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When are errors of process "fatal?" Under what circumstances (if any) can an error of process doom a plaintiff's claim? Process errors can include things like failure to serve notice or motions in a timely or correct fashion, or failure to file a timely response or petition. My understanding is that a court can dismiss a case or decide it against a plaintiff for such errors of process, and that such decisions based on process failures are not usually granted an appeal. If a plaintiff loses a case based on process errors before a trial but is still within the statute of limitations for his claim, can he always (or never) "start from scratch?" Or, put another way, can one lose one's right to seek redress of a grievance by failure to follow the rules of court? For example: Suppose a plaintiff is suing (either criminally or civilly) pro se, so there is no attorney the court can sanction or the plaintiff can blame. After a drawn out process the court gets tired of the plaintiff's ignorance of process, grants a defense motion for dismissal, and refuses a plaintiff's petition for reconsideration. Can the plaintiff go back to "square one" and file an identical but new case? If so, it seems like that might be considered to pose an undue burden on the defendant. If not, it seems like the plaintiff is being denied rights due to rules that are, in general, arbitrary even if expedient.	The legal term for what you're talking about is "prejudice." When a lawsuit (or a claim, or a party) is dismissed by a court "with prejudice," that means that the same cause of action cannot be brought again by the same plaintiff against the same defendant. It is also possible to dismiss a claim "without prejudice," meaning the same claim can be brought at a later date. When, exactly, a civil case can be dismissed with or without prejudice will depend on the jurisdiction where you're litigating. However, the general rule is that once the suit is underway, most dismissals are with prejudice. For example, in U.S. federal court, the plaintiff has the right to dismiss the suit without prejudice only up until the defendant responds to the complaint (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)), unless all of the defendants agree to be sued again later (this does happen, sometimes, but normally only as part of a broader settlement). So, yes; you can lose your substantive legal rights if you refuse to follow the court's procedural rules. Most courts, especially in federal court, where there is a fairly permissive standard of pleading, will give plenty of leeway to pro se litigants, but in the end they have to follow the rules. In my own experience, when pro se claims are dismissed, it's generally on the merits. If cases are dismissed for procedural reasons, it's almost always a case of a pro se litigant refusing to listen to the judge's clear instructions for what they need to do (or, more often, not do).	The law regarding proof of service allows service of summons by publication in case a defendant "is not a resident of the state, but has property therein and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action". Plaintiff must file an affidavit saying that he believes that you are not a resident, and he either mailed the summons to you or states that your residence is unknown. Knowing how to contact a person is not exactly the same as knowing their residence, so the statement in the affidavit might be true. There is a one year limit on your right to defend and reopen if not served personally. The statute of limitations tolls after the cause of action has accrued (which I suppose would be defective service of the summons, viz. perjury in the affadavit). For recovery of real property, the time would be ten years. The court rules allow that "At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued". (This is clearly a matter that your attorney needs to address).	Nope. Say I sue you successfully, and the court delivers a judgement that awards $1000 in damages. It is not the responsibility of the small claims court to ensure that the judgement is fulfilled. In fact, the debtor (person who lost) can outright refuse to pay the creditor (or the person who won). They are not in violation of any law at this point. However, the creditor can ask the court for options on enforcing their judgement, and these can include, but are not limited to: Garnishing wages Providing a court order Seizure of assets (through court sheriff, don't use this yourself or you end up getting into criminal matters) and others to enforce the judgement. The debtor isn't liable for refusing, unless when they are in violation of a court order. Violating a court order is a criminal matter, and the debtor could possibly be found guilty of contempt of court. Oh, and the case wouldn't move on to a higher court. Cases go to a higher court when an appeal is made, generally when there has been an error in enforcing the law. You also need to be provided leave to make an appeal.	Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.	In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, you could usually be sued in the jurisdictions where the events giving rise to the claim took place, if you were personally served with process anywhere in the world in a procedurally correct manner. If this happens and you default or fail to cooperate in the judicial process, you will probably have a judgment entered against you. If you lost, the other party would get a judgment against you (an official declaration of a court that you owe another party money that authorizes various involuntary means of debt collection from your income and assets). This could be enforced against assets you have in the jurisdiction where the judgment was entered, or could be "domesticated" to a different jurisdiction where you had assets by bringing suit or exercising another process set forth by treaty or a law of the jurisdiction in which the foreign judgment holder seeks to domesticate the judgment. Whether the foreign judgment is conclusive against you or not, depends upon the domestic law of the place where they seek to enforce the foreign judgment, the nature of the underlying claims upon which the foreign judgment is based, and the legal process used to obtain the foreign judgment. Many countries will pretty much automatically enforce a judgment enforcing a breach of a contract between private sector parties obtained through the ordinary legal process in a country whose legal system is recognized by the U.S., but often will not give legal effect to legal procedures like a pre-dispute "confessions of judgment", an award of exemplary damages, an award of non-economic damages, or an award based upon a legal theory that is not recognized by the jurisdiction in which you seek to enforce the judgment. In general, judgments of U.S. courts in tort cases are rarely recognized by other countries. Similarly, a U.S. court, for example, would not enforce a foreign judgment, from say, ISIL controlled territory, for breach of a contract to deliver slaves to a buyer. Some Saudi Arabian money judgments are not enforced in the U.S. because the courts have held that their system does not protect basic principles of due process and the rule of law, which is why contracts with Saudi Arabia often have arbitration clauses instead of relying upon the royal courts in existence there. Some countries might enforce a judgment entered following a trial on the merits regarding a dispute, but not a default judgment, without essentially bringing the lawsuit all over again in the country where the assets are located, applying the general principles of legal concepts known as "collateral estoppel" and "res judicata". Most countries have special laws specifically governing when an arbitration award will be enforced with a money judgment in that jurisdiction and when it will not be enforced. This varies considerably from one country to another. The U.S. is unusually deferential to employment and consumer arbitration, but most countries will recognize express signed contractual arbitration agreements in a business to business situation that conforms to basic standards of due process.	When a complaint is first file, per case law, courts have a duty to believe each allegation you make on information and belief as long as they are each not contradicting any other statement or other evidence present at the time of filing. This isn't true. The court doesn't have to actually believe you. The court merely has to assume for sake of argument that the things said are true for the narrow purpose of evaluating whether they describe a legal wrong in a formal sense. Also, under modern federal pleading rules in the U.S., the judge doesn't have to believe you and can dismiss your complaint if it is not "plausible." Your attorney has a duty to not merely assume that everything that a client tells the lawyer is true. In federal court, the governing rule is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which states that when an attorney files and signs a document in court that the attorney: certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. The California state law obligations is more or less identical in substance, although the procedural rules of California are codified differently than the federal rules. So, a lawyer is required to reasonably inquire into whether the client is telling the lawyer the truth about the client's motives and about the facts. It is a breach of the lawyer's duties to the court and the profession to simply take what a client tells the lawyer at face value, accepting it uncritically.	Courts only decide disputes If the written contract says X but the parties agree they meant Y, then the court adopts Y. However, if the written contract says X but one party asserts Y and the other Z, the court takes the written contract as definitive. The parol evidence rule would prevent any evidence being introduced if X is unambiguous. Plaintiff presents contemporaneous evidence that the parties did not intend the Written Agreement to be integrated, even though the template they used contains the integration clause. The plaintiff can’t introduce that evidence in the first place unless there is some ambiguity to be resolved. If it’s plain on the face that integration (whatever that is) was intended then we’re done here counsel, move along. But what if at the same time that they signed the Written Agreement in question the parties signed another agreement covering some of the same subjects? If the documents don’t create a practical conflict then we’re in the same place as before. If they do then the court will try to resolve that within the written documents - a later document will usually prevail over an earlier one and a more detailed document over a more general one. Extrinsic evidence is almost always excluded. Or what if there is incontrovertible evidence that both parties subsequently and intentionally acted contrary to some term of the Written Agreement? That would suggest that the Written Agreement did not represent the Actual Agreement. No, that would constitute a waiver by one or both parties - you can choose not to enforce (waive) your rights under a contract. This can be one off or, if repeated often enough, a waiver for all future breaches. Alternatively, the parties are free to change the terms of their contract; maybe that’s what happened.	I will assume that your question pertains to the United States. In other jurisdictions, different rules could apply. Context matters. The usual penalty for spoliation of evidence (the technical term for what you describe) in a civil case is a judicial determination or jury instruction that the evidence destroyed would have established the relevant part of the other side's case had it not been destroyed. In all of these cases, your failure to take affirmative action to preserve the evidence once you knew that there was a bona fide likelihood that you would be sued could be held against you by making an adverse determination that the evidence would have been unfavorable to you and possibly also money sanctions. You could not be held in contempt of court for this if these events happened before a case was commenced. In a criminal case, where you are a defendant, you have an absolute right to not incriminate yourself and do not have to take affirmative action to preserve evidence, although this right is limited to criminal cases and your failure to preserve evidence can still be held against you in a civil case. Certainly, in situation 4 you are a potential criminal defendant, so the 5th Amendment protection would apply. In situations 1 and 2, where the precautions were not put in place to facilitate a crime, the 5th Amendment would protect you if you were a potential criminal defendant, but suppose that you are a bystander like a third party ISP representative. If you were a third party, at a minimum you would have to be put on notice of the police need for the evidence, would probably have had to have had the police ask you for the evidence, and of course, would have to be aware that the destruction was imminent and have the power to prevent that destruction. If all those conditions were present, you might be guilty of obstruction of justice (there are precedents for inaction knowing of the consequences in the fact of a police question amounting to obstruction of justice). In situation 3, this kind of action pretty much amounts to being an accessory to some crime before the fact (unless someone was successfully deceived by a very elaborate story) and would likely make anyone involved part of a conspiracy to commit the crime that the destruction of the papers would facilitate. While the papers themselves might have been evidence of a crime or civil wrong, the destruction of the papers might itself be considered part of the crime, regardless of what could be established regarding the actual content of the papers.
Is there a definition of "biological sex" in U.S. law? According to MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT / SUBJECT: Military Service by Transgender Individuals: • Transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria are disqualified from military service, except under the following limited circumstances: (1) if they have been stable for 36 consecutive months in their biological sex prior to accession; (2) Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria after entering into service may be retained if they do not require a change of gender and remain deployable within applicable retention standards; and (3) currently serving Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since the previous administration's policy took effect and prior to the effective date of this new policy, may continue to serve in their preferred gender and receive medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria. • Transgender persons who require or have undergone gender transition are disqualified from military service. • Transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria, who are otherwise qualified for service, may serve, like all other Service members, in their biological sex. (emphasis mine) So this seems to rely heavily on one's biological sex, but a US legal definition of biological sex is not something that's easy to find online. Is there one at all? If so, what's the text?	I did a lot of digging through case law and statutes, but I don't see a definition for "biological sex" anywhere in federal law, though after looking through those cases, it seems pretty clear that courts think of "biological sex" as a definition of "sex," and that they take it to mean the sex listed on your birth certificate. Even if we could find a straightforward statutory definition, it probably wouldn't do much to inform the interpretation of this memorandum, as it would only apply to the specific section of law in which the definition was included.	germany Is there any act of husband or wife which can be considered as rape? The paragraph for sexual offences is §177 StGb. Obviously there are nuances between those offences, not everything is "rape", but all of it is illegal. To answer your question, yes, the same acts that are considered rape when they are not husband and wife. While marriage had been an exception, this was considered archaic by many and this exception was removed in 1997: Vergewaltigung in der Ehe ist seit Juli 1997 strafbar. Mit dem 33. Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz wurde das Merkmal außerehelich aus dem Tatbestand der Vergewaltigung, § 177 StGB, gestrichen, sodass seitdem auch die eheliche Vergewaltigung als ein Verbrechen geahndet wird. Translation: Marital rape has been punishable since July 1997. With the 33rd Criminal Law Amendment Act, the characteristic "extramarital" was removed from the definition of rape, § Section 177 of the Criminal Code, so that since then marital rape has also been punished as a crime. There is no mention of how consent is to be expressed or even that it needs to be expressed explicitely.	The only real answer is that the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the constitution, and specifically the argument that the 13th Amendment prohibits a draft for compelled military services has totally rejected that argument. For many years now the US has not used a draft, and it is obviously possible for the US to have an enduring and powerful military without any draft, which was perhaps not apparent to the Justices in 1918. A draft had been common in this country from the colonial period, through the Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In reaction to the problems during the Vietnam War, and the great opposition to any draft at that time, the US has not used a draft since, although it retains a legal requirement to register for a possible draft, and the legal authority to impose one should it be thought wise. Note that this was not because of the 13th Amendment. Note also that compelled service by the citizens (or residents) in a locality, particularly to fight fires and floods, when the usual forces are inadequate to that end, has been commonly used. Such compulsory service has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th Amendment. Also, as mentioned in comments, citizens can be compelled to do jury duty, which could in theory be considered "involuntary servitude" but has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th amendment. The answer by Trish (now deleted) thoroughly described the many differences between a slave and a drafted soldier. Still, drafted military service might be thought to be a form of involuntary servitude. But the Court (and the laws and other courts as well) have not treated it as such. In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) the Court thought the idea that compulsory military service constituted involuntary servitude was so wrongheaded that it thought a very brief mention sufficient to refute this contention. It wrote (at 245 U. S. 390): Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement. It is clear from the text of that opinion that the justices thought that the existence of a power to draft soldiers was essential to the implementation of the constitutional power (article I section 8): To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; The opinion discusses the history of compelled military service in the United States, in the colonies before there was a United States, and in Great Britain before that. The opinion says that: Compelled military service is neither repugnant to a free government nor in conflict with the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty. Indeed, it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right of the government to compel it. and Further, it is said, the right to provide is not denied by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot include the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This however but challenges the existence of all power, for a governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power. One may disagree, but that is the law of the land as interpreted by the final body authorized to make such interpretations, the Supreme Court, and it remains good law today.	The law upheld by the decision is a New York law, and thus only applies in the state of New York. Its current text reads in relevant part: No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of the state who is... Not a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, after July first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, to an alien teacher employed pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education permitting such employment. The citizenship requirements of this subdivision shall not apply to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed whose immigration status is that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and who would otherwise be eligible to serve as a teacher, or to apply for or receive permanent certification as a teacher, but for the foregoing requirements of this subdivision. The last sentence of that will no longer be effective starting Nov 30 2022. So, this law only says they are prohibited in New York public schools. And even then, they are allowed if they are applying to be a citizen, if they are hired pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education, or (until 2022) if they are a lawful permanent resident of the US. Other states may have other laws, of course.	There is a report about a male-to-female transgender woman here: http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lawreport/2017-06-27/8651398#transcript She managed to do the following: 1. While legally being a male, she got a preliminary passport as a woman so she could travel to Thailand, have an operation, and not run into trouble returning with a male passport and a female body. 2. While legally still being male, but with a female body, she married a woman in Australia. That was fine because legally she was male. 3. She has received a passport as a female. 4. She was refused a change of her birth certificate as long as she is married. So the current state is: She is (in fact, biologically) a woman. She is married to a woman in Australia. That marriage is perfectly legal, however, it is officially a marriage between a man and a woman. She has a woman's passport. The Australian government cannot and doesn't want to do anything to make her marriage illegal. BUT she cannot change her birth certificate without getting divorced first, and if she got divorced and changed her birth certificate, she couldn't remarry the same woman, or any other woman.	At the federal level, employment discrimination as prohibited here is at its core a tort rather than a crime. Probably the most pertinent first part of the law is Subpart B, which encompasses procedures. The EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) may receive allegations of a violation, and there is a procedure for deciding on the merits of the case. After charges are filed, there is an investigation by the EEOC, which may include a public hearing. Based on the investigation, the commission may dismiss the charge (technical flaws in the complaint); they may issue a letter of determination to that effect if they find that there was no reasonable cause for the complaint. They can also encourage a negotiated settlement. In making this determination, the commission follows its own guidelines, as encoded in the regulations. So if the commission determines by its rules that there was a violation, the courts will generally defer to that finding unless the finding is contrary to what Congress said. If there is no dismissal or settlement, then they issue a determination that there is reasonable cause (§1601.21). Then there is a procedure to rectify unlawful practices, which includes the possibility of a conciliation agreement. Finally, starting at §1601.27, we get to the point that somebody might get their day in court. If the accused still refuses to relent on whatever point was at stake, the matter can go to trial: The Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent named in a charge not a government, governmental agency or political subdivision, after thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of a charge with the Commission unless a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission has been secured But also, the aggrieved can take the accused to court at any time. The allegation then must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.	I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.	Only in the “most unusual and extraordinary circumstances” "conceivable" Respect for the chain of command is central to the armed services. As a result, lower ranked officers generally cannot relieve a higher ranked officers of command. Instead, they must work through the chain of command, taking their complaints to their superior's superior. To do otherwise is usually considered mutiny. As far as I know, the only service that has made formal provisions for this is the Navy. This makes sense, given that ships at sea may be out of contact for extended periods. The Navy regulations involving a subordinate can relieve a superior of command are found in § 1088. Relief of a Commanding Officer by a Subordinate of Chapter 10: Precedence, Authority and Command of the US Navy Regulations, issued by the Secretary of the Navy. Here is what that sections says: In the “most unusual and extraordinary circumstances,” a commanding officer can be relieved only by the “next in succession to command.” The problem must be so “obvious and clear” that any “reasonable, prudent and experienced officer” could reach only a “single conclusion:” that leaving the officer in command would “seriously and irretrievably prejudice the public interests.” Unless it is a “undoubtedly impractical,” the subordinate cannot act “without the approval of…higher authority...” The subordinate can act only after “much careful consideration” and after an “exhaustive investigation of all the circumstances…” The decision “must be based upon…substantial evidence,” and supported by “the official views of others in a position to form valid opinions…” Any subordinate who relieves a superior will “bear the legitimate responsibility for…such action,” and “must be prepared to justify…” it.
Is there any theory that would let someone recoup their money from buying overpriced jewelry? This question is inspired by this article. Alice purchases jewelry from dealer, Bob, for $15 million. Alice hires Carol to appraise jewelry. Carol advises Alice jewelry is worth $5 million. Alice sues Bob for $10 million. Is there any legal theory under which Alice could win her suit against Bob? If so, what are the minimum facts Alice must prove? Clarifying assumptions This is not a fraud case. Bob did not defraud Alice in the sense that he promised to deliver X and, instead, delivered Y. As a dealer, Bob knew the jewelry would appraise for $5 million when he sold it to Alice. Bob told Alice the purchase was a "great investment" that would "only go up in value." All legally required disclosures and disclaimers (if any) were made. The suit occurs after any statutory buyer's remorse period expires (if any). The sale took place in San Diego, California.	Consideration Consideration under a contract must be "sufficient" but it does not need to be "adequate". Insufficient consideration falls under the following headings: performance of a duty imposed by law performance of a duty already imposed by contract acceptance by the creditor of part payment by a third party Composition with creditors Moral obligation Illusory or uncertain promises Adequacy refers to whether the transaction represents a poor deal or not for either party - the law will enforce contracts that give effect to poor deals. On the face of it jewelry on the one side and money on the other are both sufficient consideration to support a contract - the law does not care if they are adequate. Basically, if you pay too much for something - tough titties. Representations A representation is a non-contractual statement of fact made by a party before or at the time of making a contract, addressed to the other party and in fact induces the party to enter the contract. If the buyer can prove that the vendor made the statements that the jewelry was a "great investment" that would "only go up in value" then these would be misrepresentations - bearing in mind that this would need to be proved on a transaction by transaction basis since each is a separate contract. There are legal remedies for misrepresentation in several areas of the law: Some representations become terms of the contract - the innocent party must either sue for damages or recind for actionable misrepresentation. If the misrepresentation led to a contract being entered into by mistake (which is a legal term of art and not applicable here), the contract may be void. A misrepresentation may become a collateral contract. If it is an "actionable" misrepresentation then the contract may be voidable a negligent misrepresentation may give rise to the tort of negligence. a fraudulent misrepresentation may give rise to the tort of deceit. Consumer law may also provide remedies (I don't know enough about Californian law here to comment). An "actionable" misrepresentation must have actually induced you to enter the contract, that is, you must have relied on that representation rather than your own judgement.	Do you have a contract? It depends on the website’s terms but almost certainly not. It is standard practice in e-commerce terms and conditions that your selecting “buy” and giving the vendor money does not create a contract; you are merely making an offer that the vendor can accept or reject. For example, Amazon’s terms are clear that the contract only comes into existence when they dispatch the goods, until then they are free to cancel your order and return your money. Here the vendor rejected the offer. Is this false advertising? Maybe. It would depend on the specifics of the ad and whether, overall, a reasonable person would be mislead or deceived. It’s possible you misunderstood but that doesn’t necessarily make it misleading or deceptive. I misunderstand a lot of things; that doesn’t mean they were objectively misleading or deceptive. Notwithstanding, a business does not have to make good on false advertising. An incorrect advertised price does not force the business to anccept offers of that price. It may force a correction and may require the item to not be sold until the price is corrected and it may expose the business to fines, but it does not give anyone the right to buy at that price.	What would happen if this money was not returned? The former employee would, based on the given circumstances, be guilty of theft contrary to section 1 of the Theft Act 1968: (1) A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it... Section 5 defines "Belonging to another" to include: (4)Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration [...] an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the property or proceeds. Setion 4 states that: (1)“Property” includes money... Although there are statutory defences to theft, at section 2, to acting dishonestly they are not satisfied in this scenario: (1)A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— (a)if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other of it, on behalf of himself or of a third person; or (b)if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or (c)(except where the property came to him as trustee or personal representative) if he appropriates the property in the belief that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps. A very similar set of circumstances arose in the case A-G Ref (No 1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182 The defendant, a police woman, received an overpayment in her wages by mistake. She had noticed that she had received more than she was entitled to but did not say anything to her employer. She did not withdraw any of the money from her bank account. The trial judge directed the jury to acquit. The Attorney General referred a question to the Court of Appeal. Held: [by the Court of Appeal] It was possible for a theft conviction to arise where the defendant had not withdrawn the money. There was a legal obligation to return the money received by mistake.	user6726's answer about civil action is good, as you appear to have lots of evidence that document-based in terms of bank records, etc. And media shaming would work; but you could be sued in retaliation, even if you're right. But try calling a prosecutor - such as a county attorney - rather than an arm of law enforcement. The police are always overworked and can be reluctant to try and put a case together for the local prosecutor. Contacting a county attorney is free and doesn't require you to get a lawyer, and it can be a surprisingly effective tactic against a criminal. A phone call or a detailed letter to the county attorney for the person's county of residence that explains the criminal activity may be the key to getting some movement in the situation. You have lots of hard evidence to hand the attorney about an individual who is committing fraud, and that evidence may make simply make the case for the attorney, as it is documented evidence they can immediately verify and use, either at the county level, or be passed to the district (state) prosecutor. A loss of $4000 is significant, and may be a felony in that state. But the "$6,000 in products that were not shipped" is intent on the criminals' part and is not a loss to you. If it is a county with a large population, the attorney will have many assistants who may have time to pursue the case. An attorney for a small county may be looking for an easy case. And who knows? The attorney's office may already know the person - if it's a county with a small population, or if that person already has a criminal history (which you could research yourself in that county's records) - and that makes the case even easier for the attorney.	Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.	What you're talking about is a liquidated-damages clause, where the contract explicitly spells out the damages to be awarded in the event of a breach. The law will vary some from state to state, but these clauses are generally enforceable. Some courts limit their use to cases where calculating the damages resulting from the breach would be impossible or impractical. But in the United States, along with all other common law jurisdictions, courts generally agree that if the liquidated-damages clause appears to penalize the breach instead of simply compensating for it, it is not enforceable. See, e.g., Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass'n, 17 Cal.4th 970, 977 (Cal. 1998) (“A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671(b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.”) The trillion-dollar damages clause "bears no reasonable relationship" to the damages that would actually result from a breach of a software license, so you can safely expect a court to refuse to enforce it, and limit you to whatever damages you could actually prove in court. Even if you were to drastically reduce it to "all the money you have, and then some," "all the money you have," "half the money you have," or even " "1 percent of all the money you have," the language still makes clear that the contract is not aimed at compensating for the breach, but rather penalizing the breaching party. In the end, what you're talking about isn't going to work, because contract law is generally less concerned with penalizing people than with making them whole.	Colorado statute 42-6-206 imposes disclosure requirements on the sale of vehicles with salvage titles. That you didn't know it was a salvage does not seem to be of concern to this particular statute. This means that you are potentially entitled to redress against the people who sold you the car as well, provided the sale occurred in Colorado and they failed to disclose it to you (i.e., you didn't just forget about it in the intervening years). Given the presence of a law specifically covering your circumstances, it may be worth consulting with a local attorney to see what your obligations are. There may be mitigating circumstances, but they are not currently obvious to me if they're there. (conventional wisdom in the industry is that all private sales are "as-is" with no implied warranty of merchantibility and no recourse for a buyer who doesn't do due diligence -- I was shocked to find a statute specifically protecting buyers of salvage vehicles)	This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits.
Is it illegal for an adult to contact a minor if the minor's parents have instructed the adult not to do so? I am 17 yrs old and my parents have told my boyfriend and his parents not to contact me (and have told me not to contact them) because they disapprove and believe their family is causing me harm mentally and trying to turn me against my parents. However, my parents are misinterpreting and assume said family has malicious intentions, which is not true (their intentions are innocent and they genuinely intend to do no harm). They told his parents not to contact me, but I reached out to the parents and let them know that I would be willing to have a phone call with them so they could check in on how I was doing, which we have done once. Is it illegal for them to contact me if my parents told them not to, even though I initiated the contact and they were really just talking to me because they care to see how I am doing? Thanks.	Your parents have authority over you, and not other people. The courts, however, have authority over everyone, so your parents could petition the courts to order either the parents or the boyfriend to not contact you until you are 18. The courts would probably grant the petition, if the judge feels that it is in your best interest (based on the totality of facts). If a no-contact order is issued, then contact would be illegal.	Sometimes running away is a juvenile offense, but it is not an offense for which an adult aged eighteen or over would be arrested or punished. An adult would not be returned home.	Citizens Advice in the UK has some great advice pages on dealing with harassment, but your options are limited - you can't actually stop someone from contacting you, but you can make their actions have consequences. Try contacting the police, who may speak to the individual in question and that may be enough to stop the harassment, or you can try applying for an injunction against the person in court (commonly called a restraining order). If the person breaches the injunction, then it can become a criminal matter.	Adults are bound to contracts with minors The technical term is that a contract with a minor is that it is voidable by the minor unless it is subject to the exemptions - a contract for necessities or a contract of benefit to the minor (e.g. a reasonable mobile phone contract). Until the minor chooses to void it, it is binding on everyone involved. They can do this anytime before they reach majority or within a reasonable time after that providing the contract is not complete. That means, for one and done transactions, the contract cannot effectively be voided because the contract is complete - think of a child buying an ice cream, riding a bus or going to the movies. If it is voided, the minor is obliged to return whatever consideration they received and that is still in their possession. So, for the mobile phone contract, if it included a handset, they must return that providing they still have it.	NJ Rev Stat §9:6-1 may be the source of the rumor (since it was in the news), but that law prohibits "the habitual use by the parent or by a person having the custody and control of a child, in the hearing of such child, of profane, indecent or obscene language". The NJ Supreme Court recently declined a First Amendment argument for overturning the law. Otherwise, a candidate is disorderly contact, NJ Rev Stat § 2C:33-2(b), A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense if, in a public place, and with purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive language, given the circumstances of the person present and the setting of the utterance, to any person present. N.J. v. Burkett somewhat tests this law, though the specific acts (which were found to be puerile yet legal) are not adequately described to test the limit on this ban on profanity (as a subcase of coarse language). The statute still stands, but seems not to have been otherwise prosecuted.	Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.	There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.	In Texas, sex offenses are defined in Texas Penal Code § 21.01, et seq., and rape and kindred offenses are defined as sexual assault § 22.011 and aggravated sexual assault § 22.021. None of those laws prohibit the conduct described (assuming adults who are not in a teacher-student relationship with full mental capacity), nor do they prohibit the video as long as there is no intent or threat to disclose it. Of course, not recognizing that it is the same person both times in an in person meeting when they have sex is highly implausible.
Ending joint-tenancy agreement by sending registered mail to the landlord - was it done properly? 6th September sent the Special Delivery to the landlord: (courtesy of me - sent an email informing letting agent about the situation) Snippets from tenancy agreement Commencing on: 7 September 2016 Term of Rental: Twelve Months 1.2 The obligations and liabilities of the Parties under this Agreement are Joint and Several. 1.3 The Parties listed above agree that the Landlord’s Agent may provide their name, address and other contact details to third parties including, but not limited to, the Landlord, contractors, referencing companies, utility providers, the local authority and the appropriate tenancy deposit protection scheme provider. The obligations and liabilities of the Parties under this Agreement are Joint and Several. Notices under Section 47 & 48 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987: For the purpose of Section 47 & 48 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 the address at which any Notices (including Notices in any proceedings) may be served on the Landlord by the Tenant, is as set out below, until the Tenant is notified in writing to the contrary. 13 Upon the expiry of this fixed term of Rental, if no instruction has been received by either the Landlord or the Tenant, then the Agreement shall become statutory periodic. This means that the agreement will continue on a monthly basis until notice is received, two months from the Landlord and one month from the Tenant. Research I did back then I did a lot of research how to remove myself from the tenancy. I did call Shelter - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shelter_(charity) - I did follow their recommendation. The rationale was as follows: There is joint tenancy It automatically continues... ...unless it is cancelled Therefore I did cancel I genuinely thought that charity dealing with homelessness is the best source of information. Was cancellation to renew done properly? Now I'm being told that the landlord didn't agree. Does the landlord have to agree?	No, it was not done properly See here. You cannot, and the landlord cannot agree to remove your name from the joint tenancy. You can cancel the tenancy for both of you, as can your ex. If you do this, the landlord is not under any obligation to offer your ex a lease on the same terms or at all so they would risk becoming homeless. The court has the power under the Family Law Act to make such a substitution so you can apply to them for such an order.	he is jointly liable for the remaining 3 months, even though he never signed anything. Is this true? That seems unlikely. The lease is between Adam and the landlord. Although the lease might have language making all tenants jointly and severally liable, it would affect Bob only if it can be proved that he was aware of those terms when he moved in. Your description does not elaborate on any agreement(s) between Adam and Bob. But Adam is not allowed to impose on Bob any obligations merely because relations between them broke down. Absent a contract between Adam and Bob, the question of whether Adam is entitled to any recovery from Bob could only be assessed on equitable grounds.	If she rents the room to Bob mostly furnitured, then by default the termination period is two weeks to the end of the month. However, it is three months by default if she rents it to Bob without furniture. Is my understanding correct so far? This is covered in §573c BGB (the German civil code). By default the notice period is three months. (But is increased for the lessor (Alice) after 5 and 8 years.) For residential space that is only leased for temporary use, a shorter notice period may be agreed. (This applies e.g. to hotel rooms.) For residential space under §549(2)(2), notice of termination is allowed at the latest on the fifteenth day of a month to the end of that month. (This is almost, but not quite, 2 weeks.) Where §549(2)(2) describes: residential space that is part of the dwelling inhabited by the lessor himself and has largely to be furnished with furniture and fixtures by the lessor himself, provided that permission to use the residential space has not been given for permanent use to the lessee with his family or with persons with whom he maintains a joint household set up permanently. This seems to apply here since Alice and Bob are sharing the flat. is it possible to define a shorter termination period in the contract, say one month? Or is the legal default of three months always applicable and cannot be changed by contract? Per §573c (4), these notice periods are minimums: “An agreement deviating from subsections (1) or (3) to the disadvantage of the lessee is ineffective.” Thus, the rental contract could allow Bob to leave on a shorter notice period, but Alice can't kick out Bob with shorter notice period. Notice periods only matter when one party wants to terminate the contract against the interests of the other party. If both voluntarily agree that it's best to part ways, they can sign a termination agreement effective for some arbitrary date, no notice period required.	Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused.	If you buy a house, you can generally rent out a room in the house, unless in that jurisdiction there is some law against renting rooms in houses (that's actually a condition in my neighborhood, one widely ignored). If it's legal to rent (lease) a room, it is generally legal to sub-lease that room – as long as that's allowed under the original lease contract. I have never heard of a jurisdiction that has a blanket prohibition against subleases. So as far as the actual question goes, the answer is, "yes". The links are about something a different, namely rent control law in San Francisco, and the question of whether a tenant can be evicted from a rent-controlled unit because the owner wants to move in to the unit. Owner move-in eviction requires a specific procedure for giving notice, and the links are about these requirements. Conceivably, though, the question could be whether a person can buy a house that is being rented out, do a proper owner move-in eviction, and then lease a spare room. The SF rent laws require a good faith intent to move in and use as the primary residence for 3 years, and nothing prohibit subsequently leasing a room. Those laws pertain to evictions, not re-rentals. (It should be noted that once eviction under section 37.9(a)(8) has been carried out on a unit in a building, no other unit in the building can ever be so recovered. That could mean that the room in the house could never again be recovered, if it is considered to be a separate "unit" from the "unit" that is the whole house).	A "land contract" is not a way of renting property, it is a way of purchasing property on an installment basis without bank financing. It is Ohio's version of what in some other places is known as "contract for deed". See "What is a Land Contract in Ohio" and "How Land Contracts Work" The actual law is Section 5313. In a land contract, the buyer has equitable but not legal title. The buyer normally pays all taxes and fees, and is responsible for maintaining the property, just as if s/he has bought the property. But if the buyer defaults, all payments and equity would be forfeit to the seller. Until the buyer has paid 20% of the purchase price, or made 5 years of payments (whichever comes first) a single missed payment constitutes default and can lead to the buyer being evicted with all payments to date going to the seller, the buyer coming out of the deal with nothing. Also, if the seller still has a mortgage and defaults, the buyer may lose everything paid to date. The buyer does not have the protections that a lease gives a tenant, nor the protections that legal title gives a purchaser via a traditional mortgage. Land contracts are often used when the buyer cannot qualify for a mortgage. The buyer pays interest, and it is often at a higher rate than the current rate on a mortgage. Land contracts are often a form of predatory lending, but for some buyers they make sense. A buyer needs to carefully review the contract with a lawyer knowledgeable about land contracts, and consider the risks and benefits of this form of financing. As I understand it, there cannot be a valid land contract for one apartment in an apartment building. A land contract must be for title to the land and all fixtures, including all buildings, on it. (There was at one point some unclarity if the question referred to an apartment. It is now clear that it refers to a house, so this statement is not relevant to the OP, but may be to others.) It is not clear just what the OP's landlord (LL) has in mind. It may be that LL plans to offer a "land contract" in which the purchase would be completed only after a very long time, with the idea that the OP would simply default when s/he wanted to move. Such a default could harm the OP's credit. There seems no benefit to the OP in such a scheme compared to a lease, unless LL will lower the price significantly, taking into account maintenance costs and taxes, which OP may well be expected to pay under a land contract. Note that a landlord can't legally force a tenant to sign a document cancelling a lease, or to sign whatever s/he will call a "land contract". Nor can s/he cancel the lease without the tenant's consent except for good cause as specified in the law (such as not paying rent). S/He could become uncooperative on other matters if a tenant doesn't do as s/he wants. If a tenant does cancel his or her lease, s/he will lose some rights. Others are guaranteed by law as long as the tenant is paying rent. If one signs a "land contract", what happens depends on its provisions. OP needs to very carefully consider just what is being offered, and its risks and any possible benefits. Details of the contract will matter. No matter exactly what LL has in mind, this is not at all a usual procedure for a landlord. OP or anyone in a similar circumstance should be very careful.	The Supply of Goods and Services Act doesn't apply here. Section 1(1) says that the only contracts concerning goods covered by the Act are those 'under which one person transfers or agrees to transfer to another the property in goods'. A lease doesn't transfer the cooker to you: it gives you exclusive possession of a dwelling containing the cooker. The cooker remains the property of the landlord. Assuming that your lease is for fewer than seven years, the statutory provision for a landlord's repair obligations is set out in s11 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. Unfortunately this does not help you: although the landlord is responsible for maintaining the gas and electricity supply equipment, the Act specifically excludes 'appliances for making use of the supply of ... gas or electricity'. The text of your lease may have specific provisions for the repair and upkeep of the cooker, so you should read it carefully and seek advice if you are unsure. Most landlords will leave copies of the instruction manuals for installed appliances. You should ask for a copy of the manual if one was not provided and can't be found in the flat. In practical terms, you should report the fault in writing to the landlord (or managing agent if you have one), saying that you are unable to use the cooker and that it is a potential danger given that you don't understand how it works. At the very least, you should ensure that the condition of the cooker is reflected correctly on your inventory.	What the landlord is doing is forcing you to abide by the terms of your lease agreement. You most likely agreed to a 1 year lease on a signed document, which means you're pretty much screwed because if he wanted to, he could force you to fulfill the lease and pay him anyway. However, his remarks about when you can notify to terminate are wrong. See end of answer. About Terminating Your Lease Early However, there are a few loopholes you can exploit. The easiest one is to get him to increase your rent. Ask about it, tell him that you're considering staying but tell him you want to know if he's going to increase the rent by much. If he declares that he is going to increase the rent, perfect. Get him to send it to you in writing (which he is legally required to do). Just in case though, have him on speaker phone and record every conversation you have from now on without telling him. This is legal (see this answer) and is a powerful form of evidence, so exploit the hell out of it. If you can get him to tell you that he's going to increase your rent, then you can legally submit a notice to terminate tenancy on the grounds that you do not wish to pay the increase. In this case, the amount of notice that you have to give is capped to the day that the rent increase is to take place. If you try this, do everything you can to get it in writing. Don't feel proud of snaring him and immediately announce that you're leaving because of this as soon as he says it on the phone, because you're screwing yourself out of going through the proper channels to make sure you not only win, but you've made your case air tight. Also, feel free to let you landlord know that he owes you money. Landlords in Ontario have to repay you a capped interest rate on your last months' deposit every 12 months. This rate is decided annually and for 2015 is capped at 1.6%. If your landlord wants to be anal about the rules and stick the letter of the law to you, do it back. Becoming a pain your landlords ass is a great way to get them to either become more flexible, or make a mistake that will give you an out. Notice that if he does increase the rent, he can demand that you increase your last months deposit and force you to pay it. You could "accidently" make him aware of this right in a conversation where you are concerned about a rent increase immediately after letting him know that he owes you money for the interest. "I'm concerned about the rent increase because I have to increase my deposit by law too." This way, he'll hopefully have the thought "I can avoid having to give him any money by increasing his rent by the same interest rate, so he'll owe me what I owe him, therefore I owe nothing. I'm so smart!" Then he cheerfully gives you a notice to increase rent, at which time you invoke your right to terminate tenancy on short notice due to an increase in rent. Your Landlord Is Wrong All that aside, your landlord committed an illegal act when they refused your notice to terminate, because he's denying you your rights under the RTA. From the Residential Tenancies Act: A tenant may terminate a tenancy at the end of a period of the tenancy or at the end of the term of a tenancy for a fixed term by giving notice of termination to the landlord in accordance with section 44. 2006, c. 17, s. 47 The details adjust a little bit depending on your circumstances, but the conditions in section 44 are basically to ensure the following: You are giving 60 days notice. You are not giving 60 days notice where the termination date you provide is less than the previously agreed term, except in special cases like the one I mention about increased rent. There is nothing in section 44 that can be confused to mean that you must wait until you have passed the end of your term before you can decide to leave. I suspect your landlord is deliberately interpreting the use of wording like "may terminate at the end of" to imply you have to wait to give your notice. A notice of termination is not a termination. It is a notice that in the future, you are going to terminate. Let's remove the confusion by replacing the word "terminate" with "vacating the premises and not paying another cent". That should remove any ambiguity that could be abused. So frankly you can simply go straight to the board, file the appropriate form with them and just pack up and leave when you've reached the date specified in the notice to terminate. Your final month is covered by your deposit. File the form immediately, let them know about the conversation you had with your landlord, then go to your bank and cancel the cheques you've already written (except for your deposit cheque) and simply ignore the landlord, carrying on with your moving plans. You should ask the Board if this illegal act has any ramifications. Perhaps because he has done this, this gives you an immediate out or something else. Call the Board and tell them what happened and ask them. They have an obligation to inform you correctly. Sources: Landlord Tenant Board of Ontario FAQ Final Note The Board is there to serve you, free of charge. They have a duty, as it is their explicit directive, to assist you in all matters regarding being a tenant. Phone them, talk to them at length, demand assistance. They are to inform you of your rights and guide you on the appropriate action, forms and procedure to assist you in resolving any issues you have. Note that I wrote the whole bit about getting out of your lease early legally before I refreshed my memory on the fact that you can/should give your 60 days notice before the end of your lease period. That makes the case much simpler as a I note in my answer. I left the information I already wrote however because it could be applicable or at least be of some help to others. Also note that if you're saying that the landlord came to get more cheques on the basis of his lie that he used to refuse your attempt to legally leave, then you'll need to cancel those cheques. That costs money. That alone is enough of a case to take him before the Tribunal and force him to repay the cost of those cancelled cheques. You may even successfully claim further damages or the Tribunal may voluntarily award you money for the actions your landlord is deliberately taking to deprive you of your rights. Talk to the Board.
Asked for contract ending, with no response, and still able to use the product Background: A couple of years ago I ordered a domain, and I used it to test some things. So for clearance, I paid for it. I asked if I could use a webserver for testing and they agreed and gave me a free webserver to use, for a non-discussed period. I used it, but after a couple of years I didn't use it anymore. When I got an invoice to pay, I thought that if I didn't pay it the domain would not extend and the webserver would be shut down. After that I did not look at the domain/webserver anymore, I've got an email that reminded me that if I didn't pay my domain would be deleted/sold and that was it. After that I didn't got any messages from the company. After a while I was going to the website, and it was still online, I looked if I could still log in to the webserver and I could still log in and modify it. I have since sent other emails to the company and received no response. Question: Is it legal to use the domain/webserver? I don't pay anymore and have received no invoice. Could I be required to pay for all the years I had the domain but did not pay for it? Note that I live in the Netherlands.	It is rather unclear what the facts are, and the legal answer would depend crucially on those facts. My understanding is that you bought a domain from a provider, and they allowed you to use a web server for some period. It also appears that you don't have a clear understanding of the contract, which may have been made online and you might not have retained a copy of the agreement (which would allow you to look at the terms). The assumption that failing to pay substitutes for explicitly cancelling a service is incorrect. If under the contract you agree to pay a certain amount per year, then you have been racking up charges for some time, and you would need to actually cancel. Ultimately, they could take you to court to force you to pay what you owe, although usually there are less drastic intermediate steps. In court, they would produce their documents to show that you owe money, and your attorney would somehow counter, perhaps by alleging that you had a good-faith belief that the contract had been terminated. It is possible that they simply messed up and failed to send you an invoice earlier, which could explain the lack of invoice. At any rate, the fact that you haven't gotten an invoice does not legally entitle you to avoid paying for the service, whether or not you use it. On the premise that they haven't taken back the domain (seems like they didn't), you can legally use it. However, if you do use it, then that would trash any claim that you believed the contract had been terminated (to argue "I thought it had been canceled" entails "and thus I didn't use the service").	It looks like the gym was allowed to take the money out of your bank account and didn't. They didn't notice that they didn't take your money, so they can't really expect you to notice it. So you haven't done anything that would be criminal. The bigger question is how much you owe them. If you used the gym all the time, like someone paying monthly would do, they will most likely have the right to payment. That's not unlimited, there will be some "statute of limitations" so they can't ask you for 30 years back payments, but with less than two years they probably have a right. If they raised prices, it's unlikely the would have a right to that because they never told you. The situation while your subscription was frozen is interesting. Basically you just walked in, used the gym without paying, but they didn't stop you in any way. I could walk into your gym, ask if it is Ok to use it, and if they say "yes" and don't mention payment, I'm in. So for this time you can argue whether or not you owe them money. Summary: You haven't done anything criminal. You most likely owe them money. About the money, they can take you to court if you don't pay which will cost both sides money. Since you did use their service and other users did pay, the morally right thing would be to pay what seems fair to you, possibly with some negotiation. And legally, you might consider paying them enough to make both sides happy enough so you can stay a gym member and don't get sued for the money.	It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.	What's the worst that can happen? If you do nothing, it's a bit inconvenient. If you delete all that company's stuff, who knows what they could sue you for. I'm not saying they would be right, but being sued can be expensive, no matter whether you are wrong or right. Send a letter by registered mail, with a witness to the contents, that you are the only one with admin rights to these sites, and asking them how they would like to take over these sites, and informing them that you will delete anything on your personal email after a reasonable time if you don't hear from them. And since anything you do is work for you, you should expect some appropriate compensation. Deleting their property, even if it affects you, is risky.	This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy.	For a contract (including ToS) to be valid, one of the things it must have is "legality of objects". That is, if the contract purports to require anything that is unlawful in the jurisdiction then (barring a severance clause) it is not a contract. In common law countries, the starting point is that people are free to contract for and about anything they like - a contract is simply a mechanism for exchanging value between the parties on whatever terms they wish. However, judges and legislatures have decided that there are some things you cannot trade and some terms that are unconscionable or against the public interest and these vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction*. For example, a contract is not legal in any jurisdiction if its terms seek to exclude the intervention of the courts - this is against public policy. So for example, a binding arbitration clause requiring the parties to accept a private arbitrator's decision as final excludes the courts, yes? Well, in Australia, yes, such clauses if used in a contract between parties with different bargaining power (like a Telco and its customers) are invalid because they prevent the weaker party pursuing a class action. However, they are perfectly legal in the United States because the SCOTUS has determined that the customer can persue litigation after arbitration is finished so this doesn't impede the courts. These are essentially the same laws interpreted by the courts so that they have totally opposite effects. So this might lead you to think that you'll put one in - it'll be OK in the US and Australians will represent such a tiny share of your market that you don't care if I can't enforce my ToS there. Except, if your website is visible by Australians, you have just exposed yourself to a government fine of up to AUD 5,000,000 (say USD 3,000,000) per day for breach of Australian Consumer Law. As a general guide (which is very stereotypical), US jurisdictions are the most permissive in the rights they will allow their citizens to give up: the US attitude is that everyone is free to make the best deal they can. European jurisdictions are the least permissive in this regard: most European countries follow a more social welfare state model and the citizen needs protecting from themselves. Commonwealth countries tend to be more in the middle.	I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B).	Is that extortion? false advertising? or in any way illegal? Not at all. The owner of the site is simply exercising his right as outlined in the terms and conditions from when the user signed up. And giving users an option for continued use of the site (that is, for him not to exercise a right of which they were always aware) does not constitute extortion.
Conditions that denote as true (allowed) or false (not allowed) for a written law What is the general rule law professors teach in law school for determining whether something is allowed or not allowed, based on written law? When I read any piece of legislation, I sometimes wonder if the politicians understand logic. I am a software engineer, not a lawyer. Which is probably a good thing, otherwise I'd be confused out of my mind. Law is definitely not a science, because there are so many conditions in written legislation that conflict with one another! So if a software engineer tried to develop software to make a decision for any situation based on written law, the computer would start smoking from confusion. Is it safer to assume something is not allowed until you find enough evidence that it's allowed? Or is it safer to assume something is allowed until you find enough evidence that it's not allowed? Or do you look at the beginning sentences of a given piece of written legislation, and use the rest of the written law as exceptions to the rule stated in the beginning? Comparison: In software, whatever condition is met first, that's the path chosen! So you can think of an order of precedence happening. Conditions/Laws at the top of the source code should be most specific, if they are identical conditions/laws found lower in the source code. But the order in which you read written law probably doesn't work that way? condition 1: dog is black, dog is friendly ==> pet the dog condition 2: dog is black, dog is mean ==> don't pet the dog condition 3: dog is black, dog is friendly, dog is quiet ==> condition never met, because it's more specific than conditions above with same criteria, plus extra criteria condition 4: dog is black, dog it friendly, dog is quiet, dog has fluffy hair ==> condition never met	The general rule is, anything is allowed unless it is forbidden (and not that you can only do things that are expressly permitted). The logical structure of law may be a bit more challenging than procedural programming logic, since it may require a global knowledge and evaluation of the entire code (typically but not absolutely, the scope of the search for "unless otherwise" conditions is restricted to "in this chapter"). In other words, the law is a set of propositions which must all be true, and unlike actual execution of instructions in a sequence, law is to be interpreted simultaneously but hierarchically (that is: the order in which clauses are written is not significant). The appearance that the law is self-contradictory is largely illusory, though the resolution of the conflict may require a careful reading of the law and knowledge of jurisdictional hierarchy (federal law is superior to state law, which entails a particular resolution of the apparent conflict). Sometimes there are real conflicts, which usually result from using words in conflicting ways (note the practice of re-defining words "in this chapter/section/title"). The reason why law is not a science is that law is normative, not descriptive: it dictates what is allowed (a determination made through the political process), and does not attempt to discover what independently is. The reason why the legal process cannot be implemented in software is that software does not yet correctly interpret natural language, and law is written in natural language following interpretations based on judgments of what choices a reasonable would make. Perhaps if you propose a piece of law that you think is contradictory, it would be possible to show how the contradiction is illusory.	Not under US law Under the US copyright law, specifically 17 USC 203: a) Conditions for Termination.—In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under the following conditions: The conditions are somewhat complex, and I will not quote them here. The author or authors, or the heirs of the author or authors, or a majority of them, have the right to terminate copyright transfers an license grants. This termination must be effective on a date within a five-year period starting 35 years after the transfer or grant was made, or 35 years after publication. There must be a notice of intent to terminate, sent at least 2 and not more than 10 years before the effective date of termi\nation. Section 205 (a) (5) provides that: (5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant. Section 205 (b) provides that: (b) Effect of Termination.—Upon the effective date of termination, all rights under this title that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the author, authors, and other persons owning termination interests ... ... (4) A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after the effective date of the termination. As an exception, however, an agreement for such a further grant may be made between the persons provided by clause (3) of this subsection and the original grantee or such grantee’s successor in title, after the notice of termination has been served as provided by clause (4) of subsection (a). Summary Under US copyright law the author, co-authors, or the heirs of the author(s), or a majority of them may cancel a license during a specific five-year period No provision in the license or other agreement may waive this right, or bind the author not to exercise it. Open source and copyleft licenses generally do not mention this legal right of the author. Derivative (modified) works created under a canceled license may continue to be used, but the right to create new derivative works is withdrawn. It is not clear how an author goes about sending the required notice when a work was distributed widely to the general public under a permissive license. Open source licenses have been around long enough that early license grants could be subject to such terminations. But I have found not news reports or court cases about such terminations or attempted terminations and their effects. Probably most authors of open source software will not want to terminate the licenses they once granted. But some may, and US law gives them the right to do so. Users of software or other protected content under such licenses should be aware of these termination rights.	It says They shall not confer the right [[to attend any meeting of members] and [to exercise one vote for every share held]]. The elements joined by a conjunction such as "and" should be grammatically parallel. Since the part after the conjunction is an infinitive verb phrase, the thing to which is it joined by the conjunction should also be an infinitive verb phrase. However, it is normal in English to use "or" when joining elements in a negative statement. For example, if it is forbidden to sing and it is forbidden to dance, one could post a sign saying "no singing or dancing." If the sign said "no singing and dancing" it could be interpreted as a prohibition only on doing both at once. So the sentence should read They shall not confer the right to attend any meeting of members or to exercise one vote for every share held. Perhaps less ambiguous: They shall not confer the right to attend any meeting of members or the right to exercise one vote for every share held. But the drafting error is unlikely to change the meaning of the text, since it is fairly easy to identify it as a drafting error.	Everything is allowed unless the law says it isn’t Common law systems like the USA are ‘exceptions based’ - the law permits everything except what it prohibits. So, your question is backwards - rather than looking for laws that allow it, you need to look for laws that prohibit, restrict or regulate it. There are laws that regulate this but none that prohibit it.	The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error.	Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section.	Ethical rules for lawyers are enforced by a separate committee or board or department (states vary) to which complaints can be made by lawyers and members of the public. If a complaint appears to have merit, the board has someone prosecute the case in a quasi-criminal manner, which the board hears like a court, subject to an appeal at some point. The consequences range from an order to attend an ethics course, to publicly or privately scolding the lawyer, to suspending the lawyer's license, to disbarring a lawyer, depending upon the severity of the offense. The board interprets the rule in course of the deciding the case. This doesn't provide any relief to the aggrieved party. It merely protects the general public from bad lawyers. There are many interpretive principles and precedents for interpreting what violates Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1. if a client makes false written statements about key dates (say a week long period) in matters of fact and the lawyer knows they are false, what are their ethical responsibilities? If statements are made to the Court, Rule 3.3 (candor to the tribunal) applies, not Rule 4.1. Another example, in matters of divorce and custody, is a lawyer expected to make truthful statements in court regarding the nature of custodial interference? It would be unusual for an attorney to make a statement of fact to a court on any issue. Usually that is reserved for witnesses.	This is a quite complicated area of evidence law in the U.S. as there are many statements which are inadmissible under the hearsay rule, but there are also many statements that would otherwise be hearsay that fall within exceptions to the hearsay rule. In U.S. federal court practice, hearsay is governed mostly by Federal Rules of Evidence 103, 104(a), 201, 801-807, and 1101. Most state court rules of evidence in the U.S. with regard to hearsay closely track the Federal Rules of Evidence. Some states do not follow this pattern but are substantively very similar as the Federal Rules of Evidence largely track of the common law rules of evidence before they were codified. Rule 801 provides two exclusions from the definition of hearsay and a foundational definition. Rule 802 prohibits the introduction of hearsay into evidence unless an exception applies. Rule 803 provides 23 exceptions to the rule. Rule 804 provides five more exception to the rule. Rule 807 provides a final residual exception. So, in proceedings where the hearsay rule applies there are 31 main exceptions to the general rule, in addition to the argument that the general rule does not apply, but this still excludes lots of statements. Rule 201 (judicial notice) is another exception. Some of the main reasons to admit hearsay are that: It is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted (e.g. to prove the someone was present and talking at a place not that what they said was true, or to prove that someone said something defamatory or fraudulent, or to prove the someone made a "verbal act" with legal significance like agreeing to a contract or ordering someone to do something). It is a statement of a party opponent or someone affiliated with a party opponent (i.e. someone affiliated with the other side in the lawsuit or criminal case). It is a prior statement of a person made under oath and subject to cross-examination. It is a business record or public record or an "ancient document" (currently ancient means before 1998 in the federal courts, and typically more than twenty-years old in the state courts). It is a market quotation. It is a statement made describing things "in the moment", for medical diagnosis, or when the facts were fresh in the "declarant's" mind. It pertains to rights in real property, or to family relationships. It is a statement contrary to the interests of the person making it. It is a statement made when the declarant's death was believed to be imminent (i.e. a dying declaration). It is a statement made against someone who caused the witness to be unavailable. There are reasons that the statement is reliable and the intent to provide the statement is cleared with the court in advance. The matter upon which a statement is made is of general public knowledge not reasonably subject to dispute, is easily confirmed without doubt by a court, or is from a learned treatise. Hearsay objections are also waived if a timely objection isn't made to them. See Federal Rule of Evidence 103. And, courts have some discretion to allow hearsay testimony on immaterial matters or matters that are not seriously disputed in the case for expediency's sake. Rules 104(a) (excluding preliminary matters) and 1101 set forth when the hearsay rule applies and when it does not. Rule 1101 excludes from the rule a variety of preliminary matters, mostly in criminal cases such as: grand-jury proceedings extradition or rendition; issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; a preliminary examination in a criminal case; sentencing; granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and considering whether to release on bail or otherwise. Rule 805 governs the complicated situation of hearsay within hearsay. Rule 806 coordinates the hearsay rule with rules on how it is proper to introduce evidence about the credibility of a witness. There is also a constitutional rule of criminal procedure, called the "confrontation right" that established minimum standards for the exclusion of hearsay evidence in criminal trials even when a court's procedural rules do not exclude it. Most states also have a hearsay rule pertaining to oral promises made by dead people called the dead man's statute, and limitations on introducing oral statements related to written agreements called respectively, the parole evidence rule and the statute of frauds. In contrast, in the U.K. courts, roughly speaking, hearsay is generally admissible when the person making the underlying hearsay statement is available to testify, or is unavailable, which subsumes a large share of the U.S. hearsay rule, and makes much more hearsay admissible. U.K. practice would also allow admission of almost anything without a U.S. hearsay exception since they are derived from British common law evidence rules related to hearsay. The main purpose of the hearsay rule is to prevent a defendant in a criminal case or lawsuit from being denied an ability to cross-examine witnesses in court because they would like to present evidence by affidavit or letter instead, effectively placing that burden on the prosecution in criminal cases, or on a plaintiff in simple civil cases, rather than forcing the defendant to pro-actively subpoena witnesses for the other side in the case. The rule has a broader sweep than that, but that is its core purpose.
Why do legal scholars influence civil codes' interpretation, more than judges? Source: A Brief Introduction to Law in Canada (2017). p. 39 Top. Publisher uploaded chapters 1-3. As the foregoing account makes clear, the civil law system has a long and historical evo-lution on the European continent. It has been shaped by Roman law more than English common law was. It also differs from the common law in that judges play a more active role in the judicial process (such as in the questioning of witnesses and marshalling of evi-dence), in what is referred to as an inquisitorial system. Further, the interpretation of civil codes is more influenced by legal scholars than by judges. inquisitorial system a feature of civil law proceedings whereby trial judges actively assist lawyers in present-ing their cases and are free to call and question witnesses and to order investigations into other evidentiary matters; contrasts with the adversarial system used in common law courts I know that Continental Law judges "works within a framework established by a comprehensive, codified set of laws". But how does this absence of official stare decisis explain the grey sentence overhead? https://imgur.com/ZEKyLhx may help.	First off, let me confirm that this text accurately describes the reality. Second, this is less far afield from the common law than you would think. If you are in a jurisdiction without any binding case law on a particular point, a so called "question of first impression", you then turn to persuasive authority. Persuasive authority includes case law that is binding in some other jurisdiction and legal scholarship, often in the form of a treatise or commentary. And, it is much easier to find an answer in a treatise which is carefully arranged on a subject matter basis, than to do case law research from other jurisdictions. This is particularly true when you have not devoted a lot of time to learning how to find the needle of the law you want in the haystack of the mountain of decided cases on all available subject. The very difficult task of case law research was only possible on more than an isolated hit or miss basis at all in common law systems where case law matters in the years before the 1980s when computerized case law word searching started to become possible at an affordable to lawyers price, because a lot of full time institutional actors devote a great deal of time and money to developing and maintaining tools like digests, citation indexes, and annotations to statutes to allow practitioners to locate that case law. If court decisions don't serve as binding precedents, those institutions aren't developed. For example, in common law countries, until very recently, there were no good resources for locating trial court decisions and rulings in state courts which handle the bulk of litigation, but whose rulings are not binding precedents. (Electronic record keeping in trial courts has changed the economics of this practice and made it much more common to publish trial court decisions and to index them appropriately.) So, if persuasive authority in your legal system in the form of non-binding case law is hard to find because it wasn't worth the money for the legal system to collectively develop the resources to publish and index it on a systematic basis for an audience of pretty much the entire legal profession, the other form of persuasive authority, legal treatises, becomes much more influential by default. You see something similar in very early legal opinion writing by American judges before the institutions necessary to systemically utilize case law precedents was developed. Judges were constantly citing treatises like Blackstone, which is something they rarely do now, because that was what was on their bookshelf. Further, there are feedback effects. Smart people who wish to influence the law for society without going the legislative route in common law countries will often seek careers as judges. But, absent the psychic perk of influencing the law and making a difference in society, a lot of the most ambitious people in the judiciary in a common law system will choose instead to go the route of academia and seek to become law professors where they can have a similar influence, while earning similar pay and having more time off and freedom to pursue your own personal and professional interests. So, in systems where legal precedents aren't binding, people who might otherwise be inclined to write probing legal opinions that develop legal concepts are less inclined to become judges, and the people who do become judges care more about getting the right result and less about explaining their decisions in a way that will influence future judges in the same circumstances. Finally, consider that many civil law legal systems involve countries with a lot less appellate litigation than the United States (currently 330 million people with more than 200 years of case law), or the UK (currently 60 million people with about 1000 years of case law), or India (more than 1 billion people with a couple of centuries of case law, since colonial precedents have relevance). Suppose that you live in Denmark or Belgium or Portugal or Costa Rica or South Korea, where your population is much lower and your time frame during which your legal system has been in place is not as long. In a situation like that, half a dozen or a dozen leading legal scholars can publish treatises over ten or twenty years that are going to cover, somewhere, the lion's share of the pressing issues in the legal system, and there is probably only one law school in the entire country, so it is quite likely that most of the lawyers in the entire country took contracts or property or family law from the the same people in law school, which makes them predisposed to consider a treatise written by that professor a credible one in that area of law. And, all other sources are a comparative vacuum. If you are a judge, why cite non-binding precedents from your fellow non-specialist judge in a country that simply has no precedents in many areas of law and has fewer carefully reasoned ones, when you could instead look for guidance from the person who taught you this area of law in the first place and literally "wrote the book" and who was probably consulted by the government in any recent amendments to relevant civil code or statute of broad general applicability. And, once you start out using those methods, it becomes habitual and legal treatises become very influential.	how (academically) acceptable are such discussions and proposals? Some academic somewhere has probably discussed it, and did not breach strong academic norms by doing so. Is it the academically acceptable practice to argue about such questions or is it a marginal view? It isn't taboo to argue such a position, but it is highly marginal and extreme. It is even more extreme in Eastern Europe (nominally in the civil law tradition) than it is in common law countries (which have more of a natural law tradition), and would be least marginal in the U.S. which has a strong natural law tradition, although it would marginal even in the U.S. Legal positivism (i.e. the law is what legislators and the governmental process including courts and citizen ballot issues says it is), is very strong now compared to prior eras and stronger in civil law countries than in common law countries. The battle between natural law and legal positivism was mostly won by legal positivism by the late 19th century although the debate continued indifferent to the reality on the ground. Philosophically, human rights are often viewed as an enlightened codification of natural law (which sometimes justifies its extraterritorial application), but it would be rare for someone who was a strong supporter of natural law to argue that human rights codifying natural law should be disfavored (really, that kind of reasoning is mostly seen in pre-modern Confucian legal arguments in China as part of the Eastern rule of law v. rule of man argument that tends to favor rule of man on the theory that any codification can be twisted by sneaky lawyers).	When? There are basically several times to look at when you want to look at the text, and then in what language. The Codex Iustinianus itself is part of the Corpus iuris civilis and contained only laws given by the previous emperors, while other older laws were in the Digesta/Pandecta and the Novellae contained any new imperial laws after 534. The whole CICiv, was given an introductory text right from inception: When it was compiled, back around 528, one of the books of the CICiv was the Institutiones Iustiniani, which was the prescribed legal education basis - the study book for the aspiring lawyers of his time. It contained how to practice law and cases that were to be discussed. On this basis, a glossa marginalis commentary has survived in Turin, which was made from a copy of the Institutiones. The commentary is dated to be contemporary to the CICiv and was made by adding comments around the real text, making researchers believe this was a work by a teacher, so he could answer or explain parts of the text, or reference earlier parts of the book easier. Around the 7th century, the Pandekta/Digesta were pretty much forgotten in big parts. In the middle ages, it took about till late 1000s, early 1100s, to re-compile the CICiv, when Irnerius of Bologna did manage to collect a sizeable portion of it by rediscovering the Littera Florentina and added to this collection by referencing earlier glossae. The Florentina alone is more than 900 pages long, and his littera vulgata/bologniensis (a german edition's Bibliography an Italian edition's bibliography), a new commentary on the re-compiled laws, including large parts of the Digesta. This book became the new introduction and teaching text about the CICiv and leading teaching bok for all lawyers in Europe at that time. This text is, what defined the roman tradition of law In the 19th century, legal scholars that studied a lot of the CICiv and argued along those lines - a style predominantly Existant in Germany - were known as Pandectists. One of the more central books of them was the Lehrbuch der Pandeketen by Karl Ludwig Arndts von Arnesberg (Stuttgart 1877). The praxis that developed in these circles greatly did influence the style of how the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch BGB was organized and written, and this systematic was exported. Later, books such as Paul Koschaker: Europa und das römische Recht (4th edition Munich 1966) did recept the whole roman legal body, giving the CiCiv a very thorough look, and how it influenced the modern Code Civil and Germanic tradition of law, while Franz Wieacker: Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung (2nd Edition, Göttingen 1967) did look at the Pandectists and how they were influenced by the CICiv. As more scholarly works I want to point to three that were referenced in the notes of the page when my ancient history Professor mentioned Roman Law being "verklauselt, kompliziert und voller sonderfälle" (~complicated and with many exceptions) in passing. A Short History of Roman Law by Olga Tellegen-Couperus (1993) does spare the last 8 pages on the CiCiv. The more thorough Herbert Felix Jolowicz; Barry Nicholas: Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (Cambridge 1967) does spare the last chapters on the CICiv. Adolf Berger, Adolf: Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (The American Journal of Philology 1953) is taken still one of the main shorthands and (sometimes outdated) bibliographies under historians. Large parts of the Latin CICiv (as #12) can be accessed in "the Roman Law Library" by the Grenoble University, together with edition scans.	Organically rather than by design, laws and courts preceded the theoretical constitutional basis. Kings developed a practice of legislating in council, rather than solo, meaning that their edicts went out not as "the King decrees XYZ" but "the King, with the assent of the archbishops, bishops, abbots, barons, etc., decrees XYZ". This eventually became the Parliamentary system, wherein only Parliament could make laws (especially about raising taxes) and the King alone could not. Because of the gradual evolution, it's not easy to point to the first such statute or even the first proper "Parliament". The form was not settled. Nowadays we expect Acts to start with a set "enacting formula", to be published in a set way, and to be called "Acts" at all. Earlier laws lacked these elements. It was common for Parliaments to transact a variety of business, such as appointing officials or distributing money, without strictly distinguishing a category of what we would now call a "public general Act", something setting out broadly applicable rules under the tenor of law. To take an early example, the Domesday Book was undoubtedly commissioned by William I in council in 1085, but we could argue for a long time whether that really counted as a law made by the King alone or through a proto-parliamentary approach. The Assize of Clarendon in 1166 is closer - we have the text and it refers to the counsel of all the barons - but still not obviously "an Act". Magna Carta came in 1215 and was repeatedly confirmed by successive monarchs in slight variations; only the 1297 version is currently deemed to be an Act still partially in force. At the same time as this legislative activity, a bewildering array of courts applied essentially customary law for local cases. If you commit a murder in Durham in 1300 and would like to not be executed, then you would be appealing (I think?) to the mercy of the Prince-Bishop in his own court. A few dozen miles away and the process and authority was different. Things gradually became more uniform and systematized, and by the sixteenth century there was enough critical mass of legal philosophy to try to "explain" the legal system more formally and in recognizably modern terms. We may as well take Edward Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England (1628-1644) as a turning point: four volumes setting out a comprehensive view of what English law was all about. In contrast, take Bracton's similar work of 1235, which was the first real analysis of case law in England. Bracton was writing in a context without a general idea of precedent, and where the binding extent of Roman civil law was not clear. By Coke's time that was well established. But they are both trying to make sense of the law as they found it: giving explanations for the data, if you like. (A parallel course was taking place in Scotland with its institutional writers, although they ended up with a different system from England's. They were equally trying to explain what they saw.) Some of the early modern authors contributed to figuring out which decisions of past Parliaments or councils should be taken to be Acts, as such. Coke, in particular, also set out the criterion that an Act should purport to have been made by all three of the King, Lords and Commons. Our modern consolidated versions of the statute book derive from this time, and on legislation.gov.uk you can see the oldest Act still in force, The Statute of Marlborough 1267. That's different from the oldest Acts ever made, as discussed above, a more slippery concept. Ideas such as the separation of powers are reverse-engineered in this way. Indeed, it's not obvious that Britain has that separation. It may not be the right way to understand the governmental and legal order that has developed. John Locke might have thought it would be a good idea, but Walter Bagehot denied it was a useful frame for analyzing the interrelationships of various public bodies.	Short Answer The concern raised is a real one, but it is much less serious than one might naively expect. Long Answer Precedents Apply Only To Resolve The Legal Arguments Presented On The Facts Found To Exist At Trial A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Develop Facts At Trial Isn't A Serious Problem A precedent determines the law as applied to a particular set of facts found by the trial court and confirmed as properly in the trial court record by the appellate court, as to a particular legal issue. Failure to prove facts at trial due to the fault of counsel for a party in the trial court changes the scope of the precedent. Failure to establish facts in one case that sets a precedent, doesn't prevent a similarly situated party, in a case with essentially the same actual facts, from doing a better job and thus presenting a set of facts that are not governed by the same precedent. The precedent from the ill argued case would not apply because the facts as found by the trial court would be different. A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Present Legal Arguments Isn't A Serious Problem if a someone lost a case merely because they did not come up with an argument which, should they have come up with, would convince the judge to rule in their favour, and that case has become a precedent, the fate of any following cases in lower courts with comparable facts will be decided by that unluckily slow-thinking litigant/lawyer. Likewise, suppose that due to incompetence of counsel, a key legal argument isn't made. When a trial court lawyer makes that mistake, the precedent will merely resolve the legal arguments that were resolved by the trial court. This won't preclude a future litigant from making different legal arguments that are stronger in the same circumstances since the precedent won't resolve those legal arguments. For example, suppose that a trial, a lawyer for one side fails to argue that the statute of frauds (which requires certain contracts to be in writing) bars the claim, and the judgment in favor of other other side on an oral agreement is upheld on appeal. A lawyer in a new case with the same facts can move to dismiss the other side's claim based upon the statute of frauds, because the precedent upholding the oral agreement didn't resolve the question of whether the statute of frauds could be used to dismiss the claim arising under that agreement. There Aren't Better Alternatives To Sift Through Legal Arguments No lawyer can make every argument. The incentives of the system and the professional regulation of lawyers, however, increases the likelihood that the strongest arguments will be made to the court setting the precedent and in the trial court before an appellate court considers the issue, relative to pretty much any other means of clarifying ambiguous issues in the law, where the advocates for different legal rules usually don't have the same strong incentives to argue their cases as well as they possibly can. The Risk Posed By Ineffectual Rhetoric In Favor Of Good Rules Of Law Is Real But Limited This doesn't mean that bad lawyering doesn't give rise to bad precedents. But when this happens it is usually because for a given argument and set of facts, the lawyer for one side is so much more rhetorically effective in making a legal argument than the lawyer for the other side which is proposing a "better rule" of law. But the exclusion of people who can't finish law school and pass the bar exam from the process makes a truly decisive advantage for one party over another in rhetorical effectiveness fairly rare. To the extent that rhetorical failure in appellate briefing is the cause of a bad precedent, the long term systemic effect of this problem (some would call it a feature of the system rather than a flaw) is that the side with more resources that can afford to hire better lawyers will tend to produce legal results that favor similarly situated parties going forward. Thus, it produces a sort of diluted "natural selection" effect (a bias that is equally, if not more concerning, in the duel of lobbyists for all sides of an issue in the legislative process). The other safeguards discussed below, limit this risk, although not completely. Other Safeguards Subject-Matter Jurisdiction The requirement of an actual "case and controversy" for subject-matter jurisdiction, and the requirement of "standing" for subject-matter jurisdiction are designed to prevent someone from intentionally making straw man arguments on appeal that produce precedents that are bad law. Thoughtful Appellate Judges When Opinions Are Published Also, appellate court precedents are made by a panel of multiple (usually three at the first direct appeal level) experienced and esteemed judges who are acutely aware that the decisions that they are making in precedent setting cases influence the law in other cases which causes them to look beyond the arguments of the parties to resolve the dispute. It isn't at all uncommon in such cases for an appellate court to resolve a case on appeal on the basis of arguments not made by either party in their briefs, or precedents or statutes not mentioned by either party. Furthermore, most appellate court decisions are unpublished opinions that expressly determined by the panel making the decision not to make a binding precedent, which allows panels of judges in these cases to take less care to run afoul of the risk of making a bad decision due to bad lawyering by a party. So, in the minority of cases that are published and create binding precedents, judges are especially careful to consider this risk. Five More Safeguards The other main safeguards in the case law system against bad precedents due to poor lawyering by a party are: (1) the ability of uninvolved third-parties to file amicus briefs in connection with an appeal presenting perspectives on legal issues not presented by a party, (2) the ability of a state supreme court or the U.S. Supreme Court (or both) as the case may be, to overrule intermediate appellate court precedents that were wrongly decided, (3) the ability of legislatures to change non-constitutional legal rulings by statute, (4) the procedural requirement that the relevant state or federal attorney general be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in cases challenging the constitutionality of a law, and (5) the ability of the political process to amend the relevant constitution to address a bad binding precedent by a highest court on a constitutional issue that the legislature cannot fix. Collectively These Safeguards Help Somewhat None of these safeguards are fool proof. But, collectively, these safeguards reduce the risk of a bad precedent being established due to bad lawyering in an adversary system, that the inherent limitation of a precedent being limited to particular facts and particular legal arguments provides as a primary means of preventing. Other Causes Of Bad Precedents Are More Of A Problem In general, once all of the considerations above are taken together, the risk of a bad precedent being made due to bad lawyering, while it is real, is significantly smaller than the risk that a bad precedent will be made because the appellate judges rendering the precedent making opinion are bad judges. Bad judges usually end up as judges with appellate precedent making power because they were selected more based upon political considerations, as they are in many states, and in the federal system, rather than primarily based upon the soundness of their legal judgment. When one risk factor that can lead to a bad decision is much larger than another risk factor that can lead to a bad decision, further improvements in the smaller risk factor will rarely make all that much of a difference in the overall likelihood that the system will produce a bad precedent. So, the adversary system, is, on balance, good enough make the risk of bad precedents arising from bad lawyering a not very troubling problem with the system, even though it is a real risk that sometimes does produce bad precedents.	It depends on the judge. Both narrative and question-answer formats can be required. Under the narrative format, the defendant gives their statement. The prosecution can then cross-examine. Under the question-answer format, the defendant plays both the role of themself and the role of their representative. They ask questions to themselves then answer. This was used in United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1989).	I think what you're talking about is probably quite rare. There are certainly law firms that market their ability to thoroughly investigate the facts, aggressively question or impeach hostile witnesses, present compelling evidence at trial, or make persuasive oral arguments. But I don't think I've ever heard of a firm that treats any particular litigation tactic as its specialty rather than treating it as part of its specialization in domestic relations, DUI defense, employment law, etc. If you think of litigating at different stages of a case as "techniques or functions," then I'd point to the various firms that consider themselves trial specialists, or appellate specialists, or even Supreme Court specialists. Even then, though, any of those specialties is going to involve a variety of discrete techniques or functions. A trial lawyer needs to do investigations and cross examinations and closing statements, and a Supreme Court specialist needs to be able to petition for cert, draft merit briefs, and give oral arguments.	The notion of a peer for purposes of the jury is someone who "walks in the same shoes" as the defendant or litigants. A freeman was to be juried by other freemen, a Peer of the Realm by other (capital P) Peers, a landsman by other landholders, and a marine by other sailors. The ancient origins of a judgment by jury were rooted in removing allegations by the defendant, alleging unfairness of the process, since the defendant himself was a party to the selection of those who would weigh his actions before the law and mete out punishments, the defendant could have confidence that he wasn't being railroaded. In the USA, we've done away with the codified, defined social definitions such as peerage and royalty and owned/indentured vs. free...so we are all, as far as the law defines, equal peers.
What kind of lawyer should I speak with about getting out of a lease on the basis of breach of contract? The apartment complex I’m renting from are shirking their obligations to me by blaming the issues on me. Can I get out of these lease without paying the fee for early lease breaking?	You want a lawyer who accepts tenant-side landlord tenant cases, usually a solo practitioner or small law firm or legal clinic. Medium to large sized law firms usually don't practice that kind of law at all, or only represent landlords, as a matter of policy. The usual problem, however, is that lawyers are often too expensive relative to the amount in controversy to make sense to hire to fully represent you in a matter like this one. You might want to have a "limited engagement" such as a one time consult with a lawyer, rather than a full retention of a lawyer, over an issue like this one.	I do not have anything official proving that I gave him the 2-months worth deposit What did you do, hand him a wad of cash? Pay by check, and put what it's for on the memo line. You've been there for nine months and there are several other people who can testify that you've been living there, so it would be difficult to claim that you aren't a renter. If you can show that the landlord is aware of your residence, that definitely helps even further, as does receiving mail there, registering to vote or with the DMV with that address, etc. Question 1 : what would be the best course of action to force the landlord to give me the requested lease agreement? You can't "force" someone to give you an agreement. That's kinda part of the definition of the word "agreement". If you find the conditions unacceptable, you can find another place to rent. When I asked the landlord about what he was planning to do regarding that, his answer was that it was not his business. It doesn't seem like it is. You could take the money you would have given to the other roommate, and give it to the power company instead. If paying for the utilities is part of the renters' responsibilities, and the renters are not paying for the utilities, then it's their choice to not have power. In California, landlords are required to make power available, but that just means that they can't interfere with you purchasing it from the power company, not that the landlord has to pay for it (if the landlord had agreed to pay for it, and isn't, then you can deduct the cost from the rent, but you can't simply withhold all rent, and your question indicates that the landlord hasn't agreed to pay for power anyway). Am I protected in any way, or can the landlord just come in my room and throw everything away, or worse just point me with a gun and force me to move? It would be difficult for the landlord to get rid of you, and would probably take several months to do legally. Performing an eviction himself, rather than getting the sheriff's department to do it, would expose him to serious charges, especially if a gun were used. Besides criminal charges, "If this or other unlawful methods, such as locking a tenant out or seizing his possessions before an eviction process has ended, are used to force a tenant to leave a property, a landlord may be subject to fees up to $100 per day of unlawful method use." http://homeguides.sfgate.com/tenants-rights-utility-billing-california-8073.html However, while the legal process will take a long time, at the end you will still be liable for back rent, and you will have an eviction on your record, which will make it harder to rent in the future.	How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.	Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario.	Your rights and responsibilities in this realm are a matter of local law, sometimes down to the level of the city, plus whatever is stipulated in the lease. In San Francisco, for example, No Person shall have upon any premises or real property owned, occupied or controlled by him, or her, or it any public nuisance [which includes] Any visible or otherwise demonstrable mold or mildew in the interiors of any buildings or facilities This does not say whether the owner or the occupant is liable for remediating the situation. Shower mold is gross but not a health hazard (the SF ordinance just lumps all mold into one category). Since you have no written lease, there is no automatic clean-up requirement. There might be a law requiring a tenant to clean the premise to its original condition, for instance in Washington, tenant must Upon termination and vacation, restore the premises to their initial condition except for reasonable wear and tear or conditions caused by failure of the landlord to comply with his or her obligations under this chapter. Landlord duties are here: there is no duty to provide ventilation. However, the bathtub appears to be in a common area and not your particular unit. The landlord duties also require the landlord to Keep any shared or common areas reasonably clean, sanitary, and safe from defects increasing the hazards of fire or accident so in Washington, it's his problem and not yours. In general, even if a tenant is responsible for some form of cleanup, that does not constitute legal license for a facility upgrade. It might cost a couple hundred dollars to hire a person to wash ordinary mold accumulation, and does not justify getting a $5,000 new tub. Since this is in a common area, you would not be solely liable for whatever the damage was. The part where you say "crack in a common bath tub" is a large red flag: it suggests to me that somebody negligently broke the bathtub, and then caused behind-the-wall damage by letting water infiltrate without notifying the landlord. If you broke the tub and let it rot, you could be liable. If the tub was broken already and the landlord didn't bother to do anything about it, that is his negligence. The three questions that you should try to answer are: (1) what are the duties of landlord and tenant in my jurisdiction, (2) what was the actual harm done, and who did it, (3) what is the ordinary cost of whatever repair was done.	At common law, a tenant is entitled to "quiet enjoyment" of the property. This means that the owner can only interact with the tenant as spelled out in the lease or in an emergency situation. First, calmly and quietly write down a list of your grievances. Then check your lease to see what the landlord is entitled to do. Cross off any grievances that are permitted by the lease. Take this and the lease to your solicitor and pay him to write a letter to your agent advising them of your grievances and asking that they stop. Without knowing where you are, we do not know what additional rights and dispute resolution procedures are available in your jurisdiction. Very few jurisdictions still rely entirely on common law as real estate is one of the most highly government regulated areas of life wherever you are. Your solicitor will know and, for less that a week's rent will give you solid advice.	Do I have any recourse for invalidating all or part of the contract? No. There is a presumption in contract law that when a contract is reduced to writing then what that writing says is what the parties agreed. Also, if you signed it, then you are legally stating: I read it, I understand it and I agree to it - don't sign things you don't understand. If your lawyer has produced something you don't understand then have them redraft it until you do. Would a successful suit against the lawyer for malpractice or negligence make any difference? No. A suit against you lawyer may get you damages from your lawyer but it will not affect the rights of third-parties. What is best practice for avoiding flawed contracts like this in the first place? Read and understand the contract. Educate yourself enough in the law so that you can do this. Your lawyer is there to give you professional advice; you are there to make your own decisions.	Is there any way I can persuade the new landlord to start renting apartment as close as possible to the end of 30-day period? If you already signed a contract with the "immediate move-in" clause, it is going to be difficult to persuade the new landlord. That is because the landlord would have no incentive to postpone his source of income and there is no statute or legal provision available to you on that. If you have not signed the contract, then you two can still negotiate until either party leaves or you reach an agreement. Under contract law, the latter is referred to as knowingly and willfully entering a contract.
How to contest compensation as an independent contractor I am curious how I would go about contesting how I was compensated as an independent contractor to the IRS for tax purposes. Is there an official channel for this or do I have to go some sort of court, small claims court. This question is specific to CA, USA. Long story short, I am doing my taxes for lyft and how the payments work as I understand it is: Either the rider pays me 'the driver or independent contractor' the ride total and I pay lyft their 25% the for using their services OR the rider pays lyft and they pay me AFTER they have taken out the fee/expense per ride. Now, I am curious because they list my AGI (adjusted gross income) as 25% more. As in I am payed by the rider and give them their cut, yet the amount I am payed does not include that when I am payed at the end of the week. So it seems they take the money from the passenger, deduct their cut and pay me. So why am I paying income tax on money I didn't receive?	You don't pay income tax on the part that is paid to Lyft. They are correctly listing the entire amount you earned for driving through their service - that is how much is supposed to be used as your income in the eyes of the law. You then deduct the amount you paid to Lyft in fees etc as a business expense in your tax forms, under the appropriate section. That will alter your adjusted gross income when determining how much taxes you actually owe. If you're confused on how to enter that deduction properly, consult a tax agent or other support mechanism for the service you are using to file your taxes.	It is a principle of equity (of which damages are a part) that you are not entitled to be enriched. Let's say that the first collision did damage costing $500 to repair. If after the second collision the cost of the repair is now $700, the first driver is liable for $500 and the second for $200. That said, let your insurer sort it out - that's what you pay your premiums for.	Suing them and winning may not be that difficult, and you can generally sue a business even if it ceases to operate as a going concern. Collecting the judgment you win, however, is likely to be very difficult. Still if you are going to sue, the sooner the better, because outside of bankruptcy, the general rule is that the person who is first in time to actually seize the available assets of a company with more debts than assets is first in right to those assets. Also a squeaky wheel is often the one that gets the grease. "Shaming" companies on social media often works for going concerns, but is rarely effective when a company is actually going out of business soon. There are special remedies available against recipients of improperly diverted funds when funds are deliberately sucked out of the organization without receiving anything in exchange for its money (this is called a "fraudulent transfer"), but those cases are expensive to bring and hard to prove. Often in the case of a legitimately failing business, operating losses and not improper diversion of funds from the company, is the reason that it doesn't have enough money to pay all of its debts in full, so this remedy is not available. Winning a lawsuit simply gives you a piece of paper stating that the defendant owes you money which you can then use to seize money and property from the defendant and/or people who owe the defendant money, if you can find either of those things. But, you can't get blood out of a turnip, and the alternative formal collection mechanism (forcing an involuntary bankruptcy) requires the coordination of multiple significant creditors and may not provide much better results if the company has genuinely run out of money, although unpaid wages are often entitled to priority in bankruptcy up to a certain dollar amount which is a preference that is not generally available outside of bankruptcy court. There are sometimes laws that can be invoked to hold people affiliated with the management of a defunct business personally responsible for unpaid wages (sometimes the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and sometimes state wage claim acts). And, very rarely in egregious cases that affect lots of people where there was an intent to stiff you before you finished earning new wages at the company, a local or state prosecutor will prosecute a company or its officers for "wage theft". Finally, "freelancers" often have far fewer rights in efforts to collect wages than true employees, so a mere independent contractor is in a weaker position and should consider that fact when deciding whether or not to settle. Bottom line: consider seriously accepting a settlement because the cost of collection and the unavailability of assets to collect from once it goes out of business may make a bird in the hand worth more than two in the bush.	According to Wikipedia Vicarious Liability is a type of liability under the doctrine of "Respondeat Superior" (an employer is responsible for the actions of employees performed within the course of their employment). Now, in the first case that you have mentioned, the employee was on duty and was supposed to be under the supervision of the supervisor. Therefore, any mishap that might happen would be considered to be during the course of employment. Thus, attracting Vicarious Liability for the employer. While in the second case, an independent contractor (or a third-party) was put to work. This contractor is not an employee of the Rail company, but rather someone who is under a contract to fulfill a particular task. This essentially means that the Rail company cannot have complete control over the actions of the contractor, as it is not governed by the rules of the rail company as set out for its employees. But because both the parties were under some contract, the contracting party (that wanted to have a task accomplished) should have supervised in some manner, which translated to the Rail Company's personal liability.	Under U.S. law, a U.S. court can assert jurisdiction sufficient to enter a binding judgment (called "long arm personal jurisdiction") if the events giving rise to the lawsuit took place in the state where the state or federal court in which the suit is brought is located. Generally speaking, modern U.S. law allows the service of the summons and complaint that gives the court jurisdiction over the defendant if the events giving rise to the suit took place in the state, to be served anywhere in the world (or even in outer space, for that matter). But, the practical reality is that serving someone with process from a U.S. court in another country would be difficult and expensive, and enforcing the judgment if you win could likewise be difficult. There are also a couple of other problems specific to small claims court: Many small claims courts do not have the full jurisdiction that the U.S. Constitution allows them to have by virtue of the statutes that authorize them and their contemplation that proceedings take place predominantly or entirely in person. It isn't uncommon for the statute authorizing a small claims court to limit its jurisdiction to defendants that live in the same county. Most small claims courts are only allowed to enter money judgments subject to some very narrow and idiosyncratic exceptions. Most small claims courts do not have jurisdiction to order specific performance of a contract to sell a car, even though they could award money damages for breaching the contract to sell the car if those money damage could be demonstrated convincingly. These barriers particular to small claims court could be solved by filing suit in another state court that has broader jurisdiction. (The federal courts would probably not have jurisdiction over this case even if there was "diversity of citizenship" between the parties because the amount in controversy would probably be less than $75,000 unless it was a very fancy car indeed to be worth that much used.) Different consideration would apply if these facts and circumstances arose outside the United States, depending upon the jurisdiction in question.	They have to pay you for all hours "worked". If you are an intern, it would come down to whether you are an unpaid intern and therefore agreed to that or if you are a paid employee. I noticed your post said you were an intern and then were asked to stay on, so I don't know if you stayed on as an intern or employee. Employees should be compensated for their time and effort, so if you are an employee you should get some compensation. As for how you claim it, you are going to have to talk to them. If it bothers you that you won't be paid for the training and they won't agree to pay you, your best bet is to find a different job. This article lists how to take them to a tribunal or talk to a union, if you do not want a different job and wish to pursue the matter: https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/work/rights-at-work/pay/problems-getting-paid/#ifnotgettinganywhere	He may be entitled to (part) of the deposit or he may owe you more money When you and he agreed you both entered a legally binding contract - you are obliged to sell the vehicle to him, he is obliged to buy the vehicle from you. The deposit is merely the first instalment of the payment for the vehicle with the balance being due on delivery. They are not refundable by default. He now wants to repudiate the contract and you have several options: you can refuse his repudiation and require him to complete the contract within a reasonable time. He probably won’t do this so when he doesn’t we move on to one of the other options. In essence, this is simply a warning shot that if he doesn’t complete the contract you will move on to item 2. you can accept the repudiation and sue for damages, these would include your lost rent, pro-rata of registration, insurance etc. from the time you would have sold to the time you do sell, any additional advertising, any difference in the price you ultimately get if it is lower than his offer etc. you can accept the repudiation in return for keeping the deposit in lieu of the actual damages. This in makes the deposit a liquidated damages amount and it must follow all the same rules, basically it must be a genuine pre-estimate of the damage you would suffer and not be so high that it amounts to a penalty. You can accept the repudiation and, as a gesture of goodwill, return some or all of the deposit.	First of all, the USA's legal system is not here to be referee to every single little "gotcha" mistake, and every little mistake doesn't mean a payday for someone. The employee at the tax preparer screwed up. They mixed up your folder with the other guy's folder. It was an honest mistake, which is another way of saying "nobody stands to gain from this." The best LEGAL action you can take is to either destroy the copy in your possession, or mail it back to the tax preparer, and call it a good day, done well. The law of torts exists to adjudicate sincere and structural divergences of interests, not to fix silly mistakes. As a point of law, what was the damage of this "event?" Some random person (you) saw a 1099 belonging to someone else. In good faith, you attempt to find and reinstate the rightful owner with their document. All good. As it is, you have zero "standing" in a case of inadvertent clerical error between two other parties.
Is the California court ruling that coffee can increase cancer risk justified? A court in California ruled against companies that may have to put a warning that tells customers there is a possible cancer risk linked to coffee by saying the companies "failed to meet their burden of proof on their Alternative Significant Risk Level affirmative defense". Is this ruling justified? This is somewhat related to this answer since it addresses the health risk of acrylamide which is the court's argument for why coffee should have the cancer risk warning. Given the convincing data in the answer I linked, I'm finding it hard to see how the court justified this ruling.	From a legal perspective, I think the ruling is reductio ad absurdum correct. California voters passed Proposition 65. Consequently, CA Health and Safety Code 25249.6 says "No person in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear and reasonable warning to such individual, except as provided in Section 25249.10". Section 25249.8 mandates a list, and defines "known to the state" A chemical is known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity within the meaning of this chapter if in the opinion of the state’s qualified experts it has been clearly shown through scientifically valid testing according to generally accepted principles to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity, or if a body considered to be authoritative by such experts has formally identified it as causing cancer or reproductive toxicity, or if an agency of the state or federal government has formally required it to be labeled or identified as causing cancer or reproductive toxicity. Acrylamide is so listed, and has been for 18 years, reason code listed as "AB-IARC, AB-US EPA". The law does not say that "the benefits may outweigh the risks", nor does the law say anything about usual doses. There is an "escape clause", if one (the defendant) can prove that there is no effect (25249.8(b)): An exposure for which the person responsible can show that the exposure poses no significant risk assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question for substances known to the state to cause cancer, and that the exposure will have no observable effect assuming exposure at one thousand (1000) times the level in question for substances known to the state to cause reproductive toxicity, based on evidence and standards of comparable scientific validity to the evidence and standards which form the scientific basis for the listing of such chemical pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 25249.8. In any action brought to enforce Section 25249.6, the burden of showing that an exposure meets the criteria of this subdivision shall be on the defendant. The answer on Skeptics does not address the EPA finding (and the science underlying it). At this point we can only conjecture about the defense's scientific argument (the ruling is still in the works, pending feedback from parties), but the judge said "While plaintiff offered evidence that consumption of coffee increases the risk of harm to the fetus, to infants, to children and to adults, defendants' medical and epidemiology experts testified that they had no opinion on causation" and that the coffee makers hadn't presented the proper grounds at trial to prevail. Insofar as human subjects testing of suspected carcinogens is illegal, any argument that "but this only shows that it causes cancer in rats" is legally empty: rats are a suitable proxy for humans. This is a state report addressing a potential carcinogen, 4-Methylimidazole. The report notes that to have a No Significant Risk Level finding, the substance must have less than a "daily intake level posing a 10^-5 lifetime risk of cancer". A further requirement is that "risk analysis shall be based on the most sensitive study deemed to be of sufficient quality" (whatever that is). This study mentions a previous study which was rejected because "these studies do not meet the criteria specified in Section 25703(a) because the experiments were not designed to adequately control for and examine the potential carcinogenicity of 4-MEI". Basically, Spiegelhalter's argument is too meta, and doesn't constitute a proof that acrylamide poses no risk of cancer. If the defendants commissioned an independent scientific study to overcome earlier carcinogen findings, perhaps the study failed on technical grounds. The bar that has to be cleared is very high. The EPA regulation says that the maximum contaminant level goal for acrylamide is zero. That is the carcinogen-science basis for specific allowable levels in water supplies.	The Supreme Court has said that "when a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given".1 This needs to be "clear and convincing" proof.2 The "clear and convincing" standard is higher than simply "more likely than not" or "preponderance of the evidence".3 It has been equated with "highly probable".4 In your hypothetical, the prosecution failed to prove that it was more likely than not that consent was freely and voluntarily given. They are far from meeting the "clear and convincing" standard that is required. The evidence resulting from the search would be excluded. I also recommend gracey209's answer, which explains why this hypothetical is not realistic, and describes many other factors that go into the determination of whether a search is reasonable -- the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not consent. 1. Bumper v. North Carolina 391 U.S. 543 (1968) 2. State v. Danby, 11 Ohio App. 3d 38 (1983): "Accordingly, a warrantless search based upon the consent of the defendant is valid if his consent is voluntarily given. [...] Furthermore, the degree of proof constitutionally required is proof by "clear and positive" evidence. [...] In construing the phrase "clear and positive" in terms of evidentiary proof, we observe that several courts have held that it is quantitatively equivalent to proof by clear and convincing evidence." 3. Calderon v. Thompson 523 U.S. 538 (1998) 4. Colorado v. New Mexico 467 U.S. 310 (1984): "Last Term, the Court made clear that Colorado's proof would be judged by a clear and convincing evidence standard. [... W]e thought a diversion of interstate water should be allowed only if Colorado could place in the ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are highly probable."	It is legal, at least in the US, for a store (or other entity) to refuse to sell any item to any individual for any non-prohibited reason (prohibited reasons are typically things like race or religion). More over, in various US jurisdictions, it is prohibited to "furnish" alcohol to a "minor" (for example, under California's ABC law), which can be interpreted as prohibiting to an adult if they reasonably suspect that adult will pass the alcohol onto the "minor". This is to prevent "straw" sales. Additionally, larger chains generally prefer to have harmonized policies across branches, and where practical, across state lines, so will have policies that can accomodate multiple alcohol control regimes.	No. A federal court may not vacate the conviction which the state court declined to vacate under these circumstances. On March 22, 2009, a jury found Luis Villavicencio‐Serna guilty of first‐degree murder of Armando Huerta Jr. Scant physical evidence linked him to the charge. The conviction instead was largely based on testimony from three of his friends, all of whom later recanted. Villavicencio‐Serna exhausted his state‐court appeals and then sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Throughout these proceedings, he consistently has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. He emphasizes the lack of physical evidence connecting him to the murder, and he suggests that several factors - inconsistencies between the testimonies of his three friends, their subsequent recantations, and the interrogation tactics used by the police—reveal that the police pressured his friends to implicate him. Finally, he offers an alternative theory that links another group to the murder. In the face of these arguments, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld his conviction. The [federal] district court, applying the double‐layered deference required by section 2254(d), concluded that the state court’s decision was not unreasonable, and so it refused to issue the writ. See Villavicencio‐Serna v. Melvin, No. 17 C 5442, 2019 WL 2548688 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2019). Although we sympathize with the district court’s observation that “the lack of any physical evidence in this case is troubling,” we too conclude that Villavicencio‐Serna has not shown enough to entitle him to issuance of the writ. We therefore affirm.	Two reasons that spring to mind: The Respondent wanted the appeal to proceed so that they would have definitive case law from a higher court. That is they thought they would win and, quite possibly, the appellant thought they would win too. Rolling the dice on a losing proposition is not so bad if you have no skin in the game so the Respondent is encouraging the appeal. Its a commercial PR decision - it looks bad in the press if you use your money and power to prevent someone from pursuing their legal rights. This way, they can put their hand on their hearts and say "we gave them every opportunity to prove us wrong".	There is a saying that you can't sue city hall: that is applicable here. Governments enjoy sovereign immunity, and cannot be sued for their errors of judgment unless they specifically allow it. Safety regulations are an example of a situation where the government hold all of the power and shoulders none of the responsibility. If a government forbids sale or use of a substance on some grounds (could be safety, could be economic impact, could be something about preventing the moral decay of society), and the grounds later turns to be false, you cannot sue the government because of lost business opportunities. Generally speaking, that which is not prohibited is allowed, so there would have to be an affirmative duty for the government to prevent all forms of harm. If there were such a legal duty, there is a miniscule legal foundation for suing the government for shirking its duty. That is not a completely hypothetical possibility, in that the state of Washington imposes a constitutional duty on the legislature to provide public education, and the Supreme Court has done things to enforce this duty (the contempt of court fines are up in the realm of $80 million). Since there is no jurisdiction that imposes a duty on the government to absolutely prevent all harm, you won't be able to sue the government if they fail to outlaw a thing that is eventually proven to harm someone.	I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract.	Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.
Arbitration OptOut In the United States, is it required by law for a company offering a long term service contract to include an option to opt-out of their arbitration agreement, if the customer chooses to exercise that option? If yes, is it legal to set a time restriction such as 30 days or less to opt-out of the agreement then take away the option, requiring the customer to use arbitration after the 30 days to resolve disputes. Does it benefit the customer to use arbitration over the regular courts or is the arbitration clause in place purely for the benefit of the company?	In the United States, is it required by law for a company offering a long term service contract to include an option to opt-out of their arbitration agreement, if the customer chooses to exercise that option? No. (There may be isolated exceptions to this principle for very particular kinds of services, but the exceptions are rare and this is not the general rule.) Does it benefit the customer to use arbitration over the regular courts or is the arbitration clause in place purely for the benefit of the company? It almost never benefits the customer to use arbitration in lieu of regular courts. This is put in place primarily to prevent consumers from bringing class action lawsuits and because arbitration forums are routinely biased in favor of the company. Usually, an arbitration clause has the practical effect of denying the consumer any legal recourse whatsoever, and the consumer almost never actually utilizes this right. Also, an arbitration decision can't be overturned by a court even if it clearly and obviously misstates the facts and applies legal rules that are clearly contrary to the law.	If you have no contract to provide the service then you have no obligation under contract law to do so. However, if you are aware that withdrawing the service could or would cause damage to their business then doing so may leave you open to a suit on the basis of negligence; particularly if you do so precipitously and without warning. You should write to them in the following terms: Despite our agreement that the contract would not be renewed you have not made any arrangements to stop using my service. Consequently I consider that by your actions, you have continued to treat the contract as ongoing. I am happy for this arrangement to continue on a month-by-month basis and will be invoicing accordingly. If this is acceptable, please respond by 4pm on x/y/z; if you do not do so I will switch the service off at 4pm on x/y+2/z	Jurisdiction has not been provided, so I've written a general answer: Not necessarily; often, such provisions clauses will have their own expiration dates, for example "for five years after signing, X", with X still being valid after cancellation up to 5 years(so if you cancel after 3 years, X is still valid for 2 more years), or "for two years after cancellations, Y"(especially common with non-compete clauses) where the time-limit of Y starts when the contract is cancelled. Other clauses are meant to indeed be enforced forever, such as some non-disclosure, non-disparagement, or indemnity clauses. For example, an indemnity clause in a contract that prevents a party from suing the counter-party for work done under the contract would be pointless if it could be bypassed by a party terminating the agreement. There are lots of legal limits, based on the terms of the provision, and its nature, all governed by the contract law of the jurisdiction under which the contract was drafted under and/or is governed by (this is generally obvious, except for some cross-border contracts, which generally will have a declaration as to whose laws apply). It is not inherently abusive, but can certainly be abused. What is considered abusive often varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (not only on this issue, but on legal issues in general). It depends on the jurisdiction, and generally on the terms of the provision itself. If the court asked to enforce the terms of the agreement feels that the provision is illegal or abusive, they won't be enforced (and possibly the entire document declared null and void, depending on the central-ness of the illegal or abusive provision; some provisions specifically state that invaliding the provision doesn't invalidate the whole contract to try to prevent this). If they don't feel the provision is illegal or abusive, they will generally enforce it.	I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right.	This paper describes a website created to test the hypothesis that nobody bothers to read the TOS, and it contained a privacy clause saying that "we may share everything, and a clause that by agreeing to these Terms of Service, and in exchange for service, all users of this site agree to immediately assign their first-born child to NameDrop, Inc. If the user does not yet have children, this agreement will be enforceable until the year 2050. All individuals assigned to NameDrop automatically become the property of NameDrop, Inc. No exceptions. Since this was not a real webpage, there was no attempt to enforce. TOS is just another kind of contract, so the question is which kinds of contract conditions are enforceable and which kinds are not. It depends on whose laws you are operating under, which explains the use of expressions like "void where prohibited by law". There are innumerable conditions that could be included in a contract which are unenforceable. A contract requiring a person to commit a crime is unenforceable. Many jurisdictions have laws prohibiting a person from waiving certain rights, for example you cannot sign away your right to be represented by legal counsel in a dispute. There are related "unfair / deceptive" practices laws, which might include meta-conditions that any clause disclaiming liability must be prominently displayed. These are terms that a reasonable person would clearly know in advance are illegal and unenforceable. There is also a concept of "unconscionability", a finding that a certain condition favors the business to the point of "shocking the conscience", which may take a deeper legal analysis to evaluate. A requirement to litigate small disputes in California might be deemed unconscionable for a customer in an East Coast state, but it might not be. A typical characterization of an unconscionable contract is one that "leaves one party with no real, meaningful choice and is unreasonably advantageous to the other party", especially when due to asymmetrical negotiation power. For example, Ellis v. McKinnon , 18 Cal. App. 4th 1796 (employment contract for a salesman, commissions were forfeit if company had not received payment from the customer by the termination of employment). The main case law in the US in this area is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, where a customer bought furniture on credit, with a clause allowing repossession of all of the furniture in case of default by the customer. The doctrine is encoded in UCC 2-302. However, "unconscionable" does not mean "I don't like it". In lieu of statutory price controls, a customer probably cannot avoid paying an agreed on exorbitant price for a product ($100 for a dozen rolls of toilet paper). Here is a bit more legal analysis of unconscionability, which focuses on three factors: one-sidedness, oppressiveness, and likeliness to result in unfair surprise.	Yes I would reach the same conclusion as DaleM, i.e. that the arbitration clause still applies to the dispute in the question, but for a different reason.<1> While the severability principle is indeed a concept in arbitration law, I don't believe that is the relevant doctrine here.<2> Termination Of Employment v. Termination Of An Employment Contract What terminates when a period of employment ends is the employment itself, not the contract of employment. The contract remains effective as to rights and obligations arising during the course of the employment covered by the contract. (This concept would also sometimes be described in terms along the lines of "the right to a remedy for the workplace injury and the right to have disputes related to that resolved in arbitration are vested rights" that are not modified when the contract term of employment ends.) This concept isn't particular to the arbitration obligation. For example, if contract of employment that did not contain an arbitration clause provided that the employee was paid $200 an hour for the first six months and $220 an hour for the second six months of a one year fixed term employment agreement, but the employer failed to adjust paychecks according after the first six months and continued paying the employee at $200 an hour instead (assume to avoid the issue of waiver that this wasn't readily apparent on the face of the paystubs provided to the employee), the employee could bring suit thirteen months after the employee's employment terminated for the $20 an hour not paid as agreed during the last six months of the contract even though the employment period had ended. The contract still remains in force to govern the rights and obligations of the parties arising during the period of employment. Examples Of Termination Of The Contract Itself In contrast, sometimes one contract is replaced, even retroactively, with another contract, in what is called a "novation" of the original contract. This truly does terminate the old contract, so that only the replacement contract remains. So, if, for example, the original employment contract contained an arbitration clause, but this was replaced by a new employment contract without an arbitration clause three months later (in the sample case, before the worker was injured<3>), then the arbitration clause would not apply because the contract, and not just the employment was terminated. Similarly, support that the workplace injury was the second dispute between the employer and employee that had come up. The first was a dispute over the rate of pay received which was resolved by a settlement agreement negotiated by lawyers for the parties before either arbitration or litigation in court was commenced, which expressly terminated all rights, known and unknown, of the parties arising under the contract, and the second was the workplace injury for which the relationship of the injury to work was only discovered later on. In this case, the contract and not just the employment had been expressly terminated, and so the arbitration clause would not apply to the workplace injury dispute (which would be barred by the settlement agreement and which may or may not have had an arbitration clause of its own). End Notes <1> At least assuming that the dispute would have been subject to arbitration if a dispute were litigated while the employee was still employed. There can be circumstances when a workplace injury is not subject to arbitration even if the employer and employee undoubtedly agreed to an arbitration clause that applies to the dispute in question. For example, workplace injuries arising from sexual assault are not subject to arbitration in the United States. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. <2> The severability principle usually concerns a determination of the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the face of certain kinds of arguments that the entire contract as a whole is voidable. It also does not apply in cases where there is a dispute over whether any contract of any kind was formed in the first place. For example, if someone presented the court with a contract containing an arbitration clause and sought to compel arbitration, and the defense to a motion to compel arbitration was that the defendant had never met or had any connection with or communication with the defendant or anyone related to the alleged contract. <3> The hard case, where the novation takes place after the injury, is complicated by legal doctrines regarding the conditions under which a vested legal right can be waived, which may or may not be met depending upon the circumstances under which the novation was entered into by the parties and presents conceptually distinct legal questions in addition to the legal questions already present in the simple case where the injury takes place after the novation.	Law (regardless of its type) supersedes contract, provided it has jurisdiction over the persons bound by that contract. Contract provisions that are counter to law are generally held to be void. State law has authority over an employer's policies or hand book. However, there may be exceptions in state law (so I would double check). A frequent exception (at least in California law, which I am most familiar with) is for very small businesses. Another exception, from C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5), is if you are considered a "contractor" rather than an employee, per the government's determination. It is possibly worth your time to let you employer know of this conflict before termination if possible, so that they can adjust their policies, rather than in an adversarial position after termination, if only to avoid the headache.	tl;dr: If you are not satisfied with the service provided by the restaurant, you should take your business elsewhere and write negative, but honest reviews of the establishment. That will over time solve the problem as well without legal intervention. To answer your question if the restaurant can refuse service if you don't tip is actually a much more difficult question than it might sound. I can't find any case law on this subject, such practice is however perhaps more widespread than commonly expected and my interpretation of the law is that they in most cases actually can, at least if they demand payment up front as take-away services often do. It is for example a 'well known fact' that if you don't tip the waiters at the Oktoberfest, they will usually ignore you and don't take any further orders. It is a dirty and unfair way to conduct business, but not necessarily a violation of law. Even if a tip indeed is legally defined as a voluntary donation by the customer, there is in German law also the concept of 'freedom of contract'. Contrary to popular belief, restaurants and other businesses in Germany are not obligated to serve or accept a customer as long as they don't violate other laws, e.g. anti-discrimantory laws and they don't even need any particular reason for doing so. If you want to enter a club or fancy establishment and the bouncer doesn't like your face, he will make use of this right, refuse you entry and be fully within his legal rights to do so. When you order food for take-away, your order must first be interpreted as a contract offer and the restaurant can, albeit with some restrictions, in most cases freely decide to accept your offer and enter a contract which binds them to deliver food, or they can simply refuse your offer and return any payment you may have done in advance.
Entering the US with an expired green card I'm a Filipino passport-holder but I also have an expired US green card. I'm currently in South Korea for my master's degree and I wish to visit USA this summer to see family. My green card's expiry date is August 2017. I applied for a master's program scholarship March 2017, got accepted in June 2017, got my ticket from the scholarship organization July 2017, and flew out August 2017. I didn't (couldn't?) renew my green card due to following reasons: Yes, I could've renewed 6 months before it expired as recommended, but I didn't expect I'd get a full-ride scholarship for a master's degree. My plan was to renew my green card after graduation (May 2017) because I had to save up $540 for the renewal fee. Let's say I did renew my green card 6 months before or before it's expiration date AND got accepted to the scholarship program July 2017... There would be no guarantee that I'd have my greencard before August 2017 as it takes 5-9 months for the new green card to be issued; If I did renew and got my new green card before August 2017, I'd have to apply for a re-entry permit and that's another 2-3 months of waiting... I was accepted 2 months before so, again, there's no guarantee I'd have said re-entry permit before August 2017. Because the scholarship process went by so fast, I was a bit stressed with what to do with my green card. I have all intention to remain a US permanent resident but I also couldn't just throw away a FREE master's scholarship program (knowing that US higher-ed is just extremely expensive). Back to my question... I want to visit family this coming summer break. But of course I have to come back to Korea to finish my master's... and I plan to go back to USA after obtaining my master's degree. Is my best option to apply for a tourist visa? Do I need to give up my green card? Am I considered as someone who abandoned their residency? Are there other better options in my case that would allow me to visit US for a bit and finish my degree then go back to US? Also, I'm an "international student" in Korea. I live in my school dorm and have NO purchases of an apartment, car, or any of that. I just have a Korean bank account.	You will probably not be allowed to enter the United States if your visa is expired. Sometimes foreign student advisors at a college or an immigration attorney will know how to expedite the process to get it renewed in time. Also, sometimes the offeror of a scholarship can move it back to accommodate your inability to get a timely visa renewal, assuming that it is possible to get a visa renewal at all. Applications from the Philippines are processed more slowly than applications from any other country as a matter of official policy. It also isn't obvious to me that you are really talking about a green card (lawful permanent residency) as opposed to a student visa. A tourist visa does not suffice in cases where you need either a student visa or a green card. You need professional help ASAP as this is a highly technical, non-intuitive area, even if that means paying an immigration lawyer hundreds of dollars.	Only hire specialists in immigration with at least several years of experience (ask him or her about this). Hire an attorney and not just a notary. Hire someone who has someone in the office who speaks your native language. Hire someone for whom you can afford to pay the entire fee. Look at Yelp and other online reviews. Check the Attorney Registration website in your state to make sure that the lawyer is still in good standing in your state. Get referrals and anti-referrals from people you know who have used immigration lawyers. See if he or she seems to know what he's talking about and what you're talking about in your initial meeting and ask for a time and fee estimate. Remember that your goal is to hire someone who can get the job done. Don't stress about whether this is the best person for the job.	As in most cases it depends on the details. The length of a blade (> 44mm and width > 10) is important and the circumstances. Assume a fine to something up to € 10000, but a sentence up to 3 years is also possible. In Germany it is not crime (anything that can be fined or minimal sentence is less than 1 year is not a crime). I assume that they took your home address and let you leave the country, which alone is a sign that it not a crime. Since you were so smart to place this in your luggage, where it garantied to be found by airport security, you will probably get something in the range of the minimal fine. You also cooperated by giving a statement, which will assist to lessen the fine (you were after all caught red handed). Having it on your person in a public space, the fine would have be higher. Swinging it around among peaple in a threatening manner, will lead you into the range of a sentence. When the fine arrives, there will be bank transaction form. Go to the next post office or bank and pay it, retaining the receipt. Border control will not be interested in you (they only get alerts for proper criminals). Customs (Zoll) could be interested to enforce the fine, show them the receipt. Pay the fine and get on with your life. As to the U.S. Consulate (forget Embassy, State Department: they deal only in diplomatic affairs) all they will tell you is you must obey the laws of the country you are in assisted in getting an English speaking lawyer when requested send you bill for their efforts A Consulate deals with citizen affairs (administration, assistance). Most Embassies have a Cousulate department inside, but not all. In Berlin it does not. The Cousulate is about 20 Kilometres away from the Embassy. The right to call them is based on the Vienna Conventions 1815 and 1961. All countries that reconised these conventions are required to allow a foreigner to contact their Cousulate. A dual citizen, when inside the country where they are a citizen, do not have this right.	ICE has a degree of authority to deport without court hearing, via an expedited process. The legal framework for such deportations are explained here, and rely on 8 USC 1225. The Secretary of DHS has authority to establish rules, and has recently done so here. The current regulations pertaining to expedited removal are at 8 CFR 253.3. There is no exemption for people being medically treated, for covid-19 or any other reason, but "parole" is available (at the discretion of the attorney general) to "parole" an immigrant if it is "is required to meet a medical emergency". Thus an illegal immigrant in the ICU might be exempt from immediate deportation, but that is at the discretion of the AG. State and local officials do not have the authority to interfere in the enforcement of federal law, even if the state or municipality has declared itself a "sanctuary". The criminal penalties for interference are spelled out here; no law compells cooperation, the law simply prohibits forcible interference.	The law upheld by the decision is a New York law, and thus only applies in the state of New York. Its current text reads in relevant part: No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of the state who is... Not a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, after July first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, to an alien teacher employed pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education permitting such employment. The citizenship requirements of this subdivision shall not apply to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed whose immigration status is that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and who would otherwise be eligible to serve as a teacher, or to apply for or receive permanent certification as a teacher, but for the foregoing requirements of this subdivision. The last sentence of that will no longer be effective starting Nov 30 2022. So, this law only says they are prohibited in New York public schools. And even then, they are allowed if they are applying to be a citizen, if they are hired pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education, or (until 2022) if they are a lawful permanent resident of the US. Other states may have other laws, of course.	Exact wording might matter here, so I looked up the law. It says "a permanent resident complies with the residency obligation with respect to a five-year period if, on each of a total of at least 730 days in that five-year period, they are physically present in Canada". Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 28(2)(a). If you visit the Canadian side of the park, you're "physically present in Canada". It would therefore appear that this would meet the requirement. I am by no means an expert in Canadian immigration law, though.	The law only addresses possible legal consequences, from which you could surmise what actually happens. If a person stops paying rent, the landlord institutes eviction proceedings, and may sue for the remainder of the rent for the term of the lease: they have an obligation to try to find a replacement tenant, to mitigate the damage. Some relief is available to the landlord in the deposit, from which the unpaid rent might be deducted, but let's assume that after that, the actual damage suffered is $5,000. When you sue a person in your home state, the court serves official notice that the defendant must appear to answer the charges, and the state has jurisdiction over the respondent because they are in that state. Giving notice and collecting on a judgment across jurisdictions can get complicated and expensive, so it would depend on what kind of treaties exist between the countries. There is the Hague Service Convention which may simplify the business of giving notice to parties, which works if the respondent fled to Norway or India but not if they fled to Somalia or Turkmenistan. Since it turns out the US is not party to any multinational treaty recognizing foreign judgments, that country is not obligated to care about a US judgment, so unless the person left assets in the US, you may not be able to collect. You could sue in the person's country (hire a local attorney to pursue the matter). The main legal question would be whether there is any conflict between the lease and local law: while the basic idea of a lease is universally recognized, there may be peculiar conditions or procedures applicable in that country. (Norway has some laws pertaining to "shared utilities" which don't exist in the US, which might put a US lease at odds with Norwegian law, and there are rent-raising rules that don't exist here). It might be necessary that you appear in court in that country to swear under oath that the lease was agreed to voluntarily, or the court may require a special form of 'notarization' not available in the US. None of that renders international litigation impossible, though a favorable judgment might be unlikely in some courts. The cost of litigation might be much higher than what would be awarded by a court.	You don't say what jurisdiction's patent laws you're interested in, and priority dates can differ in different schemes. I'm answering as to U.S. law only. In the United States, under the current hybrid "first-inventor-to-file" system, the priority date--the date that determines who "wins" if there are multiple claims to a specific invention--is, with some exceptions that I won't go into, the date of your first application. In other words, the date that the PTO got it in the mail. Once your application is submitted, it is--again, with some limitations I won't get into--prior art for the purposes of any later-submitted application. They can't get another application later, grant it first, and then deny your application based on the later-submitted application. Your application date would still win out. Could someone in the USPTO slip your application out of the stack, fudge the dates, and convince some other company to submit a similar application to get priority over you? Not as a practical matter, no. The USPTO isn't one guy in a room; it's a large organization, and the person who opens the mail, types in your application details, and sends you a receipt, isn't the same guy who knows whether your invention is any good or not. And, frankly, very few patentable inventions are going to be worth someone risking their job and/or jail time over--especially when there would be significant evidence of the misconduct--for example, your patent agent's files. So what are the chances that the examiner on your patent: 1) Is a nefarious character who has lived a life of public service long enough and wants to go rogue; 2) Has a friend in the mailroom who is also an expert in the field of your invention; and 3) Has a conduct in industry who is willing to break the law for the rights to your invention? Slim to none. And if you have an invention that is really so revolutionary that it's going to be worth so many people risking so much to steal it, odds are there will be other evidence that you were the inventor.
Is it illegal for a business to ask for proof that an animal is a service animal? I work for a hotel in Tennessee. I know it's illegal to refuse service to a guest with a service animal, despite not being a pet-friendly hotel, but I've been told that it's illegal to even ask for proof that a guest's animal is a service animal. Is there any truth to this?	No, you cannot ask for proof/documentation. According to the U.S. Department of Justice: In situations where it is not obvious that the dog is a service animal, staff may ask only two specific questions: (1) is the dog a service animal required because of a disability? and (2) what work or task has the dog been trained to perform? Staff are not allowed to request any documentation for the dog, require that the dog demonstrate its task, or inquire about the nature of the person's disability.	Yes and no. While there are no general laws that ban the display of offensive symbols, they are prohibited in certain circumstances. Significantly, this is in the workplace. It is illegal to discriminate on the following bases in the workplace: Race Sex Pregnancy Religion National origin Disability (physical or mental, including HIV status) Age (for workers over 40) Military service or affiliation Bankruptcy or bad debts Genetic information Citizenship status (for citizens, permanent residents, temporary residents, refugees, and asylees) For instance, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 US 742 (1998), the majority found: a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination based upon race could assert a claim for a racially hostile work environment, in addition to the classic claim of so-called "disparate treatment." Since you haven't been specific about the nature of the offensive symbol, some examples might be: displaying a swastika displaying sexually offensive material displaying racially offensive material These are likely only to apply if the employer ought to have known, or did in fact know, that an employee (or in some cases, the customers) of a business would be offended, or it would amount to discrimination. Of course, a single display of only the symbol is not likely, on its own, to create a hostile work environment - it would need to be considered with the rest of the facts - but it can certainly be a contributing factor. It's a bit difficult to list all the situations where similar laws might apply, but this is one of the most prominent (and, to be honest, one of the ones that I'm personally interested in).	It is not legal for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex anywhere in the US (see http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm). Exemptions exist where the discrimination is for bona fide occupational qualifications and, irrelevantly, religious reasons. It is completely legal for a consumer to discriminate on the basis of anything they want to. It is also legal for a business to assist the consumer in that discrimination. Bona fide occupational qualifications generally only apply to instances in which the BFOQ is considered reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular business. Mere customer satisfaction, or lack thereof, is not enough to justify a BFOQ defence, as noted in the cases Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. and Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.. Therefore, customer preference for females does not make femininity a BFOQ for the occupation of flight attendant. However, there may be cases in which customer preference is a BFOQ—for example, femininity is reasonably necessary for Playboy Bunnies. Customer preference can "'be taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to perform the primary function or service it offers,' that is, where sex or sex appeal is itself the dominant service provided." None of the occupations you mention would, on the face of it, meet the requirements to be BFOQ. Allowing their customers to express a preference for a specific gender may impact on the capacity for the business to deliver on that preference but it would not generally allow a BFOQ defence if this impacted their hiring policies. A possible exception is if the business catered to that preference exclusively, for example, an all female gym with all female staff but I am not aware that this has ever been tested and if a male personal trainer wanted to take them on he may very well win. As an aside, there is no BFOQ defence for racial discrimination except for artistic works where the first amendment rights overrule the anti-discrimination laws.	The Rent Ordinance para (e) explicitly precludes that possibility: Any waiver by a tenant of rights under this Chapter 37 shall be void as contrary to public policy. If he attempts to enforce such a clause or in any way dislodge you from the unit, he is liable for a substantial penalty. The legality of a rebate scheme is not clear, but probably would also be deemed illegal, because there already exists provision for buyout, which has specific restrictions. For the rest of the week, tenant buyouts are subject to these provisions. The problem is that the horse may have left the barn. The landlord has to have provided you with a Pre-Buyout Disclosure Form (which is to be signed and filed) before any negotiation / discussion with the tenant. Since we're talking about obeying the law, it has to occur to the landlord that there is a buyout option, and then he has to give you and file the disclosure form before he opens his mouth. He also has to know what the requirements of a buyout agreement will be in the future. Starting on Monday, the law regarding buyouts changes (it doesn't clearly make an agreement impossible, but it's a reminder that the law can be changed). In terms of legally-enforceable agreements, you could agree to a buyout in the far future, but the agreement might not be enforceable under future law. For example, the disclosure form requires new information to be provided, so if he doesn't do that, the disclosure is invalid (the preamble to the amendment points out that the change in law was directed at legal actions that were considered to violate the spirit of the law). Hence a buyout for two years in the future is legally risky.	The only applicable federal law is the Animal Welfare Act. Since you are presumably not operating under a federal research grant, and are not engaged in interstate trading of research animals, you are not subject to that law. That leaves you with state laws. An example is Washington's law on prevention of cruelty to animals. In general, you can't be cruel to an animal, but animal experiments are not per se animal cruelty. If you were a "research institution", you would be subject to RCW 16.52.220 which imposes certification and registration requirements on you and the animal suppliers. If an animal suffers pain from your experiments, you could be prosecuted for cruelty to animals, but that requires causing suffering "knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence".	No one can give you an elephant without your consent. If you don't consent, then it doesn't matter what provisos they spoke to you. They didn't give you an elephant at all. They abandoned an elephant on your property. You owe them no consideration. Call animal control and they make it "go away" (read: probably to a welcoming zoo). If you did consent, now the question arises of whether it is legal. And that works out exactly the same as if you'd purchased the elephant yourself.	You are responsible It is unlikely that the arrangement you had with the sitter amounts to a contract. Even though there was consideration on both sides, at first blush it seems unlikely that both of you intended to create legal relations. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? Notwithstanding, if there is a contract it is silent on who is responsible to for injury to the pet so it would fall back on the law of negligence anyway. For the sitter to be responsible, she must have been negligent. She wasn't. See Is there liability for pure accidents? Looking at the elements: a duty to the plaintiff, such a aduty probably exists. breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), she didn't (see below). the plaintiff must have suffered actual harm, no question that you have. the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of that harm, and that harm was foreseeable, probably it wasn't (see below). Here are the facts: She took the dog on public transport - not unreasonable, many people do. The fact that you wouldn't is irrelevant since you did not communicate this prohibition to the sitter. She took it to an off-leash park - not unreasonable, that's what they are for. She rode an escalator - it is unclear if she carried the dog or expected the dog to ride the escalator itself. The first is clearly reasonable, the second may or may not be depending on the size of the dog etc. She noted the injury and had it treated - eminentely reasonable. So, in general, she has acted as a reasonable person would. It is also far from clear to me how any of the decisions made would result in foreseeable harm to the dog. Remembering that the standard is would a reasonable person foresee that there was a risk of harm barring extraordinary circumstances. By the way, the legal reasoning is exactly the same if you had entrusted her with your child or your car.	united-states Since "lying" is not a clearly-defined legal concept, we need to look at a specific kind of (non)statement. Some lies are plainly illegal, for instance saying in the context of a sale that "this column is made of pressure-treated lumber" when in fact it is make of sand and Elmer's glue is fraud. A receptionist being told to say "Mr. Smith is at a conference in New York" when he is actually drunk in Chicago is a legal lie. Now the question is, who can refuse to tell this lie (without suffering employment consequences), and on what grounds? Generally, in the US you can be ordered to tell such a legal lie as part of your employment duties. If I refuse, I can be fired. If you refuse, you can request a reasonable accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since you proffer that your religion requires you to tell the truth / forbids you from telling a falsehood. If you make a claim for a religious accommodation, then the issue becomes whether there is a reasonable alternative. Such an accommodation might be that you instead say "Mr. Smith is not available"; or perhaps someone else who does not have a religious objection will be forced to act as receptionist for the day. This is specifically about religion. "I don't want to" or any similar idea does not provide protection against being fired. However, bear in mind that there is no official list of approved religions and their beliefs which the courts will refer to in determining whether your refusal was protected. If you claim "As a Pastafarian, I can't lie", the courts will not accept the premise that declaring yourself to be Pastafarian (a parody "religion") is valid. The available governmental resources on the fine line between general moral code and religious beliefs are quite sparse.
Going to court after agreeing to multiple dispute resolutions Dave and Bob co-found a company together and both sign a shareholders agreement.They then work together on the company full-time for a year. Dave is then accused by Bob of breaching the agreement by starting a side project. Dave disagrees that he breached the agreement, but still wants the dispute resolved as he believes in the company and wants to move on from the issue. Bob proposes a resolution to the dispute: Dave meets certain deadlines to accelerate the progress of their company, in exchange for this Bob will drop the issue. It's all things Dave will need to do eventually anyway, so they verbally agree and Dave believes all is well again. A week later Bob comes back to Dave and says that he has changed his mind. Bob now wants Dave to sign some ownership of his side project over to their company. Dave is initially hesitant, but Dave still believes in their company, so agrees to give their company 5% ownership of the side project. The paperwork is drafted up and emailed out, and again Dave believes all is sorted. A few weeks go by and Bob still hasn't made an effort to confirm that he is happy with the drafted paperwork, and nothing has been signed. At this point Dave gets fed up with with Bob and decides he has had enough. Dave leaves the company, remaining only as a shareholder, and gets a full-time job elsewhere. A couple of months go by and then Dave receives a message from Bob saying that because of the dispute, he wants to take Dave to court in an attempt to take Dave's shares back by force and take full ownership of the side project that caused it. Dave informs Bob that he is happy to sell his shares back, as he put in the work to build the company. Dave and Bob both put offers on the table, but cannot agree to an amount. It reaches the point where Bob and Dave cannot agree and going to court is the next step. At each stage, Dave has made full effort to resolve the dispute, however Bob has initially verbally agreed, but then changed his mind. How is this viewed in court? Dave is concerned that going to court could be expensive, but doesn't want to settle for a share value that doesn't represent the work put in. EDIT: To clarify, the proposed resolution for Dave to sign over 5% ownership of the side-project to their company was decided and agreed upon in a meeting between Bob, Dave and the company lawyer	It sounds to me like the parties made proposals with an intent to draw them up and formalize them but didn't intend to form binding agreements. The first agreement sounds vague. The second was committed to writing, suggesting that the written deal was to be the real agreement, and not executed. In the last case, it doesn't appear that there was an agreement because there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term, which was the price. Going to court is expensive. It is expensive whether this is litigating underlying disputes or trying to enforce an alleged oral settlement that is disputed. Also, settlement discussions that don't result in a resolution are not admissible as evidence in court. Making a deal would be nice, but Dave's concept of what constitutes a deal seems to be out of touch with reality.	There is no "normal" or "standard situation". The parties are free to negotiate whatever terms they like within any limitations imposed by law. If you're unhappy with the proposed terms then you should either negotiate to include a liability limitation clause, refuse to agree the NDA, or consider whether the benefits of signing it outweigh your concerns. If you are entering into the NDA as a consumer and with a trader, then in england-and-wales, you might have some protection from Section 62 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 which provides: (1) An unfair term of a consumer contract is not binding on the consumer. (4) A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer. For example, a contract which imposes unlimited liability on a consumer, while capping the liability of the trader, could be unfair. This will very much depend on all the circumstances and what the contract as a whole says: (5) Whether a term is fair is to be determined — (a) taking into account the nature of the subject matter of the contract, and (b) by reference to all the circumstances existing when the term was agreed and to all of the other terms of the contract or of any other contract on which it depends. A term also can't be assessed for fairness if it specifies the main subject matter of the contract (which arguably a liability clause in a NDA does) and the term is transparent and prominent (see Section 64). "I also don't understand the following wording: ...breach of this Agreement may cause irreparable harm to XXXXXX. Therefore, in addition to any other remedies available to XXXXXX, XXXXXX may obtain injunctive relief in the event of any breach or alleged breach of this Agreement without proving actual damages." What this is saying is that, in addition to all the usual actions that the other party could take against you for breaching the NDA (e.g. suing you for damages in the event that they suffer a loss from your breach), they can also apply to a court for an injunction without needing to prove that your breach caused them any loss. An injunction in this case would be a court order requiring you to stop breaching the NDA (e.g. to stop divulging information subject to the NDA).	Possibly Your employment contract is only one part of your deal You are also bound by the company’s constitution and any shareholder agreement that may exist. Companies often have wide ranging powers to repurchase their own shares at fair market value or following a pre-specified formula. It’s not uncommon for private companies to get an option to purchase shares automatically from ex-employees.	This is called a qui tam action. It's a concept that's been around a long time in the English legal system (predating the US), to encourage people to help the government enforce its laws. The more contemporary system is to give private parties the right to sue on their own behalf for some wrong (known as a "private attorney general" system), which is how things like civil rights claims tend to work; the difference with qui tam is that the government is the plaintiff (source) It's possible when the law says that a claim under some section may be filed by a private person on behalf of the government; at the time the article was written, the false marking statute (35 USC 292) stated that "Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event one-half shall go to the person suing and the other to the use of the United States." In a qui tam action, the government is the plaintiff; it's just that instead of a public attorney handling the case, it's handled by a private party. There were three active qui tam statutes in US federal law as of 2009 (source: CRS): the False Claims Act (31 USC 3730), the patent marking claim, and an Indian protection statute (25 USC 201). The patent marking qui tam provision has been repealed, leaving just the two. For the Indian protection statute, I can't find any reference to any special procedure; for the False Claims Act, there is a special procedure included in the law. In the False Claims Act, when an action is submitted, the government is notified and the complaint kept sealed for 60 days while the US government decides what to do. If the government wants to take over the case itself, it can do that; if it wants the private party to run the case, it can do that too; if it wants to dismiss or settle the case it can do that as well. It can also ask for the time to be extended, or for discovery to be delayed to gather evidence or prosecute a separate criminal or civil case. If the government lets the private party run the case, they can still intervene later if they have a good reason. After the case finishes, the private party gets 15-25% of the judgment or settlement (if the government took over the case) or 25-30% (if the private party ran the case), plus attorney fees. If the facts the case was brought under were publicly known when it was filed, the amount shrinks to 0-10% if the person supplied information to the government that wasn't publicly known when it was supplied, and the case is dismissed if the person just learned about it from public sources. For the false marking statute, a district court actually found it unconstitutional in part because of the lack of the extensive procedure found in the False Claims Act. There, the procedure was just to file the case like normal; the clerk had to tell the Patent Office that a claim had been filed within a month, but one issue was that a settlement could have happened in that time and bound the government. It's possible higher courts would have ruled had that section not been repealed later that year. As for other countries, the idea came to the US from England, but the Common Informers Act 1951 eliminated it there. However, private prosecutions (which do exist in England) are similar in that the case is on behalf of the Crown, but handled by a private party; they're different in that the private party doesn't get any part of the judgment. While it's hard to prove a negative, I can't find any evidence of qui tam provisions outside the US.	IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here.	You have several issues. Breach of Contract When you sign up with each of those services you are entering a legally binding contract and must comply with the terms of that contract. For example, this is taken from Facebook's terms: Here are some commitments you make to us relating to registering and maintaining the security of your account: You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission. You will not create more than one personal account. I haven't checked but its a fair bet that the other services have similar terms. Unless you have permission, what you are doing breaches these terms of service. If what you do causes damage to Facebook et al then they can sue you and your employer for damages. Even if it doesn't they can probably bar you from having an account for as long as they like. Improper use of images This is jurisdictional but it is generally required to have the permission of the subject of a photograph where that photograph is used for commercial gain. There are exceptions where the person is not the primary subject (e.g. crowd shots, or images primarily of something else where the person happens to be in the shot) but the type of photos you would use for these services are not going to be exempt. The sanctions for breaching this will be dependent on jurisdiction. Breach of Copyright Somebody owns the copyright in those photographs. If you do not have a licence to use them in the way you propose then you are breaching their copyright. The copyright holder can sue for damages (if any) and any profits you make. Vicarious Liability An employer is strictly liable for the actions of their employees, jointly and severally with the employee. That means a plaintiff can go after either the employer, the employee or both. An employee may have some statutory or contractual indemnity but this is by no means common.	If I did not sign promotion bonus document, my career would be over. Is this duress? No. The premise is hardly true or even logical, and what you describe falls short of duress. Not every imbalance of bargain power implies duress. First, it seems that you could have declined the bonus, thereby preempting the sanction/remedy for leaving within 12 months. Second, it seems hard to prove (and unrealistic) that your career would have been over if you refused to sign the document. The employer can easily refute that allegation by pointing out that there are many others who did not sign that employer's document and yet work elsewhere as investment bankers. You would need certain, additional context to reasonably allow for a conclusion that your career altogether depends on what happens with this single entity. Third, your mention that "the bonus mitigates the horrendous weekly hours" reinforces the idea that signing the document was your preference (namely, for the purpose of obtaining some additional, non-compulsory stimulus) rather than employer-inflicted duress. The rationale and decision for acceptance of those conditions reflects that you knowingly exercised your freedom of contract. A party is not entitled to void a contract only because he belatedly changed his mind about conditions of which he was aware beforehand.	Variations of contracts must be consented to by all parties. This means that if the company sent your friend varied terms, it would have included means by which she would have consented - this may be by continuing to use a service. You cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract. You could try to charge the company PoS terminal storage fees, but it's highly unlikely to be enforceable if they don't agree to it. In theory if they are aware of the change and they accept them in some way then they are bound to the terms just as she would be, even if they later claimed that they were not aware of them. There is some precedent - in Russia - for this with a bank and it made the news some time ago. There's plenty of cases in which people who don't read EULAs or loan contracts thoroughly are still forced to honour their obligations to their creditors under them.
Is it a crime to receive money from one individual and give it to another individual to reduce their taxes? I have two relatives, Alice and Betty. Alice wants to give Betty a $20,000 cash gift, but because this is over the $14,000 cap for tax-free gifting, they are concerned about Betty's tax responsibility as the recipient. To solve the problem and reduce Betty's tax burden, Alice wants to give me a $6,000 gift and then ask me to give a $6,000 gift to Betty. This way, no cash transfers are greater than $14,000. My concern is that this may be considered tax evasion, or some other crime, which I don't want to be implicated in. Otherwise, if this is merely a legal tax avoidance, that would be fine.	It is not necessarily a crime to do this, but the gift to you and from you to Betty would be disregarded and treated as if gift directly from Alice to Betty, if the IRS knew all of the facts. A gift implies a donative intent directed at you. When there is an understanding that you are acting at Alice's direction, you aren't receiving a gift, you are acting as Alice's agent. This said, this scheme, or the alternative it seeks to prevent, has no impact on Betty, because gift taxes are imposed on the donor rather than the recipient of the gift. And, in most cases, a gift in excess of the $14,000 per person per year gift tax exemption will have only a minimal impact. This is because each person is entitled to make a combination of gifts in excess of the exemption during life and transfers to non-spouses and non-charities at death of $11,200,000 per lifetime (adjusted annually for inflation). Usually, all that is necessary if the limit is exceeded is for the donor to file form 706 (a federal gift tax return) at the same time as the donor's income tax return, and this form is very simple if the only gifts given are cash gifts. Transfers to a U.S. citizen spouse are gift and estate tax free, as are gifts to foreign and domestic charities. Spouses who file a Form 709 in a year may treat gifts given by one spouse as actually given half by each spouse. If someone dies not having used their entire $11,200,000 (adjusted for inflation) lifetime exemption, their surviving spouse, if any, inherits that unused portion and can use it at their death in addition to their own lifetime exemption. So, Alice and Betty are trying to evade a tax law that is easy and trouble free to comply with, and may provide future benefits by documenting the intent of the parties with respect to a large gift (so that someone doesn't later try to characterize it as a loan or contribution to a trust estate, for example). While it isn't a crime, it is ill advised and won't benefit them materially in the end.	A gift creates a permanent transfer of title from the giver to the receiver. That is, a gift cannot be taken back. To be a gift there must be: Intention of donor to give the gift to the donee (donative intent) Delivery of gift to donee. Acceptance of gift by donee. If, at the time of the gift(s) you and your ex were not living together then there should be no doubt that everything you mention would be a gift. However, if you were living together then it is not clear that they are. If the TV were wrapped and given on Christmas with a card saying “To you, Love me” then it’s a gift. If it was bought for “our place” then it probably belongs to both of you. Similarly for the bathroom fittings.	If the ability to get a Pannini is conditioned on buying paper towels for money, then he isn't really selling paper towels for $2 and the Pannini for free, he is really selling a package consisting of paper towels and a Pannini for $2, so it would probably still be illegal. The phrase lawyers and judges use to talk about attempts to create loopholes like this one is "too clever by half", which means: "Shrewd but flawed by overthinking or excessive complexity, with a resulting tendency to be unreliable or unsuccessful."	Sure You run a restaurant employing relatives and cronies and you scrupulously pay them and their taxes. Say $500k. That is clean money. You take some money from running the restaurant but not enough to cover costs. Say $200k. However, you declare that your revenues were actually $800k with the difference being $600k of dirty money which “customers” paid in cash. You pay your taxes on your $300k profit and now have nice clean legitimate money. Now, what legitimate businesses typically do is underreport their cash income to minimise taxes but a laundering front overreports and pays too much tax to clean the money. For every $1 of dirty money going in you only get 70c out (or whatever depending on local taxes) but that money is clean.	In essence, Schwab is stating that they are not a law enforcement agency and they have neither the interest nor the legal right to pursue criminals. They state that they will assist law enforcement but also tell you that, from their experience, law enforcement while they have the legal right also don't have any interest in doing so. This is completely correct. I'm not going to comment on what you should do to protect yourself from identity theft. With respect to the reverse transfer: you are on very shaky legal ground here - you transferred funds without authorization and you are not legally allowed to do this even to recover your own losses. If you had limited this to just recovering your own funds then you would be extremely unlikely to be prosecuted but by taking more than was yours you have technically committed a theft of your own. That said, it seems unlikely that law enforcement will be interested - Schwab are not making a complaint and I doubt that the original thief will - for obvious reasons. However, its possible (even likely) that this was not the thief's bank account - this is likely to be an innocent third party's account that the thief was using to obfuscate their crime. If so, the money you took (both the original amount and the extra $50) you took actually belongs to that innocent party - your money had probably spent very little time in that account.	What you linked to is a list of definitions of terms used in the laws of Arkansas. The actual Arkansas law on gifts to elected officials reads as such: Persons elected or appointed to select offices, including members of the general assembly, shall not solicit or accept a gift from a lobbyist or a person acting on behalf of one. A lobbyist shall not offer or pay for food or drink at more than 1 planned activity in a 7 day period. Does not prohibit the acceptance of: (1) Food, drink, informational materials, or other items included in a conference registration fee; and (2) Food and drink at events coordinated through the regional or national conference and provided to persons registered to attend. Ark. Const. art. XIX,§ 30. http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-gift-laws.aspx The official is just not supposed to accept gifts, besides the provision for lobbyists to pay for food or drink. It's not that they can take a gift and pay $100 dollars.	If the parents own the house (as shown on the official deed) it will go as they leave it in their wills, or as the local law for intestate inheritance (no will) directs. Who paid all or part of the down payment will not matter. If the intent was for that to matter, then the child who provided the down payment should have been listed as partial owner, or some written agreement should have been made specifying the rights involved. Otherwise the down payment would be considered as a gift. If the child owns the house (as shown on the deed) it would not be part of the parents' estate, and their will(s) would not affect it. It would remain the property of the child. If the down payment was a loan rather than a gift, as shown by a written agreement of some sort, then that debt would be an obligation of the estate, to be paid before any legacies were distributed.	Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.
Corporation files ch. 7 but wholly-owned subsidiary LLC does not file - how does this happen? I have an interesting situation. I’m a customer of a US corporation through its wholly-owned LLC subsidiary (one of several). The entire corporation (including the subsidiarys) shut down operations and the parent corporation filed chapter 7 bankruptcy a few weeks ago. However, the subsidiary LLCs have not (yet) filed bankruptcy. I am a small creditor of the subsidiary and I personally don’t expect to see any money in any case but I’m just trying to understand how this works. I know there are many creditors of the LLCs who are left hanging. The LLCs seem to have just disappeared. The US trustee for the parent corporation bankruptcy has announced that we are not creditors in that case. Can anyone provide any insight into how this works or any speculation as to what will happen?	When an entity goes bankrupt, its affairs are subject to detailed court supervision and creditors rights with respect to the bankrupt entity are severely limited by an "automatic stay" that funnels all disputes between creditors and the entity to bankruptcy court. This process, in the case of a medium to large sized business, is very expensive. If lots of creditors of the consolidated group are creditors of an entity that doesn't have any assets, it may not be worth the trouble to go through that process, since those creditors will get nothing, or there may be other reasons that it needs to function as a non-bankrupt entity. The creditors of the non-bankrupt LLC could force an involuntary bankruptcy, if they suspect that some creditors are being unduly favored or if they want more transparency, but they might prefer a non-bankrupt company if it allowed them to pursue their creditor's rights outside of bankruptcy and it had some assets. There are some very tricky collective action problems involved in cases like these, that must be made with imperfect information. It could be that the parent company is looking for a quick reorganization that is insulated from the day to day affairs of the company and involves a restructuring of only long term debt and a subsidiary bankruptcy would complicate a simple, pre-packaged plan. Still, it is hard to know with limited information.	Liability of a Person LLC means "Limited Liability Company"; in the absence of such an entity (or equivalent) there is no "Limited Liability". A partnership, which is what you are describing, or an individual has unlimited liability. What this means is: An individual (operating alone or as a member of a partnership) is liable for their actions. They are responsible for the debts the business incurs (including those arising from legal liability) and must pay for them from their personal assets. A company is liable for its actions, however, the members of that company are liable only to the extent of the money that they have invested. Contractual protection A person (which includes individuals and companies) can attempt to limit liability by contract, however, there are limitations to this: Your liability is only limited against people who are bound by the contract; third parties (like an aggrieved copyright holder) are not Most jurisdictions restrict limits to liability that can be made in consumer contracts and some B2B arrangements You can't contract outside the law: if the law says you are liable then your contract that says otherwise is not worth a pinch of s***. You are only liable for what you are liable for To have a liability, you have to have done (or not done) something that created a liability under statute, tort or contract. There are legal means in many jurisdictions that protect content hosts from copyright claims: but you have to do what the law says you have to do to avail yourself of them. "we" or "us" will refer to ... ... has to be the person(s) that are running the business - if that is Bob and Terry Jones then that's what you write, if it is ExampleWorks LLC, write that. It cant be "example.org" because that is a domain name; not a legal person. It can't be "ExamplePedia" because wtf is that anyway? Get real advice You are running a business and exposing yourselves to liabilities and losses that you know about and probably a bunch that you don't know about. When you learnt to drive a car, or ski, or play soccer you got instruction from people who knew how to do what you wanted to do: running a business is exactly the same: get proper advice from people who know what they're taking about and pay for it if you have to.	Bankruptcy does not normally end a contract Of course, bankruptcy may cause the bankrupt to breach the contract because they can’t fulfill their obligations allowing the other party to terminate it. Assuming this doesn’t happen, a contract is both an asset and liability of the bankrupt company in that they create both benefits and obligations. As such, it must be dealt with by the bankruptcy trustee like all other assets and liabilities. This particular contract creates a liability on the other IP assets of the company and, in a sense, is part of those assets. So, whoever ended up with those assets has them encumbered by this license (whether they know it or not). If those assets were sold then the buyer is bound, if they were distributed to the creditors or shareholders then they are bound.	I am unfamiliar with a "perpetual contract" and that phase does not appear in any reported appellate court decision of the State of Oklahoma. However, usually unpaid utility bills do constitute a lien against the property that is enforceable against a subsequent purchaser, which has the same practical effect. This kind of obligation is also sometimes described as an "encumbrance". Usually, in an arms length sale of real estate through real estate agents, a title insurance company is hired and is responsible for determining if there are any outstanding liens, pro-rating utility bills, pro-rating property taxes, etc. at closing. If the title company fails to find a lien and there is one, the title company is responsible for paying off the lien that it failed to find (although it can often force the previous owner to indemnify it for the payment it has to make). It could be that since water service was not currently being delivered, that the title company did not search in the manner that it should have to find this lien, or it could be that there was no title company used and so no one ever checked. Also, if the property was conveyed with a "warranty deed" such a deed contains a promise from the seller that there are no liens or encumbrances not listed on the face of the deed that have to be paid, and the seller has liability for breach of the warranty of title. But, if the property was conveyed with a "quitclaim deed" there is no such warranty.	Companies dissolve by one of two modes: voluntarily or involuntarily. If it's a voluntary dissolution: the assets remaining after paying all the creditors are distributed among the owners according to their ownership percentages or by some other agreement. The successor owner of the IP will be determined at that time. In the case of an involuntary dissolution: usually as part of a bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court will first transfer all the corporate assets into a receivership managed by a trustee. The trustee will then disposition the company's assets (including the IP) per the laws of bankruptcy. The successor owner of the IP will be determined through that process. Many of the company's assets will be liquidated by auction and sold to the highest bidder; and the auction proceeds will be used to pay the company's creditors. So in the event of an involuntary bankruptcy dissolution, the successor owner of the IP will have most typically outbid all other bidders at the liquidation sale/auction. If there is any money left over after all the creditors and bankruptcy fees are paid, the remainder will be distributed to the shareholders as above described.	In the US, "insider trading" includes both legal and illegal versions. When a corporate employee buys or sells shares of their company, they are insiders and they are trading (there is a requirement to report to the government). The illegal version involves breach of fiduciary duty or confidence. The relevant section of the federal regulations is 17 CFR 240.10b on "Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances", and you will note that the section does not rely on the term "insider" in the law part, instead it directly characterizes what acts are illegal. Thus it would not matter, from a legal perspective, if someone considers you an insider. It is illegal to trade in securities using a “manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance”. This relates to what is commonly known as insider trading via rule 240.10b5-1, by defining as manipulative and deceptive trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information (emphasis added to focus on the core requirements). Whether or not you have a "duty of trust or confidence" is determined by common law standards, that is, it depends on how courts have ruled on similar matters. For instance if the CEO of Apple tells you "Our computers explode and it's gonna be on the news tonight, the stock is gonna tank, but it would be illegal for you to act on that information", then it would be illegal, because you are aware that the CEO has a duty to not use that information (thus you "inherit" the duty). This also holds if he doesn't tell you that acting on the information, since it is expected that you know that the CEO of Apple could not legally act on that information (even if in fact you are unaware of the law -- ignorance of the law doesn't get you anywhere good). However, if you are unaware and could not know that the person making the factual disclosure is divulging information that he has a duty to shut up about, then you might not get prosecuted.	united-states Are customers who withdraw their profits and lending earnings from FTX during its last days before its bankruptcy liable to clawback from creditors? It seems that some companies and investors, such as Binance, are liable to pay creditors through clawback for FTX collapse as a result of fraud. If the right conditions are met the amounts paid can be clawed back. There are a lot of special rules that apply but the most general is that if you receive money or property to pay an amount owed on a debt within 90 days of the bankruptcy petition being filed without providing substantially contemporaneous and equivalent value at the time that you receive the money, and the amount received is more than you would have received in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, then the amount received may be clawed back into the bankruptcy estate. Usually, in financial transactions, the dollar values in an account in your name are considered to be contractual debts owed by the financial institution to you, rather than "your property". So paying amount the balance of an account (to the extent it has been at that level for at least 90 days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition) will usually be a preference and give rise to a clawback obligation if the bankruptcy estate choses to enforce that right (in a Chapter 7 that call is made by the bankruptcy trustee, in a Chapter 11 that call is made by the "debtor-in-possession"). If a clawback amount is not returned voluntarily, court action can be taken to recover it. This is what a court has ruled, for example, in one recent crypto bankruptcy case. The lookback period is 1 year rather than 90 days for "insiders". If the debt is backed by new collateral in this time period, even if not paid, the agreement to provide new collateral can be invalidated (certain additional technical rules apply to this provision). Small amounts (up to $600 for consumer debtors and $5,000 for non-consumer debtors) are disregarded even if the payment would otherwise be a preference subject to being clawed back. To make sure I have fully answered the question: What about profitable customers? Suppose a customer made trading profits and earned interest from lending his cryptocurrencies on FTX. He managed to withdraw his funds just hours before FTX's collapse. Is he liable to for the clawback? Yes. If the conditions described above are met. The logic is that people who pull out money at the last minute due to luck or insider information should not be treated differently than those who do not do so. The relevant section of the bankruptcy code is 11 U.S. Code § 547 (Preferences). It states: (a)In this section— (1)“inventory” means personal property leased or furnished, held for sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business, including farm products such as crops or livestock, held for sale or lease; (2)“new value” means money or money’s worth in goods, services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law, including proceeds of such property, but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation; (3)“receivable” means right to payment, whether or not such right has been earned by performance; and (4)a debt for a tax is incurred on the day when such tax is last payable without penalty, including any extension. (b)Except as provided in subsections (c), (i), and (j) of this section, the trustee may, based on reasonable due diligence in the circumstances of the case and taking into account a party’s known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses under subsection (c), avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property— (1)to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2)for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3)made while the debtor was insolvent; (4)made— (A)on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B)between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and (5)that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if— (A)the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B)the transfer had not been made; and (C)such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title. (c)The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer— (1)to the extent that such transfer was— (A)intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and (B)in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange; (2)to the extent that such transfer was in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee, and such transfer was— (A)made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or (B)made according to ordinary business terms; (3)that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor— (A)to the extent such security interest secures new value that was— (i)given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description of such property as collateral; (ii)given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement; (iii)given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and (iv)in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and (B)that is perfected on or before 30 days after the debtor receives possession of such property; (4)to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor— (A)not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and (B)on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor; (5)that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such security interest exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the later of— (A) (i)with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (ii)with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B)the date on which new value was first given under the security agreement creating such security interest; (6)that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section 545 of this title; (7)to the extent such transfer was a bona fide payment of a debt for a domestic support obligation; (8)if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $600; or (9)if, in a case filed by a debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $5,000.2 (d)The trustee may avoid a transfer of an interest in property of the debtor transferred to or for the benefit of a surety to secure reimbursement of such a surety that furnished a bond or other obligation to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoidable by the trustee under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of such surety under such bond or obligation shall be discharged to the extent of the value of such property recovered by the trustee or the amount paid to the trustee. (e)(1)For the purposes of this section— (A)a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of real property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of such property from the debtor against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and (B)a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee. (2)For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is made— (A)at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 30 days after, such time, except as provided in subsection (c)(3)(B); (B)at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such 30 days; or (C)immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such transfer is not perfected at the later of— (i)the commencement of the case; or (ii)30 days after such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee. (3)For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred. (f)For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition. (g)For the purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of a transfer under subsection (b) of this section, and the creditor or party in interest against whom recovery or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the nonavoidability of a transfer under subsection (c) of this section. (h)The trustee may not avoid a transfer if such transfer was made as a part of an alternative repayment schedule between the debtor and any creditor of the debtor created by an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency. (i)If the trustee avoids under subsection (b) a transfer made between 90 days and 1 year before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor to an entity that is not an insider for the benefit of a creditor that is an insider, such transfer shall be considered to be avoided under this section only with respect to the creditor that is an insider. (j) (1)In this subsection: (A)The term “covered payment of rental arrearages” means a payment of arrearages that— (i)is made in connection with an agreement or arrangement— (I)between the debtor and a lessor to defer or postpone the payment of rent and other periodic charges under a lease of nonresidential real property; and (II)made or entered into on or after March 13, 2020; (ii)does not exceed the amount of rental and other periodic charges agreed to under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I) before March 13, 2020; and (iii)does not include fees, penalties, or interest in an amount greater than the amount of fees, penalties, or interest— (I)scheduled to be paid under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I); or (II)that the debtor would owe if the debtor had made every payment due under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I) on time and in full before March 13, 2020. (B)The term “covered payment of supplier arrearages” means a payment of arrearages that— (i)is made in connection with an agreement or arrangement— (I)between the debtor and a supplier of goods or services to defer or postpone the payment of amounts due under an executory contract for goods or services; and (II)made or entered into on or after March 13, 2020; (ii)does not exceed the amount due under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I) before March 13, 2020; and (iii)does not include fees, penalties, or interest in an amount greater than the amount of fees, penalties, or interest— (I)scheduled to be paid under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I); or (II)that the debtor would owe if the debtor had made every payment due under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I) on time and in full before March 13, 2020. (2)The trustee may not avoid a transfer under this section for— (A)a covered payment of rental arrearages; or (B)a covered payment of supplier arrearages.	No more than using your own phone, eyeglasses or underwear while working for the LLC. These are all tools of trade than one wold expect employees of the LLC to bring to their job (especially underwear). There is potentially a problem if assets of the LLC are alienated for personal use rather than the other way around. However, that would be subject to a reasonableness test - using your work computer to book a personal holiday is eminently reasonable. Where there is a real liability issue is if the use of that personal asset caused damage to third parties e.g. if the personal computer was hacked and damage resulted. This would allow a potential plaintiff to bypass the LLC and sue the owner directly (or, more likely, as well).
Is there a legal right to party? I understand that this might be somewhat of a stupid question but I must ask it. Does one have the legal RIGHT to party in the United Kingdom and / or United States? For example some of the fundamental rights are the right to liberty, the right to self-determination, the right to freedom of movement, the right to freedom of expression. Would a court acknowledge that people have the fundamental right to party? If not would it be possible to start a petition to pass a law that acknowledges the right to party? NOTE: by right to party I mean right to throw and / or attend a party.	The "Right to Party" as defined by the organization known as "The Beastie Boys" is not defined in any portion of their discourse on the matter of the "Right to Party". Rather, the entire discourse poetically describes a youth, presumably under the legal adult age of 18 (given restrictions on smoking cigarettes and owning adult literature in the second verse), who faces restrictions upon his or her rights by his legal guardians, in this case a mother, father, and teacher. Whereas the dictionary definition of the verb form of "Party" is defined by Oxford Dictionary as "Enjoying oneself at a party or other lively gathering, typically with drinking and music." As established, the subject of the proposed treaty on this right is legally barred from drinking, though a party may exist without alcohol and thus would not prevent the subject from engaging in an act of partying. A party or lively gathering would meat the definition of "Freedom of Peaceful Assembly" under the First Amendment Rights of the United States Constitution as well as "Freedom of Association" under the same amendment. Said party may additionally be for any purpose so long as it is peaceful. The state may impose reasonable restrictions on the party, such as noise ordinances, age based restrictions on minors including "Adult Contents", cigarettes and alchohol, as discussed. While typcial, they're absence does not prevent the assembly from rising to the level of "party" as previous defined. Beastie Boys contends that the restrictions place upon the subject of their discourse on the Right to Party is unreasonably restricted by the confiscation of several items, enforced school requirements, and dress code as defined by the legal guardian in their right as authority of the youth's rights. Beastie Boys offers little evidence that these restrictions are unreasonable or prevent the subject from "partying" as defined above. Beastie Boys do propose that the authority known as the father can not restrict the use of cigarettes by the youth as the father "smokes two packs a day". While Beastie Boys is correct that this meets the definition of hypocritical, the father is assumed to be of legal age to purchase cigarettes and is legal allowed to restrict access to them based on reasonable age restrictions and possible heath risks the father wishes to prevent in the youth that he may or may not be suffering from. As there are no formal requirements for a peaceful assembly to rise to the level of party, it can be presumed that these restrictions would not affect the party as defined. It should also be noted that in the Beastie Boys discourse, that the authority figure referred to as mother did not restrict the youths ability to listen to the content of the discourse, nor were any restrictions described tailored in such a fashion as to restrict the discourse specifically. While there is no amendment defining the right to party in the United States Constitution, the 9th Amendment does clearly state that citizens rights are not enumerated in the constitution and other rights not discussed in the constitution may exists and be claimed by the individual. From an originalist standpoint, it is widely accept that a good number of The Framers of the Constitution quite frequently met the accepted definition of the phrase "Drunk off their Ass" and thus, would not reasonably be against what can be defined as a "party". Additionally, many were participants in an event that was known as the "Tea Party", which was agreed by many to be quite the lively gathering at its time and was still viewed as quite the "radical" affair of the day, many wearing costumes such as those who attended in clothing traditional of Native Americans. They were also most likely not drunk during the course of this party. Thus, the intent of the framers was never to restrict or deniegn such a right Thus, a reasonable court in the United States would hold that the Right to Party does exist for all U.S. citizens and is inalienable. Beastie Boys also argues that it is acceptable to fight for one's right to party. This does not conflict with the First Amendment Right to petition government for grievances so long as it is again a peaceable affair. Given the poetic nature of the discourse, we can presume that "Fight" would mean to defend or struggle in a non-violent manor for such a right. This is backed up through originalism as the restrictions placed on many citizens of Boston for their actions during the Tea Party were subsequently fought against for many years, culminating in the Constitution. Thus, it can be assumed that the United States does recognize the right of the people to party and the right of the people to fight for the aforementioned right. This right would still be subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions so long as said restrictions are content neutral to the message of the party.	It means what it says The person who owns the land has a right to a seat in the parish church and, if there are not enough seats then they get one and other people have to stand. This is all pretty archaic but it stems from English law where parishes were geo-political and not just religious. Who got to sit was decided by the church-wardens and parishioners had a right to a seat without payment - visitors could be charged. However, some parishioners had an additional right by virtue of their office or landholding to a seat before other parishioners. The United States is in some ways a legal “time capsule”. Many common law countries have progressively codified the common law which tends to “fossilise” the law since judges are no longer able to say “well, that was a sensible law then but it’s clearly outdated so I’m changing it”. Since the United States did this earlier and harder than most other jurisdictions and has a natural progression back in time from the west to the east you get these lovely little anachronisms.	In the case of the US, the only anti-discrimination laws that would cover an event is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under the rubric "public accommodation", in Title II. But that law does not prohibit sex discrimination. The extent of "public accommodation" is not clearly defined, but generally is held to be about "a place", and would include "entrance into this facility". It might be illegal in California, though, since the Unruh Civil Rights Act is more generic, not excluding sex on this point. The main issue would be whether this organization is a "business".	I’m guessing you have seen a sign in a business that read - “Management reserves the right to refuse service to anyone”. At least in the US, they do not need a reason as long as the reason isn’t unlawful discrimination. They can decide not to serve you.	If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech.	The Scottish Claim of Right makes clear that the people of Scotland are Sovereign, not Westminster. Not so much. It establishes principles of parliamentary monarchy... (for example) That the chargeing of the leidges with lawborrowes at the Kings instance and the imposeing of bonds without the authority of Parliament and the suspending advocats from their Imployment for not Compearing when such bonds were offered were Contrary to Law That the putting of Garisones on privat mens houses in tyme of peace without their Consent or the authority of Parliament is Contrary to law ...while inviting William and Mary to accede to the Scottish throne: The said Estates of the Kingdome of Scotland Doe resolve that William and Mary King and Queen of England France and Ireland Be and be Declared King and Queen of Scotland To hold the Crowne and Royall Dignity of the said Kingdome of Scotland To them the said King and Queen dureing ther lives and the longest liver of them and that the sole and full exercise of the regall power be only in and Exercised by him the said King in the names of the said King and Queen Dureing ther joynt lives And after ther decease The said Croune and Royall Dignity of the said Kingdome to be to the heirs of the body of the said Queen which failing to the Princess Ann of Denmark and the airs of her body which also failing to the aires of the Body of the said William King of England And they do Pray the said King and Queen of England to accept the same accordingly ... That for redress of all greivances and for the amending strenthneing and preserveing of the lawes Parliaments ought to be frequently called and allowed to sit and the freedom of speech and debate secured to the members In other words, it provides that the monarchy is not absolute, and that its power is circumscribed by parliament. One thing it certainly does not do is circumscribe the power of the Westminster parliament, which had no power in Scotland before the Acts of Union of 1707. Before then, the Westminster parliament was only the Parliament of England. The Acts of Union provided, in part, That the United Kingdom of Great Britain be Represented by one and the same Parliament to be stiled the Parliament of Great Britain With that act, the Parliament of Great Britain assumed the role of the Parliament of Scotland. As a consequence, the Claim of Right Act of 1689 grants power to the Westminster parliament rather than circumscribing its power. To the extent the people are sovereign, this sovereignty is vested in their representatives in Westminster. On the other hand, if you're talking about the 1989 claim, that document has never had or claimed any legal force.	Yes they can You are approaching this from the wrong direction. Their right to enforce what you can and can't do doesn't come from radio-spectrum law; it comes from property and contract law. You are on their property subject to a license that they give you to be there. One of the terms of that license is that you won't set up or operate a wireless network. No doubt there are other things you are not permitted to do; for example, you may not be able to sell goods and services. If you breach the terms of the license then you are trespassing and they are within their rights to have you removed. In addition, if you are a student (or staff), this is probably one of the terms of your contract with the university. If you breach it, they can terminate your candidature (employment). Contracts can impose obligations on you that goes beyond what the law obliges you to do. Indeed, there is no contract if it only requires what is already required.	Standing requirements are different in state and federal courts, and from one state to the next. A random individual would not have standing to object to a stranger's abortion in federal court, and likely not in any state court, under normal circumstances, as they are not injured in any meaningful way by the abortion. I don't know what the normal rules of standing are in Texas, but it is likely perfectly acceptable for the Legislature to wave its wand to grant standing to whomever it wants regarding any violation of the law it sees for. That seems to be what is happening here.
Company wants to hold funds for customers Are there any licensing or special bank account requirements for our company to hold funds for a customer and later deliver those funds back to the same customer? Similar to a savings account but for a consumer customer. Is this highly regulated in the U.S and if so what is necessary to accomplish this? Also, I am thinking that an escrow type of account might handle this. Can we borrow against that escrow account or pledge it as collateral?	It is sometimes necessary or desirable to hold customer money in a separate account because it is their property. For lawyers, this kind of account is highly regulated. For most other kinds of businesses, this kind if account is not highly regulated. If you were required to have an account of this time, you could not borrow against it or pledge it as collateral. The whole point of having a separate account is to hold the property in trust for the benefit of the customers separate from your own funds and not subject to your creditors. Sometimes a separate account of this type is set up to fund an employee retirement fund that does not qualify for the tax treatment of a 401(k) or IRA or similar account. An account set up for this purpose is called a "Rabbi Trust" (political correctness was not a big thing when this kind of trust was given its name, and the name has unfortunately stuck). But, in those circumstances the exposure to the firm's creditors is intended from the outset for tax purposes and to give the beneficiaries an incentive not to screw up the company, rather than being problematic.	united-states Are customers who withdraw their profits and lending earnings from FTX during its last days before its bankruptcy liable to clawback from creditors? It seems that some companies and investors, such as Binance, are liable to pay creditors through clawback for FTX collapse as a result of fraud. If the right conditions are met the amounts paid can be clawed back. There are a lot of special rules that apply but the most general is that if you receive money or property to pay an amount owed on a debt within 90 days of the bankruptcy petition being filed without providing substantially contemporaneous and equivalent value at the time that you receive the money, and the amount received is more than you would have received in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, then the amount received may be clawed back into the bankruptcy estate. Usually, in financial transactions, the dollar values in an account in your name are considered to be contractual debts owed by the financial institution to you, rather than "your property". So paying amount the balance of an account (to the extent it has been at that level for at least 90 days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition) will usually be a preference and give rise to a clawback obligation if the bankruptcy estate choses to enforce that right (in a Chapter 7 that call is made by the bankruptcy trustee, in a Chapter 11 that call is made by the "debtor-in-possession"). If a clawback amount is not returned voluntarily, court action can be taken to recover it. This is what a court has ruled, for example, in one recent crypto bankruptcy case. The lookback period is 1 year rather than 90 days for "insiders". If the debt is backed by new collateral in this time period, even if not paid, the agreement to provide new collateral can be invalidated (certain additional technical rules apply to this provision). Small amounts (up to $600 for consumer debtors and $5,000 for non-consumer debtors) are disregarded even if the payment would otherwise be a preference subject to being clawed back. To make sure I have fully answered the question: What about profitable customers? Suppose a customer made trading profits and earned interest from lending his cryptocurrencies on FTX. He managed to withdraw his funds just hours before FTX's collapse. Is he liable to for the clawback? Yes. If the conditions described above are met. The logic is that people who pull out money at the last minute due to luck or insider information should not be treated differently than those who do not do so. The relevant section of the bankruptcy code is 11 U.S. Code § 547 (Preferences). It states: (a)In this section— (1)“inventory” means personal property leased or furnished, held for sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business, including farm products such as crops or livestock, held for sale or lease; (2)“new value” means money or money’s worth in goods, services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law, including proceeds of such property, but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation; (3)“receivable” means right to payment, whether or not such right has been earned by performance; and (4)a debt for a tax is incurred on the day when such tax is last payable without penalty, including any extension. (b)Except as provided in subsections (c), (i), and (j) of this section, the trustee may, based on reasonable due diligence in the circumstances of the case and taking into account a party’s known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses under subsection (c), avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property— (1)to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2)for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3)made while the debtor was insolvent; (4)made— (A)on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B)between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and (5)that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if— (A)the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B)the transfer had not been made; and (C)such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title. (c)The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer— (1)to the extent that such transfer was— (A)intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and (B)in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange; (2)to the extent that such transfer was in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee, and such transfer was— (A)made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or (B)made according to ordinary business terms; (3)that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor— (A)to the extent such security interest secures new value that was— (i)given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description of such property as collateral; (ii)given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement; (iii)given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and (iv)in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and (B)that is perfected on or before 30 days after the debtor receives possession of such property; (4)to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor— (A)not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and (B)on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor; (5)that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such security interest exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the later of— (A) (i)with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (ii)with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B)the date on which new value was first given under the security agreement creating such security interest; (6)that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section 545 of this title; (7)to the extent such transfer was a bona fide payment of a debt for a domestic support obligation; (8)if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $600; or (9)if, in a case filed by a debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $5,000.2 (d)The trustee may avoid a transfer of an interest in property of the debtor transferred to or for the benefit of a surety to secure reimbursement of such a surety that furnished a bond or other obligation to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoidable by the trustee under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of such surety under such bond or obligation shall be discharged to the extent of the value of such property recovered by the trustee or the amount paid to the trustee. (e)(1)For the purposes of this section— (A)a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of real property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of such property from the debtor against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and (B)a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee. (2)For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is made— (A)at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 30 days after, such time, except as provided in subsection (c)(3)(B); (B)at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such 30 days; or (C)immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such transfer is not perfected at the later of— (i)the commencement of the case; or (ii)30 days after such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee. (3)For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred. (f)For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition. (g)For the purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of a transfer under subsection (b) of this section, and the creditor or party in interest against whom recovery or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the nonavoidability of a transfer under subsection (c) of this section. (h)The trustee may not avoid a transfer if such transfer was made as a part of an alternative repayment schedule between the debtor and any creditor of the debtor created by an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency. (i)If the trustee avoids under subsection (b) a transfer made between 90 days and 1 year before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor to an entity that is not an insider for the benefit of a creditor that is an insider, such transfer shall be considered to be avoided under this section only with respect to the creditor that is an insider. (j) (1)In this subsection: (A)The term “covered payment of rental arrearages” means a payment of arrearages that— (i)is made in connection with an agreement or arrangement— (I)between the debtor and a lessor to defer or postpone the payment of rent and other periodic charges under a lease of nonresidential real property; and (II)made or entered into on or after March 13, 2020; (ii)does not exceed the amount of rental and other periodic charges agreed to under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I) before March 13, 2020; and (iii)does not include fees, penalties, or interest in an amount greater than the amount of fees, penalties, or interest— (I)scheduled to be paid under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I); or (II)that the debtor would owe if the debtor had made every payment due under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I) on time and in full before March 13, 2020. (B)The term “covered payment of supplier arrearages” means a payment of arrearages that— (i)is made in connection with an agreement or arrangement— (I)between the debtor and a supplier of goods or services to defer or postpone the payment of amounts due under an executory contract for goods or services; and (II)made or entered into on or after March 13, 2020; (ii)does not exceed the amount due under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I) before March 13, 2020; and (iii)does not include fees, penalties, or interest in an amount greater than the amount of fees, penalties, or interest— (I)scheduled to be paid under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I); or (II)that the debtor would owe if the debtor had made every payment due under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I) on time and in full before March 13, 2020. (2)The trustee may not avoid a transfer under this section for— (A)a covered payment of rental arrearages; or (B)a covered payment of supplier arrearages.	By "unlicensed" you mean that it doesn't state a license for use (MIT, GPL, etc.)? Those licenses are just a codified bundle of terms of use that cover many many edge cases. You have in place a much simpler agreement that covers the primary situation: you using/modifying the code for your own use. It's just like borrowing a car. You will ask a friend "hey, could I borrow your car for a bit?" "sure!". You know there's a possibility that you'll get in an accident or something weird will happen, but you think the chances of that are minimal and you would be able to work it out. If you ask a car rental company, they'll give you a full contract covering every situation that may happen. Similarly, a large company would be hesitant to borrow a car for corporate use without a legal framework surrounding it. So you will likely be in the clear if you are just using it for a small project with minimal legal/financial implications. If you plan on turning your project into a multi-billion dollar empire, you should revisit your agreement.	Having done a bit of brief research, I find that "legit" is a synonym for "good". So, no. The header announcing a "principal amount" serves no purpose and could be misinterpreted as indicating that there is a loan. There is no reason to indicate the date twice, which gives rise to two different values of "date". The phrase "For value received" can be interpreted in at least two ways, one being "in exchange for some unspecified value to be received at some future date by Promisor", and "in exchange for a specific value already received by Promisor". Under the later interpretation, Promis(s)ee probably could not breach but under the former, Promis(s)ee could. So it makes a difference. You can just pay to the Promis(s)ee, and not imply that you are creating a pay-to-order instrument such as a check. That still leaves you the option to pay with a check. Or was the intent to say "pay on demand"? The expression "the sum of £500 shall the Promisor fail to meet his target" is not grammatical in US English, and I'll leave it to a UK speaker to judge if this is, over there. I assume that this is supposed to express conditionality, in which case "if" is a useful term. Then the meat of the contract, I guess, is that if the Promisor fails to meet somebody's target of 47.5 work hours per week, then Promisor has to pay Promissee £500 (and not otherwise). It's really not clear how anyone would know whether "meet a target of 47.5 work hours per week" has come to pass. Does that mean "work at least 47.5 hours per week"? Does that mean "for each of the three weeks within the time period" (or did you mean "work 47.5 hours within some one week, within the 3 week period"). Being explicit that the work obligation extends for 3 weeks would be legit (vide supra). Supposing that the second clause means "Promisor will pay £500 by 5:00pm 2 July 2016", you should put it that way. Or if you mean "Promisor will pay £500 by 5:00pm 3 July 2016", say that. Deadlines for performance should be stated very directly and clearly, and require no calculation and interpretation. And I'd suggest including a clause stating that "Promissor" and "Promisor" are used interchangeably in this contract. Or else be consistent in spelling. Note that almost any contract can be given some interpretation. From the perspective of creating a contract, the first concern should be over clearly expressing the intentions of the two parties in written form. After all, you don't have a contract if there is no meeting of the minds.	Why do you think Oracle have not been protecting their trade mark? Using a trade mark to describe the product (“Written in JavaScript”, “Seeking JavaScript developer”) is not an infringement and the trade mark owner is under no obligation to, indeed, cannot stop this. Where they are required to defend their trade mark is when it is being used in such a way that there is the risk of confusion that the goods or services could be confused with the trade mark owner’s goods or services. Further, they are not required to defend all breaches, only enough to show that they are actively doing so. Also it is not important that the trade mark be associated with the trade mark’s owner. Do you know who owns the trade mark “Ben & Jerry’s”?	FDIC Regulation 500 prohibits discrimination in making loans on the basis of "National origin" but not on the basis of immigration status. This story from The Nation says that Bank of America is denying accounts to non-citizens, and arguing that it is legal because of increased risks, although there are current court challenges to this. Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A is a case now pending challenging loan denials based on immigration status. This has particularly come up in regard to DACA recipients, rather than people with LPR status. The US "public accommodation" laws probably do not apply, as a bank is not usually considered a place of public accommodation. Any specific state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of immigration status might apply. In short, this is an issue still not clearly settled. There seems to be no law or regulation requiring banks to ask for citizenship information, much less to deny accounts based on it, and it would be well to seek a bank with a different policy if possible. The above is very US-specific. Many countries do limit banking access based on citizenship, i understand. I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. Before challenging any bank action, you may well wish to seek advice from a lawyer.	I'm assuming you are talking about "warrants in debt" and not arrest warrants. A warrant in debt is that the creditor has filed with a court for the repayment of a debt. The court will then issue a judgement (in default if you do not appear) either for the creditor or the debtor. After that, the creditor can then (if they win) seek things such as garnishment to repay the debt. Now in the UK, they have accepted the "Electronic Communications Act of 2000" which means that a Qualified Electronic Signature (QES) is as legally binding as a "wet ink" signature. Non-QES signatures may also be binding, but that requires additional evidence. Let's take an example of a small personal loan. Let's say you apply electronically for a loan of X amount. The loan is approved and the money is transferred into your bank account electronically. You spend the money but make no attempt to repay the loan. First the bank will make attempts to collect the debt via normal means, then they may sell the debt to a debt collector. The debt collector will apply for a "warrant in debt" to take you to court for the amount (possibly with fees). If you do not appear, a default judgement will be applied to you. If you signed the loan application with a QES compliant system, that signature is all the debt collector will need to show that you accepted the debt and the repayment terms. If you did not sign with a QES system, they can still submit the application but they may have to prove other things, like: Your intent to obtain money for some purpose Your action in keeping/spending the money No action on your part to return or rectify the transfer Any payments you may have made towards the loan (shows that you acknowledge the loan and terms) So no, as of at least 2000 most countries accept some type of electronic signature to be legally binding. An entirely different topic would be if the debt is legal without the paperwork. Many debt collection agencies buy debt in bulk that may not be much more than an Excel sheet with the amounts and names/addresses and other personal information. A lot of times the entire debt "paper trail" is not transferred with these debt purchases so a debt collector may have purchased $10 million worth of debt for $50,000 that is nothing more than an Excel sheet. I believe in the US this has held up, but I'm not sure about the UK/rest of the world. What the YouTube people may be saying is that they don't have anything regarding the debt as far as binding paperwork goes. That may be something completely different.	You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do.
Fair Child Support in California Let say wife owns 2 houses values at 2.5M with income only from stock trades. The husband earns 150K before tax, has no saving, no properties and won't take anything from the 2 houses. The wife doesn't want any alimony but only child support. The 2 kids are to stay with mom. What would be a fair amount for child support?	There are statutory guidelines that are based upon the gross income of each parent, the number of children, the extraordinary expenses of the children, and number of nights a child spends with each parent, which are adopted by states in order for the states to be eligible for federal welfare programs; although standards vary somewhat. Income can be imputed if a party has an ability to earn income but does not exercise it. But, assets owned aren't considered unless they produce or could produce income. In the absence of a showing of unfitness sufficient to terminate the parental rights of a parent for abuse or neglect, or some extremely unique circumstance (e.g., one parent is on the space station 365 days a year), no parent ever has 100% of the nights with the children. Without having a more realistic estimate of the number of nights with each child, and a fair guess of the capacity of mom to earn income including income from stock trades, it isn't possible to make a realistic estimate. To get the correct estimate, you would need to do a full fledged child support guidelines calculation, but this question doesn't have enough information to do that. A good rule of thumb is that child support for two children is typically about 25% of the difference in income of the couple times the number of days that one parent has a child more than the the parent, divided by the number of days in the year. For a pretty typical parenting time division, that would work out to about 10% of the difference in income between the parties paid by the higher income party to the less high income party within a normal range. But this is strictly a rule of thumb. However, in a case like the one you describe, the rental value of one of the houses would probably be imputed as income to the wife, as would the profits she makes in an average year from stock trades. The rental value of a $1.25 million house is probably about $72,000 a year. It is hard to value stock trades which depend upon the size of the portfolio and the skill of the trader. If the stock trades generated $28,000 of income a year and the wife has the kids 5 nights a week, and there were no extraordinary expenses, child support might typically be on the order of $416 a month. If wife made $78,000 from stock trades, child support would be nominal (they would have equal incomes, but she would have a few more days a year). But, that involves some very specific assumptions. Also, in situations like this one where the facts are so extraordinary relative to a typical divorced couple and the family is very affluent on a combined basis, the judge has wide discretion to deviate from the guidelines on a case by case basis. In reality, no case like this has a clear fair or typical resolution and it would depend a great deal upon how the case was argued and how the facts were developed by the parties and their counsel.	That is, if my mom is sued by somebody for some reason, does that mean I am being sued, and my personal assets are at risk, rather than just hers'? Having power of attorney doesn't mean that you become "one and the same" person, it just means that you can stand in their place legally. If somebody sues your mother, you are authorized to act on your mother's behalf, but that doesn't mean that you are liable for any judgement. Of course there is a fiduciary responsibility to act in your mothers best interest, and violating that can open you up to suits that you are responsible for (because the suit would be against you, not your mother). And, what if she runs out of money, would I be personally financially liable for covering her expenses? No, you wouldn't be. Debts would be settled the same way as if she didn't have anybody acting as PoA. She (you) could declare bankruptcy on her behalf and have the debts discharged. This doesn't obligate you to pay them. And then, what if I simply don't have time to deal with her affairs, that is where I am being put in a position where I have to choose between keeping my job and my personal relationships at home versus going to deal with things over there, would having POA force me to do the latter? This is a personal decision for you. You could alternatively pursue having her declared as an "adult ward of the State". You need to consult a lawyer if you take on full power of attorney, to both protect you, your assets, and your responsibilities. This is something that you really need a lawyer to draft so that the lines are clear, and the expectations are as well. You may need to get a court involved if she is not of clear mind to sign these papers.	If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability.	Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease.	Beware: The details will depend not only on jurisdiction, but also on the details of the parents, the parenting agreement and, of course, on the situation of the child. However, here are some general guidelines (mostly independent of jurisdiction): Ideally, you should resolve the problem by non-legal mechanisms. However, you may have to resort to legal means if this fails. I would advocate a gradual escalation of your reaction: First, do not assume malice. Nicely ask parent A why the plan was not followed. Maybe it was a simple oversight, maybe there was an emergency? Try to find out, and decide whether the change was warranted. If there is no satisfactory answer, clearly remind A that the parenting plan is binding for everyone, and that it is important for both the child and the parents that they can rely on it. Stress that any last-minute changes must be discussed as soon as possible, even in emergencies. This should be done in writing, maybe even by registered mail. If the problem repeats, send a last letter indicating that you will seek legal remedy if the problem persists. This letter may work better when sent by a lawyer. A letter from your lawyer to A's lawyer (assuming you both have one) may also prompt A's lawyer to explain to A that they are hurting the child and themselves by violating the parenting plan. Finally, if all the above fails, go to court. You could ask for a change in the parenting agreement, maybe with less frequent changeovers, or with changeovers that are easier to arrange, or at an earlier time, such that a delay causes less problems. You could also ask for a formal permission to have the child fetched by the police or similar on subsequent violations (though that is a rather desperate option, and may not be available). If you reach this point, following the previous steps should give you a fighting chance to prevail in court, as you have demonstrated that you tried everything to make the agreement work. Courts generally take a dim view of people who violate an official agreement. In Georgia specifically, like in most US states, violation of a court-ordered parenting agreement by one parent is a serious matter. The other parent can ask the court to hold the parent in contempt of court. The court can then order a number of consequences for these violations, such as awarding the other parent extra visits or monetary compensation, up to and including sending the parent to jail (this only happens in extreme cases). The article Violation of Custody and Visitation Orders in Georgia gives a good overview.	Any property of a decedent which does not evade probate because of a transfer on death deed is subject to probate. It turns out that this probate avoidance in New York can include one automobile within a family, here is the main form and a companion form. But let's say that the car is worth more than the limit (and you don't want to pay the estate the excess), then it might have to go through the longer process. That does not mean that the spouse cannot use the vehicle, as long as the spouse takes reasonable action to transfer the vehicle (waiting 5 years is not reasonable).	The fact that you're not a native speaker of English doesn't alter the legal situation. If you literally had no understanding of English but for some reason you signed a piece of paper, then you might argue that there was no agreement in the first place, but obviously you do speak some English. Most people don't actually understand what contracts mean (on both sides). Contracts are still enforced, based on what the contract says. The move-in data is proposed, not firm, and it even indicates what the charges are if your circumstances change and the dates have to change (whereas is their circumstances change, they wouldn't have a basis for charging extra). It also does say that there will be no refund if you change your mind. So the piece of paper says "No refund". The problem seems to be that there's an "agent" whose statements you relied on, who is ultimately responsible for this problem, and s/he implied that you could get a refund. It's not clear what kind of "agent" this is (is he working for you, or for the owners?). You'd have a somewhat different legal basis depending on which it is, but you could sue someone in either event, assuming that you could actually persuade the court that you were given false information which you relied on. The statement "they will refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is false; the statement "they may refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is true. If the latter was the statement that you relied on, then you knew (or should have known) that that isn't a promise, it's just a guess, and if you read the piece of paper you know that it's a promise with no basis. So I would say it comes down to establishing what promise was made to you. Arguing that the agent "made" you sign isn't going to get you anywhere (unless you can prove actual coersion).	TL;DR: It is a $100.000 lawsuit. Talk to a lawyer. If getting out of lawsuits was as easy as acting through a company and selling it afterwards, nobody would ever get paid damages. In addition to that, any answer will depend heavily on a lot of data that you do not disclose (location, kind of company, what is the basis for the lawsuit, etc.). Talk to a lawyer. But, a couple of points to help you understand the situation: the only reason she was 51% shareholder was because my father wanted a certain tax exemption for minority women owning businesses. It does not matter the reason, she was the shareholder. And in fact, I would not publicly use that reason as an excuse before checking with a lawyer, because perhaps it could be considered fraud1. she gave up her rights to the business. Exact wording of the agreement will be important for your lawyer. Did she return ownership of the stock? Or did she just agreed not to manage the business? In C corporations, stockholders are only liable for the money invested (i.e., the value of their stock may drop to zero, but no one can sue them for more). In other kind of companies (unlimited companies), owners can be forced to pay (fully or partially) for the debts of the company. does it matter if she sells her shares at this point or will she still be sued? Who exactly is going to buy the stock? It does not sound like the company is publicly traded, but just a small operation. Unless her 51% is worth more than she is being sued for -or the buyer thinks that the lawsuit will fail-, people won't be interested. Of course, it might be tempting to "forget" telling about the lawsuit to prospective buyers, but that probably will end with the buyer suing your mother when they discover that she has not fully disclosed the status of the company. Talk to a lawyer. 1But explain all of the details to your lawyer, s/he may make use of them and convince your father to take full responsability. And your lawyer will not inform the authorities. Talk to a lawyer.
Can you be sued for money if your product is released for free? Say I create a product that I release for free and take no profit in any way. If this product somehow violates the copyrights or trademarks of another company, is there risk of needing to pay for damages to that company?	Yes. Money damages can be awarded in this circumstance and would likely be awarded if the infringement was found to have occurred and not to have been fair use. Even in the absence of proof that any profits are made, there are statutory damages that can be awarded on a per offense basis for copyright violations, and trademark cases in addition to having statutory violations can measure damages by harm to the trademark owner and not just unjust enrichment to the infringer.	Why do you think Oracle have not been protecting their trade mark? Using a trade mark to describe the product (“Written in JavaScript”, “Seeking JavaScript developer”) is not an infringement and the trade mark owner is under no obligation to, indeed, cannot stop this. Where they are required to defend their trade mark is when it is being used in such a way that there is the risk of confusion that the goods or services could be confused with the trade mark owner’s goods or services. Further, they are not required to defend all breaches, only enough to show that they are actively doing so. Also it is not important that the trade mark be associated with the trade mark’s owner. Do you know who owns the trade mark “Ben & Jerry’s”?	The band's logo can be protected by both copyright and trademark. The band's name is probably only protected as a trademark. Trademark would not apply to your personal use, because to infringe a trademark, you need to "use" the mark, and "use" in trademark law generally means selling an item that has the mark on it. As far as trademark law is concerned, no sale means no infringement. Copyright protects the exclusive right of the owner to copy a "work" (it's much more complex than that, but we don't need to get into the details here). Copyright probably applies because you would "copy" the logo, which under copyright law is something only the copyright owner can do (absent authorization from the copyright owner). You would therefore theoretically be infringing copyright by copying the bands logo on a shirt or something you want to wear yourself. That said, while I agree with the first answer that fair use may apply in theory, there would never ever be such a complex discussion about fair use in this case... because in fact there's absolutely no chance an individual would get fined or sued for having copied a band's logo and name on something he/she wants to wear his/herself. Getting sued by the band The band will not notice. If you're lucky enough to meet the band (or somebody close to the band) in person while you are wearing your garment, they would either not notice or not care. At worst, they'll ask you where you bought it in case they suspect you bought it from someone who illegally sells fake merch. Even then, all of this seems very unlikely. If you are extremely unlikely and the band notices it and sues you (and finds a lawyer to take a case like that to court), my inclination is to think the judge would be extremely mad with the band (and its lawyer) for losing the court's time with such a trivial matter. No judge would allow lawyers to waste the court's time pleading such a complex thing as fair use in a case like that. Getting fined The police would not notice either, because the only time the police cares about copyright is when somebody makes a complaint (nobody would make a complaint about you), except when they seize containers full of copyright infringing stuff (that is destined to be illegally sold for profit) in a port or at a border somewhere. The only possible scenario where I could imagine that there would be legal consequences is if you wear a t-shirt with the bands logo in a YouTube video (or in a picture) where the only thing that you see basically is the bands logo on your t-shirt. Even this scenario is extremely far fetched, but let's say the video becomes popular and the band notices. Well, the likeliest scenario is that they would file a DMCA notice and get YouTube to take down the video, with very little chances that there would be more important consequences to you. Have fun!	Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use".	If you have a truly novel and non-obvious game idea, you could patent it, and that would cost many tens of thousands of dollars if not hundreds of thousands of dollars (U.S.) in legal fees, etc. and probably a couple of years of patent prosecution, if your idea has not already entered the public domain through public display or sale. Most ideas for games are either not novel, or would be obvious to a person skilled in designing games. But, if your idea is really and truly new, you could do it.	It would be copyright infringement. You had the copyright holders permission to make one copy of the song by downloading it. At that time, if you gave me a copy of that song, it could be argued that very, very little damage was caused because I just had downloaded that song myself with practically the same effect. Today, that argument is not valid anymore. So this is definitely copyright infringement. That's your question answered. I doubt that anyone would take action if you gave a copy to someone and it was found out. Making it available to the world for free download is another matter. That could easily get you into trouble; in the USA there could be a fine up to $150,000 without any proof of actual damages needed.	Making a profit does not make the act illegal: it is illegal without there being any profit. The act of copying without permission is what makes the act illegal. Profit might maybe enter into the matter if you are talking about the "fair use" defense, since certain kinds of works can be partially copied for certain purposes. You could quote a few lines from a novel in a review, for instance. The judgment of whether a given act of copying without permission is allowed under fair use is complex and involves a balancing act. Profit becomes relevant in that a non-profit use favors fair use and a for-profit use disfavors it. Wholesale copying of works of art as you describe is illegal (is infringement). However... "illegal" is a pretty broad concept. If you infringe on my intellectual property, you almost certainly will not suffer any consequences unless I sue you. Taking "illegal" to mean "in violation of the law", infringing copyright is illegal because it violates the law, but I have to make a federal case out of your infringement – I have to sue you. As it happens, it can also be a crime to infringe copyright, and in that case, the government and not the copyright holder pursues the matter. If a person knowingly infringes copyright, he might be prosecuted, thus the Megaupload case which in the US is realized in the indictment US v. Dotcom. Moreover, profit motive is a required element for criminal infringement. (Also note that you don't have to actually make a profit for the profit element to be present). You cannot sue a person unless they have harmed you, so if you know that Smith copied Jones' work you can't sue Smith for harming Jones. (This is what they call "standing"). You might sue Smith, but not for infringement itself. If they sold you an illegal infringing copy, then you could sue. Or, their infringement could diminish the value of your legal copy. This website gives a multi-nation overview of criminal copyright infringement laws.	Your title and your question are totally different. If someone pirates a book, makes printed copies, and sells them for profit, that's the point where it switches from plain copyright infringement to being criminal copyright infringement. Which means jail instead of paying damages is possible. If you buy one of these printed copies, not knowing that they have been created illegally, and not being willfully ignorant that the printed copies were created illegal, then you didn't commit copyright infringement yourself. Since you are asking the question, it's obvious that you now know that there was copyright infringement, and buying any more copies would be encouraging copyright infringement with no excuses for you. You can be sued for damages. It is unlikely to happen since suing takes likely more effort than getting any damages from you is worth. The correct thing to do is ask the seller for your money back and destroy the copies. If they don't refund your money you can inform the copyright holder.
Will remarriage affect alimony and child support in this circumstance? I'm a widowed artist. I have money in investments as a result of life insurance which I draw from when necessary - which with two kids is pretty much all the time. The investment income is under $10,000 (US) per year. Now, some artists make lots of money, but most make precisely zero dollars. I'm fine with this. But I can appreciate most women being like "I'm not going to support some guy." Fair enough; I support myself just fine, but whatever. What I'd like to know, for reference, is whether a woman receiving child support and alimony from a dissolution of marriage would have those sources of income reduced upon remarriage to a partner without an income (US). What about with investment-only income of, say, $5,000 per year? I realize this might be a case-by-case basis.	Short Answer Child support does not change upon remarriage per se, although remarriage often results in a change of circumstances that does require a change in child support. Alimony often terminates upon the remarriage of the person receiving it, but not always. Usually, it does not terminate upon remarriage only when a separation agreement reached by the parties says that it doesn't terminate. Thus, generally speaking, a man's child support and alimony obligations will not be reduced because he has a new spouse and/or her children in his household. Child Support Child support does not change based upon marital status. It is a function of the income (of all types) of each of the parents, of extraordinary expenses of the child, and of overnights spent with each parent per year (it can also change if a child, perhaps one of several provided for in the child support award, is emancipated). Special rules apply when child support is owed to more than one co-parent (e.g. someone with two ex-wives and five children from a combination of each of the prior spouses and a current spouse). Critically, child support is not a function of the expenses of the parents or of the non-extraordinary expenses of the children. Income for child support purposes does not distinguish between earned income and investment income, or between taxed and untaxed income, and has a very broad definition of income that sometimes includes untaxed gifts. But, as a matter of policy, some child support laws disregard second or third jobs, or earned income in in addition to a full time job or full time combination of part-time jobs, when calculating child support. Income for child support purposes does not include a spouse's income. Child support obligations can be updated based upon a substantial change in these factors. So, unless the remarriage results in a change in income, in a child's extraordinary expenses, or in overnights spent, it isn't going to change child support. Also, income includes income imputed to a party where someone could work but chooses not to do so. So, if a remarried mother quit her good paying job when she remarried, she might not necessarily get a reduction in child support since she could have kept her job and chose to drop it instead. Obviously, this is an oversimplification, particularly with regard to imputed income. But, federal welfare statutes require states to have relatively similar child support laws for all but the most affluent people. Alimony Alimony also known as maintenance or separate maintenance, historically terminated upon the remarriage of the person receiving it, or upon the death of either party to the former marriage. But, since this is not federally regulated (except with respect to its tax implications), it isn't as uniform among the states. Remarriage of the person paying maintenance is not historically a ground to reduce or change maintenance obligations. The majority rule is that the historic rule applies to remarriage in the case of court ordered maintenance that does not arise as a result of the agreement of the parties. But, the parties may, by agreement, provide that maintenance does not terminate upon remarriage. This applies only to maintenance payments due in the future. One cannot, for example, obtain a refund of a lump sum alimony payment that has been made already because the spouse who received it promptly remarried even though the lump sum alimony payment was set based upon assumptions by the judge that the spouse receiving it would not remarry for a long time. The minority and emerging rule is to allow courts to impose maintenance awards which are not terminated upon remarriage without an agreement of the parties to that effect. Another, basically opposite, minority rule is to forbid maintenance agreements where maintenance does not terminate upon remarriage. I don't have any good surveys at my disposal regarding which states follow which rule. There is quite a bit of variation between states regarding circumstances where de facto remarriage involving co-habitation, etc. amounts to remarriage even though the maintenance recipient is not legally remarried. Some states will treat this as a de facto remarriage, others will consider this to be the kind of change in circumstances that allows a maintenance award to be modified, and still others will ignore de facto remarriage entirely. In general, maintenance awards are much harder to modify than child support awards where modification is relatively routine when there is a change of circumstances. Usually, maintenance awards are made with consideration given to the income and broader economic circumstance of the parties when it is awarded, but is not a function of current income or expenses except to the extent that the original award because unconscionable or at least very unfair in the circumstances as they develop. One factor that could make a maintenance award unconscionable and subject to modification is the inability of the spouse obligated to pay it to pay. For example, support that the spouse obligated to pay maintenance was disabled and had a much reduced income a result - the maintenance award might be reduced. The obligation associated with supporting a new spouse for the person paying maintenance would very rarely be considered a change in circumstances requiring a change in the maintenance award. But, ultimately, this is a facts and circumstances test. I could imagine maintenance changing, if, for example, the new spouse was disabled and required extraordinary care that was costly in terms of both time and money, limiting the resources available to the person paying maintenance.	The first question would be whether those papers are indeed "legit", and we don't do product reviews. Assuming the company didn't mess up and she was legally served, the next question would be whether she responded (in the legal sense) or not. If she failed to respond at all within 21 days (add 9 days if she is out of state), then your next step would be to file default divorce paperwork (presumably that's covered in the service you paid for). If she agreed to the divorce and the courts knows that, then you file some more paperwork and she doesn't have to show up to anything. If she disagreed, there will be an "answer" and possibly a counterpetition. There is an exchange of paperwork w.r.t. assets, a mandatory mediation stage, more paperwork, disclosures etc. and a pre-trial conference, followed by a trial. If you are at this stage, attendance is mandatory. As long as you have proof of service, nobody requested a postponement, and there is some evidence to support your claim, a default judgment can be issued. It's not clear what "divorce proceeding" you are referring to that involves her attendance. However, you can file divorce paperwork yourself or using an online service, and using an online service does not render the paperwork illegitimate. It's not guaranteed that the service did what would be necessary for you to get the outcome you desire, but that's beyond the scope of what we can tell you.	Of course it doesn't work. You haven't discovered an end-around to property ownership I gave someone a car and want it back (they refuse) You no longer own this car. It is now titled in their name. Your interest in the car is now exactly zero whether or not they paid for it. I use a shell company to buy my own debt Okay. This has nothing to do with the car. You're now out of the cash it took you to set up this new entity. How are you doing this? I assume it means paying off your creditors with money you already have. You will also have to come up with some type of bogus documents that explain to the future court why this was even done. If you have the money, why do you have debt? My shell company sues me for conveying the car to conceal it from creditors Um, Ok. Now you're also out filing fees. Let's assume you know how to do this without paying an attorney to do it for you. I settle Makes sense, since you're suing yourself. The shell company now gets a court order to seize the car Seize the car how? This is a stretch. A judgement would be against you for the value of the car. You can't settle a lawsuit using assets you do not own. A court won't order something repossessed because of an unrelated squirrelly lawsuit. An exception would be a bankruptcy court that rules the item was sold or disposed of outside the court's orders. I would expect an astute court to hit you with contempt or sanctions for trying to use it to further your interests with some sort of end-around to property ownership. Expect more fees for this use of the court's time. The shell seizes the car No. Now I have the car back No.	What kind of contract would that be? One about... arbitration? One about "I hereby relinquish my claim for payment of X?" --- children cannot be taken away from their father, no matter what. - OP That contract is void in germany because this contract not only violates public policy, it tries to modify something that is regulated by law into a way that does offer less than the law demands as a minimum. That's not allowed in Germany. Further, a clause that gives custody to the father by default is also Sittenwidrig in Germany, and thus void under §138 BGB. So would be a clause that gives it to the mother by default by the way. In a case of controversy, only a court order can assign guardianship. And only the court can take guardianship away. When the kid is born its guardianship gets assigned to the parents as guardians by §1626 BGB. While it is possible to give your partner guardianship if you're not married under 1626a BGB it is explicitly impossible to assign guardianship for any compensation to either party (e.g. the mother or the new guardian may not receive anything other than the guardianship in the specific paper) under 1626b BGB. Thus a contract that does anything else in addition to guardianship, like a prenup, voids at least the guardianship clauses. And you have to tell the court about that assignment of guardianship under ($1626d BGB). Now comes the kicker: §1628 BGB forces the parents to apply to the court to solve any problems of huge impact, such as guardianship: So technically, mediation results are fully non-binding and you can not mandate it. Also, since all marriages are through the state, it needs a formal instrument of the state to be dissolved. The only three ways that the state ever allowed this to be done after WW2 were a) annulment through a court, which only was possible till 1998, or b) divorce through a court, c) death of one of the marriage partners. Yes, it takes a judge to divorce a marriage under $1313 BGB or one of the two married to die. Because you can't divorce without a filing in court, a clause that demands to divorce in some way that is not including §1313 BGB, that clause would be void. It might be legal to have a clause that demands to try to solve issues in arbitration before filing for divorce or sorting the belongings in such a way, but it can't supplant the court requirement.	No law in the US requires that parent and child have the same last name. It is usual that a child's name match that of at least one parent, but not required. A parent can change his or her name, without changing the names of any existing children. Also, when a child is adopted, the child's name need not be changed to match the name of the parents, or either of them. I have read of cases where a widow remarries, and takes the name of her new husband, but an adolescent child retains his or her birth surname. I suppose this would also be possible legally if it is the husband who changes name on remarriage, but i have not read of such a case. I think, but I am not sure, that a child's name could be changed to a different name than the name of either parent. It may be that this would only be done if the child is old enough to understand and agree to the change.	Because of the appeals process. By settling now he: Gets the money now rather than in 2-3 years when the appeal finishes Gets $31 million rather than whatever the appeals court decides (which may be considerably less)	The general rule is that the ability to have a valid divorce has nothing to do with where the marriage was entered into, or the citizenship of the parties. Usually, any jurisdiction with sufficient contacts with either member of the couple has jurisdiction to enter a divorce. Hence, generally, people get divorced in the place that they live. The problem in this scenario is step 5. I think that it is highly likely that the U.S. Embassy is simply wrong, unless there is some serious irregularity in step 4. An annulment after four years of marriage, as opposed to a divorce, is highly irregular and would not be allowed in the vast majority of jurisdictions. But, maybe there are facts and circumstances that make it otherwise. This fact pattern, while it on one hand sounds like a "for a friend" question based on real facts, also sounds like some important details that may be outcome determinative have been omitted.	TL;DR: It is a $100.000 lawsuit. Talk to a lawyer. If getting out of lawsuits was as easy as acting through a company and selling it afterwards, nobody would ever get paid damages. In addition to that, any answer will depend heavily on a lot of data that you do not disclose (location, kind of company, what is the basis for the lawsuit, etc.). Talk to a lawyer. But, a couple of points to help you understand the situation: the only reason she was 51% shareholder was because my father wanted a certain tax exemption for minority women owning businesses. It does not matter the reason, she was the shareholder. And in fact, I would not publicly use that reason as an excuse before checking with a lawyer, because perhaps it could be considered fraud1. she gave up her rights to the business. Exact wording of the agreement will be important for your lawyer. Did she return ownership of the stock? Or did she just agreed not to manage the business? In C corporations, stockholders are only liable for the money invested (i.e., the value of their stock may drop to zero, but no one can sue them for more). In other kind of companies (unlimited companies), owners can be forced to pay (fully or partially) for the debts of the company. does it matter if she sells her shares at this point or will she still be sued? Who exactly is going to buy the stock? It does not sound like the company is publicly traded, but just a small operation. Unless her 51% is worth more than she is being sued for -or the buyer thinks that the lawsuit will fail-, people won't be interested. Of course, it might be tempting to "forget" telling about the lawsuit to prospective buyers, but that probably will end with the buyer suing your mother when they discover that she has not fully disclosed the status of the company. Talk to a lawyer. 1But explain all of the details to your lawyer, s/he may make use of them and convince your father to take full responsability. And your lawyer will not inform the authorities. Talk to a lawyer.
Can beneficiaries be pursued for damages inflicted in life? This is only for fictional literary research If a person confesses to a crime on their deathbed, one that caused unfathomable property damage and loss of life, will their heirs be forced to forfeit the estate left to them in that person's will? What about portions of the estate given to them in life? Will they be permitted to retain copyrights or patents created by the deceased?	It doesn't matter if a debt arises as a result of normal commercial transactions or because of liability for a legal wrong - if you owe money you owe money. While you are alive you are responsible for settling your debts out of your assets as and when they fall due. When you die, your executor has the same responsibility. The executor's first responsibility is to settle the debts of the deceased - only after they have done this can they make distributions to the beneficiaries. One of their duties is to advertise the death of the person and invite anyone who has a claim against the estate (as a creditor or beneficiary) to come forward - the law puts time limits on how long they have to do so. If some of these liabilities are disputed then the executor must hold back enough funds to cover the disputed amount (and the costs of defending against it). Intangible assets (copyright, patents etc.) are no different from tangible assets - they can be offered to the creditor to (part) settle the debt or the can be liquidated (sold) to get cash to settle the debt if there is insufficient cash in the estate. Once all known debts have been settled or successfully denied the executor can distribute whatever assets are left in accordance with the will (or the law if there is no will). If they do all this in accordance with the law then they have no liability. The beneficiaries never have any liability. Sometimes the estate will be insolvent - its liabilities are greater than its assets. The executor's duty in that case is to follow the applicable bankruptcy law.	No. This is not a provision that the testator or testatrix (i.e. the person writing a will) may waive in advance. But, the slayer statute does not get invoked unless an interested person invokes it in a probate proceeding after a death, and if no interested party wishes to invoke it, the will would be given effect anyway (just as it would in a case where no one could prove that someone was a slayer). Some states apply the slayer statute to will substitutes, and some do not. Similar laws that revoke dispositions upon divorce are pre-empted for interests in employee benefit plans subject to ERISA, but the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to resolve the issue. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152, 121 S.Ct. 1322, 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001) (pre-empting divorce revocation statutes, but declining to decide whether ERISA preempts state statutes forbidding a murdering heir from receiving property as a result of the killing) (cited as good law in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator, 555 U.S. 285 (2009) at footnote 14); Wasserman v. Schwartz, 364 N.J.Super. 399, 836 A.2d 828 (2001) (circumventing ERISA pre-emption). But see, Herinckx v. Sanelle, 281 Or.App. 869, (Oregon App. October 26, 2016) (Oregon slayer statute pre-empted by ERISA and reviewing variations in state slayer statutes). A notable comprehensive review of the California and common law rules regarding how the slayer statute applies in murder-suicide cases where the victim and suicidal killer own property in joint tenancy is found in In re Estate of Castiglioni, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 288, 40 Cal.App.4th (Cal. App. 1995). The murder-suicide scenario is also addressed in depth in the case In re Gleason, 947 N.Y.S.2d 761, 36 Misc.3d 486 (Surrogate's Court 2012). Also, the definition of homicide that qualifies under the slayer statute sometimes covers only certain forms of homicide. For example, it might apply in cases of murder or manslaughter, but not in cases of negligent homicide. Alaska, for example, takes the minority position that unintentional homicides suffice to invoke the slayer statute, subject to a manifest injustice exception. In re Estate of Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702 (Alaska 2006).1 There is unsurprisingly little or no case law on an intentional waiver of these provisions, and assisted suicide would often not qualify as an eligible homicide although this would vary from state to state. But see, Colorado Proposition 106 (adopted by voters November 8, 2016) as it pertains to insurance benefits. A Sample Statute The currently effective section of the Colorado Revised Statutes (modeled on the Uniform Probate Code, which is highly influential to legislative drafters and in courts with common law rules, but is not actually adopted verbatim by a majority of states) which are applicable to this issue reads as follows: § 15-11-803. Effect of homicide on intestate succession, wills, trusts, joint assets, life insurance, and beneficiary designations (1) Definitions. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a transfer of an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument. (b) "Felonious killing", except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, is the killing of the decedent by an individual who, as a result thereof, is convicted of, pleads guilty to, or enters a plea of nolo contendere to the crime of murder in the first or second degree or manslaughter, as said crimes are defined in sections 18-3-102 to 18-3-104, C.R.S. (c) "Governing instrument" means a governing instrument executed by the decedent. (d) "Killer" is any individual who has committed a felonious killing. (e) "Revocable", with respect to a disposition, appointment, provision, or nomination, means one under which the decedent, at the time of or immediately before death, was alone empowered, by law or under the governing instrument, to cancel the designation in favor of the killer, whether or not the decedent was then empowered to designate himself or herself in place of his or her killer and or the decedent then had capacity to exercise the power. (2) Forfeiture of statutory benefits. An individual who feloniously kills the decedent forfeits all benefits with respect to the decedent's estate, including an intestate share, an elective-share, an omitted spouse's or child's share, the decedent's homestead exemption under section 38-41-204, C.R.S., exempt property, and a family allowance. If the decedent died intestate, the decedent's intestate estate passes as if the killer disclaimed his or her intestate share. (3) Revocation of benefits under governing instruments. The felonious killing of the decedent: (a) Revokes any revocable (i) disposition or appointment of property made by the decedent to the killer in a governing instrument, (ii) provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment on the killer, and (iii) nomination of the killer in a governing instrument, nominating or appointing the killer to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee, or agent; and (b) Severs the interests of the decedent and killer in property held by them at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right of survivorship or as community property with the right of survivorship, transforming the interests of the decedent and killer into tenancies in common. (4) Effect of severance. A severance under paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of this section does not affect any third-party interest in property acquired for value and in good faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship in the killer unless a writing declaring the severance has been noted, registered, filed, or recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the property which are relied upon, in the ordinary course of transactions involving such property, as evidence of ownership. (5) Effect of revocation. Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the killer disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the killer predeceased the decedent. (6) Wrongful acquisition of property. A wrongful acquisition of property or interest by a killer not covered by this section shall be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit from his or her wrong. (7) Felonious killing; how determined - time limitations on civil proceedings. (a) Criminal proceedings. After all right to appeal has been waived or exhausted following the entry of a judgment of conviction establishing criminal accountability for the felonious killing of the decedent, such judgment conclusively establishes the convicted individual as the decedent's killer for purposes of this section. (b) Civil proceedings. Notwithstanding the status or disposition of a criminal proceeding, a court of competent jurisdiction, upon the petition of an interested person, shall determine whether, by a preponderance of evidence standard, each of the elements of felonious killing of the decedent has been established. If such elements have been so established, such determination conclusively establishes that individual as the decedent's killer for purposes of this section. (c) Time limitations on civil proceedings. (I) A petition brought under paragraph (b) of this subsection (7) may not be filed more than three years after the date of the decedent's death. (II) Notwithstanding any provision of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) to the contrary, if a criminal proceeding is commenced in a court of this state or in another jurisdiction against an individual for the felonious killing of the decedent, a petition brought under paragraph (b) of this subsection (7) may be filed so long as the petition is filed no later than one year after all right to appeal has been waived or exhausted following an entry of a judgment of conviction, or a dismissal, or an acquittal in the criminal proceeding. However, if the death and the possible culpability of the slayer for the felonious slaying of the decedent is not known to the petitioner within the three-year period of limitations established pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c), the accrual of the action under paragraph (b) of this subsection (7) and the possibility of the tolling of the running of the three-year period of limitation under subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) shall be determined according to the principles of accrual and tolling established by case law with respect to similar limitations established under section 13-80-108, C.R.S. (d) Judgment of conviction. For the purposes of this subsection (7), a "judgment of conviction" includes a judgment of conviction on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a judgment of conviction on a verdict of guilty by the court or by a jury. (8) Protection of payors and other third parties. (a) A payor or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or transferred an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument affected by a felonious killing, or for having taken any other action in reliance on the beneficiary's apparent entitlement under the terms of the governing instrument, before the payor or other third party has received written notice as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (8). A payor or other third party shall have no duty or obligation to make any determination as to whether or not the decedent was the victim of a felonious killing or to seek any evidence with respect to any such felonious killing even if the circumstances of the decedent's death are suspicious or questionable as to the beneficiary's participation in any such felonious killing. A payor or other third party is only liable for actions taken two or more business days after the payor or other third party has actual receipt of such written notice. Any form or service of notice other than that described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (8) shall not be sufficient to impose liability on a payor or other third party for actions taken pursuant to the governing instrument. (b) The written notice shall indicate the name of the decedent, the name of the person asserting an interest, the nature of the payment or item of property or other benefit, and a statement that a claim of forfeiture or revocation is being made under this section. The written notice shall be mailed to the payor's or other third party's main office or home by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or served upon the payor or other third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. (c) Upon receipt of the written notice described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (8), a payor or other third party may pay to the court any amount owed or transfer to or deposit with the court any item of property held by it. The availability of such actions under this section shall not prevent the payor or other third party from taking any other action authorized by law or the governing instrument. The court is the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent's estate, or if no proceedings have been commenced, the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents' estates located in the county of the decedent's residence. If no probate proceedings have been commenced, the payor or other third party shall file with the court a copy of the written notice received by the payor or other third party, with the payment of funds or transfer or deposit of property. The court shall not charge a filing fee to the payor or other third party for the payment to the court of amounts owed or transfer to or deposit with the court of any item of property, even if no probate proceedings have been commenced before such payment, transfer, or deposit. Payment of amounts to the court or transfer to or deposit with the court of any item of property pursuant to this section by the payor or other third party discharges the payor or other third party from all claims under the governing instrument or applicable law for the value of amounts paid to the court or items of property transferred to or deposited with the court. (d) The court shall hold the funds or item of property and, upon its determination under this section, shall order disbursement in accordance with the determination. A filing fee, if any, shall be charged upon disbursement either to the recipient or against the funds or property on deposit with the court, in the discretion of the court. (e) Upon petition to the court by the beneficiary designated in a governing instrument, the court may order that all or part of the property be paid to the beneficiary in an amount and subject to conditions consistent with this section. (9) Protection of bona fide purchasers; personal liability of recipient. (a) A person who purchases property for value and without notice, or who receives a payment or other item of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is neither obligated under this section to return the payment, item of property, or benefit nor is liable under this section for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit. However, a person who, not for value, receives a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who is entitled to it under this section. (b) If this section or any part of this section is preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this section, a person who, not for value, receives the payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part of this section not preempted. 1 The other four states and District of Columbia arguably adopting the minority position that negligent homicide invokes the slayer statute are as follows, from footnote 5 of the dissent to the Alaska Supreme Court's decision cited above. The District of Columbia slayer statute covers homicide resulting from grossly negligent conduct. See Turner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 487 A.2d 614, 615 (D.C.1985) (explaining that the slayer statute covers "unintentional killing derived from reckless or grossly negligent conduct"). Louisiana's slayer statute covers all criminal homicide. In re Hamilton, 446So.2d 463, 465 (La.App. 1984) (holding that slayer statute "was intended to include situations such as that presented by this case, where a beneficiary does not intentionally and feloniously cause the death of the insured but is nonetheless held criminally responsible for that death"). North Carolina's common law slayer rule prohibits inheritance after any wrongful homicide. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1975); Matter of Estate of Cox, 97 N.C.App. 312, 388 S.E.2d 199, 201 (1990). The continued application of this common law rule has been criticized in light of a slayer statute barring only intentional killers from inheriting. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-3; see also generally Julie Waller Hampton, The Need for a New Slayer Statute in North Carolina, 24CAMPBELL L. REV. 295 (2002). Kentucky Revised Statute § 381.280 bars inheritance from those convicted of any felonious homicide. "Reckless homicide" is a felony. KRS § 507.050. Kentucky defines "reckless" as "a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe." KRS § 501.020. Reckless homicide in Kentucky is therefore equivalent to criminal negligence in Alaska under AS 11.81.900(a)(4). Kansas Statute § 59-513 states that "[n]o person convicted of feloniously killing, or procuring the killing of, another person shall inherit." Involuntary homicide under Kansas law extends to "killing of a human being" committed recklessly, during a misdemeanor, or "during the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner." KS ST§ 59-513. This arguably could extend to grossly negligent conduct, especially as KS ST§ 21-3201 explains that "[t]he terms 'gross negligence,' 'culpable negligence,' 'wanton negligence' and 'wantonness' are included within the term 'recklessness' as used in this code." A federal district court has held that Kansas's slayer statute does not apply to negligent homicide, and there appear to be no state cases interpreting the scope of the statute or applying it to negligent homicide. Rosenberger v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 F.Supp. 379, 382–83 (D. Kan. 1959) (explaining that "the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute must have been to give effect to the common-law rule"). The Kansas slayer statute is essentially unchanged since Rosenberger.	The only time it is relevant is when an estate is subject to the Generation Skipping Transfer Tax. But, the exemption from the tax is currently (as of 2019) $11,400,000 per donor per lifetime, so if the expected inheritance is less than that amount there is not a tax issue. When I started practicing law (in 1995), the exemption was $600,000, so it affected a lot more people. All aspects of inheritance are governed by state rather than federal law except the income tax, estate tax and generation skipping transfer tax issues. Otherwise this is permitted under U.S. law in every state (some countries, such as Mexico, only allow a child to be disinherited by a Will for dishonoring the parent in some way or predeceasing). Many people intentionally devise an inheritance plan (in the narrow sense this would be a bequest or a devise, and an inheritance is what you receive from someone without a will, but there is also a broader sense of the word) along the lines that you are suggesting.	You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.	Yes That is very simple - copyright is an exclusive right that starts automatically with the creation of a copyrightable work. The default situation is that the author has an exclusive rights to make copies of the work and derivative works. If the code is published somewhere by the author but the author has not said anything about its licence or copyrights, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. They have the right to just publish it somewhere, others don't. If you try to contact the author and they don't say anything and ignore you, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. If it's impossible to find the author (e.g. I have certain cases with literary works where it's not clear who inherited the rights after the author died), then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. That being said, certain forms of reuse (recreating ideas, learning from them, etc) would not be a copyright violation. But in general the situation with the author not saying anything is almost the same as the author explicitly stating "all rights reserved, you're not allowed to do anything, violators will be shot" - some specific uses are allowed even against author's wishes (e.g. 'fair use' clauses) but everything that needs their permission really does need their explicit permission.	There are numerous what-ifs. Society’s moral values and thus laws may change. Or the unlikely death of your wife makes this question moot. (Let’s hope not.) Yes, failure to render assistance is punishable under § 323c Ⅰ StGB. Everyone can commit this crime (Allgemeindelikt). However, this section concerns accidents, contingencies or other unplanned adverse events. In your specific case there is no element of “surprise” though, quite the contrary. Your wife does not even need to be aware of the circumstances; the assessment “is there an accident” is made objectively. Having said that, unfortunately there’s a difference of opinion how courts judge (case law) and how “legal scientists” (at law school) think. Ultimately it depends on what evidence investigators find. Frankly, § 323c Ⅰ StGB is a “minor issue” here. You can get at most “just” a one-year-sentence. And there’s the option to consider one’s own spouse’s death as poena naturalis, thus refrain from imposing any penalty because the grieving widow “won’t learn anything” from that, § 60 1 StGB←§ 153b StPO. I’d worry more about §§ 211 ff. (murder, manslaughter, etc.): To kill someone means, a) any short‑term shortening of lifetime through action, or b) in the case of § 13 StGB, any failure to potentially prolong the lifetime. § 13 StGB, Garantenstellung, also applies to spouses, cf. § 1353 Ⅰ 2 BGB. It could be argued that failure to take, say, a loaded firearm away from you constitutes manslaughter. Or, worse, maybe you’re particularly wealthy and she’ll inherit your assets. This could be construed as greed, an aggravating circumstance. At any rate it’s necessary that the omitted action makes a difference, i. e. prevents or at least inhibits the crime’s success (your death). At some point, with terminally-ill patients, you might say “he’ll die tomorrow anyway”. Then your wife could attend your suicide. Finally, for a legally airtight plan I’d seriously consider to change the jurisdiction though, e. g. by going to Switzerland. Everything happening here is subject to German criminal law, § 3 StGB. PS: Marriage can be viewed as a kind of contract. In principle you are completely free in formulating its terms. However, you cannot make provisions concerning termination of life (nichtdisponibles Rechtsgut).	In general, the law seeks to make all parties whole. There is no mechanism for profit-sharing between thieves and their victims. Victims of theft are entitled to receive their money back plus the applicable rate of interest (called the judgment rate). They are not entitled to profits or windfalls above and beyond the statutory judgment rate of interest. What if the act of stealing the money has destroyed the owner's business and has left him with a lot of debt and bankrupt? Criminal statutes provide for the return of stolen funds plus interest. Recovery of damages, as you describe, is provided by civil statutes and common law. So, to recover damages, the victim would need to sue the thief in civil court.	The statute of limitations is quite relevant. A couple points to help explain why: First, there are a lot of different legal actions that could arise from someone stealing property. You could have criminal charges for theft, you could have a civil claim for conversion (to pay the value of the stolen property), you could have a civil claim for replevin (to return the stolen goods), and you could have a civil action to determine the true owner of the property. All those cases arise under different laws, and all of them could have different SOLs. The fact that time has run out for one doesn't necessarily mean that time has run out for all of them. Second, improperly obtaining title does not mean that you are not and never will be the true title holder. Take a look at the doctrine of "adverse possession," which basically allows you to become the true owner of real or personal property by simply acting like the owner for a long enough period of time -- ranging from 5 to 21 years, depending on the jurisdiction. Third, SOL is a restriction on when you can start a lawsuit. Sometimes, as Dale M said, it starts when you actually learn about the transfer, but it could also start when you would have learned about the transfer if you had exercised reasonable diligence. So the fact that a lawsuit is happening now regarding something that happened a long time ago doesn't necessarily mean the SOL was inoperative; it may just mean that the SOL didn't start until long after the transfer, or it majy just mean the litigation is dragging out. Fourth, the Facebook example is not a good one. That lawsuit is primarily focused not on the transfer of property, but on breaches of contract, for which the relevant statute of limitations is six years. Second, those breaches are focused on a contract reached in 2004. Because the lawsuit began in 2010, it was started within the statute of limitations. Had Ceglia waited until today to file it, he probably would time-barred.
GDPR email consent - Pre ticked "No" box We are currently creating an email to gain consent from our customers to email allow us to market to them. We are currently using Mailchimp to put the email together and it is currently not allowing us to leave the tickbox's empty. Can we pre-tick the "No" box for our customers? Making them change it to yes if they would like to receive marketing emails.	Yes, since you default to no consent, ergo consent would have to be positive. It's rather unsatisfactory though as a sort of double-negative, and needs careful wording to make sure consent is informed. However, this may be a technical problem as it seems odd that you can't have an unchecked checkbox. Does the word 'checked' perhaps appear in the HTML? https://ux.mailchimp.com/patterns/forms#radio	You could, but how should the companies that want to handle your data know this? If they have no affirmation from you that you allow them to process your data in any way, other than those they are already allowed to because of the exceptions, they have to - under GDPR - assume you don't want them to process your data, and thus have to ask you.	GDPR rights and obligations cover different things: A duty of the data processor towards the government of the country where they operate to present certain documentation, and to implement technical and organizational measures to protect data. These would be audited by government agencies, not the individual customer. A single data subject cannot waive them. A duty of the data processor to process and store personal data only with a legal justification. User consent is one possible justification, if it is informed, revokable, etc. So a single data subject can waive a "ban" on storing his or her data in a database along with all the other users who waived that "ban," but the duties towards the government regarding that data would still apply. A duty of the data processor to respond to an Article 15 request by the data subject in a certain way and timeframe. If a data subject writes a letter to the data processor and explicitly states that the letter is not an Article 15 request, then Article 15 does not apply. The data subject would of course have the right to make an Article 15 request at a later time.	Are my assumptions correct? Yes, this is precisely the sort of thing that would fall under the purview of "the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party", as it fundamentally enables you to deliver the service to the data subject, and its also difficult to argue that "such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject" given its a fundamental part of delivering the service before any consent can be given. Its not the intention of the GDPR to solely require a direct relationship between the data controller and data subject, its intention is to allow the data subject to control more of the relationship than they did previously - in some cases, that control remains with the data controller, which is why not all of the lawful basis for processing rest on consent. So long as you ensure that the CDN provider has a relevant privacy policy and is identified as a data processor in your privacy and data policy then you are good to go. In my mind, this is similar to the issue of how the data subjects packets get to you from their computer - we aren't including all of the network providers who carry the packets between the data subject and the processor (despite the fact that those providers will have access to much of the same information as the CDN, such as IP address, source, destination etc), even though in many cases we don't know that information (for example which route it will take over the internet). The only difference here is that as the data controller, you know about the CDN and can include it in your policies, so you should.	By itself, a chess position is not personal data. Personal data is “any information relating to an … identifiable natural person”. Since the file in question includes the name of the opponent, it is clearly personal data about the opponent. If the files are used for “purely personal or household purposes”, the GDPR won't apply per Art 2(2)(c). If the files are shared more widely – especially if the files are published – then GDPR becomes relevant. The person/entity who is data controller has to consider GDPR compliance. Data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data (the “why” and “how”). The first question would be under which legal basis this personal data about another person can be shared. The GDPR offers multiple legal basis, notably “legitimate interests” and “consent”. Consent is always an option, but must be freely given (entirely voluntary). Legitimate interests can serve as a legal basis after a balancing test between your interests and the data subject's rights and interests. This balancing test also depends on the reasonable expectations of the data subject, which in turn depends on the more general context. For example, in a chess community where such sharing is completely normal there would likely be a legitimate interest for you to share games as well, if the games occurred in the context of this community. But if you play a game with a friend who is not part of this community, the friend cannot reasonably expect that their name and associated personal data would be shared. The second question would be how you would satisfy further GDPR compliance obligation, in particular the Art 13/Art 14 right to information. When collecting personal data, it is necessary to provide certain information such as your identity, what processing is being carried out, and how the data subject can invoke their GDPR rights (a privacy notice or privacy policy). This might be difficult or awkward to do. Practical solutions to these problems: If you want to share a game but aren't sure that the opponent is OK with this, remove identifying aspects such as names. For example, you could crop a screenshot, or describe the game in textual notation without listing the opponent's name. Play the game via a chess website that publishes the game. This way, the website is the data controller, and you and the opponent are the data subjects. This avoids having to act as the data controller yourself. This might work for private interactions, but not e.g. if you run a chess club and require members to play via that website – you might still be in a data controller role then and have full compliance obligations.	The GDPR allows the right to access to be limited if this access would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others” (Art 15(4) GDPR). However, access to the recording would not give you more information than you've already received during the phone call, so this exemption is quite unlikely to apply in any case. UK data protection law also has a large list of additional exceptions, as summarized here by ICO guidance. These exemptions also cover some aspects of trade secrets, and even mention insurance examples. However, not such exemption is likely to apply in your case: the recording would not give you more information than you already have. If the data controller is concerned about some parts of the conversation, they should provide a redacted copy and explain why the redactions were performed. They should not reject the request outright. If the data controller wants to reject the request entirely, they must do so within the time frame for the DSAR (one month), must explain their reasons, and must inform you that you're allowed to lodge a complaint with your supervisory authority or to sue them. However, ICO guidance is flexible on how detailed the reason for refusal can be: Where an exemption applies, the reasons you give to an individual for not complying with a request may depend upon the particular case. For example, if telling an individual that you have applied a particular exemption would prejudice the purpose of that exemption, your response may be more general. However, where possible, you should be transparent about your reasons for withholding information. Here, I don't see any reason why full transparency would be a problem, so I would expect that the data controller can point to a specific exemption in UK data protection law. If you are unsatisfied with the data controller's response, please consider lodging a complaint with the supervisory authority. In the UK, this is the ICO. On the ICO complaints page, you can fill out the online form about “your personal information concerns”.	I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!	Contacting a business email about a business matter is usually fine, but in this case we have an unsolicited marketing communication (spam), not really a business matter. The client's jurisdiction likely has more specific rules about spam. Also, it is unusual (read: presumably illegitimate) to contact individual employees rather than the company's official address with the offering. From the GDPR perspective, every processing of personal data (such as email addresses that might identify natural persons) needs a legal basis (Art 6). Let's go through them: consent? No. necessary for performance of a contract involving the data subject? No. legal obligation? No. vital interests? No. public interest? No. legitimate interest? Perhaps. The client has a legitimate interest to conduct their business. However, this legitimate interest must not be overridden by the data subject's interests, rights, and freedoms. Such as the interest in not being disturbed by spam mails. It is the Data Controller's (your client's) responsibility to balance the legitimate interest themselves to determine whether they have a legal basis, but I really don't think that they do. In conclusion, your client's idea is a bad idea: They likely do not have a legal basis for this under the GDPR. They are likely violating more specific anti-spam laws in their jurisdiction. They are working hard to get their domain put on spam filter lists. Note that already the step of collecting employee email addresses is personal data processing and needs a legal basis. Of course, the GDPR does not apply when the client is not established in the EU and only processes the addresses of persons that are not in the EU.
Is it possible for an artist to retain the rights to their artwork while also allowing the client to reproduce the artwork? I'm designing an album cover for a client and they want the rights to put the album cover art on a multitude of items (posters, tshirts, etc). Is there a way for the artist (me) to retain the rights to my work while giving the client limited rights to reproduce the art for any means of marketing the album? If so how would I word this in a contract?	Yes. This type of contract is called a license. Lawyers write them.	You might be able to use a site like the Internet Archive to preserve the TOC even after the site is shut down. The real liability trap here is if the site does not have the authority to give you this license. If a user uploads a photo that they do not own, and you use it, you are infringing the copyright of the original owner. Innocent infringement is not a defense to liability (although it may reduce damages in some cases.)	If you do not have permission to make and distribute reproductions of the work, then it is illegal to make and distribute reproductions of the work. US copyright law Indian copyright law	This may well be infringement, but I agree that you should start by reaching out to the instructor. You don't want to pay a lawyer if the matter can be be adjusted peacefully. In the US there is a special limited exemption to copyright for "use in classroom instruction" which might apply in such a case. I am not sure if there is a similar provision in Canadian copyright law. But the instructor is likely to change his practice if you notify him of your objection, even if he has the technical right to use the photo. At least it is worth finding out. If he won't, then you can always consult a lawyer.	I'd like to sell t-shirts with the direwolve emblem of the "House Stark" in Game of Thrones, and of course, I've been immediately asking myself if HBO which produces the serie actually had some copyright on that emblem. This is not a close case. Your proposal, or anything remotely similar, would almost certainly constitute a copyright violation and result in a lawsuit by the producers of the show if not done with a license from the company. They would easily win this lawsuit. The damages that they were awarded would greatly exceed the amount of profits you made from your sales (realistically, more than a $1,000 per T-Shirt plus many tens of thousands of dollars of legal fees and costs would be typical). You would probably have to go bankrupt and some or all of the damages award against you might survive bankruptcy because your copyright violation was an intentional act. Every episode of the TV show is a copyrighted work and what you are proposing would be a "derivative work" since it is derived from the copyrighted TV show. Derivative works made without a license from a a copyright holder are a violation of copyright laws. There are also probably myriad specifically trademarked symbols and phrases that are registered with the appropriate government official (the Patent and Trademark Office for U.S. trademarks). So, it is highly likely that there would be a trademark violation as well if a license was not obtained. Your basic business model is at its very heart and essence fundamentally illegal. There is nothing you can do to fix it without getting written permission from the publishers who have probably long ago sold the rights to do this to somebody else for an immense amount of money. You should abandon this idea and try to come up with another business venture instead.	Yes. The copyright owner of a work has the exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted work" or to make "derivative works" of it. 17 USC 106. Copyright law is older than the photocopier, and it applies to copies made by means of any technology. If your intent is to duplicate the protected work, whether you do it by tracing, photocopying, or even freehand, you are infringing that right. It is possible that you could squeeze into one of the copyright exceptions, such as fair use, but these are much narrower than people tend to assume they are (especially outside of the U.S.), and they boil down to: "Well, yes, I copied your copyrighted work, but..." The bottom line is: is it copyrighted? Did you copy it, in whole or in part? Then, unless you have a very good reason, you've infringed the copyright. Whether you do it by means of tracing paper, jellygraph, or iPhone doesn't matter.	You are in breach of Copyright. Plain and simple. Certain websites allow you to use the website content as long as a link is made, but the website must clearly state that. You may also use a tiny portion of the content if it falls under Fair Use, where "Fair Use" does not mean "I want to". The best thing to do is not to do it. You can't copy anybody's work without consent. If you're thinking about Google specifically then they offer multiple APIs so that you can use their content in a wide variety of ways.	It's hard to say, under the Twitter TOS. They do not claim that copyright is transferred to them: "You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. What’s yours is yours — you own your Content (and your photos and videos are part of the Content)". But you do license the content: By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. You agree that this license includes the right for Twitter to provide, promote, and improve the Services and to make Content submitted to or through the Services available to other companies, organizations or individuals for the syndication, broadcast, distribution, promotion or publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and conditions for such Content use. Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals, may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services. The totality of conditions, including the Twitter Rules, is ever-evolving and not apparently contained in a single link. From what I can tell, there is no condition that prohibits a user from copying tweets into a book. There are numerous statements about "respecting copyright" which refer to taking material that is not licensed to Twitter and redistributing: nothing about redistributing licensed material.A plain reading of the first bold sentence says that you can make your content available to the world, not restricted to "retweeting".
Cursing in NJ by an Elected Official Councilman What is the statue number that addresses an adult (an elected official) cursing at another adult publicly in New Jersey?	NJ Rev Stat §9:6-1 may be the source of the rumor (since it was in the news), but that law prohibits "the habitual use by the parent or by a person having the custody and control of a child, in the hearing of such child, of profane, indecent or obscene language". The NJ Supreme Court recently declined a First Amendment argument for overturning the law. Otherwise, a candidate is disorderly contact, NJ Rev Stat § 2C:33-2(b), A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense if, in a public place, and with purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive language, given the circumstances of the person present and the setting of the utterance, to any person present. N.J. v. Burkett somewhat tests this law, though the specific acts (which were found to be puerile yet legal) are not adequately described to test the limit on this ban on profanity (as a subcase of coarse language). The statute still stands, but seems not to have been otherwise prosecuted.	Try the phone or email contacts at Florida Department of Law Enforcement - Home. The state of Florida doesn't appear to maintain a statewide officer registry, but that department should be able to verify someone is or isn't a officer in conjunction with the police department closest to your location. If this neighbor is threatening or attempting to enforce the law while not showing ID that proves he/she is an officer, that's serious, and you should call the local police department. Talking about being a LEO while drinking beer at a BBQ is less serious, but still could be a third degree felony. See Statutes & Constitution - Florida State Statutes: 843.08 False personation.—A person who falsely assumes or pretends to be a firefighter, sheriff, officer of the Florida Highway Patrol, officer of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, fire or arson investigator of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Corrections, correctional probation officer, deputy sheriff, state attorney or assistant state attorney, statewide prosecutor or assistant statewide prosecutor, state attorney investigator, coroner, police officer, lottery special agent or lottery investigator, beverage enforcement agent, or watchman, or any member of the Florida Commission on Offender Review and any administrative aide or supervisor employed by the commission, or any personnel or representative of the Department of Law Enforcement, or a federal law enforcement officer as defined in s. 901.1505, and takes upon himself or herself to act as such, or to require any other person to aid or assist him or her in a matter pertaining to the duty of any such officer, commits a felony of the third degree,	Defamation of public figures is governed by the "actual malice" standard: the person making the statement must either have known that it was false at the time they said it, or must have been acting with reckless disregard for the truth (meaning they had serious doubts that the statement was true at the time they said it). The First Amendment bars a public figure from winning a libel suit unless they demonstrate that the defendant fell in one of those categories, because any lesser requirement would discourage people from speaking on topics of public concern for fear that they might say something wrong and be sued for it. The standard was first applied for public officials in New York Times v. Sullivan, and later cases have extended it to public figures in general. If someone genuinely thinks Obama was born in Kenya, it is not libel for them to say that. Even though you could argue that any reasonable person should know that's wrong, it's not enough -- the defendant had to have known it was wrong or seriously doubted it. Even if your sole basis for claiming he was a gay prostitute is that you heard a rumor from a friend, if you actually believed them, you can say he was. You aren't required to check Clinton's book to verify a quote before repeating it; if you read it on a website and had no reason to think they were lying, you can say that the quote was in there. It is extremely difficult for a public figure in the United States to win a defamation lawsuit. This is the system working as designed; a public figure who wants to correct lies being told about them can put out the correct information (which is easier for them than for most people), which is preferable to government action (and libel judgments are government action, because they involve a government officer ordering you to pay someone else money and/or do and/or not do something).	Yes, it is illegal in North Carolina, which defines your sex as what's on your birth certificate. At any point in your transition, even when it's long complete, you'll still have to use the restroom for the gender on your birth certificate (hypothetically assuming the law is still in place). See e.g. this CNN coverage and this followup. Will you actually be arrested? Probably only if there's a complaint. The police haven't yet figured out how they're supposed to enforce this law.	You are right, the entry and exit photos are only evidence that you were there. This is something they need to prove so the photos may only be for that. Their statement that you didn’t display a valid ticket/permit is, at present an unevidenced assertion. If you contest this, they will provide evidence that you didn’t (e.g. the actual records they refer to) and you would provide evidence that you did and, if it goes to court, the judge will decide what evidence they prefer. As this is not a criminal matter, they need to prove the offence on the balance of probabilities. However, there are almost certainly administrative remedies which will allow you to contest the fine without going to court. This would involve you sending them a copy of the permit and them assessing whether their belief that you didn’t display it is justified or not.	The only applicable law is the local trespassing law. If he wants, the proprietor can demand that the patron leave, and if the patron does not leave, he can be arrested for trespassing. It uncontroversial that the First Amendment protects racist declarations.	canada You have tagged this 'criminal law', so I will stick to that, and avoid non-criminal anti-discrimination regimes. Criminal Code, s. 319 makes it an offence to wilfully incite or promote hatred against an identifiable group. It does not matter whether the person that is being communicated to is a member of the identifiable group (meaning "any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin"). What matters is a strict mens rea requirement that the communication was done with the intent of promoting or inciting hatred against such a group. If the accused holds such intent, it is no defence that they mistook the person they were communicating with as not being a member of such a group. See generally, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697. Hypothetical laws If instead you are asking about what a hypothetical law could require (since you ask, "If a law for example criminalises intimidating or assaulting someone who suffers from dwarfism..."), then as a matter of statutory interpretation, the law could be written in a way that makes the mistake you describe a defence or it could be written in a way that does not allow that defence. E.g. "Any person who assaults another, knowing that the other person is X, commits an offence..." This phrasing of the law clearly would require the accused to know that the person they have assaulted is in the category X in order for the assault to fall within this specific variant of assault. E.g. "Any person who assaults a person that is X, regardless of whether they know the other person to be X, commits an offence..." Under this phrasing of the law, knowledge of the status of the target of the assault clearly does not matter. However, Canadian law has constitutional minimum mens rea requirements for elements of crimes that bring risk of imprisonment. If the offence is punishable by imprisonment, then the variant that essentially removes the mens rea from the element relating to the target's status would be unconstitutional.	Relying on this version, proof of truth is only allowed in order to establish a "public interest" defense or for a "necessary defense"; but also "if an official is charged with the commission of an act in the exercise of his office". Good luck with "necessary defense". It is not a defense to say "But what I said is true". However, if the defamed person has been convicted in court of said act (the defamatory statement) then there can be no punishment.
What effect does Brexit have on Britons' Right to be Forgotten? As I understand it, the Right to be Forgotten was promulgated solely as an EU regulation1. Assuming that the UK follows through and leaves the EU, would search engines no longer have to remove results related to British subjects?	The 'right to be forgotten', as currently being applied throughout the European Union (EU), does not come from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which will come into force 25 May 2018. Rather, the current basis exists in the Data Protection Directive, 95/46/EC, article 12(b): Right of access Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller: [...] (b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data; This was one of the main points upon which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided Google Spain v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, the judgement which allowed for individuals to ask for search engines to remove results containing personal data. The CJEU explained that the 'right to be forgotten' was not absolute and should take into account economic considerations as well as other rights (paragraphs 85 - 88). The GDPR, article 17, for purposes of contrast, has a more robust and explicit right of erasure than currently in force: Article 17 Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: [...] Shortened for clarity GDPR, article 17 fleshes out much of the lack of specifics that the Directive's article 12(b). It should be noted that the UK's Data Protection Act 1998 is a transposition of the Data Protection Directive. This means that the full effect of the rights and obligations in the Directive are contained within the Data Protection Act 1998. Furthermore, the interpretation of the rights and obligations of the Data Protection Directive by the CJEU are highly influential on interpretation of the Data Protection Act 1998. This is due to the European Communities Act 1972, s 3(2) which states: Judicial notice shall be taken of the Treaties, of the Official Journal of the Communities and of any decision of, or expression of opinion by, the European Court on any such question as aforesaid; and the Official Journal shall be admissible as evidence of any instrument or other act thereby communicated of any of the Communities or of any Community institution Even without the above provision, it would be extremely likely that British courts would take into account Google Spain, given that the foundation of the Data Protection Act 1998 is the Data Protection Directive. The most likely outcome is for British courts to uphold the interpretation in Google Spain and allow for data subjects to request removal from search engines. Of course, it is not entirely possible to know without a test case, but it is doubtful any major search engine would attempt to deviate from the current situation as there is currently legal certainty. The Data Protection Act 1998 will still be in force after the future Brexit agreement and is certainly not contingent on continued EU membership. Update The current DPA will be repealed when Brexit comes in to play and will be replaced by a new one. Read more about the new data protection bill on the ICOs web site, which is based on the GDPR with certain derogations and additions.	Sure: No Constitutional rights are totally unencumbered. Even natural rights like the "right to life" are legally "infringed" through various theories (e.g., self-defense, capital punishment, warfare). The Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear weapons that would reasonably be used in self-defense or in military service. You don't have to go to strategic weapons like nukes to find "reasonable infringement" of that right. For example, even though the military and even police routinely use explosives, individuals are absolutely subject to the whims of a federal regulatory agency (the BATFE) as well as state restrictions if they want to keep and bear detonators. Also, I'm not aware of an absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear devices by non-government entities. E.g., various government regulators oversee private entities that operate commercial and research nuclear reactors and other activities that put them all-but in possession of nuclear arms. If an individual really wanted to legally keep and bear a nuclear weapon it could probably be done with enough money and oversight. (Amendment: Except, as cpast points out in the comments, that there is a law against private possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Which just goes back to the broad answer to your general question: In practice there are no unencumbered rights. Constitutional "rights" might better be called things that require "strict scrutiny" and "narrow tailoring" of government infringement.)	Overview The "right to remain silent " is a feature of US law, inherited, like much of the basic structure of US law, from the British law of the late 1700s. The right is also retained in modern UK law, in a somewhat different form. The laws of many countries that do not inherit their legal system from the English/British source do not include the right. For example, the legal system of France does not. Such a system is clearly possible and need not be an arrant tyranny. Whether such a right improves the justice and fairness of the system could be debated, but it is not essential. Note that it is not the case that a jury must pretend that a defendant would have testified in accord with a defense lawyer's opening statement. Indeed the jury is routinely told that opening statements are not evidence and should not be regarded as such. But a US jury is instructed that it should not draw any inference or conclusion of guilt because a defendant remains silent. A defendant is entitled, by remaining silent to in effect say to the state "Prove it!" and need not offer a competing version of the events of the alleged crime. In UK law, an accused person's failure to deny the crime may be considered at the trial. Historical origin The right arose as a reaction against certain specific practices considered to be abusive and unfair. In several English courts, particularly the Court of the Star Chamber, the practice arose of compelling suspected persons to attend and asking them under oath if they had commuted various illegal acts. If such a suspect had in fact committed the act asked about, then the suspect had the choice of confessing to a criminal act that carried a severe penalty (often death), or committing perjury, which was both a criminal act and was widely believed to be a grave sin, possibly condemning a person's soul to hell. Or if the accused remained silent, a serious punishment for contempt of court could be imposed, and that might be treated as evidence of guilt. These practices contributed to the abolition of the Star Chamber court in 1641. The right to silence seems to have been established in English law after the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, as described in the Wikipedia article, although it was not fully established until well into the 18th century. Current US Practice The right in the US not only applies during a trial for the protection of the accused. The right permits a person being questioned by the police to refuse to answer questions, with the assurance that such refusal may not later be used in court to help convict the suspect. Many lawyers advise anyone questioned by the police who are or might be under suspicion to refuse to answer any questions at all. The right also means that a witness who is not a defendant may not, in a criminal or civil trial, be required to answer a question if the answer might later be used to help convict that person of a crime. There are other implications of the right, and the details are too long to go into in this answer – whole books have been written about the right and what it does and does not cover, and the reasons behind it. The general principle may be taken to be that when the government accuses a person of crime, it must undertake to prove the crime by its own resources, not compel the accused to assist in the process. A system in which an accused is required to respond to specific questions can be imagined. To some extent it has existed at various times and places. It need not involve torture or coerced confession, but could require an accused, during a trial, to respond to specific questions. It would violate the principle that the state must make its case without help from the accused. The value of that principle can be debated. Other Legal systems In the article "French Criminal Procedures—Surprising Features of a French Trial from Bloomberg, it is said that: The “right to silence” is limited. During a trial, the judges usually turn to the defendant and ask for the defendant’s response to the evidence in the record. A refusal to respond will lead to a strong inference of guilt. A defendant is not, however, put under oath.	Article 8 is pretty clear. The fact that it is recommended to extend the draft to women indicates that there is a conflict needing resolution. A relevant case before the European Court of Human Rights ruled on this and found the law to violate articles 14 and 8 of the ECHR. They identify an exoneration from the tax under the Military-Service Exemption Tax Act sect. 4. Reading the judgment could be helpful (maybe you know the case). What I get from it is that there are a bunch of situation-specific details that could be applied (e.g. you have to first complain formally in-country before going to ECHR), and issues of disability level and the distinction between disability and illness. This gives a model for anyone to attempt to resist the tax, but only a change in the law will get rid of it.	That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure.	Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task.	First of all, the wording in your question hints at the UK deliberately launching a missile (even if it is a test one) towards the USA. Nothing in the news piece you link to support that supposition, the general idea is a missile that was launched towards the Atlantic Ocean that steered off route. From your link: The treaty recognizes five states as nuclear-weapon states. The NPT limits other states from researching (including testing) nuclear weapons and/or delivery vehicles. In exchange, they get access to nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Treaty preambles are general, introductory texts that explain the intent of the treaty. They are not binding, and the language clearly shows it (Hint: It states "Desiring to", "Recalling to". Binding agreements use "Shall", "Shall not", "May" or "May not", and are more specific about what are the restrictions). As stated above, the test was not "in North-America". It was from international waters "towards Africa", probably to be sunk before it reached land1. There is no notion anywhere that there was an intention of violating the airspace of any country. Certainly, the UK would be responsable if one of their missiles test fails and the missile ends causing damages, and the USA can protest any violation of its airspace, even if unintentional. But it is not "a test of ballistic missiles in North America", and certainly the USA has no more rights outside its territorial waters than, say, Gambia does. The only restriction would be the internationally stablished procedures for testing missiles, which are setup to avoid any kind of issues (the test scheduled date and path is published2 with time enough for third parties to take notice). So yes, it is business as usual. 1Idea: African countries are countries, too, and they have the same right as the USA for their airspace not to be violated by the military from other countries. 2Both to allow for air traffic to avoid dangerous areas, and to ensure that anybody detecting the launch does not think that it is an attack.	"Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" on the website you linked to is very clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights only means the EU institutions can't discriminate based on age, and that EU law is not allowed to be age discriminatory. It doesn't mean that individual acts of age discrimination are illegal: In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The practice of youth and senior discounts is older than the charter of fundamental rights. The charter will be interpreted in the light of continuity, it definitely wasn't the intention to outlaw price discrimination. There are specific laws that make price discrimination based on certain principles legal, e.g. UK equality act: Age discrimination - when discrimination is allowed in the provision of goods or services
Can I legally present data from public API's on a website? I am in the process of creating a website that will use data to present information on publicly traded companies. The tools that will present this data will be free to use and I will never charge a fee to use them. I am accessing the data through various API's that I have found through my research. All of the API's are free to use. If my website increases in popularity, and I monetize the website through advertisements, will I be breaking any copyright/intellectual-property laws?	"I am accessing the data through various API's that I have found through my research. All of the API's are free to use." The API's you "found" and are using may be "free" in a monetary sense - i.e., you don't pay for them and they appear to be public information - but those APIs will have a Terms of Service (TOS) attached to the use of the APIs and the data by the company which provides the APIs. A Terms of service (TOS) (Wikipedia) outlines the legal and acceptable use of the API and is a legally binding contract. Those TOSs may very well restrict the access and end usage of the data, so read the TOS for each API. A TOS is a contract; break the contract - by accessing the data without permission, without a license, by selling the data, or by any other activity expressly restricted - and you open yourself up to possible legal action, which could include copyright and trademark violations, among others. At very least, the companies that run the APIs can deny you access if you break the TOS; at very most, they can sue you. A company being "publicly traded" doesn't mean all the data about those companies is free and publicly accessible. Some may be; other data is compiled by the company which provides the API, and they can restrict access to that data through their TOS. If certain types of data are indeed factual - facts can't be copyrighted - the TOS may still legally restrict usage, because the company developed and owns the format that the data is presented in and the API the data is accessed by. It's possible that you could enter into a licensing agreement with the company that provides the API so you can access the data and monetize it, but that's up to the company, you and your lawyer.	Pretty much everything you need to know about the ownership and licensing of your material on Medium is in the Medium TOS you contractually agreed to when you signed up with the service. Basically, you granted Medium a license to use the work, but you did not agree to an exclusive license nor turn over copyright to them. Part of that Terms of Service – Medium Policy reads: Content rights & responsibilities You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. You’re responsible for the content you post. This means you assume all risks related to it, including someone else’s reliance on its accuracy, or claims relating to intellectual property or other legal rights. You’re welcome to post content on Medium that you’ve published elsewhere, as long as you have the rights you need to do so. By posting content to Medium, you represent that doing so doesn’t conflict with any other agreement you’ve made. By posting content you didn’t create to Medium, you are representing that you have the right to do so. For example, you are posting a work that’s in the public domain, used under license (including a free license, such as Creative Commons), or a fair use. We can remove any content you post for any reason. You can delete any of your posts, or your account, anytime. Processing the deletion may take a little time, but we’ll do it as quickly as possible. We may keep backup copies of your deleted post or account on our servers for up to 14 days after you delete it. Pertaining to presenting Medium content in an iFrame on another site, this is reasonably close to not allowing that: You may not do, or try to do, the following: ... (2) access or search the Services by any means other than the currently available, published interfaces (e.g., APIs) that we provide;... You can use Embed Code Generator \| Embedly to embed an iFrame of a Medium page on another site. But contacting Medium via the email at the bottom of the TOS would tell you for sure if it is OK. Comments on your pieces on Medium do belong to the owner. And You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. appears to cover the idea of copying your material from Medium to your own site. If in doubt, ask them.	You probably can. There are a few questions here. First, is the message protected by copyright? In general, it probably is, but there are many exceptions that might allow you to use it without permission. Unfortunately, these exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The exceptions tend to allow the use of small excerpts of a work for various sorts of purposes that don't undermine the copyright holder's ability to profit. That leads to the second question, which is why you are using that message. If you're including it in your source code so you can test whether a message generated at run time is in fact that message, that's one thing, and it's probably okay. On the other hand, if the owner of the copyright sells a database of all its message strings, and you're compiling a similar database that you also intend to sell, that's probably not okay. A third question concerns the Firefox license terms. It's entirely possible that they allow you explicitly to do what you're considering, in which case it doesn't matter what copyright law says about it. On the other hand, Firefox is open source software, and under some open source licenses, if you incorporate any of the source code in your own product, you are required to release your product's source code under the same license. If you're not already planning to do that, you should consider carefully whether including that error message would trigger that provision (if there is one) of Firefox's open source license.	Probably not. There are potential problems on the levels of copyright, data protection, and the Youtube terms of service. You should assume that comments are typically covered by copyright. You do not have a license to these comments, only YouTube does. Therefore, YouTube can show the comments but you can't copy them – just like YouTube can stream your videos but others can't download them and host them on their own websites. To cover the copyright angle, you'd either need to obtain a license from the commenters, or get a sub-license from YouTube, or identify a suitable copyright exception. The comments are personal data within the meaning of the GDPR, so that your processing of these comments (including mere storage) would be subject to GDPR as well. You need a legal basis for processing personal data. Which legal basis is suitable would depend on the purpose of processing, and on your relationship with the commenters. Potentially applicable legal bases in this context: you have a contract with the commenters that requires you to show the comments on your website. For example, I could see such a contract if there were a “featured comment” perk for a Patreon subscription. But this is not going to fly with random commenters. you have a legitimate interest (LI) that allows the processing. A LI requires that you conduct a balancing test where you weigh this interest against the commenter's rights. This is very specific to the purposes for which you want to show the comments. However, a LI will generally only apply if you have an existing relationship with the commenters, making it possible for them to expect that this processing will occur – unlikely if you'll be scraping comments from YouTube. you have obtained consent from the data subject. Consent must be specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous – you can't obtain consent by writing “by commenting under this video you consent to XXX” in the video description. Regardless of legal basis, you would have to inform the commenters under Art 14 GDPR when you scrape their comments from the platform. Finally, consider the platform terms of service. I have not read the YouTube ToS recently, so I don't know what their specific conditions are. But in general, such ToS will not allow you to scrape content from their platform in order to host it somewhere else. The ToS might allow certain actions like embedding a link/iframe to such videos on other sites, without allowing other actions such as copying other user's content to your site.	This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta.	I've found Google's filtering based on licence to not be very reliable, at least not reliable enough to trust from a practical legal perspective. Using a photo that you don't own the copyright to is a risk. You may be infringing copyright by doing so. The owner may eventually ask you to stop, or they may sue you for damages. Further, some copyright infringement is criminal 17 USC 506. In my opinion, it would be unwise to use a work commercially that you don't affirmatively know you have permission to use.	"...the listing ad of property is not a property of website." Why do you think that? Just because a website exists does not mean you can legally scrape it. Read the Terms of Service of the site; there is a good chance the TOS forbids scraping or copying of any part of the website in any manner, including scraping. If the property listings are from a third party service that provides real estate listings to websites, then those property listings are licensed to that website, and by scraping them you will likely be violating the TOSs of those two services. By illegally scraping the content of a website, you are opening yourself up to being involved in copyright infringement and/or being liable to be the subject of a civil lawsuit.	There seems to be no controversy about whether you are allowed to make a copy of a publicly accessible GitHub repository by forking it. As they agreed by accepting the GitHub terms of service and making their repository public, the repository owner grants that and a few other rights to all GitHub users. The actual question seems to be whether you may then publish the URL of your fork. Of course you may, to the same extent that you may publish anything else. The URL is data, not a creative work, so copyright does not apply to it. The considerations are the same as for publishing URL of the original repo. There are things you might say about the URL or the repository it identifies that could get you into trouble, such as claiming rights you do not have, or misrepresenting the rights that others have or that you can grant to them. Or publishing false and derogatory remarks about the code might conceivably land you in hot water. But the URL itself is not an issue.
Why can NTSB reports not be admitted as evidence? According to 49 U.S. code § 1154, part (b), No part of a report of the Board, related to an accident or an investigation of an accident, may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. That is to say, an NTSB report may not be used as evidence in a civil action for damages, resulting from an aviation incident. This is re-iterated at the end of most final NTSB reports. My question is what is the motivation and reasoning behind this legislation? While some of the elements of the report may be of a subjective nature, there is a specific section detailing factual information. Could the motivation be to force admittance of the original evidence, rather than the NTSB report which would potentially secondary source? A more interesting aside is also, can it be admitted into evidence if the civil action is not for damages from the incident in question? What if a report has tangential relevance in a potentially non-civil, say, criminal action?	"The purpose of the statute making the NTSB's reports of accidents inadmissible in actions arising out of such accidents is to exclude reports that express agency views as to the probable cause of the accident because that is a finding in the province of the jury or fact finder." Britton v. Dall. Airmotive, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-00547-EJL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163211, at 5-6 (D. Idaho May 20, 2011) (citations omitted). "The legislative history of this statute demonstrates that the purpose of this exclusionary rule is to prevent a usurpation of the jury's role as fact finder." McLeod v. ERA Aviation, No. 93-294, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3204, at 3 (E.D. La. Mar. 12, 1996) (citations omitted). "This limitation on the admissibility of the NTSB report, however, applies to the official conclusions of the NTSB, not to the factual accident reports of the investigators." Britton, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163211, at *6 (citation omitted); accord 49 C.F.R. § 835.2. By its terms, the statute applies only to civil actions, but the report would be subject to the ordinary hearsay rules if offered in a criminal case. See Fed. R. Evid. 801; United States v. PG&E, 178 F. Supp. 3d 927, 946 (N.D. Cal. 2016).	Lawyers may break confidentiality with client permission. You can also break your own confidentiality and talk to the prosecutor yourself. The prosecutor's response is up to the prosecutor; however, they tend to not be super excited about giving immunity to a witness for the defense if they might want to prosecute the witness later (and courts often are fine with that), so the more they suspect about your true role the less likely they are to grant it. No. If the feds later find truly independent evidence (they have the burden of showing it's truly independent), they can prosecute. Some states give transactional immunity to witnesses (you can't be prosecuted for crimes you testified about for any reason), but the Fifth Amendment doesn't require it and at least the feds aren't bound by state transactional immunity. It's hard to prosecute, but is possible if prosecutors play their cards right. Yes, it does allow civil liability. There is no right against self-incrimination in civil matters, only criminal liability. If the forced testimony leads to a lawsuit that bankrupts you, too bad.	The standard in civil trials is "on the balance of probabilities" or "more likely than not." This is often expressed as "more than 50% likely", but this question is meant to provide an edge case to this standard of proof. Despite one person being provably innocent, could all 3 people be found civilly liable for 1/3 of the damages, since each individual has a 67% chance of having committed the crime? General Rule: No Generally speaking, the answer is "no". A plaintiff must prove liability by a preponderance of the evidence as to each individual defendant. This flows from the basic structure of tort lawsuits (a civil claim alleging damages suffered from criminal acts is a form of tort lawsuit). The Narrow Market Share Liability Exception There is pretty much only one circumstance where something similar to your example. But, it isn't strictly analogous because it only applies when all of the defendants can be proven to have harmed some of the plaintiffs and the only question outstanding is who harmed whom. Defendants may be innocent of harming some of the plaintiffs, but can't be innocent of harming any of them, to face liability in this scenario. This occurs which is when a class action lawsuit is brought against all (or almost all) of the multiple separate defendants who manufactured the products of the same type, all of which were defective. A manufacturer of a defective product is strictly liable for all harm caused by the defective product, but usually a plaintiff must show precisely which defendant's product caused that particular person's injury. But, in the class action context, where (almost) all of the people who made the defective products are sued by (almost) all of the people who were injured by defective products of that type, courts have allowed the class to recover an amount calculated to represent the aggregate economic value of the damages suffered by all members of the class combined. Then, the aggregate damages award is allocated among the defendants in proportion to their market share of the defective product. Then, the amounts paid to the class by the various defendants are then allocated to members of the class based upon the estimated damages suffered by each subgroup of class members (or in separate case by case damages hearings). This is an exception to the usual requirement to prove causation against each individual defendant in the case of each individual plaintiff, because the risk of injustice by the process overall to any given defendant is small, and requiring proof of causation in this situation creates a burden on plaintiffs that lacks the justification that it would have if the injured parties had sued on a piecemeal basis. But, this only works when the defect in the product was shared by everyone who made that kind of product, and was not simply a "quality control" issue in the manufacturing process. For example, this kind of market share causation could be appropriate against all makers of tobacco products or asbestos or lead based paint. But, it would not be appropriate in a product liability case where some cars with built with substandard parts while others were built with parts that met the specifications for the cars and those that were did not cause any harm.	No Federal law and most states have an notice of alibi rule that requires a defendant to identify witnesses who will testify as to their alibi and where the defendant claims to have been. The validity of these rules was upheld by the Supreme Court in Williams v Florida: The Fifth Amendment would not be violated if, after the alibi witness had given evidence, the court granted a continuance to allow the prosecution to seek rebuttal evidence (this point was conceded by Williams's lawyers). Consequently, all the notice-of-alibi law did was allow the prosecution to do so before the trial, instead of having to interrupt the trial. It did not provide the prosecution with more information to use against a defendant than they would eventually get in any event.	Can a Lease with Missing Pages be used as Evidence in Court? Yes. Being relevant to the claim(s) and signed by the parties gives the filed pages evidentiary weight. If the filed evidence is disputed, its filing shifts to the adversary the burden of proving that the missing portions of the contract outweigh the materiality of that evidence or that the filed pages are unreliable (i.e., fake). Likewise, during discovery, the party who only preserved some of the pages could (1) request the adversary to provide a copy of the signed contract, and/or (2) submit a request for admissions in which the adversary is asked to admit or disprove terms of the lease that are at issue.	As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury.	That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.	If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically.
How might a defense attorney use the fact that the accused was coerced? Examples from the movie Se7en SPOILER ALERT FOR THE WHOLE MOVIE. THIS GIVES AWAY THE ENDING. In the film Se7en directed by David Fincher, a killer, J Doe, obsessed with the seven deadly sins carries out a grisly series of murders that coerce the victim or others to be unwilling participants in their death or the death of another. In murder number 5, representing lust, Doe puts a gun in the mouth of an unnamed brothel patron and threatens to kill him unless he kills a prostitute. The patron complies to save his own life, and is released by Doe. The patron stays at the scene until Police arrive, still partially tied up, and traumatized by what he has seen and done. The officers seem sympathetic, because they have been investigating these series of murders and know that Doe has been able to coerce people into basically murdering themselves so far. The patron admits everything he did during his interrogation, sobbing despondently, but pleading that he only did it because he had a gun in his mouth. At the end of the movie, Doe turns himself in and offers to show Detective Mills the location of more bodies. He taunts and antagonizes Mills during the trip. When they arrive where Doe instructs, a delivery van shows up, and delivers a box containing the severed head of Detective Mills' wife. Doe gives a cruel, upsetting monologue to Mills, bragging self-righteously about what he has done and smirking as he informs the yet-unaware Mills that his wife had been pregnant. Mills' partner asserts that Doe has done all this to goad Mills into shooting him out of wrath, thus completing the list, and Doe doesn't deny it. Mills struggles for a few moments, then gives in and shoots Doe in cold blood. Later he is shown arrested, appearing to have offered no resistance. Both these incidents take place in New York. I'm curious to know what the legal outlook is for each of these people. I expect that they won't escape prison, but I also suspect their sentences will take into account the circumstances? How could their defense attorney potentially use these circumstances in making their case?	In the first case, under US law, you are not considered guilty in most cases where you are forced to commit a crime under duress (gun to your head would certainly qualify). Murder is a rare exception to this rule, and the patron can be tried for the murder of the prostitute. Given the nature of Doe, who uses situations of duress to force a no win scenario for his victims, a good defense would likely work to get Jury Nullification of this crime, given the circumstance. The likely defense would be to validate that the man would not ordinarily kill a prostitute and thus only under a situation such as the one presented would he. It is still a crime, but the jury could choose not to convict, but it's a gamble as the law of crime of duress is likely to come up in the course of the trial. Situation 2 is a little more grim, as in this case, Doe has already surrendered and is custody and admits to a crime that is personal to the detective. I haven't seen the movie, so I can't suggest if there was an appropriate time for Mills to be pulled from the case prior to this revelation, but if such an opportunity happened, he should have. Since Doe is not threatening Mills at the point of time and he had already carried out his crime and been captured, Mills is an officer of the law who is killing someone in his custody. This is a crime and should be prosecuted. The circumstances might serve as mitigating factors and the jury may nullify, but these are circumstances that are less likely than the above case. Mills is also the lead detective in this case (?), and thus should know how Doe functions and what he is trying to get done. In the role of prosecutor, I personally would not push the crime against the patron as the likely jury would be too sympathetic to the defense. I would prosecute Mills as his responsibilities as a law enforcer and his training would have made him well aware that what he did was a crime.	Daniel Fleetwood, and his wife who watched the movie with him, were bound by a confidentiality agreement: She can't say much more because she had to sign a confidentiality agreement. Basically, both he and his wife signed a contract, if they had said anything they would have been in breach of that contract and could have been sued. Such agreements are standard, even for actors, so presumably, the lawyers at Disney know what they are doing when they write such a contract. NDAs such as this often specify hefty fines. I am doubtful that his illness would have meant they would have lost a case against him in that situation - it would have meant a whole lot of negative publicity, but if the contract was legally binding, the health condition does not matter. Daniel himself died five days after watching the movie.	Possibly negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter. Really dependson the state where this happens and the exact elements that need to be proven. Lester has asked his wife to do something that he knows might result in her death and does not warn her. He probably has a duty to warn her.	I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty").	I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!).	“Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all.	The article seems to state the legal standard which I repeat here in a Google Translate version: The former Government delegate for Gender Violence, Miguel Lorente , defines vicarious violence as "violence that, when it seeks to hurt and harm women, instead of doing it directly, seeks to harm people who have special meaning for them." Harming a child or other person with special meaning to the true target of the violence is, of course, already a serious crime in Spanish law. A finding that the crime was a form of vicarious violence is a sentencing enhancing finding of fact by the court that makes a convicted defendant eligible for what U.S. lawyers would call "life in prison with possibility for parole" even though Google Translate provides a more literal translation from the Spanish of the words used to describe the enhanced sentence for which someone becomes eligible if this is established. Of course, there are other reasons why some people might hurt their children, such as part of a pattern of abuse toward the children unrelated to spousal abuse, for the purpose of collecting life insurance money, as part of sexual abuse, and so forth, so presumably there exist certain criteria in the Spanish legal system to distinguish these cases. Other than the legal definition set forth above, there does not appear to be any further legal guidance for the courts in determining if this sentence enhancing fact has been established. It is merely a question of fact for the judges on the court to determine based upon the evidence presented at trial by the prosecution and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Lawyers for the defendant can argue that this sentence enhancer should not apply because one of the different motives in the quoted material from the question was the actual or predominant motive, and the prosecution can argue that it was indeed vicarious violence, and then the judges have to decide whether they think that the prosecution has met its burden of proof to establish this motive and impose the enhanced sentence (which is authorized, but not required, even if it is established). This isn't going to be the easiest point to make in a typical case for the defendant. Usually, the defense is primarily going to be trying to cast doubt upon whether the prosecution has met its burden of showing that the defendant is guilty of the underlying crime at all, and, for example, having the defendant testify that he did it because he was a pedophile, rather than to hurt his wife is not going to help him all that much. Instead, I would expect that the usual approach of the defendant's lawyer would be to argue that the prosecution's evidence, if believed, supports a prosecution theory of the case that, for example, this murder was about insurance money and not about intimidating the defendant's wife. Another way the the defense could fight this sentencing enhancing claim at trial would be to argue that the specific evidence of the prosecution offer to show the defendant's alleged vicarious violence motive isn't credible in all of the ways the one generally casts doubt on the credibility of evidence in a court case. For example, the defense might offer evidence from a different witness than one offered by the prosecution that cast's doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's witness. Or, the defense might ask (or have the judges in the case ask) questions of the witness who is the key witness on the vicarious violence motive issue, that casts doubt on that witnesses' own testimony (perhaps by pointing out contradictions in the testimony or that the witnesses couldn't have been where the witness claimed to be in earlier testimony). Also, it doesn't appear that vicarious violence has to be an either/or question. Nothing in the definition of vicarious violence suggests, for example, that a defendant can't both have a motive to collect insurance money, and a motive to intimidate the child's mother, at the same time, "killing two birds with one stone" so to speak.	It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question.
Is it piracy to obtain software you purchased in an alternate way? Lets say you purchased software in the 90s or early 2000s, but lost the license key and or the disc. Another possibility is the company is no longer supporting and or does not provide older versions of its software. What you do have: the receipt with your name on it. the box from over 15 years ago. a statement from your bank proving it was purchased with a credit card with your name on it with the same date as the receipt. The computer with this software crashes and the license key is lost in a unrecoverable hard drive. In layman's terms, is it illegal to pirate the software by some means and crack it to get the product that was paid for to work? To be clear in this scenario, the item in question is a box with a CD containing the software and inside the same box a key is included to activate said software. This box is purchased from a retail store. The pirated software will only be used by the original owner as a replacement and not distributed or sold. Is it illegal to create an unauthorized copy of the software. Is it illegal to circumvent the software license key checks? Is the receipt enough to prove you own the key and if not why? Is there law to protect the consumer from having to purchase the software twice in this situation?	The DMCA prohibits circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to a copyrighted work. So you can't legally "crack" the software, period -- even if you own a disc containing the software and have a valid license to use it, a license to use the work is not authorization to circumvent access controls. So if the disc is copy-protected, by my understanding of the DMCA, you're kinda screwed. (The company might be willing to provide you a replacement copy, even if only to maintain the illusion that the software is "licensed, not sold". But you can't make one yourself.) Likewise, if you have a copy of the disc but have lost the license key, you're screwed. Even if you could prove beyond any doubt that you are the licensee, there's not any law i'm aware of that would compel the copyright owner to provide you another license key. And courts have held that distribution of license keys without authorization is a violation of the DMCA. So whoever might provide you another key, if they're not the copyright holder, has broken the law. If you managed to copy the disc from a friend (without circumventing any kind of copy protection), and had your own license key, you might be in a better position. Many EULAs allow you to make a backup copy. Even if they didn't, copyright law does, so there's a possible case for fair use.	I'm not sure this would be a copyright violation. 17 USC 117 says: (a)Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy.—Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner... Due to the shutdown of the license server, it is impossible to use the program without an adaptation. It is therefore an "essential step in the utilization of the computer program", and not infringing, in my opinion.	What you're talking about is called black-box reverse engineering. It can be done, and as long as you are meticulous in your record keeping the fact that it has been done should be an appropriate defence against copyright infringement. But that doesn't help against patent claims - while in copyright cases the fact that code has or has not been directly copied is critical, in patent cases it its irrelevant: if you use a patented method, it's a violation. You therefore will need to be careful about any patents that may have been issued to the original author, as well as avoiding copying.	As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum).	You have a contract with the 3rd party vendor. The 3rd party vendor has a contract with Amazon. These two contracts are not related in any way.	Software licenses are protected by copyright, meaning that you need the author's permission to copy them. One way to get permission is to buy a license, since many of them are for sale. Sometimes (e.g. CC licenses) a license to copy the license is granted. You can also read and understand what is in a license, and use that knowledge to write your own. This is different from copying the license, since what you are extracting from the existing licenses is the ideas, not the specific expression.	If you're in the U.S., then section 117 of the Copyright Act is likely what you're looking for. The U.S. Copyright Office says: Under section 117, you or someone you authorize may make a copy of an original computer program if: the new copy is being made for archival (i.e., backup) purposes only; you are the legal owner of the copy; and any copy made for archival purposes is either destroyed, or transferred with the original copy, once the original copy is sold, given away, or otherwise transferred. Based on the information you provided, it sounds like you meet all three of these criteria. They also note that your particular software's license agreement might include special conditions that affect your right to make a backup copy. Such a warning would only make sense if it was legally possible for the software distributor to make such a limitation, so I'm afraid the direct answer to your main question is "yes". It's definitely not the norm - at least in my experiences - but it is a possibility so you'll need to consult your program's license agreement. There's also a possibility that the company misunderstood you and was thinking that you were running a backup server (in the sense of a redundant infrastructure) and not making an offline backup of your entire server. It's quite normal to require an additional license for the former case.	It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages.
Is it illegal to refuse to provide proof of income after receiving a loan/credit? Say someone applies for a loan and they get the loan. Afterwards the lender wants to see proof of income, but the lendee denies and refuses to provide any proof after the fact. Given that it's after and not before, is there any difference in legal routes? If one refuses to provide proof of income before receiving any money, it's obvious that the lender can just not give it and not care -- but what about after the loan was given? Can they legally demand you provide proof after they give money? Are you required by law to do so then? If you refuse, would they cancel your account and make this a civil/term based account termination -- or is this actually an entire criminal suit to unfold? Because it's very easy to say no and avoid giving proof, but saying no isn't proof of being guilty yet. Realistically, how far could this turn serious if the lender demanded and the lendee refused?	First, refusing to provide proof of income to a lender cannot possibly be a crime per se. Lying about your income to get the loan might be fraud, but whether you agree to provide proof to the lender later cannot be a crime. Second, the loan agreement may contain language which obligates you to provide proof of income as requested. If the lender did not verify income up-front, this is not unlikely. If so, refusal to provide such proof would entitle the lender to any available remedies. It's possible that a loan agreement could entitle the lender to pursue specific performance which, if granted, might compel you to provide proof (or some alternative if this is impossible) or be held in contempt of court for refusing to comply with a court order. More likely, the lender would be able to require accelerated repayment of what they're owed. If, based on your refusal to provide proof of income, the lender suspects you committed fraud when you applied for the loan, they can file a police report and press charges. If the prosecutor thinks they have a case and chooses to pursue that charge, proof of income (at least, when you applied for the loan) might have to come out as part of your defense. This is all very speculative. Most likely you can just ignore the lender's request and avoid missing any payments. I wouldn't expect any favors from this lender going forward.	If something small or relatively unimportant is incorrect in the document, would you sign it? if my reported debt is high and the bank is willing to give me a loan anyway, then this section of the document shouldn't matter to me. I would not consider it unimportant. The item at issue relates to debts you have (or admit), and it is part of a document whereby you seek to incur further debt. The fact that an inaccuracy of that sort seems immaterial to you does not guarantee that it will be inconsequential. For instance, the inaccurate duplication might be pigeonholing you as a high-risk exposure, allowing the bank to impose on you harsher restrictions now or in the future (especially in the event that you fall behind on the payments). Moreover, knowingly consenting to that inaccuracy could complicate your requests to correct errors (if any) in subsequent credit reports. The rating agency could refute your request by saying "This loan document with your signature on it reflects that you owe this high amount", and the loan officer will not be there to help you. There could be additional ramifications, but these are two I can think of right now. The loan officer's pretext that the inaccuracy stems from auto-populated fields means nothing if that explanation is not clearly stated by the bank in the document you are signing. The document constitutes (or is an important part of) an explicit contract between you and the bank. Others' carelessness about contracts they sign won't help you if things turn ugly later on.	The "point" of including bank-interest income on your tax return rather than having the government automatically deduct what it feels that you would owe is that the government is not legally empowered to take money away from you in that fashion. The government is legal empowered to compel you to pay your taxes, and there are numerous rules enacted as law or as a consequence of laws passed. You can read the various relevant laws here. There simply is no general law that says that banks must withhold taxes on interest. There might be a specific case when an entity is subject to backup withholding (as a response to a taxpayer not following certain rules). There are also special rules regarding non-resident alien withholding, which could require interest withholding. Apart from the intrinsic political unpopularity of imposing new withholding requirements on people, it is difficult to compute the correct amount to withhold, since not all interest is taxable. In theory, a set of rules could be constructed to require withholding of interest income, if Congress were to pass a law similar to 26 USC 3402.	This (as always) depends on jurisdiction, but usually - No, just taking the money is not legal.. In most jurisdictions, if you have a claim (the rent, in your case) against a debtor , and the debtor does not pay, you are not allowed to take any enforcement action (taking property, coercing the debtor) yourself. Instead, you must obtain a court or administrative judgement confirming your claim. Even then, often only a court officer or the police may actually enforce payment of the debt. This is mostly to protect the debtor from unwarranted enforcement action (such as taking more than you are owed, or collecting a disputed debt). For example, in Germany, to enforce a debt the creditor must first obtain what is called a Vollstreckungstitel or just Titel (title) - an official document confirming that there is an outstanding claim. This is on top of any contracts already existing. A Titel is obtained either through a regular court judgment, or through an abbreviated, administrative process called Mahnverfahren (essentially, you ask the court to send the debtor a letter about your claim, and if the debtor does not file an objection, you get the Titel). Once you have a Titel, the creditor can enforce it any time they choose (with a Titel, the statute of limiation is extended from the usual three years to 30 years). However, actual enforcement must be performed by an officer of the court (Gerichtsvollzieher). Only they may do things such as collecting the debtors property, force open doors and even imprison uncooperative debtors. I don't know the exact situation in the USA, but I believe it is roughly similar. For example, the equivalent of a Vollstreckungstitel is a Writ of execution.	Threat of lawsuit can't be illegal It is a basis of functioning legal systems, that if you have a case, you can sue. However, nothing in any such legal system requires them to sue. Instead, offering a resolution out of court - like arbitration or offering to relinquish a claim for payment - is legal. Adding pressure by saying "This is my offer, otherwise I sue" is not extortion, because after the suit is filed, it is with the courts. Should the claimant file a frivolous lawsuit, then the court will deal with it - dismissing the case and sanctioning the claimant and their lawyer. See also these questions: Why is threatening to sue not considered extortion? Why should one never threaten to sue? What is the point of sending a demand letter?	Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked & answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false & misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness.	The law regarding proof of service allows service of summons by publication in case a defendant "is not a resident of the state, but has property therein and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action". Plaintiff must file an affidavit saying that he believes that you are not a resident, and he either mailed the summons to you or states that your residence is unknown. Knowing how to contact a person is not exactly the same as knowing their residence, so the statement in the affidavit might be true. There is a one year limit on your right to defend and reopen if not served personally. The statute of limitations tolls after the cause of action has accrued (which I suppose would be defective service of the summons, viz. perjury in the affadavit). For recovery of real property, the time would be ten years. The court rules allow that "At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued". (This is clearly a matter that your attorney needs to address).	Your bank is not discriminating against you. Your reasons for not having the required amount of funds pass thru your account has nothing to do with your marital status. In general, it's problematic to make a chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination. For example. Your argument is analogous to the following. My boss fired me for being late to work. But I was late to work because my child woke up late and missed the school bus; so I had to drive her to school. Therefore, my boss fired me for having children. That type of chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination just doesn't hold water. It is non sequitur and a requires a leap of logic.
Are all crimes committed in Washington DC federal crimes? Since Washington DC is a federal territory, do all crimes committed there automatically become federal crimes?	It’s complicated. Most crimes in DC that would be state crimes elsewhere are punished under the DC Code, which was at one point written by Congress but which the DC Council now has the power to amend (subject to Congress’s right to change it at any time). Crimes under the DC Code are tried in the DC Superior Court, which is generally considered a local court. Its judges are appointed by the President (subject to Senate confirmation) for 15-year terms, but the President must pick from a list made by a commission with both federal and local membership. Appeals from Superior Court go to the DC Court of Appeals, which is not the same as the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit. From the DC Court of Appeals, appeals go to SCOTUS just like appeals from state supreme courts. Prosecution can be done by the city Attorney General (normally handles misdemeanors) or the federal US Attorney for the DC District (normally handles felonies). Jails are handled by a city department, prison terms are handled by the federal BOP. DC is in the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States, so many generic federal crimes apply there. However, in practice they are not charged in US District Court as violations of the US Code but in DC Superior Court as violations of the DC Code. For double jeopardy and many other constitutional purposes, the DC Code has to comply with restrictions on federal power. This is part of the reason Heller was brought in DC: gun rights groups wanted to set a precedent under the 2nd Amendment before they had to argue that it applied to the states under the 14th.	(The original title of your question suggested you might think that federal circuit precedent binds state courts: it generally does not, even on matters of federal law.) But regardless, Congress would not be able to legislatively lower the constitutional floor. If a certain police act is prohibited by the Constitution, Congress cannot legislatively allow that act, whether in a single state or uniformly across all states. That means that if the Fifth Circuit has decided that the use of some new investigatory tool is a search under the Fourth Amendment, no law that Congress passes could affect that holding. When congress creates laws that result in different effects for different people (e.g. people in Texas vs. people in Florida, as in your hypothetical), the distinction must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Many of the enumerated powers allow for local distinction, some prohibit it. Some examples where Congress has distinguished between states include: localized agricultural programs, time zones, voting rights protections, and various others listed in ohwilleke's review. Some distinctions between states could also intrude on principles of federalism and state sovereignty (e.g. the Supreme Court has said that the Voting Right Act does this). Maybe I am unimaginative, but I cannot think of a legitimate federal government purpose that would call for the powers that police have against the people to vary from state to state. Any such variation would have to come from the states themselves: from their state constitutions, or legislative choices to provide heightened protections. Discord between circuits is problematic (see a list of examples of existing splits), and this is why the Supreme Court of the United States will often hear an appeal where there is a circuit split on a question of constitutional rights.	The rules of criminal procedure are going to differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In US federal court, for example, a criminal trial in absentia can happen, but only in limited circumstances. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. A notable example of a defendant not appearing for a federal criminal case is the recent case, arising from the Mueller probe, against Concord Management and Consulting LLC (a Russian entity).	18 U.S. Code § 611 is the relevant law. (a) It shall be unlawful for any alien to vote in any election held solely or in part for the purpose of electing a candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner, unless— (1) the election is held partly for some other purpose; (2) aliens are authorized to vote for such other purpose under a State constitution or statute or a local ordinance; and (3) voting for such other purpose is conducted independently of voting for a candidate for such Federal offices, in such a manner that an alien has the opportunity to vote for such other purpose, but not an opportunity to vote for a candidate for any one or more of such Federal offices. This is not the most straightforward of law on the books. It says "you can't vote unless..." three things. It has to be locally legal to vote for something other than a federal office, the election has to include something other than voting for federal office, and it cannot be possible to vote for a federal office at the same time. Given that, it is impossible for any alien (even documented) to vote for president. Extant alien-voting laws are no higher than municipality, most being in Maryland. Violation of the law is a crime. Because non-citizens are not allowed to vote in state-wide elections, the theory is that they literally cannot vote, so they will not receive a ballot, which comes from the state. Here are the election laws for Maryland. There isn't a provision for "disqualifying" a vote, instead a person is prevented from voting in the first place if they are successfully challenged, because they can't prove who they are or the person they claim to be is not registered to vote (a non-citizen will never be registered with the state to vote, assuming no fraudulent documentation). Takoma Park non-citizen residents can vote in city elections and they register with the local gov't, not the state.	It is unlikely that Bob's conduct would constitute disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace in the fact pattern you described and the police and the Mayor who ordered to police to act have probably violated Bob's constitutional rights. While governments may adopt reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions on free speech, and the inquiry as to whether a time, place and manner restriction is reasonable is a fact specific inquiry, the facts presented in this question are in the heartland of free speech protections and so an arrest is likely to violate a clearly established constitutional right. Bob believes the mayor to be corrupt. The mayor is an ex police officer. So Bob decides to protest in front of city hall at noon with a sign and speaking loudly about his dislike for the mayor while walking back and forth on a public sidewalk. Bob is in a public place that has a long tradition of being a symbolic public forum for expressing grievances. He is articulating statements that he holds in good faith about a matter of public concern relating to a public figure. Noon is not a time at which there is a need to maintain quiet. There is no indication in the question of any special facts that would modify the usual considerations in this fact pattern (i.e. the building is not on fire requiring fire departments to keep people clear, there isn't a Presidential motorcade nearby, there is no indication that there is an ordinance on the books in advance that attempts to reasonably accommodate protesters in the interest of some important interest (e.g. not interfering with security lines)). Realistically, absent negative facts which are not mentioned, this looks like a strong case for a constitutional violation and a weak one for criminal liability.	Suppose I live in State A, but am on vacation to State B. While on vacation, suppose someone living in State C, but currently in State D, accesses my bank account to take money out illegally. The bank has a central headquarters in State E, although my branch of the bank is in State F. In which of these states could I file a lawsuit? Any of them? All of them? The thief would be the defendant in a lawsuit brought by you. The fact that you are on vacation in State B is irrelevant. You can always sue someone where they are domiciled, so State C is one forum where you could sue the thief. You can also always sue a natural person (as opposed to an entity) in a State where they are physically served with process, so if a summons from the courts of State D were served upon the thief while the thief was in State D, then State D could handle the case. You could also probably sue in State A on the grounds that intangible property is deemed to be located where the owner is domiciled and the theft of intangible property was a harm directed a State A. But, there is an argument that if the thief has no way you knowing that you lived in State A as opposed to State F where your branch is locate, that the thief's actions were targeted at State F. State E would not be a very plausible state to argue that there is jurisdiction. A federal district court has geographic jurisdiction only over cases that could be heard in the state courts of the state where it is located, so a federal court case would be brought only in the states where a state lawsuit could be brought. A federal court cases would either have to seek at least $75,000 (since there is diversity of citizenship between you and the thief), or would have to state at least one theory arising under federal law (which might or might not apply to this case). The you can choose which state to file in from those that are available. Which of these states could file charges against the person? A state can prosecute if the crime happened there, or if the crime caused a harm there. In this case the answer to both of those questions could be muddy. Basically, State A or F is probably where the crime caused harm, and it isn't clear from the OP facts where the crime was committed by the thief (we only know where the thief is now). These acts would also probably violate some federal crime that could be prosecuted in federal court, mostly likely the federal courts in State A or State F. Which of these states could file charges against the person? Could the federal government file charges as well? Would more than one prosecution violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment? What if these were countries instead of states? The double jeopardy clause applies to prosecutions within a single U.S. state, and in addition to any state prosecutions, a single prosecution can be made at the federal level. Likewise, prosecutions in different countries do not count against each other for purposes of a double jeopardy clause. Many U.S. states have a binding or non-binding policy of not prosecuting crimes that have already been prosecuted by another U.S. state or by the federal government, the U.S. Justice Department likewise has a non-binding policy of not prosecuting cases which have already been prosecuted by a U.S. state or another country. But these policies do not have constitutional dimensions and are not required by the 5th Amendment. if I use a Canadian Wi-Fi network without authorization from within the United States, would US or Canadian law apply? In criminal cases, choice of law and jurisdiction over the case are the same thing, because a state or country can only apply its own criminal laws. In civil cases, choice of law is a question distinct from jurisdiction. A court applies the law with the most significant connection to the disputed legal issue in question (sometimes more than one set of laws in a multi-issue case), even if it is the law of a different state or country, which is a standard that affords a judge considerable discretion. Either U.S. law or Canadian law could be plausible to apply in this case depending on the detailed circumstances and the legal issue that is disputed.	I said this in a comment, but I'll put it in an answer. When France forcibly confines an American, the United States is entitled to ask France, "what the hell do you think you're doing, trying to confine our citizen in your country?" There are really just six basic answers that the United States will accept, and nothing in this scenario is specific to France or the US (it applies any time a foreign national is arrested by any country), and the six responses are the six basic principles of jurisdiction: Active nationality: "He's our citizen too! What the hell do you think you're doing, questioning how we treat our own citizens?" The US doesn't generally get to question how France treats French citizens, even if they're also American citizens. And France gets to require its citizens to obey French law anywhere in the world. Subjective territoriality: "He broke our laws on our soil. We don't care that he's your citizen, he has to obey our laws while he's here." This and nationality are by far the most well-accepted answers. Protective: "He threatened our state. We have the right to protect ourselves." This applies to things like attacking French government personnel or forging a French passport or similar: France isn't protecting its citizens, it's protecting France itself. Objective territoriality: "He may have committed this crime outside France, but its effects happened inside France. We can punish him for causing those effects." For instance, if you're in the US but hack a computer in France, France has an argument that they get to punish you for that. Passive nationality: "He may be American and have done this outside France, but he hurt our citizens. We have the right to protect our citizens." Again, a plausible argument. This is not necessarily a strong argument, but it can be made. Universality: "This thing is a crime against all of humanity. It's something that needs to be stamped out by all countries working together, without worrying too much about whether or not the defendant actually affected the country prosecuting him in any way." This is very rare. Murder is not a crime of universal jurisdiction. It's limited to more severe crimes, as well as crimes of a fundamentally international nature. So piracy is on the list, as is plane hijacking, as is genocide. Killing an ambassador is on the list: you're a threat to international order. But normal murder? Not even close. It's not a crime with international implications, and it's not a crime which is so fundamentally horrific that it needs to be ended by any means necessary. The death penalty has never been considered to be that fundamentally horrific, and likely never will be, particularly when (as in the US) it is limited to people who have committed something that is an extremely serious crime in any country (i.e. murder). The only way France could make a remotely plausible argument that it gets to punish American executioners is if they're dual citizens or if they executed a French citizen. Then France can't arrest the executioner because US is a sovereign state and gets to impose its own penal laws. But normally? France couldn't arrest them even if it wasn't for the fact that they're executing US government policy, because Americans in America don't generally have to obey French laws.	"Checking someone's digital footprint" could be stalking, depending on the circumstances. The better question to ask is about the legality of a certain action, and not the specific name used in a jurisdiction (although indeed in Washington there is a defined crime of "stalking"). I don't know what you mean by "checking someone's digital footprint", and it is not defined by law. Looking at RCW 9a.46.110, we can first discern that it does not matter for the definition of the crime where these people live or where the robbery took place. If two people from Alberta travel to Alaska and harass or murder a person from Texas, Washington law does not enter into the equation. The crime that you're asking about is the snooping, so for Washington to have jurisdiction, the snooping has to be "in" Washington. That does not mean that both parties have to be in Washington – there can be complex jurisdictional laws if the accused is in another state or country. The accused can easily be prosecuted in his own state, he can also be prosecuted in a foreign country, if he is caught there or if he is extradited to that country. For the act to be stalking, the first element is that "He or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses or repeatedly follows another person; and...". Harassment is defined in that section as a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or when the course of conduct would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of his or her child. Since there was no communication between the parties, there is no harassment in the legal sense. There is no "following" either, therefore the act fails to constitute stalking w.r.t the first elements. Since the crime is defined by a conjunction of elements and your scenario fails on the first conjunct, it is not "stalking" (it is also not "harassment" as defined in RCW 9A.46.020, 9A.46.060.
Does any amendment in the bill of rights take priority over any other? As far as I know, unless a contract/compact states otherwise, or a provision was added at a different point of time, every provision in the contract carries the same priority. The bill of rights was added to the constitution all at once and so each amendment carries the same priority and so when there is a conflict least restrictive means has to be applied.	Sometimes rights conflict with each other, and the courts decide which right takes priority. The Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant is entitled to "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor". The Fifth Amendment says "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". And the First Amendment gives the right to free speech, which includes the right to not be compelled to speak. If you're on trial and try to get someone else to confess on the stand, his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination trumps your Sixth Amendment right to have him testify. But if he couldn't take the fifth (for example, if he had already been acquitted), your Sixth Amendment right would override his First Amendment right to free speech.	No, under US law, it is an "executive agreement", not a "treaty". The vast majority of US's international agreements are done as executive agreements, and not treaties; and the power of the executive branch to make executive agreements has been repeatedly upheld in the courts. Specifically, there are two types of executive agreements: "Congressional-executive agreements". These are the ones that require changes to legislation to be implemented. Congress passes the needed legislation just like any other normal legislation, i.e. a majority of both houses of Congress. Most trade agreements are passed as congressional-executive agreements. "Sole executive agreements". These are the ones that do not require changes to legislation to be implemented. Congress is not involved at all. This Iran nuclear agreement is a "sole executive agreement" because it does not require Congressional action to be implemented. (So it doesn't need to be passed by a simple majority by Congress.) The President already has the legal authority to implement all of the US's obligations under the agreement, which are the relief of certain Iran sanctions. Some of those sanctions were implemented by the President, and which the President can remove by himself. Some of these sanctions were implemented by Acts of Congress, but those Acts specifically give the President the authority to waive them. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (the "Corker bill"), passed by Congress in May 2015, also confirms that "It is the sense of Congress that: [...] this Act does not require a vote by Congress for the agreement to commence;" As to your question about whether something can "have the effect of a treaty if it's passed by a simple majority". The answer is yes (in the other way around). The Supreme Court ruled in the Head Money Cases that "treaties" (ratified by 2/3 of the Senate as specified in Article II) have the same legal effect in US law as regular legislation passed by Congress (by a simple majority of both houses), which means that Congress can modify or repeal (insofar as US law is concerned) any "treaty" that is ratified by the Senate, by passing a later law that contradicts it, just like it can with regular legislation. So, yes, any regular legislation passed by a simple majority (including for congressional-executive agreements) has the same legal effect as treaties.	No state can amend the US Constitution by itself. Technically, an amendment to the Constitution can be proposed a constitutional convention that is called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures (though this is has never happened; all 27 amendments have been proposed by the Federal Congress, which is the alternative path). This can be done without any kind of Federal approval what so ever. After proposal, an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures. EDIT: Regarding how to "get a convention started": This hasn't been tested, since a non-Congressional amendment has not, to my knowledge, been attempted, but I would imagine a Convention would be called if 2/3rds of the states submitted requests to Congress (which would probably either be a law or a joint-resolution, which is like a law without executive approval, but the form would probably be governed by each state's respective Constitution). Alternatively, it may be sufficient for state legislatures to designate delegates who meet up somewhere (as that is essentially what happened with the Constitutional Congress, i.e. the delegates who met and drafted the US Federal Constitution). A point has been raised in another answer that there may be an issue; however, I'm not convinced of this being a bar to a Convention. The delegates at the Constitutional Congress were original chosen to discuss changes to the Articles of Confederation, but wound up throwing the whole thing out and starting from scratch instead. Therefore, I do not see calls for a convention with differing but related objectives to be a problem; the whole point of a Convention in the Constitutional Amendment process is to discuss and compromise; otherwise, why require it before skipping to the 3/4ths of states ratifying, if the 2/3rds of states already have to agree on exactly what is being proposed before sending delegates.	The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in.	Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.	Generally speaking the "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble to the US Constitution is not relied on for anything. It does not grant additional power to Congress or the Federal government as a whole, neither does it restrict the Federal government beyond the restrictions already included in the body of the Constitution. Congress often accepts hearsay when it takes testimony before a committee. Such testimony need not comply with the rules of evidence that apply in court. I am not clear what you mean by "to pretext privacy and the right to try", please clarify this. I am not aware of any "right to try" under the Federal or State governments. The word "pretext" is not usually used as a verb in this way. Edit The link on "right to try" goes to a Quora question about laws passed by Congress later being held to be unconstitutional. That does happen. but I have never herd it called "the right to try". The link on "pretext" goes to a security.se question about a "convict internet". I don't see what that has to to with the preamble to the Constitution. 2nd Edit The "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble has nothing to do with laws against discrimination, neither authorizing nor restricting such laws.	US Constitutional law generally recognizes the right of freedom of movement, e.g. in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168. The more recent case Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 affirms the position that restricting the "right to travel violates the Equal Protection Clause absent a compelling governmental interest", and one of the specific rights subsumed under the right to travel is "the right to enter and leave another State". The "compelling governmental interest" is a reference to standard of judicial review known as strict scrutiny, where a law that restricts a fundamental right (the right to travel) is required for a "compelling state interest", is "narrowly tailored" to that purpose, and is the "least restrictive means". It is highly likely that each state has a statute that grants broad powers to the governor in case of a state of emergency. Such an order would then have to be scrutinized strictly, with respect to the narrow tailoring and least restrictive aspects of the question. We would then have to analyze the specifics of the case and order.	Before getting into the technical answer to this question it is worth noting that when matters of a constitutional nature are involved then in practice it is not just a matter of a technical "legal" answer. Students and academics like to pose hypothetical questions such as "What would happen if the Queen refused assent to a Bill?" or "If Parliament is supreme, could it abolish the courts?" etc. The practical reality is that a liberal democracy, such as ours, ultimately relies on those in positions of power to respect the democratic conventions and preserve the constitution. When there is a legal angle to some constitutional issue the courts will play their part but, whatever legal analysis their judgments may contain, they will always have in mind the importance of maintaining our democratic system. It is also worth noting that where an Act contains an "ouster" clause (saying that a certificate of X shall not be questioned in any court of law) the courts always find a way to interpret that so that it does not apply in any case where the courts think they should adjudicate! Those preliminaries out of the way, I think the technical legal answer to your question is that first of all the Speaker decides and provides a certificate under s.2(2). You will see that s.2(1) deals with "any other bill" (your third bullet point) and s.2(2) requires a certificate from the Speaker that "the provisions of this section have been duly complied with" (i.e. that it is indeed in the "any other bill" category). Of course there is a further question of whether, if the Speaker gets it wrong, the courts could intervene and exactly how that might happen (the so-called "John Bercow question" of what if a Speaker goes rogue), but the initial technical answer to you question is "the Speaker of the House of Commons".
Neighbors trampoline on my property We live in a community with small yards and restrictions on putting up fences in the yards. Recently, my neighbor assembled a trampoline and I'm sure it's a couple of feet on my property. I'm not worried about a few square feet of yard, since our kids play together all the time, but I am worried that I may be liable for damages if one of our other neighbor kids was hurt on said trampoline. This is in Illinois, USA. I know trampolines are red-flags, and would not have one in my yard, but since it's obvious who's trampoline it is, how much risk am I assuming with this situation? EDIT: So technically the lots are organized under a "condo" association, and we most definitely have a HOA. Tramps are not addressed since they would not be considered "permanent" fixtures. My swing and slide playscape did need to be approved. No biggie. Also, Insurance company informed me that I am not at risk in the current state of things. If it was all on my property or was operated as "my trampoline" it would be a different matter. ( I do intend to get that in writing :) )	Check out this article on "Attractive Nuisances" http://realestate.findlaw.com/owning-a-home/dangers-to-children-attractive-nuisances.html Here are some of the general requirements of something being an "Attractive Nuisance" A potentially dangerous condition exists on the property The landowner created or maintained the potential hazard (this one is important since you did not create nor maintain the potential hazard) The landowner should have known the condition would attract children The landowner should have known the condition could harm children Generally, a landowner is not going to be held liable for the injuries of a undiscovered trespasser. Consider that word undiscovered. (aka, the landowner doesn't know someone is sneaking in and using the trampoline) However, if a landowner knows that trespassers have been on his/her land, then these persons are discovered trespassers to whom the landowner owes "the duty of ordinary care to warn of danger." What all this means? Anyone can always be sued for anything. If the kid jumps badly, lands on your property, gets hurt, they might have a case or the judge might see it your way. Perhaps consider the laws of "Attractive Nuisances" and "Discovered Trespassers". To note: A lot of people might say that you can't be held liable for something like this, but that is slightly false. As a property owner you CAN be held liable for anything that happens on your property. Including someone trespassing onto your property without your permission, even to commit crimes, and hurting themselves in the process. Many court cases have ruled in favor of the law-abiding landowner, but that's not to say there is a guarantee of this. The best thing to do is always minimize your risks.	Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.	I think that the language In consideration of permission to use, ... Recreational Sports Department ... arising from, but not limited to, participation in activities, classes, observation, and use of facilities, premises, or equipment. would be read as limiting the waiver to cases in some way connected with the RSF. Even so limited it is rather broad, and may not be enforceable. In particular public facilities are not always allowed to obtain a waiver of otherwise valid negligence claims. If it were interpreted to mean "all claims on any matter, even ones having nothing at all to do with the RSF" then I think it would be so broad as to be unenforceable as unconscionable, and as misleading, so that there was no meeting of minds.	Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.	Charlie is not a party to the contract between Alice and Bob Alice and Charlie have no contractural relationship and Alice cannot require him to do anything nor is he liable to Alice in any way. Alice’s issue is with Bob who has clearly breached his contract. Alice can sue Bob for damages and may be able to end the lease. There is no trespass because Charlie is there with the permission of the leaseholder. From Charlie’s position there is no reason to believe that Bob does not have the authority to give this permission so Charlie is not in breach of the law. The police will see this as a civil matter and won’t intervene.	we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.	There are a number of rules related to trespassing vegetation, reviewed in Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355. Virginia law was set in Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519, that encroaching trees and plants are not nuisances merely because they cast shade, drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or just because they happen to encroach upon adjoining property either above or below the ground. However, encroaching trees and plants may be regarded as a nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual harm to adjoining property. If so, the owner of the tree or plant may be held responsible for harm caused to [adjoining property], and may also be required to cut back the encroaching branches or roots, assuming the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance. so under the circumstances, you can't make him do anything. However, the court continues that the adjoining landowner may, at his own expense, cut away the encroaching vegetation to the property line whether or not the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance or is otherwise causing harm or possible harm to the adjoining property. You are, however, responsible for damage to the tree caused by such trimming, and you can't trespass onto his property to trim it (fences are often an approximation of property lines)	Does the town have any responsibility towards the direct and indirect damage done to these properties? What can be done to hold the town responsible for potentially lost property value, and direct property damage? Most claims are barred by some sort of governmental immunity and also face strict procedural hurdles, but it isn't impossible that the defectively installed storm drains could give rise to some liability for property damage if the suit were brought swiftly in the proper manner. Also, even if there is liability this will almost certainly not extend to lost property value, only to direct property damage, because while the direct property damage might be caused by something that the government has waived sovereign immunity for, the lost property value is almost entirely due to its discretionary regulatory decisions about land use and whether it should provide storm drainage at all. There are several potential theories of municipal liability that need to be considered. One is that the township has liability because it approved development that foreseeably caused this problem. This claim is probably without merit although there might be a claim against the homeowners who inadequately drained their properties in a way that impacted their neighbors. This is because land use regulation is a discretionary governmental action. A second is that the township has liability because it had a duty to an individual property own to provide adequate storm drainage and failed to do so. This claim is probably also without merit. This is also a discretionary governmental action and even if it was not, would not meet New York State's "special relationship" test set forth below. A third theory is that the township has liability because once it undertook to install storm drains the workmanship of the storm drains that it installed fell below the standard of reasonable care in workmanship that applies to all construction work that foreseeable causes injuries to persons or property. This is a much closer call and might prevail, although it would still be subject to the strict procedural limitations of the New York Court of Claims Act including a 90 day statute of limitations under Section 10(3) of the Act and a notice requirement. There would also be no right to a jury trial in the case. Once the storm drain is actually built, there is arguably a non-discretionary duty to build it in a workman-like manner and the location of the particular defective drain may trigger New York's "special relationship" test. Also, it might be possible to sue the private contractor that defectively installed the storm drain for the township. As explained in a July 8, 2014 article written by a lawyer in the New York City law department which is more or less identical in its sovereign immunity status to a New York State township: When municipalities are sued in tort, two of the most powerful bars to recovery are the public duty principle and the governmental function immunity defense. When these two principles are applicable, the City will not be made to pay compensation even if a City employee had been negligent and caused an injury. . . . An injured person alleging an injury caused by the City’s failure to perform a public duty cannot recover unless the injured person alleges and establishes, as an element of his or her claim, a special relationship by which the City assumed a specific duty with respect to the injured person. . . . the plaintiff, to present a prima facie case for recovery, must first successfully establish a special duty. If the plaintiff cannot get past the special duty hurdle, there is no need for the court to address the applicability of the governmental function immunity defense, which provides absolute immunity for discretionary determinations where discretion has been exercised. The often-repeated policy reason for limiting governmental tort liability is that government would not be financially viable if it were made the insurer of the safety of the public for injuries caused principally by third parties. Governmental entities could have a disincentive from providing important governmental services if they knew that doing so could seriously jeopardize the public treasury. The courts do not limit recovery, however, when a municipality acts in a proprietary capacity — when its activities essentially substituted for or supplemented those undertaken by a private enterprise, such as property ownership, operation of a motor vehicle, or providing hospital services. When a municipality acted in its governmental capacity, sovereign immunity historically protected the municipality against tort recovery by injured persons. That absolute protection against tort recovery lasted in New York until the State Legislature, in 1929, waived New York State’s sovereign immunity as part of the Court of Claims Act. Although the waiver by the State Legislature only mentioned the State of New York, the Court of Appeals in 1945, in Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361 (1945), interpreted the waiver to apply as well to municipal entities like New York City. But as the Court of Appeals subsequently held, the waiver did not eliminate all governmental immunities or other bars to governmental liability. In the years since 1945, courts wrestled with sorting out when liability was appropriate and when it was not. For example, courts generally refused to hold municipal governments liable for failing to prevent fires or crime. Municipal governments undertake all sorts of public duties like police protection, fire protection, child protection, education, building inspections, and the like. Were a municipality liable every time a crime was committed that governmental actors had failed to prevent, or an inspector made a mistake, or a student was not sufficiently educated, it would be under a crushing financial burden that could result in bankruptcy. At the same time, courts created exceptions that allowed negligence claims to proceed even where municipalities performed quintessential governmental functions. Special duty was one such exception. Another exception allowed for liability where the governmental action was ministerial rather than discretionary. . . . In October 2011 the Court of Appeals [*ed. the highest court in the state of New York called a state supreme court in most other states] in Valdez v. City, 18 N.Y.3d 69 (2011) clarified 70 years of jurisprudence and articulated an analysis to be applied when considering whether an individual may sue a municipal government for negligent performance of, or failure to perform, governmental functions. The decision in Valdez must now be the starting point in analyzing liability in any negligence tort suit against the government or governmental actors. First, the Court of Appeals confirmed the basic tenet that although sovereign immunity was waived in the Court of Claims Act, tort liability will generally not attach to governmental entities or government employees performing governmental functions, regardless of whether the function is discretionary or ministerial. Where statutory or regulatory mandates require a government to act for the benefit of the public as a whole, the government and its actors cannot be sued for failing to provide or negligently providing such services. The Court articulated this principle as the “public duty” rule, not as “immunity.” In order to overcome the public duty bar, an individual as a threshold issue must show that there existed a special duty running in favor of the claimant as an individual. The Valdez Court held that for a litigant to proceed successfully with a tort suit against a municipality, a plaintiff must first plead a “special duty” running specifically to him or her. A special duty can be formed when a municipality or its employee: • violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; • assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant, and dangerous safety violation; or • voluntarily assumes a duty that generated justifiable reliance by the person through the employee’s actions or promises to the person. The Valdez Court also held that whether the facts are legally sufficient to establish a special duty is an objective question of law for the court. The Court of Appeals made clear, therefore, that special duty is neither an exception to immunity nor a defense, but instead is an initial and essential element of any tort claim against the government and governmental actors. The Court of Appeals also made clear that, even if a plaintiff succeeds in articulating a viable special duty, tort liability may still be barred by the “governmental function immunity defense.” Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 75-76. That defense shields governmental entities from liability for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions. This discretionary defense is qualified in that the municipality must establish that the governmental action related to the incident was both a discretionary one and that discretion was, in fact, exercised. A government employee’s failure to perform a ministerial action, on the other hand, may subject the government to liability if a special duty has been established. In late 2012 and mid-2013, the Court of Appeals issued two additional opinions which reconfirmed Valdez’s analysis of when the government may be sued in tort. In Metz v. State, 20 N.Y.3d 175 (2012), twenty people were killed and many others injured when a tour boat on Lake George capsized. Plaintiffs claimed that State inspectors had negligently inspected the vessel and had failed to exercise any discretion in fixing the number of passengers who could safely travel on the tour boat. They argued, therefore, that the State was not entitled to immunity for their actions. The Appellate Division, Third Department, ruled that the inspection function was governmental and found that plaintiffs had failed to establish a special duty. However, the Third Department went on to find a viable claim against the State because the State could not demonstrate that it exercised discretion in certifying the vessel as seaworthy. The Court of Appeals reversed and rejected the Third Department’s analysis. The Court, relying on Valdez, ruled that, since inspections are a governmental function, the Appellate Division’s analysis should have ended with the finding that plaintiffs had not established a special duty. Insofar as the plaintiffs did not and could not articulate a special duty, no liability could be imposed against the State and the nature of the governmental conduct – discretionary or ministerial – was not relevant. There was no reason to address the immunity defense since the plaintiff had not established the initial requirement of a special duty. In Applewhite v. City, 21 N.Y.3d 420 (2013), plaintiff, a 12-year-old child living at home and cared for by a private nurse, went into cardiac arrest after being administered certain medications. The plaintiff’s mother called 911 and an ambulance arrived within minutes. The plaintiff child and mother sued the nurse and the City, claiming that the child suffered severe brain damage as a result of negligent treatment at the scene. Plaintiffs argued that, although maintaining the 911 system and ambulance services are governmental functions, once the EMTs cross the threshold and tend to the patient, the function becomes a proprietary one. The City responded that the function continues as a governmental one and that no special duty was created. The Court of Appeals agreed with the City’s argument that the emergency rescue function is a governmental police protection function both before and after the emergency medical personnel arrived. Because these were governmental and public duties, the plaintiffs needed to articulate a special duty in order to state a viable tort claim. The Court then ruled that there existed a question of fact as to whether the City assumed a special duty under the unique circumstances of the case and remanded the case for trial. For litigants against the City, step one in developing a claim is to distinguish the City’s proprietary activities from the governmental. If proprietary, then there generally is no issue of a public duty bar and the claim may proceed. If the activity is governmental, however, the public duty bar must first be overcome. As an element of the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff must allege and establish the existence of a special duty. Assuming a plaintiff successfully overcomes the special duty hurdle, the government will still not be liable if the challenged conduct was discretionary and it exercised discretion. If plaintiff overcomes the public duty principle and the immunity bar, the plaintiff’s tort claim may then proceed.
What level of knowledge about Law should every person have? And how to get that knowledge (either free or paid)? As we go through the education system, we all learn a little bit of literature, history, biology, chemistry, physics, and mathematics. In my experience, I have not come across any education about law, not even the basics. We would all agree that every person should be taught the basics of mathematics or they would be at a significant disadvantage in society. Similarly, there has to be basic knowledge about the law that every individual should know or they would be at a significant disadvantage in society. For those of you who have studied law, what would you say is the bare minimum amount of knowledge about the law that every person in society should have in order to feel comfortable and also to prevent others from taking advantage of them (or perceive they are taken advantage of)? What are some resources available for ordinary individuals who want to acquire that basic understanding of the law without getting a full degree in law? Please provide any books, courses, articles that could be used for this self-study.	A lot, but let's be practical. Or nothing, depending on how it is taught. I experienced the joy of obligatory 4th grade Spanish instruction, where there were virtually no Spanish-speaking teachers (they relied on a edu-tv show): it was not at all effective and didn't last a year. Teacher training on the subject matter is a big problem: so it should be taught like chemistry or high school health, and not mathematics or literature (focused class taught by an expert, for juniors or seniors). There used to be "high school civics" which taught a little bit of this, but primarily focused on politics and not the consequences of politics. Before constructing a curriculum, you need a goal (well-articulated and reasoned, not just an emotional position like "it would be good to know this"). History and literature are more on the side of "that's what it means to be educated", whereas mathematics and grouse-trapping is more on the side of "survival basics". Elementary legal education is more on the side of survival skills, which means, given a choice of an hour on voir dire versus an hour on 4th Amendment search and seizure, the hour should be spent on search and seizure. Although it is a bit abstract, elementary jurisprudence is one of those mixed survival-skill + abstract fundamentals that is so important that everybody should understand (some of) it. The reason is that it goes to the question "what is the law?". Most people believe incorrectly that "the law" is only that which was passed by Congress / the legislature, and there is very little appreciation for the necessity of interpreting the words of the law-givers. The concrete target of elementary jurisprudential education should be an understanding of why we have appellate courts. Contract-reading would be rather high on the list of priorities, at least as long as attorneys are allowed to charge for their services and free legal advice is not deemed to be a fundamental constitutional entitlement. It is easy to say "you should have your attorney read that contract", but very few people do. The goal is to improve people's ability to understand the consequence of contracts so that they don't mindlessly agree to everything, given the reality that people are not going to take all of their contracts to a lawyer and ask if it's okay to sign. Every citizen should know when they are in over their heads and should hire a lawyer. Also high on the list would be a solid understanding of "my rights as a citizen". People tend to intuit what the law is in terms of their feelings about "my rights", so if you feel that you have a right to barbecue a hamburger, then you will tend to think that it is legal to do so. It is therefore very important that every citizen have a solid understanding of what "your rights" are, and ways in which your feelings can be mistaken. Basic education on the Commerce Clause (and state relatives) is very important, given that the Commerce Clause is a major source of counterexamples to people's intuitions about their rights.	Early in the history of the US, various states passed laws adopting the then extant common law and at least some of the statutory law of Great Britain (much of which was in origin the Law of England) as law in those states. Such laws would still be valid, unless later acts had amended or replaced particular provisions. Tracing which provisions had since been altered would be a massive task. Basic common law, particularly definitions of crimes such as fraud, theft, murder, and of torts such as conversion, slander, libel, and the like will probably be largely unchanged, with some modifications. Blackstone's Commentaries remained a significant legal text used in training lawyers and in legal practice in the US through much of the nineteenth century.	Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine.	I'll answer out of order for a more logical presentation. Why would lawyers "leave the practice altogether", "[b]efore these lawyers lower their prices further they will"? Only about 30% of people earn a four year college degree. A lawyer is a college graduate who had to be in roughly the top 50% of his or her undergraduate class to be admitted to law school, so that puts him or her in the top 15% of academic ability. To actually finish law school and pass the bar exam, a lawyer has to be in roughly the top 12% of academic ability compared to the general public. Lawyers have strong reading and writing skills, reasonable communication skills, understand complex business and family matters, and are reasonably well organized compared to members of the general population. They also come with background checks completed in advance to weed out risks of criminal or otherwise dishonest or high risk employees. These are highly transferrable skill sets and a J.D. is a good substitute for an M.B.A. in many positions. Newly minted lawyers who choose to work in business management or a kindred field can typically secure middle management jobs in business and finance without much difficulty assuming that they weren't disbarred or had their licenses suspended for dishonorable reasons, or in a field related to their undergraduate major in college. So, if a lawyer can't earn a minimum compensation as a lawyer that rivals what the lawyer could earn in middle management, the lawyer will leave law and work in a non-legal post. Many lawyers do just that. And, indeed, since grant based financial aid is very rare for law school, most newly minted lawyers who aren't independently wealthy have huge student loan debts ($200,000 at the completion of an undergraduate degree and law school wouldn't be unusual), so if they want to avoid a default or an extremely long repayment period for a debt that can't be discharged in bankruptcy, they aren't free to accept a very low income even if they are willing to live modestly. The floor of what a lawyer can make in terms of compensation before having to seek better paying non-legal work is on the order of $40,000 to $60,000 of net compensation before taxes per year depending upon the local cost of living. In the long run, average legal incomes need to be even higher, because if too many people end up earning only marginal compensation, more potential lawyers will choose other career paths (e.g. as loan officers at banks, in insurance sales, in real estate brokerage work, as small business owners, as middle managers in big businesses, as H.R. officers, as financial analysts, as management consultants, etc.) which provide greater or similar returns with less student loan debt, fewer years of education, and less risk. Why can't fees be lowered "enough on individualized, bespoke services to meet the unmet need at an aﬀordable price"? Lawyers have bills to pay - a fully furnished and equipped office, at least a part-time per lawyer staff person, suits and dry cleaning, bar dues, and compensation for themselves (the floor on which was discussed above). But, providing "individualized, bespoke services", rather than mass producing services with a paralegal heavy practice (the way most debtor oriented consumer bankruptcy shops run, and the way prosecutor's offices and public defender's offices run), then it takes a lot of hours to provide those services. (The average prosecutors office has expenses of about $50 per felony case or less, not including law enforcement efforts to gather evidence and put the facts together coherently, and public defenders have even lower expenses per average felony case, perhaps $35 or less.) Even the most basic legal services (e.g. writing a simple will, defending a simple residential eviction or collection case or a DUI) takes 4-8 hours of lawyer time to accomplish, and you can't spend 100% of your time providing legal services either, as you have to devote some time to marketing, evaluating potential clients, supervising bookkeeping and administrative tasks, continuing education, etc. So, at most, a lawyer can handle at most about 200 very simple cases a year, or fewer cases that have any sophistication, and sometimes people don't pay their bills or don't pay on time. A 10%-25% bad debt rate would be pretty typical in small firm practice. Realistically, each lawyer needs about $90,000+ of gross collected revenues to cover expenses and make a floor compensation amount. So, a lawyer has to collect at least $500 to make a very modest living and just barely get by on a typical very small case provided at an extreme discount. A lawyer needs more like double that amount of gross revenues per very small case to make a decent living, and that all assumes that marketing efforts can reach enough people to keep the lawyer busy. If a lawyer's marketing or AR collection rates fall, fee collections per case have to rise. The trouble is that lots of people can't afford to pay a lawyer $500 to $1,000. This isn't affordable to them. Keep in mind that 40% of Americans don't have the ability to pay an unexpected $400 expense, and that the percentage is much higher in a place like Alabama or West Virginia. A $500-$1000 legal fee expense for even a very simple matter is something that most people with "unmet legal needs" simply cannot afford to pay no matter how badly they need those services. These are the people with "unmet legal needs", and the cases they face are often cases like defenses of criminal charges likely to result in some sort of conviction, or no asset bankruptcies, or defenses of foreclosure or eviction or collection cases, non-employment related immigration cases, or child custody cases, or defense child support collection actions, in which case there is no significant pot of money from which fees can be paid, even if a lawyer's client wins. (In cases where there is a significant potential "pot of money" like money owed for work done or a personal injury case, legal needs usually are met.) Also, while lots of Americans can't afford even a $400 legal bill, there is a pretty significant group of businesses and upper middle class and wealthy individuals who can afford to pay tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars per legal matter, and for whom a lawyer can provide value added to the client even at that price. For example, businesses and landlords that need commercial leases to be negotiated, documentation of and negotiation of multi-million dollar business financing deals, tax planning for a complex conglomerate, personal injury litigation in cases with clear liability and serious injuries, business disputes, representation of clients in connection with the bankruptcies of medium and large businesses, employment litigation, white collar crime defense, etc. This kind of work requires a lawyer's marketing effort to be much more modest and dramatically reduces the time spent evaluating new cases. A lawyer may need only five or ten cases like that per year instead of 200 small potatoes cases, while earning much better compensation. So, the legal needs of those who can afford to pay are met, and the legal needs of people who can't afford to pay lawyers at any fee that a lawyer can break even at (realistically closer to $125-$175 per billable hour after bad debt and time generating work and idle time until new clients are secured is considered), and who don't have economic circumstances from which legal fees can be extracted in their cases, go unmet. Until such time as legal work can be provided with fewer attorney hours, or by someone who has less well paying alternatives to practicing law, and with less expensive educations, it will remain this way indefinitely without some sort of subsidy or insurance coverage. Also, keep in mind that practicing law provides an irregular income in small firm practice due to irregular payment timing and ebbs and flows of new clients, so to keep to any reasonable set of fixed living and overhead costs paid, a lawyer must have months that generate much more than the lawyer's "monthly nut" in order to generate savings for lean months. Finally, a lot of the very low paid lawyers are retirees, part-time employees who are also homemakers, are people moonlighting as lawyers in addition to another job, or are charitably inclined independently wealthy people. So, they have additional sources of income and aren't supporting themselves from full time work as lawyers. These are the only people who can afford to work as lawyers for lower amounts of income per year. But, even then, independently wealthy people normally have the best access through social and family networks to people who have an ability to pay them to work on high dollar matters, so they normally end up in high paying jobs where their "rain making" capacity is part of why they are paid so well, rather than giving their services away on a charitable basis. Observation An important corollary of this analysis is that the problem of unmet legal need cannot be solved simply by producing more lawyers, because if you produce more lawyers and all legal need capable of paying for the work is met, the new lawyers will simply pursue non-legal careers.	Laws update, collectively, very frequently. Laws are embodied in statutes, regulations, and court rulings, statutes being the most stable of the three. In terms of what an individual lawyer would do, the most important is to focus on the relevant and ignore the irrelevant. If you mostly write wills and trusts, that defines a subset of issues that are important to you; if you are a tax attorney, that is another subset. If you ask a contract attorney about some highly speculative matter of constitutional law, the answer will most likely be "That's outside my area of specialization". The concepts of "subscribe" and "free" are mostly antithetical. If you want the really good stuff, you can subscribe to Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. If you want the really free stuff (as generally seen here), the simplest solution is to use Google which may direct you to Findlaw, Justia, Cornell, Avvo or Law SE (unabashed plug). New is not necessarily better, and frankly, new statutes are the least informative, because legislatures often say things that are less than clear on the face of it, and will need to await either administrative creation of a regulation that spells out what the law means, or a court ruling that does the same thing – maybe 10 years after the law was passed.	Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.	My lawyer answers my question, thinking he is giving legal advice to a non-client when he is actually answering a client's question. But if you read the FAQ, posts at law.stachexchange are not legal advice. In fact, questions that are so specific as to risk becoming a request for legal advice are routinely closed. But let's go further: The issue at hand is not the one your lawyer is hired to help you with. He is not your lawyer for that issue. Even if we considered the relationship through law.stackexchange legal representation, the conversation would not be privileged. You are posting in a public forum, and expecting reply in the same way. You are free to waive the privilege of communication with your lawyer, and you are doing that by using this way of communicating with him. At this point, the only thing your lawyer would have done would be voluntarily giving for free some info that he could have billed you for. What exactly would be the issue here? It is exactly what pro bono is for. The only way to breach confidentiality would be if your lawyer were to convey things that you said to him confidentially to the public, but here it would not be relevant if the OPs author were already his customer or not.	This is a US-law answer. The Constitution protects various rights of individuals, and in general, there is no abrogation of your rights if you receive a benefit from government. Your presumption that taxpayers fully fund researchers and materials is incorrect, in the US, although there are some researchers whose salaries are entirely paid by taxes. So as a matter of basic law, a person is entitled to intellectual property that they create, regardless of how they interact with the taxing structure. US law has a concept of "work for hire", whereby if I am hired by Podunk U to write a book, the book may be the property of Podunk U and not me the author. Usually, publicly supported institutions have policies that reign in the tendency of universities to lay claim to the research output of their faculty (but not staff) in terms of copyright, but not patents. In principle, a publicly supported university could hold that faculty are hired to write books and therefore any book that they write is a work for hire. This is not done for mostly political reasons. There are various employer-mandated obligations on university employees to make works "open access", but it would take an act of Congress to make this a uniform legal requirement for, e.g., "anyone working for a company who in some manner receives funding from the federal government". There is no such law in the US. Incidentally, this liberty extends to other domains, such as food, because all food is in some way touched by federal money. The explanation for why the law is what it is is entirely political, that in the US, the concept of private property is recognized and protected by law, and there is no law allowing the arbitrary taking of private property. The law can be changed (it may take some constitutional amendments). You could follow this up on Politics SE to ask, what would be the most-acceptable abrogation of property rights in the US which had the effect that "if you receive direct or indirect tax support, you lose your property rights" (probably too broad for SE, but that's the underlying political issue). If you want a model of what such a law might look like, you can start with the US law regarding patents and federal assistance. There are many specifics which would have to be re-written to get the situation where a person benefitting from government funding must turn over their copyright to government. First you would have to pin down what it means to benefit from taxpayer support. The usual way this is done is in terms of being a party to a funding contract between a government agency and an employer. This has no direct effect on authors (who 99.99% of the time do not contract with the government), so the law would also have to require parties to government funding contracts to impose contractual restrictions on any individuals vaguely receiving a benefit from such funding, so that those who benefit from a funding contract must assign copyright to the government. The set of people who benefit indirectly from grants is vastly larger than the set of people who receive dollar amounts from grants, so the law needs to be specific (do students who learn from teachers supported by a grant therefore themselves benefit from tax dollars). This is a major infringement on the property rights of individuals, so such a law would be challenged in court and subject to strict scrutiny. It is unlikely that the case can be made that turning over copyright to the government is a compelling government interest; however the interest is stated, it would have to be the least restrictive and most narrowly tailored means of accomplishing that end.
Can males be held liable for child support for wife's child? Lets say a single male living in California were to get married to a woman who has an existing one year old child from her previous marriage. If in the future they were to get divorced, how much of a chance is there that he could be held liable for child support of that child?	According to http://info.legalzoom.com/divorce-am-responsible-kids-not-mine-20971.html Your stepchildren -- the biological kids, adopted children and stepchildren that your spouse acquired in another marriage or relationship before marrying you -- are usually not legally entitled to support from you after you divorce your spouse. However, if you signed a contract with your spouse agreeing to provide child support for a stepchild after a divorce, a court will likely compel you to honor the contract.	If I did punch him , would that be okay? No, that would be Assault and Battery. If you did him serious injury you could face a charge of Grievous Bodily Harm. If you killed him, that would be murder. If you are in the UK, Canada or Australia and you were charged with murder you could claim provocation in an attempt to have the charge reduced to Voluntary Manslaughter. If you were in the US you could attempt to argue "extreme emotional or mental distress" if you are in a state that has adopted the Model Penal Code for any of the charges; if successful your sentence would be reduced. I saw people punch one another over this in movies. And I saw aliens invading the Earth in the movies - what happens in the movies if not necessarily true. Kissing my wife is adultery right? No, extramarital sex is adultery. Notwithstanding, adultery is not illegal in common-law countries. I'm pissed and don't know what to do? I sympathise with you but this is not a legal question. Whatever is going on between you, your wife and your neighbour is a social situation; not a legal one.	You have pretty well enumerated when it is legal. On the face of it it appears that the 11 year old acted illegally. So, if he is not being prosecuted, why not? Age of criminal responsibility. Below a certain age (I don't know about Alabama but in NSW it is 12) a person cannot by law be held criminally responsible because they are deemed to lack the emotional and mental maturity to distinguish right from wrong; this is particularly relevant when the same action can be legal or illegal depending on rather nuanced circumstances. Public interest. A DA may consider that prosecution of this child in these circumstances is not in the public interest. Prospect of conviction. A sensible DA may decide that there is very little prospect that a jury will convict notwithstanding that there is adequate evidence to prove guilt. This is a subset of the public interest; it is in no one's interest to spend time and money on a trial that will probably end with an acquittal.	They retain sui juris after "divorce" or death of a spouse. A minor becomes sui juris upon marriage (civil marriage pursuant to Thai Civil and Commercial Code, article 1448). [Art. 20] The status of sui juris won't be revoked by divorce or death. This rule is not written in statutes but is interpreted in such manner. However, if a court judged that marriage is null and void (e.g. a valid marriage did not exist because of same-sex marriage, polygamy, consanguineous marriage etc.) and a spouse is aged under 20, his/her status of sui juris also become null and void.	in washington state can a divorce case last 32 months Yes. There is no limit to the possible duration of a divorce case, especially where at least one represented party has any money. This report showcases various instances of divorce proceedings that have lasted longer than the marriage itself because lawyers dragged the case for as long as they want. Being in Washington or New Jersey makes no difference. Your description, including the mention that your "helper" from the divorce packet babysat your kid, suggests that you have been scammed. If you want to get divorced, it is in your best interest to learn about divorce & procedural laws of your state and then take the helm of your proceedings. You did not specify the conditions of the divorce packet you purchased. It is therefore unclear whether the packet provider has any duty toward you in the direction of an attorney-client relation. That being said, your husband as the adversary in the proceedings has no obligation to inform you about proceedings if he already notified the person representing you in court.	This is a matter of state law, so the answer is not precisely the same in all jurisdictions. Many states have laws that prohibit child support orders from being modified retroactively. In those states, they can only be modified back to the date of the motion seeking to modify them. In the case of an adult child in college, where an agreement ends child support at a given date, simply not living in the home while in college or on vacations during college is not likely to be a valid basis for discontinuing child support or modifying it, because this was a circumstance that was foreseeable when the order was entered. The fact that a child has some support from others or from a part-time job does not necessarily discontinue the obligation.	Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.	This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know.
Could a high school teacher require their students to register to vote in New York? Suppose that I'm a social studies teacher in a high school in New York state. Odds are good that I'm teaching high school seniors about American history and politics. I want my students to get involved in the system that they're a part of. I tell my students that I will give them extra credit if they register to vote. My Questions Would giving this as an assignment be legal under New York state law? If it's not forbidden under state law, could it be forbidden by individual counties, towns, districts, or schools? Potential Complications Privacy. Some students might be fine with registering, but not with telling me. Citizenship. Some of my students might be undocumented, or might be on a foreign exchange. Age. I know you can register if you're going to be 18 before election day, but some of my students might just miss the cutoff. Assumptions and Facts It's a public school. I'd prefer to give out forms and have my students fill them out in class that day, but I could live without it. I know exactly as much about my student's age and citizenship as I'm legally allowed to know. It doesn't matter what offices are on the next ballot. It would be a small and optional assignment; you could get an A in the class without doing it. Giving out a grade for actually voting is beyond the scope of this question (and likely moot, since few people would be over 18 at the start of the academic year).	According to New York law ELN § 17-142: Except as allowed by law, any person who directly or indirectly, by himself or through any other person: 1. Pays, lends or contributes, or offers or promises to pay, lend or contribute any money or other valuable consideration to or for any voter, or to or for any other person, to induce such voter or other person to vote or refrain from voting at any election, or to induce any voter or other person to vote or refrain from voting at such election for any particular person or persons, or for or against any particular proposition submitted to voters, or to induce such voter to come to the polls or remain away from the polls at such election or to induce such voter or other person to place or cause to be placed or refrain from placing or causing to be placed his name upon a registration poll record or on account of such voter or other person having voted or refrained from voting for or against any particular person or for or against any proposition submitted to voters, or having come to the polls or remained away from the polls at such election, or having placed or caused to be placed or refrained from placing or causing to be placed his or any other name upon the registry of voters; ... is guilty of a felony. I think extra credit could be considered "valuable consideration".	Assuming, for purposes of argument, that such a change could be made by executive order, or indeed by legislation, rather than by amendment, yes, the change could and would have to have an effective date, and apply only to persons born after that date. Indeed that would still be true if such a change were made by constitutional amendment. Consider, people whose parents (or one of whose parents) are US citizens, but who are born outside of the US, are or may become citizens (by statute), but only if the citizen parent complies with certain rules specifying a minimum period of residence in the US, and other conditions. Those periods and conditions have changed over the years, and each such change had an effective date. If such a change could be made but could not be made with an effective date, then it would apply retroactively, and deprive people who are already citizens of their citizenship. There is no valid equal protection claim, because the same rules apply to both individuals, they merely give different results for the different birth dates. (See my answer to this question for why I do not think such a change would be valid except by Constitutional Amendment.) EDIT: I suppose such a changed interpretation, if made at all, might take the position that such births never did validly convey citizen ship, and all people whose parents were not validly in the country had never been citizens. That strikes me as even less likely to pass judicial review, but one cannot know what the Supreme Court will do when faced with a truly novel situation.	The exact procedure varies from one district to the next, but generally speaking, it is essentially by lottery. The procedure is typically spelled out in the court's local rules. Jump to page 105 of SDNY's local rules for an example. The lottery system is not entirely random, though. Frequently it is weighted to make it more likely that a case is assigned to a judge from the district's courthouse nearest to the parties, or to make it less likely to be assigned to the chief judge or a judge on senior status. There are then various other rules governing assignments of cases to new judges or visiting judges, but those typically don't happen when a case is originally filed.	In South Carolina for example the law says A permit holder must have his permit identification card in his possession whenever he carries a concealable weapon. When carrying a concealable weapon pursuant to Article 4, Chapter 31, Title 23, a permit holder must inform a law enforcement officer of the fact that he is a permit holder and present the permit identification card when an officer: (1) identifies himself as a law enforcement officer; and (2) requests identification or a driver’s license from a permit holder. In Washington, on the other hand, the law simply requires a permit (or the gun must be locked in the trunk), and you have no obilgation to volunteer such information. Some states allow local options, e.g. NY generally has no duty to inform law but apparently Buffalo, Rochester and NYC do. It's pretty complex, because there is variation in exactly what laws say depending on whether the gun is loaded, or whether it is concealed, or in the trunk.	Massachusetts is a 'two-party' state. So you'd have to have consent from them to record. You could probably travel to a 'one-party' state such as one of the states listed here and call them while recording. In a one-party state, only one of the parties to the conversation needs to know about the recording. In those states you don't even need to inform them. It would be interesting to see if the law applied to where the call center is located. When calling credit card companies these days, the call may be routed to any number of places depending on call loads, and those places might be out of country as well.	In an extreme hypothetical situation: at a meeting where there is a quorum present, there are 50 members qualified to vote in attendance. An issue comes up for a vote, and 45 people abstain, 3 vote yes, 2 vote no. Would this pass 3 to 2, or is there some overriding part of "majority present and voting" that I am just not understanding? The measure would pass 3-2. The words mean what they say. Quorum requirements prevent the small number of people voting from being unfair.	For federal trials, 28 USC 1865(b) states that the judge shall deem any person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries in the district court unless he (1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who has resided for a period of one year within the judicial district There are similar requirements in other states, for example in Washington, RCW 2.36.070 which includes being a citizen as a mandatory qualification. There are typically also age and residency requirement, requirements for competency in English, mental capacity also felon-exclusion provisions and charges-pending exclusions. The qualifications are jurisdiction-specific. Many people never serve on a jury, indeed many are never called to serve on a jury. There is no reliable count, but polling indicated that around 1/3 of adults have served on a jury.	I know of no specific provision of the Constitution that would forbid it. I know of no court case in which it has been found unconstitutional. There's no "irony" clause in the Constitution. Taxation without representation may have been a grievance, but there's no inherent reason why the framers would have had to forbid it. US citizens do still have the "freedom to expatriate" (and avoid taxation) if they renounce their citizenship. There are already other examples of "taxation without representation" in US law (e.g. District of Columbia), which also have not been found unconstitutional in court, as far as I know. In many cases, expatriates can still vote for federal offices, including Congress (e.g. in a state where they used to live, or where a parent used to live). See https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/registration-ballots. The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes" with few limitations. There is certainly no explicit exception for expatriates. As far as I can tell, it would be constitutional if Congress were to impose an income tax on everybody in the world, regardless of residency or citizenship; it would just be hard to enforce.
Can the US government be compelled to honor the NATO treaty? The North Atlantic Treaty (which establishes NATO) commits each member to mutual defence in case any member is attacked. The treaty has been ratified by the US, so it is legally binding. My question is, can the US government be legally forced to honor this? For example, if hypothetically a NATO country is attacked and the US refused to help (for some reason, e.g. it has an isolationist President or it doesn't want to escalate the conflict into a world war), can someone go to a US court and make it force the US government to do it? For example, the court might achieve this by making people in the government go to jail if or pay a lot of money they don't do it.	First, the practical answer is no: even if they ordered the President to go to war, the President can just refuse. The military is generally in the habit of listening to orders from the President, particularly if the question is "do we or do we not go to war;" the courts do not have the power to command the armed forces. They could try issuing an injunction instructing the military to go to war, but the injunction would be ignored. They could try holding people in contempt, but the President is in charge of almost all federal law enforcement (and can pardon criminal contempt), so that's not going to work. And even if the President could be punished for contempt, if he thinks intervening will result in the annihilation of the human race in a thermonuclear war, he will not issue the orders. But that's assuming the courts would even try to intervene. They wouldn't. Courts don't generally want to issue orders that they know will be ignored. In this case, the relief being sought (i.e. an order to do something) is a kind of relief that is up to the discretion of the court. So even if a court would be legally justified in issuing that order, they have an easy out. (For damages claims, Congress can just refuse to appropriate any money to satisfy them; no federal money can be spent unless Congress appropriates it). There's an even earlier out, though. Courts are not political branches of government; one of the basic rules of jurisprudence is that courts should not get involved in deciding something that's really up to the elected branches. Baker v. Carr had a list of factors to consider: a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Foreign relations in general is very often grounds for deference, as is military strategy. Courts are utterly unqualified to determine proper diplomatic or military actions to take, or to evaluate whether the President's actions were enough to meet the requirement of "do what's necessary to restore security;" foreign policy is a case where a country needs a unified face (because other countries aren't particularly willing to deal with US internal politics), and where the courts could easily screw up what the government is doing; and whether to send Americans to war is a question that is clearly a matter for those accountable to the people. So, federal courts cannot analyze this question to decide whether or not the government has done anything wrong; it's for the other two branches to decide.	The fact that an explosive device is improvised is irrelevant to any law of war with which I am familiar. "Legal in war" is more a matter of deciding which treaty, convention, or custom you care to respect.	The way "with intent to lose citizenship" works in US law is extremely demanding; it is very hard to establish it by doing anything short of appearing before a consular officer and formally renouncing citizenship. Other ways include serving in the military of a country at war with the US, being convicted of treason for committing one of the specified potentially expatriating acts (serving in an army at war with the US is sort of a trial-less special case of that, because engaging in a war against the US is treason), or serving in a "policy-level position" in a foreign government. The State Department says as much in the link. Obtaining citizenship is listed as a case where the administrative premise applies; so is swearing allegiance to a foreign state, serving in the military of a state at peace with the US, and serving in lower-level government posts of a foreign state. In those cases, the person retains US citizenship but at some point in the future may be asked by the State Department if they wanted to renounce it. Intent to renounce citizenship is established only by explicit declaration if you've only obtained citizenship in another country. With "policy-level posts" the premise doesn't apply, but then the State Department just decides on a case-by-case basis. You may well lose US citizenship (although the King of Thailand was born in the US, and I'm not sure if he's considered to have lost citizenship), but it's not automatic. Your senior ministers may lose citizenship, but it is likewise not automatic. But the normal citizens? The link explicitly says that the administrative premise covers that.	Could the US extradite the Russian Hackers who started the cyber attack against the US private sector and US government agencies and departments? No. The United States and Russia do not have an extradition treaty. See Russian Indictment and Extradition \| American Constitution Society. And within Russia, extradition is constitutionally prohibited; see Chapter 2. Rights and Freedoms of Man And Citizen \| The Constitution of the Russian Federation. Is there forced extradition? Maybe. Either country could use covert action or even start a war to "force" extradition, or use a form of covert or overt rendition to bring the individuals to a country to face trial.	The Antarctic Treaty does not nullify claims or prevent land ownership, and most of Antarctica is claimed by one of a handful of countries. However, these claims are not recognized by most countries. There are many entities that are not universally recognized, including the Republic of Somaliland which is recognized by no-one (January 2022). One should include declaration-only micronations such as Liberland. In other words, you can say whatever you want, declaration does not make it so. A new nation could, in principle, can be created as it was done in the case of East Timor and South Sudan, which underwent processes of self-determination. These were lands that had permanent populations, unlike Antarctica. Such a process of peaceful nation-creation would, without doubt, involve the intervention of the UN to determine if this new nation represented "the will of the (resident) people".	The use of the active duty military in a law enforcement role is not unconstitutional but it is prohibited by the posse comitatus act. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (adopted 1878). The text of the relevant legislation is as follows: 18 U.S.C. § 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Also notable is the following provision within Title 10 of the United States Code (which concerns generally the organization and regulation of the armed forces and Department of Defense): 10 U.S.C. § 375. Restriction on direct participation by military personnel The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law. The act does not apply to the National Guard mobilized at the request of a state governor. In practice, 10 U.S.C. § 375 has more bite because a federal prosecutor can and usually would refrain from prosecuting a crime ordered by his ultimate boss, the President, and there is not legal duty to prosecute every possible crime, but 10 U.S.C. § 375 creates an affirmative duty on the party of the Secretary of Defense that might be enforceable in a civil action.	Yes. A person may not be punished for action taken in good faith reliance upon assurances from an appropriate authority that he will not be punished for those actins as a matter of U.S. Constitutional law. See, e.g., U.S. v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).	The settlement was a politically motivated act to provide de facto disaster relief and express a moral apology in a cash that there is no plausible way that the U.S. would lose if it litigated the case on the merits. The articulated basis for making the payment would not survive a seriously argued dispositive motion from the United States government, either on behalf of the U.S. government itself, or against the federal law enforcement officials involved under Bivens. A complaint making such a claim would barely survive a motion for a Rule 11 sanction for making a frivolous claim if the government pushed the point, and then, only on the theory that it advanced a good faith argument for change in the law, not on the theory that it was supported by existing law. The Parkland case was considerably weaker than the Charleston shooter of 2015 case even, because Parkland involved a discretionary law enforcement decision, while Charleston arguably involved a non-discretionary administrative matter (although the government probably could have won that case as well).
If you purchase the keys to a room/house/building, do you have the legal right to enter? In a TV show, one of the characters buys a storage locker. In that storage locker are keys. Then he goes to the place that the keys open and lets himself in. My question is this: By purchasing the keys, are you also purchasing the right to enter the location? If no, what would you be charged with? Trespassing? If yes, why?	Purchasing a lot that contained the keys does not provide any rights to access the locks that those keys would open. What someone who did this would be charged with would vary by both location and also by prosecutorial discretion. The only exception in this scenario would be if the storage locker contained the deed to the property in question.	You may contact a towing company; they will ask who you are, and will politely inform you that since you aren't the property owner, they aren't authorized to take someone else's car that is trespassing on the property. [Addendum] The first step in unraveling the legalities of the situation is seeing that only the property owner can give permission to enter (park) on the property. That permission can be rescinded, but only by the owner. The owner seems to have given permission and has stated in advance some conditions under which permission might be rescinded. The towing company could be called (by the owner) to act as the agent for the owner and remove the offending vehicle; but the towing company cannot just up an do this on their own. If they were to spontaneously tow a vehicle without officially acting on behalf of the owner, they would be liable for damages, owing to their having torted some guy's chattels. So the company will want to know that they are protected, in acting as the agent of the property owner. One way to do that is to verify that the person calling the towing company is the owner. Another would be to get the caller to swear that they are the owner and indemnify them against damages, in case they get sued. That pound of cure is more costly and annoying than the ounce of prevention of making sure that you're towing a car with proper authorization, so it's unlikely that they would just tow the car on your say-so. You might try suing the complex owner for some kind of breach of contract, if you think you have a contractual right to a parking space and they are negligent in doing what's necessary to meet your contractual right. The lease says "we may...", not "we will", so they haven't promised to absolutely enforce this rule. Or, of course, you could call the manager and mention that there's still a problem.	Sounds a lot like a bad-luck, move-on situation. I can't imagine any reason why the complex would have any duty to watch your bike for you or otherwise ensure that no one steals it. The fact that you bought it knowing that the bike shed had not yet been built and that the security gates were broken would probably count against you. If you know who stole your bike, you'd have a much better case against them, but it doesn't sound like that's the case. If you're looking for a typical contingency-fee arrangement, in which the attorney takes a fee from your winnings, I'd imagine you're going to be especially out of luck, based on two hard facts: The total damages you can collect is probably going to be equal to the price of your bicycle: £400. The average hourly rate at national firms for the most junior lawyer is already more than £200. If you sat down with such a lawyer, explained your situation, discussed your options, and then tasked the lawyer to write a threatening letter to the apartment complex, you'd already have incurred more fees than the value of the bicycle. Probably no attorney is interested in that arrangement -- especially since it's highly unlikely the complex would pay. So unless you're actually willing to pay hourly rates, I can't imagine any lawyer taking this case. Even if you were, no one may take it just because lawyers don't like taking cases that they're going to lose.	The most minimal elements of theft are: An unauthorised taking or use of another's property; and An intent to permanently deprive that person of that property or its use You've authorised the fee as per the terms of service that you agreed to. If you didn't read the terms of service, you are deemed to have read it. As the first element is not satisifed, no, it's not theft. As to what that fee is for, it's not really a question of law, but because they're a business and they are entitled to recover the costs of providing products or services and make a profit when you use their products or services, I fairly confidently would say that they're charging you to recover the costs of providing you their products and services as well as to make a profit from your use of their products and services. But again, not a question of law.	Although I don't think there's a general principle that stealing a key is equivalent to stealing what it unlocks, some jurisdictions may certainly have laws that punish the theft of a key more severely. For instance, see the North Dakota Criminal Code, section 12.1-23-05, which grades theft offenses. Paragraph 3i provides that: Theft under this chapter is a class C felony if: [...] The property stolen consists of a key or other implement uniquely suited to provide access to property the theft of which would be a felony and it was stolen to gain such access. So if you steal $50,001 in cash, you are guilty of a class A felony, punishable by 20 years imprisonment and/or a fine of $20,000 (see Chapter 12.1-32). If you steal a key that unlocks a safe containing $50,001 in cash, and it can be shown that you stole the key in order to gain access to the cash, you are guilty of a class C felony, punishable by 5 years imprisonment and/or a fine of $10,000. If you steal a key blank that doesn't unlock anything, but has similar intrinsic value to a key (say, a couple of dollars), then you are guilty only of a class B misdemeanor, punishable by 30 days imprisonment and/or a fine of $1,500.	Yes, they still have to go through the normal eviction process and must still provide the minimum number of days required by their local jurisdiction in order to vacate the property. By moving in and establishing residency, the tenant and landlord form an implied lease - the tenant does not need anything in writing in order to establish their legal rights to tenancy. More information: No written lease--Am I in trouble?	First off, you cannot booby trap your property, period. It is both illegal and tortious. But, as you noted, there are already questions/answers that deal with this issue. Sure enough, if the police get a no-knock search warrant, that in and of itself is the Court order allowing entry by any means necessary. When the officers, there by right of law, breach the outer perimeter and stop at the warnings, they will not be seeking any other court orders to have you allow them "safe entry". Their warrant gives them all the right they need, as probable cause of crime and violent intent or intent to destroy evidence was already presented to a judge. If, in real life, you actually put up signage or state explicitly that they're being forewarned that you intend to harm, trap, maim, or otherwise make it unsafe to enter; or that doing so will result in an attempt to destroy evidence, that is something they have already assumed (hence the seeking and granting of the no-knock vs. a regular search warrant). However, the signs in and of themselves are not protected speech, but rather overt threats, and that would put you in a very precarious position indeed. If the police get a "no knock" warrant (the most invasive, difficult to get warrants, whereby there is a grave risk of destruction of evidence or injury to persons), the police will ensure they have safe passage – they've come prepared for dangerous entry long before your signs, but once they see them, you could rest assured they will take them as they are intended: as a direct threat to their safety, and they will deploy a SWAT or other heavily armed entry team (who is usually there anyway for these dangerous entries). You could expect things like smoke/out canister and teargas, flash bangs, and heavily armed and well armored officers attempting to force you from your dwelling. Presumably, if you need to disarm traps to escape the situation, they can enter. Assuming you're home when they invade with chemical weapons, whether you come out or not, they will force you to disarm whatever booby trapping you may have in place that may destroy evidence, likely walking you in as their human shield in the event you're lying about any dangerous ones. That is probably your best case scenario. They may just decide to throw you through the perimeter once they get their hands on you, just to see what happens! If you don't exit and are home or if you are lucky enough to be out, the bomb squad, ATF, and SWAT will converge on your property in less than typical means. Because from your warning they can assume some incendiary or explosive device exists, bringing it into the jurisdiction of other agencies. If they cannot disarm the trap, they would send a robot in first to set it off, or cut through your roof, or knock down a wall – whatever it takes to get in without using a typical means of ingress/egress, so as not to chance your trap. Regardless, you can rest assured that they will get in, and you will pay for the trap you set for law enforcement. Further, to whatever charges you'd have been faced with from evidence flowing from the original warrant will now be added additional charges like attempted murder of a peace officer; if you have any roommates or known associates: conspiracy to do those things; attempted destruction of evidence, criminal interference with a police investigation ... all at a minimum. If anyone is actually harmed, your signage offers you no shield from criminal or tort liability, and you will be lucky to live through the experience once they get their hands on you. Police tend to not like being the targets of intentional maiming, dismemberment or death. You have to understand that, according to this hypothetical, you are intentionally trying to harm law enforcement, or destroy evidence of your dangerous criminal activity. These are not invaders, or intruders according to the law; they are the people whose job it is to enforce the laws, collect the evidence (if you weren't getting arrested pursuant to the fruits of the warrant, you certainly would be at that point). The signs themselves would make excellent exhibits in the coming case of State v. you. BTW: The only reason they have left John Joe Gray alone is that he knows the Henderson County Sheriff Ronny Brownlow, who has been told that the ATF, FBI, and State SWAT, would all be happy to enter and get or kill Mr. Gray if need be. Since the Sheriff never filed any federal charges, and has determined that he doesn't want to breach (and it's in his jurisdiction to determine this), the Sheriff, aware that Gray's entire family is holed up in the "compound", decided it's not worth going in. It's as well known as it is anomalous. When the police want in, and have the right to get in, they will get in. That Sheriff just decided it's not worthwhile.	You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.
Why government can catch silkroad but not bitconnect? I think part of the answer should be in computer science. But part of this is probably law. Bitconnect is a ponzy that recently collapse. The thing is it's not on dark web. Yes the people are anonymous. But there have to be some people working on that website. Government can just subpoena the server. Silkroad, however, is behind dark web. Very difficult. What did bcc did to avoid law enforcement? Do they host their site at some bulletproof server? How do they remain anonymous without dark web? Why government can't just subpoena the host and got their names? What I am thinking is the following. BCC is suspected of being a ponzy for a very long time. C'mon. Every single company like BCC is a ponzy. They offer fix return. They claim outrageous money machine (they call it volatility engine) that most likely don't exist. BCC is not hosted on dark web. So there must be some servers that does it. Government can request image of the server like they did on silk road. Then it'll be obvious who access it, where the money go, etc. Then just seize the guy. Update: Now Bitconnect has collapse as expected However, the website is there https://bitconnect.co/ I think a judge has ruled against them. https://www.coindesk.com/us-court-freezes-bitconnect-assets-as-lawsuits-mount/ So I wonder why there was no progress? My point is, we all know, this is is fraud. And we know they try to do this anonymously. However, their server is there in plain sight. So I wonder why the cops couldn't track the operators?	The answer is more law than it is computer science. You can't tell if a Ponzi scheme is a Ponzi scheme by looking only at individual transactions in the scheme. The individual transactions involve buying something, selling it, entering into loan or investment contracts, and the like. What makes a Ponzi scheme a Ponzi scheme is that the promoters make their money primarily from the investors and individuals acting as sub-promoters in the scheme and not from end users of whatever is being nominally promoted by the Ponzi scheme. Only by analyzing the finances of a purported Ponzi scheme can you determine that it is indeed one. The individual transaction documents and transactions can be facially legal, but still be an illegal Ponzi scheme if the economics of the scheme as a whole are illegal. (Similarly, it is impossible to tell if an anti-trust violation is illegal simply by looking an individual transactions carried out in furtherance of the anti-trust violation. You can't tell if goods are being sold below cost to damage competition, for example, just from a single sale of goods transaction in isolation.) In contrast, many of the transaction at Silkroad were illegal in isolation - buying or selling controlled substances or child pornography or whatever else was forbidden to sell to the counterparty in the transaction. If you can just look at a single transaction and determine that it violates the law, it is much easier to develop the probable cause needed to do a fuller investigation or to make arrests.	Whether this is considered a trade secret (at least in the US) depends partly on whether you've taken reasonable action to keep it secret. If an employee thought it was OK to publish the algorithm, that's evidence that you didn't try very hard to keep it from getting out. Even if nobody's noticed it yet, getting the blog post taken down in't going to get it off the internet. You may as well try to do it anyway. If nobody has noticed the algorithm by now, you want to make it harder for them to find. You need an IP lawyer pronto. Depending on where you are, you might be able to get a patent on the algorithm still, but patents are hard to enforce, and it appears to be getting harder in the US to patent algorithms. (There's a Stack Exchange site so people can look at patent applications and see if they can invalidate the application with prior art.) You can't license out the algorithm without having some legal way of stopping other places from just using it. If you have more proprietary algorithms or things that aren't generally known that give you a competitive advantage, it would be a good idea to inform employees that they aren't supposed to reveal them. Check with your IP lawyer to see what you should do.	According to Julian Assange, CNN committed a crime violating § 135.60 of the New York criminal code "coercion". Reddit, while being a private company, is still considered a public forum. Anything said on these sites can be used against you if your actually identity is discovered.	You can't own a database; you might, however, own (have) the copyright to a database if you created it or the creator transferred that right to you. You can also possess a copy of a database: the question is whether it is legal. "Leaked" implies that it is taken without permission, so you might be in violation of copyright law by possessing a copy. The only databases that would escape copyright protection would be those US government works, things put in the public domain, and things publically licensed to allow copying. Plus, any database whose content fails to exhibit a modicum of creativity (Feist). A database might be inherently illegal (at least in your hands), so it would depend on what the content is. The first thing that comes to mind is a database from a child-porn website, which contains numerous illegal images: see section 110 of Title 18. "Leaked" information might involve violation of 18 USC 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act), which prohibits unauthorized hacking. It does not directly prohibit being in possession of a hacked database: but you might still be prosecuted as an accessory after the fact. (That is one of those ad libitum areas of the law where there's no way to know for sure what is and is not "okay"). If they do prosecute you, you might rely on Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, where because it was a matter of "public interest", propagation of illegally obtained material was held to be protected by the First Amendment. Also there is the case of the Pentagon Papers. At the federal level, there are no controls over storing credit card information so if you get a copy of the Target or Home Depot hacked database, there's no federal law against that (if we discount "accessory after the fact"), but there are circumstances in Minnesota where retaining such information could be illegal.	You wrote: As far as I believe, it is permitted under GDPR to record and store non-anonymized web server access logs, as these can be useful for security reasons. True, Recital 49 GDPR: The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response teams (CERTs), computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems. You asked: My question is whether this anonymization process counts as processing personally identifiable data under GDPR? IP addresses are personal data in some cases, so yes, you're processing personal data. Then, these anonymized logs will be fed into an analytics tool to provide stats on unique visitors, page hits, etc. These are purposes considered compatible with initial purposes according to Article 5.1.(b): Personal data shall be (...) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for (...) statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); As a matter of fact, you might be required to anonymize the data for those purposes, see Article 89.1: Processing for (...) statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. If I were to anonymize the logs and continue to use them exclusively for security reasons, would that change anything? No, you would be processing data in a manner compatible with initial purposes (ensuring network and information security). Or does it not matter what I do with them once they are anonymized? Yes, it does. If you're not using them for "archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes" then you're using them for purposes incompatible with initial purposes. You would need to find new legal basis for processing. does this extra anonymization process on top then take it over the line meaning that consent and a privacy notice would be required? It depends on what you want to do with anonymized data. In your case, for security purposes or security and statistical purposes, you don't need the consent and there is no requirement for the privacy notice (but sure, it would be nice to publish one). For other purposes it might be different.	There are three main aspects to this: Its their website, and their terms of service. They can enforce those terms, or change them (in some appropriate manner). You have no recourse if they remove you, block you, or delete your account, for example. That's the measure that you would probably have, virtually every time. To claim damages, or litigate beyond just website access control, requires a legal claim. But there's a catch there. To claim damages, they need to show actual damage, which they wish to be compensated for. If you misused their website but no actual harm can be shown, the total damage claimable is zero, whether or not you followed their rules. Merely entering dishonest information isn't by itself harm. So they would have to show they suffered damage/harm because of that, which is directly attributable to your behaviour, was foreseeably harmful etc, or similar. They also need to consider legal costs, and ability to enforce, especially if you are in a different country. If for some reason the computer use was also illegal, then a criminal act could be committed and they could notify law enforcement. For example suppose you did this in the little known country of Honestania, where the law says that to prevent trolling and online abuse, anything posted on social media under any but your own legal name is a crime. Or suppose you'd been banned from the system and ignoring/evading such a ban was criminal computer use or criminal trespass due to the forbidden/unauthorised access (which can happen in several places). But this is purely for completeness; I guess you'd know if you were taking it further, into criminal computer use.	This would probably constitute illegal wiretapping and would certainly constitute a 4th Amendment search if conducted by law enforcement. Normally, the definition of whether something is "public" for purposes of an expectation of privacy is whether it could be detected by a human being unaided by technological enhancements from a place where someone could lawfully be to make that kind of observation. Some of the relevant cases are Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. (1967) (tape recorder outside a public telephone booth was a search violating the expectation of privacy) and U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. (1984) (tracking device placed in barrel by authorities violated expectation of privacy). RFID signals are not "public" even if they are not encrypted with a private code because a device, such as the ones identified in the question, is necessary to receive them. The Wiretap Act, codified by 18 U.S. Code § 2511, is a federal law aimed at protecting privacy in communications with other persons. Typically, when you think of a "wiretap," the first thing that comes to mind is someone listening to your telephone calls. But the Act protects more than that. Under the Act, it is illegal to: intentionally or purposefully intercept, disclose, or use the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication through the use of a "device." The Act provides criminal and civil penalties for violations, although it creates various exceptions to when interceptions and disclosures are illegal. From here. In this circumstance, despite being passive, one is intentionally intercepting the contents of electronic communications through the use of a device. The fact that there was not in all cases an intent to communicate through, for example, an RFID chip, on a specific occasion probably does not suffice to render it not a communication.	If the website containing the GDPR-wall processes any personal data of users who hit the GDPR-wall, the GDPR applies to that website. This can be as simple as writing a logfile of all visits to the website. In this case it will be illegal if the website owner does not comply with the GDPR. However a supervisory authority would probably not spent any time on such a minor violation. As long as the the website with the GDPR-wall does not process any personal data, the GDPR does not apply, so nothing in the GDPR can forbid the GDPR-wall. Some related remarks: The GDPR does not require a "privacy policy" on the website if the website does not process any personal data. If personal data is processed based on consent, that consent must be freely given. Also it may not be disruptive. So a cookie wall asking for consent would be illegal. But the GDPR does not care about any other disruptive popups, as long as they are not related to asking for consent. Using GeoIP is a perfect way to implement such a GDPR-Wall, because it would block everyone from within the EU, but nobody else. So it blocks exactly those for who the GDPR would apply. In such a case it would not be reasonable to expect anything more from a website owner. A user which uses a proxy, can not expect to be protected by the GDPR, because it bypasses a restriction set by the owner of the website. A webserver does use the IP-address of all incoming requests, to send the reply back. That could be considered a processing of personal data, but everybody seems to agree it is not. I am not sure why. But I do agree that it would be very impractical if that is considered processing of personal data. I added an example from the Washington Post So you have to pay $9/month for a GDPR compliant subscription. Because the price you have to pay is not unacceptable high, I think it would be valid to offer the premium version this way. This does not force you to choose one of the other subscriptions. In december 2018, the Austrian DPA (DSB) has confirmed that a similar offer is lawful. On derstandard.at you get a choice between free access with tracking and advertising, or pay 6 Euro/Month for tracking free access. Because 6 Euro/Month is cheaper than subscribing to the printed edition, the DSB accepted that as a valid choice. More information can be found on noyb.eu or, (with more details but in German), on wbs-law.de.
Republishing in old book, what are ones rights and obligations? I have an old book on shelf, published in, and copyright date of 1913 (US). Looking over a copyright law page on the subject, I am thinking the copyright has expired but am not 100% sure. What kind of research do I need to do to reasonably determine the copyright has expired? What I am considering doing is scanning the book, the pictures in it (photos and hand art), then perhaps self publishing the results on amazon or maybe a website. Assuming the copyright has expired and there is no infringement, I publish it online, what (copy?)rights would I then have if any?	Yes, if the book was published in 1913, the copyright has expired. You can freely scan it in and publish it. But note you have NO copyright to the material. You didn't write it. Copyright law gives rights to the AUTHOR of a work. It doesn't matter how much effort you went to scanning it in and formatting it. Nothing in copyright law says that that gives you any rights. If you add anything creative of your own, you would own the copyright to the new material. Like if you drew new illustrations and added them to the book. Or if you included your own commentary. Or you added explanatory footnotes. That still wouldn't give you rights to the original text, but you would own the new material. But in the same vein, if the book was originally published in 1913, but the copy you have includes material added by a later editor, that later material might still be protected by copyright. Just a side thought, it occurs to me that if I was going to republish a public domain book, a good idea would be to add footnotes. If my footnotes appear on almost every page, then no one else could just take my electronic files and sell them himself. He'd have to go through page by page and purge out all the footnotes. Make it hard for someone to "borrow" your work and you might scare them off.	You would first have to find out if publishing a book was "for commercial purposes". I can write a book and publish it as a hobby. Next you check if there is any copyright infringement. It doesn't sound like there is. Using your website as a tool to create these diagrams doesn't give you copyright unless the result contains your own copyrighted work. So at best there is a violation of your terms and conditions for your website. You can sue about that, but might have to specify damages. If you allow commercial use say for a fee of $1,000, that would give you grounds to claim damages. Or if someone used your website so excessively that it costs you money, that would be damages.	There aren't bright line rules in the area of fair use (which is the core issue - you are clearly copying a work that has copyright protected portions, at least - the question is whether fair use provides a defense and whether some portions are not copyright protected). This inquiry is fact specific and driven by general standards. Context such as whether the use would be free or commercial matter as well. For your own notes, anything goes pretty much. This generally wouldn't constitute "publication" of the work and would be for personal educational used by someone who paid for the book anyway. For shared notes - it depends. Also not all kinds of copying is created equal. Some parts of textbooks are themselves in the public domain or not protectable by copyright. For example, even a lengthy quote from a scientific journal article would probably be allowed with attribution. It would also be easier to evaluate based upon the type of textbook. A history textbook can have protection similar to trade non-fiction and can have very original exposition. An algebra textbook, less so. Your question also points to an end run. If the professor is the author of the textbook (many of mine were in something of a racket), you could get permission from the author.	It's not clear to me that your website is, per se, illegal. (Though good luck finding a webhost with a hard drive large enough to store it. Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone is roughly 38,000 characters. If I've done my calculations correctly, storing all of the strings of this length or shorter would require something like 1053760 GB of storage. Give or take.) The main problem is in distributing the "index" of the string containing the text of Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone. This index is just the integer obtained by taking the entire text as a string and treating it as a number in base 26 (A = 1, B = 2, etc.) In other words, all of the information contained in the book is also contained in the index number, and in a relatively simple way. Distributing this number is therefore entirely equivalent to distributing the text; you don't need the website at all. It's entirely analogous to e-mailing the text to someone else; in that process, the text is transformed into a number (in binary, under a different encoding scheme) along the way. But you couldn't seriously argue in a court of law that you were not distributing the text, you were just telling a friend about a very large number. Just to back this up with some actual law citation: US copyright law gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to make and distribute copies of the work. And a "copy" is defined as follows: “Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. In other words, J.K. Rowling (and/or her publishers) have the exclusive rights to distribute that integer, since the work is "fixed" in it by its very nature, and since the work can be reproduced from it.	That means that a person cannot put a new cover or binding on a book, and then resell it or lend it, unless permission is obtained from the publisher. This has the effect of prohibiting libraries, which need to rebind most books, from carrying the book without the publisher's permission. This condition did not apply in the US, because under the US Law's First Sale Doctrine, the seller cannot impose such conditions on the buyer. The very standardize wording was, I think, once part of the Net book Agreement (NBA) used by Penguin and other UK-based publishers on sales in the UK and the Commonwealth. You will find it on many used books from such publishers. I believe the main aim was to prohibit discount resellers of used books, and to prohibit sale of "stripped books" (reported to the publisher as "unsold and destroyed"). I believe that this is no longer in effect, but I am not sure. The NBA was dissolved in 1995.	A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission.	Yes. The copyright owner of a work has the exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted work" or to make "derivative works" of it. 17 USC 106. Copyright law is older than the photocopier, and it applies to copies made by means of any technology. If your intent is to duplicate the protected work, whether you do it by tracing, photocopying, or even freehand, you are infringing that right. It is possible that you could squeeze into one of the copyright exceptions, such as fair use, but these are much narrower than people tend to assume they are (especially outside of the U.S.), and they boil down to: "Well, yes, I copied your copyrighted work, but..." The bottom line is: is it copyrighted? Did you copy it, in whole or in part? Then, unless you have a very good reason, you've infringed the copyright. Whether you do it by means of tracing paper, jellygraph, or iPhone doesn't matter.	For works released after 1989, Copyright notices don't have any legal consequences in the United States. They are just a friendly reminder of who created the work and that they take their copyrights seriously. But those notices are not required anymore to enforce your copyrights on the works you created. If you have proof that you own the copyright on something and when it was created, and if it's still within the term limits, then you can take legal actions against people who violate your copyright. Disney has a history of repeated worldwide lobbying for extending the expiration durations in copyright laws in order to avoid any of their classic cartoons from falling out of copyright protection. So it could be that they try to intentionally muddy the waters and make it harder to find out which of their works expire when. That way people are less sure about what Disney works are and are not in the public domain, making it more risky to use them. But that's just my theory.
Does the failure to honour an express refusal invalidate prior claims of having implied consent? Suppose a local health district (LHD) has used a patient's electronic medical record (eMR) for training purposes. Upon learning that they have done this, the patient is displeased and tells them so. The LHD responds, "we had implied consent", and the patient begrudgingly accepts. However, let us now suppose that the patient realises, "hey, express refusals always override claims of implied consent." So he prepares an express refusal to consent to the use of his health records for training purposes and delivers it to the LHD. The express refusal notice is lawful. However, let us suppose that the patient learns that the LHD has continued to use his medical records for training purposes, meaning they have failed to honour the patient's stated wishes. Now, to avoid ambiguity about what has happened: The express refusal notice is accepted as valid and lawful by the LHD The reason why the LHD is unable to stop using the is due to technical limitations of the eMR system This is the first time any patient has ever withdrawn consent -- it has to do with a particular type of training use that the patient knows is occurring but the public at large is unaware of it. The LHD could have cancelled training if they wanted to. Or bused people to another LHD for training. Or designed a system that did not have this limitation. Or designed a system that did not require the use of patient records. Am I correct in arguing that the LHD never really had implied consent to begin with? In other words, does the failure to honour the express refusal inform us about the legitimacy of prior claims of implied consent? I believe that it does. This is my argumentation: The LHD never had implied consent, because it never had any intention of honouring any expression of autonomy that was orthogonal to its own self-interest. In effect, when the LHD started using the patient's health records for eMR training, it did so hoping that nobody would ever work out that they could exercise their autonomy and refuse to consent to such uses. The inability of the LHD to honour the express refusal invalidates any claim that it ever had implied consent to begin with. What it has done is no different to someone taking a book from my bookshelf without asking, then claiming it was borrowed and not stolen, but then failing to return it when I ask for it back. The LHD never had implied consent to use the patient's health records for eMR training, nor did it ever have implied consent to use the records of any other person for training. Thoughts?	Am I correct in arguing that the LHD never really had implied consent to begin with? In other words, does the failure to honour the express refusal inform us about the legitimacy of prior claims of implied consent? No. They had implied consent and had not intent at the outset to dishonor it. They have violated the patient's privacy right when consent was expressly withdrawn, and they discovered that they cannot easily comply and therefore did not comply. The fact that they have made it expensive for themselves to comply with their legal obligations going forward does not imply that they lacked implied consent at the outset, so they should have no liability for the time period from when the training materials started to be used until the time when implied consent ended. They are only responsible going forward for their failure to honor the patient's wishes. It is not at all exceptional for a legal obligation to turn out to be more difficult to comply with when it arises than was anticipated when the systems that make the legal obligation difficult to comply with were implemented. Health care companies aren't expected to be prophets who can foresee the complex confluence of factors that has painted them in a corner, particularly when a situation has never come up before the current one. It is likely that no one person was ever even simultaneously aware of all the facts necessary to know that this could happen. Someone in the IT department will often not be intimately familiar with what is going on in the training part of the operation and what the privacy rules that apply are and even if someone was, that someone may have been in no position to do anything about it at the time. Health care providers aren't supposed to be evaluated with 20-20 hindsight. Given that they almost surely did not and could not easily have known that they had made a future express withdrawal of consent very difficult to effectuate, scienter can't be attributed to it. And, honestly, they are in more than enough trouble simply trying to deal with the problem post-express withdrawal of consent when they did start to violate privacy laws.	If I may paraphrase the scenario: The customer has a contract with the insurer The customer is contemplating undergoing a certain procedure and is unsure if it is covered under the contract The customer calls the insurer to ask this specific question The insurer says "yes" The customer undergoes the procedure The insurer refuses to pay on the ground that it is not covered under the contract. Let's put aside issues of evidence and what can be proved and assume these facts are not in dispute. There is no question that the contract has been renegotiated; it hasn't. This avoids the necessity of considering if the insurer's employee has the authority to do this or it the customer can rely that they do even if they don't. There are two possibilities: The procedure is covered and the insurer must pay under contract The procedure isn't covered and the insurer must pay under the tort of negligent misstatement. The insurer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The insurer owes a duty of care to a customer who asks such a question to answer it correctly. It is foreseeable that the customer would act on the insurer's advice and incur costs that they may have avoided if the correct advice had been given. Nothing is ever certain in the law but this is as close as you can get.	This is called the "waiver trap," and it can be quite harsh indeed. Rule 8 and Rule 12 require a defendant to assert most affirmative defenses almost immediately -- either in their answer or in either a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Failure to assert them does indeed result in a waiver of the defense. For instance, in Hunter v. Serv-Tech, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on defects in service of the complaint. The defendants' motion purported to "reserve the right" to challenge personal jurisdiction, as well, but did not actually move for dismissal on that basis. After the service issue was resolved, the defendants actually moved to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction, but the court denied the motion, saying that Rule 12 requires an actual assertion and argument in support of the defense: The Court is aware that the outcome it reaches today is a harsh one, especially in light of the fact that it appears that, absent waiver, this motion might well be granted. But the Court is duty-bound to apply the law as it is written, and as written the Rules enact a policy of requiring all 12(b)(2)-(5) defenses to be made by motion, once, prior to filing an answer. Given this policy, Offshore’s “reservation” language is not sufficient to preclude waiver. So the court acknowledges that the defendant had a winning defense, but it must nonetheless continue to litigate. The rule is applied quite strictly in cases involving Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) defenses. There is quite a bit more wiggle room for other affirmative defenses, i.e., defenses that allow the defendant to escape liability regardless of whether his conduct was wrongful, but it still remains quite dangerous to omit any available defense from your first responsive pleading. See, e.g., Am. Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528, 1537 (11th Cir. 1983) ("In any case, we need not consider these points since SFC waived its right to advance the statute of limitations defense by its failure to assert this affirmative defense in any pleading filed below in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)."). As a practical matter, then it is not usually sufficient to simply say "I disagree" in response to a claim, unless your defense amounts to either a denial that the facts supporting the claim are true or a denial that the facts as alleged creates a cause of action. If you intend to assert an affirmative defense – such as personal jurisdiction, statute of limitations, failure of consideration, accord and satisfaction, immunity, etc. – you must say so clearly. So if your first responsive pleading is an answer, it is typically sufficient to simply say, "The claim is barred by the statute of limitations." But if your first responsive pleading is a motion to dismiss, you need to both assert and argue your defense; otherwise, you risk waiving it as in Hunter. Note, though, that there are some affirmative defenses that are not waived by failing to assert them immediately. Failure to join a necessary party, for instance, can be asserted at any time up until trial, and subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at basically any time at all.	Possibly I am Australian so I am not familiar with Albertan labour law but I have done a little research and the underlying common law principles are similar. I will assume that you are covered by Albertan law and not the Canada Labour Code. The next part of the answer is based on A Guide to Rights and Responsibilities in Alberta Workplaces. First, if you lost it they would need to ask you to pay for it, they could not deduct it from your pay without a garnishee order (p. 10). Second, if the device is safety equipment, and it is certainly arguable that it is, then it is the employee's responsibility to use it and the employer's responsibility to keep it in safe working order; this would include replacing it if it were lost (p. 12). The common law position depends on a) the contract and b) if any negligence were involved. Contract What does your current employment contract say about your use of the employer's equipment generally and this item in particular? If it says something then, unless it is an illegal term, that is what happens. If it is silent, then it turns on the particular circumstances. Also, a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, if they are trying to introduce a new term then you have to agree to it; remembering that there may be consequences to taking a stand against your employer, you should say that you do not agree - this removes the risk that the employer could argue that there was tacit agreement. Negligence In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, as an employee this is virtually a given; breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), this would depend on the circumstances of the loss or damage. You have to take reasonable care of the equipment - this is not a subjective standard, you need to do everything that a person in your position can do to protect the equipment from loss or damage; the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff. This has to do with the "proximity" of the harm, if for example the device needed a battery change and you took it to a technician who damaged the item in changing the battery then your actions are not proximate to the loss; and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Well, if it is lost or damaged this is pretty unarguable. So, if you take reasonable care of the device and, notwithstanding, it is lost or damaged then you would not be liable for negligence ... probably. Talk to your union rep; this is exactly the sort of stuff that they are there to sort out.	Your question is about "Would it be kidnapping if I was injured and someone took me to a hospital without my consent", so I don't understand these other answers which say "it depends on the situation". The key point is what you mean by "without my consent". Good Samaritan laws are also relevant, which offer defenses to people who do things that would otherwise be unlawful when they are doing it with good intentions to help someone who they believe is injured or would become injured without their intervention. The main things to consider are the degree of injury, which is a spectrum ranging from no injury at all to being dead, and whether the injured person is conscious. Are you so injured that you are unconscious? In most jurisdictions, being unconscious is considered as you consenting to any actions which are done with the intent of giving you medical assistance, which is on a spectrum of saying "hey are you ok?" or shaking you in order to wake you up, all the way up to treatment including major surgery. So by being unconscious it is usually automatically consent, but if you are awake and are refusing help or treatment, even if you could die if you didn't receive treatment, it would be easy to argue that you were not consenting and that any treatment/assistance etc was unlawful. This situation sometimes happens, and EMTs are often trained to wait until the person goes unconscious to then give them medical assistance/transport etc, but assisting someone before they go unconscious could still be argued as permissible, if the injured person was so distressed that they were unable to give/refuse consent, or at least if the assistor believed that to be the case. This is why if someone has a major medical problem and is unconscious, hospitals can resuscitate them and even perform surgery without them signing a consent form. By being unconscious, it is considered that they are consenting to any necessary surgery to help them, even including amputation or other negative consequences. Conversely, if someone has a valid Advance healthcare directive on file which forbids measures such as resuscitation, they will be considered not to consent, and will usually be left alone without life-saving assistance. Resuscitating/performing surgery on someone in this case can be cause for damages to the injured person, because it would have been clear that they did not consent to such assistance.	The parenthesized part means that if you are being compelled by law to disclose some confidential information, you must promptly notify the company of that fact. They could they respond by trying to get you excluded as a witness, or to limit your testimony, but you don't have to care what they do once they've been notified that you were subpoenaed. It may well be that every time the opposing side asks you a question, "your" side will object, and the judge will decide whether to sustain or overrule the objection. The only way in which you would defer to the company lawyer is by not answering the question before the question is finished (i.e. give the attorney 2 seconds to voice an objection). You would not have to "bring" the employer's lawyer along to a deposition, but that lawyer would probably be present and would similarly raise objections, if he felt like it. Your duty is simply to tell the company that you are being compelled to testify. In case the police or a detective agency are investigating the matter and they come to interview you, you are not compelled by law to answer (or to hand over documents), therefore you are supposed to decline to answer (and you are not obligated to inform the company that someone asked a question). As for an administrative subpoena, the perhaps tricky part will be knowing whether you are being compelled to testify, or invited to testify. The wording of the paperwork should inform you whether this is compulsory.	There are three kinds of restraining orders in Minnesota, but what they have in common is that a person petitions the court to order a person to e.g. stop the harassment and have no further contact. This order if granted by the court will be served on the respondent, and all actual restraining orders are valid. A forgery which was not actually ordered by the court is not a restraining order, and of course it is not legally valid. But you don't seem to be claiming that this is a forgery. In principle, a person can obtain a copy of a restraining order under The Minnesota Data Practices Act. However, there are limits on access to certain records. Minnesota Court Rule 4 restricts access to domestic abuse and harassment records, blocking disclosure until the respondent has been served with the order. If someone fails to obtain a record in such a case, it could be because the request was made before the order was served. Even if the request was improperly denied, that does not invalidate the court order. Subsequent comments by OP indicate the possibility that he was not given the restraining order, as required by law, which would substantially impact the validity of the arrest. This handbook from the courts spells out the rules for handling these orders. If it is impossible to personally serve the notice on respondent (he can't be found), then it is possible for the court to order notice by publication, where an item is placed in the newspaper (legal notices, which nobody reads). In other words, you can be "served" in the legal sense, but not know it (however, the police will know it, so if BCA is saying "we can't find any restraining order", this would be a plainly improper arrest).	Is it GDPR compliant that I can't access the account that I created and the personal data that I shared because "I haven't completed their internal pre-qualification process"? Article 15 defines a “Right of access to the data subject” but it's difficult to see how this could be construed as a right to log into a specific website. Common sense suggests this would be a very bad idea. If they are willing to provide the data through another means (say a report or data dump of some sort), the obligation would seem to be met. In fact, article 15(3) even states that data controllers should merely provide the information in a “commonly used electronic form” (i.e. not necessarily through access to their systems or whatever form they are using internally for the processing). Have you asked for that and would you be satisfied by that resolution? Is it GDPR compliant that their answer to my deletion request is "We will delete the data..." The text of article 17 (right to erasure) explicitly specifies that such a request must be honored without “undue delay”. Article 12, which defines some of the modalities for the rights to access, rectification or erasure by the data subject, also provides that controllers shall “provide information on action taken on a request […] without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request”. You haven't provided any time frame and I don't think there is anything wrong with acknowledging the request by promising they “will” do it but in light of article 12, it seems you would indeed be entitled to know once they have actually taken further action. However, you implied you might want to access the data first and it's not clear to me whether you explicitly invoked the GDPR in earlier communications. So I would clarify and reiterate my request (access or erasure) and ask them for explicit confirmation once it has been satisfied.
Can you keep illegal information? This answer to the question Can numbers be illegal? makes a good argument, and AFAIK it comports with the law. It follows other answers in observing that any piece of information can be encoded by numbers. Yes, there are pieces of information that are illegal to possess – e.g., child pornography, stolen intellectual property, financial numbers intended to commit theft or fraud. But it asserts, without reference to law, that if you don't know that application of the number your possession can't be illegal. So it begs the following two interesting questions: Do information possession crimes always require mens rea? I can't think of a circumstance in which one could be charged for a crime for possession without knowledge of the significance of the number. I know this is a "prove a negative" problem, but if anyone knows of a possession crime that does not require a guilty mind that would be noteworthy. Is there a safe harbor for possession of an "illegal" number? If you are found in possession of stolen property, even if you lack mens rea, you are not allowed to keep it. If you are found in possession of stolen data can you keep it if it also represents something you can possess? E.g., if an encrypted version of your password database also happens to produce a JPEG-encoded image of child pornography, can you keep it if you show that you have a code that transforms it into information that is not child pornography?	Intent would greatly factor into the case. As mentioned, possession of child pornography is illegal. There was a case, where a man had inadvertently downloaded such images. In the case, it was shown that there was sufficient evidence that it was accidental and without his knowledge. Presumably, if you by happenstance created an identical code through encryption/compiling, there would be a lack of evidence of intent or evidence of your intended use. For example, your stored password manager file happens to store data identical to an illegal image. The password manager output is provable and repeatable to show that it was simply circumstantial. If you have hundreds of such outputs that all "just happen to be illicit images" you would probably fall on the wrong side of reasonable doubt. As to whether you can keep the data, the programmers for the password manager would probably update their system to modify the output to avoid bad press. The general idea is that the "illegal number" is so incredibly specific that accidental cases are very unlikely to occur, and if it did, that there would be forensic evidence indicating intent and use.	Following the guidance of the police In summary: If the item is hazardous or dangerous you should report it to the police using the emergency number. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a private place, hand it to the owner of the premises - it's their responsibility to attempt to find the owner and the property becomes theirs if they can't. If the item is non-hazardous and found on public transport, hand it to the operator - they have their own by-laws about lost property. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a public place, if it has a serial number, hand it to the police - they may be able to trace the owner if it is a government document, hand it to the issuer if it is of low value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner "these could include asking people nearby or in offices or shops. You could also consider leaving a note with your details. If you can't find the owner there's nothing more we can do and you should dispose of the item." if it is of high value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner and if you can't hand it to the police.	You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.	You would report illegal income via Schedule 1, line 8. At the bottom, after naming many specific legal sources of income there is a line 8z "Other income. List type and amount" with very little space. The instructions refer you to Miscellaneous Income in Pub 525. They do list "Stolen Property" as a category, saying If you steal property, you must report its FMV in your income in the year you steal it unless in the same year, you return it to its rightful owner. However, there is no requirement to report the illegal nature of your income, and it is not difficult to describe such income in non-incriminating terms, such as "miscellaneous income". If they are not satisfied, you may inform them of your 5th amendment right to not incriminate yourself. Invoking your right to silence does not constitute probable cause for a search warrant.	This is a super complex question and no one really knows the answer yet. Orin Kerr is probably the leading scholar on this question, and he generally argues that forced decryption of one's own device is not a Fifth Amendment violation. As I understand it (and oversimplifying by a lot), one key piece of his position is that requiring you to put in your password is a statement about your knowledge of the password itself, not about the contents of the machine into which you are entering it. And because your knowledge of the password for your own devices is presumed, an exception for "foregone conclusions" would leave this compulsion unprotected by the Fifth Amendment. You can read one of his explanations here. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with that approach, but a California judge recently reached a conclusion similar to Kerr's. This will probably by a question for SCOTUS before too long.	Stealing money is theft, see RCW Chapter 9a.56 in Washington, and analogous laws in other jurisdictions. What you describe is theft, as defined under RCW 9A.56.020, and that is a crime. Defenses are available only in case of an open taking made under a good faith claim to title to the property ("it's my money"), or an irrelevant defense related to pallet theft from a pallet recycler. There is no exception arising for goods "in the possession of a criminal organization". There is also no applicable attainder process for declaring an organization to be a "criminal organization" to which such an exception could be referred, in Washington or any other state that I am familiar with. At the federal level, 18 USC Ch. 96 does not have a provision for declaring some organization to be a "criminal organization", but it does prohibit using proceeds from "a pattern of racketeering activity" that a person or organization participated in, to support a business engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. There is an extensive but specific list of trigger crimes, which are all federal crimes. Supposing that a state wanted to make it legal to steal from criminals, there would have to be a suitable definition of "criminal". Compare the various sex offender laws, where under dell-defined circumstances, a person is legally declared to be a sex offender required to register. If the property is in fact the proceeds of a criminal activity (not merely "in the possession of a criminal") or is used to support criminal activities, it might be seized under civil forfeiture statutes. However, those statutes only allow the government to seize the property – vigilante civil forfeiture is still theft, a crime for which you can be prosecuted. The state might seize such assets and, when challenged in court, may have to prove that the assets a seizable (this is highly jurisdiction-dependent). The prospects that a prosecutor will turn a blind eye to a theft on the grounds that the victims are criminals is pretty small. More likely, everything gets seized and everybody gets prosecuted.	You did not commit any crime, but that does not mean you cannot be charged with a crime. Up to the point where you take the item back out of your pocket, a police officer would have probable cause to believe you were attempting to steal the merchandise, and probable cause is all he would need to charge you. At trial, the government would have the burden of proving that you intended to actually steal the item, but it can satisfy that burden merely by showing that your actions were consistent with such an intention. You would have the option of testifying that you planned to pay for the item. From there, it would be up to a jury to decide whether it believes you. If so, you should be acquitted. If not, you would likely be convicted, and your conviction would likely be affirmed on appeal.	Your kid is not in trouble; he's a minor. You're in trouble. A criminal case for the charges a prosecutor would bring, i.e. destruction of property (the data) or for a relevant cyber or computer crime (malware, etc.), and/or a civil case for damages due to the destruction of the data would both hinge on one point: the concept of intent. See intent - Wex Legal Information Institute and Civil Law vs. Criminal Law: The Differences \| Rasmussen College. Did you knowingly intend to cause damage or data loss with the structure of the name? It's pretty clear you did. The structure of a name that can invoke an SQL command is not in any sense a standard name in spelling or format or punctuation. So how would you convince the jury or judge that you had no intent when you named your kid? The possible poor design of a data system that didn't sanitize inputs is no defense. Saying the door was unlocked so I assume the homeowners didn't care if I trashed their house will get you laughed into jail or on the hook for a stiff civil judgement.
Is there any "delik aduan" like laws in the west? In Indonesia there are laws called "delik aduan" that define acts as crimes only if someone files a complaint. These are like civil laws in that someone has to file a complaint, but they are like crimes ("pidana") in that the penalties include incarceration. One such law is defamation: It's only a crime if someone that feels hurt by some speech reports it and sues. Otherwise it's not a crime. I.e., law enforcement will not search for or prosecute defamatory speech. Another such law is adultery: It's only a crime if someone "complains" and reports it to cops. Otherwise it's not. Basically, someone else, not the state can decide that this is a crime. Delik aduan laws are quite clear in that they require a private-party complaint. Do we have such laws in US? Many acts that constitute such crime are not prosecuted because nobody bothers reporting it. However, in case of governor election, Ahok is jailed due to one such case. The law the way it is written is so elastic that anyone could be jailed by it. However, most of the time, the guy accused of the law is not running for gubernatorial election. Hence, most of the time, there is little incentive to use the law. Western countries have elections too. They also have criminal and civil laws. Do they have "delik aduan" (reportable chapter) kind of laws?	That sounds a lot like the German Antragsdelikt (literally "crime by request"). That is a crime (defined in the criminal code), that can only be prosecuted if the victim requests it. Antragsdelikt mostly applies to less serious crimes, such as slander or petty theft, while "serious" crimes, such as robbery or assault must always be prosecuted (Offizialdelikt). Also, there are many minor crimes (relatives Antragsdelikt) which are usually only prosecuted by request, but where the prosecution can also decide to press charges if it is in the "public interest" (usually because the act is deemed a serious infraction). Similar concepts exist in Austria and Switzerland.	Since we don't have a system of robot justice, it's impossible to say whether a prosecutor would file charges in this bizarre circumstance, since filing charges is discretionary. However, this situation does fit the description of murder. It is intentional, it causes death (maybe, vide infra), it is not legally justified (as self-defense, or as an act legally sanctioned by a state executioner), the victim is a person. It is not sanctioned by any "death with dignity" statute. The one issue that might be effectively argued by the defense assuming the irrefutability of the factual claims of your scenario is that perhaps the relevant crime is assault with a deadly weapon, since it probably could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim died from the shooting, and not from being incinerated by lava. It depends on where the person is shot, and with what.	Defamation laws do not distinguish between charitable organizations and others: however, in the US there are special considerations for "public figures" (they are not afforded as much protection). The medium does not matter -- texting, blogging, letter-writing, whatever. The defamatory statement need not have been received by a wide audience – it suffices that the message was received by one person other than the person being defamed. A single defamatory act is all it takes: there is no requirement of there being an established and repeated practice of defaming. One way to defend against a charge of defamation is to show that the statement is true. An alternative is to show that the statement is incapable of being proven true or false (e.g. calling someone a "jerk" doesn't assert a factual proposition). A careful scrutiny of the actual statement, performed by an attorney specializing in such matters, is really the only way to know whether words like "may", "possibly" would make a statement an expression of opinion rather than a statement of fact. A person suing for defamation would have to have suffered a loss, but there is a category of false statements, per se defamation, considered to be so injurious that damage need not be proven. That included allegations of criminal activity and allegations of professional incompetence, either of which could be applicable in the context you are describing. The First Amendment provides much protection against such suits, which may not exist in other countries. Because of this, a law was recently passed in the US, 28 USC 111, which says that domestic courts will not enforce a foreign defamation judgment that is inconsistent with the First Amendment. [Addendum] This part is crucial: "The only people I've expressed my concerns to, aside from the organization itself, is my parents and my wife's parents. However, they have shared with a few friends...". If you alleged illegal behavior to your parents, that's a problem. If you only said e.g. "I have concerns", that's not a problem. It would also matter in what way you tried "to disclose to a U.S. based organization details of the foreign organization they are supporting that indicate it might not be on the up and up".	Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED	A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable.	Short version: No, no one has even been prosecuted. Does the perjury clause apply to all the information in the notification, or only the statement that the complaining party is authorised to act etc. ? This seems to be answerable by the plain text of the statute that you quoted: A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. There doesn't seem to be any remotely grammatical way to read "under penalty of perjury" as modifying anything in the first part of the sentence (i.e, the statement or the information in the notification). The closest we could come would be reading "A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury" as saying that the information is both accurate and under penalty of perjury. Even if we ignore the fact that that would add a stray comma (as comma errors are not uncommon), that still leaves us with "that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly in-fringed" after an additional comma. This would need a conjunction (such as "and") that is not there in order for it to read at all correctly. On the other hand, it is perfectly grammatical to read it as: A statement: that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. This would mean that only the statement that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright holder is made under penalty of perjury. Thus, the "statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized" described in § 512(c)(3)(a)(v) and referenced in your second question is not made under penalty of perjury. I couldn't find any case law regarding this, though, which brings us to the second question: Has anyone ever actually been convicted of perjury as a result of sending a DMCA notice that lied about the "good faith belief" in the infringing nature of the target material? As far as I can tell, no one has ever even been criminally prosecuted for sending false DMCA notices, let alone convicted. In fact, as far as I can tell, no one has ever been prosecuted for false copyright claims under any other laws, either. It's a bit difficult to find an authoritative reference stating something has never happened, and the best I found was the Wikipedia article on Copyfraud, which cites Fishman, Stephen. The Public Domain, Nolo (2006), pp. 24–29 for the proposition that (presumably as of 2006), "[n]o company has ever been prosecuted for violating" a related law on false claims of copyright. Obviously, that's not a great source, due to the date, not having access to the original text, and the fact that it's not quite the same law. I also tried quite a number of search terms on Google and found no criminal prosecutions there, either. There have, however, been civil suits regarding such bad-faith misrepresentations: Automattic, owners of Wordpress.com, have filed at least two. In at least one of those, a lack of such a good-faith claim by the defendant was in fact found by the court: Similarly, here, the Court finds that Defendant knowingly misrepresented that Hotham violated his copyright because Defendant could not have reasonably believed that the Press Release he sent to Hotham was protected under copyright. Moreover, there can be no dispute that Defendant knew, and indeed, specifically intended, that the takedown notice would result in the disabling of Hotham's article. This resulted in the court finding the defendant liable for damages under § 512(f) for the time and money that the plaintiffs spent dealing with the results of the fraudulent DMCA takedown notice. Neither the court nor the plaintiffs mention perjury at any point other than quoting the takedown notice (unsurprising, though, given that it's a civil suit).	In the US, there are no (and can be no) laws against hate speech. You also cannot sue a person for using an ethnic or similar epithet. A false accusation, however, might be grounds for a defamation lawsuit. Word connotations do not matter, what matters is the denotation, for example calling someone a "rapist" denotes a specific criminal act. Even calling someone a rapist isn't necessarily defamatory, since hyperbole abounds especially on the internet, so in order to actually be defamation, the statement would have to be understood as a particular accusation (a form of unlawful sexual assault). A defamatory statement has to be made with reckless disregard for the truth of a statement, which is not the case in the situation you describe (perhaps the person correctly said that so-and-so is a therapist, but was ineffective in their use of English).	Defendants in the US would be charged with racketeering, not bribery, since government officials were not bribed. The DoJ indictment against Webb et al. is here: most of the defendants are not citizens of the US, though none are listed as being government officials. DoJ could certainly seek an indictment of ministers, senators or presidents of foreign countries. If said official were in the US on an ordinary passport, they could be arrested. They also might be arrested by e.g. Argentinian policy and extradited to the US, but whether that would be legal depends on the country (some countries don't extradite their own citizens; there would have to be an extradition treaty between that country and the US). It is inconceivable that any nation would hand over a sitting president because of an indictment by the US, and generally unlikely for any government official, but the official could be locally deposed first. But whether a government would do this is basically a political question, not a legal one.
Can states legitimately enact immigration law or policy that is contrary to federal immigration law? Federal Immigration and Nationality Act Section 8 USC 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)(b)(iii) says Any person who encourages or induces an alien to reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence is in violation of law, shall be punished as provided - for each alien in respect to whom such a violation occurs fined under title 18, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. That said, does it follow that it would be a violation of Federal law for a government official to declare a state/city to be a "sanctuary state/city" for the specific purpose of harboring and protecting unauthorised immigrants from lawful deportation?	No, it does not follow. Mostly, because that's not what is actually happening with sanctuary cities. First, there is no actual definition of a sanctuary city, neither in the law or, more specifically, in immigration policy. Here's what happens in sanctuary cities. Section 1373(a) of Title 8 of US Code states that local and state governments are prohibited from enacting laws or policies limiting the exchange of info re: citizenship w/Department of Homeland Security. So if you work for the local Department of Human Services, and someone shows up to sign up for public benefits and you find out they are undocumented immigrants, if you wanted to report that person to ICE, no government could forbid you from doing so. Conversely, the federal government can't force you to report that undocumented immigrant. Likewise, the detainers that ICE issues, which are requests to the local government to inform them when a given undocumented immigrant is to be released, are not mandatory. If that action is taken, the jail can hold the undocumented immigrant up to 48 hours for ICE to act. If ICE doesn't act, the person must be let go. A report by the DOJ's inspector general looked at a random sampling of cities that receive federal funding and found that each of them had certain policies in place that limited cooperation with ICE and ICE's detainers. However, the same inspector general found that Section 1373 is not applicable to detainers. In sum, the IG determined that, although there were no explicit policies forbidding state or local employees from cooperating with ICE, non-compliance with detainers in some jurisdictions at the very least were "inconsistent with ... the intent of Section 1373." Legal arguments abound. One argument is that the administration is interpreting Section 1373 too broadly in order to include both types of sanctuary cities. Another is that Section 1373 violates the anti-comandeering doctrine of the 10th Amendment. I guess the real answer is, "stay tuned," but for now, no it does not follow that it is a violation of federal law for a government official to declare a state/city to be a "sanctuary city."	Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.	Assuming that all of these locations are in the same state, this is not an issue of federal law and is not governed by the U.S. Constitution. The geographical jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officers is exclusively a matter of state law and has no single correct resolution. Different states handle the issue differently. Even if state law or the state constitution prohibited the arrest, this violation of state law or the state constitution, would not give rise to a federal claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which may vindicate only federal rights, and could not form a basis for a collateral attack on a state court conviction in a federal court habeas corpus petition which is likewise limited to vindications of federal law rights. Any remedy would have to be secured in the state court system invoking state law rights (assuming for sake of argument that state law provides such a remedy), or in a diversity lawsuit in federal court applying state substantive law, if the defendant was from another state and the amount in controversy was in excess of $75,000.	I believe there are courts that have affirmed convictions for obstructing official business or something along those lines, but the general consensus seems to be that conduct like this is not a crime, or that it cannot be criminalized without violating the First Amendment. The most recent decision on point came just a few weeks ago. In Friend v. Gasparino, No. 20-3644 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2023), a man sued police for arresting him because he had set up a sign saying "Cops Ahead" two blocks away from where they were running an operation to enforce distracted-driving laws. The trial court dismissed the case, holding (1) that the sign was not protected by the First Amendment because it was "of little, if any, public concern"; and (2) that even if it was protected, the officer's conduct in arresting him satisfied strict scrutiny because if police wanted to prevent distracted driving, there was no less restrictive alternative to arresting the plaintiff. But the Second Circuit reversed, holding (1) that speech remains protected even if it is not a matter of public concern; and (2) that there was no evidence that limiting the plaintiff's speech was necessary to permit the state to write citations and enforce the law, even if it would have been helpful.	No, each state is a "sovereign" and whenever a statute describes a crime it is always some act committed by a "person" and these two categories are mutually exclusive. See, for example, US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947): "In common usage, the term `person' does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so." Repeated by US Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979): "In common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it."	This law sounds likely to be unconstitutional and/or invalid because it is pre-empted by state or federal laws. Among other things it probably violates the First Amendment right to petition the government, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws (by depriving people who have had previous police calls of the right to call the police without penalty) and due process (by imposing a penalty based upon a call, without a presumption of innocence, rather than a finding of wrongdoing that overcomes a presumption of innocence). It could also implicate a tenant's right as a Fourth Amendment seizure without probable cause, or a Fifth Amendment taking of property without just compensation. It is probably also pre-empted by state law which establishes the grounds for which someone may be lawfully evicted, which almost certainly do not include this condition. Likewise, the conditions under which liability for police injuries is imposed are also probably pre-empted by state law. California has an express statutory prohibition on this kind of rule at Cal.Civ.Code § 1946.8(c) which provides that: A landlord cannot punish, or threaten to punish, you or another resident for exercising your right to request law enforcement or emergency assistance on behalf of a: victim of abuse; victim of crime; or person in an emergency. Your landlord also cannot put any penalties in place if a person who is not a resident or tenant calls law enforcement or emergency assistance to your residence. To be protected under this law, the person who calls the police must believe that law enforcement or emergency assistance is needed to prevent or deal with an act of abuse, or the heightening or worsening of an act of abuse, a crime, or an emergency. The American Civil Liberties Union is currently actively attempting to identify cases where these laws (often called nuisance laws) are being used in this manner for the purposes of bringing litigation to invalidate the laws or restrain their use. Litigation is in process in Seattle, Washington and East Rochester, New York. The ACLU also notes that: In situations where an alleged "nuisance" offense is related to an incident of domestic violence, landlords may choose to evict all the residents to avoid future incidents or police calls that could result in a fine. Yet, these evictions violate federal law. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has made it clear that tenants who are denied or evicted from housing because they have suffered domestic violence can file sex discrimination complaints with HUD under the federal Fair Housing Act. Thus, there would often be pre-emption of the local law by federal law as well. An op-ed piece in the New York Times reviews similar issues in Lakewood, Ohio and Milwaukee, Wisconsin, pointing out that the U.S. Constitution and federal housing laws are likely to be violated by these statutes. In at least two instances, one included in an edited question in Norristown, Pennsylvania, and one mentioned in another answer, the case of Somai v. City of Bedford in Bedford, Ohio, the ACLU has concluded favorable settlements after litigation to have these ordinances repealed and to win compensation for aggrieved parties, although, because they are settlements, neither case establishes a binding appellate precedent. We don't intend to challenge the laws at this time - they make it easier for us to evict problem tenants whose visitors damage our property - but were wondering if there are examples of similar laws that have either gone unchallenged for a long period of time or that have been challenged and judged to be legal. As landlords, you are in a difficult position. These laws have not gone unchallenged for a long period of time nor have they been challenged and judged to be legal. Instead, in all likelihood, a legal challenge to these newly enacted laws is likely to be imminent. And, while you face violations of local laws in these cases by not taking action, you may face federal housing law liability if you do utilize these laws and these laws are found to be invalid.	There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake.	In reality, nothing will probably happen. There is no record of anybody being prosecuted for ignoring the census since 1970 (as of 2014, the article hasn't been updated since then). 13 U.S. Code § 221.Refusal or neglect to answer questions; false answers: (a)Whoever, being over eighteen years of age, refuses or willfully neglects, when requested by the Secretary, or by any other authorized officer or employee of the Department of Commerce or bureau or agency thereof acting under the instructions of the Secretary or authorized officer, to answer, to the best of his knowledge, any of the questions on any schedule submitted to him in connection with any census or survey provided for by subchapters I, II, IV, and V of chapter 5 of this title, applying to himself or to the family to which he belongs or is related, or to the farm or farms of which he or his family is the occupant, shall be fined not more than $100. (b)Whoever, when answering questions described in subsection (a) of this section, and under the conditions or circumstances described in such subsection, willfully gives any answer that is false, shall be fined not more than $500. (c)Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no person shall be compelled to disclose information relative to his religious beliefs or to membership in a religious body. The entire 13 USC Chapter 7 deals with offenses and penalties related to the Census: 13 USC Chapter 7, you as a citizen would fall under sub-chapter 2 "Other Persons". If you don't submit your answers, the Census bureau will send out a person to collect your responses. How you behave with that person may be more of an issue with regards to your liability.
To what extent can one claim copyright over a sound? It would seem unlikely that one could secure copyright of the musical note A 440 (for example). Generally, more complex sounds (music, sound effects) are complex permutations, mutations or compositions of other, more basic sounds. We also know that a sound is essentially a vibration of air. The sound exists at different states (when it is "played", when it is "composed", when it is "heard" and at other times and in other states). The same sound frequency will be slightly different in each of these states. For example, if you listen to a piano being played, the sound is different 1 inch from the Piano than it is 100 metres from the Piano. The question then becomes how complex does the sound have to be for it to be copyrightable and what is it that you are securing? Are you securing the sound as it is played or as it is heard? How mutated or composed does a note (such as A 440) need to be before it is copyrightable? Does the law take a scientific approach to trying to answer this question or has it been largely built on broad, casually accepted defintions of 'music'? i.e A lawyer thinking that something sounds enough like something else to be the same ... Further does the law break sound down into lower constituent parts when attempting to answer this question? i.e What is the Frequency of the sound, the waveform of the air vibration, the pitch, the timbre, the sonic texture? etc. Is there a definitive list of lawfully mandated measurements which would be used to determine the 'uniqueness' or 'similarity' of a sound? (Feel free to answer the question in relation to the law in the country in which you reside)	As for the subject matter (what can be protected), amplitude, frequency, harmonic pattern, duration etc. are all physical facts, and there is no protection for physical facts. The basic requirement is that the thing protected must be "creative". Once you have a creative composition (assuming it is a composition, where infringement is harder to establish), the question arises whether a particular other composition infringes, or is an independent creation deserving its own protection. Again, the law does not deal in technical acoustic properties, and "similarity" is dealt with in an essentially subjective manner. The find of fact, who is an ordinary observer, has to weight all of the evidence and decide whether there is substantial similarity (or striking similarity) which could be evidence of infringement (substantial similarity is not against the law, copyright infringement is). Both parties to the litigation will present testimony supporting their contention and refuting the others' contention. At some point, one side is likely to introduce expert testimony to the effect that there are only so many possible melodies, which if persuasive can overcome a feeling that two compositions are rather similar. The law only addresses the logic of that judgment, and not the scientific facts. For example, in the case of Testa v. Janssen, the legal premise is set doen that "proof of direct access is unnecessary where striking similarities between two works are present". HOw then do you know if there are striking similarities? To prove that similarities are striking, plaintiffs must demonstrate that "such similarities are of a kind that can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, independent creation, or prior common source." Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y.1973) citing a previous ruling on that point. Ultimately, the courts cannot not dictate a scientific procedure for making that determination.	The question as worded implies that if something is a parody it is automatically fair use or allowed in US copyright law. This is a myth. First of all, in a copyright context, the term "parody" is somewhat limited. In that sense, a "parody" is a new work which comments on the original (often but not always by mocking or ridiculing the original). A mere alternate version which modifies the form of the original, perhaps humorously, but not to comment on the original or perhaps on much of anything, is not a parody. A new work which modifies the original to comment on something else, but not on the original, is a satire. Of course many works may be both parodies and satires in this sense. See this law.se Q&A for extensive quotes from Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co 268 F.3d 1257 (The case of The Wind Done Gone vs Gone with the Wind) and discussion of what is and is not a parody in US copyright law, and when a parody is fair use. A parody, because it comments on the original, will often be found to be a fair use of the original. But not always. The full four-factor analysis must still be done, and the results are never certain until a court has passed on the specific case. See this law.se Q&A for more on fair use. I can't tell from the question whether the modified song is truly a parody in the sense used in copyright law. If not, it probably isn't fair use, although it might be for other reasons. By the way, a song written for a television show or video to be distributed commercially is a commercial use, even if a non-profit corporation is involved, and even if there is an educational purpose. Note that fair-use is a strictly US legal concept. Even if something is fair use under US law, it may be copyright infringement under the laws of some other country.	Your question is whether you can copy instrumental portions of recorded music, and modify it to create a new work, without permission. The answer is that this is illegal. This would be creating a "derivative work", and under copyright law, only the copyright holder has the right to authorize creation of a derivative work. Whether or not you have paid for a copy of a recording, you would still need a separate license to legally extract and use part of a recording. This includes taking just one instrument, and includes taking just a part of one instrument. Material on Youtube is subject to different licenses: in some cases items are free of restrictions, in some cases, you can't legally copy them at all. The standard Youtube license does not allow any copying. Copyright infringement of music is rather common. Enforcement of copyright must be pursued by the copyright holder, and you would need to discuss your specific plans with a copyright attorney to determine your probability of getting sued. Ultimately, you might get away with minimal copying, relying on a fair use defense (you still get sued, but you might prevail and not have to pay). There are street rumors that there is an N-note threshold for copyright infringement, where people often pick numbers from 3 to 7, but in fact there is no clear rule. This resource assembles relevant case law. Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, in the 6th District, establishes the rule that any amount of copying is infringement, whereas VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone in the 9th District rejects that finding and allowed a case of .23 seconds (230 milliseconds) of copying. The "de minimis" doctrine is independent of "fair use" which has a statutory basis, but seems to have arisen from similarity doctrines which are involved in proving that copying took place.	We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games.	My question is, because I am not making any income from the distribution of the game, would the use of the copyrighted music fall under Personal Use? There are some "private use" exemptions in Australian copyright law but they have some fairly narrow conditions. These exemptions are fairly narrow because the point of copyright law is not to prevent you from making money with someone else's intellectual property but to protect the other person's ability to make money with it. If Alice writes a song and Bob distributes it free of charge, Alice loses revenue. Similarly, it is Alice's right to decide whether that song should be included in a freely available open-source software product, and her right to decide whether to allow that use without charge or in exchange for a license fee.	It depends on how much you "copy" (including translate). If you were to have a list of 250 or even 1000 challenging words that appear in the movie, and even list the words in the order that they first appear in the movie, then there is no question of infringing on their copyright. If you create a transcription or translation of any part of the movie, then you are potentially infringing (a transcription being where you write down the spoken English dialogue). There are circumstances, pertaining to "fair use", whereby you could defend yourself in a lawsuit, but you would really need to engage a copyright attorney to advise you where the limit is. The purpose of the "fair use" defense is to make it possible for someone writing a review of a movie to actually quote short bits of dialogue. From the perspective of what would be useful for language learning (i.e. the amount of text that you would need to copy), providing a translation would almost certainly constitute infringement. In listing words which occur in a movie, you would not need to limit yourself to just single words, because there are idiomatic expressions like "down with that" or "kick the bucket", which involve a number of words but function as single units. When it comes to text, the copyright holder does not own the specific words, but he owns the "expression". The closer your product is to replicating that text, the more likely it is that the product will be found to infringe (this is why my example involved just listing the words once: and it should not be the 25,000 most difficult words, since that would amount to near-literal copying for a substantial initial part of the movie). If the movie is also released with e.g. Arabic subtitles (which would involve a licensing agreement), then greater caution would be advised in providing a word-list of difficult words that appear in the movie, because of the "effect on market" consideration.	Well, actually, fair use is maximally relevant. Copyright means, put simply, DO NOT COPY. Citing or not is irrelevant (plagiarism is a whole other non-legal kettle of fish). Technically, what you describe is violation of copyright. However, under section 107 of Title 17 (the copyright law), you could attempt to defend yourself against an infringement suit on the basis that your action was "fair use". See this LSE q&a for the essentials of fair use.	The first copyright law dates from 1710, so it's not true that Chekhov wrote before any copyright laws. Any work from prior to 1924 isn't necessarily safe to use (it depends on when the author died). It is in the US but will complicate things if you publish internationally. Unless you translate with something like Google translate, translation is definitely a creative process. This is especially true (although probably not significant legally) for something like a poem, where its' extra hard if you try to keep the original metre and rhyme scheme. If you publish work in the public domain, you would have some claim to the typography. If the translator has done a copyright assignment to the publisher as part of the publishing agreement, they would hold the rights to the translated version.
Why'd the 1st Amendment (US Constitution) 'become a weaker shield' if it 'is an all-purpose shield for journalists'? Original: Dworkin. A Matter of Principle. p. 385 Middle. First Slighted: Legal Writing in Plain English (2nd edn, 2013). p. 85 Middle. But this strategy of automatic appeal to the First Amendment is, I think, a poor strategy, even if the press is concerned only to expand its legal powers as far as possible. For if the idea becomes popular that the Amendment is an all-purpose shield for journalists, warding off libel suits, deposi- tions, and searches as well as censorship, then it must become a weaker shield [bold mine], because it will seem obvious that so broad a power in the press must be balanced against other private and social interests in the community. What will then suffer is the historically central function of the First Amendment, which is simply to ensure that those who wish to speak on matters of political and social controversy are free to do so. Perhaps the surprising weakness of the First Amendment in protecting the defendants in The Progressive and Snepp cases, for example, is partly a consequence of the very effectiveness of the press in persuading the courts, in an earlier day, that the power of the First Amendment extends well beyond straight cen-sorship cases. I don't understand how the greyed phrase explains the bolded.	Basically, the author is saying that if the First Amendment were interpreted in the way described, as an all-purpose shield -- and therefore, journalists were not subject to libel laws, and could not be searched or deposed -- then journalists, being all but above the law at that point, would have a tremendous amount of power. There would need to be checks and balances to that power for the sake of justice, personal privacy, etc, lest we end up ruled by the press. The implication, and the point of the bolded part, is that these checks and balances must inherently weaken the protection offered by the First Amendment. So the Amendment can be seen as either an all-but-inviolable protection of the specific freedoms enumerated within, or as a general get-out-of-jail-free card that can be voided as community interests demand. It can not reasonably be both strong and overly broad.	Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.	This page lists the highlights of case law regarding prior restraint and the First Amendment. Two pertinent cases are New York Times Co. v. United States, where the court held that despite the potential harm of publishing the revealed information, the prior restraint doctrine was more important (the government cannot prohibit speech before it happens). Reno v. ACLU affirms that even if a publication might cause harm to a class of people, that (limited) harm does not justify universally prohibiting the speech. There is no criminal penalty arising from the government censoring speech. A civil lawsuit – "section 1983" – is possible against an official who illegally attempts to suppress expression contra the First Amendment. The award might be just a dollar if the person so oppressed cannot prove actual damage. Technically, the sky is the limit, and it just depends on how outrageous the jury finds the government's action. If the government were to order suppression of opposition to its policies, we could easily be in the territory of world-record awards for violation of civil rights.	The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering.	The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary.	Neither of the posters in question would constitute a "true threat" which can be subjected to legal sanctions consistent with the First Amendment. The nature of the communication, in the context provided in the question, is clearly metaphorical. The U.S. Supreme Court, incidentally, will be hearing arguments in the case of Counterman v. Colorado on April 19, 2023, pertinent to this question, in which the issue presented is: Whether, to establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective "reasonable person" would regard the statement as a threat of violence. This would, however, be a far closer case under British law, as illustrated by a recent case in which a British teenager was sentenced to 11 year years in prison for inflammatory Internet postings that it was established were a major factor that pushed the people who carried out mass shootings at a Buffalo, New York grocery store and a Colorado Spring gay nightclub to carry out their attacks. As reported by CNN: Daniel Harris, 19, from Derbyshire in northern England, posted videos shared by Payton Gendron, who pleaded guilty to the shooting in Buffalo, as well as videos linked to Anderson Lee Aldrich, the suspect accused of killing five people in a mass shooting at an LGBTQ nightclub in Colorado Springs, Colorado, last November, the court heard, according to PA. Sentencing Harris in court in Manchester, northern England, Judge Patrick Field was quoted by PA as saying, “What they did was truly appalling but what they did was no more than you intended to encourage others to do when publishing this material online.” The postings made by Daniel Harris which led to his conviction would almost certainly not have been actionable under U.S. law which has much stronger First Amendment protections than the U.K.	That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.	It is not decided whether such, in areas, filming can be prohibited. In a "public forum", First Amendment rights are maximally protected, and this includes filing (Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 in particular §A(1) for a summary of the law on this question). In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 the court refined public forum doctrine to distinguish quintessential, limited, and nonpublic fora. In a nonpublic forum, the government may "reserve the forum for its intended purposes": but, such a reservation must be viewpoint-neutral. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 states that "The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time". In a nonpublic forum, demonstrations can be forbidden, especially when demonstrations are incompatible with the purpose of the forum (example: military bases). The particular question you raise has not ended up in court. One may be tempted to reason that First Amendment rights can be arbitrarily curtailed in a non-public forum, but such a restriction would have to have appropriate justification – the restriction would be subject to strict scrutiny. Simply saying "We don't want people filming inside the holding area" is not a valid justification. But, the police are not required to announce their legal argument in advance. If you get busted and film, and they make you stop, you can sue for violation of your First Amendment rights. Your attorney would then need to make a good argument that this restriction is to be subject to strict scrutiny, and that it fails.
If someone removes a speed limit sign, can one still be ticketed for driving over the limit? Say a truck driver were to plow into a speed limit sign, rendering it completely unreadable, and further completely unidentifiable as a speed limit sign. It just so happens that this same sign is the first sign indicating a drop to a lower speed limit. I am driving 60 miles per hour on a 60 mile per hour street, and pass by where originally sat a sign indicating a drop to, say, 40 miles per hour. As there is no sign, I don't know to slow down, and continue driving until stopped by a police officer who claims I am driving past the speed limit. Even if the road is legally set to be a 40 mile per hour road, with no sign indicating the decrease in speed, and no way of knowing there had ever been a speed limit sign there, can I still be ticketed for going over the speed limit?	Obviously the police isn't checking all the time that all the speed limit signs are still where they should be, so in practice you would get a speeding ticket, which the police officer would give you with a good conscience. And you might very well think that you missed the sign, and pay the fine without complaining. If you are sure there was no sign, you could say to that officer "I didn't see any speed limit sign, where was it? " and hopefully he or she would tell you where that sign was supposed to be. Then you might go back, find the sign on the ground, take a photo, take it to the police officer who would then take action to get the sign back up, and would most likely make that speeding ticket invalid. There are exceptions: A speed limit sign can actually allow you to go faster than you would be allowed without the sign. For example in a town the normal speed limit without any signs might be 30mph, and the sign said 40mph. If the police officer stops you going 45, you have no excuse because without the sign the limit would have been 30. Or you have one sign 30, followed by a sign 40. Same situation if the "40" is taken down. Or the police should have put up repeating signs every two miles, but put them every mile. If one sign is down, they could still be within the legal limits. And last, assuming the police didn't put the sign up just for fun, there is probably something making it unsafe to go 60mph if there was a sign 40mph. If that is something you should have seen, and doing 60mph was dangerous for reasons you should have seen, then you might get a ticket for driving at an unreasonable speed. Even if there never was a speed sign. You are never allowed to drive at a dangerous speed.	In general, yes, police could do this. I am not aware of any US state or locality which requires an officer to execute a stop as soon as a traffic violation is observed. Whether the police would act in such a way is another question, but in some areas maximizing citation revenue is a high priority, so police in such areas might act in such a way. If police think a person's actions are "suspicious" and think that the person might be involved in some crime more serious than a traffic violation, it would be common procedure to follow without making a stop or arrest to get a better idea of what the person was doing. Many police I have encountered seem seriously concerned to stop someone driving in what they consider an unsafe way as quickly as possible, and so stop violators promptly, but I don't say that motivates all police all the time.	This varies greatly by state, but the pedestrians "right of way" is quite a common misconception. Pedestrians do not always have the right of way, but you're also not allowed to just run them over if they're in the middle of the street. That's why states have jaywalking laws, and a lot of people don't realize that they can be ticketed for it - because it's a huge safety concern for a pedestrian to walk in the street outside the designated areas. The NCSL provides a Pedestrian Crossing 50 State Summary that outlines the laws regarding pedestrian crossing. Particularly, there are two lines that frequently repeat throughout all the states: Pedestrians may not suddenly leave the curb and enter a crosswalk into the path of a moving vehicle that is so close to constitute an immediate hazard. Pedestrians must yield the right-of-way to vehicles when crossing outside of a marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection. Bottom line: if there is a pedestrian randomly in the middle of the street somewhere, you are fully obligated to attempt to not hit them with your vehicle. Feel free to curse them out (if that's your thing) because in most states they are themselves breaking a law. If an accident can't be prevented due to a pedestrian's actions, then the pedestrian is fully at fault and you will not be held responsible in any way.	Ohio Revised Code Section 4511.25 indicates it is acceptable to drive on the left side of the road when there is an obstruction, and it is otherwise safe. Section 4511.31 indicates it is acceptable to pass in a no-passing zone if the slower vehicle is traveling less than one-half the speed limit, if it is otherwise safe. It does not contain an explicit exception for obstructions. It explicitly overrides Section 4511.30, but not 4511.25. It would take some investigation to figure out which section prevails.	California Vehicle Code, division 3, chapter 1, article 1, section 4000: A person shall not drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, or logging dolly, unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code or registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an off-highway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device issued by the department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left standing in an offstreet public parking facility without being registered or paying registration fees. (Section 38010 defines "off-highway vehicles", essentially agricultural, construction, and other vehicles that are never driven on state roads) Article 2, section 4156: (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, and except as provided in subdivision (b), the department in its discretion may issue a temporary permit to operate a vehicle when a payment of fees has been accepted in an amount to be determined by, and paid to the department, by the owner or other person in lawful possession of the vehicle. The permit shall be subject to the terms and conditions, and shall be valid for the period of time, that the department shall deem appropriate under the circumstances. Article 7, section 4850: The department, upon registering a vehicle, shall issue to the owner two partially or fully reflectorized license plates or devices for a motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle, and one partially or fully reflectorized license plate or device for all other vehicles required to be registered under this code. The plates or devices shall identify the vehicles for which they are issued for the period of their validity. Article 9, section 5202: A license plate issued by this state or any other jurisdiction within or without the United States shall be attached upon receipt and remain attached during the period of its validity to the vehicle for which it is issued while being operated within this state or during the time the vehicle is being held for sale in this state, or until the time that a vehicle with special or identification plates is no longer entitled to those plates; and a person shall not operate, and an owner shall not knowingly permit to be operated, upon any highway, a vehicle unless the license plate is so attached. A special permit issued in lieu of plates shall be attached and displayed on the vehicle for which the permit was issued during the period of the permit’s validity. Divsion 17, article 1, chapter 1, section 40000.1: Except as otherwise provided in this article, it is unlawful and constitutes an infraction for any person to violate, or fail to comply with any provision of this code, or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to this code. In short, yes, you need a license plate or equivalent temporary registration permit to drive on the highways; California is a bit unusual in that it requires license plates for parked vehicles as well.	This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied.	Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.	I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer In France, the Code de la Route (Article R413-15) outlaws the possession of devices that detect or disturb, or are intended to detect or disturb, the operation of devices or systems that record or regulate road traffic, or allow evasion of road traffic offenses. This Article was last amended on 3 January 2012, and it is punishable by a fine of up to €1,500, confiscation of the device, and confiscation of the vehicle. The law is not prescriptive about such devices, and this is likely intentionally so. This Article is technology-agnostic, and would apply to any device with such a purpose. You can therefore assume that all speed radar detectors are illegal.
A borrower signed a promissory note in which he put up an annuity plan and his 401k plan as collateral. Borrower defaulted and there is strong evidence of promissory fraud. How can the annuity plan account and 401k account best be reached?	Generally speaking, a security agreement purporting to use a 401(k) account as collateral is void as a matter of law unless the loan is made by the institution that maintains the 401(k) account. This is also true of many annuity accounts which have special retirement account character (e.g. a TIAA-CREF annuity as part of a teacher's retirement plan). A non-retirement private annuity could normally be foreclosed upon in some manner as security, by forwarding the note, evidence of default and the security agreement to the private annuity holder, assuming that the security interest in the private annuity was properly perfected under the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9. If it was not properly perfected, it still might be possible to access this assets in a court action to enforce the promissory note and security agreement. Default would be sufficient to get a money judgment under the promissory note, and the mere fact that a 401(k) was pledged as collateral when it was not legal to do so would not show promissory fraud, without a showing that the borrower knew this and intended this effect. Otherwise, it could simply be a mutual mistake as to the legality of that security agreement. A court might very well find not fraud but negligence on the part of the creditor for not taking the proper steps to obtain collateral status for the collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code. Even if there was promissory fraud, this would only prevent discharge of the debt in bankruptcy if the creditor made the proper showing in a contested adversary action timely filed in a bankruptcy and would generally not permit access to the 401(k) funds. There are very few exceptions to the immunity of 401(k) funds from creditors claims and nothing in the OP suggests that the facts necessarily to benefit from any exception would be present in this case.	If he is still pressuring you for the money even after filing insurance, talk to your city or county prosecutor's office. If you call the police, they may say they're too busy to deal with it and that it's a "he said-she said" situation anyway. But if you go to the local prosecutor, they should be more interested, as this could be a felony, considering the amount of money demanded, and they can instruct the police to help investigate.	The Facebook forum doesn't prevent a contract from being formed. But, for a contract to be formed there must be an affirmative agreement, not silence (at least in cases that aren't between merchants). If they later decide to work together without reaching an agreement on the details, the draft contact could be considered, but the Facebook forum for its delivery and that fact that it wasn't expressly assented to might reduce its weight as part of the evidence in an attempt to determine what the terms of their oral or implied agreement to work together involved. It would be very unusual for a broker not to get a signed agreement in writing to pay his fees, although an oral or unsigned agreement to pay a broker is not necessarily barred by a statute of frauds. A finder of fact would be quite skeptical of a broker's claim to have an agreement in those circumstances and often the professional regulatory provisions related to brokerages would require that fee agreement must be signed and in writing even if contract law does not require that this be done.	What would be the best course of action now? It has been six months with no communication from him or his estate lawyer, and no will has been filed with the court. Since it's not entering probate, is there any guarantee that he has to faithfully execute the conditions of the will at all or notify any of the beneficiaries? Without probate, can he simply choose to not execute the will? A will has no effect or validity until it is admitted to probate. You can't do anything with a will outside a probate proceeding. Usually state law requires that a will that is in someone's possession be lodged with the court, whether or not they plan on opening up a probate estate, but this requirement is widely ignored. Unlike a will, a trust can be administered without court supervision, without being admitted to probate, although usually, the trust is required to file a notice of its existence with the court if it has become irrevocable (a requirement that is also widely ignored). The trustee of a trust has a fiduciary duty to administer the trust in accordance with its terms and to keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about it. Again, sometimes the notice to the beneficiaries is overlooked. Also, it wouldn't be unusual for someone to inaccurately say that a will provided that a certain thing happen, when, in fact, that was a provision in a trust. People are sloppy in ordinary conversation about the distinctions between wills and trusts. If a trust was drafted to avoid probate, the will is probably just a "pour over will" which states that if there is any property that is not in the trust as her death that it is hereby transferred to the trust. Normally, a person would not have both a trust designed to avoid probate and a will with substantive provisions at the same time. If you suspect that you know who the trustee is, the first step would be to write a formal letter that you can prove was sent and received (e.g. via certified mail or FedEx), asking if there is a trust, and if there is one, if you are a beneficiary of that trust, and asking for the trust agreement (or at least the parts of it pertinent to you status as beneficiary). If the person that you suspect is trustee is a trustee, he has a legal duty to let you know these things (which doesn't mean that he necessarily will do so). If you fail to receive cooperation or a response after this initial inquiry, you may need to hire counsel to attempt to obtain this information through the courts.	Do I have standing to sue a credit bureau or lender after being approved for a loan but being prevented from signing due to their error? Unfortunately, no. The email you got from the loan agency reflects that no contract was formed yet. The email merely is the loan agency's expression of interest to proceed toward the formation of that contract. Absent that formation of the contract, even if for reasons beyond your control, you are not entitled to the benefits or consideration(s) the contract would provide. Nor would the lender be entitled to your compliance with the terms of that contract, terms which might not even be informed --let alone known-- to you. There is no legal obligation from one party to the other. Lastly, the agency's or bureau's faulty process/questionnaire is not actionable either. Lender's reluctance to employ an alternative method is within his freedom of contract.	If you lived in a community property state, that would create responsibility for your late wife's debts (but Kansas is not one). If you signed a financial responsibility agreement you would be liable (but I assumed you did not). No matter what, her estate is liable, and that could eventually affect you (her debts must be paid first). However, there is one last criterion, the "doctrine of necessaries". This ruling notes Kansas recognizes the doctrine of necessaries, under which a spouse can be held liable when the other spouse obtains necessary items, like food or medical care, on credit. See also St. Francis Regional Med. Center, Inc. v. Bowles for support that the doctrine survives in Kansas.	Controlling shareholders of a company have a fiduciary duty to other stockholders (see the section on controlling stockholder/company in the reference). That is, their decisions must be guided by the legitimate interests of the other stock holder, they can't privilege their own outcomes, or maliciously torpedo the interests of the other stockholders. If you think they have deliberately made bad decisions just to screw you, you can sue them for breech of their fiduciary duty. Of course their defense can be that they made decisions for perfectly rational reasons that respected their fiduciary duty, but simply turned out badly. You'd have to provide evidence that the decisions were reckless and/or malicious.	If the purported guarantor can prove the facts stated then they are not a guarantor You can rely on the signature and the onus of proving it isn’t theirs on the balance of probabilities rests on the guarantor. However, if they can do that, then they never agreed to be guarantor and you’re out of luck.
Copyright on a physical object where no patent exists Lets say my company make a new shape of Rubik's Cube (a round ball twisty puzzle) and we call it a "Ball Cube" (my company is called "Puzzles" so its a "Puzzles Ball Cube"). I patent the "Ball Cube" and start selling it... 20 years later the patent expires and lots of other twisty puzzle manufacturers create the "Ball Cube" and call it their own brand so lets just say "Rubik's Ball Cube" and "LanLan Ball Cube" and "China Ball Cube". Are they free to do so? do i legally own copyright for the "Ball Cube" phrase or the design of the original? Or would I have to file for a trademark? Can a physical object like this twitsy ball cube be protected under copyright after the aptent expires?	You would want to establish trademark protection on the phrase "Ball Cube": copyright is not generally a good way to protect names or other short phrases. See, for example, Can I copyright the name of my band? from the U. S. Copyright Office, which notes that "names are not protected by copyright law." Furthermore, you're interested in preventing others from selling a similar object using a similar name, and that's precisely what trademark protection is for. The ball cube design would potentially be eligible for copyright protection, but you should be aware that this protection would not extend to elements of its design that originated in Rubik's Cube, because your design would be a derivative work.	Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties.	Can I sell below parody T-Shirts? Sure, you can sell those shirts. But there is no guarantee that your own determination and claim of Fair Use for a parody would prevail in court. The determination that your use of those derivative designs - Fair Use as a Parody - is not yours to make; it is for a court to make, if and when the copyright holders of those two franchises choose to take you to court. Your determination of Fair Use could only be valid in the US; there may be no Fair Use law in your country, and any relevant international laws and agreements will impact what the legal steps the copyright holders can take against you. Read Fair Use again for exceptions to the law and about international laws such as as Berne Convention and World Intellectual Property Organization. Warner Brothers (Superman) and Paramount (Godfather) could decide at any time to confront you with a cease and desist letter or a lawsuit to challenge your claim of Fair Use. They may win; you may win your defense of their lawsuit. That's a risk you will take. The fact that other people currently produce shirts with similar designs doesn't mean anything. They may not have been confronted by the copyright holders; or the copyright holders may not care to confront small producers of possibly infringing designs and products.	I'm assuming that you are in the UK, as you are talking about the British Standards Institue. In general the truth cannot be copyrighted but an expression of that truth can be, provided that it is creative or original to at least some extent. In this case the equations and constants you want to use are descriptions of scientific truths. If you translate them into another form (e.g. a computer program) then you are not copying the creative bit (the layout and arrangement of those equations and explanatory text), so you are not violating the copyright. Edit: I should also have said for (3) that their descriptions of the constants and variables will be copyright. You would have to avoid copying their words. However given that these are going to be terse descriptions of facts your words can still be pretty similar without infringing on copyright, because there are only so many ways of describing the acceleration due to gravity, or whatever. Take a look at some alternative references to see what words they use.	I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies.	If you have a truly novel and non-obvious game idea, you could patent it, and that would cost many tens of thousands of dollars if not hundreds of thousands of dollars (U.S.) in legal fees, etc. and probably a couple of years of patent prosecution, if your idea has not already entered the public domain through public display or sale. Most ideas for games are either not novel, or would be obvious to a person skilled in designing games. But, if your idea is really and truly new, you could do it.	The basic principle about copyright protection is that the expression of an idea is protected, but the idea itself is not. So wholesale copying without permission is infringing. But the abstract algorithm is not protected by copyright (and let us assume that it also isn't patented). By way of analog, an insertion sort is a pretty easy concept to grasp, and once you understand it, you can re-create it, independent of how the original example (where from you learned about the sort) is expressed. So the question is whether it is necessary for you to copy that code (copyright protects against copying), or can you independently re-express the algorithmic idea (ideas are not protected)?	A character can not be copyrighted. Only a work (picture, text, movie etc.) featuring that character can. However, a character can be registred as a trademark (more specifically, its name and its appearance).
What did SCOTUS signify by 'metaphysical doubt'? Legal Writing in Plain English (2nd edn, 2013). po. 214 Bottom - 215 Top. Link to old edition. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment is proper.29 As the Supreme Court has made clear, a nonmovant cannot raise a genuine fact issue merely by showing "some metaphysical doubt" about the facts.30 If the record as a whole could not lead a rational fact-finder to decide for the nonmovant, then no genuine fact issue remains for trial.31 As this Court has observed, summary judgment "affords a merciful end to litigation that would otherwise be lengthy and expensive."32 30 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; see also Little v. Liquid Air Carp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The relevant para. beneath from Matsushita, doesn't explain this term though, which (I divine) signifies something else than the signification in philosophy? Second, the issue of fact must be "genuine." Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 56(c), (e). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), [Footnote 12] its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. See DeLuca v. Atlantic Refining Co., 176 F.2d 421, 423 (CA2 1949) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 943 (1950); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (1983); Clark, Special Problems	Basically, the idea of incontrovertable evidence is that the evidence points to one and only one truth, and the fact-finder need not doubt it (metaphysical doubt) unless opposition provides material fact that refutes the claim. That is, the defendant may be innocent until proven guilty, but evidence that shows guilt exists on the defendant's part is not false just because it demonstrates this. Thus, if the person making the claim meets the burden of proof, the person in the defense must refute with new evidence that raises doubt about the new fact. One should not assume it is not factual just because it aids in the claim against a defendant. You cannot doubt the evidence just because you doubt it; there must be a reason.	The Constitution does not state your opinion of SCOTUS's job, instead it just says that there shall be one supreme court with judicial power, and it says what kind of cases are within the jurisdiction of that court. Thus The Constitution does not mandate whether rulings will adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis, will be based only on a narrowly literal interpretation of The Constitution, or will be based on a general sense of justice. The Constitution also does not say anything about the rules of that Supreme Court, therefore the court is free to set its own rules, and to allow or to not allow amicus briefs. Many points raised in amicus briefs fall on deaf ears, sometimes because they are based on non-shared legal assumptions. You can read a very brief summary of the over 140 amicus briefs in this case here. If you read various SCOTUS opinions over the past 225+ years, you will see that the court does make reference to fact, not just statements of the law and constitution. This brings it well within the scope of "potentially relevant" to determine some fact. The lawyers get to argue how facts relate to legal conclusions, but the basic fodder for any legal decision is some set of facts. The specific briefs you mentioned are: Pro-Life Obstetricians and College of Obstetricians. The latter's argument is self-summarized as Amici’s position is that laws regulating abortion should be evidence-based, supported by a valid medical or scientific justification, and designed to improve—not harm—women’s health Pro-Life Obsetricians' position is self-summarized as support for a law that rationally furthers Mississippi’s interest in protecting women’s health from risks posed by later- term abortions, which are now well established in the literature These statements refer to interpretive doctrines previously established by SCOTUS, but not literally expressed in The Constitution. In US v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 introduced concepts of constitutionality (not literally stated in The Constitution) whereby cases could be reviewed either with "strict scrutiny" for protection of Constitutional rights or else discernment of a "rational interest" in government taking a certain action. Either of these kinds of judicial review require a comparison of law to "the facts". Hence "the facts" can be legally relevant.	Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.	Language is contextual. When the meaning of a communication is at issue in litigation, that meaning is gleaned from the totality of the evidence, not from any presumption of what a word means in isolation. "Okay" can mean "yes", it might mean only that you understand, it might communicate coerced acquiesence falling short of actual consent. See the discussion in R. c. Byers, 2018 QCCQ 4673: [81] Regarding the petitioner’s pretention claiming that she “clearly express her wish to consult an attorney”, the Court considers that the answer “OK” does not show a clear intention to consult a lawyer. [82] At the most “OK” could mean that she understood, that she heard them and also could [have] signified “Yes, I would like to consult an attorney”. [83] In the decision Ellis, the Court of appeal had to analyze the meaning of the words “OK” as part of evidence of purchasing a firearm, the Court considered that this had an equivocal meaning. [84] Moreover, the Court wrote: “[40] (…) Viewed in the context of the whole of the evidence, we consider it a reasonable inference that the two responses “Ok ok” signified nothing more than an acknowledgement of the prices quoted.” [85] For analysis purpose, the Court will consider that the answer “OK” means “yes”. See also R. v. Potvin, 2012 ONCA 113: The pertinent facts known to the appellant were straightforward. The complainant repeatedly said “no” to sex and then appeared to say “yes” by uttering the word “okay”. Viewed in the context of all that preceded it, we agree with the trial judge that the complainant’s use of the word “okay” was ambiguous. In the absence of further inquiry by the appellant, a single “okay” after five refusals over a sustained period of time was simply insufficient to ground a reasonable but mistaken belief in consent.	An example is that a person eventually convicted of a crime has made a false statement in pleading "not guilty". 1001a would compel confessions, because you cannot legally conceal a material fact. In a judicial proceeding, the analog that prevents certain kinds of "lying" is the law against perjury, which is much stricter than the broad language of 1001.	It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.	Focusing on evidence is putting the cart before the horse; what is relevant is proof. In the case overall and on any point in particular one party has the burden of proof to the requisite standard; balance of probabilities for a civil case, beyond reasonable doubt for a criminal case. The burden of proof is often associated with the Latin maxim semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit, the best translation of which in this context is: "the necessity of proof always lies with the person who lays charges." So, if I make an assertion that is disputed then I have to prove my assertion; if I cannot then my assertion is not proven. In practice this can get a little mucky and the burden of proof can switch from side to side like a tennis match as evidence is presented and rebutted but it is important to remember who has the burden at any given time. It is also worth noting that absence of evidence can also be evidence; especially when such evidence should be readily available. For the testimonial example: A business Bragco presented a glowing testimonial from Newco in its advertising material. The regulator (ACCC) has made the allegation that the testimonial is false; they bear the burden of proof. As evidence, they list the databases they have searched that indicate that Newco is not a company, business or person and that therefore the testimonial is false. Bragco has 2 choices: they can rebut the ACCC's evidence or they can deny it but present no evidence. They do actually have a 3rd choice; they can agree with the ACCC in which case they would probably have cut a deal before the case got to court. Rebuttal is easy (if the testimonial is genuine): they can produce Newco who will testify that yes, they exist and yes, they gave the testimonial. On the balance of probabilities, the ACCC has not met their burden; case dismissed. However, if they remain silent then the court will consider the evidence before it, in summary 1) no evidence of Newco can be found 2) Bragco who has a relationship with Newco chose not to provide evidence of the latter's existence. On the balance of probabilities, the ACCC has met the burden; proceed to judgement. Note: if they were seeking a criminal conviction then they may not have met the burden. @Mowzer has asked me to address the following: Bragco produces an expert witness who testifies the search of databases was not exhaustive and could have missed the target person because the databases do not contain an exhaustive list of people. Also, the target person could have used an alias. Similarly, no exhaustive list of businesses exist. Nor does every business need to be registered in a searchable list anyway. Furthermore, it's not the obligation of the company to keep records on everyone who writes a testimonial and be able to track them down. That's not their job. This testimony would be unsuccessful for a very simple reason: the judge is not an idiot. Balance of probabilities is a simple standard of proof: given the arguments and the evidence put forward; which do you think is the most likely version of events. Accepting all the evidence, what we have is 1) there was a negative search 2) that search was not exhaustive 3) Bragco could have produced some evidence that Newco existed (an email, a last known address, the name of a director) 4) it actually is an obligation on a company to keep such records since it was their choice to use the testimonial: having it challenged is reasonably foreseeable. You be the judge; how do you decide? Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, however, in Australia at least a business must be conducted in the name of a natural person(s) or through a registered business name or a registered company. If the business name or company cannot be found on the register then, legally, it does not exist QED. If the business is being conducted by a natural person then surely there must be some evidence of that person's existence that the defendant could present? These cases do happen, see ACCC v P&N Pty Ltd, however, in that case the facts were not disputed i.e. the defendant agreed that it had been a very naughty boy so the question of evidence had not come up. As for keeping records. There are obligations imposed by statute and there are obligations imposed by reasonable business practice. For example, financial records of companies in Australia are required to be kept for 7 years. If you sell a product for which an Australian Consumer Law claim could be made 10 or 20 years after the sale (whitegoods for example) and you did not keep a record of sales; you would be exposed to anyone who claimed they bought the product from you if you only kept records for the statutory period. This has already been borne out in asbestosis claims: if a person claims they worked for you 30+ years ago and you have no records then the court will accept that they did work for you - after all, they were there, right?	No-ish, it is not. The relevant sticking point would be in their DMCA takedown notice, where they have to follow 17 USC 512(c)(3)(A) and include in their notice (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. The key here is having a "good faith belief". There is a credible scenario where a company A could file multiple notices for the actually same material B posted by the exact same person C, where the person has the right to post that material, and do so in good faith. If A was not able to locate evidence of the permission to C, then they would shift the burden of proof to C – "good faith belief" doesn't mean that they have to be right, just that they have to actually think they are. If C also uses the name D, A would not be able to determine that the work was licensed to D based on the fact (once they know that) that it is licensed to C. DMCA abuse is not an permanently open escape hatch. 17 USC 512(4) states Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section— (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it. See Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011. The ruling judge found that "Defendant could not have reasonably believed that the Press Release he sent to Hotham was protected under copyright". The appeal court drew on precedent and dictionary to fill in gaps w.r.t. "good faith belief", that the person should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was making misrepresentations In this case, the abuser was flagrantly abusing the takedown system, and there is some reason to believe that in the instant case, the abuser had actual knowledge of non-infringement. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America provides an alternative outcome. In this case, Rossi operated a website that appeared (note the word appear) to offer free downloads of movies, and the rights-holder MCAA filed a takedown notice. In fact, it did not offer any such downloads, but MCAA's investigation stopped prematurely. This court held that "good faith belief" is subjective, so Rossi did not prevail. It is no doubt crucial that Rossi actually counted on his customers thinking that you could get actual downloads of protected material. Whether or not a DMCA abuse suit would succeed would depend very much on the factual details of why the material is not infringing, and how easily the rights-holder could know that there was no infringement.
Can I sue a restaurant for serving me meat in vegetarian dish? I am a vegetarian for religious reasons. I was at Chipotle on Saturday and ordered a sofritas rice bowl which is "vegan approved". To my surprise, I found a chunk of chicken in my bowl when I was halfway through eating it. Made me feel sick to the stomach realizing that I may have eaten chicken already. Went back to the Order desk and showed the server meat in my bowl. They immediately offered a refund and asked if I wish to file a complaint. The manager brought out a complaint form and filled for me. Gave me a copy as well. I did not take any refund. just walked out, I was very upset. My question is: Can I take a legal action against Chipotle?	An essential component of your contract with them is that they will provide you with food free of animal stuff (the exact nature of "vegan approved" may be up for debate, but actual meat should not be included). So they breached their contract with you, and you might sue them for breach of contract. The case of Gupta v. Asha (orders were mixed up) could be useful in this matter. In this case, Hindus were served samosas containing beef, despite repeated assertions that they were vegetarian. Plaintiffs sued, the case was dismissed, and the appeals court deemed that the lower court was part right and part wrong. The important thing to understand is that you have to claim a specific legal wrong (and your attorney would advise you about that). Those plaintiffs made a claim under NJ product liability law, and that was dismissed because the product wasn't defective, it was simply the wrong product. They also made a claim regarding fraud, and there was at least a legal question behind that claim, but because there was no ascertainable loss (e.g. the plaintiffs were not hospitalized because of the omission), so that claim too was dismissed. Likewise a negligence claim was dismissed. Plaintiffs did get to first base w.r.t. the claim of emotional distress arising from breach of contract. I have no evidence regarding the final disposition of the case: the point is that there might be a legal basis for a lawsuit in your state, but you would need to secure the paid assistance of an attorney.	The most important fact to bear in mind is that there's no way to predict whether a given individual will decide to file a suit against you, though we might say on what basis he might, if he so chooses. There are two basic grounds for a suit, one pertaining to trademarks and the other pertaining to use of names – misappropriation and violating the right of publicity. A word can be a trademark, but the scope of protection is somewhat narrow because the protection is in terms of use within a given business. So calling your computer company "Apple" is out, but calling you roofing service the same is okay (assuming that somebody didn't previously register "Apple Roofing"). The main consideration is the likelihood of confusion. Supposing your business were selling landline telephones and I don't think Apple computer company sells such phones, you might still be in trouble if you called your company "Apple Phone", since they certainly do sell phones. There are thousands of trademarks that include "Puff", including Cocopuffs and various pizza and cheese puffs. Since "Puff" is such a generic word, there is a higher bar to proving infringement (there are thousands of trademarks including "Puff"). "Puff Daddy" is, however, a registered trademark covering perfume, jewelry, clothing and certain online services, so there is a non-negligible chance of confusion. In the case of names (or apparent names), an additional concern is whether this is commercial exploitation without consent of a person's name (which causes harm to the subject). The underpinning of this tort is that such a use falsely implies an endorsement of the product. Again, with a fairly generic word like Puff, there isn't a clear implication that Sean Combs has endorsed a product that is called "Puff Communications", but "Puff Daddy Communications" would almost certainly cross that line. The main issues, then, are the extent to which the name is generic vs. unique, and whether it is likely that a person would interpret the product or service as being the same as another, or would constitute an endorsement.	It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.	Is it true that I cannot buy a puppy and smash it deliberately for my perverse amusement (regardless of whether it's in front of them or not)? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? Is it true that I cannot buy a cow or a pig and throw it into a woodchipper similarly for my perverse amusement? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? You can't do either of these things. Every state has some sort of law banning cruelty to animals. For example, in Colorado, the laws prohibiting cruelty to animals are codified at Sections 18-9-201 to 18-9-209, Colorado Revised Statutes. The core language of the statute is codified at Section 18-9-202(1)-(1.5) (as of July 1, 2014) which states (in language that is not atypical nationally) that: (1)(a) A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence ovedrives, overloads, overworks, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beats, allows to be housed in a manner that results in chronic or repeated serious physical harm, carries or confines in or upon any vehicles in a cruel or reckless manner, engages in a sexual act with an animal, or otherwise mistreats or neglects any animal, or causes or procures it to be done, or having the charge or custody or ay animal, fails to provide it with proper food, drink or protection from weather consistent with the species, breed, and type of animal involved, or abandons an animal. (1)(b) Any person who intentionally abandons a dog or cat commits the offense of cruelty to animals. (1.5)(a) A person who commits cruelty to animals if he or she recklessly or with criminal negligence tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. (1.5)(b) A person commits aggravated cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. (1.5)(c) A person commits cruelty to a service animal if he or she violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this section with respect to a service animal . . . whether the service animal is on duty or not on duty. The rest of the statute mostly spells out sentences and other remedies and definitions applicable to these offenses. For what it is worth, the laws against cruelty to animals, and the now obsolete laws prohibiting cruelty to slaves that existed when slavery was legal in the U.S., were quite similar. So, yes, an animal (pet or otherwise, there is almost no formal legal distinction between pets and non-pets, even though in practice, people evaluate what is cruel to a pet and to a farm animal differently) is property. Yes, someone who owns an animal may intentionally kill it or maim it, or have someone acting at the owner's instructions do so. But, an owner must do so humanely under the circumstances and must do so for a good reason (such as for food, to put down a sick or injured or dangerous animal, or for experimental research). Ranking states is a bit difficult. There are some states that have felony cruelty to animals statutes and some that don't. I don't have the time to look for an exhaustive survey of the law state by state (one summary is here). There are some states that are quite specific (like Colorado) and others that are more general in language. Idaho has an express provision that killing animals that are harrying livestock is an acceptable reason. Some of the difference boils down to how the law is applied in practice, rather than to the language of the statutes on the books. The overall gist of the statutes, however, is pretty similar: don't be cruel in how you do it, and don't harm animals if you don't have a good reason for doing so. There is also a lot of conduct (for example, separating mothers and young children, amputating body parts such as claws or tails or reproductive organs without consent, or confining and leashing them) that would cause emotional harm to animals and which would be grave human rights abuses, that is not prohibited as cruelty to animals. Similarly, there are many farming practices that are accepted as not violating these laws like the process of creating veal or foie gras that could be characterized as cruel but are accepted as not violating the laws against cruelty to animals. To a great extent, these exceptions, which are rarely codified, are simply a matter of custom and practice and tradition, rather than having any well reasoned logical derivation from statutory language.	There isn't likely to be a single universal definition; a word can be defined in different ways for different laws. It's entirely possible that these laws have no more specific definition of "food" than what you've found. In that case, a court interpreting the law would presumably follow the plain meaning rule, under which "ordinary words have their ordinary meaning". Should there be a dispute, a judge would have to determine whether the substance in question is "food" in the ordinary sense of the word (in some cases, judges have cited widely used dictionaries when looking for an "ordinary" definition). They would also try to determine whether the legislature would have intended this particular substance to be covered by the law.	This is not "libel," which is a form of defamation (publishing a false and defamatory statement that injures another). "Bait and switch" is a type of violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Law. That Law makes it illegal for a business to engage in any false or deceptive practices, or to perform any false or deceptive acts, in commerce. Read more about it on the Massachusetts' state government site. If the restaurant's conduct was deceptive and it caused you harm (for instance, you would not have gone into the restaurant and ordered at all if you had known you had to order a drink to get the favorable price on sliders,) there may be a violation.	If the "Pokeball" image is copyrighted and/or a trademark of Nintendo/whoever makes the Pokemon games, then whoever put that image out there under CC 3.0 BY is in violation and can be sued and will probably lose, and you would be in violation and can be sued and will probably lose. Your penalty would almost certainly be less since your violation was "innocent", that is, you had no way of knowing that the "Pokeball" imagery was somebody's protected intellectual property. ... Except you kind of maybe should know that, unless whoever made the Pokemon games (Nintendo or other) put the image out there and you can verify that, that maybe this license could be bogus and you should consult with who you imagine the owner of that IP may be or an impartial professional who could tell you for sure. I'm thinking if it were me I would do a little more research - and maybe get a paid opinion - if I was really thinking about using this for any but private purposes.	If you want to sue them, you should start with the US Constitution (as a model), in particular the Free Exercise clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". The question is whether one could overturn homicide statutes on the grounds that an individual holds to traditional beliefs that a human sacrifice is required every few months. Or, is it an unconstitutional prohibition of the Mormon belief in polygamy to outlaw polygamy, see Reynolds v. US, 98 U.S. 145. The court held that the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so, the only question which remains is whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship; would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Observe that a religious exception to the law would be unconstitutional, as establishing religion as a means of gaining extra rights. The reductio ad absurdum of the unfettered religious-belief excuse is: Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. The "wall of separation" was modified more recently in the 60's and 70's. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, the issue was compulsory education imposed on Amish children, where higher education was held to be antithetical to the Amish doctrine of a simple life. The court rules that The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children and especially it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish There were additional holdings pertaining to the legitimacy of the purported belief (that is, is there really such a doctrine – clearly yes). You might have better luck purporting to be a Rastafarian or Hindu, so I will set aside that complication. The core question will be whether the government has a "compelling interest" in the restriction, also whether the restriction is narrowly tailored. In the case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, Sherbert's employer required her to work 6 days a week (a change in policy during her time of employment), which she refused to do (as a member of SDA) and was fired. Sherbert was denied unemployment benefits because the firing was for cause. The court ruled that Disqualification of appellant for unemployment compensation benefits, solely because of her refusal to accept employment in which she would have to work on Saturday contrary to her religious belief, imposes an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of her religion. and There is no compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute which justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's right to religious freedom under the First Amendment. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 brings us to the neighborhood that you are interested in living in. The relevant detail is that Smith (and Black) were fired for ingesting peyote in connection with a ceremony at a Native American church. The court ruled that The Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use, and thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use To be more precise, Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. We can contrast this with Lukumi v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520. The city of Hialeh passed an ordinance forbidding animal sacrifice, specifically to suppress the Santeria church. The Supreme Court said, no, you may not do that: Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability. However, where such a law is not neutral or not of general application, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny: It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied ... The ordinances' texts and operation demonstrate that they are not neutral, but have as their object the suppression of Santeria's central element, animal sacrifice. At least so far, restrictions on drug use have not been overruled as conflicting the the Free Exercise clause, although if e.g. Washington state were to prohibit Mormons from purchasing marijuana (where others can), that would surely be struck down as unconstitutional. There are a number of other relevant developments, for example Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993, in reaction to Employment v. Smith, and that law statutorily mandating that strict scrutiny be applied to the question of whether a law violates the 1st: but this was ruled unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507. Then in Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (Schedule 1 tea for religious purposes), the court ruled that The courts below did not err in determining that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca which is to say, we have a case where the federal government was prohibited from enforcing a drug prohibition involving religion. A challenge of the type which you have in mind will surely also involve the question of the legitimacy of the purported religion, where UDV was founded in 1961 whereas one might suspect that your claimed religion is a pretext to smoke pot (hence the Rastafarian suggestion). The WWII era conscious objector cases held that the CO exception to military service is not limited to governmentally-approved religions, but as a general rule, the courts have not ruled that you can simply claim to have a religious belief which is being infringed on and thereby be excempt from the law. The basic issue would be whether either the US government of the state of Kentucky have a compelling interest in preventing the use of marijuana. The Kentucky Supreme Court does indeed recognize the concept of "strict scrutiny", so the case is not doomed from the start.
Can jury nullification apply to a civil lawsuit? What I am referring to, is when a jury rules that the accused is technically guilty, but shouldn't be punished for it anyway. In other words: the jury determines that the letter of the law conflicts with the spirit of it, and chooses to follow the spirit instead. Can this be done in a civil case? My understanding is that if you go to court with someone over a contract, the case is not tried by a jury. But, can the law still be overridden in the interest of justice? For instance, imagine a scenario where a A brings in his car for repairs. The mechanic B charges him twice as much as agreed for it, and when A complains he points to some fine print in the contract that A didn't notice when he signed it, which says his prices will be twice what is agreed on tuesdays between 3 and 5pm, and look at that: A brought in his car at 3:05! So while B is technically correct, it is entirely plausible that a jury might look at this and say: hang on, that's clearly absurd, you can't go around charging people more because they didn't notice your cleverly worded loophole. Except, that since this is a civil case, there's no jury. So, is a judge allowed to say that? You may disagree with my specific example, but hopefully you get the point: I'm asking whether it is possible for a court without a jury to rule against the technical interpretation of a law, if they determine that following the letter of it would in this single case by unjust, or contrary to the spirit.	Your question isn't quite as simple as it sounds; some civil cases are tried before juries, and though a judge can give directions to a jury to give a particular verdict, they are not always required to obey; there are eighteenth-century English cases on the point that established that principle for most related jurisdictions. But your last sentence does have a simple answer: No. A judge usually takes an oath on assuming office, to administer the law without fear or favour. That means he will investigate the relevant law (with the assistance of the parties' lawyers), and enforce what it says. "This law would be unfair to the customer, so I will ignore it" would be just as bad as "The mechanic threatened to hit me with a wrench, so I find for him". Of course, most jurisdictions do have overriding principles of fairness; it may be that this contract term was not shown to the customer, so is not enforceable, or it may be that it is contrary to public policy to be uncertain what repairs will cost. But unless there is an explicit legal reason, the judge will have to find for the mechanic. It would be neither improper nor unusual for the judgment to include the sentence "This result is clearly unfair to the customer, and I urge the legislature to look at closing the loophole; nevertheless, the law is clear, and I find the customer must pay the increased price."	Can defense request findings of fact before resting? Is it possible for the Defense to avoid presenting affirmative defenses (like Self Defense) before the Court has found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime? If so: How? No, no and not applicable. A verdict is a singular declaration by the jury (or judge) that the state has or has not proved their case. Affirmative Defence These are all affirmative defenses which defeat or mitigate the consequences of the unlawful conduct and the onus of proof lies with the Defence, not the Prosecution. An affirmative defence must be pleaded in a timely manner. If the Prosecution fails in their burden to prove the unlawful conduct the affirmative defence does not get engaged. This is a threshold decision point for the trier of fact and the judge should so instruct the jury. Of necessity, affirmative defences require some admission of fact, however, these facts may not be in contention anyway. Where they are in contention, it requires a strategic choice by the defendant as to whether to use the affirmative defence or not. Is there some theory or principle that illuminates why this is not considered a violation of the Defendant's fifth-amendment rights? Because the defendant is not compelled to make these defences.	Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh.	This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off.	Criminal conviction by a judge after acquittal by a jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. A criminal conviction involves both a finding of fact and the application of the law, and a judge (unless this is a bench trial) doesn't find facts, he makes judgements of law. Overturning an acquittal after a jury trial would thus be in essence a whole new trial (moreover one where the defendant was not given a renewed opportunity to defend himself).	Quoting from here, Jury nullification occurs when a jury returns a verdict of "Not Guilty" despite its belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation charged. The jury in effect nullifies a law that it believes is either immoral or wrongly applied to the defendant whose fate they are charged with deciding. In essence, a jury decides that a law should not be legal in the situation, and as such the charge is unwarranted. One of the first cases was in the trial of John Peter Zenger, in 1735, where a law against libels was used against him, and subsequently nullified by a jury. It was subsequently used against the famous Alien and Sedition Acts, as well as The Fugitive Slave Laws. Zenger was the first case in America; in 1670, it was used in the case of William Penn and William Mead, who were acquitted of "illegal assembly" as Quakers. In an interesting twist, the jurors were imprisoned, as jury nullification was not explicitly legal, but they were later released. Interestingly enough, according to The New York Times In 1895, the Supreme Court ruled that jurors had no right, during trials, to be told about nullification. The court did not say that jurors didn’t have the power, or that they couldn’t be told about it, but only that judges were not required to instruct them on it during a trial. The Times also wrote that nullification had been used against laws against alcohol and gay marriage, though it did not cite specific cases.	Here's the thing: if the plaintiff/appellant/claimant are the same legal entity as the defendant/respondent, it's plain to see that one of them must lose. For instance, consider a case where two trains operated by the same corporation collide. Assuming that the drivers both performed their duties, the company is vicariously liable – such a case is frivolous and is likely to be thrown out for that reason. It's just a waste of time and money. Or your second example: If the woman was driving the city vehicle and crashed it in the course of her duties, it is the city that will be the defendant in the proceedings, not the woman. So essentially: while it's difficult to prove that something has never happened, these are good reasons to expect it would not happen.	NO If there were no extenuating circumstances (or they should not have been looked at as they were not presented), the losing party can petition for reconsideration and appeal the decision as a matter of law. The Judge/court of appeals then reviews the case and decides if the verdict stands. But you can't plead new facts at that stage, so if the losing side's lawyer messed up the case, that's up to them, not the judge. If it was a criminal case, the victim can't force the DA to appeal either, though they can try to get an injunction in related civil cases. But no person, or for the matter neither party, can sue the judge at all for misbehavior on the bench because judges have judicial immunity. Even when they did something so out of scope, such as a judge ordering from the bench that a lawyer shall be beaten up by police because they missed a court date, they get immunity as they acted as a judge (Miles v Waco). Indeed, let me quote from the first section of that SCOTUS case (emphasis mine): A long line of this Court's precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages. See, e. g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson *10 v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).1 Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, "it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872). ... Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 554 ("[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly"). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 (1982) (allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity). In the example OP posed nobody, not even the police, becomes liable for the actions of Bob but Bob himself: Police does not need to help you, even if they know for a fact that something is happening right now. There's a huge error in the case as presented by OP You start to work up a case, and points 1 to 3 are fine. But you start to get off the rails starting in point 4: The evidence does not say that someone is to be locked up, it only indicates what the facts of the case (upon which is to be decided) might be. The decision if someone is to go to jail or not is only up to the verdict - which happened in dot 5. Dot 5 however indicates that the judge looked at extenuating circumstances which is also evidence, so point 4 is presented incompletely. Let me present a more complete version of point 4: Evidence from side A was presented, as was other evidence by side B. To the victim, it seemed that side A (either her attorney or the DA, not clear from OP) had the better evidence and might get a conviction on side B. But the Judge did weigh the evidence differently than the observer and declared a verdict favoring B in point 5 to the dissatisfaction of the victim The missing bullet between 5 and 6 (a motion for reconsideration or appeal) does not seem to happen. Assuming it did not happen, because months go by, the verdict becomes final and the case becomes res iudicata - the case is closed. Point 6 is a different and separate crime. The case files of the earlier case can get pulled to show a pattern of behavior, but not to re-adjudicate the earlier case. Finally: Point 7 does not matter before the law: If-Then hypotheticals can't be adjudicated. Because the counterpoint to the presented argument in this point is: Would the lawyer of Side A have filed for reconsideration and/or appeal, the verdict would not have become final and waiting for the verdict from the court of appeals, Bob might still await the next step of the trial. tl;dr As presented, the rundown of the hypothetical case does not present anything that the judge could be liable for but instead shows that side A did not take the necessary steps to ask for reconsideration or file an appeal to the verdict they didn't like. The separate incident opened a new case, the hypothetical that side B would sit in jail is conclusory.
How can a license agreement or terms of use be enforced on a minor? Since a license agreement/terms of use document is a contract between the publisher and the end-user, and since minors are prohibited from entering into legally binding contracts in most U.S. states, how can any sort of terms be legally enforceable? The inability to agree to license terms has all kinds of potential legal ramifications. For example... App store agreements from Apple, Google, Amazon, etc. specify that parents are responsible for the in-app purchases of their children. Can parents be held liable if their child creates their own account without their parents' consent? Can a company seek damages arising from an activity where such an activity is otherwise legal, but prohibited by the license (e.g. video game modding or publishing cheat software)? Can a parent seek damages against a company for using data that was obtained under a waiver of rights by a license agreement (e.g. children uploading content to social media sites that would otherwise be protected by other laws)? Also, would the story change at all if the person in question were of legal age, but legally incompetent?	Business question Since a license agreement/terms of use document is a contract between the publisher and the end-user, and since minors are prohibited from entering into legally binding contracts in most U.S. states, how can any sort of terms be legally enforceable? Legal question May an online publisher enforce its product license agreement/terms of use against a minor ? Answer Yes, an online publisher can enforce its product license agreement/TOU against a minor until such time the minor voids the agreement. Discussion The opinion of the court in C.M.D. v. Facebook 2014 WL 1266291 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014), Inc. discusses this very legal question and clarified that terms of service of Facebook are enforceable against minors who use websites and further suggests that to disaffirm such terms of service, minors likely must terminate their accounts and stop using the website. The key question in front of the Judge in this case was whether the contract at issue between minors and Facebook - was one of the narrow types of contracts with minors that were void, or if the contract was merely voidable under California Family Code 6701. The court rules in favor of Facebook.	The Stack Exchange "requirement" of a particular type of attribution is unlikely to be enforceable, given the terms of the CC BY-SA license. The actual Creative Commons license, the part that governs the relationship between the parties, is the "legal code" license agreement. The CC BY-SA agreement contains two clauses relevant to the form of attribution. One, as the question points out, is paragraph 4(c), which states that "credit may be implemented in any reasonable manner." This language is much less restrictive than the StackExchange blog post. The other relevant clause is the last clause of the agreement, paragraph 8(e), which is a standard integration clause: This License constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the Work licensed here. There are no understandings, agreements or representations with respect to the Work not specified here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional provisions that may appear in any communication from You. This License may not be modified without the mutual written agreement of the Licensor and You. In other words, any changes to the license, which would include any additional restrictions on the nature of the attribution that may be given (besides the "reasonable manner" specified in the license) are effective only if both parties agree to do so in writing. The specific law applied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction is going to vary, but in general, in the United States, when you have a fully integrated agreement such as this license, a court will not look at anything outside the four corners of the agreement to determine the parties' rights and duties. If a court finds this to be a fully integrated agreement, and refuses to consider "parol evidence," meaning statements outside of the contract, then StackExchange can post a page asking people to attribute content in a particular way, but no, they cannot require it.	It's really your client that should be asking these questions. Writing the app is perfectly legal. So you can enter a contract with that client to write the app and deliver it to them, ready to be put on the Google Play store or the App Store (entering a contract needs to be done carefully, obviously). I'd make 100 million percent sure that the contract states clearly that you have zero responsibility if the app is rejected or removed for non-technical reasons, and that the legality of actually selling and running the app is also not your responsibility. The reason is that I very much suspect that running the app might be illegal, and that the chances of getting it permanently on one of the stores are rather slim. And solving those problems is outside of what a software developer can competently do.	The FTC has myriad regulations (depending on site/content/ etc.) that must be complied with - this is especially true if children will be interacting with others. Ideally, you should have the assistance of an intellectual property attorney or a regulatory specialist if this is something you expect to be wide reaching and/or geared toward children. All of that being said, the following link offers much information regarding compliance with COPPA for small entities. If you plan on doing the compliance work yourself, there is also a liaison, or virtual "help desk" run by the FTC. Depending on what you're doing and your ability to interpret complex regulatory frameworks, you could accomplish this yourself. I'd recommend that you start here, where you'll find links to other regulations that may be applicable and easily found, and then decide if you need a specialist based on the breadth of your work product and what you find that may apply. Or, at a minimum, you may be able to narrow the scope of your question after reviewing this help section, if you find you need help analyzing a certain section. https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions Good luck!	I've answered this in the context of US patent law, but similar principles apply elsewhere in the world. As stated in 35 USC 271, "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent". Thus, a patent provides the patent owner with the right to exclude others from performing these actions, and the right to sue anyone who does perform these actions (both to stop them from infringing the patent, and to collect monetary damages for their infringement). Creating an infringing product and then licensing it under the GPL (or any other scheme) does not change the fact that it infringes a patent. 35 USC 271 also states that "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer". This means that, even if the creator of the infringing product does not perform any infringing acts in the US, the act of offering it for free use could be construed as induced infringement of the patent, and they could still be sued for that infringement.	The first thing that has to be done (in court, or via lawyer-to-lawyer communication) is that The Company has to prove that they own the copyright. If they accomplish that, you can defend yourself by providing proof of a license to download and redistribute. From what I can tell, you cannot directly prove that, since the rights-holder did not give you the license. The issue is that a third party cannot impose a license on a work simply by putting it out there with a file that claims to be a license from the artist. So this brings in the Free Music Archive: they presumably have some evidence that the rights holder did indeed grant the alleged license, and may be able to provide proof. Your argument may be credible, in the sense that you had a good-faith belief that the item was so licensed, and the website would provide a basis for concluding that that belief is reasonable. If the work was licensed, then the some rights holder would know that, but not necessarily the current one. Assume the artist made a recording, transferred the rights to Company A, who later sold the rights to Company B who is now coming after you. Artist may have licensed it when it was his, and forgot to tell A. A may have licensed it when they sold the license to B. Artist may have improperly licensed it after he sold the work to A (under the "I wrote it, I have the right to do whatever I want" non-legal theory). A might have improperly licensed the work after selling the right to B (maybe by mistakenly including it in a package deal, i.e. via bookkeeping error, rather than ignorance of the law). Or, they may simply have forgotten. If this is a DMCA takedown notice, the notice-giver could just be abusing the system. But we don't know how you were contacted, so I'll leave DMCA out of this for now.	The EULA is in most jurisdictions a legally binding contract; there is plenty of case law that supports this. You can only be liable under a contract for breaching its terms and only to the extent that the other party suffers harm from that breach. Clearly, if you haven't read the terms then you are greatly increasing the chance that you will inadvertently breach them but not reading them would not, of itself, be a breach and I can't see what harm could flow anyway.	Choice 2 is what the writers of the license have in mind. You own the physical media on which the copy is delivered, such as a DVD or floppy disk (if there was physical media). But you do not own the copy of the software, you merely have purchased a license to use it, which may be revocable under specified circumstances. This is different from the law in the case of a book. Why you buy a book, you own a copy of the book, although you do not own the copyright to the book, and may not make additional copies. The license model was adopted by commercial software distributors for several reasons, but largely to avoid the "first sale doctrine". When you buy a copy of a copyrighted work, you have the right (under US law at least) to lend, rent, sell, or give-away that copy. You do not need the permission of the copyright holder to do any of these. Those in the commercial software business did not want customers to be able to do those things legally. By making the software subject to a license, which is a contract, they could write that license to restrict or prohibit those rights. Sellers also wanted to prohibit reverse engineering of the software, and to restrict use of the software. (For example, to limit the user to installing it on a single computer.) There was at first much dispute over the enforcability of such license agreements. But most US courts now accept them as valid and enforceable, and copyright law has been modified to take account of them. Specifically, 17 USC 109 (2)(b)(1)(A) seems to include a legislative acceptance of this rule.
can I get sued without accepting EULA I plan publishing information in an article about Software which is the result of people reverse engineering the software. The author of the software has been attempting to sue people who made use of the information because it is against the EULA. I do not have the software myself nor have I ever accepted the EULA. I am only using information I found on the internet (public websites, etc.) and write my article based on my researches. My question is: Can I be sued for doing this because it is against the EULA which I never accepted? The reason I am doing this is because it is a security threat for the users of the software however it needs more attention in order to be addressed by the company.	No. You cannot be held liable for violating the EULA if you have never used the software and are only reporting what people who did use it told you. Of course, people bring groundless lawsuits all the time and you might have to defend such a lawsuit if you are sued. In some places you could be subpoenaed to disclose your sources, and in others, a reporter's privilege would allow you to quash such a subpoena.	If you aren't including those libraries, then yes because it's entirely your own work. If you are publishing those libraries, then no because their licenses will limit how you can do that. GPL's and MIT's main features are restricting how you can distribute software that includes the licensed code, and they don't allow the "do whatever you want" of public domain.	Is it a violation of copyright to publish a computer program that exactly produces such a piece, without containing the piece itself in the program? Yes. A program that reproduces a particular work is functionally a derivative work and is a copyright infringement. A program that composes music not tied to a particular work would be patentable, but the algorithm would not be protected by copyright, although derive works based on the code implementing the algorithm might be protected by copyright. Of course, this assumes that the person devising this algorithm knows about the original work that it will produce. If the person devising and the person using the algorithm are ignorant of the existence of the prior work that it produces, it is not a copy or a derivative work and is not infringing. The source of the creation of an allegedly infringing work in relevant in copyright law even thought it is not relevant in patent and trademark law. Copyright protects independent inventors of the same work from infringement liability, although this may be hard to prove. In theory the burden of proof to show copying is on the personal bringing the lawsuit alleging infringement. But, a copyright infringement plaintiff can meet their burden of proof in a copyright case by inferring that copy was made from the circumstantial evidence of the allegedly infringing work's similarity to the allegedly infringed work without direct evidence of copying or deriving the work from the original work.	Under your proposal, the author cannot effectively use the software at all, much less sell his creative efforts. The EULA clearly states that copyright is automatically transferred to the vendor when a document is created. The author gets started, writes "It was a dark and stormy night" then has a moment of writer's block, saves and closes, takes a walk, then tries again. The author has transferred copyright in the work to vendor, and needs vendor's permission to make revisions. So you have to tweak the EULA to grant automatic permission to author to create derivative works (revisions), and to distribute. A more effective strategy would be to impose a revenue-sharing formula on any commercially-exploited work created using the software, rather than attempt to directly seize the intellectual property. The CC "NC" license attribute is a distant version of what you are looking for - it prohibit any money-making use of the software. What you would add to that is a condition that the software can be used commercially, provided a certain compensation be rendered. You would of course have to be very clear in advance about what was actually agreed to.	The GPL does not forbid you from charging money for software, nor does it require you to provide source code to the general public. What the GPL requires is that your software be free software, with "free" used in the sense of "free speech" rather than the sense of "free beer." According to the Free Software Foundation (authors of the GPL), the right of users to sell software is a requirement for it to be free software. If you receive a GPL license for software, you can give it to whoever you want provided you also ensure that person can get the source code. You don't need to make the source code available to the public, only to the people you actually distribute the binaries to. The GPL is structured along the lines of "if you distribute the software to someone, you must give them these rights;" it is not structured along the lines of "you must distribute the software." Of course, if users have the right to distribute copies for free, it's hard in practice to charge money (all it takes is one user distributing copies). But that doesn't mean you can't try. Some companies make substantial money selling free software through various models (e.g. Red Hat, which charges money for support). Others might bank on the fact that plenty of people are willing to pay to get it from the official site, and aren't interested in finding a free copy somewhere. It doesn't matter; as long as they license the software to you under the GPL and give purchasers access to the source code on the same terms, they're in the clear (if you want to redistribute binaries, it's your job to redistribute the source code as well).	Yes, but ... It doesn’t protect you. Let’s imagine you put such a clause in and a person in Europe used your service notwithstanding: they’ve broken the contract but you’ve broken the law. You get the fine and they get ... nothing. Because you can’t contract outside the law you never had a valid contract with them so you have no basis to sue. Further, because you are purporting to something you can’t legally do, you are probably on the wrong side of misleading and deceptive consumer protection law: which is another fine. If you can ensure that you don’t breach local law - like by not operating over the internet - then you can choose not to deal with e.g. Europeans. If you can’t guarantee that, then you’re stuffed.	It is illegal to make copies of copyrighted materials without license. In the case of software, obviously it will be illegal to make copies by copying and installing the software without a license, but we are not talking about that. If I have a legitimate license of say Photoshop, and I start the application, parts or all of the code will be loaded into the RAM of my computer, which is a copy. According to copyright law, it is legal for me to make that copy. You are allowed to copy legitimately owned software into RAM to execute it. If your copy of Photoshop is illegal, and you start the application, the copy that is made into RAM is again copyright infringement. Having read the software license for the software that you get when you buy a Mac, it seems that if you steal my computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement, and it seems that if you buy such a stolen computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement as well, because the license that I received when I purchased the computer covers anyone using it with my permission, and covers anyone who legally buys the computer from me, but doesn't cover a thief. Now does this affect the work that you did? No, you have the full copyright on your work. Copyright law doesn't require that your tools are all used legitimately.	By "unlicensed" you mean that it doesn't state a license for use (MIT, GPL, etc.)? Those licenses are just a codified bundle of terms of use that cover many many edge cases. You have in place a much simpler agreement that covers the primary situation: you using/modifying the code for your own use. It's just like borrowing a car. You will ask a friend "hey, could I borrow your car for a bit?" "sure!". You know there's a possibility that you'll get in an accident or something weird will happen, but you think the chances of that are minimal and you would be able to work it out. If you ask a car rental company, they'll give you a full contract covering every situation that may happen. Similarly, a large company would be hesitant to borrow a car for corporate use without a legal framework surrounding it. So you will likely be in the clear if you are just using it for a small project with minimal legal/financial implications. If you plan on turning your project into a multi-billion dollar empire, you should revisit your agreement.
Is it legal to drive a vehicle with the driver wheel on the opposite side? A few years ago I was in Belgium for a music show. Given that the singer was famous, people came from other countries, including buses from the UK. Naturally the driver seat on an UK registered bus is on the right side, but when it entered France and then Belgium the driving lane was on the right side (and not in the left, as in UK). It seemed to me very accident-prone to drive on the wrong side of the road, but there were a lot of buses and also smaller vehicles. My question is: was any traffic law infringed? Is it legal to drive a vehicle with the driver seat on the opposite side? I specifficaly mentioned France and Belgium, but I would be interested as well in other countries where this type of situation might happen due to proximity with neighbouring countries where the drive lane is on the opposite side.	People can take their personal cars through the Channel Tunnel from Great Britain to France. They don't actually drive their cars through the tunnel, but going by car is a perfectly normal way to travel between those two countries. That's probably the most well-known place where drivers will switch from driving on one side of the road to the other, but there are many more . If driving with a car with the wheel on the "wrong" side were forbidden, these options would not exist, because at least one direction of travel would not work. Now, of course, that doesn't mean a country like Belgium, which does not have to direct way to Britain, couldn't forbid cars with the steering wheel on the right. But at least for EU states, that seems to be forbidden, as Poland and Lithuania learned when they tried to require cars that were to be registered there to have the steering wheel repositioned to the left Consequently, the Court holds that the position of the driver’s seat, an integral part of the steering equipment of a vehicle, comes within the harmonisation established by Directives 2007/46 and 70/311, so that, in the context of the registration of a new vehicle in their territory, the Member States may not require, for reasons of safety, that the driver’s seat of that vehicle be moved to the side opposite the direction of the traffic. It notes in that regard that the legislation at issue provides for exceptions with regard to the use of vehicles equipped with a steering-wheel on the right by people who reside in other Member States, and travel to Poland and Lithuania for a limited period (for example, tourists). That fact shows, according to the Court, that the contested legislation tolerates the risk involved in such use. So even those countries that tried to ensure that registered cars had the steering wheel on the "right" side made provisions for cars that were just traveling through. And the EU does not consider it a valid law to require wheels to be repositioned.	The route described is probably in violation of Section 22100 of the vehicle code: Except as provided in Section 22100.5 or 22101, the driver of any vehicle intending to turn upon a highway shall do so as follows: (a) Right Turns. Both the approach for a right-hand turn and a right-hand turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb The approach for the second turn is being made from the middle of the road. Neither of the exceptions apply, as 22100.5 is about U-turns at traffic lights, while 22101 is about turns controlled by markings or signs. Additionally, since you describe the route as a "curve to the street and turn right out", it's probably in violation of Section 22105: No person shall make a U-turn upon any highway where the driver of such vehicle does not have an unobstructed view for 200 feet in both directions along the highway and of any traffic thereon. Since the driver didn't make a complete right turn, it's likely that the forward view of oncoming traffic was partially blocked by the car's A-pillar or even the passenger seat, while the backward view of traffic was limited because none of the car's mirrors was pointed in the correct direction. It's certainly in violation of Section 22108: Any signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. The side road's not a hundred feet wide. There's no way the driver could have given the required signal for the second right turn. There's a decent chance this is also in violation of Section 22102 of the vehicle code: No person in a business district shall make a U-turn, except at an intersection, or on a divided highway where an opening has been provided in accordance with Section 21651. The six lanes of the main highway make it likely that this intersection is in a business district. "Business district" is rather broad, including not only roads lined by businesses, but roads lined by apartment complexes and other multi-family housing developments. And finally, the catch-all offense of "reckless driving" (Section 23103) could probably be applied: A person who drives a vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.	An affirmative defense is a way of avoiding conviction by acknowledging you did the act claimed, but that such act was among the exceptions provided by the law which makes such acts otherwise an offence. That is, you affirm (acknowledge, admit) your action of using the device, but you are claiming that your use of the device (handsfree as a GPS guide) is okay, and therefore you should not be convicted. For all intents and purposes in this situation, your "2" and "3" are the same thing. The device is supported by something other than you holding it, and you are able to keep both hands on the wheel while using it in this way. Finally, a plain language reading of the definition for "hands-free accessory" suggests that using an object in the car to support the device where it can be seen, or using a feature of the device that speaks directions which you can hear, neither of which requires moving your hands off the wheel, will be considered such an accessory. It is also worth pointing out that such usage of a device (placed in a cradle or on the dashboard or turned up so it is heard) will be well-known to the legislators, and there is a reasonable interpretation of the law that would allow such usage. If this ever went to court, and somebody used this defence for this situation, they would probably be okay.	People in the UK (who are not subject to immigration control or other restrictions) do not have to carry any form of identification. This doesn't answer all parts of your question, but s164 Road Traffic Act 1988 is appropriate to the part about driving. a person driving a motor vehicle on a road ... must, on being so required by a constable or vehicle examiner, produce his licence and its counterpart1 for examination, so as to enable the constable or vehicle examiner to ascertain the name and address of the holder of the licence, the date of issue, and the authority by which they were issued. (s164(1)) So it makes no difference why you were stopped: a constable or traffic offiver can demand production of your licence if you were driving. The same power exists if you're suspected of having caused an accident or committed an offence, even if you're not driving at the time of the production demand. Non-production is an offence: If a person required under the preceding provisions of this section to produce a licence and its counterpart ... fails to do so he is, subject to subsections (7) to (8A) below, guilty of an offence. (s164(6)) However, it is a defence to produce the licence (or a receipt for a licence) within seven days of the demand (s164(7-8)). In practice, the officer will give you a 'producer' requiring you to present your licence at a police station within seven days, after which you will be guilty of the non-production offence. The implication of this is that it is not required that you carry your licence; merely that you have it available to produce within seven days. 1 Presumably the reference to 'counterpart' will go away when the counterpart is abolished on 8th June 2015.	Yes. There's a sentence about this in the DMV handbook: Center Left Turn Lanes A center left turn lane is located in the middle of a two-way street and is marked on both sides by two painted lines. The inner line is broken and the outer line is solid. If a street has a center left turn lane, you must use it to prepare for or make a left turn, or to prepare for or make a permitted U-turn (CVC §21460.5 (c)). You may only drive for 200 feet in the center left turn lane. This lane is not a regular traffic lane or a passing lane. To turn left from this lane, signal, look over your shoulder, and drive completely inside the center left turn lane. Do not stop with the back of your vehicle blocking traffic. Make sure the lane is clear in both directions and then turn only when it is safe. Look for vehicles coming toward you in the same lane, preparing to start their left turn. Vehicles using the center turn lane. When turning left from a side street or driveway, signal and wait until it is safe. Then you may drive into the center left turn lane. Enter traffic only when it is safe. You can stop in the center left turn lane as well while waiting to merge into the regular traffic lane. You should not stop in nor drive through a dedicated turn lane that might exist in a center left turn lane.	The US Department of Transportation does not "recognize" fast lanes, or have any limits on highway speed, which are determined by the states. Here is a resource on the various keep-right laws of the states. No state has a "fast lane" that allows speeds greater that the legal limit, nor does any state have a law requiring drivers to drive exactly the posted limit. Every state has some provision regarding slow-moving vehicles, and none frame the matter in terms of fast-moving vehicles. The legal convention is that slow-moving vehicles must be on the right, not the left. Some states have the restriction that you may not drive in the left lane except to pass, for example 625 ILCS 5/11-701(b), (d). You may drive in the left lane in Utah, but you must not impede traffic (which means you must move to the right). The signage depends on the laws of that state, and in all cases reflects laws against too-slow driving, and never approval of too-fast driving.	U-turns are prohibited in certain circumstances (Highway Traffic Act Paragraph 143). It does not say that U-turns are prohibited at intersections controlled by traffic lights. By the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, U-turns at intersections controlled by traffic lights are generally allowed. However, in determining fault for insurance purposes in Ontario, The driver of automobile “A” is 100 per cent at fault and the driver of automobile “B” is not at fault for an incident that occurs, [...] when automobile “A” is making a U-turn [...] (Insurance Act Paragraph 19.)	The published statues pertaining to Vermont vehicle registrations reference operation by a person "on any highway." This specific statute applies to a motor vehicle or trailer. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle nor draw a trailer or semi-trailer on any highway unless such vehicle is registered as provided in this chapter. There are no references I could find regarding private property within the statutes. It's common to consider that any vehicle operated exclusively on private property can be done so without registration and therefore without the inspection.
Does any host provider currently comply with GDPR? According to Rec.81; Art.28(1)-(3) of the GDPR regulation, "The carrying-out of processing by a processor should be governed by a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, binding the processor to the controller" A controller that wishes to appoint a processor must only use processors that guarantee compliance with the GDPR. The controller must appoint the processor in the form of a binding written agreement, which states that the processor must: only act on the controller's documented instructions; impose confidentiality obligations on all personnel who process the relevant data; must ensure the security of the personal data that it processes; abide by the rules regarding appointment of sub-processors; implement measures to assist the controller in complying with the rights of data subjects; assist the controller in obtaining approval from DPAs where required; at the controller's election, either return or destroy the personal data at the end of the relationship (except as required by EU or Member State law); and provide the controller with all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR. I've checked every major host provider there is and none offers such guarantees. So question is, how do I as a controller comply with GDPR if there's no host provider (aka processor) who'll sign a contract addressing all 8 points required by the GDPR? The regulation clearly states that controller is responsible for this.	Well actually... I think you'll just need to wait a little more. I monitor the situation quite closely and I can tell you that it's just a matter of time. Microsoft was one of the first (if not the first) to communicate openly about the GDPR and the changes that follow. From the blog post: If your organization collects, hosts or analyzes personal data of EU residents, GDPR provisions require you to use third-party data processors who guarantee their ability to implement the technical and organizational requirements of the GDPR. To further earn your trust, we are making contractual commitments available to you that provide key GDPR-related assurances about our services. Our contractual commitments guarantee that you can: Respond to requests to correct, amend or delete personal data. Detect and report personal data breaches. Demonstrate your compliance with the GDPR. Microsoft is the first global cloud services provider to publicly offer you these contractual commitments. We believe privacy is a fundamental right. The GDPR is an important step forward to further clarify and enable individual privacy rights and look forward to sharing additional updates how we can help you comply with this new regulation and, in the process, advance personal privacy protections. Microsoft has set up an informational site on GDPR here. If your eyes are on any other provider, I think the only way to learn more is getting in touch and inquiring about their progress and process. Hope this helps.	Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive.	The consent presented in the question is a text-book example on how to not secure consent under the GDPR. The GDPR requires concent to be explicit, specific, freely given, and informed. This particular privacy policy does not measure up to any of these requirements. The GDPR goes to great lengths to regulate consent. For instance, in Article 7 (2) is says: Any part of such a declaration [of consent] which constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding. So if the consent obtained is not explicit, specific, freely given, and informed, and the company relies on consent to ensure lawfulness of processing, it is breaking the law (and may be fined under the GDPR). The big problem with this privacy policy is this sentence: Your continued access to or use of any of the Services shall be deemed your acceptance of the Privacy Policy. As you've noted, the GDPR requires consent to be explicit. What "explicit" means is spelled out in Recital 32, which (among other things) says: Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. And Recital 32 goes on state that consent must be specific: When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them. The full privacy policy lists 16 different purposes for which personal data is collected, but do not seek specific consent for any of them. Consent under GDPR must also be freely given. Recital 42 says (among other things): Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. Here the company states that continued use of the service "shall be deemed your acceptance". The only way the data subject can refuse consent is to not use the service, which is to the detriment of the data subject. This also makes the consent invalid. Finally, the GDPR also requires consent to be informed. What this means is spelled out in Recital 42, which (among other things say): For consent to be informed, the data subject should be aware at least [...] the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended. Here the data subject is supposed to consent to some unknown, future change which may be to allow different purposes of the processing. This also invalidates the consent.	No, it is not legal. Regardless of their location, the only legal options for companies serving to EU residents are to either deny access altogether or to make consent truly optional1 Recital 42 states (emphasis mine): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement[...] Recital 43 states: Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. 1 Of course, remember that consent is only one of several means that allow them to process data. For example, if you were getting a trial account for a limited time, it would be considered a legitimate business need to ensure that you are not just opening new trial accounts when the old ones expire. So, if they wanted some data from you to ensure that you are not a previous user and you refused to provide it, then they could deny giving you that trial account without breaking the GDPR.	You are processing the users IP address in order to carry out the translation to a physical location (see my comment for the technical issues with that) and an IP address is most certainly considered personal information, so yes under the GDPR you are going to need a published policy because you are both data controller and data processor. You need to inform the user of what you are doing, and you need to tell them of the legal basis for the processing (there are several under the GDPR, of which consent is only one - but in your case its going to be the easiest to justify). If you use a third party service for the location translation, you also need to inform the user of that and make available the third party services data processing policy.	GDPR gives you a lot of flexibility here to choose either DPA. From Art 77: Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, every data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his or her habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement if the data subject considers that the processing of personal data relating to him or her infringes this Regulation. However, the DPA from the company's country would be designated the lead supervisory authority for this investigation. If multiple DPAs are involved, they would coordinate with each other. There is no EU body that you could contact directly. But if the different DPAs have a dispute regarding this investigation, the EDPB would provide a consistency mechanism. This mechanism has been used in the past e.g. to force the Irish DPA to correctly apply the GDPR against companies from the Meta group, like WhatsApp and Instagram. Though it might slow things down, it could be advantageous to have multiple DPAs involved, precisely so that the investigation is double-checked. If the lead supervisory authority declines the case, this would also enable the other DPA to do its own investigation. So, it would be a good idea to lodge a complaint with the DPA of your home country, and let it forward the issue to other DPAs as needed. However, contacting the DPA in the company's country would also be fine, especially if you are fluent in the relevant official language, and/or if you live in Ireland.	As stated by GDPR article 3 you are required to follow it under the following circumstance: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. You can read the recourse better at What is the legal mechanism by which the GDPR might apply to a business with no presence in the EU?, but in short the US will allow the EU court to press it's rulings due to wanting to keep its trades, treaties and other similar things in place.	Under GDPR article 6 paragraph 1 item (c) one lawful basis for processing personal information (PI) is: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; The obligation to attribute a reused work under a CC license is such an obligation. Moreover, the licensor has the option under any CC license to specify a pseudonym for attribution of that work, or to waive attribution totally. Not doing that while releasing content under a CC license that requires attribution could reasonably be considered consent to publish that name along with each re-released copy of the work, so there are at least two lawful bases for processing that name and making it public. In some jurisdictions the license has the status of a contract, which imposes an obligation to attribute the author properly under GDPR Article 6 paragraph 3, as described in more detail in the answer by amon. Also, usernames are PI if and only if it is reasonably possible to associate them with a specific natural person. If a person chose a user name for a single site, not used for any other, and did not post any info that allows the person's identity to be determined, it is not PI. Often, of course, the person can be determined.
Can a person be prosecuted for unknowingly possessing illegal computer files? Today there was a news article that claims researchers have found illegal files embedded in the Bitcoin blockchain. This is a large database-type file that contains a list of all the Bitcoin transactions that have ever happened along with possible "meta-data" and it's claimed that some of this data contains illegal images of child abuse. Bitcoin power users may have the entire blockchain downloaded locally to their computers, but people do not just browse the file for fun. It contains transaction data that is parsed by automated bitcoin clients and mining utilities, so you wouldn't expect any user to directly access the database and just browse it. Everyone's copy is exactly the same, so if illegal content is proved to be in the blockchain, then everyone with a copy possesses the illegal content. So, the question is... Could someone be arrested or otherwise "get in trouble" because they have a hidden illegal image on their computer that they do not know about? Especially since the file is hidden amongst useful data that is required for certain bitcoin tasks that the users do have a legal right to participate in? Tagging as US because that is my primary concern, but would be interested in other locations. It was German researchers that have found the material.	There is a federal law, 18 USC 2252, which criminalized distribution and receiving of child porn. One part of the law addresses a person who (1) knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; The next part addresses one who (2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; The word "knowingly" is crucial here: it may mean that if you don't know, it's not a crime. The wording is not completely clear, in that maybe the law only says that you have to know that you received and don't have to know anything about the item that you received. So it is up the the Supreme Court to say exactly what that means. In US v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, they did. The court held that "knowingly" does not just mean that you know you are receiving or distributing, because that would yield absurd results such as that a retail druggist who returned a roll of film unprocessed would be guilty of distributing child porn, just in case the film contains child porn. As the court says, "We do not assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended such results". There is a general constitutional presumption that any crime has a scienter requirement (Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600): "the standard presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct". The court rejects the narrow interpretation that "knowingly" just applies to the verb, and "This interpretation is supported by the canon that a statute is to be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions". There are also state laws which are untouched by X-Citement, which may make possession of child porn a strict liability offense. Washington state law is written so that you have to know or intend ("Knowingly develops, duplicates, publishes, prints, disseminates, exchanges, finances, attempts to finance, or sells a visual or printed matter that depicts a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct as defined in RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a) through (e)" or "Possesses with intent to develop, duplicate, publish, print, disseminate, exchange, or sell any visual or printed matter that depicts a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct as defined in RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a) through (e)".) The statutory rape law on the other hand has no requirement pertaining to knowledge or intent (1) A person is guilty of rape of a child in the third degree when the person has sexual intercourse with another who is at least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old and not married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least forty-eight months older than the victim. I don't know whether some state's statute was written without a "knowingly" requirement.	It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law.	Laws against such actions are not stated in terms of popular and fluid concepts like "computer virus", they are stated in terms of clear concepts like "unauthorized access". There are federal and state laws against this. This web site lists and links to all of the state laws on the matter. There is also a federal law: a detailed legal analysis by DOJ is given here. There are some limits to federal jurisdiction, for example "protected computers" include "computers used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". The term "affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication" is widely used in federal law, and can be used to prohibit growing feed for your own animals. Anything that you "send" clearly affects interstate commerce (the internet is internationally connected). 18 USC 1030(a) says Whoever ... (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains...(C) information from any protected computer Essentially, a computer connected to the outside world is protected. The key here is "without authorization". If you authorize MS to report back stuff about your computer, that is not unauthorized. It may not be possible to use their product without giving such authorization, in which case you can use a different product that doesn't require that you grant authorization. There is also the possibility that some software producer has technically violates the law because they think that it's okay for them to access the computer as long as they do no harm. Typically, people are not aware that they have granted software publishers access to their computer. The concept of "harm" is pretty much irrelevant to computer-crime criminal law. It would be relevant, though, if a plaintiff were to sue someone for sniffing around their computer: then you'd have to show that you were damaged.	It's legal as long as you follow these guidelines: They [The Cached Files] are created only for the purpose of viewing (In Your case listening) content The copies do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holders. The creation of the copies does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the works. Source: http://www3.ebu.ch/contents/news/2014/06/eu-court-rules-on-legality-of-in.html	The user can always claim that. Whether such a claim will be believed is another matter. A party to a contract with a "wet-ink" signature can claim that it was forged or that the signer was impersonated. But such claims are hard to prove, particularly if they are not true. The answer to the question in the title is that terms are binding if the user freely agrees to them, and if they meet the conditions for a legally binding agreement in the relevant jurisdiction. The question in the body is more about what evidence will establish this. Suppose the code behind a web-site is so designed that no user is allowed to proceed without affirmatively accepting the ToS, and the operator can demonstrate this. That will be persuasive evidence that the user did accept the terms. If the site logs the consent in a database along with a timestamp that would be further evidence. A journaling database provides an audit trail of changes, which would be further evidence. Evidence of other users that the site always worked that way, and of coders that the code had never permitted a user to proceed without accepting the ToS might also help. Backups of the DB stored with a 3rd party including the consent logs would also provide evidence that the timestamps were present and unchanged. A hash of the log can be stored on the blockchain. The site could also send a "registration accepted" email to the user (if the user has provided an email address) which could include a mention that the user had accepted the ToS. Such an email would be reserved in the logs of the senders and receiver's email providers, and could be retrieved as evidence. Ultimately it will be a question of what the finder of fact believes, if the matter goes to court. And as user Amon says, the US standard is preponderance of the evidence (that is, the evidence is at least a little bit stronger on one side. This is sometimes loosely expressed as more than 50% or 51% or better proved, but courts do not in fact measure degrees of proof in numbers), not absolute proof.	According to EU case law, everything in your scenario is legal except if Example Site is hosting the image without authorization and Pirate Site is a for-profit site, then Pirate Site is presumed to be violating Article 3 of the Copyright Directive on communication to the public (in this scenario, Example Site is also trivially violating Article 2 on the right to reproduction). In Meltwater, Case C-360/13, the court ruled that browser cache and on-screen copies fell under the temporary reproduction exception, Article 5(1) of the Copyright Directive. This means that the visitor is not infringing copyright (IPKat reference). In BestWater, Case C-348/13, the court ruled that embedding content was itself not a communication to the public when that content was hosted with rightsholder authorization, and so did not violate Article 3. This means that Pirate Site is not infringing on communication to the public rights (it is also not creating a copy itself, so is not breaking Article 2) (IPKat reference). When content is not hosted with authorization, the situation is quite a bit more nuanced. GS Media, Case C-160/15, is the controlling case. Here, the court ruled that if a link (note it doesn't even have to be embedded/hotlinked) is posted by a for-profit site, that site is expected to have done its due diligence to ensure the linked content is hosted legally. Therefore, it is presumed to be violating Article 3, i.e., the burden of proof is on the link posting site to demonstrate that it had done its due diligence in verifying the legality of the linked content. So in this scenario, Pirate Site is presumed to be infringing on communication to the public rights (IPKat reference - WARNING: slightly NSFW image here, Playboy was one of the parties to the case).	It is probably illegal, just not pursued. In the case of something like bank robbery, you'd have a victim that filed a police report. A murder would need to be discovered somehow - either a missing person report or a dead body. If the porn shoot happened somewhere that a member of the public saw it and subsequently filed a police report, the video could be used as evidence. Absent a report, the police simply have no reason to look into it (unless the police catches them in the act, but we probably don't see those videos posted online). Why would these public offenses go unreported? Perhaps nobody sees it. Perhaps the bystanders in the video are paid extras. Maybe they're filming in what appears to be public but is actually private property. Perhaps they have a permit to use a public space for this purpose. Perhaps they just got lucky. Again, there might be some confirmation bias here - you're not going to see as many videos of folks they catch breaking the law, since they will either be interrupted and stopped or (maybe) have their videos ordered taken down.	Can you unambiguously, legally, and conclusively determine what is and is not a "porn site"? I'm sure many are easy... but what about that "Swimsuit modeling" site, or the "Artistic Nudes" site featuring classic French Renaissance paintings? There will always be a grey area. What makes a "site" in a legal sense? Consider all the blog sites filled with user generated content: If just a few pages out of tens-of-thousands are hardcore, indisputable porn, would you require the entire domain to be classified XXX, even if 99% of its content is completely innocent? Who would enforce this? Are you proposing an "Internet Police" force to review all new domain names and their content before they get approved? That is called "Prior Restraint on Free Speech", and is established law. Suppose a site does get approved, then immediately changes the content of their pages from Cooking Recipes to hard-core porn. Who is going to review and approve every update to every website, when sites are updated constantly?! Maybe you're proposing that any individual who finds porn on a .ORG site has the right to sue for damages? This would likely clog the courts with endless vigilante lawsuits about what content belongs on which domain. This is a flat out horrible, poorly thought out idea.
My Boss wants me to correct checks paid to us I work for a county government. We process over 16,000 checks over about 2 months. I have an issue with some things we do. If someone writes a check out wrong, for example if he doesn't put the correct change in either the box or Written Out, we have to change it. If someone writes in the box 285.00 but Written says eighty five 00/100 my boss will make us write it in ourselves. I don't feel comfortable changing someone else's check. I just want to find out whether this is legal to do or not.	On a check, if the two amounts do not match, the written out amount should be considered correct. Section 3.114 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that: If an instrument contains contradictory terms, typewritten terms prevail over printed terms, handwritten terms prevail over both, and words prevail over numbers. So, you simply accept the check for the written out amount. DO NOT make changes to the document because that is fraudulent. If the amounts do not agree, you can't pick which one you want to use - you must use the written amount. If the written amount is incorrect, your only choice is to reject the check or accept it for the written amount (and bill for or refund the difference).	You can read about your rights as a California tenant at http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/landlordbook/catenant.pdf This is rather ridiculous: 1) No judge will evict someone for paying rent by mail. (I assume you have the new landlord's address.) 2) If the landlord cashes the check you mail then he's not going to be able to claim you didn't pay the rent. If he actually refuses to cash your mailed check then that's all to the good for you. 3) You can ignore any requirements imposed by the new landlord that aren't in the lease, just as the landlord could ignore any new requirement imposed on him by you. Even some terms in a lease can be ignored, because not all terms in a contract are legal. (This is especially the case in tenant-landlord law.) If you think there will be trouble then use certified mail.	You have no legal duty to inform callers they have the wrong number. Official business is not carried out by telephone, despite the fact that some collection agencies commonly use the tactic that there is service of process forthcoming, or some other legal jargon, to entice a callback. From a non-legal perspective, you may want to call and tell them to take you off their call list and that they have the wrong number; otherwise, they are likely to continue to bother you day and night. It appears to be either a scam or a collections attempt.	The relevant part of Texas law is in the property code, §§92.101-92.109 §92.104 allows them to "deduct from the deposit damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or as a result of breaching the lease", and then they must "give to the tenant the balance of the security deposit, if any, together with a written description and itemized list of all deductions" (except when there is uncontroversial rent owed). §92.109 states what the landlord's liability is, namely a landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of this subchapter is liable for an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, and the tenant's reasonable attorney's fees in a suit to recover the deposit. This requires bad faith, not just being wrong. If you dispute the deductions, you can sue the landlord to recover the deposit. The law also provides that "In an action brought by a tenant under this subchapter, the landlord has the burden of proving that the retention of any portion of the security deposit was reasonable". In order to extract more money from you for putative damages, the landlord will have to sue you and establish that there was an additional $2,000 damages. If the court finds that you did actually did damage the apartment, you may be ordered to compensate the landlord. Until you get such an order, you don't owe them anything; you may be able to recover the damage deposit if the "damage" was insignificant. This sketches the process of suing in Justice Court to get your deposit back, highlighting details like the demand letter that you might not have known you have to write. As far as your credit history is concerned, this is not entirely clear. The Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates the industry of credit reporting, and crucially you can dispute false claims of debts. This does not prevent a person from making such a claim. I do not have an account with the Big 3 reporting services, so I don't know what their standards are for recording a putative debt. However, you can insert a suitable statement in your record disputing the validity of the claim. It is most likely that the landlord would sell the putative debt to a collection agency. That industry is regulated by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and there is a procedure about disputing an alleged debt.	They can't simply keep the money; that's against the law. But in a situation like this, it's easy to get lost in the bureaucracy. The company may be in violation of different laws, re: For Your Information \| United States Department of Labor, so you can try pointing this out in another email or letter. The threat of the Feds or other enforcement agency looking into the matter may make something happen. Or, try this: find the CEO (or a similarly high-ranked executive) on LinkedIn; many have open messaging in interest of good PR. Message/email them and carefully (and nicely) explain the situation. (A CEO will likely have an assistant monitoring their LinkedIn account. But, there are many stories of Steve Jobs, Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos personally responding to emails.) Someone will make it happen and the employees who have not been helpful will be in hot water.	So these are the basic rules of the tax game: The taxpayer (employee, in this case) is liable for tax on income earned by him. On occasion, the payor of the income to be received by the taxpayer is required to withhold tax on the payment, remit the withheld tax to the IRS/state/local tax authority and pay the balance over to the taxpayer. If that happens, the taxpayer is entitled to a credit against his taxes for the amount withheld by the payor. Failure by the payor to withhold the required amount of tax does NOT excuse the taxpayer from paying tax on the income he earned. So company B is right.	It is not illegal to treat the employees differently. As long as nobody is being paid for less than the time worked, this is legal. Treating employees differently because of protected characteristics is unlawful discrimination. However, the duration you have worked there is not a protected characteristic. It is perfectly legal for the employer not to mandate new employees clock in and out. It would even be legal (if not a great idea) to hire new employees for twice as much.	The difficulty is that tips are, by statute, considered a form of wages rather than a form of self-employment income for the tipped employee for income tax purposes (in contrast, employers don't have to keep track of tips for minimum wage purposes, tipped employees just have an extremely low minimum wage+). (If it was self-employment income, withholding and paying self-employment tax which is paid in lieu of FICA taxes, would be solely the employee's problem and none of the employer's business.) A comment notes, probably correctly, that: If wages plus tips do not add up to the full regular (non-tipped) minimum wage, the employer must pay the difference. This is not well-enforced, however. So, employers have a duty to report to the IRS and withhold taxes from their best estimate of combined wages and tips in a manner authorized by IRS regulations. If they don't, the employers face stiff penalties from the IRS for failing to withhold taxes. There are tax regulations and other forms of official guidance governing when it is permissible to infer tips on cash payments in this fashion. It isn't truly "wage theft". The employee still gets whatever the actual tip is, and the employer still doesn't get the tip itself. Instead, what the employer does is withhold taxes for the benefit of the employee (and with respect to FICA an equal share of employer obligations withholding) based upon estimated wages and tips combined. The income tax withholding is annually reconciled (in theory anyway) against actual taxes owed on the annual tax return. If you maintain good records, you might get audited, but you'd probably win. If you maintain sloppy records or don't keep track at all, you'd probably lose in an audit. To reconcile the error in income tax reporting in federal tax law, the waiter files a 1040 with the W-2 from the employer. The waiter reports the amount withheld in one box. The waiter reports the correct amount of wages and salary and tips rather than the incorrect amount in the wage and salary box. The waiter files a supplement to the tax return page explaining the that W-2 is inaccurate. The waiter calculates tax and shows entitlement to a refund, and the IRS either writes a check or audits after which the IRS or if there is no agreement the tax court decides who is right. Cash tips should be logged daily by the waiter and regularly deposited. (I've done this before personally, with success in the audit process, in cases of erroneous 1099s for my personal taxes.) Reconciling errors in FICA withholdings is rather more difficult, but erroneous overwithholding still provides a benefit to the employee, and the employee's survivors, in the long run in that case. This is done in the form of larger Social Security benefit checks that are based on the inflated wage and tip estimate and the actual FICA taxes paid. If the employee actually receives more cash tips than reported by the employer and doesn't correctly increase the amount in a tax return, the tipped employee is actually engaged in petty tax evasion (and, in practice, excess cash tips are rarely reported). The circumstances under which a fixed percentage may be properly set and what it should be are too technical for an answer here. Systemically, the problem with the applicable regulations is that the inferred tip percentage is benchmarked against the tips paid on credit card payments, per IRS guidance and permission, but actually, customers tip at lower percentages of the bill when paying in cash than when paying via credit card. This is a flaw in the law, but it doesn't represent impropriety on the part of the employer.
Using passport as domestic ID I turned 18 last July and I do not currently have a drivers license, nor a state ID (meaning I have no actual photo ID) . However, I do have a passport. Can I use this when people ask for ID, given that I'm in America as an American, for example, when I'm at the bank?	Yes. A domestic passport is sufficient photo ID for any purpose (other than driving or establishing state residency) and is expressly authorized as sufficient ID for employment on a form I-9 and for banking "know your customer" rules. Indeed, for some purposes, even an expired passport is sufficient ID as it establishes citizenship.	Driving without a license is illegal in every state in the US, and a judge presented with evidence that establishes probable cause that a person has engaged in driving without a license can issue a warrant for that person's arrest. Doing so is in no way prohibited by the US Federal Constitution, nor by any state constitution.	Unless the notary personally knows the signer, the notary should, and normally will, ask for identification, and the name that the notary puts in the notarization certificate should be copied exact6ly from whatever ID is presented. For Alan Jones to sign as J7, he would need some sort of official proof, acceptable to the notary, that he is "J7". What would that be? I doubt that any notary would certify such a doccument. (If the document is signed as "Alan Jones" but the ID says "Alan J Jones" I am not sure if the notary must follow the ID or may follow the document, assuming that the notary is convinced that the two are the same person. Many notaries in practice will follow the ID.) I agree that the normal way would be for the document to say "Alan Jones, also known as 'J7'", and possibly include wording such as "I Alan Jones, am the person who posts on site XYZ.com as "J7", and specifically who posted a message starting {quote} at {timestamp}." (Or it could give the secure hash of the message, or of several messages.) This would clearly est6ablish a link between the document and the online conversations/acts that it is meant to refer to. The questions says: a need has developed for Alan Jones to sign a document using the name J7 I doubt that doing such a thing is either required or helpful. Rather I suspect he will need to sign a document in which he acknowledges being the particular "J7" involved in the matter.	If you were an adult, the risk would be a lot higher. You can get away with things when you are 13. And since you are not an adult, the purchase contract is voidable so your parents can void your purchase. Don't do this ever again. It's not a "prank". You say you have no money and your parents have no money. The money on that card could be the last bit of money that the card owner had. Worst case someone has become homeless, had a bit of money in his card account, and you took the last of their savings. Does that make you feel bad? It should.	You would check with the authorities in the state where your parents last lived. Actually, you can write to any congressperson, and they can pay attention to you or ignore you as they like. (This also applies to people who live in the US; if you think a representative other than your own will be more likely to follow your request, you can write to them instead.) The reason it's most common to write to your own representative is that they have a political motivation to consider your request (you are more likely to vote for them if they do what you ask). If you were to vote for a congressperson, that would be in the district where your parents lived (but that is governed by state law).	My story: UK passport holder, resident in Switzerland, driving from Houston to San Antonio and stopped doing 105mph in a 60mph section of highway. I was given the citation and instructions, etc., but told the officer I was leaving in 2 days and may not be able to tend to it in time. On my return to Switzerland, I called the court and asked how I could pay. I was told I could get a money order from the post office, to which I replied, "Really, the Swiss Post office will issue U.S. money orders?" After a further 15 minutes of conversation about how I was willing but unable to pay, the officer said, "Well, I guess that we ain't commin' to Switzerland to get you so just ignore it!" I asked if I could have that in writing and he asked me to write to the court and explain my situation. 3 weeks later and I received a reply saying all was forgiven and I should have no problem re-entering the U.S. or the State of Texas. So my advice would be to call them, and act willing to pay. Things may have changed and you may be able to pay with a credit card, but if you act willing and they are unable to accept your payment, then as long as you have a paper trail, you should be fine. I have entered the U.S. dozens of times since and have even sponsored visas for others.	Are licenses not required to explicitly state Nah, not at all. Licenses state whatever they want. There is no authority to compel license writers to include any particular statements. In case a license you wanna use does not make sense, you either seek clarification or do not use it.	Name and date of birth are not sufficiently unique to identify a person. While name, date of birth, and place of birth do not have to be unique, either, it reduces the number of false positives. Also, date of birth is somewhat better known than place of birth for most people. Motorist: "Sorry, officer, I seem to have lost my wallet. Everything was in there, ID, license, ..." Cop: "Tell me your name, date and place of birth, and I'll run a query if you do have a license."
Legal implications between Member- and Manager-Managed LLCs Upstate NY (USA) here, if it makes a difference. If you Google "llc member managed vs manager managed", you'll get 10,000 lame blogs that all say the same thing: Member-Managed (more common): All members take part in day-to-day operations/management of the LLC; and Manager-Managed (less common): Only a subset of members, or even non-members run the LLC day-to-day But no where does one very important question get answered: is there a legal/enforceable difference between the two, or are they just conceptual?!? Meaning: Are there legal/procedural/financial differences? Or, is it just a concept, and what the Operating Agreement states is what actually dictates who runs the LLC day-to-day?	On a day-to-day basis, there is no practical impact of the distinction between manager-managed vs. member-managed LLCs. On a side note, I don't think the definitions in your question are accurate. Member-managed simply means the manager is a member of the LLC. It doesn't mean ALL the members are actively involved in the management. Usually there is only one chief in charge. If that chief also happens to be a member of the LLC, then it's member-managed. If not, it's manager-managed. Aside from accurate definitions, the only place I am aware it makes any difference is on some forms you fill out at the bank and at the IRS or state taxing authority. Otherwise, it's only conceptual. AFAIK.	In general property owners and employers can impose any rules on their property and employees (respectively) that are not prohibited by law. Granted, there are extensive statutes and regulations to protect "employee rights." I have not heard of protections that include "possession of prescribed medications," but that does not mean they don't exist in your jurisdiction. If you really want to know whether you have a legal right as an employee, and you can't find it in written law or regulation, you would have to consult regulators or employment law attorneys in your jurisdiction. (As a practical matter, of course, it might make sense to first find out whether one's employer wants to assert a policy infringing the right in question.)	Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline.	Why do you think they have the same shareholders? There’s no reason to believe that they are related corporations just because they share an address. I am shareholder and director of 4 corporations. 3 have the same shareholders in the same proportion. The other has different shareholders. All of them have their registered office at my accountant’s premises. It’s a small suburban practice so there are probably only a few hundred companies at that address. A large city practice would have thousands or tens of thousands. The property management company probably provides the same service.	In general, "a signed piece of paper" is not "a contract". It may be a record of a contract, but the contract itself is the meeting of minds where an agreement is reached and doesn't depend on the existence of the piece of paper. (Depending on the jurisdiction, some sorts of contract are required to be in writing, but this doesn't usually apply to employment contracts; it's usually contracts involving land.) What is far more worrying to me is that you don't know how much they are going to pay you. That suggests there hasn't been a meeting of minds, and there is no contract. (It might be that "the going rate" is good enough to form a contract - to determine that would require advice from a local lawyer.) I suggest you don't write up a formal agreement, but nag your boss to decide how much they are actually going to pay you.	It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst.	Suing them and winning may not be that difficult, and you can generally sue a business even if it ceases to operate as a going concern. Collecting the judgment you win, however, is likely to be very difficult. Still if you are going to sue, the sooner the better, because outside of bankruptcy, the general rule is that the person who is first in time to actually seize the available assets of a company with more debts than assets is first in right to those assets. Also a squeaky wheel is often the one that gets the grease. "Shaming" companies on social media often works for going concerns, but is rarely effective when a company is actually going out of business soon. There are special remedies available against recipients of improperly diverted funds when funds are deliberately sucked out of the organization without receiving anything in exchange for its money (this is called a "fraudulent transfer"), but those cases are expensive to bring and hard to prove. Often in the case of a legitimately failing business, operating losses and not improper diversion of funds from the company, is the reason that it doesn't have enough money to pay all of its debts in full, so this remedy is not available. Winning a lawsuit simply gives you a piece of paper stating that the defendant owes you money which you can then use to seize money and property from the defendant and/or people who owe the defendant money, if you can find either of those things. But, you can't get blood out of a turnip, and the alternative formal collection mechanism (forcing an involuntary bankruptcy) requires the coordination of multiple significant creditors and may not provide much better results if the company has genuinely run out of money, although unpaid wages are often entitled to priority in bankruptcy up to a certain dollar amount which is a preference that is not generally available outside of bankruptcy court. There are sometimes laws that can be invoked to hold people affiliated with the management of a defunct business personally responsible for unpaid wages (sometimes the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and sometimes state wage claim acts). And, very rarely in egregious cases that affect lots of people where there was an intent to stiff you before you finished earning new wages at the company, a local or state prosecutor will prosecute a company or its officers for "wage theft". Finally, "freelancers" often have far fewer rights in efforts to collect wages than true employees, so a mere independent contractor is in a weaker position and should consider that fact when deciding whether or not to settle. Bottom line: consider seriously accepting a settlement because the cost of collection and the unavailability of assets to collect from once it goes out of business may make a bird in the hand worth more than two in the bush.	How close is such a statement corresponding with the reality? Legally, such language is a meaningless statement of future intent that at best makes clear that the person making the statement isn't waiving any of their legal rights. Certainly, no infringer would have standing to sue if they failed to do so. Whether a joint venture member or foreign reseller could sue the company for failing to enforce its IP rights is another question that presents itself very differently and depends upon much more than what the warning labels state, such as the language in the joint partnership or reseller's agreement with the copyright owner. Also, in criminal copyright violation cases, even if the copyright owner asks for the maximum possible consequences, the U.S. Justice Department is under no obligation whatsoever to go along with that request. Likewise, a judge has no obligation to impose the maximum penalty allowed by law following a criminal conviction, even if the copyright owner and the U.S. Justice Department both request a maximum sentence for someone who pleas guilty or is convicted of the offense following a trial. In practice, something like 98% of federal criminal cases, and a similar percentage of federal civil cases, result in agreed resolutions which result in less severe penalties than the maximum penalties allowed by law. This happens as a result of a mutual agreement to resolve the case with a guilty plea, or a settlement agreement in a civil case, or both. Also, in practice, none of these companies, nor the federal government's prosecutors, have the resources to press anything but the most clear and serious copyright violation cases, and cases that are valuable for P.R. purposes. Anything else is essentially a random lottery from myriad cases that could have been brought in order to counteract the argument (both political and legal) that their copyright protections are empty and completely unenforced is a large part of the cases to which the statutes would make it seem that they apply. Also, in a case brought by a joint venture owner or reseller for failure to enforce a copyright which causes the partner damages, presumably in some sort of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty action, there would be no way to prove damages from all of the non-enforcement, since enforcing every known infringement would not be cost effective and would reduce the net profits of everyone involved.
Pedestrian Hit because Stopped in Crosswalk There was a Reddit discussion about this gif, which shows an accident involving a man stopped at a crosswalk who is basically invisible from a distance due to a bright light. Some are saying the pedestrian always has right of way, while others are saying the pedestrian shouldn't have stopped in the crosswalk in the first place. Who's at fault?	When a pedestrian is in a clearly marked crosswalk, and didn't suddenly leap out in front of an oncoming car, the vehicle operator is legally obligated to stop. Stop, not merely slow down, see for example RCW 46.61.235 The operator of an approaching vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian or bicycle to cross the roadway within an unmarked or marked crosswalk when the pedestrian or bicycle is upon or within one lane of the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. For purposes of this section "half of the roadway" means all traffic lanes carrying traffic in one direction of travel, and includes the entire width of a one-way roadway It is legal to stop and ask "Excuse me, can I pass?", or words to that effect, in case a pedestrian gets stalled. There is no defense whereby you don't have to stop if it is dark, or you are free to ignore pedestrians in the crosswalk if there is a bright light. The burden is on the driver to see the pedestrian that he is about to hit. It is also not a defense that the guy in the right lane did not previously cream the pedestrian. The pedestrian is not invisible, although perhaps because of the light it was not possible to see the pedestrian until the car is maybe 20 feet away. If the driver had slowed down in a manner appropriate to the circumstances (as is required by law), he could have easily stopped before the crosswalk. It is not a defense that "this street is posted for 30, I was doing 30", because you are never allowed to drive faster than is safe for existing conditions.	I can't see anything to say this is a state-wide ban. Do they have to give an opportunity to return unused fireworks for a refund? The ban imposed by Portland Fire and Rescue appears to relate to the use, not possession, of fireworks so I assume that the stores' / State's regular refund policies would apply. Due to unusually hot temperatures and dry conditions, PF&R is announcing an immediate ban on the use of all legal and illegal fireworks...	An insurer can’t find anyone at fault An insurance company cannot find you or anyone else at fault - they don't have the power. They are alleging that you are at fault and, presumably, demanding damages. Whether you are at fault or not is a matter for you to concede (by paying them) or a court to determine based on the evidence when they sue you (or you sue them for your damages). The other driver’s insurer only knows what they have been told and it’s likely the other driver genuinely believes they were not at fault and, based on what you say happened, they may very well be right, or at the very least, that both drivers were at fault. For example, it’s not clear if you turned from the left most lane into the left most lane as you are required to do or if you changed lanes during the turn. Notwithstanding, it sounds like you drove into them (that is, the front of your car was behind the front of their car) and the fundamental rule of driving is don’t drive into things - failing to avoid a collision is a go to offense in all driving rules.	Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence.	I live in MD near DC, and have been ticketed by the cameras in both DC and MD. At least for speeding and red-light violations (and I think for all camera detected violations) these are just fines, not true moving violations in that no license points are assessed, and there is no impact on insurance, provided the ticket is paid, unlike what would have happened had an officer written the ticket in person. One can contest the ticket, but it is not likely to be worth the time and trouble. This policy of not assessing points is precisely because there is no assured way of determining who the driver is with current technology, although cameras that can see the driver through the windshield and match him or her against a database by facial recognition may be coming. Currently a human reviews the images in an effort to rule out false positives and certify that an actual violation is shown. The name and title of this person is shown on the notice I get, at least from MD. What one can do "proactively": do not speed or go through red lights pay all camera tickets promptly (or file the paperwork to contest them). If unpaid beyond the deadline they turn into more serious violations that do carry points, just like failing to attend a court date.	The question asks for analysis of a specific accident, and I'll leave that to other answers. This answer is focused on conceptual misunderstandings in the question itself. Where does fault lie in the following situation; and what tickets if any should be issued according to Illinois Motor Vehicle Code and why? Again who is at fault or what %'s of fault should be applied and why? Lawsuits v. Traffic Citations It is important to understand that whether tickets could be issued according to the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code, and legal fault in a lawsuit arising from an accident involving a motor vehicle are two very different legal concepts. Also, there isn't necessarily only one person at fault or only one person who has violated the Motor Vehicle Code. Motor Vehicle Code Violations Violations of the Motor Vehicle Code are analyzed one by one in a criminal or quasi-criminal traffic court proceeding where the issue is whether a fine or other punishment should be imposed for violating it. One person being cited does not mean that another person can't be cited as well. These proceedings would be brought by the "People of the State of Illinois" against each defendant by a government official at government expense. The government also has no legal obligation to bring charges for every violation that could in theory be legally supported by the facts. The outcome of the traffic court proceedings would be inadmissible evidence in a lawsuit arising out of the accident. Usually the police report will also be inadmissible evidence unless the police officer who wrote it is brought into court to testify in support of it, or the parties stipulate otherwise. Civil Liability In A Lawsuit In a lawsuit, brought by the private lawyer for a person who has suffered damages from the accident (called a "plaintiff") must show that someone else was negligent, which means that they failed to act with reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent harm to others, that this caused their damages, and must prove their damages. Private lawyers for the defendants whom the Plaintiff seeks to assign fault to are usually paid for by the defendants' insurance companies and argue against their clients having liability. A jury hears all of the evidence and assigns a percentage of fault to each party including the plaintiff. If the person injured is found by a jury to be at least 50% at fault, then there is no recovery. If the person injured is found to be less than 50% at fault, then the other parties at fault have legal liability to the plaintiff based upon their percentage of fault. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1116. Negligence in a lawsuit doesn't necessarily have to involve a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. A jury can find, for example, that someone was driving too fast for the conditions despite not violating the speed limit, or stopped too abruptly, even if those aren't Motor Vehicle Code violations and can find a percentage of fault based upon that conduct. A violation of the Motor Vehicle Code does not automatically translate to fault either. Violations of the Motor Vehicle Code are a basis for a finding of fault, in what is called negligence per se, if the code section violated was intended to prevent the kind of accident that actually happened. Failure to use a turn signal, for example, will rarely constitute negligence per se in an accident where one car rear ends another car. There are very simple cases where one can truly state with absolutely certainty that only one party is at fault for purposes of a negligence lawsuit. For example, comparative fault is hard to argue in a case where a garbage truck hits and damages a building while the driver isn't paying attention and the building owner sues the garbage truck driver and his employer, although even then the issue of what damages should be awarded can be litigated. (Full disclosure: I litigated this case for a building owner until it had to be transferred to new counsel due to a merger of my law firm with another law firm that represented the other side in the case.) But usually (at least in cases that go to trial) there is at least some colorable argument that more than one person involved failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances and if so, the jury must allocate fault percentages on a basis that it feels best allocates responsibility for the harm caused to a particular plaintiff by the accident as it sees fit in their good judgment using common sense. And, this allocation of percentage fault is almost impossible to overturn on appeal if there is any argument based upon any evidence introduced at trial that the people to whom fault were allocated indeed not totally without fault. It is impossible to say, as a matter of law, what percentage of fault should be assigned to each at fault party when more than one party is potentially at fault. This is question purely for the finder of fact (usually a jury, but the judge in a bench trial).	united-states Speed limits can be enforced by any means (except photo-radar) in most U.S. jurisdictions without notice that it is being used. Those laws are close to being uniform in the U.S. due to federal coordination on federally funded roads, even though state and local laws are what governs them directly. Some U.S. jurisdictions prohibit the issuance of photo-radar speeding tickets without notice before entering the photo-radar picture taking zone. I'd have to research further to see if New York City does. The purpose of the language on the sign is to make drivers more fearful of being caught in circumstances where they don't see someone trying to enforce the law, not to have greater legal effect.	It's legal The Ohio Court of Appeals has addressed a nearly identical situation in State v. Paseka. The relevant law is, as you noted in the question, R.C. 4511.39, which states, in relevant part: No person shall turn a vehicle or trackless trolley or move right or left upon a highway ... without giving an appropriate signal The facts in this case are directly on point—an intersection where continuing straight puts one on a different road, while the original road requires a turn to stay on it: Appellant was traveling west on State Route 6. At a certain point, Route 6 veers to the left. As appellant approached that area of State Route 6, he chose to maintain a straight-ahead course which automatically placed him on Wahl Road. He was stopped for failing to activate his turn signal in violation of R.C. 4511.39. The court ruled that this did not violate the law requiring the use of a turn signal: It is undisputed that appellant’s straight-ahead entrance onto Wahl Road did not require him to turn his vehicle, nor did it require him to switch into a different lane. As such, we fail to see how appellant violated R.C. 4511.39. Here's the intersection in question, via Google Maps: Imagery ©2021 Google, Imagery ©2021 Maxar Technologies, State of Ohio / OSIP, USDA Farm Service Agency, Map data ©2021
unknown US citizen, do I owe taxes My parents are US citizens who, moved to Brazil and had me 32 years ago. We never went back. The US doesn't know about me I'm sure. I don't even have any US documents. But I wonder still, I have worked for years, and just learned US citizens need to pay US income tax, but I have never paid US taxes. Now I want to travel more, and I worry, if I go to US they will arrest me and make me pay?	It is likely that you don't owe any taxes even though you have worked for many years in Brazil. Earned income that is earned outside the U.S. by natural persons who are U.S. citizens (as oppose to entities like corporations) up to a certain amount that is indexed for inflation is excluded from taxation under Section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code. The cut off is $104,100 U.S. per year in 2018 (about 347,000 Brazilian Reals per year). Also, unearned income and any excess earned income can benefit from the standard deduction and personal exemption from U.S. income taxation unburdened by your foreign earned income up to the threshold. This can be quite substantial. Similarly, if you have children, they would benefit from the child tax credit which would reduce your income tax obligation. And, any U.S. federal income tax due on your unearned income to the extent that it exceeds the standard deduction and personal exemption from U.S. income taxation is reduced by any Brazilian taxes you paid on your Brazilian income as a result of the foreign tax credit. The bottom line is that unless you are very affluent and have significant unearned income, it is unlikely that you owe any U.S. income taxes. Even if you do owe U.S. taxes after these considerations, they wouldn't arrest you. You have to be "willfully" violating U.S. tax laws for it to be a criminal offense and this is one small corner of the law where ignorance of the law is an excuse. And, the Internal Revenue Service would first have to send you several notices by mail setting forth the amount that they think that you owe, allowing you to dispute that amount, and the declaring that you owe it, before you have a potentially criminal tax violation that is well defined enough and communicated to you well enough that you can willfully fail to file a tax return or can willfully fail to pay. So no, they will not arrest you and make you pay, at least not until they send you lots of notices which you ignore. On the other hand, if you do owe any U.S. income taxes there is no statute of limitations on collecting those taxes for years in which you were required by U.S. tax law to file a tax return but did not (basically, years in which you owed U.S. taxes). So, if you, for example, won a big lump sum payment playing the lottery when you were 20 years old and owed U.S. income taxes as a result (even though you didn't know it), those taxes could still be collected by the IRS when you are 40 years old since you did not file any U.S. tax return for the year in which you had taxable U.S. income. Finally, under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 enacted in December last year, U.S. taxation of the foreign income of U.S. persons was reformed in the most significant way in the last seventy years or so, and the taxation of U.S. persons on foreign source income is greatly curtailed for 2018 going forward. This is not retroactive, but could mean that as you come into your higher income earning years in middle age, that the taxation of U.S. citizens on their worldwide income is no longer a serious concern for you, even if it would have been under U.S. tax law before then. Enforcing laws that have since been repealed is also rarely an administrative priority for the IRS. It is also hard (to the point of being economically not worth it) to enforce U.S. tax laws against someone who has no U.S. assets. It is also possible that even though you were a dual citizen at birth, that you could have taken an act (e.g. voluntarily serving as an officer in the Brazilian military) that could cause you to lose your U.S. citizenship. So, even if you were a U.S. citizen at birth, it is not 100% certain that you are a U.S. citizen now.	In the U.S.: To my knowledge all states and jurisdictions that with a "sales tax" technically have a "use" tax, which means the tax liability falls on the purchaser. However, they require "businesses" (whose exact definition varies by jurisdiction) to collect and remit that tax on behalf of "consumers" (which can also vary, e.g., to exclude businesses that resell). Historically consumers have avoided paying use taxes by purchasing from out-of-state businesses that are not subject to their home states' laws on withholding the use tax: while technically a violation of the tax law neither consumers nor states have had an interest in calculating or auditing use taxes owed, except in the case of very large and unusual transactions. There is a large effort underway by states and "brick-and-mortar" stores that lose business to this virtual "mail order tax exemption" to subject out-of-state businesses to the requirement of collecting use taxes on behalf of the state. A few online businesses (notably Amazon) have acquiesced to this demand. To answer your question: In the U.S., an individual who is not making a "business" of selling items or services is generally exempt from the requirement to collect sales tax. It is the purchaser who has the legal obligation to declare and pay tax on such transactions. But purchasers rarely do.	Don't even think of going there. If you refuse to pay taxes with this argument, the IRS will take this as a "frivolous tax return", and give you a fine of up to $5,000. If you are trying to argue that this is illegal, you only make things worse. The IRS gets about 20,000 to 30,000 frivolous tax returns every year, so every argument you could come up with they have heard a dozen times.	You have not committed a crime or a violation of non-criminal law when you swear something under oath believing in good faith that what you are saying is true, and you are mistaken. The law does not expect omniscience. Also, making a false statement under oath is only sanctionable if you make a false statement of a "material fact." Whether or not you have a Social Security number is not a "material fact" in the context of a passport application where the material facts are that you are the same person as the person described in your birth certificate, that the parents there are to the best of your knowledge your parents, that the birth certificate is authentic, and that you have not renounced U.S. citizenship. The question about a Social Security number is there for administrative convenience, not to make any determination about your right to a passport. You should apply for a Social Security number. If you already have one, your actions consistent with not having one will only corroborate the fact that you were ignorant of that fact when you applied for a passport, and you will have your existing Social Security number provided to you. As a practical matter it is unlikely that you have one. There are no forms that your non-U.S. parents would have to be filled out that would have required one, and you know that you haven't applied for one in the past. Before Social Security numbers of dependents were required on U.S. tax forms, most people didn't get Social Security numbers until they got their first job.	Assuming that the age of criminal responsibility in your jurisdiction is more than five (I don't know any jurisdictions where it isn't), then you can't be arrested for this. It is possible that the therapist will have to report the information, and it will appear on your record if you apply to work with vulnerable people. On the other hand, if your parents put you up for adoption aged five (but kept a sister), they will have had to explain why - and that is likely to have been recorded (unless this is so long ago that record keeping was much more lax in those days). I would recommend finding a different therapist that is more comfortable being told about these things. You might also need to consult a lawyer for a short while (they will often offer a 30 minute free consultation).	This is a tricky question on the intersection of visa and tax laws. It is tricky because every country can make its own rules that apply when you are in that country or do business in that country. Even within the EU, there is no uniform approach because freedom of movement merely covers the right to work in a country, but not the rules which have to be followed when doing so. Thus, you have to fall back to reading each individual country's rules and legislation. In general: Whether you are even allowed to work or which work activities are permitted depends on your visa or visa-free status. If you are a permanent resident or citizen of the UK, you can come to and work in every EEA country, until the end of the Brexit transition period, subject to the same rules as residents in that country. Often, visa-free visits or business visa allow some business activities such as attending meetings with clients or collecting information, but not performing actual work. If you're interested in what business activities the UK allows visitors from other countries to do, take a look at the visitor rules. Income tax may be due at the place of tax residency or where the income is generated/earned, in particular where you actually perform the work. There is a widespread belief that you only gain tax residency after staying in one country for 6 months, but this is misleading in the general case: every country makes its own rules, and income tax may be due even without (permanent) tax residency. The relevant countries (the country where you work and the country where you normally reside) might have a tax agreement that specifies where tax is due. Within the EU, it is fairly common that a person works in a different country than the one they reside in, so there is a well-developed network of tax treaties. Often, certain activities are exempt from local taxes, such as compensation for visiting researchers or regular employment. There's also a good chance that profit from independent work / business profits are only taxable at the place(s) where that enterprise has a permanent establishment – but it depends on the details. This section is based on the OECD model tax treaty (https://doi.org/10.1787/mtc_cond-2017-en) which most treaties follow closely. If no tax treaty exists that exempts your income from local taxation, you must consult the local tax laws. VAT rules are entirely different, and for B2B services are generally taxed at the location of the client (place of supply rules). But every country makes its own rules. Exception: within the EEA, cross-border B2B supply is always taxed at and by the client via the reverse-charge mechanism. So things can get quite tricky, and a business visitor should inform themselves beforehand what activities they are allowed to perform abroad and whether there are tax implications. is it any different from a UK author going travelling, taking lots and lots of notes, or even writing his/her next novel whilst in various locations, and publishing once returned to the UK? Here no tax implications arise because the travelling author is not paid during their travels, but they have to consider visa rules when performing their work. Such rules often have exemptions for artists. However, it depends on the rules of the travelled country. what basis does a government have for deciding "where" work was done? Each country is sovereign and can make its own rules. How would that apply if a team of software developers had a virtual "pair programming" session, with one in USA, one in UK, and one in the Far East ? "Where" has that software been written? It is not generally relevant where software was written, aside from copyright or export regulation issues which might have their own rules. Since each of the three programmers is working in their own country, no particular visa or income tax issues arise. However, if they have a common employer, the employer does have to consider the local employment laws regardless of where the employer is established, which may include paying some taxes in every country.	I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down.	Given that there are almost 200 countries on Earth and most people don't have any information about Lesotho (etc) it is impossible to say what the frequency of such taxes is. There are also many ways in which media-taxes are imposed, so it depends on which sub-class of taxes you're interested in. However, such taxes are by no means rare. Many countries impose a license requirement on televisions and / or radio: Albania, Austria, Bosnia, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Montenegro, South Korea, South Africa, UK and so on. It is also indirectly collected as a fee on electric bills in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Serbia, Pakistan, Turkey, Mauritius. In general, when broadcasting is state-supported, the state gets its money from taxes, so the case in Norway and Sweden seems to be that you pay a tax for broadcast, and it's just part of your taxes, just like in the US the local transit tax becomes part of your property tax. Note that I did not list a majority of the countries in the world, because I don't know about taxing and broadcasting in Lesotho (etc.). This page gives some information, but it's not authoritative or exhaustive.
Papal nuncios, diplomatic immunity, and canon law Supposing I thought my country's papal nuncio owes me money and he thinks otherwise. So I sue him and he gets the case dismissed on the grounds of diplomatic immunity. Maybe I could go to Vatican City and sue him there. (?) But since the Catholic church has tribunals of the kind in which canon lawyers practice, might a local tribunal of that sort in my own neighborhood suffice? (Obviously it's not the sort of thing those courts usually handle. Nor do the courts in Vatican City in the present day usually try cases in which a defendant gets sentenced to imprisonment, and yet that happened and was in the headlines about six or seven years ago.)	It depends in part why you think he owes you money: is it about real estate in the US, it is about his role as executor or heir in an estate, does it relate to professional or commercial activity outside his official function? This is covered by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Article 31. If so, you can sue him the regular way. Enforcement of a judgment can be a challenge, since he can't he held in contempt for ignoring the order, and the police can't enter the embassy to take property. A theoretical alternative would be to take the case to the local Archdiocese, but Canon 366 precludes that "the seat of a pontifical legation is exempt from the power of governance of the local ordinary unless it is a question of celebrating marriages", so taking your case to the Archdiocese of Washington is pointless. Consequently, I think the case would have to be presented to the Roman Rota. But from what I can tell, unless this situation is a violation of church law, you will fail to state a cognizable claim.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	You would be amazed at how vanishingly few the number of cases are where a signature is disputed. Signatures are easy, quick and don't require you having inky fingers all the time. They are so useful that to throw them out to deal with infinintesimally small fractions of disputes over their veracity (bearing in mind that 99.999999999% of contracts never have a dispute that gets to a court [or at all]) is ridiculous. When it does happen, handwriting analysis is probably not going to be put into evidence anyway. Testimony like "I saw him sign it" is way more likely to be used.	Like this Let's assume that the perpetrator is a California based company. The Brazilian government initiates a prosecution in Brazil. It follows its proper course and the company is convicted and the judge orders a fine of, say 5 million Real. The Brazilian government takes this judgment to a Californian court who determines that the case was conducted correctly under Brazilian law. This would be a judicial review and not a retrial on the issues. Further, they would check that the matter was not in conflict with ant treaty between the US & Brazil about such matters. If the Californian court is satisfied that this was done correctly, it issues a judgment for the same amount in USD. The Brazillian government then collects against that debt using all the normal methods in California. Refusal by the company to pay will now be contempt of court in California. Virtually every country in the world reciprocally enforces judgements for other nations. By the way, there is no extraterritoriality in the offence: the offence was committed in Brazil and prosecuted in Brazil, the enforcement is under US law in California.	Standing requirements are different in state and federal courts, and from one state to the next. A random individual would not have standing to object to a stranger's abortion in federal court, and likely not in any state court, under normal circumstances, as they are not injured in any meaningful way by the abortion. I don't know what the normal rules of standing are in Texas, but it is likely perfectly acceptable for the Legislature to wave its wand to grant standing to whomever it wants regarding any violation of the law it sees for. That seems to be what is happening here.	I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract.	Yes, certainly. A prominent example was Lawrence v. Texas. The defendants were charged in state court with "deviate sexual intercourse". They moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional. Their motion was denied and they were convicted and fined; the denial was upheld by the state's court of appeals. They then appealed to the US Supreme Court, which eventually ruled that the statute was indeed unconstitutional. A defendant likely wouldn't have standing to sue the state for enforcing the law in general, only for enforcing it on the defendant himself.	This appears to be a complaint about lawyers using the legal process to achieve what their client wants. Forgive me, but this seems to be like complaining that doctors only want to cure the client's disease, architects only want to design the client's buildings and generals only want to kill the client's enemies. Your lawyer is not your business strategist or your life coach! A civil case is always about the money. If you are pursuing a civil case over a principle then you are going to spend a lot of money and probably lose. The use of a lawyer should always be part of your wider negotiation strategy in the same way that your armed forces are part of your diplomacy; in both cases the threat of use is usually better than the actual use. A civil case always follows a failure to successfully negotiate. Not all by any means, but most, civil cases would be better settled by agreement than litigation by all parties. If you believe that your objectives can best be served by a social media campaign, political pressure, etc. then go for it. Your lawyer can advise you what the risks are wrt to defamation etc. but ultimately how you choose to pursue your goal is up to you. Lawyers, understandably, look for legal solutions. A public relations professional is far better placed than a lawyer to inform your media strategy.
Is Ambush by New Parking Sign legal unless prohibited? I came across the following NYC article from on the internets whilst researching the situation for ATX: https://newyorkparkingticket.com/proposed-nyc-parking-law-relieves-pain-new-parking-sign/ The original law recognized the injustice of installing a new parking sign while cars were parked in spaces regulated by the old sign, and issuing parking tickets based upon a violation of a parking sign that didn’t exist when people parked their chariots. Horrible but true. As per the above, in NYC, it appears that there are currently explicit laws on the books that prevent installing the sign and issuing the parking tickets on the same day/week that the sign gets installed, and/or providing an affirmative defence for issued tickets. What about other jurisdictions, specifically, Austin in Travis County, in Texas? Wouldn't an appropriate notice and grace period be required for the cars parked under the old signs (or lack thereof) provided that the new signs are respected within XX hours? (All other local laws in ATx did seem to have similar provisions, e.g., it was widely reported that at first only the warning was to be given for violating the hands-free ordinance.)	In general, you don’t need an alternative defence. It is inherent in the common law that, unless the statute is explicitly retroactive (and legislators are reluctant to go there) it cannot make illegal that which was at the time of the act, legal. For example, assume the old sign had unlimited and the new sign reduces this to 2 hours. If you parked before the sign was changed you could leave your car there forever so long as you never move it. The NYC law give further rights - a period of grace where the owner can rely on the old restriction as a defense, even if they parked after the sign had been changed.	I do not know whether anyone has ever tried it, but it would not take much for a judge to conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of a speed limit sign is that the speed is to be measured relative to the surface of the road or to any other object that is stationary in that frame of reference. Does there exist provisions in any legal system to fix this legal loophole? Most rules for interpreting legal texts fix "loopholes" of this sort by providing for the consideration only of interpretations that are reasonably likely to have been intended, or that a reasonable person might arrive at. The interpretation that the speed limit could be measured against any frame of reference (or indeed any one other than that of the Earth's surface) is not reasonable.	I have beaten all but one of my traffic tickets just by going to court. In one case, the judge threw out the charge because he couldn't read the officer's handwriting on the ticket. In another, the officer charged that I was parked in a "no parking" zone on a particular street (at night), but gave a cross street where parking was, in fact, allowed.	The statute in question is section 26708 (13)(B): A vehicle equipped with a video event recorder shall have a notice posted in a visible location which states that a passenger's conversation may be recorded. It doesn't require it be visible to all passengers and doesn't make any provision for visually impaired passengers. I am not licenced to practice in California but know of no cases clarifying how "visible" the notice needs to be. I wouldn't suggest trying to hide the notice, though.	You will still have to pay A ticket can be ammended if the state so chooses (they can look up what color and model your car is). The car is probably on video. The officer can testify if they wrote your car info down somewhere else. And if they identified you inside the car as the violator, the car's color hardly matters. The idea that minor mistakes or omissions on tickets can get you off is a myth. From an actual lawyer	§Sec. 54-212 of the ordinance states (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell, offer or display for sale, give, lend, transfer ownership of, acquire, carry or possess any assault weapon or large capacity magazine in Cook County So if the gun is an assault weapon, it is not legal to sell. That ends the legal inquiry. Beyond that, we can only conjecture as to possibilities, for example (1) you may be mistaken in your assessment of some particular firearm, (2) the authorities don't know yet so haven't taken action or (3) they do know and they have taken action. Your link did not lead to any obvious things that count as an assault weapon, perhaps you could be more specific.	Almost everywhere, in any circumstances, it is the driver's responsibility to operate their vehicle so as not to get in an accident. When two drivers collide, responsibility can be divided among them depending on the details. However, when a driver hits a stopped object (including another vehicle), it is always the driver's fault for not operating his vehicle safely. It is possible the other vehicle may also receive a minor parking ticket or similar infraction for stopping on a shoulder or other invalid place. But that citation will not do anything at all to relieve your responsibility to operate your car without hitting obstacles.	Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the "spirit" of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of "No trespassing without permission". It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. "Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last" Isn't really "ill-phrased" either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what "nonsense" you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said "free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st", you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either.
Is creating a new GPS trace a derivative work while using GPS-based ADAS? There is a database of precise GPS traces. A trace from this database can be used in an Advanced driver-assistance system to help keep the vehicle in its lane. The vehicle in question is driven by a human driver. Another precise GPS trace of vehicle's trajectory is recorded while using the original trace for ADAS - is the newly created GPS trace a derivative work of the original database or not? The ADAS system is constantly monitoring vehicle's current position against the original GPS trace and may only issue a warning in case the vehicle should leave the path of the original GPS trace. The ADAS system by itself however is not able to intervene via vehicle steering and thus change the vehicle's path. I am specifically interested in two cases - whether the above use case is a: derivative work according to the US copyright law derivative work in terms of the ODC Open Database License (ODbL)	A GPS trace of a car's path, on its own, is unlikely to be covered by copyright in the first place. It is primarily made up of facts (the locations of roads and lanes), and there is no creativity involved in its creation. A database of facts may be protected by copyright as a compilation if there is some amount of creativity in how it is assembled, but this does not extend any protection to the individual contents of the database (cf. Feist v. Rural).	Very few terms have a single "legal" definition or meaning that applies to all laws, and can be looked up as if in a dictionary. Rather, when a specific meaning is needed in connection with a particular law, that law will include a definition. But that definition will often not apply to the use of the same term in other laws or other contexts. Here I suspect that the OP has found the definition section of a US Federal law regulating commercial transport in interstate commerce. Obviously in such a law, those terms would be defined in the context of commercial transport. That does not mean that the same meanings will be applied in other laws. Driver's licenses and other traffic and motor vehicle regulations are largely matters of state law in the US. Definitions from a federal law, or indeed any law but that state's Motor Vehicle Code (or whatever a given state calls such a body of law) will simply not be relevant. The argument sketched in the question simply does not follow.	You don't have to, but you probably want to for a couple of reasons: It's courteous, and in the spirit of open source It's someone else's work, and you're using it. The least you can probably say is "thank you." It will also probably help you stay in the clear: since you're using software in binary form, where the notice isn't immediately accessible, then by providing a copy of the license, you respect that licensing term in another way. It tells your users what's up with the program Let's admit it, having the license accessible to the users tells them what's in the program and so on. It's another way of providing attribution, like I listed in the first reason above. Many apps, desktop and mobile, have a screen or panel to indicate the projects and licenses that they use. They don't have to be straight in the user's face, they can be a little button in the "About" screen of the program. To answer a little confusion: the binaries are still a derived form from that source code. Analyse the heading: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. The software is still there, it's just there in a different form, a compiled form. Therefore, the copyright and permission notice should probably stick around, even if it's just a file somewhere.	Yes, you can use such eye tracking if you obtain consent in a suitable manner. But obtaining consent is going to be very difficult for you. The processing activity in question occurs within the context of an EU establishment of the data controller. Thus, GDPR applies regardless of where the data subjects are located. Under GDPR, any processing activity needs a clear purpose and a legal basis. Typical legal bases are necessity for performing a contract with the data subject, legal obligations, a legitimate interest, or consent. Conditions for consent are listed in Art 7 GDPR. Once your have a purpose that is covered by a legal basis, you can collect the minimum data necessary to achieve the purpose. For example, let's assume that the purpose is a scientific study for which gaze tracking is necessary. The study's subjects can be informed about the context of the study, about how the data will be used, and can then be asked for consent for proceeding. Of course, participation in the study is only possible when consent is given. This is perfectly fine as far as the GDPR is concerned. But things might be more difficult when data is used for a different purpose, for example in order to track user interests in a web shop. You do have a legitimate interest in optimizing the website, but this interest likely doesn't outweigh the user's privacy interests. Legitimate interest always requires a careful balancing test. If the user cannot reasonably expect the data collection to happen, that is an indication that consent would be a better legal basis than legitimate interest. Accessing a camera feed means accessing information stored on the end user's device. Per the ePrivacy directive, this requires consent regardless of whether the information in question is personal data. Cookies, mouse pointer tracking, or eye tracking with a camera are all equivalent in this regard. Consent must be specific, informed, and freely given. It is an unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes, and must involve some clear statement or affirmative action. Prior to starting the eye tracking, you must provide sufficient information about what is happening, and must make it possible to easily decline consent. You cannot bundle unrelated consent together (e.g. eye tracking consent + cookie consent). You cannot make access to a service conditional on unrelated consent. E.g. a web shop does not need camera access, but an augmented reality does. Still, consent must be specific so consent for AR purposes can probably not be used to authorize eye tracking, which might need separate consent. Browsers do not grant camera access by default, and instead show a permission dialogue where the user can allow access or block further requests. This permission dialogue cannot replace your compliance obligations such as providing the necessary information so that the user can make an informed choice. Since GDPR requires that consent is freely given and can be declined, you might find it difficult to convince anyone to give consent to this fairly invasive tracking procedure. You might be able to incentivize consent e.g. with small discounts on a web shop, but the incentive must remain small enough that there really is a free choice between giving or declining consent. The EDPB has issued guidelines that are relevant to your scenario. These guidelines are not law, but are well-reasoned official interpretations that are frequently cited by courts. Guidelines 05/2020 on consent Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data through video devices Practically speaking, I doubt you will find eye tracking to be useful. First, you can likely achieve your purposes through less invasive means. Recall that the GDPR only allows you to process the minimum data necessary to achieve a purpose. Second, eye tracking is difficult for technical reasons. Bad lighting and weird angles make it difficult to obtain a useful feed. Cameras might be in different positions relative to the browser window, so that the eye tracking would have to be calibrated before acquiring data. Eye tracking typically involves processing the video feed on the user's device, but this is computationally expensive that will make the website unusable on lower-end devices, in particular mobile devices. And of course, many PCs don't have a camera in the first place.	You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license.	There are vendors providing software to facilitate this sort of task. Avalara is perhaps the best known, but I don't have any experience with it and couldn't say whether it's actually any good or not. But the bottom line is that in a destination-based sourcing regime, sales taxes must be computed based on the address of the destination, not city or ZIP code associated with that address. As Avalara has noted, this is a giant hassle, but it's nonetheless the current state of the law. Of course, this assumes the seller has sufficient nexus with Louisiana to trigger a duty to collect sales taxes in the first place. From the question, it is not clear whether this is true.	It is reasonable to interpret the statement in their Github repository README.md as a "public domain" license for anything contained there. However, their "usage guidelines" backpedals a bit ("generally are not copyrighted", the misleading implication that content used commercially is subject to restrictions that educational and personal uses are not subject to). Although it is true that works "created by the US government" are not protected by copyright, not everything associated with a government agency is created by the US government. An agency might have a policy that they will not post material that is not copyright-free, there is no practical means of knowing if an item is an actual government work, versus a government-supported or government-hosted work (where copyright is held by someone else). If you trust their implication that all of those items in the repository are indeed government works, then they are free of copyright. I don't know any reason to not believe them, although sometimes the government is wrong and they end up liable big-time for infringement. However... NASA Open Source Agreement Version 1.3 (another copy on a NASA web page) on first glance seems to contradict the "government work" theory. Here, they claim to grant certain rights to users and also impose impose restrictions (including obligatory registration). This does not make any sense for a work that is in the public domain. The license is legally defective in that it fails to fill in relevant blanks (agency name, title of work, URL for obligatory registration). Also notice that the license is only for software. The scope of that license therefore has to be something narrower – it applies only to software, and presumably software that is not "a government work". I have no idea what software NASA could legally give away and is not a government work which is therefore not protected by copyright.	You are responsible for what data is being processed by your website. When you embed third party components on your website (e.g. iframes, scripts), you are at least jointly responsible with the third party providing these components. You are only responsible for what happens on the website (i.e. what processing is under your control), not for what the third party provider does with collected data on their services. However, note that information will be transferred to Google's servers regardless of whether the visitor has a Google account! The Fashion ID case is relevant case law establishing and explaining these points. Since you are (jointly) responsible, you need a legal basis for collecting personal data through the tracking snippet and sharing it with the third party (here Google). For example, the legal basis could be a legitimate interest, or could be consent. A legitimate interest requires that you balance this interests against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the data subject (the site visitor). If the data subject wouldn't reasonably expect this tracking, you cannot rely on a legitimate interest. Consent can always work, except that it is a freely given, informed opt-in – likely unsuitable for conversion tracking. Which legal basis to use is primarily your responsibility. You argue that the tracking snippet does not collect personal data. However, this argument is not well supported. Under the GDPR, personal data does not only include directly identifying information such as an email address, but also any information “relating” to an identifiable person. Identification includes the ability to single out someone, e.g. by a browser fingerprint. For purposes of conversion tracking, Google will clearly try to collect data that allows the visitor to be singled out, thus collecting personal data. Furthermore, specific kinds of information are regulated by the ePrivacy directive. This includes “traffic data” and “information stored on a terminal device”, regardless of whether this information is personal data under the GDPR. Under ePrivacy, such information can only be used as strictly necessary to provide the service requested by the user (and conversion tracking is not strictly necessary), or when the user gives their consent. Depending on what information is collected by the tracking snippet and on whether you are subject to ePrivacy, you would have to collect consent anyway. There is also the issue that Google Ads is an US-based service, and transferring data to the US is largely illegal since the 2020 Schrems II ruling. The US do not provide an adequate level of data protection, so that transfers would require additional safeguards. Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) for Controller to Controller transfers are not sufficient by itself. Of course those extra safeguards are effectively impossible to implement and no one is doing this correctly, but it's worth considering that there is additional legal risk. Explicit consent can provide a legal basis for transfers even to a country with inadequate protections, but that mechanism is intended for occasional transfers. In conclusion: you have wrongly concluded that no personal data would be involved you are jointly responsible with Google for whatever data is processed by the conversion tracking snippet you need a legal basis for sharing this data with Google legitimate interest may be sufficient, depending on what data is involved (consider ePrivacy) and depending on the result of your legitimate interest balancing test alternatively, you may require every visitors consent to track their conversions – unlikely to result in good data additionally, such use of Google Ads may run into issues around international transfers due to the Schrems II ruling this kind of stuff is difficult, and no one is really doing this correctly :/
Gmail harassment and IP address Under what circumstances will the police subpoena Gmail for an IP address? I have been harassed by my ex girlfriend but it has stopped a few months ago. She has not so much harassed me as she harassed my other ex girlfriend and my ex wife. I have recently gone on a dating site and started chatting to this woman. I told this woman about my ex and she emailed my ex to try make peace. I think this woman I was chatting is actually my ex trying to get information. If I go to the police will they do anything? I have also gotten an email from my ex's husband where he says that I must stop lying to this woman I'm chatting to on the date site. The date site woman never contacted me again and blocked me after my ex told her I was lying.	Law enforcement only investigates crimes, and they have significant discretion regarding which crimes to investigate. If they considered a crime to have occurred in your case, they could certainly seek a court warrant requiring Google to turn over IP addresses. More likely, you might have standing to seek relief in civil courts. In such a case, you could try to get the civil court to issue a subpoena for a third party like Google to provide IP addresses. Of course, you could have your civil suit contested by the counterparty, and even if not the court may decline to issue a subpoena, and if even if it issues one the third party may object to the court, or simply decline to comply with it.	This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.	Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.	"Legal problem" is too vague to be included. "Investigation" needs a bit of refining; "lawsuit" is relatively simple (as long as you mean "actual lawsuit" not "idea that maybe we could sue"). There is no central list of all lawsuits against a given party, but you could theoretically check every jurisdiction to see if there is a lawsuit. That's a really big list, maybe in the millions if you want to be complete. You can use ordinary Google search to find announced lawsuits, typically by government agencies. Finding investigations is even more difficult: you will not be able to determine what investigations I am conducting. Even determining the existence of investigations by police including e.g. the FBI is hard to do. A government attorney is the one most likely to reveal that they are investigating some party with the intent to sue them. Again, you can't get a complete list, you can use Google to get an indication of who has announced an investigation (your results will generally not say whether the investigation was closed, unless you pursue that question as well).	Let me be sure that I understand the situation. You set up an account with Big Company, which uses BigCo as a trademark. You want email about that account to reach you with a unique address, so you set up '[email protected]" and gave that as your email when setting up tha account. You don't plan to use that address for any purpose but communications from BigCo to you and from you to them. (Of course these aren't the actual names.) Have I understood the situation correctly? It seems that you ar not using 'BigCo" in trade, nor are you likely to be confused with an official representative of BigCo, so you are not infringing their trademark. However, someone using such an email more generally could perhaps be so confuse, so BigCo has a somewhat legitimate concern, as they cannot know the very limited use you plan to make of this address. The only way that the could force you not to use such an email address would be via a court order as part of a suit for trademark infringement, whcih under the circumstances I doubt they would get. However, unless they have some sort of contract with you to the contrary, they can control who registers on their site. and could refuse to register you using an email address that includes their name or alias. Convincing them to accept your registration, even though it does no harm to them, will almost surely be more trouble than it is worth. Give them "[email protected]" or something else that is not their name, but will suggest their name enough that you will know who it is. This will serve your purpose fully, and avoid a long argument with people who are reading from a script (once you get past the automated process, if you can even do that). This is all assuming that I have understood the situation correctly. I am also largely assuming US law, since you didn't mention a jurisdiction. (EDIT: UK law should not be very different on these points.)	Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent?	Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh.	What kind of recourse can OP pursue to swiftly clear their name? The OP's "recourse" is to prove the truth - that he is not a convicted or accused (by a prosecutor) sex offender - to those who defamed him, who are presumably the bar owner(s), who instructed the bouncer to remove the OP because he was a sex offender; and possibly the bouncer, who may have told Anne that the OP was a sex offender; and possibly others who later on social media said the OP is a sex offender, such as Anne herself. The facts of who may be a sex offender and who may have falsely asserted someone is must be sorted out, and that's usually done by lawyers before a lawsuit (with a possible settlement from "We're going to sue" threat letter by the OP's lawyer); or in the discovery process of an actual lawsuit; or in court by a jury. It's entirely up to the OP to take legal action, hopefully under the advice of a lawyer; and it's not a good idea for the OP to confront the bouncer, Anne or others and possibly complicate his own situation. As for anything happening "swiftly", that's another point entirely. The OP could sue for damages to his reputation and/or to require the defamers to retract their statements, or for other compensations. Many personal injury lawyers give free initial consultations. See Defamation \| Legal Information Institute for definitions and the laws regarding defamation, libel and slander (which can vary due to jurisdiction; in some areas, defamation is criminal as well as civil). Libel is published defamation, as in defaming someone in messages on social media; slander is spoken defamation, such as what the bar bouncer may have done. Do they have a strong case for egregious defamation? The likelihood of "a strong case" is for the OP's legal counsel to determine; they will look at the evidence of defamatory statements, the likelihood of getting monetary damages from the bar and/or the individuals involved, and other factors.
What is the difference between Libel and Libel Per Se? Defamation is defined on various legal online resources (as well as here, and Libel is written and published defamation. Libel is defamation and defined as a false and unprivileged statement of fact that is harmful to someone's reputation, and is published as a result of negligence or malice. Libel per se is libel without the need for any explanation, when "libel is clear on its face." What is the self-explanatory aspect of Libel per se as opposed to the explanation that is needed with Libel? What are some examples of the differences and/or the inter-relatedness of Libel and Libel per se? Must you always shown to be Libeling in order to Libel per se?	Defamation per se (thus libel per se) pertains to the nature of the statement and the question of whether there was harm done to the person. For some accusatory statements, it must be proven that the statement actually caused damage to the person. If the statement falls into one of 4 categories, it can be defamation per se, meaning that by its nature it causes damage. The categories are accusation of involvement in criminal activity, having a loathsome, contagious or infectious disease, sexual looseness, and professional incompetence: if you falsely accuse a person of being an inept prostitute with chlamydia, it is taken for granted that you have caused damage. (I understand that there has been some contraction of the sphere of per se liability especially for the claim of having a disease). For other kinds of accusations, viz. defamation per quod, it must be shown that there was actual harm done. Falsely reporting that an administrator had said "Nobody wants to send their daughter to the rape school" doesn't fall into one of these 4 categories, thus it would have to be proven that the statement caused some harm.	There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction.	US Law Combining the traditionally separate common-law torts of libel and slander would probably be a matter not for the court system, but for the legislature, and these are matters of sate law in the US, and vary from one state to another. Many states have not codified the law of defamation by statute, and one must check court cases in each state to find the particular rules that apply in that state. As Nolo's page on "Defamation Law Made Simple" says: "Defamation of character" is a catch-all term for any statement that hurts someone's reputation. Written defamation is called "libel," while spoken defamation is called "slander." To the best of my knowledge, there is no US state that has three separate torts, "libel", "slander", and "defamation". Some states, such as Illinois, have combined libel and slander into a single tort of defamation, others have not. Traditionally, in a slander case the plaintiff must prove actual damages, whereas damage could be presumed in a libel case. (see the LII page on "Slander" for confirmation of this.) States that have preserved the distinction retain this difference in many cases. That is one reason why some states have not combined them. Another is legislative inertia: if the existing laws are working well enough, why go to the effort of rewriting them? When the law of defamation has not been codified, the traditional reluctance of common law courts to change form where there is no significant change of substance also works against combining the torts. See also the Wikipedia page on "United States defamation law" Specific State Laws California: Cal. Civ. Code §§ 44, 45a, and 46. Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. §51-5-4. Illinois: 740 ILCS 165/1 Pensylvania 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8341-8345 See "State Law: Defamation" from the Digital Media law Project for case citations in many US states. Non-US Law In some other common-law countries, the difference has also been preserved, probably for similar reasons. Again it will be a matter for the individual legislatures, not the courts, to combine them or leave them separate. See also the Wikipedia article on "Defamation"	(Assuming the jurisdiction is the US.) Your question I was wondering whether there are any limitations on using photos of private individuals on websites. is the least of your potential problems. Photos of the public taken in public are mostly legal to use and publish, and you own the copyright on the photo, and generally don't need a model release. But your plan of posting the photo with accompanying information about (alleged) fraud: There's a fraud conducting business in my state and I want to create a website that warns others of his fraudulent practices. is potentially legally problematic. As phoog indicates in his comment, you need to be aware of defamation, both at the federal level and among states, as some have criminalized defamation (Wikipedia). Libel is the publication of provably false facts by one person about another person. For a full outline of defamation (libel and slander, and including private and public figures), see Libel and Slander \| Nolo.com. What you want to do is publish "facts" about this alleged fraud on the website with a photo of the individual, linking the fraud allegations to them. That is potentially libelous. The facts of the fraud may be provably true, or they may be provably false; that remains to be seen. But the facts don't matter when considering what actions the person can take against you if you publish such information on your website. If this business and the individual(s) feel they are not committing fraud, they can sue you for libel in civil court, alleging that you have damaged their reputation and impacted their business by publishing those facts on your website with the photo identifying the person and their business. If they take legal action, and you can prove the business and the individual(s) are committing fraud with provable facts - hard evidence of fraud, such as legal documents and court judgments - than you should (no guarantees) be able to successfully defend yourself in a libel suit brought against you by that person. Even if the business and the individual(s) are aware of facts that prove their fraud, and know they will probably not prevail in court, they can still take you to court, and it will cost you whatever time and money it takes to defend yourself. My responses above concern what legal actions the alleged could take against you if you published the website with the photo and information about the alleged fraud. No one here is advising you to put up the website with the photo and the "facts" as you see them, even if you have hard proof of the facts of the fraud; you should find legal representation before taking any action with the website. And, no one here is advising you to open any legal action against the person; that's your choice in terms of determining your case and if you can show actual harm that was caused by the alleged fraud by the individual, and you should find legal representation before taking any action.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	That really depends what they lie about In the United States, there's no general law against lying. The fact that a statement is false doesn't inherently strip it of protection under the first amendment. Public figures lie to the public all the time. That's why news companies have fact checkers. Was it defamatory? It is, however, illegal to defame someone. If someone makes a false statement of fact (that is, not an opinion) about a person or company, they may be liable for that. Whether they are liable for that depends on a number of factors, including whether the target is a public figure (see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan), the speaker's knowledge of its falsity, and whether the target was damaged by it. Was it part of some other criminal scheme? False statements to the public could be part of some sort of fraud, for instance. Pump and dump schemes, for instance, are illegal. Was it under oath? Lying under oath (such as when testifying in court) would constitute perjury, which is a crime. There are many other situations in which lying could be a crime (such as lying on your taxes), but these are the main ones I can think of that would be about lying to the public. In this case (I'm unfamiliar with the details of what he said, so I'm just going off your description), I can't immediately think of any reason that could lead to liability. Mocking and calling something a "nothing burger" is pretty clearly an opinion, not a false statement of fact. I'm not aware of any securities law against saying you don't like something you're actually invested in (though I'm not especially familiar with securities law).	A courtroom is not a podium A court is a forum for resolving a specific dispute. Testimony is restricted for a number of reasons the most all encompassing of which is relevance. For testimony to be admitted it has to go to the issue in dispute. For a person charged under the laws of, say, India, it cannot be in any way relevant what the laws of, say, China have to say about the issue. Similarly, for a person charged with a Federal crime, state law is irrelevant (and vice-versa). There is no free speech issue here because testimony is given only for the purpose of resolving the case. If it’s not relevant to that you can’t introduce it and, if you persist in trying the court can hold you in contempt.	What a country claims to be the case certainly doesn't guarantee what is the case. The constitution (at least as of 2012) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea) says: Article 67. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations. Needless to say, North Korea is not generally considered a bastion of free speech. The People's Republic of China has a similar provision in its constitution. When we get to countries where those outside the country consider there to be some level of freedom of speech, there are still restrictions. In the UK, the Official Secrets Act makes it a crime for any person to republish leaked classified information. Germany makes it illegal to deny that the Holocaust happened. Until 2013, Canada made it illegal for a person to use telecommunications to say something that would expose people to hatred for some reason covered by antidiscrimination law. Many, many countries criminalize child pornography. Many, many countries have copyright laws. "Free speech" does not mean "you can say whatever you want and the government can't stop you." It means "as a general rule, the government can't restrict what you're saying because they don't like it." I am unaware of any country with a functional government with unfettered freedom of speech.
How does Seth MacFarlane get away with defamatory commentary? How does Seth MacFarlane/Family Guy/Fox get away with defamatory words/depictions that harm the reputation of brands/companies/logos/mascots/characters/real people? Or, do they get sued a lot and just deal with it? I want to write a book with corporate characters but don't want to have lawsuits showing up at my front door. What do I do to avoid lawsuits?	Note: this can vary by jurisdiction. Defamation in General Defamation can be libel, which is written, or slander, which is spoken. In order to prove you are the victim of defamation, you must show that the statement that allegedly defamed you was: published false injurious, and unprivileged Published means that some third party (other than you and the individual who allegedly defamed you) saw or heard the statement that allegedly defamed you. This can be achieved through media as varied as a newspaper, a picket sign, or even in conversation. The truth is not subject to suit for defamation. It doesn’t matter how mean something is, if it is true, you can’t sue. Thus, the statement made must have been objectively false (therefore protecting opinions). You must show how your reputation was hurt by the statement. Being ostracized in your community, losing work, being harassed by reporters, are examples of ways to show the statement was injurious to you. Finally, there are certain situations where the importance of free speech is even more important than usual to make a speaker’s statement be considered as “privileged.” For example, it is so important for a witness in a trial to be frank and open in their testimony that it is recognized they should not feel constrained by worrying about whether they will get sued for defamation. Thus, a witness who falsely testified to something in court or a deposition is not subject to defamation suits. Obviously, prosecution for perjury is possible if they testify to something they know is false. The Public Figure You are talking about the Family Guy and other TV shows which make fun of politicians and other well-known people from Kelsey Grammar to Whoopi Goldberg. Because the value we put on the ability to criticize our government and those we elect to it, as well as all publicly influential people in general, the people Family Guy, etc., make fun of, public figures, have a higher bar to reach when it comes to proving defamation. A public figure is someone who has gained prominence in the community as a result of his or her name or exploits, whether willingly or unwillingly. Easy examples of this can include politicians, CEOs, NFL quarterbacks, or movie stars. However, certainly, depending on jurisdiction and context, certainly regional or local level individuals may at times be considered public figures. To prevail in a case alleging defamation, a public figure has to prove the above-mentioned four elements and, additionally, must show that the person who made the statement was acting with “actual malice.” This rule derives from the Supreme Court case New York Times v. Sullivan where SCOTUS described the reasoning as deriving from a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. Thus, a private person claiming defamation has more protection as a victim than a public figure does as a victim. When people put themselves out there for any reason, they are causing themselves to become a matter of public interest and subject to scrutiny. A private person should not have to walk around with the same burden on his mind because he has not likewise put himself out there. That said, the private person may be “pushed” into the public sphere without his consent due to other occurrences that drew the public’s attention to him. The Limited Purpose Public Figure Finally, a person may be a limited purpose public figure where he has purposely and noticeably put himself out there in some public controversy with the purpose of influencing the controversy’s outcome. An example is a church pastor who decries abortion because “he thrust himself to the forefront of a particular controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issue.” Another is a local expert on suicide because that person “distinguished herself in this particular field.” Limited purpose public figures must also show “actual malice” to prevail in a defamation suit. Parody/Satire These forms of communication, despite containing statements that may be intentionally injurious and/or offenses, are protected under the notion of political commentary. Satire and parody are protected, “provided a reasonable reader would not mistake the statements as describing actual facts.” So, someone who is the subject of parody of satire cannot sue “unless the irreverent comments contain a provably false fact.” In addition, they must also prove the “actual malice” element and the four original elements. Various factors go into deciding whether something is parody or satire and it is a reasonableness test where none of those factors are subject to an absolute requirement or subject to a certain level. For context, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of actions reporters can take when publishing parody and satire, noting again that no single item below must be included and the presence of one of them does not provide an absolute defense. Is the content at issue separated or labeled to indicate it is not straight news? Does the irreverent tone exist throughout the piece? Does the publication have a history of producing satire or parody? For example, the difference between The Onion and cnn.com. Are there illogical or over-the-top situations or actions in the piece? Are there fictitious names that are similar to real ones? Such as, “Don Drumpft” and “Plaidimir Vutin” (which I’ve actually seen somewhere once!). If this is based on a specific event, how soon after or long after was the content published? If the event is still in the public memory vs. if it has long been forgotten. Is there a disclaimer indicating it satire or parody? Note that a disclaimer must be reasonably visible and accessible to the average reader. Content seen on shows like the Family Guy are a) usually against public figures and b) usually sufficiently done in a context that conveys the fact that it is satire or parody. Therefore, suits against the show’s creators simply do not (or are very rare and even more rarely successful) do not materialize.	What is allowed and what happens are different things; this is why we have police, courts and prisons. If everyone followed all of the laws all of the time we would need none of these. The videos are copyright and without the permission of the copyright holder (the NFL) you cannot reproduce or distribute them. A defense to copyright violation is if the usage is fair use or fair dealing. What you see on line is: Done with permission of the NFL Fair use as it is being used to comment on or analyze the performance; like a critic's book review. Unlawful and not pursued (yet) because the NFL considers it not worthwhile.	Yes you can, and you can even include "editorials or subjective content". However, if you include factual statements, or words that imply factual statements, the company could claim that they are false, and therefore defamatory. Indeed they might claim that in any case. If you make no false statements of fact, they should not be able to win a defamation suit, but you might need to spend time and money defending yourself if they choose to sue. The detailed rules on defamation vary by jurisdiction, in the US by state. But in no US state can defamation be found against a person who neither made nor implied a false statement of fact. Use of the name of the company, along with "boycott" as in "BoycottXYXCorp.com" would not infringe any trademark XYZ might have. It is clearly Nominative use, as no one could reasonably believe that such a site was run by, sponsored, or endorsed by XYZ. Again, XYZ could always sue, even if they are highly likely to lose quickly.	While @jqning is absolutely correct in stating that truth is always an "absolute defense" to a claim of defamation, keep in mind that truth can be a subjective thing. What is one person's version of the truth, may not be another's, even with regard to the same exact experience. Also, while "statements of opinion are not defamation" is typically regarded as true, it has very broad exceptions and is not something that can be relied on in isolation. Defamation is generally defined as a false, published statement that is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. An online posting, even on an obscure website, will likely be seen by a few people, thus satisfying the publication requirement. A plaintiff cannot succeed in his or her online defamation claim if the defendant's defamatory statement is true. So, for example, if a customer posts a review of your restaurant on Trip Advisor claiming that there were roaches crawling around, you may sue them for defamation. You would then have to prove that there was no roach infestation, and thus, the defendant's statement was false. However, what if there was only one? What if he has a witness who saw it? His truth may be different from yours, and it is up to the trier of fact to decide. Also, getting sued, whether or not you prevail, is at minimum a pain and can be a very expensive ordeal. Opinions are exempt? OK: Following that line of reasoning, restaurant owner shows he's had monthly inspections and prophylactic measures to ensure against pests and the exterminator testifies. The defendant, fearing he's in trouble now, claims that his assertion of roach infestation was just his opinion based on his experience. Opinions are privileged under the law of defamation, right? Not always! Importantly, an opinion may be viewed, generally, as a statement of fact (employing the "reasonable person" standard) if it is something that is either provable or disprovable. What this means is that if the reasonable person would construe your statement to be factual, and not mere opinion, it will be deemed as such and if untrue then you're liable for defamation. The courts may interpret, "I think that [restaurant] has a roach infestation problem," as a statement of fact. This has occurred in numerous cases where people think they can say what they want as long as they couch it as an opinion, with words like "I think..." or "In my opinion...". But when someone says something that factual in opinion form, that is not protected. So, if Jane says, "In my opinion Joe Schmoe is a pedophile..." without absolute proof that Joe is, in fact, a pedophile, then this is libelous (defamation if published or spoken to another). This is because the statement in and of itself is one of "verifiable fact couched in opinion" and it is so damaging to Joe's reputation that if it's not true it is libel per se (defamatory if published – meaning shared). A statement of verifiable fact is a statement that conveys a provably false factual assertion, such as someone has committed murder or has cheated on his spouse. While the law varies some, and sometimes substantially, from state to state, here are some often used examples arising from California courts. Libelous (when false): Charging someone with being a communist (in 1959) Calling an attorney a "crook" Describing a woman as a call girl Accusing a minister of unethical conduct Accusing a father of violating the confidence of son Not-libelous: Calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar" in chance encounter (because hyperbole in context) Calling a TV show participant a "local loser," "chicken butt" and "big skank" Calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch" Changing product code name from "Carl Sagan" to "Butt Head Astronomer" Since libel is considered in context, do not take these examples to be a hard and fast rule about particular phrases. Generally, the non-libelous examples are hyperbole or opinion, while the libelous statements are stating a defamatory fact. Modified photos that can be shown to scandalize persons or businesses are clearly defamation, and are quite popular on social media. So, for example, if you threw the flyers (I assume you didn't but as an example) all over, and then photographed and published your opinion about the business littering neighborhoods, this would be libelous. The less obvious and absurd the modification, the more likely it is that a court will find it defamatory. So, a picture of a woman with a man's naked torso photoshopped on will not be defamatory, a version photoshopped showing what is to be purported to be her naked body, is. In your case, you face two issues that you should ask yourself: Is your opinion really verifiable (or non-verifiable) facts couched in words that try to make it opinion, or is it truly just your opinion. If fact, is it absolutely true? If the answer is yes, it's fact and yes, it's absolutely true, you're OK. Keep in mind though what I mentioned about truths differing: What if the business didn't know they were put there, or, what if they were placed on cars in a public place and blew in the wind? That could be a problem. While you are most likely fine, you may want to just say, X business's fliers are all over the place, littering the neighborhood and (assuming you called and asked them to pick them up, or wrote them) they refuse to pick up the litter. It sounds like the statements you made are fine, because you don't say that the business littered, or that they put them there; you say they are "plastered" all over, but you don't accuse them openly. That isn't to say it wouldn't be found to suggest fact that they would have to show isn't true (or that they didn't get permission from the property owner). My point is only that, in general, be careful. If he felt that you misrepresented what he did by way of distributing fliers, or if he thought you doctored the photo or set it up, he could sue you if he felt it damaged his business's reputation.	There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law.	I don't believe Canada uses the public official/figure distinction. American defamation law uses the distinction to determine whether to require proof of actual malice, but Canada does not require proof of actual malice. Canadian defamation law has a lot of other parallels to American defamation law, though, especially in terms of privilege. I'd expect the University could claim any of several available privileges, including truth, qualified privilege, and fair comment. And because it's a government institution, it's conceivable that it might even claim absolute privilege, though I definitely don't know enough about their interpretations of the privilege to say one way or another. For a broad primer on defamation law in Ontario, you can check out this report from the Law Commission of Ontario.	Unfortunately, the "but everyone does that" (BEDT) argument doesn't hold water as evidenced by prosecutions of looters. Would uploading this video be a copyright infringement? It would be hard to answer this part of the question without knowing where and from whom the clips had come from. If the clips came from a company like ESPN or a YouTuber that doesn't give you permission to be able to use their clips then yes this might be a copyright infringement. If you use video/clips that are labeled as creative commons then nt it wouldn't be an infringement. YouTube has a feature for this. Would my actions be fair use? First, we'll need to understand what fair-use is. Fair use is the ability to use copyright material under certain circumstances without permission. To best determine if using copyright-protected material in your work you should weigh it against the four factors of fair use. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; The nature of the copyrighted work; The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. More information about fair-use here Youtube outlines their fair use guidelines here	So as per recent Supreme Court decision in Matal v. Tam, the phohibitation of the registration of trademarks that may "disparage" persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols was ruled Unconstititutional. At issue, Tam, the bassist and founder of an all Asian-American band that was named after a slur for Asians (the linked article contains the Band Name, but to avoid a possible rule violation, I will not use the actual term). Tam was unable to register the trademark for his band due to the term being a slur, despite the bands intention to use the term in a re-appropriated manner. SCOTUS held that the act was unconstitutional and that Trademark protection did not constitute government speech beyond that the specific mark was registered with the government and thus protected. The decision found 9-0 in favor of Tam. (The case gained some fame as it immediately ended litigation on the name of Washington D.C. NFL football team as well). The other famous case is that of Jacobellis v. Ohio which held obsecenity is not protected speech, but that obscenity is to be determined by the most local levels of government. After all, what is Not Obscene to Los Angeles could be highly obscene to the Amish in Pennsylvania (Basically, no opinion was agreed too, but this was concurred with and every Justice held a concurring opinion). This case is famous for Justice Potter Stewart's concurring opinion, in which he stated obscenity should be limited to only Hard Core Porn, but famously did not offer a legal definition of that term beyond "I know it when I see it [and the motion picture involved in this case is not that]." Basically, check your local limits for guidance, as there is no federal or state law to help discuss this. Finally, as a small aside, the specific name of the establishment in the OP may be on it's face a little naughty, but "Dick" is a diminutive name for "Richard" and this gets all sorts of playful puns on it's other vernacular uses. For example, in one comic featuring Batman's young ward Robin (Dick Grayson), who was admonishing other heroes for not protecting their secret identity, one character comments to another that "Robin is being such a -" only for the second character to interrupt and remind the first "No real names." Another example is the stage name of a famous parody artist who sepcializes in singing modern pop songs in the style of a Vegas Crooner or Lounge Singer, Richard Cheese. The pun relies on knowing this nickname. For one that is not punning on the body part, The Red Green Show once had a sketch where Red Green (the character's name) was talking with the town's notorious liar, Hap, who in this particular sketch dropped the time he went whaling and chased after the "Great White Whale Moby Richard." Red asks if he meant the titular whale from the novel Moby Dick, to which Hap responds, "I didn't know him that well, Red."
If I’ve no WhatsApp account am I still a node on their social graph? And if so can I request to be deleted? I have never used WhatsApp so I have never shared my phone’s contacts with them or consented to their terms. Many of my friends and family do use WhatsApp and they will all have me in thier contacts under the same name and phone number. Therefore I must have node WhatsApp’s social graph? It might be only my name and number that they have, but It’s certainly enough for them to tie it to my Facebook account and to infer a profile of me by analysing the activity of the social graph around me. If this is the case do I have any right to ask WhatsApp to delete my node as I’ve never consented to be included? (I live in the UK).	I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!	I assume this refers to the case covered here: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/may/22/facebook-fined-mishandling-user-information-ireland-eu-meta The gist is: Under GDPR you can only transfer personal data from inside the European Union to the outside if you have procedures in place that ensures it is still protected to European standards. Facebook was found to have failed in that regards, specifically when it came to access by US spy agencies. It seems indeed quite plausible that it is not possible to transfer personal data from the EU to the US in a way that is compatible with both EU and US law. The EU and the US are in negotiations to find a way to make this legally possible. But until then, it seems that if you do have a European subsidary and want to keep all of your account data in the same place, it needs to be a place with robust privacy protections. That doesn't require it to be in the EU, but something like US, Russia or China would be illegal.	It doesn’t make you exempt from the GDPR if that’s what you’re asking The hash you produce is linked to one (or a small number) of computers and it therefore serves as an ID number. Because that ID number is linked to the owner of the computer it is personal information and if you are collecting it, you must comply with the requirements of the GDPR - valid legal reason, deletion when no longer required, deletion on request, data security etc.	I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.	No. While UK data controllers must register with the ICO, they only have to provide general contact details. The ICO does not provide a public registry of data controllers. Outside of the UK, there is no requirement to register with the Supervisory Authority unless a DPO is appointed. Per Art 13 GDPR, every privacy notice must disclose the contact details of the controller, and of their DPO (if applicable). The GDPR does not require controllers to have a specific email address for data subject requests. Controllers have to fulfill the request regardless of the channel through with the request is made, so that normal channels for support or contact should be appropriate. The ICO writes in its guidance to controllers on the right to access requests: Are there any formal requirements? No. The UK GDPR does not set out formal requirements for a valid request. Therefore, an individual can make a SAR verbally or in writing, including by social media. They can make it to any part of your organisation and they do not have to direct it to a specific person or contact point. Of course, if a controller does not make contact details available or otherwise refuses to accept a valid data subject request, you can ask the ICO for assistance.	Since the Steam ID contains or may contain enough information for it to be possible to link your account to you as a physical person, it would definitely be considered "personal data" according to Article 4 of the GDPR. However, by agreeing to the DOTA2 terms of service, you have given consent for them to show your information to other players (or at least that is included in most terms of service I have read for other games. I have not read the one for DOTA2 specifically). Replays are an interesting corner case. If download of replays are only possible for other players or if the wording of the ToS says that you consent to displaying your user ID to anybody, that would mean that they would have covered their bases. As long as they comply with other parts of GDPR, like "the right to erasure" (Article 17) that is. If the API is accessible to anyone and not covered by the ToS you might have a case. If you only want to remove the traceability between you and the replays, you can always evoke Article 17 and delete your account.	TL;DR In theory there's nothing wrong with your method, it's just a way to authenticate the user, and without authentication a user has no right to request anything anyway. But in practice it looks like your method doesn't have a way to deal with situations where users lose or forget their authentication data and want to be able to recover their account. Failing to deal with that in a modern system might be considered an unacceptable bad practice and so be against the GDPR principles of security and privacy by design. EXTENDED VERSION I might be wrong or not understand the question correctly, but I don't see how this is different from many other common cases where encryption is not involved. Think about it, you aren't able to give the user their own personal data unless they provide the ID and encryption keys. How is this significantly different from the fact you aren't able to (or rather you should not) show a user their own data unless they provide their own username and password, or they convincingly authenticate themselves in any way? Just like you can't ask Facebook to show you all the data collected about Donald Trump only by claiming you are Donald Trump, you can't be required to give a user their own data unless they provide the encryption key. It can be seen as your way to authenticate users (among other things). Edited: multiple IDs/keys I didn't understand your method involved multiple IDs and keys. In theory, the situation is still the same, only with multiple pieces of data for authentication, like the user had to remember multiple usernames and passwords. Failing to provide all IDs and all keys will result in a partial authentication. But with such an approach a potential problem becomes more evident: your authentication scheme might be against the GDPR principles of "security and privacy by design and by default". Basically, your methods might be considered bad practice because they fail to deal with the common issue of lost or forgotten passwords. If a user tells you they have lost a USB drive containing all their IDs and keys and they don't have them anymore, what do you do? You can't delete their data because you aren't able to know what their data is, without another way of authenticating. And their data is now at risk, because somebody else might have their IDs and keys. If you had an email address associated with all the user's IDs and data, then you might be able to confirm their identity (for example sending an email with a link) and delete all their data. As you see, things can get pretty complicated, it all depends on the details of your implementation, and just adding or removing one detail might change the whole scenario.	Yes such a username would be personal data. It is information that relates to an identifiable person. In this context,a person isn't identifiable only if you can infer their real-world identity, but already if you can single out one person's records. Thus, your random IDs and any linked information would be personal data as well. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean that processing it is illegal. It just means you need a legal basis. That could be necessity for performing a contract with the data subject (like saving game progress), a legitimate interest, or consent. Taking into account GDPR principles like "data protection by design and by default", it could be sensible to hide a players stats from the leaderboard until they give consent. On the other hand, you may have a legitimate interest to provide leaderboard data for ranking/comparison, especially if the leaderboard entries are pseudonymized. In any case, it should be clear to the users which information is visible to others.
Do You Need a Permit to Cook Free Food on the Sidewalk? I'd like to open a food stand in Los Angeles to cook food for homeless people. Do I need a permit of some sort to cook food and give it away free of charge?	According to the LA County Public Health Department: "Food facility" means an operation that stores, prepares, packages, serves, vends, or otherwise provides food for human consumption at the retail level, including, but not limited to, the following: An operation where food is consumed on or off the premises, regardless of whether there is a charge for the food. Any place used in conjunction with the operations described in this subdivision, including, but not limited to, storage facilities for food-related utensils, equipment, and materials. So your food stand is a "food facility" for the purposes of the law. As such, as far as I can tell, you would be subject to the same permit and inspection requirements as any other similar food facility, like a commercial food stand.	A reasonable hypothetical example of where your clause "C" would be applied: A defendant is written a citation for "spitting on the sidewalk," in violation of a hypothetical Portland city ordinance. In presenting extenuating details, the defendant indicates that the expectoration occurred because she had taken a bite of vended food that was belatedly discovered to have been infested with maggots. The notion of encountering rotted food would clearly not have been contemplated by the definition of the "spitting on the sidewalk" ordinance, where the notion of having a cheekful of chewing tobacco definitely would be.	I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed.	Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.	I'd take the city council's advice and realize that you could be charged with a crime. Their job is to know the local laws and put them into place, as well as know how those laws relate to state law. As for state law, the Revised Statutes of Missouri, RSMo Section 574.115 Making a terrorist threat says: 574.115. Making a terrorist threat, first degree — penalty. — 1. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree if such person, with the purpose of frightening ten or more people or causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation, knowingly: (1) Communicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (2) Communicates a false report of an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. 2. The offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree is a class D felony. 3. No offense is committed under this section by a person acting in good faith with the purpose to prevent harm. A fake gun turret on a porch in the public view that tracks people who walk by could be interpreted as making a terrorist threat because it (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. And, it's probably safe to assume your turret has the "the purpose of frightening ten or more people." The fact that the gun turret is on private property doesn't mean much; it is in view of the public and your intent is for it to be seen by the public and you want to invoke fear in the public members who walk by. And it's not going to be seen by the council as some sort of security; threats are not security. If you did put up such a turret, and the state didn't take action under 574.115, and there is no local law on the books that applies, the council can easy put one in place at their regular council meeting with a simple motion and vote. Since you already asked the council, they may already be considering such a law. And, depending on the county, the council could invoke a law addressing threats to the public that has more severe penalties that the state law, because Missouri is a home rule (Wikipedia) state.	Following you around with the intent of harassing you is stalking. I don't know whether there's going to be a law actually requiring social distancing in Florida. In other states, I've seen laws set up to make it a crime to violate an order of the Director of Public Health or something like that. I don't know whether Florida actually has an order requiring social distancing by the general public.	"Public place" is not a good description of a bar. "Public accommodation" would be a better description. But it isn't a public accommodation 24-7-365(366). It's only a public accommodation during the hours it is open to the public. Presumably the owner is free to close it to the public and rent it to some private group. During the rental period, it's up to the private group to decide who to admit. (The owner would have a veto for anyone who can't be admitted, for example, because the person isn't old enough to enter a bar.) The private group is not bound by the policies that prohibit unfair discrimination by public accommodations.	user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says.
Why should a witness have to be arrested if they didn't answer the summons of a subpoena? If this is a why of the law based on policy, I will move it to the politics site. I do not think it is right to arrest someone who hasn't broken any laws. The witness didn't probably show up due to medical, psychological, or some other reason. What if the witness went out of the jurisdiction or out of the country?	A witness who disobeys a court order has automatically broken the law. Indeed, this is the most fundamental of laws; you can't decide "If I turn up to the hearing I may be punished for my crime; but not attending isn't against the law, so goodbye." A witness who goes out of the jurisdiction cannot, of course, be punished while there (though when he returns he may have to explain why he chose to leave having been warned that he must attend or face penalties- that is the meaning of sub poena). But your assumption that anybody who fails to attend probably had a good reason betrays a fundamental, though common, misunderstanding. A court has determined that your evidence is necessary for justice to be done. There is therefore no good reason not to attend. It may well be that a doctor would prefer that you did not go to court that day, and if you apply to the court it may be possible to find some arrangement. But you are not allowed to decide 'my convenience is more important than discovering whether the defendant should go to jail or not". Civilised countries have people who are empowered to make that decision; they are called judges, and the decision has been made.	Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest.	What remedies are therein the United States? I would imagine that the witness could be prosecuted for perjury. My guess is that the plaintiff could prosecute the witness for the lost damages. Are there any other remedies like reopening the original trial or declaring a mistrial so that the plaintiff could sue the (deep-pocketed) defendant, or would this be double jeopardy? Perjury prosecutions are like unicorns. They are rumored to exist but are almost never seen. A prosecutor would be exceedingly unlikely to bring charges in such a case, but it might not hurt to ask. Even if the criminal prosecution prevailed, however, the defeated plaintiff would be no better off, or might get out of pocket court costs as restitution at most. You could request that the witness be sanctioned for contempt. But, this leaves the loser in the original case no better off unless the judge made the highly unusual decision to award compensatory damages as a contempt sanction. Similarly, if you have reason to believe that the attorney knew that the testimony offered was false, that would be grounds to grieve the lawyer which could result in the lawyer's suspension or disbarment, but that is very difficult to prove and again would not advance the unjustly defeated plaintiff's cause. Assuming that the time to move for a retrial (usually two weeks) expired when the new evidence was discovered, you could move to set aside the verdict (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 or the equivalent state rule). The deadline for such motions based upon fraud by an adverse party is usually six months. Sometimes an independent action to set aside the verdict for fraud on the court could also be brought (sometimes within two or three years), which is an uphill battle, but probably the best option if all other deadlines have expired. The witness probably has absolute immunity from civil liability outside that court case for the testimony offered, so a civil action suing the witness for lost damages would be dismissed. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply, but a similar doctrine called "res judicata" (a.k.a. "claim preclusion") prohibits retrying a case that was tried on the merits between the same parties, if it has become a final order. So, filing a new case is ruled out assuming that no appeals were filed within the deadline for doing so. And, even if the deadline for filing an appeal has not lapsed, it probably wouldn't prevail because the key new evidence wouldn't be in the record. It would be better to file to set aside the judgment in a motion and to appeal if that motion was denied.	The most important rule for an extradition from Germany is this: If the role of the countries were reversed, would the person be convicted in Germany according to German law? You say the link claims that he couldn't be convicted now, because he would have been convicted twice for the same crime. So he wouldn't be convicted in Germany if the roles of the countries were reversed, therefore no extradition. (The next important rule is this: There must be enough evidence that the person would be prosecuted in Germany, not necessarily convicted. You also need to convince the court that the accused will get a fair trial when extradited, that there will be no cruel or unusual punishment, including death sentence, and lastly there is no extradition for small crimes when the extradition plus having to appear in a foreign court can be considered worse punishment than the actual punishment for the crime. All these irrelevant in this case, I think). "Auslieferung unstatthaft" just means "extradition inadmissible" or "extradition illegal". PS. Ludl asked "shouldn't there be some law that if someone cannot be extradited from Germany because of extradition law, they can still be prosecuted in Germany". That would be completely unnecessary. Let's say one US citizen murders another one in Germany, the USA asks for extradition (they wouldn't, because it is a German matter, but they could ask of course), and Germany rightfully refuses. Then since it is a murder on German ground, it will be prosecuted in Germany. It would be absurd to think that a failed extradition request could protect a murderer.	In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split"	Such a search would have been emotionally satisfying for many people, but it would almost certainly not have been legal. Evidence that someone committed a crime is not always sufficient to permit a search of their home. An arrest warrant requires probable cause to believe the target individual committed an offense, and a search warrant requires probable cause to believe that the target location will have evidence of a crime. So whatever evidence they had that Epstein committed a crime, they would generally need a separate warrant to search his properties for evidence of that crime. There is no "emergency clause" for search warrants. I imagine you're thinking of the "exigency" exception to the requirement that the police obtain a warrant before searching property, which allows a search in cases where there is an actual emergency, where evidence is being destroyed, or when someone ducks into private property while officers are pursuing them. "Reasonable suspicicion of possible threats to ... potential victims" would not be enough to justify a search based on an exigency. If Epstein is already in jail, he doesn't really pose a threat to anyone, he isn't able to destroy any evidence, and no one is pursuing him anywhere.	There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement.	An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution.
Are these HOA rules legal? Many condo associations and HOAs restrict renting to some extent. Is it legal for a condo association or HOA to allow renting, yet impose some or all of these rules: The minimum amount of rent you can charge is X. Criminal background checks must be performed (and the record must be clean). The renter's monthly income must be at least Y times the monthly rent. (In my experience Y=3 is the norm.) Minimum credit score? I'm fairly certain any single owner can implement these rules if they wish, but I'm asking if an HOA or condo association can force every owner to implement these rules. If the answer is "Yes, they can", then: How would they enforce it? It seems like the HOA would have to be able to request to see the tenant's credit report, background check, proof of income, and rent checks to make sure the rules are being followed. What is to stop the HOA from making the requirements arbitrarily high to effectively prevent renting? (Minimum credit score set to 850, for example.)	Yes, they can. How would they enforce it? It seems like the HOA would have to be able to request to see the tenant's credit report, background check, proof of income, and rent checks to make sure the rules are being followed. The HOA might have to make a rule giving it the right to audit members on pain of a fine or something. What is to stop the HOA from making the requirements arbitrarily high to effectively prevent renting? (Minimum credit score set to 850, for example.) Nothing. It could ban renting entirely. This comes with one important caveat. If the rental restrictions have the intent or effect of violating fair housing laws, the regulations may be void as contrary to public policy. In some cases, a total ban on renting would expose the HOA and its members to less risks than a rule that does this by implication or via selective enforcement of the rules. Basically, this means that regulations designed to bar renting based upon protected categories under the particular acts that apply (e.g. race, disability, sex, marital status, religion) would be invalid. Also the HOA has to get its members to approve the rule and not repeal it. If the rule is so draconian that it reduces the fair market value of units, the members may decline to adopt such a rule or may get rid of it.	If it's not in the lease agreement, then you did not agree to it. Even in the absence of the law prohibiting the late fee, the landlord would not be able to impose it because it is not in the lease. It is of course up to you whether you want to test it. It may be more trouble than it is worth. Then again, it's probably not worth the landlord's trouble to begin eviction proceedings over a late fee. Paying late and refusing to pay the fee would probably sour your relationship with the landlord, which is usually something you want to avoid. If you do pay late at some point, you may want to point out to the landlord the relevant provision of Massachusetts law. The matter would probably end there: either the landlord doesn't know about it, or the landlord is hoping that you don't know about it. Pointing it out in a polite manner will inform the landlord of the law and that you are acquainted with the law. Unless the landlord is quite unreasonable, that should take care of it. Whether there is any law prohibiting landlords from announcing an intention to take a prohibited action is indeed a different question. Is there any legal reason for me to bring this up and get the landlord to formally acknowledge that they will not in fact charge illegal late fees? No. You have a contract with the landlord that already says you are going to move in. He cannot modify that contract simply by sending you a letter.	Your lawyer will advise you whether to worry, but it is not a crime to not pay the rent. The action that the landlord can take is (a) evicting you and (b) suing you for the unpaid rent. Whether a written lease is necessary depends on which province / territory you are in, since that is the level at which landlord-tenant law is determined. As far as I know, no province allows a person to avoid their rent obligation on the grounds that there was no signed lease. It doesn't matter if you have been living elsewhere most of the time or all of the time.	As stated, this is not a reasonable restriction and runs afoul of the Fair Housing Act. You cannot discriminate based on family status, with an exemption for "housing for older persons", and the act "does not limit the applicability of reasonable local, state, or federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling" (let's leave aside HOA restrictions for a moment). The number of occupants can legally be restricted in terms of a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest such as parking availability, safety, noise or securing the property. A restriction based on square footage or number of bedrooms might be reasonable: a blanket rule "no more than 4 people" is not reasonable. This article notes some of the state complication in interpreting "marital status", in terms of "not being married to each other".	This depends on the law of the specific jurisdiction, but there is non-trivial similarity in those rules across the US. The general rule is that the person who owns the property must maintain the property. There are often local ordinances that explicitly say that, for example this which is the legal mechanism behind this guidance on tree-trimming. A municipality can do the trimming, or they can send official letters to property owners telling them to trim the bushes. It does not matter whether the sign is on your property via an easement, what matters is where the tree is. You are not responsible for trimming your neighbor's tree if the stop sign is on your property.	Maybe, but it is not a de jure taking. There are vast numbers of restrictions on what one can do with one's property and on businesses that one can conduct on that property. Zoning ordinances prevent me from setting up a chemical factory where I have my house; I can't build it up 4 stories and there is an obligatory setback from the property line for any extension. I can't freely build on my land, I need government permission in the form of a permit. This is allowed (Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255), when the regulatory action advances a legitimate governmental goal and therefore the action is not a taking. The government might "take" land by rendering it useless without the formality of condemnation (United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745). But a moratorium on evictions does not render the property useless. The tenant remains liable for rent.	First of all, usually negligence by an HOA or its agents does not create liability for owners of the HOA directly. Instead, it creates a debt of the HOA, which the HOA might choose to pay through assessments on individual owners. But, the creditor probably doesn't have the right to compel the HOA to make those assessments, although they could starve the HOA of funds needed to operate and the creditors might be able to seize common interest property management by the HOA (depending, in part, on some quite subtle details of how the association has been set up that have varied, mostly as as matter of customary practice that changes in different time periods - in some HOAs, common interests are owned by the HOA, in others they are tenancy-in-common interests of the owners with limitations on transferability). Second, self-settled trusts (i.e. trusts for you benefit funded with money from you) are almost always ineffective (outside some select asset protection oriented jurisdictions of which Idaho is not one) as they are a form of fraudulent transfer. So, no it wouldn't work. In particular Idaho Statutes § 15-7-502(4) states: If a person is both a settlor and beneficiary of the same trust, a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of the settlor’s beneficial interest in such trust does not prevent the settlor’s creditors from satisfying claims from the settlor’s interest in the trust estate that relates to the portion of the trust that was contributed by the settlor. The same subsection clarifies that federal rules related to grantor trusts are not relevant to this determination, and other parts of the statute also clarify the relevant definitions.	In a normal rental property, the tenant is in a contract with the telecommunications provider and landlord has no business listening to the communication. When the landlord does provide internet access for tenants, he/she gets into a complicated legal position. The owner of the internet connection is generally liable for things like copyright violations, hate speech, etc. coming from that connection. This law predates open-access wifi connections and even the internet. Legislation and legal precedent are only slowly catching up with that new reality.
Is probable cause of a crime necessary for a subpoena to be issued? In order to get a subpoena, wouldn't the prosecutor have to show probable cause that a crime was committed? According to news outlets (example), Mueller has subpoenaed a Trump organization. I did some research and the answer seemed to be 'yes', but I was talking it over with a friend of the family who took some law classes and the answer was 'not necessarily'. So is probable cause that a crime was committed necessary for a subpoena to be issued?	A grand jury subpoena needs to not be oppressive or unreasonable: see US v. R Enterprises, 498 US 292. The purpose of a grand jury is to determine if there is probably cause: "the Government cannot be required to justify the issuance of a grand jury subpoena by presenting evidence sufficient to establish probable cause, because the very purpose of requesting the information is to ascertain whether probable cause exists". The court held that The unique role of a grand jury makes its subpoenas much different from subpoenas issued in the context of a criminal trial. Thus, this Court has held that a grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and that its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials Also note that The grand jury's investigatory powers are nevertheless subject to the limit imposed by Rule 17(c), which provides that "the court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive" (emphasis added). Since a grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable, the burden of showing unreasonableness, as the above language indicates, must be on the recipient who seeks to avoid compliance So the bar is lower for a grand jury investigation, such as this one.	A subpoena is a kind of court order. Specifically it is an order to a particular person to appear and testify at a particular time and place. In many but not all cases, the order also requires that person to bring specified records or documents along. That is known as a subpoena duces tecum. In some cases this is used to, order the production of documents without any accompanying testimony. The word "subpoena" comes from Latin words meaning "under penalty" because the order requires the person to comply under penalty of being held in contempt of court and fined or imprisoned. Ther are many other court orders, such as an injunction which is generally an order not to do something. Different jurisdictions may use different terms for orders with similar effects. The exact name and exact effect of a given order will vary with the jurisdiction, which is not stated in the question at the moment. The needed process to obtain a court order will also vary. Without a jurisdiction, a more specific answer cannot be given. It is not unlikely that a subpoena of some sort will be the answer, but the details will depend on the jurisdiction, and on the reason why the information is being sought. It is likely that a lawyer will need to be consulted on the best way to obtain such an order. If the issue is the same one as in this question or this question it is very unlikely that any court order would be sought for the person's information. If one were sought the details would depend on the asker's jurisdiction, which is not stated there as far as I can see.	I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions?	The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering.	If the government withholds information that is pertinent to the credibility of a witness is that cause for a mistrial? Only if the error is not harmless under the standard applicable to evaluating harmless error in criminal cases (there is a voluminous case law on that point). Basically, it means that a new trial may be held and a conviction vacated on a charge against a particular defendant if there is a reasonable possibility that the withheld evidence, when considered in light of the total picture of evidence presented at trial, might have changed the outcome on guilt or innocence. Does whether the government knowingly or unknowingly withheld this information influence whether a mistrial will be granted? Not really. Knowledge is imputed. If someone in the prosecution team including the police knows, then it is known to the entire team for Brady purposes. If no one knew that it had the information (e.g. a key exculpatory document in possession of the prosecution was misfiled in one of dozens of bankers boxes of documents that it seized in a search and no one reviewed those particular boxes knowing to look for a document like that one or attuned to its potential significance, since it wasn't supposed to be in the place where it was filed), then it hasn't been withheld in the Brady sense unless someone specifically asked for the information in question with enough specificity that it could have been located if they looked at what they already had. The knowledge that must be disclosed is what the prosecutor's office or the police the prosecutor's office is working with knows. So, if a beat cop hides exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor's office, that is a Brady violation, but if the cops do a sloppy investigation that fails to reveal exculpatory evidence that is out there to be found, it isn't a Brady violation. Likewise, if a cop in another department halfway across the state knows something that impacts the credibility of a witness and the prosecutor is totally unaware of the existence of that information as are all the cops working on the case, then that isn't a Brady violation. What If It Isn't A Brady Violation? Exculpatory evidence discovered after the trial that isn't a Brady violation not to disclose may still be grounds for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence in a motion for post-trial relief. But, the standard to get the court to grant a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence that was not withheld in a Brady violation is much more stringent than the mere harmless error standard. Instead: With a single exception, criminal defendants in the United States seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are required to establish only that the new evidence makes it more likely than not that, in a new trial, they would be acquitted. Ohio requires clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. There's a lot of case law on what constitutes newly discovered evidence which is "new, material evidence that was unavailable at the time of the original trial[.]" If evidence was available, but not used at trial, it can't be presented in a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Often this means that it can't be considered even if the salience of the evidence previously available is only clear later in the light of other evidence that is genuinely newly discovered, or the defense attorney's failure to use that evidence in the first trial was negligent to a level constituting legal malpractice.	No Even if there were any evidence that any member of the US government were involved (there isn’t), that is a matter for the US justice system. The US is not a member of the International Criminal Court so no Supra-National body has jurisdiction.	This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.	How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.
Does a company own my company's product if I use their open source code? Does a company own my company's product if I use their open source code? I am reading through the SDK License agreement of a company's code and it reads: ======================================== 2. Intellectual Property (a) [corp name] SDK and [corp name] Code. All right, title and interest in and to the intellectual property embodied in the [corp name] SDK and [corp name] Code, including any improvements, enhancements or other modifications thereto made by [corp name], is owned by, and shall remain the property of [corp name], including, without limitation, any associated patents, copyrights, trademarks and logos. [corp name] is free to use, implement and incorporate in the [corp name] SDK and [corp name] Code any suggestions, ideas, recommendations or feedback of Licensee, without payment of additional consideration to Licensee. Licensee acknowledges that the [corp name] SDK and [corp name] Code shall remain the sole and exclusive property of [corp name], notwithstanding such use, implementation or incorporation. ======================================== (b) Licensee Products. All right, title and interest in and to the intellectual property embodied in the Licensee Products, including any improvements, enhancements or other modifications thereto made by Licensee, is owned by, and shall remain the property of Licensee, including, without limitation, any associated patents, copyrights, trademarks and logos, subject to [corp name]’s ownership of the [corp name] Code and [corp name] SDK. ======================================== Can they sue me and/or take my profits if I use their code? What if I only look at their product and reverse engineer it? What is the extent of legal power they have in this situation?	You should probably get a lawyer, but my reading is this: The company whose SDK you use owns their SDK, owns their code, and is free to take any of your ideas how to improve their code without paying you. But they say that ideas are ten a penny, so this is mostly there to prevent pointless lawsuits. On the other hand, it says that everything you do with your product is yours. I might be completely wrong, that's why you should get a lawyer.	The requirement to make the code publicly available is binding on Olio, and on Olio's successor, Flex. Olio, by accepting the code under the GPL, had contracted with the original author of that code, one of the contract provisions being to make any modified code available publicly. If Olio fails to abide by that agreement, it is in violation of the license, and the original author could sue Olio for copyright infringement, or sue Flex as having bought the assets and liabilities. But the individual employees of Olio are not under any obligation to publish such modified code, as they were presumably not parties to the license deal -- Olio was. Therefore the NDA does not require them to violate any law or contract to which they might be parties. The NDA could probably not be used to prevent the employees from testifying if called in such a copyright suit. If the NDA did require an illegal action, it would be void. If it merely required a person to violate a civil agreement that could be settled for money, it might or might not be enforceable, depending on the exact provisions, its reasonableness under the exact circumstances, and the local law.	You can license the use of your IP only for certain uses, for example (most commonly) "non-commercial". The general template of permission is "You have permission to ___ as long as you ___". What the user is permitted to do, in your scheme, is something along the lines of "only distribute the output in this manner", or "not distribute code developed with this tool anywhere else". It's up to you to prove that someone violated that condition, if they did.	It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.	If the code is unrelated to your employment you own the copyright no matter if it is written in Visual Studio, on a piece of paper or tattooed on your butt. In the same way a sculptor owns the copyright in their sculpture even if they use someone else's chisel. Using Visual Studio in this way may, however, violated your contract with your employer and/or their contract with Microsoft. Why go there? Visual Studio Community is free.	If I make a working prototype and upload it on youtube will it prevent others from getting a patent on the idea? Generally yes. If the core information is accessible to the public, it becomes "prior art" and cannot be patented anymore by someone else. That includes you. Depending on local legislation, you have a small time window to apply for a patent (after disclosure) but if you don't, it's public domain and everybody is free to use it. If it's mainly code, you may be able to upload to Github and attach a license to it but that offers only limited protection. Globally? That depends on local legislation which there are too many of, to answer this here.	Based on the contract language quoted in the question, and the facts stated there, it would seem that the employee owns the copyright on the software. It would seem that the software was not created "during the course of employment." However, when the employee offers it to the employer free of charge, the employer may well want to own the copyright and any other related IP. The employer might want the employee to sign an agreement transferring the copyright. Or the employer might simply treat the software as belonging to the employer. Asserting and enforcing the copyright against the employer might be difficult. Insisting on even a token payment would help establish thst the copyright belongs to the employee, or gettign the employer to sign an acknowledgement of the ewmployee's copyright would have a similar, bnt even stronger effect.	It depends on what information you are sharing, how you got it, and what rights the business asserts over the information. For example, if it is content created by the business and they claim copyright protection you can only use it without their permission in accordance with Fair use exceptions. If you obtain the information through some limited/conditional access agreement you would be subject to the terms of that agreement. As always: If you want a legal opinion specific to your use case you need to consult a lawyer in your jurisdiction.
Can a vigilante be useful for a police department? (Just for reference, this question is for a story I'm working on, and I wanted a realistic look at the law's side of things.) So, a lot of fiction likes to play off the trope of a Vigilante. This person, (superhero or otherwise) often cuffs the baddies, and leaves them gift wrapped for the police, along with providing damning evidence to go with that. So my question is, does that actually help the police in any way? These situations are almost always portrayed as: Acquiring evidence without a warrant Falsely imprisoning a person/criminal (This does not always involve the Vigilante seeing the crime happen, but they are usually acting like a police officer and pre-empting the crime. The Vigilante is generally unable to be present for the accused to 'face their accuser'. So, if evidence came from a known Vigilante, can it be used in a court of law?	Can a vigilante perform an arrest? This depends on whether the vigilante has the power to perform a citizen's arrest. The rules depend on the jurisdiction (and vary from state to state in the US), but generally the power to perform a citizen's arrest is quite limited. It may include the power to 'pre-empt' an offence if the would-be offender has attempted to commit the offence. However, often the power is limited to particularly serious offences (eg. felonies). There may also be a requirement that the crime occurred in the citizen's presence, or that the citizen was unable to contact the police instead. Is evidence obtained by a vigilante admissible? In the United States, the constitutional exclusionary rule generally prevents evidence from being admitted if the government obtained it illegally. I answered a general question about the scope of the exclusionary rule here. However, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained illegally by a private individual: Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). In Burdeau, the defendant's papers had been stolen and turned over to the government, which proposed to present them as evidence to a grand jury. The Supreme Court said: In the present case, the record clearly shows that no official of the federal government had anything to do with the wrongful seizure of the petitioner's property ... there was no invasion of the security afforded by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure, as whatever wrong was done was the act of individuals in taking the property of another ... We assume that petitioner has an unquestionable right of redress against those who illegally and wrongfully took his private property under the circumstances herein disclosed, but with such remedies we are not now concerned. However, the exclusionary rule in some states goes beyond the Fourth Amendment. For example, article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that evidence illegally obtained 'by an officer or other person' is inadmissible. This provision was apparently enacted to deter vigilantes: Bubany and Cockerell, 'Excluding Criminal Evidence Texas-Style: Can Private Searches Poison the Fruit?' 12 Texas Tech Law Review 611 (1981), p 625. Can such evidence be admitted even if the vigilante is not present? Assuming that no exclusionary rule applies, evidence obtained by a vigilante can potentially be admitted through the testimony of a police officer or other witness, subject to the rule against hearsay and the question of reliability. The rule against hearsay means that a police officer cannot give evidence that a vigilante told them that the accused was guilty. Evidence of this kind is not admissible because the accused has no opportunity to challenge the reliability of the source of the information in cross-examination. The rule against hearsay does not apply when the probative value of the evidence does not depend on the truth of the absent vigilante's assertion. If the evidence provided by the vigilante is really 'damning' then it might fall into this category. For example, a vigilante might provide the police with a weapon that has the accused and victim's DNA on it, or tell the police that incriminating evidence can be found at a particular location. A police officer can then give evidence that the weapon was tested and found to have matching DNA, or a search warrant was executed and the incriminating evidence was found. There is no admissibility issue here. However, the fact that the police were tipped off by a vigilante who has broken the law and is not present to face court may cause the jury to reject the evidence as unreliable (ie. it could have been planted).	So for your first question, yelling "Stop Thief" loudly at the thief is perfectly legal (Like Yelling "Fire" in a crowded theater, it's legal if the theater is infact, on fire... the quote implied that it was a prankster who drew amusement from the reaction of the people who took him seriously). This may alert store employees, who have a specific kind of Citizens Arrest Power known as "Shopkeeper's Privilege" and is a reduced liability compared to Citizens Arrest. This is also pretty basic self defense agains people who are not engaged in any physical action against you but are starting to scare you. Suddenly shouting draws attention to you and discourages them from their behavior "I SAID DON'T TOUCH ME" being suddenly shouted in a Wal Mart is going to get notices from the immediate crowd drawn to you, and by poximate location, the person who is making you uneasy. For your second question, maybe, it depends... since the cop is clearly chasing the guy, you meet the qualification to use non-deadly force in stopping the criminal (i.e. you are witnessing a person committing a crime, in this case, resisting arrest or persuit) and it would certainly be reasonably non-deadly force if you were to trip, grab, or push the fleeing suspect. Citizens Arrest doesn't specify a minimum time to qualify, so if the officer is seconds behind, and you detain the criminal in this action until the gap is closed, it still counts.	This would be illegal in Australia (Criminal Code Act 1995 part 10.7: any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer), the US (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) and any other jurisdiction that I can think of. There is no exception allowing vigilante action in case a person has a reasonable belief that the material on a website is offensive or illegal. In general, the law does not allow immunization against criminal prosecution in case the victim of an attack is himself a criminal. Only the government has the right to punish criminals.	In short, no, that cant be a pardon for those police officers who would be now influenced to take more violent actions towards those they detain. Pardons are only applicable to past actions. You may be pardoned before charges are filed, but the actions must have already occured. Though I less certain about this, simply because Ive never heard such a thing proposed, I would also note that it is highly improbable that the actual statement he made - generic and during a speech - could everbe interpreted as an affirmative act intending to grant pardons to anyone who may act in that manner in the future.	In many jurisdictions, there is a "witness fee" that one is required to pay, as a token recognition of the value of a person's time. Fact witnesses can often be obligated to appear and testify, for minimal compensation, but not against themselves. In federal cases, Rule 17(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the defendant to apply to ask the government to pay the witness fee if they cannot afford it and the presence of the witness is necessary for an adequate defense. The other side of a case (in this example, the prosecutor) could try to impeach the witness's testimony (i.e. make him seem less credible in the eyes of the jury) by demonstrating that the witness is a "professional witness" (i.e. fees from saying things in court are a major part of the witness's regular income). That doesn't seem to apply to the facts you've listed, where the witness just happened to be in that place and time to observe what happened and (assuming for this question) accurately testified as to what he saw. Personally paying the police officer or judge for a favorable result is a different question with a different answer.	Nothing is typical Investigators have wide discretion on how (and if) they pursue an investigation of an alleged crime. When they make an arrest is part of that discretion. Making an arrest starts all sorts of clocks running on the legal process and investigators may not want to do that for all sorts of legitimate reasons.	In most US States (probably all of them) failure to follow the Lawful orders of a police officer is itself a crime, and is grounds for the officer to arrest the person, even if the person had not done anything wrong prior to that. This obviously leads to the question: what orders are lawful? The officer has a pretty broad range of discretion. Ordering a person out of a car, or to roll down a car window, is pretty clearly lawful. Ordering a person to commit a crime would not be lawful. Neither would ordering a person to submit while the officer rapes or robs the individual be lawful. In practice, the officer will usually think that all of his or her commands are lawful, and might feel threatened by any failure to comply. In which case, the officer might shoot. This might not be upheld later if the command was not lawful and/or the officer's fear was not reasonable, but that will do the person shot little good. It is usually wise to comply with any commend, unless it puts you very directly at serious risk. Remember you don't know what else has happed to the officer that day. Has the officer had a fight with his/her spouse that morning? Just been denied a promotion? Been turned down for a mortgage? None of that should matter, legally, but it will affect the officer's attitude, and can lead to escalation, even if the person stopped is in no way at fault. An instruction to "shut up" is probably not going to provoke an officer to shoot if it is disobeyed, but it might help to escalate the situation. It is probably lawful, depending non the exact circumstances. As to the first amendment issues, that would probably come under the 'time, place, or manner" regulations that may be applied to speech. And even if it is not held to be lawful, the time to contest it is in court, not during the stop. If the officer feels safer with the window fully rolled down so that the officer could reach in, that is probably a lawful command.	The advantages are: police officers, like all enforcement officers, have discretion on how they treat what they perceive to be transgressions of the law they enforce. If you are cooperative and helpful they may exercise that discretion to your benefit, if you are obstructive and difficult they may exercise it to your detriment: this may be the difference between a warning, a ticket and an arrest. one of the things that judges are allowed to take into consideration when sentencing is remorse. While the linked podcast indicates that this is not an easy thing to objectively define, it includes accepting that what you did was wrong and mitigating the harm that was done which would include cooperating with law enforcement. The disadvantages are: you may reveal information that is not known to the officer. This may or may not be admissible evidence but, notwithstanding, it may serve as a basis for further investigations which can discover things you would rather the police officer did not discover. For example Officer: "Do you know why I stopped you?" You: "I assume because of the dead body I have in the boot."
Would it be legal to use deadly force in a stampede? Imagine a stampede where there is a reasonable fear of death or grievous bodily harm. Would it be legal for a victim to use deadly force in the form of a gun or knife in this scenario? In states where family or strangers can use deadly force, would it be legal for them to shoot the stampeders?	Self-Defense Law In A Nutshell Self-defense (or defense of others) with deadly force is generally authorized when a reasonable person would believe that the use of death force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person (i.e. there aren't non-deadly options that can accomplish this end) and a reasonable person would believe that the use of force will prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person, subject to exceptions that would not apply to a private individual using deadly force in a stampede situation. Incidentally, every state and every country absolves someone of liability for homicide when deadly force is used in self-defense, or in the defense of others (not necessarily family), although the exact details of when this is justified varies slightly. For example, in D.C. v. Heller, the right to self-defense is considered a natural or universal right. The analysis would be somewhat different if the shooter were in law enforcement, and would be different again in the case of a shooter who was in the military with more or less clear orders. But, that legal standard doesn't get you to an answer. The Complex Phenomena Called Stampedes The analysis would be extremely fact rich, in the sense of exactly who one would attempt to shoot, what that would be likely to accomplish, and what other alternatives would be available. And, to do that, you also need to understand the phenomena of deadly stampedes which are complex and often somewhat counter-intuitive phenomena. While there are circumstances where it could be legal self-defense or defense of others to shoot a stampeding individual to save someone's life, there are also many stampede circumstances where a use of force would not be justified. In practice, most stampedes, as a matter of physics, can only be stopped by removing a crush of bodies from the rear, where they do not know that they are causing a deadly stampede, while those at the front who end up directly harming others are frequently physically incapable of stopping. Essentially, in a typical stampede that causes death, the problem is an inability of the people at the front to communicate to the people at the back to slow down. And, when a stampede is caused by a genuine threat to the people at the back like a fire or a terrorist, there is nothing that would persuade the people at the back to slow down anyway. So, usually, shooting to kill someone at the front of a stampede would not achieve the intended result of protecting someone in its path. The person shot would either continue to surge forward while dead under the crush of bodies behind them, or would have their dead body trampled over by the next person in line who also has no physical ability to do anything other than to surge forward. So, usually, using deadly force to shoot someone at the front of a stampede will be futile and only cause an unnecessary death. Given that using deadly force in a stampede, if directly at people in the front, is almost always futile, the question for the judge or jury deciding the case becomes whether a reasonable person would know that at the time, which would have to be decided a case by case basis. Sometimes it is obvious from someone in a vantage point to shoot at the front of a stampede that this would be futile and sometimes it isn't. This question would be highly fact specific and depend a lot upon exactly what information about the situation was available to the person shooting a person in the stampede. The situation where deadly force might not be futile would be one in which there is no actual life threatening harm that people are fleeing in which the deadly force is directed at the people in the back who are driving the stampede (even though they don't know it), to shock them into ceasing to do so. But, in that situation, if the shooting is done by someone who understands the situation well enough to know that this is what is actually necessary, that person also may be capable of firing warning shots or shooting to injure with the same effect, so justification might also be in doubt. Protecting Targets of Mobs v. Protecting Targets of Stampedes A similar situation where the use of deadly force might be justified is something visually similar to a stampede, but quite different in what would work factually. This is a mob that is about to attack someone, possibly armed with pitchforks or knives or clubs or broken bottles or a noose. In the case of a mob, the use of deadly force to protect someone threatened by the mob would almost always be a justified use of force in self-defense or the defense of others, because shooting someone in the front is likely to be both necessary and effective.	He would be thanked and sent on his way. We don't generally punish people for preventing murders, even if they are rogue cops or soldiers. If you wanted him to plausibly land in legal peril, he'd probably need to do more than simply save someone's life. The most obvious possibility, I think, would be if he were to continue inflicting harm on the attacker after cuffing him. At that point, there's probably no justification for a continued use of force, so he could face assault charges there. Also possible would be that the way he handled the situation -- the amount of force he used, the failure to de-escalate, failing to call for assistance -- just violates some police or military policy. I don't know if that would jam him up in the way you're looking for, though.	Possibly negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter. Really dependson the state where this happens and the exact elements that need to be proven. Lester has asked his wife to do something that he knows might result in her death and does not warn her. He probably has a duty to warn her.	None of this affects a claim of self-defense I've described elsewhere the things that do affect a self-defense claim in Wisconsin. These do not affect it. Protesters I'm not sure what you mean by this: the existence of protesters has nothing to do with a claim of self-defense. The standard for lethal self-defense is much higher than could be satisfied by simply being near an angry crowd. Specific actions of protesters could affect it, but you'd need to detail which actions you're referring to. Rittenhouse indicating intent to protect property from protests This might affect the claim if it were his property (which it was not). Section 939.48(1m)(ar) of Wisconsin law provides for a castle doctrine if, basically, the person has unlawfully broken into or is currently unlawfully breaking into the defendant's home, vehicle, or place of business. Since it was not his property, this defense doesn't apply.	This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.	In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source.	There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law.	Yes, police have special permission to use force For example, from s230 of the new-south-wales LAW ENFORCEMENT (POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES) ACT 2002: It is lawful for a police officer exercising a function under this Act or any other Act or law in relation to an individual or a thing, and anyone helping the police officer, to use such force as is reasonably necessary to exercise the function. So, police can use force (even deadly force if reasonably necessary) when performing their duties.
What are the limits of "implied consent" when obtaining a driver's license? This question comes out of reading this New York Times article (quoted below), about a bill that would allow officers to use a "textalyzer" to digitally search phones for evidence that the phones had been handled recently: The technology could determine whether a driver had used the phone to text, email or do anything else that is forbidden under New York’s hands-free driving laws, which prohibit drivers from holding phones to their ear. Failure to hand over a phone could lead to the suspension of a driver’s license, similar to the consequences for refusing a Breathalyzer. The intention is behavior change: “We need something on the books where people’s behavior can change,” said [Félix W. Ortiz, a Democratic assemblyman who was a sponsor of the bipartisan Textalyzer bill], who pushed for the state’s 2001 ban on hand-held devices by drivers. If the Textalyzer bill becomes law, he said, “people are going to be more afraid to put their hands on the cellphone.” The US Supreme Court has unanimously ruled that when somebody is arrested, their phone can't be searched without a warrant. But the bill’s authors say they have based the Textalyzer concept on the same “implied consent” legal theory that allows the police to use the Breathalyzer: When drivers obtain a license, they are consenting in advance to a Breathalyzer, or else they will risk the suspension of their license. (Emphasis added.) The analogy to the Breathalyzer is based on comparability of dangers, too: Deborah Hersman, the president of the nonprofit National Safety Council and a former chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board, ... said the Textalyzer-Breathalyzer comparison was apt because looking at and using a phone can be as dangerous as driving drunk. “Why are we making a distinction between a substance you consume and one that consumes you?” How far does this "implied consent" legal theory go? Can it be extended to mean that drivers' license applicants give "implied consent" to have their cars, homes, or body cavities searched in detail, or give "implied consent" to physical control by police (to enforce any failures to comply with an instruction), etc., if police request that power and find a suitably sympathetic audience in the General Assembly? It's an old argument that increasing police search powers increases safety, because it allows the police to search out and stamp out whatever behavior creates the danger to others. Where's the line, if any, which limits the extent of how far that can go? What do people really consent to when applying for a driver's license? Can "implied consent" be retroactive, such that if I have a New York driver's license today, that means I've given "implied consent" to whatever permissions the General Assembly grants police a couple years after I've gotten that license? If not, does a license renewal establish that "consent?" There is some precedent in that having gotten a NY license a few years ago does indicate consent to be bound by traffic laws including updates and changes that occur during the period of license validity. Is "implied consent" to searches one of the topics covered by that? This is tagged for New York, but as the article notes: If it were to pass in New York,... it could well spread in the same way that the hands-free rules did after New York adopted them. So feel free to answer for other jurisdictions, if they are a better fit for your expertise, and note that in your answer.	Breathalyzer tests are distinct from blood tests because the former does not "implicat[e] significant privacy concerns" (see Birchfeld v. ND). A cell phone is like a blood test, because it implicates significant privacy concerns, especially the level of electro-snooping that would be required to determine if someone had recently committed a phone-use offense. As the court held, Because the impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing is great, the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. A breath test might (but also might not) also satisfy the exigent-circumstances exception (waiting some number of hours for a warrant can easily result in the destruction of evidence), but a cell phone case could not give rise to such an exception. It should perhaps be noted that the "implied consent" laws are misnamed, because consent is not the issue. The 4th Amendment ban is on unreasonable searches, not unconsented searches. If you actually consent, it is reasonable for the police to search. I am not aware of any ruling to the effect that "because the defendant consented, the search is valid". In the context of breathalyzer law and case-law, an essential component of what makes the search reasonable is that it is incident to an arrest. With or without consent, or an implied consent law, Having assessed the effect of BAC tests on privacy interests and the need for such tests, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. Extending "implied consent" to cause-unrelated searches of cars, homes, or body cavities might not pass strict scrutiny. The state has a legitimate interest in public safety which justifies some minimal intrusion, but adding a provision that "when you drive, you give implied consent to searches of everything" is not narrowly tailored. But since driving is a privilege and not a right, the state has much more leeway to give you an ultimatum: if you don't cooperate with the search, you can lose your license. On the other hand, SCOTUS has not actually approved of this slogan about driving being a privilege. Something noteworthy from Birchfield is that the court also disapproves of blood tests because a less invasive method of achieving the result is available, and they grant that "Imposition of a warrant requirement for every BAC test would likely swamp courts, given the enormous number of drunk-driving arrests, with little corresponding benefit". There being no less-invasive alternative means of realizing the legitimate state interest in stopping distracted driving, I actually expect that when this comes to pass and the matter ends up at SCOTUS, there will be another important change in search law (but "implied consent" will still be irrelevant).	canada The law "The [Criminal] Code requires 'ongoing, conscious consent' to 'each and every sexual act' and can be revoked at any time." See R. v. Sweet, 2018 BCSC 1696, citing R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28. "The definition of consent for sexual assault requires the complainant to provide actual active consent throughout every phase of the sexual activity. It is not possible for an unconscious person to satisfy this requirement, even if she expresses her consent in advance." R. v. J.A., para. 66. The Supreme Court has explicitly declined to decide "whether or in which circumstances individuals may consent to bodily harm during sexual activity" (R. v. J.A., para. 21). However, in the context of a non-sport fist fight or brawl, one cannot consent to another intentionally applying force that causes serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm: R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714.1 And at the provincial appellate level, it has been held that "consent is not a defence to a charge of sexual assault causing bodily harm in circumstances where the accused has deliberately inflicted pain or injury upon a person that gave rise to bodily harm" (R. v. Quashie (2005), 198 C.C.C. (3d) 337 (Ont. C.A.)). Consent would be irrelevant in a charge of criminal negligence or manslaughter, if the activities were to escalate this far (R. c. Deschatelets, 2013 QCCQ 1948, para. 175-77). The content of advance negotiations is not relevant to whether the complainant was consenting to the impugned conduct, however, it may be relevant as evidence of expectations about how consent would be communicated between the parties throughout the conduct. See R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33, para. 93 (citations omitted): For example, in some cases, prior sexual activities may establish legitimate expectations about how consent is communicated between the parties, thereby shaping the accused’s perception of communicated consent to the sexual activity in question at the time it occurred. American scholar Michelle Anderson puts it this way: “… prior negotiations between the complainant and the defendant regarding the specific acts at issue or customs and practices about those acts should be admissible. These negotiations, customs, and practices between the parties reveal their legitimate expectations on the incident in question.” These “negotiations” would not, however, include an agreement involving broad advance consent to any and all manner of sexual activity. As I will explain, a belief that the complainant gave broad advance consent to sexual activity of an undefined scope will afford the accused no defence, as that belief is premised on a mistake of law, not fact. See also R. v. Sweet, 2018 BCSC 1696, para. 141: ... consenting adults may enjoy the personal autonomy to establish rules such as “no means yes”. If so, in my view, this passage suggests a corollary requirement to establish an alternative “safe word” or other mechanism to ensure that each party is also able to maintain their personal autonomy to put an end to unwanted sexual activity. Application A contract cannot provide advance consent, therefore it is irrelevant as to proof of consent during the acts. However, advance agreements can (and several courts suggests should) set out the expectations about how consent will be communicated. Any evidence of such agreements would be relevant to establishing the defence of "mistaken belief in communicated consent." None of this would assist an accused in the circumstance where a court finds that any consent was vitiated because the accused deliberately inflicted pain or injury that gave rise to bodily harm (this position has not been confirmed by the Supreme Court). If you are simply asking how to prove a fact in litigation, see this Q&A. 1. Since this is a judicially-developed limit, the conception of "bodily harm" used here does not necessarily have to match that codified in the Criminal Code. But: "The common law definition of 'bodily harm' has been substantially incorporated in s. 245.1(2) of the Criminal Code, and means 'any hurt or injury to the complainant that interferes with the health or comfort of the complainant and that is more than merely transient or trifling'" (R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633).	There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law.	In the US, obscenities, insults, racial slurs and so on are legal, owing to the First Amendment. An actual, believable threat to maim you would not be legal, under Cal. Penal 422, but "I oughta punch you" would not be a criminal threat. Some forms of aggressive driving constitute reckless driving, if they are driving "in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property". It is also against the law to follow too close (you must follow reasonably and prudently). Exceeding the speed limit is a violation of Veh. Code 22352, even if it's to pass a guy on a bike. Of course, we can't tell if you are obeying the law, but even if you were doing something illegal in your biking such as blowing away a stop sign, "the other guy was bad" is not a defense against a citation for illegal driving.	What law in the U.S. governs when you need to pull over for a traffic stop? Specifically, Massachusetts? Refusal to submit to a police officer, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 25 (2016) governs. The relevant part reads: Any person who, while operating or in charge of a motor vehicle . . . who shall refuse or neglect to stop when signalled to stop by any police officer who is in uniform or who displays his badge conspicuously on the outside of his outer coat or garment . . . shall be punished by a fine of one hundred dollars. What about a police standing on the side of the road, waving you over? (perhaps at a speed trap) If the police officer is on a uniform and displays his badge, probably. What about a police just standing on the side of the road, looking at you? Assuming the police officer doesn't "signal" you to stop, you would be okay under this statute. Whether he is legally justified in asking you to stop is a separate issue outside the scope of you question. Bottom Line: Someone who doesn't want to run afoul of this law should stop whenever they think a police officer is pulling them over.	No. The laws specify what you can and what you cannot do. If the intent of the authority was that you were allowed to drive at 45 mph, you would have a speed limit of 45 mph, not a speed limit of 40 mph. If you go at 41 mph, you are breaking a law and can be punished. That said, law enforcement officers usually have some leeway on how to enforce the law, and they could very well let it pass with just a warning (or even ignore it if they have more pressing issues); the circunstances of it are specific to every situation and officer. The only point that could be made would be if the difference was so small that it could be argued that it can invalidate the evidence on the basis of margin of errors. If the radar catches you driving at 41 mph but the error margin of the radar is 5%, you could argue that you were driving at 39 mph and that the reading is due to the error in the radar1. That would enable you to challenge the evidence (but here the point is not that you are allowed to drive at 41 mph but that there is no proof that you were driving at 41 mph). From what I know, most police forces will be aware of that and avoid issuing fines unless you are well above that margin of error2. 1In fact, in Spain word of the street is that radars are set to account to possible margin of error of the radar, plus possible margin of error of the vehicle speedometer -even if it is the vehicle owner's responsibility to ensure that it works correctly- and some leeway. 2Some people post on the internet the "magic formula" of how many % of speed you can go over the posted speed limit based on those calculations. Of course those magic formulas rely in the radar and the speedometer being 100% accurate and the driver never getting distracted a few seconds and passing it. So, even assuming that those magic formulas are correct, if either the radar or the speedometer are not accurate or the driver gets distracted for a few seconds, you are at risk of getting a ticket.	In the U.S. there is no law that requires you to ever say a word to a law enforcement officer, and lawyers generally encourage you to minimize what you communicate to them anyway. I can't think of any situation where a request for information could not be demanded in writing. As a practical matter, in some situations you will probably be subject to some extra scrutiny and inconvenience: E.g., in a stop-and-identify situation, you could hand the officer a note saying, "Please make any requests for information from me in writing." The officer may infer that you have some disability, but if he does not (or discovers you don't) he may get irritated enough to subject you to harassment for "contempt of cop". Of course, if you can understand him, you are still required to obey an officer's lawful orders no matter how they are communicated. But "speak" is not a lawful order.	Can the police seize your phone without a warrant UK? YES An arrest on suspicion of rape (an indictable offence) triggers two powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) to search premises for evidence without a warrant. Which power depends on where the arrest was made: s.32(2)(b) PACE: if the offence for which he has been arrested is an indictable offence, to enter and search any premises in which he was when arrested or immediately before he was arrested for evidence relating to the offence. Note that s.32(2)(b) does not have the power of seizure attached, but the officer can use the "General Power of Seizures" at s.19 PACE s.18 PACE: (1) ... a constable may enter and search any premises occupied or controlled by a person who is under arrest for an indictable offence, if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is on the premises evidence... (2) A constable may seize and retain anything for which he may search under subsection (1) above. IF... the phone is not on the suspect at the time of the arrest (say the police arrest the suspect in their home) but in another room on the shelf - either s.32(2)(b) or s.18 would apply IF... being outside at the time - s.32(2)(b) possibly if he had just left, s.18 otherwise.
How do the expiration dates on driver licenses not count as an "arbitrary revocation" Driver licensing is ostensibly legally valid based on the following: The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking under rules of general application permits to drive an automobile on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or permitted to be held by some and refused to others of like qualifications, under like circumstances and conditions. Why are license expiration dates (and associated requirement to pay renewal fees) not considered arbitrary revocations of the license?	Arbitrary doesn't mean what you think it means The term arbitrary describes a course of action or a decision that is not based on reason or judgment but on personal will or discretion without regard to rules or standards. A clear rule that a license fee is required to be paid by a certain date that is the same for everyone is pretty much the opposite of arbitrary.	Name and date of birth are not sufficiently unique to identify a person. While name, date of birth, and place of birth do not have to be unique, either, it reduces the number of false positives. Also, date of birth is somewhat better known than place of birth for most people. Motorist: "Sorry, officer, I seem to have lost my wallet. Everything was in there, ID, license, ..." Cop: "Tell me your name, date and place of birth, and I'll run a query if you do have a license."	The relevant offence is at s.47(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988: A person who uses on a road at any time, or causes or permits to be so used, a motor vehicle to which this section applies, and as respects which no test certificate has been issued within the appropriate period before that time, is guilty of an offence. Benin commits an offence as he uses the car on the road, and as not having a valid and current MOT (usually) invalidates motor insurance, the car would in all likelihood be seized under s.165A of the Act. Aisha may commit an offence if it can be shown that she causes or permits Benin to use the car. This would hinge on what steps she would reasonably be expected to keep the car off the road and/or prevent Benin from using it such as taking it back (via a pre-arranged MOT appointment to not fall foul of s 47) taking the keys from him or selling it - which she can do as the registered keeper (the credit company is the actual owner).	health care checks. Hotel check in. Employment? maybe. Background Checks? doesn't matter. It actually does matter, because there is sometimes a law governing the documents that may be shown for a given purpose. For example, the I-9 form, for verifying someone's eligibility to accept employment in the US, has a well defined lists of documents that an employer must accept, and the passport card is one of those documents. A similar situation exists for Transportation Security Administration screening of air passengers. On the other hand, laws concerning proof of age for buying various products will vary from state to state, and retailers may or may not be required to accept any particular document. In the case of alcohol sales in North Carolina, for example, there is a brochure that lists "acceptable forms of identification" on page 17 and explicitly says that "passports may be in the booklet or card form." But that does not seem to create a legal requirement for the retailer to accept passport cards, because page 19 outlines the retailer's right to refuse, saying among other things that "there is no legal recourse by a customer who you have refused a sale." US passport law (22 USC Chapter 4 and 22 CFR parts 51 and 53) doesn't have anything to say about the passport's or passport card's role as an identification document; it speaks only of the more specific role as a travel document. So the general answer to your question, appears to be no. There is no law generally requiring people to accept a passport card if they also accept passports or driver's licenses. But in most specific instances, there may be a general requirement such as "government-issued identification" that includes passport cards in addition to passports and driver's licenses, or there may be a list that explicitly includes passport cards along with driver's licenses and passports.	If you buy a large piece of land, closed to the public, then yes. You would need a license for your car to allow drivers to use it without hands on the wheel, or the driver will get arrested. But first you need a license that allows using the car on public roads at all. That’s what all the car manufacturers have to do. Requires for example crash tests, tests how polluting the car is, and so on.	Yes Of course, the period is not actually "indefinite" - it has a definite end: the date of your death. It also has another (unstated) endpoint: the point at which the information ceases to be confidential other than through your breach: for example if published in a patent application. The correct legal term here is not "indefinite"; its "forever" or "perpetually". I prefer forever because perpetually technically means "all the time" rather than "neverending". However, documents commonly use “indefinite” when they mean “forever” so there is unlikely to be grounds to dispute the interpretation. Under US law there is no prohibition on perpetuities as there is in most common law jurisdictions (80 years is typical) so this contract is totally legit. As for the law preventing "morally bankrupt practices and intellectual enslavement"; it does: you don't have to enter this contract if you don't want to.	No, she cannot 42-2-101(3), C.R.S. provides: “No person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has in his or her immediate possession a current driver’s or minor driver’s license or an instruction permit issued by the department under this article.” "(5) No person who has been issued a currently valid driver's or minor driver's license or an instruction permit shall operate a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without having such license or permit in such person's immediate possession." The law requires you to carry your license. If your sister only has an instruction permit in her possession, she must operate under its rules until she is in possession of her permanent license. Just in case people think "highway" means a high-speed roadway, the CRS defines highway: "Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel or the entire width of every way declared to be a public highway by any law of this state.	Pennsylvania is one state sometimes cited as having such a law, but the law does not refer to "keys in the ignition", instead, An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol... Similarly in Washington, A person is guilty of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug if the person has actual physical control of a vehicle within this state... California law is narrower, since It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of any alcoholic beverage to drive a vehicle and this does not include being in physical control. See Mercer v. DMV which affirms that the person must have been driving, but it is not necessary to witness the person driving. Keys in the ignition can be evidence that you were driving, likewise a warm engine or tires, car is in gear, you're in the middle of the road. I doubt that any law is stated in terms of "keys in the ignition", more likely it reduces to actual driving, or being in control of the vehicle.
Its Wrong, But Is It Class Action Wrong? After viewing my receipts I noticed a company is charging it’s customers for extra items I assume by “accident”. When I go back the next day to confront them they apologize and are gracious enough to give a credit for the full ticket price. During one of these returns I watched 5 others that were there for the exact same thing I was and considering it wasn’t the first time for me I assume this must be happening a lot. What I didn’t realize until my third trip is I wasn’t receiving the full amount back I had paid tax on the initial purchases but I was only receiving the price of the item. Technically it wasn’t a return because I hadn’t received the item but I still paid tax on it. Based on the number of people I’ve seen this has happened to I can assume the actual amount people is much larger as I am not their very often and even though the amount is small for each person the sum would probably be much higher for the company. Is this a class action or just wrong.	This is for educational (and fun!) purposes and is not and should not be thought of as legal advice and, if you're planning on doing something with respect to your situation described above, you should seek the counsel of an attorney in your jurisdiction. The question: Well, it's wrong regardless of whether it is a class action lawsuit. Now, it is not a class action because a class action is created by the determination of a judge. So, you need to know if this situation would qualify to become a class action. Certifying the class: The most important part is having the "class" certified. The "class" is the group of people with similar injuries sues the same person or company or several people or companies. Prior to this, a plaintiff must fill out a standard complaint filing and check the appropriate box to indicate the intention to file a class action. State level requirements: Requirements to become certified as a class vary by state. Most states, in general, follow broad requirements which require the plaintiff to prove: the representative plaintiff has suffered the same alleged injuries as the proposed class. The allegations are assumed to be true for the purposes of certification (since the trial has not started) the class can be defined clearly enough to determine who is and is not a member the number of class members makes joining all of them to the lawsuit impractical (40 or more is almost always enough, 21 or less is almost always not enough) a common set of facts or legal interest underlies all of the members’ alleged injuries the representative plaintiff’s claims are so similar to the class members that litigating the representative plaintiff’s case will adequately decide the absent class members’ cases, and a class action is the best and most efficient way of resolving the claims, either for the plaintiffs or for the defendants. Federal level requirements: Similarly, there can be class actions at the federal court level, too. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 covers Class Actions. Rule 23(a) establishes four "threshold requirements" for certification. They all must be met. They are: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of class members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical of those of the class (typicality); and (4) the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy). Additionally, the court then must find that at least one out of three more possible conditions are met. Under Rule 23(b), those requirements are: (1) that prosecution of separate actions risks either inconsistent adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant or would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of others; (2) that defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class; or (3) that there are common questions of law or fact that predominate over any individual class member’s questions and that a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication. Burden of proof: The burden is wholly on the plaintiff to not only plead each element that must be met, but also to prove those conditions exist. The standard of proof here is a "preponderance of the evidence," which is the one used in civil cases and is less than "beyond a reasonable doubt" required of a criminal case. Misc. items of note: If a class is certified, then one plaintiff participates in the litigation, while the others essentially await adjudication. There are more complexities than appropriate to delve into here. For example, you'll notice there is no number requirement; rather, numerosity with respect to the practicality of joinder of all members of the class. FYI: However, generally, 20 and less is considered "insufficiently numerous," while 40 or more will often "satisfy the numerosity requirement."	Based on the advice from @user6726, here's how I disputed the charge. First, I called FedEx customer service. They declined to waive the fee, and informed me that if I didn't pay, it would go to collections. So, I waited a few months and let the collection agency send me their version of the bill. Then, I sent the following reply (paraphrased) to the collection agency, by registered mail. On date, we received a letter from your agency demanding a payment for Federal Express Canada Co. I am writing this letter to dispute this debt, as I do not believe that we owe it. The debt claimed by Federal Express Canada appears to be related to FedEx invoice n, consisting of a Clearance Entry Fee of $X. I called FedEx on date to dispute this fee. It appears that they have decided to proceed with demanding payment anyway. The facts of the case are as follows: In month, we received an unsolicited birthday gift from a relative in the United States, which FedEx left at our doorstep, with no signature required, and no indication that accepting the package would incur an obligation to FedEx. As the value of the gift did not exceed 60 CAD, the package was admitted into Canada duty free. The Clearance Entry Fee is a fee imposed by FedEx, not on behalf of any government agency. “Clearance Entry” is an “unsolicited good or service”, as defined by the BC Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, Chapter 2, Section 11. We did not order the shipment of the package, and did not consent verbally or in writing to the “Clearance Entry” service claimed to have been provided by FedEx. Therefore, as provided in Section 12 of the Act, we have no obligation to FedEx, and FedEx has no cause of action against us. The burden of proof that the service was not unsolicited rests with FedEx, and until such proof is provided, this debt is void under BC law, and you, as a collector, must not collect or attempt to collect money from a person who is not liable for the debt. Based on Section 116 of the Act, I am requiring you to communicate with me only in writing, at the address given above. At this point, I expect that your next communication would either contain: Proof that we consented to the “Clearance Entry” service provided by FedEx, or A statement that the debt is invalid, and that we are discharged from any obligation to your agency or to Federal Express Canada in regards to this matter. In addition, please inform any credit reporting agencies to which you have reported this debt to, that this debt is currently in dispute. I will require proof that you have done this. It has been over two months since the collection agency received the letter, and we still have not heard from them. Evidently they have decided that it is not worthwhile to pursue this case.	They say they will award seven top prizes There are three people who are winners Acne lied about how many winners there would be and the fact that there were proposed to be more than there were may have induced people to enter. Well, that looks like sufficient evidence to prove the tort of misrepresentation right there. I'll run the class action on a contingency basis.	You didn't consent to being ripped off. You did however fail to grasp the terms under which you were permitted to park on their property, and you failed to pursue an alternative (such as looking for change; using a credit card). It is possible that you should have known that this was a no-change-given machine, since one can often see that there is no mechanism on these machines whereby you can actually get change. However, if you have clear proof that you owed $6 and you paid $10, then 4 of those dollars are properly yours, and there is a reasonable chance that you could prevail in a suit against them. There is even a greater chance that they would refund the difference, just as a sensible business practice. "Exact change" is legal and can even be the law, especially in government-run transportation systems.	You have no legal duty to inform callers they have the wrong number. Official business is not carried out by telephone, despite the fact that some collection agencies commonly use the tactic that there is service of process forthcoming, or some other legal jargon, to entice a callback. From a non-legal perspective, you may want to call and tell them to take you off their call list and that they have the wrong number; otherwise, they are likely to continue to bother you day and night. It appears to be either a scam or a collections attempt.	If the employee has the choice - bonus and membership, or no bonus - then I expect the offer to be legal. Since it is a real bonus and part of your salary you will have to pay income tax on it. What might be illegal, but not your concern, is if your company tells investors how well the company is doing, and how well the membership scheme is doing, when in reality 80% of members are employees paying effectively nothing.	No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.	Apparently an obscure business forced the California government to collect tax from amazon. No, this is not true. Mr. Grosz filed a lawsuit asking the court to force California to collect tax revenues. The lawsuit is still pending before the court without a decision on the merits. As the saying goes, anyone can sue for anything; their success is another matter. The apparent legal basis for standing is section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows taxpayers to sue against wasteful or illegal government spending: 526a (a) An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a local agency, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax that funds the defendant local agency ... The Plaintiff has claimed that, allegedly, there is a mandatory duty to collect taxes and that failure to do so constitutes a waste. The court will decide if it will accept this argument and compel the collection.
Voting while serving a sentence for felonious refusal to pay taxes Last I heard (but my information may not be up to date) in 49 48 of the 50 states in the U.S., persons serving a sentence for a felony are not allowed to vote. Suppose a person is convicted of a felonious failure to pay a tax. Under the 24th Amendment, their right to vote cannot be denied for that particular offense. (If it were tax evasion, i.e. concealing facts in order to avoid paying, that would be different matter, if I'm not mistaken.) My question is whether that has ever happened, i.e. a person convicted of a felonious failure to pay a tax has been allowed to vote while serving a sentence because of the 24th Amendment?	The 24th Amendment states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. But, no one in incarcerated in prison (and hence loses the right to vote) merely for failing to pay taxes. Usually, one is incarcerated in prison on tax charges for fraud in connection with one's tax obligation which is different from failure to pay. (A misdemeanor conviction does not result in the loss of an ability to vote, even while in jail.) Refusal to pay, on grounds other than lacking the money (inability to pay isn't a criminal offense), when done without full compliance with other tax return filing obligations, is tantamount to tax litigation abuse and abuse of process, not mere failure to pay a debt.	The previous constitutional provision, which copies the wording of the 13th Amendment to the US Federal Constitution, would in theory have allowed a converted criminal to be sentenced to lifetime slavery, or to a long period of indentured servitude, although this has not commonly been done. This language has allowed convicted criminals to be sentenced to many years of hard labor in a prion setting, including under circumstances where the convicts are rented out to private employers. I take it that such practices would be forbidden by the new language, and that only a limited period of "community service" would be allowed, not under prison conditions, and not designed to benefit private employers. It is not clear to me just what the limits of "community service" are, in intensity or duration. But the suggestioinb seems to be that they would be much less intense, in both aspects, than traditional "chain gang" sentences.	In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.	No. The relevant provision of the United States Constitution is Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 which states in the pertinent part: The President . . . shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The correct conclusion flows pretty directly from the definition of a "reprieve" and a "pardon", both of which, in the ordinary senses of these words refer to granting forgiveness for acts that have already occurred. One of the leading cases on point which supports this view is Ex parte Garland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 380 (1855), which states: The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions. Despite its antiquity, this case remains good law and has been applied repeatedly in subsequent cases (although few on the right of a President to pardon future crimes which just hasn't come up). Other Observations The President's pardon power is limited to federal crimes, so no President may pardon or commute a state or foreign conviction. The nature of the pardon power, if any, with respect to state and local crimes is governed by each respective state constitution and varies rather considerably. The power in the U.S. Constitution is broader than that is some state constitutions. For example, the corresponding provision of the Colorado Constitution, applicable to convictions entered by the state of Colorado, does not allow crimes to be pardoned prior to a conviction. Article IV, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution provides: "The governor shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason * * *." The History Of The Pardon Power One of the most thorough and up to date reviews of the scope and nature of the federal pardon power can be found in the law review article, Todd David Peterson, "Congressional Power Over Pardon and Amnesty: Legislative Authority In The Shadow of Presidential Prerogative" 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1225 (2003). In particular, it has an interesting historical overview of the power at pages 1228-1235 (pagination and footnotes omitted): The President's pardon power derives from the authority that had been invested in English kings since the end of the first millennium. Although the King possessed plenary power to grant pardons, over the years Parliament imposed specific limitations on the pardon power in order to avoid perceived abuses. For example, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 made it an offense for any person to imprison an English subject outside of the country and, in order to avoid an evasion of the writ, Parliament prohibited the King from granting a pardon for violation of the statute. Nevertheless, English courts frequently took an absolutist view of the King's pardon power. Thus, in Godden v. Hales, the Lord Chief Justice upheld a royal pardon on the ground that the Kings of England were absolute sovereigns; . . . the laws were the King's laws; . . . the King had a power to dispense with any of the laws of Government as he saw necessity for it; . . . he was sole judge of that necessity; that no act of Parliament could take away that power. The Parliament, however, persisted in its efforts to rein in the pardon power and, in 1700, adopted the Act of Settlement, which stated that "no pardon under the great seal of England [shall] be pleadable to an impeachment by the commons in Parliament." This limitation was enforced against the King, although it did not apply to pardons granted to relieve punishments imposed after the impeachment of an official. The royal pardon prerogative was imported into the American colonies whose charters gave the leaders substantial authority to pardon offenses. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, neither the Virginia plan nor the New Jersey plan contained a pardon power. Nevertheless, at the insistence of Charles Pinckney, Alexander Hamilton, and John Rutledge, a pardon clause similar to the English Act of Settlement of 1700 was added to the draft constitution. Thus, the first report of the Committee on Detail proposed that the clause read: "He [the President] shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons; but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment." The issue of legislative control over the pardon process was addressed directly by an amendment proposed by Roger Sherman of Connecticut. James Madison's journal notes that "Mr. Sherman moved to amend the power to grant reprieves and pardon' so as to readto grant reprieves until the ensuing session of the Senate, and pardons with consent of the Senate.'" George Mason argued that the Senate already possessed too much authority, and the proposed amendment was rejected by a vote of eight to one. The convention did approve a motion to insert "except in cases of impeachment" after pardon and remove the words "but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar." Luther Martin then sought to limit the President's power to grant pre-conviction pardons by inserting the words "after conviction," following the words "reprieves and pardons." Martin, however, withdrew his motion after James Wilson argued that "pardon before conviction might be necessary, in order to obtain the testimony of accomplices." Edmund Randolph then offered an amendment to exclude "cases of treason" from the pardoning power. This proposed amendment was defeated, although its exclusion was later to prove controversial. Thus, although the framers realized that the pardon power was subject to potential abuse by the President, they declined to place any limitations on the President's pardon power or grant the legislature any authority to check potential presidential abuses. The debates following the convention's passage of the Constitution reveal more about the framers' views on the pardon power. In the Federalist 74, Alexander Hamilton attempted to respond to the criticism that the President could pardon his accomplices in a case of treason. Hamilton acknowledged that "there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of [the legislative] body or of a part of it." Hamilton argued, however, that the reasons against such legislative authority outweighed any in its favor: "[i]t is not to be doubted that a single man of prudence and good sense, is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives, which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever." In particular, Hamilton argued, in the case of large scale seditions that attracted significant popular support, we might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same spirit, which had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing itself of the good nature and weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary. Thus, Hamilton argued not only that the power was properly reposed in the President, but that it would be dangerous to grant such power to Congress. Finally, Hamilton argued that it was appropriate to grant the President pardon power in order to ensure that the authority could be exercised with appropriate dispatch: "In seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the Legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed that a discretionary power with a view to such contingencies might be occasionally conferred upon the President; it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable whether, in a limited constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic before-hand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity." There was little debate about the pardoning power during the state ratifying conventions. George Mason continued to argue that the power should not be given to the President. An opponent in New York suggested that pardons for treason should not be allowed without congressional consent. Ultimately, the Constitution was adopted without any express limitation on the President's pardoning power. The Supreme Court has on a number of occasions discussed the general scope of the pardoning power. For the most part, with exceptions to be discussed later, these decisions contain broad dicta concerning the unfettered nature of the President's power and the inability of Congress to impose any legislative restrictions on it. For example, in United States v. Wilson, the Court held that a pardon must be pleaded in order to be effective. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the [C]onstitution gives to the [P]resident, in general terms, "the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States." As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it. Marshall further defined the pardon as an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court. In Ex parte Wells, the Supreme Court considered whether the President could grant a conditional pardon in the form of commutation of a death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment. The Court noted that pursuant to the Pardon Clause, the President has granted reprieves and pardons since the commencement of the present government. Sundry provisions have been enacted, regulating its exercise for the army and navy, in virtue of the constitutional power of [C]ongress to make rules and regulations for the government of the army and navy. No statute has ever been passed regulating it in cases of conviction by the civil authorities. In such cases, the President has acted exclusively under the power as it is expressed in the [C]onstitution. The Court noted, however, that "[t]here are also pardons grantable as of common right, without any exercise of the king's discretion; as where a statute creating an offence, or enacting penalties for its future punishment, holds out a promise of immunity to accomplices to aid in the conviction of their associates. When accomplices do so voluntarily, they have a right absolutely to a pardon . . . ." Thus, at least in dicta, the Court recognized Congress's authority to regulate clemency in the military and to adopt statutes granting immunity for cooperation in a criminal investigation. In Ex parte Garland, the Court spoke in sweeping dicta about the exclusive power of the President over pardon and amnesty. In Garland, the Court considered the issue whether a former Confederate senator would be permitted to be a member of the Supreme Court Bar without taking the statutorily required oath that he had never voluntarily given aid or comfort to the confederacy. The petitioner had received a presidential pardon and argued that the pardon exempted him from the requirements of the oath to which he could not truthfully subscribe. The Court held that it was "not within the constitutional power of Congress thus to inflict punishment beyond the reach of executive clemency," and therefore, the petitioner was entitled to membership in the Bar. In the course of the opinion, the Court broadly defined the President's pardon power: "The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions." In Ex parte Grossman, the Court considered whether the President's pardon power extended to criminal contempts of court. The Court upheld the President's power to issue such pardons based on the history of royal pardons for contempt in England. The Court also looked to the long history of presidential pardons of criminal contempts of court. In responding to the argument that a presidential pardon of contempt of court would interfere with the ability of the federal courts to protect their own decrees, Chief Justice Taft noted that the Constitution provides a number of powers to the branches which give them the ability to check the other branches of government. With respect to the pardon power, the Court stated: "[t]he executive can reprieve or pardon all offenses after their commission, either before trial, during trial or after trial, by individuals, or by classes, conditionally or absolutely, and this without modification or regulation by Congress." The Court also noted that the President exercised the pardon power without any significant judicial check on his pardoning authority: "It is a check entrusted to the executive for special cases. To exercise it to the extent of destroying the deterrent effect of judicial punishment would be to pervert it; but whoever is to make it useful must have full discretion to exercise it. Our Constitution confers this discretion on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he will not abuse it. An abuse in pardoning contempts would certainly embarrass courts, but it is questionable how much more it would lessen their effectiveness than a wholesale pardon of other offenses. If we could conjure up in our minds a President willing to paralyze courts by pardoning all criminal contempts, why not a President ordering a general jail delivery?" In Biddle v. Perovich, Justice Holmes wrote an opinion for the Court in which he upheld the President's conditional pardon of a convict sentenced to death on the condition that his sentence be commuted to life imprisonment. Justice Holmes suggested a different rationale for the pardon power than Chief Justice Marshall had enunciated early in the 19th century. Rather than being a private act of grace that must be accepted and proffered to the court by the one pardoned, Justice Holmes saw the President's pardon as serving public policy ends: "A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed. . . . Just as the original punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare, not his consent, determines what shall be done."	Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records.	The president alone has power, under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, to grant pardons for federal offenses. Many states have an analogous power for governors, to pardon state offenses. In some states, though (for example Minnesota), there is a board in charge of the process (made up, in Minnesota, of the Governor, Chief Justice and Attorney General). Likewise, in Canada, pardons are granted by a board. Although POTUS has the power, in terms of implementation it is a bit more complicated, since he doesn't sit around wondering "Who should I pardon": he has an Office of the Pardon Attorney who makes recommendations. However, there are other ways to get out of jail (besides doing the time), namely having the conviction overturned, being paroled, and credit for good behavior. Federal parole is no longer an option, but the other avenues are open, at least in principle.	It depends on the jurisdiction. Some states don't require a signature. In California refusing to sign is grounds for arrest: CA Codes (veh:40300-40313) 40302) Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this code, not declared to be a felony, the arrested person shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of the offense and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where the arrest is made in any of the following cases: (a) When the person arrested fails to present his driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of his identity for examination. (b) When the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to appear in court. (c) When the person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate. (d) When the person arrested is charged with violating Section 23152.	In general they are not told. In fact, I am not aware of any jurisdiction where they are told by the judge officially. In fact judges will normally charge a jury that they must accept the law as stated by the judge, and ignore any other source of the law, whether they like it or not. But the Judge has no way to enforce such a charge. According to the Wikipedia article The 1895 decision in Sparf v. United States, written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. It was a 5–4 decision. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present legal argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge. A 1969 Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Moylan, affirmed the power of jury nullification, but also upheld the power of the court to refuse to permit an instruction to the jury to this effect. We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge, and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused, is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision. Nevertheless, in upholding the refusal to permit the jury to be so instructed, the Court held that: …by clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that they may decide according to their prejudices or consciences (for there is no check to ensure that the judgment is based upon conscience rather than prejudice), we would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness. This should not be allowed. It is not so much that jury nullification is a right of the jury, as that there is very little right for the prosecutor or judge to inquire into why the jury acted however it did. If there is a suspicion that the jury was bribed, or influenced by prohibited communications, that can be looked into. But otherwise a jury is like an oracle, its actions have no specified reason or justification, they are whatever they are. The judge (or an appeals court) can set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that no rational jury could find in a particular way -- this is mostly used to overturn convictions based on insufficient evidence. But a jury has almost total freedom to believe of disbelieve any witnesses, so if it disbelieves, it could acquit, regardless of whether it rejects the law under which charges are brought. So there is no way to tell if a particular verdict was based on nullification, or on disbelief of the witnesses, or some other possible ground. In any case, there is no provision -- that I k now of -- to set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that it was an instance of nullification, so inquiring into whether it was would be of little point. This attitude toward jury verdicts goes back to the very early origins of trial by jury, when it was a replacement for Trial by Ordeal. The Ordeal had been considered a way of asking God to decide the issue, and there was no way to ask God to clarify the decision. When it was replaced by jury trial, no way to ask for clarification was considered possible there either -- the jury was said to voice the decision of the community at large: the formal term for jury trial was "to be tried by the country". See C. Rembar's The Law of the Land and H.C. Lea's The Duel and the oath for more on this history. This article reports on recent cases where juries have refused to convict in Marijuana cases.
Can you really ignore a summons just by avoiding it? In the first episode of Jessica Jones, the title character is tasked with delivering a summons to a strip club owner who is accused of maintaining an unsafe workplace. (A pole dancer got a concussion after the pole broke.) The character, who has some sort of superpowers, has to deliver it because the owner's bodyguards make it impossible to actually hand over the summons. Can you really avoid being summoned just by refusing to physically touch the paper?	There may be places, either real or fictional, where avoiding works. It is a great plot point for instance, but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure upon which most United States based localities structure their rules do not make avoidance a viable strategy. The rules for serving a summons can be found at https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_4 include the following: (2) doing any of the following: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. and then later it discusses applying any costs incurred as a result of avoiding the service: Subdivision (d). This text is new, but is substantially derived from the former subdivisions (c)(2)(C) and (D), added to the rule by Congress in 1983. The aims of the provision are to eliminate the costs of service of a summons on many parties and to foster cooperation among adversaries and counsel. The rule operates to impose upon the defendant those costs that could have been avoided if the defendant had cooperated reasonably in the manner prescribed. Also if the target of the summons can be shown to have tried to evade service the time limit for service may be altered: The procedure of requesting waiver of service should also not be used if the time for service under subdivision (m) will expire before the date on which the waiver must be returned. While a plaintiff has been allowed additional time for service in that situation, e.g., Prather v. Raymond Constr. Co., 570 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ga. 1983), the court could refuse a request for additional time unless the defendant appears to have evaded service pursuant to subdivision (e) or (h). It may be noted that the presumptive time limit for service under subdivision (m) does not apply to service in a foreign country. In California's guide they discuss a variety of means of service and then under personal service state: The server gives the papers to the party being served. It can be at the party’s home, work, or anywhere on the street. The server has to identify the party being served and hand the legal papers to him or her and inform him or her that they are court papers. If the party being served does not want to take the papers, they can be left on the ground in front of him or her. If he or she takes the papers and tears them up or throws them away, service is still considered to be valid. The person being served does not have to sign anything. The server then fills out a proof of service, detailing when, where, and how (in person) the papers were served. The server signs the proof of service and returns it to you to file in court. Personal service is complete the day the papers are served.	Where the President explicitly tells a newspaper that they should reveal their sources. Is this not illegal in the US? It is not illegal. Well, it would be a U.S. Attorney, rather than the President himself. You're thinking of shield laws, but no such law exists at the federal level. Moreover, although some people might think that the First Amendment ("freedom of the press") would protect a journalist in such a case, the Supreme Court has held that it doesn't, though the government is required to "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest". So if a reporter were subpoenaed in federal court to reveal a source, and they couldn't convince a court to quash the subpoena under the Branzburg test, they'd have to either reveal their source or be held in contempt. In practice, many reporters have chosen the latter, and served time in jail rather than reveal the source. For instance, Judith Miller. There've been a number of proposals to create such a federal law, but so far Congress hasn't seen fit to do it. According to the Wikipedia article, every state except Wyoming has some sort of shield protection for journalists, either in statute or case law, though the protections are not necessarily absolute. So a state court or prosecutor would find it much more difficult to enforce such an order.	Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals.	As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them.	If you are directly suing two people regarding a shared set of circumstances (e.g. two co-signers on a promissory note to plaintiff, or two people who both contributed to causing an accident burting the plaintiff), the caption and name of the lawsuit is: PERSON v. DEFENDANT1 and DEFENDANT2. The entire complaint together with a summons directed at DEFENDANT1 goes to DEFENDANT1 and the entire complaint together with a summons directed at DEFENDANT2 goes to DEFENDANT2. There are cases that do have captions like PERSON v. AWESOME PERSON v. SUPERAWESOME PERSON. But that means that PERSON sued AWESOME PERSON, and then AWESOME PERSON, after being sued by PERSON, then turned around and filed what is called a "third-party complaint" against SUPERAWESOME PERSON. A typical fact pattern there would be LANDLORD v. TENANT for damage to property and TENANT v. SUBTENANT to indemnify TENANT for damage actually done by SUBTENANT for which TENANT is nonetheless responsible to LANDLORD.	The law of Washington is probably typical. Under RCW 9A.56.110, "Extortion" means knowingly to obtain or attempt to obtain by threat property or services of the owner, and specifically includes sexual favors. By RCW 9A.56.130(1), A person is guilty of extortion in the second degree if he or she commits extortion by means of a wrongful threat as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(25) (d) through (j). Then looking at the relevant definition of threat (please note that there is a numbering error in the statute, that should be (28), I don't know if they will fix it), it says (28) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent:... (e) To expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or (f) To reveal any information sought to be concealed by the person threatened; Second degree extortion is a class C felony. It is not first degree extortion, since that requires the threat to be (a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or (b) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or (c) To subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint; Washington does not include a category of rape by extortion, though I've heard rumors that there is such a crime in some states. (It is not rape by forcible compulsion, second degree rape, because forcible compulsion is defined as "physical force which overcomes resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of death or physical injury to herself or himself or another person, or in fear that she or he or another person will be kidnapped": that is, there has to be actual or threatened physical force)	One option would be for an attorney to spend one of their peremptory challenges, which they could do as long as the juror is not a member of a racial minority (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79). Even then you can, you just have to give a valid reason other than race. Otherwise, the side wishing to strike for cause has to show that there is reasonable doubt that the prospective juror can be impartial (basing their decision just on the evidence presented and the law as explained by the court). Turning the accused / juror relation around, one might be able to strike for cause if the stripper was accused of some form of grave immorality and if the spinster was a leader of a radically puritanical religious sect that held that strippers must fry for said grave immorality crimes. The underlying assumption is that any prospective juror will be impartial, unless they say (or said, or have done) something that shows otherwise.	Maybe, maybe not. The answer is implicit in the restraining order, which I assume you have a copy of. If the wording is unclear, you can ask your attorney. The order will state the consequences for violating the order, so you have some idea what the risk factor is. A person may also petition for a new restraining order to include bill-paying, which may or may not be granted.
Calling for the suspension of due process by a president Would calling for the seizure of guns from unnamed citizens and the suspension of due process in doing so constitute treason?	Treason is basically the only crime explicitly defined by the Constitution. According to Article III, Section 3: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. So, no. What this hypothetical president is calling for is unconstitutional, is almost certainly grounds for impeachment, and may even be criminal, but treason it ain't. And that's assuming he actually does it. Simply calling for it, without acting (or directing others to act) to bring it about, may well be protected by the First Amendment.	Not for that reason This would not make the Act invalid. The interaction between the two laws would simply mean that criminal prosecution would only succeed for acts on or after the Act came into effect. So, even though the law purports to invoke criminal sanction for acts before it came into effect, the Constitution says it can’t so it doesn’t. That doesn’t render the law invalid, just unenforceable for that period.	Generally, no. The party to the action will be the State (commonwealth). The prosecutor acts as the agent of the state. The sheriff is not a party and cannot appeal.	Defendant's girlfriend should produce the copies of the recording to police, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney. Possession of the recording should induce the police and prosecution to at least re-evaluate the charges against Defendant, as Defendant would be able to subpoena the gun's owner to testify about the purchase and then use the recording to impeach him if he then denies owning the gun. It is unclear, though, whether the audio actually has any value because we don't know what charges Defendant is facing. If he's charged with unlawfully owning a gun, the recording would likely be quite helpful; if he's charged with unlawfully transporting a weapon, the recording's value would probably depend on whether the law in question outlaws "knowingly" transporting a weapon or "negligently" transporting a weapon, or transporting a weapon regardless of whether he knew about it.	@Dale M is basically correct, but fudges a bit on the process. The court issuing the order would issue an order to show cause to a government official who is alleged by the person who sought the order to have violated the order after having received legal notice (i.e. service) of the order. If that individual fails to appear at the appointed time and place in the order to show cause, a warrant issues for that individual's arrest. If that individual does appear, the allegedly contemptuous individual is read their rights and a hearing date is set. At the hearing, if the person appears, the person seeking the contempt finding (or some other attorney appointed by the court) prosecutes the case and if the person is found in contempt, then contempt sanctions issue. If they do not appear, a warrant issues for their arrest and a hearing is held on the merits promptly following that arrest. An individual can also be ordered to show cause in an official capacity in which case the contempt sanctions would be imposed against the organization rather than the individual. Usually, in federal court, the U.S. Marshal's office has primary responsibility for arresting people on contempt warrants. The U.S. Marshal's office primarily reports to the judicial branch, although strictly speaking, it is part of the Justice Department, and ultimately reports to the Attorney-General. There are actually two kinds of contempt - remedial and punitive. Remedial contempt sanction can include indefinite incarceration or a fine (often a per day fine) until the violation of the order of the court ceases and is allowed only when it is possible to comply with the order going forward. Punitive contempt has a sanction comparable to a misdemeanor conviction and applies in cases where the goal is to punish someone for a past violation of a court order whether or not it is possible to comply going forward. (Both of these are examples of "indirect contempt", i.e. violations of court orders that take place outside the courtroom. A different summary process called "direct contempt" applies when someone misbehaves in the presence of the court - this is summary incarceration or fine without a trial on the spot for disrespecting the dignity of the court in the courtroom.) Established practice is to direct a contempt order at the lowest level official necessary to remedy the violation of the order. There are a few examples in living memory of cabinet members being held in contempt, however (e.g. the Secretary of Interior, with regard to Indian Trust fund litigation), and keep in mind that in the case of remedial contempt an official can purge the contempt and be released from any sanction by resigning from office, after which the official no longer has the ability to comply. I am not aware of any instance in which the President of the United States has personally been held in contempt of court, but I am also not aware of any authority that specifically prohibits a court from holding the President in contempt of court. While contempt is the only "hard" remedy for a violation of a court order, the bureaucratic structure of the federal government is also set up in a manner that once a court order definitively resolves a legal issue, the higher ups in a federal agency are supposed to take all reasonable actions to insure that their subordinates follow that order (and they are themselves subject to contempt sanctions if they fail to do so). And, keep in mind that most of the people in the chain of command are civil servants with legal protections from unlawful employment actions hired on a merit basis, not political appointees, and that lots of the people in the chain of command are also members of unions that provide individual employees with the ability to fight wrongful employment action from a superior for violating a court order. In particular, the top lawyers in the executive branch would in ordinary times direct government employees to follow a clear court order and to cease and desist from explicitly disobeying one. Among other things, the courts could probably deny lawyers who refused to do so the right to practice law in federal court. But, usually things never reach this point. Then again, we are living in interesting times. There are about 670 political appointee positions in the executive branch, many of which are currently vacant and less than a dozen of which would be relevant to any given dispute in any case. There are about a million, civilian, non-defense department, non-postal service employees in the United States government, of which perhaps 100,000 or so are in the Department of Homeland Security and fewer are in the CBP. As far as I know, the CBP political appointees from the Obama administration have resigned and a replacement has not been confirmed by the U.S. Senate yet (there has been a Department of Homeland Security appointee confirmed if I recall correctly), and there are only a few people in the agency that political appointees can hire without either receiving Senate confirmation or using the merit based hiring process for civil servants (which takes a while, especially given an executive order imposing a hiring freeze). So, realistically, we have a case where the acting head of the CBP is probably a GS-15 or Senior Executive Service grade civil servant, rather than a political appointee, at the moment, who was hired as a civil servant many years ago, who is doing his (or her) best to follow the less than clear guidance he is receiving from his superiors and government lawyers (perhaps errantly). There could also be remedies in the form of declaratory judgment. The Court could declare as a matter of law on a case by case basis that, for example, Fatima Jones is not deportable and is lawfully within the United States and is entitled to be released from custody. This specific finding as to an individual would be very hard for the administration to escape sanction for. And, the Court could also declare that the entire executive order, at least as applied, is invalid (e.g. for failure to comply with the administrative procedures act, or for failing to include an exception for contrary court orders) or is unconstitutional.	Note the following argument: the landmark 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which ruled that state officials cannot obstruct “the measures of a government [the federal government] created by others as well as themselves.” “In other words,” Kalt and Amar summarize, “a single state cannot use its power to derail the functioning of the United States.” (Amar is a Yale constitutional law professor, Kalt, his student) On the other hand, you have the argument by a Hofstra constitutional law professor that the 25th amendment can be applied when the President is occupied with a criminal case, ergo, the functioning of the United States can be carried on unimpared. At the end-of-the-day there is no absolute answer as it is still being argued academically and has never been specifically settled by the courts.	The situation is that Executive Order 2020-33 is no more, and a new order, 2020-68 exists. The old orders to stay home are now copied under this order, but it may be necessary for her to re-issue (a subset of) the orders so that they are pursuant to #68 and not #33 (live by the technicality, die by the technicality). If she does not do that quickly, I expect there to be legal challenges. The law (30-403) doesn't say that orders issued pursuant to a declaration of a state of disaster expire when the authorizing declaration expires, but one can reasonably infer that that is what the legislature had in mind when this law was passed. But that is a matter for the courts to decide. Deference to the executive, which is the usual way that courts operate, would favor an interpretation where saying "All previous orders that rested on Executive Order 2020-33 now rest on this order" counts as re-issuing the same orders with a new number in the text. The law does not say that the circumstances authorizing an emergency order have to be completely different. Perhaps the legislature will revise the law in the future, but it is what it is right now.	Some of the documents are here. As document 61 of the trial, the government motion for bench trial, argues, There is no constitutional right to a jury trial for criminal contempt charges resulting in a sentence of imprisonment of six months or less. Arpaio responds in document 62 that Defendant Arpaio acknowledges that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for defendants charged with “petty” offenses where the maximum sentence does not exceed six months imprisonment, but continues the argument (the point being that there is no question that there is no absolute right to a jury trial, esp. in the instant case). He argues Many of the actions of the referring judge will become an issue in the case, calling into question the objectives and motives of Judge Snow. A public official’s actions and motives should and must be decided by an impartial jury of the elected official’s peers. The court order is document 83. There, The Court finds that this case is appropriate for a bench trial. This case focuses on the application of facts to the law to determine if Defendant intentionally violated a court order. Essentially, since there is no right to a jury trial and no compelling reason to grant a jury trial (e.g. the court found no merit to his argument that there would be the appearance of impropriety), the motion for a bench trial was granted. The order cites case law regarding the "not longer that 6 months" rule from Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454; United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488; United States v. Aldridge, 995 F.2d 233; United States v. Berry, 232 F.3d 897.
What kinds of crimes do not affect persons or property? A crime is a public offense, so I would think that anything that constitutes a crime has some kind of influence on one or more persons or property, i.e. it changes the public universe in some negative way. According to a recent CA Criminal Justice exam of mine, "A person may be guilty of a crime even where his or her act has no immediate effect upon the person or property of another." "Immediate" is not further defined. If this is true, what are some examples?	Yes, and sometimes it even makes perfect sense that such an activity would be a crime. For many crimes, attempting the crime is a crime. The attempt may have no actual effect on any person or property, but is still illegal. According to 16 U.S. Code § 1538(a)(1)(C) it is illegal to kill an endangered species on the high seas. A whale in international waters cannot really be considered anyone's "property" (and since it's in international waters there can't even be some weird theory of it being the government's property) but it is still illegal. 18 U.S. Code § 700 purports to prohibit the desecration of a flag, although this was found unconstitutional. 18 U.S. Code § 708 makes it a crime to commercially use the coat of arms of the Swiss Confederation, for some reason. And 18 U.S. Code § 711a makes it a crime to use the slogan "Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute" for profit, except as authorized. (But maybe that sort of thing counts as intellectual property.) 18 U.S. Code § 342 makes it a crime to operate a passenger train under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This really only affects people and property if the train is driven improperly as a result; if you make it safely, you'd probably never even know. But the driver would still be facing up to 15 years in prison if he was caught doing that. And finally, according to A Crime a Day on Twitter: 33 USC §1232(b), 33 CFR §401.101 & §401.94(a) make it a federal crime to violate the St. Lawrence Seaway regulations by not having a copy of the St. Lawrence Seaway regulations while you pass through the St. Lawrence Seaway.	We are talking about larceny and larceny & destruction of property in the two cases. So at the minimum, there are more laws that apply. But what are the laws? Florida names its Larceny statute... Theft: 812.014 Theft.— (1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently: (a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property. Destroying someone's else property in Florida is in the statute on Criminal Mischief: 806.13 Criminal mischief; penalties; penalty for minor.— (1)(a) A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he or she willfully and maliciously injures or damages by any means any real or personal property belonging to another, including, but not limited to, the placement of graffiti thereon or other acts of vandalism thereto. So, yes, you would additionally get the criminal mischief charge, but... that only grants monetary damages of 250 USD plus the damages done to the items for first timers, but it can become upgraded to a felony in the third degree - which has a maximum limit of 5 years. Note that damaging items in the course of theft is specifically an aggravating factor for the theft charge, if grand theft is combined with property damage of 1000 USD and more. A bicycle costing between 750 and 5000 USD is grand theft, felony in the third degree according to 812.014.(2)(c)1. This is also the 5 years limit. One could get both sentences... but still only sit 5 years, because often sentences are served concurrently, only rarely consecutively. So, no, you do not necessarily commit a higher offense just for breaking the lock - you'd need to have a 1000 USD damage for that - but you most certainly commit additional offenses that can result in a higher verdict in the end.	Civil law instead of criminal law Not all things that we commonly refer to as "illegal" are actually crimes - many of them refer to violations of contracts or other obligations where the harmed party may (or may not) use the civil system to obtain some satisfaction, but the government and prosecutors will not do it for them. In general (with some exceptions, depends on jurisdiction and circumstances), most low scale copyright violations are treated as a civil matter - it allows the harmed party (i.e. the copyright owner) to sue you for damages in a civil court, if they wish and are able to do so. However, it generally is not a crime (again, with some exceptions - e.g. large scale distribution often is) so the government and police on their own cannot, should not and does not investigate and prosecute violations of software licence terms.	This is called solicitation. A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime. Model Penal Code § 5.02.	The most apparent potential offences would be under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, but these require the mens rea of "knowingly" or "intentionally" doing things without authorization, or doing so "with intent to defraud", etc. See also the Department of Justice's manual entry on this family of offences. Particularly relevant is this quote: As part of proving that the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally, the attorney for the government must be prepared to prove that the defendant was aware of the facts that made the defendant’s access unauthorized at the time of the defendant’s conduct. Given your stipulation that the person has unintentionally viewed or downloaded the material without authorization, this would not be a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030.	There is a legal concept of de minimis: the idea that some offenses, civil or criminal, are too small to be worth prosecuting. For example, a photograph of a city scene that incidentally captured part of a copyrighted billboard in one corner of the image infringes the copyright on that billboard. But if the copyright holder were to sue, it's virtually certain the suit would be thrown out due to the minimal nature of the infringement. Technically speaking, yes, what you describe is a crime. But any prosecutor who tried to bring charges to that effect is likely to be chewed out by the judge for wasting everyone's time. (Incidentally, assuming the reporter and property owner are US citizens, the crime is failure to cross at a designated crossing point (19 USC 1459, a customs offense) rather than improper entry (8 USC 1325, an immigration offense).)	Is there something in the language of the act that makes sexual harassment a civil rather than a criminal offence? Yes. Laws that create criminal offenses have to have language to the effect of "violation of this law is punishable by up to X years of imprisonment or a fine of up to $Y", or "violation of this law is a Class Z felony." Sometimes it is not entirely clear if violation of a law can form a basis of a private civil lawsuit, or if it can only be enforced by government officials, from the language of the statute alone. When it is unclear the courts have to resolve that ambiguity. In rare instances, it may be clear that some parts of a statute have criminal penalties, but due to unclear wording and punctuation in the statute, it is hard to tell precisely which parts of the statute these criminal penalties apply to, and in those cases, courts also have to resolve that ambiguity. There is also some conduct that it is constitutional to punish with a civil penalty, but not as a crime that can result in incarceration. For example, it is unconstitutional in most states to incarcerate someone for failing to pay a debt, but there can be a civil penalty for failing to pay a debt. Courts decide if these constitutional limitations are violated. Similarly, while Congress can enact both crimes and civil penalties, there are some governmental bodies, like school districts or water boards, that have the power to enact certain civil penalties, but do not have the authority to create new crimes. Was that up to the lawmakers to decide, or is that just something that evolved out of the ways the courts and prosecutors responded to sexual harassment claims? And who decides such things in general? Generally, this is decided by lawmakers. Obviously, however, anyone can lobby legislators to take one position or another. Also, the fact that something has a civil penalty does not necessarily mean that prosecutors aren't the people who enforce the law. Sometimes violations of the law prosecuted by prosecutors have civil rather than criminal penalties. For example, many tax law violations are prosecuted by government lawyers with civil penalties, but only a small minority of tax law violations are prosecuted criminally. Further, it isn't uncommon for a type of offense, like securities fraud, to have both civil penalties and criminal charges available as remedies that can be enforced by prosecutors. And, when that happens, prosecutors get to decide which tool to use. For example, even if exactly the same conduct could be prosecuted with either a civil penalty or a criminal charge, prosecutors might prefer a civil penalty because the burden of proof is much lower, the 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination does not apply (you can refuse to testify but that fact can be used against you in a civil penalty case), and a defendant in a civil penalty case doesn't have a right to a lawyer at government expense. Also, enforcing a civil penalty generates net revenue for the government most of the time, while criminal punishments normally cost the government more money to carry out than any revenue the government may receive from the person found guilty for fines and court costs. On the other hand, trying to enforce a significant enough civil penalty to discourage misconduct against someone who has no money or property may be a futile effort, while criminal sanctions could discourage misconduct from other similarly situated people in the future.	Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant).
Drinking (alcohol) in the passenger seat/backseat of a car/taxi in the States My question is a fairly simple one, but consists of multiple clauses: Is it legal for you to drink in a car if you are not the person driving it? Is there (and if there is, what is it) a difference if the vehicle is a taxi or limousine, meaning the driver is paid for service? Is there a difference among different States in the US regarding this? On a personal note, I don't see the problem with drinking if you are not the one who's driving. I guess the laws regarding this (if exists) were written because they are worried that drivers will be more likely to drink themselves if they see people drinking right next to them.	Wikipedia says: Open containers in vehicles Prohibition of Open Containers of Alcohol in Motor Vehicles as of 2009 To comply with the TEA-21 rules of the federal Department of Transportation, a state's motor vehicle open container laws must: Prohibit both possession of any open alcoholic beverage container and consumption of any alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle; Cover the passenger area of any motor vehicle, including unlocked glove compartments and any other areas of the vehicle that are readily accessible to the driver or passengers while in their seats; Apply to all open alcoholic beverage containers and all alcoholic beverages, including beer, wine, and spirits that contain one-half of one percent or more of alcohol by volume; Apply to all vehicle occupants except for passengers of vehicles designed, maintained or used primarily for the transportation of people for compensation (such as buses, taxi cabs, and limousines) or the living quarters of motor homes; Apply to all vehicles on a public highway or the right-of-way (i.e. on the shoulder) of a public highway; Require primary enforcement of the law, rather than requiring probable cause that another violation had been committed before allowing enforcement of the open container law. Currently, 39 states and the District of Columbia are in compliance. Alaska, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Wyoming have similar limits on the possession of open containers in vehicles, but not to the level of TEA-21 compliance. TL;DR: Open container not allowed in vehicle, even if it's a passenger using it. Exception for buses, taxis, limos. There may be differences in some states.	This is likely to be a matter of policy rather than law That is, it’s not likely there is a law prohibiting it but it is highly likely that the person’s training and their employer’s policy on the matter is that they must complete a ticket once they start it. It’s a pretty universal anti-corruption measure - it prevents the situation where they are writing the ticket, the owner appears and offers them half the value of the fine in cash to stop: well, they can’t stop so they can’t be tempted by the bribe. Of course, the bribe can be offered before they start but, when fighting corruption, you minimise the opportunities rather than eliminate them. I know that police and rangers (private people can’t issue tickets) in new-south-wales are so restricted.	Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.	I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.	As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury.	It might be illegal, depending on where you are. If it is known to the person who owns the vehicle occupying your space prior to doing so that wheelclamping may be the result, then the common law doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to a willing party, harm is not done") would lead to a conclusion that one who knowingly places themselves in a situation where harm may befall them is not entitled to bring a claim of tort against the other party (in the United States assumption of risk is a similar doctrine, but doesn't apply here because wheelclamping is an intentional act). In your situation, this means that the owner occupying your space cannot bring a case in tort against you. While it is generally applied to harm to people, there is precedent (albeit in British case law) for the doctrine to be applied to vehicles, and specifically, to the situation you describe - see Arthur v Anker and Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest. While cases from other jurisdictions are not binding, I have not been able to find any similar cases in the United States, and so it is possible that such cases will be persuasive. Note that this is highly jurisdiction-specific, and there may be laws in your state that make it unlawful - at least one high-profile case involving a McDonalds and its parking lot operator cites California law authorising only law enforcement to impound vehicles, and considering wheelclamping such an act. However, I have not been able to find the record of a judgement on this matter. It is also likely that if the payment you request is excessive, the owner would be able to seek relief, in the form of reducing the payment owed to a reasonable amount. However, if the parking space was not marked in some way to signal that it was reserved for use, then the owner of the vehicle may be entitled to seek injunctive relief and damages from a court. This would be on the basis of, if you only wheelclamped the car and declined to remove the wheelclamp upon the owner's request, the tort of detinue. But, if you attempted to request payment from them, then as Dale mentioned in his answer, you have committed extortion (wheelclamping is actually listed as a crime of extortion).	UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence.	The hitting by itself would not be too bad (though the police would likely take a close look because of the two scratched cars – was the driver drunk or something?), but the subsequent running constitutes a crime under § 142 StGB (official but non-authoritative translation). The maximum sentence for this is imprisonment for three years, but a first-time offender would most likely be sentenced to a fine corresponding to a few months’ income, if there are no aggravating circumstances.
how to prove perjury? How is perjury proved in a rental arbitration hearing? The testimony is sworn. Of course, people make mistakes, mis-speak etc. But if verbal sworn evidence is self-contradicting does rise to the level of proof to show that not only does the narrative not fit but that the story was fabricated? This is strictly a "he-said, she-said" type scenario. Arguably, one story makes sense, the other does not. How can that be taken to the point of showing fraud through perjury? Without a recording or transcript, of course. Just to make it that much harder. This is related: perjury is "the offence of willfully telling an untruth or making a misrepresentation under oath".	Laws criminalizing perjury are not about being mistaken or less believable in your testimony. The crime is, very narrowly, stating something which you do not believe to be true, while under oath. If you make a statement that happens to be untrue but you believe it is true (you are mistaken), that is not perjury. In the US, moreover, you have to assert something literally untrue, not simply say something that could be interpreted as being untrue. Rental arbitration hearings are nothing special, except that witnesses may or may not be sworn under the particular state's laws. If a witness is sworn and unambiguously asserts "Jones gave Smith $1,000 at that time", and another sworn witness asserts "Jones did not give Smith any money at that time", that might suggest that one witness testified as to something that they did not believe to be true. It might also show that they were standing in different places. Even if the circumstances show that the two witnesses observed the same facts, you would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one party knew at the time that their statement was false. It is also possible that one witness made mis-remembered or misinterpreted what they saw. They might say or write something else (under oath, or elsewhere) that establishes that they knew better. An example is US v. DeZarn, which clearly established that the defendant could not have believed the statement that he testified to. With no official record of what a party testified to, it may not possible to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a party committed perjury, since it can be reasonable to doubt claims of what he actually testified to. The defendant's attorney may, however, have to create such a doubt. Some answers could be perjurous if the question and answer are short enough, for example "Did you cash the check?" "No", if witnesses to the hearing testify convincingly that this exchange took place.	The burden of proof is always on the plaintiff (except for counterclaims brought by the defendant against the plaintiff). In your example, the businessman has to prove that he did not rape her.	In closing arguments, an attorney should only refer to evidence that was admitted at trial. In opening arguments, an attorney may refer to evidence that the attorney reasonably believes will be admitted at trial, and if the attorney has grounds to admit the transcript as an exhibit, could do so. If not, the attorney could still reasonable state: the evidence will show that an arresting officer described Mr. Jones as "crazy" without showing a transcript or explaining where it comes from (on the theory that the officer will either testify to that effect at trial or will be impeached at trial with the transcript for testifying in a contrary manner). Usually the transcript can usually be admitted only for impeachment, so usually it wouldn't be admissible absent contrary testimony at trial. But there are exceptions that apply to that rule which could make it admissible and hence proper to reference or show in opening arguments.	In general, signing means you cannot deny the accuracy of the information in the future In general, there is no prohibition on knowingly stating falsehoods under the law. That is, it is not illegal to lie. Exceptions include when you are under penalty of perjury (e.g. on oath in court), when you are making certain declarations to government (e.g. your tax return), you are acting dishonestly to cause gain or harm others (e.g. fraud), etc. However, by signing the document, you may create a legal fact that is independent of the real-world facts. For example, if you sign a receipt for $1,000 then you create a legal presumption that you received $1,000 even if there was actually only $500 in the envelope. You would need some pretty spectacular evidence to overcome that presumption. Now, I don’t know what you are signing that has factual errors in it but, if they are material errors, don’t. Just don’t.	When it comes to the obligation to tell the truth, there isn't all that much difference between a lawyer's obligations and those of a pro se litigant -- at least as far objective truth. But not every question has a single truthful answer. Professionalism rules impose some higher standards on lawyers in cases that are a bit murkier than just asking, "Were you at the Capitol on January 6?" In the United States, the analogous rule lays out some bright-line rules. Rule 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. (b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. (c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. (d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse. Subsection (a)(1) gives a good example of where the duties of honesty diverge for lawyers and pro se parties. If a plaintiff tells the court honestly -- but mistakenly -- that he lost $1 million in profits, but later discovers that he only lost $100,000, his lawyer has a clear obligation to correct that statement for the court; the pro se plaintiff's obligation is not clear. Similarly, if a plaintiff tells the court that he is entitled to those lost profits if he can prove elements A, B, C, and D, but later learns that the Supreme Court has also imposed a requirement that he prove E, the lawyer has an obligation to notify the court of this development; the pro se plaintiff does not. On the "overriding" language: I don't read it as generally having any effect on a lawyer's duty to be honest to his client. Instead, it means that the lawyer's duty to the court overrides the lawyer's duty to the client. In either of the above hypotheticals, for example, the lawyer acted honestly and ethically in presenting his evidence and argument, even though his statements turned out to be false. Correcting the record on either point would reduce or possibly eliminate his client's likely recovery and be against his client's best interests. Once the lawyer discovers the error, he is therefore faced with a conflict of interest: he has a duty to act in his client's best interest, but he also has a duty of honesty to the court. Chapter 13 says that his duty to the court overrides his duty to his client.	Unless you received an order from the court prohibiting contact, it might be legal; but it's probably not the best idea. Let the lawyers handle it Attorneys have far better, more effective means of dealing with this situation than the course of action you describe. Lawyers have productive tools to accomplish the job and they know how to use them. For example, assume the best-case-scenario results from your idea and you get the other side to admit their affidavit is fallacious in some way. "Aha!" you shout. "Success! Daylight!" But then what? It's not on record. You can't testify to the admission because that's hearsay. Now imagine they next share this information about your little conversation with the counterparty that had them sign the affidavit in the first place. After first being alerted of your concerns, they both now act in concert to shore up their stories and you never see that "daylight" again. Contrast that outcome with one where your guy or gal's attorney deposes the witness under oath, gets them to concede to your version of the facts then introduces the deposition as favorable evidence at trial. That's a much better outcome for "your side." Wouldn't you agree? Be wary of unintended consequences Generally speaking, such direct contact between the parties is often problematic and rarely helpful. (Except, in some cases, when direct contact between the parties leads to a negotiated settlement. Which happens far less often than the direct contact going sideways making the situation even more intractable.) Before you launch off on your own and do something that might be counterproductive. First, identify the areas of the affidavit that you think are inaccurate. Give that information to the party you support, then have them run it by their attorney to figure out the best way to handle the situation.	You don’t need to hire an attorney If you like, you can represent yourself. Just like you can build your own house, repair your own car or amputate your own limb. You only need to be a lawyer if you are representing someone else. However, there is a saying that goes: A person representing themselves has a fool for a client. Your lawyer is a professional, you aren’t. They know what to do when the other side says “Objection, facts not in evidence” or how to correctly fill out, file and serve a pleading; do you?	Based on the question, this was not perjury; if the officer did not review the footage, the fact that his testimony was in error indicates a mistake, nothing more. To even consider a perjury charge, the prosecuting authorities would need evidence that the officer knew the testimony was wrong when he gave it. You do not indicate the jurisdiction, so nobody can say whether an appeal would lie (since new evidence has come to light), whether the conviction could be quashed for procedural failure (if multiple requests for evidence were really not received) or whether a complaint could be made against the prosecutor, the defence lawyer, or even the judge. But no case has ever been strengthened by brandishing about words like 'perjury' without being able to substantiate them.
Is it legel to sell used bikes online as a business? I am thinking about buying used bikes from China, shipping them to the US and selling them online. I would like to sell branded used bikes. Is this legal? Are there particular copyright or customs issues around such a business?	There is nothing illegal about selling used bikes online. Importing goods is subject to legal regulation such as customs duties. These goods might even be subject to punitive steel and aluminum tariffs since bike metal could easily be converted to metal for other purposes. And, if the bikes have fake trademarks, they might be interdicted, although the "first sale rule" makes import of bikes with real trademarks legal. There is nothing remotely related to copyright at issue in your proposal.	They don't actually claim to have a patent. Lots of people license a patent, and then they are using "patented technology". The only effect of this statement is: If you want to copy their product, you better find out what patent they are licensing, otherwise you might be in legal trouble. And their statement means you should have known that your copy of their product is covered by some patent, so you lose some defenses if you are accused of using a patent without license. And of course many customers think if something is patented then it must be good. Which is not true obviously. But logically who owns the patent doesn't make a difference to that, so their statement isn't misleading IMHO.	That means that a person cannot put a new cover or binding on a book, and then resell it or lend it, unless permission is obtained from the publisher. This has the effect of prohibiting libraries, which need to rebind most books, from carrying the book without the publisher's permission. This condition did not apply in the US, because under the US Law's First Sale Doctrine, the seller cannot impose such conditions on the buyer. The very standardize wording was, I think, once part of the Net book Agreement (NBA) used by Penguin and other UK-based publishers on sales in the UK and the Commonwealth. You will find it on many used books from such publishers. I believe the main aim was to prohibit discount resellers of used books, and to prohibit sale of "stripped books" (reported to the publisher as "unsold and destroyed"). I believe that this is no longer in effect, but I am not sure. The NBA was dissolved in 1995.	It comes down to intent ... and possibly responses to illegal activity. Localbitcoins intention is to facilitate trade in bitcoins - in itself a legal undertaking. Cryptocurrancy transactions can be used for illegal purposes but it is not the sites intention to enable that. Amazon.com intention is to facilitate trade in books - in itself a legal undertaking. Some books contain material that is prohibited under some countries laws but it is not the sites intention to enable trade in illegal books. Ebay.com intention is to facilitate trade in "stuff" - some "stuff" is illegal but it is not the sites intention to enable trade in illegal stuff. Silk Road intention was to facilitate trade in illegal goods and services - therefore they are accessories to the crimes committed.	This doesn't sound like fraud (against you, at least), but it does sound like an unfair or deceptive trade practice, which is outlawed by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and perhaps the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, both of which prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices. I don't know about Pennsylvania, but the FTC has on many occasions taken action against companies for engaging in just this kind of behavior. To find out whether you would be able to take action against the other company, you'd want to find a good competition lawyer in Pennsylvania. For some more basic background on the FTC's rules, check out this primer.	Why do you think Oracle have not been protecting their trade mark? Using a trade mark to describe the product (“Written in JavaScript”, “Seeking JavaScript developer”) is not an infringement and the trade mark owner is under no obligation to, indeed, cannot stop this. Where they are required to defend their trade mark is when it is being used in such a way that there is the risk of confusion that the goods or services could be confused with the trade mark owner’s goods or services. Further, they are not required to defend all breaches, only enough to show that they are actively doing so. Also it is not important that the trade mark be associated with the trade mark’s owner. Do you know who owns the trade mark “Ben & Jerry’s”?	There are a number of existing legal sites that do this, for free or for pay. The main concern for a website operator pertains to the DMCA "safe harbor" provisions, which protect against vicarious liability for infringement. A "report piracy" option is not sufficient; see this answer to a related question.	You seem to have a solid understanding of the ePrivacy implications, but lack a fundamental insight: your organization does not have a right to achieve its mission or a right to disseminate unwanted marketing. But other people do have a right to not be subject to excessive marketing. Of course, reality is more complex, so it's probably not entirely impossible to do marketing. In your point 1, you note that some EU/EEA/UK countries distinguish ePrivacy protections between consumer and business subscribers. You can research the exact rules in the potential customer's country. This may allow you to email corporate/business accounts. I would strongly advise against messaging via Linkedin if there is a chance that the person is using that account for personal purposes like networking or hunting jobs, not just for conducting official company business. ePrivacy has markedly different rules for email marketing vs phone marketing. Whereas there are pretty strict rules for electronic messages and robocalls, manual cold calling can be OK from an ePrivacy perspective. However, many EU/EEA/UK countries have rules that go beyond ePrivacy, and may have a kind of do-not-call registry that you must respect. Of course manual calls take more effort than spamming emails, but recall the above point that you don't have a right to spam other people. Phone calls are probably the most appropriate approach when the company lists individuals' phone numbers on its website. This will at least give you a few seconds of attention with a real human, more than you can expect from an email that is likely to be caught by spam filters. Marketing via physical mail tends to have very lax rules. Note that every company/business that has a website will have to disclose its contact details including an address there, so this information is easy to acquire. However, chances are low that anyone would seriously engage with that marketing. You can consider alternatives to direct marketing, so that interested companies eventually come to you. Things like press releases, writing guest articles in industry publications, speaking at relevant conferences, working on search engine optimization, buying ads. On the GPDR aspects: GDPR and ePrivacy overlap, and it is necessary to comply with both sets of rules (GDPR likely applies here via Art 3(2)(a)). But where they potentially contradict each other, ePrivacy as the more specific law has precedence. For example, ePrivacy overrides the default GDPR legal basis rules when it comes to email marketing to existing customers (opt-out basis, no consent needed) or to using cookies (needs consent unless strictly necessary). Information that relates to corporations is not personal data, but information that relates to individual employees or to sole proprietors would typically be personal data. Since you are unlikely to obtain consent for using this data, you would need an alternative GDPR legal basis such as a "legitimate interest". Relying on a legitimate interest requires that you conduct a balancing test, weighing your interests like marketing against the recipient's interests, rights, and freedoms. Core question in this context is whether the data subject can reasonably expect their personal data to be used like this, taking into account the nature of their relationship with you. Since there is no pre-existing relationship, claims of a legitimate interest are weak to start with. However, it may be possible to argue that when a company makes employee contact details available via its website (not LinkedIn!) then relevant marketing can be reasonably expected. I would rather not rely on such arguments, though.
Use of copyrighted character in software, as a joke I sometimes insert copyrighted fictional character's images from a franchise on the rarest of error screens ("should never happen" type of thing). This time though, I work for a company, making their internal software, not as a hobby. While no-one will probably ever see the fictional copyrighted character in question, and even if so, it's there jokingly and is not in any way related to operation of the professional software I'm making, does it fit under fair use? Is legality of this something that I should worry about? Edit: What if the image in question is my own drawing of the character?	No, it does not fall under fair use: It is commercial use in nature It is a copyrighted work It is hard to say what portion of the copyrighted work you'd be using based on your description, so test three is inconclusive It could be argued in your favor that the infringement would not have an impact on their potential market, but it could potentially impact the value If discovered the owner of the copyright could pursue action against the company you work for.	Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board.	I agree that you have a very strong copyright fair use case. Although the logo is creative and you're using the entire thing, your use is for a nonprofit educational purpose and does not affect the value of the work. The logo is also probably trademarked. But you aren't using the mark in commerce, so I don't think that will be a problem for you.	No These are derivative works and making them is copyright breach. Doing this as a hobby or even for the entertainment of friends in private is likely fair use. Distribution or performance in public (monitored or not) is likely not fair use and you would need a licence. Here is a summary of the relevant law in australia.	To answer the question in your title: Yes, software licenses are copyrighted. They are written works that involve (significant, expert) creative effort to create. The best solution would be for Grammarly to hire a lawyer and say "we want a new EULA. We think this one covers a number of points our current one doesn't". Most legal documents will be copyright for the same reason (there may be a few that are so stereotypical that there is essentially no creative effort in putting them together).	This is not (necessarily) copyright violation It's possible that Quora's usage falls within Fair Use. At the very least, the argument could be made. If it does, then there is nothing that Stack Exchange or the OP can do. Stack Exchange can choose not to protect their copyright Unlike trademarks, which lapse if not protected, copyright endures. Therefore Stack Exchange can pick and choose the copyright fights they want to get involved in and those they don't. If you have brought it to the attention of the copyright owner (or, in this case, licensee) and the copyright owner chooses not to act then you have done all you can and significantly more than you have to do. The OP has copyright I note that one of the examples is your question. As the copyright holder, you are free to issue a DCMA takedown notice on Quora if you feel your copyright has been violated.	Can a system include such information? it is surely technically possible. Would it be a violation of copyright? That depends. First of all, any such information can be included if the copyright holder has granted permission, probably in the form of a license. But in that case this question would probably not have been asked. I therefore assume that no permission has been granted. (It doesn't matter if a request was made and the answer was "no", a request was made but ignored, or no request was ever made. No permission is still no permission.) The names of fictional locations are nor protected by copyright. Including, say, "Rivendell" or "Hobbiton" in the selection list for a timezone setting would not infringe the copyrights held by the Tolkien estate. But a map is a different thing. If the OS includes and can display a map of a fictional region, one that is copied from or based on a map published with the fiction, or by some third party, then that would almost surely be copyright infringement, and the copyright holder could choose to sue for infringement. S/he might choose not to sue, but that is a risky gamble to take. If this is in the US, statutory damages could be awarded, and could intheory go as high as $150,000, although they are not likely to be as high as that, that is just the maximum legal limit (per work infringed, not per copy). The standard is whatever amount the court thinks "just", up to the maximum. (If proof of willful infringement is not made, the upper limit is $30,000, still a sizable sum.) If the OS designer created the map independently, using names from the fiction, but not otherwise basing it on the fiction, and in particular not imitating any map created by anyone else, then it may well not be infringement, but it would still be wise to consult a copyright lawyer. The question would be more helpful if it made clear just what would be hypothetically included in the OS, and to what extent it would be based on someone else's work. There is also the question of why someone would want to include fictional places, but that really doesn't change the legal issue.	All your work is yours. They've made it very clear it wasn't a work for hire, so it's yours. They can't copyright any of their ideas. You can't copyright an idea. Only specific creative elements authored by them and present in your work could be covered by copyright. You didn't use their block diagrams. I don't see how references to other sites to look at would constitute a creative element they authored. That said, you probably want to talk to a lawyer and get a written legal opinion that you can rely on.
How are MMOs with real money economies allowed to operate? A lot of Massively Multiplayer Online games include a form of "premium" in-game economy that may be purchased with real money (cash) by the player, usually for the purposes of faster progression in the game or cosmetic upgrades. For example, there are Gems in Guild Wars 2 which are originally purchased with cash (but may then be traded in-game using the game's normal currency). Taking the example a step further, Hex: Shards of Fate (an online-only trading card game with similarities to Magic: The Gathering) has a "platinum" currency which may only be purchased using cash via the game's store, and is the only way of purchasing new booster packs of cards in the game. The developers have expressed that they want players to feel that their collection of digital cards has real value and the in-game auction house facilitates trades of cards, the rarest of which are trading for amounts in platinum valued up to about $100 each. The terms and conditions for the game state (as many other games do), and I'm paraphrasing here, that items within the game may not be traded for outside of the game for real currency. Not only does this make monetary sense for the developers, but I assume this is also to avoid a stack of legal troubles around money laundering and gambling/gaming laws in different territories. However, Entropia Universe (wikipedia link) has as its key feature an in-game economy which is tied directly to US dollars, and specifically allows players to "cash out" of the game and back into real money. They have even gone so far as to produce bank cards which withdraw from the game and have now formed an actual bank to regulate trades. My question is why are there not more games which take this approach of a game economy tied directly to real money? I understand that the economy needs to be carefully designed and balanced to avoid over-inflation (in-game) or other exploits leading to in-game currency being "created" from nothing, but the bigger concern seems to me to be the legal issues this would create. Given the amount of random chance involved in the game is this not effectively gambling? If so, how does Entropia Universe allow worldwide users without kicking up a storm of trouble from different regional authorities and governments? Surely this is exactly the kind of thing which is banned in certain US states (I am not a US citizen) or other countries. Is it because the game is based in Sweden and their more permissive laws allow for it? If so, do the laws of the country in which the player resides not take precedent?	I can see at least two defenses. Game of Skill Defense. Already mentioned in the comments. Entertainment Defense. One could claim the game itself is a form of entertainment and, therefore, all funds spent while playing the game are for entertainment purposes only vis-a-vis the game itself. And not any alleged gambling within the game. Consider the fact that the gambling rewards, after all, (i.e., mining stuff) are limited to being used inside the game and have zero utility outside the game. Ergo, all payments are strictly for entertainment purposes.	Those countries have more restrictive gambling laws than others. For discussion of some of those relevant laws, see here. For example, [In Hong Kong], "Under the Gambling Ordinance, a prize draw is considered to be a form of lottery. Lotteries include raffles & sweepstakes... In most cases, prior approval is needed for a prize draw in the form of a licence and for the majority of competitions, this will need to be in the form of a Trade Promotion Competition Licence. Selling, disposing, printing and publishing tickets without a licence are criminal offences ... punishable by fines or imprisonment. Because of Italy's strict restrictions, Unless a promotion falls under one of exceptions provided by the DPR, it is not possible to run multi-jurisdictional promotions, they need to be addressed only to people located in Italy and any activity, including the server, used for the promotion must be located in Italy.	Would a marketplace for trading receipts be legally allowed to operate? Yes, or at least I think so, since it is highly doubtful that any legislation outlaws receipts trading. Unlike other documents, there is no commonplace notion that receipts are secret, non-transferable, or even private. For it to be actionable, the marketplace would have to engage in, or openly promote, practices which are "more unequivocally" illicit. The possibility that some people might pursue receipts for tax fraud, enjoyment of unearned rights, or other illegitimate purposes does not imply that trading of receipts in and of itself is unlawful. For instance, a person might come up with a bizarre --but nonetheless plausible-- hobby of collecting receipts with certain sequences of figures.	Explanatory note #176 on the Gambling Act 2005 specifies: There are some exceptions to the general prohibition on gambling by children and young people. Children and young persons may participate in all forms of private or non-commercial gaming and betting. Young persons may participate in lotteries and pool betting on association football. Children and young persons may use the category of gaming machine with the lowest stakes and prizes (Category D). They may also take part in equal chance prize gaming at certain premises, as provided under Part 13 of the Act. Cribbage and Dominoes are both exempt forms of "Equal Chance Gambling" which can be played on alcohol licensed premises (e.g. pubs). As @richardb points out, while young people (i.e. your son) are normally allowed to take part in Equal Chance Gambling there are explicitly excluded from doing so on alcohol-licensed premises using the "Exempt gaming" provisions as outlined in Sec.280 Children and young people must be excluded from the gaming. So you can't play for money (assuming the absence of a suitable Family Entertainment Centre license or similar), however playing not-for-stakes doesn't fit the definition of "Gambling" in terms of the act. Gambling is defined as either "Gaming", "Betting" or a "Lottery" It's not "gaming" without a prize: In this Act “gaming” means playing a game of chance for a prize. It's not "betting" without a prize: For the purposes of section 9(1) a person makes a bet (despite the fact that he does not deposit a stake in the normal way of betting) if— (a)he participates in an arrangement in the course of which participants are required to guess any of the matters specified in section 9(1)(a) to (c), (b)he is required to pay to participate, and (c)if his guess is accurate, or more accurate than other guesses, he is to— (i)win a prize, or (ii)enter a class among whom one or more prizes are to be allocated (whether or not wholly by chance). And it's not a Lottery either (I won't quote the whole section here as it's a bit wordy but you can check for yourself here) So as long as there is literally no stakes or prize (whether money or otherwise) you can play with a young person in a pub.	It depends in part on what you mean by "money". US $100 bills are a prime example of "money". Art 1 §10 Cl. 1 of the US Constitution says No State shall ...coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts... Under the constitution, only the federal government can "print money" in the "universally usable" sense. Anyone can print or otherwise "emit" objects with economic value, and such objects can be voluntarily accepted in trade. State and local governments can incur debts and thus spend money now that they do not yet have, as long as there is no legal limit on a government's ability to go into debt. California could issue IOU-bucks with the intent that a holder could redeem them as real federal money or as gold or silver at some point. This limits the ability of a state treasury to print money, since in principle and practice it is redeemable in gold or silver. Each state has some set of laws and constitutional provisions that prevent writing rubber checks ad infinitum, for example only allowing debt for large capital projects (building) and requiring voter approval; requiring expenditures to not exceed projected revenues; granting emergency debt-mitigation powers (e.g. hiring freezes) to the governor when a state does go into unauthorized debt. In California, Art IV §12 of the state constitution requires a balanced budget, meaning that the state cannot create infinite obligations without infinite revenues. From the legal perspective, private banks do not create money, although non-legally, people may talk about what banks do as "creating money". At that point in the discussion, we will have left law and moved to the realm of economic theory.	Unless the game is out of copyright, e.g. chess, snakes and ladders, Go, or checkers, your software would probably be considered a derivative work of the copyrighted game and an actionable infringement. The fact that you do not monetize it is not a defense. You would need written permission in the form of a license agreement from the copyright owner to do this legally. The penalties for violating copyright laws in this way could be punishingly serious.	Yes. Being a sequel or using the other assets, in either case, you are making a derivative work. Without a license, you infringe on the right holder's exclusive right to make or license derivative works: A sequel is usually a classic case of "how the story unfolds further". See Anderson v. Stallone, where the author of an unlicensed sequel script was struck down. A modification of the original game - aka Mod - uses the assets or parts of them. Modding is often contentious, sometimes it is encouraged. Usually, when you install a game, you agree to a EULA that dictates what you can or can't do - so there is the real possibility you violate a contract if you step out of that contract. Some game smithies are modder-friendly and encourage it, as a mod community keeps a game relevant longer. Bethesda for example hands out a modification package for Skyrim and other titles, but it also provides a separate EULA what you can and can't do with these modification-tools. Many games however don't provide a modding pack and have a EULA that explicitly bans users from making modifications or derivative works. As a result, there have been cases against modders, and there are a lot of C&D letters sent out to modders that use assets of games. So there is a high chance that litigation for violation of the contract or copyright infringement can be started. A rather high-profile case that ended somewhat recently was the "Red Dead Redemption Visual Enhancement Mod". Take-Two sent a modder a C&D, filed suit, and then the parties had arbitration. The arbitration result contains a clause that forbids the author of the mod to ever create any derivative work (aka: mod) for a Take-Two or Rockstar game again. The C&D (as well as the case and leverage in arbitration) hinged on a violation of the Rockstar EULA License Condition i, which bans any modifications wholesale: You agree not to, and not to provide guidance or instruction to any other individual or entity on how to: i [...] display, perform, prepare derivative works based on, or otherwise modify the Software, in whole or in part;)	The developers of the site localbitcoins.com are providing a service that is not itself illegal. They explain their service and its limitations in their Terms of Service (my emphasis): All trades on this site are concluded solely between users of the service, and while LocalBitcoins.com may help in resolving disputes between the parties, it does not itself become a party to such transactions, contracts or relationships. LocalBitcoins.com is not a Bitcoin marketplace but a service enabling its users to set up markets for peer-to-peer exchange by way of creating advertisements for trades directed to other users. Until local or national jurisdictions decide that people advertising to conduct person to person crytpocurrency trades are illegal, the site is legal. Some users of the site may be evading taxes or laundering money, and those could be crimes in jurisdictions, but if so, those crimes are perpetrated by the individuals that have contacted each other through the site, and not the site developers or owners themselves.
Do the police need probable cause or a search warrant to search a rental car being driven by someone who didnt rent the vehicle? I'm not seeking legal advice, but rather I'm seeking others thoughts and reasoning on a case that has been disposed of already, which seems to be a violation of constitutional rights afforded to individuals against police performing illegal search and seizures, without probable cause, permission of the driver or "owner" of the vehicle or even a search warrant. A friend of a friend was recently pulled over while driving a rental car that was rented in my friend's name. The driver (aka - friend of a friend) was not listed on the rental car contract as a person allowed to drive the rental vehicle. He was stopped by police and the vehicle was searched inside and out, with the officers telling the driver he was not even allowed to legally drive the vehicle, and since he was in a car rented under someone else’s name, and without him listed as a driver on the contract, they didn't need his permission, didn't need probable cause and didn't even need a search warrant to tear the car apart under the suspicion he was transporting a controlled substance. It came out in the court case that followed, that the driver basically "appeared suspicious" to the officer, and this was the entire reason behind the search of the vehicle with no probable cause or search warrant and no permission to search the rental. Should the driver have the same rights in a rental car that he's not a listed driver on the rental contract, as he would if he was in his own vehicle; which should protect him against illegal search and seizures by police with no probable cause, as police stated in their own words at his trial? To be clear, this wasn't a stop and frisk, this was a complete search of the entire vehicle	In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split"	Apparently, people are citing these cases for the proposition that there is a right to drive a car without a license (several facebook accounts making this claim have been shut down and a document making this argument is signed with the Biblical name of God). This is frivolous poppycock reserved for conspiracy theory crackpots that also never works. A lawyer who tried to make an argument like this in court would probably be sanctioned by the trial court judge for making a frivolous argument, and might even risk suspension of his license to practice law, unless he made clear that he was arguing for a change in the law that is not supported by any current law. Like all rights, the right to travel, including the right to travel by motor vehicle, is subject to reasonable restrictions which include the requirement that one have a driver's license that is currently valid. No court has ever held that having a traffic code regulating the use of motor vehicles on public roads is unconstitutional, nor has any court every held that the government may not obstruct public roads in a reasonable manner for purposes such as maintenance, parades, and the like. The question in People v. Horton (the correct citation to which is 14 Cal.App.3d 930, 92 Cal.Rptr. 666 and not the one cited that conflates two separate citations in different reporters to the same case), entered by an intermediate appellate court in California on January 29, 1971, is whether a search of an occupant of a motor vehicle requires probable cause under the 4th Amendment as incorporated by the 14th Amendment to apply to the states, and under parallel California constitutional provisions, and it hold that even occupants of motor vehicles have a 4th Amendment expectation of privacy despite the exigent circumstances associated with a motor vehicle. A more complete quotation from the case states: Applying these principles to the instant case, we are impelled to conclude that Officer Winfrey did not have legal cause to stop appellant's automobile. Appellant was driving within the legal speed limits, not erratically, and there were no visible operational defects on the vehicle. Furthermore, although the officer observed two young passengers in the vehicle, he saw no furtive or suspicious movements and he had no information that the youths were being kidnaped, detained or molested in any manner. In fact, the only reason given by Winfrey for stopping appellant was that appellant was driving a vehicle along the streets of Modesto at 1:15 in the morning with two young passengers and that he did not look old enough to be their parent or guardian. Clearly, even if we should assume that what the officer observed constituted unusual activity, and it is difficult to make such an assumption in this modern age, the activity alone did not suggest that it was related to criminality. The Attorney General argues that Officer Winfrey had reasonable cause to stop appellant's vehicle on suspicion that appellant was aiding and abetting his two young passengers to loiter in violation of the municipal ordinance of the City of Modesto. However, driving along city streets, even at 1:15 in the morning, is not “loitering.” (In re Cregler, 56 Cal.2d 308, 312 [14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305]; In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d 845, 853 [64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353].) For all that Officer Winfrey knew, appellant could have been driving his two young passengers home from a theater or other authorized place of amusement. We are not insensitive to the numerous problems which face police officers on patrol in a mechanized nation. As we stated in Bramlette v. Superior Court, 273 Cal.App.2d 799, 804 [78 Cal.Rptr. 532], “[t]he use 934 of the automobile in criminal activity has vastly increased the possibility of unlawful conduct, and the likelihood of escape by criminals from the scene of their crimes.” Moreover, we are cognizant of the fact that the great majority of police officers assume the grave responsibility which our society has foisted upon them in a courageous and conscientious manner. Nonetheless, the right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right which must be protected by the courts. Consequently, while we do not censure Officer Winfrey or question his motives, the fact remains that he stopped appellant's vehicle solely because it was occupied by young people. Were we to condone the stopping of vehicles for this reason alone, no matter how altruistic the officer's motive might be, we would lend our approval to the creation of a second class citizenry; we would also contribute to an already deteriorating relationship between the youth of America and law enforcement officials; in a free nation this relationship must be based on mutual confidence and respect. Having decided that Officer Winfrey did not have probable cause to stop appellant's vehicle in the first instance, it follows that the subsequent search was unlawful, even though consented to by appellant, and that all evidence adduced therefrom was the product of an unlawful search. As our Supreme Court said in People v. Haven, 59 Cal.2d 713, 718, 719 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381, P.2d 927]: “A search or seizure made pursuant to a valid consent before any illegal police conduct occurs is obviously not a product of illegal conduct. A search and seizure made pursuant to consent secured immediately following an illegal entry or arrest, however, is inextricably bound up with the illegal conduct and cannot be segregated therefrom.” The case of People v. Franklin, 261 Cal.App.2d 703 [68 Cal.Rptr. 231], is squarely in point. There, as here, the officer stopped the defendant's vehicle without probable cause, and afterward defendant consented to the search which ultimately uncovered marijuana. The court in reversing the conviction, at page 707 of the opinion, had this to say: “The stop having been illegal, the search, though by consent of the vehicle owner, does not breathe legality into the resultant find by the officers.” A later California case before the same intermediate appellate court a few years later, also distinguished People v. Horton, holding that while driving in a car as a juvenile as 1:15 a.m. was not "loitering" that similar conduct did violate a municipal curfew ordinance for minors which was validly enacted and not unconstitutional. In re Francis W., 117 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1974). The claim that People v. Horton recognizes a constitutional right to drive without a license was analyzed and rejected in the case of Newman v. Garcia, 2016 WL 8939133, Case No. 3:16-cv-137-J-PDB (M.D. Fl. September 26, 2016) in which a federal trial court ruled on a motion to dismiss a civil rights claim brought by a man alleging that his constitutional rights were violated because he was arrested for driving with a suspended driver's license in which he sought $28 million of damages. The judge in that case held in pages 3-5 of the Slip Opinion that dismissed this claim that: Right to Travel Newman primarily argues Officer Garcia violated his constitutional right to travel by issuing him a citation for driving with a suspended license and stopping him from driving his car. See generally Doc. 2, Doc. 12. He contends he has a protected liberty interest in driving on public highways, he does not need a license to drive, and a driver's license is a contract between the state and a person that is cancelled when the state suspends a license. Doc. 12 at 3–4, 7. In Kent v. Dulles, the United States Supreme Court explained the right to travel—the freedom to move “across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well”—is “part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law.” Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958). It has long been recognized as a basic constitutional right. Att'y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 901 (1986). “A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.” Id. at 903 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A restriction on one method of travel does not violate a person's constitutional rights. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999). There is no constitutional right to the “most convenient form of travel.” City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982). 4 The constitutional right to travel does not include a fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle. Duncan v. Cone, 2000 WL 1828089, at 2 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished); Miller, 176 F.3d at 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has recognized a state's power to “prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles.” Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915). That includes passing legislation requiring drivers to have licenses. Id. Such a regulation is “but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens.” Id. Newman cites many state-court cases he contends support his argument he has a right to drive without a license. See Doc. 12 at 3–4. They do not. See People v. Horton, 92 Cal. Rptr. 666, 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (addressing legality of traffic stop and search; observing, “The right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right which must be protected by the courts” (emphasis added)); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 137–38 (Ariz. 1963) (addressing state law suspending license of uninsured motorist involved in an accident who does not post sufficient security); Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869, 871, 872 (R.I. 1958) (addressing state law suspending license for failure to deposit security with the registrar; observing, “[T]he right to use the public highways for travel by motor vehicles is one which properly can be regulated by the legislature in the valid exercise of the police power of the state”); Payne v. Massey, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495–96 (Tex. 1946) (addressing ordinance regulating operation of taxicabs); Teche Lines, Inc., v. Danforth, 12 So. 2d 784, 785, 787 (Miss. 1943) (addressing state law regulating stopping on certain portion of highway; observing right to travel “may be reasonably regulated by legislative act in pursuance of the police power of the State”); Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583 (Va. 1930) (addressing contention city could not change ordinance to permit revocation of license; observing, “regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part ... by granting, refusing, and revoking ... permits to drive an automobile on its streets”); Swift v. City of Topeka, 23 P. 1075 (Kan. 1890) (addressing ordinance restricting use of bicycles on sidewalks and a bridge).4 Newman does not cite authority to support his contention a driver's license is a contract with the state that is cancelled when the license is suspended, and he does not explain how the existence of a cancelled contract would support his argument that Officer Garcia violated his constitutional rights. See generally Doc. 12. Other courts have rejected similar arguments as meritless or frivolous. See Oliver v. Long, No. CV-06-2429-PCT-LOA, 2007 WL 1098527, at 5 (D. Ariz. Apr. 12, 2007) (unpublished) (argument that by cancelling all contracts with California Department of Motor Vehicles plaintiff could violate traffic laws with impunity “frivolous,” “specious,” and “nonsensical”); North Carolina v. Ellison, 471 S.E. 2d 130, 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (argument that by cutting up license and returning it to Division of Motor Vehicles plaintiff had rescinded contract with state and could drive without complying with statutory requirements “without merit”). Absent authority to support the argument that a suspended driver's license is a cancelled contract with the state, and in light of states' authority to regulate the operation of motor vehicles on their roads, the argument is meritless. *5 Though Newman enjoys a constitutional right to travel, he has no fundamental right to drive. A state may regulate the operation of vehicles on its roads, including requiring a license. Officer Garcia informed him of the suspension and informed him of the consequences of driving with a suspended license but did not restrict his right to travel by other means of transportation. The complaint does not plausibly allege Officer Garcia violated Newman's right to travel The other two cases cited, in addition to the flaws noted below, also predate the U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion that a state has the power to “prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles.” Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915), including passing legislation requiring drivers to have licenses. Id. Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779 is an opinion from a Delaware state trial court entered on February 27, 1907 (111 years ago as I write this). It held that at the time, in Delaware, on the public highway in question, both cars and pedestrians had an equal right to use the road and both had a duty of care in the contexts of a lawsuit against the car owner for causing an accident through negligence. It did not reference any fundamental or constitutional right and has no precedential value and has in any case been superseded by statute. Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236 is an opinion from a Delaware state trial court entered on December 13, 1905 also involving liability for an automobile accident. It says in the pertinent part: A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public streets of a city as a vehicle of any kind. In using any parts of the streets all persons are bound to the exercise of, reasonable care to prevent collisions and accidents. Such care must be in proportion to the danger or the peculiar risks in each case. It is the duty of a person operating an automobile, or any other vehicle, upon the public streets of a city, to use ordinary care in its operation, to move it at a reasonable rate of speed, and cause it to slow up or stop if need be, where danger is imminent, and could, by the exercise of reasonable care, be seen or known in time to avoid accident. Greater caution is required at street crossings and in the more thronged streets of a city than in the less obstructed streets in the open or suburban parts. Like Simeone, it predates the adoption of a statutory traffic code in the state of Delaware, has no precedential effect, is no longer good law, and does not purport to establish any fundamental or constitutional right. It merely enunciates the default rules governing the use of public highways by cars and pedestrians in the absence of other laws or regulations.	As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury.	You have the right to notify the owner of the car of their vehicular trespass and the consequences of that. You do not have the right to damage the car in giving said notice. You have the right to offer to clean the gum off whatever part of the car you stuck the notice to. If you succeed in cleaning it,the other party will not have a legal cause of action, in all likelihood, since there is no damage (though with a bit of imagination they might come up with some 'missed business opportunity' loss). The court would probably find your choice of sticker to be negligent (put the notice under the wipers? use painter's tape -get some if you don't have any). The rationale 'we had no other choice' holds no water: there are alternatives. 'Criminal Damages' is a concept in UK law, but it relates to willful damage such as vandalism, not accidents. It would be an issue if you had planned to cause damage, but that seems not to be the case here.	From a US perspective, in a word, "no". Firstly, "presumption of innocence" is in a trial, not in police interactions. Being arrested does not violate the presumption of innocence. Police do not need any reason to interact with you or ask you questions. Police can arrest you if they have probable cause to suspect you have committed a crime, but this is not always necessary. More on this later(in the fourth section). Secondly, I wouldn't describe requesting to see your ticket, or any document as a "violent communication", in general. It may be rude or insulting, but not violent. (Also "violent communication" is not a legal term. The closest legal terms, verbal assault and threatening communication, are also not this.) More over, there is no indication of am implication of lying in this request. Thirdly, there are many situations in which possessing a document or credential is not sufficient; one must legally display or present them upon request. For example, multiple occupational licenses such as liquor licenses and barber/cosmetology licenses require that the licenses be prominently displayed; whereas, in California at least, a vehicle driver on a public road must not only possess their driver's license and proof of insurance, they must produce them upon the request of any law enforcement officer (Source: https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/brochures/fast_facts/ffvr18). Fourthly, there are situations in which you can be legally searched and questioned without reasonable suspicion. Examples of this include boarder searches and sobriety checkpoints. Sources: (US Supreme Court rulings): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Martinez-Fuerte; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan_Department_of_State_Police_v._Sitz A note on sources: bdb484 and I have opposing court case sources. My sources have binding precedent over all courts in the US, save the US Supreme Court, whereas theirs don't have any binding precedent, but are more directly on-topic.	New York has a "stop and identify" law which says that a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. However, there is no requirement to carry an identifying document or to prove your verbal statements of identity. For that matter, there is no requirement that you have your license in your possession when driving, you simply have to be duly licensed. In this case, the officer has reasonable suspicion of a crime, so you do have to tell him your name, address, and what you were doing. In Washington, there is no stop-and-identify law, so you don't even have to tell the police who you are. There does exist a requirement to identify yourself if you are stopped for an traffic infraction: (1) Any person requested or signaled to stop by a law enforcement officer for a traffic infraction has a duty to stop. (2) Whenever any person is stopped for a traffic infraction, the officer may detain that person for a reasonable period of time necessary to identify the person, check for outstanding warrants, check the status of the person's license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle's registration, and complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction. (3) Any person requested to identify himself or herself to a law enforcement officer pursuant to an investigation of a traffic infraction has a duty to identify himself or herself and give his or her current address. However, the proposed scenario does not fall under this requirement because you weren't stopped. Also note that the limited ID law of Washington does not compel you to provide a document, it compels you to provide information. It is a misdemeanor to drive without a valid Washington license, but it is only an infraction to drive having been issued a license but not having it in your possession, as long as you provide an alternative ID document. So if you drive without a license in WA and are stopped, you have to show an ID document or suffer the misdemeanor alternative. But again, in this scenario you were not driving and were not stopped, you will not be forced to provide a document. Because driving without a license is a misdemeanor and the officer did not observe you driving, under Washington's arrest without warrant law, he cannot arrest you for suspicion of having committed the misdemeanor of driving without a license. (The arrest without warrant law is a bit more complicated, see the 11 exception subsections, none of which apply here). If your goal is to try to be forced to show your driver's license, you might try Indiana, where the law says A person who knowingly or intentionally refuses to provide either the person's: (1) name, address, and date of birth; or (2) driver's license, if in the person's possession; to a law enforcement officer who has stopped the person for an infraction or ordinance violation commits a Class C misdemeanor. But again, you were not stopped for an infraction or ordinance violation, so you may keep your license in your wallet.	Warrants You say: "Formerly if a person was NOT apprehended in the commission of a felony, but was merely a suspect, then the authorities had to INDICT the suspect to prove sufficient evidence." This is not true. What the authorities had to do was issue a warrant which required no prerequisites or even suspicion that the person was involved in the crime. If I had the power, I could issue a warrant any time I felt like it. The abuse of warrants was one of the grievances that led to the American Revolution and is the primary driver for the fourth amendment to the Constitution and the limit that warrants can only be issued on "probable cause". Needless to say, all Western democracies have similar protections. Statute law In common law jurisdictions, parliament/congress can overrule the common law by passing an act that effectively says "the law is now this". With the rise of professional Police starting with the Glasgow Police in 1800, the statutes that created (or regulated them) extended the power of arrest without a warrant beyond what the common law allowed. For example, in new-south-wales, the police power of arrest without a warrant is in s99 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002. The general power of arrest without a warrant is in s100 (which also broadens the common law power to allow arrest where a person has "just committed" an offence or has committed a serious indictable offence for which they have not been tried at any time in the past) and the power to arrest with a warrant is in s101.	There are two very important points you should keep in mind here: You are not under any obligation whatsoever to investigate the owner of a vehicle parked on your property. You have full rights to tow any unauthorized vehicle off of your property. So, by far the easiest thing for you to do is to shift all responsibility off of yourself. Make it somebody else's problem. Try the police first. The safest thing you can do is simply dial 911 (or try to find a non-emergency number if you live in a major city, but Nebraska suggests just calling 911 directly) and report the abandoned vehicles to police. Their process for declaring a vehicle abandoned can take a bit longer (takes seven days in Nebraska). Essentially they'll document the vehicles' location and tag them, and probably run the license plates (if they come back stolen, they'll be towed by law enforcement immediately). Then they'll come back seven days later and, if the vehicles are still there, have them towed as abandoned vehicles. Law enforcement will sometimes only respond to private parking complaints that are actually on paved surfaces, and it sounds like these vehicles are just parked out in the middle of a field somewhere, so they may not actually care. But it doesn't hurt to check. If that fails, just have it towed. If law enforcement says it's ok or doesn't care about the vehicles, the next easiest thing for you to do is to call around to different tow companies, and see if one will tow it off your property for free in hopes of recovering tow costs and other fees from the actual owner of the vehicle, or through sale of the vehicle if it's never claimed. Let them do all the research and contact the owner, or report the vehicle to the police if necessary. You don't need to do any of the work yourself. Sure that doesn't get you any money, but any scenario that gets you money will be a very long process and it sounds like you just want the vehicles gone. You do not own the vehicles. The previous owner saying you bought the vehicles with the land is blatantly wrong. Ignore him, completely. By that logic, someone buying an apartment complex would subsequently take ownership of all vehicles on its private parking lot. That's not how vehicle ownership works in any state, and you do not own the vehicles, nor do you have any right to dispose of them. Even if the vehicle is abandoned, there is still a legal process that must be followed to claim ownership of an abandoned vehicle with the state. Unless you really want to take ownership of the vehicle, those processes are probably way more time and effort than you're willing to expend (usually resulting in years of waiting). Taking it to a scrap yard could be very bad for you. Since you do not have ownership of the vehicles, you definitely should not take them to a scrap yard. Destroying the vehicles without giving a person the chance to come claim the vehicles could get you into a lot of trouble. You're basically destroying someone else's property. If the person came back looking and found out you destroyed them, they may even be able to press charges against you, the scrap yard, or a combination of both (a Class IV felony in Nebraska, since vehicles are worth more than $1500). As an aside, any legitimate and reputable scrap yard should outright refuse to destroy the vehicles for you, because you won't be able to provide them with any documents that verify your ownership of the vehicles. Make sure you don't destroy the vehicles in any other way, though. Again, shift the responsibility. Don't put yourself into situations if you don't have to. Law enforcement and tow companies deal with this stuff every single day, and are much more qualified to handle this situation in a legal way than you are. Let them take all the responsibility off of you, and don't worry about doing anything yourself. It will make sure you don't do anything illegal, and thus don't open yourself up to repercussions later on down the line.
Transferring public domain material into a country where it is still in copyright I've noticed that, in Australia, books created by authors who've died before 1955 are in the public domain. For example, all of George Orwell's works are available from the University of Adelaide: https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/o/orwell/george/ It mentions on the website that you must check the copyright laws in your country before downloading. However if one was to download it in Australia and transport it to a country where the copyright is in force (say, the UK), would it be illegal? If this would not be illegal, where is the line drawn between importing something physically like this, and downloading it?	Prompted by this recent similar question, I've revisited this question and deleted my original answer as it was completely off the mark. This is its replacement. It is illegal, and it turns out to be an international standard in the Berne Convention. Article 16 in full: (1) Infringing copies of a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected. (3) The seizure shall take place in accordance with the legislation of each country. Your scenario falls squarely within point (2) and the imported George Orwell book is to be treated as an infringing copy within the UK. The implementing UK legislation for (2) can be found in Section 27(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.	According to the Wikipedia article "List of countries' copyright lengths" the only country currently having no copyright law is the Marshall Islands, and that country is said to have a non-copyright-based law providing that "Unauthorized sale or commercial use of sound & audio-visual recordings is prohibited"[1] However, if a person goes to the Marshall Islands, makes unauthorized copies of works there, and posts those copies to the net, the copyright owner could obtain an injunction under US copyright law requiring the site operator or host to remove the infringing content or be shut down.[2] Similar orders can be obtained under the laws of other countries. In addition, the copyright owner could send a takedown order under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).[3] A copyright suit could be brought by the copyright owner in any country where the unauthorized copies are distributed and, if damages were awarded, property subject to the jurisdiction of the court could be seized to pay them. In the US, infringing copies could be seized by customs officers when they are imported into the US.[4] Also, If an infringement suit is won, the court an order any infringing copies to be seized adn destroyed.[5] Conclusion Of course, if such copies were made in small numbers and distributed privately, the copyright owner might not learn of it. And in any case the copyright owner might not choose to take legal action. But merely making such copies in the Marshall Islands will not make the infringer safe from civil actions, nor will it make the copies lawful in the US, nor in most other countries. Notes [1] Unauthorized Copies of Recorded Materials Act, 1991 [20 MIRC Ch.2]". [2] 17 USC 502 (a) provides: (a) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright. [3] 17 USC 512 (c)(1)(C) and 17 USC 512 (c)(3) [4] 17 USC 602 (a) provides: (a)(1) Importation.—Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501. (a)(2) Importation or exportation of infringing items.—Importation into the United States or exportation from the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords, the making of which either constituted an infringement of copyright, or which would have constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable, is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under sections 501 and 506. [5] 17 USC 503 (b) provides: As part of a final judgment or decree, the court may order the destruction or other reasonable disposition of all copies or phonorecords found to have been made or used in violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.	It is reasonable to interpret the statement in their Github repository README.md as a "public domain" license for anything contained there. However, their "usage guidelines" backpedals a bit ("generally are not copyrighted", the misleading implication that content used commercially is subject to restrictions that educational and personal uses are not subject to). Although it is true that works "created by the US government" are not protected by copyright, not everything associated with a government agency is created by the US government. An agency might have a policy that they will not post material that is not copyright-free, there is no practical means of knowing if an item is an actual government work, versus a government-supported or government-hosted work (where copyright is held by someone else). If you trust their implication that all of those items in the repository are indeed government works, then they are free of copyright. I don't know any reason to not believe them, although sometimes the government is wrong and they end up liable big-time for infringement. However... NASA Open Source Agreement Version 1.3 (another copy on a NASA web page) on first glance seems to contradict the "government work" theory. Here, they claim to grant certain rights to users and also impose impose restrictions (including obligatory registration). This does not make any sense for a work that is in the public domain. The license is legally defective in that it fails to fill in relevant blanks (agency name, title of work, URL for obligatory registration). Also notice that the license is only for software. The scope of that license therefore has to be something narrower – it applies only to software, and presumably software that is not "a government work". I have no idea what software NASA could legally give away and is not a government work which is therefore not protected by copyright.	No It says right on the page you linked: These downloads are not public domain, as they are parts of content that has already been licensed and distributed. Although using these downloads may be permissible as long as the project itself falls under the rule of "Fair Use," it is ill-advised to use these downloads for any project intended for profitable gain or commercial advertisement, unless otherwise stated by Kyutwo.com.	US Laws are Free of Copyright Federal Works 17 USC 105 says: Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise. The phrase "work of the United States Government" has been interpreted to mean any work created by an officer or employee of the government in the course of his or her official duties. See 17 USC 101 for the official definition. This includes the text of (any and all) legislation. The official texts of all US laws (and federal regulations) are in the public domain, and no one may claim copyright on them. Strictly speaking, this is not a matter of "fair use". Fair use is an exception for limited uses of copyrighted content. The texts of these laws are not protected by copyright at all, and never have been. State Works In addition, while works of the various US states are not automatically in the public domain, the text of state laws, and I believe of the various state and local regulations are also in the public domain. This Wikipedia article says: Federal statutes are in the public domain and no copyright attaches to them. The same is true of court decisions. In State of Georgia vs Public Resource Org, Inc 11th Circuit No. 17-11589, (October 19, 2018) a three-judge panel of the US 11th Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: The general rule that legislative codifications are uncopyrightable derives from an understanding of the nature of law and the basic idea that the People, as the reservoir of all sovereignty, are the source of our law. For purposes of the Copyright Act, this means that the People are the constructive authors of those official legal promulgations of government that represent an exercise of sovereign authority. And because they are the authors, the People are the owners of these works, meaning that the works are intrinsically public domain material and, therefore, uncopyrightable. The Wikipedia article linked above quotes State of Georgia v. Harrison Co, 548 F.Supp 110, 114 (N.D. Ga 1982) as saying: The citizens are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners, regardless of who actually drafts the provisions, because the law derives its authority from the consent of the public, expressed through the democratic process. It also quotes a US copyright office publication as saying: As a matter of longstanding public policy, the U.S. Copyright Office will not register a government edict that has been issued by any state, local, or territorial government, including legislative enactments, judicial decisions, administrative rulings, public ordinances, or similar types of official legal materials. Likewise, the Office will not register a government edict issued by any foreign government or any translation prepared by a government employee acting within the course of his or her official duties. However, some states do attempt to claim copyright in electronic versions of their state codes. The 2015 LA Times story "Georgia claims that publishing its state laws for free online is 'terrorism'" reports on a recent infringement suit by the State of Georgia against Carl Malamud, who makes copies of the Georgia Annotated Code available for free online. The state claimed that the annotations are protected by copyright. In State of Georgia vs Public Resource Org, Inc 11th Circuit No. 17-11589, (October 19, 2018) a three-judge panel of the US 11th Circuit Court of Appeals found this claim to be without merit. After a thorough review of the law, and an examination of the annotations, we conclude that no valid copyright interest can be asserted in any part of the OCGA. ... In most states the “official” code is comprised of statutory text alone, and all agree that a state’s codification cannot be copyrighted because the authorship is ultimately attributable to the People. ... When a legislature enacts a law, or a court writes an opinion rendering an official interpretation of the law in a case or controversy, they are undisputedly speaking on behalf of the People, who are properly regarded as the author of the work. ... Because we conclude that no copyright can be held in the annotations, we have no occasion to address the parties’ other arguments regarding originality and fair use. Non-US Laws UK laws are protected under Crown Copyright, although permissive licenses for reproducing copies are easily available. Many other countries have similar provisions. The US, however, does not generally recognize such copyrights. The position of the US Copyright Office is that: [T]he Office will not register a government edict issued by any foreign government or any translation prepared by a government employee acting within the course of his or her official duties. Laws Incorporating Copyrighted Works by Reference Laws sometimes include by reference privately developed and copyrighted documents. For example, building codes and other safety codes may be developed by private groups, often national non-profit organizations, and incorporated into state laws by reference. This means that the text of the privately developed code is legally part of the law, and the law cannot be fully understood and complied with without reading the code. But the code is a copyrighted work, and the copyright holder may charge for copies. For example, this official Texas web page says: The Texas statutes, administrative rules, and local ordinances occasionally adopt, incorporate, or refer to technical codes published by independent organizations. These codes describe scientific and safety standards for structures and discuss specifications for fire safety, electrical systems, plumbing fixtures, construction practices, and many other topics. ... Codes are not reprinted within the statutes or the local ordinances themselves. They are "adopted by reference" or "incorporated by reference" and are usually available to review at the city clerk's office and at some public libraries. Please contact your local public library or your local government for assistance accessing codes not available online. Federal Copyrights However, this does not mean that anything "published by the US government" is in the public domain or is free of copyright. The Federal government often hires contractors to prepare various works. These works are protected by copyright. Frequently, the contracts will assign this copyright to the Federal government, which as 17 USC 105 says: ... is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise. Such works are therefore copyrighted, and the copyright holder is or may be the US Federal Government. They are protected in the same way and to the same degree as works of private authorship. Many works funded by the US Federal Government fall into this category.	It's still under copyright, so you'd need to contact the publisher for permission, although if the artist (or in this case the executor of the estate Lynn Caponera) still retains the rights to the work sometimes going straight to the them can be a better option, especially in this case as it's for a non-profit and for a library in particular. The library also might have certain rights for reproduction, they generally pay a bulk fee to publishers but outside lending I'm not sure what that covers, so I'd check with the library manager (either branch or regional depending on who handles legal and licensing) as well.	Copyright protection exists for any work (picture, paragraph, song etc), and persists for many years until it expires. Unless the work was created a long time ago, or was created by the US government (not the same as "funded by government money"), you should assume that the work is protected. That means that you must have permission to copy it. Sometimes, a work has associated with it some such permission, in the form of a "license". Without such a license, you have to request the copyright owner for permission to copy – whether or not they say that the work is protected by copyright (because by law it is protected, so they don't have to say that it is). If you request permission to copy, and do not receive the required permission, then you cannot legally copy the work. The copyright holder has no obligation to explicitly deny permission. You can certainly list the URL for an image, you just cannot copy the image in your book.	No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though.
iPad hijacking at night We are having issues with our neighbors. I play music from my iPad at night to help me sleep, using headphones, and my neighbor has been hijacking it and playing discordant sounds to wake me up in the night is this illegal?	This would be unauthorized access to a computer. The offence is found in Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Note that this is a criminal offence, approaching the police about it might be the best way of handling the situation (if you want to go that route, and also, I'm not a lawyer).	YES in germany §23 StVO (1a) Wer ein Fahrzeug führt, darf ein elektronisches Gerät, das der Kommunikation, Information oder Organisation dient oder zu dienen bestimmt ist, nur benutzen, wenn hierfür das Gerät weder aufgenommen noch gehalten wird und [...] (1a) Whoever is driving a vehicle may only use an electrical device that is serving communication, information, or organization or destined to be used for this if... 1. they don't pick the device up or hold it and [...] That is plenty clear: holding the device is banned in any way, and implies using it under German legal precedent.	I would agree with @DaleM that it is probably legal to install such a camera, however I think that you may have recourse - Apparently, California has Civil Stalking Laws and you may be able to get a restraining order prohibiting him from monitoring your front door. (You may also look into harassment, which would be related)	You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't.	It depends where you and your friend are and where the copyright was created. Ripping music for personal use is considered fair use/fair dealing in most jurisdictions. Having multiple copies/devices for personal use is OK too - practically, you can't watch more than one at a time unless you have a very unusual brain. If the intention is that both you and he would have and use copies then that is a violation.	A few years ago, there was a trial in the USA about some short sound on some music CD: One party claimed that one piece of music on the CD contained a sound of less than one second length which is copied from another CD without the permission of the copyright owner of the other CD. It could never be found out if this claim was really true. The court's decision was: If it is not possible to distinguish between a copy and a work that does not depend on the other work at all, it is not a copyright infringement - even if the sound has been copied from the other CD. For this reason, I'd guess that a 4x3 image would not be a copyright infringement, yet, while 60x45 would definitely be one. Just for reference: The same image as 3x4 and as 45x60:	IANAL, just a programmer with an interest in legal rules. Due to the very permissive nature of the MIT license, no, it does not appear that anything illegal has been done. Specifically, the section to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software (emphasis mine) grants everyone the right to modify your code and share those modifications, provided one includes the license. Since this person has included your license (including your copyright notice), they have followed the conditions of the license and are able to share your stuff. Legally. Ethically, I still think its ****. This might be a good starting point in selecting a license (note the Modification column). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_free_and_open-source_software_licenses The CC-BY-SA license family, as mentioned by Ron Beyer in comments is on this list, for example. TL;DR: You unfortunately granted a more permissive license than what you wanted/needed to. This was a BadThing(TM), analogous to giving too broad of access rights to a method or class. Determine your desired permissions, then select a license that matches what you'd like to grant.	Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?
Why haven't jurists corrected the ambiguity of 'civil law'? Source: A Brief Introduction to Law in Canada (Mar. 2017). p. 39 Bottom. Box 2.3. "Common Law" and "Civil Law": Alternate Meanings As we have seen, some legal expressions have different meanings in different contexts. It addition to referring to legal systems, the phrases "common law" and "civil law" can have other meanings, too. The phrase civil law is sometimes used as a synonym for private law—in other words, laws governing the relationship between persons (as opposed to public law, which deals with the legal relationship between a state and its individual members). Private and public law are generally recognized distinctions in both common law and civil law systems (except perhaps in some so-cialist countries). Therefore, somewhat confusingly, there could be a reference to civil law (where the context means private law) and its application in a common law jurisdiction. Adding to the confusion is the fact that in many civil law countries, their civil codes are primarily concert*d with private, or civil, law matters as opposed to public law ones. Criminal law and other areas of public law are frequently dealt with in other "non-code" statutes. However, the key features of civil law systems—such as the inquisitorial approach of judges and the lack of precedent—usually apply to these legislated areas as well. The phrase common law, apart from its reference to the legal system that originated in England. can also refer to decisions by courts exercising their "common law" jurisdiction (used in contradistinction to decisions by courts exercising their "equitable" jurisdiction), and to case law generally (used in contradistinction to legislation, or enacted laws). This polysemy of 'civil law' (e.g. our "civil-law" tag) can be easily untangled, if 'civil law' is restricted to mean only private law OR only continental law, or if 'civil law' is abandoned and overriden with the latter two terms. So why haven't jurists (lawyers and judges) done so?	The English language does not have the equivalent of the French Academy to officially regulate questions of spelling, grammar, punctuation and word meaning. Jurists don't control how the language is used and for the most point don't bother to try to do so. Also, context almost always clarifies this particular ambiguity.	Why do you expect different courts to determine different laws in the same way? The Czech and UK laws that implement the GDPR are necessary different because they are the products of different legislative and legal traditions and are written in different languages. The differences may be minor but they will exist. Particular cases will have different factual and legal nuances and be interpreted by different courts with very different judicial traditions. Czech courts set no precedents in UK courts and vice-versa. It’s no surprise that there will be different outcomes. Even jurisdictions with much closer legal traditions like US Federal Circuit Courts and Australian states often have divergent precedents on similar (or the same) legislation.	tl;dr No, it won't be a viable defense. Background Touch has an established interpretation at common law. The common law is judge-made law. If an offense involving touch existed at common law, then the meaning of touch is "defined" by the judicial opinions themselves. As the comments have noted, you'll be able to find hundreds of years worth of opinions where judges have, by example, determined what qualifies as touching. Putting your hand on someone, yes. Spitting on someone, yes. Blowing from a distance, no. These examples make up the common law definition of touch. But how, you may ask, would the common law evolve to include new information? The answer is clear. Say Jill purposely hits Jack in the face with a shovel. When appearing before the judge, she says, "we have a new understanding of atomic proximity, so technically the atoms in the shovel never made contact with the atoms in Jack!" The judge will say, "that's interesting, but it seems irrelevant to what we're trying to accomplish with the law: Jack still had to go to the hospital. Judgment for Jack." Now the common law has incorporated the new information (...at Jill's expense). Touch isn't defined at the atomic level when interpreting a statute. Some offenses are defined, not by judges, but by statutes enacted by legislatures. If the language in the statute is ambiguous, courts have to interpret its meaning. This is often done by looking at the purpose of the statute or by looking at the plain meaning of the language. Statutory interpretation: purpose Where a court does not employ the plain meaning approach, it will often look for evidence of the drafter's intent. In this case, the court would ask what the purpose of a law like battery is. They'd probably conclude it has to do with preventing harm and offense. In fact, they probably included things like that in the statute itself. So they'd wonder if defining contact at an atomic level would help to prevent harm and offense; that seems unlikely. In so doing, the court may analyze the legislative history. It may look at events that happened around the time the law was enacted: did the legislature propose it because people were hitting each others' faces with shovels? It might even appeal to the state of the common law at the time the statute was enacted for the proper definition. Statutory interpretation: plain meaning First, it might help to look at an example from District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). There the Court was tasked with interpreting some Second Amendment text. In doing so it said, "we are guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.' Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings." Id at 576-77. Statutory interpretation also makes use of this plain meaning approach. As stated by the Court, "where the language of an enactment is clear, and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.” United States v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); see also Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). This is bolstered by the practice of explicitly defining words with technical meanings in a definitions section of the statute. For example, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code employs a number of terms in a technical sense, and 9-102(a) defines 81 words that are intended to take on a technical meaning. Another example is the Illinois battery statute, 720 ILCS 5: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual. The statute doesn't have a technical definition for "physical contact." So under plain meaning we'd construe it in its common sense. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary (a favorite of U.S. courts) defines touch as, "to bring a bodily part into contact with especially so as to perceive through the tactile sense." That definition implies that tactile sensation is what triggers (2), not any atomic concept of proximity. If you're interested in further reading, proper interpretation of the term "physical contact" came up in the insurance contract setting in Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Busby, 219 Cal. App. 4th 876 (2013). united-states	In legal systems descending from English law, the term equity refers to an aspect of those legal systems that has origins distinct from positive law and the traditional common-law writs. Equity traces its origin to the Court of Chancery. Much of what follows can be found in Snell's Equity. Equitable remedies (equitable relief) are those remedies available through rules and principles of equity, today applied by courts of unified jurisdiction. Some distinctions Equity as part of law: equity is certainly part of law in the sense that it is part of the legal system, applied by courts, and can result in equitable remedies. "Equity in this sense has been a feature of many legal systems from ancient times" (Snell's Equity, §1-002). Equity versus law: equity is distinct from "law" (or common law) in the sense that equitable remedies are meant to supplement "legal rights." The common law and equity operated in their own areas of specialisation. Even in cases where common law and equitable rules touched on the same subject matter, the rationale of equitable intervention was not to conflict with the common law. The Chancellor's jurisdiction over the parties was in personam and enforceable by specific remedies, unlike those of the common law which were generally for the orders for the payment of money. (Snell's Equity, §1-012). Legal and equitable remedies: "The division between legal and equitable remedies is an accident of history which cannot be explained in any other terms. No defining characteristic sets the remedies developed in Chancery, as a class, apart from the remedies developed by the common law courts." (Snell's Equity, § 14-001) History and the present A well-accepted unifying feature of "equity" and "equitable remedies" is their origin in the Court of Chancery of specialist equitable jurisdiction (Snell's Equity, §1-003). Even though today, this distinction in jurisdiction has been abolished by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, equity still means that body of law with its origins in Chancery. While equitable rules and principles have certainly continued to evolve, they all trace their pedigree to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (Snell's Equity, § 1-004). Equitable doctrines have retained their distinctiveness as "secondary" to legal rights. They impose an overlay: that "primary legal rights should be exercised consistenly with good conscience" (Snell's Equity, § 1-033). This view from Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 SCR 534 highlights the messiness and debate about the confluence and remaining distinctiveness of equity and law: I am aware that reservations have been expressed in some quarters about this fusion or, perhaps more accurately, mingling of law and equity... But no case was brought to our attention where it has led to confusion, and there are many cases, some of which I have discussed, where it has made possible a just and reasonable result. It simply provides a general, but flexible, approach that allows for direct application of the experience and best features of both law and equity, whether the mode of redress (the cause of action or remedy) originates in one system or the other. There might be room for concern if one were indiscriminately attempting to meld the whole of the two systems. Equitable concepts like trusts, equitable estates and consequent equitable remedies must continue to exist apart, if not in isolation, from common law rules. But when one moves to fiduciary relationships and the law regarding misstatements, we have a situation where now the courts of common law, now the courts of equity moved forward to provide remedies where a person failed to meet the trust or confidence reposed in that person. There was throughout considerable overlap. In time the common law outstripped equity and the remedy of compensation became somewhat atrophied. Under these circumstances, why should it not borrow from the experience of the common law? Whether the courts refine the equitable tools such as the remedy of compensation, or follow the common law on its own terms, seems not particularly important where the same policy objective is sought. Equity prevails Even though equity has developed as supplemental and secondary to the common law, "in a conflict between the two, equity would prevail" (Snell's Equity, §1-010). For example, where a contract would be enforceable by its terms at common law, an equitable remedy developed called recission that allows for the "extinction of a contract and the resotration of the parties to their original positions" (Snell's Equity, § 15-001). This has been codified in some jurisdictions. See British Columbia's Law and Equity Act, s. 44: If rules of equity and law conflict, equity prevails 44 Generally in all matters not particularly mentioned in this Act in which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity prevail. Where this distinction can matter This distinction can still matter. As just one example: "Different rules of following and tracing have evolved at common law and in equity" (Snell's Equity, § 30-052). See Citadel General Assurance Co. v. Lloyds Bank Canada, [1997] 3 SCR 805 at para. 58: In my view, a distinction should be made between the imposition of liability in “knowing receipt” cases and the availability of tracing orders at common law and in equity. Liability at common law is strict, flowing from the fact of receipt. Liability in “knowing receipt” cases is not strict; it depends not only on the fact of enrichment (i.e. receipt of trust property) but also on the unjust nature of that enrichment (i.e. the stranger’s knowledge of the breach of trust). A tracing order at common law, unlike a restitutionary remedy, is only available in respect of funds which have not lost their identity by becoming part of a mixed fund. Further, the imposition of liability as a constructive trustee is wider than a tracing order in equity. The former is not limited to the defence of purchaser without notice and “does not depend upon the recipient still having the property or its traceable proceeds”; see In re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts, supra, at p. 276. If a remedy is understood to be a legal right, then the innocent/wronged party is owed that right once the wrong is recognized by a court. However, if the remedy is understood to be equitable, no one ever has a claim as of right to the remedy, and it will always be subject to the discretion of the court to grant the remedy even if accepting the wrong underlying the claim. Some equitable remedies Wikipedia gives one list of equitable relief consistent with much of what is in Snell's Equity. Here I'll only list some of those that you'll most likely recognize: injunctions (Snell's Equity, § 18) specific performance (Snell's Equity, § 17) rescission (Snell's Equity, § 15) rectification (Snell's Equity, § 16) tracing (Snell's Equity, § 30-051) equitable estoppel (as a family of related doctrines), as distinct from common law estoppel (Snell's Equity, § 12) Maxims of equity Wikipedia also lists various maxims of equity also consistent with much of what is in Snell's Equity, § 5). I'll only highlight a few that are still widely relevant and known: "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands" "Equity aids the vigilant and not the idolent" (the principle behind laches) "Equity looks on as done that which ought to be done" (the principle behind equitable assignment)	Yes, a judge may use the bible when making a decision. However, the usage nearly always takes the form of citation (in the form of scholarly texts) rather than precedent. That said, the lines get blurry sometimes. In Banks v. Maxwell, 171 S.E. 70 (N.C. 1933), the N.C. Supreme Court was tasked with resolving a dispute where the plaintiff had been gored by a bull. As a means of anchoring precedent and establishing a strict liability rule when a bull has previously gored, it stated "[t]he familiar rule of liability for injuries inflicted by cattle has remained approximately constant for more than 3,000 years. This rule of liability was expressed by Moses in the following words..." The court goes on to cite Exodus 21:28-30.	You have accurately summed up the conundrum. There is little else to say. You need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant. You will come to find that there are many instances of such confusion in the law. The historic technical distinction in the law (especially in tort law) between assault and battery has been collapsed in the everyday vernacular and this had made its way even into the way that the words are used even by law enforcement officers and legislators, who grew up speaking the vernacular language like everyone else. Where I live, in Colorado, the word "menacing" has been used be legislators to replace the historic sense of the word "assault" and the words "assault" and "battery" have become synonymous. But, in England, they are struck with a situation in which the meaning of the word "assault" has become context specific.	"Esq" Is short for "Esquire" which was once the lowest level of the English system of titles for nobility and gentry (originally an esquire was a sort of apprentice knight, and later it indicated that a person was a "gentleman" but without any higher title) Lawyers started using it to indicate that although paid professionals, they claimed a social status above that of tradesmen and shopkeepers. It is now largely obsolete, but some lawyers still use it. Most of the other initials refer to the form of business organization that a lawyer or law firm uses. More specifically: "PA" means "professional association" a form of organization which reduces the individual liability of members of the firm. See this q&A A pay is in many ways similar to a corporation or an LLC. "PLLC" means "professional limited liability company" which is a version of an LLC used specifically by groups of doctors and lawyers. "PLC" like "PLLC" means "professional limited liability company". The two terms are interchangeable when used for law firms, but PLC is also used for a Public Limited Company, which is a quite different sort of thing, and will not be a lawyer or law firm. APC, A.P.C., PC, P.C., and Prof. Corp. all stand for "Professional Corporation" a form of organization which is similar to a PLLC. "LLP" means "Limited Liability Partnership" a variation on the classic partnership organization. "SP" means "Sole Proprietorship", that is one lawyer working alone. None of these tell you anything about the kind of law a lawyer or firm does. None except SP tell you anything about how many lawyers a firm has. And none tell you anything about how competent a lawyer is. For the most part, none of these terms is of any importance to a client or would-be client of a lawyer or law firm. Reputation of the specific firm is far more important.	france Yes, both for civil and criminal law, but in different ways. The general principle of civil law in France (and I believe every civil-legal-system jurisdiction) is that one is liable for any damage they cause through fault. Of course, details differ greatly between what is considered a damage, what are the standards to prove causation or fault, etc. Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 2, 18 janvier 2018, 16-28.392 specifically endorsed a lower court reasoning that distinguished between préjudice moral (moral damage) and préjudice psychologique (psychological damage). The latter is about quantifiable medical damage (even if mental rather than physical), while the former covers grave breaches of wellbeing. In the case at hand, a couple was assassinated when their child was two years old; the child later developed severe psychic disorders as a result of the trauma; it was found that a compensation for the préjudice moral of losing his parents at a young age did not foreclose a later suit for the préjudice psychologique of developing mental troubles (which became visible much later in his life). To be honest, I would be extremely surprised if any jurisdiction recognized no cause of action for any type of psychological damage. There might be issues of burden of proof etc. such that in practice suing for psychological damage is unviable, but a complete bar on any civil action predicated on psychic damage seems unthinkable. Regarding criminal law, many assault-type crimes are scaled by gravity. That gravity is evaluated by days of "complete inability to work" (search incapacité totale de travail through that section of the penal code). While the notion has been standardized by work law cases, it also applies outside a work context when the damage prevents one from doing basic life actions (children, retirees or the unemployed can be subject to a "complete inability to work"). Whether the damage that caused it was physical or mental is irrelevant. Two notes though: physical damage resulting from assault is more easily quantified by that scale than mental damage. If a mob boss breaks your bones, you spend one month in the hospital, and then you get out roughly healed; it’s easy to say that it cost you one month of your life. If the same mob boss kills your wife in a gruesome manner, you might be haunted for life, but still be able to work, feed yourself etc., past one or two days of shock. "Low-level", long-lasting damage is not well-measured that way. quantifying the duration of a "complete inability to work" depends on the victim’s active cooperation with the prosecution (such as going to see a doctor to get a certificate). That is possible because the civil and criminal causes of actions are usually joined in a single trial, during which the victim will try to prove injury. (It is possible for the victim to open a separate civil trial, but that’s usually not a good idea. The same exact remedies are available by joining in the criminal trial; usually the prosecutor has the same goals as you in proving the facts, so why not let them do it and save some lawyer fees?) It would probably not be reasonable in a common-law system with separate trials. It also breaks down in certain cases (e.g.: in a good fraction of spousal abuse cases, the victim refuses to testify against the accused).
What semantic notions underlie 'articles' with legal apprenticeship? Source: A Brief Introduction to Law in Canada (Mar. 2017). p. 265 Middle. Historically, in Canada, there was debate over rival methods for teaching law. Some members of the legal community believed that traditional English vocational methods for training lawyers should be followed. These methods were based on an apprenticeship model where- by law students served "under articles," and obtained practical experience and direct knowledge of the law by working with and under the supervision of a practising lawyer. This training could also be supplemented with law society lectures. On the other side of the legal education debate were those who favoured the idea of formal university training at a recognized law school, where professors (rather than practising lawyers) taught the law. The debate was resolved in favour of the current model, which combines academic course-work with articling requirements.4 articles an apprenticeship under a practising lawyer 4 William H Hurlburt, The Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession in Canada and in England and Wales (Calgary and Edmonton: Law Society of Alberta/ Alberta Law Reform Institute, 2000) at 69-78. How did "article" semantically specialize to this legal signification?	There is no generalisation. The "articles" are articles of clerkship. The context permits the implication of that specific usage, in the same way that talking about "cars" at a racetrack isn't a generalisation of the word "car" - it's an implication of specifically racecars. Ancestry.co.uk explains well what the articles actually are. Briefly, they are simply fixed-term apprenticeship contracts between an established practicing lawyer and a student who wishes to become a lawyer.	What's the use of contracts if you can't take a contract violator to court? A clear, thoughtful contract can be a deterrent to misconduct, and Australia is one of many jurisdictions where pro se litigation is allowed. Self-represented litigants certainly have to undergo a steep learning curve and are expected to comply with a code of conduct, procedural law, and so forth, but my point is that hiring a lawyer is not compulsory. Even if for some reason the defrauded party declines to sue the tortfeasor (thereby forfeiting the recovery of the losses), there is a societal obligation to alert others about the tortfeasor's misconduct. Making the contract available to others facilitates alerting them on objective grounds so they don't become the tortfeasor's next victim, and it simultaneously helps for setting the record straight that the damages/losses were not one's own fault. Without a contract, it would be more difficult for others get a sense of whether misconduct occurred at all. Or worst, halfway down the line, you don't have any money left to pay your lawyers, and they leave the case. Hence the importance to litigate in pro per from the start. It is easy for a person retaining a lawyer to postpone (be it due to family obligations, workload, and so forth) his learning of the law. But that postponement only makes the client more vulnerable to his lawyer's subsequent withdrawal when court proceedings are midway: the client would have the dilemma of either finding another lawyer to resume the case --predictably at a higher cost--, or cram the learning curve in trying to keep up with the proceedings.	This is a close call, in the example that you suggest, because it won't have been executed with the proper formalities and it isn't clear that the content at a url would be fixed in its language at the time that the Will is executed. Subject to an exception for personal property memorandums (and a more subtle one for powers of appointment in trusts) you can't change the terms of a Will once it is signed except by a Codicil executed with the same formalities. Certainly, the best practice would be to assume that the answer is no. There are times when a reference to an external document in a will is allowed (e.g. a reference to real property by address rather than a full legal description found in a recorded deed), but a list of beneficiaries would ordinarily not be allowed unless it was effectively a reference to vital statistics records (e.g. "all children born to or adopted by me.") In general, references to external documents are not allowed when used to establish the nature of the testator's donative intent (a "testator" is someone who writes a will), unless it "describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification" and can't be modified after the Will is signed, but can be used to establish general facts about reality. One exception in Colorado is that a "personal property memorandum" designating who will receive specific items of tangible personal property can be incorporated by reference and does not have to be executed with the same formalities as a will. It isn't clear to me if a url could be a valid personal property memorandum and that issue has never been tested in Colorado. Colorado's probate laws are based on the Uniform Probate Code and would be substantially identical to any other jurisdiction that adopted the Uniform Probate Code's substantive provisions. The primary statutes governing this (which aren't necessarily easy to understand without context) are: Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-502. Execution--witnessed or notarized wills--holographic wills (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section and in sections 15-11-503, 15-11-506, and 15-11-513, a will shall be: (a) In writing; (b) Signed by the testator, or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction; and (c) Either: (I) Signed by at least two individuals, either prior to or after the testator's death, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he or she witnessed either the testator's signing of the will as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will; or (II) Acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments. (2) A will that does not comply with subsection (1) of this section is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting. (3) Intent that the document constitute the testator's will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator's handwriting. (4) For purposes of this section, “conscious presence” requires physical proximity to the testator but not necessarily within testator's line of sight. (5) For purposes of this part 5, “will” does not include a designated beneficiary agreement that is executed pursuant to article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-503. Writings intended as wills (1) Although a document, or writing added upon a document, was not executed in compliance with section 15-11-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (a) The decedent's will; (b) A partial or complete revocation of the will; (c) An addition to or an alteration of the will; or (d) A partial or complete revival of the decedent's formerly revoked will or a formerly revoked portion of the will. (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall apply only if the document is signed or acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of the decedent's spouse. (3) Whether a document or writing is treated under this section as if it had been executed in compliance with section 15-11-502 is a question of law to be decided by the court, in formal proceedings, and is not a question of fact for a jury to decide. (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a designated beneficiary agreement under article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-510. Incorporation by reference A writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-511. Testamentary additions to trusts (1) A will may validly devise property to the trustee of a trust established or to be established (i) during the testator's lifetime by the testator, by the testator and some other person, or by some other person, including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts, or (ii) at the testator's death by the testator's devise to the trustee, if the trust is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before, concurrently with, or after the execution of the testator's will or in another individual's will if that other individual has predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust. The devise is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or the testator's death. (2) Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, property devised to a trust described in subsection (1) of this section is not held under a testamentary trust of the testator, but it becomes a part of the trust to which it is devised, and is administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the governing instrument setting forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before or after the testator's death. (3) A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator causes the devise to lapse, but exhaustion of trust corpus between the time of execution of the testator's will and the testator's death shall not constitute a lapse; a revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator shall not cause the devise to lapse, if the testator provides that, in such event, the devise shall constitute a devise to the trustee of the trust identified in the testator's will, and on the terms thereof, as they existed at the time of the execution of testator's will, or as they existed at the time of the revocation or termination of the trust, as the testator's will provides. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-512. Events of independent significance A will may dispose of property by reference to acts and events that have significance apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will, whether they occur before or after the execution of the will or before or after the testator's death. The execution or revocation of another individual's will is such an event. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. Separate writing or memorandum identifying devise of certain types of tangible personal property Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. There is not a statutory definition of a "document" or a "writing" in the Colorado Probate Code.	It does not need to be expressly defined in statute in order to be legally effective. Courts have no trouble interpreting ordinary words used in their conventional way. And there is no other definition that could work instead, considering the full body of law that (1) intends to apply to the whole of the United Kingdom, (2) often distinguishes between "Great Britain" and "Northern Ireland", (3) often distinguishes between "England", "Wales", "Scotland" and "Northern Ireland", (4) treats "Great Britain" as synonymous with England, Wales and Scotland, and (5) often uses "Great Britain" without further ceremony, as if it's a term that doesn't need to be explained. It is helpful that legislation (at least in the modern era) is consistent about the view that "Great Britain" refers precisely to England, Wales and Scotland all together. By virtue of the Interpretation Act 1978, "United Kingdom" means Great Britain and Northern Ireland. from which we may deduce immediately that Great Britain means the United Kingdom except for Northern Ireland. There is no sibling '"Great Britain" means...' clause, but construing it any other way than the normal meaning would not work. From the combined definitions of "England", "Wales", "British Islands", etc. - which by reference, also deal with such historically doubtful areas as Berwick and Monmouthshire - there is no other way to interpret the term "Great Britain" without distorting the required meaning of "United Kingdom". Including too much or too little in "Great Britain" would give the wrong result, in particular for statutory extent clauses that refer to the whole United Kingdom and ought not to accidentally leave out Cornwall or include Hanover. We do not need to go as far as the Acts of Union, which is lucky since that would entangle us in concerns about whether "England" includes "Wales", or other historical anomalies that are not relevant in current law. I would treat the Acts of Union as giving added force to the conventional meaning, rather than being the source of that meaning, since there are uses of the term which seem to be more about Great Britain considered as a place than the political entity. For example, the Food Safety Act 1990 s.18(3) talks about "any food which has not previously been used for human consumption in Great Britain", which seems to talk more about the food culture of the place, even predating the Acts of Union, than about the Kingdom of Great Britain or its successors. The term "Great Britain" is frequently used in statutes in the customary way. For example, The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 s.28 creates a "Great Britain register" and a "Northern Ireland register" of political parties, and s.38(1)(3)(b) provides for the "Great Britain register" to cover precisely England, Scotland and Wales. The Northern Ireland Act 1998 s.87 is about provisions of UK social security law that operate differently in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Electricity Act 1989 (as amended) provides for the issue of "GB certificates" as opposed to "NI certificates", and also defines "the relevant part of Great Britain" as meaning either "England and Wales" or "Scotland" (s.32M(1)). The Agriculture Act 2020 s.35 provides for a "red meat levy" to be paid between "one country in Great Britain" and "another such country", and goes on in 35(8) to list the levy bodies for England, Scotland and Wales. So all of this points to the same common meaning as in everyday life. In court, for example, Lord Hoffman in Serco v Lawson [2006] UKHL 3 had to consider the Employment Rights Act 1996 s.196, since repealed, which governed "work wholly or mainly outside Great Britain". (And by the way, in 196(1)(b) is a listing of "England and Wales" and "Scotland" as the two possible bodies of law relating to Great Britain.) In his judgement, he says: It is true that section 244(1) says that the Act "extends" to England and Wales and Scotland ("Great Britain"). But that means only that it forms part of the law of Great Britain and does not form part of the law of any other territory (like Northern Ireland or the Channel Islands) for which Parliament could have legislated. That is, he does not find it difficult to gloss the extent provision in 244(1), which doesn't include the exact words "Great Britain", as actually referring to Great Britain. Other legislation refers to "Great Britain" as a locale, like the Wild Animals in Circuses Act 2019 which talks about "an animal of a kind which is not commonly domesticated in Great Britain". This is a straightforward reference to the kind of activities typically going on in that location, treating it as the island(s) and not the political entity. The expression does not include the territorial sea, by default; some statutes include it, like the Gas Act 1986 s.5(9) which says: For the purposes of this section a place is within the jurisdiction of Great Britain if it is in Great Britain, in the territorial sea adjacent to Great Britain or in an area designated under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964. There are several other instances of particular statutes defining "Great Britain" to include adjacent waters, but they do not define the core concept of Great Britain otherwise. They do not need to.	Different jurisdictions have different attitudes and histories. The difference is probably more cultural than legal and both leases are quite likely legal in both jurisdictions. In general, US jurisdictions tend towards laissez-faire capitalism and contracts have a buyer beware slant. Civil-law European countries are much more collective and have very strong consumer protection. Canada and other Commonwealth countries fall somewhere in the middle.	It is complicated to answer why a law is what it is. Judge Frank Esterbrook writes (in the forward to Reading Law by Scalia and Garner): Every legislator has an intent, which usually cannot be discovered, since most say nothing before voting on most bills; and the legislature is a collective body that does not have a mind; it "intends" only that the text be adopted, and statutory texts usually are compromises that match no one's first preference. If some legislators say one thing and others something else, if some interest groups favor one outcome and others something different; how does the interpreter choose which path to follow? I will provide the historical background leading to the current fair use statute and case law, but take from it what you will as to why it is what it is. Fair use is a statutory defence provided by 17 USC 107. Its application is clearly demonstrated in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Fair use was an "exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act". (Campbell) Courts had been finding exceptions for "fair abridgements" and other precursors to fair use as far back as under the Statute of Anne of 1710. (Campbell, citing William Patry's "The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law".) This doctrine worked its way into US case law in the nineteenth century. In Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CCD Mass. 1841)1, Justice Story distilled the essence of law and methodology from the earlier cases: "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." (Campbell) Folsom states: There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work. This early incorporation of fair use focused on whether something new was being created, or whether the "chief value" of the original work was being taken. This primary focus on transformativeness has stuck with with fair use doctrine until today. Campbell said (internal citations removed): The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation ("supplanting" the original), or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is "transformative". Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use. Campbell also includes the following statement of rationale for why Congress included section 107: Congress meant § 107 "to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way" and intended that courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 66 (1976) (hereinafter House Report); S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 62 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report). There is no support for your separation of "parody, comment, and criticism " from "teaching, research, and news reporting", or that there are differing amounts of commercial use allowed for these types of work. The statute lists together "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research" as examples purposes. The statute requires that "whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes" be considered in all fair use cases. There is also very little if any First Amendment rationale expressed for the fair use doctrine. The intersection of the First Amendment and copyright law is more clearly found in the idea/expression dichotomy. 1. Folsom v. Marsh full opinion text	Yes Yes Yes However, these are pretty standard contract terms. Many, many terms survive the end of the substantive agreement. For example, terms with respect to ongoing confidentiality, dispute resolution, warranties, termination itself etc. The second is so common it actually has a named legal doctrine: reading down. In the absence of such a clause, if the contract inadvertently exceeds what the law allows, it preserves the contract rather than leaving both parties without contractural protection.	Canadian lawyers who handle this kind of matter usually describe themselves as "human rights" and/or "discrimination" lawyers. No formal regulatory specialty is recognized or required, however. Any licensed lawyer in good standing is legally permitted to take on such a case.
Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris In 1989, Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris unanimously declared New York City’s Board of Estimate Unconstitutional, as it violated the “one man, one vote” principle derived form 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection standard. The Board of Estimate made almost all municipal decisions, and was occupied by eight ex oficio members: The Mayor of New York City The New York City Comptroller The President of the New York City Council The Borough President of the Bronx The Borough President of Brooklyn The Borough President of Manhattan The Borough President of Queens The Borough President of Staten Island The first three were elected in a city-wide election, and had 2 votes on the Board, while the Borough Presidents, elected by residents of their respective Borough’s, each held one vote on the Board. The Supreme Court ruled the Board Unconstitutional because residents of Queens, the least populous Borough, had the same representation as the members of the most populous Borough, Brooklyn. The problem, with this unanimous decision, is that this allegation simply isn’t true. As the three officers who held the most power (controlling 6 out of the 11 votes) were elected City-Wide. Therefore, the members of the more populous Borough, Brooklyn, would have more representation. I don’t claim to smarter than the Supreme Court, so, what am I missing?	The Board of Estimates still gave small boroughs like Staten Island more representatives per voter than large boroughs like Manhattan. Therefore it violated the one man, one vote principal which is evaluated with respect to all representatives having votes in a body, not just those that hold a majority. The analysis is to take all at large seats that don't violate the one man, one vote rule off the table and look at the fairness of the allocation of the remaining seats. This was an easy case, not a hard one, for the U.S. Supreme Court. The leading case are: First, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that malapportionment claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were not exempt from judicial review under Article IV, Section 4, as the equal protection issue in this case was separate from any political questions). As Wikipedia explains (links to selected full text opinions added): The "one person, one vote" doctrine, which requires electoral districts to be apportioned according to population, thus making each district roughly equal in population, was further cemented in the cases that followed Baker v. Carr, including Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) which concerned state county districts, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) which concerned state legislature districts, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) which concerned U.S. Congressional districts and Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) which concerned local government districts, a decision which was upheld in Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). Evenwel v. Abbott (2016) said states may use total population in drawing districts (as opposed to eligible voters).	Ultimately the answer (in the US) is the US Constitution. The courts pretty much have the unlimited power to interpret the law, and the limits on power mainly pertain to what the state can do. The length of the leash on the government depends on what kind of rights are at stake. The weakest and default limit is known as "rational basis", and comes down to asking whether a government action is rationally related to a legitimate government interest (such as stopping terrorist attacks) plus whether there was due process and equal protection. There are more rigorous standards (intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny) in case a law involves a "suspect classification", or in case a fundamental constitutional right is infringed. In the case of strict scrutiny, the government would have to show that it had a compelling interest in the action, the law would have to be "narrowly tailored" (i.e. does that thing and only that thing), and should be the least restrictive way to achieve that result. Roe v. Wade is probably the best-know example of that kind of review, which held that abortion laws "violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy". A court would not order a party to do an impossible act. A court could order a party to do something which the party had argued was impossible, but you can interpret a court's decision to indicate that it rejected the argument. The defendant would not shoulder the burden of proving that the action was impossible, though they would have to counter the government's argument that the act could be performed if they believe it is not possible. (In the Apple case, the argument would probably be some Apple-internal document that says "Yeah, we can do it, but do we want to?"). There is probably an expense-related limit in that the courts would not order Apple to liquidate all of their assets to comply. But: if a case were to end up at the Supreme Court, the court is stricken with mass insanity and arbitrarily orders a defendant to do the impossible, there is only the option of impeachment and Senate trial to remove the offending justices, and that is just not going to happen. There is no higher authority that overturns SCOTUS.	From what I read, it appears that the final quoted statement is not saying another authority does this so much as the Archivist does not do it. Which would mean that the when the state notifies the Archivist and says "We ratified the amendment" the Archivist accepts that the state did all required steps to ratify the amendment and doesn't need to tick a check box list of steps. Or to put anotherway, the lawful Ratification of a Constitutional Amendment in a State is determined by the state's own institutions and not the Federal Government's. Once the state says it's ratified, the Feds assume it was done so following the states own processes and was not done in an underhanded fashion.	The constitution "does not confer the franchise [the right to vote for President] on "U.S. citizens" but on "Electors" who are to be "appoint[ed]" by each "State". (Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. P.R. 2005)) Thus, since no citizen has the right to vote for President, it isn't the case that Puerto Rico's citizens are being treated differently in this regard. It is just that Puerto Rico has no representatives in the Electoral College.	WWII Supreme Court Cases During WWII, the Supreme Court dealt with three main issues in their cases on Executive Order 9066: curfews, exclusions, and internment of persons with Japanese ancestry. In the lesser-known Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States case, the court had to determine whether imposing a curfew on those of Japanese descent was valid. The main constitutional issue ended up being the effectiveness of the Fifth Amendment in providing for due process of law in times of war. In the end, the court decided that a curfew was indeed justified. Following this, the majority of the court found in Korematsu v. United States, that the exclusion of those with Japanese ancestry from certain military zones (in this case, the West coast) was also constitutional. In their decision, they heavily relied upon the Hirabayashi case. The question of internment of people with Japanese ancestry was not actually decided constitutionally. Another case, a habeas corpus case, Ex parte Endo might have resolved it, but the Court concluded this case in favor of Endo without going to the constitutional level. A day before this decision was announced, the government suspended Executive Order 9066, leaving the question unresolved. In these cases, Justice Frank Murphy's opinions stand out. In Hirabayashi, he sternly warned of the racism involved, but felt that the curfew was indeed justified. However, in Korematsu, he evidently felt that the exclusion was without basis and dissented, calling the majority opinion "legalization of racism." Current Law In theory, these cases still stand. This is because they haven't been explicitly overruled, and the changes to the constitution since Hirabayashi aren't relevant: Amendments XXII and XXV have to do with procedural issues with the office of the President, amendments XXIII, XIV, and XXVI are related to voting rights, and XXVII addresses Congressional salaries. The constitution for the purpose of a similar order is thus unchanged, and so should theoretically be covered under Korematsu & Hirabayashi. However, its effective status as precedent is shaky. For one, it has been widely condemned, and courts would likely avoid using Korematsu & Hirabayashi if possible, or attempt to make a distinction from them given a slightly different order. Second, the convictions against Korematsu and Hirabayashi were overturned in the 1980s based on evidence being possibly concealed by the government. This was confirmed by the Department of Justice in 2011. However, this is an error of fact, and as such the ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) used would still technically stand as precedent. Lengthy Update: The Supreme Court has since declared Korematsu incorrect in Trump v. Hawaii. However in doing so, the court explicitly distinguished the two cases. Thus, many consider the declaration to be obiter dictum, i.e. an aside that is non-precedential. I'll quote the relevant portion so that readers may decide for themselves: Finally, the dissent invokes Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944). Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission. [...] The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—"has no place in law under the Constitution." Additionally further muddying the issue is that the judgment directly moves from referencing Korematsu to referencing concentration camps. But as noted above, Korematsu dealt with exclusion, not internment in concentration camps as is often popularly believed (though Murphy's & Roberts's dissents dispute the distinction so the Trump v. Hawaii judgment may implicitly be validating this). Korematsu paragraph 20: It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers—and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. Future Challenges If another such order occurred, it would almost certainly reach the Supreme Court. The Court would then have to adhere to, reconcile with, or overrule Korematsu & Hirabayashi. In Hirabayashi, the following key piece of reasoning was given (and quoted in Korematsu): Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty to this country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry, we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against it. Regardless of personal beliefs, it is hard to argue the logic behind this particular statement (mainly because it is so broad, in my opinion). However, these "prompt and adequate measures" would still have to be weighed against the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, we now have a historical example of what may happen if race-based exclusion were allowed, and this could inform the justices' decision. A completely different way that such an order could be ruled unconstitutional could be through separation of powers violations. It could be ruled that Congress cannot constitutionally delegate the powers expressed in Executive Order 9066, but this is rare. It was mentioned in Hirabayashi, but the court did not consider this issue, saying that since Congress agreed with the order, this point was moot. Conclusion Though the letter of the law suggests that another order like Executive Order 9066 is possible, in practice it would face significant hurdles. Such an order would likely face challenges based on the Fifth Amendment and almost certainly make its way to SCOTUS. Then, it would be up to them to decide. I'll end with this quote from the late Justice Antonin Scalia: Well, of course, Korematsu was wrong [...] But you are kidding yourself if you think the same thing will not happen again.	The question that you pose can't be answered in the abstract and the conceptual framework you introduce in the section entitled "Resume" is largely unsound from a legal perspective, even if it may have some political theory usefulness. Indeed, even the framework of "relative power" doesn't really work. The question almost always presents itself in a binary fashion. Either a law enforcement officer has authority to do some particular thing, or the officer doesn't. Frequently, there are multiple law enforcement officers in different agencies who all have the authority to do a particular thing, and whoever gets there first may do so. In U.S. law, law enforcement is highly decentralized. There are hundreds of distinct federal law enforcement agencies, dozens of distinct law enforcement agencies in every single state, and almost every local government (sometimes even school districts, water boards, and park districts) have their own law enforcement agencies. All told, the number of independent law enforcement agencies in the U.S. is in the low tens of thousands. Something on the order of 90%+ of those law enforcement officers report to local governments like cities and counties and have no direct chain of authority that goes up beyond that point. The remainder are split roughly equally between the state level and the federal level, but highly fragmented within each such level between different agencies within each state and with the federal government. The most common kind of law enforcement officer in the federal government is not the stereotypical F.B.I. agent. Instead, it is a federal park ranger. A few small states are more centralized (e.g. Hawaii), but massive decentralization is the norm. The law enforcement officers in every single one of those agencies has a statutorily defined jurisdiction. Rather than being a neat hierarchy in which one law enforcement agent is always superior to another law enforcement agent, one has to analyze the circumstances in light of a particular grant of jurisdiction. There are general trends in how these grants of authority are made, but they are far from uniform. Most grants of authority include both territorial and subject matter elements. State police can typically arrest anyone for a violation of state law within their state, but not for violations of federal law or the laws of another state under circumstances where a citizens arrest is not authorized and where there isn't a warrant outstanding. A state game warden can arrest you for violating hunting laws in his geographic area, but not for violating state tax laws or federal immigration laws. A village constable in a tiny hamlet in rural Tennessee can arrest the chief of police for the Tennessee Valley Authority's law enforcement agency (the TVA is a federally charted independent government agency), for drunk driving in that constable's village. In contrast, an F.B.I. special agent doesn't have the authority to make that arrest, but could arrest either the village constable or the TVA chief of police for taking a bribe contrary to federal anti-corruption laws. There are law enforcement officers who specialize in investigating crimes by other law enforcement officers (often in the same agency). In state and local police agencies these are usually called "internal affairs officers", with a unit in the state police or state bureau of investigation that works closely with a unit of the state attorney general's office having a secondary role in this task. In the federal government, the Inspector General's office in each cabinet department is typically charged with primary responsibility for these kinds of investigations. In the military, improprieties by active duty soldiers in connection with their implementation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice would usually be investigated by the criminal investigation service in each cabinet level department (i.e. the Army, the Navy (including the Marines Corps), and the Air Force) within the Department of Defense. But in neither case is the conceptual issue one of authority. Usually any law enforcement officer in a particular agency has authority to arrest any other law enforcement officer from the same agency (with the possible exception of their direct superiors). It is a question of focus and job responsibilities, not of legal authority. There is a notion of federal supremacy under the U.S. Constitution. In a bald showdown of authority between federal law enforcement officers and state law enforcement officers, say, over who is entitled to custody of a non-law enforcement officer criminal who has been arrested, the federal law enforcement officers will prevail. But, these showdowns are rare, and interagency conflicts within state governments and the federal government respectively, if not reconciled sooner, are more often resolved by a Governor or President, through a chain of management command authority within that governmental entity, than in the courts. Even when there is no one shared chief executive between law enforcement officers, usually these disputes are resolved by negotiation between the chiefs of the respective officers, rather than through legal channels. This is much less true in most countries other than the U.S. Most countries have far fewer independent law enforcement agencies, and have more clear and hierarchical lines of authority between them. This distinction is illustrated by your professor's example: If the Queen of England pointed a gun at the President of America and the President of America pointed a gun at the Queen of England, could you prosecute and/ or charge any of them? In the U.K., nobody has the authority to arrest the Queen, and the authority to arrest the U.S. President would be highly limited by diplomatic treaties relating to the treatment of foreign heads of state. In the U.S., the question is tricker and quite fact specific. The President has immunity for his official acts, but not for his private acts. If this standoff with guns breaks out on the floor of the U.N. in the context of a breakdown of negotiations, the President hasn't committed a U.S. crime. On the other hand, suppose that the President and the Queen have been having a private tryst at a bed and breakfast at our small village hamlet in Tennessee where they have managed to escape their respective security details. (Pardon me for bringing such an icky vision into your head, this is purely for educational purposes and you should censor your own thoughts as you imagine it. I blame the questioner's professor for presenting a scenario that has this possible aspect to it.) The village constable can arrest the President for this crime in violation of Tennessee law (assuming that the President doesn't have legal justification for his acts such as self-defense) since this act was conducted in an unofficial capacity. But he probably can't arrest and charge the Queen under diplomatic treaties that the U.S. has with the U.K. In contrast, a U.S. Secret Service agent would have authority to seize the Queen sufficiently to disarm her and prevent her from being a threat to the President, even if he couldn't charge her with any crime.	The phrase "reasonable doubt" was formed hundreds of years ago, and does not hold any mathematical or probabilistic meaning. It is for each individual juror to decide for themselves what constitutes "reasonable doubt", and whether the evidence presented to them has crossed that threshold. EDIT for extra clarity: As stated above, the definition of "reasonable doubt" is intentionally vague, and left to be decided by each juror for themselves on a case by case basis; as such there is no single rule that can be applied to jurors (also note barring accepting a bribe, a juror cannot be legally sanctioned for their conduct as a juror, nor their vote, regardless of the evidence before them). So one juror might judge by P(A\|B), another might judge by the defendant's appearance, another might judge by the majority of their peers (so that they can go to a ball game that evening, such as in the film 12 Angry Men), another might disagree with the law (see: jury nullification) and so vote not guilty on that basis, and another might bow to social pressure and convict despite overwhelming evidence that the defendant is not guilty (for example, at the end of To Kill A Mockingbird). A prosecutor cares about convincing the entire jury that the defendant is guilty(outside of Oregon and Louisiana, where only 10/12 vote is needed to convict, so the prosecutor only cares convincing 10 jurors). The defense only cares about convincing a single juror (or three in LA or OR), although more can be useful to prevent a mistrial. The defense (in theory) should not care whether or not the defendant is guilty. The origin of reasonable doubt was in Britain, where certain jurors would refuse to convict, despite any evidence, due to religious prohibitions of "Judge not, less ye be judged".	Vice President Aaron Burr was indicted in his last year as Vice President in both New Jersey and New York. The crime was killing Alexander Hamilton in an (illegal) duel. His solution? Simply don't go to those states. Eventually the charges were dropped on technical reasons. But it was nevertheless clear that no one considered it a particular problem for a sitting Vice President to be indicted in multiple states at a time, or even just one. This bit of history is even mentioned in the revised DOJ opinion referred to in Putvi's answer. Ultimately that opinion decides that the comparison between a Vice President and President is apples-to-oranges nonsense—their relative levels of power, importance, and constitutional stature are radically different—, and no substantive inferences could be made from a VP's indictability to the President's. Of course, this DOJ opinion is just the opinion of DOJ lawyers. It is not a court opinion, nor otherwise binding. It does strike me as well-written and logically strong, but it is wholly untested in a court of law (SCOTUS or otherwise). It is simply their advice on what the best course of action the DOJ can take is, given their particular function and powers within the US government and overall constitution. The main conclusion being that those functions and powers are inadequate for the DOJ to decide if it is constitutionally sound to indict a sitting President (that's a job for the judiciary), and so simply advises that they avoid that powder keg and never do so. The opinions actually do specifically hold that it might be constitutional in the right situations; they simply conclude they cannot and should not be the ones deciding if a particular case qualifies or not. For a more definitive answer, you may have to wait for various court cases against President Trump and his administration to make their way through the system. In several of them the President's/White House's lawyers have argued for absolute immunity on all criminal matters, state or federal. The judges have, to date, seemed disinclined to agree; many seem straight-up shocked that this is being seriously proposed to them. But those cases are still in progress, so we can at best make random guesses at what the actual opinions will be, and it is even harder to know what will happen on the almost-certain appeals up to the Supreme Court.
Did Ready Player One have to get licenses for the usage of all its video game characters? Ready Player One is a recent book and upcoming movie that makes heavy usage of famous (and less famous) characters from video games (also movies and shows). Did the book have to get permissions and license from the copyright holders of all those creators? Would the upcoming movie have had to get fresh licenses for its usage? This sounds like it would be prohibitively expensive since they use many extremely popular characters.	Did the book have to get permissions and license from the copyright holders of all those creators? Probably not. This probably wouldn't have counted as a covered derivative work entitled to copyright protection and might have amounted to fair use with just mention in the text of a book Would the upcoming movie have had to get fresh licenses for its usage? Yes. It almost certainly did, probably at some considerable expense (although the producers may have already owned the rights to many of them) and there were probably some editorial changes in the characters made as a result of the negotiations to replace expensive licensor demands with less expensive characters. Also, keep in mind that contracts can be creative and often are in the financing of movies. The license was likely for a percentage of profits rather than a flat dollar amount, which was budgeted to be reasonable. No license means no inclusion in the movie and the loss of exposure if not included is an incentive to deal in addition to the license fee as exposure may increase the value of the licensed property if the movie is good.	Can a system include such information? it is surely technically possible. Would it be a violation of copyright? That depends. First of all, any such information can be included if the copyright holder has granted permission, probably in the form of a license. But in that case this question would probably not have been asked. I therefore assume that no permission has been granted. (It doesn't matter if a request was made and the answer was "no", a request was made but ignored, or no request was ever made. No permission is still no permission.) The names of fictional locations are nor protected by copyright. Including, say, "Rivendell" or "Hobbiton" in the selection list for a timezone setting would not infringe the copyrights held by the Tolkien estate. But a map is a different thing. If the OS includes and can display a map of a fictional region, one that is copied from or based on a map published with the fiction, or by some third party, then that would almost surely be copyright infringement, and the copyright holder could choose to sue for infringement. S/he might choose not to sue, but that is a risky gamble to take. If this is in the US, statutory damages could be awarded, and could intheory go as high as $150,000, although they are not likely to be as high as that, that is just the maximum legal limit (per work infringed, not per copy). The standard is whatever amount the court thinks "just", up to the maximum. (If proof of willful infringement is not made, the upper limit is $30,000, still a sizable sum.) If the OS designer created the map independently, using names from the fiction, but not otherwise basing it on the fiction, and in particular not imitating any map created by anyone else, then it may well not be infringement, but it would still be wise to consult a copyright lawyer. The question would be more helpful if it made clear just what would be hypothetically included in the OS, and to what extent it would be based on someone else's work. There is also the question of why someone would want to include fictional places, but that really doesn't change the legal issue.	Your example powers are tropes and their basis in public domain The Queen of Pain's scream is modeled after the Banshee, which had a scream that would kill... and there are LOTS of variants of Banshee. In fact, "Our Banshees Are Louder" is a trope. Hiding in a shadow or walking through it is for example a typical feature of Ninja stories since the Edo Period, and a common Trope as "Shadow walker". That makes those two powers older than You can not have a copyright on concepts, facts, or ideas. Facts are not copyrightable, which was decided LONG ago over Feist v Rural. Neither can you copyright concepts or ideas. You won't get a claim on the concept of a damaging scream or turning into shadow. See also Copyright.gov (emphasis mine): How do I protect my idea? Copyright does not protect ideas, concepts, systems, or methods of doing something. You may express your ideas in writing or drawings and claim copyright in your description, but be aware that copyright will not protect the idea itself as revealed in your written or artistic work.	If your app is published under US law, then the DMCA would apply, just as if it was a web site. The DMCA doesn't say anything about what particular technology the distributor is using. TO be protected by by the DMCA's "safe harbor" provision, you will need to include a notice in your app that you accept takedowns, and provide an address or method by which they can be sent, and an agent who will receive them. (You can be your own agent if you choose.) When and if you recieve a take down notice, you must check if it is valid in form. According to this Wikipedia article, a takedown notice must include: (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site. (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (See the actual text of the relevant section of the law.) If you receive (through your designated agent) a valid takedown notice, you must promptly remove the content and notify the poster (or you can instruct to poster to remove it, but you must do so yourself if the poster does not). If the poster then files a valid counter notice (see the linked sources above) with your agent, you must notify the sender of the original notice, and if the sender does not notify you of a copyright suit filed within 10-14 days, you must restore the content. Provided that these rules are complied with, the host gets a 'safe harbor" and cannot be sued for copyright infringement, nor for the act of taking down the content. I believe that the agent must be registered with the US copyright office. The courts have not ruled on just how quickly an ISP or other host must react to the takedown notice. It must be "expeditious". Moreover, Under the DMCA (i) 1) (a) The host must have, post, and enforce a policy denying access to repeat infringers, or lose safe harbor protection. The text of the provision is: (i) Conditions for Eligibility. -(1)Accommodation of technology. —The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider— --(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers;	Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties.	No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.)	To the best of my understanding: US copyright law does not have anything in particular to say about credits of this nature, for the most part. The law doesn't even say that you have to credit people at all. It just says you have to get a license (i.e. "permission") to use the item in question. Even that is only required when the work is not a "work made for hire" (i.e. any work by an employee of the production company, within the scope of their job). There are some weird situations where the law does require a credit (e.g. a compulsory license acquired under 17 USC 115 requires the licensee to preserve metadata identifying the original song and artist), but this is the exception rather than the rule. The exact wording and ordering of film credits (and TV/other credits) is typically the product of extensive negotiations between all of the people credited, the production company, and (in most cases) their respective unions. It is thus subject to contract law rather than copyright law. Copyright licenses usually mandate some sort of credit be given, except for certain specialized types of work such as ghostwriting (where the whole point is that you don't get credited). Some licenses are more flexible on this point than others. For example, Creative Commons licenses set out a specific list of things that must be included, and mandate that it must appear alongside other credits if there are any, but other than that, you can basically word and display the credit in any way that is "reasonable." However, one-off private licenses will likely be much more specific and restrictive about how the credit is displayed. Speculating: It may be the case that different attorneys drafted different licensing agreements with different credit phrasings wholly by accident, or for no particular reason, simply due to a lack of direct coordination. In other words, nobody was actively trying to make sure all the credits matched, so they didn't.	Any adapted work derived from a work used under a CC-BY-SA licnese must be distributed, if at all, under a compatible license. The question is whether a large work incorporating a much smaller work is said to be "based on" that work. The CC-BY-SA 4.0 legal text does not use "include" or "incorporate" or any similar term to define an adapted work, instead it says: Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. If including a single work makes your book Adapted Materiel, than you must either release the book under the same license, or else not rely on the CC license. I am not at all sure if such use would make the book Adapted Materiel. If the content could be quoted (perhaps only in part) based on fair use or fair dealing or a similar theory, you would not be relaying on the license. But whether such use is legitimate is always a very fact-bound question, which will depend on various specific facts. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for a summary of US fair use principles. If the materiel you want to use would not qualify under fair use (or whatever similar principle applies in your jurisdiction), and the book would be considered Adapted Material, then you would have to omit it or put the book under the CC license. I see in The CC case law page the statement that: The atlas was a compilation not a derivative work, so did not need to be licensed under the SA term, Which might apply to your book. If it does, you would not need to place the book under a CC license. Update: On reading CC's detailed wiki page on Drauglis v. Kappa Map Group, LLC I find the statement that Use of a whole work is suggestive of a "compilation" rather than a derivative work subject to the ND/SA terms. attributed to the US District court (DC district) that decided this case in 2014. If that decision were followed, it would seem that the book would not be considered a derivative work and while proper attribution must be provided, and the applicable license must be indicated, the book itself need not be released under CC-BY-SA.
Can media illegally downloaded in banned regions be legally used in regions where it is not banned? Suppose you live in a region where the government has banned the purchase of some media (e.g., songs, movies, or software). So you cannot legally purchase licenses from the owners; the only way to obtain them is on the black market where copies are pirated. If you take a pirated copy to a region where it is not illegal to purchase it, is it then legal to possess and use the media?	No, you cannot ever legally use copyrighted property without a valid license from the copyright owner. It is understandable that when government restrictions prevent people from licensing intellectual property, people will turn to piracy and black markets to obtain them. However, whenever you find yourself in a region where you can legally license the property, you are (presumably) also in a region where intellectual property rights are respected, and it is illegal to use the property without a proper license from the owner. I.e., the fact that you paid a pirate for a copy – even where that was the only option to obtain one – does not give you a license. You have to obtain a license from the owner.	Downloading commercial software without permission would be infringement, unless an exception to copyright (probably fair use in the US) applied. That the maker and copyright owner no longer supports or sells this software would not change that. The first-pass fair use analysis in the question is reasonable, and a court might find this to be fair use, but it is far from assured that it would be so found. US statutory damages could be as high as $150,000 or as low as $750 if Microsoft sued and won. However, as you say, there is no current or plausible future market for Windows 95, and there are lots of copies on CDs and other media floating around, easily available if anyone wanted a copy. I suspect that Microsoft would not choose to take such a matter to court, even if they became aware of it. If Microsoft does not choose to sue, there is no enforcement action by anyone. Of course they could choose to sue, it is their right to sue.	Generally not. There is a notion in copyright law called the first-sale doctrine in which after a particular copy of a copyrighted work is legitimately sold, the purchaser can sell, lend, lease, give away, or otherwise dispose of the copy as he sees fit. Copyright does not give the copyright holder exclusive rights to authorize resales. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 for the relevant US law; in other countries the same principle is sometimes called exhaustion of rights. There are limits to the doctrine. In the US, it does not allow for for-profit software rental (for most software) or musical record rentals. Moreover, software companies noticed the part where the doctrine applies to a transfer of title (i.e. an actual sale). If you read a typical software EULA, it is generally quite explicit that the software was licensed to you instead of sold; this is why. Courts in the US have often enforced these provisions (particularly if the license imposes limits like "you can't resell it"); European courts have, as far as I know, been far less willing to accept that argument. However, as a general rule resale is specifically not forbidden by copyright.	Yes, it does. Using the downloaded content, whether it was scraped or individually downloaded one file at a time, for research or for commercial purposes would violate that TOS provision (unless some other provision contradicts it, or you obtain specific permission). The site owner could sue you for such a violation, should the owner become aware of it. I do not think it would be likely to be a criminal offense, depending on the jurisdiction.	That licence does not allow you to do what you want It’s a non-commercial licence and your usage is commercial (making money). You don’t need a licence to perform commentary or review of a book Providing that you use as little material as necessary from the original work, commentary and review is one of the exceptions to copyright carved out by fair dealing in most English speaking jurisdictions. In the USA, the fair use exemption is not so clear as it involves a four factor balancing test. Your planned use is in favour of being fair use, your commercialisation is against.	According to the current version of the TOS: You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. This explicitly says you own your content, although Medium has some rights to do some things. And they won't sell it without permission, so unless Medium itself is publishing this book, it would seem to be copyright infringement. (Of course, I don't know what the TOS said when you originally wrote the article.) If what was copied was not copyrightable (like a quote from the Constitution, or a simple uncreative graph of something obvious) then it wouldn't be infringement. But your article was probably more than that.	http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/dk/dk091en.pdf is the Copyright Law in English for Denmark. You should probably try to find a Danish version to ensure the translation is accurate. Chapter 2 lists the exemptions from the general rule that you need the copyright owner's permission to use their IP. Unfortunately, the usage you have made does not meet the requirements for private use (s12): digital copies may only be shared among the members of one household, placing them on the web extends beyond your household. It may meet the requirements of educational use (s13) providing that your school has met the requirements for Extended Collective Use (s50). For photographs, this seems unlikely, such arrangements are usually limited to songs and television works. Under Chapter 6b, you are permitted to use "orphaned works", however, this requires that you have made a diligent search for the owners and have been unable to either identify or locate them. Copyright violation is subject to both penal sanctions (fines and in egregious violations imprisonment) (s76) and damages (s83). TL;DR Yes, you could be sued. Yes, the copyright holder would probably be successful. No, it is extremely unlikely they would bother.	There is no such law; copyright secures exclusive rights for the copyright holder (and related rights sometimes secure certain rights for the author which cannot be sold or given away except through death), but it cannot be used to force them to spend money to distribute it in a form that you can conveniently use. Such a rule would defeat the purpose of copyright law, which is to give the copyright holder control over the use of the work, not take away their ability to do so. You can certainly request that they release the work, and can offer to pay them for doing so. But someone who does not own the copyright or any related rights cannot use copyright law to force the person who does own the copyright to spend their own money to convert a show into a new format.
When can jobs discriminate against a protected class? In Canada the Human Rights Act protects against discrimination relating to race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered. Despite this, I know certain job types that routinely discriminate based on sex. For example (at least where I live) jobs to promote certain products face to face in public venues often specify 'male' or 'female'. Also when hiring actors for film, they hire based on skin colour and sex (e.g. a military scene probably has mainly males). Wouldn't non-co-ed sports teams technically be in violation too? Are there exceptions to the law to allow such activities?	Exceptions 15 (1) It is not a discriminatory practice if (a) any refusal, exclusion, expulsion, suspension, limitation, specification or preference in relation to any employment is established by an employer to be based on a bona fide occupational requirement; Actors fall clearly within the exemption - when casting Othello you are allowed to advertise for a reasonably young black man. Other “bona fide occupational requirement” can be more problematical. By the way, similar exemptions are pretty much universal in all jurisdictions.	A business owner can normally refuse service for any reason unless anti-discrimination law, or some other specific law, applies. "Critic of the business" is not a protected class. Whether a business would act in such a way I cannot say if it would risk significant negative publicity. But I see no legal reason why they could not.	You are correct that the federal law does not prohibit sex discrimination in "public accommodations", the category that includes your examples. State laws tend to be more restrictive, see for example Washington's RCW 49.60.215 which declares that It shall be an unfair practice for any person ... to commit an act which ... results in any distinction ... except for conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons, regardless of race, creed... sexual orientation, sex... PROVIDED, That behavior or actions constituting a risk to property or other persons can be grounds for refusal and shall not constitute an unfair practice. The definitions allow for a few exceptions as to what kind of place is so restricted, most notably a facility "which is by its nature distinctly private", nor "any educational facility, columbarium, crematory, mausoleum, or cemetery operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution". Here is a paper that summarizes the situation with women'-only clubs. For example, New Jersey law has the exception that nothing herein contained shall be construed to bar any place of public accommodation which is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, and which shall include but not be limited to any summer camp, day camp or resort camp, bathhouse, dressing room, swimming pool, gymnasium, comfort station, dispensary, clinic or hospital, or school or educational institution which is restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex... So it depends on the state, but most states prohibit any sex discrimination in public accommodations.	Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise.	Elected officials are not "employees subject to the civil service laws" unless a state has made extremely odd decisions, and maybe not even then. The "civil service," as that term is used when talking about government employment, consists of at most those people who work for the government as a career. It generally actually means something even more restricted: civil servants are people protected from arbitrary action or political cronyism. For instance, the Labor Department's Wage and Hour division (interpreting the same type of language) defines it as follows (29 CFR 553.11): The term “civil service laws” refers to a personnel system established by law which is designed to protect employees from arbitrary action, personal favoritism, and political coercion, and which uses a competitive or merit examination process for selection and placement. Continued tenure of employment of employees under civil service, except for cause, is provided. Elected officials, in contrast, do not have an expectation of continued employment other than for cause -- they can be voted out for any reason whatsoever.	It may be discrimination, but it is not discrimination based upon any reason that the company is prohibited from engaging in. This conduct is legal in pretty much all U.S. jurisdictions.	Why is a business allowed to refuse a customer? Because also freedom of contract is a right. Except for discrimination on the basis of protected categories, a person or entity is entitled to discretion on whether or with whom to do business and enter contracts. The last sentence in your post reflects a misconception of "completely different set of values and laws" between the USA and members of the EU. Clearly there are many differences, but a comparison of the Wikipedia link you posted and, for instance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 reflects an overlap of protected categories in the laws of the Netherlands and of the US, such as religion, sex, race, or national origin/nationality. One would need persuasive evidence to support a finding of unlawful discrimination in the two examples you have experienced. Assuming the bank responded to your GDPR inquiry truthfully, the bank's refusal to open an account might have stemmed from profiling or decision-making that (1) does not precisely require specific data about you, and/or (2) uses information the bank does not need to log for purposes of compliance with the GDPR. Note that the GDPR does not outlaw algorithmic decision-making. Since legislation in the EU (as in the US) portrays an approach of market economy, both bank and landlord are entitled to made decisions on the basis of their inner policies for risk management. The policies might be unclear to you, but that does not necessarily mean they contravene principles of equal opportunity.	(For a definitive answer, consult an employment attorney). According to the federal Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, in general, An employee cannot be forced to participate (or not participate) in a religious activity as a condition of employment. This requirement comes from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Answer 14 on this page elaborates: Some private employers choose to express their own religious beliefs or practices in the workplace, and they are entitled to do so. However, if an employer holds religious services or programs or includes prayer in business meetings, Title VII requires that the employer accommodate an employee who asks to be excused for religious reasons, absent a showing of undue hardship. Similarly, an employer is required to excuse an employee from compulsory personal or professional development training that conflicts with the employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. It would be an undue hardship to excuse an employee from training, for example, where the training provides information on how to perform the job, or how to comply with equal employment opportunity obligations, or on other workplace policies, procedures, or legal requirements. So the questions would be: Is the activity in question a "religious service or program"? This might be ambiguous, and you might have to consult an employment attorney for a more informed opinion. Does it "conflict with your sincerely held religious beliefs or practices"? Would it be an "undue hardship" for the employer to excuse you? Note that this law might not apply to employers with fewer than 15 employees. It also doesn't apply if you work for an employer such as a church, or a religiously affiliated hospital or educational institution, or the like.
What happens if I licensed a contribution to an open source project but it is discovered that I did not have the right to do so? Suppose I made a patch to Linux kernel. I am supposed to confirm that I own the code. (Forgive me if "own" is not the correct term.) As I understand, this is a specific case of a general concept called a "contributor license agreement", and I am to sign it rather often if I wish to contribute to high-profile open source projects. However, there may happen a case that I write the code not in my spare time but while working for hire. Or otherwise not own the rights I am attempting to transfer to the maintainers of the project I am contributing to. That may get discovered quite long a time after the contribution is made, so the code may be in use by many people out there. What legal actions may the actual owner of the code attempt, if we suppose that they hate everyone else in the world and want to inflict as much harm as they could, and possibly also obtain money? How much of the suffering outlined above will fall on: Myself? The maintainers of the project I wrongfully contributed to? The users of the project? P.S. I would especially enjoy an answer that highlights the difference between me pushing the code I do not own while signing a license agreement, and pushing the same code while not being required to sign anything − i.e. how does the requiring of a contributor to sign an agreement change the situation, for all the sides involved.	What happened is that you created a legal mess. You are obviously on the hook for copyright infringement. The maintainers of the project will scramble to replace your code with newly written code. They will likely ask your company which code they are complaining about - that puts your company into the problematic situation that they shouldn't identify code that isn't theirs, that it will be hard to sue for infringing code when they didn't give the project maintainers a chance to fix it, and that everything they identify will be replaced. Since it is your actions that caused the trouble, anyone suffering damages from your actions can sue you.	The Apache 2.0 license purports to be irrevocable, but it also presupposes that the supposed licensor has the right to grant permission to copy. In this case, that is untrue, so there never was a proper license and nothing to revoke (the copyright owner grants permission in the form of "a license" which is a legal abstraction, that normally is specified in the license document). An end-user snared by this illegal license might attempt to sue the author because of the legal screw-up but paragraph 9 says that the supposed licensor cannot be held liable. In this case, though, "licensor" is defined not as the person who hands you the license document, but as the copyright owner. So it's the employer who would be not liable under the terms of the document (but since the employer had nothing to do with the license, it's as though the license never existed). The end-user is a secondary infringer (the employee is the primary infringer, in illegally distributing the material). Under US law, that doesn't matter, the user is still liable. Under UK law, secondary infringement includes the element that you have to have reason to know that the copy is infringing, which in the scenario that you describe is not the case.	There is no provision for automatically relicensing infringing works (for example, distributing a program that contains parts covered by the GNU GPL and that is therefore a derived work will not automatically place the infringing program under GPL, even if that is the expected way for derived works to comply with the license. Instead, the derived work becomes at the very least undistributable, as there are competing copyright holders that disagree.	I realize there's already an answer, but I'd like to go into more detail. There are generally two kinds of open source software licenses: permissive and copyleft (the latter sometimes called viral). Both are intended to allow people to freely use, modify, and redistribute a work while ensuring the original author gets credit. This contrasts with releasing your work into the public domain, which would allow anyone do literally anything, even claim to be the author. The difference is that permissive licenses allow you to re-license your derivative works however you like, while copyleft licenses require your derivatives to be licensed under the same license (hence the term viral). The reasons you'd choose either one are philosophical and political and beyond the scope of this answer. Both the Apache License and the MIT license are permissive, so incorporating MIT licensed code into your Apache licensed project is certainly allowed. Just be sure to attribute the original author for the parts your incorporated and include a copy of the MIT License terms, as required by the license. Go ahead and read it to make sure you get all the details right; it's fairly short and easy for a layperson to comprehend.	It doesn't work like that! If the code is not properly licensed, you can not acquire a license for it. If you don't have a license, you can not use it. Usage without a license is copyright infringement and not allowed: the copyright is with the author, and only the author may make derivates or copies or allow them to be made by licensing it. You do not gain copyright by fixing a licensing error - in fact, you commit copyright infringement if you do not have a license, and providing wrong copyright management information is illegal under 17 USC 1202	germany I am reasonably sure that works like this would be Public Domain, i.e. not copyrighted in the first place. In Germany, copyright (or more precisely, Author's Right) can only be held by a natural person, which is a legal term of art that essentially means "human being". There are two groups of natural persons involved here: the programmers and the creators of the works which are part of the training set. However, I can't see how either group could have a reasonable claim of copyright. Note: there have been similar discussions about GitHub Copilot, an AI that writes code for you. It is my understanding that the process used by GitHub Copilot is roughly comparable to the process used here. With GitHub Copilot, there have been instances where significant snippets which are part of the training set have appeared in the output with only minor alterations. In this case, it is likely that the original author will have copyright over that portion of the output. However, IFF a human being were actually involved in selecting specific works, then there is probably a copyright based on the creative decision of selecting this particular work and rejecting all the others. This is similar to the classic textbook example of a driftwood sculpture: the creative process here is not creating the sculpture but choosing to pick up this particular piece of driftwood instead of the hundreds of others on the beach. So, if you simply generate these works and publish all of them, there is no copyright. If you generate a large batch and then select a certain number, then the person who made the selection might hold a copyright.	The GPL does not explicitly specify a time within which the source code must be provided, which probably means a "reasonable time" is allowed. What is "reasonable" would eventually be evaluated by a court, if the matter ever got that far. But please note that only the copyright holder (or the holder's authorized agent) can sue for infringement. The license does not give other people a right to sue for infringement, and I doubt that any license could grant such a right. One could inform the copyright holder who could sue, but the holder need not sue, and undertaking such a suit would involve expense, time, and effort. Whether the offer to provide the source constitutes a binding agreement is not clear, and may well vary in different jurisdictions. The question does not state any particular jurisdiction.	You can do whatever you like with posts made after you change the rules - you have to leave the previous stuff alone. The contributors' have accepted the terms of the licence: They own the copyright or have permission from the copyright holder to post it (the promise) They agree that it can be edited altered or removed CC-BY-SA allows people to copy the stuff off the website and republish it - this is way outside what the contributors agreed to. These people have given permission for their work to be altered but not copied.

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