § 81(1) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz, which reads (after putting it through Google Translate): Who by a behavior that is likely to arouse legitimate annoyance, disturbs public order, commits an administrative offense and is punishable by a fine of up to 500 euros, unless the behavior is justified, in particular by the use of a constitutionally guaranteed right , In the event of aggravating circumstances, instead of a fine, imprisonment can be imprisoned for up to one week, or up to two weeks for repeated offenses. This law is almost certainly constitutional as it specifically allows exercise of constitutional rights. Note this also includes human rights, as Austria has included the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its constitution. Given that, I'm guessing if the interviewee had wanted to, he would have had a decent shot at having this charge dismissed.	The only religious matter I'm aware of that are inadmissible are for special circumstances where one's religious beliefs may be compromised if asked in court. The classic example tends to be clergymen/women being subpeonaed for information against a defendant in court. Conversation with clergy is protected in the United States and is one of a few times cops are not allowed to listen to your one phone call or visit. The typical invocation of this would be a criminal, who confesses his sins to a Catholic priest, and may confess to a crime while receiving the Sacrament of Penance. Since Catholic Priests are bound by the "Seal of Confession" to not speak about the identity of the sinner or nature of the sin. The Priest can be excommunicated if he does this. However, if the religion of the witness is relevant to the case (say a discrimination case) it might be prudent to inquire into the witness's religious beliefs. Suppose a major employer has a special menu in their cafeterias for Hala and Kosher observers but does not offer a fish or non-meat option for meals on Fridays in Lent, then a Catholic's belief in this practice might be called into question.
Can You Be Prosecuted Under US Law for Counterfeiting Foreign Currency? Let's imagine that I'm a person living in the US who wants to counterfeit foreign currency and then convert it into US dollars. Let's say it's the currency of a country that the US doesn't really have formal relations with (no extradition treaty, etc.); let's say this country is South Sudan. Can I be sent to jail either in the US or in South Sudan? If you would be sent to jail in South Sudan, is there another country's currency that would make this viable? Would I still be thrown in jail if I didn't convert the money into dollars?	It's illegal under US law. 18 U.S. Code § 478 says: Whoever, within the United States, with intent to defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any bond, certificate, obligation, or other security of any foreign government, purporting to be or in imitation of any such security issued under the authority of such foreign government, or any treasury note, bill, or promise to pay, lawfully issued by such foreign government and intended to circulate as money, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. There are several similar laws for similar crimes: § 479 - Uttering counterfeit foreign obligations or securities § 480 - Possessing counterfeit foreign obligations or securities § 481 - Plates, stones, or analog, digital, or electronic images for counterfeiting foreign obligations or securities § 482 - Foreign bank notes § 483 - Uttering counterfeit foreign bank notes § 488 - Making or possessing counterfeit dies for foreign coins § 502 - Postage and revenue stamps of foreign governments According to version of the South Sudan penal code I was able to find, counterfeiting is illegal. But if I understand section 7 correctly (which I might not), most counterfeiting is not prosecutable under South Sudan law if it is not done in South Sudan. Having a counterfeit revenue stamp, however, would be, as would fraudulently altering a coin. Given that there's not an extradition treaty and that it's already illegal under US law, this probably doesn't matter much, though	The applicable law is the New Zealand Anti-Money Laundering law. The regulations describing exactly what is covered don't mention Bitcoin cleaning, but the "wire transfer" and "currency exchange" bits probably cover such a thing. I certainly wouldn't like to be the test case. There was also this case in Europe.	I am unfamiliar with specifically US laws on this but under common law (which US law is derived from) there is the crime of "Theft by Finding", however, because you turned it over to the authorities who, after the required time period were unable to find the rightful owner, the money becomes yours. However, you still have to pay your taxes on it: http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/07/03/found-money-is-awesomebut-must-pay-uncle-sam/ As far as I can see, income is income whether it comes as cash, diamonds or long lost antiques. As far as the money laundering aspect, that is something the authorities would need to prove - as opposed to you just being lucky.	The most important rule for an extradition from Germany is this: If the role of the countries were reversed, would the person be convicted in Germany according to German law? You say the link claims that he couldn't be convicted now, because he would have been convicted twice for the same crime. So he wouldn't be convicted in Germany if the roles of the countries were reversed, therefore no extradition. (The next important rule is this: There must be enough evidence that the person would be prosecuted in Germany, not necessarily convicted. You also need to convince the court that the accused will get a fair trial when extradited, that there will be no cruel or unusual punishment, including death sentence, and lastly there is no extradition for small crimes when the extradition plus having to appear in a foreign court can be considered worse punishment than the actual punishment for the crime. All these irrelevant in this case, I think). "Auslieferung unstatthaft" just means "extradition inadmissible" or "extradition illegal". PS. Ludl asked "shouldn't there be some law that if someone cannot be extradited from Germany because of extradition law, they can still be prosecuted in Germany". That would be completely unnecessary. Let's say one US citizen murders another one in Germany, the USA asks for extradition (they wouldn't, because it is a German matter, but they could ask of course), and Germany rightfully refuses. Then since it is a murder on German ground, it will be prosecuted in Germany. It would be absurd to think that a failed extradition request could protect a murderer.	The US has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in the US. Canada has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in Canada. As added complications, if you are a Mexican citizen then Mexico has jurisdiction and if your victim is Chinese then China has jurisdiction. If you get arrested on an Interpol warrant in Spain then Spain has jurisdiction. And so on ... Your implicit assumption is that jurisdiction is exclusive, it isn't. Any country (or sub-national jurisdiction) that claims jurisdiction has jurisdiction, at least to the extent of testing that claim. Whether any given polity has jurisdiction depends on the particular law involved, some laws are only applicable within that countries borders others are extra-territorial, some are applicable to citizens but not non-citizens or vice-versa, etc.	As in most cases it depends on the details. The length of a blade (> 44mm and width > 10) is important and the circumstances. Assume a fine to something up to € 10000, but a sentence up to 3 years is also possible. In Germany it is not crime (anything that can be fined or minimal sentence is less than 1 year is not a crime). I assume that they took your home address and let you leave the country, which alone is a sign that it not a crime. Since you were so smart to place this in your luggage, where it garantied to be found by airport security, you will probably get something in the range of the minimal fine. You also cooperated by giving a statement, which will assist to lessen the fine (you were after all caught red handed). Having it on your person in a public space, the fine would have be higher. Swinging it around among peaple in a threatening manner, will lead you into the range of a sentence. When the fine arrives, there will be bank transaction form. Go to the next post office or bank and pay it, retaining the receipt. Border control will not be interested in you (they only get alerts for proper criminals). Customs (Zoll) could be interested to enforce the fine, show them the receipt. Pay the fine and get on with your life. As to the U.S. Consulate (forget Embassy, State Department: they deal only in diplomatic affairs) all they will tell you is you must obey the laws of the country you are in assisted in getting an English speaking lawyer when requested send you bill for their efforts A Consulate deals with citizen affairs (administration, assistance). Most Embassies have a Cousulate department inside, but not all. In Berlin it does not. The Cousulate is about 20 Kilometres away from the Embassy. The right to call them is based on the Vienna Conventions 1815 and 1961. All countries that reconised these conventions are required to allow a foreigner to contact their Cousulate. A dual citizen, when inside the country where they are a citizen, do not have this right.	As for a member of the Universal Postal Union, what repercussions will occur for country B? None. Are they allowed to keep stealing stuff at the sender insurer's expense? Well, country B isn't stealing stuff. Bad actors in the employe of country B are stealing stuff. This is a matter for law enforcement in country B. If country B is endemically corrupt as seems to be implied, then it is likely that the bad actors will continue to be bad actors. As for the insurer, they are in the business of selling insurance against theft (among other things) and they will take this into account in setting their premiums. Will they face any penalties (e.g. banned from the Union) that would encourage them to hold their customs to account? All member countries of the UN are entitled to be members of the UPU and it seems unlikely that such minor issues could lead to expulsion from the UN - nation-states that have committed genocide are still UN members after all. Since the UPU appears to produce more upsides than downsides, being one of, if not the single most successful and universally adopted international treaty in history this is just one of the minor annoyances.	Yes, but ... It doesn’t protect you. Let’s imagine you put such a clause in and a person in Europe used your service notwithstanding: they’ve broken the contract but you’ve broken the law. You get the fine and they get ... nothing. Because you can’t contract outside the law you never had a valid contract with them so you have no basis to sue. Further, because you are purporting to something you can’t legally do, you are probably on the wrong side of misleading and deceptive consumer protection law: which is another fine. If you can ensure that you don’t breach local law - like by not operating over the internet - then you can choose not to deal with e.g. Europeans. If you can’t guarantee that, then you’re stuffed.
How to tell which state governs the "Terms and Conditions" of my website? In the "Terms and Conditions" page of my website, I have this paragraph: These Terms will be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of XXXXX, and you submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in XXXXX for the resolution of any disputes. I personally live outside of the United States. If the web-hosting server of my website is located in Texas, and I use a Oregon physical address which I got from a mail-forwarding service (similar to PO box) as my contact information in my email newsletter, should I replace the XXXXX in the aforementioned paragraph with "Texas" or "Oregon"? Or should I replace it with the name of the country where I live instead?	You may want to select a state where you have some sort of presence. According to this article, personal jurisdiction can be waived, but subject matter jurisdiction can not, and "for pragmatic reasons some states deny subject-matter jurisdiction to specific claims, such as those arising in other states". In other words, if nothing about you, the other party, or the case has any relation to the state, the court doesn't necessarily have to listen to the case. And if that happens, the provision about them submitting to the jurisdiction is worthless. Beyond that, are you OK with going to court in the location you select? Do you know whether all your terms and conditions are valid in that location? Do you know whether one place or another has more favorable interpretations of the laws, or more favorable local rules, when it comes to the types of disputes you are likely to have? You probably want a lawyer to help you decide.	A business is free to set its pricing model in whatever way it chooses, unless there is a specific law restring this. As no country or jurisdiction is mentioned in the question, there is no way to judge if some specific law applies. (In the US that would probably be a matter of state law.) A business could set its prices at 10 per user, but with a Minimum charge of 100 if it chose to do it that way. It is up to a potential customer to decide if this is a fair price or not. As long as the price plan was disclosed in advance, the customer has no ground for a legal complaint. The customer could always ask the business to change its policy, but there would be no legal duty to make a change.	Various Privacy Laws may Apply If you live in the EU, the site may be required to delete this information under the GDPR. If you live in the UK, you may have the right to deletion under the UK-GDPR. In each case the procedure for enforcing such a right if the business does not respond depends on the law of your country, and would involve a suit in the courts of that country. Even if a judgement including a court order is obtained, enforcing this on a US firm may not be easy. If you live in California, you may have a right to the deletion of the info under the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) (soon to be replaced by a modified version, the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA)). If you live in Virginia, you may have rights under the Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (VCDPA). All these right are subject to various exceptions. Several other states, including Colorado, have passed similar laws, but they have not yet gone into effect. See also "Consumers’ “Right to Delete” under US State Privacy Laws" published by Consumer Privacy World and written by By Glenn A. Brown on March 3, 2021. Since the information was collected (posted) when you were less than 12, your parents may have the right to request deletion under the Federal Children's Online privacy Protection Act (COPPA) The DMCA deals with alleged copyright violations, not with personal privacy issues. CCPA / CPRA The CCPA right to delete applies only to information supplied by the Data Subject (DS). The CCPA right to delete is given by California Civil Code section 1798.105 The Buisness has 10 days to acknowledge a request, and 45 days to respond, which may be extended for an additional 45 days. Note also that the CCPA requires various notices to be delivered to the consumer, and normally requires a privacy policy to be posted. This must include notification of the consumer's rights. Under the CCPA a consumer may not sue a firm directly to enforce the right to delete. Instead a complaint may be made to the California Attorney General, who is empowered to take enforcement action. Only in cases of a data breach ca a consumer sue a firm directly. Note that he CCPA appliws only to firms that: are for-profit businesses that do business in California and Have a gross annual revenue of over $25 million; or Buy, receive, or sell the personal information of 50,000 or more California residents, households, or devices; or Derive 50% or more of their annual revenue from selling California residents’ personal information. See also the official page "California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)" VCDPA Section 59.1-573 (A) provides that (A) A consumer may invoke the consumer rights authorized pursuant to this subsection at any time by submitting a request to a controller specifying the consumer rights the consumer wishes to invoke. A known child's parent or legal guardian may invoke such consumer rights on behalf of the child regarding processing personal data belonging to the known child. A controller shall comply with an authenticated consumer request to exercise the right: ... (A) 3. To delete personal data provided by or obtained about the consumer; (A) 4. To obtain a copy of the consumer's personal data that the consumer previously provided to the controller in a portable and, to the extent technically feasible, readily usable format that allows the consumer to transmit the data to another controller without hindrance, where the processing is carried out by automated means; and (A) 5. To opt out of the processing of the personal data for purposes of (i) targeted advertising, (ii) the sale of personal data, or (iii) profiling in furtherance of decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects concerning the consumer. Under subsection B the controller (firm) has 45 days to respond, which may be extended for up to an additional 45 days Under 59.1-574 (A) a controller has verious obligations including to: Limit the collection of personal data to what is adequate, relevant, and reasonably necessary ... and to: Not process sensitive data concerning a consumer without obtaining the consumer's consent, or, in the case of the processing of sensitive data concerning a known child, without processing such data in accordance with the federal Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. з 6501 et seq.). Under subsectiuon (B) the rights may not be waived by contract. Under subsection (c) the controller must provide: a reasonably accessible, clear, and meaningful privacy notice and this notice must contain: one or more secure and reliable means for consumers to submit a request to exercise their consumer rights under this chapter. Such means shall take into account the ways in which consumers normally interact with the controller, the need for secure and reliable communication of such requests, and the ability of the controller to authenticate the identity of the consumer making the request. Controllers shall not require a consumer to create a new account in order to exercise consumer rights pursuant to з 59.1-573 but may require a consumer to use an existing account. various exemptions are provided for in the VCDPA. As with the CCPA, the previsions may only be enforced by the state Attorney General, not by private lawsuit. The VCDPA only applies to: persons that conduct business in the Commonwealth or produce products or services that are targeted to residents of the Commonwealth and that (i) during a calendar year, control or process personal data of at least 100,000 consumers or (ii) control or process personal data of at least 25,000 consumers and derive over 50 percent of gross revenue from the sale of personal data. In many ways it is quite similar to the CCPA. COPPA COPPA is a federal law that applies to services, including websites, that collect personal information about children under age 13. It imposes various responsibilities and restrictions on such providers, and give the parents of such children various rights. According to the FTC pagw "Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan for Your Business"" Even if parents have agreed that you may collect information from their kids, parents have ongoing rights — and you have continuing obligations. If a parent asks, you must: give them a way to review the personal information collected from their child; give them a way to revoke their consent and refuse the further use or collection of personal information from their child; and delete their child’s personal information. The FTC's FAQ on COPPA states: The primary goal of COPPA is to place parents in control over what information is collected from their young children online. The Rule was designed to protect children under age 13, while accounting for the dynamic nature of the Internet. The Rule applies to operators of commercial websites and online services (including mobile apps and IoT devices, such as smart toys) directed to children under 13 that collect, use, or disclose personal information from children, or on whose behalf such information is collected or maintained (such as when personal information is collected by an ad network to serve targeted advertising). The Rule also applies to operators of general audience websites or online services with actual knowledge that they are collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children under 13, and to websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information directly from users of another website or online service directed to children. Operators covered by the Rule must: ... Provide parents access to their child's personal information to review and/or have the information deleted; ... Maintain the confidentiality, security, and integrity of information they collect from children, including by taking reasonable steps to release such information only to parties capable of maintaining its confidentiality and security; Retain personal information collected online from a child for only as long as is necessary to fulfill the purpose for which it was collected and delete the information using reasonable measures to protect against its unauthorized access or use; The same page says that COPPA: applies to operators of commercial websites and online services (including mobile apps and IoT devices) directed to children under 13 that collect, use, or disclose personal information from children. It also applies to operators of general audience websites or online services with actual knowledge that they are collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children under 13. The Rule also applies to websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information directly from users of another website or online service directed to children. The FTC, some other federal agencies, and US states may enforce the COPPA Rule.	You are processing the users IP address in order to carry out the translation to a physical location (see my comment for the technical issues with that) and an IP address is most certainly considered personal information, so yes under the GDPR you are going to need a published policy because you are both data controller and data processor. You need to inform the user of what you are doing, and you need to tell them of the legal basis for the processing (there are several under the GDPR, of which consent is only one - but in your case its going to be the easiest to justify). If you use a third party service for the location translation, you also need to inform the user of that and make available the third party services data processing policy.	It would be terribly risky for you to simply link another company's terms of service. What if they take their server down? What if they change their terms? You would not even know when exactly the changes were made. Copying their terms means you might run into copyright issues on the text. Either pay a lawyer to write your ToS for you, or see if you can find something in the public domain.	No Recognition of territorial claims is the sole province of the diplomatic branches of national government, and of heads of state. In the US it is the State Department, and ultimately the President. The actions of telephone operators and people engaging in other forms of communication cannot and do not bind the decisions of the President, or of other heads of state. Besides, there may be cases in which a telephone country code or a web domain may not match the actual, undisputed legal status of a territory. Accepting a phone call does not affect a country's legal status. For decades the US did not recognize the communist regime in China. Legally, it considered that the Republic of China (aka Taiwan) was the only valid government, and the acceptance of telephone calls did not change that.	Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins? Well, they can, but they have no legal backing to make it happen. Their chances of succeeding are about as good as me requesting a Ferrari, a Yacht and a Mansion. I can make that request. People will laugh. I will not get it. I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related You have no way to know who owns what email address. And it's none of your business. Your only interest should be in whether the address is owned by the person that is creating the account. You probably already do that by sending a confirmation link to the email address when people sign up. I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request The only way you have to comply with such a request is if the owner can prove their identity. As far as I understood, the "Finnish city" was three degrees away from that. They could not provide any proof they are who they said they are, they could not provide a finite list of accounts they claimed to own and they could not even provide proof they own those accounts. They literally just wrote an email with zero legal meaning. I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one The correct way to handle this is have a feature on your website where the account owner can delete their own account. GDPR compliant. Then you make a text template explaining how to use that feature and reply with that template to every request, no matter how stupid (like this case) they are. If they cannot identify themselves to you by proving they have access to their "own" email, they have no business wasting your time. Legally, they could provide you with a different method of identification. In case of a Finnish school, that would probably need to be power of attorney from all children's legal guardians and a specific way to identify the accounts that is consistent with the data given (for example if they entered their full name and address on your website). You would probably in your rights to demand a certified translation if it's all in Finnish. Apart from the fact that you as a private US citizen have no real means to check the validity of all that paperwork, personally, if I saw hundreds of pages of certified translated paperwork, I would probably just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their hands. Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) Indeed. You should not delete people's data because a random punk on the internet sent you an email. You need to identify who the request is from and if they are allowed to make such a request. Whether you have a legal duty to actually keep data, is up to you or your lawyer to find out. It depends on your data and laws. It is perfectly legal to make a website with a textfield that deletes any data you enter after a second. Destruction of data you own is only a problem if you break other laws with it. For example the IRS might not be amused if you destroyed invoices and other proof of taxable income. "Some dude claimed I must in an email" is not going to fly with them. That said, again, please, identify who you deal with, find out if their claim is valid. Don't do stuff because random internet punks write you an email. Because the next mail you get, will be from a Nigerian Prince. Please wisen up before opening that one. People on the internet, through stupidity or malice, might not have your best interests at heart. Don't believe random emails.	The general answer is "yes." Who ever said that only one set of laws applied? Jurisdiction isn't a matter of "one country's laws matter here, let's find out which one it is." All jurisdiction means is that your laws apply to the conduct, not that no one else's can as well. Broadly, there are a few sources of jurisdiction that are generally considered legitimate (to at least some degree) in international law: Territoriality: You have jurisdiction over actions performed in your territory. You also have jurisdiction over crimes where just one part of the crime happens in your jurisdiction (e.g. standing in country A and shooting someone in country B), or even if it just has a significant effect in your territory. Nationality: You have jurisdiction over crimes committed by your citizens anywhere in the world, regardless of whether or not they were breaking the law of wherever they were. Passive personality: You have jurisdiction over crimes committed against your citizens anywhere in the world. Protective: You have jurisdiction over crimes directly harming core state interests, like counterfeiting your passports or sabotaging your warship. Universal: A handful of crimes (like piracy or genocide) are so serious that every country in the world can exercise jurisdiction. If you catch a pirate, you can punish them. These are accepted to different degrees. Passive personality and protective jurisdiction tend to be iffier; territorial jurisdiction is unquestioned (although if it's just based on effects in your territory, it becomes a bit iffier as well). But any of them can be a basis for jurisdiction. If multiple countries have jurisdiction, whoever actually has the offender decides who will try them (jurisdiction to make an arrest is limited to the country in which the arrest is made). So: If you're located in a country, you have to comply with their laws, and they can regulate just about whatever they want, including what you're doing to foreign computers. The foreign country can also generally regulate what you're doing, because part of what you're doing is happening on their territory. Even if both you and the computer are in a foreign country, you may have to answer to the courts of your country of citizenship. Depending on what exactly you're doing, the protective principle may come into play. For instance, if you hack into a computer on a foreign military base, the foreign country could prosecute you for endangering their security. If you're coordinating a genocide, universality applies and anyone can prosecute you. If you hack the computer of a foreigner, passive personality may apply, although this tends to be controversial.
What is the legal status of challenging polyamory prohibition in USA? I know some people (especially in various poly/kink communities) have discussed the idea extensively that post-same-sex-marriage SCOTUS decision, it should be possible to defeat the prohibition on polyamory. But... internet talking is one thing, legal cases are a different ballgame. As such, I have a two-fold question: Has anyone tried to bring actual cases to various courts that would result in a challenge to the prohibition on polyamory? If so, it's be appreciated if the legal theory, main arguments, and results could be summarized? Is there consensus among legal experts on what good legal theories and arguments that could be used to bring such cases in theory?	"Polyamory" is usually used to refer to having more than one romantic relationship at a time, which is pretty unobjectionable as far as the law is concerned. It might get you into trouble in a divorce proceeding, but the laws that still exist addressing it are largely dead letters. I assume you're asking more about polygamy, or having more than one one spouse at a time. I was surprised to learn that there hasn't been much activity in this area since Obergefell, at least not a lot that has led to development of the arguments you're asking for. The most on-point case I can find is Collier v. Fox, No. CV 15-83-BLG-SPW-TJC, 2018 WL 1247411 (D. Mont. Feb. 22, 2018), where a married couple and another woman sued the state because its criminal and civil laws prohibited the second woman from entering into the marriage. The court tossed the challenge to the criminal prohibition based on the parties' standing, saying that there was not a sufficient threat of criminal prosecution, and it dismissed the challenge to the civil restrictions based on Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878), where the Supreme Court said that each state has the right "to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its dominion." There was no appeal, so the decision was never reviewed. The only other case I've seen directly challenging the laws was Sevier v. Thompson, No. 2:16-CV-659-DN-EJF, 2018 WL 1378803 (D. Utah Jan. 26, 2018), where some anti-gay activists tried to overturn Obergefell by suing to force Utah to let one of them marry a computer and three of them marry each other. If you can't guess how this ends, I'll tell you that it does not end well. The plaintiffs all admitted that they didn't actually want the relief they were asking for, so the court threw the case out on standing. The same dude also tried to intervene in a lawsuit (United States v. North Carolina, No. 1:16CV425, 2016 WL 7335627 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2016)]) over the North Carolina bathroom bill, saying that a man trying to marry a machine or marry multiple people belonged in the same category as a man trying to marry a man or a man who identifies as a woman. I'm sure you won't be surprised to learn that the court told him to go to hell again. Because these were all tossed at the very early stages, there wasn't much development of the arguments for or against polygamy, though it was clear that everyone was basically talking about an extension of Obergefell's recognition that "the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person." There have been several scholarly articles, though, addressing the issue. A few that popped up include: A Yale law professor considering whether plural-marriage bans could survive a challenge based on equal protection rather than due process; A Loyola Marymount professor reviewed several post-Obergefell books considering the future of plural marriage and concludes that (1) Western condemnation of plural marriage is strongly informed by racism and xenophobia, (2) legal reactions against plural marriage may do more to harm the people they are meant to protect, and (3) whatever benefits may accompany plural marriage, banning it does not entail the same kinds of harms as bans on gay marriage; and A William & Mary law student published an article running through the different ways a court might analyze the question and argued that Obergefell should generally permit polygamy, regardless of which test a court applies.	The key difference is the motivation for denying service. Generally, a business can deny service for almost any reason, or for no reason, and doesn't have to explain its reasons for doing so. However, laws may make it illegal to deny service for certain specific reasons. The federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. So a business may not deny service for those specific reasons. In the Colorado case, there was a similar state law that also forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. If they deny you service because of your political views, or the way you dress, or because they just plain don't like you as a person, that's legal. If they deny you service because of your sex, or race, or on the other bases in the Civil Rights Act, that's illegal. Obviously, since a business doesn't have to say why they're denying service, or could lie about the reason, this could make it hard for a plaintiff to prove that denial was in fact based on (e.g.) race. They might be able to do so by finding out about internal discussions within the business, or by showing a pattern of denial to customers of a particular race. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the baker made it easy by explicitly stating that he was denying service because of the customers' sexual orientation, or at least because of the same-sex nature of the marriage in question. This would appear to violate the Colorado state law. Had he just said no without giving a reason, it would have been harder for the plaintiffs to make their case. (A state commission held that the baker did violate the law, but the US Supreme Court reversed because, they said, the commission had improperly taken the baker's religion into account.) But there is no such law that forbids discrimination on the basis of political views, so Alex Jones can't make a similar case.	No, and certainly not for the reason implied (essentially a one spouse per jurisdiction in which one has citizenship rule which doesn't exist anywhere). At least under the law of every U.S. jurisdiction, you cannot be married to more than one person at the same time (anywhere in the world), and it is a crime to do so. Several dozen countries in the world recognize polygamy as legal (mostly in predominantly Muslim countries, not all of which allow polygamy, and in Africa where pre-Christian custom permits it), of course, and this does not violate the laws of those jurisdictions. The U.K. does not generally permit polygamy, but gives some recognition to and does not criminalize, polygamous marriages entered into in a place where it is lawful. But the concept proposed in the question would still not be legal under U.K. law. UPDATE: A California court ruling concurs with this analysis.	This is from an opinion piece (albeit by Law profs.) so you'll have to bear/excuse the tone and check the details... but seemingly there some similar laws introduced earlier this year, on different topics though: But the subversion of private enforcement laws to restrict individual rights goes far beyond abortion. Since the beginning of this year, Tennessee has authorized students and teachers to sue schools that allow transgender students to use the restrooms that match their gender identity; Florida has followed suit, with a law that allows students to sue schools that permit transgender girls to play on girls’ sports teams. My opinion is that the comparison falls short on (2), as the [plaintiff] students seem to have to be from the same school, so it's not as broad as SB.8., in terms of who can sue. (N.B. found a more in-depth news article on the Florida sports law. Some of the writeups on this aren't totally clear on that though, just saying "another student" can sue. I couldn't find the exact text of the law insofar.) The promoter of SB.8, actually gave some inspirational examples in an interview, and they are somewhat older: And this is ground that's been ploughed before - under current Texas law under Medicaid fraud, for example. Any person who discovers Medicaid fraud can bring a civil case to bring that forward. The Chick-fil-A law, Senate Bill 1978 from last session about your religious freedom, that also allowed any person to bring a civil action. So it's not a new concept in Texas law, and if elected officials won't follow the law, we'll empower the people of Texas to do it, and we think it makes sense. (Hat tip to a Politics.SE answer for this latter quote.) Again, I didn't check the details... I suspect there may be some divergence from the strict letter of the (1) requirement. I bet (Medicaid) fraud is criminal as well. It seems the Chick-fil-A law failed to do its (immediately) intended job because it was attempted to be used against a city municipality, but the suit was dismissed (on appeal) due to governmental immunity... The private enforcement of the Medicaid fraud issue was apparently passed because of the huge backlog that existed at one point in the state/agency enforcement in Texas: The Office of Inspector General was lambasted in a state review last year [2015--seemingly] for, among other things, a massive backlog of cases and a failure to recover significant tax dollars from providers it accused of fraud, sometimes incorrectly. N.B., these are referred to as qui tam cases, but they don't quite entirely substitute the plaintiff, at least not in the insurance cases that were won: So-called qui tam cases allow whistleblowers to file lawsuits alleging fraud on behalf of the government. If the claims turn out to be legitimate, state and federal laws award a finder’s fee of between 15 and 25 percent of the total settlement or judgment. Interestingly higher awards are possible if the government declines to intervene, but they are still not 100% going to the private initiator (under the False Claims Act)--from Wikipedia: If the government does not decide to participate in a qui tam action, the relator may proceed alone without the Department of Justice, though such cases historically have a much lower success rate. Relators who do prevail in such cases may potentially receive a higher relator's share, to a maximum of 30%. As Wikipedia also notes, some such laws that entirely left the prosecution to a private entity were found unconstitutional, at the federal level e.g. In 2011, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the False Marking Statute was unconstitutional. Judge Dan Aaron Polster determined that it violated the Take Care Clause of Article II of the Constitution, because it represented "a wholesale delegation of criminal law enforcement power to private entities with no control exercised by the Department of Justice". Of some note, the FCA requires that the complaint actually be served on the government and not the actual defendant. This basically ensures that the gov't is notified of all such actions. The Texas-specific legislation on qui tam fraud cases actually seems to mirror the federal one pretty closely: A whistleblower under the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act [TMFPA] may be entitled to an award between 15% -25% if the state intervenes in the case. If the state chooses not to participate in the litigation, then a whistleblower may be entitled to an award between 25% – 30% of the amount recovered. Nonetheless, a court may reduce the award if the court finds that the action is based primarily on information disclosed by someone other than the person bringing the action. [...] Note: Changes to the Texas laws were enacted by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 1 (S.B. 219).	The relevant portion of the U.S. Constitution is the full faith and credit clause (which the Respect for Marriage act is primarily an implementation and enforcement of). This requires states to honor marriages and divorces entered into in different states (subject to limited public policy exceptions that the Respect for Marriage act further limited), and also, for example, paternity determinations and court judgments from other states. This was one argument among many used to argue that same sex marriages from other states should be recognized in other states. But the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), in which it established a right to same sex marriage in all U.S. states, relied instead mostly upon a substantive due process clause analysis similar to that of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which held that bans on interracial marriage were unconstitutional. The Article IV privileges and immunities clause protects very little (mostly the right to interstate travel and the right for an out of state resident to be licensed in a profession in a state). The Slaughterhouse cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), in the late 19th century gave a very crabbed interpretation to the 14th Amendment privileges and immunities clause, limited that only to rights arising from federal citizenship. The logic of the Slaughterhouse line of cases spilled over into the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution. The Article IV privileges and immunities clause applies to rights specific to state citizenship to prevent those rights from being denied to out of state U.S. citizens. But those rights are few and far between, and court crafted exceptions have been carved out in cases where it does exist (hunting and fishing license fees and college tuition, for example).	1. Are this and similar ordinances constitutionally valid? Yes. Some future court might decide the law is invalid at some future time. But that possibility is hypothetical and speculative. Therefore, as of now, the law is valid unless and until it is challenged and overturned. 2. What defenses could a government make if challenged? It depends on what grounds the law is challenged. Your question about possible defenses is highly dependent on the nature of any challenge — which you have not specified in your question. The U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits laws respecting a number of things such as freedom of the press, speech, religion, peaceful assembly, bearing arms, etc. to list just a few of the most notable ones. But your question does not assert the law in question violates any specific or particular prohibition against it. Although the question mentions "restricting free movement as well as targeting only a specific demographic," it does not specify any part of any constitution that prohibits these things. Therefore, your question is unclear as to what might present a constitutional problem for the law. It is also unclear which constitution you think might contain prohibitive language. Is it a federal constitutional issue that concerns you? Or is it a state constitutional matter? In either case, which issue specifically concerns you? Your question needs to address these specifics in order to analyze it and respond in a meaningful way. Look at it like this... just as it is impossible to prove a negative, so is it impossible for anyone to conclude with absolute certainty that any law is not unconstitutional because no one can predict with certainty every possible future challenge a law might face. There are just too many possibilities to (pre-emptively) exhaust them all with certainty. Also, no one can predict with certainty how any future court might rule on the future challenges (which themselves are unpredictable as previously argued). Therefore, one can only say I think the law is unconstitutional and here are my reasons. Then others can analyze the law and the reasons; then offer an opinion. Further, based on precedent, would they likely be successful? See above answer to question numbered 2. Laws aren't required to be "justified" by the constitution. Constitutional justification for a law is a meaningless phrase. There is no requirement for a law to be "justified" by any constitution other than that the legislature is empowered by the constitution to make laws. That's all the justification any law needs. Beyond that, however, no law can violate the constitution as determined by a Supreme Court (or the last court to rule) if challenged.	The modern rule is that individuals in a married couple are almost never considered a single person (ownership of real property in a tenancy by entireties in a few states mostly in the Northeast, is a narrow and rare exception). Historically, considering a married man and woman to be a single person (a legal doctrine called coverture) was common place in the common law, but almost all such rules have been superseded. Lots of the relevant law and legal history is considered in the answer to this question at Law.SE.	There are no feasible legal actions that you can take. The implausible action is to sue the state on some constitutional grounds and have the order overturned in part. The order contains no appeals process, so you would have to attack the order itself. There are, here and there, lawsuits on Free Expression Clause grounds regarding the shuttering of churches, which stand the greatest chance of prevailing at the level of SCOTUS. Even if the court were to rule that under these circumstances the right to attend mass church meetings cannot be restricted, it is significantly less likely that application of the emergency powers acts to weddings would be found to violate a fundamental right.
Is it illegal to use a proxy chain in the UK? As you are all aware about the whole Facebook fiasco.... I am now wanting to be as anonymous as I can online, one method I found was to use a proxy chain. I am just wondering if it is legal in the UK before I try to set one up :) Bearing in mind that this will not be used for any illegal purposes such as: hacking, torrenting files illegally, streaming films illegally It's purely for normal web browsing but hopefully more secure Furthermore if it’s like this hen it’s very similar to using a tor browser or onion tor? Another thing I have heard is that by using a tool like this your ISP is likely to cut/slow down your internet, any truth to this?	No, it is not illegal in UK to use proxies. No, it is not like the tor concept. No, the ISP does not slow you down (they mostly throttle detectable p2p connections), but if you use public proxies, many of them will be unacceptably slow. Note: for things like facebook, a proxy is utterly useless. You already donated your private data to them, there's nothing to hide.	You ask them explicitly, maybe adding that you need that info specifically to calculate tax. IP address is not reliable because your customers could be using VPN, Tor, or be on vacation overseas. (By the way, "IP" on a website about law would more likely be understood as "Intellectual Property", not "Internet Protocol address".)	The law of each country where you offer the app for download applies, and you have to consider: Privacy Policy (GDPR in EU, CCPA in California, APPI in Japan, LGPD in Brasil, and more - check each country to be on the safe side) Disclaimer versus AGB/Terms and Conditions (e.g. Germany), not required but recommended Impressum (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) Value Added Tax (VAT) which is taken care of e.g. by Google Play for most countries but not all (e.g. not for Japan) in case the app is not free Consumer Protection Law - applicable (and different) everywhere There might be more, but these are the important ones I am aware of.	It is definitely illegal in Russia as well, but the police will do nothing. Previous activity of this group included forcefully attacking people who tried to speak to a girl who disliked it and handling over such people to police to get fined "for hooliganism". Usual practice in Russia is to beat the people whom the random girls around dislike. This group stepped a bit further, involving police. They use illegal or questionable methods, definitely. But they use them in a manner that people would be unlikely to complain to police because they themselves either did something illegal or public opinion is not on their side. The police usually will do nothing even with much more serious violations, like beating somebody.	In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say.	On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details).	I'm curious to know, because Google allowed their ownership of the domain to expire, why do they still have the rights to it even when it was bought by another individual. You're making an incorrect assumption here. The domain was never allowed to expire. An error in Google's domain registration interface allowed him to make an order for the domain. The domain was never actually purchased, but the act of ordering the domain gave Mr. Ved access to the domain in Google's Webmaster Tools. As the domain was never actually available for purchase, Mr. Ved had no rights to it. (The domain is not even registered through Google's domain registration interface; it's under a completely separate company, MarkMonitor, that specializes in high-value domains.)	Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task.
Are "slavish copies" of public domain work in the public domain? I had previously been under the impression that the photographed reproductions of public domain artwork were copyrighted - further research has made me question whether this is always the case. I wanted to clarify whether the below is indeed an exception, and if so how strong a protection it is. While searching for public domain images on Wikimedia I found the following: "The official position taken by the Wikimedia Foundation is that 'faithful reproductions of two-dimensional public domain works of art are public domain'." After checking the subsection for the United States, where I live, I found another statement that "Under the rule in Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corporation, a mere 'record' photograph of a 2D work of art (i.e. a photograph which is an as-accurate-as-possible copy of the original) acquires no copyright protection." After reading the article on this case, it seems to be correct that the above is a non-binding but influential precedent, if not law, so long as the reproduction is a "slavish copy" of the original. It's impressive to me that an organization as large as Wikimedia is willing to rely on this ruling, but I also wanted to get an outside opinion. So, is all the above true, and if so how strong a legal protection is this precedent? Is there anything else I should know about using it? A secondary question, if the above holds, would be whether this precedent would also allow the use of "slavish copies" that are on websites hosted outside of the United States if I myself live in the U.S. Bounty Edit: While I'm grateful for the answer I received, I'm making a bounty available for someone who provides a robust and practicable answer directly applicable to the USA. Thanks.	German perspective: In German law, there is the concept of Schöpfungshöhe (threshold of originality), which is required for authorship rights (Urheberrecht) to apply to a work. Basically, the idea is that a minimum of creativity is required for something to be protected. However, that bar is rather low. Thus, for example: Literary works are protected practically always. Maps are generally protected, even though you might argue they "slavishly copy nature", because the act of choosing what to show and what not is already creative. However, a faithful photographic reproduction of a painting is not eligible for Urheberrecht to apply (LG Berlin, AZ 15 O 428/15) So yes, a "slavish copy" of a work would not qualify for protection if there is no creativity involved. Note, however, that other types of protection apart from Urheberrecht might apply, such as Sui generis database right.	It's allowed by the Creative Commons Attribution -ShareAlike license, and intentionally so. The Wikimedia Foundation wants things like this to be possible; that is part of the goal of open content. (This license is also used on Stack Exchange content, so the same applies to e.g. this answer.) However, it is important to remember that this is not a public-domain equivalent license. If you copy from a Wikipedia article (or an SE post), you must comply with the "Attribution" and "ShareAlike" requirements. Attribution: You must give credit to the author. For Wikipedia articles, which typically have many authors, a link to the page is sufficient; editors agree to this in addition to the license when they save their edits. For Stack Exchange content, a link to the post itself should be enough. (To get a link to a post, click the "share" link below the post.) ShareAlike: If you modify the content, you must release your modified version under the same or a compatible license. You can't copy this answer, add more information (or translate it into another language, or make any other change), and keep an all-rights-reserved copyright on it, or release it into the public domain; your version must also be released under CC BY-SA. As long as you follow these requirements, copying is allowed and encouraged.	As the quote in your question notes (albeit in contrapositive form), Asimov's fiction may be made legally available for free download on the net with the permission of his estate. It is either that case that Princeton University's physics department (or whatever individual person or agency put up the story online) has obtained permission from Asimov's estate to distribute the story on their website, or they simply distribute it without legal permission, and Asimov's estate has not taken legal action to have it removed, which they may or may not choose to do in the future. Consider also that the Princeton distribution does not appear to have been meant to be in any way public: looking one directory level up (Princeton University Physics 115A and B: Physics for Future Leaders) shows a course overview with syllabus and lecture notes, without any apparent link to the story. Probably, it was put online for use exclusively by students taking that particular class, and the professor(s) just didn't put any controls to stop it from being accessible to anyone who knew the URL. This doesn't really change that fact that its public accessibility is, strictly speaking, copyright infringement, but it may be a favorable factor toward a finding that distribution outside of the class was innocent infringement, which can lessen (or, rarely, nullify) the penalty. (And it may be quite possible that distribution within the class was defensible under fair use/dealing, which considers educational context as a favorable factor.)	There aren't bright line rules in the area of fair use (which is the core issue - you are clearly copying a work that has copyright protected portions, at least - the question is whether fair use provides a defense and whether some portions are not copyright protected). This inquiry is fact specific and driven by general standards. Context such as whether the use would be free or commercial matter as well. For your own notes, anything goes pretty much. This generally wouldn't constitute "publication" of the work and would be for personal educational used by someone who paid for the book anyway. For shared notes - it depends. Also not all kinds of copying is created equal. Some parts of textbooks are themselves in the public domain or not protectable by copyright. For example, even a lengthy quote from a scientific journal article would probably be allowed with attribution. It would also be easier to evaluate based upon the type of textbook. A history textbook can have protection similar to trade non-fiction and can have very original exposition. An algebra textbook, less so. Your question also points to an end run. If the professor is the author of the textbook (many of mine were in something of a racket), you could get permission from the author.	These files are not public domain Read it carefully, it only says “public domain musical compositions in a MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) file format.” The compositions are public domain, the MIDI files aren’t - they are a derivative work (a translation) covered by their own copyright. Specifically, “© Copyright 2001 University of Arizona. All rights reserved” right next to a big “Contact us” link. Literary and artistic works that are derived (legally) from existing works have independent copyright even if the original no longer does. Mozart, for example, did not write his compositions in MIDI format. Now, it may be the intention of the University of Arizona that you can use it but, if so, they have not made this clear. It’s possible that the authors (mistakenly) thought that because the originals were public domain, their derivatives would be too. The music school should have talked to someone from the law school. All of the purposes that they talk about on the “Purpose” page are equally applicable to widely licensed (e.g. everyone) or narrowly controlled (e.g. staff of the University). Overall, a prudent person would assume that these works are copyright of the University of Arizona and can’t be used without permission or a fair use exemption. Your proposed usage is not fair use. However, there is a big “Contact us” link on every page so you can always ask for permission.	Who knows. It doesn't matter. 17 USC 102 lists the kinds of things protectable by copyright under US law. These are: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. A landscape feature is none of these and is not subject to copyright protection under US law, nor I think under the law of any other country. The "copyright notice" has no legal effect. 17 USC 120 Specifically prohibits copyright being used to prevent the taking of pictures of a building from a public place. In many countries Freedom of panorama (FOP) specifically permits publication of photos taken from public places. Se also this article on FOP. FOP is an exception to copyright protection, which applies to copyrighted architectural works and publicly posted works of art, such as sculptures. Since landscape features are not copyrightable at all, FOP does not strictly apply to them, but all the arguments for FOP would apply to them even more strongly. In US Law, particularly under the Fiest vs Rural case, only works with original content, created by a person, are protected by copyright. (Other countries generally have similar limits on copyright.) But a feature of the landscape is not the original creation of any person. (If someone carved the landscape into a designed shape, it might be protect able as a sculpture.) 3 and 4. If it were a building, you could take pictures of it from a public place or a private place where you have a legal right to be, under 17 USC 120 . But since a part of the landscape is not protected by copyright at all, this is not really relevant. No under the US First amendment there is generally a right to say even false things. But if the landowner attempts to enforce this "copyright" it would be considered frivolous and any court proceeding would be promptly tossed out. The sign gives the landowner no rights s/he would not otherwise have.	is it plausibly the case that ownership of an original photograph would be awarded to the subject (or the subject's heirs) because the subject did not consent to the making of the photograph? No The photograph belongs to the person who owned the photographic plate. Copyright in the image belonged (it has long ago entered the public domain) to the photographer. Subjects (then and now) have no claim on either. Do Massachusetts laws indeed protect personality and publicity rights in photos more than 160 years old, if they were originally taken without consent of the subject, and are now used without consent from the subject's next of kin? No The people in the photograph may bring a suit. These people are long since dead and their estates have long ago been wound up. There is no longer anyone with standing to bring such a suit. Does the US 13th amendment give any private right of action to claim property obtained via ownership of slavery, or that may constitute a "badge of slavery"? No In its entirety, the 13 amendment reads: Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. It does not deal with the products of slavery at all.	Please Note: This was written before the title change of this question and may no longer be applicable According to the Harvard website: In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 US 340 (1991) the United States Supreme Court held that copyright does not extend to a mere compilation of facts. In this case, it was a telephone directory much the same as the one in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the Court also ruled that something more than simple "sweat of the brow" labor was required before copyright protection would ensue, with some modicum of authorial originality necessary. Accordingly, it was held in Feist that copyright did not extend to a telephone directory, no matter how laborious a task its compilation was. The decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) is highly significant, therefore, in that it permits copyright or quasi-copyright protection to be extended to non-copyrightable material through the use of contract. One would have to consider each meta tag independently. For example, the "description" tag could by copyrightable since it is written for more than just the 'facts', such as a subtle advert for the site that is more than an objective description. However the 'og:type' would not be copyrightable since it would just be considered a fact. Now, if you are using it on another website and sourcing it properly, you could probably use it under "Fair Use" Uses That Are Generally Fair Uses Subject to some general limitations discussed later in this article, the following types of uses are usually deemed fair uses: Criticism and comment -- for example, quoting or excerpting a work in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment. News reporting -- for example, summarizing an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report. Research and scholarship -- for example, quoting a short passage in a scholarly, scientific, or technical work for illustration or clarification of the author's observations. Nonprofit educational uses -- for example, photocopying of limited portions of written works by teachers for classroom use. Parody -- that is, a work that ridicules another, usually well-known, work by imitating it in a comic way. A copyright would exist on the image. One would have to know what license currently applies to the image to know for sure, however, the "Fair Use" to copyright would still apply. With Fair Use, the entity type that uses the image is important. There is much more leniency when a non-profit uses copyrighted information than when the information is used in commercial activity. (With, of course, more exceptions.)
Can an apartment contractually prohbit tenants from saying certain words? This is a semi-ridiculous question from a law-ignorant but curious person. My apartment prohibits tenants from having firearms on the property, by the lease. in the United States, the "right to bear arms" is a constitutional right. (I understand there's disagreement about what that means, that things are more complicated than just that phrase, and etc.) So, theoretically, can an apartment 'infringe' on other constitutional rights as well, such as freedom of speech, as long as it's in the lease, and the tenant signs?	Firstly, your "apartment" doesn't prohibit anything; Your tenancy contract does. A terminology nitpick, but one that can shed some light on what is actually happening. TLDR: Your right to bear arms isn't being infringed, its being traded away. An unreasonable trade may be invalidated by the courts. Firearms restrictions are far less likely to be voided than speech content limitations. Yes, you have the right to bear arms(whatever exact meaning of that is). You also have the right to voluntarily agree to a binding agreement limiting that right, in exchange for a consideration. Compare a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). You have the right to freedom in your speech: you also have the right to agree to binding limits on your freedom of speech, in return for consideration (such as money or access to information). Every contract is structured in the same general way: Party A agrees to do or avoid doing certain things, in exchange for Party B agreeing to do or avoid doing certain things. So, in essence, what the apartment contract says is, that you agree to do or not do some things (including paying rent), in return for your landlord temporarily granting you some rights(such as the right to reside(generally exclusive), the right to control the space, etc. ), and imposing some obligations on themselves (which vary from place to place). In your case, one of the things that you are trading is a limitation on your right to bear arms(note that you can still bear arms, just not on the property in question). Now one thing to note is that courts have the power to enforce contracts; they also have the power to void contracts, in part or in full, if they are illegal or "unconscionable". In general, restricting (the content of) speech is not reasonable (e.g. having a general noise level restriction is reasonable), so is more likely to be struck down than one restricting firearms on the rented property.	Can the HOA compel payment? Yes, at least from the standpoint of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. That is because the resident obtains some benefit(s) from the HOA's activity & expenses, such as the maintenance of common areas and other items that advance the common good of the community. However, a drastic or arbitrary increase in invoices might not be enforceable, especially if these are unreasonable. The HOA would need to persuade in court that the resident accepted or would have knowingly and willfully accepted such drastic change. HOA bylaws: Are they enforceable absent a contract? If by bylaws you mean something other than bills, the question would depend on the substance & scope of those bylaws as well as the HOA's/resident's jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that a written & signed contract is oftentimes unnecessary. There is the notion of "implicit contract" to refer to rights and duties that can be inferred from the parties' conduct and the expectations that can be inferred therefrom. This notion of implicit contract is common in situations where there is no written document that reflects the parties' intent in the relation they willfully enter.	What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation.	This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.	Two factors are relevant. First, the language of the lease sometimes contains an abandonment clause that makes vacancy a default under the lease. This is common in a commercial lease, as vacancies can undermine the apparent viability of a strip mall or mall, but these provisions are less common in residential leases where the rent is current. Second, since this in New York City, there is an issue of rent-control. Rent-control benefits are available only for residential leases, and if you do not live there for long enough, it could be reclassified as a pied-a-terre and cease to qualify as a rent-controlled apartment. If your apartment is not a rent-controlled apartment, this isn't a concern, but if it is, further research related to continued qualification as a rent-controlled apartment in New York City is necessary.	Is this illegal? No, subject to some possible narrow exceptions discussed below. Do the social media companies have a duty under the First Amendment to not censor users? No. Indeed, usually, there is greater liability exposure for failing to censor content, for example, by failing to honor a "take down notice" under Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based upon an alleged copyright violation, or for failure to censor content related to potential sex trafficking. The First Amendment to the United State Constitution (which applies to state and local government via the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution) is a limitation on the power of governmental actors only. This said, some state constitutions, such as California's, provide free speech protections not just from government action, but also in spaces that are privately owned, but are open to the public and constitute de facto public forums. The authority of California to expand its state constitutional protections to these private settings was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). It is conceivable that these doctrines could be expanded to public Internet forums in the case of California based social media companies (e.g., Facebook has its headquarters in Menlo Park, California; so does its sister platform Instagram; LinkedIn is based in Sunnyvale, California; and Google is based in Mountain View, California). There are also laws that limit how employers can regulate employee speech in a labor relations context, although most of them don't have constitutional dimensions. It is conceivable that these doctrines could limit social media platform's authority to limit some kinds of speech by their own employees, or in situations where the social media platform looked like it was acting as a mere agent of some other employer controlled by that employer for all practical purposes. There has also been litigation related to free speech on social media regarding the rights of governmental account holders to exercise the same kinds of account management that is available to other users, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government. The social media platform operator is not itself the primary target in these cases, but if it simply implements its terms of service neutrally with respect to all account holders, it could be facilitating a constitutional violation by its governmental account holders and could conceivably be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation of the law by a governmental account holder (in the context of a lawsuit for money damages this is a special subtype of something called a civil conspiracy).	renting a single room with three other guys each renting their own rooms means exactly what it says. What you are paying for is that room, plus shared access to the common areas. Without knowing exactly what your lease says, especially with respect to the common areas, it's difficult to give a proper answer. I suspect that the lease for your room says nothing about who can live in the other rooms. Unless the lease says otherwise, the landlord has full control of the common areas. (Compare with a large apartment building, with hallways, stairwells, lobbies, etc., which must be maintained by the landlord.) This isn't an unusual arrangement, but I've never understood why anyone, landlord or tenant, would want it. There's far too much potential for conflict. You, yourself, could be a totally obnoxious person that the other three guys can't stand, but they'd have to put up with you. Their only alternatives are to move out or to ask the landlord to evict you. Moving out would be a lot of trouble for everyone. But, depending upon jurisdiction, as long as you're paying the rent on time and not causing damage to the property, eviction could be a very difficult and long process. And eviction is hardly in the landlord's interest. It costs a lot of money and time, and might not be granted even if she did apply. Why might a landlord spend so much time at the house they're renting? I'd be concerned about the implications of a woman going out of her way to do yoga in an area rented to four men. That is the part that sounds most strange in this situation. How do I resolve this? I'd start looking for a room somewhere else.	You can contract to do anything that is not illegal. In many jurisdictions unconscionability is a thing that statute or case law makes illegal. These clauses may be unconscionable, however ... In most jurisdictions real estate rental agreements are highly regulated; particularly as regards eviction. So, even if these don't cross the line into unconscionable (and for what it's worth, they're nudging it at least) they are probably prohibited anyway. There probably is an independent third party that decides on evictions anyway in the form of a court or rental tribunal.
Why Offer Arbitration Opt-Out As I understand it, in the United States there is no legal obligation for a company to offer its customers the opportunity to opt-out of their arbitration agreement. So why do some companies offer their customer a very short window in which they can opt-out of the arbitration agreement? Does offering the limited opt-out option give the company some added legal protection? (It doesn’t seem to be for the customer's benefit or it wouldn’t have a time limit, so I assume it must offer some legal or strategic benefit for the company to include it?)	Companies that operate worldwide have to comply with the law everywhere they operate. Some jurisdictions consider mandatory arbitration in standard-form consumer contracts to be unenforceable - providing the out may overcome this.	Issues of strategy rest with counsel, not the client. Thus, in the situation you posit, the lawyer is not required to follow the client's desires. One might observe, however, that a competent lawyer will avoid the conflict entirely by addressing the issue before accepting the client. If the client is firm in wanting to direct the lawyer's negotiation or litigation strategy, and the lawyer is unwilling to do so, the lawyer should decline to take on the case. When I practiced, prospective clients who wanted to run things were very politely declined and shown the door. I don't see anything unethical about accepting such conditions from a prospective client, but the attorney isn't required to do so, and can decline the employment.	This is contract law. There is nothing in legal codes that stipulated that this is valid, but rather that by signing a document that allowed for a signatory to void the contract if one of the terms was broken (don't do drugs... don't do criminal acts) is a valid agreement and the contract documented it was signed, thus the clean roommate was allowed to void his agreement without penalty for the exit because of the terms within. You can call it a loophole or a clause but it's perfectly valid as the contract was entered without any duress by both parties and the terms were violated. It should also be pointed out most shows in the vein of "Judge Judy" are not actually being handled in a real courtroom setting or real civil trial, but a set that is designed to look like a court room. What is actually going on is a legal process called "Binding Arbitration" where both parties in a disagreement sign a separate contract stating that they will agree to the decision of a neutral arbiter, who need not be a judge (though having a legal background is very helpful). With rare exception, the outcome cannot be appealed or elevated to a real civil court (unless the losing party is not cooperating with the arbiter's judgement, or the case is dismissed without prejudice, which is judge speak for allowing a civil case to be refiled or filed with another court. Typically this happens when the plaintiff is the victim of something that requires a little more legal authority in the judgement.). They also don't typically do this in a real court room but in a conference room. The court room trappings in these tv shows are for the audience. Arbitration does not create a legal precedence and typically the requested settlement must be small claims ($5,000 or less) though Judge Judy type shows will pay for travel and lodging for both parties and their witnesses regardless of outcome.	This is not illegal if the transaction has any relationship to the foreign country (this limitation is called the minimum contacts test). These agreements called choice of law or forum selection clauses are routinely honored. It usually isn't illegal for a clause to exclude a United States court as a forum as to the parties to the contract. The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws § 80 (1971), a source often relied upon by courts regarding common law rules upon which they have no binding precedents, states that: [T]he parties agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable. This doesn't actually divest the U.S. courts of jurisdiction over the case, but does mean that if you bring the case in a U.S. court in circumstances where there is no reason that the clause isn't valid and applicable, that your case will be promptly dismissed, possibly with an award of attorney fees and costs against you for trying to evade a valid contractual provision. The law concerning the scope of a choice of forum clause's application, and who decides that question, can be somewhat involved, but in particular cases, where the existence of a binding contract is undisputed and no exceptions to the general rule upholding these clauses is present, the enforcement of a choice of forum clause is often uncontroversial. As Wikipedia explains (in the forum selection clause link above): In Future Industries of America v. Advanced UV Light GmbH, 10-3928, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York City affirmed the dismissal of a case that sent the parties to Germany because the forum selection clause made German courts the exclusive forum. By contrast, the same court in Global Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 08-1358, affirmed the refusal of the lower court to refer the parties to Ireland because the clause was not exclusive, and the litigation continues in America. The state of New York has a statute expressly dealing with those circumstances under which a New York court may not dismiss a case on the grounds of forum non conveniens if the parties' contract provides that the agreed upon venue is a court in New York and if the transaction involved an amount more than $1 million. Currently, a U.S. Circuit Court split is emerging over whether forum selection clauses in a contract supersede pre-existing arbitration clauses in regulatory membership rules, such as FINRA. Statutory exceptions may apply in some cases. For example, under U.S. law, a provision allowing a debt collector to bring suit in consumer debt collection cases outside the place where the consumer debtor resides is void as a matter of public policy under the Fair Debt Collection Act. But, as a general rule, such clauses are not prohibited. Two of the leading cases upholding such clauses in U.S. law are M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 32 L. Ed. 2d 513, 92 Sup. Ct. 1907 (1972) (discussed in this law review article) and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). And, although both of these cases were in the specialty of admiralty law there is no reasoning in these cases confining the holding of these cases to a maritime law setting. More law review treatment can be found here.	First of all, there is no breach - they said they would pay it "over the course of the first year"; in what way is the first week not part of the first year? Second, breaching a contract doesn't always allow the aggrieved party to terminate it: in fact, being able to terminate is only for the most egregious of breaches or ones that are specifically spelled out as giving a right to termination. For example, failure to deliver (or pay) on time or in full would not allow termination, only damages.	What kind of contract would that be? One about... arbitration? One about "I hereby relinquish my claim for payment of X?" --- children cannot be taken away from their father, no matter what. - OP That contract is void in germany because this contract not only violates public policy, it tries to modify something that is regulated by law into a way that does offer less than the law demands as a minimum. That's not allowed in Germany. Further, a clause that gives custody to the father by default is also Sittenwidrig in Germany, and thus void under §138 BGB. So would be a clause that gives it to the mother by default by the way. In a case of controversy, only a court order can assign guardianship. And only the court can take guardianship away. When the kid is born its guardianship gets assigned to the parents as guardians by §1626 BGB. While it is possible to give your partner guardianship if you're not married under 1626a BGB it is explicitly impossible to assign guardianship for any compensation to either party (e.g. the mother or the new guardian may not receive anything other than the guardianship in the specific paper) under 1626b BGB. Thus a contract that does anything else in addition to guardianship, like a prenup, voids at least the guardianship clauses. And you have to tell the court about that assignment of guardianship under ($1626d BGB). Now comes the kicker: §1628 BGB forces the parents to apply to the court to solve any problems of huge impact, such as guardianship: So technically, mediation results are fully non-binding and you can not mandate it. Also, since all marriages are through the state, it needs a formal instrument of the state to be dissolved. The only three ways that the state ever allowed this to be done after WW2 were a) annulment through a court, which only was possible till 1998, or b) divorce through a court, c) death of one of the marriage partners. Yes, it takes a judge to divorce a marriage under $1313 BGB or one of the two married to die. Because you can't divorce without a filing in court, a clause that demands to divorce in some way that is not including §1313 BGB, that clause would be void. It might be legal to have a clause that demands to try to solve issues in arbitration before filing for divorce or sorting the belongings in such a way, but it can't supplant the court requirement.	This would appear to be a simple application of contract law - the exchange of money for a promise (to sell at a fixed price in the future). Option contracts are only regulated if they relate to options over securities (like company shares) - not if they are over personal property (like baseball cards).	I can answer for the U.S., if that's helpful. The general rule, in the United States, is that covenants not to compete are enforceable as long as they are reasonable. What constitutes "reasonable" varies from state to state. Factors considered generally include: What kind of actual harm will come to the business if you go to a competitor? In other words, is this rote language they include in every contract, or did they put it in yours because you know all the secret formulas and have the customer list memorized? Is it reasonable in time, location, and scope? Something preventing you from taking any job anywhere in the United States for ten years won't be enforceable; something preventing you from taking a job with the exact same title in the same industry in the same town for the next six months might be. The general rule at common law was that covenants not to compete were unenforceable restraints of trade; the fact that they're enforceable at all is later law created by each jurisdiction, and that means it's going to vary based on your specific jurisdiction. If you want to know whether it's okay to take a specific job based on a specific non-compete you signed, you will need to talk to a legal professional licensed in your jurisdiction--and even she may not be able to tell you for sure.
Is it legal to litter in international waters? Suppose I'm on a private yacht. I'm in international waters, and I forgot to bring a trash bag. So, I go ahead and just dump all my crap into the ocean. Is that illegal?	The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter is probably the right starting point: The purpose of the Protocol is similar to that of the Convention, but the Protocol is more restrictive: application of a "precautionary approach" is included as a general obligation; a "reverse list" approach is adopted, which implies that all dumping is prohibited unless explicitly permitted; incineration of wastes at sea is prohibited; export of wastes for the purpose of dumping or incineration at sea is prohibited. However, this is probably one of those situations which is difficult to enforce any action against an individual working with small amounts of waste. Necessarily, some items will be lost overboard accidentally.	If a private citizen or a company disposes of a piece of property with no expectation of its return, then it can be collected by another person without hindrance. It is considered "abandoned" per UNITED STATES v. REDMON. Thus, the intent to relinquish ownership and abandon trash is tantamount to “throwing away” a subjective expectation of privacy in it that society accepts as objectively reasonable. In short, when it comes to abandoned property, “I know it when I see it,” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (identifying what constitutes “obscene” material), and when the police see abandoned garbage which has been left unsecured in its usual place and at its usual time for collection, it is theirs for the taking.. Since Musk has stated that there is no reasonable possibility of its return and since he is no longer in communication with it, it can be considered (for all intents and purposes) to be abandoned garbage unlike, for example a privately owned orbiter or a communication satellite. "We estimate it'll be in that orbit for several hundred million years, maybe in excess of a billion years," Musk said before launch. Tuesday night, he tweeted: "Third burn successful. Exceeded Mars orbit and kept going to the Asteroid Belt." SpaceX's Tesla's out-of-this-world view	Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal.	Your legal obligation to pay income taxes is generally dependent upon where you perform the work, not where the funds you earn from doing the work are delivered. If you do work in Turkey that causes you to receive earned income, you owe Turkish income taxes on those earning, and your employer has a legal obligation to the Turkish government to make sure that those taxes get collected, or your employer will have to pay your taxes (with penalties) for you. If your employer has to do that, your employer will dock your pay to cover your obligations regardless of which bank account you use or whether you set up a corporation that does work in Turkey as a subcontracting company rather than in an employee-employer relationship. Any of the actions you propose to evade Turkish income taxes would constitute criminal tax fraud and could lead to you and the payroll officials at your employer's company who were complicit in allowing you to attempt to evade Turkish taxes spending time in a Turkish prison. Then you'd be deported. And, of course, you'd be fired probably as soon as you were criminally charged. The U.S. would cooperate with Turkey in pursuing you, your employer and your employer's payroll officials, although I don't know how the Kuwaiti government would respond.	Neighbors(including us) around the property started to mow the part in front of their yard(the weeds grew very high) and continue to do so(is it illegal for us to mow this overgrown land?). There are probably city codes around maintenance of lawns, cutting grass and clearing weeds. You should alert the relevant authorities and they will make sure that the maintenance occurs. You should probably not do it yourself since (a) you don't owe the owner any favors and (b) you might cause trouble for yourself. Recently there was some mowing by large tractors but very little was cut and most of it grew back. The question is really whether their activities bring them into compliance with applicable city codes or not. If they are compliant and you simply don't like how they maintain their property, that is tough luck. If they are not compliant, you are well within your rights to vigorously report them to relevant code enforcement authorities. This overgrown golf course is home to many wild animals(coyotes, snakes, foxes, alligators, etc..) See above 1) Is there any legal action that we can take to force the land owner to maintain the land? See above 2) Could this land somehow under some law be divided and given to the maintainers. This is an interesting question. Technically there are circumstances wherein you could take what's called adverse possession of part or all of the property. This would probably include doing things like actually residing on some piece of that land and establishing a residence there - perhaps getting mail or paying taxes there or paying utilities or operating a business - for a certain period of time without any interference from the technical owner. If you can meet the requirements of adverse possession then you might be able to become a legal owner. Unless you have little to lose, however, actually doing it might be difficult. 3) Is it legal to walk/drive on this land. (I see people walking their dogs, and driving atv's and motor bikes on the golf course) Unless you have been given notice otherwise, it is perfectly legal to walk wherever you like. It is the owner's responsibility to provide reasonable notice and take reasonable precautions against unwanted trespass; e.g., putting up a wall or fence, closing and/or locking a door or gate, posting signs and/or hiring security to patrol the property and enforce property rights - or occasionally checking to make sure their property isn't overrun with squatters.	When you breach a contract, you can get sued in local court, and if you don't show up to defend yourself, default judgment will be entered against you. Then the aggrieved party will have to collect, but the court in Washington (to invent a jurisdiction) can't enforce an order against a person in Norway (to invent another jurisdiction). So the aggrieved party would need to take enforcement of the judgment to the Norwegian courts. In the actual case of Norway, this is fairly simple, you just call an attorney in Norway to do the paperwork. It might be harder if the other jurisdiction is Belarus. If you return to the US, even if there is a money judgment against you for the rent owed, you will not be arrested for that debt. Depending on the state (about half of the states), you might be arrested for failing to comply with a court order to pay the debt. The difference lies in refusing to comply with a court order, versus simply having a debt. The State Department conveniently lists the reasons for denying a visa. Owing money or having an uncollected judgment against you is not one of the possible reasons, in fact even having been ordered by a court to pay, ignoring the order, and the court issuing an arrest warrant does not make you inadmissible.	Reports I've seen are that these seed shipments have false customs declarations, claiming that they contain something else, e.g. this one which was declared as "ring". That would violate 18 USC 542: Whoever enters or introduces, or attempts to enter or introduce, into the commerce of the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance, or makes any false statement in any declaration without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or procures the making of any such false statement as to any matter material thereto without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, whether or not the United States shall or may be deprived of any lawful duties; or Whoever is guilty of any willful act or omission whereby the United States shall or may be deprived of any lawful duties accruing upon merchandise embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission— Shall be fined for each offense under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Indeed, if they had been properly labeled "seeds", the packages would probably have been intercepted by US Customs and never have been delivered in the first place. International shipment of seeds and other agricultural products tends to be tightly regulated due to the risk of spreading plant diseases. There is also the Federal Seeds Act, 7 USC 1581: The importation into the United States is prohibited of— (1) any agricultural or vegetable seeds if any such seed contains noxious-weed seeds or the labeling of which is false or misleading in any respect; Under 7 USC 1596 violation is punishable by a fine of up to $1000 for the first offense, and up to $2000 for each subsequent offense.	Can I refuse, turn around, and just not enter the USA ,get back on a plane, turn around and drive back, or do I have to give over my devices just because I showed up? In theory you can refuse and turn around. At a highway check point or in a private boat disembarking context, that is fairly feasible. If you turn around before you are searched and get back across the border, the border control officers can't pursue you. In a commercial airplane or commercial boat disembarking context, this is as a practical matter, not a very feasible thing to do, because you can't as a practical matter, turn around and even if you plan to return, the only way you can make it to a return trip without passing through customs is if the border control officer refuses to admit you. The law is that non-probable cause searches are permitted at border checkpoints (and indeed even near a border checkpoint on the in country side), but this isn't much clarity about when that authority ends (short of returning across an international boundary) when deciding not to enter at a border checkpoint. Also, there is also a split of authority over whether a cell phone search is allowed in the first place. The Second Circuit in the U.S. has held that it is not, but the law is unresolved in many U.S. states at this time.
In what order do collateral and guarantees pay off a defaulted loan or bond? Company A is issued a loan that is guaranteed by Company B and is secured by liens on Company C's assets. Company A defaults on its loan. In what order are the collateral and guarantees used to pay off the creditors who own the loan? For example, is the collateral security from Company C used up completely first and then the guarantees from Company B relied on next, or is it pro-rata somehow between the security and guarantees, or something else entirely? Is there a standard part of an indenture or credit agreement where I can check this, or a convention if not?	To start with, this is a highly technical issue upon which different jurisdictions may differ, and in which different rules may apply in different circumstances either by agreement or by statute. Also, similar situations are sometimes treated differently in this regard in bankruptcy and out of bankruptcy. The majority rule is that the lender may choose which remedies - such as collateral and guarantee rights, to enforce, and the lender may choose in which order to enforce them. For example, most jurisdictions allow a lender to collect from a guarantor even when collateral is available to the lender, in lieu of foreclosing on the collateral. Sometimes, however, special rules apply. For example, if the guarantor is a government agency (e.g. the Small Business Administration or the Veteran's Administration), often the lender is required to take all reasonable efforts to collect from the borrower and recover the amount owed from collateral, before the guarantee can be invoked. Similarly, sometimes the law distinguishes between an accommodation party who receives no consideration in a transaction who signs as a direct debtor, and one who signs in a guarantor capacity. Those jurisdictions may require a good faith effort to collect from direct debtors (often including attempts to foreclose upon collateral) before attempting to collect from guarantors who sign as such. There are also arrangements, such as credit default swaps or a situation when a consumer provides a credit card payment authorization which a creditor can use in the event of a default (or the large dollar amount equivalent of such an arrangement called a "letter of credit"), in which the line between what constitutes collateral and what constitutes a guarantee can be blurred.	I find the "is collapsing" statement troubling. Companies grow, shrink, and restructure all the time. Nelnet might be coming apart, or somebody might be trying to generate clicks for a news story. The normal situation, when a company goes into bankrupcty proceedings, is that a trustee tries to recover as much of the assets as possible to pay out creditors. This would suggest an increased, not decreased, attempt to collect repayments.	Ultimately, if they force you into bankruptcy, everything, except: tools of your trade household items (clothing, furniture), however, if these are worth significantly more than a replacement then they can be sold and you get given a replacement. Short of this they can: garnishee bank accounts garnishee wages and other income seize and sell personal property acquire liens over real property The cannot force you to borrow money pay them, however, this may be a better option than any of the above, particularly bankruptcy. If you are in such a situation you should seek advice on how to best deal with it. Most creditors are willing to negotiate over amounts and timing: something latter on is better than nothing ever.	Let me start by saying that real estate contracts are some of the most heavily regulated contracts and details vary enormously by jurisdiction. That said ... To vary a contract, the contract must actually contain provisions that allow for it to be varied and variations must be in accordance with those. These sorts of clauses are common in long-term contracts (building, mining, logistics etc) but are less common (but not unknown) in transactional contracts like real estate sales. If the contract does not contain such provisions then it can only be varied by a collateral contract which has the same basic requirements of any contract - in this particular case, were you offered something in return for agreeing to delay settlement? If you weren't you do not have a collateral contract that varies the original contract. Notwithstanding, even though the other party delaying settlement from the 11th to the 18th is a breach of the contract by them, by agreeing to it you would be prevented from enforcing your rights under the contract by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This presumes that they actually settle by the 18th - if they don't all bets are off and you can enforce the rights you have from their breach by failing to settle on or before the 11th - just don't agree to any more extensions. What you remedies are will be detailed in the contract. These would normally include issuing a notice for them to settle by a given date - if they don't do that you can terminate the contract and keep the deposit. You could also sue for damages. Don't do any of this (or anything else) without getting legal advice first. Edit The OP has put in a comment a rather vital piece of information: there is a clause making settlement contingent on the buyer selling their condo. If the delay is in accordance with that clause then the vendor is stuck, even if settlement takes 10 years.	Short Answer The question of whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the real property is located. The place where the parties to the agreement reside, or where the documents are signed, is irrelevant. I am not aware of any exceptions to this rule anywhere in the world. In some circumstances, the parties may reach an agreement regarding whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse if the law of the jurisdiction permits agreements of this type. But, often the parties are not allowed to vary this aspect of their real property mortgage agreement by contract. Choice is law for loans secured by collateral which is property other than real property is pretty much irrelevant in the U.S. This because the law is the same in every U.S. state, territory, or district. Long Answer Background regarding recourse and non-recourse loans To clarify, the terms "recourse" and "non-recourse" are normally used to refer to the remedies available in the event of foreclosure of a loan secured by property that serves as collateral for the loan. When the collateral is real property, the core documents in the transaction are a promissory note that represents a borrower's promise to reply the funds borrowed from any assets available to the borrower that is not exempt from creditor's claims, and a document representing the fact that the collateral may be seized if the promissory note is not paid as agreed, and that the creditor's interest in that collateral has priority over all third parties seeking to collect their debts out of that property which cannot be erased by transferring the property to someone else. This document is sometimes called a mortgage, and a substantially equivalent document used mostly in the Western U.S. is called a deed of trust. I will call this document a mortgage for simplicity, whatever its true name in your locality. In the case of a recourse mortgage, if the borrower defaults, the lender can foreclose on the mortgage, which results in a foreclosure sale at which the lender can bid all or part of the debt secured by the collateral together with any additional cash desired, and their parties may make cash bids. Ignoring for the moment the complications involved when there are multiple mortgages and liens with different priorities encumbering the real property, the person who makes the highest bid at the foreclosure sale is given ownership of the real property in exchange for paying the price bid at the foreclosure sale either in cash (in the case of a third-party bid) or in the from of a reduction in the debt owed, in the case of a lender bidding the debt owed against the property. If the mortgage is a recourse mortgage, then if the lender bids less than the full amount of the debt owed on the promissory note and is the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, then the debt owed on the promissory note is reduced by the amount of the bid made by the lender and the remainder of the balance owing on the promissory note is a personal debt owed by the borrower to the lender called a deficiency judgment. For example, suppose that you buy a house for $1,000,000 with a $200,000 down payment and an $800,0000 recourse mortgage loan. Some time later, the balance owed on the mortgage loan from regular monthly principal and interest payments is $775,000. But, due to a collapse in the real estate market in the real estate market where your house is located, your house, which had a fair market value of $1,000,000 when you bought it, now has a fair market value of $725,000. You lose you job due to the same economic downturn that has caused the market value of your house to decline and are unable to make mortgage payments. The lender forecloses on your house and bids $725,000 at the foreclosure sale, even though you still owe $775,000 on the promissory note. After the foreclosure sale is completely, the lender owns your house, and you still owe the lender a deficiency judgment of $50,000. The lender may now collect the $50,000 deficiency judgment in much the ame way that the lender would collect a judgment entered by a court on an unpaid credit card bill for $50,000. The lender can garnish your wages (once you get some), can seize your bank accounts, and can seize other property which you own which is not protected by a statutory exemption from creditors. In a recourse mortgage the economic risk of declining property values that wipe out the down payment equity is born by the borrower. In contrast, if you had a non-recourse mortgage, the lender's sole remedy would be to seize the collateral and the lenders would not be able to obtain a deficiency judgment no matter how little your house was worth. Operationally, this means that the lender is required to bid the full amount of the debt owed by the borrower to the lender at the foreclosure sale, even if the property is worth much less than the amount of the debt owed. In the case of a non-recourse mortgage the economic risk of declining property values that wipe out the down payment equity is born by the lender. Choice of Law For Real Property The place where the documents are signed and the domiciles or place of organization of the parties to the agreement are irrelevant to the question of whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse. In the U.S. (and everywhere else that I am aware of), the law governing security interests in real property, such as mortgages and deeds of trust and liens is the law of the place where the real property is located. So, if you take out a mortgage on property in a non-recourse state, the mortgage will be a non-recourse mortgage. Usually, in a non-recourse state, it is not possible for a lender and a borrower to mutually agree to make the mortgage a recourse mortgage when the default rule is that mortgages are non-recourse mortgages. In contrast, if you take out a mortgage on property in a recourse state, the mortgage will be a recourse mortgage, unless the borrower and lender expressly waive the right of the lender to obtain a deficiency judgment in a foreclosure within the mortgage document. Choice of Law For Other Property The law governing security interests in property other than real property in the U.S. is usually the Uniform Commercial Code which contains choice of law rules. While, in theory, different rules that states could adopt regarding whether security interests in property other than real property are recourse or non-recourse, in practice, every U.S. state has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code as a matter of state or territorial or district law, and at the level of generality of whether a security interest (which is the legal name for a mortgage with collateral other than real property under the Uniform Commercial Code) is recourse or non-recourse, the law is uniform throughout the United States, although there might be slight technical differences between the laws of different states or other jurisdictions within the U.S. based upon the version of the Uniform Commercial Code that is on the books or the decision of state legislators to deviate from the uniform statute's language. The Uniform Commercial Code of each state contains choice of law rules determine which state's version of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to a case. And, the choice of law rules of the Uniform Commercial Code in the state where a lawsuit pertaining to the personal property security interest is what a court in that state applies to resolve the choice of law question. These rules are generally consistent with each other. Footnote on Macroeconomic Implications Of Recourse v. Nonrecourse Mortgages The incentives of lenders and borrowers when entering into mortgage loan arrangements is different in recourse and nonrecourse mortgages, particularly, when the decision to give a borrower a loan is made by a third-party mortgage broker subject to bureaucratic conditions, or by a low level bank employee who acts in the same way, rather than by someone with an economic stake the financial well being of the lender. When mortgage loans are non-recourse, down payments are small, and housing prices are rising, and may be entering a real estate bubble, a borrower is in a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation. If real property values collapse, the borrow loses only his small down payment. If real property values go up, the borrower can sell the property and pocket all of the profits (in some circumstances the profits are even tax free). The borrower has little incentive to worry about the possibility that the fair market value of the real estate could collapse at some point. But, if the decision to allow the borrower to borrow is made by an employee or broker with nothing to lose if a loan is authorized when it shouldn't have been because the risk that the property values will collapse due to a real estate bubble are too great, the mortgage broker has an incentive to be lax in underwriting the loan to make sure that the borrower can really make the payments and that a foreclosure of the loan will realize enough value to pay of the loan if a real estate price bubble collapses. And, since the bank can get its money back and more by foreclosing if the borrower doesn't make payments while prices are going up, there isn't much of an incentive to make sure that the evidence of the borrower's ability to make the payments on the mortgage is accurate. The incentive of the broker or employee is usually to get as many mortgages processed as possible, even if that means overlooking problems with paperwork in a loan application, or using an appraiser who will say that the property being financed is worth what is necessary to get the loan approved, even if you know that the appraiser is cutting corners or just making up inaccurate values to get what the broker wants done. These events can conspire to make a real estate mortgage very bad and to expose the entire community of lenders who make loans in a non-recourse state to catastrophic losses in the event that a real estate bubble collapses. In contrast, this is much less likely to happen in a recourse mortgage state, where the risk of a downside loss deficiency judgment discourages borrowers from trying to finance the purchase of a house that could easily lose more value than the down payment if it was apparent that a real estate bubble was developing. So borrowers would self-police. The reason for this extended footnote and story is that this was one of the root causes of the financial crisis. A handful of states with big real estate markets and non-recourse mortgages (California, Florida and Texas mostly) started to experience real estate bubbles and mortgage lenders, because they had bad incentives in their mortgage origination systems didn't do enough to prevent themselves from financing the purchases of overprices houses. Eventually, the real estate bubble collapsed, lots of borrowers with overpriced houses and little money down defaulted on very large mortgage loans, and the lenders took huge losses on their real estate mortgage portfolios which were supposed to be ultra-low risk but weren't because the people evaluating the real estate mortgage investments overlooked or willfully ignored the risks. This, in turn, resulted in losses so great at the financial institution level that almost every major investment bank in the country and almost every subprime lender in the country went out of business or went bankrupt, and the collapse of this part of the financial industry, in turn, wrecked havoc on every firm in the economy that relied of these financial institutions as a source of investment or a source of financing for their unrelated businesses. The result was the worst recession since the Great Depression.	In business dealings, you would have a contract with a company, not with its owner. The new owner inherits both the assets and liabilities of the company. It's up to the buyer of the business to do due diligence before buying the company. The old owner may escape obligations to clients and suppliers once the sale of the business is complete, but the new owner could sue the old owner for fraud. (It may be possible to escape some liabilities by declaring bankruptcy, but that's not the situation you described. One unethical accounting trick that a company can use is to split the company into two corporations such that one branch inherits the liabilities, and it go defunct.)	It depends How good is your (legal) English? For example, do you know the legal difference between "will", "shall" and "must"? Or, the difference between "employee", "subcontractor" and "worker"? Or the difference between "bankruptcy", "insolvency" and an "act of bankruptcy"? Contingency What are you going to put in your dispute resolution clause? Do you prefer mediation, arbitration or litigation? Will it be a one size fits all or will it be escalating? What happens if one of you dies? Or emigrates? Or divorces? Or is convicted of a crime? A financial crime? A violent crime? A sexual crime? Or what if such is just alleged but not proven? What happens if the company ceases to exist? Or is sued? Or is acquired by someone else? Or by one of you? Who is responsible for insuring the subject matter of the contract (if anyone)? To what value? If the person who should doesn't can the other person effect the insurance and claim the premium as a debt due and payable? Not all of these will be relevant to your contract. Familiarity How familiar are you with this sort of contract? Is this something you do all the time or is this a one off? For example, I am happy to enter a construction contract without legal advice because that's my business and has been for many years - I know my risks and how to manage them, inside and outside the contract. However, when I set up shareholder's agreements, wills and business continuation insurance with my partners, we went to a lawyer. What is your relationship with the other person i.e. how much do you know and trust them? Stakes If the contract is not very important (which is something that varies with the participants, for some people a million dollar contract is not important for others a $5 one is), so that if, by screwing up, you are OK if you lose everything you've staked then write it yourself. Alternatively, if the contract is vitally important to you and your heirs and assignees unto the 6th generation, I'd get a lawyer to write it - its pretty cheap insurance. How long the contract lasts will be a factor in this - a contract that exposes you to risk for 3 months is different than one that does so for 25 years. Basically, its a risk reward calculation. TL;DR Contracts only matter when relationships break down. If you reach for the contract then you can expect that the other party will be playing for keeps and that contract is your only defense against the worst they can do. If you are happy with your skills in mitigating against a cashed-up opponent who wants to see you go down no matter the cost then draft it yourself.	No, because you are affecting the car's value by selling its parts. The car is collateral to the loan, so if you don't make the payments, the lender has the right to repossess and resell it to recoup their money. If they are unable to recover at least the outstanding balance of the loan through resale, you will be on the hook for the difference. This is called a "deficiency balance". Simply having possession of something isn't adequate basis to decide you can do whatever you want with it. You have physical possession, but the lender is the first lien holder on the title until the loan is satisfied.
How can you get back intellectual property from a bankrupt startup? I have written some software for an American startup that has since gone bankrupt. The intellectual property consists of: Software code Patents that have me listed as their inventor, but that, according to online patent registers, are still assigned to the now defunct company The company, having had investors, has apparently auctioned off all of its assets, including the intellectual property. I therefore have the following questions: How can I find out whom the intellectual property now belongs to? For the patent, is this possible through the patent office? If the assignee has not been changed in the patent register, is it possible to reassign the patent to myself, since the company has apparently neglected to do so? I would also be happy about other general advice for this situation. Can you just call the current owner and ask to buy the IP back? How does one go about that?	How can I find out whom the intellectual property now belongs to? For the patent, is this possible through the patent office? If it is a patent, the patent office; if it is a copyright, the copyright registrar. You could also look at the return from the auction in the bankruptcy court case file, which would control even if the patent office and copyright registrar records haven't yet been updated. You could also call the person who conducted the auction, or the lawyer who arranged for the auction, to ask. Often they would cooperate in telling you this information since a bankruptcy auction is, by definition, a public sale anyway, and cooperation might help them gain positive referrals from you in the future. If the assignee has not been changed in the patent register, is it possible to reassign the patent to myself, since the company has apparently neglected to do so? No. Doing this would be a form of fraud or embezzlement. The intellectual property became the property of the bankruptcy estate. If the bankruptcy estate is determined to have property not disposed of in the case, you would have to petition the bankruptcy court to have the remaining assets sold for the benefit of the creditors of the estate at fair market value. The Follow Up Questions I'm going to decline to answer the follow up question about how to arrange to purchase intellectual property from someone when you would like to own it, once you determine who the owner is. This is a more general question that applies to lots of circumstances and is as much a question of economics as law. There is an Ask Patents.SE forum, which might be a more appropriate place to ask that question.	Generally not. There is a notion in copyright law called the first-sale doctrine in which after a particular copy of a copyrighted work is legitimately sold, the purchaser can sell, lend, lease, give away, or otherwise dispose of the copy as he sees fit. Copyright does not give the copyright holder exclusive rights to authorize resales. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 for the relevant US law; in other countries the same principle is sometimes called exhaustion of rights. There are limits to the doctrine. In the US, it does not allow for for-profit software rental (for most software) or musical record rentals. Moreover, software companies noticed the part where the doctrine applies to a transfer of title (i.e. an actual sale). If you read a typical software EULA, it is generally quite explicit that the software was licensed to you instead of sold; this is why. Courts in the US have often enforced these provisions (particularly if the license imposes limits like "you can't resell it"); European courts have, as far as I know, been far less willing to accept that argument. However, as a general rule resale is specifically not forbidden by copyright.	Short Answer The kind of lawsuits you could end up being involved in simply from owning a copyright are similar to those you could end up being involved in for receiving shares of stock in a publicly held corporation that never actually pays any dividends - i.e. only those that are inherent in any kind of property ownership. There Would Be No Criminal Or Tort Liability If by "can I get in legal trouble just for the simple fact of owning these copyrights? . . . please give legal precedents where people have been somehow punished for just owning a copyright[.]" Normally, when you use the term "punished" you are thinking about criminal or tort liability. If, by "legal trouble", you mean can you have criminal liability or civil liability for wrongdoing in tort (i.e. for a civil wrong), the answer is that you probably can't get in "legal trouble." I can't think of any way that mere ownership of a copyright could give rise to that kind of liability in the way that you might have to be concerned if, for example, you owned real estate that wasn't maintained and caused an injury to someone. You Could Still End Up In A Lawsuit But if, by "legal trouble", you mean that you can't be legitimately made a party to, or involved in, a lawsuit that doesn't allege that you are personally at fault, the answer is that you probably can get in "legal trouble." I'll provide some examples, although not necessarily specific cases where these things have happened, because they are largely self-evident. Instead, I indicate what my personal experience as a lawyer has been with each kind of situation. For the most part, the legal principles involved would be general to pretty much any kind of property interest in anything and are not really specific to a copyright in particular. But, because it is a copyright rather than another kind of property, in the U.S. at least, the lawsuits would have to be brought in federal court, rather than in state court, in some of these cases, because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases related to the validity, registration, and enforcement of copyrights. You could also be subjected to a subpoena because as a copyright owner you have access to, or might have access to, information that is relevant for some other lawsuit or criminal prosecution. The cases where you could get into a lawsuit basically fall into the following categories: Disputes Over Who Owns Or Should Own The Copyright Or A License To Use It The author leaves you the copyright in a Will, but the author's heirs are convinced that the author was mentally infirm and sue to have the Will invalidated. You have to be involved in the lawsuit because you were one of the beneficiaries of the allegedly invalid Will. (I've handled half a dozen Will contests). The Will could also be invalid because the author had a contract or divorce settlement requiring the author to leave the copyright to someone else and the author violated that contract. (I've handled a case with this fact pattern, although involving real estate rather than a copyright.) Unbeknownst to you, before the author's death, the author sold the copyrighted work to someone else and they sue you in a lawsuit intended to establish that they own it and not you. (I've handled cases similar to this involving water rights.) Unbeknownst to you, before the author's death, the author licensed the copyrighted work to someone else and they sue you in a lawsuit intended to establish that their license is still valid. (I've handled cases like this involving leases to real estate.) Unbeknownst to you, the author obtained the copyright for a work that was actually written by someone else (or for work that was done "for hire" while working for someone else whom they had agreed would own the copyright). As the current owner of the copyright you could be sued in an action to have the author's copyright invalidated. In a variant of this scenario, the author could have omitted a co-author of the work when filing for a copyright and the co-author could sue to be legally recognized as a co-author. (I am handling a lawsuit like that right now involving a copyright.) Suppose that the author got divorced shortly before death and didn't disclose the existence of the copyright in the divorce action. The author's ex-spouse could sue you to recover all or part of the copyright that might have been awarded to the ex-spouse in the divorce if the existence of this asset had not been concealed, perhaps under a legal theory known as "constructive trust" (which would mean that the legal fiction that you were holding this copyright in trust for the true legal owners of it to be determined in the future, as a result of the author's wrongful conduct, would be utilized). (I've represented a client in a divorce where this remedy was obtained by a party.) Suits To Gain Ownership Of The Copyright As Part Of Debt Collection Suppose that the author was subject to a tax lien before the author died for unpaid income taxes, and the author's estate does not pay off that tax lien in the probate proceeding in which you receive the copyright. The taxing authorities could sue you to enforce their tax lien to collect the author's unpaid taxes. (I've represented people in income tax lien cases, although never one where someone ended up dying before the collection could take place.) Another kind of taxes that could give rise to a tax lien on a copyright would be those arising as a consequence of the author's death. In the U.S., that would usually involve estate taxes. In Canada, this would often involve capital gains taxes on increases in the fair market value of the copyright that arose during the author's lifetime. (When I handle probate cases, I consider this possibility and have published a couple of articles on liens in probate cases.) Similarly, if the copyright were used as collateral for a loan that was unpaid at the author's death, the lender could sue to seize the copyright in partial payment of the loan. (I've handled cases like this involving real estate and ownership interests in companies.) Suppose that the copyright had genuine economic value and the author gave it to you at a time when the author was insolvent (i.e. had debts greater than the total value of the author's assets and the author was not paying the author's debts as they came due). A creditor of the estate could seek to set aside the transfer to you in what is known as a "fraudulent transfer" lawsuit in order to seize the copyright in order to collect a debt. (I've litigated fraudulent transfer lawsuits involving other kinds of intellectual property, although never a copyright.) Subpoenas You could end up being involved in some sort of "legal trouble" because you could be subpoenaed to provide information that you have as a result of being a copyright owner. Still, this is really no different from the risk you can have of being subpoenaed to provide information related to all many of things that you know about in your daily life that could be relevant to a court case, for example, knowledge you involuntarily obtain when you witness a car accident, or run a credit card transaction for someone that could provide the customer with an alibi in a murder case. (I issue subpoenas all the time in civil cases and routinely represent people who have received subpoenas.) In these situations, you could be required to provide records or show up to a deposition or trial to testify at a witness, with only minimal compensation, even though no one is trying to impose civil or criminal liability of any kind on you personally. Still, this legal obligation could be a significant economic burden to you that you can do nothing about but suck up and comply with. But, if you failed to respond to the subpoena, a warrant could issue for you arrest for contempt of court and you could be incarcerated or fined until you complied with the subpoena, and of course, if you lied while you were testifying (or at least, a prosecutor and judge believed that there was probable cause to believe that you were lying during your testimony), you could be prosecuted for perjury. Obviously, in these cases, the civil or criminal consequences would be due to your own personal misconduct in connection with a court case and not your ownership of the copyright itself, of course. For example, suppose that the author's son was getting divorced. He or his wife might subpoena you to produce records such as the copyright transfer document, to prove that the son didn't inherit that asset, to prove that it isn't an asset of the son in the divorce. (I've had cases where issues like this are litigated, although not yet involving a copyright.) As another example, suppose that the federal government suspected the author and daughter of being part of a money laundering scheme and was prosecuting the daughter for this crime (the author, being dead, wouldn't have to worry about that prosecution). The daughter's defense attorney might subpoena you to testify in court regarding the fact that you received the copyright as a gift rather than purchasing it, and that you weren't collecting royalties on it, in order to prove that the copyright wasn't being used as part of the alleged money laundering scheme; or the prosecution might call you to testify to the same information because the author had been reporting royalties from the copyright on his tax returns when in fact he hadn't been receiving any royalties and the money he received was really from a cocaine dealing cartel. (Creating paper trails to make it possible to disprove money laundering allegations if they were ever made is something that lawyers involved in business and estate planning and asset protection planning matters, like me, spend a lot of time worrying about, even though we rarely end up actually litigating it in the end.) Footnote: Some Extremely Unlikely Extreme Privacy Cases There are extremely rare cases in which the mere public acknowledgement of the existence of the copyright could have national security or trade secret implications, and you could be sued, or subject to legal action or threatened legal action of some kind in order to suppress public knowledge of the existence of the copyright. For example, suppose that the name of the work was "A User's Guide To Cracking The Chinese Military's Nuclear Weapon Control Codes." Furthermore, suppose that the author was a former employee of the National Security Agency (N.S.A.) which is the spy agency that secretly cracks foreign government's codes. In this situation, you could probably be subject to secret legal action to put a gag order on the existence of this work. This is because if China knew that someone in the U.S. had cracked their nuclear weapon control codes, they would change them and this would impair U.S. National Security. (As a mathematics major in college I discovered that a significant number of PhD mathematicians in certain specialities related to cryptography end up being basically coerced to work for the NSA because their research is classified for national security reasons, so they have to get paid a decent salary to work for the NSA or never publish their work which deprives them of an ability to make a livelihood (e.g. as a professor or business consultant) using their knowledge - its a running source of dark humor among advance math students contemplating graduate school studies. I also have many estate planning clients who work for intelligence agencies, i.e. for spies, who have to keep certain information secret for national security purposes.) Similarly, suppose that the name of the work was: "A Computer Program Designed To Utilize Backdoors To Encrypted Fortune 500 Company Databases Pursuant To Section 324(b) Of General Software Corporation's Service Contract Which Nobody Ever Reads", and the author was a former employee of General Software Corporation that used this backdoor for its own selfish business advantage contrary to the client's financial interests, which was legal because corporate software clients authorized this in an obscure clause of their standard service agreement. Perhaps access to this backdoor is actually the source of most of General Software Corporation's profits as it actually barely breaks even on its code writing and maintenance work. In this situation, General Software Corporation could probably take legal action to put a gag order on you to protect their trade secret, because if this trade secret became public, its value would be destroyed because the companies affected would shut down this valuable back door. (In my practice, most of the trade secret disputes involve living people in the legal marijuana industry, but if one of them died, this kind of thing could come up.)	Under the First Sale doctrine, when intellectual property is imparted to an actual physical thing, the first commercial buyer of that actual physical thing (that is made with proper intellectual property licensing or permission) is entitled to use it without further intellectual property limitations. As Wikipedia explains at the link: The first-sale doctrine (also sometimes referred to as the "right of first sale" or the "first sale rule") is an American legal concept that limits the rights of an intellectual property owner to control resale of products embodying its intellectual property. The doctrine enables the distribution chain of copyrighted products, library lending, giving, video rentals and secondary markets for copyrighted works (for example, enabling individuals to sell their legally purchased books or CDs to others). In trademark law, this same doctrine enables reselling of trademarked products after the trademark holder puts the products on the market. In the case of patented products, the doctrine allows resale of patented products without any control from the patent holder. A different analysis applies if the goods when first made were already infringing. But, in practice, the aggrieved IP owner usually sues the primary infringer or an importer of the infringing goods, rather than a retail purchaser, in those case.	I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies.	Tricky. First, what is better for you? You usually start an LLC to protect yourself (the person) from liability in case things go wrong. Worst case, you lose all the assets of the LLC. So if the LLC owns the copyright, that is an asset, which can be lost if the LLC goes bankrupt. So I'd say it's better for your protection if you own the copyright personally. If you created the software in your own time, before the LLC was started, then you own the copyright. You should create a proper contract saying that the LLC has the non-exclusive right to market the software and keep profits from the sale of the software, and that this agreement can be cancelled by you at any time. Signed by you, as a private citizen, and by the director of the LLC, which happens to be you as well, on behalf of the LLC. That will give you maximum personal protection. On the other hand, investors won't be willing to invest in your LLC, because it basically owns nothing of any value. So if you want investments, then you may be less able to protect your assets, because the investors want to protect their assets as well.	You can't patent an algorithm, but I'll assume you are talking about the case where you have patented a machine or process that uses an algorithm, but that adds significantly more, and that the software being distributed implements much of this process. Courts might find an implied licence or promissory estoppel when distributing software under an open source licence that doesn't explicitly exclude patent licencing as part of its terms. It would be prudent to state your patent rights and explicitly exclude a patent licence if you intend to enforce your patent rights. As an example, this software implicates a patent , so they allow "permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its documentation for educational, research, and non-commercial" purposes. Users that want to use the software commercially need to contact the authors who also happen to be the patent owners, and I assume would negotiate a patent licence at that point.	Short Answer No, you may not do this legally without permission in the form of a license from the owners of this intellectual property. Your video game based merch business plan is a horrible, horrible idea. There is no reasonable way that you could have known just how horribly awful and bad an idea this was without talking to someone familiar with the law. So, I'm not saying that this was a stupid or unreasonable question. But, now, you know. And, you should run away from this idea as fast as you can. Long Answer What you are proposing to do is blatant infringement of copyright (and trademarks) through the creation of derviative works, on a systematic basis, for profit, without permission, in a manner that does not constitute a parody or satire or any form of fair use. This kind of economic activity is precisely what copyright and trademark laws are designed to prevent. The case against you for liability could only get more clear if you were selling pirated copies of the game itself. You would have no legal defenses (other than statute of limitations if they waited to many years to sue you, which they almost certainly would not). You would be liable for statutory damages of up to many thousands of dollars per infringing item and the attorneys' fees the intellectual property owners incurred to sue you. The owners of the games could probably get a court order to destroy all of your merchandise, and a restraining order and injunction to force you to immediately shut down your business at any time. They could obtain all of those remedies without sending you a cease and desist letter before suing you. The moderately likely worst case scenario economic liability that you would face would be on the order of 100 times the amount of profits you could hope to make in a best case scenario, and the likelihood that you would incur some significant civil liability is on the order of 85%-90% (with almost of of the little or no civil liability percentage attributed to scenarios in which the company doesn't notice that you are infringing upon its intellectual property rights). Also, the more profitable you are and the higher the volume of goods you sell, the more likely you are to be sued. The liability risk to profit ratio grows with each additional dollar of profit you make. There is a good chance (perhaps 65%-75%) that they could establish that your violation was willful and wanton in these circumstances, which would also prevent you from discharging any part of the massive judgment against you in bankruptcy. So, there is a better than 50% chance that you'd be stuck with an intellectual property rights infringement debt, which could easily run into the high hundreds of thousand or even many millions of dollars, plus post-judgment interest at a rate similar to the market rate for high risk junk bonds, for the rest of your life. In terms of the economic harm involved to you, this would be almost as bad as having all of your property seized and then being sold into slavery for the rest of your life, if a coin toss bet comes up tails, but you get to keep the coin if it comes up heads. A settlement in which you turned over every penny you ever made in the venture, destroyed all of your products, shut down the business and paid them an additional low five figure amount in lieu of penalties and attorneys' fees would be a very generous offer. You would also face a real risk (perhaps 10%-15%) of some low level felony criminal liability (perhaps several years in prison). This is a business plan that is so toxic with immense, near certain liability risks of the worst possible kind that you should put on gloves before picking it up and tossing it into your nearest available fireplace or campfire. This business plan poses more liability risk to you than opening up a nightclub, bribing your contractors and code inspectors to ignore all fire and electrical codes, painting the walls with turpentine, padlocking all of the exit doors from the outside, changing a $1 cover and selling booze at cost to get huge crowds, and then booking bands with lots of fireworks in their stage shows on a nightly basis. (Yes, I really had a client who was stupid enough to come up with this business plan until I talked him out of it.) From a civil liability perspective, you would have less exposure to economic liability if you started a business that involved abducting random cats and dogs and goats off the street and charging customers to forcibly rape and then mutilate them, while filming it for distribution on the Internet with your real name and fingerprints in a watermark on every image and close ups of the animals collar tags and the goats' brands. The likelihood of criminal liability would be quite a bit greater (perhaps 60%-80%), however, even though the punishment if you were convicted of felonies for the bestiality business would be similar to the punishment for a conviction for copyright and trademark infringement. (Thankfully, I have yet to see a client try to implement this business plan.) Go hire someone to secure a license from the intellectual property owner for you (perhaps an IP lawyer or an agent or broker), or forget about it. This is an industry where you absolutely must be legitimate, and you have to go big or go home. The economies of scale are simply too immense to ignore. If your anticipated gross sales aren't at least $500,000 a year or so, you probably shouldn't even consider doing it whether it is legal or not. A license, if you could get it, would probably cost $6,000 to $12,000 in professional fees to negotiate (if you could accomplish this feat at all), perhaps a similar amount for an upfront fee to the intellectual property holder, and probably 10%-35% of your profits on an ongoing basis. This is because the market rate of licenses of this kind are geared towards what large scale distributors selling wholesale to Wal-Marts, department stores, and national mall chains could bear (I have some clients that happily pay these kinds of license fees so they can sell branded products, manufactured in China and then imported, on a high volume national basis.) The license fees would be a huge bargain by comparison to your economic exposure to infringement liability. But, if even the licensing fees (if you could negotiate a deal to pay them) are too expensive, then, this business plan doesn't make economic sense even with permission in the form of a license from the intellectual property owner. In that case, you should instead go into the lemonade stand business or buy a food truck, or become an Uber driver, or open a coffee shop or a liquor store, or something like that, with less liability risk and a more proven business model. If you must make video game merch without permission, do it in a back alley of a small town in rural Mexico on a cash only basis (where lots of people do stuff like this without getting caught), rather than an online store, where any bored paralegal or network manager in the video game company's law firm can find you at a moment's notice and might win a promotion or a raise or a bonus for doing so.
Can a person be compelled to testify against themself in a civil trial? I read that a key piece of evidence against Bill Cosby in his recent criminal trial was testimony he gave in a deposition in response to a civil suit filed against him by one of his accusers. In the deposition, he stated that he had given quaaludes to women. So, if he was compelled to give this testimony in the civil trial, then it would appear to be an end run around the constitutional protections against self incrimination. Either that or was he just foolish to voluntarily give the deposition. Which was it?	The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies only in criminal trials, but it permits a witness to refuse to answer a question in either criminal or civil cases, including in a deposition. If he had committed crimes or thought that his answers might have incriminated him, he should have declined to answer. I'm not terribly familiar with this case, but it occurs to me that a lot of the allegations against Cosby go pretty far back; it could be that he was talking about something so far back that he wasn't exposed to any criminal liability. In a case like that, it may even be that a judge had already ordered him to answer the question. Assuming that he voluntarily answered the question, he has waived his right against self-incrimination and the testimony is generally admissible.	Laws criminalizing perjury are not about being mistaken or less believable in your testimony. The crime is, very narrowly, stating something which you do not believe to be true, while under oath. If you make a statement that happens to be untrue but you believe it is true (you are mistaken), that is not perjury. In the US, moreover, you have to assert something literally untrue, not simply say something that could be interpreted as being untrue. Rental arbitration hearings are nothing special, except that witnesses may or may not be sworn under the particular state's laws. If a witness is sworn and unambiguously asserts "Jones gave Smith $1,000 at that time", and another sworn witness asserts "Jones did not give Smith any money at that time", that might suggest that one witness testified as to something that they did not believe to be true. It might also show that they were standing in different places. Even if the circumstances show that the two witnesses observed the same facts, you would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one party knew at the time that their statement was false. It is also possible that one witness made mis-remembered or misinterpreted what they saw. They might say or write something else (under oath, or elsewhere) that establishes that they knew better. An example is US v. DeZarn, which clearly established that the defendant could not have believed the statement that he testified to. With no official record of what a party testified to, it may not possible to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a party committed perjury, since it can be reasonable to doubt claims of what he actually testified to. The defendant's attorney may, however, have to create such a doubt. Some answers could be perjurous if the question and answer are short enough, for example "Did you cash the check?" "No", if witnesses to the hearing testify convincingly that this exchange took place.	It is somewhat understated, because your silence can also be used against you. In Salinas v. Texas, defendant Salinas was "just talking" to police, not in custody, and his silence (as opposed to shock and outrage) at the question of whether shell casings found at the crime scene would match his shotgun. This "adoptive admission" was introduced as evidence against him. In order to prevent your silence from being used against you, you must invoke the 5th amendment. There are two exceptions to the rule that you must invoke the 5th to be protected by it. First, a criminal defendant need not take the stand and assert the privilege at their own trial. Second, a witness’s failure to invoke the privilege must be excused where governmental coercion makes their forfeiture of the privilege involuntary (Miranda). In lieu of coercion, you must preface your silence with an invocation of your 5th amendment rights.	Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent?	Only in a civil case Yes, in a civil case, Alice generally can call Bob as a witness to take the stand. In many cases, this is done very early, locking in their testimony, before expert witnesses or other evidence by the plaintiff are presented to try and undermine the testimony. Alice may ask only questions that have relevance to the case. Let's take for example a dispute about a contract: Alice may ask Bob if he engaged in negotiations to form the contract, about the matter of the contract, if he signed the contract, or how he (or his employees) fulfilled (or not) the contract. Pretty much everything that pertains to the contract or the execution thereof. This does not extend to the settlement of the case or attempts thereof. Alice may not ask if Bob has an affair with Clarice unless that somehow is material to the contract at hand. Alice may not re-ask questions where an objection was sustained in the same way. However, Bob might not need to answer all questions (there are things that are banned from being asked), especially as Bob's attorney will object to questions. A few examples of competent questioning can be seen towards the end of My Cousin Vinnie, though this is a criminal trial. Never in a criminal trial In a criminal trial, not only can the prosecution not call Bob to the stand, he has to elect to go to the stand to even be questioned by the prosecution. That is because he can "plead the 5th". There is a tiny exception for civil cases, where they can do so there too.	Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked & answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false & misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness.	It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.	In a civil rights action in which someone prevails (which is by no means certain in this case, but not impossible either), there is at a minimum an award of nominal damages (i.e. $1) and the reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs incurred in the lawsuit. A jury could also award a prevailing party non-economic damages, and/or exemplary damages (a.k.a punitive damages) in connection with a violation of civil rights. There might also be injunctive or declaratory relief stating that this was a violation of civil rights and requiring the government to adopt practices to prevent harm going forward. It is hard to see how there would be any economic damages at issue in this case, but it isn't impossible to imagine some circumstances in which they could be proven, perhaps.

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